Was Aristotle a non-classical logician?

Authors

  • Luis F. BARTOLO ALEGRE Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), Munich, Germany, l.bartolo@campus.lmu.de. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3312-6297

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2024.sp.iss.06

Keywords:

history of logic, logical system, syllogistic, paraconsistent logics, connexive logics

Abstract

This paper discusses the possible classification of Aristotle’s syllogistic as a non-classical logical system, positing Aristotle himself as a non-classical logician. Initially, we find compelling arguments for this thesis, particularly regarding the expressive power and the rules governing logical inference inherent in Aristotle’s approach. My analysis nevertheless addresses two significant counterarguments. The first, the special case objection, posits that Aristotle’s syllogistic can be framed as a classical logic which deals with canonical syllogistic forms. I argue that this objection is insufficient, as it is possible to point cases in which his system seems to differ from classical logic. The second counterargument, the formalisation gap objection, highlights that Aristotle’s syllogistic resists straightforward modern logical interpretations. This latter objection is evaluated as more compelling and substantial. In particular, a distinction between two concepts is proposed which could help us understand what Aristotle was aiming at in his theory of inference: the notions of ‘to follow from’ and ‘to be a conclusion of’. While the former aligns with the usual sense formal validity, the second requires an inferential structure connecting the premises to the conclusion, explaining why Aristotle excluded inferences like from AA syllogisms despite acknowledging that A follows from A.

 

References

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Published

2024-12-31

How to Cite

BARTOLO ALEGRE, L. F. (2024). Was Aristotle a non-classical logician?. Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, 69(Special Issue), 95–113. https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2024.sp.iss.06

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