S T U D I A
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SOCIOLOGIA

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MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF URBAN SPACE.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MĂNĂŞTUR DISTRICT

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RÉSUMÉ. Représentations mentales sur l'espace urbain. Construction sociale du quartier Mănăştur. Dans cet article on propose une modalité de déterminer les caractéristics générales des cartes mentales détenues par ceux qui utilisent l'espace du quartier Manastur de Cluj-Napoca. Les principales dimensions suivies se réfèrent aux caractéristics spaciales et sociales de l'espace utilisé par les acteurs sociaux, mais ils se réfèrent aussi à la manière dont ces caractéristics se configurent dans la composition des cartes mentales. Conformément à ces cartes mentales, les individus développent des routines d'utiliser l'espace urbain et ils se construisent de vraies stratégies pour l'aborder. A la suite de cette analyse, on a détérminé le fait que ces cartes mentales sont, en grand part, socialement construites. En même temps, on a détérminé quatre catégories d'individus auxquels correspondent des cartes mentales spécifiques. Ainsi, les caractéristics des représentations mentales des individus varient-elles en fonction de leur zone de résidence (dans le quartier/ailleurs), de l'identification de ceux-ci avec l'espace du quartier et de l'attitude envers le quartier (positif, negatif, neutre).

Research Topic

The present study attempts to outline the typology of using the urban space of Mănăştur district from Cluj-Napoca. The main issue of this research is the mental representation of the space used by the individuals, mostly because it guides the social actors in their orientation in space. Therefore, in this article I will approach the mental map topic, trying to outline the main characteristics of the mental maps that social actors use in their orientation in Mănăştur neighbourhood, but also the way these characteristics are configured.

Theoretical Issues

The use of urban space depends, on the one hand, on the characteristics of the urban space (spatial characteristics, but mostly social characteristics), on the manner this is formally constructed by social actors responsible for urban planning and urban design, but also informally by those using it, through the meanings they attach to space. On the other hand, the use of urban space depends on the characteristics of those using it, of which the most important are the socio-demographic ones. The age, the occupation, the education, the income and the gender of the individuals are translated in different life styles, in different ways of perceiving and acting in the urban space.

The mental representations of urban space are translated in very complex mental maps which play a part in individuals' orientation in urban space, by the reduction of its complexity. More than that, based on these mental maps, social actors develop routines of using urban space and actual strategies of approaching it and its characteristics. The mental maps of urban space contain not only spatial elements but also social characteristics of this space.

The first author who has brought into discussion the issue of the mental representation of urban space, but also its importance to the formal or informal social actors using it, was Kevin Lynch, in 1960. In his article, ''The City Image and its Elements'', Lynch talks about the existence of an image of the city the individuals possess and which is based on a public image of the city. The existence of a public image of the city, shared by a group of individuals, enables the orientation in the urban space, but also the cooperation with other individuals. Probably, there is not just one public image of the city, but there are more of them, each one being shared by a different group of individuals. Individual images of the city are unique, each of them representing an approximation of the public image of the city that social actors share. This image represents a mental map of the city which guides the individuals' activities in the urban context, providing them a coherent background for their spatial orientation.

According to the same author (Lynch, [1960] 2000), this image is composed of five physical elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks.

The *paths*, as defined by Lynch, ([1960] 2000: 480) are channels along which social actors move and the other elements of the city image are positioned. These are, for many individuals, the predominant elements in their city image, and they can be streets, railroads, channels or avenues. The results of a research carried out by Lynch in a few cities from USA have highlighted some of the aspects of the way these paths appear in the individuals' images of the city. Thus, the importance of the paths depends on the level of individuals' familiarity with the city, on the amount of the activities that social actors carry out along them and on certain physical characteristics these paths possess.

The *edges* of the city are, according to Lynch ([1960] 2000: 480), lateral references and linear elements that are not considered or are not used as paths by the individuals. These elements may be perceived by the individuals as being impenetrable, restricting their access to what is on the other side, or as connecting points of two or more areas of the city, allowing the individual a wider range of mobility in space. In any of the two situations, these elements contribute to setting the limits of certain areas of the city, and therefore, to the construction of a more clear image of the city. But there are also mental edges of the city, socially or psychologically perceived or constructed by the individuals, which can play a role in the outline of an image of the city. In this situation, the mental map of the city consists not only of mental representations of physical characteristics of the space, but also of mental representations of social characteristics of the space.

The *areas* of the city, as defined by Lynch ([1960] 2000: 480), are large spatial sections of the city having some common characteristics. The use of these areas depends on the individuals as well as on the structure of the city, the areas

being used for exterior or interior reference. To some extent, the structure of the city image depends on these elements, people feeling better oriented in space when the city areas are structured in a well-ordered background.

According to S. Matei (2004), the mental maps are imaginary diagrams people use to orient themselves in physical space either we talk about districts, cities or countries. They are qualitative spatial representations, images with unique configurations, and therefore hard to translate in measurable units. These images contain information as the arrangement of objects in space or places that must be avoided, but the way they are configured depends on the individuals' perceptions, values and emotions. Furthermore, the areas of the city are coloured in people's mind, in green or red, according to the social features of the areas, to their reputation and to what people believe about the inhabitants of these areas and their activities. Thus, the 'green' areas are the preferred areas, the well reputed ones, and the 'red' areas are those inside of which the individuals do not feel safe, and therefore they are avoiding them.

So, the areas of the city appear in its inhabitants' mind as a dichotomous distinction which includes the potentially dangerous areas and the safe spaces, preferred by the individuals. Talking about the poor included in a public-housing system from a city in USA, K. Gotham and K. Brumley (2002) affirm that these individuals use a set of distinctions of spaces according to which they have developed a routine of using the space of their district. These people's image of those spaces is a stereotypical one. The areas have symbolic names, as "safe spaces" for the secure spaces and as "hot spaces" or "hot streets" for the places and streets with a high level of delinquency, and therefore characterized by insecurity.

The *nodes* are, as defined by Kevin Lynch ([1960] 2000), strategic spots for the individuals, mainly because this is the place where individuals have to decide what way to follow. They are foci from and to which people can go and they are represented by crossroads, bridges or markets.

The *landmarks* are, according to Lynch ([1960] 2000), the result of the construction of the urban space; they are physical objects to which individuals have attached meanings and information accessible to other individuals through their destination. Like the other elements of the image of the city, the landmarks represent objects of different sizes which are reference points for the inhabitants of the city, through the uniqueness that characterises them, and through their contrast with the background.

In an article concerning the orientation of the individuals in the urban space, Georges Mounin (1980) outlines the historical evolution of landmarks, especially that of the formal ones. He assets that the individuals use as guidelines in their movement inside the urban space either formal landmarks, settled by the formal actors involved in the construction of urban space, as street names, or informal landmarks, settled by the individuals themselves. Also, the landmark system is different for those who live in the city and for those who live outside of it, but there are differences between those who live in the city, too. According to Mounin, the way people orient themselves around the city has evolved in time, by the replacement of iconic, visible reference points, with some arbitrary, abstract and hard to memorise

landmarks, inside the formal system of landmarks. The informal system of landmarks was characterised by a reverse tendency, that of replacing the abstract landmarks with iconic, identifiable ones, or with social ones.

Research design

The type of design I have chosen is the cross-sectional one. This type of research design is characterised by the lack of time variation and by emphasising the distinctions between different categories of individuals. This study has in view to determine the characteristics of the mental maps that different categories of individuals use in their orientation in Mănăştur neighbourhood, highlighting the differences between these categories of individuals.

The research methods used for collecting the data are qualitative. Thus, the main method for collecting the data is the semi-structured interview, but I have also used another methodological tool, that is the mental map of the neighbourhood. The construction of this methodological tool is based on the methodology of Kevin Lynch ([1960] 2000) according to whom the mental map of the district is composed of five physical elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks.

A more recent variant of this methodological tool belongs to S. Matei (2004), who has refined it and made it easier to use. According to him, the mental maps are imaginary diagrams used by the individuals to navigate the physical space. They are qualitative representations with unique configurations which contain information such as the arrangement of objects in space or places that must be avoided, but also information that refer to the social particularities of certain spaces. According to the same author, the areas of the city are coloured in people's minds according to the social features of these areas. Thus, their categorisation is a dichotomous one, including on the one hand, green areas (well reputed areas, agreeable to the individuals or safe spaces) and, on the other hand, red areas (areas that are not safe for the individuals).

Based on these considerations, I have constructed a methodological tool adapted to my own research needs. Thus, I have chosen a qualitative version of this tool, namely the method of the blank sheet of paper. This method consists of the individuals sketching, on a blank sheet of paper, the five elements mentioned above. This kind of approach allows a bigger flexibility both of the way individuals sketch the elements and construct their discourse, and of the issues the interviewer can bring into discussion, and this flexibility proper is had in view in an exploratory research as ours. Thus, the sketching of the mental map of Mănăştur district is part of the interview, because it claims a set of supplementary information from the individual and, to a certain extent, a standardisation of this information. The interview begins with an introductory part, in which the individuals are asked information about their life story (but especially about the places they have lived and live in), and then, they are asked to sketch the five elements on a blank sheet of paper. During the individuals' sketching the five elements, the interviewer asks for further information about them and asks questions which will direct the discourse to the issues had in view or to other important aspects that may occur.

The population had in view by this research consists of informal actors that use the space of Mănăştur district. But this category consists not only of those who live in the neighbourhood, but also of other individuals who live in Cluj-Napoca and use this space.

As far as the selection of the individuals who were interviewed is concerned, I have chosen a varied sample which contains components not strictly representative for the population, but exemplary individuals, selected according to the relevant variables for the research. In this situation, the variables that are relevant for the research are: age, gender, education, occupation/profession, ethnicity and district of residence. According to these variables, the components of the sample have been determined and, in March 2005, 12 individuals were interviewed.

Data analysis

The perception of the neighbourhood as a whole is one of the aspects concerning the way individuals represent themselves Mănăştur district. During the interview the individuals were asked to enumerate three characteristics they considered to be defining for the district. Thus, there are several differences in the way different categories of individuals represent themselves the neighbourhood as a whole.

A first difference appears between those who live in Mănăştur and identify themselves with its space on the one hand, and those who live in the neighbourhood but do not identify themselves with its space on the other hand. The individuals from the first of these two categories present the district in positive terms, as a special, unique space, which is different from the rest of the city and which can satisfy all their needs.

> *"A young district…I mean there is more young population, children, youth…now I compare it with Gheorgheni district, because this is the best pattern for me. It is joyful, it's full of life…I have always seen it like this. And it's…I don't know what to say (pause). It seems to me it's like a centre. It seems to me…I don't know, I see it as being distinct from this whole Cluj, it seems to me it's like a city, that's how I see it."[1]* (Anca, 24)

But the category of those who do not identify themselves with the space of the district is divided. On the one hand, there are the individuals who have been living in the district for several years, despite the fact they do not want to live here. The fact that certain circumstances or economic conditions forces them to live in a space they dislike from any point of view, determines them to show a bad attitude towards the neighbourhood. Accordingly, the presentation of the defining characteristics of the neighbourhood by these individuals is made in negative terms:

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[1] In Romanian (the original version): „*Cartier tânăr... În sensul că-i mult mai multă populaţie tânără, copii, tineri...bine, eu acum compar cu cartierul Gheorgheni, că ăsta mi-i cel mai bun tipar, ăăă, e vesel, e plin de viaţă... aşa l-am văzut întotdeauna. Şi...îi, nu ştiu ce să mai zic. (pauză) Mi se pare ca un centru. Mi se pare, nu ştiu, îl văd separat de Cluj-ul ăsta întreg...mi se pare ca şi un oraş, aşa îl văd, ca şi un oraş.*"

> *"[...] populated, because the number of inhabitants per square metre is big, it seems to me it's too much, or crowded, dirty and big."[2] (Rodica, 23)*
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> *"Poor ... narrow and it provokes phobia. And I got to live in Mănăştur by looking for an apartment to rent. And I couldn't find one in other places and this is how I got to live here. And I have avoided Mănăştur anyway and if I were to choose, I would certainly not move there. Not because...but because it's very, it seems to me it's very far from the world and it's pretty isolated, and you don't have any place to go, except for restaurants, let's say not bad reputed, but anyway, which I wouldn't go to."[3] (Raluca, 24)*

On the other hand, those who have been living in Mănăştur for a very long time, but do not identify themselves with its space, even if they got used to living here, present the district from a neutral posture, embracing all the ideas that circulate about Mănăştur.

> *"Well it's a workers' neighbourhood firstly. But there aren't only workers. I know a lot of cases of engineers or teachers or even doctors who live in Mănăştur, so there aren't only workers, but probably there are all social categories, from workers to professors. [...] and it is very big."[4] (Letitia, 54)*
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> *"...the biggest district from Cluj, this is one aspect, as number of inhabitants and as the space designated for housing. [...] the areas, in fact, with a population, I say, at least that is how people used to think...most of the workers were here, and therefore, the whole district was made purposefully for being inhabited by workers and by...by people of middle and low class...The third one...huge, what can I say?"[5] (Florin, 29)*

The last category of individuals is that of the inhabitants of other districts of the city who use the space of Mănăştur district on a regular basis. These individuals present the neighbourhood in the same negative manner as those who have been living here for a short period of time.

> *"The size, the centre I mean, is big. I mean this is one of the oldest districts from Cluj. In fact, I think that the oldest one is Gheorgheni. It's one of the oldest settlements, not districts...and the third word is delinquency which is or it*

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[2] In Romanian: *„...populat, că-i foarte mare numărul de locuitori pe metru pătrat, mie mi se pare foarte mult, sau înghesuit, murdar şi mare."*

[3] In Romanian: *„Sărac, ăă...strâmt şi provoacă fobii.[...] Şi am ajuns să locuiesc în Mănăştur căutând un apartament de închiriat. Şi negăsind în altă parte, aşa am ajuns să locuiesc acolo, şi oricum am evitat Mănăşturul şi dacă ar fi să aleg, nu m-aş mai muta acolo, cu siguranţă. Nu pentru că..., ci pentru că îi foarte, mie mi se pare că-i foarte departe de lume şi destul de izolat, şi chiar nu ai unde să ieşi, decât în localuri, să zic, nu prost famate, ci oricum în care nu aş ieşi."*

[4] In Romanian: *„Păi, este un cartier muncitoresc în primul rând. Dar nu sunt numai muncitori. Eu ştiu multe cazuri de profesori sau ingineri sau chiar doctori care stau în Mănăştur, deci nu numai muncitori, îs probabil toate categoriile sociale, de la muncitori până la profesori universitari. [...] şi e foarte mare."*

[5] In Romanian: *„...cel mai mare cartier din Cluj, asta-i o chestie, deci ca număr de locuitori şi ca şi spaţiu, alocat zonei locuibile [...] Zonele, de fapt cu o populaţie, zic eu, cel puţin aşa a fost gândirea, cei mai mulţi muncitori în zonă, şi ca atare tot cartieru' era expres făcut pentru a fi locuit de muncitori şi de...de oamenii mai de clasă medie şi joasă, să zic. Al treilea...imens, ce să zic?"*

was, I don't know to what extent it does exist, but I know it exists. I mean that there are a lot of stories and events you hear about from your neighbours, you know, you have never seen them, but you always hear about them."[6] (Maria, 32)

"…crowd…mediocrity and (she is thinking) a lot of dwellings, an excess of dwellings, you know, of blocks of flats. [...] (Talking about what mediocrity means :) Well, there are different social strata, especially modest persons, with lower economic conditions. There are also areas like Grădini Mănăştur area, where I think the prices of the apartments are bigger and probably, also the possibilities of those who live there are the same…but certain areas where there are…where is a population with lower incomes."[7] (Ramona, 25)

Another important aspect of the mental map of the district the individuals operate with is connected to the way they perceive and use the areas of the neighbourhood. A first remark is that the way different areas of the district are perceived by the individuals is the almost exclusive result of certain social constructions, even when it comes to those who live in the neighbourhood. The good or the bad fame of certain areas of the district originates from the information obtained from other persons, and not from their own experiences, for all the individuals interviewed. From this point of view, we can talk about a relatively homogeneousness of the mental representations of the district's areas. The bad famed areas are the peripheral ones generally, and particularly Mehedinţi and Parâng areas, and even Calea Floreşti, which are seen as spaces where delinquency is more frequent than in other areas of the district. On the other hand, the bad reputation of these areas is the result not only of the activities that take place here, but also of the social categories of those living in these areas. Thus, the majority of those interviewed consider that a low social stratum population is concentrated in these areas.

"A bad famed area is obviously Mehedinţi, that's how I have it in mind, and probably I will always see it this way. [...] No, I have no personal experiences, but I have seen a lot of things, or…I have heard. From friends, neighbours…even the Police came in Mehedinti because there was a fight. There were usually many scandals of gypsies, and there were rumours, gossips or I don't know how to call them, in the neighbourhood and the same in Calea Floreşti, very many things about the gangs from Calea Floreşti area. I have heard about very many conflicts that ended with Police's implication, or even arrests, or… [...] I have always considered Mehedinţi the social

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[6] In Romanian: „*Mărimea, deci zona centrală este mare, în sensul acesta, vechi, în sensul că este unul dintre cele mai vechi cartiere din Cluj, cel mai vechi cred că este Gheorgheni-ul, de fapt. Este una dintre cele mai vechi aşezări, şi nu cartier, şi, al treilea cuvânt, infracţionalitatea care era sau este nu ştiu în ce măsură există, dar ştiu că există. În sensul că...bine, sunt atâtea poveşti şi întâmplări care se aud de la vecini, ştii, niciodată nu le-ai văzut tu şi totdeauna le-ai auzit.*"

[7] In Romanian: „*Ăăă...aglomeraţie,...mediocritate, şi (se gândeşte mult) multe locuinţe, un exces de locuinţe, ştii, de blocuri. [...] (vorbind despre ceea ce înseamnă mediocritatea:) Păi, sunt diferite pături sociale, în special oameni mai simpli, cu posibilităţi materiale mai reduse. Bine, că sunt şi zone, zona Grădini Mănăştur unde un pic preţurile apartamentelor cred că sunt mai mari şi probabil că şi posibilităţile celor care locuiesc acolo îs la fel şi.... Dar unele zone unde îs..., unde-i o populaţie mai...cu venituri mai mici.*"

class with… predominantly those from lower social strata, because there are very many gypsies, or at least there used to be."[8] (Anca, 24)

"Mehedinţi. And even a part of Prâng area, a certain part of it, the edge of the Parâng area, the skirt of the forest area. [...] they used to talk, me and my friends used to talk: you know, Mehedinţi, what stupid things they do! So anyway people knew about…there were a lot of gypsies, there were all sorts of...a lot of things used to happen and all the bad things that used to happen, happened in Mehedinţi area or somewhere in Parâng area, I don't know where. Of course bad things used to happen in the whole Mănăştur, but here predominantly."[9] (Florin, 29)

But the contact with these areas or stories heard from people who live here make some individuals doubt that this reputation is well grounded, changing, to some extent, their way of perceiving these areas.

"With a bad, but not proved reputation is Mehedinţi. I really have a colleague who works with me and who lives on a street, I don't know if on Mehedinţi or on a street near Mehedinţi, but she told me she had been living here since she was a little girl and that she had never had any problem and that they are all stories. I really had no problem, but nor did I walk on that street."[10] (Raluca, 24)

"Well, Mehedinţi used to have a bad reputation, but this aspect has become clear to me now. Once I went to visit my brother and I have left very late at night from his place and I was alone. And I didn't see any fight, any person to threaten me with a knife. Well, it was an isolated situation, when I was walking there at night, but I really wasn't afraid and I had no problem. I don't know more, but what I know is before my brother moved here, when I used to hear all kinds of rumours that you went in the Mehedinţi area and at every corner there was someone threatening you with a knife, and all kind of things…"[11] (Maria, 32)

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[8] In Romanian: *„Cu reputaţie proastă clar, îi Mehedinţi, aşa îl am în minte şi aşa probabil o să-l văd întotdeauna.[...] Nu, nu am avut nici o experienţă personală, dar am văzut de foarte multe ori...din poveşti. De la prieteni, de la vecini, o fost iar poliţia pe Mehedinţi că cineva s-o bătut cu nu ştiu cine. De obicei, erau scandaluri între ţigani foarte multe, şi se auzeau zvonuri, deci bârfe, sau cum să le spun, din cartier, şi la fel şi de Calea Floreşti, foarte multe despre găştile de pe Calea Floreşti, am auzit foarte multe lucruri care s-or finalizat chiar cu mers la poliţie sau cu arestări sau... [...] Mehedinţi-ul l-am considerat întotdeauna clasa cea cu...prepoderent cei din clasa de jos, pentru că-s foarte mulţi ţigani, cel puţin erau."*

[9] In Romanian: *„Mehedinţi. Şi chiar şi o zonă din Parâng, o anumită zonă, capătul de la Parâng, deci zona de lizieră a pădurii.[...] se vorbea, vorbeam prietenii aşa, între noi: ştii, uite, Mehedinţi, uite ce prostii fac! Deci oricum se ştia de...erau ţigani foarte mulţi, erau tot felul...deci se întâmplau tot felul de chestii şi tot ce se întâmpla rău era în zona Mehedinţi-ului sau în zona Parâng-ului undeva, nu ştiu unde. Bineînţeles că şi alte prostii se întâmplau oriunde în tot Mănăşturul, da' aici cu preponderenţă. Şi aici erau foarte vizitate din punctul de vedere al poliţiei."*

[10] In Romanian: *„Cu reputaţie proastă, dar nedovedită, ar fi zona Mehedinţi. Eu chiar am o colegă care lucrează cu mine şi stă pe o stradă, nu ştiu dacă pe Mehedinţi sau chiar lângă, dar ea a spus că stă acolo de când e mică şi niciodată nu a avut nici un fel de problemă şi că toate-s numai poveşti. Eu sincer n-am avut probleme, nici n-am mers pe strada respectivă."*

[11] In Romanian: *„Bine, Mehedinţi avea o reputaţie proastă, dar m-am lămurit şi cu acest aspect. Chiar am ajuns odată la fratele meu, şi am plecat spre casă noaptea foarte târziu, şi chiar eram singură şi nu am văzut nici o bătaie, nici un om care să scoată cuţitul la mine, mă rog, a fost o ocazie din asta izolată, în care*

But there is one more situation when it comes to bad reputed areas and it concerns those who live in such areas. The way these individuals perceive their areas of residence is not based on rumours, but on real facts, on their own experiences in these areas. This different perception of the bad reputed areas may also be the result of the individuals' subjective reference to the area they live in, to an area with a special meaning for them. In most of the situations, the special meaning of certain areas is connected to the gang phenomenon, to meeting the friends from their spatial proximity, belonging to such an area being the main cohesion factor for the group members. More than that, there is a loyalty of the group members to these spaces, these individuals spending their spare time somewhere else very rarely.

The positive image of the well reputed areas is due to the social categories of individuals who live here, but mostly to the quality of the public and private space from these areas. Their reputation is also socially constructed.

> *"I know, from what I know, for example, that Calea Mănăștur is an area I have very rarely used, I don't know, I don't think I know five persons who live in Calea Mănăștur area. I know that it has always been presented to me, or those I know are professors, for example, who live here, it's a good area from my point of view, so good people from the point of view of their social category. It would be one of the areas where individuals from upper categories, let's say upper classes, live."[12] (Anca, 24)*

A second element that appears in the individuals' mental representations of urban space refers to the paths they use, an element that configures the whole mental map of the district. The mental representation of these elements depends on the individuals' familiarity with the space of the district, but also on their mobility in space. Thus, when it comes to those who do not know the neighbourhood very well, the paths from their mental map correspond to thoroughfares which are usually those used by the individuals. The presence of secondary paths in their mental maps is due to the fact they are or have been used with one purpose, at a moment of time, but their number is usually small. This category consists of individuals who do not live in Mănăștur, but who carry out activities here on a regular basis, but not necessarily frequently. This category consists also of individuals who live in the district, but are not familiar with its space and do not identify

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chiar mă aventuram noaptea pe acolo, dar chiar nu mi-a fost frică și nu am avut nici o problemă. În rest, nu știu, dar ce știu e dinainte să se mute fratele meu aici, când auzeam tot felul de zvonuri că mergi pe strada Mehedinți și la fiecare colț cineva scoate cuțitul și tot felul..."

[12] In Romanian*: „Știu, din ceea ce cunosc, de exemplu Calea Mănăștur îi o zonă pe care am frecventat-o foarte puțin, nu cunosc, nu știu dacă cunosc cinci persoane care stau pe Calea Mănăștur. Știu că întotdeauna mi-a fost prezentată, sau cei pe care îi cunosc sunt profesori, de exemplu, care stau aici, e o zonă bună din punctul meu de vedere, deci oameni buni din punctul de vedere al categoriei sociale în care se încadrează. Ar fi una dintre zonele în care locuiesc categoriile de sus, să le spun așa, clasele de sus."*

themselves with it. On the other hand, the individuals who live in Mănăştur and are familiar with the space of the neighbourhood have a much more detailed mental representation of the paths. Their configuration begins from the thoroughfares too, but the mental maps of the district contain also many secondary paths, their presence depending on using certain spaces and on the location of the activities that are carried out in the district. The use of certain paths and the configuration of the routes depend mostly on the activities that individuals carry out in the district, but also on their location and frequency. The concentration of the activities along the main paths of the district determines also a frequent usage of them, but the use of secondary paths is rare, special. On the other hand, carrying out activities on secondary paths too, and not only along main paths, determines a frequent use of both types of paths, and consequently a more detailed representation of the areas individuals carry out their activities into. These ways of representing and using the paths lead to particular strategies of moving along them.

These strategies are based on the principle of saving resources, especially time, but this principle is followed differently by distinct categories of individuals. Thus, the first strategy is characteristic to those who are familiar with the space of the district and who are very well oriented in space because they live in the neighbourhood or they come here very often. The strategy consists of choosing the shortest path and of avoiding making a useless detour. Another strategy belongs to the individuals who do not know very well the paths and the areas they frequent and it consists of using only well-known routes. Thus, they avoid loosing their way and, implicitly, they avoid spending their time trying to return to a known route or getting to a certain place.

Another strategy for moving inside the district consists of avoiding to carry out activities along paths or in areas inside of which individuals do not feel safe or inside of which they may be in danger (such areas are perceived by the individuals as bad reputed, being areas inside of which behaviour perceived as dangerous is frequent, but the insecurity feeling may appear also in other spaces or in certain conditions). This strategy belongs almost exclusively to women because this feeling of insecurity and vulnerability is characteristic mostly to women. In fact, this is the main aspect that distinguishes between men's and women's urban life and urban identity, not only in Mănăştur district, but in urban space generally (Saunderson, 2001).

> *"There really are no paths I avoid. For example, I can't say that this is a path, it is a little street, but without a strong reason, I can take this way to go home, or I can take this way. And if it's night, I still prefer to take the main road to go home, here in front of Minerva, rather than taking this way and walk through the dark, because that is what it often happens in Mănăştur, the energy is interrupted. But not because I have a strong reason, just as a safety measure."[13] (Raluca, 24)*

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[13] In Romanian: „*Chiar nu există căi pe care să le evit, de exemplu, asta nu pot să spun că-i o cale, că-i o străduţă, dar fără motiv întemeiat, pot să o iau pe aici să ajung acasă, sau pot s-o iau pe aici. Şi dacă*

As far as the landmarks are concerned, the differences between the individuals' manners of representing these elements are not significant. The main landmarks are learnt, especially by those who live outside the district, but there are also landmarks that are specific to every individual. Thus, every individual establishes as landmarks physical elements of urban space that he considers relevant for his manner of orienting in space and which depend on his particularities. The diversity of individuals' particularities configurations thus leads to a diversity of used landmarks and therefore, their classification becomes almost impossible.

