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SPATIALIZATION AND RACIALIZATION OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION.
THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FORMATION OF 'GYPSY GHETTOS'
IN ROMANIA IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Special Issue. Guest Editor: Enikő VINCZE

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Introduction to the SPAREX research

The articles of this issue[3] analyse the social and cultural formation of „Gypsy ghettos" in Romania as historically-rooted manifestations of the spatialization and racialization of social exclusion in contemporary Europe. Offering insights into processes of ghettoization, they deconstruct the term „Gypsy ghetto" as a discursive device that homogenizes and racializes the inhabitants of impoverished, ran-down slum areas regardless of their life stories and ethnic self-identifications, and re-construct its multiple meanings from the points of view of those living inside or outside the physical and social barriers that configure these territories, and as well as from the perspective of broader socio-economic, policy and political, and cultural processes, which create them.

The SPAREX research was not an inquiry on Roma, or on ghettos, or on urban structures, and nor even on poverty, but it was a multi-disciplinary contextual investigation on the processes of spatialization and racialization of social exclusion as manifestation of advanced urban marginality produced by neoliberal regimes (Wacquant, 2008). SPAREX is also a promising attempt to think further on various theoretical models on the overlap between class and ethnic divisions in order to understand the lasting social and spatial segregation of the Roma (Ladányi and Szelényi 1998, 2002, 2004), beyond the policy-wise misinterpretable (Stewart, 2002) model of "underclass" formation induced by capitalist structural processes (Wilson, 1970). As such, SPAREX underscores: in conditions of generalized poverty and social and territorial disparities produced by

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postsocialist neoliberal economic restructuring that affected to different degrees differently positioned social categories and territories of Romania, a whole range of inter- and intra-ethnic relations and the interplay of several interests (among others between majority population and better-off Roma controlling the distribution of resources at local level) conducted to the formation of the excluded marginal, or of the underprivileged Roma, racialized both by the majority and by the better-off Roma groups as the "inferior, undeserving population" with whom nobody wants to mingle (Vincze, 2013a).

The social and cultural formation of "Gypsy ghettos" mirrors a larger phenomenon happening across borders, that is the trend of territorialisation of social exclusion coupled with territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2007). These are processes by which precarious social categories (created by economic mechanisms and stigmatized by concepts that blame the poor for being poor) are placed into marginal (for the most of the time polluted) locative spaces. The vicious circle that ties inferiorized people to stigmatized places stems from the dynamics of uneven development in a globalized economy, which lacks the taming effects of state intervention and redistribution, as poverty can be criminalized and racialized, while the workings of the "free-markets" are featured as the keys of progress. The marginal, polluted and dangerous geographic space becomes a force of social exclusion and ethno-cultural stigmatization, and vice versa (Vincze, 2013b). Moreover, these are processes by which multiple forms of deprivation are territorially concentrated creating instances of intersectional and trans-generationally transmitted marginalities.

Faced with a phenomenon of such complexity, some of the SPAREX articles of this issue of *Studia UBB Sociologia* are more focused on structural processes (Petrovici), while others on the experiences of people subjected to them (Harbula, Dohotaru); some give voice to more critical accounts on systemic injustices, others mostly describe what is happening, depicting some general patterns, while quite a few aim at combining to different degrees these approaches (Berescu, Raț, Simionca, Vincze). But each analysis brings together discursive elements (what people say) with practical events (what people do), admitting the demand of multi-perspectivity. Together, the articles highlight that the spatial marginality of Roma might serve simultaneously as a weapon of "confinement and control" for the dominant, and an "integrative and protective device" for the underprivileged Roma population (paraphrasing Powell, 2013, who describes this double-faced process in relation with the Gypsy-Travellers from United Kingdom, following the concepts of Wacquant, 2004).

General conceptual frames

The approach of the SPAREX research plan as a whole, developed in 2011, was shaped by classical works on "urban ghettos", such as that of Hannerz, which – while describing the everyday life of the African American ghetto inhabitants –, due to the adopted situational and interactional view on culture,

concludes that the "much of what should concern us about ghetto life has its ultimate determinants in much larger structures, beyond the reach of the ghetto dwellers" (Hannerz, 1969: 13); or by studies on the formation of modernity, like the book series *Understanding modern societies*, which – instead of looking for mono-causal explanations – identifies the interactions between the political, the economic, the social and the cultural processes, factors and causal patterns of "modernity" (series editor Hall, 1992).

  Viewed in a larger theoretical angle, our inquiry attempted to situate itself into the spatial turn in social sciences, which acknowledges space as an important dimension of inquiry, as "position and context are centrally and inescapably implicated in all constructions of knowledge" (Cosgrove, 1999: 7). Recent works in many fields assert that "space is a social construction relevant to the understanding of the different histories of human subjects and to the production of cultural phenomena", and that spatiality matters "not for the simplistic and overly used reason that everything happens in space, but because *where* things happen is critical to knowing *how* and *why* they happen" (Warf and Arias, 2009: 1). Moreover, besides inquiring the space as social product (Lefebvre,1991), or the multiple aspects of the relationship between the social and the spatial (Tonkiss, 2005), or the way in which social inequalities are inscribed into space through spatial production processes and in which societal and spatial dynamics are creating segregation (Cassiers and Kesteloot, 2012), our interpretations of the phenomenon of ghettoization were also encouraged by the examination of space in relation with social justice (Harvey, 1973; Mitchell 2003; Soja, 2010).

  Critically addressing manifestations of spatial injustice, we obviously referred to the social exclusion literature as well, according to which marginalization is intertwined with deprivation, as a form of isolation that "occurs for reasons that are beyond the control of those subject to it" (Barry, 1998: 14); social exclusion is "about the inability of our society to keep all groups and individuals within reach of what we expect as a society. It is about the tendency to push vulnerable and difficult individuals into the least popular places, furthest away from our common aspirations. It means that some people feel excluded from the mainstream, as though they do not belong" (Power and Wilson, 2000); "social exclusion is not just the description of the adverse consequences of disadvantage, but of the processes by which people become distanced from the benefits of participating in a modern society" (Mayes et al., 2001: 1); social exclusion should be understood as a "dual risk" (for individuals facing it as well as the entire society, which become fragmented), and as "a result of structural processes (…) not individual failure", which needs a dynamic and multidimensional approach of investigation (CE, 2001: 16); the main virtue of the concept of social exclusion resides in "its practical influence in forcefully emphasizing – and focusing attention on – the role of relational features in deprivation" (Sen, 2000: 8).

Works on social exclusion of the Roma emphasize that this "is a complex problem of people living excluded from the mainstream society symbolically and/or economically". They stress that "ethnic categories ... are not only target groups of social exclusion but they may be actual results of the very processes of exclusion and inclusion", and "there are social contexts in which being *Ţigan or Rom,* as identified by the majority population, means being excluded" (Fleck and Rughiniş, 2008: 6).

Community studies conducted in Romania draw attention to the salience of the cumulative, mutually reinforcing links between residential segregation and reduced access to school education, decent jobs, healthcare and other public services of ethnic Roma (Kiss, Fosztó and Fleck 2009; FRA 2009; Berescu 2010; Magyari-Vincze 2006; Vincze and Harbula 2011; UNDP/WB/EC and FRA, 2011). As far as Roma housing conditions are concerned, recent studies assert that "the Romanian legal framework in the area of housing indirectly discriminates against the Roma by simply not taking into account their special situation as most Roma, due to historical conditions, do not own land or are too poor to pay for authorizations or have been forcefully settled without property documentation and have been living in a place for years" (Niţa 2009). Despite EU recommendations and the establishment of a European Framework for the National Roma Inclusion Strategies[4] (CE, Com.0173/2011) and of a European Anti-Poverty Platform[5] as part of the Europe 2020 strategy, the recent UNDP/World Bank/EC and FRA (2011) comparative EU-wide research on the situation of the Roma points out serious disparities and persistent multiple deprivation. Besides its scholarly dimension, the SPAREX project aims to contribute at social policy analysis and inform current undertakings to improve the situation of the Roma from impoverished settlements. The topics of these articles, relevant for the nowadays social and political realities of Europe, were placed into the conceptual frames of critical urban studies, taking inspiration mainly from older and newer works of Harvey on uneven development and capital accumulation through dispossession (1973, 2006) and those of Wacquant on advanced marginality and ghettoization (1996, 2003, 2004, 2008), followed by many European analysts (among them Slater, 2006; Borges Pereira, 2007; and Powell, 2013). Eventually, our main questions and related methodologies were framed at the intersection of investigations that address social polarisation and segregation as a result of economic restructuring, and of those which address the relationship between segregation, polarisation and exclusion, on the one hand, and the structure and transformation of the welfare states, on the other hand (Musterd, 1998).

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[4] *http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/national-strategies/* (Accessed: 30.11.2013).
[5] *http://inclusion-europe.org/ro/icon-display-politici/social-inclusion/eu-anti-poverty-platform* (Accessed: 30.11.2013).

