




STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS
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SOCIOLOGIA

1/2017

**STUDIA
UNIVERSITATIS BABEȘ-BOLYAI
SOCIOLOGIA**

**KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DURING SOCIALISM**

Special Issue. Guest Editors: Norbert PETROVICI and Florin POENARU

Volume 62, Issue 1, June 2017



Sociologia

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Studia Sociologia is the peer-reviewed journal of the **Faculty of Sociology and Social Work**, published bi-annually (June and December) as part of the Studia Series of the **"Babeș-Bolyai" University**.

The journal is oriented towards research articles, discussion papers, essays and book reviews which address challenging topics from the fields of Sociology, Anthropology, Social Work and Social Policy.

Academic papers grounded in empirical research or focused on the social realities of Central and Eastern Europe are particularly welcomed.

YEAR
MONTH
ISSUE

Volume 62 (LXII) 2017
JUNE
1

S T U D I A
UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI
SOCIOLOGIA

1

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
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Special Issue. Guest Editors: Norbert Petrovici and Florin Poenaru

Desktop Editing Office: 51ST B.P. Hasdeu, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Phone + 40 264-40.53.52

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Special event

Organized by the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca on the 25th of May 2017

***The investiture of Distinguished Professor Gail Kligman as
Doctor Honoris Causa of the Babeş-Bolyai University***





LAUDATIO

IN HONOUR OF DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR GAIL KLIGMAN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, ON THE OCCASION OF BEING AWARDED THE DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA TITLE OF THE BABEȘ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA¹

MARIUS LAZĂR²

Pro-rector David, President of the Academic Senate Chirilă, honored colleagues, and dear guests, friends, and students:

It so happens that I am giving this *laudatio* towards the end of a semester when I teach a course on the *History of Romanian Social Thought*, in which I discuss the stages of thinking and the main accomplishments of the most remarkable Romanian sociologists. In the last lectures, I come to speak about the development of sociology in the years after the political changes of 1989 and I necessarily refer to the contributions of the numerous foreign researchers who have produced substantial studies from and about Romania.

Their studies are already social documents. Their reports on the state of the Romanian society in the communist period, shared with the wider Romanian public only after 1989, are even more important for having been written under very particular circumstances, when autochthonous research was either repressed or distorted by censorship or self-censorship. These studies are embraced by the Romanian colleagues who salute in them an honest and objective reflection of the country under the communist regime observed by these professional witnesses. These analyses save the honour of the profession, partly lost and then partly regained after 1989, notably due to the essential contribution of these researchers. In a wider perspective, they continue along the lines of the Romanian sociological tradition and its production from even before 1945 – the field research of the Sociological School of Bucharest, of Gh. Em. Marica in Cluj and of others, work that has become today a collection of documents of an era and of the manner in which this era was able to gaze upon itself. All these

¹ Translated from Romanian by Raluca Perneș.

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foreign researchers have eventually gone native in more than one way. First, they have learnt to speak Romanian almost perfectly. As a side note, the anthropologists who have learnt Romanian in the rural areas where they did fieldwork acquired and adopted an idiom that is genuine, lacking in garishness, able to bypass disgraceful neologisms, a language to which Romanian intellectuals remain deaf. Then, they have learnt to feel along with the locals they have studied. Finally, they ended up being adopted locally as fictive kin members of their host families.

We are here today to celebrate one of these researchers. It is a great honour for me to be here and have the opportunity to profess Gail Kligman's organic connection with the most outstanding social research on Romania. In this she is accompanied by the works of other researchers such as Katherine Verdery, David Kideckel, Steven Sampson, or Claude Karnoouh.

Gail Kligman holds a BA in sociology (1971), an MA in folklore (1973), and a PhD in sociology (1977), all from University of California, Berkley. She has had a prodigious scientific career, rewarded with many awards, and is currently Distinguished Professor in the Sociology department of UCLA, Associate Vice Provost of the International Institute and was, between 2005-2015, Director of the UCLA Centre for European and Eurasian Studies.

Most of her research career is related to fieldwork in Romania, which she started in 1975. She first came here with an IREX scholarship, to conduct research for her PhD thesis on the ritual of *căluș*. Based on this, she has published the book *Căluș: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual*, which first appeared in 1981 with a preface by Mircea Eliade. The following year, the book was awarded the Chicago Folklore Prize by the American Folklore Society and the University of Chicago.

In 1978-1979, Gail Kligman returned to Romania for 13 months of post-doctoral research and settled in Ieud, a village that soon enough adopted the young American. It eventually became her privileged research site; in 1998, she also became honorary citizen of Ieud, a recognition she was so honoured about that she lists it in her CV alongside the multiple awards and titles she has been granted throughout her career. In Ieud, under the tutelage of the Institute for Ethnography and Folklore of the Romanian Academy and in constant collaboration with Prof. Mihai Pop, Gail Kligman started looking at oral poetry in the context of wedding rituals and that of funeral rituals for those who died young. But she was to go way beyond the routine folklore approach of the era, which was in the habit of separating the folkloric text from its bearers and its social context, and ended up producing a thorough monograph of the village and its transformations in the times of the 'multilaterally developed socialism'. Her analysis allows for an understanding of traditional poetry as a living form of social interaction and direct communication, in the context of everyday life, which was often a form of symbolic resistance to the constraints of the political regime as well.

Thus, a researcher with a background in sociology and training as a folklorist ended up in an atypical research situation, in a location that was 'exotic' as related to her own society – communist Eastern Europe and Romania in particular were to the Americans, at that time, from many points of view, uncharted territory. It was a journey that was to make her into an anthropologist. The author then crossed over the dogmatic but arbitrarily built borders between the fields of sociology and anthropology, to affirm – closer to the original project of the founding fathers of both disciplines – the basic unity of the social sciences, based on their shared methodologies. Her second book, *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania*, 1988, followed the symbolic anthropological approach inaugurated by Căluș, but the latter was decidedly closer to a critical social anthropology perspective than to a culturalist angle. In 1990, the book was to bring Gail Kligman another award, *American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences Book Award*.

The fall of Ceaușescu's regime in 1989 and the transformation of the Eastern European societies made it possible for Gail Kligman to become one of the recognized voices capable to present and explain to the American public the meaning of the changes in Romania, often through the means of conference presentations and papers with an immediate impact. Her research interest switched for this time on mainly to the sensitive aspects of these changes, such as the heightened interethnic tensions or the rearrangement of gender relations and the redefinition of feminine identity in the post-socialist world. Together with Susan Gal, she has written a book, *The Politics of Gender After Socialism: A Comparative-Historical Essay* (2000) and co-edited another, *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism* (2000). Both have become landmarks and bona fide textbooks for those working on related topics in Romania.

The focal point of her interest in this period was the reflection on the politics of reproduction and on the consequences of the various laws regulating abortion in the contemporary society. The Romanian experience pushed Gail Kligman to go back, in order to unearth meanings, to the period before 1989. From the description of Ceaușescu's pronatalist demographic policies and their inhuman consequences, she pieced together a solid case against the coercive control of fertility and against the attempts of conservative politicians and groups to restrain women's rights to use and protect their bodies as they see fit. The result was one of Gail Kligman's strongest and most engaged books, *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceaușescu's Romania* (1998), once again based on solid field research and data analysis.

It must be noted that the book's impact in Romania was extensive, especially after being translated in 2001. It provided arguments for feminist debates, as well as deepened the conversation about the legacy of Ceaușescu's regime and its moral culpability. Moreover, as far as the author's sociological

outlook is concerned, this book marks the moment, already anticipated by the previous studies, of a crystallization of an ethnography of the state and of the manner in which state policies embed in the everyday lives of the citizens.

The books published in these period prompted yet another wave of recognition from important academic fora: in 1998, Gail Kligman received the Heldt Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies for the best book in women's studies for *The Politics of Duplicity*; and in 2001, together with Susan Gal, another Heldt Prize of the Association for Women in Slavic Studies for the best book in Slavic/East European/Eurasian Women's Studies for *The Politics of Gender After Socialism: A Comparative-Historical Essay*. Her great accomplishments commended Gail Kligman as one of the most competent scholars of Romanian communism, propelling her in 2006 into the college for the coordination of the researchers of the Presidential Advisory Committee for the Study of the Romanian Communist Dictatorship (the Tismăneanu Commission).

At the height of her career, Gail Kligman was immersed in a new project about the process of collectivization, with her long term friend and collaborator Katherine Verdery. The research involved an impressive number of young investigators, most of them from Romania and two of them - Călin Goina and Virgil Țârău - our colleagues from Babeș-Bolyai University. Alongside their team, Kligman and Verdery conducted fieldwork and examined archives and other official and unofficial sources over the course of 13 years - exactly the duration of the collectivization process, that is. The end result was the most impressive reconstitution of this process that has transformed radically the economic structure and the social texture of the villages in Romania. The substantial volume *Peasants under Siege: Collectivization in Romania, 1949-1962* (Princeton University Press, 2011) has been rewarded in 2012 with an impressive string of awards: Barbara Jelavich Prize for Distinguished Monograph, of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies; Davis Center Book Prize in Political and Social Studies, of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies; and two Honorable Mentions of the American Sociology Association: The Barrington Moore Best Book Award in Comparative-Historical Sociology, and Best Book Award, Political Sociology Section. The book was translated in Romanian in 2015 and published by Polirom. Its full impact is yet to come, but I am sure it will produce a thorough re-evaluation of the perspective on the period before 1989, one that will necessarily have to become more nuanced, closer to the context of everyday life and more methodologically complex.

We are therefore looking at a thematic trajectory that moves, in a spiral, from the symbolic and social anthropology of traditional poetics towards identity and gender politics; and then from the sociology of post-communism to that of communism. A round trip journey. A to and fro motion, in which the amounts of personal time and objective history accumulated

meets the way of thinking required by the anthropological fieldwork, which is often fragmentary and here-and-now. Personal biography, objective history, the microhistories of the explored communities, even the history of the community of researchers that study and redefine the object of their study on the one hand, and the grand scale history on the other hand – all of these engender a reflexive outlook on the world. Within the canon of the discipline, this takes on the form of an ethnography of the state and of an historical anthropology of communism, unmatched in the Eastern European space.

Despite the diversity of their themes, Gail Kligman's books are connected by an unremitting reflection on politics and modernity in the socialist and post-socialist era. Over the course of decades of research, they paint a vivid picture of the social processes characteristic of Eastern Europe in the decades before and after 1989. They also provide a critical reflection that is often at odds with the mainstream tide of opinion and with the stereotypical thinking it generates when it comes to understanding the transformation of the region.

The ethnographic perspective on the state addresses it simultaneously as an institutional organization producing ideologues and policies on the one hand and as a generator of social discourse on the other hand. The trademarks of the author's critical voice are the emphasis of the permanent conjunction of discourses, everyday practices and the wider social and political contexts shaping them; the exquisite understanding of the complexities and ambiguities of the mundane social interactions of the social actors; and the way in which these interactions are moulded by the context and generate in their turn new meanings for the discursive practices and actions associated with those practices. Almost every study of Gail Kligman manifests an utter acuity in grasping the subtlest shifts in meaning and the extremely innovative, sophisticated strategies for social communication of the social actors, in addition to the precise conceptual map and the excellent situation in context of the subject of the analysis; both are marks of her personal academic style as well as of her method. Gail Kligman operates, in a very particular and creative manner, with the pragmatics of the social discourse in which she brings together the individuals' strategies, positions, and mechanisms of demarcation in the social field with the manner in which they are articulated discursively. All of these together impregnate the rhetoric of the language in the social practices, incorporating them as an integral part of their actions and not as an illustrative ornament. The distinctive trademark of Gail Kligman's complex way of describing the world of social relationships is perhaps best understood by looking at her dual experience as a folklorist and as a social researcher, a background she incorporates and mobilizes in an organic manner.

She has a non-manichaeist perspective on the communist era and identifies the complicated stances of the social actors and of the regime itself,

stances based on embracing some pragmatic compromises, which also allow for some forms of resistance on the part of the subjects of the socialist state's policies.

The point of departure for the reflection on the distortions of the structures of sociability produced by the regime in the Romanian society is the very experience of duplicity as a mundane strategy for survival. This is not just about duplicity that manifests itself 'horizontally' amongst the regular folk, in their everyday interactions – a type of duplicity that erodes mutual trust as a fundament of the social. The former is generated by a 'vertical' duplicity, which operates in both directions. There is first of all a duplicity from above, which is brought about by the discrepancy between the principles that legitimize the discourse of the Party-State and the 'compromises' that the agents of the state need to make in order to put these policies into practice. These compromises themselves generate a web of more or less culpable complicities between the subjects of the state and the agents implementing state domination. Thus, the communist state can no longer be perceived as a machine that acts by inexorably levelling society, as it was designed to do. The state is also not an impersonal entity, even though it represents itself as such as a means to consolidate its authority; it is instead embodied into the actual persons acting in its name and producing their own interpretation of the tasks that need to be completed. These are people who often need to employ non-canonical means and actions to complete their assignments. This is the very phenomenon that eventually produces duplicity from below, that is to say the duplicity of the subjects of the social policies, who will seek spaces for regroupment and refuge in their personal lives, enacting the separation of the private sphere from the public sphere that had been fully confiscated by the state. They will also elude as much as possible the demands of the agents of etatization. Participation in the state policies is therefore ambiguous and fragmentary, combining the political conformism demanded by the state with the social conformism of the subjects of the sphere as of yet not completely confiscated by the politics of the regime. These subjects still act freely, in accordance with the sociability and honourability norms from before the intervention of the state. As such, everyday duplicity is the expression of the conflict between the norms that legitimize state intervention in the social life and the customs of non-state social reproduction of the subjects.

There is too little time to give due credit to the whole scientific contribution and to the merits of an exemplary endeavour. There are, however, two other aspects of Gail Kligman's work that need to be acknowledged.

One has to do with the transmission of a critical understanding of the transformations that took place in our society and in the contemporary world. Through her brave approach and its ethical implications, Gail Kligman has contributed substantially to a general shift in the attitudes of the intellectual milieus in Romania over the last years, which have generally become more open

to supporting vulnerable groups: those marginalized on economic or social criteria, those discriminated on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation. But these circles are still insufficiently influential to counteract the domination of the neoconservative spirit, ready to denounce 'multiculturalism' and what they dismissively refer to as the 'principles of political correctness', in a society that has not yet had the chance to practice them on a large scale.

A second aspect has to do with her direct contribution to the re-professionalization of the social sciences in Romania. She has actively supported the reconnection of the research in the field of the social sciences in Romania to the western and more specifically American paradigms of thinking that are currently active and influential, thus contributing to giving an opportunity to contemporary Romanian social researchers to compete as equals with their counterparts in other countries, in the context of a globalized scientific market. This would probably have also happened with Romanian sociology in the interwar period through the Sociological School of Bucharest of Dimitrie Gusti and his disciples were it not for the start of World War I.

The social sciences in Romania comprise a fortunate exception to a structural condition that produces delays in other fields. Let me explain myself: in modern Romania, intellectuals were always connected to the sources of knowledge provided by western thinking, from about mid-19th century up until mid-20th century, when the tradition has been broken by the installation of the communist regime. That is to say, intellectuals were moulded or influenced by stints in the western universities, where they adopted the paradigms of knowledge that were dominant in the era. It was a process of assimilating mainstream learning that was then transferred onto the researcher's initial scientific environment. Traditional Romanian academic culture has been coagulated around the activity and all-encompassing prestige of some illustrious personalities, such as Maiorescu and Iorga, to give but two examples. There has been no field of knowledge built on the basis of competition between equals and as a consequence, aside from the adoption of western models of research, there was a lag manifested in the attachment to some paradigms that, even in their place of origin, in their 'centre' of scientific influence, were soon made obsolete by the avant-garde researches that were moulding the new patterns of knowledge. This process led to the reproduction of a disparity between a more dynamic 'centre' and a 'periphery' that it lags behind, often times over the span of one or two generations, fixed in the old ways of scientific practice. The 'peripheries' are thus engaged in a willing 'auto-colonizing' effort as far as the products of scientific work are concerned, yet are stuck in a state of dependency through their inability to also adopt the competitive model of scientific production and the competitive environment in which this production takes place. They import products, but do not import means to produce them and so perpetuate at a cognitive level what Balandier describes as 'the colonial condition'.

'The colonial condition' in the field of social research has been redefined and challenged in two ways by the arrival in Romania of researchers such as Kligman, Verdery, or Kideckel. First, the contact between the Romanian and foreign researcher does not take place predominantly in the professional space of the 'foreigners', but in the familiar national space of the autochthonous researcher. Second, the relationship with those who devoted themselves to fieldwork in Romania unfolded in terms of cooperation, rather than some kind of paternalistic hegemony. The above-mentioned researchers, through the very nature of their profession, did not come to Romania to teach lessons, but rather to understand, throughout a process of learning in which the roles are often interchangeable, which creates a two way road between those who teach and those who learn. The Romanian researchers become subjects, key informants, and research partners. This group that includes Gail Kligman has the merit of recording responsibly and of treating their sources of autochthonous knowledge honestly and non-exploitatively. Through co-opting Romanians in their research teams, they also contributed to the reconstruction of sociology and anthropology as professional fields, self-sustaining and with autonomous working principles. It is one of the roads towards de-periferialization that is open for the current young generations of researchers.

It is time, therefore, to festively declare Gail Kligman 'one of us': this is how many of us, reunited here today, have felt about her, through reading and using her books in our own research, in debates with our students and the wider public, in our teaching, in our own trajectories as intellectuals. She is 'ours' in many ways, the most important of which I have already mentioned. And this awarding of the title of Doctor Honoris Causa to Professor Gail Kligman is but a belated yet welcome ritual through which us, the academic community of Cluj, acknowledge the excellence of her intellectual work and state our intellectual affinities with her. It is a form of assuming a fictive kinship, somewhat similar to that assumed by her adoptive family in Maramureş long before us, decades ago. Her presence here for this ceremony also marks our symbolic reappropriation of the communities studied by Gail Kligman. They used to be exotic to many of us, out of lack of interest or cultural difference, but the work of the researcher has turned the nearby 'stranger' into a familiar figure. Through her research interests and due to the way in which she has devoted much of her career and much of her life to understanding Romanian communities, Gail Kligman has become 'Romanian', while remaining 'very much American', to paraphrase a famous quote.

Allow me to explain myself.

The Romanians preoccupied by 'the image of the country in the world' are at the same time sensitive to the way in which the problems in Romania are depicted by the researchers in Europe or the United States. This image from the outside does not often coincide with the one we like to contemplate ourselves.

Moreover, what we observe about the world we belong to often differs from what outsiders observe. The distinction between 'autochthon' and 'foreigner' is therefore more likely to be translated into the difference between the perception of the insider and that of the outsider from the point of view of the reality under the lens. That is to say, we are looking at the distinction between emic and etic. In stating this, I am clearly oversimplifying. In fact, there is no generalized 'us' that can be looked at as unitary and homogenous – except as an idealized version of reality or as a rhetoric artifice – any more than there is no equally generic 'other' – except as a fiction fed by the mirage of our own desires, as it might be the case for those who live in Eastern Europe with a certain view of the West.

These distinctions operate through the means of opposing the novel and the surprising, that which is different from our habitual routines, to what appears unworthy of observation, banal and taken for granted. Indeed, we only investigate and depict what seems to be significant, what makes us exclaim 'look at that!' when we interact with others. And this 'look at that!' along with the entire intellectual construction organized around this wonder, also differs with the person we address, whether they are internal or external to that reality. Therefore, in the international circuit of presenting the Romanian issues, there are four ways of addressing them: that of the 'foreigner' who writes about us for 'their own people', also 'foreigners'; that of the 'foreigner' who writes about us for 'our own people', 'the autochthonous'; that of 'the autochthonous' who writes for 'the foreigners', and that of 'the autochthonous' who writes for 'the autochthonous' – and all of these models have their own discursive constraints and assemble multiple lenses for reading and interpreting for the various audiences.

For instance, the 'foreigner' describing Romania does so according to the needs of the readers in their country of origin. In fact, they operate a 'cultural translation' that needs to resort to general information and to make explicit contexts that are taken for granted by the Romanian reader. By contrast, the puzzlement of 'the foreigner' and the local realities that capture their attention will reveal themselves as 'exotic' to the 'autochthonous', who will turn their gaze upon them for the first time and ask themselves: 'why is it that this common thing has captured the attention of the foreigner?'

Altered by the revelation of the unusual, 'the autochthonous' will be able to reevaluate their own familiarity as somewhat alien, and will reappropriate it from a fresh angle, generated by the gaze of the other. Yet, when addressing the public as an author, 'the autochthonous' will leave aside the overly familiar aspects they consider to be trivial. And when 'the autochthonous' will address an audience of outsiders, they will tend to make their own selection of what they believe is worth disclosing, sometimes to effects of confusion and boredom on the behalf of the foreign audience.

All these interplays of familiarization and de-familiarization with the reality under investigation can flip once again over the course of fieldwork. This is

because there are circumstances where ‘the foreigner’ in the field is more autochthonous than the ‘autochthonous’ sociologist that, from their office and from behind their computer, misses the mark in describing the concrete reality. What defines first and foremost the closeness with the communities under study is the degree of professionalism in conducting the research. As Bourdieu put it, it is one thing to live in a place and quite another to know it. Belonging does not imply competence and the quality of being ‘autochthonous’ is not the basis of taken for granted knowledge. In the terms of the professional coordinates of the social sciences, then, the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is redefined in accordance with epistemological, rather than domestic familiarity, that is to say, it is set by in-depth knowledge and acquaintanceship with the structural, long term aspects of the objects of the research. From this point of view, Gail Kligman’s research has turned her into a person who is ‘autochthonous’ to a much greater degree than many local researchers.

But perhaps the most important argument about this ‘indigenization’ of the researcher comes from their ability to follow their own reflexive streak. Those who find themselves alone in the field develop an ability to think independently, as well as their own way to reflect on the social world. They do a lot more than apply set rules for social research. The incorporation of their own experience, on top of the experience of the informants in field, is the key to establishing one’s own way to understand a world into which they landed through the bureaucratic backstage of an academic enterprise doubled by a research project. The solitude of fieldwork leaves just the opportunity to reinvent oneself, while at the same time reinventing the discipline to which one contributes – just like Malinowski did, abandoned for the length of World War I to do field research of an uncertain duration, facing uncertain challenges.

The anthropologist is therefore a voluntary Robinson: the shipwreck is deliberate, the familiarization with the island and its particular conditions for survival is mandatory. They are part of the job description. Fieldwork is an opportunity for reconstructing the self of the anthropologist in relation with an ‘other’ presumed from the beginning to be unknown.

In our turn, us, the ‘autochthonous’, have somehow travelled the same road in the opposite direction: we have gotten closer to the anthropologist, assuming some of their thinking and thus becoming a little bit like ‘them’. We have read their books, followed their advice, and learnt the tough lessons from the field research. The distance between ‘us’ and ‘other’ is therefore reduced as we manage to recognize ourselves in the other. The celebration today aims to mark our finding our way back to each other.



SPEECH GIVEN ON THE 25th OF MAY 2017 ON THE OCCASION OF BEING AWARDED THE DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA TITLE OF THE BABEȘ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA

GAIL KLIGMAN¹

Pro-rector David, President of the Academic Senate Chirilă, Dean Hărăguș, members of the Department of Sociology and Social Work, honored guests and friends, and dear students:

Thank you for these laudatory words, deeply appreciated if perhaps unmerited. I am profoundly honored by this extraordinary recognition of my academic contributions. For forty-one years, I have been doing research in Romania. How did I - then a doctoral student from the United States of America, an imperialist country, - end up doing research in a formerly communist one? I would like to take advantage of this special occasion to share with you some thoughts about my intellectual history, as well as some of my experiences while I pounded the streets of Romania's cities and wandered about the paths of its villages. I would also like to reflect briefly upon the impact my research here has had on my understanding of what is currently happening in the United States.

Knowing that some of you are not English speakers, I will give my talk in Romanian, asking your indulgence for whatever mistakes you hear and for my accent, most surely a mixture of American English and the vernacular speech of the region to which I will always remain affectively attached, „my” Maramureș. I proudly refer to it in this possessive form - my - because in 1994, I was made an honorary citizen of Ieud, a large village with a rich history, located in the Iza Valley.

A question is often posed to me, both here and in the US, „why Romania?” As far as I know, my family has no roots in Romania. What then accounts for my having come here? When I was a graduate student at Berkeley, I wanted to pursue my dissertation research on the medical system in what was then the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. At the time, the Yugoslavs were seemingly suspicious of the work of two American anthropologists, in consequence of which they

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informed me that while I was welcome to carry out my fieldwork there, I would be accompanied while doing it. That is hardly ideal for ethnographic or sociological research. Then Romania approved my application, as it had for many others from the West. In the 1970s, Romania in comparison with other socialist states was relatively open to the presence of foreign professors and researchers. As you know, Romania did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, after which the West looked favorably upon Ceaușescu. He was considered to be an „independent” leader, even though his courageous refusal simultaneously signalled the nationalism that guided his politics thereafter.

Hence, in 1975, I came to București, supported by an official fellowship. Everyday life was completely different than that in which I had grown up: a shortage economy, long lines, secret police, the internalization of self-censorship, which I too came to practice. Foreigners (especially from the West) were suspected of being spies. In that first year, I was always accompanied on fieldtrips by a colleague from the Institute of Ethnography and Folklore who was obligated to account for me and my activities. But since I did not really speak Romanian then, it was unclear to me what state secrets I could have discovered! (In this regard, see Professor Katherine Verdery’s forthcoming book on her secret police file, *My life as a spy: investigations in a secret police file.*) I was concerned about the secret police, who followed me all the time when I lived in București, often just a few steps behind me. I was not worried for myself per se, but rather for my Romanian colleagues and friends with whom I met. Unofficial meetings between Romanians and foreigners were discouraged. I began to understand bit by bit how Romanian citizens lived their daily lives, uncertain about who might be a potential informer

In București, I settled into an apartment building where other grantees were also housed; it was easier for a Romanian neighbor on each floor to „watch” us (that is, surveil us). I soon understood how urgent it was for me to learn Romanian, however rudimentarily. My inability to communicate is well illustrated by an anecdote that, with hindsight, is amusing. My first visit to Cluj happened some two months after I arrived in Romania. I had time to spend before an academic appointment scheduled for nine in the morning, so I went to the outdoor market. I always enjoy going to markets wherever I am, even when there is little in them. There, I took some photographs of a peasant woman ladling out cream for someone. A *milițian* unexpectedly appeared and escorted me to a local police station. I was terrified! You can imagine the scene: sitting at a desk was an imposing man in uniform, his broad chest decorated with medals. Clearly, I was supposed to say what I had done. With no small degree of desperation, I recalled some words from a restaurant menu, and using hand gestures to indicate taking pictures, I recited „carrots,

potatoes, cucumbers... etc.” The imposing figure behind the desk burst out laughing and called for his colleague who had dutifully brought me to him. Still laughing, he gave me permission to take as many pictures as I wanted at the market while I was in Cluj. That is how Cluj welcomed me! And as you see, I have continued to return.

In București, I was sent to Professor Mihai Pop, director of the Institute of Ethnography and Folklore. I had met Professor Pop when he taught as a visiting professor at Berkeley for one trimester. And since then -1975 - I have remained in contact with his extended family. Indeed, I am honored by the presence today of one of his daughters-in-law, Lia Pop, who is originally from Cluj. Similarly, I am deeply touched that my very dear friend and colleague, Professor Zoltan Rostaș, has come from București to be here today; Professor Pop introduced us in 1978 and we have remained friends since then. There are also others present from Cluj, Ieud, Sighetu Marmăției, and Vișeu de Sus, whom time does not allow me to name. They are among those who welcomed me with open hearts and form my „adoptive” families in Romania.

With time constraints in mind, I now turn to an overview of my ethnographic research in Romania, including snippets of the methodological and ethical issues I have encountered over time, in part as a foreigner. A verse which I cited in my book, *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania*, seems apposite; the multiple meanings of “being a foreigner” or “stranger” in Romanian traditional culture, “alienated from one’s own,” and “living among strangers” have never been lost on my own status:

Foreigner, foreignness
Long have you been my sister and brother
As you will be until death.

*Străină, străinătate
Mult mi-ați fost soră și frate
Și mi-or și pînă la moarte.*

Coming here in the mid ‘70s until 1988, no one other than Professor Pop could have had any idea of my life in the United States. I was actively involved in the lives of my Romanian “surrogate families” and friends, but they could only know me through our interactions here. The macro politics of the times made reciprocal visits impossible. Since 1989, colleagues, some of whom have become such close friends, like family, were able to visit me at home in California and also in Maramureș. In this regard, I want to mention Professor Adriana Băban, of UBB’s Department of Psychology, with whom I have collaborated academically for many years and who has become like a sister to me. But for most Romanians, I have remained a good example of the “social construction of identity,” issues on which I elaborated in my aforementioned book, *The Wedding of the Dead*.

Yet after forty years, how much of a foreigner am I really? Students present today in many respects know considerably less about Romania’s

recent past than I do. After all, if they were alive when the regime fell, they were very young. For sociological or ethnographic research, longitudinal experience is a plus. Unlike what ethnographers call “revisits” - when a researcher returns to a place previously studied by another scholar and reassesses or reinterprets the analysis - I have never really “left” Romania despite circumstances that certainly challenged my commitment.

As Professor Marius Lazăr has so generously discussed, my research over the decades in Romania has always explored the relationships between politics, culture, and gender before, during, and after the Ceaușescu regime. I wanted to understand the complex interplay between the state and its citizens, and the disjuncture between official discourse and everyday practice. My first two books - *Căluș: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual*, and *The Wedding of the Dead* - focused on the dramatic changes of peasant culture in an industrializing socialist state, analyzed through the lenses of calendar and life cycle customs. Both addressed the relationship between ritual practices, beliefs, and religion, on the one hand, and the official ideology of communism, on the other. The socialist state was opposed to such popular ritual practices and superstitious beliefs, promoting scientific rationalism instead. Accordingly, during the Căluș period, people often first disclaimed that they did not, of course, believe in superstition, but then went on to recount how they had nevertheless been possessed by *iele*, spirits active during that period. To counter the Căluș rites, the state celebrated the spectacular dances associated with them at an annual festival, *Călușul românesc*, held in the Olt region, in which groups of Călușari perform the energetic dances in competition. In 1999, a group of Călușari participated in the Smithsonian Folklife Festival in Washington DC, and I was delighted to be able to introduce them to the crowds. I was also able to tell a younger generation of Căluș dancers about the ritual’s history, much to my amusement and their astonishment!