Final remarks

Through data analysis, I have tried to determine the main characteristics of the mental representations of Mănăştur district and their classification according to the individuals' characteristics. This section of the article includes a synthesis of the results of the analysis.

The variables according to which the individuals were categorised, so the main differentiation criteria were: individuals' residence area (inside/outside the district), their identification with the space of the neighbourhood and their attitude towards its space (positive/negative/neutral).

Thus, I have determined four main categories of individuals. The first category includes individuals who live outside the Mănăştur district, who have a negative attitude towards the district, but who use its space on a regular basis. The second category includes individuals who live in Mănăştur and identify themselves with its space, having a positive attitude towards it. The third category includes individuals who live in the district, who do not identify themselves with its space, but who are used to living here and therefore have a neutral attitude towards the district. The last category includes individuals who live in the district and who do not identify themselves with its space too, but who also do not want to live here and therefore have a negative attitude towards the neighbourhood.

The individuals from the first of the four categories mentioned above present Mănăştur in negative terms. Thus, in their opinion, the neighbourhood is "packed", "crowded", "contradictory" and characterized by "mediocrity" and "delinquency". Their mental representation of the district's areas is dichotomous, including the well reputed areas and the bad famed areas. The reputation of these areas, good or bad, is socially constructed, the individuals getting information about these areas from rumours, and not from their own experience. Their mental maps contain the main paths in Mănăştur and the secondary paths appear only if they are frequented by the individual.

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este seară, totuşi prefer s-o iau pe strada principală ca să ajung acasă, deci pe aici prin faţă pe la Minerva, decât să merg pe-aici, şi să merg, mă rog, pe semiîntuneric, că aşa se întâmplă de obicei în Mănăştur, se ia curentu'. Dar nu să zic că am un motiv întemeiat. Aşa, din precauţie."

The individuals from the second category (those who live in the neighbourhood identify themselves with its space and who have a positive attitude towards its space) perceive the district as being a special, unique space, separated from the rest of the city, as being "a city in a city". Their mental map of the district contains, besides the two kinds of areas, a third kind of area, namely the areas that have a special meaning to individuals. The mental representations of the paths contain, besides the thoroughfares, secondary paths known or frequented by individuals. The whole mental map of the district is very detailed, revealing a high level of familiarity with its space.

Those who live in Mănăştur, but do not identify themselves with its space and who show a negative attitude towards it, perceive the neighbourhood as being packed, crowded and as provoking phobia. Their mental map is less detailed, containing, besides the thoroughfares, just the well or bad reputed areas and the paths frequented by the individual. These individuals use the space of the district just because they are constrained by certain circumstances, the neighbourhood being just a "bedroom" for them.

The last category of individuals contains persons who live in Mănăştur, who do not identify themselves with its space, but who are used to living here, and therefore manifesting a neutral attitude to the neighbourhood. Their presentation of the neighbourhood contains the ideas that are generally spread about Mănăştur. Their detailed mental map of the district contains the same dichotomous categorisation of the areas, but it also contains many secondary paths, known or frequented by them.

This categorisation of the individuals and their corresponding mental maps of Mănăştur district is not a complete one. That is why it is possible that there occur variations of the mental representations of Mănăştur neighbourhood according to socio-demographic criteria or according to other criteria that this study has not brought into light because of its nature. As I have mentioned at the beginning of this article, our study is an exploratory one, having in view to provide a basis for the construction of a complete typology of using the urban space of Mănăştur neighbourhood.

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ANNEX

Interview Guide

● elements of individual's life story (how has he got to live in the neighbourhood, where did he live before, why did he move there etc.);

● the description of Mănăştur through/by three characteristics the individuals considers to be defining for the district;

● the sketching of the mental map of the district:

→ <u>areas</u>

• the frequency and the type of use (never/rarely/daily; usual/special)

• the specific of the area/the history of the place (what kind of people live in the area, what kind of activities are carried out there);

• types of activities carried out by the individual;

• good/bad famed areas;

• agreeable/avoided areas (green/red areas);

• areas that have a special meaning for the individual;

• in-between areas/spaces;

→ <u>paths</u>

• the most frequented paths;

• the preference for/avoidance of certain paths;

• the use of routes vs. space exploration (finding certain paths)

→ <u>landmarks</u>

• learnt or settled by the individual;

• formal/informal;

→ <u>edges</u>

• physical edges vs. imaginary/imagined edges;

• "barriers" vs. connecting points

→ <u>nodes</u>

● sociality spaces;

● the individual's identification with the space of the district;

● using public spaces vs. using private spaces;

● using certain spaces as a strategy of building an identity (the use of spaces that confer a positive social reputation or the avoidance of spaces that confer negative social prestige);

NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IN URBAN SPACE

HORAȚIUS FLUERAŞ

RÉSUMÉ. National et ethnique dans l'espace urbain. Dans cet article on étudie de la perspective ethnique de Hutchinson (2000) sur la nation et de Hobsbawm (1983) sur la nation comme une tradition inventée qui doit être réaffirmée par l'éducation, cérémonies publiques et monuments publiques le conflit social et politique généré entre 1994 et 2003 par la proposition d'édifier une copie de la Colonne de Traian dans le centre historique de Cluj-Napoca. L'analyse de contenu de 20 articles qui sont apparus dans cette période révèle les dimensions de ce conflit: ethnique, financier, interpersonnel et interinstitutionnel. L'essaies de redimensionner le symbolisme du centre historique de la cité et de le conquerir par les moyennes de la réaffirmation publique des symboles de l'origine commune de la nation Roumaine ont été refusées par les représentants du pouvoir locale, urbanistes, historiens et parties de l'opinion publique.

One of the elements that define the concept of a nation is ethnicity: the nation as a dynamic historical collectivity which structures the modernity and in the same time is the result of a process of rational political construction, uses certain ethnical symbols. Including ethnicity in the understanding of a nation is necessary due to the failure of the rational political construction theories to explain the power of the ethnical movements of the latest decades and the cultural differences within them which generates rival political and symbolical projects (Hutchinson, 2000).

Ethnicity is an important regulating principle of contemporary politics, and along with it the problem of the origins gains importance, regarding a past which can be used to negotiate and resolve the problems of the present. The effect of the nationalist movements is to reemphasize the values and the pre-modernist institutions, which redefine the perspective upon citizenship and the modern state. Nationalism, as ideology of a nation or as constraint of a dominant superior culture, takes birth by the over-estimation of the idea of a nation (Gellner, 1983) and can be considered as an answer of the individuals to serious social, economical, political and natural problems and threats (Hutchinson, 2000).

In the present study I will use Weber's definition of nation (1971), Hobsbawn's definition (1983) of nation as invented tradition, and Hutchinson's dynamic ethnical perspective (2000) upon nation, in order to explain the phenomena which occurred in Cluj-Napoca between 1994-2004. The mentioned phenomena are related to the project of edification of a copy of Traian's Column in the historical center of the town.

Max Weber defines nation as a community of feelings of prestige which occur adequately in their own state and which is also endowed with a cultural mission, with responsibility for the generations which are to come. This mission is facilitated by the improvement of the characteristics of a group seen as nation. The significance of the nation consists in the superiority or at least the impossibility of replacing the cultures' values, which have to be preserved and developed through improvement of the distinctive characteristics of a group. The decisive factors which lead to the occurrence of the national sentiment may be either religion, or the ethnical element or, even more, the common political destiny. In certain contexts, people, nevertheless heterogeneous, may become alike because of their common destinies. The idea of nation implies the notions of a common lineage and an essential homogeneity, along with the sentiment of solidarity of the ethnic communities. The nation is associated, therefore, with an ethnic community identified as a population which is brought together by the myth of the common lineage.

According to Hobsbawn, the nation and its related phenomena (nationalism, the state-nation, the national symbols, the histories) are a recent historical innovation based on social engineering most often deliberated (invented by the political elites in order to justify their power in a century of revolutions and democratization, the 19th century) and always innovative. With all this newness of the concept of nation, the modern nations promote a paradox: in which the nations themselves have their roots in antiquity and are the exact opposite of the constructed, more exactly they are human communities so "natural" that they don't need any definition, only reassertion. Along with the concept of nation was also invented tradition.

Hobsbawn states that there are three most important innovations: the development of an equal substitute for church – primary education, the invention of public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. These public monuments have the role to affirm a common, though constructed, tradition of nation and to provide the symbols to identify the individuals with the nation. Through public ceremonies (commemorations, anniversaries) this bonding with a tradition and a common religion - ultimately with the nation - is realized, in a civic and religious emphasized manner. The public monuments are founding symbols of the nation, which recall it in people's minds, along with the genesis ideologies elaborated on their account.

Hutchinson introduces an integrating ethnic perspective upon the notion of nation which succeeds in explaining the come-back of the ethnic movements. The nation is seen as a dynamic collectivity, reconfigured and reiterated as a result of the repeated cultural conflicts. The conflicts ask for a continual redefinition of the identities of the communities for the restoration of their distinctiveness and autonomy. The appeal to history plays the role of providing models for the redefinition of the collective goals and also destiny myths and common origin myths which would unite and impulse the population in the process of regeneration. The nation as a quasi-related group has ethnic origins.

A distinction which needs to be done before analyzing the phenomenon is that between a monument and a historical monument. As Choay (1998) shows, the historical monument is an object belonging to a past which makes it revive in the present. The former is the object which re-memorizes a past. Generally, monuments have multiple functions: the re-memorizing function (of events, sacrifices, beliefs, etc.), the aesthetic function (the monument can also be regarded and appreciated for its artistic qualities), the attestation function (monument are proof of the past) and the maintenance of identity function (of people or social groups). In our case we deal with a project for a public monument destined to the re-memorizing and attestation of a common origin.

The case of the Traian's Column project in Cluj-Napoca

The analysis of the conflict determined by the construction project of a copy of Traian's Column in the historical center of the town is based on a content analysis of 20 articles from regional and local newspapers between July 1998 - February 1999, November 2001 - April 2002 (Table 1), among which three were commercial, and one was financed with public funds ("Curierul Primariei").

Judging from the pro/con point of view, all the articles printed by "Curierul Primariei" are favorable to this project, the ones printed by "Adevarul de Cluj" have a negative tone, using the manager's of History Museum argument against the construction of the column, making negative comments regarding the illegality of the placement of the monument and emphasizing the rivalry of the mayor with the Hungarian ethnicity. "Transilvania journal" and "Monitorul de Cluj" use a neutral tone, a descriptive one, oriented towards the shock, scandal and politics. Although the frequency of the apparition of „Curierul Primariei" is much more reduced than the others (weekly appearance), the number of the articles regarding this subject (10 articles) is greter than in the other newspapers (3, 4, 3). Only in the city hall's publication there are two journalists signing most of the articles - C. M. And V.S.-, the other articles each with a different author.

Table 1

Newspapers, publication date and initials of the authors

Newspaper	**Frequency**	**Publication date**	**Authors and number of articles**
Adevărul de Cluj	4	2 dec. 1998 (2); 30 dec. 1998; 16 nov. 2001	V. M.(1); L. P.(1); M. T.(1)
Monitorul de Cluj	3	30 dec. 1998; 6 ian. 1999; 23 apr. 2002	V.M.(1)
Transilvania Jurnal	3	3 dec. 1998; 21 dec. 1998; 30 dec. 1998,	J. C.(1); I. C.(1)
Curierul Primăriei	10	6 iul. 1998 (2); 7 iul. 1998 (2); 27 iul. 1998; 10 aug. 1998; 11 oct. 1998; 12 oct. 1998; 2 nov. 1998; 9 nov. 1998	D. P.(1); V. S.(3); C. M.(3); A. D.(1)

The attention and interest accorded to this theme differ according to the publication, from nationalistic interests, to cultural and political ones. While *"Curierul..."* exhibits a large part of the text belonging to these articles on the front page, with the continuation on other different pages, the other newspapers only exhibit on the front page the title and the introduction, while the content lies on other pages: on the page dedicated to art and culture in "*Adevarul…*", or on the one dedicated to political themes in "*Transylvania...*" and "*Monitorul...*". If in "*Curierul Primariei*" 8 of the 10 articles are big in dimension (above 500 words), the other 2 are medium in dimension (between 200 and 500 words), in other newspapers only 3 articles have large dimensions, 5 are medium and 2 are small (under 200 words).

As regarding the attached images one can notice a difference of perspective upon the problem: while the journalists from "*Curierul…*" places more importance on the cultural, artistic and national value of the original monument, as the images represent the column and copies of it, in other newspapers the images only capture the narrative aspects as well as the political scandals. These come in more reduced dimensions, representing the mayor and other personalities, the monument marking the future monument and snap-shots of the square. Above that, starting July 1998, each edition of "*Curierul...*" reaffirms and replicates the native tradition also present in the stem of the town, by printing the image of the Column next to the title and the editing staff.

In the configuration of the significance of building a copy of Traian's Column in the central square of the town, the knot is the symbolism of the monuments from Unirii Square. On that territory there is the old roman forum of the antique town Napoca, its remnants being brought to light starting with 1994. The main building of the square is St. Michael Church, a gothic building built between 1350 and 1487 by the native Germans and continued by the native Hungarians, completed with a tower in the XIXth century. Presently, the religious ceremonies are held alternately in Hungarian, German, Latin and Romanian.

In front of the church there is the equestrian statue of Matei Corvin, king of Hungary, born in 1443 in Cluj. The statue was made by the sculptor Janos Fadrusz in 1902. It is an urban monument, the first symbol of the Hungarian population from Cluj-Napoca, through which they adjudicated at a symbolical level the central square of the town and re-attested their tradition and domination during Matei Corvin, in the least. According to Fadrusz, the statue was built so the hearts of the Hungarian citizens may start burning for "our Mathyas and for the cause of our national rebirth; that's what i have been hoping for with all my heart while I created the statue." (apud Neamtu, 1999, p. 248). The square contains one more forgotten symbol of the Hungarian population, the Bánffy Palace (XVIIIth century), in a baroque style, transformed in an Art Museum.

The Matei Corvin monument generated conflicts between the Hungarian and the Romanian populations since its very unveiling, the destiny of the assembly being influenced by the repeated attempts at neutralizing its significance, either by moving it, or by changing the attached inscription, or by counter-symbols. The placing of Lupa Capitolina, copy donated by the city of Rome, on one side of the square constituted the first effort of neutralization of the symbolism of Matei Corvin's monument, through the counter-symbol of the Latin origins of the town and the Romanian people. The second successful attempt at the counter-balance of the nationalistic degrees of symbolism within the space belongs to the 90's when the Memorandistilor Monument was built on one side of the square, and Lupa Capitolina was replaced.

1994, the year of roman discoveries through open archeological researches in Unirii Square, mark the debut of the third phase in the neutralization of the Hungarian symbols by projects of conservation of the discoveries and the plan to build a copy of Traian's Column. Lupa Capitolina, Memorandistilor Monument, Matei Corvin and Traian's Column are a part of the political strategies to manipulate a myth of the common origin which was created by the political elites starting with the XVIIIth century and transmitted to our population through education. It is also a myth of confirmation and proof of the origin and the longevity in this space of the Romanian and Hungarian populations in the battle of symbolical claim of the space by the Hungarian population and its request by the Romanian ethnicity and cultural dominance.

In such a spatial-temporal context the mayor's proposition to build a copy of Traian's Column in Unirii Square generates a social and political conflict. The players of this conflicted space can be divided in at least two sides of the conflict. First of all, there is the ethnic side, of the battle for the domination of the urban space by the Romanian ethnicity in disfavor to the Hungarian one. The representatives of this dimension of the conflicted space are, on the one hand, the mayor of the town, Gheorghe Funar, along with some supporters, on the other hand UDMR, a cultural association, party of the Hungarians from Romania represented by some leaders.

The second conflicted space is represented by the material and aesthetic costs. The players involved at this level are represented, on the one hand, by the mayor and some supporters who write for the periodical newspaper of the City Hall, and on the other hand, by the prefect, the Local Council of the town, the Regional Committee of Monuments, Complexes and Historical sites - CZMASI, Transylvania's Museum of History (through its manager), and some voices of the public opinion. The conflicted space is graphically represented in Figure 1. It is both an interpersonal conflict among the representatives of the managerial stuff of local institutions, and an inter-institutional conflict.

Figure 1. The conflicted space generated by the Traian's Column building plan

From the perspective of the ethnic conflict, the argument presented by the side favorable to the project relate to the myth of the daco-roman origin and to the cultural domination of the town on the inter-Carpathian region. The desire of placing one copy of Traian's Column in Unirii Square enlists in the same strategy of manipulation of the myth regarding the Romanian population's descent from Dacians and Romans. For the mayor, a future insertion of the Column will legitimate the desire of cultural and spatial domination of the Hungarian ethnics by the Romanian ethnics by the de-Hungarian-isation and the symbolic re-conquest of the square: "The Column will show those who don't have a history of more than 1000 years who has always been and who will always be the masters of these Romanian lands"(Gheorghe Funar, in "*Adevarul de Cluj*", 2nd December, 1998). The Column, with its 29.79 m, will dominate the complex Matei Corvin, both physically, by its height, and symbolically, by the temporal hints it sends.

The construction of the monument produces a reassertion of the tradition of the daco-roman origin and its territorial mark in a symbolic space so far Hungarian: the monument represents in its supporters views "the most important source of historical certificate", "the birth certificate" of the Romanian people. (C.M. , "*Curierul Primariei*", 12 oct, 1998). The Hungarian side does not have to symbolically conquer a space, because it already possesses it, but only to defend it with aesthetic and financial arguments. None of its representatives signs any article, or is he quoted or commented upon in one of the analyzed articles.

There is a degeneration of the ethnical dimension at the level of the Romanian representatives who oppose to the construction of the monument, bringing forth financial and aesthetic counterarguments. As for the editorial level, only "*Adevarul de Cluj*" admits that one can speak about an ethnic conflict. The financial/aesthetic dimension of the conflict is configured around the same side favoring the edifice, among which Gheorghe Funar, the mayor, and his supporters, and one side disagreeing

with the edifice, constituted from representatives of the political (prefecture,The Local Council), the artistic and urban (The Regional Committee of Monuments, Assemblies and Historical Sites) and historical institutions (Transylvania's Museum of History, represented by its manager), and voices of the public opinion.

The speech in favor of the monument is constructed on two axis: a first one is the counter-argumentation and demolition of the arguments against the construction and a second one is the demonstration for the necessity of the construction. Studying the articles from the City Hall's publication, one can discover the main arguments used by the opposition against the edifice of Traian's Column copy: financial (the costs considered too high - 86 billion Lei, which was counter-argumented by minimalizing the value comparing it with the total budget of the City Hall), of urban architecture (the peril of spoiling the architectural harmony of the square), of artistic value (the connection with the kitsch) and of archaeological nature (the peril of destructing the roman underground of the square) (Table 2) .

Table 2

Arguments and counterarguments regarding the construction of Traian's Column

The opponents' argument	The supporters' counterargument
- the destruction of the medieval character of the square	- besides St. Michael's Church, all the buildings that surround the square were put up in the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth , which would exclude the medieval character of the square
- the destruction of the architectural harmony of the square	- the tower of the church, added at the end of the XIXth century, did not destroy the harmony of the church - the Column is supposed to be smaller than the tower of the church - the Column from France is placed in a resembling situate with Unirii Square - the Column doesn't visually superimpose with St. Michael's church and Matei Corvin's Monument, therefore the present components do not change - it doesn't contrast with the buildings from the background
- the Column as a kitsch	- there are numerous copies of architectural masterpieces out there in the world which are not considered kitsch - also in Cluj-Napoca, St. George's Statue and Lupa Capitolina's statues are not considered kitsch - the copy of Traian's Column is also to be found in Germany
-the destruction of the historical roman remnants	- by the established location, the Roman remnants won't be destroyed

The argumentation and counter-argumentation presented by the City Hall's publication are addressed, at the same time, to the town's citizens, as the periodical was conducting a public campaign of deconstructing the opposition's arguments and legitimating the necessity and the value of the project. The first articles

referring to this project appear from the beginning of July 1998 in order to prepare the installment of a monument and a temporary label to mark the spot in which the Column was supposed to be built. The counter-argumentation used is oriented towards the rational deconstruction of some groundless statements, counter-exemplification, urban projection, towards denial and appeal to emotions and feelings. As the newspaper belongs to the City Hall and the Local Council, not to the mayor, there is a denial of the reasons for the symbolical domination of Unirii Square. This is realized by placing the accent only on arguments regarding the historical significance of Traian's monument and of the Column, as well as the aesthetic arguments meant to fight the attitudes against this project.

The conflict generated by the project of building a copy of Traian's Column extended to several levels: ethnic, aesthetic, financial, inter-personal and inter-institutional. The ethnic dimension is only assigned to the mayor of the town; the aesthetic and financial dimensions are assigned to all the institutions involved (two of them belonging to the political power, a scientific institution which has the historical expertise and an institution belonging to decisional factors on the urban aesthetics), on the one hand, and on the other hand it is assumed by the mayor and the supporters of the project. An ethnic conflict is denied and handled by the representatives of the four institutions at aesthetic and financial level. The balance of the pro and con forces favors the opponents by their numerical superiority and by the power cumulated by decision and pressure of the institutions they represent.

The solution to this conflict seems to be a game played by the influential people involved, unless it is contested by the public opinion through voting to eliminate the initiator of the project. The attempt to brutally reaffirm a tradition and common origin regardless of the social and architectural structure of the town as well as the mass media is contested by urban population. As a response to the ethnical conflicts between the Romanians and the Hungarians, the project of Traian's Column is an attempt to manipulate the past in order to solve, through symbolic violence, and also by finding an equilibrium of the ethnic symbols in the central area of the town, the existing problems. This attempt must also be regarded from the perspective of the general nationalistic strategy to reshape the ethnic identity of a town by exhibiting symbols of the origin and history of Romanians.

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RELIGION AND PATTERNS OF MORALITY IN EUROPE

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RÉSUMÉ. Religion et modèles de la moralité en Europe. Au cours de la discussion récente entre le "supply-side" et "demand-side" théories concernant le processus de sécularisation, considération limitée a été donné à la dimension de la moralité. Les deux approches tendent à ramener la discussion à trois ensembles de données : appartenir nominal à une religion, croyance dans des idées religieuses spécifiques et participation à l'église. Cette étude tirer l'attention sur la dimension de la moralité montrant le rapport entre la religion et les différents modèles de la moralité et apporte l'évidence pour le processus de sécularisation en dépeignant l'érosion et le déclin de tous les types de moralité, particulièrement celle plus légitimée par religion. En explorant la forme de ce déclin en Europe de l'Ouest et de l'Est aussi, j'argumente du fait que la transition du communisme au post-communisme a apporté des changements structurels dans le royaume de la moralité. Une particulière attention est donnée au cas de la Roumanie afin de décrire les facteurs culturels influençant la moralité et les structures socio-anthropologiques qui rendent différents types de la moralité possibles.

Introduction

The intense debates during the last decade regarding the social conditions of the existence of religion in contemporary societies led to the development of what we call today the secularization theory. The multiple aspects of the pervasive features of the process of secularization are well illustrated by an immense quantity of empirical data gathered by anthropologists and sociologists as well. What we lack today is rather a comprehensive sociological theory regarding the social change of the religious structures and mentalities that should integrate all the dimensions of religious life that are experienced as such in contemporary societies.

In the present paper, drawing from the theoretical developments of Thomas Luckmann, we will try to integrate in current debates regarding the secularization theory a dimension that was relatively ignored by recent approaches of this phenomenon, namely the religious dimension of morality. I will explore the existing relationship between religion and the different social patterns of morality in order to highlight the process of erosion of all forms of morality (*demoralization*), especially those legitimized by a religious narrative and to show this way that the transition from communist to post-communism brought important structural changes not only in the realm of religious mentalities but in the realm of practical behavior as well.

The need of new types of data, other than the ones employed by the debates of the 60`s (nominal belonging to a religion, churchgoing, belief in god), was made necessary by the growing complexity of the theories regarding religion in contemporary societies (Tscahnnen, 1991) and by the strong dispute over the existence of a theoretical body of secularization theory (Hadden, 1987) and the existence of a so called process of de-sacralization of contemporary societies (Finke, 1992; Iannacone 1992, 1998; Stark,1999).

In one of the few studies regarding the relationship between religion and morality, Rodney Stark, one of the fierce contester of the secularization theory, argues that the durkheimian connection between religion and the moral order is incorrect, and he does this by underlying the contingent effect of religiosity on individual morality, this being strongly determined by the specific perspective on divinity (personal or impersonal, moral, immoral, amoral, etc.) and not by the ritual and communitarian dimension of religion (Stark, 2001: 619-623).

Although Stark's analysis succeeds in bringing in the contemporary debate the old weberian question of religious ethic and the diverse ways of rejection and acceptance of the world, it operates a dangerous reduction assuming an isomorphic equivalence between the different indicators of morality, loosing this way sight of the different types of moralities that have a specific institutional correlative. This means that only one type of morality can be put in a significant relationship with the religious dimension (a fact that is totally neglected by Stark), and this gives us a reliable procedure to test Stark's thesis regarding the relationship between moral order and the communitarian dimension of religion.

The result of our analysis leads us to opposite conclusions then the one that have been highlighted by Stark: the morality dimension is not only strongly dependent of the communitarian expression of religion, but continues to be, as Wilson has showed, strongly articulated in those social strata where the feeling of an integrated community has been less altered by the process of modernization (Wilson, 2000).

1. Moral communication and forms of morality

Drawing from Alfred Schutz's "interaction consequences of reciprocal perspective", Luckmann defines the moral conscience and the subjective and historic construction of morality as the inherent principle of mundane reasoning that underlies the social process of construction of a life-world (Luckmann, 2002: 21).

Situating the analysis at the level of moral communication understood both as process of moral tematization (the process of affirming the moral structure) and moralization (the transformation of constatative speech acts in regulative ones), Luckmann documents the process of the dissolution of the traditional moral order that takes place in modern societies.

In the process of identifying the socio-cultural structures of the institutional and non-institutional settings of religion and morality, Luckmann differentiates

between four social forms of religion and morality, all having their origin in the subjective experience of one of the three forms of transcendence (Luckmann, 2003:277).

The forth social form of religion[1] represents the consequence of two inter-related processes: on one side the differentiation of the economic and political system and their autonomization in relation to the religious system, on the other side the emergence of plurality of world-perspectives and the undermining of the plausibility structure of one single moral universe in which all social conditions should have their place (Berger, 1990:130). We witness the dissolution of the organic conceptions of single moral and supernatural order.

The process of transformation of the diverse forms of morality was a slow one and it did not mean the obliteration of previous social forms of religion and morality, but their apposition. This process of functional differentiation had a direct impact on the institutionalized forms of religion and morality. Losing its institutional support, both religion and morality undergo a vast process of privatization and de-monopolization. In Luckmann's formulation: "religion was transformed in private belief, morality in subjective conscience" (Luckmann, 2002:24).

Within modernity social life is immersed and organized not locally, as in the traditional communities, but societal, the agent of this transformation being the nation-state (Wilson, 2000:184). Because of the great expansion of the economic system and the development of an impetuous bureaucratic administration and the increasing urban agglomeration (making Weber to depict modernity as a hyper-rationalization of the life-world), we are witnessing a decreasing of the integrated and strongly related communities and so implicitly of religion and traditional forms of morality.

The modern social system functions not by providing an all encompassing moral order, but by elaborating and efficiently using the rational means of determination and control of conduct and by prescription of an exact role within the economic system. The main effect of this process over the values system is represented by the replacement of substantial values with procedural ones (Wilson, 200:191) and the emergence of a process of ethic rationalization.