We use the term **"Gypsy ghetto"** as an analytical construct for discussing the spatialization and racialization of social exclusion, respectively the different variations in which economic deprivation, racial stigmatization and spatial isolation intersect each other. Following Whitehead (2000), we are rejecting those views that discuss about ghettos "in terms of the behavioural and attitudinal shortcomings of their residents", and do not "provide a contextual analysis of the broader structural factors that contributed to the creation or conditions of the ghetto". That is why our ethnographic fieldwork on "Gypsy ghettos" aims at unfolding their social and cultural formation. The "Gypsy ghettos" are constituted both as localized social settings (places in the physical space) and discursive conceptualizations of social divisions (commonplaces in public discourses). We focus on understanding how different actors create and use the space (of ghettoized housing) in order to build up and maintain socio-cultural distinctions in concrete/ local contexts shaped by forces and processes of the broader political economy. In particular, we aim at understanding how and why is the space of housing used in order to create and sustain social and ethnic boundaries, or differently put, what is the social, cultural and political function of residential segregation in the (re)production of differentiations and inequalities created at the intersection of social status and ethnicity. Moreover, we also propose to address the impact of physical isolation on social contacts, (self)-identifications and generally on people's life expectancies and trajectories. In this way, we decrypt the ways in which the stigmatized physical space is inscribed into people's bodies, minds and relations, and thereby it symbolically "justifies" their exclusion. Following Wacquant's approach on the African-American hyper-ghetto and the Parisian marginal neighbourhoods (Wacquant, 2008), our research aims as well as at identifying variations of ghettoization sustained by different degrees to which poverty, racial stigmatization and spatial isolation cumulate in the process of social exclusion.

Separation, segregation, and racialized ghettoization under the postsocialist neoliberal order

In order to make a distinction between these three phenomena we used as a starting point the observations of Wacquant (2003) according to which: (1) not all the segregated areas are ethnic ghettos (only those that are enforceable isolated from and by the rest of the world); (2) not all ethnically homogeneous ghettos are poor; and (3) not all ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods are ghettos (only those whose function is to dissimilate or keep apart as a wall, in comparison with those immigrant districts, which work as a bridge and facilitate assimilation).

Proceeding from here, on the base of our field research in five Romanina cities, we arrived at the conclusion that in order to understand the social and cultural formation of "Gypsy ghettos" it would be useful differentiating between cases of separation, segregation and racialized ghettoization as follows. Separation is a voluntarily and proudly assumed process of differentiation of a group, manifested

in the creation of its "own" spaces, which are socially and/or ethnically homogeneous (separation usually functions in the case of rich people belonging to the dominant ethnic majority, but as well as in the case of better-off Roma groups, which in a sense might be also dominant at local level, at least in a relative sense, compared to other Roma groups, subjected to poverty and exclusion). Moreover, segregation is a form of separation, i.e. an imposed spatial confinement, or the enforced geographical, material and symbolic isolation of impoverished and precarious social categories. The obliged character of such a separation might be an outcome of the "exclusionary closure" enforced by the mainstream society (for example by the means of evictions and resettlements), and/or it might be a result of economic constrains that make impossible the option of leaving such spaces, combined with different types of intra-group exploitative dependencies. The cases of Roma ghettoization intersected with separation are forms of ethnic separation voluntarily and proudly chosen by better-off Roma groups, who have independent sources for living and/or are playing particular economic functions at the level of local societies, so (willingly or not) they might even become constitutive elements of the dominant society excluding poor Roma. Furthermore, the cases of Roma ghettoization are forms of ethnic segregation that subject poor Roma to imposed spatial confinement, lead to the creation of spaces that are inhabited mostly by poor Roma and are perceived by the public imaginary as (dangerous) "Gypsy neighbourhoods". This latest form of ghettoization demonstrates that in post-socialist Romania one witnesses a process of class stratification also among ethnic Roma, which turns the poorest of the poor into a socially and territorially excluded category simultaneously classified by socio-economic and ethnic or racial terms.

The ethnography conducted under the SPAREX research focused mostly on the latter type of Roma ghettoization (intersected with enforced spatial closure and poverty), creating, from this point of view alike, but from other perspectives quite dissimilar instances of residential segregation (characterized by different scales of exclusion and poverty, respectively by diverse degrees of connectedness to the rest of the cities, or even by various forms of resistance towards this marginalization), such as: the four marginalized Roma settlements nearby the landfill of Cluj-Napoca; or the Turkish-Roma community of Obor district in Călăraşi, but as well as the two deprived social housing segments from the same city (Cinci Călăraşi and Doi Moldoveni); or the social housing areas named La Castel and La bărăci in Târgu Mureş, and the improvised informal urban settlement nearby Mureş river; or the similar type of Roma segment called Dallas in Ploieşti, but as well as the deprived housing areas of the city, such as the container housing zone (inhabited predominantly by poor Romanians), or the deprived block of flat called NATO. However, the SPAREX research also documented cases in which the ethnic ghetto resulted from historical evolutions by which particular Roma groups voluntarily settled in areas separated from the rest of the city (for example the cases of Valea

Rece and Dealului street from Târgu Mureş, the case of Şumuleu street from Miercurea Ciuc, or the case of Livada district in Călăraşi, or that of Mimiu, Bereasca and Boldeasca in Ploieşti). It is to be mentioned that in the case of the latter, too, elements of voluntary separation (and related in-group solidarities sustained in terms of kinship or ancestry and lineage) are interlinked with socio-economic constraints (such as the lack of material or social capital to move out from these areas), which might be also interpreted as factors that impose on these people the "assumed" ethno-social closure. In each of the selected cities there is a vivid dynamics of power relations between the Romanian or Hungarian majority and Roma minority, between the several local Roma groups differentiated alongside diverse factors (traditional/ spoitori, căldărari or Gábor Gypsies *versus* assimilated Roma, or Hungarian *versus* Romanian Roma, and Turkish *versus* Romanian Roma), between formal and/or informal Roma leaders, local authorities and non-governmental organizations, and last but not least between the departing interest (sub)groups within each Roma segment, or between youth and aged, or between women and men of different ages always playing their roles in the internal division of labour while mixing submissive and subversive practices.

Viewed together with the preliminary conclusions of another ongoing contextual inquiry (in Romania conducted in 25 localities)[6] – whose some preliminary results are also presented in this issue of *Studia UBB Sociologia* (Vincze et all) –, SPAREX demonstrates that the formation of "Gypsy ghettos" (as instances of Roma marginalization) happens at the crossroads of multi-level processes that create territorial disparities and uneven developments between and within regions, counties and localities. The latter are producing rural areas where people are surviving out of subsistence agriculture, small towns that lack economic activities providing decent jobs for the inhabitants, or "poverty pockets" in larger cities where multiple economic deprivations become territorially concentrated. Under such conditions, it often happens that the formation of spaces of economic deprivation (of larger or smaller poor segments) are overlapping with the ethno-territorial segregation of marginalized Roma resulting from several trends, while the poor segments (not necessarily inhabited mostly by persons self-identified as Roma) are culturally stigmatized as "Gypsyhoods" (*ţigănie*).

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[6] *Short report on Romania – Uneven development and Roma marginalization: from economic deprivation to ethno-spatial exclusion* (October 2013), resulted from *Faces and Causes of the Roma Marginalization in Local Settings. Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011, focusing on Hungary, Romania, Serbia*. A joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Open Society Foundation's Roma Initiatives Office (RIO) and the Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma Inclusion program, and the Central European University/Centre for Policy Studies (CEU CPS), implemented between December 2012 and June 2014 in Hungary by the Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in Romania by Desiré Foundation from Cluj, and in Serbia by the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University.

In today's Romania the "Gypsy ghetto" is a physically isolated area defined by the public imaginary as the ethnically and socially homogeneous space of poor Roma. Predominantly, it is perceived as the "natural area" of ethnic Roma, and in this sense it is racializing poverty. In reality, the "Gypsy ghetto" is a territory from the peripheries of localities where the mainstream society outcasts its unwanted "elements" in order to keep them as far as possible from itself. Constituted as an intersectional form of socio-spatial exclusion, or as a social-class- and-ethnic-identity-based formation, the "Gypsy ghetto" is created simultaneously by economic mechanisms producing a precarious class experiencing cumulated deprivations, by policy and developmental arrangements neglecting "unworthy" people and places or even creating them, and by racializing stigmatization that not only misrecognizes, but also dishonours and dehumanizes Roma identity, associating it with an inferiorized "racial physiology".

The ghettoized space embodies processes of differentiation between "insiders" and "outsiders", between those who "deserve" belonging to society and those who do not, or mechanisms of making distinctions between the middle class and the pauperized social categories. We assume that ghettoization (and, in parallel with this, gentrification) is a terrain on and through which social actors negotiate from unequal positions of power on the shared understanding of who is to be included to and who is to be excluded from the mainstream and (highly) valued societal space. Ultimately, in a post-socialist Romania incorporated into the global trends of neoliberalism, inclusion and exclusion are about the creation of a new societal order also manifested in spatial (urban) arrangements. This order privileges the winners of the privatization and marketization of public goods, and it is inclusive for people, places, and societal areas that might be more or less easily included into the political economy of capitalism (as labour force, as geographical zones that are worth for investment, as domains which deserve development – all of these as sources of profit), but it is exclusive towards those who are categorized as surplus and needless from the point of view of the capital or who became so vulnerable that their labour might be exploited due to their socio-spatial position pushed behind the borders of legality and human dignity (Vincze, 2013a).