I would like to mention that when I finished my dissertation in sociology, I realized that no one on my committee had the cultural competency to evaluate what I had written about the Căluș ritual itself. Having been awarded the doctorate, my excitement gave me the courage to write to Professor Mircea Eliade, asking if he might read my dissertation and share his comments with me. Much to my great surprise, when I was in Ieud doing post-doctoral research, the postman delivered a letter from him. He concluded his comments expressing the hope that we would meet, an opportunity that presented itself when I was appointed as a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago where Professor Eliade taught in the Divinity School. It was a privilege to have known him and to discuss diverse subjects of mutual interest.

Just after I filed my PhD toward the end of 1977, I returned to Romania. I had hoped to work with a sorceress whom I had met when I had

visited Maramureş during that first year. Party tenets about scientific socialism notwithstanding, under the cover of darkness, local Party members went to seek the “witch’s” advice. Unfortunately, she died soon after my return, so I had to change projects. Fortuitously, I ended up in Ieud, where I spent thirteen months doing ethnographic fieldwork on weddings, funerals, and death weddings. This research resulted in an analysis of the cultural semantics of life and death, of how individuals and communities make sense of these life-changing experiences.

When I arrived in Ieud, unbeknownst to me, my beloved hostess - may she rest in peace - was reluctant to accommodate me. According to State Decree nr. 225, it was illegal for an unrelated foreigner to stay in the home of Romanians; approval had to come from Bucureşti. My living there would bring attention to this family that already had a complicated history, having had their property expropriated as “wealthy peasants” in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the Director of the Ethnographic Museum of Maramureş, Professor Mihai Dăncuş, who became like an older brother to me, insisted that I stay there, that “Aunt” (*Mătuşă*) Juji not only had a way with words, but who was also a good cook and homemaker. Furthermore, her mother had been a village midwife before professional midwives existed. And my hosts had many godchildren in the village. People were always coming to the house, meaning that my presence in Ieud would quickly become known through the traditional communication system, namely, through village gossip networks.

Among Mătuşa Juji’s understandable concerns was that being an American, I might have pretensions to living conditions they could not provide. She later confided that she had initially agreed to a one-week trial period. Luckily for me, we hit it off immediately, and thus began a process of negotiating my integration into the family so that she felt she was respecting my status according to local social norms and I did not feel so alone and isolated. (For example, I was expected to eat by myself in the “guest” room; I, however, insisted that I join the family. Similarly, I insisted on making my own straw mattress bed.) Her husband returned from his job in Sighetu Marmătiei on the weekends. Uncle Ştefan was a well-respected and thoughtful man. He and I had long discussions into the night about the pros and cons of our two systems: capitalist/democratic versus socialist/Ceauşescu’s “original democracy.” Uncle Ştefan was what Antonio Gramsci would have labeled “an organic intellectual.”

If anyone thinks that an ethnographer is the only person doing research, she or he is sorely mistaken! As a researcher, I was as much researched as those whose lives I had come to study. For the inhabitants of Ieud, I was certainly a curiosity. “What does she eat?” “Does she drink our double-distilled brandy, ‘horinca’?” Were the little embroidered flowers on my underwear “sewn by

hand or by machine?" Moreover, with my notebook always at the ready, everyone was eager to help me learn the local vernacular speech, their dialect. (One of my favorite words is from the village of Breb, in the Mara Valley: *brozbuță*, for *sarmale*/stuffed cabbage.)

While I was settling in, colleagues and friends in București wondered how I could live in leud without running water, electricity, "conditions". While everyday life was certainly different for me, unlike many living in Romania's cities, there was a wood burning stove, which meant that water could be heated, as could a brick to put under my cold feet while I worked late into the night when everyone else was already asleep. I slept under a heavy, warm woven blanket that eventually people in București were eager to buy from the women from Maramureș who made the trip to sell them in the Piața Unirii. In view of how harsh life in Romania had become, mine were in many ways the easier of circumstances.

As a foreigner, this project exposed me to the rhythms and rigors of daily life in a way that being in a city on my own could not have. Living with a family was a living lesson in the reach of the Party-state in all aspects of daily life. As an additional household member, I was also an additional mouth to feed, so I officially requested a ration card to supplement the family's allotment of eggs, oil, butter and the like. I learned early on that villagers had been told that they should not talk about the collectivization period with me, alerting me to the silencing of history, but also to the need to respect such externally imposed boundaries. Over time and with increased trust in me, younger couples discreetly asked about contraception in the U.S. I also became aware of the effects both of class and religious warfare that had transformed local social relations and social organization, although I did not then know the complex details of these struggles. The context in which things happened also mattered. What people said in the privacy of their homes often differed from what they expressed in public. I became ever more aware of the normalization of auto-censorship and *dedublare* as aspects of being. Back then, I could not have known that in the future, I would do research both on reproductive issues and the period of collectivization.

These first two projects on ritual also highlighted for me certain methodological distinctions in ethnographic practice. In Romania, following in the great tradition of the Gusti School, a team of researchers went to villages and stayed days or weeks, collecting material on different topics. Having jobs and families, it was not feasible for them to spend six months or a year away doing research. (They also did not have grants to support them.) My Căluș fieldwork was more in keeping with that Romanian tradition: I did not do fieldwork on my own, but with others from the Institute of Ethnography and Folklore (which was definitely helpful given my limited language ability). We went to many villages,

interviewing Călușari, musicians, and villagers about the ritual. We never stayed more than a few days in one place. While I did learn a great deal about Căluș and its role in people's lives and in socialist society, I knew very little about people's everyday experiences living in a socialist state. By contrast, in Maramureș, I lived with a family and slowly became more integrated into village life. I both observed and participated. Immersed in life there equipped me with invaluable experience and insights that led me to formulate more clearly that my research ultimately constituted an "ethnography of the state."

And thus, after the fall of the regime, I embarked on *The Politics of Duplicity*, which is both an ethnography of the state - Ceaușescu's Romania - and an ethnography of the politics of reproduction, analyzed through the lens of the regime's political demographic policies. This research project enabled me to better understand the process by which the state penetrated into the intimate lives of its citizens, and the social atomization that resulted from and remained a legacy of Ceaușescu's "golden era." Moreover, this project underscored how and why natality was so central to the regime's socio-political agenda, as well as the national and international repercussions that the obsession with birthrates provoked. I came to better comprehend the wide-ranging effects of banning abortion that were a hallmark of Ceaușescu's reign and which hold lessons for all who would follow in that regime's footsteps. The analytic insights that emerged regarding duplicity and complicity have influenced others' analyses of socialist societies.

Here I must note that this heart-wrenching ethnography of Romania's reproductive policies and practices today looms large in my thoughts as the U.S. government currently in power moves steadily toward banning abortion again; access is already quite limited. You may not know that before the 1973 Constitutional Amendment, only twenty states allowed abortions that met criteria for exceptions; thirty states had complete bans - worse than the provisions of State Decree nr. 770. After my research here, it is hard to imagine that the U.S. could return to such barbaric practices.

Peasants Under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962, continued my interest in understanding Romanian communism in the form of an historical ethnography of the state. Having long wanted to do a project with Katherine Verdery, we co-organized an international, multi-disciplinary and multi-generational team of nineteen researchers to study the initial collectivization period. Two of our fifteen Romanian participants are here today: Professor Virgiliu Țărău, of the Department of History, and Lector Călin Goina, of the Department of Sociology, who then were doctoral students. Also present is one of my current host family members from Ieud, Ștefan Dăncuș, to whom I owe my sincerest thanks for the family relationship we enjoy and their generous assistance, which made the research for this project easier.

In predominantly agrarian countries such as Romania, the collectivization of agriculture was the first mass campaign through which the new communist regime inaugurated its radical program of social, political, economic and cultural transformation. Through collectivization, the nascent Party-state created its mechanisms of rule and authority, but not without push back from the populace. Collectivization may have been directed from the center, following directives from Moscow, but it was implemented locally.

Our team covered a large number of communities, enabling us to address some of the concerns posed about qualitative research such as variation and representativeness. Most participants did oral historical and archival research, each of which has limitations. Oral histories suffer the effects of time and memory distortions; interviews were retrospective, and also influenced by the political-cultural climate in which they were conducted when saying anything positive about the communist period was hardly in vogue. An individual's social origins and stage in the life cycle affected his or her experiences, opportunities, and recollections. Those who lost or suffered the most generally provided the most detailed histories; for many who had been physically abused or tortured, their memories were unforgettably embodied, imprinted in their bones, so to speak.

Archival documents were no less problematic. Access to local, regional, and national archives, as well as to the holdings of the CNSAS, was inconsistent. Documents had to be read critically, sensitive to Party and Securitate distortions and outright falsifications. Without knowledge of the context in which these documents were produced as well as the social and power relations behind them, it is not really possible to gain a nuanced understanding of what happened. Reading and interpreting a document on its own is not sufficient. Our multi-methodological strategy, while time consuming, was effective in triangulating data and analysis. I also note that Katherine's and my own deep relationships over decades in the villages where we did our research often made it easier for us than for the younger Romanians who were not from the villages they studied - an unanticipated advantage that made us aware that the debate in ethnography about the pluses and minuses of being an insider or an outsider are not as straight forward as they may seem.

Let me mention a few methodological "memories" from my own research for our project to offer a taste of the kinds of surprises and issues each participant encountered in one way or another. At CNSAS, reading through various penal files, I found an organizational chart that the secret police had prepared. It listed the members of anticommunist resistance groups operating throughout the villages of the Iza Valley. Their names proved to be an invaluable find for me, and I doubt I would otherwise have come across these individuals, most of whom I

was then able to trace and interview. I also found confirmation of the murder of someone whose children I know and who was shot in the back and killed by the secret police. In the statistics about the “terrorists” from Ieud, this man was listed as “disappeared,” not “deceased” (like others). That classification flagged an interpretive issue. The category of “disappeared” is notorious in authoritarian regimes, Argentina being a good example; “disappeared” often effaces or hides the political crime of murder.

One last example, again from the penal files, raised an ethical issue for me, especially as a foreigner. I had applied to look at particular files, with the consent of living family members, but many other people appeared in these files. One such person was a woman then in her seventies. Upon meeting her, she asked how I knew of her. I assure you it is an unusual experience to tell someone that you “met” her through a reading of her secret police file! There is an ethical responsibility in this, it seems to me. At her request, to the extent that I had information that could be helpful to others whose names I came across, I shared it. That said, there was some information that I did not feel was my place to divulge. All of these concerns require - or should require - careful consideration.

It is, of course, very gratifying that my research in Romania is used in courses here as well as abroad, and that with expanding access to archival material, young researchers have built upon my work to provide greater understanding of these issues. I have not, admittedly, thought that much about how my work in Romania might one day inform my understanding of what is happening in my own country. On a personal note, I learned a great deal, for example, from Ieudeni and their deep humanism about death, in particular. Before 1989, I was incensed by my fellow American citizens who did not exercise the right to vote, but were so quick to condemn communist regimes where people could not vote freely. It was - and remains to this day - a hypocrisy I find unacceptable and one that fundamentally compromises democratic practices.

In November 2016, only 58% of Americans eligible to vote cast ballots. The outcome of the election has altered the political climate dramatically. With every passing day, we no longer know what awaits us. I could not have imagined that I would one day hear a President of the United States proclaim that the „ media [the free press] is the enemy of the American people” (February 17, 2017). Katherine and I wrote a great deal about the enemies of the Romanian people; the discourses of authoritarian leaders frequently invoke the category „enemy.” But in the U.S.?

The President foments his own rather incoherent version of „class warfare,” in which he alone represents the salvation for those forgotten by globalization processes. Among his enemies number a series of politicians who fill the „swamp” of our capital, as well as Muslims, immigrants - especially the undocumented - and anyone who does not share his views. Unmaskings

and denunciations have re-appeared in our politics (having been characteristic of the McCarthy era, 1947-1956). Like your „genius of the Carpathians” and other all-knowing leaders such as Kim Jong Un, the current President of the United States has declared that he is „a smart person,” knows better than others, and does not need daily briefings from specialists.

His promises often contradict scientific data, which, for him, are often but „alternative facts.” Recently, there was a picture of the President surrounded by miners, happy that he had promised to reopen the shuttered mines. He visits factories, making promises that may also be accompanied by threats. I was reminded of the photographs that used to appear in *Scînteia* (the Party newspaper), or of the difference between what the President declares and what people experience in their daily lives. Various members of the President’s family now occupy positions of power, even though they lack necessary training, in contrast to members of the Kennedy and Bush clans. The entwined familial relations in D.C. today remind me of the PCR, the acronym not only for the Romanian Communist Party, but also for „pull, connections, and relationships,” and „Petrescu, Ceaușescu, and relatives” (Petrescu being Elena Ceaușescu’s maiden name). While we do not benefit from the equivalence between letters, names, and what they signify, nevertheless, nepotism and ethical conflicts are flourishing in the White House.

The very fact that we can think of such things is stunning enough. Clearly, our system is bolstered by the consolidation of democratic institutions over the course of two hundred and forty-one years. Many people are now politically engaged; the public sphere is invigorated. Still, the government is dysfunctional. As in Europe, the effects of globalization and neoliberalism, combined with the promotion of rights and dignity for the identities of diverse social groups, have contributed to the emergence of sharp social divisions and tensions. This is not the occasion, however, to go on at length about our politics. Yet, it is the first time in all the years that I have been coming to Romania that I have found certain similarities between what I know from my research about your country’s recent past and what is presently occurring in ours, similarities that I find profoundly disturbing. And we too are beginning to poke fun at our own troubles, to make *haz de necaz!*

In conclusion, I reiterate that way back, I had no intention of coming to Romania, but as I have recounted, I did, and the rest is history - my professional and personal history both here and in Los Angeles, where I live. When I met my personal physician, I learned that she is originally from Romania. How is that possible? In a city as immense as Los Angeles, with a population estimated between thirteen and sixteen million, how is it that I ended up precisely in her office? Such things happen to me quite frequently. After so many years, Romania and Romanians are simply a part of my life and will be for as long as I live.

I thank you so very much for this great honor and for the friendship you have extended to me through thick and thin all of these years.

Special Issue

***KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DURING SOCIALISM***

Guest editors: Norbert Petrovici and Florin Poenaru



ANTINOMIES OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DURING SOCIALISM

Guest Editors' Foreword

FLORIN POENARU¹, NORBERT PETROVICI²

Andreas Glaeser (2011:XV) defined state socialism as an 'unacknowledged attempt to perform a revolutionary self-fulfilling prophecy'. For Glaeser, state socialism failed because its elites failed to produce adequate understandings of the everyday operations of socialism so as to devise timely reforms of the system. In short, socialism came tumbling down because of an epistemic failure. Irrespective of the validity of Glaeser's conclusion it has the merit that it raises the point about the generation and certification of knowledge about the social life in socialism. How was this knowledge produced, by what means, to what ends, in which institutional settings and what mechanisms of feedback did it generate? This issue takes knowledge production during socialism and its instantiations in various institutional settings as its starting point and seeks to trace its antinomies.

The socialist state apparatus was a systematic producer of knowledge. The bureaucratic machine often employed the methods of the social sciences to gather and classify information, hypothesise contending interpretation, and suggest policy prescriptions. A vast array of activities benefited from the integration of these methods in the everyday state operations. Minute knowledge was needed in economic and spatial planning, or in demographical, educational, and health policies. Concurrently, the secret police also deployed observational techniques and made use of field notes that had a strong resemblance with those of the ethnographers.

At the same time, the social sciences *per se* produced a vast array of analysis of the very same society. During the four decades of socialism in Eastern Europe there were significant variations in the type, quantity, and quality of scientific literature produced. These variations were strongly interlinked with the state apparatus' needs for knowledge and societal projects. But the knowledge

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produced by the social sciences cannot be simply reduced to an appendix of the party-state logic and its projects, as it was by the anti-communist historians working in the totalitarian paradigm. A significant body of literature in sociology, economy, human geography, history, and demography was produced in particular institutional settings, intellectual networks and groups. and embedded in knowledge flows that transcended both the national boundaries and those imposed by the Cold War divisions. More often than not the knowledge produced by the social sciences came into conflict with the knowledge produced by the state or with the knowledge expected by the state. Rather than being a simple relation of subordination, the relationship between the socialist state, the social sciences, and the process of knowledge production was one of contention, friction and negotiation, therefore acquiring a particular history of its own within the broader political, economic and social dynamics of socialism.

This special issue seeks to investigate precisely this tension between state apparatuses, knowledge production, and the social sciences and the underlining political, ideological, and epistemic formations constitutive of this relationship. More specifically the contributions gathered here explore the institutional settings and the intellectual practices of knowledge production within the socialist social sciences and the policy practices of the state apparatuses and their intersection and collusion. Moreover, they point out how key socialist processes like industrialization, urbanization, agricultural production, central planning, trade and secret police surveillance were imagined, developed, implemented, and recalibrated at the intersection of state needs and social sciences expertise. The aim is to open up a field of reflection about the socialist knowledge production that is anchored in institutional settings and practices and always linked with the mechanics and dynamics of state apparatuses. The overall goal has been to have a better understanding of socialist social sciences, beyond current myths and stereotypes, and to properly place their significance within the developmentalist logic of socialism. At the very least we hope we managed to open this conversation and to point out the merits of further continuing it.

This quest for embedded knowledge is the key feature of the framework of this special issue. We sought to take knowledge production seriously but not to fetishize knowledge as such. Contributions link knowledge production, either by the state, or by the social sciences, to institutional settings, policies, and overall developmentalist plans of the regime.

Norbert Petrovici's text makes a double argument. On the one hand, socialist sociology has developed in relation to the socialist economic planning and was an outcome of imagining and institutionalizing the socialist development plan after 1947. Miron Constantinescu was a key figure in both processes, mobilizing and developing sociological concepts to be used in

economic and urban planning almost two decades *before* the official institutionalization of socialist sociology. On the other hand, academic concepts, like the 'urban area', developed by Miron Constantinescu and Henri H. Stahl played an important role in actually shaping socialist urban policies, tying economic growth to sub-national levels and allowing planners to regulate the economy as a set of inter-connected production chains. This perspective does away with the standard narrative of socialist sociology as a by-product of socialist policies, strictly subordinated to political interests. Here sociological knowledge production appears to be both foundational and performative: at the root of socialist planning but also able to generate concepts which in turn enabled policies to be implemented.

In his text, Ștefan Bosomitu expands on the history of the institutionalization of sociology in relation to political dynamics by emphasizing the field dynamics that led to a particular articulation of the discipline in its official guise. That sociology was an object of political contention is clear, but the struggles around it were not confined to that. Politics of knowledge entered into play in order to define the nature of sociology and its subsequent institutional and practical configuration. At least three different strands of sociology were in competition over the legitimate nature of the discipline. Miron Constantinescu was interested to transform sociology in the key discipline for knowledge production over the socialist modernization: urbanization, industrialization, and mechanization of the agriculture. A 'new sociology' for a 'new social order'. A second school, led by Tudor Bugnariu, Henri H. Stahl and Traian Herseni, tried to renew the interwar monographical tradition and put it to work in the new social context. And a third vision imagined sociology as a 'sociology of the concrete' transformations, working in the confines of the official ideological predicaments. The first two agendas have fused together through the collaboration of Miron Constantinescu and Henri H. Stahl, both searching to capture the needs for social knowledge of the socialist state. Their endeavour was to put those needs in a sociological form and to entrust the research of these brave new world to the very state apparatus that was the agent of the transformations. The third agenda became institutionalized in the main academic centres offering both the chance for competition over disciplinary authority and a certain autonomous empiricism. The atheoretical empiricism was conducive for prestige squabbles between figures as Ion Drăgan or Constantin Nicuță, while giving the illusion that some stakes are at play in the sociological field – which obviously was not the case. However, the point was to give the sociology the autonomy to research the new society as a bureaucratic tool for recording the various social transformations.

András Vigvári and Tamás Gerőcs broaden the discussion of sociological knowledge production by investigating the concept of 'peasant embourgeoisment' not only in relation to socialism – when the need to reform the countryside was germane for the regime – but to broader history stretching back to the 19th century. They convincingly show how the development, mobilization, and subsequent rediscovery of sociological concepts is inherently linked to material transformations in periods of crisis and as such sociological knowledge cannot be separated from global historical processes and conjunctions. But this is not a simple matter of conceptual obduracy. The authors' argument is that this overlapping history of conceptual formation and historical processes has important policy effects. This bespeaks a wider tendency both before and after socialism in the region, that of deploying sociological concepts for policy purposes, thus linking once more state knowledge and social sciences.

Finally, Florin Poenaru's text also deals with the intersection between socialist knowledge production and science, but it does so by looking at an unorthodox avenue and in a rather speculative manner. Poenaru argues that the role fulfilled by the secret police (the Romanian Securitate) was not simply that of monitoring and repressing the population but also of generating knowledge about the socialist society for the benefit of the state. The secret police was thus an ample mechanism of knowledge production that accumulated in the vast archive this institution left behind. Of course, the type of knowledge this institution produced and its particular purposes in socialism is ambiguous and more research in this direction is needed. Such a perspective, however, was so far precluded, the author argues, by seeing the secret police archive as a source of knowledge not as a knowledge-form. What warrants such a perspective is a close look at what the secret police agents were actually doing: that is, at the manner in which they generated the knowledge about the socialist society. Their work was very similar to that of the anthropologists (colonial or in the later instantiations of the discipline), especially their penchant for fieldwork and writing – that is, doing ethnography. This perspective complicates the relationship between state knowledge and social sciences during socialism by pointing out to an institution that also had an ambiguous position within the regime itself. Theoretically close and subordinated to the interests of the party, the secret police officers were also very skilled and autonomous actors, aligned with the ideology of the party but also able to notice the contradictions of the regime at the grassroots level. Hence, they occupied an ambiguous position between party hierarchy and the technical intelligentsia (whom they were supposed to monitor closely), just as the knowledge produced by the Securitate sat uneasily between state knowledge and social sciences.

Postcommunist anticommunism relegated socialist social sciences to a footnote of political history and ideological subordination. To put it simply, they were never taken seriously and their entire history was erased together with that of socialism as aberrations. Following developments in the sociology of socialist knowledge production (Glaeser, 2011; Lampland, 2016; Verdery, 2014) this issue sought to take socialist social sciences seriously and thus open a necessary discussion of the relationship between state, knowledge and science during socialism.

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THE POLITICS OF MOBILIZING LOCAL RESOURCES FOR GROWTH: 'URBAN AREAS' IN ROMANIA

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ABSTRACT. In this paper I argue that sociology was a key discipline in producing relevant knowledge for managing and reimagining the socialist economic development in Romania. It played a central role in placing economic development at the subnational level, since much of the everyday economics unfolded at the level of the regions, which formed around the emerging cities. I analyse the birth of the 'urban area', an academic concept and a policy tool, as it was developed by Miron Constantinescu and his associate Henry H. Stahl. This was the main device that shifted economic growth to the subnational level and allowed the planners to regulate the economy as a set of inter-connected production chains. Sociology was disbanded as an academic discipline in 1948; nonetheless, through the figure of Miron Constantinescu, a key member of the *Political Bureau* between 1945-1957, it remained a central producer of knowledge through complex institutional arrangements, put in place in the 1950s. These institutions employed sociological figures from the inter-war sociological establishment. Their methodological skills and theoretical endeavours were put to work in applied research. I argue that some strategic developmentalist policies in socialist Romania were strongly shaped by the reworking in Marxist terms of certain key ideas of the Gustian school of a 'sociology of the nation'.

Keywords: urban zones, socialism, urban policy, developmentalism, the sociology of sociology

Placing socialist economic growth

One of the major critical analytical lenses through which real existing socialism was appraised was that of a modernist-utopian planning system, driven by technical apparatuses necessary for integrating a centrally coordinated economy and society (Bockman, 2011; Ellman, 1973, 2014). Or, as Scott formulated the issue in Foucauldian terms (2007), socialism was another instance of high-modernism that used a rational grid to systematize the chaos of the social,

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and thus became deeply repressive precisely because it took its panoptic web to its last consequence. Nonetheless, as anthropologists have repeatedly shown, socialist investments relied heavily on local knowledge, practices, and skilled brokers that linked the local with the national scale (Cullen, Dunn and Verdery, 2015; Dunn, 2004; Verdery, 1996). Romanian developmentalist economic policies are a case in point for illustrating these observations (Ban, 2014, 2016; Petrovici, 2013). Li's criticism (2005) of Scott's thesis on high-modernism can be easily reworked for the case of the Romanian socialism: the force of the socialist developmental scheme lied in capturing local practices for larger plans, by maintaining a space for negotiation.

Another major critical analytical perspective used in the analysis of socialism emphasises precisely the managerial negotiation with the central state apparatus, creating a vast array of seigniorial-like relations, which resembled in many ways a feudal society (Kornai, 1980; Mihályi, 1992). Socialism was an attempt of a hierarchical political system to catch up with the more advanced economies by recasting a redistributive system in a modern form (Csillag and Szelenyi, 2015; Mihályi, 1992; Szelenyi, 1981). Romania seemed to have been an epitome of these arrangements through the apparent 'sultanist power regime' of Ceaușescu, who tried to instil his kin members in the top positions of the party (Linz and Stepan, 1996) as well as, through the way in which socialism managed to use local energies and amass them together based on personal relationships, through negotiation, for the sake of accumulation at a national scale (Câmpeanu, 2002).

While these major paradigmatic views have their virtues, many of their predicaments derive from the scale of their analytical focus. If the focus of the analysis is on the national level, the emphasis rests on the apparently all-encompassing planning system (Soós, 1985, 1987, 1989). If the focus of the analysis rests on the factory, the empirical endeavour tends to question whether local managerial interests were harmonized and transformed into a coherent whole – which apparently was rarely the case (Bauer, 1978; Kornai, 1980).

I am proposing that the analysis should, instead, be conducted at the subnational level, because much of the everyday economics unfolded at the level of the regions which formed around the emerging cities. The mix of the messy local interests became tied together by connecting through the major cities the industrial and the agricultural chains of productions. In Romania, the urban-rural chains of production became a policy tool in the 1950s and gained momentum once again in 1970s, paradoxically, just after all counties, which were endowed with very unequal resources, were requested to produce an equal amount of the total plan. In fact, finding the scale where to place economic policies was one of the socialist developmental conundrums, and favouring the subnational had its own history.

My contention is that sociology was a key discipline in producing relevant knowledge for managing and reimagining the socialist economic development in Romania. I analyse the birth of the 'urban area', an academic concept and a policy tool, as it was developed by Miron Constantinescu and his associate Henry H. Stahl. This was the main device that tied economic growth to the subnational level and allowed the planners to regulate the economy as a set of interconnected production chains. Sociology was disbanded as an academic discipline in 1948; nonetheless, through the figure of Miron Constantinescu, a key member of the *Political Bureau* between 1945-1957, it remained a central producer of knowledge through complex institutional arrangements, put in place in the 1950s. These institutions employed sociological figures from the inter-war sociological establishment. Their methodological skills and theoretical endeavours were put to work in applied research. I also argue that some strategic developmentalist policies in socialist Romania (Ban, 2014, 2016) were strongly shaped by the reworking in Marxist terms of certain key ideas of the Gustian school of a 'sociology of the nation'.

In the next section I sketch briefly the major conundrums at play in the developmentalist strategy of growth and the major opposing policy visions in the *Political Bureau* of the communist elites. Then, I follow the definition of the concept of 'urban zone' as used by Constantinescu and Stahl in the 1970s. In the fourth section I sketch a history of the same concept as rooted in the emerging sociological and geographical fields at the beginning of the 20th century and its subsequent transformations after the 1950s. In the fifth section I analyse the way this concept was used as a policy tool and redeployed in the 1970s, this time as a critical sociological concept in the face of the new regional disparities produced by the 1970s-economic development. In the sixth part I discuss the importance of the concept of 'urban area' as a policy tool for regulating the subnational and some implications in terms of the way the sociological field restructures around this tool.

Developmentalist conundrums

After World War II, Romania consisted of no less than 78% rural population. Industrialization could only be imagined in relation to the agricultural sector. Two options emerged during this time: land agglomeration for large-scale agricultural production could either precede industrialization, or follow it. The idea of land agglomeration itself was not problematic as there was a consensus within the *Political Bureau* on this. It was more a question of order. The first solution: industrialization, mechanization of agriculture and then collectivization, or the second solution: collectivization, industrialization and then mechanization.

As pointed out by Levy (2001), what seemed to be just a contextual question was in fact a question of economic architecture which had to be addressed not only in Romania, but also in post-revolutionary Russia or elsewhere in Eastern Europe (Davies, 1980, 1989; Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft, 1994).

Under the social pressure of the peasants, the first solution pleaded for experimenting with nested market forms: the rural area to become a market for industrial products, and vice-versa, the urban area to become a market for agricultural products, following a relative parity of prices between these areas. Initially the new socialist government tried to increase the productivity of agriculture through a gradual mechanization. Between 1946 and 1951, Ana Pauker, party secretary for agriculture (between 1948 and 1952), was a defender of the nested markets approach and she opposed those economic policies that pleaded for an imbalanced pricing ratio between industrial products and agricultural products (Levy, 2001). Within the *Political Bureau*, Vasile Luca, Minister of Finance, was also a defender of this policy. Until 1951, while in a position of leadership, Ana Pauker opposed collectivization 'in force' and attempted a collectivization focused on the mechanization of agriculture, to motivate peasants to participate voluntarily in the land agglomeration. Vasile Luca successfully pushed for the parity of urban-rural products and for balancing the development of the heavy industry with light industry in order to have consumer goods for peasants (Kligman and Verdery, 2015). The Muscovite councillors opposed these solutions as early as 1947, during the first post-war monetary reforms, supervised by Miron Constantinescu (Bosomitu, 2014b). Stalin had been pushing for collectivization for the entire socialist bloc as early as 1948. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the general secretary of the Party, also preferred this first approach until the middle of 1948. After 1949, Dej changed his position and became an exponent of the second solution, alongside other actors within the *Political Bureau*, especially Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Moghioroş and Iosif Chişinevschi (Levy, 2001).