Applied to the ethic sphere, the concept of rationalization obtains in Weber's analysis the meaning of formalization and autonomization of moral-practical imperatives that lead to the uncoupling of these from their founding principles and

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[1] The first three of this are: i) archaic – non-differentiation between the external world and the cultural one (between the exterior connection of objects and the interior connection of meanings): the traditional moral order is legitimated by the different sacred and transcendental representations; ii) antique – the emergence of a institutional differentiation (the divine king, the priests) that still has a sacred character: the codification of sacred rules and laws takes place now; iii) medieval – the segregation of sacred from profane and the emergence of one single dominant institution (the church) that represents the single legitimate medium for the elaboration and maintenance of moral order; the institutional specialization of religious function take place now (Luckmann, 2003:278-80).

from the cultural representations in which they where first embedded. The autonomization of the sphere of ethics has as consequence the emergence of a formal and positive law and a profane ethics of conviction and responsibility (*Gesinnungsethik*)[2]. This process of ethic formalization leads to the elimination of any religious or metaphysic grounding of legal norms that are now considered as consensual enactments[3]. This way they become norms that are rational elaborated and promulgated and are subject to secular decision (Habermas, 1984a:163).

Weber considers that the differentiation of an autonomous sphere of values and the affirmation of a specific interior logic have two important consequences: first a substantive rationalization (defined in opposition with a formal rationalization) of the symbolic connections by affirming a distinct formal principal for each specific sphere and second the uncoupling of religious worldview, that was integrating all operational meanings in a substantive whole, from the life-world. Weber sees in this process of autonomization of the different spheres of values the main cause for the crisis of the modern world (Habermas, 1984a:244).[4]

The result of this process of de-monopolization of morality is what Luckmann calls current-morality or that type of explicit or implicit moral communication that acts in a diffuse way at the level of common sense (the distinctions between right-wrong, just-unjust) without being grounded in canonic institutional orders or integrated in a normalizing ethic settings. In the absence of a "legitimate" social form of morality and an institutional device to legislate the axiological structures of morality, the current morality will be reproduced by intermediary institutions like the family, groups of friends, mass-media, etc. (Luckmann, 2002:25).

Extensive investigations (Bergmann and Luckmann, 1999) have distinguished different forms of morality that are active in the concrete process of moral communication that enabled the formulation of extensive criticisms addressed to those prophets of the total dissolution not only of the traditional moral order but of moral communication itself.

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[2] For Weber the process of disenchantment of the world (Etnzauberung der Welt) is made possible by the emergence of rational ethic that is grounded in the objectivation of sacred inner values as means to obtain salvation. The ethic of conviction (*Gesinnungsetik)* has its origin in a religion of conviction (*Gesinnungsreligiositat)*, which is an intermediary form of religion in the long process of inner secularization made possible by the surpassing of magic beliefs through the great religions of salvation.

[3] In a well written article that analysis the structure of Max Weber's ethic of responsibility, Starr suggest the possibility of a *Verantwortungsreligion* that is based on a *Verantwortungsethik* (Starr, 1999). In Weber's perspective this two types of ethic are mutual exclusive; the ethic of responsibility although acknowledging value obligation does not presuppose any hierarchy of values as a background for the moral conduct. Because of this, wee agree with Weber that the two worldview presuposed by the two type of ethics are mutual exclusive and that it is hard to relate religion with an ethic of responsibility. This is why we consider the possibility of a *Verantwortungsreligion* as a forced interpretation of Weber original thought regarding the two types of ethics.

[4] Habermas understands this as a transformation of the different orders of action (cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, esthetic-expressive) into autonomous antagonist orders of life that overburden the human communities (Habermas, 1984a:245).

Every single analysis of moral values has to keep in sight the manifold ways of manifestation of these values and the socio-anthropological structures that make them possible as well. To match morality with one of its dimension of manifestation as for example attitude towards euthanasia or abortion (Zawila, 2004) can lead us to narrow results and facile generalizations.

Can we find at national and European level the existence of erosion and a significant decline of the different types of morality? To what extend is there a need of an ecclesiastical support in order for this dimension to be shared by different European societies? Has the expansion of modernity a significant erosion of the traditional moral structures as a necessary correspondent? And if yes, which is the socio-anthropological background that still makes such an adhesion to the different types of morality possible?

In order to outline an answer to the above questions we will unfold the analysis of the following problems: 3) in which ways the diverse indicators of morality can be reduced to certain ethic dimension; 4) what relation is there between these dimension and the different indicators of religiosity; and 5) what is the socio-anthropological background of this ethical dimension in the specific case of Romania.

3. Dimensions of morality in Europe

With the help of a factorial analysis[5] we can reduce the complexity of data regarding the diverse axiological options of the respondents to their latent dimension. The solution obtained after the factorial extraction shows the existence of three factors (dimensions of morality) and the way the different variable saturate this factor facilitates the identification of the meaning of each dimension[6].

The first factor is saturated by variables that measure the different aspects of sexual and family conduct (homosexuality, adultery, casual sex, divorce and abortion) and circumscribes in the field of moral behavior those ethical values that

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[5] In this analysis we have used data from the European Value Survey 1999 / 2000. The factorial analysis has been run in the entire population (the selected European countries) and not in each sub-population. If such a solution standardizes the latent dimensions obtained and makes easier the comparison of the different countries it has the disadvantage of eluding the cultural conditions existing in each country. So, in the Romanian space for example four such latent factors could be identified: the factor of family morality is not saturated by the variable of abortion and divorce which constitutes a factor itself. At least two reasons can be identified for this: a) the majority of the European populations that was included in the factorial analysis is catholic, and the catholic ecclesial practice is extremely intransigent regarding divorce in comparison with the orthodox one; b) the public attitude towards abortion in Romania, in spite of the strong opposition of the orthodox church, has experienced an important liberalization in post-socialist times, and is still marked by the memory of repression of abortion and the enforcement of reproduction imposed by the communist authorities (Kligman, 2000).

[6] The factorial scores have been obtained with the Bartlett method. For the advantage of this method see Culic 204: 115. I have used the principal axis factoring and original solution was rotated with the help of "direct oblim" method. A solution with three factors explains 55.91% of the variance, the KMO index is .857 and Bartlett coefficient of sphericity is 122069.02.'

are legitimized and encouraged by the church[7]. As we will see, this factor of family conduct morality is strongly correlated with the religious practice and in the segment of the population that attributes the church not only a spiritual function but a moral and a social one as well, we find the highest factorial scores.

The second factor is saturated by variables that measure the ethical attitudes towards the institutions of the state (to pretend benefits from the state when you are not entitled, not to pay your taxes, illegal commercial transactions, lying when you have a personal interest). This factor of fiscal morality has its genealogy in the stately construction of spirits, in what Bourdieu (1999:92, 80-82) calls the "formative action of lasting dispositions" of the State and its capacity to legitimize its own objectivity as a principle of vision and division of cognitive structures ("the acts of subordinations are cognitive acts"- Bourdieu, 1999:91) that operate at the level of collective mentalities.

The third factor sums up variables that specify a civic conduct, understood not in its political sense but as the care for public goods: to throw litter in public spaces, to drive under the influence of alcohol, to exceed the limited speed and to joyride. If the other two dimensions of morality have their specific institutional field (the Church and the State) the factor of public conduct morality can be harder institutionally circumscribed. We consider this type of morality as having its support in the existence of a civic community and we are able to find it at those people interested in the well functioning of the local community and in its security.

The three identified factors circumscribe different dimensions of morality. Carrying the research at the level of all these three dimensions offers us the possibility to measure and compare the different moral situations of the respondents starting not from their attitudes toward one or the other moral value (but from the latent dimension that circumscribes them) and not from a single dimension but from all the dimension simultaneously.

Analyzing the mean values of all European countries we can easily notice that at the societal level there is discrepancy between the scores regarding the family conduct morality and the other two moral dimensions and vice-versa (Figure 1).

In countries like the Check Republic, Denmark, Germany, Island and the Netherlands we can find the existence of general tendency not to share the moral dimension of family conduct and at the same time to largely accept one of the other two moral dimensions. This means that within these countries we will find a specific moral typology and that a large proportion of the population will not share traditional moral values, only a fiscal and public conduct morality. For example

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[7] In most of the analyzed European countries, the break of these norms of sexual and family conduct is not sanction any more judicial, only (eventually) morally. At the level of moral communication the sanction can take the form of moral culpabilization uttered by the different social agents (and shared by certain segments of the society) but never under the form of a culpabilization legitimized by the legal system.

almost 45.6 % from the Danish population are in this dominant situation (only 15.2 % share all three dimension while 10.4 % do not share any of the three moral dimension) whereas the Hungarian population only 9.7 % share this situation (the dominant type being the one that shares all three moral dimension, 36 % while 12,4% don't share any of the dimensions).

Figure 1. Patterns of morality across Europe

The same Hungarian model, where the dominant type is the one of acceptance of all three moral dimensions can be found in countries like Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, North Ireland, Italy, Leetonia, Malta, Poland and Romania. Countries like Belarus, Finland, France, Greece, Luxemburg, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden tend to develop a dominant type of non-acceptance of all three moral dimensions. This general evaluation needs two subsequent remarks: first, the dominant type doesn't mean the unique existing type within the country and second, the dimensions used in the analysis do not circumscribe all existing types of morality. For example, it is interesting the fact that most of these countries have the highest rate of voluntary involvement in different organizations and this suggests the existence of some kind of underlying altruism.

Of course that these countries have specific particularities that present themselves under specific cultural configurations whose meaning can be understood only when are situated in the corresponding social historic field. Only a careful analysis of these fields and the moral typologies conjugated with those of religious mentalities can highlight the exact types of morality that structure the ethical field existing in each country.

Figure 2. Moral values

The different moral dimensions not only structure differently the ethical field but they record a specific evolution. Starting with the assumption of the formation of religious and ethical attitudes in the period of adult socialization (Norris, 2005) and their persistence in time (the persons that grow old do not change their religious and ethical attitudes as they come close to the end of life) we can use the life series (in the absence of previous investigations) in order to notice the way that these moral dimensions evolve in time.

If in some countries of Europe we can identify a process of de-secularization, not the same thing can be said about ethical conduct; this undergoes a general decline. Figure 2 reproduces the evolution in time of the three dimensions within the European population[8]. If at the societal level we can notice a general tendency of a growing adhesion towards specific religious beliefs at the same time with a

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[8] The mean difference taken two by two is significant at p=0.000 (Bonferroni Test). See figure 3 an 4.

general decline of all forms of morality than we can expect to find in each of the specific population the outlining of a new type of religious mentality for which religiosity is reduced to spirituality and it is not any more relevant for the practical sphere of life but only for the objectivity of transcendental meanings of existence.

Taking into consideration the different moral typologies existing in the different European countries it is hard to state the existence of universal process that can be validated in each single case. We can notice the existence of a general tendency for clusters of countries which of course need a further and deeper analysis in order to outline the specific logic of each ethical field in each country.

Figure 3. Moral values in post-socialist countries.

Differentiating among post-socialist European countries and capitalist ones, we can notice the specific form of this moral decline. The capitalist countries undergo a large decline of the family conduct morality, whereas the post-socialist countries a decline of the fiscal and public conduct morality. In the capitalist countries for each segment of age (historical decade in our analysis), except the last one, the mean of family conduct morality is smaller than the mean of the two other types of morality; in the post-socialist the opposite is true: here the mean of family conduct morality is always bigger than the other two types of morality.

The explanation for this is relatively simple to point out. The '60 meant for much of the capitalist countries an important mutation in the field of social mentalities and in the representation of the intimate sphere (which led to the development of the "sexual revolution" concept) and this conjugated with an extended economical development and the subsequent effects of modernization led to profound change in the structure and functions of the family (Rotariu, 2003:214).

Figure 4. Moral values in capitalist countries.

At the demographical level this mutation of the social mentalities meant significant repercussion on the marriage and divorce rate and at the level of ethical behavior a massive erosion of all tradition forms of morality and a subsequent erosion of the legitimacy of the church: its role was now restricted to the spiritual sphere and its involvement at the level of family or society was de-legitimized.

In the socialist countries, where the modernity came very late into being, and the process of urbanization and industrialization were extensively planed by the communist authorities, the moral structures were less eroded and the traditional forms of marriages were being further perpetuated (Rotariu, 2003:217). By imposing a "socialist morality" against the "decadent bourgeois culture" the communist state employed an extensive cultural hegemony, promoting traditional moral values (especially those values related to the family) and legitimizing them through the enactment of secular order. Moral transgression became now anti-national sins (Kligman, 2000:53).

What Daniel Bell designates as "ideological prescribed social order" (Bell, 2001:270) includes not only the legitimized political attitudes but the different moral institutionalizations meant to create the "new man" and the mechanisms of a social reality that reproduces a moral order drawn from the guardianship of the church (which becomes now either "imperialistic" or "retrograde") and legitimized by a communist ideology.

On the other side, the relationship with the political structures is deeply affected by the process of nationalization and collectivization of private propriety and means of production and by the general lacking of goods of consumption and the restriction of civil rights. So, the political order has been always perceived as unjust and oppressing (that had a visible impact on fiscal morality), and the public

and private goods becoming the property of the state (and so the property of a small elite) radically changed the attitude towards public property (stimulating negatively the morality of public conduct).

This explains why for many of the post-socialist states the new era of freedom meant on one side religious freedom (and so an intensification of the religious activities in most of the post-socialist countries, including Romania) and, on the other side, the liberty to abolish all constraining social norms (adultery ceasing to be crime punished by the penal code, for example).

The inter-generational differences in the post-socialist countries shows that the period following the fall of the communist regimes was marked by a general decline of all forms of morality (especially the public and fiscal one) and unlike the capitalist countries where this differences normalized themselves the erosion was abrupt and constant.

4. Religion and morality. A comparison between East and West

Not all types of morality are religiously legitimized. Having a specific genealogy, each type of morality has an institutional correlate and a specific field of manifestation. From the three types of morality only the familial one has strong dependency from religious practice. Even if the ecclesial discourse contains all three types of morality, it is mainly structured by the dimension of family conduct morality[9].

This dependency is deeply rooted in the Christian world-view regarding moral behavior. Both catholic and protestant discourse (Delumeau, 1997:34) introduced in the theme of *conteptus mundi* the body and its pleasures. The directors of conscience saw always in the sexual misconduct (Delumeau, 1997:252) permanent proximities for the manifestation of the decayed human being, the contempt for this world exhausted itself in the despise of the body; *fuga mundi* circumscribed most of the time the valorization of ascetic renunciation of corporal pleasures. The orthodox cultures were not strange from such transposition of ascetics in a moral order. As in the West, the churches were always interested in the sexuality of parishioners; the confession indictment included always questions regarding the pleasures of the body (Ghiţulescu, 2004:337-43).

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[9] The values of R square and β are shown in Appendix 1. The correlation between religious practice and the morality of family conduct is almost the same as the one between the importance of God in the personal life and the morality of family conduct, and so we can reject Stark's conclusion regarding the so called error of Durkheim of the relationship between morality and the communitarian dimension of religion (Stark, 2000:619).

The origin of the two systems of rules (the law of marriage and the regulating of desire) that have as a purpose to structure the pleasures of the body can be found in the mandatory practice of confession, generalized after the counter-reform. Here begins a mutation in the field of the production of truth about the sexuality: from a direct experience, even esoteric, without being accompanied by external constrains, that had as a purpose the economy of voluptuousness (what Foucault calls *ars erotica*) to the transposition of the knowledge in an order of power and in a discourse regarding the truth about sexuality (scientia sexualis).

Figure 5. Religious participation and family conduct morality.

What at the beginning was strictly an ecclesial practice that was employed only in the priest-believer relationship, becomes in the bourgeois societies a generalized, diffuse and multiform cultural practice[10]

So, in each of the countries where the process of secularization is not an advanced one and where the church exerts further a considerable influence on the life of individuals we expect to find considerable high scores for the family conduct morality, whereas in the countries where the opposite is true, low scores for the same dimension. Using the religious participation and the degree of acceptance and legitimation of church involvement in the moral problems of a society as explanatory factors of the family conduct morality, we can graphically represent the way the different countries are situated in relationship with this dimension of morality[11].

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[10] " *It is for the first time when, at least permanently, a society affirms that its own future and fate hangs not only from the number and virtue of its citizens, not only from the norms of marriage and organizations of families but from the way each of them uses its sex* (Foucault 1995:23)."

[11] Appendix 2 reproduces the regression coefficients, where the dependent variable is the family conduct morality and the independent variables the degree of religious participation and the level of legitimation of the involvement of the church in the moral problems of a society.

Figure 6. The legitimiation of the moral function and the family conduct morality.

The countries that are most secularized in the realm of family conduct morality are the post-industrialized countries as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, France, Holland, Luxemburg, Germany, England and Island. To the same category belong industrialized countries as Czech Republic, Belarus and Bulgaria. At the opposite side are situated countries with high level of religious participation, support for the moralization function by the Church and high values for family conduct morality: Malta, North Ireland, Poland, Croatia, Italy, Portugal, and Romania.

We couldn't establish a significant relation between the type of dominant religious culture (catholic, orthodox, and protestant) and the scores of family conduct morality. But a significant difference can be established between the post-industrialized countries and the industrialized ones when it comes to the moral dimensions: the post-industrialized countries have lower scores of morality as the industrialized ones and the reason for this is that the industrialized countries continue to enable the church a large space of action (the industrialized countries credit more the church's involvement in the spiritual, moral, family and social sphere then the post-industrialized countries).

In conclusion, the introduction of the moral dimension in the analysis of secularization process has to take into consideration the fact than only one of the three dimension of morality has a religious support and legitimation, namely the family conduct morality. This methodological note is important for the future analysis: the outlining of typologies of religious mentalities structured by a moral dimension as well (necessary in order to prove the existence of a religious mentality that continues to legitimize the church involvement in the spiritual sphere but not in the moral, continues to affirm the importance of religious beliefs but not religious practice) has to take into consideration only the dimension of family conduct morality, because of the fact that only this dimension requires a religious support.

In order to depict the existence of a process of secularization, many studies assume a direct, causal and determinist relationship between the different indicators of modernity (urbanization, industrialization, and education) and the religious structures and mentalities. Further we will try to show that such an approach is wrong and that it cannot outline a specific logic of development of the relationship between ecclesial structures and the family conduct morality in each culture and society.

Assuming a direct and determinist relation between the progress of modernity and the erosion of traditional forms of morality we should encounter a uniform effect on all populations localized in the so called "origin zone of secularization" (Berger, 1990:107) within a society. In our specific situation, this will mean that in the case of the persons exposed to this secularization forces we should encounter a general absence of these forms of sexual morality or at least a considerable diminution of this. Prior to this moral erosion we should, of course, identify similar effects on the importance of religion in the life of individuals. This doesn't mean that we have to contest the fact that the progress of modernity has a general effect of secularization of societies (both at the level of religious representations and religious practice) but to outline that the cultural local factors play an important role in this process.

Analyzing the mean values of the family conduct morality in each countries of both the population that has and has not a religious participation, we can notice that in the countries where we can find a high moral values of the population that goes often to church we can notice at the same time high values in the population that doesn't go to church[12]. This means that within a social system the moral values of family conduct of a population that doesn't have a religious participation is strongly dependent on the moral values of population that has a religious participation; the countries where religion still has an important role in the society and so the back-up for traditional moral values is strong, continue to present high moral values both in the religious and secularized population.

We are drawn to the same conclusion if we use as a criterion of defining the religious population not the institutional expression of religiosity (the rates of church participation) but the dimension of religious beliefs. The moral values of the non-believing population are strongly dependent on the values of the believing population, and this suggests that the effect of the secularization forces in the field of ethical behavior is always a mediated one: it is structured by the existing relationship between the two sub-populations.

The social systems where we can find high traditional moral values are, as we have seen, the social system where religion still plays an important role and where the church's involvement not only in the spiritual field but in the moral field as well is legitimized, this fact leading to a high fluidity of moral communication

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[12] The value of R square is .826 and of β is .909.

within a society. This fact makes these societies to be strongly morally integrated and to have a low difference in regard to moral behavior between religious population and secularized ones. In societies where this moral communication function is blurred we expect to find not only low moral scores in the secularized population but high differences between the two populations as well. The differences between the two sub-populations grows as the moral values of the non-religious population diminishes and as the competences of the religious structures are not any more recognized in the moral practical sphere.

Figure 7. The family conduct morality in the

religious and non-religious population**.**

Using the observed differences between the religious practicing population and the non-practicing one we can differentiate between countries with high moral polarity and countries strongly morally integrated. The countries that are morally integrated are countries where both the religious sub-population and the non-religious one have close moral values, while the polarized countries have strong differences between the two populations and so a strong moral dissonance. The level of moral integration of a society shows us only the way the moral values are distributed within a society and not the dominant types of morality encountered in that society. A society can though be integrated around traditional moral values or secular values. So we will use a second criterion of differentiation between the analyzed societies, namely the dominant type of values: traditional and secular values, this being measured by the level of acceptance of the family conduct morality.

Figure 8. Types of societies

Traditional-secular values

Polarized Traditional Societies	**Polarized Secular Societies**
Integrated Traditional Societies	**Integrated Secular Societies**

Degree of moral polarization (vertical axis label)

Classifying the countries according these two criteria we can notice that countries that are the most morally secularized are post-industrial countries as Belgium, Luxemburg and Island and an industrialized country, Belarus. These countries have not only low levels of morality but low levels of religious beliefs and religious participation as well.

They are followed by countries with high levels of secularization (Austria, Italy, Holland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Germany, Great Britain), but in the case of these countries we can find high levels of moral values in the religious sub-populations. In the case of these countries we can find a strong erosion of the legitimation of the church's involvement in moral and social matters, its competency being restricted only to spiritual maters.

With the exception of Malta, the countries that are classified as traditional societies (strongly morally integrated) are post-socialist countries (Leetonia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Estonia, Croatia) where we can find not only high values of morality but the highest values of religious beliefs and religious practice.

The polarized countries that are traditional countries that have managed in a short time to adapt their social system to the capitalist market (Poland or Check Republic) or post-industrial countries where religion still continues to play an important role (Portugal, Ireland and North Ireland). These countries, even if they have high means of moral values, are countries where the secularized population is relatively high which strongly rejects the traditional forms of morality.

5. Socio-anthropological background of morality

The three dimensions of morality underlined above do not exist independently at the level of society. There was always a specific relationship between them that varies from society to society and an underling socio-anthropological background that makes them possible. To compare the European societies according to one of these three dimensions means to evade the specific moral typologies that exist within each society.

Even if the two societies have a similar mean regarding the family conduct morality for example, we can theoretical encounter a society where the dominant moral type is one that accepts all forms of morality and a society where the dominant type is one that accepts only the family conduct morality and rejects all the other. The simple analysis of the mean values doesn't allow us to identify the different types of morality structured within each society or to underline the structure of the ethical field, more precisely the way this moral patterns are socio-anthropological circumscribed. In order to exemplify this we will further analyze the case of Romania

In the case of Romania the results obtained after perfoming the factorial extraction show us the existence of four factors (dimensions of morality): the factor of family conduct morality is not saturated by the abortion and divorce variables, these constitutes a separate factor. We consider that this has its cause in (a) the specific way in which the orthodox culture related across centuries to the practice of divorce, and (b) in the fact that public attitude towards abortion in Romania, in spite of the Church categorical position, has known an extensive liberalization in the post-communist period and continues to be structured by the memory of repression of abortion and the control of reproduction imposed by the communist authorities.

(a) Unlike the Catholic Church that did not tolerate the practice of divorce, the Orthodox Church has manifested a great permissivity in this field; the ecclesial jurisprudence circumscribed the condition when the couple could appeal to divorce as a last resort to solve problems. Of course that within catholic culture there were institutionalized different ways to end marriage, but here the divorce brought with itself the impossibility of re-marriage (Ghitulescu, 2004:251).

The Romanian ecclesial archives from the end of 18 century and beginning of the 19 century allow us to reconstruct the invoked motives and the accepted ones by the Church when it granted the divorce. The condition for obtaining the divorce were generally speaking harder for women than men; men were invoking sexual dissatisfactions, disobedience of the wife, the incapacity of the wife to administrate the household, while the women were invoking adultery and the husbands incapacity to financially sustain the family. As in many other countries, in Romania functions as well the double standard of adultery: tolerated, even recognized as normal practice for certain social categories when it comes to men and abominable when the infidels were women (Ghițulescu, 2004:278-308).

Regardless of the gender discrimination that the orthodox culture professed in granting the divorce, we can notice a general policy of relative tolerance for this practice when the priests were able to establish the impossibility of a solution of the marital conflict, unlike the catholic Church that developed an intransigent position toward this domain, firmly circumscribing the condition of marital separation and stipulating the duty of celibacy once the divorce took place.

At the level of the Romanian social conscience, the practice of divorce did not manage to transform itself in an "immoral practice" unlike other values that the church legitimated through a religious narrative.

(b)   We can notice the same thing when it comes to the attitude of Romanians toward the practice of abortion. Even if Romania continues to be a country with high rates of non-acceptance of the possibility to interrupt a birth (like countries as Malta, Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Hungary), attitudes toward this practice are not as strong religiously structured as the attitude towards the different values of sexual morality.

Taking into consideration the fact that in other societies which are as religious as Romania, the attitude towards abortion saturates the same factor as the attitudes towards adultery and homosexuality, we consider that this thing happens in the Romanian society because the fact that the different attempts of the communist state to regulate the practice of divorce left a big scarce on the Romanian collective mentalities that made harder the interiorizing of the Church position towards this issue.

The impact that the pro-birth politics of the communist regime had on the Romanian demography was destructive. The explosion of births that followed the decree from 1955 led to systematic anomalies, both in the marital life and in the educational and market system. As Kligman manages to show, these effects caused by the artificial raise of the birth rate were only partially assimilated by the system through a corresponding socio-political answer (Kligman, 2000:225). One of the most grave and widespread consequence of this policy was the rising rate of maternal death, this being caused by the unsuccessful attempts of illegal abortions. This non-human policy that was re-affirmed along 24 years is responsible for other atrocities as well (Trebici, 1991:86-87): after the uttering of the decree, in Romania the rate of infantile deaths growed drastically. It reached 59.5 per one thousand inhabitants in 1968, this meaning a 27.7 % growth from the previous year. The infantile mortality in Romania was the biggest in Europe.

The post-communist period brings with itself a general liberalization in this realm, the freedom of abortion leading to one of the highest rates of abortion in Europe (Rotariu, 2003:349). In spite of the fact that the abortion rate drops from 315 interruptions at 100 babies born alive in 1990 to 111 interruptions at 100 babies born alive in 1999, it continues to be very high in the European context.

Taking into consideration this particularly evolutions in the Romanian social system it isn't hard to understand why, unlike the other countries, the church did not succeed, to impose on public opinion its point of view on this matter.

In comparison with the other European societies, Romania is a society where we can find high values for all types of morality; a society that is not morally polarized at the level of the religious and secular population as most of the post-industrialized countries are. At the level of each society we can find a specific way of structuring the different existing types of morality and a concrete socio-cultural conditioning of these typologies.

With the help of a cluster analysis we can try to group the different positions within the field of morality in types that are very homogeneous inside and hetero-geneous outside according to the four dimensions of morality described above. The analysis shows the existence of five types of morality clusters, and by looking at the mean values we can trace the profile of each type. So, the persons that share all four forms of morality is the dominant type of morality found at the level of the Romanian society (38.3%), followed by the type of non-acceptance of the dimension of family conduct morality and the acceptance of all other forms (24%). The type of non-acceptance of neither one of the forms of morality represents a minority of the Romanian population (7.1%) followed by the type of non-acceptance of sexual and familial morality and a weak acceptance of the fiscal and public morality (12.7%) and the type of non-acceptance of the last two and the acceptance of the first two moral dimensions (17.9%).