Methodological devices

The five cities chosen as sites for multi-sited ethnography display a whole range of marginalized Roma communities and types of "Gypsy ghettos" formation, so even if they were not selected to stand as a representative sample for Romania, by the detailed description and analysis of these instances one may have a clear picture about the trends of urban Roma marginality and exclusion. These cities are: Cluj-Napoca (part of the North-Vest Developmental Region knowing a rate of risk of poverty of circa 33%), the second biggest city after the capital with a population totalling 324,576 of which only 0.95% Roma; two towns belonging to the Central Developmental Region knowing the second lowest

rate of risk of poverty in Romania (28%): Miercurea Ciuc, the smallest among cities acting as county centre, with a total population of 38,966 out of which 78.54% ethnic Hungarians and only 0.86% Roma, and Târgu Mureş inhabited by 134,290 persons out of whom 2.43% declared as ethnic Roma, the centre of a county with the highest percentage of Roma (8.78%); and two cities from the South Muntenia Developmental Region (risk of poverty 41%): Ploieşti (with 209,945 inhabitants, and 2.52% ethnic Roma) and Călăraşi (knowing the largest Roma population in our "sample", a little bit higher percentage than the 3.25% national average, which is 3.45% out of the total population of 65,181 persons, while 8.1% of the population of Călăraşi county are Roma).

These localities know quite diverse histories of urbanization and levels of current economic development (being affected differently by post-socialist de-industrialization), but they share similar patterns of pushing towards the peripheries the impoverished, mostly Roma dwellers who cannot afford paying for housing on the private market. They differ in terms of their ethnic balances between Romanians, Hungarians, and Roma, diversity of local Roma groups and relations among them, economic and social histories, current revenues and wealth, and also political factors (public authorities, local politics and civil society).

Within each city, our joint research revealed the existence of several poor, segregated areas:[7] the four sub-areas of Pata-Rât in Cluj-Napoca (Dallas, garbage dump, Cantonului street, and Colonia Nouă or New Pata Rât); Şumuleu/ Somlyó street, Primăverii/Tavasz street, and "Pork City" in Miercurea Ciuc; Valea Rece/Hidegvölgy, La Castel and La Bărăci on Băneasa street, Domb utca/Dealului street and the small inner-city settlement on the shore of the Mureş river in Târgu Mureş; Dallas, Mimiu, Bereasca, Boldeasca, Bariera Bucureşti and the social housing near the Lukoil gas plant in Ploieşti; Doi Moldoveni, Cinci Călăraşi, Obor and Livada districts, Fundăturile Cazarmă, and Prelungirea Bulevardului 1 Mai in Călăraşi.

Moreover, in the five selected cities we also could identify several types of „Gypsy ghettos" formation, shaped among others by the non-intervention (neglect or tolerance) or by the adverse intervention of local authorities (slum clearance), such as: the eviction of renters of formerly nationalized buildings returned to their owners, who retreat to city peripheries in improvised homes or into necessity housing, where the costs of life are lower (Miercurea Ciuc: landfill, Pork city; Cluj: Cantonului; Ploieşti: container housing under the bridge); the extension of existing formal or informal settlements due to the fact that the new generations of inhabitant families do not have other housing alternatives (Miercurea Ciuc: Şumuleu; Cluj: Cantonului; Târgu Mureş: Valea Rece; Călăraşi: Obor; Ploieşti: Mimiu); the "cleansing" of the informal settlements from the central

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[7] The visited Roma segments from these localities are marked on the map of Romania at *http://sparex-ro.eu/?page_id=31*, and are mapped by photos at *http://www.panoramio.com/group/272927* (accessed 10.10.2013).

zones of the cities, over-crowed and infrastructurally underdeveloped, by local authorities, while their inhabitants are resettled into the urban (mostly polluted) peripheries (Miercurea Ciuc: waste water plant; Cluj: new Pata Rât; Ploieşti: Teleajăn/Lukoil); the demolition of houses or improvisations from urban or sub-urban areas targeted as zones for urban regeneration because their real estate value increased, whose dwellers are moved to the margins, nearby former or current industrial sites (Călăraşi: Obor and Livada; Cluj: new Pata Rât); the "temporary" removal of families and persons, renters of old working class blocks of flats, from their apartments due to the renovation of these buildings, who, afterwards, due to the system of social housing distribution do not have the possibility to return to these, and are gathered in disadvantaged locative areas in so-called social homes or in personally constructed improvisations (Târgu Mureş: La castel, La bărăci, on the shore of Mureş river; Cluj: Cantonului; Călăraşi: Doi Moldoveni and Cinci Călăraşi; Ploieşti: Blocul NATO); the disconnection of abandoned workers' dormitories from utilities, which became devastated of everything that can be removed, and later occupied by homeless people (Călăraşi: Doi Moldoveni and Cinci Călăraşi; Ploieşti: blocul NATO); the voluntary or forced removal of dwellers from old socialist blocks of flats, who, remaining without proper financial resources, cannot pay their utilities for years and accumulate huge amounts of debt, and as a result are constrained to return to their old family homes, from where their ancestors, during socialist times, resettled to block of flats, or join the existing shared spaces of extended families (Ploieşti: Mimiu; Călăraşi: Livada; Tg. Mureş: Valea Rece); the degradation of the locative conditions of the impoverished semi-rural old communities situated at the cities' peripheries (Târgu Mureş: Dealului street, Valea Rece; Miercurea Ciuc: Şumuleu, Pork City; Călăraşi: Obor, Livada, Fundăturile Cazarmă, Prelungirea Bulevardului 1 Mai; Ploieşti: Mimiu, Bereasca, Bariera Bucureşti, Boldeasca).

We repeatedly visited these settlements during our ethnographic fieldwork in 2012 and 2013, interviewed its inhabitants (by the means of informal discussions and registered semi-structured interviews) and as well as representatives of local authorities (from the City Halls and Prefectures, including Roma experts and mediators, and from some relevant county-level and regional stakeholders such as the County Agencies for Labour Force Employment and the County Commerce and Industry Chambers, or local police), but also actors from the local mass media, and moreover Romanian and international non-governmental (human rights, development and service provider) organizations involved into the life of these communities, and participated – in some cases on more, and in other cases on less – local events related to the Roma communities under scrutiny (cultural, civic, social, academic). For the sake of the analysis of the Romanian public discourse on Roma marginalization and segregation, besides the interviews conducted with relevant (media, political, and civil society) actors, producers of these discourses, we also analysed written texts, such as newspaper articles, NGO documents, and policy documents of different kinds reflecting social policies, mostly elaborated and

implemented on the domains of housing and Roma inclusion. Ethnographic inquiry and policy analysis at local level were enriched by statistically mapping the changing economic and employment-related contexts of the five cities.

By the means of these complex methods, the SPAREX research aimed to unfold the dynamics of social exclusion at various levels, the roles of different actors and the influences of structural forces, in particular neoliberal market policies and forms of indirect, institutional discrimination against the Roma, but as well as of underlying and legitimizing cultural convictions (such as ideologies of meritocracy and racism) that have been shaping Romanian society for the last two decades. In this way, the contextual inquiry tried to understand the everyday life of people inhabiting the socially and spatially segregated/ghettoized urban areas as shaped by external factors and processes.

Out of the theoretical and empirical complexities briefly suggested above, the articles published in this issue of *Studia UBB Sociologia* are covering only a limited slice, however each mirrors something out of them by using various disciplinary angles, to be further developed in a forthcoming volume. These articles do not primordially describe the ghettos' internal life, but they mostly interpret larger processes, which spatialize and racialize social exclusion: structural and cultural forces such as socio-economic restructuring and capitalist proletarization (Petrovici), precarization of labour and housing, inequalities and racism (Berescu, Vincze), urban imaginaries and views on development (Simionca); urban policies, administrative practices of public housing, and hidden racial profiling (Raț); the role of civil society in giving voice to the oppressed and transforming the invisible instances of Roma ghettoization into political subjects (Dohotaru). Furthermore, following the analytical tradition of anthropologists conducting fieldwork on marginalized communities (such as Okely 1983; Stewart 1997; Day, Papataxiarchis and Stewart 1999; Wacquant, 2004 and 2008) we also aim at interpreting the everyday practices of ghetto tenants (for example the use of family as economic and social source, Harbula) as responses to social exclusion, and at identifying their agency as a way of both creatively accommodating to their changing condition and practicing a socio-cultural and political critique towards the system that produces them as racialized ghetto dwellers.