The second position involved the collectivization of agriculture and the use of agricultural products to offer cheap consumer goods in the urban areas and raw materials for the industry. As pointed out by Levy (2001), Dej's position changed for reasons related to the socialist state's architecture. It was impossible to control the individualized peasant economy in terms of price formation, which made it impossible to secure a steady income and hence a constant level of investment in industry and key services. Gradually, the *Political Bureau* came to prefer the solution of bureaucratizing the economy, through the formation of domestic industrial markets with factories linked in production chains coordinated by the *Council of Ministers* and the *Planning Council*. Stalin was putting a lot of pressure on the entire bloc for the heavy industry, to the

detriment of the light industry, to ensure, in the context of the Cold War, that the industry across the region could be reconverted into an arms industry in the face of a possible military confrontation (Bosomitu, 2014b; Davies et al., 1994; Levy, 2001).

An unexpected solution came from Miron Constantinescu that succeeded, somehow, to propose an in-between concept that was responding both to Ana Pauker's pressure for price parity between the urban and the rural manufactured goods and Gheorghe Gh. Dej's pressure for a rural economy in the control of the state so as to maintain a manageable pace of resource extraction necessary for industrialization. The solution was the 'urban area' concept, which emphasized the diversity of local resources for growth and the necessity to interlink them in regional input/output relations between the emerging industries, which was to create urban-rural units in a complex national mosaic of diverse economic ecologies.

Between 1949 and 1955 Miron Constantinescu was the head of the *State Planning Council* and he was the main actor entrusted to design the first four planning cycles (1949, 1950, 1951-1955, 1956-1960). Also, he was trained as a sociologist, highly committed to empirical research, and, therefore, he preferred evidence-based policies. In 1949, he put together a research team to which he entrusted the research needed to devise a comprehensive planning process. The interdisciplinary team, in which Henri H. Stahl was a key player, was mainly formed by fellow researchers working in the 'monographical Bucharest school', headed in the interwar period by the sociologist Dimitrie Gusti. However, the recruitment of members in this new team depended largely on responding to the contending visions on economic development of the *Communist Party* leaders and Miron Constantinescu's contradictory position within the *Political Bureau*. With the help of this research, Miron Constantinescu could position himself in a complex manner in relation to the big issues raised by managing a socialist economy.

However, this solution came under public scrutiny only in the 1970s as a sociological observation, when the first researches on industrialisation were published. In a study on the urbanisation process in the region of Slatina, Miron Constantinescu, together with Henri H. Stahl (Constantinescu and Stahl, 1970), proposed the 'urban area' concept to capture the exchanges of population and goods between the city of Slatina and the neighbouring localities in the Olt County. This was the first book in a series of three volumes that compared the industrialization and urbanization processes in different stages in the formation of the fix capital and maturity of investments. The teams coordinated by Miron Constantinescu selected three different cases, depending on the industrialization-urbanisation „development stage”: „advanced stage” – the Braşov area (Bogdan,

Cernea, Constantinescu, and Cristea, 1970), „median stage” – the Slatina area (Constantinescu and Stahl, 1970), and the „incipient stage” – the Vaslui area (Brescan and Merfea, 1973). The meaning of the ‘urban areas’ might elude us if we only classify it as the sociological concept of some influential researchers in the 1970s. We are not dealing with a concept that describes the reality it studies. The ‘urban area’ is a normative concept with a history in the interwar period, which was reassumed as a development policy tool in the 1950s. This concept is based on an entire knowledge production infrastructure that precedes the real existing socialism and that, eventually, had important effects on structuring the socialist public policies.

The urban area

As noted above, Miron Constantinescu was not just a sociologist who had an interest in the urban issue in the 1970s. In fact, he was a key actor of the *Romanian Communist Party*: a communist *illegalist* before the Second World War, member of the *Political Bureau* and of the *Central Committee* between 1947 and 1957. He was one of the key actors of the economic stabilisation after the war, between 1947 and 1950, and president of the *State Planning Committee* between 1949 and 1955. Between 1952 and 1956 he was considered a potential successor to and competitor of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (Bosomitu, 2014b). After Nikita Khrushchev’s rejection of the personality cult in USSR during his secret speech at the *20th CPSU Congress*, in February 1956, Constantinescu was propelled by several forces in the party as Dej’s liberal successor (Bosomitu, 2014b). In April 1956, supported by Iosif Chişinevschi, another member of the *Political Bureau*, Constantinescu openly criticized Dej in front of their peers. However, Dej had anticipated this opposition and made the necessary alliances with the other four members of the *Bureau*. Because of this opposition, between 1957 and 1965 Constantinescu was marginalized within the party, holding only academic positions as president of various research institutes. Even if marginalized politically, he became an influential actor in the historiographical field: he specialised on issues concerning the tributary system (Guga, 2015), on the history of Transylvania (Constantinescu and Daicoviciu, 1961; Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, 1965a, 1965b) and on the project of rewriting the history of Romania (Constantinescu, Daicoviciu, and Pascu, 1968). Miron Constantinescu’s rehabilitation was orchestrated by Nicolae Ceauşescu, as a reactivation of the voices critical towards Gheorghiu-Dej. In 1965 Constantinescu was appointed Deputy State Minister in the *Ministry of Education*, and in 1966 he became a university professor of the new Sociology Department at the University of Bucharest. In 1969, Constantinescu became *Minister of Education* and a member

of the *Central Committee*. Between 1965 and his death in 1974, Miron Constantinescu played a central role in reinstating sociology as a discipline in Romania (Bosomitu, 2014b); as a matter of fact during this time there was a boom in the sociological production in Romania and several academic journals were founded (Costea, Larionescu, and Ungureanu, 1983).

Henri H. Stahl was Miron Constantinescu's partner in many of his political enterprises, as an expert and researcher. Henri H. Stahl was one of the most influential sociologist in the 20th century Romania, a prolific researcher and a remarkable thinker (Guga, 2015). In 1949 Constantinescu invited Henri H. Stahl to become a member in an interdisciplinary research team working in the *State Planning Council* (Stahl and Matei, 1966) and to coordinate the scientific side of the research needed for planning (Stahl, 1975). Under the supervision of the *Ministry of Construction* and the *State Planning Council* he was employed at the *Superior Institute of Social Work* (Institutul Superior de Prevederi Sociale) during 1948 and 1952, and then at the *Institute for city planning and regional development* (Institutul de proiectări a oraşelor și a sistematizării regionale) between 1952 and 1961². He received a writing leave for two years³, joined the Romanian Academy for this period and then joined Constantinescu's efforts in 1965 to build from scratch a new sociological faculty at Bucharest University (see Bosomitu, this issue). He retired in 1971, publishing intensely until his death in 1991 and supervising PhD students.

Miron Constantinescu's effort to define the 'urban areas' spans across the three above-mentioned empirical books on industrialization in Romania in the form of short vignettes. Therefore, the coherence of the concept becomes apparent only when put in a single chapter on the urbanisation processes, chapter that is part of a book that collects all the essays Constantinescu wrote between 1938 and 1971 (Constantinescu, 1971). I quote him extensively from this source:

Generally, an *area* confines the territorial realities and the units which have some specific physical, economic, and social characteristics. These socio-economic and geographical units have certain common characteristics, and what is essential is the *inter-conditioning* of all these traits and elements within an area, their *interdependence* and *interaction*. [...] *The notion of an 'area' has also been extended [from a geographical and bioclimatic area] to the order of the social phenomena when they are analysed as a territorial reality, as form of the relation between humans and nature, mediated by productive forces. An area comprises a complex of specific economic and social relations harmonized on certain coordinates. [...] The*

² Bucharest University Archive, Human Resource Direction, employee dossier S2/135, available to me courtesy of Ștefan Bosomitu.

³ The leave was received with Miron Constantinescu's mediation to write a book on the issue of the transition in Romania (Stahl, 1965).

urban areas are formed by combining production and residential spaces, the definition and space delimitation of which differs. Generally, the urban area comprises: [a] the city itself, the agglomeration of population, housing, and economic activities, concentrated in very limited spaces [...] and [b] a convergence area or an area of mutual relations between the city itself and that area called hinterland, with which the city has close and intimate mutual economic relations and on which the city partly grows. The following areas have also been delimited in connection with the city, on the basis of the frequency of participation in the supply of the urban population and industry: immediate (peri-urban, pre-city), adjacent and distant. The mutual economic connections between the two constituent parts – the territorial and functional association between the city and the convergence area (to attract labour force, agri-food products and raw materials) – define the urban integration territorial area or the urban area. The expressions ‘city-region’, ‘urban complex’ or ‘urban region’ were also proposed. In the published literature ‘area’ has a wide variety of definitions, but we consider they are insufficient. These definitions are deficient because of the static manner in which the area is defined. In our opinion, the area in the sociological sense must be defined as a dynamic *unity* in relation to the processes that occur within in. (Constantinescu, 1971:145-146, emphasis in original).

Miron Constantinescu proposes a very precise definition that systematizes his empirical material. He starts from the *geographic and bioclimatic zoning* concept to capture the distinctiveness of local natural resources and he re-labels the natural in relation with the capacities to produce and transform nature into resources using the existing means of production. He then notes that *the urban areas* were created through socialist industrialization, and they are formed by the ‘actual cities’ and ‘a hinterland area’. The hinterland area is a collector from which the labour force is recruited and that provides the supply of agri-food and raw materials. The terminological proposal attempts to capture the dynamic spatial relations between, on the one hand, the labour force and the raw material suppliers, and the urban industry on the other hand. However, through this approach he assumes a very large spatial coherence and integration. In fact, the only time when he raises the issue of the geographical contiguity is in relation with the distance and the frequency of supply, thus producing three types of hinterland: immediate, adjacent, and distant.

As soon as he begins to make a synthesis of the research results on the Slatina urban area, the analysis refers to the supply chains of labour force, produced by the implantation of new factories in Slatina and the secondary ‘constellations of urban localities’, which gradually concentrate the urban labour force from the nearby rural area. In turn, these urban localities are transformed by increasing the productivity through reorganization and investments in cooperatives. ‘At the moment, with regards to construction sites, labour recruiters

are currently discussing with presidents of production agricultural cooperatives and during winter they make contracts to hire people from households in the constructions sites that will open in spring' (Constantinescu, 1971:151). Constantinescu is concerned with (a) labour force supply (b) the industry of *consumer goods* and primary agricultural products for labour force consumption, (c) the industrialized production of agricultural products in remote areas and (d) the extraction of *raw materials* necessary for the industry of intermediate goods centred in the space of the central city or its industrial satellites.

The approach may seem strange if we consider the fact that he studied the products of the *Aluminium Factory* in Slatina of the *Machine tools factories* in Braşov, which were distributed across the country. These factories' products were *capital goods*, necessary as means of production in the Romanian agricultural and industrial sector, or for export in the *COMECON* area. As soon as we begin to consider these aspects as well, we can no longer talk only about an urban area and its hinterlands. That is, we have two different agricultural-industrial inter-sectorial circuits: on the one hand, a circuit consisting of a local industrial supply chain of raw materials and a labour force nurtured with perishable agricultural goods and, on the other hand, a national circuit of production goods. Each urban area specializes in industrial production according to the local resources and trades with the other urban areas. These stakes become much clearer in the proposal section in the volume dedicated to Slatina. An area can develop harmoniously in relation to its hinterland when it is also capable to integrate human and material resources:

Following a reorganization of the communes, according to the administrative territorial law of 1967, equipping the villages with the necessary technical and cultural equipment, supporting the industrialization tendencies of villages, developing the construction of new industrial units through inter-cooperative association, the communes surrounding Slatina could become real *residential districts* of factory workers. Hereby, the industrial and agricultural activity would intertwine, and the communes' population would participate in the development of both industrial and socialist agriculture. The entire area comprising Slatina and its hinterland would develop harmoniously. In addition, this would cheapen Slatina's endeavour to build new block of flats, it would allow a more rational use of the funds coming from factories and the *Popular Council* to build new city districts. (Constantinescu and Stahl, 1970:368)

Henri H. Stahl, the second editor of the study on Slatina, emphasized even more the role of the hinterland. Two years before the publication of the study coordinated with Miron Constantinescu, while Constantinescu was preparing the studies on Vaslui, Slatina and Braşov, Stahl was invited by Miron Constantinescu

to hold a series of lectures at the *People's University* in Bucharest on the 1968 Law on the territorial-administrative reorganisation. The lectures were published in 1969 in a short book entitled *The Administrative-territorial organization*. Even if the conceptual stake is very important, Stahl insisted that 'we can no longer distinguish, as we used to, between a rural and an urban area' (1969:60). There is a very important continuity between the two, in a double sense: empirically, the continuity is an observable process, and from a normative stand it is desirable to ensure a complex exchange between agricultural and industrial products through a consistent investment policy.

Around the central core, which is a mother-city, there is a fairly wide 'pre-city' territory, characterized by the existence of 'dormitory localities' to which I also add 'satellite localities', with a semi-industrial character. Beyond this area, there is another one called the 'peri-urban' area, characterized by its specialization in the production of perishable, consumable goods necessary for the city, and only then comes the proper 'agricultural' area. However, as agriculture is industrialized, this area also ceases to be rural, as the villages also witness a process that can be called 'urbanization', in the sense of raising the standards of living and the lifestyle from an archaic, rural one to a modern, urban one. (Stahl, 1969:60)

The urban-rural complex suggested by Stahl includes a network of localities with different functions and that implies complex exchanges advantageous to everyone. On the one hand, the archaic character of the rural areas is overcome through systematic investments in agriculture, while the peasant population is employed either in mechanized agriculture or in urban factories. Therefore, the rural areas become dormitories for a type of work that is unfolding in urban spaces or is servicing the urban space. On the other hand, rural communities become satellite localities where certain industries locate to transform the primary resources into raw materials used by the mother cities; or they can concentrate industries to further process the industrial products assembled in the mother city. Therefore, the whole lifestyle of the region changes as an effect of the material processes that derives from the economic exchanges which integrate the 'urban-rural' complex. As mentioned before, the concept of 'urban area' was not a new concept, but one that has a history in the interwar sociology.

A short history of some of the post-Gusti dilemmas

Miron Constantinescu had been a member of the Gustian School and he became a sociologist in the second half of the 1930s. In 1938-1939 he participated in the monographic researches conducted by Anton Golopenția,

Henri Stahl, and Octavian Neamțu, as part of a process to extend Dimitrie Gusti's methodological and theoretical horizon. Gusti's students had sought to correct Gusti's lack of formulating more sophisticated methods to categorize the villages and their connections with the areas they belonged to (Sandu, 2012). Following the 1938-39 research, Anton Golopenția managed to publish five volumes during the war, to sum up his research entitled *60 Romanian villages* (Golopenția and Georgescu, 1941). Miron Constantinescu was one of the authors that contributed with some monographs to this volume, from an open Marxist position (Poenaru, 2015). Dimitrie Gusti wrote the introductory study of the first volume. He absorbed his students' critics and stressed the need to build a complex typology of the villages, to build a theoretical synthesis whose ultimate goal was to demarcate Romania's 'Social regions'. During the war, Dimitrie Gusti was elected president of the Romanian Academy in 1944, and from this position he began to resume the theme of the monographic unit of analyses and drafted a research project to categorize the villages in a certain region and make inter-regional comparisons. As President of the Academy, in the position of president of the *National Research Council*, he proposed the following:

[...] to develop a systematic research plan of the entire country, in such a way that within a minimum interval we can reach the fullest knowledge of all the country's issues. The main basis of this research must remain the research of *social units*, i.e. *villages, cities, regions around the country* with their rich content full of continuing dynamism. [...] The end product of this enterprise would be to determine on the country's map which regions do not overlap with the country's administrative or geographical divisions (Gusti, 1946; quoted in Stahl, 1975:44-45).

Between 1945-1946 Gusti travelled firstly to the USSR, then to Palestine, Lebanon, France, and the United States. The purpose of the trip was to create through the *UN* an organization called *The Social Institute of Nations* to globalize his monographical approach and to secure steady resources for his endeavour in Romania. His attempt was unsuccessful. After 1947 he tried again to found *The Social Romanian Institute* – the key institutional instrument through which he financed the monographic enterprises before the war – in order to create a map of the Romanian regions, included in a *Social atlas of Romania* (Sandu, 2012). Dimitrie Gusti handed the proposal to re-establish the *Romanian Social Institute* to his former student Miron Constantinescu, with the suggestion of a possible partnership with the *Central Institute of Statistics*, whose president was still Anton Golopenția and with the *Superior Economic Council* where Octavian Neamțu was already working. Miron Constantinescu, secretary of the *Ministerial Commission for Stabilization and Economic Recovery*, replied that although his enterprise was 'just and positive', it was

built on an idealist base. As such, he invited his former professor to use the Marxist-Leninist theory and suggested he started the research in a few areas, which he designated in an official letter, requesting a reorientation towards the urban: 'Romanian sociology, a former unilateral rural sociology, must firstly become an urban sociology of the industrial centres and the working population' (Gusti, 1971: 418-419)⁴.

While Gusti refused Miron Constantinescu's offer, Henri H. Stahl accepted it. As president of *The State Planning Committee*, Miron Constantinescu began his mandate with a series of planning experiments. The first of these experiments was located in the County of Hunedoara, as part of the process of building an industrial complex where raw materials from the mines in the area were processed by a dedicated industry (Mărginean, 2015). Henri H. Stahl was one of the methodological architects of the research, as he noted later:

This field research technique, as elaborated before the war, was used and amplified within the territorial systematization actions, which begun in 1949 under the leadership of architect Ștefan Popovici, and were organized under the following formula: brief monographs developed on extremely simple forms, specifically designed to give way to mappings and the application of the so called Geddes (1915) type of 'simultaneous thinking', carried out by interdisciplinary teams comprising of an architect, a geographer and a sociologist, managed by an interdisciplinary central council.

This was the work method in the entire Hunedoara county, and until 1949 researches were conducted in the whole County of Constanța, Tulcea (the last one only through a screening made by the *Central Council*), the basins of Bistrița, Argeș, Brașov area etc., as well a long series of documentations on over 40 cities and their areas, which raised an even more precise problem regarding the theoretical relevance of the areas research, reinforcing the idea that interdisciplinary research needs a central methodological decision forum to conduct the field work and to put together a final synthesis, all of which we consider to have been proven extremely effective, thus deserving to be noted as a substantial contribution to solving the organizational problem of this type of research. (Stahl, 1975:44)

⁴ Miron Constantinescu's letter to his professor, in Dimitrie Gusti, *Opere*, vol. V, Academia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1971, pp. 418-419. Constantinescu's comment is slightly mischievous, because precisely under the pressure of selecting the unit of analysis and the issue of finding the theoretical relevance of the empirical results, the Gustians begun in 1946 the first discussions on urban planning and they conducted the first practical experiments in Hunedoara (Mărginean, 2015:81). Here, *The Romanian Association for Tightening the Ties with the Soviet Union* (ALRUS), where Gusti was one of the 1946 founders, became such a discussion forum on regional research and the analysis of similar Soviet attempts.

Constantinescu put together an interdisciplinary team coordinated by architects who were trained in Gusti's disciplinary teams; Henri H. Stahl was given a key position to set the team's methodological lines⁵. Stahl recruited geographers Vintilă M. Mihăilescu, Victor Tufescu, and Ion Conea (Rostás, 2000), and through the party, Miron Constantinescu assigned a young sociologist, Ioan I. Matei⁶, to work with Stahl. The latter became Stahl's apprentice in terms of territorial and regional planning (Rostás, 2000); he also had a subsequent independent career in the methodology and theory of territorial systematization (Mioara and Matei, 1977). This was an inaugural moment in which Stahl, together with the other collaborators trained in the Gustian method, innovated by creating simplified data collection tools on a wider area, starting with a pilot village, and then, by using visual synthesizing methods (maps) and reporting, they were able to trace the relations of exchange of goods, labour force and the region's integration in the broader economic exchanges (Stahl and Matei, 1966). Moreover, Stahl proposed a series of tools to integrate an area in a historic series of economic exchanges, suggesting possible investment opportunities based on historical trends. The systematization studies on the County of Hunedoara became the main instruments for the urbanization, industrialization and collectivization processes in the area (Mărginean, 2015)⁷. In addition, these research tools became key instruments for the studies to follow up until 1955, while Miron Constantinescu was president of the *State Planning Committee*. The most notable studies done in a similar key at regional level were: Dobrogea (1950), Valea Bistriței (1951), Argeș hydrographic basin (1952), Ialomița-Buzău hydrographic basin (1953), Reșița hydrographic basin (1954), Brașov area (1954), Bucharest's peri-urban area (1956), Ploiești area, Târgoviște areas. In addition to these studies, Stahl also coordinated studies for guiding investments in urban development: Anina, Arad, Baia Mare, Blaj, Brașov, Brăila, Chișcani, Copșa Mică, Cugir, Caransebeș, Turda, Vaslui (Costea, 2001).

⁵ It was not Henri Stahl's first investigation of the Hunedoara County, he also conducted researches in 1946 (Rostás, 2000). Moreover, he had already collaborated with architects Ștefan Popovici and Adrian Gheorghiu at the *Social Romanian Institute* before the war as part of the monograph surveys (Rostás, 2000).

⁶ Provoked by Zoltan Rostaș's comment, Henri H. Stahl remembers that Ioan I. Matei was the prison warden where Miron Constantinescu and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej were imprisoned as *illegalists* during the war. However, 'at the right time there was an arrangement with the communists' (Rostás, 2000:183). While throughout the interview, his references are appreciative: 'Matei was second in command, Matei was a debutant. He did not even study with us. He joined us more on a political line. He had not conducted sociology with either Gusti or myself. [...] I do not know how he did it. But I had no idea he even existed. A good kid otherwise. Nothing to say there.' (Rostás, 2000:183)

⁷ These innovations are discussed by the Gustians in a series of seminars in 1949 within the Romanian Association of Friends of the Soviet Union (Mărginean, 2015).

Immediately after the war, Miron Constantinescu was simultaneously a close collaborator of Ana Pauker and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. After 1947 *The Political Bureau* was a confrontation place between the two radically different visions of economic architecture mentioned above (Bosomitu, 2014b). During the meetings of the *Political Bureau*, Miron Constantinescu, as head of the *Committee for Monetary Reform* since 1947, opposed the urban-rural price parity; however, Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca managed to win that fight. As such, the reform that Constantinescu was meant to put into place followed the principle of the parity of the urban and rural markets. However, with Stalin's help, Dej managed to change the power relations and gradually imposed the solution of the state control agricultural production for the benefit of industrial development. Starting with 1949, Constantinescu, as chairman of the *State Planning Committee*, set up an industrial-oriented annual plan, and for the first five-year period 1951-1955 he built investment plans oriented towards the heavy industry development. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca had a prompt and critical reaction. However, Ana Pauker was diagnosed with breast cancer in 1951, and she withdrew to Moscow for several medical interventions. Dej took advantage of this period to begin a violent and forced collectivization process (Kligman and Verdery, 2015), and then in 1952, with Miron Constantinescu's support, he framed Vasile Luca's fall during the second monetary reform (Bosomitu, 2014b). At a first investigation level, it would seem that Miron Constantinescu was a champion of the reforms regarding the agricultural expropriation of peasants and the heavy industry.

However, his work with Henri H. Stahl throughout his presidency at the *State Planning Committee* until 1955 indicates, in fact, a much more ambiguous position. It indicates that he managed to make a synthesis between the two types of policies, and this synthesis was the *urban area*. On the one hand, the city was seen as a convergence area for a short circuit of rural fresh agricultural products, with prices that were allowed to operate freely on the local agri-food markets. On the other hand, cereal production entered a long national circuit, with prices controlled by the state. The industrial sector had to operate in the same vein, on two levels: the level of the local raw materials supply chains and a national level of the capital and intermediate goods market. After Vasile Luca disappeared from the head of the *Ministry of Finance* in 1952, Miron Constantinescu became one of the most influential economic actors in Romania until 1957. His vision of the socialist state as a multi-scalar economy with different logics of prices formation weighed a lot. Even if he was arguably one of the most influential economic policy makers, he was just one of the actors who tried to mould the socialist economy. The first three rounds of national plans were done with the attentive supervision of the Soviets. In addition, the economy as a multiplayer activity had its own logic of functioning. Therefore it was an open question whether Constantinescu's vision became inscribed in the socialist economy and to what degree.

The urban areas research

Between 1957-1965, Miron Constantinescu lost his position at the top of the political pyramid. Even though he no longer held positions such as member of the *Political Bureau*, after his 1965 rehabilitation he continued to have a great influence on the socialist economy. Between 1967-1972, together with his colleagues at the University of Bucharest, he began to study the urban areas in order to verify through empirical research the extent to which his 1950s project had worked. This project brought to life the already mentioned volumes on urban analysis (Bogdan et al., 1970; Brescan and Merfea, 1973; Constantinescu and Stahl, 1970) and a volume on a rural hinterland (Bădina et al., 1970). The research logic in these volumes followed closely the style of public policy reports. As I already pointed out in the previous section, the inaugural volume discussed the urban area concept, and then assessed the extent to which the researched cities are actually working as urban areas. Any deviation from the model was carefully noted, and Constantinescu took time to make precise recommendations in specific chapters. In his manual on the urban areas studies, Stahl (1975) later explained that this type of analysis had two stages: the research conducted before the actual intervention and then the research to track the effects of the intervention.

We can say that there is no social sphere in which the state actions cannot interfere (political, economic, cultural, sanitary, organizational and social-educational, etc.) They all raise the same question for the sociologist, namely to consider them as the two faces of a coin, as two sides of the same reality: on the one hand the *actions* undertaken (planned and accomplished) and on the other hand their *effects* on social life. In our society this issue is the basis of any practical sociological research; which justifies our claim that the sociology of a socialist state must be primarily a 'sociology of the state plan'. (Stahl, 1975:67, emphasis in original).

However, the research results were not quite satisfactory, or as hoped. In the first issue of the *Social Future*, Miron Constantinescu's new magazine that started to be published in 1972, Alexandru Bărbat, from the Iași University, published a caustic article on urban areas. In this paper Bărbat made the distinction between *functional urban areas* and *specific urban areas*. On the one hand, the functional urban areas were those areas dominated by an urban space, where the relations between agricultural and industrial products were severely uneven, in favour of the industrial ones. The functional urban areas were themselves hierarchized according to their capacity to 'converge resources', subordinating other regions, in a regional or even a national

system, by distorting the exchange through asymmetrical transactions. On the other hand, the specific urban area were areas 'determined by the geographic, the economic, the demographic and the spiritual specificities and potentialities of a given territorial complex' (Bărbat, 1972:49). The specific area had 'new urbanized rural areas', which should no longer be subordinated to the urban, requiring, therefore, a more equal exchange between industrial and agricultural products. The 1970s' cities, Bărbat mentions, disproportionately concentrate tertiary functions. Nonetheless, many administrative functions were installed firmly in 'the new urbanized rural areas'. Therefore, one could not speak of hierarchies between 'specific areas' or within a 'specific area'. If specializations may have occurred in a 'specific area', that prompted only a comparative advantage which may have ensured a balanced development at national level. Every area had its own place among the nationally distributed economic activities, capitalizing on its specific local resources.

The planned economy, specific to the socialist economy, has a clear position with regard to the area research issue. The territorial planning, aiming at the optimal development and use of each part of the country's territory, is a logical necessity in socialism. Building a multilaterally developed socialist society implies, along with the multilateral development of the productive forces (key factor in every society's progress), 'the right distribution of the productive forces on the territory, to create working conditions for working people across the country' (Ceașescu, 1971:35). Comrade Nicolae Ceașescu draws our attention especially on the practical, but also on the theoretical significance of this problem. Personally, I see the practical solution to this territorial issue as a poly-functional landscape, with specific development of each area-complex, a balanced landscape with a balanced development between the economic compartments and with a relatively similar dynamism among these compartments. (Bărbat, 1972: 51)

The subtext of this intervention is clear: the previous policies had stimulated an opposition between rural agricultural populations and urban populations and also an extraction process in favour of the industrial production. At any moment, while reading this text there is a sensation that what's needed is to name this tension: the class struggle between farmers and workers as a form of social embodiment of the socialist accumulation tensions. Some of the terms used seem to reference quite directly Nikolai Bukharin's thesis on the need for 'balance between the elements of the socialist society' and the struggles between the rural and urban classes in socialism to avoid an extractive planning (Bukharin, 2006).

As noted by Alexandru Bărbat, the urban area concept changed substantially after 1970. If Constantinescu's hope in the 1950s was to mobilize

local resources and create a mosaic of areas with specializations that would bring comparative advantages in a national space of collaboration, after 1970 it became increasingly clear that there was a growing hierarchy between urban areas. What was supposed to be possibly just some uneven intra-areas relations, was increasingly becoming an uneven inter-areas relations. These unequal relations were due to changes that took place in Romania's economic architecture.

Even though this diagnosis was rather implicit, the proposal became, once again, more than merely a sociological observation. In 1973 Miron Constantinescu used his double position in the academic system (in the *Bucharest University* and the *Social Sciences and Political Academy*) and also his political position (as member of the *Secretariat* of the *Central Committee*, vice-president of *State Council*, and president of *Central Council of the Workers Control of the Economic and Social Activity*) to initiate a 'sociological and political experiment in the leadership science' in the county of Dolj, with the help of the *County Party Committee*. The goal was to build a set of methods for collecting economic data on the production of each economic unit in the county to observe the extent to which economic chains were produced at county level. Together with mathematicians at the *Central institute for Management and Computer Science in Bucharest* Constantinescu supervised the building of a set of algorithms, based on linear and recursive programming, to allow the material resources and labour force to be treated as a set of matrices between units and economic sectors, and then to model the exchange processes at county production chains levels. The whole theme was formulated under the heading of rationalization and plan breakdown. These algorithms were built in conversation with the new input/output models of the neoclassical economists Wassily Leontief, a Russian émigré and Harvard professor who presented his mathematical research at the *Romanian Academy of Economic Sciences* in June 1968. Those who benefited most from this academic synchronization with neoclassical theories were the groups of programmers that had had access to the *State Planning Committee* data (Ban, 2016). Miron Constantinescu recruited these economists-technicians in his project. In a series of meetings in Bucharest throughout 1971 and 1972, he supervised some analyses of the major issues implied by the uniform territorial development policies, which Ceaușescu had advocated since 1968. Throughout 1972, with the help of the *Dolj County Council*, he experimented with this model and improved it in terms of a system of relevant parameters in the territory. In 1974 the algorithm was taken over by the *Central Planning Committee* and used at national level. The whole logic behind this generalization was very well captured by Constantinescu in a chapter that appeared posthumously in 1974, in a book called *Introduction to the science of the socialist society leadership*, where this process was detailed:

I remember that during a previous meeting somebody asked us why we deal with the problem of modelling the vegetables and fruits supply. This was prompted by the fact that the comrades from the *Central Institute* had made an actual proposal of modelling the production and consumption of vegetables in a certain county. Of course, the significance of a phenomenon sometimes exceeds its immediate context; in this case, what's important is the modelling of this process, the mathematical attempt to understand this issue. Today, we have the tools for an overall view on the decision theory in an essential field of economic and social development of a county of nearly one million inhabitants. In fact, if not for the preliminary attempts on primary elements, this stage could not have been reached today. [...] A source of inspiration comes from the field of sociology and political science, where I started by *affirming the importance of the area concept*. It is known that I have always supported the need to surpass the small size researches, as designed by Dimitrie Gusti: the monograph of a village, taken out of context, of the city, of the social relations it establishes, as a whole. This mentality is long obsolete. I am not referring to the philosophical or its theoretical part; I mean the methodology is obsolete. We have started [...] from an overall conception, namely an area concept that considers cities and villages as an indissoluble connection, and a dynamic approach to the development of these large social complexes in their entirety. (Constantinescu, 1974:231)

Like in the case of other proposals made by Miron Constantinescu, what appeared to be a simple technical issue obscured in fact complex political negotiations implied in the design of this particular type of economic development (see also Poenaru, 2015). Constantinescu's 1970s correction of the urban area as a developmental concept, which in fact mobilized a lot of work in terms of political negotiation and capturing the local and party interests, came to be played in its final form through a set of seemingly technical concepts and procedures. Constantinescu's political purpose seems to have been that of winning over the other political partners from the *Central Committee* by presenting his mathematical models as a more efficient territorial systematization routine and as a planning instrument. Moreover, the new techniques disguised the sociological research instruments used here as a series of harmless operations, a recipe that the state apparatus could use to collect and summarize data by minimally qualified state employees.