In order to depict the way these moral typologies are religiously legitimized we will use in our analysis the way people relate to the institution of the church namely the degree of legitimation of the involvement of the church in the different spheres of life.

One of the ways to outline the process of a societal secularization is represented by the analysis of the different ecclesial functions recognized by the population as legitimate (Dobbelaere, 2002:165-169). Recognition of the legitimacy of church involvement in the social and political sphere equates with a low degree of societal secularization, a limitation of this influence strictly to the spiritual sphere equates with a high societal secularization[13].

The process of societal secularization does not overlap with the individual secularization (the existence of a private religiosity that has not an institutional expression, that was pointed out by many studies, proves this), but circumscribes only a diminishing of the social significance of religion and its capacity to integrate in a meaningful way the different social structures.

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[13] The analysis of the legitimation of the different ecclesial function at the level of each European population reveals the direction of the erosion of these functions: first the social, family, moral and then the spiritual involvement.

Figure 9. Erosion of ecclesial functions

In the whole Europe the social functions of the Church are significantly eroded, a fact that can be established in Romania as well. With all this, the dominant type is the one of the recognition of the legitimacy of the intervention of the Church in all spheres of life including the social sphere (51.5 % and this makes Romania one of the countries with the lowest level of societal secularization) followed by the limitation of the competencies of the church to strictly the spiritual sphere (28,9 %) and the type of unrecognizing of the implication of the Church in the social life of a nation but the recognition of all other functions (19.6%).

Next we will try to determine the way the different types of morality depicted above are circumscribed by some important variables: the residence locus: urban / rural, (the process of societalization contributed to the dislocation of the traditional forms of morality that needed first the support of a community) the age (important to determine the period of socialization: before the war, the communist period, the post-communist period), the level of education (a high degree of education offers a high potential of contesting the moral norms) and the typology of relating to the main functions of the church (in order to depict the need of religious legitimation of the different types of morality).

With the help of a homogeneity analysis we can graphically represent the degree of association of these variables with the purpose to lay out the latent structure of the field of morality. A solution with two dimensions manages to explain 76% of the inertia.

We can easily differentiate the way these variables group themselves. (1) Persons that accept all forms of morality are persons that confer a strong legitimacy to the church, recognizing its competence of involvement in all spheres of life (spiritual, moral, familial and social), have a low educational level, are aged persons and live in the rural part of the country. (2) Persons that do not accept any kind of moral forms or only a fiscal and public morality and reject the traditional forms of morality activating at the level of practical behavior a secularized attitude toward life, are young people with a middle education level, live in the urban part of the country and limit the involvement of the church strictly to the spiritual sphere (high level of societal secularization). (3) People that accept all forms of morality besides the family one are people that have a high level of education, do

not agree with the involvement of the church in the social sphere but legitimize the involvement of the church in morality and spiritual sphere.

Figure 10. The homogeneity analysis

6. Final remarks

The distinction between the different types of morality allows us to circumscribe an important field for the testing of the different hypothesis of secularization. Both at the level of Eastern and Western Europe we can notice a significant erosion of all forms of morality especially the one that is most religiously legitimized.

Exactly as many sociologists and anthropologist have noticed, many of the post-socialist countries have experienced on the last decade what some called a religious revival. Unfortunately only few have managed to notice the specific form of this religious growth: it meant on one side the abandonment of the traditional forms of religiosity and the articulation of new forms (oriental beliefs, yoga, new age, etc.) and on the other side the rejection of all forms of morality. Our study enables us to explain this paradox of the simultaneous growth of religious beliefs and the decline of the traditional forms of morality by postulating the possibility of a new type of religious mentality. The fact that this simultaneity is encountered mostly among the young generations from the post-socialist states opens the question regarding the impact of globalization of the religious market.

Situating the analysis at the level of moral typologies we can observe that the type that is the least secularized is not only articulated by the most religious mentalities but is encountered at those persons that are less exposed to the process

of modernization and namely the persons that have a low educational capital and live in the rural area. This fact determines us to question the meaning of this religious growth in post-socialism (Froese, 2002, 2003) by outlining the impact that the pluralizing process had on the structure of plausibility of social worlds and so on the moral order.

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SORIN GOG

ANNEX 1. Types of morality and religious indicators.

		Religious participation	The importance of God
Family conduct morality	R square	**.399 (p=0.000)**	**.454 (p=0.000)**
	β	**.631 (p=0.000)**	**.674 (p=0.000)**
Public conduct morality	R square	.058 (p=0.191)	.040 (p=0.282)
	β	.241 (p=0.191)	.200 (p=0.282)
Fiscal conduct morality	R square	.117 (p=0.019)	.048 (p=0.238)
	β	.440 (p=0.019)	.218 (p=0.238)

ANNEX 2. Regression coefficients

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.815(a)	.664	.640	.28767570

a Predictors: (Constant), church_moral, part_rel

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
			Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.988	.165		-5.995	.000
	part_rel	012	.003	.489	4.304	.000
	church_moral	015	.003	.534	4.694	.000

a Dependent Variable: pop_mor_fam

TENDENCIES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (ROMANIA): TESTING SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE DETERMINANTS

ANDREA KURKÓ-FÁBIÁN

RÉSUMÉ. Tendances de la délinquance juvénile en Roumanie après 1989: déterminants cognitifs et sociaux. Le but général de l'étude est de présenter l'évolution de la délinquance en Roumanie après 1989 avec quelques aspects sociaux et psychologiques. Apres 1989, la Roumanie a été la témoigne d'une pauvreté, du chômage, abuse et d'une fuite des écoles montants. Ces phénomènes ont été corrélés par une montante de la délinquance juvénile aussi. En 1990 le taux d'offenses par habitant était 414/100. 000. Cette chiffre était 1575 en 2000 et 864 en 2004. On a étudié 420 cas de délinquants juvéniles. On a analysé leur familles, éducation, age et ils ont été aussi sujets des testes psychologiques (Norwicki & Stickland's Internal External Control Scale for Children, McGuire & Priestley's Testing Your Reaction, Zucherman – Kuhlan's Personality Questionnaire, et A. W. & Tucker's Inmate Dilemma Test).Les résultats ont été compare avec des résultats des études précédentes en Roumanie. Les résultats ont confirmé que les délinquantes juvéniles ont des tendances très aigues vers la délinquance, mais leur pouvoir de décider en situations risquantes n'est pas significativement différent dans une comparaison avec un group de control. Performance pauvre à l'école et fuite de l'école sont présentes dans les cas de délinquance.

      The infraction phenomenon is one of the major problems or even a tragedy of mankind. Its radiography highlights through the mirror of statistical data that in most of the countries, especially in the developed ones, an important percentage of committed antisocial actions are done by young generation, fact that causes anxiety for the public's morality[1]. Because of the social-economic reality in the post revolutionary period the research about the rate and particulary of juvenile delinquency in Romania after 1989 is very important.

      In order to assess the rate and particulary of juvenile delinquency in Romania after 1989, when a number of social and economical changes occurred, we used data from Police General Inspectorate, the National Committee for Statistics, Ministry of Justice, The Direction for Social Reinstate and Supervision, and Forensic Medicine from Cluj-Napoca. To analyze these data we used sociological and psychological methodology.

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[1] Pitulescu, 2000

Before analyzing the evolution of juvenile delinquency in Romania, after 1989, we must refer to this phenomenon before 1989; our purpose is to point out the fact that juvenile delinquency is not a new phenomenon; the Romanian society has confronted with it even before 1989, but at a different scale. Our analyses revealed that after 1989 the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency became even bigger than before and registered qualitative modifications: from an average of 414 offences/100000 inhabitants in 1990, it reached an average of 1.575 in 2000. Until 1998 the degree of offences has grown rapidly, reaching a degree of 864 ofeences/100000 inhabitants in 2004.

Figure 1. The rate of criminality during 1990-2004[2]

From a sociological point of view, this phenomenon can be explained with the help of Durkheim's Theory: after 1989 the Romanian society has been characterized by chaos. Due to the sudden changes that have occurred in the society, as well as the fact that the prestige and authority of the control instances have lowered, the acts of delinquency have increased. After ten years, the situation stabilized and the rate of offences lowered.

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[2] This and the following four figures were made by the author based on the results of the applied statistical tests on the data from Anuarul Statistic al României (Romanian Statistical Yearbook) 1990-2005, Chapter 18, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4,18.5,18.9.

The same tendency is reflected in the cases of delinquencies committed by minors. During 1989-2003 237.259 minor delinquents have been identified, which means an annual average of 16.947 minor delinquents identified. The biggest number of minor delinquents has been registered in 1998, when 27.382 minor delinquents have been identified. After 1998 the number of minor delinquents has lowered reaching to 15.670 in 2002 and 13.961 in 2003.

Figure 2. Persons investigated according to their ages (1990-2003)

As far as the age of the minor delinquents is concerned, between 1990-1997 the proportion of those between 14-18 years of age seems to be constant, representing an annual percent of 86-88% of the total minors investigated, and starting with the year 1999 the percentage has increased to 95-97%.

The results of our research show the fact that the preferred area of minor delinquents is the city, because represents a space that besides opportunities offers them anonymity. In 1990 from the total number of 63.997 of offences committed by minors, 43.426 have been registered in the urban area. The same tendency remained also in the following years, so that in 1995 out of 353.371 of committed offences, 224.236 happened in the cities and in 2003 out of the total of 206.766 of committed crimes, 110.767 happened in the urban area.

Figure 3. The number of minors investigated according to the age category
they belong to during 1990-2003

Unfortunately, in the case of minor delinquents we have to speak about a relapse. A serious thing is the fact that official statistics shows us a strong growth of the number of minor delinquents recidivists. If in 1990 only 4,2% of the total of punished minors were recidivists, after 1994 the number has increased four times more, reaching 17,5% in 2001. This significant growth of the number of minor recidivists shows us once more the necessity of introducing new preventing programmes against juvenile delinquency, based on new methods, as the old ones have not reached the purpose.

Table 1.
The number of convicted minors and the percentage of recidivists during 1990-2001[3]

Year	No. of convicted minors	(% recidivists from the total of convicted minors)
1990	1983	4,2
1991	3784	16,6
1992	4590	8,2
1993	6940	7,7
1994	9121	9,5
1995	9783	12,3
1996	10377	13,7
1997	11802	14,7

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[3] Source: Ministry of Justice

Year	No. of convicted minors	(% recidivists from the total of convicted minors)
1998	11196	14,0
1999	8797	17,0
2000	6738	16,3
2001	6726	17,5

Statistics allowed us to realize the general delinquency curve at a national level as well as for the Northern-West region of the country, respectively for Cluj County. This way we noticed that the national tendency of delinquents resembles the Northern-West region as well as Cluj County. Starting with 1992 the number of investigated offences has grown reaching its highest level in 1998, and starting to lover from 1999.

Figure 4. The proportion of investigated crimes in Cluj County and Northern-West region from the total crimes committed at national level, during 1990-2000

As far as we consider the dynamic and the tendencies of juvenile delinquency in Cluj County during 1990-2004, the results of our research show us that tendencies resemble to national one. During 1990-2004 there have been 2.544 offences committed in Cluj County, the greatest number of offences occurring in 1997 (a total of 297 offences).

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
Figure 5. The number of offences committed by minors in Cluj County during 1990-2004

Concerning gender and age, of the total of committed offences, 91,7% have been committed by boys, 40,8% of the criminals were 15 years old, while those who were 14, respectively 16 years old represent 22,4% respectively 21,4%. This is very much alike to that described in the special literature according to their age. This is the age with the highest risk of becoming a delinquent.

The social-economical transition through which our country is passing had a great influence upon school; this important place of socialization which has lost very much of its authority. This is due to the deficit in scholastic substructure, to the inadequate professional schooling of the teachers, to the lack of respect of the society towards the teachers, not to mention the indifference and the lack of interest of the parents regarding the children's education. Under these conditions phenomena like absentee, scholastic maladjustment and dropping out from school are phenomena that are often seen, phenomena that are connected to the growth of the number of minor delinquents.

According to the results of our research out of 2.544 offences committed by the minors, 1.584 were committed by minors who have graduated less than 8 classes, of which 384 were illiterates. The situation is alarming, as much as we think that beside this great number of minors who have dropped out from school before graduating 8 classes, there are the 174 minors who attended the courses of a special school and there is no information how many classes have they graduated from. These results allow us to say once more that the scholastic deviancy goes hand in hand with juvenile delinquency.

Figure 6. The number of offences committed by minors in Cluj County during 1990-2004 according to the educational level

Although according to special literature, most of the offences committed by minors are committed in gangs, according to official statistics, 68,8% of the investigated minors were alone at the moment of the offence. We doubt that the information is true because the made statistics regarding the type of crimes and the way they were committed (alone or in groups), indicates the fact that most of the offences the minors were investigated for were committed in groups (69,4%). This way the offences were committed in groups of two or three, boys and girls (mixed groups) 73,1% of the destruction offences, 64,3% of the cheating offences, 63% of the body hurting, 84,7% of the contraventions and 69,6% of the thefts. We have to mention that the results of the empirical research presented in chapter IV of this work points out the fact that in most cases, the minors were not alone at the time of the offences.

In Cluj County the preferred area of minor delinquents was the urban one, 79% of the offences committed by minors being registered in this medium. As we have already mentioned, the city is the preferred place of the gangs, it being a place were the minors are not supervised neither by family nor by community, the city being the appropriate environment for loosing time on streets in the absence of any occupation.

As far as the degree of the offences is concerned, the results of our research show that although the most offences are committed in the urban area, these are not the most serious offences, while those committed in the rural area are much more serious. The preferred offence of minor delinquents in the urban area is the theft while destruction offences and body hurting are specific to the rural area (value of chi-square: 76,14 degree of significance: 0,000). This is because of the structure of the society in the rural area.

A surprisingly result came up as far as the type of the family the minor delinquent comes from is concerned. Contrary to what is described in most of the works from the literature, there is no discrepancy between the large number of minor delinquents who come from split families (52,25%) and those who come from organized families (47,44%).

This result confirms our suppositions that the type of family the minor comes from is not a deciding factor of the juvenile delinquency. Just because the parents of a child are not divorcing when they face marital problems, it is not a warranty that their decision is the best for their child, and this is not a warranty against juvenile delinquency. On the contrary, if the parents do not get along with each other, if domestic violence (we are not talking necessarily about physical violence, the verbal one is enough) is present within the family, in an unfit familial environment, if children are neglected (physical and emotional) or do not have education there is a real risk for them to become delinquents. Our conclusion is that from the juvenile delinquencies point of view, it is much better if parents who do not get along with each other divorce, than stay together, creating this way a familial atmosphere full of fights and misunderstandings. A child raised by a single parent, who gets a proper care (physical, psychological and emotional) it is less probably to become a delinquent, while a child living with both parents in an unfit familial environment (heavy atmosphere, neglect, with an unfit parental model) risks to move away from the family, school and friends, starts searching for other preoccupations which are often offered by the gangs and this way they risk to become delinquents.

An interesting result of our research is that in relation to ethnic affiliation of the minor delinquents. Of the total of offences committed in Cluj County during 1990-2004 most were committed by Gypsies, then the Romanians and Hungarians respectively.


Figure 7. Ethnic affiliation of minor delinquents (in Cluj County during 1990-2004) (percentage)

Contrary to our expectations regarding the types of committed offences, gypsies were over presented in the group of those charged with body violation and fraud, the group of those who committed thefts having a lower average. This way we have noticed that there is a significant difference (value of chi-square: 20,23, significance: 0,01) between minors belonging to different ethnic groups, as far as the type of offence is concerned. We have also to mention the cases of relapses, which according to data are bigger as far as the Gypsy minority is concerned, the percentage of gypsies (22,1%) being bigger than that of the Hungarians (13,8%) or that of the Romanians (13,2%) on this regard. We are convinced about the fact that the Gypsies constitute a majority as primary delinquents, as well as recidivists, because they are seen as a marginal group and haven't learned about the etiquette of the society, and because they have not been integrated into the society due to the labeling. The existent stereotypes of our society regarding the Gypsies hardens their integrate into society, so that to minor Gypsy delinquents rarely is given "a second chance".

The favorite offence of the minor delinquents investigated by the police in Cluj county during 1990-2004 was theft (79,4%), robbery (5,9%), forest offence (2,1%), driving without a driving license (2%), Body violation (2%), complicity to theft (1,55), rape (1,5%), damages (1%), sexual perversity with a minor (0,65), prostitution (0,6%), attempt of theft (0,5%), fraud (0,4%), body violation out of fault (0,4%), cheating (0,4%), hiding theft (0,3%), domestic trespassing (0,3%), hiding robbery (0,2%), attempt of murder (0,25), violating the regime of guns and ammunition, (0,2%), tax dodging (0,1%), complicity to robbery (0,1%), incest (0,1%), while in the case of the next offences there was one case for each: living the place of an accident, driving an unenroled car, murder out of fault, driving under the influence of alcohol, fraudulent administration, attempt of fraudulent trespassing the frontier, blackmail, false money traffic and homicide.

Result of our research show also the fact that even female delinquents are capable of committing severe offences. So: 11,3% of the female delinquents have committed severe body violation, this percentage being much bigger than that of the male delinquents (9,8%). Beside this type of offences, girls have committed theft (83,5%), contravention (2,1%), fraud (2,1%) and damaging (1%).
The results of our investigations (from1998-2005) about the minors and teenagers delinquent behavior are presented next.

Starting from the theories about delinquency and juvenile delinquency and adding the results of our previous survey[4] we created a theoretical model related to factor that interrelate with juvenile delinquency: the integrative model of juvenile delinquency.

The basic element of this model is the risk assuming, as any of the law violation means a risk for the delinquent.

The importance of this model is that it approaches the risk problem to the juvenile delinquency from different points of view.

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[4] Kurkó-Fabian, 2006, 192-239

Juvenile delinquents are divided into two groups: the first group belongs to the youngsters seeking for strong sensations for risky situations. In the second group are the poor youngsters, who because of the poverty have to face risky situations. The members of the both groups have two possibilities: a) enter a risky situation while leads towards delinquency (theft, robbery, driving without driving license) or b) young people enter – a legitimate risky situation (surfing, parasail or seeking for a job, or trained for a new job).

Referring to the perceptions of the risky situations, of self-control or self impulsivity, there are three situations: - the situation is considered too risky and new situations are looked for; crimes are committed; a new behavior is adopted.

If a young people can't find or can't afford legal situations to satisfy the need of strong sensations, sooner or later they can become delinquents.

Figure 10. The integrative model of juvenile delinquency[5]

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[5] Figure made by the author based on the data from: literature of specialty theories of juvenile delinquency - Eysenck (1964); Strickland, Lewicki & Katz (1966); Zuckerman, M. (1971); Farley (1972); Rutter & Madge (1976); Malamuth, Feshbach & Jaffe (1977); West & Farrington (1977); Williamson (1978); Mayers (1980); Rutter, Mangham, Mortimore, Ouston (1979); Strickland, Lewicki & Katz (1966); Farrington, Biron, LeBlanc (1982); Közéki & Eysenck (1985); Cornish & Clarke (1986); Slovic (1987); Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990); Scouts (1992); McGuire & Priestley (1993); Trimpop, Kerr, Kirkcaldy (1997); Ball, Conolly (2000); Donohew, Zimmerman, Cupp, Novak, Colon, Abell (2000); Hampson, Severson, Burns, Slovic, Fisher (2001).-; and the results of the research from the Institute Of Forensic Medicine From Cluj (1997)- Kurkó-Fabian (2005, pp. 285-298; 2006)

The general goal of our research was to make an analysis of integrative model and to detect the leading juvenile delinquency conditions, while the specific goal of our research was to study the young people's capacity to make certain decisions, respectively their attitude in risky situations, all these in order to intervene in an efficient way. The practicality of this research is to point out that the social problems of juvenile delinquents (social origin, family background, education, etc.) must be understood in the context of the person's individuality, his psychological particularities like self control, impulsivity, sensation seeking, sociability and activity all these being done in a holistic manner.

According to the upper mentioned theories and the integrative model we formulated the following ***general hypothesis***: In the case of young people the factors that bring about risky situations which later lead to delinquency are caused by social factors, the age group they belong to; the need for strong sensation; the increased impulsivity and low self control. When taking decisions, the most important is the acceptance of risky situations and then the low self-control. But there is no difference in the strategy of taking decisions between the juvenile delinquents and non-delinquents of the same age.

The research methodology: STANDARD QUESTIONAIRES (Nowicki, Strickland (1973): Internal-External Control Scale for Children, McGuire, Priestley (1993): Testing your reaction, Zuckerman, Kuhlman (1993): ZPQ), and OTHER METHODS (Documents analyses, Individual halfstructured interview (Adapted from Münnich and Szakács, 1990), Tucker's Inmate Dilemma Test, The study of case)

The subjects of research: 420 prisoners from Gherla Extreme Safety Prison and External Section from Cluj-Napoca (210 of them are between 14-18 years old and 210 are between 19-21) chosen at random and other 420 persons from the control group (half of them between 14-18 and half between 19-21) chosen by the methods of pattern stratification.

The stage of research: The study have been made between 1998-2004. For conducting of the research we contacted Gherla Extreme Safety Prison and External Section from Cluj-Napoca warden. We were permitted to study the delinquents records, to question and interview them.

I. The records study gave us the possibility to find out the social situation of juvenile delinquent.

II. The second step of the investigation was the questionaires for the control group. The questions from the survey were the same as those in the juvenile delinquent's records.

III. The next step was the standard questionaires for the juvenile delinquents group and control group.

IV. The fourth step of our investigation was the application of the Tucker's inmate dilemma test for both groups.[6]

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[6] Mérő L, 1996, 16-71

V.   The last part of our research consisted of the individual halfstructured interview for the juvenile delinquents in need of strong sensations. We achieved for them the casestudy also.

The previous research results and the study of bibliography about the specific elements allowed us to create our own model about juvenile delinquency factors 'juvenile delinquency integrative model'. Based on this model we accomplished our research.

The great majority of the investigations about juvenile delinquence have a single point of view either biological or psychological or sociological. We tried to get rid of this unilateralism. Thus we took into consideration the juvenile delinquents' psychological particularities as impulsivity, and the need for strong sensations. We took into account the investigated individuals' self control to emphasize their potentiality to assume the risk. At the same time we underlined the juvenile delinquents' social particularities which participate in taking risky decisions.

The last step of our investigation was to analyze the possible differences between the juvenile delinquents and non delinquents in risky situations when they are to take the decision strategy.

We've obtained the following results:

- 73% of the juvenile delinquents live in towns where they commit law violations
- 60% of the delinquents were convicted for theft, 33,3% for robbery and 6,6% for rape.

- Analyzing the statistical data we've found a difference between the group of delinquents and control group regarding the following variables: family structure, family atmosphere, relationship with the parents, frequenting special school or correction school and the intensity of alcohol consumption (see Table 2.).

Table 2.

Comparative table of social variables[7]

Variables		Group of delinquents (%)	Control group (%)	Chi-square value, significance
Family structure	Disorganized	55%	16,7%	Chi-square: 155,98 significance: 0,000
	Parents live in cohabitation	10%	10%	
	Divorced parents	10%	10%	
	Nuclear	25%	63,3	

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[7] This table was completed by the author based on data from following sources: Cluj County Police files for minors; "Mina Minovici" Forensic Medicine files for minors, Cluj-Napoca

Variables		Group of delinquents (%)	Control group (%)	Chi-square value, significance
Family atmosphere	Frequent arguing	33,9%	6,7%	Chi-square: 315,70 significance: 0,000
	Physical discomfort	5,1%	1,7%	
	Agressivity	27,1%	6,7%	
	Lack of interest	20,3%	11,/	
	Proper	13,6%	73,3%	
Relationship with the parents	Bad	30%	20%	Chi-square: 11,2 significance: 0,001
	Good	70%	80%	
Frequenting special school or correction school	Special school	6,7%	2,2%	Chi-square: 93,15 significance: 0,000
	Correction school	18,3%	1,1%	
	None	75%	96,7%	
Alcohol consumption intensity	Exaggerated	3,3%	1,1%	Chi-square: 104,63 significance: 0,000
	Frequent	16,7%	2,2%	
	Occasional	43,3%	28,3%	
	Not consuming	36,7%	68,3	

- 55% of the juvenile delinquents come from disorganized families; 20% of cases have divorced parents or parents living in cohabitation ; only 20% come from nuclear families (Chi-square value: 155,98, significance: 0,000).
- 85% of the delinquents come from families in difficulties or need, as in 33% of the families there are physical abuses, in 5% of the families the mental disorder is present and in 26,7% of the families the aggressiveness is the main characteristic while 20% of the families show no concern in the child's education. (Chi-square value: 315,70, significance: 0,000).
- Only 36,7% of the members of the delinquent group declared they do not consume alcohol, instead of 68,3% of control group, who declared the same thing. 43,3% of the young delinquents are taking occasionally alcohol, 16,7% are taking frequently, and 3,3% of them are taking extremely much amount of alcohol (Chi-square value: 104,63, significance: 0,000).
- 38,3% of the juvenile delinquents graduated only primary school, 8,3% are illiterates, while for answering the questions, not only the illiterates needed help but also the primary school graduates. For this reason our research was more difficult because we had to replace the group questionnaire with individual ones.
- Concerning the connection with the delinquent groups, 31,6% confessed they belong to a dubious group of friends; 6,6% of them abandoned school being influenced by their friends, 33,3% participated in group to a law violation, and 23,3% declared that their groups consider the law violations values.

- Those juveniles who raised in an organized family (with opportune atmosphere, loving parents, skilled socializes, etc.) are less oriented to commit delinquency than those who do not come from such a family (see Table 3.).

Table 3.

Social factors with influence on delinquency[8]
Dependent variable: infractional condition (it is or it is not delinquent)

Independent variables	Beta coefficients	significance
Opportune family atmosphere	-0,450	0,000
Alcohol consumption	0,161	0,000
Ever worked	0,161	0,000
Special school	0,150	0,000
Disorganized family	0,115	0,000
Drug consumption	0,075	0,004
R square (%)	46,8	

- A disorganized family having a bad, aggressive atmosphere is in a positive relation with the number of crimes committed by young delinquents, while a proper family atmosphere has a negative relationship with this number. According to this fact, minors being raised in an adequate family environment commit less crimes (see Table 4).

Table 4.

Social factors having impact on the number of crimes committed by juvenile delinquents Dependent variable: number of committed crimes

Independent variables	Beta coefficients	significance
Proper family atmosphere	-0,365	0,000
Disorganized family	0,207	0,000
Atmosphere full with aggressivity	0,148	0,002
R square (%)	13,2	

Taking for example any of the above parameters, the members of control group have lived in a healthy social and familial environment regardless the delinquent group.

In case of the psychological factors we used t test to check if there is any differences between the two groups (see Table 5.).