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ANNEX:

SPAREX FIELD RESEARCH LOCATIONS:
Cluj-Napoca, Miercurea Ciuc, Ploieşti, Târgu Mureş
Pictures from Călăraşi have been included in Cătălin Berescu's article, this issue.

Fig. 1: Cantonului Street, Cluj-Napoca, 2012.

Fig. 2: "Dallas" – "Old" Pata-Rât, Cluj-Napoca, 2012.

Fig. 3: "New" Pata-Rât with municipality housing for the families evicted from Coastei Street, photo courtesy to gLOC, February 2011.

Fig. 4: Landfill of Pata-Rât, Cluj-Napoca, 2012. *Selective waste collection.*

Fig. 5: Pork City, Miercurea Ciuc, 2012.

Fig. 6: Valea Rece, Târgu Mureş, 2012. *Shacks behind the social housing.*

Fig. 7. Mimiu, Ploieşti. *The old refinery, now in ruins, in the background.*

Fig. 8. "NATO Bloc", Ploieşti. *The pipes of old refinery, now in ruins,*
in the foreground.

NEOLIBERAL PROLETARIZATION ALONG THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE IN POSTSOCIALIST ROMANIA[1]

NORBERT PETROVICI[2]

ABSTRACT. Based on five cities and their hinterlands in Romania (Călăraşi, Cluj-Napoca, Ploieşti, Miercurea Ciuc and Târgu-Mureş) I compare actually-existing-socialist and neoliberal capitalist strategies in integrating labour reproduction in the accumulation strategies. The cost and availability of the labour force needed in the circuits of production are strongly dependent on the cost of reproducing labourers. Availability and the costs of the means of subsistence have a major impact on the wage level. The combined income-strategy as partial proletarization (i.e. combining minimum wage with informal resources generated by the household) did not lose its actuality during neoliberal capitalism and is as wildly use as during socialism. Yet the capitalist imperative of accumulation may produce new types of enclosure that run against the benefits of partial proletarization. Intensive agriculture with highly mechanized tools and animal husbandry for industrial purpose, while in need of land, makes redundant important parts of the rural labour force. It is a population that has increasingly less access to combine income strategies, both because the land is integrated in global circuits of agricultural exploitation and because of capital's hopping strategies from one place to another to exploit reproduction costs differentials without redistributive constraints.

Keywords: proletarization, accumulation strategies, suburbanization, reproduction of labour force, double dwellers, urban villagers

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Introduction

Mounting evidence links the souring inequalities of the last four decades, across the globe, to the changing institutional arrangements starting in the 70s (Harvey, 2005; Massey, 2007). Accumulation practices have been reshuffled at various scales favouring high concentration of wealth while a growing disenfranchised and marginal population is excluded from the benefits of contemporary productivity (Lyon-Callo, 2004; Wacquant, 2012). Many of these transformations can be read as results of the struggle to produce new ways of proletarization through globalization (Harvey, 2005), under the growing employee's criticism (Angelis, 2007; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) and the refusal to work (Weeks, 2011).

Today's neoliberal arrangements can be seen as multifarious ways in which capitalist accumulation tried to use and capture the criticisms against bureaucracy, patriarchy, autocracy on the shop floor (Fraser, 2009; Zaretsky, 2008) and against pervasive commodification and enclosures (Fraser, 2013; Stavrides, 2012). The adaptability of neoliberalism as a policy packages of privatizations, marketization and financialization and its incredibly polymorphous tactics (Peck and Theodore, 2012) can be linked to the ability to capture and use popular moral ideas and practices, criticism and local discontent (Young, 2010). Ethics of popular entrepreneurship and struggle towards autonomy are adapted and are used by capital to produce new enclosures and new waves of dispossession of the means of production, re-creating continuously new pools of "free workers" (Jeffrey, 2008; Zaretsky, 2007).

In Eastern Europe the criticism against Fordism, bureaucracy and autocratic managerial styles are most of the time conflated with the criticism of the actually-existing-socialism (Simionca, 2012) and real-existing social-democracy (Stoiciu, 2011). Neoliberalism, as a particular type of capitalist ideological configuration, is played out in these region as a critique of communism (Buden, 2010; Tichindeleanu, 2009). Actually, neoliberal Eastern European capitalism can be read as a political-ethical project that aims not only to design markets, but also at to enact a moral transformation: to get rid of the old communist habits and practices. Capitalism is called to enact efficiency and competitiveness against the old system's residues. Therefore redistributive institutions are increasingly difficult to rescue from the criticism of the old Fordist socialist arrangements. Dignity claims in egalitarian terms or pressures to collective provision have become increasingly difficult to be formulated against hegemonic "anti-communist" discourse (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). The "communist collective rights" are supposedly predicated against the meritocracy of the markets.

Probably more apparent than elsewhere, the contrasts between the neoliberal discourse and the "actually existing" capitalism in Eastern Europe disclosed that the markets are "moral" artifacts; contractual labour and the autonomy of labourers, seen to constitute the very essence of markets, are

actually fragile constructs, underpinned by formal/informal rules and norms. Therefore, only some are bearers of the "right" contractual values and attitudes, that is those who got rid of the old "communist habits and values", those who share the "acquisitive ethics" supposedly specific to capitalism (Marinescu, 2012). Yet, the anti-communist discourse is less precise when it comes to explain how exactly the actors that enter the contractual relations are produced. How come some actors systematically can sell only their labour, because they own nothing else, while others own the means of production and can play the role of the employer? Which are the arrangements that are creating systematic enclosures of the means of production leaving some actors only as bearers of labour power?

Based on ethnographic material on the spatialization of social exclusion in post-socialist Romania (see *Guest Editors's Foreword,* this issue), this paper compares the actually-existing-socialism with neoliberal capitalism, and makes the claim that reproduction of labour in Eastern Europe is integrated in new ways in the capital accumulation strategies. The cost and availability of the labour force needed in the circuits of production are strongly dependent on the cost of reproducing labourers (Angelis, 2007; Fraser, 2009). The availability and the costs of the means of subsistence have a major impact on the wage level. The socialist urbanization of major costs of reproduction (education, health, housing, public transportation) also capitalized on the rural hinterland's non-monetized means of subsistence (especially food) by drawing on the informal exchanges provided by extended families or double dwelling both in an apartment in the city and in a village household. Through proletarization I understand, in a Marxist vein, the process of producing a population that has only its labour capacity as the sole commodity to be sold in return for a wage. The proletariat has no other means of production to assure some resources for reproduction, except the wage. But, as I argue here, there are degrees of proletarization, some means of productions owned by the wage labourer sometimes may be very instrumental to the accumulation of capital in itself. The actually-existing-socialist strategy produced a partially proletarized populations, sheltered somewhat by the various shortages of the socialist economy. In contrast, after 1989, farm land is increasingly used by the postsocialist accumulation machine directly to produce profit through highly mechanized agriculture that does not fuel the industry anymore. On the other hand, wage disparities among cities is exploited more and more in order to benefit from the differential costs of the localized means of subsistence necessary for reproducing labour force. The strategy of minimizing wages and reproduction costs produces a postsocialist proletariat more vulnerable to the whims of the overproduction capitalist crisis.

However, the degree and nature of proletarization are localized responses to labour's particular reactions, to its specific means of subsistence, types of resistances and labour exit strategies. Also, proletarization is strongly dependent on the local pattern of investments determined by localized resources and previous investments. I will follow the issue of neoliberal proletarization in five Romanian cities, Cluj-Napoca, Târgu-Mureş, Miercurea Ciuc, Ploieşti and Călăraşi and their

hinterlands, by analysing the particular junctions between socialist investment, capital accumulation strategies, and affordable means of subsistence available to workers to control for historical legacies, the article does a comparative analysis of two clusters of cases: three ethnically mixed cities from the Romanian province of Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca, Târgu-Mureş, Miercurea Ciuc), formerly an Austro-Hungarian province until 1918, and two cities in the southern region of Muntenia (Ploieşti and Călăraşi), a former Ottoman territory until mid 19th century (for more on choosing the cases see the editorial forward).

The pattern of production and reproduction of labour in these cities and their hinterlands considerably varies, yet they are important sites of specialization inside the globalized Romanian state space. My analysis compared the relative size of the sectors in the local economies (agriculture, manufacturing and services), the nature of socialist investments, the postsocialist foreign direct investments, and the types of household farming and cereal production. The cities and county vary considerably, and the rest of the analysis makes clear the axes of variations. However specificities are visible. Cluj-Napoca and Cluj County have the largest proportions of their labour force working in services after the capital city Bucharest. Ploieşti and Prahova County form the industrial hinterland of Bucharest, the most important production site for multinationals in Romania. Târgu-Mureş and Mureş County have almost an identical pattern of investment during state socialism as Harghita County, yet today Harghita County has one of the largest percentages of population working in manufacturing. Nonetheless, in Harghita there is no particularly important manufacturer or foreign investment. Călăraşi, on the other hand, is the most important city of the region, strongly connected to the globalized agricultural production.