In this context Stahl published in 1975 a volume dedicated to the methodology of 'urban areas' studies, the second volume of his methodological manual called *The theory and practice of Social Investigations*. This second volume had the subtitle *Interdisciplinary Area Research* and had the same purpose, which was to present how to make an area research during a territorial planning of a region. Just a year later, Ion I. Matei, Stahl's

apprentice, published as co-author his manual on territorial systematization that completed the 'de-sociologization' of the process and put forward specific technical concepts, casting a shadow on the whole class tensions and political struggles history embedded in them.

In a post-socialist history of sociology in Romania, Ștefan Costea and his colleagues (Costea, Cristea, and Dumitrescu, 1998), noted in passing that sociology as a discipline fell into disgrace after 1977 following Elena Ceaușescu's observation that 'sociologists are more interested in power than in science'. Elena Ceaușescu's alleged observation does not seem imprecise. Both Stahl and Constantinescu were acutely aware that any attempt to build a 'science of the nation' on sociological bases implied research tools necessary for evidence based policies and this required new state bodies capable of gathering and ordering such complex data. As Poenaru (2015) notes in a re-evaluation of Miron Constantinescu's contribution, his project to institutionalize sociology was, in fact, a project meant to include in the central planning apparatuses mechanisms for creating cadres with sociological knowledge.

Sociological knowledge and State science

With these two voices, Miron Constantinescu and Henri H. Stahl, and their allies, the old dream of the monographic school did not die; on the contrary, it entered into a symbiosis with the socialist state, co-evolving conceptually and methodologically. Moreover, it was transformed into a policy tool. I believe Stahl captures very well this institutional project in the text in which he himself defines the urban area:

However difficult it would be to harmonize these two actions [the industrialization process and the mechanization of agriculture], the solution is possible if we consider it from a demographic point of view, organizing the so called 'social dispatcher', i.e. a guidance forum of the urban-rural demography, on the basis of a detailed knowledge, obtained through demographic statistics surveys across the country, doubled by sociological research, analyzing in detail all the villages in a county (1969:85) [...] Unfortunately, we do not have yet the army of specialists we need, prepared for such operative scientific works, specialists which we have to form, using all the existing skills we have today and allowing them 'lapping' time to be fully aware of the new problems facing them. (1969:93-94)

Stahl was unequivocal; the state was the only body capable to mobilize resources to produce complex, territorial knowledge, achieved by a team ready to face such an enterprise, which would later allow the appropriate

mobilization of investments for a balanced urban-rural development. Despite these efforts to engrave sociology in the materiality of the socialist state, it seems that it had its own dynamic to obtain investments.

To properly understand the importance of the concept of 'urban area' and the policies that it implied, one must take seriously the economic policies of the socialist state and the fact that these policies had a history linked both with the professional fields and a major social tension. However, this presupposition is often bypassed, especially in the historiographical research. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the strategic context of these types of planning concepts, as 'urban areas', is a challenge in itself. Poenaru (2015) claims that Miron Constantinescu's project turned his work almost invisible and very hard to recover – especially in the context of the hegemony of the anti-communist discourse on the devaluation of the entire institutional scaffold of the real existing socialism. Guga (2015) argues that Henri H. Stahl's contemporary use also becomes partial, precisely because of the impossibility to insulate his Marxism and the fact that his intellectual project was acutely aware of his relation with the socialist state, the modernization process of the actual existing socialism and the massive social transformations he observed and approved. The history of the 'urban area' concept and the long lasting collaboration between Miron Constantinescu and Henri H. Stahl, suggest sociology was imagined as part of the socialist state project. The production of sociological knowledge or a type of similar knowledge was central to the power exercise of the state and profoundly linked with the developmentalist project of economic growth that would encompass all social strata and regions across the state space.

Such a reading puts in doubt the current understandings. Several analyses follow the process of the dissolution of the formal academic sociological training and research in 1948 and the subsequent academic re-institutionalization of sociology after 1965 (Bosomitu, 2011, 2014a, 2017; Zamfir, 2009; Zamfir and Filipescu, 2015; Rostás, 2012). These authors differ slightly in terms of naming the different groups of actors influential in setting up new schools and the organizational homes for social research starting with 1965. However, all of them share the same concern for the autonomy of the social research in a system that was trying to subordinate sociological knowledge production to the political agenda. In these accounts it seems that those actors more versatile in speculating the power plays inside the party, by making credible claims for controlling the sociological field, are the actors who could secure a career in social research. To put it in the terms proposed by Bourdieu (1995), apparently the major tension was between the autonomy of the sociological field from the political and its heteronomy. These accounts are

placing the production of the sociological knowledge in a field, with contending voices in tension over the legitimate definition of sociology as science and its relation to the political field. Purportedly, the various institutionalization proposals after 1965 differ in terms of their capability to sustain a long-term autonomy by securing qualified research personnel and a certain continuity with the interwar sociological tradition.

While this line of thought has its virtues, a different interpretation may arrange the empirical facts in a more serendipitous manner. The developmentalist project of the socialist state as a modernist take on society (Ban, 2014, 2016) was in dire need of knowledge about society. Modern states acquired this type of knowledge in diverse ways, both with the help of repressive apparatuses (see Poenaru, this issue), or productive institutions (Cucu, 2014; Pop, 2015). In Romania, one of the key political figures entrusted with economic reform, Miron Constantinescu, was a sociologist by training. In addition, many important technicians employed in the productive state apparatuses entrusted to manage the population were sociologists trained in the monographical tradition. These various actors tried to embed the production of sociological knowledge in the everyday functioning of the state, as part of the details of the economic planning, industrialization and urbanization.

Cucu (2014) shows forcefully that, from the first economic plans between 1949 and 1955, the industrial management was predicated on forms of knowledge that were ethnographic in nature. Mărginean (2015) documents through archival data that the first the urbanization process between 1949 and 1955 made use of extensive professional knowledge of the area intervened upon, and the sociological data were an important ingredient. Aware of the limitation of statistics and standardized information the local and national party officials counteracted by making in depth research about production, economic units, and employees. The way this type of knowledge worked was through dividing its manufacturing in a series of technicalities that could be entrusted to field operators and then aggregated through visualization and summation methods by planners.

Economic development was in dire need of quality data and a routine of their interpretation. And sociology was the disciplinary milieu for producing these data and theories for the modernization of the economy and state. Miron Constantinescu (1966a) after his rehabilitation in 1965 and his appointment as a Minister of Education published a volume where he collected various sociological papers under the heading of *Contemporary Sociological Research*. There he summarised in the editorial note all the sociological research that he commissioned or supervised from his diverse power positions. The list is quite impressive. The table below summarizes it.

Table 1. Governmental lead investigations with sociologists in the research team, by topic and commissioning institution, between 1947 and 1964

Type of investigation	Host Institution	Number of projects
Regional planning	Ministry of Construction	14 micro-regions 5 raions ⁸ 10 areas
Industrial location	Ministry of Construction	12 areas
Household budgets	Central Statistical Department	1 sample (5000 households)
Urban monographies	Ministry of Construction	15 towns and cities
	Institute for economic research, Romanian Academy	4 towns
Rural monographies	Central Statistical Department	20 villages 3 years panel
	Institute for economic research, Romanian Academy	105 villages
Factory monographies	Institute for economic research, Romanian Academy	3 factories
	Institute of philosophy, Romanian Academy	5 factories
Social services assessment	Ministry of Work	7 villages 4 researches in Bucharest
Educational program assessment	Ministry of Education	Unspecified
Resource-based assessments for industrial location	Institute for geological research, Romanian Academy	Unspecified
Epidemiological studies	Ministry of Health	Unspecified
Hygienic practices assessment	Ministry of Work	3 villages 1 area Bucharest Several unnamed
Labor protection	Ministry of Work	Unspecified
Popular cultural production	Ethnographic and folklore Institute, Romanian Academy	Unspecified
	Village Museum and Brukenthal Museum	Unspecified

Source: self-reported data in Constantinescu (1966b). The report specifies all the specific cases.

An important note is to be made here, about the alliance between Miron Constantinescu and Henri H Stahl. The term alliance does not imply any

⁸ The 'raions' were administrative subnational territorial units up until 1968 when the system of 'counties' was introduced.

bond of friendship between the two sociologists, or does not imply any seemingly personal tie between Constantinescu and other members of the interwar Bucharest sociological school. As painfully as the case of the incarceration and finally the death of the sociologist Anton Golopenția shows (Bosomitu, 2014b), Miron Constantinescu was not after consolidating friendships among or with sociologists. Nonetheless, Miron Constantinescu (1971) constantly cited Anton Golopenția's work and engaged intimately the work of Henri H. Stahl. But more importantly, he was active in soliciting data and theories for his policies that had an important sociological component⁹, transforming the dream of a science of a nation in a state building project. It was an institutional and epistemic alliance.

Therefore, I suggest, it is inaccurate to make a distinction to search for the autonomous and heteronomous parts of the sociological field, because the very point is that the sociological knowledge was called to be one of the backbones of the state. This process was not complete or smooth. A major new project of integrating this knowledge in the state apparatus came with the project to transform it in a mathematical issue in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, as a complete routinization of the social research. By the late 1970s the dominant research themes, by far, were industrialization, urbanization, and community studies (Costea et al., 1983). Sociology had this double role, on the one hand of an invisible state science incorporated in various degrees, facing the contradictory pressures of the socialist developmentalist and, on the other hand, of an academic enterprise that is researching the transformation of the society. This last role had its own contradictions since this research was ambiguously trying to grasp the changing realities and, in the same time, was trying to evaluate the success of the various policies in an authoritarian state. Criticism was confined to pointing how to redesign more successful policies.

Conclusions

Both Henri H. Stahl and Miron Constantinescu argued that the most advanced form of the monographic enterprise was precisely the study of the urban-rural complexes, and this redefinition of the monographic research unit called for a series of important methodological innovations. Stahl (1975) was the one to carefully enounce them. Moreover, Stahl integrated the urban area concept into a theoretical Marxist scheme, showing that the methodological problem of Gusti's empirical synthesis of the multitude of total village

⁹ Between Constantinescu and Stahl there was a routine exchange of information based on the bureaucratic subordination starting from the 1948 when Henri H. Stahl was appointed to *The Superior Institute of Social Work* (Bosomitu, 2014b).

monographs was due to his theoretical paradigm. His proposal paid theoretical attention to the nature of the material-economic relations surrounding the spatial exchanges that were emerging in socialist Romania. Guga (2015) asserted that this was not just a simple ideological concession made to the real existing socialism, in an opportunistic manner. We were facing a sophisticated and consistent Marxist proposal for analyzing the urban, in many ways parallel to the 1970s Marxist disciplinary transformations in global urban sociology. But also, this was a proposal that shaped the very system that it was supposed to analyse.

These observations opened a new avenue of inquiry in terms of the scale of analysis. The 'urban area' was a subnational unit of analysis that illuminated the workings of the socialist economy as an attempt to create a highly interlinked economy based on the available resources, an economy that was favourable to both the rural and the urban populations. However, as the research of Constantinescu and Stahl pointed out, it also showed how these attempts failed to do that. The Romanian socialist accumulation process created a hierarchical space both within and between the 'urban areas', especially after the new investment boom in the 1970s. In many Central and Eastern Europe countries, because of the urban dominance of the capital cities, precisely this subnational level was less visible, therefore orienting the research on the economy either to the national level or at the factory level.

It could be argued that in Romania the various areas specialization took place because the central plan coordinated by technicians produced a complex economic ecology that allowed the capitalization of the local contexts. However, the concept of 'urban areas' advocated a different interpretation: the locally available raw materials became the resources used to negotiate the investment plan with the national authorities and the tools to form intermediate goods supply chains. After 1949 the 'urban area' was re-assembled as a fresh socialist developmental policy concept. Apparently, what seemed to be a concept aiming to coordinate a spatial equalization and homogenization was in fact transformed into a developmental concept used for the complex mobilization of local resources for creating regional value chains. The local raw materials were selected and later became resources for locally integrated industrial chains, with one or two main final consumers. However, it would be an epistemic fallacy to infer post-factum that some areas were better off because they had more resources or some more valuable resources. As pointed out by Miron Constantinescu's definition of an 'urban area', the fact that some particular raw material became a local economic resource is an *a posteriori* artefact; however, the selection of what was a resource was operated by the different actors which were part of the power configuration that produced the local chains of production.

Sociology as a discipline played an important role in organizing the knowledge production necessary for mainstreaming the issue of the value chains and in organizing investments to create these chains as 'urban areas'. The production of the sociological knowledge was taken away from the previous interwar network of academic institutions and between 1948 and 1965, and it was placed in a complex set of economic and planning institutions. The array of commissioned sociological projects during this period is quite significant. Yet, the very type of institutional embeddedness had an important role in transforming the way sociology worked in Romania as an applied discipline, highly technical driven by state growth research questions. After the re-emergence of the academic network in 1965 the vast majority of the papers and books were on three topics: industrialization, urbanization, and community studies (Costea et al., 1983), all following the major transformations of the Romanian society after the war. Sociology became a key discipline in terms of studding the logic of development of the socialist society and economy. However, that does not mean that sociologists as such yielded power. Except for Miron Constantinescu, most of the sociologists were in a subordinated position. Nonetheless, sociological data acquisition and interpretation permeated the state apparatuses as a technique to organize knowledge production about society.

Acknowledgments. I am grateful for the comments received from Ștefan Bosomitu, Florin Faje, Paul Teodor Hărăguș, Petru Iluț, Florin Poenaru, Livia Popescu, and Zoltán Rostás. Anca Chiș translated the first draft from Romanian.

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SOCIOLOGY IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW

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ABSTRACT. Suppressed on ideological grounds, banned as academic discipline, and dismantled as scientific infrastructure in the first postwar years, sociology was re-institutionalized in communist Romania during the 1960s, largely on political grounds. Subsequently, the discipline developed and augmented within an impressive scientific infrastructure – several university departments were established, research centres and facilities initiated, and specialized periodicals issued. Still, the prosperous period of Romanian sociology concluded after just one decade, through another political decision, which confined the study of sociology to post-graduate specialization and restricted research. My paper explores sociology's institutional infrastructure, as it was established after the discipline's renewal, focusing on the institutions created, but also on the biographical analysis of those involved within these processes. My paper will address the matter from a historical perspective, discussing the developments and the evolutions in the field by circumscribing to the political, cultural, and socio-economic contexts.

Keywords: communist Romania, history of social sciences, sociology, institutionalization.

It is easy to compile a descriptive history of the evolution of sociology in communist Romania. By 1948, sociology's interwar aggregated scientific framework was dismantled by several political decisions. The process was largely influenced by the general trend of the Soviet Bloc countries, which, under the influence of the Soviet Union, labelled sociology as a 'bourgeois' and 'reactionary' science, and subsequently banned it (Keen and Mucha, 1994:6). The case of Romania had its particularities, as the ideological and political repression over the discipline was also due to the controversial rapports between interwar sociology (mainly the Bucharest Sociological School) and the political power (Momoc, 2012), the allegiance of several sociologists to the

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Iron Guard (far-Right/Fascist Romanian interwar movement) (Boia, 2011; Momoc, 2012), and the active involvement of several other sociologists within the authoritarian regimes in Romania during World War II (Boia, 2011).

The ideological dogmatism and the implicit immobility diminished in the next decade, particularly during the Khrushchev *thaw* (Zemtsov, 1986; Weinberg, 2004). *Sociology* – as a term, regained its place within the public and academic discourse. In the following years, other advancements were made, the most important one referring to the resumed dialogue with the Western academics, which granted the Eastern scholars the chance to participate in international debates and institution building (Shalin, 1978). The evolution of sociology in Romania followed a pattern similar to the other Soviet Bloc countries – the emergence of a national professional organization, the establishment of the first university departments or research centres, and the appearance of specialized periodicals (Vorisek, 2008). The (Romanian) National Sociological Committee was established in 1959. A specialized periodical was issued a few years later, while the academic chairs and the research facilities were initiated after 1965.

My paper discusses the complicated process that led to the re-institutionalization of sociology in communist Romania, and explores sociology's institutional infrastructure, as established after the discipline's renewal, focusing on the institutions created, but also on the biographical analysis of those involved in this process. The paper also addresses the matter from a historical perspective, discussing the developments and the advancements in the field by placing it within the political, cultural, and socio-economic contexts. I will further address some comments on the political, cultural, and ideological backgrounds that facilitated sociology's development in communist Romania, while also discussing the biographical trajectories of the main intellectual figures that participated in or just influenced these processes.

The central ideas I will address related to the aforementioned subjects refer to institutionalization as a complicated process, involving several initiatives and figures. The institutionalization refers to the progress achieved by the discipline within a certain framework, defined by teaching and research activities and the existence of a professional organization and of a coherent scientific/disciplinary discourse (advocated throughout specialized periodicals) (Vorisek, 2008). The simultaneous existence of these indicators defines the discipline as scientific. Based on this conceptual framework, Romanian sociology followed a tortuous and complicated path towards institutionalizations, marked by breakthroughs achieved over a couple of years – starting with the founding of a professional organization (1959), and concluded with the establishment of university departments (1966-1967).

Another important stake of the paper relates to the complicated relationship between sociology and politics. Disbanded and subsequently banned, sociology was re-institutionalized in the 1960s as a re-imagined and re-contextualized scientific discipline. The process was largely influenced by the political arrangements, as the necessity to reconsider sociology was advocated rather from *above*, and only after instrumented also from *below*. The various initiatives of re-institutionalization (that will be further discussed) emerged from the academic field, but only after the regime clearly stated its opening towards such advancements. These initiatives, but also the professional and academic backgrounds of the actors promoting them, suggest developments that were rather an outcome of a quite complex process of negotiation and adaptation between the scientific field and state/party authority. Moreover, what may have seemed to be a competition between several academic projects, was also a contest for professional preeminence. Some of the protagonists of these processes endorsed a specific project, but managed to be later active supporters of another – a situation that proves the disputes rather converged towards authority, influence, and prestige.

In order to decipher the intricate process that led to the institutionalization of sociology, I will analyse the institutional development of the discipline, but also the biographies of the preeminent actors that influenced the process. The biographical analysis is relevant, as it may suggest a more nuanced and in-depth interpretation related to the different institutionalization initiatives, but also on the nature of the relationship established between the professionals and the political power. While indicating the professional/academic background, the biographical analysis also asserts the political resources each actor could depend on and mobilize. This evaluation seems to imply that the political resources have been preeminent within a system that leveraged loyalty, intended to control and regulate, while also limiting and obstructing a critical discourse.

The biographical analysis will focus on several subjects. A summary biographical overview on the National Sociological Committee (established in 1959) members is necessary in order to evaluate the first breakthroughs made in the field, as a consequence of an external pressure, that prompted another one – from *above*. The explicit political involvement, doubled by the institutional architecture it imposed circumscribed these first advancements to a political and diplomatic agenda, rather than a scientific one. Still, these evolutions created a context that allowed several initiatives from *bellow* (i.e. the academic field). A biographical survey on the main actors of these initiatives could be relevant, as it may suggest a nuanced perspective on the interactions between the academic and the political field, and indicate the relevance of the political

resources one may employ within their scientific/academic project. With the establishment of university departments, sociology was fully institutionalized, and developed at an increased rate, while the scientific community managed to cover the 'blind spot' that had just occurred within the social sciences field. It is difficult to translate the cadres' selection that led to the assembly of the university departments. Without intending to propose an exhaustive perspective on the issue, I will try to exemplify the matter by discussing four case-studies – members of the sociology departments established within the University of Bucharest and 'Ștefan Gheorghiu' Academy.

Breakthroughs

A discussion related to the re-launch of sociology in communist Romania should not discount the moment that preceded and made possible the subsequent advancements in the field – the founding of a National Sociological Committee (NSC) in 1959 (T. B., 1962). The establishment of the NSC was not a private (individual or collective) initiative, but an assignment the regime commissioned to several high-ranking officials in the social sciences². This project was authorized by the Romanian Workers Party (RWP)'s Central Committee's Internal Affairs Section, which also imposed the future committee's membership - Athanase Joja (chairman); Mihail Ralea, Vasile Malinschi, and Petre Constantinescu-Iași (vice-presidents); Manea Mănescu (general-secretary); Andrei Oțetea, Constantin Ionescu-Gulian, and Tudor Bugnariu (members). In a similar manner, the NSC was instructed to affiliate to the International Sociological Association. The Central Committee's Internal Affairs Section memorandum was not exclusively referring to sociology. The proposed NSC was only a part of a larger project that aimed to re-connect the Romanian scientific field within the international scientific networks and debates. To be more precise, the memorandum gave similar instructions regarding a 'projected' Society of Economic Studies – which was required to affiliate to the international organization subordinated to UNESCO. Thus, NSC had more of a *diplomatic* agenda, and not necessarily a *scientific* one. A brief overview of the academic and political biography of the NSC members gives substance to this argument.

Athanase Joja (1904-1972) was a philosopher and a logician, member of the Romanian Academy (1955), and Minister of Education and Culture – the institution in charge with the implementation of the NSC project. Senior member of the Communist Party (1935), Joja was sentenced and imprisoned during World War II on political grounds. In the postwar years, he occupied

² National Archives of Romania (NAR), Fund Council of Ministers, Section Athanase Joja Cabinet, file 15/1959, p. 6: 'Address from the Central Committee's Internal Affairs Section'.

important offices: Romania's permanent delegate to the UN (1955-1957) and vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1958-1960). His political influence and his prestige within the Romanian intellectual and academic field was to be validated by his nomination as the new President of the Romanian Academy a few months later (Dobre et al., 2004).

Mihail Ralea (1896-1964) was a philosopher, essayist, and psychologist, member of the Romanian Academy (1948), founder and director of the Academy's Institute of Psychology (1956). An intellectual with leftist sympathies, Ralea supported the new regime in the postwar years, being recompensed with influential offices and positions – he was Minister of Arts (1945-1946), and Romanian Ambassador to the USA (1946-1948). Even if he suffered minor setbacks in the early 1950s (especially after Ana Pauker's purge in 1952), Ralea managed to remain an influential intellectual, mostly due to his excellent rapports with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, general secretary of the RWP (Boia, 2011; Costea, 2001).

Vasile Malinschi (1912-1992) was an economist, with a PhD in economic studies defended in 1939 and a member of the Romanian Academy (1955). He was a senior member of the Communist Party (1930s), and occupied important offices in the postwar years – he was Rector of the Academy of Economic Studies (1949-1954), Minister of Inland Trade (1949-1954), and vice-president of the State Planning Committee (1954). Vasile Malinschi authored several important contributions on the industrial and agricultural developments in postwar Romania (Dobre et al., 2004).

Petre Constantinescu-Iași (1892-1977) was a historian, member of the Romanian Academy (1948), and founding member of the Communist Party (1921). In the postwar years, he was Minister of Propaganda/Information (1945-1946), Director of the 'Nicolae Iorga' Academy's Institute of History (1948-1953), and Minister of Religious Affairs (1953-1957). In 1959, Constantinescu-Iași occupied an influential office within the scientific and ideological field – as he was president of the National Committee of Sciences (1955-1974) (Ștefănescu, 1978).

Constantin Ionescu Gulian (1914-2011) was a Marxist philosopher and member of the Romanian Academy (1955). In 1959, Gulian was a professor at the University of Bucharest, head of the History of Philosophy Chair within the Faculty of Philosophy, and director of the Academy's Institute of Philosophy.

Andrei Oțetea (1894-1977) was a historian and member (and Head of the History Section) of the Romanian Academy (1955). He was a professor at the University of Bucharest, Head of the World History Department (1948-1964), and director of the "Nicolae Iorga" Academy's Institute of History (1957-1970) (Ștefănescu, 1978).

Manea Mănescu (1916-2009) was an economist, and an unusual presence within this committee, as few could have foreseen his subsequent political career. Still, in 1959, Mănescu was a member of the communist nomenclature. He occupied important offices within the State Planning Committee and the Comecon (Dobre et al., 2004).

Tudor Bugnariu (1909-1988) was a Marxist philosopher, and member of the Romanian Academy (1955). Bugnariu was a senior member of the Communist Party (1934), and occupied several offices in the postwar years, focusing rather on his academic career. In 1959, he was a professor at the University of Bucharest, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy (1958-1965) (Bosomitu, 2017).

The brief detour through the biographies of the NSC members was necessary in order to understand the Committee's pronounced mandate – rather political (and also diplomatic) than scientific. The active interference of the political deciders altered the scientific framework of the 'new', 're-imagined' discipline, as it implied an unreasonable control over it. In addition, it is easy to notice that the academic background of the NSC members was only marginally linked to sociology – suggesting that the regime was not necessarily interested in a credible renewal of the discipline, but rather in a supervised and limited one. The regime's reluctance may have been caused by the stigma put on sociology in the past decade, and its pre-war (fascist) traditions, but also by a possible and hard to assess impact of Western theories. Thus, the 'new' sociology emerged – at least in 1959 – as a 'captive' science (Cotoi, 2011), as the regime chose to over-control it, by imposing the institutional framework and selecting its 'adequate' personnel. Furthermore, except for its activity abroad – Romanian delegations (generally including the same persons – officials of the NSC) participated at the ISA International Congresses in 1959 (Milano) and 1962 (Washington, DC) –, the NSC advanced no clear plan or program for an authentic and complete institutionalization of the discipline³. But the existence of the NSC was important as it restored sociology as a legitimate academic discourse, facilitating and promoting the further development of the discipline.

Initiatives

The re-institutionalization of sociology was decisively influenced by an *external* pressure, which determined an *internal* change. This external pressure refers to the advancements made in the field by the other socialist countries. In 1963, officials of the Central Committee's Science and Art Section

³ NAR, Fund Council of Ministers, Section Athanase Joja Cabinet, file 15/1959, pp. 7-8: 'Statute of the People's Republic of Romania National Sociological Committee'.

discussed and highlighted the Romanian Academy's underperformance in fields where the other socialist academies had advanced significantly – the case of 'concrete sociology' was emphasized⁴. This specific context authorized several initiatives that aimed at a further institutionalization of sociology (Rostás and Stahl, 2000). These initiatives were not necessarily distinct intellectual and scientific projects, but rather proposals to fill in a 'blind spot' that had appeared in the social sciences field.

Tudor Bugnariu, the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, instrumented a first initiative. A Marxist intellectual, Bugnariu was born in 1909, in Budapest, in a Romanian family from Transylvania. After the end of World War I, his family returned to Transylvania – in Cluj, now province of the Kingdom of Romania. Bugnariu graduated the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy of the 'King Ferdinand' University in Cluj, with a major in sociology (1932). During his student years, Bugnariu adhered to the leftist/anti-fascist student circles. His political commitment became much more coherent in 1933, as he became a founding member of the Transylvania branch of the National Antifascist Committee. In 1934, he also adhered to the Communist Party, outlawed in Romania since 1924. The same year, his antifascist activity became a crime, as the Romanian authorities outlawed the National Antifascist Committee, considering it a 'communist' organization. Bugnariu was arrested in January 1935 and indicted in a process, which was highly publicized in the media. He was sentenced to one year in prison. Subsequently, he lost his job as a professor. After he was released from prison, Bugnariu continued his communist and antifascist activity, being once more sentenced to prison in 1937, and held into custody and detained in a concentration camp in 1940, on political grounds. After the end of World War Two, his militant biography granted him a public and academic career. Besides some political offices – he was mayor of Cluj (1944-1945), secretary of the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade (1947-1948), and Deputy Minister of Education (1956), Bugnariu focused on an academic career, as a professor at the University of Cluj (1948-1952; 1953-1956) and the University of Bucharest (1952-1953; 1958-1975) (Bosomitu, 2017).

Bugnariu's institutionalization project *re-imagined* sociology as closely linked to its interwar, autochthonous traditions. In this respect, he instrumented his project in collaboration with Traian Herseni and Henri H. Stahl – both of them former preeminent figures of the Bucharest Sociological School. A programmatic article signed by Bugnariu and Herseni advocated for

⁴ NAR, Fund Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Agitprop Section, file 9/1963, pp. 35-37: 'Protocol of the Central Committee's Science and Art Section Meeting (November 4, 1963)'.

a reclaim of the interwar traditions in sociology (1964). Although the authors acknowledged it as being 'idealistic', 'unscientific', and 'obsolete', they also claimed that some techniques and methods employed by the interwar sociology could and should be reconsidered. Moreover, the two authors asserted that the 'tradition of monographic researches' (characteristic to interwar sociology), was never lost, but evolved during the postwar years, assimilating a Marxist methodology (Bugnariu and Herseni, 1964: 7). The main problems related to this 'project' were its lack of political support, but also to the controversial figure of Herseni. Traian Herseni (1907-1980) was one of the most important members of the Bucharest Sociological School, but his political commitment to the far-right (fascist) Iron Guard was disapproved of in the postwar years – he was expelled from the University of Cluj (1945), arrested, sentenced, and imprisoned for his role in the 'national legionary' administration. He was released from prison only in 1956, being subsequently socially marginalized and forbidden to publish. He was partially 'recovered' by Mihail Ralea, who reintegrated him as a researcher within the Institute of Psychology (1958). Even if Herseni was allowed a gradual rehabilitation, his political past was never forgotten, nor forgiven (Boia, 2011; Costea, 2001; Momoc, 2012). The second major issue related to Bugnariu's project refers to the lack of political support. Bugnariu assumed that he would be supported in implementing his project by the Minister of Education and Culture – Ilie Murgulescu. Former comrades during the 1930s, both students with leftist and antifascist sympathies, Bugnariu and Murgulescu had collaborated in 1956 at the Ministry of Education – Murgulescu as Minister, Bugnariu as his Deputy. But the 1956 experience was rather unpleasant for both of them, as they were released from office and found responsible for the student unrests that had occurred in the context of the Hungarian Revolution⁵. Murgulescu would have been rather an obstruction in Bugnariu's plans, as he would have constantly postponed his initiative⁶.