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[8] This and the following six tables were made by the author using statistical methods on data from the following source: Police General Inspectorate and Forensic Medicine from Cluj-Napoca

Differences between the two groups regarding the psychological factors

Psychological factor	Delinquent	Average	t value	df	Significance
Self control	Yes	17,28	19,03	838	0,000
	No	12,33			
Impulsivity	Yes	19,17	7,22	838	0,000
	No	15,93			
Sensation seeking	Yes	9,62	19,00	838	0,000
	No	5,87			
Sociability	Yes	7,67	-2,53	838	0,011
	No	8,08			
Activity	Yes	11,33	6,40	838	0,000

From the above table turns out that:

- The value of self control is much higher in case of delinquents than in case of the other group (value t: 19,03 at 0,000 significance).
- Juvenile delinquents are more impulsive than non-delinquents (value t: 7,22, significance: 0,000).
- There is a difference at the delinquents' advantage concerning the sensation seeking (value t: 19,00, at 0,000 significance). We can say that juvenile delinquents have more pronounced desire for living such a hard sensations.
- Delinquents are more active than their non-delinquents mates (value t: 6,40, significance: 0,000).
- Delinquents are less sociable (value t: -2,53, significance: 0,011), but the more sociable a delinquent is, the more he commits crimes (value Beta: 0,108, significance: 0,022) (see Table 6.).

Psychological factors, a measure of delinquency related to the number of committed crimes (standardized regression coefficients, significance)
Dependent variable: the number of committed crimes

Independent variable	Beta coefficients	Significance
Type of self control	0,164	0,001
Sensation seeking	0,151	0,003
Sociability	0,108	0,022
R square (%)	7,7	

These results confirm the fact that there are significant differences from the psychological point of view between juvenile delinquents and non-delinquents.

The act of taking decisions is very important in everyday life because it ensures the genuineness and coherence of the behavior.

The next step in data analyzes was the χ^2 test applied for the Inmate Dilemma Test results.

The aim of using this test was to highlight the possible differences that may occur when making decisions in risky situations for both groups having the same age.

The next table shows the number of persons taken part in this experiment.

Table 7.

Numerical distribution of cases

	Cases					
	Participants		Excluded		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total	840	100,0	0	,0	840	100,0

Here are the results for each person:

Table 8.

The answers about the Tucker's Inmate Dilemma Test

Delinquent	Answer possibilities				Total
	I don't confess anything	We both confess	The other confes	I confess	
Yes	308	14	7	91	420
No	301	63	14	42	420
Total					
	609	77	21	133	840

The number of persons who chose the first option, namely "I don't confess anything" is almost equal in both groups (308, 301). Referring to the other options there is an obvious difference in the number of persons for a particular answer.

It is interesting to notice that a double number of delinquents compared to non-delinquents chose the last option that they confess. We strongly believe that this answer is the cause of the situation they actually are in: they are in prison. This answer reflects somehow a "change to the good way" indeed. Results from this table can not tell if there are any differences regarding the strategy used in decision making. To find out the answer to this question we need statistical analyses of the collected data. For this, in the next step we declare the null hypothesis according to wich: "juvenile delinquents use different strategies when making decisions in risky situations". We used χ^2 method to test this hypothesis.

Table 9.

χ^2 test results

	Value	Liberty degrade (df)	Asymp. Sig. 2(sided)
Pearson χ^2 **Total**	51,648 840	3	,000

df=3 , χ^2=51,648, critical value =7,815 at p=0,05
51,648>7,815

Critical value=7,815 for p=0,05 significance degree 51,648>7,815 → H_0 could be abandoned.

Because the value obtained by applying the chi-square test is greater than the critical value, we've abandoned the null hypothesis and we accepted the original one, according to which the differences about the strategies in the studied groups are insignificant.

This way we can state that in risky situations the delinquents adopt similar strategies to their non-delinquent mates. The cognitive patterns playing role in the decision making process turned out to be independent from the fact that a person is delinquent or not.

The results of our investigations show that our hypothesis is true: in the case of young people the factors that bring about risky situations which later lead to delinquency are caused by social factors, the age group they belong to; the need for strong sensation; the increased impulsivity and low self control. When taking decisions, the most important is the acceptance of risky situations and then the low self-control. But there is no difference in the strategy of taking decisions between the juvenile delinquents and non-delinquents of the same age.

The conclusion is that both general and juvenile delinquency growths when major socio-economical changes appear in the society's life.

The juvenile delinquents risk assuming is determined by upper mentioned elements: the age, the strong sensation wish, high impulsivity, and low self-control. In taking the decisions the reduced self-control and the risk assuming play an important part. In risky situations there are no differences in taking decisions between juvenile delinquents and non-delinquents of the same age.

Both general and juvenile delinquency develop together with the essential social-economic changes of a country. After 1989 in Romania the economic and social changes led to the general and juvenile delinquency.

The sociological science cannot leave aside the social relations and the life conditions that highly influence the individual's socializing process. The goal of the research is to reveal the dysfunctions or even the contradictions, which could lead to the law violations.

The socializing process that develops is based sometimes on conflicts between individual and society, between legitimate wishes and the methods, resources, and possibilities offered by the society to fulfill them, between conditions, dispositions, and facts that often guides to maladjustment forms or instable personalities.

In the case of juvenile delinquency the statistics shows that law violations demonstrate force, lack of judgment and experience and fear with frequent manifestations of violence, robberies, vagabondage and prostitution.

The goal of our work was the presentation of the evolution and the tendencies of the juvenile delinquency in between 1990-2005, and to study its social, psychological and cultural aspects.

The prevention of the juvenile and adult delinquency has a special meaning. To prevent the delinquency, recognition of the leading factors and the measures taken to hinder the delinquent behavior development is needed. The following observations are considered important:

Delinquency is a determinate multi-factorial behavior. The efficient prevention could be accomplished only through the co-operation, in a complex team, where the psychologist, the psychiatrist the forensic expert, the sociologist, and the social worker are present together. These could make a team capable to fight for delinquency prevention and especially for the prevention of juvenile delinquency.

Juvenile delinquency might be presupposed. With the help of the adequate methods the future delinquents could be identified due to their social, economic and familial status and due to their attitude facing school. Through an adequate orientation and a good education their delinquent behavior could be reduced. The great part in this has the social worker.
The child, the teenager should be always investigated in his own psych-social and familial context. Rehabilitation is possible only in this environment.

We do not have the power to stop the phenomenon; we can only show to the general public and especially to persons who are able to oppose the juvenile delinquency the gravity and seriousness of this phenomenon, but in the same time we must underline that in order to realize a successful prevention of this serious problem, it must be approached in a holistic way (taking into account both social and psychological factors). If we do not use the holistic approach, the prevention will fail, because of the biased point of view or position.

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*** Direcția de Cazier și Evidență Operativă din Inspectoratul General al Poliției Române, Date statistice

*** Inspectoratul General al Poliției din cadrul Ministerului de Interne, Date statistice

*** Institutul Medico-Legal, Cluj-Napoca (1995), Dosarele inculpaților minori

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*** Institutul Medico-Legal, Cluj-Napoca (2003), Dosarele inculpaților minori

*** Institutul Medico-Legal, Cluj-Napoca (2004), Dosarele inculpaților minori

*** Ministerul de Interne, Inspectoratul de Poliție al județului Cluj, Serviciul Cazier Judiciar și Evidența Operativă (1990-2002), Date statistice

*** Ministerul Justiției, Date statistice

*** Poliția Județului Cluj (1990), Date statistice, registre

*** Poliția Județului Cluj (1991-1995), Date statistice, registre

CITIZENS' PERCEPTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN RELATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING. FROM ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENTALITY

LAURA NISTOR

RÉSUMÉ. Les perceptions des citoyens sur l'Union Européenne et ses décisions vis-à-vis de l'environnement. Dans la littérature enviromentale d'aujourd'hui la méthode de traiter les problĕmes de l'enviroment (comment et a quel niveau les traiter) est importante. Quelques auteurs sont pour un gouvernement enviromental, malgré ça, due a la complexité des problĕmes, le niveau auquel cette institution representerait 'un bon gouvernement' n'est pas clair. A un premier regard, les problĕmes globals de l'enviroment devraient impliquer un gouvernement global ou un régime, mais il y a des cas ou le consensus est en danger a cause des différents negociations ou ŕ cause de la force des decisions locales. L'étude présent, aprčs quelques aspects concernant le gouvernement enviromental, present une analyse secondaire de l'opinion des citoyens européens concernant comment et ou les decisions enviromentales devraient etre prises, basée sur les dates de l'Eurobarometre Standard et Special. En voyant la diversité des opinions, finalement, mon conclusion est que la théorie du gouvernement enviromental de Foucault sera le millieu dand lequel la notion du gouvernement enviromental pourrait etre comprise mieux.

Environmental governance. Levels and actors

Due to the challenge economic globalization represents towards environmental quality, various political institutions, think-tanks, commercial organizations and NGOs stand for the building of a global environmental governance or an environmental regime as a partially integrated collection of world-level organizations, understandings and assumptions that specify the relationship of human society to nature (Meyer *et al.*, 1997: 623) and represent a framework within which environmental problems could be dealt in a joint way (see for example Young, 1994; Boda, 2004). Since "no single state can individually control the direction or alter the distributions of effluent, but neither is any one state insulated from the effluents of others" (Choucri, 1993: 26-quoted by Jakobsen, 1999) a global environmental regime within which the modalities of governing global green problems and processes should be stated (Watts, 2002) through "norms and rules that are specified by a multilateral legal instrument among states to regulate national actions on a given issue" (Porter & Brown, 1991:20-quoted by Jakobsen, 1999) seems completely reasonable.

Debates however are evident: skeptics usually argue that economic globalization will anyway overload the environmental one, so effective environmental regulation is difficult to win within the framework of global capitalism, while transformationalists believe in global capitalism's capacity to overcome its internal contradictions, so that environmental considerations will play an increasing role in the future (Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002). As a consequence of clashing assumptions, environmental governance not by all means is considered as a kind of transnational, *global* institution which authority and duties are clearly defined, but frequently denotes a very general, fuzzy or multi-level approach and refers to

> "[…] *any institutional arrangement* that attempts to control individual or organizational use of natural resources, ecological systems, and sinks for wastes in order to meet objectives such as sustainable use, protection of public health, and protection of valued species or places. Societies have developed *many institutional structures for environmental governance*, all of which are effective in some circumstances, but none of which is universally successful." (Brewer & Stern, 2005:41- emphasis mine)

From such definitions is not hard to see that nation-states, international institutions, or environmental NGOs - the latter being more and more transnational -, separately, or together, could represent a kind of environmental governance (top-down or bottom-up or horizontal) and since none of them is universally successful it is difficult to say what kind of - if any - institutional arrangement would be *the* environmental governance.

Defining environmental governance as "the attempts by governing bodies or combinations thereof to alleviate recognized environmental dilemmas", Davidson & Frickel (2004: 471-477) provide a very useful insight into the problem on this regard. The authors assess the conceptual frameworks within which environmental governance has been described ever since[1]. The pluralism, agency-capture, ecological Marxism, ecological modernization and social constructionist approaches of environmental governance they describe refer mostly to nation-state level attempts,

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[1] Thus, pluralism is the framework which denotes the assumption that public policy in connection to the environment is marked by competing interests of various agents (corporations, civil organizations, states, etc.) and is the result of this competition since according to the agency-capture approach "those agencies that have the most powerful constituencies tend to gain more administrative favor, whereas agencies whose constituencies are relatively less organized (…) face shortages in the resources needed to function". States within environmental governance are viewed by ecological Marxism as contributors not to the ecological restoration, but to ecological degradation, as far as (neo-liberal) states function via capital. On the contrary, the ecological modernization insists on how the environmental problems have generated institutional transformations in industrialized and neo-liberal social systems, "how state and economic actors in industrialized nations have increasingly expressed a willingness to support ecological improvements as a rational response to environmental and material limits" (p. 476) especially in Western Europe. Social constructionist approaches refer to the manner environmental problems are represented and communicated dependently on "how social and political understandings of nature and environmental problems are crafted, contested, and legitimated or not"(p. 477).

while global environmental governance we are talking about, they view as the most recent focus of the literature, denoting how the role of the nation states has been changed since "global environmental crises problematize the boundaries of territorial states and, hence, the capacity for domestic political response" and push environmental governance to transnational levels[2] (see also Castells, 2000).

Now, if we turn to the *global* environmental governance, problems are still more complex. Analysts frequently accentuate that the multiplicity (concepts, agents and structures) of the term environmental governance - mostly when it is considered on global level - implies a number of contradictions: sometimes it appears as having a greater legitimacy compared to that of nation-states[3], while other times it seems weak in implementing its authority concerning environmental protection[4].

The regime approach, which considers the case of environmental governance as an example for an international regime, suggests that the globalization of environmental problems has a twofold effect: nation states assume greater environmental responsibility and, as a consequence, participate in more multi- or bilateral environmental agreements (Davidson & Frickel, 2004), which are not compulsory set up by a governing body but are part of a broader regime

> "[…] wherein stable patterns of behaviour result from compliance with certain norms and rules, whether these are laid down in a legally binding instrument or not" (List & Rittberger, 1992: 89-90- quoted by Jakobsen, 1999)

and represent the case of policy diffusion, a horizontal process by which policy innovations are communicated in the international system and adopted voluntarily by an increasing number of countries in the absence of formal contractual obligation (Busch, Jorgens şi Tews, 2005). As voluntarily as it is, however, horizontal diffusion can

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[2] I have also to add, that all the above approaches are perfectly relevant also within the framework of global environmental governance. It's not difficult to observe for example how states have competing interests when comes about transnational environmental regulations. Busch et al. (2005:151) referring to the EU-level environmental governance, for example recognizes the importance of the fact how " […] individual member countries of the European Union (EU) attempt to actively shape EU policies in accordance with their own policy styles and regulatory traditions in the hope of minimizing the cost […]". This phenomenon is true not only abut the mostly Western and Scandinavian member states who want to see their stringer regulations transposed into the EU-level, but also about the newer member states or accessing countries, mostly post-socialist, who negotiated transitional periods for applying the EU-acquis in order to minimize the cost of the accession. We also know cases, when the protection of the environment developed into an international or bilateral conflict. The conflict between Romania and Hungary around the Tisa river contamination with cyanide compounds in 2000 is an example in this case.

[3] Since environmental governance

   "Is among the most transparent, participatory, and accessible realms of global governance to state and non-state actors alike. […] It has also generally been responsive to justice and equity concerns. […] They also frequently attempt to combine global concerns with local decision-making and accountability, where activities are focused." (Bernstein, 2005:140)

[4] The same author notice that it occurs probably because a number of international institutions concerned mostly with economic globalization appear as part of global environmental governance also, however they "subordinate the environment to the goals of open markets, corporate freedom, efficiency and economic growth." (Bernstein, 2005:140)

be seen from the rational choices point of view: it's better to do all the things other parts are doing, because of minimizing the cost of subsequent political and administrative adjustment (*ibidem*). Sprinz & Vaahtoranta (1994) in their 'interest-based explanation' regarding the participation of the countries in international environmental agreements present within a quite simple model two dimensions influencing the countries: their 'ecological vulnerability' and 'the cost of pollution reduction'. The authors do not make difference whether the problem is national or global, as far as a country could be in favor of an international agreement even in the case when pollution is generated by its own sources, exactly for the fact that in this way costs of conforming emerge in other countries, too (see also Boda, 2004).

Although assumptions which question the 'good' or democratic character of the EU as whole[5] are not rare, when talking about global environmental governance, the EU is - especially on basis of regulations - usually referred to as a good example: "due to its relatively strong functional institutions" being to date "the first experiment in supranational democratic governance" and "unique in its power to counteract environmental side effects of global capitalism" (Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002: 1324), and opinions are even more homogenous when it comes about the role of the EU in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, where the EU practically completed the financial conditionality of the World Bank, which at the beginning of the 1990s "formally required the preparation of a National Environmental Action Plan as a condition for receiving World Bank loans and effectively made this instrument mandatory for borrower countries" (Busch *et al.*, 2005: 156). Of course, we could initiate an ample discussion on these level about the role of WB, IMF and EU as agents of good governance in post-communist countries, but this is not our goal in the framework of the present article. We could however say, that the Europenization process has a catalyzing effect on ecological modernization in East and Central Europe, as far as the EU put compulsory for the accession not only the formal transposition of legislation, but also 'the establishment of adequate structures for implementation and enforcement' (European Commision, 1994- quoted by Lynch, 2000). It's also important to stress, that acquis implementation and application occurred with the help of financial instruments like European aid. All in all, the process of acquis transposition illustrates mostly a global (EU-level) environmental governance (policy infusion), and less a voluntarily diffusion (regime) since grants and loans are based on several rationalities: trans-boundary pollution; regional and global security and commercial interest (Andersen, 2002) both from the part of the EU and the country.

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[5] John Coultrap (1999) for example speaks about a 'democratic deficiency' regarding the EU, meaning that "the flow of influence from the people to government is impeded in some way" (p. 108), due to the deficit of mainly three institutions: the supranational Euro-elections, transnational party federations and the European Parliament, and to different causes: the lack of coordination, dominance of national over supranational politics and to the marginal institutional position of the EP.

In the following chapter I turn to present some issues concerning EU-citizens opinion over years about how to govern the environment, using data available from Standard and Special Eurobarometers.

The case of environmental decision-making in the EU

Environmental issues and EU-citizens

The seriousness of environmental problems and the importance of protecting the environment have been widely approved by Community citizens over time. In 1974, when the first Eurobarometer was undertook, the protection of the environment was selected by those questioned as the fourth (4,56% average range) most important problem of the upcoming four-five years period (Euro-Barometer no. 1.). As a consequence, and as an approval of the first common environmental action plan, when referring solely to the environmental protection and pollution-fighting problems, a clear majority saw introduction of a common policy for these problems to be very important or important (42% and 35% in 1974; 48% and 31% in 1975 (Euro-Barometre, no. 4.).

The second Community-level environmental action plan, beginning with the year 1977 took the problem of environmental protection more rigorously than the first one and, data show, this strategy was welcomed by citizens: in 1979 high consensus occurred between EU-election candidates and general public regarding the introduction of stronger measures of protection (61% and 35% of election candidates being strongly agree and agree with this, while 63%, respectively 30% of the general public stated so) (Euro-Barometre, no. 16), the situation among general public being approximately similar in 1981 and 1983, too (Euro-Barometre, no.19). However the year 1986 has marked already the final year of the third environmental action program, protecting the environment and fighting pollution remained salient among Europeans, being on the third place among issues for priority debate in the European Parliament (Euro-Barometre no.25). As answer to a multiple-choice item considering the issues European Government should be responsible for, 61% of those questioned in 1987 considered that issue is the environment and the percent is even higher in 1988 (66%), a situation to be expected after the Chernobyl event (Eurobarometer, no. 29).

After twenty years of Eurobarometer polling, in 1993 a ranking type item (single-option) reveals 12% of the questioned think protection of the environment is the top problem facing the EC, which is exactly the double of the 1974's finding (then 6% of the interviewed thought this). (Eurobarometer no. 40). When dealing with such kind of ranking type questions, it is important to note, that single options usually require a comparison with other issues, as far as respondents cannot 'vote' for the solution of several problems simultaneously as in the case of rating type questions, so ranking questions measure more properly the priority of an issue (Dieckmann & Franzen, 1999). That's why in 1974, in the period of the heavy economic recession affected the world, not surprisingly the item 'fight rising

prices' was at the top of the list (40% of those questioned). This economic problem tops the list even in 1993, but with a considerably lower percent (20% of those questioned) (Eurobarometer no. 40). Rating type items in relation to the environment however also reveal the perceived importance of the issue: in 1994 protection of the environment is rated as a policy area of particular priority for EU Parliament (43% of the interviewed thought so) (Eurobarometer no. 42) and the situation is similar even in 1995, when the first Eurobarometer on EU 15 level was applied (49% of the questioned citizens expressing this view) (Eurobarometer, no. 43).

Since 1997 the environment as an area of particular priority for EU slowly downwards: in 1997 the environment falls to the third position among areas for priority action by the EU Parliament (36% of citizens think so) being overcome by issues like unemployment and fight against drug trafficking and crime (Eurobarometer no. 48); maybe due to the different wording of the question- the protection of the environment being associated with the problem of consumers' protection- protection policies raise to the top second priority actions in the European Parliament in spring 1998, however the percentage is lower than in 1997 (27%) (Eurobarometer no. 50); in 2000 among twelve issues listed, the environment is rated at the fifth place as a priority (84% of those questioned in spring and 86% in autumn) after problems like fighting unemployment, maintaining peace and security in Europe, fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, fighting poverty and social exclusion (Eurbarometer, no. 53); this trend is continuing in spring 2001; in autumn 2001, however, the issue is placed on the sixth place, preceded by the problem of guaranteeing the quality of food products (Eurobarometer no. 55 and no. 56). Although percentages similar, the priority of the issue regarding environmental protection is placed on the seventh place in spring 2002, now besides the quality of food products the problem being preceded by the problem of fighting terrorism, which placed on the second place illustrates practically the salient character of terrorism issues after 2001 9/11, which is even more evident in the autumn survey when terrorism tops the list; now the environment overcomes the food product problem, being on the sixth place (Eurobarometer no. 57 and no. 58). Trends are similar in spring 2002, however in autumn 2002 the environment is situated only at the eight place overcame besides the above mentioned issues also by the problem of controlling illegal immigration (Eurobarometer no. 59 and no. 60). In 2005 it seems the protection of the environment is an unimportant problem situated on the 12th place among 14 issues, with a 4% of those questioned expressing this view, similar to that 3 % occurred in spring and autumn 2004. The average in the New Member States (NMS) is even smaller (2%), actually only the Danes being more concerned about the environmental protection (12%) among Europeans (Eurobarometer, no. 63).

How can we explain this down warding trend of the perceived priority of EU action regarding the environment? First of all, there is the problem of salience. Environmental problems usually are analyzed through 'issue attention cycle' (Downs, 1972- see also Dunlap, 1995) which reveals the salience of a problem at a giving

moment, compared to another problem. Following this model, we can say that after the middle of 1990s the Europeans' opinion show a kind of *it seems the environmental problem is in good hands*, so it has moved into a 'post problem stage'. Besides this evolution of the cycle regarding environmental problems from the 'pre-problem' and 'alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm' stages to 'post-problem stage' other new problems emerged which captured the attention of the public, the most visible of them being the terrorism problem and those regarding the labor market (unemployment, illegal immigration), the latter evolving to a real concern especially as the EU opens to the countries of Eastern Europe.

In conclusion, it is about the salience of other huge social and economic problems which concern Europeans, and not about the fact that citizens do not trust EU in dealing with environmental problems. On the contrary, when asked about the role of the EU about each of the listed 14 issues, the environmental protection is situated on the second place, 52% of the questioned citizens considering the role of the EU is positive in relation to protecting the environment (Eurobarometer no. 63) (see Figure 1.)

Figure 1. National or EU-level decision-making. The Europeans opinion over three decades

[*=survey results between 1989 autumn- 1994 autumn based on EC 12; **= survey results between 1995 spring- 2004 spring based on EU 15, ***= since 2004 autumn survey results are based on EU 25]
(Made by the author based on data from Eurobarometer series 1974-2004 Autumn[6])

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[6] All the Eurobarometers- both Standard and Special have been downloaded on 15th September 2005 from the website www.europa.eu.int

As Figure 1. shows, over the years it seemed that:

"Environmental policy is the classic example of the type of problem which seems to lend itself to a community-level solution. In fact, in 1974-75 on average more than two in every three interviewees selected this option in preference to the national one. "(Euro-Barometre, no. 22, 1984 Autumn, pp.38-39.).

"Support is most marked by far for common rules for the protection of the environment, with nine out of ten interviewees feeling that the Member States should take decisions jointly. In the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Italy virtually all those interviewed expressed this view. (Eurobarometer, no. 31, 1989 Spring, pp. 22.).

It is also interesting to note the case of the former socialist countries. An unprecedented high majority of those questioned in these countries, expressed in the early 1990 desire for closer cooperation with EC regarding environmental problems (91% in Czechoslovakia and 90% in Poland) (Eurobarometer, no. 34.). Or taken the case of our country, in 2004 61% of Romanians thought the EU has a positive and active role in dealing with environmental problems (Eurobarometrul no. 62).

Now, if we link the wished EU-level decision-making about the environment to the above presented environmental governance issues, we are able to make a general conclusion: Europeans' option for EU-level decision making concerning the environment against national levels, means in the eyes of these citizens, that the EU is likely to appear as a 'good environmental governance' than the nation state, or the fact that for citizens the national government as a unique controlling body lost its sense. 'Good governance' can be conceptualized in opposition to 'bad governance' which is characterized by "arbitrary policy-making, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption" (Mertus, 1999: 1351-quoted by Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005: 202). Certainly, the term has a broader social and political acceptance, but referring to environment could denote a kind of trust of Europeans in the fact environmental problems can be dealt in a more professional and accountable way on the EU-level. Over the years, as presented above, the EU has developed various environmental action plans and policy which horizontally have been adopted by nation states. We can just presuppose that the skepticism of Europeans about deciding environmental issues on national level could be linked to the so called three Cs (Competence-Compatibility-Capacity) (Young, 2002). With other words, they might think the EU-level decisions about the environment could be elaborated with more competence, with a better implementing capacity and would be more compatible among nation states that one elaborated on nation state's level.

Really is the EU perceived as a good environmental governance?

Looking to other deeper data a different situation occurs which makes us to feel in a very uncomfortable situation when trying to elaborate a general framework concerning the way Europeans view a good environmental decision-making: on Community level there have been conducted surveys (within the framework of the so called Special Eurobarometer surveys) in 1982, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2004, in which framework the environment and environmental problems have been treated

in a more complex way as far as problems regarding the perception of the environment, the urgency of some environmental problems, the way of solving the problems, etc. have been asked. These surveys show that Europeans are not by far so clear when coming about the environment, and about the fact that the EU is the best level of decision-making about the environment, etc. as based on Standard Eurobarometer series we might think. The most relevant issue compared to the above presented wish of citizens to take environmental decisions on EU-level rather then on national level, is the fact that when more (two) options are possible, Europeans tend to favor 'joint-decisions': in majority of cases (except the New Member States average option in 2004 Special Eurobarometer for a local level decision-making) there is not a level which clearly distances itself from other decision-making levels, usually the situation being both-both: the EU and national government, and even lower levels.

Of course, we have not to diminish the methodological (different item-formulations) impact on the results: in1992 and 1995 Special Eurobarometer, the item concerning which level is the best regarding environmental decision making was a simple one-choice item as in the standard surveys, and those questioned favored the EU against the national level. However, when introducing an item regarding the judgment of the effectiveness several public authorities at local, regional, national, EU or world-level deal with the environment, results have not been at all in favor of the Union. In fact as the lower graph shows, all the possible decision-taking levels have been judged as ineffective with a little advantage for local and regional levels.


Figure 2. Europeans' perception regarding the effectiveness of various levels' actions in relation to environmental protection
[Made by the author based on data from Special Eurobarometer- The Environment no.37 (1992) and 43.1 bis (1995)]

In fact, in both years occurred the situation that

> "In general, Europeans appear to be very critical of the effectiveness of the actions of public authorities: considering all levels of authority, the average number of responses <<not very efficient>> or <<not at all efficient>> is practically twice as high as the average number of <<somewhat efficiently>> or <<very efficiently>> responses" (Special Eurobarometer Environment 1992: 113)

However we should also note that in 1992 as well as in 1995 and also in 1999[7]

> "[…] the percentage of <<very/somewhat efficient>> answers diminishes regularly the further one goes from the local level […]." [Special Eurobarometer- The Environmnet no. 37.0 (1992), p. 117]

and

> "[…] the actions of public bodies at European level is particularly interesting. In effect, this is considered to be effective by 27% of people interviewed, putting them in a close tie for third place with national bodies (28%)" (ibidem, p. 117).