The argument will unfold in five sections. First, I discuss the issue of proletarization both in socialism and capitalism. Second, I will point to the data I use and the methods employed to analyse them. Third, based on available data and information provided by previous studies, I discuss the urban-rural interconnections in the accumulation processes during socialism. Forth, I follow the major urban transformations in the five cities during the first two postsocialist decades. Fifth, I analyse the major transformation of the rural areas in Romania and the ways it shaped an immense labour pool for the major cities. Finally, I conclude with some remarks on the lasting postsocialist accumulation strategies.

Proletarization: from actually-existing socialism to neoliberal capitalism

As it is clearly showed in rivalling theories of actually-existing-socialism, bureaucratic collectivism (King and Szelényi, 2004) and state socialism (Tamás, 2008; Tichindeleanu, 2009), a salient trait of the system was the competition between bureaucracies for economic and political resources at all scalar levels of the state. And, undoubtedly, the competition for labour was an important part of

the complex plan negotiation and hoarding strategies that defined actually-existing socialism (Verdery, 1991). The availability of cheap labour is highly dependent on the sheer number of persons willing to be employed for a wage and the costs of their reproduction – housing, health, transportation, education, safety, food (Angelis, 2007). The process of enclosure of land and available spatialized resources by the socialist government was major instruments for uproot rural populations and producing a proletariat. These can be found back at the times of the industrial revolution (Polanyi, 2001), but constitute major elements of the accumulation through dispossession at the peripheries of the global economy (Bonefeld and Caffentzis, 2007). Yet, the particular form taken by the enclosure processes under soviet-type state socialism, that of the brutal "collectivization" (Dobrincu and Iordachi, 2009), did not produce the same degree of dispossession and the mass of floating dispossessed peasants observed elsewhere (Bodnar, 2001).

Extensive enclosure and depopulation of enclosed lands would have produced a shortage of agricultural labour, hindering the acute need of working hands in the extensive agricultural exploitations, specific to the actually existing socialism (Turnock, 2009; Verdery, 2003). Given that industrial expansion was fuelled by the surplus in agriculture, as a state strategy to yield endogenous growth, any systemic labour shortage in agriculture would have been critical – and it was, as some scholars argue about the end of the socialist system (for a review see Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1994). On the other hand, massive enclosures would have had dramatic effects on the cost of reproduction and implicitly on the wages. The uprooted populations transformed in wage workers are in need of various services such as housing, health, food, childcare and other social services that could no longer be granted by the community. Either these services are available, affordable and included in the wages (directly or indirectly through state redistribution), or workers should provide themselves these services through informal arrangements such as shanty towns. The latter option comes with costs for the state, as it weakens state potential for social control and the creed in the "workers' state".

Consequently, a common pattern of the Eastern European city was that "the growth of urban industrial jobs seems to have been much faster than the growth of the permanent urban population" (Szelenyi, 1996: 292). The proletarization processes produced cities where the urbanization remained behind industrialization processes. The term is coined in contrast to the "over-urbanization" of the peripheries and the "regular" urbanization of the core capitalist countries. The naming of the process is indicative that this is a piece of an auto-colonialist discourse postulating that the "Western capitalist path" is the "normal" path. That is also obvious from the fact that the "under-urbanization" thesis iconic characters: the commuter and the urbanized peasant, indicators of the supposedly failed modernity of the socialist city. The commuter, as a "double dweller" (both of the city and of the rural area), was rather the actor that linked places and simultaneously exploited the resources of the factory and of the household farm. The "urban villager" was the urbanite strongly dependent on exchanges with the village, through the extended family or

informal ties. This putatively failed modern actors stand for greater systemic failures. The "under-urbanization" is a triple effect: the need to control the expansion of cities in order to prevent shrinkage of available land for agriculture; the need to redirect investment resources toward manufacturing in industry and to avoid unproductive investments in infrastructure; and finally, the need of the dictatorial state to control the possible dangerous concentration of urbanites. In this narrative, the modernity run by the socialist state is a partial modernity, a mock modernity of an industrial economy constrained by the systemic need of a primary agricultural sector.

As Bodnar (2001) rightly argues, the whole issue has to be put in an alternative frame to avoid the auto-colonialist montage of "the socialist city". Her solution is to read the socialist economy as a strategy of a developmentalist state at the periphery of the capitalist world system, with a fair success in renegotiating for semi-peripheral position. The effect of this change of perspectives is that "under-urbanization" becomes the means that permits to qualify "the greater retentive force of agriculture and the thereby emerging combined income-earning strategies that have historically accompanied east-central European industrialization" (2001:28). One can go further, and read in the combined income-strategy of the commuter and the urban villager as a partial proletarization. It is not just a response of the Eastern European countries (Chang and Brada, 2006; Zhang, 2008) or more general of socialist countries as Bodnar (2001) argues. It is a response to the accumulation imperative to minimize the cost of reproduction of the labour force.

Minimizing the cost of wages, through speculating on partial monetization of the means of subsistence and unpaid reproduction costs, sits in the core of the capitalist accumulation processes (Dalla Costa, 2012). The actually-existing-socialism urbanized some of the reproduction costs to minimize their wage costs on the local level, while it still used some of the unpaid reproduction labour of rural households. In the "socialist city montage", the infrastructural investments in housing, education or health are too hasty indexed as costs. Nevertheless, it is not an exception that the reproduction has been transformed into an industry capable of absorbing productive capital[3], not so different from the "normal" capitalist strategy (Federici, 2012). Actually, the post 70s relocations and outsourcing of capitalist enterprises are exploiting wage differentials stemming from reproduction costs differentials on a global scale. Sometimes, in glaring continuity, multinationals are using similar strategies to the socialist-type ones, by directly subsidizing the commuting costs of the rural labour, yet still paying the minimum wage (i.e.

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[3] Take the case of housing in Cluj, it was a major resource in the plan negotiation (Petrovici, 2013). Providing housing for the workers was a major dispute for more investments in manufacturing. Becoming completely industrialized through innovative on site production of the blocks of flats, the production of apartments became very cheap. Yet that had a major impact on the reproductive costs needed to be accounted by the wage, making more competitive the city in attracting rural labour. While wages were fixed nationally, reducing the costs of reproduction through urbanization, the relative value of the wages became bigger.

Fujikura, Ekerle and Emerson in Cluj). Or, these multinationals, subsidized by the local state, are suburbanizing their production facilities directly in the rural fringe areas – for the case of Nokia, Bosch and deLonghi in Cluj see Zincă (2011).

The combined income-strategy (i.e. combining minimum wage with informal resources generated by the household) did not lose its actuality and hardly can be relegated to a "failed" modernity. Today it is played out by the very iconic figures of neoliberal modernity: multinationals. Partial proletarization becomes a means towards a legitimate end: to profit from low wages of populations with rural households or the cheap products of these households used by multinational's employees. Yet the imperative of accumulation may produce new types of enclosure that run against the benefits of partial proletarization. Intensive agriculture with highly mechanized tools and animal husbandry for industrial purpose, while in need of land, makes redundant important parts of the rural labour force. The high rates of transnational migration to Western Europe of rural populations from Easter Europe can be linked exactly to the making of a surplus population through investments in the intensively industrialized agriculture (Stan and Erne, 2013; Troc, 2012). It is a population that has increasingly less access to combine income strategies, both because the land is integrated in global circuits of agricultural exploitation and because of capital's hopping strategies from one place to another to exploit reproduction costs differentials without redistributive constraints.

Data and Method

To understand the contradictions of the rural-urban accumulation processes during socialism and the first postsocialist decades, I use two types of data. First, I rely on the data series published in the Statistical Yearbook edited by the National Institute of Statistics (INS). The data for the last two decades are available in electronic format as the TEMPO dataset. Most of the data are only available at the county level, are rarely at the local level of municipalities. The current county structure is a result of an administrative restructuring in 1968 with some transformations in 1981. Nonetheless, the data series are available in county format also for the 50s and the 60s in the statistical yearbooks from the 80s. These data, probably, are estimations done by the socialist planners, since the counties were created in 1968/1981. In addition some counties even did not have any regional tradition as such (i.e. Călăraşi[4] and Harghita[5]). These county-statistics

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[4] Before 1960 Călăraşi city was the capital of the Ialomiţa County. Between 1950 and 1952 it became the capital for the new, wider region Ialomiţa. Ialomiţa Region is absorbed between 1952 and 1968 in the Bucharest region. Călăraşi city in this period is still a capital, but of the smaller administrative unite called Ialomiţa Raion. After the administrative reorganization in 1968 Călăraşi becomes once again the capital of the Ialomiţa County. In 1981 Ialomiţa is reorganized and Călăraşi County is formed with the county capital in Călăraşi city. The yearbooks after 1981 refer to the Călăraşi County and where there were no recalculations of the previous years I've attributed the data from the former Ialomiţa County to Călăraşi County. The new county Călăraşi absorbed more than 70% of its area from the previous Ialomiţa County. I am grateful to Eniko Vincze for providing this information.

are most of the time approximations from the area of influence of a city or a network of towns. Even if imperfect, the county-statistics offers a measure of the hinterlands. I also use counties as proxies for the spatial variation across the state space, even if maybe other cuts would do more justice to the ways in which localities are clustering together. Some data series, unfortunately, are available only for the 90s, i.e. the land usage and livestock.