As Bugnariu's project was delayed and eventually adjourned, other similar initiatives occurred. Ioan Drăgan advanced a significant one. Prototype of the 'new academic' (schooled within the communist educational system), Drăgan was cumulating important academic and public offices – at that time, Drăgan was associate professor of Historical Materialism at the Institute of Medicine and Pharmacy, and Director of the Social Sciences Sector within the Ministry of Education. Since he had been a student of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest (1951-1955), Drăgan became a member

⁵ NAR, fund Romanian Communist Party Central Committee – Chancellery, file 172/1956, pp. 2-5 ('Protocol of the Central Committee Politburo meeting – November 13, 1956').

⁶ CNSAS Archives, fund Informational, file 124, vol. I, pp. 104-105.

of the Communist Youth Union, and editor of the Propaganda Section within the Romanian Broadcast Service. After graduation, he was a lecturer within the Historical and Dialectical Materialism Chair at the Faculty of Philosophy, and deputy chief editor of *Contemporanul* – the most important cultural magazine in communist Romania. Moreover, in 1959, Drăgan became a member of the Communist Party⁷. Drăgan's initiative was not by definition a scientific one, but rather a political one. A significant program from 'below' was never formulated beyond the academic debates. Drăgan's peculiar status – he was both an academic, and a Party bureaucrat, allowed him to 'negotiate' the matter between the two sides.

A Compromise

Political deciders thus settled the dispute between the two competing 'projects'. A directive of the 1965 Communist Party Congress referred to the necessity to reconsider the importance of the 'field social investigations' or 'concrete sociology'. The person mandated to organize a roundtable – gathering several professionals in the field –, was Drăgan⁸, and not Bugnariu – a decision that proves the competition between the two was already settled. The event was quite important for the subsequent development of sociology. The roundtable decided on the future institutional framework of the discipline, established the 'new' sociology's main areas and directions of research, and concluded on the theoretical relationship between sociology and historical materialism. The debates also settled the place of sociology within the larger field of social sciences.

The roundtable gathered high-ranking officials (Mircea Biji, Director of the Central Statistics Directorate; Tudor Bugnariu, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest; N.N. Constantinescu, Head of the Political Economy Department, Academy of Economic Studies; Petre Năvodaru, Deputy Director of the Central Statistics Directorate), former experimented sociologists (Henri H. Stahl, Traian Herseni, Gh. Dumitrescu – all of them members of the Bucharest Sociological School), and other social scientists from the fields of architecture, urban planning, demography, public health, anthropology, philosophy, medicine, and economics. The debates concluded on the *degree of autonomy* of sociology in relation to the official ideology in general, and to historical materialism in particular. The re-imagined sociology was to be *subordinated* to historical materialism, defined as '*the theoretical and methodological basis of social field research*'. More precisely, sociology was

⁷ NAR, fund Romanian Communist Party Central Committee – Cadre Section, file D/728, passim.

⁸ 'Sociological Research – Roundtable', in: *Contemporanul*, no. 29(979), July 16, 1965.

mandated to *'thoroughly analyse the quantitative determinations of the social process'*, offering thus *'a solid support for the qualitative theoretic analysis'*⁹ of historical materialism. During the debates, other important details were asserted. Unexpectedly, Tudor Bugnariu was the only one to refute the advocated importance of the 'autochthonous traditions' in sociological research – claiming that the 'new' sociology should not be narrowed to 'monographic research'. Another important outlook in regard to the 'future' discipline was argued by Herseni, who recommended that all the programs of 'social planning', 'social construction', and 'social amelioration' should be preceded by extensive projects of 'social diagnose'. The discussions also formulated, determined, and authorized sociology's anticipated main areas of research – most of these related to the major reconfiguration the Romanian society experienced in the previous two decades. They argued for the necessity of researches related to the urbanization, industrialization, and collectivization processes, and their social impact: population dynamics (exodus from rural towards urban areas), the management of production, labour productivity, community life, the workers' time budgets. In addition, sociological investigation was to grant special attention to subjects related to family, population (demography, health and hygiene studies), education, culture, or public opinion¹⁰.

The roundtable debates concluded on three major issues: the necessity to advance and intensify the 'concrete sociological research'; the need to guarantee an adequate institutional framework of the discipline – a Centre for Sociological Research was planned, along with other departments of sociology within the already existing research institutes; the urgency for training and qualifying specialists – in this regard, a Department of Sociology was to be established within the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest. All these three issues were to be promptly implemented. The importance of sociology and the subsequent necessity to reconsider it was validated by the resolutions of the 9th Party Congress (July 1965). A Centre for Sociological Research, subordinated to the Romanian Academy, was founded in the summer of 1965, while the Department of Sociology was established one year later at the Faculty of Philosophy.

A biased and unilateral perspective on the evolution of sociology between 1959 and 1965 could suggest an unrestricted control the political power claimed over the re-emerging discipline. Although the regime's deciders intended to regulate and supervise the 'new' sociology, its progress during these years was rather an outcome of a quite complex process of negotiation and adaptation between the scientific field and state/party

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

authority. The 'success' of Drăgan's initiative suggests such a thesis, as beyond his political mandate, he was, in fact, merely an ingenious mediator between the two sides. The authorities favoured Drăgan's initiative just because he was able to better negotiate the matter, encompassing both the authorities 'instructions' and the scientific field's expectations. By contrast, Bugnariu never succeeded to compromise on this 'necessary' dialogue between authorities and the scientific field, disapproving of the political interference on the matter. In fact, after the Centre for Sociological Research was established in 1965, with him not being involved in the process, he rejected the new institution, which he considered nothing more than a 'propaganda institute'¹¹. And still, the post-1965 progress and transformation of sociology could have unfolded as a compromise between the two 'competing' initiatives. But Bugnariu's career was to face some major interferences during 1965. The political changes occurred in 1964-1965 (the RWP Memorandum in April 1964, which asserted the end of the USSR hegemony over Romania; the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in March 19, 1965; and the rise to power of Nicolae Ceaușescu) inspired ample debates among the students – including those of the Faculty of Philosophy. Faced with a situation considered alarming and unstable, the authorities overreacted, ordering a thorough investigation of the *Securitate*. Bugnariu, Dean of the Faculty, denounced the regime's excesses, standing by his students. As a consequence, he was statutory penalized by the University Party organization, being later dismissed from office (Blaga, 2012; Ianoși, 2012). Constantin Nicuță capitalized on the situation, being appointed as new Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy. Nicuță (1906-1991), a sociologist and philosopher, had been professor at the Faculty of Philosophy since 1963. He graduated from both the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy (1932) – the latter with a major in sociology. Lecturer at the Faculty of Iași (1930s), he was dismissed due to his political (leftist) sympathies. After World War II, Nicuță had an impressive career, occupying both academic and public offices. He was appointed professor of historical materialism at the University of Iași (1946), general secretary of the Institute of Romanian-Soviet Studies (1948-1951), professor at the 'A. A. Zhdanov' Party's Superior School (1951-1956), deputy minister of Education (1956-1958), Ambassador of Romania in Vienna (1958-1959), Chief of the Romanian delegation to the UN (1959-1960), and Ambassador of Romania in Paris (1960-1963) (Costea, 2001). In 1965, after he was appointed as the new Dean of the Faculty, Nicuță took full advantage of the possibility in order to impose his influence over the

¹¹ CNSAS (National Council for the Study of the *Securitate* Archives) Archives, fund Informational, file 124, vol. I, pp. 75-77.

emerging sociology. The plausible ‘negotiations’ between him and Drăgan settled with a compromise: two chairs of sociology were to be established within the Faculty of Philosophy, one ruled by Drăgan, the other by Nicuță. This *status quo* was soon to be interfered with by the re-ascent to power of an intellectual and former leading figure of the Communist Party – Miron Constantinescu, who was to be rehabilitated by the new regime.

Miron Constantinescu (1917-1974) was a Marxist intellectual, senior member of the Communist Party (1936), and a former associate of the Bucharest Sociological School. He graduated from the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy of the University of Bucharest (1938) – with a major in Sociology. He participated in the former monographic campaigns of Gusti’s school (1938-1939), and was a member of its informal leftist faction, along with Henri H. Stahl, Mihai Pop, Dumitru Corbea, Roman Moldovan, Gheorghe Retegan, Tudor Alexandru Stoianovici, etc. Imprisoned during World War II for communist activity, Constantinescu became an important member of the Communist Party leadership, occupying influential offices during the first postwar decade. He was the chief editor of the Party’s official newspaper, *Scânteia/The Spark* (1944-1945); secretary of the Bucharest Party organization (1945-1946); secretary of the Democratic Parties’ Bloc (electoral alliance dominated by the Communist Party) – from this position, Constantinescu was in charge with the coordination of the electoral campaign (1946); Minister of the Mines and Petroleum (1948-1949); president of the State Planning Committee (1949-1955). Constantinescu also became a leading figure of the Communist Party – member of the Central Committee (1945-1960), of the Politburo (1945-1957), and of the Secretariat (1952-1954). In 1957, he was purged and removed from office, after a dispute with the general secretary of the Party, who considered it a *de facto* putsch attempt. He was later marginalized by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime – a situation that allowed him to resume his intellectual career. Constantinescu was rehabilitated by Nicolae Ceausescu after 1965, regaining an important political capital (Bosomitu, 2015). Constantinescu became the promoter and the protector of the ‘new’ sociology – mediating the complex relation between it and the regime’s deciders. While his political statute granted the discipline a prevalence among the other social sciences (Kolaja, 1974; Tismăneanu, 2004), Constantinescu’s influence over sociology also prevented an independent development of the discipline. He always sought to control and regulate the field, imposing themes and areas of research, authorizing or delaying promotions, and even disallowing certain former members of the Bucharest Sociological School to reconnect with the ‘new’ sociology (Bosomitu, 2015).

The three initiatives aforementioned were not strictly distinct academic projects, and never competed one against the other, but merely emerged in

specific contexts. All the three initiatives acknowledged the same opportunity, but challenged it in different manners. It is quite obvious that Bugnariu's project had a primacy – due to its representative's academic positions. But Bugnariu's inability to capitalize on the situation, doubled by his reluctance and (even) insufficiency towards a negotiation with the political deciders adjourned and later annulled his efforts. In this specific context, a 'new' initiative arose, that mediated the 'necessary' dialogue between the academic and the political field. This project did not contest the previous one – as it included initially its promoters (Drăgan's roundtable involved Bugnariu, Herseni, and Stahl). Bugnariu's 'fall' in 1965 allowed Nicuță to interfere with what could have been a compromise. Constantinescu's re-ascent to power revoked the established *status quo*, but never challenged it. He only assumed a primacy over the field, acknowledged by the others. Still, every initiative may have advanced in a distinct manner, if were it not to be intruded by the subsequent one. We may assume that Bugnariu's sociology could have developed assuming the monographic traditions of the Bucharest Sociological School, while also reclaiming its former cadres. In the same manner, Drăgan's project could have unfolded as an uncritical and compliant discipline, as it assumed a compromise between the field and the political deciders, that Bugnariu considered was unreasonable. Miron Constantinescu's interference within the field may be perceived as a reinforcement of this political control over sociology. Paradoxically, his political status granted the discipline a degree of autonomy, almost impossible to be attained by the previous projects. 'Ruled' by Miron Constantinescu, sociology became a privileged social science, and it acquired an explicit assignment – to assist the political deciders with major societal projects (urbanization, industrialization) by providing the required information and data. The continuities and interconnections between the three initiatives, and the fact that the three never competed one against the other, allowed a fluency of professionals and ideas. The case of Henri H. Stahl is illustrative, as he was an integral presence within the three projects. Certainly, his role and his involvement was neither similar, nor proportionate.

The institutional development

By the late 1960s sociology was a fully institutionalized academic discipline in Romania – with a professional association, departments within the major universities, an important research infrastructure (research institutes, laboratories), and several specialized periodicals.

The institutional development of sociology comprised both teaching units (university departments) and research units (departments, laboratories).

The first university departments were established in 1966 – at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest (Constantinescu and Grigorescu 1970), and at the Faculty of Philosophy and Political Sciences of the ‘Ștefan Gheorghiu’ Academy of Social and Political Studies (the party’s superior school) (Iordăchel, 1970). One year later, similar departments were instituted within the other two major universities in Romania: a Department of Philosophy-Sociology, at the ‘Babeș-Bolyai’ University of Cluj (Kallós and Roth 1970), and a Department of Psychology-Sociology, at the ‘Alexandru Ioan Cuza’ University of Iași (Bărbat, 1970). Subordinated to these departments, several *sociological laboratories* – with specific research tasks (mainly field investigations), were founded: in 1966 within the University of Bucharest, in 1968 at the universities of Cluj and Timișoara, and later in Iași (Costea et al., 2006). Other institutions – with specific research assignments, were subordinated to the Romanian Academy. The first significant example is the Sociological Research Centre, founded in 1965, but also the Department of Sociology, established within the Romanian Academy’s Institute of Philosophy – which carried out research in the field of industrial sociology, rural sociology, mass culture sociology, the theory of social development, and the sociology of nation (Cernea, 1970). Similar departments were later instituted within the Centres for Social Sciences in Cluj, Iași, and Timișoara.

Research units and facilities were also established outside the academic sphere. In 1968, a Research Centre for Youth Problems was founded, as a governmental agency, subordinated to the Ministry of Youth Affairs. The Centre’s main objective was the study of youth considered as a dynamic social category in the process of its formation and integration into work and life (Bădina, 1970: 63-64). The Centre comprised several interdisciplinary teams (sociology, ethics, pedagogy, psychology, philosophy, statistics), that approached different themes of research, with a specialist of the Centre working simultaneously on different projects. The main themes addressed by the Centre’s researchers dealt with youth and labour, youth and socio-political life, youth and family, sociology of youth, etc. (Bădina, 1970a; Bădina 1970b; Schifirneț, 1999).

The main purpose of this impressive infrastructure stemmed from the need of the party to comprehend the ‘new social’. During the previous two decades, the Romanian society experienced massive reconfigurations – the industrialization and urbanization processes, the collectivization of the agriculture, massive migration from the rural towards the urban areas, which restructured the anterior societal foundations. Sociology was thus called to understand and then decipher the consequences of these processes, to discern the nature of this ‘new social’, but also to provide solutions to overcome the regime’s problems and impasses. More precisely, the main purpose of sociology was not

necessarily to reveal the regime's dysfunctionalities, but rather to discuss them, and offer solutions in order to surpass them. But the conclusions and/or solutions provided by the sociological surveys – when (and if) it was requested –, were frequently acknowledged with extreme caution and even with suspicion by the decision-makers. This situation was a result of the unbalanced relationship between the scientific field, the party's bureaucratic apparatus, and the party's decision makers, and the latter's scepticism towards the scientific narrative that could have implied a 'critical' discourse. Moreover, Miron Constantinescu's political past – purged for attempting a putsch over the secretary general of the party, and his deep implication and almost complete control over sociology may have indicated that his agenda was not solely scientific. In fact, there is an apocryphal mention that states an explicit accusation formulated against Constantinescu, claiming that he was trying to use sociology to magnify his political ambitions. (Mihăilescu and Rostás, 2007).

Professionals, cadres, networks

A major issue related to the newly institutionalized discipline refers to the lack of professionals in its field. At the end of the 1960s, when sociology's institutional and scientific infrastructure was rapidly expanding, there were several former professionals of the discipline – 'survivors' of the former Bucharest Sociological School. With minor exceptions, none of them played a consequential role within the process. Except Henri H. Stahl – already mentioned, the 'new' sociology excluded figures such as Traian Herseni, Mihai Pop, Octavian Neamțu, Vasile Caramelea, Gheorghe Retegan, etc. In the cases of Traian Herseni, Gheorghe Retegan, Octavian Neamțu the regime's continuous reluctance to engage with stigmatized former sociologists was discernable. As mentioned before, Herseni's fascist past was never forgotten, nor forgiven, while Retegan and Neamțu were stigmatized as they had been indicted (Retegan even sentenced) in a major postwar political trial (Betea, 2011). As for the others, as their postwar careers were already obstructed, they 'migrated' towards other disciplines, and preferred to continue their activity within those specific fields: Caramelea in anthropology, Pop in ethnology and folklore.

Many of the individuals that were appointed within the newly instituted departments of sociology were philosophy or psychology graduates. Their academic background was only incidentally linked to sociology. The department of the University of Bucharest was an exception, as it included Henri H. Stahl, a leading figure of interwar Romanian sociology. Some argued that at the beginning, the professors were learning along with their students (Mihăilescu and Rostás, 2007). In order to overcome this fact, the authorities facilitated international

dialogue and exchange, through conferences and workshops, but mainly through fellowships awarded to many of the new and young professionals, mostly within Western universities (Bosomitu, 2015). The sociology departments were thus formed and supplied with a mixture of academics (professionals with an exclusive academic background) and apparatchiks (professionals that also had important careers within the party bureaucratic apparatus). Without attempting to suggest a comprehensive overview on the matter, I will exemplify these issues through several cases which reveal some patterns.

Aurelian Bondrea (b. 1928) was, similar to Ioan Drăgan, the prototype of the 'new academic'. After 1944, he became a member of the Communist Youth Union, and a member of the Communist Party (1946). Subsequently, he became a party activist, occupying several unimportant offices: director of a community centre, instructor of a County Party Organization, editor of a regional Party newspaper. In 1953, he was accepted as a student of the Instructors Party School, being later employed as an activist of a Regional Party Committee's Agitprop Section (1953-1960). Meanwhile, he graduated (without attendance) the Party Superior School, receiving a Bachelor Degree in Philosophy. After obtaining a PhD diploma in philosophy in 1964 – still within the Party Superior School - he was promoted as an instructor of the Central Committee's Agitprop Section (1964-1968). In 1968, he was employed secretary of a municipal party organization. Meanwhile, he was also a member of the scientific council of the Faculty of Philosophy of the 'Ștefan Gheorghiu' Academy (the former Party Superior School). In 1969 he returned to Bucharest, where he was appointed lecturer at the Department of Sociology (University of Bucharest), and deputy general director of the Directorate of Higher Education within the Ministry of Education. In 1970, he was the beneficiary of an eight-month academic exchange program in France¹². Within the Department of Sociology, Bondrea taught a course on the sociology of mass-media (Constantinescu and Grigorescu, 1970).

Petre Cristea (b. 1929) had a comparable trajectory. A former steelworker at the Hunedoara Steel Plant (1950), he was selected to attend a two-year Party School, which gave the workers the chance to continue their studies, and in 1952 he was accepted at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest. After graduating – with a major in psychology, he was employed within an evaluation centre for juvenile delinquents, of the Ministry of Interior (1957). In 1959, he was appointed as chief of cabinet of the department of historical and dialectical materialism within the Institute of Medicine, and subsequently as a lecturer (1960). In 1964, he was enrolled within a doctoral program at the Party Superior School and, after obtaining his PhD in

¹² NAR, fund Romanian Communist Party Central Committee – Cadre Section, file B/982, passim.

philosophy (1968), he was appointed lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University of Bucharest. In 1970, he was in charge of the seminars on methods and techniques of research¹³.

Aculin Cazacu's (b. 1939) intellectual and professional career falls into a totally different category. He had an almost exemplary professional trajectory and, until his appointment as a lecturer within the Department of Sociology, University of Bucharest – he had only incidental contacts with the party spheres and the party bureaucratic apparatus. After graduating the Faculty of Philosophy (1961), he was employed at the Institute for Pedagogical and Psychological Research. In 1967, he was appointed as a lecturer within the Department of Sociology. He also benefited of a six-month academic exchange program at the University of Brussels (1970-1971). In 1969, he became a member of the Communist Party, but he never occupied offices within the party's bureaucratic apparatus¹⁴.

A similar example is Ion Iordăchel (b. 1933). Student of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Iași (since 1951), Iordăchel was selected within a larger group of students that were to continue their studies in the Soviet Union. He graduated from the University of Leningrad (1957) with a bachelor degree in philosophy. Upon returning to Romania, he was employed as a lecturer in social sciences at the University of Medicine in Bucharest. In 1963, Iordăchel was accepted within a doctoral program at 'Lomonosov' University in Moscow. In 1965, he defended his PhD in sociology. He was later employed at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, and, since 1967, within 'Ștefan Gheorghiu' Academy, where he was appointed chief of the Department of Sociology (1971)¹⁵.

These case-studies suggest that the sociology departments (at least those considered) were formed and supplied with a mixture of academics (professionals with an exclusive academic background) and apparatchiks (professionals that also had important careers within the party bureaucratic apparatus).

Epilogue

The 'fortunate life' of sociology in Communist Romania was to be concluded after only a decade. The short timeframe in which sociology was fully re-institutionalized never allowed sociology to develop into a critical discourse on modernization. This situation was also influenced by the

¹³ NAR, fund Romanian Communist Party Central Committee – Cadre Section, file C/1216, passim.

¹⁴ NAR, fund Romanian Communist Party Central Committee – Cadre Section, file C/1560, passim.

¹⁵ NAR, fund Romanian Communist Party Central Committee – Cadre Section, file I/746, passim.

ambiguous relationship established between the discipline and politics (mainly due to the intricate process that led to its re-institutionalization), but also by the manner in which Miron Constantinescu imagined the new discipline, as an instrument intended to serve the regime's claim to scientific knowledge. This peculiar framework that sociology articulated and developed generated specific tensions between the professionals and the political deciders, the first rarely managing to supply the bureaucratic apparatus with more than dispersed and inconclusive data, the latter being rather reluctant and evasive in regard to the beneficial effects of these data. Several other circumstances (political, cultural-ideological, and biographical) influenced and precipitated the discipline's new marginalization. In 1970, the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, assimilating the Romanian Academy's prerogatives and infrastructure (in the field of social sciences) was established under the direct subordination of the Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee¹⁶. Initially, the appointment of Miron Constantinescu as the new President of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences (ASPS), and the establishment of a distinct Section of Sociology within the Academy were both beneficial and favourable circumstances. But the subsequent evolution sealed the increased control of the communist regime over the social sciences in general, and sociology in particular. One year later, Romania's cultural policies were subjected to a major, ideological reorientation, following the launch of Nicolae Ceaușescu's famous 'July Theses' – a mini 'Cultural Revolution' that implied the return of dogmatism, conformity, and the dismissal of every attempt at autonomy (Verdery, 1991). But a decisive circumstance in this process was the premature death of Miron Constantinescu (July 1974), which denied sociology the support and influence of party officials and of the decision-making bodies (Mihăilescu and Rostás, 2007). As a result, a gradual decline was imminent. In the following years, the research infrastructure was dismantled, while in 1977 the study of sociology was restricted to post-graduate curricula (Costea et al., 2006).

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¹⁶ Decree no. 121/March 18, 1970 regarding the founding of the SRR's Academy of Social and Political Sciences, in *Buletinul Oficial*, Year VI, no. 22, I Part, March 18, 1970, p. 130.

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THE CONCEPT OF 'PEASANT EMBOURGEISEMENT' IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIFFERENT HISTORICAL CONJUNCTURES

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ABSTRACT. The paper combines the historical analysis of the social transformation of rural Hungary with the evolution of the sociological concept of 'peasant embourgeoisement'. The authors highlight the long lasting impact of the concept in the understanding of academic knowledge production. The concept was the product of thorough ethnographic studies in the inter- and postwar periods by scholarly intellectuals, whose aim went beyond academic purposes and translated into a political agenda of rural modernization. To make such a methodological combination the authors demonstrate that the global historical context is necessary in the understanding of how knowledge production occurs and interacts at various historical conjunctures, especially during periods of crises.

Keywords: peasant embourgeoisement, subsistence economy, world system, narodnik movement, rural society.

Introduction³

In our paper we make a critical review of the concept of 'peasant embourgeoisement', which has been repeatedly applied in the Hungarian sociological discourse and thematised by various intellectuals since at least the early 20th century. The popularization of the term 'peasant embourgeoisement' was the legacy of sociographical narodnik movement⁴ from the interwar period. During state socialism, the concept gained dominance amongst rural sociologists. In both periods the concept was used not only for academic purposes, but also as

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³ This paper was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA). The number of the research project is 115644.

⁴ The sociographical movement in the interwar period consisted of popular writers who pushed for a national agenda. In the following paper we call them the 'narodniks'.

a social vision that meant to challenge either the dominance of large estates in agriculture in the 1930s, or the official modernization paradigm of the socialist regime in the 1970s and 1980s. In this paper we investigate the story of the concept by applying Reinhart Koselleck's method (1989) in order to find out: (1) how the concept was canonized in the Hungarian social sciences; (2) how certain historical conjunctures made the concept one of the most instrumental theories of rural sociology in Hungary; (3) how the term was reconceptualised in various sociological discourses at certain crisis periods.

In the following we trace the story of the concept not only from the perspective of academic knowledge production by particular intellectual groups, but also from a broader social historical perspective, in which both the query of these intellectuals and the subject of their studies – the peasants – have been embedded. In other words, our analysis combines a social historical study focusing on the formation of social structures with a genealogical study shedding light on the evolution of the concept of 'peasant embourgeoisement'. Our aim is to reflect on the relationship between scientific knowledge production and the social-material structures to explain how and why certain ideas reappear at certain historical conjunctures. Our approach will allow us to make a historical analysis of a concept, in which the changing social forms and the various meanings behind it will create a coherent unity between the subject and the object. Thus our method targets the social reality in a way that demonstrates how the concept originates from, and at the same time reflects upon reality (Koselleck, 1989). We will not make any sociological analysis of the intellectual groups, however. We take their ideas as reflections on the reality in the historical conjunctures of crises. Both the ideas of the *narodnik* movement and the rediscovery of these ideas originate in the crisis years of the 1930s and 1970s-80s.

The concept of 'peasant embourgeoisement' contains not only the historical analysis of the social formation of the peasantry in a broader historical-sociological context, but it also involves those global dilemmas regarding modernization and social development which *narodniks* and their followers raised. This is no coincidence since in social historical studies focusing on peripheral regions the study of the peasantry has always been a crucial issue (cf. Amin, 2014). The semi-peripheral capitalist development of the region created favourable conditions for agricultural export production, and thus social processes are inextricably connected to the domain of agriculture (Wallerstein, 1974). Hungarian sociology, hence, has always treated rurality and rural modernization as a priority (Vigvári, 2016). Within this thematic focus poverty and underdevelopment has been thoroughly explored and thematised by various concepts and ideologies. The concept of 'peasant embourgeoisement' - both in the interwar period and during state socialism – had a crucial role in these efforts, partly because it had various facets: (1) it was a sociological model and a political

program; (2) it focused on and criticized the power of the landowning middle classes; and (3) it has also been a keyword for geopolitical programs ('third-way alternatives') articulated from a Central Eastern European position, whereby both western capitalist and eastern socialist systems were refused.

In this paper we combine the structural analysis of the social transformation in a *longue durée* perspective (Braudel, 1958) with the evolution of the concept of 'peasant embourgeoisment'. We want to highlight the long lasting impact of such a concept in the understanding of academic knowledge production. We believe that a more global context is necessary to see how knowledge production occurs and interacts with the changing forms of social relations. The global context in our paper will be about the analysis of the development of historical capitalism from Central Eastern Europe's semi-peripheral uneven development's point of view. In the first section we will start the analysis by introducing the historical context of the concept, before we turn our focus to the concept of 'peasant embourgeoisment' in the second section.

The historical process of uneven capitalist development in Hungary

In this section we explain how uneven capitalist development produced rigid social structures in rural Hungary. The most important social historical processes in this regard were land concentration in the form of manorial estates on the one hand, and the growing number of landless or below-subsistence land-holding classes, on the other (Pach, 1966). The concentration of land based on agro-export production to the world economy was the result of the country's semi-peripheral integration as a satellite agro-supplier to the rising European core during the formation of the international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1974).

The rural population and the question of the land reform

Throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century this polarization – both in terms of the distribution of land, and between the different situations of social classes – was periodically problematized in debates and proposals about potential land reforms. Different agrarian classes had a somewhat different approach to the question of the land reform (Gyáni, 2004). In our analysis it is crucial to distinguish between these positions. We want to highlight that the political agenda in each historical period reached the rural population in an uneven manner. Some of the peasantry was attracted and mobilized for the cause, others lived in a more isolated situation and the opportunity to access land was beyond their hope.

During the Habsburg era, the question of the legal status of the serfs and the question of the land reform were the most divisive political agendas regarding rural development. For the peasantry the question of land reform served not only as a promise for advancing their social reproduction, but it carried strong symbolic value in their moral universe as well (Gunst, 1987). Meanwhile the absolute size of the peasant class had been on a steady decline throughout the centuries due to the historical processes of land concentration (Ditz, 1867). Additionally, the already heterogeneous peasant class had become even more fragmented since the end of the 19th century when capitalist production accelerated the process of land concentration (Kövér, 2004). The process of social fragmentation among the peasantry (Orosz, 1995) meant that not everyone was expelled from their land to become a labourer (or simply enclosed in holdings big enough to ensure only reproduction), but a wealthier upper strata of the middle peasantry emerged in-between the major social processes of the rising estates and the growing number of the landless agrarian proletariat (Gunst, 1987; Gyáni, 2004). As a result of uneven capitalist development, enormous estates and middle-sized farms coexisted in the rural agricultural landscape from the 19th century throughout the interwar period (Orosz, 1995; Gunst, 1987). The so-called question of the land reform was usually advocated by these 'in-between' middle peasants and some semi-proletarian agrarian labourers. Middle peasants targeted the large estates, while semi-proletarian workers sometimes tended to attack middle peasants. Despite the liberal attitude of the large landowner classes regarding the question of serfdom in the 19th century, the majority of them strongly opposed the idea of a radical land reform (Gunst, 1987). In fact, ruling classes managed to keep away most attempts until as late as 1945.