With these results in mind it is particularly interesting the situation occurred in 2002 and 2004, when however a methodologically different item[8] reveals Europeans think the two most effective levels of taking environmental decisions are the EU and the national one (Fig. 3)[Special Eurobarometer- The Environment no. 58 (2002) and 217 (2004)]

Those questioned in 2004, similarly to the year 2002, with an approximate fifty-fifty percent think the EU and national governments are the best levels of decision-making about the environment, however the 3 percent grow of the EU is seen in a more optimistic way by the survey:

> "[…] The perception of the European Union as being the most suitable decision-making level in the field of environment protection has strengthened since the previous survey in 2002. These opinions are testimony to the increasing will among citizens for more harmonized approaches when dealing with environmental issues" (Special Eurobarometer 217, 2005:22)

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[7] The results from 1999 Special Eurobarometer survey are not so detailed (Special Eurobarometer no. 51.1)

[8] Now, Europeans have been asked not about wether a level is effecient or not, but in a multiple (2) choicec item about comparing the effectiveness of several levels regarding environmental decision making. Thus, the item is somewhat intermediary between the Standard Eurobarometers EU-national level and the effectiveness items of 1992-1999 Special Eurobarometers.

Figure 3. The Europeans' option for the most effective levels of decision-making about the environment
[multiple -2- choices, among EU 15 (2002) and EU 25 (2004)].
[Made by the author based on data from Special Eurobarometer- The Environment no. 58 (2002) and 217 (2004)]

Certainly there could be such a tendency, however when talking about such possible further evolution, it is important to note, that when we separate between the EU 15 and the ten new member states, an interesting situation occurs: 50% of those from the New Member States (NMS) taken together, think the local government would be the best level to take environmental decisions.

Figure 4. Europeans' option according to their country's member-status for the most effective levels for taking decisions about the environment

[Made by the author based on Special Eurobarometer- The Environment no. 217 (2004)]

This is a very interesting phenomenon as much as in general citizens of the ten New Member States', mostly the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are in general those who trust more the EU and are more satisfied with the way democracy works on the EU-level than citizens of the EU 15 (Eurobarometer no. 63). A possible answer for this divergence could be the fact that when asked about the five main environmental issues they are worried about, however those from the NMS are also worried about the kind of global problems the EU 15 mentioned with priority, the former obtained in a major percent for local issues and

> "This seems to prove that for the citizens of the New Member States, environmental concerns are strongly related to daily issues that affect their lives such as the quality of the tap water they drink or the air they breathe or the management of the waste" [Special Eurobarometer – The Environment no. 217 (2005):6].

NMS' s option for local-level environmental governance is not by far a strange situation in today's literature. Especially activists of the Third World in relation to international governing institutions' developmental policies express a view for 'decentralized natural resource management and community-based forms of environmental regulations' (Watts, 2002: 1316). But also in USA due to some unfortunate local experience in relation to Clean Air, Clean Water Act and natural resource management programs top-down strategy has generated considerable dissatisfaction (Brewer & Stern, 2005: 43). Scholars concerned with the case of legitimacy and environmental governance mention also the possibility that as the authority over environmental policy moves from domestic to international settings perceptions that decision-making processes are insufficiently democratic would increase' (Bernstein, 2005:139) as well as the preference for 'vertical decentralization toward local governments' (Swyngedouw, forthcoming)

As a consequence, we would tend to say according to Sonnenfeld & Mol (2002) that

> "People's environmental priorities are different in different parts of the world (climate change vs. clean water; nature conservation vs. the <<brown agenda>>), and definitions of environmental problems diversify as they are mediated by local backgrounds, history and traditions" (p. 1331)

and

> "supranational political institutions are relevant in different ways to different countries. Countries vary profoundly in terms of economic development, political and economic integration in the global system, political institutions, and environmental reform capacity" (p. 1324)

As we've seen, Europeans' opinion regarding the best level of deciding about the environment is rather dilemmatic than in favor for the EU-level as at first sight seemed based on the Standard Eurobarometers' data, and it would be hard to say how an environmental governance should looks like. Citizens' opinion on this

regard is practically a mirror-image of what's going on among socio-environmental scholars, international institutions, transnational NGOs, etc. regarding environmental dilemmas. Debates along this question intensified after Garrett Hardin's thesis regarding the 'tragedy of the commons' (1968), which states that when a good is common and the access is free, usually the end is the overuse of the resource. Of course, a radical difference between local and global commons is the number of actors using, or deciding about a resource, usually in case of global resources, actors are much more heterogeneous, as far as there can be nation states, transnational political and civil organizations (Dietz et al., 2002). But since the question is about forms and levels of regulations, there are cases when upper levels are implied in local commons' management. Since Hardin's thesis it has became a common place that resources collapses frequently due to the 'free-riders'. To solve the free-riders problem, local common resources frequently became properties of a government on local or national level, or have been privatized for example through World Bank strategies. However this kind of 'resource enclosing' also generated as tragedies as the overuse, since privatizations mean to break up traditional local economies and distribution-mechanisms (see for example Shiva, 1993; Boda, 2004: 219).

Not surprisingly, the problem of trust as a state of favourable expectation regarding other people's, institutions actions and intentions (with other words: A trust B to do X) (Hardin, 2002) is always implied when coming about decisions concerning the 'commons'. Let's turn now to Europeans' trust in institutions when coming about the environment.

Here, we are close to the efficiency-type question from the 1992, 1995 and 1999 Special Surveys: Europeans express a generalized distrust regarding political authorities.

If we refer only to the most recent survey (Fig.5), it's clear that the majority of citizens trust the media, the civil organizations, ant the scientists. Political actors, whether they are nation-states, European Union, not speaking about commercial organizations are not well trusted. The situation of the political parties standing for the environment (green parties) represents an exception among political actors. In Europe the public's receptivity for green issues arose at the end of the 1980s- differing from America where the publics' interest in green issues arose at the end of the 1970s and during the Reagan administration- and generated the situation that in 1989's elections citizens show predilections and really vote green parties to the EU Parliament. Wolfgang Rudig (1991) analyzing the situation occurred in 1989 however stated that votes are soft-votes, due to civic sensibility towards post-Chernobyl problems and to the emergence of the debate over global warming rather then to a real political commitment along green issues (with other words the

Figure. 5. Who do Europeans trust when it comes about the environment

[multiple – (max. 3 answers) – choice item].

[Made by the author based on Special Eurobarometer- The Environment no. 217 (2004)]

public was receptive to green party messages). In the present situation, trust in green parties can also be described by civic disposition towards accepting messages of the 'new politics' which appear as a real political alternative discourse to that of conventional party discourses (van der Heijden, 2002). Recently many scholars have argued that environmental policy-making is more and more scientific and technocratic, caught in techno-narratives and as a consequence citizen participation is at stake (e.g. Fischer, 2000). In such an expert-society, the 'new politics', NGOs' and media discourses regarding the environment appear as more familiar and more diverse to citizens who do not want anymore neither a meta-narrative nor a techno-narrative, but various reflexive rationalities.

The generalized distrust in political institutions and the more trust in civil organizations do not represent a surprise anymore: since Inglehart's (1999) famous study, trust-related literature continuously has been describing the so called 'trust gap' regarding political institutions worldwide. Barbara Misztal (2001) a leading theorist in contemporary trust-research for example states that

> "The current deficit of trust, which attracts increasing attention of social scientists, is seen as stemming from the combination of many different factors: more critical, sophisticated and disillusioned citizens, more opaque institutional norms and less trustworthy politicians" (p. 371-372)

and as a consequence - as Misztal says- usually emerges 'the civic communitarian strategy' as a 'supply side of trust' (idem) or 'a counter-hegemony towards the shortcomings of the neo-liberal states'[9] (Swyngedouw, forthcoming), which is completely understandable if we just look- according to Keane (2003) to the growing number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) which

> "tend to pluralise power and to problematise violence; consequently, their peaceful or <<civil>> effects are felt anywhere, here and there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary level itself" (p. 8).

However it is interesting that while citizens mostly trust the civil organizations actually they do not see a real chance for solving environmental problems through giving environmental NGOs more say in decision-making (only the fourth option on EU 25 average in 2004- Special Eurobarometer, 2004). Those questioned see a real opportunity for solving environmental problems in making the existing EU and national regulations stricter and in a better applying of the existent regulations. Put this result in a larger contextual framework one can assess, that it probably occurs because questioned are worried about such global environmental problems like air and water pollution, climate change, genetically modified organisms and chemicals, in relations to which both NGOs and the media have already done a lot in pushing them to the public and policy agendas, and now it's the time when national and international institutions should think about better regulation, implementation and resolutions[10] and if results don't appear movements towards more civilian say in deciding may be expected[11], or on the contrary, we might find ourselves in the situation that better implementation of the regulations citizens would like to see probably would mean more trust in political institutions. Such teleology, as Bouckaret and van de Walle (2003) states is quite common:

> "Politicians, journalists and citizens increasingly express their worries about a decreasing level of trust in government (…) The underlying hypothesis of these politicians, public administrators and journalists, but also of researchers, is that

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[9] The movement from governanance towards governmenatlity I'll talk later is by far viewed as a consequence of NGO involvement into the environmental policy-making.

[10] This opinion regarding stricter regulations and their implementation can also be connected to a micro-social phenomenon called 'environmental skepticism': half of those questioned in 2004 however relate that undertake environmental behaviors, think such behaviors do not have real results unless others don't do the same; and that's also why only smaller part of questioned think everybody should pay eco-taxes, while 35% express the view that only those who pollute should pay such taxes.

[11] After all civil society is also a byproduct of governmental action or inaction (Keane, 2003); and "especially in those situations where nation-states are paralyzed, act to slowly, or ignore nonscientific rationalities that press for environmental reform, new subpolitical arrangements emerge" (Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002:1325).

more trust and more satisfaction will equal better governance. Increasing the quality of governance will thus also lead to citizens who are more satisfied and more trusting. When the concepts of trust and satisfaction are used in the general discourse, they are assumed to measure citizens' evaluation of the quality of 'steering' of society and of the direction in which society is 'steered'." (pp. 330.).

Of course, the trust and satisfaction equal good governance presupposition is dangerous, however we must also note the classics like Almond and Verba's (1963), Inglehart's (1999) famous empirical studies which recognize that trust is essential for democracy to work, while Fukuyama (1995) insist on trust as a key to democratic participation and to economic success (quoted by Misztal, 2001). De Vries (2001) synthesizing the classics among other things also assumes that

> "Generalized trust is positively related to what nowadays is seen as *good governance* (emphasis added), that is, the honesty and openness of local policy-makers, their propensity to interact with the public and with societal groups in general, and the absence of technocratic attitudes" (p. 410).

As a conclusion, if we could measure an environmental good governance through citizens' satisfaction and trust, we would say they are not so sure about the fact whether the EU or their national government represents such a governance. What remains would be a future look on the further evolution regarding the satisfaction with the implementation of regulations citizens would like to see. However, it is also important to note that due to complex linkages between good governance and satisfaction and trust respectively, useful insights from marketing literature tend to note that even when citizens and stakeholders believe services are good, they do not necessarily express greater trust in governments, with other words, when services improve, trust does not necessarily rise. As a consequence, contestations of good governance were often not about low service performance, but about failures in the way government carried out its task, for example in relation to informing citizens about the background of decisions (Bovaird & Loffler, 2003).

Till now we've seen that the problem of environmental regulation and protection is complex, towards which the citizens of Europe don't show a universal view but various opinions. Some requirements are however evident: global problems should be dealt more on transnational rather that on national level, but when problems of the surrounding environment concerns more the citizens, they would like to decide about these problems on local level. Anyway, stricter regulations of the political institutions are welcomed. All in all, we are able to put these conclusions into the larger framework regarding environmental governance and decision making the American literature has been recently summarized, according to which institutions for a 'good' governing the commons have to

> "[…] meet basic requirements of environmental governance, such as providing needed information and infrastructure, resolving conflict, inducing compliance with rules, and adapting to change […]. Common institutional forms include direct control by centralized government agencies; indirect control through quasi-privatized and tradable

allowances or quotas; nongovernmental control through market mechanisms; nongovernmental control by associations of businesses, communities, and resource users or by representations of diverse interests on decision-making bodies (e.g., of environmental interests on corporate boards); partnerships and collaborations that cross jurisdictional or sectoral lines; and participatory forms of governance that combine expert and lay knowledge and authority." The citation continues with a remark could be the conclusion of the above presented facts: "Although each of these institutional forms can meet governance requirements under the right conditions, none is uniformly successful." (Brewer & Stern, 2005: 42)

Instead of conclusion. The governmentality approach

Regarding the complexity of views how environmental dilemmas should be solved, it is difficult to say that Europeans are for a specific type of environmental governance. On the contrary, results suggest that 'no governance works best for all situations' (Brewer & Stern, 2005) and usually a conjunction of governances 'outside and beyond the state' is preferred. That's why in the followings I stand for the broader governmentality instead of the governance approach as a general framework within which the above results can be understood.

When assessing the complexity of environmental governance some authors (e.g. Baldwin, 2003; Goldman, 2001; Goodie & Wickham, 2002; Watts, 2002, etc.) recognize the parallelism between the Foucault defined bio-power, as the expression of how the state and its apparatuses come to make the fostering of life and the care of population a part of a new regime of power (Foucault, 1991) and 'green governmentality' as a way of how nature became the object of governing. NGOs, transnational organizations, several think-thanks and political (transnational) institutions are all trying 'to impose some sort of (environmental- emphasis mine) control over transnational corporations and rogue states' (Watts, 2002, p. 1315). What is important on this regard, and what Europeans also want to see is that within such kind of governmentality the boundaries between organizations whether they are political, private or civil are more permeable (Swyngedouw, forthcoming).

The Foucauldian term governmentality is the semantic link between forms of control (to govern) and modes of thought (mentality) (Foucault, 1999; see also Lemke, 2000). Understood like this, environmental governmentality expresses the manner by which nature became the object of political and economic calculation (Baldwin, 2003), refers to how-environment-is-governed, which are the environmental problems and how they are defined by various actors, and how problems are dealt with on various levels. Foucault's theory of governmentality is very useful regarding the multiplicity of ways environment is governed, since the theory is not just about a state as a 'unified apparatus, but as a network of different institutions and practices' where 'power operates not from a single source but through a set of procedures and techniques (Jonathan, 2004). There are forms of governmentality, conjunctions and mediations between these modes of government, so that the

classic nation-state as the single mode of governing is re-organized[12]. Of course, results do not suggest a kind of *endism* regarding the death of nation-state, as far as a sort of state-level regulations citizens want to be stricter. The point is that the governmentality of environment- since there might be different problems, interpretations, levels and instruments problems are dealt with- is a broad concept, deeper than the state's approach to nature. In fact, there are

> "novel forms of surveillance, regulation, self-policing, participation, and so on through which nature is governed- the ways, in other words, in which the environment is rendered governable- and the sorts of citizen-subjects that are made in the process" (Watts, 2002, p. 1316),

so we have not to take anymore only the regulations on national level, but to recognize the changing nature of the 'art of government' (Goldman, 2001) with all it implies: international attempts like international environmental law as "a range of formal governmental techniques to manage, regulate and protect the environment" (Goodie & Wickham, 2002, p. 39) standing at the basis of a world environmental regime; transnational NGO networks and so on. In reality, as Lemke (2000: 10-11) correctly observes, governmentality, or in our case environmental governmentality is not about how state looses its power,

> "is not a diminishment or a reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities but *a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government* and *the apparence of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs)* […]." (emphasis mine)

And since both forms of control (to govern) and modes of thought (mentality) are different

> "This encompasses on the one hand *the displacement of forms of practices that were formally defined in terms of nation state to supranational levels*, and on the other hand the development of forms of sub-politics <<beneath>> politics in its traditional meaning." (ibidem- emphasis mine).

Considering this framework I think, the governmentality approach could serve at least as one option for explaining the Europeans' attitude towards environmental decision-making, their preference to simultaneously handle this problem on various levels, through various ways depending on the particularity of the most important problems citizens consider.

Marinetto (2003) following Michel Foucault states that this approach takes government "as a complex and ever-changing process that forges ways of thinking

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[12] Swyngedouw (forthcoming) provides a very useful analyzes in this sense. He talks about three basic forms of re-organization of the state which structuralize after all the environmental governmentality: the externalization of state functions through privatization (e.g. corporations); the up-scaling of governance, meaning that the nation-state delegates its authority to other higher scales or levels of governance (e.g. the EU); the down-scaling of governance which- as we have seen in case of Europeans- means not only the involvement of NGOs, but also 'the process of vertical decentralization toward local governments' (p. 25)

about governing with a myriad of practices that proliferate throughout society" (p. 103). Since governing practices are not immanent in the state but are dispersed throughout society" (Marinetto, 2003, p. 110) based on the above results, on the one hand, a bottom-up governmentality can be outlined, which would involve citizen-participation in form of community. This would be the answer of why many Europeans would like to see their environment to be managed on local level and also for the fact why they trust mostly non-political actors and express a kind of 'states-in-society' attitude a kind of embedded state, meaning that substantive state action is conditioned by states' linkages to civil society (Frickel & Davidson, 2004) in a kind of 'third way' partnership Giddens (1998).

On the other hand, there is the top-down environmental governmentality of the EU for example, which profoundly changes the nation state's 'art of governing' by exercising 'the conduct of the conduct' through international socialization' denoting the process how international governance induct states into the ways of behavior 'that are preferred among an in-group' like the EU in our case. As Merlingen (2003) correctly outlines

> "By complying with IGOs prescriptions and proscriptions, governments, among other things, gain the legitimacy that comes with acting in accordance with international standards of proper behaviour. A high degree of international legitimacy, in turn, carries advantages such as improved access to other international organizations" (p. 364),

however the more skeptical citizens- as the above presented graphs shows- usually do not welcome the 'governing-at-a-distance' or colonizing techniques solely, but an interplay between top-down, regulation-centered and bottom-up, sub-political and locality-sensitive governmentality.

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SOCIALIST URBANIZATION IN THE CEAUŞESCU ERA: POWER AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION OF HABITATIONAL SPACE IN CLUJ

NORBERT PETROVICI

RÉSUMÉ. Urbanisation sociale pendant l'Époque de ceauŞescu: pouvoir et relations economiques dans la production de l'Espace habitationnel de Cluj. Dans la production de l'espace la planification socialiste Roumaine a utilisé la distinction entre l'investissement et le dépense et ça distinction est vue à différents niveaux: industrie/habitation, scène/hors de scène de la voisinage; les quartiers de l'ouvriers/les quartiers de l'intelligence. Les effets pour la période de Ceausescu sont: a) l'espace urbaine est déconnecté et duale, il est produit à l'intersection de les opérations de l'économie de pénurie et celles de l'idéologie triomphaliste qui légitiment le système politique; b) le temps urbaine, produite par l'économie de pénurie est arythmique et étatisé.

Introduction

There is an extensive literature which shows that the urban space bears the distinctive mark of social position and social differentiation, of class, gender, and ethnic hierarchies. Space is a creation of social relations. Or as Castells (2000: 441) has put it: "space is not a reflection of society, it is the expression of it. […] Space is not a copy of society - it is society. The spatial shapes and processes are formed through the dynamics of the whole social structure." Different societies will have different spaces and times. So, it is legitimate to speak of capitalist spaces and times and socialist spaces an times. But how actually do they differ?

In a very penetrating review of the literature which tries to tackle this question, Judith Bodnar (2001) argues that an adequate analytical vantage point for addressing this problem is the Iván Szelényi's (1978, 1983) classical theory of the redistributive state, framed in the theory of space production. Socialist space and time are *produced* in the framework of the *redistributive state*. The production of space, following Lefebvre (1974), Castells (1977) or Harvey (1976), is a process of negotiation and power struggles in which there are legitimized and reified the inequalities of access to political and economic localized resources. These processes of negotiation are fought in a redistributive system. Szelényi develops Karl Polanyi's (1957) typology of forms on economic integration which argues that there can be basically three forms of social exchange: reciprocity, redistributive, and market exchange. These forms can be found in different proportions in different societies, but one of them is the dominating one. Szelényi theorize socialism as a social

formation in which redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange are integrated under the logic of a redistributive state. Since Polanyi's typology of forms of economic integrations is comparative in intention – capitalism and socialism both have the same forms of economic exchanges, only the dominant integrating mechanism is different – there can be built an analytical continuum of positions with respect to space production. At the left end of the spectrum, one can find the Marxists, who argue that socialist space and time is a specific production of the redistributive state, and is the 'mirror' of the capitalist way of production (Szelényi, 1996; Bodnár, 2001). At the right end of the spectrum, one can find the ecologists who developed the thesis that socialist space production is very similar to the capitalist production, because of the informal markets and the logic of spatial distribution in an industrial society (and the socialist stat is a special instance of such kind of societies) is the same everywhere (Enyendi, 1992, 1996, 1998)[1]. We think that the former position missies its intention to produce a comparative perspective, since the method of the 'mirrored comparisons' (Stark, 1986) is equating socialism as capitalism flipped on its head. Instead of a set of concepts that link in a comparative perspective socialist spaces and capitalist spaces, the negation is used to flip the concepts. The latter position instead of providing a set of real comparative concepts, uses the gradation as a method for theorizing. The challenge is then to find a set of concepts that can link capitalist and socialist space productions in a genuine way, not just by flipping the sides or using gradation.

We will try also to address this puzzle relying on the systems theory (Parsons, 1978; Luhmann, 1995) combined with Marxist approaches of urban space (Harvey, 1985; Castells, 1977, 2000). Instead of using a Newtonian perspective of space as a container of objects, representation that structures mundane perceptions, we use a Leibnitzian perspective on space, where space is a product of the reciprocal relations between objects. Then we can understand the production of space as a production of bodies (human and non-human) accomplished in different fields or social sub-systems. Therefore, we can integrate Foucault's perspective (1995) on architecture as political technology, through which human bodies are disciplined and coordinated, with the empirical and theoretical developments of Kligman (1998) on the disciplining process during Ceausescu's socialism. Our empirical focuses will be on Cluj in the Ceausescu epoch, one of the most important Romanian cities.

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[1] Enyedi represents a moderate representative of this position. He labels himself as an author who stands in the center of this spectrum, since he claims that the socialist production of space is similar with the capitalist one although it has some specifics. He argues that the industrialization has the same spatial logics in capitalism and socialism, the main difference consist in the fact that the socialist state can control better production. Otherwise the social actors are appropriating the space in the same manner: in capitalism on the formal markets, in socialism on the informal markets. In our view this is an ecologist argument which tries to integrate the insights of the redistributive state theory and claims that the differences between socialism and capitalism with respect of space production are only of degree.

Space and time in capitalism and socialism

Absolute space and time are a creation of modernity and of the way modern social systems function and interact. Harvey (1985) argues that the birth of these representations is in fact the beginning of capitalism. Following Le Goff's (1982) and Thompson's (1967) arguments, Harvey shows that *absolute time* is a creation of the organization of manufacture and dealership because of the fact that in the process of production and commercialization one needed the timetables of workers to be disciplined. This implied that one could obtain a synchronization and coordination of human bodies engaged in differentiated, but complementary actions. A more complex division of labor necessitates a more refined rhythmic movement of time, surpassing the inexact and variable segmentation offered by the natural and religious rhythms. The bells and clocks that called the workers to factories became the symbols of the new chronological system. Nevertheless, economic organization and its subsequent discipline could not generalize in rural areas or in small towns with a low industrialization rate. The capitalist rhythmic time generalization appears through exchange processes and not through production processes. Those different centers of production and commercialization synchronized through merchandise and row material circulation. Train, telegraph, telephone and radio helped spread the new time organization. In this theory of absolute time's birth, Harvey distinguishes between money and capital. The former constitutes an exchange medium, the latter represents the circulation of money with the purpose of making more money. That is - with money, one buys commodities (means of production and labor force) and produces other merchandise that are sold for an amount of money greater than those invested.

Money, as well as capital, played a central role in the constitution of *absolute space*. Space cannot be considered independent of money, because money makes the connection between the place of buying and that of selling. The two places can - and they often are - different from the point of view of cultural, social, and personal specificities. Money makes equivalent the qualitative differentiations between merchandise through their quantity, and then operates a similar equivalence upon the qualitative difference between places, through their transformation into impersonal exchange spaces. Capital permits social networks' forming, which would not be possible due to distances. Capital also includes very different persons into the same economic projects. Capital and the promise of profit annihilate distances and unite very different points in a uniform space.

Space and time have a strong connection with money and capital in the capitalist system. However, how is space and time structured in a socialist system? Which are the rhythms and modes of interconnection of places in communism? If we re-conceptualize money as a *symbolic generalized medium of communication* (Luhmann, 1982) and capital as the *structural coupling between firms and market* (Baecker, 2001) we can then use the conceptual scheme advanced by Harvey to understand socialist space and time.

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Luhmann advances the concept of symbolic generalized medium of communication from the Parsonian (1978) theoretical developments with the purpose of indicating a series of codes that facilitate specialized communication and that are in the same time motivators. Money is a medium permitting the fluidity of communications through transmission of selections (wanting to buy or sell), in a standardized way, through generalized symbols (i.e. banknotes). On the other hand, Luhmann argues that one can understand the economic system as being formed of more social subsystems: firms and the market. The market represents an emergent subsystem that results from the interaction of firms, and the firms are organizations whose operations regard the reproduction of the organization and adaptation to the environment (Baecker, 2006). Structural coupling is a concept taken from cognition biology (Maturana and Varela, 1987), through which it is undertaken the conceptualization of self-reproductive systems, operationally close but opened to the environment from an energetic point of view. Structural coupling between firms and market refers to the fact that the two subsystems maintain their operational independence while being in the same time in co-evolution as they make their internal complexity reciprocally available. Capital is the calculus of opportunities obtained from evaluating the two complexities.

By using this conceptual language, we can understand money and capital from another perspective. In the socialist economy, production coordination between firms is made through plan and not through prices. Planning and coordinating the objectives of the plan is bureaucratically handled through hierarchically coordinated directives, in other words through power. If money represents the transmission of a selection that motivates positively, power instead represents the transmission of a selection that motivates negatively or by unpleasant alternatives (withdrawal from collaboration, loss of job, activating some contractual clauses, etc.) (Luhmann, 1982). Coordination in the socialist market happens by means of power as symbolic generalized medium of communication. Money functions as a dual code: payment vs. non-payment. Planning functions by the code: investment *vs*. spending. Structural coupling between firms and the socialist market targets the increase in power or, as Szelényi (1978) has put it, it targets the growth of redistributive capacity of the firm, its capacity to accumulate commodities in store, with which it can negotiate some advantages, the result being the creation of a shortage economy (Kornai, 1992).

The effect on time is double, as Verdery (1996) notes. On the one hand, time in the socialist factory is marked by the capacity to obtain row materials through negotiations with other managers or with the party and administrative bureaucracy. Unlike capitalism, where time is rhythmic because of production and distribution, in Stalinist socialist time is very arrhythmic because of the stop-and-go production in an environment of chronic shortages. These shortages were an effect of maximizing the redistributive capacity on all levels (capital accumulation starting from the symbolic generalized medium of power). On the other hand, time

is etatized because the chronic shortage means an increase in waiting time for the acquisition of goods and services. The main beneficiary and producer of this arrhythmic time is the socialist political system. Integrating the economy as shown in the plan is implemented and enforced by the political system. A perverse effect of arrhythmic time is the fact that social actors must cue for an indefinite period for any goods and services and they are left with little time for anything else, including revolt.

The effect on space is again double. On the one hand, space is in the same time *diluted and concentrated*, depending on redistributive profitability. Industrial zones occupy extensive areas and concentrate significant infrastructure investments, while habitation areas are very concentrated spatially (Bertaud and Renaud, 1995) because they are classified as expenditures (Szelényi, 1986). The bureaucratic planner's investing-spending distinction is observed on the ground in the industry-habitation dichotomy. On the other hand, the space is *disconnected*. Given the fact that disciplining does not happen through rhythmic time, but through etatization, the necessary distances and time are not minimized. The different functions become disconnected, between the space of habitation and the industrial space there are great distances and the accessibility is diminished (Bertaud and Renaud, 1995). Stalinist socialism disconnects practices because simultaneity is not a requirement of profitability any longer. Therefore, it is not a requirement of political capital maximization (Verdery, 1996).

