STRATEGIC ASYMMETRY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT IN THE CONTEXT OF A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH TO US FOREIGN POLICY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbeuropaea.2025.2.12Keywords:
China, Taiwan, deterrence, military strategy, US transactionalismAbstract
This article examines how a transactional approach to United States foreign policy reshapes strategic asymmetry and deterrence dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. While existing scholarship focuses primarily on military balances and operational feasibility, this study argues that the most consequential asymmetry is political rather than material. It provides a comprehensive examination of contemporary cross-strait security dynamics, focusing on the accelerated military modernization of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the evolving asymmetric defense strategy of the Republic of China (ROC), in the context of declining confidence in U.S. strategic ambiguity. By doing so, the study highlights the deepening strategic asymmetry that characterizes the current security environment. It further argues that this asymmetry has far-reaching consequences for regional stability and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The erosion of confidence in long-standing U.S. strategic ambiguity raises concerns that Taiwan could be used as leverage in U.S.–China negotiations. Economically and politically, the United States’ increasingly trade-focused policy agenda significantly affects Taiwan. The weakening of Taiwan’s so-called “silicon shield” demonstrates that transactionalism fundamentally reshapes the meaning of asymmetry in the Taiwan Strait by shifting deterrence from a credibility-based model toward a conditional and negotiable one.
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