Earlier attempts at land reforms, such as the one in 1920 were usually ineffective, because the structure of the concentrated large estates remained relatively intact, and just a disproportionately small share of the manorial lands were distributed among the peasantry. Gale Stokes (1991) claims that among the different land reform policies that were implemented in most of the countries in the region after World War I, the least radical was the Hungarian. The reason was that the ruling classes were strong enough to prevent any radical alteration in the property structure. Thus the implementation of reform policies had ambiguous consequences and an uneven effect on different social classes and groups (Stokes, 1991).

On the one hand, as we mentioned, large estates managed to remain in power and offered very small shares in the land redistribution. According to the estimates of Gyáni (2004), approximately 8% of the overall arable land was distributed among the landless classes. On the other hand, about one million people with hardly any land were eligible to receive small plots (the average

size of the new plots was less than 1.5 acres⁵) in exchange for monetary reimbursement⁶. Since almost no one among the property-less classes possessed sufficient financial resources to invest into such purchase, a key element of the land reform was to offer state subsidized credits, i.e. mortgage-loans to help the popular classes. The rising indebtedness among the newly smallholder agricultural class later became a great source of financial stress. It was not only that the economic turmoil of the 1930s made the payment on the loans difficult, but the average size of the farms was too small to produce sufficient revenue (Gyáni, 2004). Thus the majority of this smallholder class did not become free peasants in practice: they remained tied to the local estate as wage earners in order to supplement their low revenues from their own land.

Even though access to any land – even below what would actually be necessary for subsistence – represented the illusory effect of social mobility for the new owners, in the 1930s this illusion was lost for the small, below-subsistence farmers, due to the wave of bankruptcies that they suffered (Gyáni, 2004). For them the economic crisis made the already rigid social structures impossible to overcome. However, peasants with middle-sized or even larger farms could survive and consolidate their social position after the crisis. They managed to extend their farms either by buying up smaller plots of land (sometimes from the bankrupted small farmers) for cheap, or by leasing land and gaining access to cheap labour force, the consequence of which was the escalation of political tensions amongst the rural classes.

A fraction of the agricultural workforce had long been almost completely proletarianized. They were employed on manorial estates as manorial servants. Their relationship to the means of production, i.e. to the land was very ambiguous. Their fate was tied to the estate, therefore these people were isolated from the rest of the rural population. In spite of the very limited access to small plot farming or to the possibility of breeding animals, manorial servants were the furthest from the idea of farming one's own land. This made them very difficult to reach and mobilize (Gyáni, 2004). Despite this fact, several studies explored the livelihood of manorial servants (cf. Illyés, 1968). They remained relatively passive and unaffected even in periods of land distribution.

Other wage labourers represented the majority of the agricultural workforce. They usually possessed some land, hence they had experience in farming, but the size of their farms was too small to allow them to farm independently. They depended on agricultural wages and the labour market was operational

⁵ In the traditional Hungarian metric system which Gyáni uses one 'hold' equals ca. 4300 m². In the international metric system, one acre is ca. 4000 m² (Gyáni, 2004:406).

⁶ The number of small-holding peasant households tripled from 540 000 to 1.6 million due to the land act. The dominant size of small farms remained below 3 hold, their numbers doubled from 580 000 to 980 000 (Gyáni, 2004:312).

because of their presence. On the labour market supply-and-demand was rarely in balance, instead the seasonal fluctuations brought great uncertainty in their lives (Gunst, 1987; Gyáni, 2004). These classes were more interested in the land reform than fellow manorial servants, hence, when the agenda of the land reform was raised these classes were easier to be politically mobilized. Agricultural wage labourers might have developed some enthusiasm for acquiring land for two reasons. One reason was that many of them owned some land and they had experience in cultivation. The other reason was symbolic (Gyáni, 2004). Many of them lived a mobile life because they had to follow seasonal work throughout the country. These people were not tied to one particular estate hence they were more mobile and easier to be mobilized for political causes than fellow manorial servants. In general they were more open to radical thoughts. They did not only target large estates but in periods of rapid social polarization amongst the peasantry, frustration grew against the upper strata of the middle peasants. Tensions between the two groups intensified after the 1930s because of the land concentration and the subsequent polarization amongst themselves (Gunst, 1987; Gyáni, 2004).

The Hungarian sociographic narodnik movement in the interwar period

Despite the decline in the number and economic significance of the peasantry from the 19th century, the political recognition of peasants gained ground due to intellectuals who sought to find the way out of the country's alleged backwardness through political programs building on them. Intellectuals themselves formed a very diverse group, with each political fraction founding references for various ideas in different social groups. In the 1930s a particular group of popular narodnik intellectuals embraced middle peasants (Némedi, 1986; Papp, 2012; Rézler, 1943). Their movement was called 'third way' and interestingly some of their ideas made a long lasting impact even after the war. These intellectuals documented the life of the free holder middle peasants and made valuable sociological observations that affected knowledge production on agricultural modernization even during state socialism.

According to their political agenda, the development of the country should be based on the rise of the free-holder peasantry into a class of independent producers, on which market relations should also be based. In their interpretation, 'third way' meant neither capitalist nor semi-feudal estates, nor the socialist model of kolhoz economy (Némedi, 1986). These concepts were an idealization of the real economic situation both in terms of the dynamics of historical capitalism and the social patterns through which these global forces translated into a semi-peripheral agrarian society. Even though they had a certain degree of social

sensitivity, and they aimed to improve the situation of the lower classes of agricultural workers, their vision put a disproportionately large emphasis on one particular class: middle peasants (Papp, 2012). Looking at it from the global context, the viability of social reproduction of the peasant class was the exception not the rule. As we noted, the social structure was dominated by extreme concentration of large estates produced by semi-peripheral capitalist integration on the one hand, and the growing number of wage labourers with very few possession, typically not enough for reproduction, on the other. While the question of land became their focal point, various intellectuals deployed different terminologies to describe the essence of their vision.

László Németh (1935), a famous Hungarian writer, who is regarded as the leader of the interwar *narodnik* movement, envisioned a peasantry-based social order that would find inspiration in other international examples, e.g. Scandinavian (in particular Danish) farm economies. His vision was called Garden-Hungary, the social basis of which would have built up from small, middle-sized free-holder peasants (Németh, 1935). Garden-Hungary was a projection of this class position into a wider universal class idea, somewhat similar to the way classical political economists tended to refer to the class interest of the bourgeoisie as universal. The *narodniks* regarded Garden-Hungary, based on the idea of small farmers as a universal class, for being neither the product of feudal-capitalist development (based on the manorial estates) nor that of socialism (based on soviet experiment at the time with *kolhoz*), but an independent 'third way' (Németh, 1935). Ferenc Erdei spent much of his early academic years studying the free-holder peasantry and the stratification of Hungarian peasants (Erdei, 1943), and called their economic fortunes as 'peasant embourgeoisement' (Erdei, 1973; Erdei, 1974). This was an idealization of the desires and morals of this particular class that neglected the surrounding social processes amongst which both the overall underdevelopment and the particular class relations emerged.

The members of the sociographic *Narodnik* movement observed the misery of the peasants, and they feared the disintegration of this class due to those powerful social processes that produced polarization. The concept of Garden-Hungary and the idea of 'peasant embourgeoisement' were regarded as a radical social idea in which no estates and no proletariat would dominate. In the ideal world of both Erdei and Németh the economic model contained elements of economic autarchy which fit well with the idea of 'third way', as a sort of delinking from the forces of the world economy. However, World War II restructured the whole landscape of intellectual utopias along with the opportunity structures of different political projects. A nice example is how after the war the biographies of the two *narodnik* scholars tended to bifurcate. While Németh kept his strong opposition to socialism, and later to socialist collectivization, Erdei held

key political positions in the state socialist regime, and as a minister of agriculture (1949-53) he became personally responsible for collectivization and agricultural modernization (Huszár, 2010).

Post WW II

After World War II, the occupying Soviet forces seized power in Central Eastern European countries, which resulted in a new wave of land reforms. In 1945 the communist party pretended to be the proponent of the land reform based on previous narodnik ideas articulated throughout the interwar period in Hungary. This policy was more radical and thorough with respect to the structure of land ownership than its predecessor in 1920⁷. It broke up the large estates and, furthermore, land was allocated to the lower agrarian classes (Ö. Kovács, 2012).

The consequences of the reform were, however, short-lived. By the early 1950s the Stalinist economic model was already in effect: heavy industrialization enjoyed priority over agriculture (Valuch, 2004). In fact, agriculture was functionally sacrificed to serve the needs of rapid industrialization. Under state socialism, industrialization contributed to the continuation of the historical legacy of large-scale farming in the form of the kolhoz-economy. Despite that, the soviet-type kolhoz, which was forcefully established in Hungary between 1949 and 1953, was based on state ownership, and what it achieved was the first successful attempt to transform particular groups of the rural population into a fully wage-earning class.

This was, however, only partially successful because it did not manage to fully penetrate the wage form into the peasant class. The reason for its limited success was that the paradigm shifted its focus from agrarian modernization to industrialization in which agricultural production served the needs of the industry. From an agrarian point of view, this assumed the brutal exploitation of both individual producers and the whole of the sector (Ö.Kovács, 2012). This brutal exploitation was interrupted with the 1956 revolution, which was also fuelled by the violent nature of the Stalinist regime trying to restructure the systems of production and social reproduction in rural Hungary. This violence had to be tamed.

⁷ The National Peasant Party and the Independent Smallholders' and Peasants' Party together won a landslide victory (over 60% of the votes) in the first free election after the war in 1945. The National Peasant Party represented the interest of the small peasantry, while the Independent Smallholders' and Peasants' Party represented middle peasants. Narodnik intellectuals were overrepresented in the former party.

The second, less violent wave of collectivization came after the revolution of 1956 (Ö. Kovács, 2012). The task to combine the socialist modernization effort with elements of *narodnik* ideas was given to Erdei again, who conducted a reform on new grounds. The second collectivization in the 1960s stopped serving the interest of the industry and instead implemented policies that fostered progress for agricultural production. In addition, the roles in the collective's internal division of labour largely reflected upon the legacy of the local social situation. Individual farmers, though not as private property owners, were still eligible to be shareholders in the local collectives.

In essence collectivization achieved what it was designed for: it dismantled the peasant class and turned its former members into wage labourers. The rural population was from this point either employed in the expanding industrial complexes, or in the agricultural collectives, both of which were managed by the most progressive norms of the era, taylorism (Bell, 1984; Valuch, 2004). We need to underline that this type of modernization coalesced with global forces as former agrarian structures were replaced by wage relations in the economy. Naturally under state socialism this happened in a different institutional environment than it happened on the other side of the Iron Curtain, because the wage form was introduced upon public instead of private property relations. But despite this institutional and ideological diversity, the penetration of the wage form was the catalyst in the transition to the capitalist mode of production all around the global semi-periphery in the 1950s and 1960s (Boatca, 2015; Dunaway, 2012).

Similarly to how this global trend unfolded elsewhere, semi-proletarian household economies also mushroomed in Hungary from the late 1960s onwards (Gábor R., 1979). In the reform era of the late 1960s, workers in the collectives (also employed in the industry) were allowed by the state to cultivate small plots for gardening (Valuch, 2004). In addition, surpluses produced in the household economy were untaxed by the socialist state, and the state collectives were permitted to purchase products from the households. As a consequence of this liberalization, the so-called second (or subsistence) economy became an integral part of the rural division of labour besides the industrialized mass production of grains and small-plot garden-farming (Hann, 1980; Sozan, 1983; Szelényi, 1988).

The reason for this liberal approach by the state in the late 1960s was that the consequences of the social transformation could not be stabilized due to the global economic and financial crises. The global crises of the late 1960s reached state socialist countries by the middle of the 1970s (Gerőcs and Pinkasz, 2017). Real wages fell due to restrictive fiscal policies and investments and industrial output had to be kept in check. The interruption in the social transformation brought back non-wage forms of agrarian production, which relied heavily on household production in the form of houseplot farming (second economy). In the 1970s the parallel structure of large-scale farms in the form of collectives and the dependent houseplot farming around rural households

co-existed in a state socialist agrarian division of labour. Despite the fact this agrarian structure originated in the global capitalist crisis, the emergence of the second economy was celebrated for understandable reasons by large segments of the rural population who carried strong memories of independent farming and was also celebrated by the scholars from the so called 'democratic opposition' who embraced narodnik ideas in their attempt to oppose state socialism (Szelényi, 1988).

The second economy gained significance during the growing economic hardship of the 1970s and 1980s. It was a period of indirect austerities, when restrictions in the wage-system were introduced harshly. Liberalization was fostered by state regulation because it served as a substitution for the weakening social safety net. In that sense, the function of the second economy was to provide an extra source of income for labourers in a period of wage control in factories. The more general consequence was the interruption of the penetration of the wage system and the subsequent reversal to a semi-proletarian household economy. Similar trends occurred in the global semi-periphery during the crises years of the 1980s (see e.g. the Latin American experience).

Despite these hardships and the reversal of the wage system, successful peasants could use the surplus in the second economy for representative modernization, which sociologists found new forms of social mobilization and labelled with the term 'rural embourgeoisement' (Kovách, 1988; Szelényi, 1988). This included investments in the comfort of their homes (many of them without basic amenities at that time in rural Hungary) and in the upward-mobility of their children by supporting their migration to the cities for education. The paradox is that the symbolic values and the concrete form of social mobility under the phenomena of 'rural embourgeoisement' was actually the result of a global economic crisis in the 1970s and the subsequent austerity programmes implemented by the socialist state.

The origins of the concept of 'embourgeoisement' in Hungarian rural sociology

Social scientists conceptualized historical processes not only for academic purposes but also as sociological models for political programs. The term 'peasant embourgeoisement' was first used to refer to the process of agrarian modernization in the late 19th century (Hofer, 1975; Kósa, 1998). In the case of Hungary the process of 'peasant embourgeoisement' happened under an extremely unequal structure of land possession characterized by the gradually emerging manorial land and the proliferation of agricultural proletariat. Regarding the definition of 'peasant embourgeoisement' social scientists emphasized the changing economic habits, the abandonment of the former peasant culture, and the changes

in mentality. All of these would suggest that the differences between the urban and the rural lifestyles had started to fade (Sárkány, 2000). However, the geographic representation of bourgeois peasants within the wider agricultural society was unequal, and they were underrepresented in terms of numbers, even though social sciences have always been paying special attention to this subject (Kósa, 1995).

Later the rural Hungarian countryside was overwhelmingly affected by growing social tensions in the interwar period (Gunst, 1987). The unequal possession of the land, the growth of agrarian proletariat and the deprivation of political rights all amplified these tensions (Gyáni, 2004). The aforementioned *narodnik* movement struggled to raise awareness of the growing inequalities by encountering the communities of the villages and putting their experiences into journalistic and ethnographic works (Papp, 2012). On the other hand, they had a vision of modernizing the rural areas and reducing the tensions of the society through providing equal access to land.

As we have already mentioned, the term 'peasant embourgeoisement' had been an important theoretical benchmark for Ferenc Erdei (Erdei, 1973; Erdei, 1974), the then young sociologist who initially played a key role in the *narodnik* movement. Erdei referred to 'peasant embourgeoisement' as the exemplary alternative to the agrarian proletariat, and as the role model for raising the peasantry. In many of his early writings Erdei considered the lifestyle and the morals of these peasants as the desirable pattern, which is produced by a specific mode of agrarian production, which could be the vehicle not only for peasant embourgeoisement, but also for national development (Bognár, 2010). To take one example, Erdei studied the country towns (*mezőváros*) surrounded by hamlets, and the residential structure which is typical to the Hungarian southern Great Plain area (*Nagy Alföld*). These country towns had a special spatial and social composition. In the centre of the structure is the town itself that represents the embourgeoisement class, which despite its farmer background, uses symbolic instruments to show social mobility (e.g. in architecture or in clothing). But the centre is also linked to economic units, which are the real social and economic basis of these people's livelihood around and in the periphery of the towns. These are the scattered farms (hamlets) on the peripheries that were the sites of seasonal agricultural production and served also as summer residencies for the middle peasants from the country towns (Erdei, 1974).

For the young sociologist, the country towns of the Great Plain area symbolized the national agenda of 'third-way' based on the everyday experiences of the socially upward mobile middle peasants. In his view, this structure went beyond the class-based opposition of the urban and rural differences, produced by capitalist development. At the same time, it also offered an alternative to the Soviet-type *kolhoz* model (Bognár, 2010; Erdei, 1974).

For Erdei the theory of ‘peasant embourgeoisement’ was not merely an academic subject. In fact, he instrumentalized his academic findings and later applied them to a wider societal context: he used the model of ‘peasant embourgeoisement’ in his political program as a desired future path for the Hungarian society (Bognár, 2010). Thus the concept of ‘peasant embourgeoisement’ became a third-way political vision popular in the *narodnik* movement, that (1) emphasized the distinctive traits of the social development in Central Eastern Europe; (2) in terms of political program refused both the western capitalist systems and the soviet proletariat dictatorship; (3) desired a policy of egalitarian distribution of land based on the dismantling of the manorial lands and fostering interventionist economic planning based on local resources. Therefore, coining the notion of ‘peasant embourgeoisement’ was not only a contribution to academic discourses, but it also became an integral part of a populist political program in the first half of the 20th century.

The discovery of the ‘houseplot’ and the concept of ‘rural embourgeoisement’ in the 1980s

Rural or peasant embourgeoisement became part of the Hungarian sociological discourse again in the 1980s (Huszár, 2015). From the late 1970s-1980s onwards, rural researches were inspired by the transformation and development of rural Hungary and they ‘discovered’ the growing significance of domestic subsistence farming in local economies (Hann, 1980; Sárkány, 1983; Sozan, 1983; Szelényi, 1988).

According to the policy introduced in the mid-1960s, workers were permitted to practice houseplot farming (Szelényi, 1988) in an area up to 1 acre/person. Soon, small subsistence economies developed which produced goods to satisfy family requirements on the one hand and surplus which could be sold to the collective, on the other. The houseplot farming became the rural form of the so-called ‘second economy’ (Gábor R., 1979; Galasi, 1985; Róna-Tas, 1990) which allowed workers to accumulate some wealth in times of economic hardship. The disadvantage it produced was that it tied workers to the houseplot, thus houseplot farming contributed to the anchoring of the proletarianized rural population.

By providing extra profit for the rural working class, subsistence farming (houseplots) also played a crucial role as a social safety net. However, such extra labour activity demanded additional labour after the wage-duty. Second economy provided an extra income source for labourers in a period of industrial wage control (Gábor R., 1979). The return to semi-wage forms did not occur in large factories nor in the agricultural collectives but in and around the family houseplots (Valuch, 2004).

The transformative role of subsistence farming on the local social relations was clear. Theories that emphasized the temporary and self-sufficient nature of subsistence farming proved to be false because in reality these small economic units were tied to the surrounding collectives. Houseplots developed strong market links (even if market exchanges were limited at this time), and because of the fact that there was an upturn in their activity, the growing market relations translated into the extension of production. Regarding the broader division of labour, tight links to the collectives were immanent. As a consequence of the process, in the 1980s rural sociologists became especially interested in the development of the houseplots (Kovách, 1988; Szelényi, 1988; Harcsa, 1991; Juhász, 1991). Sociologists wanted to know what capacity subsistence farming in the form of houseplots might bring in relation to broader social changes. They presumed that these units might play an important role in transforming the state socialist system.

Knowledge production on houseplot farming: from the theory of proletarianization to the concept of 'third way'

Few Hungarian sociologists considered subsistence economy important not for transforming the social system but as a secondary consequence in the process of rural proletarianization. István Márkus (1973), who had carried out fieldwork in the surrounding villages of Budapest in the Galga valley, found that families involved in commodity production in the second economy for nearby markets in Budapest were so-called 'post-peasants'. In his description post-peasants were not innovative agricultural entrepreneurs. Márkus emphasized that the surplus these families made were usually invested in their children's education or in establishing their urban life, instead of improving the capacity in production as proper entrepreneurs would probably do. In short, these extra revenues were immediately channelled out from production into social mobility, which in most cases functioned as departing from agriculture (Márkus, 1973). István Kemény (1972) revealed in his studies about factory workers in the 1970s that the new generation of industrial workers with peasant ancestry – the 'new working class' as he put it – were usually underqualified and their incomes were at the bottom of the wage system. Therefore these workers still made a good use of their links to rural relatives and utilized the knowledge of houseplot farming to compensate for their insufficient wages (Kemény, 1972).

Contrary to that notion, Iván Szelényi (1988) interpreted the subsistence economy as an innovative individual strategy for the proletarian working-class to socially mobilize. Szelényi and his research team thoroughly studied and explained

in academic papers the expansion of the second economy. By looking at the social-economic role of houseplots, Szelényi insisted that their significance was beyond the economic value of generating extra revenue, because this activity might have also resulted in the transformation of 'social behavior' (Szelényi, 1988).

In his publications Szelényi used the theory of 'rural embourgeoisement' (Szelényi, 1988) and based his agenda on the economic potential of subsistence farming (second economy). In his book *Socialist entrepreneurs: embourgeoisement in rural Hungary*, Szelényi (1988) considered the expansion of the subsistence farming as one of the most genuine inventions in socialist Hungary. He argued that the form of commodity production in the houseplot farms proved that it had not merely been a temporary phenomenon of modernizing agriculture in general, but as a subsector supplying the markets it might become permanent within the economic system of state socialism. In Szelényi's view the political relevance of the second economy cannot be ignored, because these households contributed to the transformation of cultural traits that confront the practices of the bureaucratic state-apparatus. Overall, he expected that this type of economic activity would weaken the political system (Szelényi, 1988).

Notwithstanding, Szelényi argued that houseplot farming did not only substitute wages, but the rising market activities also helped the legal environment to be gradually liberalized. He insisted that specialization in farming and the subsequent accumulation of wealth could be taken for granted as an indicator of entrepreneurship in the making. His main argument was that the role of houseplots was beyond wage compensation. It served as a strategy for entrepreneurs to bourgeon within the legal frame of state socialism (Szelényi, 1988). Additionally, becoming an entrepreneur in the second economy could be viewed as a form of resistance in his interpretation. He thought that this economic activity in the informal sector was a sort of silent grassroots revolution. Furthermore, Szelényi emphasized in his concept of rural embourgeoisement that the entrepreneur habitus developed in the frame of the second economy contained the potential to challenge the intellectual notion of the 'bourgeoisie'. He suggested that the new term could replace the former notion with a more bottom-up and popular understanding of the 'bourgeoisie', freed from the classical intellectual determinants (Szelényi, 1988). These social changes could serve, by quoting Erdei, for a 'third-way' solution to create an alternative both to the socialist system and to western capitalism at the same time. Contrary to contemporary intellectuals, Szelényi and his colleagues favoured a model in which development relied on small-scale houseplot production.

The narodnik legacy in studying 'rural embourgeoisement'

Szelényi's notion of 'rural embourgeoisement' was intentionally based on Erdei's terminology about the 'peasant embourgeoisement'. While Erdei recognized the middle peasantry in the country towns as a new model for Central Eastern European modernization, Szelényi saw the capacity in subsistence farming partly due to their informal fashion as an element which might challenge state socialist centralization. Apart from that both approaches paid attention to the land-holding rural middle classes. Moreover, they both combined empirical research on peasant activities with broader intellectual visions, which they translated into a political agenda.

According to their interpretation, Central Eastern European modernization was trapped in an impasse, and in order to avoid the furthering of backwardness, countries such as Hungary with its experience of houseplots needed to return to the path of development that had been abandoned and interrupted at the end of the 1940s (Szelényi, 1988). This group of scholars used the land reform of 1945 as a basic reference to which they suggested to return. No surprise that the idea of 'peasant embourgeoisement' was enhanced by the land reform and the following years were going to be celebrated as the experience of 'third way' development. Szelényi and his colleagues opposed the idea of catching up with western societies. Their belief was consistent with interwar narodnik ideas, according to which the successful development must be an alternative version of free market capitalism.

As Szelényi wrote in his book

[...] on this organic trajectory, family farms and large estates, market competition and officials' powers are carefully balanced in order to avoid both the anarchic individualism of its Western and the untrammelled state power of its Eastern neighbours. The last 40 years should probably be seen as a rather unfortunate, socially costly side-track, which pushed Hungary and perhaps the rest of the region backward in time and eastward in geography. During these postwar years the Soviet Union tried to force on its western neighbours a monolithically statist, bureaucratic and clientelist form of internal social and economic organization that was alien to them. It may make sense to suggest that Hungary (and probably Poland?) are once again searching for a social identity that will distinguish this society both from the Soviet model and from Western capitalism. The question of the 'Third Road' again returns to the intellectual agenda of Eastern Europe (Szelényi, 1988:21-22).

In Szelényi's view, though, the rise of the subsistence economy was the direct continuation of the process of 'peasant embourgeoisement' from the inter- and immediate postwar period, but with the interruption of state socialist intervention. Therefore he described these phenomena as the 'interrupted embourgeoisement' in

the 1980s (Szelényi, 1988). Not only the phenomena were continuous, but Szelényi also attempted to prove that the peasants he found in the second economy had direct links to those families which had been studied by Erdei in the Great Plain area. The protagonists of 'interrupted embourgeoisement' are, to put it simply, the descendants of Erdei's peasant farmers, who after the establishment of the socialist regime gave up on their economic activities and temporarily became proletarians.

In a nutshell, some Hungarian sociologists referred to family producers on the houseplots as agents in social transformation. The term 'rural embourgeoisement' has inspired a novel trend in intellectual discourses, as they have reformulated the concept into a more comprehensive, popular understanding, which was previously not completely compatible with the notion of the 'bourgeoisie'. The notion of 'peasant embourgeoisement' went beyond the sociological investigation of domestic subsistence economies, insofar as it was developed into a 'third-way' narodnik type vision of modernization supporting houseplot farming and entrepreneur habitus. Thus the concept of 'rural embourgeoisement' of the 1980s, similarly to how it was used in the interwar period, (1) had been a sociological model and a political program, (2) focused on the power of the land-holding middle classes and (3) had been a geopolitical program and a third-way alternative adjusted to the social development of Central Eastern Europe by refusing the western capitalist and state socialist systems.

Conclusion

In our paper we sought to conceptualize rural modernization from the perspective of uneven capitalist development. Contrary to the classical notion of rurality as a backward sphere of society, unpenetrated by modernization, we argued that rural modernization is in fact an integral part of the evolution of historical capitalism, especially in the history of semi-peripheral development in Hungary. Moreover, 'peasantry' as a social class has not only played a crucial role at several historical conjunctures, but also were and still are crucial semantic reference points both in the memories and in the visions of the rural population in Central Eastern Europe. These memories and visions are embraced not only by rural families, who in some cases identify with the free peasantry and the idealization of the land, but in fact were kept alive by the long lasting impact of the concept of 'peasant embourgeoisement', embraced periodically by sociologists from the inter- and postwar periods. No coincidence that this vision has a strong impact on contemporary Hungarian rural sociology even today.

We argued in the paper that despite the several controversial outcomes of the different waves of modernization in the history of Central Eastern European semi-peripheral development, the different modes of reintegration to the capitalist world economy systematically reproduced rigid social structures and identical sociological concepts of rural development in accordance. Thus, the latter can also be treated as embedded in the different waves of modernization.

In the paper we focused on cyclical shifts in the inter- and postwar period, with special attention paid to changes between the wage and non-wage forms of the rural economy. Between 1945 and the late 1960s the wage form of organizing labour penetrated in most of the Central Eastern European economies under the command of socialist collectivization and the booming urban industrialization. During this period, due to intense industrialization, there was almost no room for houseplot farming which was strictly prohibited by state socialist legislation. The long downturn in the global accumulation reached Central Eastern Europe already by the middle of the 1970s. In Hungary, the effects of the crises were transmitted through state policies with respect to both restructuring and rescaling public administration and the new forms of organizing labour by wage and income policies. In the latter case, the emergence of the so-called rural second economy - which in fact was a return to subsistence farming - was a result of the limitation of the wage-system. Accordingly, we can distinguish between different phases each of which host various concepts for rural modernization. Cycles in knowledge production followed these changes as well. It is interesting to note that the rediscovery of the narodnik ideas of 'peasant embourgeoisement' occurred in a period of economic hardship, similarly to the origin of these ideas that date back to the crisis of 1931. The renaissance of narodnik ideas was made possible by thorough ethnographic studies carried out in the 1970s and 1980s. Scholars of the time used the idea to re-introduce the notion of third way development that they wanted to contrast with state socialism. They did not perceive the crises as immanent to global capitalism, but they believed this social transformation was the product of state socialist legislation⁸.

Contrary to their notion, the rigid historical social structures (land concentration in the form of estates and collectives and dependent houseplots), thus, reappeared during the declining phase of state socialist modernization. We believe that the origin of the concept of 'rural' and 'peasant embourgeoisement' was attractive for rural sociologists and fellow intellectuals who were in search for an alternative (third way concept of) modernization when they studied the extremely uneven and concentrated nature of agricultural social system in Hungary both in the inter and the postwar periods. These intellectuals encountered the

⁸ We need to highlight that similar processes were to be observed in other semi-peripheral regions with, however, different institutional settings. In Hungary the expansion of the second economy was not unique to agriculture, but it also occurred in other spheres of the economy.

depressing dominance of enormously large estates and the growing size of landless agricultural labourers. They were thus not simply in search for social groups in-between these structures, but they tended to believe that the rediscovery of the middle peasantry could serve as the basis of a new modernization model. They treated, however, these social categories as if they were separate from the rest of the social system, or as if these social fragments could be taken as reminiscence of positive social formations from earlier epochs. But this was a political agenda as well. These ideas proved to have a strong mobilization effect and influence over various reform agendas when agrarian modernization was among the priority of policy makers.

In a nutshell, we wanted to demonstrate that the crisis of the overall economy in the 1970s and 1980s was exactly the period when researches on the second economy were conducted, while at the same time, the idea of 'peasant embourgeoisement' was rediscovered by intellectuals who used the reformulation of the concept to challenge the modernization promises of the state socialist regime in order to find alternatives to the impasse of state socialist modernization.