Second, I use accounting data packaged together as the Inventory of Romanian Firms, 2012 (LRF2012) by the company Borg Design. This dataset offered information on the economic profiles and structure of ownership of almost all active firms in Romania. The data offers only information about the private firms, and excludes all public structures (i.e. the health, the educational and the administrative system) or public firms (autonomous public companies –i.e. "regii autonome" in Romanian). The dataset does not cover all companies, but only those that have submitted their accounting data for the last semester of 2012. Consequently, some systematic biases could occur in what types of firms were included in the dataset. Still, because the information is available at firm level, it is a highly valuable resource.

To recover the spatial distinctions of interests I summarise the data using two versions of the singular value decomposition (SVD): weighted multidimensional analysis and the principal axis factoring with equamax rotation (Jacoby, 1991). SVD is a powerful method that reduces a large set of attributes to smaller, more manageable one, synthesizing the variability of the initial set into its principal axes of variation. The method sets a clearer image of the initial complex spatial distribution of the variables used, constructing models of only two or four axes of variation, minimizing the loss of information (Pacione, 2009). The weighted multidimensional analysis has the particularity that is capable of producing a mapping of the data from multiple sets of data. In this case, I superpose in a bi-dimensional map the various types of investments across the counties every five-year, during state socialism. The principal axis factoring reveals a set of axis of variation in the data with the assumption that each dimension is measuring with error a true axis of variation in the data. In what follows, I will discuss the issue of proletarization during socialism and postsocialism, tracing-down its implications with the help of the statistical procedures described above.

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[5] In the XIX century Transylvania, part of the Habsburg Empire, Ciuc and Odorhei were two different counties. After Transylvania becoming part of Romania in 1918 the two counties remain separated until they became part of an autonomous Hungarian region after 1950 during socialism. In 1968 Odorhei and Ciuc are becoming a single county called Harghita. Miercurea Ciuc becomes the county capital of Harghita, not without a political fight with the Odorheiul Secuiesc city. The data on Harghita County are recounted on the bases of the administrative border set up in 1968. I am grateful to Eniko Vincze for providing this information.

Path dependency investments and partial proletarization in socialism

Accumulation strategies, as local junctions of multiple scalar forces, as argued above, are strongly dependent on the availability of labour force and cost of their reproduction. Two somehow complementary strategies are visible when looking at the dynamics of labour force generation during actually existing socialism in Romania. First, there is a strong local path dependency of the tendency to become an employee. While only 25% of the population was earning a wage in 1950, the figure increased to 42.5% in 1985. Yet, this increase was at steady rate across Romania; the county-level percentages of employees have remained relatively constant[6] from the 1950s until the end of the 1980s (see Table 1). This means that while the absolute number of employees increased, the hierarchy among the counties did change. The rate of expansion of the economy was uniform across the country, maintaining the initial difference among them. These trends are highly surprising given the fact that the plan was discursively set put to level up these differences. Until the end of the 1960s, the planning was broken down at the level of products and services that have to be delivered. After the administrative reorganization of Romania in 1968, the planning was built in such a way that each county had to deliver products and services equivalent of a fix lump sum. The country was divided into smaller administrative units to better use localized resources. Therefore, the new form of the plan produced slight variations of the total employees after 1975, at the county level, due to spikes in focused investments in counties' industry, accompanied by the creation of new cities (Călăraşi and Miercurea Ciuc are transformed into cities from relatively small towns in the 1970s).

Table 1.
The dynamic of the employees in socialism, Romania

	1950	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
County position in the ranking of counties						
Prahova	3	2	2	2	2	2
Cluj	5	5	5	5	6	6
Călăraşi	27	29	31	32	32	32
Harghita	23	24	26	26	29	29
Mures	15	10	12	12	13	14
The percentage of the number of employees in the county from the total number of employees in Romania						
Prahova	2.30%	3.29%	3.28%	3.29%	3.36%	3.38%
Cluj	2.13%	2.67%	2.82%	2.87%	2.89%	2.84%
Călăraşi	0.65%	0.86%	0.94%	0.89%	0.98%	1.09%

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[6] The data may be an artefact of the recounting and recomposing the trends using the new administrative borders set up in 1968. Even if that may be a possibilities, the logic of the data is preserved if we investigate the trends before the administrative reorganization when data were aggregated on the "regional" level, the administrative units between 1950(2)-1958.

	1950	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
Harghita	0.74%	0.95%	1.06%	1.19%	1.22%	1.22%
Mures	1.22%	2.01%	2.06%	2.13%	2.15%	2.14%
Total employees	4073	6270.3	7079	8276	9320	9646
Total population	16311	19027	20253	21245	22201	22725

Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook (1986).

Second, to deliver such a uniform output across the country paradoxically made even stronger the path dependence on the pre-socialist economic configuration, and further on the decades, on the previous cycles of investments. Despite the uniform investments across Romania, the economy was highly differentiated, with regional specialization. The policy of constraining local economies to produce high outputs equivalent with the size of the local economy in the 1950s and 1960s as well as, to have the same output across the counties from the beginning of the 70s, made the pre-socialist investments highly relevant. The areas already having a high level of capital and labour were given a head start. Moreover, the most developed cities were placed in the confortable seat of negotiating more investments, further producing a unequally developed economy (Petrovici, 2013).

The relative constant ranking of each county across the decades in terms of labour fractions is preserved through a constant fraction received from the total investments available at the national level. The effect is that in 1985 there is a high correlation of the ranks of each county of the number of industrial factories as well as the number of employees (Spearman's $\rho= 0.901$). This is hardly surprising. Such a close match is possible because the industrial sector is the main employer and the expansion of the industrial sector produces an expansion of waged labour. Yet, the surprising effect is the high specialization of areas. One can argue that it is only because of the centralized plan coordinated by technicians that such a complex ecology could emerge. Even if such an argument weighs heavily, the strong path dependency of development points in the direction that the local bureaucracies produced local blocks of power that negotiated the plan in order to suit the available local resources best. Former pre-socialist factories became the grounds of new investments (Chelcea, 2008; Mustață, 2007), available raw materials and the local tradition of their uses became part of the plan negotiation, and new investments were building on the last round of developments.

Table 2.
Number of factories and employees in 1985

County	No. of factories		No. of employees	
	End of year no.	County's ranking	Annual Average	County's ranking
Călărași	22	40	29,744	38
Cluj	70	4	134,911	4
Harghita	44	16	60,610	25
Mures	62	8	101,065	10

County	No. of factories		No. of employees	
	End of year no.	County's ranking	Annual Average	County's ranking
Prahova	79	3	177,594	3
Romania	1913		3,503,952	

Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook (1986).

Looking at the available data on investments, a two dimensional geography can be discerned by using a weighted multidimensional analysis of the five-year funds per economic branched that went on each county (Figure 1).

Fig. 1. The structure of investments at the county level 1950-1984.

Multidimensional weighted unfolding of the investments by activity

Normalized Stress 0.006; Kruskal's Stress-I = 0.0783105; Kruskal's Stress-II = 0.1890500

<div align="right">**Table 3.**</div>

The relative importance of the dimensions according to the years

Weighted multidimensional analysis

Source	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Specificity
1955	1.538	1.118	0.06
1960	1.573	1.067	0.103
1965	1.322	1.432	0.191
1970	1.388	1.355	0.127
1975	1.463	1.259	0.047
1980	1.542	1.14	0.049
1985	1.63	0.979	0.179
Total weights	**0.609**	**0.392**	

Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook (1978, 1971, and 1986).

On the one hand, a continuum between counties that capitalized on construction and industry as opposed to agriculture (dimension 1). Most of the waged labour was concentrated in the areas with high rates of development of the industry and constructions, while the counties that specialized in agriculture were using a higher proportion of the informal labour of the peasant household, organized in cooperatives. The peasants working in cooperatives were receiving dividends from their annual production after barter taxes were paid to the state and the needed investments were made. While this strategy benefited heavily from the unpaid labour of peasants in extensive agriculture, when it came to animal husbandry it was a total failure. Therefore in 1968 through state owned agricultural companies, systematic wage labour was introduced in animal husbandry, producing an increase in the number of employees in the primary sector (Dobrincu and Iordachi, 2009).

On the other hand, some counties became increasingly specialized in commerce, capitalized on transportation investments and services offered to commerce (dimension 2). These types of investments were more important at the beginning of the 60s and then became once again relevant in the 80s (see Table 3). International commerce held a key role at the end each wave of industrialization: the first wave (that lasted from the end of the 40s and the end of the 50s), and the second wave of industrialization (that started in 1968 and ended in mid 80s). The first wave ended with a process of re-Stalinization of the socialist economy through Ceausescu's reforms in the 70s and the second ended with an IMF loan (Ban, 2012). Commerce was the method used both times to avoid entering collapse and to restart the economy. Counties as Costanţa, Bihor, Iaşi and Arad with their major border cities became important points for connecting with the Western commercial circuits or the barter agreement with the soviet bloc.