This space-time structure can also be found at the level of the socialist neighborhood. The investing-spending distinction enters the housing space to split it in two. Let us see how the space is produced in a socialist workers' quarter from the standpoint of this distinction.

The split of workers' quarter: scene and backstage

The field will be that of Manastur district, situated in the south-west of Cluj-Napoca. Its construction began in 1968 and continued until the end of socialist period, in 1989. The construction of this district links to the Ceausescu's industrialization beginning with the '70s and to various successive phases of economic invigoration due to industrial investments.

In Manastur neighborhood, one can draw a distinction between the vast spaces having the purpose of triumphal representation of socialism and the closed and crowded spaces amid blocs of flats. The investing-spending distinction taking the form of industry-habitation constructs a new distinction, that of scene and backstage. This division of living space during Ceausescu's regime finds its origin in two different, but closely linked processes from the late Stalinist Romanian communism: shortage economy and nationalist legitimating.

Backstage. If initially Manastur was designed as a humanistic and functional plan (Cârstean, 2005) with playgrounds, parks and bigger spaces between blocks of flats, the final plan was hardly so. Massive investments in the socialist industry in the beginning of the '70s required a considerable workforce and this constituted a

pressure on urbanization and the workers' quarters[2]. The large numbers of workers implied large costs for housing. A larger space for one quarter or district implied bigger infrastructure costs, which increased the costs of urbanization, classified as services for the population, expenditures. One strategy to minimize the infrastructure costs was, among others, increasing the density of buildings in a district. The initial humanistic plan of Manastur meant lower density and additional spaces for 'loisir'. But the realities of industrialization in a shortage economy led to minimizing investments for consumption, favoring production means.

To the pressure of industrialization one may add the pressure of 'rationalization' of non-agricultural urban space, an effect of socialist economy. The urban space extension was strongly restricted by the poorly performing urban economy that had a permanent need for the capital accumulation from the extensive agriculture (Ofer, 1978). The redistributive socialist logic determined the industry to be capital intensive and the agriculture to use work extensively (Campeanu, 1990). One effect of this strategy was the permanent struggle for the agricultural hinterlands near the towns. In the '70s, when the second wave of industrialization begins - Ceausist project to invigorate the economy, of Stalinist origin -, the planners realize that in this way they are uselessly consuming agricultural space near towns. That is how the decree stating space 'rationalization' was given. This meant higher density of constructions, amid two blocks could appear a new one (Deletant, 1993). The two pressures: of *saving on the quarter's infrastructure* and of *space rationalization*, powerfully interconnected and produced what we called the backstage of workers' quarters.

Frontstage. The distinction between scene and backstage in the workers' quarters is a production of the Ceausescu period, because of two requirements: developmental and legitimating. On the one hand, we have the structural constraints of the shortage economy; on the other hand, we have the new type of the system's symbolic-ideological control. As Kligman (1998) noted, Ceausescu resorted to violence more rare than Gheorghiu-Dej and in a more specific way. Violence was only used as a last resort to obtain submission. There were preferred other types of disciplining: symbolic forms of domination and fear induction[3]. On the one hand, the propaganda discursively built 'the golden age' and 'multilaterally developed

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[2] The real industrialization of Cluj began only in the '70s, in the second wave of industrialization, that of the Ceausescu era. We can speak about two waves of industrialization in Romania. The first starts in the beginning of the '50s and especially after 1955 and it is of socialist type, and the second begins in the '70s. In the first wave, the mass of the population from the big cities grows and the smaller towns are beginning to be invested in because they are in regions with natural resources for the production of goods of investment that are needed because industrialization. In the second wave, besides the big cities, appear a series of smaller towns that will be urbanized, but they are not concentrated in natural resources areas. They are dispersed inside the country according to the ideology of equilibrated regional development. In the same period, the urbanization of small towns with natural resources is stopped or slowed down.

[3] The well-known 'Securitate', the impressive network of informers recruited by the secret police and the repeated interrogations of "suspects" were the very methods through which the political system disciplined by inducing fear (Securitatea, 1994).

socialism'; on the other hand, the secret police sanctioned punitively discursive deflections that contradicted this virtual socialist hallucination[4]. The propaganda discourse was presented in a nationalist wrapping meant to symbolically appropriate people with the nation and the state. Manipulating workers with nationalist symbols functioned perfectly. The workers took it in a double sense: one that refers to being Romanian[5] and one referring to a territorial notion[6]. The system appropriated the worker (and not only the worker) with a triumphal national identity and in the same time tried to symbolically make the appropriation with the districts and towns they were brought to live in.

That means that the political system succeeded in creating spatially a double network for disciplining the workers. On the one hand, it created a network of symbols to symbolically appropriate workers spatially and as identity[7]. One the other hand, it created a network of supervision distributed uniformly all over to inspire the necessary fear for the reproduction of the daily routine and informal order. Symbolic disciplining took form in the scene of socialist districts: big blocks of flats, wide streets, complicated geometrical constructions and a marker of the place. Nevertheless, the socialist economy could not support similar investments in

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[4] The population knew that the system was lying and that they themselves were lying. This communist duplicitous and accomplice style of communication was transparent for everyone (Kligman, 1998: 241). Lies protected the official version and the informal world of daily life. Still, this duplicity had a strange efficiency in restructuring identity repertoires of a significant part of the working class. The lies were seen as lies only when they were flagrantly contradicting daily perceptions. And only when they could be falsified with a naïve version of truth theory, correspondence between perception and discourse. As the system tried to diminish the knowledge stock through deprivation of information means and in the same time made sustained efforts to control the informal markets of debate (e.g. by controlling typing machines), propaganda manipulation was harder to recognize as lie since a corresponding version of the truth could not falsify the official discourse. For this it was needed a theory of truth based on coherence.

[5] Gheorghe Funar, the nationalist elected three times (1990-2004) as mayor of Cluj-Napoca had his most significant electorate in Manastur district.

[6] The spatial identity of workers of Manastur was built during communism and against it. Manastur was built on the ruins of a Romanian village from the suburbs of an urban area dominated by Hungarian ethnics. This facilitated the transfer of spatial identity of the expropriated former rural dwellers onto the district. It also facilitated the opposition to the intrusive communist system, assimilated with its bulldozers. Troc (2003) describes this identity contradiction by thinking of the hanger at the entrance of Manastur that stated that there began Manastur district and there ended the communist system. Still, the symbolic nationalist manipulation had such a success that it haunted the "after life" of the district, in the postsocialist period. Manastur was the symbolic property of Romanian workers and the Hungarians were excluded from this game. The Hungarians living here still use the Hungarian names for the streets, from the inter-war period when they symbolically dominated the town (Pasztor, 2004). Not even the younger generations of Hungarians could not symbolically appropriate this space; they are identifying themselves, like their parents, with the historic centre of the town (Pasztor, 2004).

[7] To which we can evidently add the symbolic appropriation of the worker with the production process. Even if the workers did not have any saying in the planning of production, where the bureaucratic and technical apparatus had the power, they still had an important saying in what concerns the power relations in the factory. In the party meetings, the workers could attack the superior hierarchical structure. A very good description of the mechanism is found in Burawoy and Krotow, 19xx.

the rest of the district. The priority for investment was represented by the industry; habitation space was only a necessary investment. That is why the backstage appeared, an area influenced by the shortage economy. The scene was necessary for the functioning of the system. It was the way the political system tried to legitimize itself in front of the workers.

A case of the distinction: working and intelligentsia quarters

The socialist system is stratified and the distinctions drawn by the power are accompanied by the distinctions made by the social actors who make use of the housing spaces. A normal question could be in this case: how are these social actors distributed according to neighborhoods? The housing inequalities represent a relevant indicator for the relative position of different social categories within the context of social hierarchies. That is precisely why within the socialist system this advantage was withdrawn from the financially coordinated market and placed within the framework of redistributive mechanisms (the markets coordinated by power). Housing became one of the measures taken during socialism in order to reduce the existing inequalities. Evidently, the redistributive mechanisms were monopolized by the most powerful social categories that used them in order to make use of the above mentioned advantage. In spite of this, a part of the housing system continued to be financially coordinated. To a much lesser extent, the accommodations continued to be distributed according to the housing market. The two ways of housing distribution were separated when the market was focused on the rural areas and the redistributive mechanisms covered the urban areas. The two ways of distribution did not become isolated, especially in the urban areas where the socialist system caused and increased the housing crisis by offering more jobs than a sufficient residential capacity. In addition to that, the urban housing market was even legalized after the mid 70's in the central European countries and in Yugoslavia. That is why dual mechanisms causing housing inequalities were taken into consideration[8].

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[8] Basing his arguments on studies from the '70s in Hungary, Szelenyi (1986) asserts that the political system is the main source of housing inequalities through redistribution. This mechanism of allocation was considered to favor the workers and the less privileged. However, because of the power configuration in socialism, new apartments were allocated systematically to managers, intellectuals and clerks. Szelenyi arguments that some social categories are completely forced into the informal housing market, so that the market creates a secondary mechanism of diminishing inequalities. Tosics (1987) and Hegedus (1987), on the basis of studies from the '80s, argument that there are no social categories completely forced into the market and that both the redistributive and the market are creating housing inequalities. Recent studies on housing show that the market is the main mechanism of creating inequalities, and redistribution softens them (Bodnár, 1996; Clapham, 1995). These contradictory positions can be synthesized by periodization of socialism and postsocialism (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996, 1998; Bodnár & Böröcz, 1998; Rona-Tas, 1994). In the classic socialism, of stalinist type, the market played a role of reducing inequalities and the redistributive system of creating inequalities. In the reformed socialism both the market and the redistributive system are mechanisms of creating inequalities. In postsocialism, the market is the main mechanism of creating housing inequalities and the redistributive system reduces them.

In Romania there were no such reforms, the urban housing markets were well limited and the principal mechanism of allocation was redistribution. Our preliminary multivariate statistical analysis[9] of the statistical data[10] referring to this socialist period in Cluj indicates that: 1. the redistributive system favors those who have a higher education; 2. in the redistributive system young people are at an advantage; 3. when an apartment is bought on the market, the average area of a room is higher if education is taken into consideration[11]. This makes us to believe that the market is a secondary mechanism of distribution and consequently reducing inequalities, whereas the redistributive system is the main mechanism causing those inequalities, a system where the beneficiaries will always be the dominant social positions, those holding a technical (the technocracy) or a humanistic (the intellectuality) degree.

Wile socialism was 'built', these middle classes that were politically at an advantage could intervene in the socialist redistributive process in such a way that they monopolized the better and the newer neighborhoods. Those who held an educational degree and had an important position in the social mechanisms (even if it was a subordinate position) succeeded in getting better housing conditions. Still, it seems that the young are rather correlated with bigger housing areas (even if the correlation is small). This means that as the young settled in towns, they received apartments in newer buildings. If we take into consideration the way in which these spatial inequalities exist in Cluj, this piece of information completes the image of the socio-spatial divisions. In comparison to the workers' case, the degree holders came into towns with a certain delay and settled in the central and east-central neighborhoods, according to the communist projects. Of course, this is only a schematic image of the mentioned process of development, and consequently still bearing some distortions.

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[9] Data we used were collected in March 1999 by a joint project of the Romanian Babes-Bolyai University and the German Gottingen University. The data observes housing quality in Cluj-Napoca. The sample was made up of 984 households and was extracted by a simple aleatory procedure, being representative at the level of household and not person. The medium error is ± 3%. The advantage of this database is that it permits the delimitation of the way the house was obtained during socialism.

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[11] We would like to test two hypothesis: 1) the state is the main source of inequality and the market is a mechanism of reduction of inequalities; 2) education and age are sources of housing inequalities through redistributive mechanisms. To test these we used a nonlinear regression with factors of interaction: Area = β_1 + β_2*state + β_3*market*status + β_4*state*status. Where: *Area* is medium surface for living per room; β_i are regression coefficients; *state and market* are dummy variables that indicate the housing circuit of allocation and *status* is the head of family's age in 1999, respectively the head of family's education acquired until 1999. Due to large disproportions in the numbers of persons allocated through the two circuits, we will use bootstrap estimations for 100 samples drawn from the initial sample. By this regression design, we can verify if there are parallel circuits of inequality creation and which are the induced inequalities.

Figure 1. Spatial dispersion of graduates relatively to non-graduates
In the census tracks in Cluj-Napoca in 1992

Source : The 1992 Population and Households Census.

The dichotomy investment/expenditure are also present as far as the processes of housing are concerned. The educated persons systematically receive better and more central housings, while the workers receive less comfortable housings in the peripheral suburbs, a distribution materialized in the grouping of workers in certain neighborhoods or parts of the neighborhoods, on the one hand, and the technocracy and the intellectuality in better neighborhoods (built according to more housing needs; see the map bellow), on the other hand. The first neighborhoods were built in the '60s (Gheorghieni, Grigorescu), then followed a second phase of constructions (the Mănă¿tur and Zorilor neighborhoods) and finally, the Mără¿ti neighborhood, in the '80s. In the neighborhoods built in the '60s settled especially the intelligentsia of the first phase of industrialization and some of the workers. In
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the neighborhoods built in the '70s and in the '80s were distributed mainly the workers of the second phase of industrialization, whereas in those built in the '80s settled also the intelligentsia.

This socio-spatial structure is legitimated mainly by meritocracy. The tension between the redistributive principles (in favor of the popular classes) and the principles of meritocracy concerning the housing redistributive processes has been a constant concern across the Central and Eastern Europe (Bodnár & Böröcz, 1998). In Romania, the solution for this situation was the duplicity and the ambiguity of the ideological discourse. On the one hand, the socialist post cards were celebrating the workers' neighborhoods and the accomplishment of the great communist project of social equalization (Lazăr, 2003), and, on the other hand, it was the intelligentsia that systematically occupied the newer buildings. Consequently, the political and the cultural capital was in Cluj the source of the socio-spatial privileges during the socialist period, and because of the meritocratic principle this way of distribution was considered an investment in the human resources of the system.

Concluding remarks

Planning in socialism is handled bureaucratically, through hierarchically coordinated directives, i.e. power. Coordination in the socialist market happens by means of power as symbolic generalized medium of communication. Socialist planning functions by the code: investment vs. spending. What is investment is derives form the structural coupling between firms and the socialist market targets: investment is what is increasing the redistributive capacity of the firm, its capacity to accumulate commodities in store, with which it can negotiate some advantages. Expenditures are those payments which are necessary for the production, but are not increasing the redistributive capacity of the firm. The definition of what is investment and expenditure can change through ca co-evolution of the to subsystems: firms and socialist markets.

Power and redistributive power are the functional equivalents in socialism of the money and respectively capital. In the production of space the Romanian socialist planning used the distinction between investing/spending, and this distinction is seen in space at different levels: industry/habitation. What is specific to the Romanian urban planning after 1970 is its nationalist twist. The distinction investing/spending is reentering itself in and is producing the distinction scene/backstage of the neighborhood and workers' quarters/intelligentsia quarter. The effects are the following for the Ceausescu's socialist period: a) urban space is disconnected and dual, produced at the intersection between the operations of the shortage economy and the those of the triumphal ideology that legitimized the political system; b) urban time, produced by the shortage economy, is arrhythmic and etatized.

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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WELFARE STATE TRANSFERS IN REDUCING POVERTY IN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION

CRISTINA RAȚ

RÉSUMÉ. L'efficacité du tranfert de l'assistance sociale pour la réduction de la pauvreté en Roumanie et Hongrie pendant la premiére décade de la transition post-communiste. L'oeuvre presente aborde le role du statut dans la redistribution du capital materiel et social neccesaire pour la prevention et pour le combat contre l'exclusion sociale, en analysant comparativement l'impact des transferts sociales sur la situation de la population deprivee de Roumanie et Hongrie pendant la periode de transition. Les programmes actifs (les cours de qualification professionnelle pour les chomeurs ou les services de renseignement des maires) peuvent avoir un role important dans le combat de la deprivation materielle et sociale, mais pour qu'ils soient efficaces dans des situations aigues il est neccessaire qu'ils soient doubles par des transfers de ressources materielles. Par leur haute convertibilite, les transfers pecuniaires permettent l'adequation de l'aide aux besoins du beneficiaire et rendent responsable l'individu sur l'utilisation du capital financier duquel il dispose. L'eficacite des transferts sociaux pecuniaires est mesuree dans les termes de la reduction absolue et relative aux quote-parte de pauvrete et du deficit moyen relatif (la profondeur de la pauvrete). L'analyse statistique des dates nous montre que, en Roumanie, les transferts sociaux ont eu une contribution beaucoup plus reduite dans la diminution de l'etat de pauvrete qu'en Hongrie, durant toute la période 1995-2002. L'étude est divisée en deux parties: la première partie essaie d'offrir une description synthétique des principales modifications concernant les systèmes de protection sociale de la Hongrie et de la Roumanie post socialiste; la deuxième partie fait l'évaluation de l'efficacité des transferts sociaux dans la lutte contre la pauvreté dans les deux pays dans la première période de la transition.

Introduction

In the case of the post-socialist region, the ways in which social problems are defined and their corresponding policy responses justified are strongly marked by two, often contradictory, factors: path dependency and susceptibility to the external constraints of international policy actors. The following lines propose an investigation of policy responses to problems of poverty and unemployment in post-socialist Hungary and Romania, confronting basic mechanisms of state social protection with their short-term outcomes of reducing socio-economic deprivation.

The first part of the paper offers a brief historical overview of those pillars of state social protection, which are supposed to have the strongest potential impact on overcoming poverty: state transfers for the family, unemployment and social security benefits. The poverty-reduction effectiveness of these transfers during the first decade of transition is evaluated in the second part, by employing various sources of statistical data.

1. A short overview on welfare state transition in Hungary and Romania

The patterns of restructuring the welfare state in Hungary and Romania diverged from the very beginning of the transition: it embraced a liberal vision on social security and a radical-changes strategy in the case of Hungary, and a more social-democratic approach and a small-steps strategy in the case of Romania.

Focusing on the Central Eastern European region, Deacon (2000) tries to offer a classification of the new welfare regimes according to their level of economic development, the influence of the church on policy design, labour-union mobilization, totalitarian or authoritarian legacy both before and during the socialist regime, the impact of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB) on the policy design after 1989, and the already mentioned nature of political change. He argues that a social-democratic welfare state, close to the Scandinavian model described by Esping-Andersen (1990), can be seen rather as a 'perspective regime' than an actually implemented (or implementable?) model for Central Eastern Europe; nevertheless, the Czech Republic might be considered to approach this model. The second potential model identified by Deacon is the conservative-corporatist one, the Polish welfare state holding most of its features. Hungary is seen as the closest to the liberal welfare regime, being marked by a relatively high level of economic development, reduced influence of the church and labour-unions, a rather weak totalitarian-authoritarian legacy, and a strong impact of international agencies in shaping domestic policy.

Although Deacon does not expand his analysis to the case of Romania, it can be mentioned that Romania does not really match any of the above-mentioned models. The relatively low level of economic development, the nature of the political change, and the moderate influence of international agents on domestic policy indicate that the conservative-corporatist model is more or less suitable. Nevertheless, neither the labour unions nor the Orthodox Church hold strong influence on policy design, as they do in the case of Poland.

János Mátyás Kovács (2003) argues that indicators of socio-economic development and evaluations of welfare policy performance allow different interpretations of the restructuring welfare states in the post-socialist region. He subsequently describes two different narratives of the transition. The first narrative, 'leaping in the dark' (Kovács, 2003: 6-9) considers that the substantial reduction of welfare provisions, in line with a liberal-residual design of social policy and the pursuit of integration into the global market economy, had as its basic outcome the

deterioration of the quality of life. The second narrative, 'marking time' (Kovács, 2003: 9-11) advocates the role of economic growth in sustaining the welfare state and the need of a radical shift from socialist principles in policy design. The author himself proposes a third narrative, entitled "muddling through", pointing out that the gradual character of the transformations, the "small-steps" policy, and the lack of consistency in policy design gives room for divergent interpretations of the policy design.

Kovács (2003: 1-4) draws attention to tensions emerging from antagonisms between processes of liberalisation and of democratisation that are supposed to take place simultaneously, and states that:

> … an important reason for the lack of widespread social revolt in Eastern Europe after 1989 lies in the fact that home-made and invisible welfare provided a buffer that allowed the new governments to make bold steps towards the dismantling of 'the communist welfare state' and ceased the democratisation-versus-liberalization paradox. Nevertheless… they have to proceed rather slowly in the decomposition of the soviet-type welfare arrangements in order to maintain social peace. (Kovacs, 2003: 4).

In the case of domestic policies, these antagonisms between liberalisation and democratisation processes regard the tension between the socialist legacy of an interventionist state that uses economic subsidies as the main tool of social security, and the pressures from international economic actors (primarily the IMF and the WB) to speed up the economic reforms and capital re-investment and decrease public expenditures on welfare. Nevertheless, both Hungary and Romania decided to adopt a social-market economy, i.e. to maintain a certain level of state-control over the functioning of the market through imposing minimum wages (the case of Romania), subsidizing basic products, offering credits to micro-enterprises, subsidizing wages for the employees recruited from the unemployed or the new graduates, etc.

Throughout its 'muddling through' transition (Kovacs, 2003), Romania based its social policy on state subsidies for unprofitable state-owned enterprises and compensations for the market price of gas, electricity, and other basic goods, while lowering the real value of financial transfers. Whereas state budget revenues from indirect taxation represented around 75% of the revenues obtained through direct taxation in the early '90s, their shares were approximately equal in 1997, and by 2000 indirect taxations represented 250% of direct taxation revenues, aggravating the relative disadvantage of the worse-off (Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei, 2002). Unemployment benefits, early retirement (*anticipative* retirement), and compensatory payments for dismissed workers were the main tools for securing welfare in Romania.

In Standing's view (Standing, 1998), during state-socialism Central Eastern European countries were rather well-performing in terms of poverty relief, poverty prevention, basic social security provision, and income redistribution, at least in comparison with the Soviet states. They were nevertheless hardly efficient in dealing with other functions of the welfare state, namely the promotion of social mobility (Standing refers especially to occupational mobility) and, consequently, restructuring the economic field and the labour market.

Besides the in-kind benefits received primarily by Party members and technocrats, socialist states subsidised the prices of basic goods and services, including housing, offered free medical assistance, access to education, in other words universal services for their 'obedient' citizens[1]. They also developed the insurance-based components of the welfare state, namely the pension system (the Bismarck model) and, to a certain extent, maternity benefits such as paid maternity leave and income-supplements for working mothers with many children. However, these benefits were conditioned by the employment status of the person, and the social safety net (i.e. means-tested benefits for those outside of the formal labour market or working for low wages) was missing (see Popescu 2004; Ferge, 2000; Pop, 2000, Zamfir 1998).

The above mentioned tensions between the liberalisation and democratisation processes, translated at the level of welfare policy in wavering between 'residual' measures of targeting the most disadvantaged through means tested income support, and 'solidaristic' measures of offering universal benefits as compensation for the consequences of past policies and present economic hardships, led to a stronger reliance of social security on the second and the third sector. The perpetuation of the extended family model and the social norm of helping one's needy relatives were supposed to counterbalance the scarce state support. However, the general impoverishment of the population made difficult the exercise of any welfare functions by the local community. The traditional care and material support received from the family, confessional organisations, or communities of neighbours could hardly be effective in compensating for the lack of state provisions targeting the poor and vulnerable. In this context, international charity organisations became the most important providers of social services and material aid, moreover, they offered alternative models of social assistance for those working in the governmental and the national voluntary sector.

There was a strong legacy of a "serviced heavy, transfer light" social security (Standing, 1998:227), in which subsidies to the economy played the role of buffers for the consequences of very low productivity (Ferge, 1992a, 1992b), wages were maintained on a low level given that social services were assured by the enterprise through allocations from the state budget. The inertia (or path dependency?) of the welfare state was to maintain the minimum wage on the subsistence-level and to continue to subsidise big economic enterprises, even though the privatisation process had begun already in the early 90s and in meanwhile a considerable part of the population fell into poverty and a part of the budget ought to be spent on in-cash benefits for them.

In the case of Romania, the balance between 'state paternalism and individual responsibility' (Popescu, 2004) was inclined towards the interventionist state,

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[1] Deacon (2000) argues that socialist states were based on a "contract" of welfare for political obedience between the Communist Party and the citizens.

which nevertheless failed to protect the dependent (children from poor households, low-income elderly, persons with special needs) and those whose labour-market insertion was rather frail (unemployed formerly performing labour-intensive jobs, vocational or high school graduates, Roma persons). The political discourse was one of providing compensations for the communist abuses and increasing the general welfare of an impoverished population (Zamfir, 1998).

In the case of Hungary, social problems have been defined primarily as consequences of the barriers placed by the socialist state in the free functioning of the economy, although policy analysts stressed the importance of a systemic change of the political regime as a whole (Szalai and Orosz in Deacon, 1992; Deacon and Szalai, 1990). The emphasis was laid on strengthening the already existing (nevertheless still incipient) private economic entrepreneurship and attracting foreign capital (Grootaert, 1993).

It is difficult to judge to what extent these discourses were consistent with the actual policy design (Ferge, 2000), given that they continued to favour families with children in the case of Hungary, and to subsidize state-owned or privatised large enterprises with the costs of considerable wholes in the national budget in Romania. Therefore direct social transfers to the population (financial benefits and/or services) represented a considerably larger share of the gross domestic product in Hungary, as compared to Romania.

Table 1.

Social expenditures as % of GDP in Hungary and Romania

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Ungaria	22,5	22,7	29,6	31,9	31,3	32,3	-	-	23,8	24,4	23,5	-	19,8
Romania	14,2	16,6	17	16,5	15,2	15,5	16	15,7	15,9	17,3	18,4	17,2	18,2
EU-15	25,4	25,5	26,5	27,7	28,8	28,4	28,3	28,5	28	27,6	27,6	-	27,3

Sources: UNDP Country Reports (2000, 2003); Eurostat Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, Technical Annex (2005)

Central Eastern European countries were different in terms of types of social assistance offered to those defined as economically deprived: one can hardly say whether the process of convergence occurred due to the commonality of problems or rather as the result of the quest for EU integration: more specifically, the Open Method of Coordination in the field of social policy (EC Lisabona, 2000) and the requirements of implementing National Action Plans against Poverty and for Social Inclusion (EC Nice, 2001).

Braithwaith, Grootaert, and Milanovic (1999) offer an extensive analysis of welfare-states performance in overcoming socio-economic deprivation in post-socialist Europe, based on the macroeconomic data, as well as the results of social surveys carried out in Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Russia, and the Kyrgyz Republic in 1993. They conclude that, at the time, none of these countries offered

extensive and substantial assistance for the poor, and describe social security systems as "dispersed" in the cases of Russia and Hungary (small benefits for a relatively large number of households), "concentrated" in the cases of Poland and Estonia (considerable benefits, but delivered only to a few households), and "irrelevant" in the case of Bulgaria (only a few of the needy households receive benefits, but their level is too low to make a difference).