The origin of these social processes are embedded in the uneven nature of capitalist development; therefore when we study rural development, we also need to be precise on the exact scale of analysis in which we want to grasp the respective social relations and the different concepts of rural modernization. In our research we wanted to understand how these rigid social structures that had been reproduced during different cycles of modernization with respect to the modes of organizing labour and to the forms of regulating the heterogeneous agricultural workforce contributed to the development of scientific knowledge production. In our paper we sought to combine socio-historical development with the evolution of the various ideas regarding 'peasant embourgeoisement' which had been the most valid concept of rural modernization in the Hungarian sociology. In more general terms, we wanted to reflect on the relationship between scientific knowledge production and the social-material structures to explain how and why certain ideas reappear in the history.

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECURITATE: SECRET AGENTS AS ANTHROPOLOGISTS

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ABSTRACT. In this paper I regard the Securitate (the Romanian secret police) as an epistemic form through which the socialist state gathered knowledge about reality, while it also performatively sought to create reality in keeping with its ideological presuppositions. More generally I suggest that the Securitate was in fact a form of (social) science deployed by the state in relation to its subjects. Just as any instrument of knowledge, the work of the Securitate was not simply descriptive but also, in the process, it aimed to shape its very object of inquiry. The Securitate was one of the institutions, central no doubt, through which the Romanian socialist state sought to define and protect its own, new, version of reality and social order. From this perspective, far from being an outcome of the socialist power, the secret police was what constituted that power to define and bring into being a new reality. In this process the secret agents played the role of anthropologists of the new world.

Keywords: secret police, socialism, knowledge, developmentalism, class

Secret agents as anthropologists²

The opening of the secret police files (the Securitate in Romania) has been one of the most socially and ideologically entrenched battles of post-communism. The East German model of full disclosure and independent examination of the STASI files (despite its particular context undergirded by the complete take-over by the German Federal state) offered the blueprint for other post-socialist countries. Even more divisive was the role, function, and meaning of the data found in these archives. For some, the files would reveal the scope and brutality of the secret police activities and the identity of those particular individuals who wilfully (or less so) contributed to the bleak effectiveness of this ill-fated institution. Others, less seduced by the 'truth'-effect of these archives, pointed out to the danger of simply prolonging the

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² Many thanks to Norbert Petrovici and Florin Faje for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.

logic of the secret police into the present, by continuing similar practices of de-masking, lustration, and ostracism.

Moreover, these debates magnified at the societal level a discussion that was otherwise limited to professional researchers: how to deal with and integrate archival data into historical narratives? Of course, the special nature of the secret police archive and its content added another layer of complexity. Two main approaches emerged. On the one hand, the files in the archive were endowed with the power to directly speak the truth about the regime and about the past. By opening them, it was expected that the post-socialist society would be able to understand *whodunit* and thus establish unequivocally the guilt. This was a moralistic perspective expressed in the language of Christian theology imbued with references to 'guilt', 'redemption', 'confession', 'sin', 'moral rectitude', 'forgiveness' in relation to both the 'victims' and the 'perpetrators'. Usually this was the perspective of the anti-socialist intellectuals, former dissidents and political prisoners of the regime. For them opening up the archive of the Securitate was a moral act linked to transitional justice. Such a perspective trampled the epistemological and methodological concerns of this data in favour of their immediate content and power of revelation.

On the other hand, professional historians and researchers ultimately expressed epistemological and methodological concerns and questioned the nature of these documents and their value as immediate generators of knowledge and truth. In addition, some streams of criticism also questioned the overlap between the state (as owner and administrator of these archives) and the state-sponsored research of these archives. CNSAS (*Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității*, the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives – the state institution mandated to administer the archive) is the best example because its functionaries (state employees as it were) are at the very same time both administrators and researchers of these archives. This perspective placed the files of the Secret Police in a challenging theoretical and methodological conundrum, thus opening a pathway to a more solid, nuanced, and complex investigation with the specific tools of the historical social sciences.

However, in this perspective too, the secret police files remained strategic research sites about the socialist past. The archive constituted a *source* of knowledge about communism, albeit a more complex and challenging one than the moralistic approaches were able to or interested to concede.

In this paper I suggest a different view. I propose to analyse the archive of the secret police, its content and the manner in which the data was collected and archived as a particular *form* of knowledge. By asking what kind of knowledge the knowledge generated by the Securitate is, the focus shifts from the information contained in this archive to the mechanisms of its functioning and knowledge-generating practices. It is thus also a way of moving from methodological concerns

with data to an analysis of the formation of epistemic forms during socialism. As such, my interest is not in what the knowledge produced by the Securitate has to offer in relation to the present or to the socialist past. Rather, I am interested to understand the very mechanisms of production of this knowledge and its social and political relevance as it was produced. In this way – as a form of knowledge – the discussion about Securitate opens up two interrelated fields of inquiry that have remained so far under-researched (if not completely ignored) because of the collective bias in relation to the data collected in this archive.

First, there is the issue of knowledge-production during socialism. How and in what ways, through which means and institutions, did the socialist regime generate knowledge about the society it simultaneously sought to transform and govern? What was the relationship between state institutions and the party, between policy and ideology in this process? Secondly, and strictly related, what was the status and purpose of socialist social sciences in this process of generating and disseminating knowledge about socialism?

The question of knowledge and science and the relationship between them cuts through the heart of the socialist regime. Socialism was a political form that justified its political monopoly on a superior form of knowledge, on a scientific understanding (and mastering) of the historical transformation. This superior knowledge dictated the blueprints for the societal change at all levels envisaged by the socialist developmentalism. But two contradictions soon emerged. The first was related to the ways in which the socialist regimes were able to know (that is, to measure and compare) whether the transformations they had envisaged were indeed implemented. Put differently, what were the ways in which the socialist regimes were able to know whether the society was really being transformed according to their superior scientific plan? Moreover, if things failed to go according to plan, was this a shortcoming of the plan or of its lack of proper implementation? What were the means to know and measure these aspects in order to generate ideological and policy changes? Secondly, the socialist regimes were not forced to operate only in relation to an internal reality that they simultaneously sought to radically transform and manage. They had to interconnect with the capitalist world either directly through technology and capital imports or indirectly in the global market and in the geopolitical competition. How were the socialist regimes generating knowledge about *these* realities and with what tools, methods, and specialists? What was the impact of this knowledge on the socialist ideology and social science?

Such questions have been long overlooked in the research about socialism, obscured by other concerns that emerged from the transitology paradigm and from its critics. Recently, however, the trend is changing and concerns with the paradoxes of knowledge production during socialism come to the forefront for the Romanian case (see Cistelean and State, 2015).

In this paper I want to make a contribution in this direction through this proposal: the Securitate not only represented a particular form of knowledge during socialism but it was also a form of science deployed by the socialist state in order to make sense of and investigate the everyday reality of socialism. As such its *modus operandi* was very close to that of professional anthropologists working in the field and generating everyday knowledge. That secret police officers misrecognized western anthropologists as spies (as one of their own, that is) further testifies to this relationship (Verdery, 2014). Recognizing Securitate as a form of anthropological knowledge raises the question of its relationship with the social sciences of socialism and also casts into a new light the type of material that is usually referred to as the archive of the Securitate. This paper has only a preliminary role in this discussion - that of setting the stage for further inquiry.

Theoretical and Methodological State Apparatuses

What does it mean to analyse the archive as a *form* of knowledge and not simply as a *source* of knowledge? Ann Stoler suggests that a good starting point is to read along the archival grain (Stoler, 2009). As such, the archives have to be understood from the perspective of the state and its bureaucratic creators in contrast to the typical academic reading of such archives, either of the colonial administrations, or, recently, of the secret police that tries to subvert them by employing a perspective of the natives or of the victims, respectively. Stoler is then right to point out that while a reading against the grain might have powerful counterhegemonic effects, it also runs the risk of seeing the state as homogeneous, bounded, ordered, and with a clear purpose at the expense of administrative tentativeness, flux, internal splits, contradictions, and even chaos.

This observation is relevant for the Securitate archive as well. Anti-communism has portrayed this institution as all-powerful and omniscient, the real backbone of the regime's repressive and totalitarian nature. In so doing, it simply prolongs the image the Securitate was constructing about itself in order to augment its hallow of power. Moreover, such a view precludes a meaningful understanding of the actual functioning of the institution, especially of its historicity and actual embedding in the wider structure of the socialist regime and ideology.

By contrast, I take a different view and regard it as an epistemic form through which the state was gathering knowledge about reality, while it also performatively sought to create reality in keeping with its ideological presuppositions. The Securitate was not only a tool of control, suppression, and

violence, but also a productive institution. It generated knowledge accumulated in the files we read today, but also in other various institutional practices and dynamics, legal provisions, and emotional and bodily dispositions, which generally tend to remain opaque due to the textualist focus on files and their factual content.

More generally I suggest that the Securitate was in fact a form of (social) science deployed by the state in relation to its subjects. Just as any instrument of knowledge, the work of the Securitate was not simply descriptive but also, in the process, it aimed to shape its very object of inquiry. The Securitate was one of the institutions, central no doubt, through which the Romanian socialist state sought to define and protect its own, new, version of reality and social order. From this perspective, far from being an outcome of the socialist power, the secret police was what constituted that power to define and bring into being a new reality.

The Bolshevik secret police, the CEKA, was established immediately after the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, with the defensive goal of protecting the revolution from its many internal and external enemies. But its roots run deeper. In *The Russian Revolution*, Sheila Fitzpatrick (2008) wrote that the tsarist regime put in place a secret police after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, a fact also stressed by Richard Pipes (1995). Many Bolshevik revolutionaries had direct contact with this secret police during their underground and exile years. They were constantly harassed by it, intimidated and learned how to trick it through the romantic mechanisms of disguise and faux names, still possible in a world far away from sophisticated data bases and profiling techniques. The strict internal discipline of the underground Bolshevik party was also premised upon the need to keep agents of the tsarist secret police away from infiltrating its ranks, something that was not always successful. Following this interaction, the Bolsheviks developed a certain habitus that would guide their actions after taking power, especially in the first years of War communism and during the Civil War. Exposing internal enemies would remain a constant task for all subsequent socialist regimes.

While the establishment of the tsarist secret police responded to very concrete needs of the state in order to deal with increasing anti-systemic and revolutionary movements from the late 1870s onwards, it was hardly a Russian phenomenon. Following the 1815 Vienna congress that reorganized Europe after the Napoleonic wars, the secret police was a burgeoning institution across Europe, with a view to deter other European nations to upset the balance of power on the continent. States wanted to know beforehand about other states' planned actions in order to counter them. So began a golden age of European espionage, using mainly infiltrated agents, travellers, and diplomatic personnel (Crowdy, 2006).

The secret police was an integral part of the larger modern principles of surveillance and policing developing from mid 18th centuries onwards. Jeremy Bentham's ideas, famously analysed by Michel Foucault, signalled a wider change in the principles and forms of governance, suited to deal with the emerging industrial mode of production and its attendant specific social relations. These techniques of management, control and surveillance travelled back and forth globally through imperial and colonial networks, tested and perfected in different milieus. In a different but connected vein, E.P. Thompson also showed the role secret police played in early industrial Britain in enabling the capitalist class to bring into being the British working class and pattern it according to its interests, by infiltrating the workers' circles and spying on their insurrectional plans (Thompson, 1963).

Abroad, the activity of the secret police was salient in building the European colonial empires and especially for projecting the British imperial power globally. This process entailed, among other things, the construction of a vast imperial archive. Thomas Richards (1993) noted that the myth of the imperial archive rests on two conceptions of knowledge: it has to be both positive and comprehensive. For the Victorians, the project of positive knowledge divided the world into small facts, understood as pieces of knowledge that were certain and that could, according to Mill and Comte, be verifiable. The accumulation of these tiny elements would lead then to a comprehensive knowledge, to the totality of knowledge. This imperial legacy of the 19th century inscribes the monopolistic possession of knowledge as undergirding the exercise of power. As Richards observed, in a distinctly anti-Derrida vein one might add, the archive is neither a building, nor a collection of texts, but an imaginary junction point of what is known or considered to be knowable – in short the phantasmatic representation of the epistemological possibility of total knowledge. The existence of the secret police is an outcome of the idea that everything about reality is and should be knowable, graspable, and archiveable.

But the archive is the interface between knowledge and the state. As Richards pointed out, in late 19th century and early 20th century the physical embodiment of this imperial archival fantasy was Tibet, the archive-state, the state as archive where Sherlock Holmes too retreats to enhance his wits:

The archival confinement of total knowledge under the purview of the state was Tibet, an imagined community that united archival institutions in one hieratic archive-state. In Western mythology Tibet was a sanitarium for the recuperation of an exhaustive knowledge that was always in danger of entropy, loss, or destruction. It was a fortress of solitude to which Sherlock Holmes, repository of a complete knowledge of all the streets of London, retires during his two-year disappearance, beyond the reach of call, to collect his wits by meditating on the sum total of knowledge itself. (Richards 1993:11-12)

As such, the state is central to human life and knowledge. More to the point, state and knowledge are inseparable and the state becomes the very epistemological foundation for the existence of knowledge, which in turn must remain the purview of the state. Or, as Richards aptly put it, there is an inseparable link between classified information in the sense of ordered, catalogued, taxonomized, and classified information in the sense of hidden, cached, secret. Ordered and catalogued: the scientific knowledge is inextricably linked to the power of secrecy.

State knowledge and secret knowledge are almost interchangeable and the means to acquire them virtually indistinguishable. In the 19th century, despite its ubiquity, spying was still an amateurish and non-formalized occupation. As Richards noted about India, it emerged from within the circles of intellectuals and friends belonging to universities and learned societies. The security police of the British Empire (the Secret Service, the Foreign Office) primarily recruited its agents and derived its methods of operation and surveillance from within these circles, particularly those involved in producing classified (in both meanings) and comprehensive knowledge, especially the geographical, demographic, and ethnographic societies. Such members were multi-tasked: spies producing knowledge about the colonial reality while their reports recommended forms of altering that reality, of making it more governable, transparent, and knowable.

The interwar period, and then the demands of World War II, enhanced and professionalized these practices of knowledge production and accumulation. Intellectuals and scientists were drafted into states' war machines in order to map out reality and contribute vital knowledge and expertise against the enemy. In the post-war era the new global hegemon – the US and its allies – continued the practice of producing knowledge about world via the influence of the secret police. David H. Price documented in detail, and with staggering examples, the collusion between the CIA and the anthropologists during the Cold War and the role the knowledge generated by the latter played for the activity of the former (Price, 2016). Just like previous imperial archives, the CIA sought to construct an archive that would be able to archive everything for further potential use. As Price writes:

As part of its effort to monitor and control international developments the early CIA collected and curated global knowledge. The agency envisioned that even the almost random collection of knowledge could eventually, if organized and retrievable, later be used in intelligence capacities. The scope of its approach to collecting disarticulated bits of knowledge is shown in Jane Schnell's classified article 'Snapshots at Random' (1961), which described a CIA collection known as the 'Graphic Register'. This was the agency archive of photographs collected from all over the world showing routine features and elements of

physical culture. These photographs were catalogued and analysed for use at some unknown date in CIA operations... The CIA believed that if enough information was collected from enough angles, American intelligence could develop a comprehensive view of the world it sought to control. No mundane event or artefact was too insignificant for collection... This project was an emblematic representation of the CIA's mid-century project: it was well funded, global, brash, panoptical, without borders or limits. It was funded despite the unlikelihood that it would ever produce much useful intelligence, and working under conditions of secrecy removed normal general expectations of outcomes or accountability. (Price 2016:12)

In the context of the Soviet modernity in Eastern Europe, the agents of the secret police played a comparable role. They had to generate classified information about the socialist reality for the state, while also being asked to suggest modes of intervening in the reality that they were describing with a view to making it intelligible for state action and policies. As such, state knowledge and secret knowledge were virtually indistinguishable.

Just like in the western case, the institution of the socialist secret police, the Securitate in the Romanian case, was also constituted at the intersection between the state, the archive, and the practices of gathering, storing, and using knowledge. Ultimately, specific to the Securitate was its production of knowledge for the benefit of the state. Therefore, the kind of knowledge the Securitate produced, the theoretical and empirical tools used to generate and validate that knowledge and the social purposes it fulfilled offer important elements of investigation into the nature of this institution, beyond its typical and stereotypical description as a repressive one.

My argument is that what the Securitate did was to construct a form of anthropology for the benefit of the socialist state, not dissimilar to the colonial roots of the discipline as such. I have two reasons to suggest this point: one relates to form, the other to substance.

First, at the level of form, if we look carefully, the jargon of the Securitate apparatus, and its *modus operandi*, are remarkably similar to the anthropological toolkit that defined it as a legitimate discipline in the modern scientific division of labour. For example, both the secret agents and the anthropologists start out with a 'research plan' that guides their inquiry, which must remain flexible enough in order to be adjustable to the circumstances in the field. Both operate with categories of 'subjects', 'informants', 'hosts', 'goals', and 'networks'. Both activities presuppose a laborious work of gathering and managing fieldwork materials, such as field notes, written texts, diaries, declarations, and interviews and both have to use triangulation in order to verify and certify their findings. Thus, both are activities eminently based on writing, during various stages of their research.

In both cases the writing-up process is a distinct activity, usually pursued in settings remote from the field and from the informants, incorporating previous notes, interpretations, and a specific jargon and rhetoric, while being aware of the institutional expectations and rules. Both have to report to their 'supervisors' in order to discuss the progress of the research and the possible paths of interpretation and action; both are also requested to undergo a personal process of self-reflection, trying to understand their position in the field and to achieve clarity about the sense of their own work (and to eliminate any possible sources of contradiction or conflict).³ Therefore, the Securitate archive constitutes a vast corpus of writings, highly political, ideological, and hegemonic, that isolates social facts about reality, which are then presented as expert knowledge by virtue of their epistemic authority. Or to put it differently, the Securitate is a mechanism that turns reality into words and as such makes scientific and epistemic claims.

Secondly, at a more substantial level, what anthropology and the Securitate share at the level of producing knowledge is their focus on social relations, social interactions, and social networks (see also Verdery, 2014). Basically what they look at and try to grasp is how the social is being constituted and how it evolves in time at the intersection between and as a result of the interaction of individuals, groups, and institutions. Finally, I would even argue that what is salient for both is a quest for – in fact a fixation with – 'hidden knowledge': not in the sense that knowledge is being purposefully hidden by somebody, but in the sense of 'deep knowledge', not easily accessible and evident, below the immediate surface of what meets the eye. Both anthropology and the Securitate start from the immediate, the everyday and the familiar in order to discover what is behind all that, larger networkers, longer historical trajectories, bigger structures and connections.

The practice of using secret agents for generating knowledge about reality should be regarded therefore as a particular practice among many other modern ones of rendering the world knowable and graspable. The secret agents and the anthropologists, while performing particular tasks in differently patterned institutions, nonetheless share a common epistemological ground in the way knowledge is defined, accumulated and used, specific to western modernity. Both are involved in processes of 'translating' the surrounding world in specifically codified languages and both share the ambition of rendering visible the hidden.

³ For a detailed discussion of anthropology as a science of writing and making notes and especially fieldnotes, see Roger Sanjek 1990. Despite its unbearable post-modern take, it is a good account of how anthropology is essentially based on the process of classifying information obtained from informants. For what the Romanian secret agents and informers did and how their work resembles that of agents in the field, see Carmen Chivu and Mihai Albu, 2007.

Ultimately, both produce thoroughly de-naturalizing effects, elevating concrete, immediate phenomena to abstract understanding. They are two of the most important epistemic tools through which the very concept of a global modern world becomes conceivable. Ultimately, they are a form of science of the social.

Two immediate concerns may be brought up here: first, that the practice of anthropology, and therefore the knowledge it produces and its purposes, is diverse and it cannot be captured in an ideal-type description of the discipline, especially following the manifold internal differentiations and dialogues that took place at least after 1968 and following the postcolonial critique from within the discipline; second, that while the practice of anthropology might be historically problematic and initially linked to practices of colonialism, eurocentrism, and racial domination, it still cannot be compared – even at its worst – to the activities and ultimate purposes of a paranoid and clearly repressive institution. Both concerns have merits, and they perhaps require a subsequent wider description. For the purposes of this paper suffice it to note that despite its internal difference and divergent historical paths what is specific to anthropology – its trademark – is the concept and practice of ethnography at its core: that is, in short, offering a written account about an observed reality.⁴ This was what the Securitate was in principle called to do – with the significant difference that it benefited from the leverage of state institutional and legal backing to do its ethnography. But, as I will discuss below description is never simply a description but it has a performative character as well, at the same time creating the realities it purports to simply describe. Surely, performative effects are usually different and highly dependent upon the context of their appearance.

As for the second concern, I do not suggest here that anthropologists are anything like the socialist secret agents (even though David H. Price documented a number of cases when anthropologists have been exactly that, willingly or not), and not even like their colonial ancestors. Rather, I suggest that there is an isomorphism between their activities and that secret agents, for reasons I will discuss below, employed anthropological tools.

Katherine Verdery too observed the link between Securitate and anthropology in the study of her Securitate file as an ethnographic object. She noted, for example, how the Securitate agents thought she had received intelligence training by observing her own anthropological practice: keeping fieldnotes, using informants that received a code-name, jotting down general information about context and environment, operating with a special code and so on. No wonder,

⁴ Of course, things are never that straightforward and even such a minimal definition is problematic. For a mapping out of the wider predicaments of ethnography as concept, practice, and genre, see the classic Clifford and Marcus, 1986.

they believed, the anthropologist must be a spy if they shared so much of the actual process of gathering knowledge and transposing it into pieces of information that could be archived, retrieved, and reassembled together. This was not simply a parallel concerning methods, but a more structural one. As Verdery also noted, what the secret policemen ultimately tried to do was to 'make close examination of everyday behaviour and interpret what they found' (Verdery 2014:87). The Securitate, therefore, had as its object of inquiry the everyday life of the socialist regime and as such they had to deploy a series of tools, but also to generate a notion of the social itself and how it works, in order to grasp its dynamics and report about it to the higher echelons of the party. Indeed, they were the 'eyes and ears' of the party, but in this very anthropological sense: a specific form of knowledge and practice that sought to understand the nuts and bolts of a society in its daily, everyday life interactions.

In their influential work *Laboratory Life*, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986) explored the daily routine of a group of scientists that led to the creation of scientific facts. What they noticed was that most of the work of the scientists consisted largely of producing various forms of *inscriptions* and that most of their time was spent writing and revising. This writing accumulated as papers to be published in scientific journals accompanied by an entire corpus of diagrams, texts, charts, maps, and so on. The authors concluded that the laboratory was a place that took statements of one level of facticity and transformed them into other levels, in a 5-step scale that ranged from very factual to speculation. Latour and Woolgar offered a processual definition of science. Instead of a substantive answer to 'what is science?' they suggested to look at practices and analyse what the scientists *do*.

This idea of science is helpful for understanding the secret police as a form of 'mapping' the reality aimed to transform the everyday reality into scientific inscriptions, legible, intelligible, and usable for the exercise of power. The secret police is then a large social laboratory established by the state in which social facts are transformed into scientific facts through processes of recording (testimonies, conversations, meetings, and so on), observation, codification, taxonomy, cartography, reading and, above all, writing for the use of the political power. Ultimately, in modernity, science is nothing else but the promise of rendering intelligible and visible, through various mechanisms and techniques, things that are otherwise opaque, discreet, and invisible.

But in this case there is more to it. The Securitate was tasked not only to gather knowledge but also to actively take part in shaping the new socialist reality. As it were, the Securitate had to integrate in its functioning two types of opposing knowledge and knowledge production mechanisms. On the one hand, the positivist and empirical knowledge which emerged by engaging the reality

through particular knowledge tools. On the other hand, *a priori* knowledge that emerged from the theory of communism, that is, from the truth of ideology. This *a priori*, superior knowledge had to inform the remaking of reality and had to, by definition, take precedence over the empirical reality as such.

To put it differently, the secret police was called simultaneously to acquire factual knowledge (through surveillance, recordings, etc.) while subordinating it to the truth of ideology (which entailed deciding who was a spy, a traitor, etc. based on theory and ideology). The real contradiction of knowledge at the heart of the socialist regimes, best exemplified by the secret police, is that they had to rely at the very same time on both deductive and inductive logic. Inductive logic meant broad generalizations based on very particular and fragmentary details: for example, the observation of a dialogue between two dissidents would necessary be the sign of an anti-regime complot sponsored from abroad. The possibility for these broad generalizations was offered by the very ideological presuppositions on which the regime was premised.

Already rooted in Marxism there was the strong imperative that the task of any socialist politico-philosophical practice was to change the world. This belief was quintessential for the Bolsheviks that took power in USSR in 1917 and in practice defined the existence of the Soviet system as a better alternative to Western modernity. All spheres of life were to be thoroughly transformed in keeping with the socialist thinking and against all bourgeois remnants. The material world, people, and social relations had to undergo, simultaneously, a radical break with the past. In this context, the arts also had to break with their focus on representation (of nature, of reality) and actively take part in the revolutionary transformation of society by changing ideas, habits, feelings, and so on.

This idea was well rooted in the avant-gardes of the early 20th century and after 1917 became part of the socialist project more generally. But if the artists and cultural creators were called upon to take active part in this sweeping transformation, so were the secret police officers (Vatulescu 2005). They had to monitor and report on people, but also to actively take part in moulding them as New Men. At the heart of the socialist secret police was not only a desire to repress and control, but also to actively and performatively create better citizens.⁵ Or, as Rancière put it apropos of police in modernity

The police is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the police lies neither in repression nor even in control over the living. Its essence lies in a certain way of dividing up the sensible (Rancière 2010).

⁵ It is perhaps useful to note in this context that the name of the foreign intelligence service of East Germany was: Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung –the Department of Enlightenment (Garton Ash, 1997:16).

Deriving originally from the distinction J.L. Austin made between constative and performative utterances, performativity describes the active making of reality through speech and discourse. The performative act comprises the locutionary level (the speech itself, organized by phonetics, syntax, grammatical rules and so), the illocutionary level (the social function of the locution), and the perlocutionary level (that is the social effect it generates). Discourse has the reiterative power to produce the phenomena it regulates and governs. Performative acts cannot be judged according to criteria of true and false, as it is the case with the constative ones, but with some criteria measuring their effectiveness or persuasiveness. Precisely the capacity of power to performatively construct the reality and the subject of its exercise, also offers the space in which resistance to that power can be formulated by breaking the chain of reiterability.

Alexei Yurchak (2005) developed this point in a compelling fashion in relation to Soviet communism. He believed that what characterized this system was people's repeated enactment of the form of the regime's authoritative discourse, without attending to its constative meaning. The repeated performance of these fixed forms opened ways for the emergence of various meaningful and creative activities, communities, beliefs, and networks. As it were, the very exercise of power through its performative celebrations, parades and ritualistic speeches created the Soviet reality while also engendering the preconditions for its own subversion.

One of my informants witnessed the following episode one day in the CNSAS reading room. While consulting his own surveillance file, a man took out a pen and started to make his own annotations on the original, marking those things that were factually true and crossing out those that were false or incorrect – to the horror of the archive's guardians.⁶ This is perhaps the perfect metaphor, the extreme case, of how the files were generally read in post-communism: with an eye to their correspondence to reality, to their trueness in relation to facticity. But, as suggested already, this kind of reading might miss the point.

The common thread of the files is that they seem to document various attempts at challenging the reality presented by the socialist regime, attempts at formulating, presenting, disclosing a different reality. To put it differently, secret files registered attempts at or actual instances of challenging the socialist Reality through an account of reality based on a representational and empirical perspective, ranging from banal conversations about the lack of bread in shops to

⁶ This episode also raises interesting questions about ownership and property of the archive. Who do the files belong to? Do the people surveilled have any claim to the files? Are the files solely the property of the state even though the files usually contain personal items, like letters, intimate conversations and so on? I owe this point to Katherine Verdery.

more political positions and to summaries of Radio Free Europe bulletins. These small acts of dissidence, or to put it in Yurchak's terms, these refusals to participate in the performative production of the socialist Reality that every citizen was expected to do were then codified in the language and imaginary of the Securitate which effectively meant the beginning of anti-regime complots, or the traces of an imperialist plot, or acts of provocation and unrest and so on.

Class Struggle for Knowledge

In *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus* Georgi Derluguian (2004) noted that one of the causes that have laid the foundation for the collapse of the socialist states was informational scarcity: that is, the lack of genuine information on the actual state of the economy and society. The attempt to establish a monopoly in every sphere of life, from the economic plan to the sex life, deprived these Party-States of a mechanism through which to evaluate and control the performance of their own bureaucracies and work of the intelligentsia.

Similarly, but in a different vein, Andreas Glaeser (2010) proposed an epistemic explanation of the failure of state socialism. For Glaeser socialist states failed because the socialist elites did not manage to produce adequate understandings of everyday functioning of the society. Therefore, they could not develop timely reforms of the system, in keeping with wider societal mutations. By remaining strictly observant of ideological dogmas, the party leaders lost touch with the actual reality and also lacked the proper means to understand it. Ultimately, communism failed when it could not sustain any of its pretences: neither that of a superior knowledge producing a better life for all, nor that of the power to actively shape reality for the better.

While Glaeser is right to point out these inbuilt tensions within the socialist system, he overstates the case concerning the extent to which various socialist regimes were keen to implement what he calls a 'monolithic intentionality': that is, the subordination of the entire social reality to the ideological norms devised by the Party. Socialist parties did not produce only hard-core ideologues shaping the new socialist life discursively, but it also had to create various technical specialists and scientists able to run the economy and the society. While the regime tried to keep them in check and subordinated to the ideological project, they nonetheless had their own autonomy conferred by the mastery of technical and scientific competences and knowledge. What Glaeser fails to see therefore, like many western scholars of socialism, is the class nature of the regime itself. Instead of seeking the contradictions of the socialist system in a too rigid attachment to ideology that prevented meaningful knowledge about the reality, as Glaeser

suggests, we should note instead how the very structure of the socialist regimes created insurmountable contradictions, both social but also at the level of knowledge production and, as such, at what was possible for the socialist social sciences to achieve.

Silviu Brucan (1990) also referred to the constantly growing contradiction between the ideological foundations of the socialist regimes and their social realities. Because these regimes were as far as possible from the Marxist idea of communism and even from Lenin's concept of development, the actuality of actually existing socialism was hidden under more and more ideological verbiage. This created a particularly uneasy situation for the socialist social sciences especially that, in the apt formulation of Brucan, social data and facts acquired an 'illegal' character (Brucan 1990:39). It seems that the socialist regimes could not and did not want to look into their own functioning through the social sciences because they knew what they were going to find there: their own contradictions and internal tensions. The activity of the secret police was called to nonetheless generate this necessary knowledge for the use of the party-state, with scientific means, but only for the eyes of the officialdom. Only such an institution that was simultaneously loyal to the regime but distinct from the party-state hierarchy was suited to satisfy the paradoxical knowledge requirements of the regime: that of creating reliable though nonetheless cached knowledge about the socialist society.