By the end of the 80s, Călăraşi was one of the most mechanized area in Romania specialized in agriculture (always ranking between the 3rd and 5th county along the 70s and 80s) and was capitalizing the most in terms of national investments in agriculture (especially irrigation systems and alike). Part of the greater Wallachian Plain, Călăraşi benefits from the most fertile soils of the smaller Bărăgan Plain. Mureş and Harghita became specialized in exploiting the rich Carpathian Mountains capitalizing on investments in forestry and associated industries. Prahova continued to be a source for oil extraction and derivate industries such as chemistry, building materials and manufacturing tools. Being a presocialist city of command and control for the Transylvania Region, Cluj bargained on the development of public services and used pre-socialist Austro-Hungarian investments (metallurgy, footwear and building materials strongly connected to the local available raw materials) to control the nature of its industry.

The capital investments in socialism were co-opting already accumulated expertise in dealing with specific and local raw materials. A standard criticism of the actual existing socialism was its utopian modernist all-encompassing planning system with complex mathematical models needed to integrate the centrally coordinated economy (Bockman, 2011). Or, in Scott's (1998) terms, socialism was just another instance of high-modernism that supposedly used a rational grid to order the messy social, becoming strongly repressive exactly because it took to its final conclusions the panoptical mentality. But the Romanian socialist investments strategies were rather contextualized situated strategies of development, which used local knowledge and practices. If I were to reformulate Li (2005) criticism of Scott's argument for this specific case, I would say that the power of this modernist socialist schemata of development lies in its capacity to metissage the messy local by capturing situated ways of doing in greater plans through the technique of leaving space for negotiation. Actually existing socialism, in a similar vein as contemporary capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Fraser, 2009), was capable to use local energies and synthetize them through negotiation in a greater scale of accumulation. Therefore, labour force was invited to enter the accumulation in a two folded manner. First, by using local expertize in specific industries to enrol in the socialist system as wage earners – process that had its struggles and brutality of forced enrolments (Chelcea, 2008), but also had its cooptation through normative discourse (Kideckel, 1988). Second, by speculating on the unpaid peasant work, lowering the urban wages, directly and indirectly. To sum up, the path dependency and partial proletarization, far from being non-modern strategies, were actually part of a multi-scalar governmental rationality favouring the aggregate accumulation process.

The regionalization of postsocialist capital

The total number of wage earners decreased dramatically in the last 25 years (Table 4). The trend started during the last five years of socialism.

By the end of the 1980s the total number of employees decreased to 35% of the total population, and the trend continued up until 2010 decreasing to 20%[7].

Table 4.

The dynamics of the employees, at the county level, in Romania, *1990-2011*

Rotated factor loadings of the ratio of number of yearly mean employees to the mean employees in 1990

Year	Mean (std. dev) [thousand]	Mean of % (std. dev)	Extracted Communalities	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1991	199 (164)	92% (3%)	0.408	-.064	.189	.607
1992	182 (139)	84% (4%)	0.949	.002	.096	.969
1993	166 (128)	80% (6%)	0.686	.237	.134	.782
1994	161 (132)	77% (5%)	0.663	.232	.330	.707
1995	155 (130)	75% (6%)	0.613	.054	.536	.568
1996	149 (118)	73% (6%)	0.708	.032	.600	.589
1997	143 (110)	68% (7%)	0.492	.154	.554	.401
1998	135 (104)	65% (6%)	0.668	.343	.696	.258
1999	130 (107)	58% (6%)	0.628	.190	.707	.303
2000	115 (84)	55% (6%)	0.895	.458	.801	.208
2001	111 (95)	55% (6%)	0.934	.524	.781	.222
2002	111 (96)	53% (7%)	0.950	.702	.601	.311
2003	110 (101)	54% (7%)	0.935	.773	.528	.245
2004	111 (105)	52% (7%)	0.924	.836	.416	.228
2005	107 (103)	52% (7%)	0.971	.903	.369	.137
2006	109 (112)	53% (8%)	0.971	.920	.340	.094
2007	112 (118)	56% (8%)	0.983	.940	.292	.118
2008	117 (125)	57% (9%)	0.981	.946	.282	.077
2009	121 (136)	53% (9%)	0.967	.952	.220	.109
2010	114 (130)	49% (8%)	0.968	.958	.202	.098
2011	104 (121)	48% (9%)	0.965	.958	.204	.074
	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings			8.752	4.723	3.784

Source: Table FOM104D, TEMPO INS. (Retrieved: November 2013). Author's analysis.
Note: Principal Axis Factoring, Equamax rotation, KMO=894; The factorialized data are percentages of number of employees at county level using 1990 as base year.

The sharp 15% drop happened in the first postsocialist decade and stabilized to 20-21% in the second postsocialist decade. In this section I follow the logic of dismantling the labour force and disembedding it from the complex socialist rural-urban arrangements inside the accumulation process. Also I sketch the new needs for workforce that emerged in the second postsocialist decade during the steady economic growth of 2000s and new accumulation arrangements.

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[7] In the last three years the official figures show a reversal of the trend, each year meant an increase with 1% of the percentage of employees to the total population of Romania. Yet, the increase is due more to an official acceptance of a decrease of the total population and an increase of the Romanian diaspora.

A crucial point to be made is that the very dramatic process of dissembling and reassembling the workforce was not uniform across the state space. If we are to take 1990 as baseline, three patterns can be observed, in the factorialized data (Table 4).

Table 5.

The percentage of the employees 1990-2010 from the base year 1990

County	1990	1991	1995	2000	2005	2010
City						
Călăraşi	47.319	84.0%	57.9%	43.9%	45.7%	43.9%
Cluj-Napoca	171,262	99.0%	79.5%	66.0%	68.0%	72.1%
Miercurea Ciuc	35,265	92.6%	77.6%	64.4%	44.0%	53.0%
Targu Mures	100,563	94.3%	72.4%	57.4%	54.8%	54.9%
Ploiesti	154,032	91.7%	79.7%	58.8%	51.4%	56.3%
County						
Călăraşi	106,210	80.7%	65.4%	47.6%	41.2%	35.4%
Cluj	287,509	98.8%	80.0%	59.2%	60.7%	62.1%
Harghita	122,384	91.7%	74.4%	61.4%	47.7%	48.5%
Mures	217,367	93.7%	75.4%	59.3%	57.1%	52.8%
Prahova	340,951	90.5%	81.4%	51.6%	50.8%	47.2%
Total Employees in Romania	**8,155,605**	**92.9%**	**75.7%**	**56.7%**	**55.9%**	**53.7%**
% Employees from the total population	35%	33%	27%	21%	21%	20%
Total population	23,207,000	23,185,000	22,681,000	22,435,000	21,635,000	21,432,000

Source: FOM104D, TEMPO INS. (Retrieved: November 2013).

A first trend is that of massive decrease in the employed population up until the mid-90s. The exit strategies from employment were multiple: mass firings coupled with early retirements (Popescu, 2004), long term unemployment coupled with urban to rural migration (Gheţău, 2005; Rotariu and Mezei, 1999) and labour migration abroad (Anghel, 2012; Sandu, 2010). This is a general trend across Romania, and continues in localized manner along the two postsocialist decades in some areas of Romania. Călăraşi County is a perfect illustration of the trend. It suffered a massive loss of workforce in the first part of the 90s, yet the trend continues until the 2000s. By 2011, only one third of the number of wage earners from 1990 were still employed in the Călăraşi County.

The massive job loss started to ameliorate in the second part of the 90s and fully became stable at the beginning of 2000. In many counties the total employees of 1990 figure steadied around 40-55% (Table 5). Also, this is the period when most of the startup firms successful in the second decade were set up. Harghita and Mureş are good illustrations of such a dynamic of labour. Even if these counties started the recovery in the second part of the 90s, there was no increase above this point.

The third pattern captures the spatial dynamics of the economic growth that started in 2002[8]. The figures indicate that indeed the heart of Romania's economy is its capital city, Bucharest. Here the loss of jobs during the last two decades is hardly visible when compared with the rest of the country. The capital city is embedded in a complex web of global relations and needs to outsource production across the state. A strongly concentrated manufacturing area with important investment in logistics facilities is the axis formed by the cities of Bucharest-Ploieşti-Braşov. This was a major economic conglomerate also in the pre-socialist Walachia region given the oil pits and refineries located along this line (Murgescu, 2010). This corridor concentrates important contingents of workforce and it was in a constant search for new labour pools throughout the 2000s. The second important economic area is Timiş County and the whole Banat region, part of the Austro-Hungarian Region, simultaneously specialized in agriculture (more specifically cereal production) and manufacturing (see Figure 2). The third important economic powerhouse is the whole region of Transylvania. With its Autro-Hungarian legacy, Transylvania is specialized in raw material extraction for industrial production and its use in production facilities dispersed across the region (Verdery, 1983). An important part of this production is destined to be exported and takes place either in fully foreign capital owned facilities or in ones that are partnership between domestic and foreign capital. (see Figure 2). The city of Cluj capitalized on its central position in the region and its historical connections with the region's cities networks and became in the last decade a center of command and control specializing in services. Other two important points on this economic map of the employers are Argeş County with a strongly oriented economy towards the automotive industry around Renault factories and Constanţa specialized in commerce, being the most important harbour in Romania (see also Ionescu-Heroiu, 2013).

