A Formal Reconstruction of Interpretive Scarcity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2026.1.03Keywords:
Epistemic Injustice, Hermeneutical Injustice, Imprecise Probabilities, Bayesian Epistemology, Psychiatric DiagnosisAbstract
The theory of hermeneutical injustice analyzes the wrongs suffered due to deficiencies in the shared interpretive resources of a society. A hermeneutical injustice is diagnosed when individuals of a social type are persistently and systematically hindered to understand a significant part of their experiences due to such interpretive scarcity. The theory uncovers a number of important phenomena, such as the relationship between symmetry in ignorance and asymmetry in consequence. In this paper, we develop a reconstruction of deficient interpretive resources to capture such phenomena more precisely and investigate novel implications of the existing theoretical account. The formal reconstruction is set in the framework of imprecise probabilities, a generalization of classical probability which represents an additional quality of uncertainty or ignorance. This quality we deploy to reconstruct a kind of interpretive deficiency and analyze it for both normative force and explanatory power. We conclude that (1) symmetrical ignorance is consistent with asymmetric epistemic action even under shared values and (2) insufficiently developed interpretive re-sources, as represented by imprecise probabilities, can induce a dispersion of credal states. The former is a contribution to the established theoretical discourse, whereas the latter is a novel observation; in tandem, these conclusions illustrate the continuity of the reconstruction with existing work as well as its surplus value in aiding discovery.
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