Such a mechanism was even more necessary since it articulated with the class contradictions at the heart of all socialist societies. Every socialist party faced a similar conundrum after taking state power: on the one hand to quickly swell the numbers of industrial workers which represented the ideological justification of the socialist party's grip on power as revolutionary avant-garde; on the other to dismantle the old state and form a new one around loyal bureaucrats and cadres. On top of that, the Soviet model of socialism was predicated on the nationalization of the means of production and the institutionalization of the Plan as the main mechanism of rationalization of the economic and social life. This instantly created at least three social classes of actors with both converging and diverging interests: the emerging industrial workers, the party-state bureaucracies that merged together in the control of the state and production, and the technocracy in charge of devising and implementing the Plan that even though initially was recruited and had strong links with the top echelon of the party-state nexus it nonetheless enjoyed its own degree of autonomy by virtue of its technical competence. This was also the class mostly in need of accurate social scientific data about the socialist society in order to devise the Plan accordingly and correct its implementation. Not surprisingly at all therefore, in the Romanian case Miron Constantinescu, a high profile politician, was the first person in charge

with devising and implementing the first 5-year Plan, but also the person who contributed the most to the development of a socialist scientific discipline at the very heart of the socialist state (Poenaru, 2015; Petrovici and Bosomitu, this issue).

This social arrangement once set in motion it had its own *sui generis* course as a result of the internal design of socialist developmentalism, but an important external factor also had an important pulling force, especially in the Romanian case. The pivoting towards the west after the second half of the 1960s increased the role of the technocracy, which was now called not only to manage the Plan but also to coordinate the cooperation with the global capitalist world. This naturally increased further the need for specialization of the technocracy and its dependency on a different type of knowledge than the one provided by the official ideology. Among other causes it led to an inevitable rift between the party-state bureaucracy and the technocracy in the very process of exercising state power and economic development.

It was in this context that the secret police came in handy in order to keep track of everyday knowledge, and more importantly, to monitor the activities of the technocracy, unbounded now by the adherence to the superior knowledge of socialism. Then, the population most targeted by the Securitate surveillances, especially in post-Stalinism, was the technocracy, simply because it was best situated in a position from which to challenge the Party's monopoly of knowledge and information and its evaluations on the state of the economy and society. The Securitate was a tool in the hands of the party-state bureaucracy that was used in order to monitor the actions of the technocracy, and as a deterrent to the accumulation of knowledge in alternative centres.

The role of the Securitate becomes even more important if we consider the landscape of scientific knowledge production. By and large, all academic fields essential to governance, such as the economics, politics, diplomacy, and so on were strictly subordinated to party control through a series of party-schools (Gheorghiu, 2007). So was philosophy, considered essential for developing party ideology and staunch cadres. Disciplines like sociology and anthropology that could offer a challenge to the Party's monopoly of power by confronting it with its actual societal effects were institutionally castrated and neutralized and thus rendered to a large degree irrelevant (see Poenaru, 2015). These niches did accommodate a series of interesting practitioners and sound sociological work (for example works in urbanization, but also the fertile intersection between sociology and literary studies that generated an important sociology of the intellectual field – see Gheorghiu 2007), but it was far from the critical potential manifested by the social sciences across the socialist block in challenging official

knowledge production and dissemination.⁷ Even worse, history, archaeology, and literary studies – usually disciplines in which critical and alternative knowledge practices and interpretations get articulated – were incorporated into the practices of constructing the nationalistic cult of personality. In this context the Securitate had to fill the task of monitoring and reporting back on what was happening in the society to the benefit of the party.⁸

This division of labour for knowledge production and accumulation was discernable also in the different pathways of formation specific to various classes of the socialist state. Initially, the party cadres were formed in party schools that constituted accelerated forms of upward social mobility mainly by virtue of ‘healthy origin’ with a view to replace the interwar bourgeois ruling classes and bureaucracy. Skill and knowledge were less important than loyalty to the party and to the socialist ideology. But because of that, party schools also lacked symbolic authority since admission was not tied to knowledge but to the desire for advancing in a political career. As Vladimir Pasti showed, every manager of the socialist bureaucracy had to be first of all a ‘good socialist’ (Pasti 2006). This notion was then formalized based on a reasoning in which one’s motivations and values depended more on one’s social milieu and upbringing than on personality. This led to the creation of the ‘*dosar de cadre*’ (the cadres dossier) – a register in which the entire biographical trajectory of a person was recorded and measured against the criteria of ideological and party fidelity.

Starting in late 1960s, however, significant transformations of the socialist state and economy posed a challenge to this model. The Party started to reward technical competences, not just political loyalty. In this context, the university system gained a different symbolic status, together with a vast injection of funding. Entering university was now considered a major achievement, holding the promise of a firm sense of future and prestige. To put it differently, the socialist state began to cultivate its own professional middle class, with consumerist expectations and specific lifestyle.

Tensions soon abounded. While party apparatchiks were overall less prepared to run the economy, they nonetheless remained in charge of the commanding heights of the economy and of the Plan. They retained the power to allocate and distribute resources and generally to establish the overall directions of

⁷ See in particular the works of János Kornai, Ivan Szelenyi, and Pavel Câmpeanu who wrote his books under pseudonym and in English, in contrast to his Hungarian counterparts.

⁸ Remarkable in this sense is the collection of documents from the Securitate archive compiled by Florian Banu (2012). There it becomes evident how the Securitate was struggling against austerity measures affecting its own activity to document all aspects of the everyday life during the 1980s, from systemic aspects like the distribution of goods in shops to accidental cases like food poisoning in children’s camps. The entire social world was putatively the object of the Securitate’s observation activity.

the society. Consequently, the technocracy remained both politically, economically, and symbolically subordinated to the party cadres, and ideologically subordinated to the working classes, which was also on average slightly better paid (Brucan, 1990). The technocracy, naturally, began to accumulate frustrations in relation both to the party and the working classes and to become severely hindered in its development by the political monopoly of the party.

These sentiments were amplified by the economic crisis beginning to take root at the end of the 1970s and to reach dramatic proportions during the 1980s. Then, the mobility within the socialist system came to a virtual halt, frustrating the technocracy which was wasting its skills while being excluded from power by incompetent bureaucrats.⁹ In addition, because of the deep suspicion of the Party towards the intelligentsia, the recruitment of cadres was done internally from party schools which, following the 1960s professionalization, were able to produce technical specialists too, with competences to run the economy. This was however at the expense of theoretical and ideological specialists which could have generated alternative political projects and economic visions within the top echelons of the Party. The professionalization of the party schools and their abandoning of ideology explain perhaps why there was no reformist Marxist current in Romania, compared to other countries of the former bloc, which could have been politically productive during the drab 1980s (Gheorghiu, 2007).

In this context, the Party, through the 'eyes and ears' of the Securitate, sought to keep under control and surveillance the disenchanting and frustrated intelligentsia, while it actively devised policies for limiting its growth. In the late 1970s, the party reorganized the education system by drastically limiting the number of university places for socio-humanist disciplines, while encouraging only certain technical ones, such as engineering, traditionally more aligned to the party interests (Brucan, 1990). This was necessary since under the new economic constraints the party could not absorb anymore the graduates from these disciplines, leaving them largely disenchanting and prone to rebellion.

But the party was not interested in actively repressing the technocracy either. Rather, it aimed just to discourage outright rebellion through constant harassment, intimidation, and threats while keeping at bay the accumulation of alternative knowledge. One of the strategies envisaged by the Securitate and the party was to allow the technocracy limited cultural consumption and cultural practices and to encourage escapist, non-political activities. Of course, serious collisions did take place occasionally, some very violent, others leading to serious reprimands and even short-time jail sentences. But by and large, the idea of a particularly harsh oppressive regime was not warranted. The Securitate was perhaps more intrusive because of its instructions to know everything, but not

⁹ A longer and more complex discussion in Konrad and Szeleny (1979).

more violent. The myth of the violence of the Securitate is an *a posteriori* one, devised by the intelligentsia as a class in order to justify its lack of political courage against the party as well as the lack of any organized, sustained forms of dissidence.

Unsurprisingly then, in post-communism it was largely the intelligentsia that had a high stake in opening the Securitate files and in cultivating the anti-communist politics of history and memory. Ultimately, the files of the Securitate comprised the biography of the intelligentsia as a class in formation, which was germane for the process of claiming political and economic hegemony in post-communism. Consequently, the post-communist pressures to open the Securitate archive are a distinctive mark of the class struggle already constitutive of the socialist society, now prolonged in post-communism, but displaced as concerns with 'memory', 'justice', and 'truth'.

By invoking the ubiquity of the Securitate surveillance, as an epitome of the brutality and dictatorship of the socialist regime in general, the files of the Securitate were elevated to the status of irrefutable proofs for the need to condemn the past in the name of the formal bourgeois rights pertaining to free expression and protection of the private sphere. The files became the traumatic legacy of the past and the evidence for the necessity to dismantle the old society and build a new one based on western values. As such, the files could always be mobilized as reminders whenever the hegemonic consensus of the transition was questioned: they became the insurmountable limit to understanding the past, the vantage point for its interpretation.

The temptation to inscribe the Securitate as the perpetrator of all evils, to turn the secret agents into societal scapegoats has a long tradition *within* the socialist regime itself. This model was offered by the de-Stalinization process inaugurated by Khrushchev's secret speech in which the secret police was blamed for siding with the dictator against the party and the working class. Similarly, in Romania, in a speech in August 1968, at the height of his attempts to consolidate power around the nation, Nicolae Ceaușescu also pointed the blame in the direction of the Securitate for the abuses of the 1950s and for generally working independently against and outside the party control (Banu, 2012).

This engendered not only a reorganization of the Securitate, bringing it under close party control, but also inaugurated a period of coming to terms with the Stalinist past and with the crimes of the Securitate. During the 1970s, literary, cinematic, and intellectual productions openly confronted the Securitate abuses, sometimes authored by people who actively suffered as political prisoners. The centrality of the Securitate as evil is not a post-socialist invention, but an ideological construction of the party itself from the time when it actively sought to create its own intelligentsia. The two are inextricably linked.

But there is a deeper complexity concerning the relationship between the Securitate and the Party. Despite their close connection, their interaction was far from frictionless, thus cautioning against simplistic views that see the Securitate as entirely subordinated to party politics. In fact, the Securitate enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and some of its actions managed to frustrate party apparatchiks. In Romania, the shattering event was of course the defection of general Pacepa to the CIA in 1978.

In fact, what the view that simply subordinates the Securitate to the party and to the dictatorial logic of the regime itself misses is in fact the historical transformations that shaped the institution itself. It also hides the fact that we know so little about this organization and its workers, beyond the ideological simplifications of anti-communism. In the 1950s, the Securitate rank-and-file was mostly recruited from working class and peasant backgrounds. Some of its initial violence and hands-on behaviour were a result of the class struggle these people were called upon to enact against the former bourgeois owners and exploiters. The Romanian fascists –the legionars – were also prime targets for this institutionalized violence, and some of them were recruited in order to help catch and re-educate others (see Totok and Macovei, 2016). But just like in other areas, from the 1970s onwards, the Securitate started to recruit people based on training and merit, educated in a parallel system of institutions. For secret police officers too, their ideological commitment and class origin became less important than their skills.

In short, the Securitate itself was gradually becoming a corpus of technical cadres, almost like a mediator between party-state bureaucracy and technocracy – to be sure, a very privileged one in terms of its position within the society, but also in terms of power and access to knowledge. They were the first to notice the disastrous effects of party policies, especially in the 1980s, and to actively attempt to resist party tasks. What was initially an attempt of the party to try to subordinate the production of knowledge about everyday life gained an autonomy of its own and became a counter-force to party interests and knowledge production mechanisms. This trajectory dovetails once more the multiple paradoxes at the heart of knowledge production during socialism that this paper tried to stake out.

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Critical Reviews

Editorial Note:

This section provides reviews and critical reflections upon recent evolutions in social research, with focus on changing societies and current dilemmas.

BOOK REVIEW

***The Value of Labor: The Science of Commodification in Hungary, 1920-1956*, by Martha Lampland, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016, 368 pages**

ÁGNES GAGYI¹, TAMÁS GERŐCS²

Following on the path of questioning that Lampland laid out in *The Object of Labor* (1995), *The Value of Labor* delves deeper into the technopolitical history of the commodification of agrarian labour in Hungary. Previously, Lampland has maintained that the individualized concepts of time, money, and labour imposed by socialist collectivization bore continuity with pre-socialist agrarian modernization, and were instrumental to the transition to capitalism. In *The Value of Labor*, she follows expert and policy debates in 1930s work science, and points out their continuities with the institutionalization of the work unit in the Stalinist phase of collectivization. Such continuities contradict the Cold War concept of Stalinist modernization as Soviet models imposed from scratch. Targeting debates in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS), history of economics, and Cold War history, Lampland draws three interconnected conclusions: 1) an emphasis on the role of markets in determining the value of labour obscures the historical construction of the knowledge, policy, and material infrastructures that perform its commodification; 2) performativity of economics should also be understood through the history of the material infrastructures of scientific intervention; and 3) the Cold War periodization that separates socialist and capitalist modernization does not stand in face of the historical continuity between pre-socialist and socialist infrastructures of labour commodification.

While Lampland's conclusions primarily address debates within the above fields, her findings are interesting and relevant contributions to other fields too, where many of her conclusions are shared. In the field of debate on the interconnected historical development of capitalism, especially in the tradition

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and debates around the world-systems approach, semi-peripheral modernization is analysed as a process of integration into capitalism as a global system (Wallerstein, 1974). In the context of that socio-historical process, the commodification of agricultural labour in Hungary that Lampland traces can be seen as part of a long-term social transformation structured by penetrating global forces of capitalist development. The social positions of the actors whose debates Lampland analyses can be identified within that larger process. Lampland's remarks on structural continuities between the interwar period and Stalinism, as well as her descriptions of various ideological and moral standpoints within agrarian debates, resonate well with a world-system perspective on the structural process of capitalist integration (Frank, 1977). Just like Lampland's conclusion on continuity, this perspective also contradicts the Cold War paradigm of treating socialist and capitalist modernization as separated entities. In what follows, we bring several examples where we think the resonance between the two perspectives opens promising possibilities for understanding long-term local social transformation across political systems.

Large estates and the question of the land reform

From the perspective of world-economic integration, the structural rigidity of large-scale farming in Hungary is rooted in the country's integration as a satellite agro-supplier to industrializing core countries at the early stage of capitalist development (Pach, 1963). As this type of semi-peripheral integration in the international division of labour favoured large-sale farming for export, it engendered a concentration of land in the hands of a few powerful manorial landowners, and the corresponding growth of a class of landless agriculture labourers.

One notable example of political clashes that Lampland mentions from the 19th century was the one between large landowners with rising manorial economies and the middle segments of the land-holder nobility. The latter's estates were not large enough to compete in the world market, they were undercapitalized and therefore unable to modernize their estates, and their production depended on coercive forms of labour control and market protection. As such, they were interested in the formation of the coerced cash-crop labour force that Engels (1882) called the second serfdom in the Prussian context, so as to stay competitive on the agrarian market. In the first half of the 19th century, political debates fuelled by these class dynamics among land-holders focused on issues like the juridical status of the serfs, and the role of the credit system in a predominantly feudal legislation, in a situation where the commercialization of land had become essential. One of the famous advocates of the abolition of

serfdom and the commercialization of manorial lands to improve financial credibility was István Széchenyi, one of the biggest land-holders of the time. As one characteristic point in the debate around agrarian modernization, Lampland mentions Széchenyi's stance for the commodification of labour (the liberation of the serfs) and the commercialization of land (the expansion of the credit system) as an early example for technocratic modernization (Lampland, 2016). Viewed from the perspective of the historical dynamics of capitalist integration, that stance stood in line with the economic position of large landholders exposed to pressures from the world market. It was their interest to create a labour market based less on coercion and more on the wage form of labour control, and to gain access to financial instruments such as state bonds or private capital. Széchenyi's stance was heavily opposed by his fellow contemporaries with smaller land holdings that were not in the position to implement competitive innovations, and feared losing their manpower together with their own social position after the abolition of serfdom. On the other hand, Széchenyi firmly opposed land reform. If manorial land had been distributed amongst the agrarian workforce simultaneously with the abolition of serfdom, the emergence of the wage form would have been impeded, as workers would not be free in the double sense of Marx's term. This would have harmed the large estates' interests that pointed towards the commercialization of land and the commodification of labour.

A similarly dynamic social fragmentation happened among the peasantry. Their number had been on a steady decline for centuries, and by the 19th century, semi-proletarian agricultural labourers outnumbered peasants by a great margin (Gunst, 1998). However, a thin stratum of the peasantry managed to acquire land either by purchase or lease in order to produce for the local markets. Due to that process, enormous estates and middle-sized farms coexisted in the rural agricultural landscape in the interwar period. Landless villagers were hired not only by landlords, but also by land-bearing peasants. In the interwar period, Hungarian narodnik intellectuals heroized land-bearing peasants in their political agenda for land reform. Their social status was universalized in an ideal of a Hungarian third way agrarian development (neither capitalist, nor socialist), which they sometimes referred to as the garden economy (Németh, 1943). The term of peasant embourgeoisement (cf. Erdei, 1973) was created to describe the possibility of universal social flourishing in Garden Hungary. This was an idealization with a narrow focus on one particular class within a process pointing towards the concentration of land and the formation of agrarian wage labour. It is this ideological moment Lampland identifies as (left) political alternatives being articulated for a land reform that would have benefited a free-holder peasantry in the 1930s. After the devastation of the war, the political agenda of the narodniks was strong and popular, and helped to restore the rural

social order. The land reform they initiated, which enjoyed the backing of the post-war coalition, including the communists, targeted large estates. However, the social transformation which the Moscow-backed communist party had envisioned and later applied was not peasant embourgeoisment, but the Stalinist model of industrialization, for which they needed a completely different approach to agriculture.

Lampland emphasizes that rather than a genuinely ‘Socialist’ turn, Stalinist collectivization featured a strong continuity with previous structures of estates and agrarian labour. Indeed, the structural push for large-scale, increasingly technological agriculture remained in place, while the increased productivity of agriculture was used for a next phase of structural integration in the world capitalist economy: the effort to catch up with the industrialization of core countries. The ‘free’ agricultural work of interwar estates, in fact coupled with repressive forms of labour control, including slavery, coerced cash-crop labour or semi-wage forms depending on patronal ties, found its continuation in a proletarianization process which, however forceful, did not manage to fully penetrate the wage form into the peasant class, and coupled brutal exploitation of the agrarian sector for the sake of industry with pushing individual producers to complement their livelihood with farming small plots. This semi-proletarian type of agrarian labour has been described as a lasting characteristic of semi-peripheries across cycles of world-economic integration (Dunaway, 2012). That debates over the measurement of labour value or assessing conditions of migrant workers were similar in geographically distant locations, as Lampland notes e.g. between Hungary and Mexico (Lampland, 2016:94), follows from typical tensions of the integration process in similar world-market positions. The continuity of that process implies a localized story of uneven development, bridging early forms of the second serfdom in the 16th century, manorial serfdom in late 19th century, and the forceful exploitation of peasants by state-socialist cooperatives in the middle of the 20th century. From a world-economic point of view, the continuous sweep of modernization Lampland points out coalesced with global trends, as former agrarian social structures were replaced by industrialization, urbanization and proletarianization – although amongst different institutional settings. The transformation Lampland follows in the commodification of agricultural labour in the 1930s and 1940-50s in Hungary appears as an element of a shift in integration characteristic to semi-peripheral positions across the globe: industrial development based on domestic exploitation of agriculture. Her focus on the technopolitical implementation of that integration carries a relevance to that scale of comparison.

Morals, technopolitics, and expert interests

Some differences in assessment follow from the difference between an STS-based focus on contingent histories of knowledge production, and a focus on the world-economic conditions of the same institutional process. What a focus on global integration would link to positions of speakers in the interest structure of agricultural transformation – as in the case of Széchenyi's relation to money in agriculture, or in the case of villagers' positions on collectivization (Lampland, 2016) – Lampland lays out as differences of moral imperatives and principles of social cohabitation (Lampland, 2016).

A difference regarding the significance of technopolitical structures also follows from the difference of perspectives. At certain points Lampland seems to associate technopolitical structures with a responsibility over distortions of the local modernization process. For example, following the narratives of a specific strain of literature on historical context (Berend and Ránki, 1958; Borhi, 2004; Pető and Szakács, 1985; Valuch, 1996, etc.), she portrays the history of Stalinist economic policies as a struggle between rational expertise and ideological industrialist politics, like in the case of István Friss and the Institute of Economics (KTI) under the reformist government of Imre Nagy (Lampland, 2016). Viewed from the perspective of world economic integration, this interpretation seems to take sides between the contradictory effects of one and the same modernizing effort. From the latter perspective, the contradiction between these two standpoints does not follow from a difference between ideological and rational thought, but from two different rationalities connected to the internal contradictions of the socialist catching-up effort. State socialism, similar to other state-led industrial development projects in the global semi-peripheries in the post-war world economic cycle, involved a catching-up effort in a situation of relative lack of capital and technology vis-à-vis the centres of the world economy. A characteristic contradiction of such efforts is that they come under the simultaneous pressures to develop technology in order to improve their terms of trade on the long term, and to rely on existing levels of technology with immediate export possibilities to pay for technology imports (often provided by agriculture). The alternation between the two strategies, coupled with position struggles within the apparatus, is a long-standing characteristic of such efforts, as is the problem of external debt following from the failure to solve the contradiction between technology imports and export pressure. From this perspective, it is not specific policy schemes or technopolitical agents who are responsible for the 'distortions' of the modernization process, but the uneven nature of capitalist development globally, which systematically locks semi-peripheral catching-up efforts in the contradictions represented in the struggles between those respective agents.

Finally, Lampland's demonstration that agricultural expert knowledge created and propagated before 1945 was finally implemented within the structures of the party state also opens the question of the position of experts within the material process of world economic integration. The story of the materialization of 1930s agricultural expert knowledge, and its intriguing transgression of the temporal and political borders of a Cold War framework, is coupled with a story of a professional class struggling for a new expert infrastructure, and later occupying positions within it. In the 1930s experts propagated modernization measures based on Western models in a situation where this knowledge was not yet required either by landlords or by the state. This might create the impression that ideas for agricultural modernization appeared as a bodyless technical knowledge, which appeared locally, struggled for self-implementation, and then got materialized in historical technostructures. Viewed from the perspective of class dynamics within world-economic integration, on the other hand, the historical 'body' of experts proposing modernization measures before being integrated into real relations of power seems to be a regular feature of East European professional classes. The historical phenomenon of local intellectuals stepping up as propagators and initiators of modernization projects has been linked to the limits of middle class development in a semi-peripheral position, where ambitions for middle class life standards on par with Western models are recurrently channelled towards political projects and state positions (Janos, 2000). In this sense, the 'cyclical movement of intellectuals in Eastern Europe' across positions like the *Bildungsbürgertum* of the 19th century, vanguards of the communist modernization process, or the 'second *Bildungsbürgertum*' of the 1980s and 1990s (Szelényi and King, 2004) is tied to the historical dynamics of this specifically situated professional class, and its changing relations to the power structures that incorporate or exclude them. How expertise relates to geopolitical hierarchies and local development interests is a question entangled into complex layers of alliance and conflict within changing modes of world-economic integration. It is also a question that touches upon the generic issue of the social conditions of social knowledge, on which Lampland's case study offers a formidable window for reflection and comparison.

Technopolitics in global integration

Lampland emphasizes that her research uncovers a contingent history of the material implementation of scientific knowledge, where contingency can explain why similar formalizing processes can lead to different outcomes, and thus serve as a historically and culturally sensitive base for comparison,

beyond Cold War frameworks. In this approach, it is historical contingencies of institutional constructs that create multiplicities in the global modernization process. Viewed as part of global integration, local institutional processes appear as contingent not only upon their own histories but also on conditions set by the interrelated and uneven process of global modernization. In the latter sense, deficiencies and contradictions of semi-peripheral modernization, debates on the role of large estates, the obligations of the peasantry, or the monetization of agricultural labour are not only locally conflictual practices or competing knowledges, but represent various conflictual interest positions within local constellations of the capitalist world economy. While it was not Lampland's aim to analyse the commodification of agricultural labour from the perspective of the global capitalist process, we think that connecting the debates and technopolitical processes she reconstructs to positions and tensions of global integration could powerfully contribute to the same aims she follows: to transcend the ideological periodization of the Cold War framework, and move towards globally comparative approaches that account for the materiality of the social process.

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BOOK REVIEW

Ruling Ideas. How Global Neoliberalism Goes Local
by Cornel Ban, Oxford University Press, 2016, 314 pages

MIHÁLY ZOLTÁN¹

Cornel Ban's book provides an economic and historical narrative of two distinct articulations of neoliberalism: the case of Spain and the case of Romania. These two compelling cases are presented as vastly different from each other. Spain on the one hand represents a moderate market economy, and thus seen as embedded neoliberalism, with numerous social measures aimed at regulating the free market impetus. On the other hand, Romania is regarded as a more radical case, having newly adopted this type of market economy, termed disembedded neoliberalism. The book is structured into four parts, each with two chapters dealing with different aspects of the two cases. For the purposes of this review, the chapters discussing Spain will be combined into a continuous narrative, likewise for the case of Romania.

In the case of Spain, resistance to free market liberalization was a common occurrence. In numerous instances during the country's history, Spanish elites retained a significant degree of welfare measures. Beginning with the 1970s economic policies started shifting from Keynesian to new Keynesian economics, emphasizing monetarist strategies instead of interventionist ones. The economy stood on middle ground between state intervention and market fundamentalism. Key industrial assets received state support, while liberal elements from the new classical school were gradually implemented. The long-time socialist governing party, PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), lost its left leaning members during the early 1980s, while the national workers union, UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), failed to maintain existing Keynesian policies. In 1989, Spain's central bank joined the EMS (European Monetary System) leading to more drastic export oriented neoliberal policies with significant effects: monetary schemes aimed at reducing inflation, labour market deregulation, tax cuts for higher income and privatization of major state owned

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companies. The early 2000s continued along roughly the same lines, with a balanced liberalization model, rejecting income flat tax and steering the economy toward complex technological production. Post-Lehman crisis Spain initially resisted IMF imposed austerity packages by defending public spending, increasing taxes for higher income and stimulating production, but in 2011 austerity programs were finally implemented due to EU structural pressures.

A period of dictatorship is a common factor in both cases. The main difference is that Franco's Spain had relative academic liberty which enabled a number of scholars to study liberal economics in U.K. and U.S. based universities, while Ceaușescu's Romania was isolated, with marginal or no contact with western academia. This degree of isolation was a major factor in radicalizing neoliberal policies in Romania, bearing resemblance to theoretical economic models – an 'idealized market economy model' – which prevailed over the existing neo-developmental policies of the early 1990s. Ban attributes the failure of these populist measures to 'predatory strategies' used by local oligarchs, bankrupting a number of state companies, while increasing the level of inequality.

From 1996 onwards, state intervention dwindled partly due to IMF structural reform packages postulating liberalization and privatization. Roughly 40% of state assets were privatized (industrial output decreased by 20% in 2000), public spending dropped by 50%, followed by the dismantling of the workers' unions and corporate friendly taxation. After Romania's EU ascension, the economic policies followed the competition state model present in and around Central and Eastern European countries at the time (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007; Drahoš, 2009). These measures emphasized productive flexibility and labour-side deregulation – evidenced most starkly by the 2011 Labour Code changes (see Guga, 2014; Adăscăliței and Guga, 2015) – meant to integrate Romanian industry into western supply chains.

Bearing in mind Romania's isolation during the socialist period, local translators of neoliberalism were mostly locally trained, with a few having had short-term affiliations with western liberal institutions. This lack of training directly contributed to the radically disembedded neoliberalism in the country. Certain local NGOs, or 'public policy think tanks' aiming to legitimate neoliberal ideas benefited from foreign funding. For example, the Joint Vienna Institute (JVI) – with ties to the IMF, World Bank and the OECD – trained economists who would later form the local economic elite of the 2000s. Other instances include CERPE (Centrul Român de Politici Economice) and SAR (Societatea Academică din România), both with ties to the Hayek Institute and AmCham (an international neoliberal lobby group). These think tanks extended their influence over local academia, political parties, private companies and civil society in general.

Neoliberal ideas were proliferated in two ways: along technocratic lines – economic theories and models voiced in technical terms –, and using a simplified rhetoric, or ‘folk neoliberalism’, predominantly used in the media.

The post-2008 period saw the emergence of drastic austerity packages conditioned by international coercion, although the IMF granted a certain degree of freedom in implementing these reforms. Romanian elites embraced this freedom by enforcing even harsher policies than prescribed by global institutions: VAT increased from 19% to 24%, public budgeting was cut by 25%, and social benefits (including unemployment, childcare and disability) were also reduced by 15%, all while maintaining a flat tax on income. Furthermore, 90% of state aid for industry was allocated to multinationals, further solidifying the country’s competition state role. On a rhetorical level, neoliberalism was synonymous with democracy, while anything welfare related meant a ‘crisis of values’ associated with laziness and backwardness.

Ban’s book provides an intricate and comprehensive narrative about past and present economic transformations in Spain and Romania. Focusing on global and local interconnections, and describing the mechanisms of ‘translation’ – encompassing a variety of international and national institutions with key individuals – linking them both, contributes to the definition of neoliberalism as a diverse entity, rather than a uniform, colonizing phenomenon. Ban’s definition of neoliberalism as an ‘evolving hybrid’ is in tune with other authors (Clarke, 2008; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012; Ekholm-Friedman and Friedman, 2008; Tsing, 2009) who emphasize the importance of the local in relation with the global, and more specifically the portrayal of neoliberalism as a concrete manifestation in local contexts, while remaining abstract when viewed globally. Assuming such a perspective opens opportunities for a grassroots endeavour, especially one centred on regional industries in periods of economic transformation.

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Sociologia

Faculty of Sociology and Social Work

“Babeș-Bolyai” University

ISSN: 1224-8703

Volume 62 / Number 1 / June 2017

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