A second study that ought to be mentioned concerns the experience of unemployment in post-socialist countries (Gallie, Kostova, and Kuchar, 2001). In an earlier comparative study of Western European welfare states, Gallie and Paugam (2000) argue that the type of predominant family relations, through the support offered to the unemployed relatives, is highly likely to influence the wellbeing of the unemployed. Cohesion and solidarity within the extended family in countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal or Greece is expected to compensate for the sub-protective nature of the unemployment policy (Gallie and Paugam., 2000:17). However, the family fails to foster the labour market reintegration of the unemployed person, although it might offer protection against emotional distress and material deprivation. The conclusions are similar with respect to three Eastern European countries as well, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria (Gallie, Kostova, and Kuchar, 2001). On the basis of data provided by national surveys in selected Eastern and Western European states with different unemployment policies, the authors point out that in all countries the unemployed could appeal to social networks to a less extent than the employed, and their level of psychological distress was strongly related to the financial stress they had to face. The most affected by psychological distress were the unemployed from Bulgaria, and the basic determinant of their distress resided in the material hardships, and not the social stigma associated with the unemployed status.

It is difficult to say whether 'social exclusion'[2] is the most adequate label for poverty and its social consequences in the case of Romania. Poverty rates remained high throughout the 90s, and affected a large population of the same socio-economic categories: notably the families with several children, the unemployed, the agricultural workers, and the elderly. Changes in poverty rates after 2000 are considerably influenced by modifications of the method of poverty assessment: using a poverty line at 60% of median household income per equivalent adult, which includes the value of goods for domestic consumption, leads to a low poverty threshold expressed in purchasing parity dollars, and consequently to lower poverty rates than absolute measures.

According to the public opinion polls (see Gallup, 2004), the majority of the population reported that they experience deprivation. The lack of longitudinal

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[2] For an overview on the history of the concept "social exclusion" and its use in the EU policymaking see Barnes, M. et. al. (2002), Begg, I. and Berghman, J (2002), Pena-Casas, R. et. al. (2002), Mayes, D. C. et. al. (2001).

panel studies makes problematic to trace conclusions on the prevalence of transitory or chronic forms of deprivation, which are nevertheless crucial for any conclusions about social exclusion.

Poverty was measured either in terms of household expenditures or in terms of income, against a relative poverty line (50% or 60% of the national median or mean) or against international standards in purchasing power parity dollars (2 PPP $ or 4 PPP$ per equivalent adult per day). Although the outcomes of these estimations show slightly different pictures on poverty, depending on the indicators and the equivalence scales used[3], it can be said that poverty rates in Romania had been higher than in Hungary throughout this period, regardless of the method of measurement.

Table 2.

Consumption poverty rates and poverty gaps in Romania 1995-1998 (ICCV estimations), and 2002 (World Bank estimations)

Poverty rates					Poverty gaps				
1995	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**2002**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**2002**
25.27	19.85	30.81	33.82	39.34	6.43	4.51	7.93	9.13	12.20

Source for 1995-1998: Teşliuc et. al., 2001: 51. The poverty threshold was computed as 60% of average consumption per equivalent adult. Source for 2002: Teşliuc et. al. in *The World Bank Report,* 2003: 48

Table 3.

Poverty rates and gaps in Romania, 2000-2002 (CASPIS)

	Poverty rates			Poverty gaps		
Income poverty	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**
Including the value of goods produced for domestic consumption	17.1	17.0	18.1	21.9	22.1	22.5
Excluding the value of goods produced for domestic consumption	26.4	25.7	26.2	36.9	37.2	35.1
Against a 2 PPP $ threshold	20.0	16.6	15.7	-	-	-
Against a 4 PPP $ Threshold	67.2	60.7	58.2	-	-	-
Expenditures poverty line (national minimum basket)	35.9	30.6	28.9	-	-	-
Extreme poverty (national definition)	13.8	11.4	10.9	-	-	-

Source: CASPIS (2004). The poverty threshold was computed for the first two rows as 60% of median household disposable income per equivalent adult. The OECD 2 equivalence scale was used.

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[3] For an overview on the development of poverty measurement used by the European Commission see Atkinson (2002) and Atkinson et. al. (2002).

Table 4.

Income poverty rates and poverty gaps in Hungary, 1991-2003 (TARKI)

Poverty rates					Poverty gaps				
1991 - 1992	1995 - 1996	1999- 2000	2000- 2001	2001- 2002	1991 - 1992	1995- 1996	1999- 2000	2000- 2001	2001 - 2002
12.8	18.3	14.6	14.4	15.9	33.2	29.8	25.3	27.3	25.9

Note: Poverty line: 50% of mean household income. Data split by ethnicity are not available.
Source: TÁRKI Monitor Reports, 2004, in the Statistical Annex for NAPSInc of Hungary, 2004: 15

Table 5.

GINI coefficients in Hungary and Romania, 1989-2000

Gini Coef.	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Hungary														
Earnings	0.27	0.29	-	0.31	0.32	0.32	-	-	0.35	-	-	-	0.39	-
Income	0.23	-	0.21	-	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.27
Romania														
Earnings	0.16	-	0.20	-	0.23	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.41	0.39	0.39
Income	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.35	0.29

Source: UNICEF TransMonee dataset, 2003.

Poverty assessments reports in both Hungary and Romania highlight the fact that families with children, those with unemployed members, pensioner-households with no wage-earner, especially those from the rural area, self-employed agricultural workers and farmers with small properties are at a higher risk of income poverty than the rest of the population (See CASPIS 2002, CASPIS 2003, World Bank 2003, UNDP 2004, NAPSInc Hungary 2003, Szalai, 2005, Popescu 2004, Ladányi and Szelényi, 2004, Teşliuc et. al. 2001).

Given the regulations of entitlement, one should expect that the most widely received state transfers by the above listed household-types are child and family benefits, unemployment benefits, and means-tested income support benefits. These benefits should represent a considerable share in the total household income, otherwise their usefulness is contestable.

However, the analysis of the 2000 Yale dataset (own calculations), collected within the a study conducted by Szelényi (2002), reveals that in Romania the average share of social assistance benefits in the total household income of those from the lowest two quintiles was below 2%, whereas in Hungary around 3% (slightly higher in the case of non-Roma households). Unemployment benefits provided, on average, less than 4% of the household income in Romania for both Roma and non-Roma families. In Hungary, the corresponding figures were 8% for the non-

Roma households and those perceived as Roma, and 4% for the Roma households. State transfers for children and the family represented around 8% of the household income in the lowest two quintiles in Romania, whereas in Hungary these offered more than 20% of household income. In Romania, the only major exceptions are Roma families from the lowest quintile, whose incomes are so low that child allowance constitutes 32% of their household budget.

After 2000, the Romanian welfare state has known several changes, which might have influenced the effects on state transfers on the well-being of citizens. Changes took place in the Hungarian system of social protection as well, although these were not as significant as those from Romania. The following paragraphs try to offer an overview of these changes (see also Szalai, 2005; Popescu, 2004; Gál et.al., 2003; Pop, 2000; Szívos and Tóth, 1998).

State transfers for children and the family

In Romania, before the Law 61/1993, child allowance was received as an income-supplement for one of the parents (usually the father), conditioned upon his/her working status. There was no means-tested additional support designed specifically for families with children. Given that many Roma were not working or they lost their working status right after 1990, in 1990-93 they were basically not entitled to receive financial support for children. After the implementation of the new law (61/1993) all children were entitled to receive child allowance (not their parents), but all school-aged children were supposed to attend institutions of education in order to receive the allowance, which was administered by schools. This conditioning was partly intended to increase school-attendance among Roma children by offering a financial incentive for families to send their children to school. However, many Roma families lacked identity papers (including birth certificates of their children) and there were long delays in submitting all documents needed for receiving the allowance although many non-governmental organizations were helping Roma to get their official papers. In 1997 (Law 119/1997), families with more than two children were entitled to a supplement to the child allowance. This supplement was not means-tested, it was offered upon request and its value was small and decreased considerably in real terms until 2004, when the laws on child benefits were changed. Now, universal child allowance is doubled by a means-tested component whose values are slightly higher in case of one-parent families (governmental ordinance OUG 105/2003). The third element of universal family support consisted of a birth-indemnity, which was only given at the birth of the first four children – thus a measure which discriminated against larger families, such as those of the Roma.

Parents were also entitled to social insurance benefits such as paid maternity leave and two-years of paid parental leave to care for their children, but given that these benefits were conditioned by being employed for at least 12 months during the last two years (later 10 months from the previous year), a considerably number of needy families were not entitled to receive these benefits.

In Hungary, the structure of family benefits was different and it had considerable impact on reducing poverty among the Roma. Since April 1990 families had been entitled to child-raising support regardless of their working status. Social-insurance based paid maternity-leave and child-care parental leave were doubled by a non-contributory flat rate component of cash transfers for families with children below the age of three (the amount of the benefits was the minimum pension). The only exception was the period 1996-1998, when these benefits were means-tested[4]. The value of family benefits in Hungary is much higher than in Romania. Birth-indemnity is not conditioned by the rank of the child (as it is in Romania), but by attending at least four medical screenings during pregnancy. In addition, needy families who have children aged between three and seven receive a means-tested child-raising allowance.

Unemployment benefits

In Romania, the first law on the social protection of the unemployed was implemented in 1991 (Law 1/1991). The unemployment benefit was offered for 270 days, it was earnings related and depended on the length of contribution. The upper limit of the benefit was set at 85% of the minimum wage, and the lower limit at 75% of the minimum wage. The maintenance-allowance was at a flat-rate of 60% of the minimum wage in the economy. The actual amount of money received on the basis of unemployment insurance was thus very low, but delivered for approximately two years and three months (nevertheless, conditioned by means-testing). Workers who lost their employment due to strategic restructuring of big state-owned enterprises (such as mining industry or heavy metallurgy) received compensatory payments, aimed to constitute the initial financial capital necessary to start a private enterprise. These benefits were introduced by governmental ordinance OU 98/1999, and the amounts received varied between 6 and 12 times the average wage of the enterprise to be restructured (Pop, 2000:17). Several studies pointed out the inefficiency of these measures in terms of re-integrating the beneficiaries in the labour market. The ordinance is no longer valid. The legislation on the protection of the unemployed was changed in 2002 (Law 76/2002): the level of the benefit was established at the fix rate of 75% of the minimum wage, and its period of receipt depends on the period of contribution.

In Hungary, the first law regarding unemployment was implemented in 1957, and the present law in 1991. The period of benefit receipt depends on the period of contribution and varies between 90 and 360 days. The amount of the benefit is determined by previous earnings, the period of contribution, and the length of unemployment. There are upper and lower limits of the benefit, based on the level of the minimum old-age pension.

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[4] For an analysis of this policy change see Haney (1997) and Ferge (2000).

Means-tested social assistance

The last resort of support, means-tested welfare benefits, were introduced in Romania as late as in 1995 (Law 67/1995 on social aid), and they were supplemented by in-kind benefits in 1997 (Law 208/1997 on social canteens). However, both forms of support ought to be financed by the local governments, which led not only to law levels of the benefit and those of take-up, but also to considerable regional disparities. The minimum income guarantee was introduced only in 2001 (Law 416/2001), and social support is financed 20% from the local budget and 80% from the central state-budget. However, recent studies reveal that neither the effectiveness, nor the targeting of social aid have significantly increased since 2002 (Pop, 2003; Early Warning Report, 2002; Grecu et.al., 2004).

According to the estimations of the 2003 World Bank Report on the basis of the 2002 Romanian Household Budget Survey, 36% of the Roma households facing extreme poverty received cash transfers for the minimum income guarantee (MIG), as compared to 15% of the Romanian households and 5% of the ethnic Hungarian households[5] (World Bank, 2003: 140). As compared to 2000, the proportion of households receiving cash welfare transfers in 2002 thus increased. The difference in benefits receipt between Roma and non-Roma households could be explained by the difference in the depth of poverty, the poverty gap being larger for the Roma households. Nevertheless, these very low take-up rates put under question mark the effectiveness of the MIG program[6].

The logistic regression aimed at revealing the determinants of receiving MIG pointed out that ethnicity of the household head is not a significant predictor[7] (World Bank, 2003: 141). Low educational qualification, being self-employed in agriculture or unemployed increase most significantly the chances of becoming a MIG recipient. Given the low level of MIG and the low rates of up-take it is hardly reasonable to speak about "welfare dependency" among the extreme poor in Romania, either in the case of Roma and non-Roma households (see Berevoescu et.al., 2001; St¾nculescu and Berevoescu, 2004).

In Hungary, there is no general system of minimum income guarantee: means tested social assistance is available for the elderly who are not entitled to old age pensions, to persons who are not able to work, and for unemployed who are no longer entitled to receive unemployment benefits, who actively seek for work but they have not managed to integrate on the labour market. As mentioned before, needy families with children benefit from social aid before the child is below the age of two, and a child-raising support allowance, when there are children between the age of three and seven in the household.

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[5] The nationality of the household head was taken into account.

[6] For the 2004 evaluation of the implementation of the Minimum Income Guarantee in Romania, and suggestions for improvement, see Grecu et.al., 2004.

[7] Roma households have relative chances comparable to Romanian households to receive MIG: odds ratio=1.47, p=0.119.

2. The effectiveness of state transfers in overcoming poverty

The effects of state transfers on the well-being of the population can be evaluated in several dimensions: in terms of *effectiveness* (to which extent do they fulfil their purposes?), *efficiency* (is there an optimal balance of costs-benefits?), *coverage and targeting* (do they reach out those at need, i.e. are social transfers received by those whom they were designed for?), and *redistribution effects* (to which extent do they reduce inequalities) (see Braithwaite et. al., 2000: 99-156; Popescu, 2000).

The following lines compare social policy measures aimed to combat poverty and social exclusion in Romania and Hungary with respect to their effectiveness: to what extent they reduce poverty rates and poverty gaps in absolute and relative terms.

Table 6.

Poverty rates and state social transfers in Hungary, 1992-1997

Poverty rates Hungary	All income sources	Without family benefits	Without unemployment benefits	Without pensions	Without social assistance benefits
1992	10.2	13.7	11.9	25.1	10.8
1993	6.6	10.2	9.1	28.0	7.3
1994	7.3	11.6	9.7	30.8	8.0
1995	9.0	14.8	10.8	26.7	9.5
1996	12.7	18.0	14.3	29.9	13.3
1997	12.4	16.5	13.4	37.4	13.6

Source: Szívós and Tóth, 1998: 25.
Note: Poverty threshold established at 50% of total median per capita household total income.
No equivalence scale had been used. Data source: TARKI household panel, 1992-1997.

Table 7.

Poverty rates and social transfers in Romania, in 1995-98 (ICCV)

Poverty rates Romania	All income, including pensions, before transfers	After unemployment benefits	After state transfers for children	After social assistance benefits	After other non-contributory benefits	After all transfers (excluding pensions)
1995	30.4	28.7	28.5	30.0	30.0	25.3
1996	23.8	22.6	22.1	23.4	23.7	19.9
1997	36.9	35.9	33.1	36.2	36.7	30.8
1998	40.3	38.9	36.7	39.8	40.0	33.8

Source: Teşliuc et. al., 2001: 166-173. Figures represent % of households.
Note: Poverty rates were calculated against a relative expenditures-poverty threshold which included the value of goods produced for domestic consumption.
The equivalence scale developed by ICCV was applied (see Teşliuc, 2001).

Table 8.

Poverty reduction of state transfers in Hungary, 1992-97

	Family benefits	Unemployment benefits	Pensions	Social assistance benefits
Absolute poverty reduction				
1992	3.5	1.7	14.9	0.6
1993	3.6	2.5	21.4	0.7
1994	4.3	2.4	23.5	0.7
1995	5.8	1.8	17.7	0.5
1996	5.3	1.6	17.2	0.6
1997	4.1	1	25	1.2
Relative poverty reduction				
1992	25.5	14.3	59.4	5.6
1993	35.3	27.5	76.4	9.6
1994	37.1	24.7	76.3	8.8
1995	39.2	16.7	66.3	5.3
1996	29.4	11.2	57.5	4.5
1997	24.8	7.5	66.8	8.8

Source: Szívos and Tóth, 1998: 25.
Note: Poverty threshold established at 50% of total median per capita household total income.

No equivalence scale had been used. Data source: TARKI household panel, 1992-1997.

Table 9.

Poverty reduction of state transfers in Romania, 1995-98 (ICCV)

Romania	Unemployment benefits	State transfers for children	Social assistance benefits	Other non-contributory benefits	All transfers (excluding pensions)
Absolute poverty reduction					
1995	1.7	1.9	0.4	0.3	5.1
1996	1.2	1.7	0.4	0.2	4.0
1997	1.0	3.8	0.7	0.1	6.1
1998	1.4	3.6	0.4	0.2	6.4
Relative poverty reduction					
1995	5.5	6.3	1.4	1.1	16.8
1996	5.1	7.2	1.6	0.7	16.7
1997	2.7	10.2	1.8	0.4	16.4
1998	3.5	8.9	1.0	0.5	16.0

Source: Teşliuc et. al., 2001: 166-173. Figures represent % of households.
Note: Poverty rates were calculated against a relative expenditures-poverty threshold which included the value of goods produced for domestic consumption. The equivalence scale developed by ICCV was applied (see Teşliuc, 2001).

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Table 10.

Poverty reduction of state transfers in Hungary and Romania, 2000-2001

Poverty rates	All income sources		Without social transfers		After pensions, without other transfers	
	HU	**RO**	**HU**	**RO**	**HU**	**RO**
2000	9%	17.1%	45%	38.4%	19%	21.3%
2001	10%	17.0%	44%	41.3%	20%	22.3%
2002	9%	18.1%	43%	42.2%	18%	22.9%
Absolute poverty reduction						
	Pensions		All social transfers, excluding pensions			
	HU	**RO**	**HU**	**RO**		
2000	26%	17.1%	10%	4.2%		
2001	24%	19.0%	10%	5.3%		
2002	25%	19.3%	9%	4.8%		
Relative poverty reduction						
	Pensions		All social transfers, excluding pensions			
	HU	**RO**	**HU**	**RO**		
2000	57.8	44.5%	22.2%	10.9%		
2001	54.5	46.0%	22.7%	12.8%		
2002	58.1	45.7%	20.9%	11.4%		

Source: For poverty rates in Hungary: Appendix to the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (2003). For poverty rates in Romania: The CASPIS Report on the Indicators of Social Inclusion/Exclusion, 2002. Own calculation of absolute and relative poverty reduction.

State pensions have a considerable role in reducing poverty rates in both countries, and their effectiveness in terms of absolute and relative poverty did not change significantly between 2000 and 2002. In 2002 Hungary, poverty rates were by 25% lower due to state pensions, and 58% of those households who would had fallen below the poverty line without state pensions avoided poverty. In 2002 Romania, the effectiveness of state pensions was lower: poverty rate decreased only by 19% due to state pensions, and 46% of the potential poor avoided poverty as a result of state pensions.

However, all other benefits were considerably less effective in Romania than in Hungary. In 2002 Hungary, all social transfers (excluding pensions) decreased the poverty rate by 9%, whereas in Romania only by 5%. In relative terms, 21% of the potential poor in Hungary avoided falling below the poverty threshold due to state transfers other than pensions, whereas in Romania less than 12%. Given that the law on minimum income guarantee (Law 416/2001) was implemented in Romania in January 2002, it can be said that the introduction of this means-tested income supplement failed to improve the effectiveness of the social protection system in terms of combating income poverty.

Table 11.

Poverty reduction of state transfers in Hungary and Romania during the process of EU integration

	2000	2001	2002	2003
At risk of income poverty before state transfers				
EU-15	23	24	-	25
Romania	21	22	23	22
Hungary	17	17	15	17
Income poverty rate after state transfers (60% median income poverty line)				
EU-15	15	15	-	15
Romania	17	17	18	17
Hungary	11	11	10	12

Source: Eurostat, 2005.

The effectiveness of state transfers in poverty reduction refers not only to the extent of poverty (poverty rates), but also to the depth of poverty, in other words to diminishing the poverty gaps.

Table 12.

Reduction of poverty gaps by state transfers in Romania, 1995-98

Poverty gaps	All income, including pensions, before transfers	After unemploy-ment benefits	After state transfers for children	After social assistance benefits	After other non-contributory benefits	After all transfers (excluding pensions)
1995	9.5	8.3	8.4	9.2	9.3	6.4
1996	6.6	6.0	5.8	6.3	6.5	4.5
1997	11.5	10.7	9.4	11.1	11.5	7.9
1998	13.3	12.2	10.8	13.0	13.2	9.1
Absolute decrease of poverty gaps						
		Unemploy-ment benefits	State transfers for children	Social assistance benefits	Other non-contributory benefits	All transfers (excluding pensions)
1995		1.2	1.1	0.3	0.2	3.0
1996		0.6	0.8	0.4	0.1	2.1
1997		0.8	2.2	0.4	0.1	3.6
1998		1.1	2.5	0.3	0.1	4.2

Relative decrease of poverty gaps						
		Unemploy-ment benefits	State transfers for children	Social assistance benefits	Other non-contributory benefits	All transfers (excluding pensions)
1995		12.2	11.5	3.2	1.9	32.0
1996		9.5	12.7	5.4	1.4	32.0
1997		6.9	18.7	3.8	0.5	31.2
1998		8.5	18.9	2.2	0.5	31.4

Source: Poverty gaps reported by Teşliuc et. al., 2001: 190-197. Own calculations.

Table 13.

Romania. Poverty gaps before and after state transfers in 2000

Poverty gap house-holds (% of the poverty line)	Earnings before pensions	Pensions	Child allowance and family benefits	Unempl oyment benefits	Social assistance	All transfers (excluding pensions)	Money received from relatives	Donations from institutions	All income sources
Poverty gaps as % of the poverty line									
Non-Roma	84.1	56.3	51.0	53.7	55.8	47.9	55.5	56.3	46.4
Considered Roma	78.8	65.8	59.6	62.1	63.8	53.8	64.1	65.6	49.8
Declared Roma	77.7	72.4	65.9	70.3	70.2	61.6	70.7	71.9	57.2
Poverty gaps in PPP Dollars									
Non-Roma	38.7	25.9	23.5	24.7	25.6	22.0	25.5	25.5	21.3
Considered Roma	36.2	30.2	27.4	28.5	29.3	24.7	29.5	29.4	22.9
Declared Roma	35.7	33.3	30.3	32.3	32.3	28.3	32.5	32.2	26.3

Source: Yale dataset (2000). Own calculations. Poverty gap reduction of each social transfer and other income sources was computed separately by using equivalised earnings after pensions as a baseline. Note: In 2000, 1 PPP Dollar=9138.34 ROL (Eurostat, 2003).

Table 14.

Hungary. Poverty gaps before and after state transfers in 2000

Poverty gap households	Earnings before pensions	Pensions	Child allowance and family benefits	Unemployment benefits	Social assistance	All transfers (excluding pensions)	Money received from relatives	Donations from institutions	All income sources
Poverty gaps as % of the poverty line									
Non-Roma	88.4	76.3	51.6	64.6	70.2	33.8	75.8	76.1	32.9
Considered Roma	87.6	73.9	51.5	63.4	68.7	35.7	73.6	73.8	35.1
Declared Roma	86.2	67.8	56.1	60.3	64.8	45.7	67.5	67.7	44.3
Poverty gaps in PPP Dollars									
Non-Roma	125.2	108.1	73.1	91.5	99.4	47.8	107.3	107.8	46.6
Considered Roma	124.0	104.7	72.9	89.8	97.3	50.6	104.3	104.5	49.8
Declared Roma	122.1	96.0	79.4	85.5	91.8	64.7	95.6	95.8	62.7

Source: Yale dataset (2000). Own calculations. Poverty gap reduction of each social transfer and other income sources was computed separately by using equivalised earnings after pensions as a baseline. Note: In 2000, 1 PPP Dollar=116.642 HUF (Eurostat, 2003).

In 2000 Romania, if only earnings and pensions are included in the household income, poverty gaps are higher in the case of the Roma households (72%) than in the case of the non-Roma (56%). In Hungary, the situation is reverse: poverty gaps are 68% for the Roma and 76% for the non-Roma households. When all income sources are taken into account, in both countries poverty gaps are higher in the case of the Roma: 44% in Hungary, and 57% in Romania, whereas for the non-Roma these figures are 33% and 46% correspondingly.

Table 15.

Romania. Relative reduction of poverty gaps in 2000

	Pensions	Child allowance and family benefits	Unemployment benefits	Social assistance	All transfers (excluding pensions)	Money received from relatives	Donations from institutions
Non-Roma	33.0	9.4	4.7	0.9	15.0	1.5	0.1
Considered Roma	16.5	9.4	5.7	3.1	18.2	2.5	0.4
Declared Roma	6.8	8.9	2.9	3.0	14.9	2.4	0.7

Source: Yale dataset (2000). Own calculations. Poverty gap reduction of each social transfer and other income sources was computed separately by using equivalised earnings after pensions as a baseline.

Table 16.

Hungary. Relative reduction of poverty gaps in 2000

	Pensions	Child allowance and family benefits	Unemployment benefits	Social assistance	All transfers (excluding pensions)	Money received from relatives	Donations from institutions
Non-Roma	21.3	17.3	11.0	4.4	32.7	0.4	0.2
Considered Roma	15.6	30.4	14.2	7.1	51.6	0.4	0.2
Declared Roma	13.7	32.3	15.3	8.0	55.7	0.7	0.2

Source: Yale dataset (2000). Own calculations. Poverty gap reduction of each social transfer and other income sources was computed separately by using equivalised earnings after pensions as a baseline.

In Hungary, 32% of the poverty gap was closed through state transfers in the case of non-Roma households, and 56% in the case of the Roma.

In 2000 Romania, state transfers reduced only a small proportion of the poverty gap for all households: 15% for both self-declared Roma and non-Roma households, and 18% in the case of households considered Roma by interviewers. Social assistance had a low relative influence on decreasing the poverty gap throughout this period, nevertheless, its impact was slightly higher for the Roma households (3% relative reduction in both 1998 and 2000) than the non-Roma households (1% relative reduction in both 1998 and 2000). A bit larger impact was held by state transfers for children and family benefits which benefited relatively more the non-Roma (19.6% relative reduction in 1998, 9.4% in 2000) than the Roma households (13.2% relative reduction in 1998, 8.9% in 2000). The earlier studies of ICCV (see Teşliuc et. al., 2001: 51) pointed out in 1995 state transfers (excluding pensions) closed 32.2% of the poverty gap for the Romanian households and 21.4% for the Roma households. In 1998, the discrepancy between the effects of state transfers was even sharper: 32.7% versus 18.2% of the poverty gap (Teşliuc et. al., 2001).

Conclusions

During the first decade of post-socialist transition, in Romania none of the non-contributory state transfers offered effective protection against poverty, and the insurance-based unemployment benefits had only a modest influence on preventing poverty. The Hungarian welfare state was slightly more effective through its financial transfers to the unemployed and social assistance benefits. However, it had a substantial contribution to closing the poverty gap through family benefits. In Hungary, child-care indemnities for parents had a universal component (in addition to the contributory one), and the universal child allowance was doubled by a means-tested family benefit. In Romania, child-care indemnities for parents were conditioned by previous employment, and the values of the

universal child allowance and supplementary allowance for families with many children were very low. Before the 2003 changes in the legislation, these were not complemented by a means-tested component for needy families.

Due to the delayed implementation of means-tested income support benefits and the low level of cash transfers, the Romanian welfare state was rather ineffective in reducing poverty rates and poverty gaps. Between 2000 and 2002, all state transfers (excluding pensions) reduced the poverty rate only by 5%, as compared to 10% absolute poverty reduction in Hungary. In relative terms, social transfers prevented only 11% of those at risk of income poverty from falling below the threshold, whereas in Hungary the corresponding figure was almost double, 22%. All state transfers (excluding pensions) closed only 15% of the poverty gap in 2000, as compared to around 50% in Hungary.

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