The data available during actually existing socialism offered the possibilities to construct a neat map of the major investments and labour force need across Romania. No equivalent data can offer such a clear image for the contemporary economic arrangements. The short summary above is indicative of the great diversity of specialization and the complex arrangements through which cities entered the global economic games. The map of localities that export manufacturing (figure 2) is probably the best proxy of the new global embeddedness of local economies. To unpack the way labour force participates in the accumulation processes a possible starting point may be the unexpected fact that the process of disassembling the workforce hit most the counties with high investments in agriculture and forestry during socialism. Given that most of the wage earners were concentrated in industrialized urban areas, one could have expected that the major industrialized areas would have had to suffer most from the deindustrialization. There is a significant negative correlation (Table 6) between the nature of socialist investments

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[8] The global crisis of 2008-2009 can be easily seen in the data, all the counties had a decrease in employment form 2009 to 2011.

Fig. 2. Localities with exports in Romania in 2010

Note: The red line delineate the extended Transylvanian region in the NV part of Romania much more dense that the rest of the country in terms of localities with export manufacturing.
Source of data: National Institute of Statistics.

(dimension 1 and dimension 2 from Figure 1) and the percentage of employees active after two postsocialist decades. The more investments were focused on agriculture rather that industry in a county during socialism, the higher the postsocialist unemployment in that county. The counties specialized during socialism in agriculture lost more employees that those specialized in industry. The anomaly dissolves if one observes that the counties specialized in agriculture lost a very high proportion of the employees, because the major cities lost important parts of their population.

Table 6.

Correlations between the structure of the employment at the county level and socialist axis of investments

Pearson Correlations	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
(A) Industry vs. Agriculture Investments (Dim. 1)	1.000				
(B) Commerce and Services vs. Industry Investments (Dim 2)	-0.327*	1.000			

Pearson Correlations	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)
(C) % 2011 employees in manufacturing	0.059	-0.210	1.000		
(D) % 2011 employees in agriculture	0.434**	-0.382*	-0.143	1.000	
(E) % 2011 employees from 1990	-0.276*	-0.159	0.300	-0.379*	1.000

Notes: All percentages are calculated at county level.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Sources: The % of employees by sector: *The Romanian List of Firms*. The % of employees from 1990 TEMPO. Author's computations for the statistical indicators.

Take for example Călăraşi city which has lost 50% of its population. A steel factory was put in place in Călăraşi at the end of the 70s that employed at its peak fifteen thousand workers, mostly men. The figures goes up as high as 30 000 if we take into account the entire plant, with all the connected production taking place. This absorbed the surplus population created by the mechanized agriculture. Călărăşi County benefited from important investments in irrigations and agricultural machines. Feminized factories were also built to balance the highly masculinized steel industry and also to absorb the surplus population of women not working in agriculture (the work in the state agricultural companies was slightly masculinized). To capitalize on the agricultural profile of the county there was important investments in food and beverage industries. Apart from the food industry all the other industries had no local traditions and no real connections to economic geography of the region and the rest of the state space except through the central plan.

Most of the socialist investments were using already local industries and capitalized on the structure of pre-socialist employment. Some of the industries were beyond the scope and nature of local power alliances, i.e. the iron and steel industrial platform in Călăraşi had nothing to do with the primary sector except absorbing the proletarized population by the mechanized agriculture. Nonetheless, the local resources became major fixes during the postsocialist economic crisis. Călăraşi County became by the end of the 2000s the most important centre for agribusiness[9] profiting from the rich soil for agriculture.

This type of remaking of local economies is indicative of a greater repositioning and renegotiating the link between the cities and the resources in their rural vicinities. Far from attempting a typology, it is instructive to look at the ways in which such local reshapings of economic landscapes are instrumental in the processes of scale jumping. The cases of Harghita, Cluj and Prahova counties are indicative of how labour force resources are interconnected with the use of the local resources.

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[9] Statistically, Călăraşi County is disputing the first place with Timiş County, centred around Timişoara city, a very important economic pall in the Western part of Romania.

As the rest of Transylvanian counties, both Mureş and Harghita have important contingents of employees working in manufacturing, facilities dispersed in the whole county. Harghita, especially, is ranking among the counties with the biggest workforce in industry in Romania (in the last decade between the 5th and the 9th rank among all counties). However, in contrast with the other industrialized counties, the percentage of employees working in firms with foreign capital (i.e. 5% in 2011) is below the national average (11%). Harghita has a high level of dispersion of the economic activities and a great variety of economic activities in the localities across the county. That can be attributed to the dyad between Miercurea Ciuc and Odorheiu Secuiesc, in competition for local resources and investments. The pre-socialist Odorheiu Secuiesc was more developed than Miercurea Ciuc, yet the latter benefited more from the second wave of socialist investments in the 1970s. The major socialist industrial investment was a branch of the Brasov tractors factory, the locality being selected because of its presocialist connection to the railway system. The postsocialist factory ceased to be a relevant employer in the Miercurea Ciuc. Both cities have now roughly the same size (between 36-38000 inhabitants) and a similar profile i.e. forestry, garment production, food processing, and transportation and car dealing. The postsocialist economic trajectory is still significantly influenced by the nature of the socialist investments because much of the former factories are still important infrastructural resources and they shaped the human resources available. Transportation, car dealership and repair (in Miercurea Ciuc around 1500 employees in 2012) absorbed some of the former workforce employed in the Tractor Factory. On the other hand, the local raw materials offered the chance to continue the old business that already knew how to use them. For example the mineral water industry, using the sparkling water springing from the volcanic mountains, rich in iron and other minerals, employed in 2012 almost 2600 persons across nine localities in the county.

Table 8.

The distribution of economic activities (NACE codes) in the five counties

	Mures	**Harghita**	**Călăraşi**	**Prahova**	**Cluj**
Total number of employees	115815	62478	41464	159105	182962
Number of localities per county	347	196	140	266	320
Average number of NACE codes per locality	11.3	14.4	10.1	13.5	12.7
(standard deviation)	(30.8)	(32.5)	(26.2)	(30.8)	(39.9)
Correlation between employees per NACE codes in the county capital and the rest of the county	0.65	0.55	0.35	0.57	0.79

Source: TEMPO INS and LFR2012 (Retrieved: November 2013). Author's computations for means and standard deviations

As other major Transylvanian towns, Cluj-Napoca has an important manufacturing sector in 2012, especially in garments and footwear production (more than 6000 workers), in food industry (almost 3000 workers) and in the automotive industry (more than 3000 employees were working for multinational like Fujikura, Bosch, Eckerle, Emerson, with investment plans in 2013 for another 2000) and furniture production (more than 3000 employees). Probably a specificity of Cluj-Napoca, the city has an important service sector. Cluj-Napoca is strongly specialized in information technologies (7067 employees were working for 1056 firms), financial transactions (2069 employees in 1100 firms), and, more generally, professional services linked to the global outsourcing networks. Cluj County consistently ranks second, after Bucharest, in terms of percentage of workers employed in professional services from the total county employees. Cluj-Napoca economy dominates the entire county, the correlation between the number of employees in the private sector in various economic activities between the city and the rest of the county is very high (r = 0.79). Metropolization plans started already in 2008, exactly because capital was strongly suburbanizing in search for cheap rural labour force. Two industrial parks out of the four major investments of the city were in neighbouring localities of Cluj-Napoca. On these suburban plants were invited multinational like Nokia, Bosch and DeLongi, in search for cheap labour and the rural hinterlands were offering exactly that.

Prahova County is one of the most urbanized areas in Romania with two cities and thirteen towns. Even if Prahova is a major industrial site and one of the most important cities in Romania, it does not have a major polarizing effect in the area. The most important reason is that the city is strongly dependent on Bucharest processes of externalization of manufacturing. However, this externalization unfolds in the whole county. If in Ploieşti 35% of the city labour working in private firms was employed in manufacturing in 2012, in the rest of the county the figure was 45% (according to LFR dataset). Nevertheless, the correlation is just 57%, because the city of Ploiesti and the rest of the county because the dense urban infrastructure that offers the chance for flexible locations of production facilities. Also, because of the rich oil pits the area knew an important development at the beginning of the XX century. Ploieşti is the home of the most important refineries in Romania and much of the socialist industry that developed in the city was strongly linked to oil: chemical industry, machineries for the oil extraction and pipe line transportation. This major industrial platform was used in 2012 for two major types of industries: machinery manufacturing (more than 3000 employees in Ploieşti and 2300 employees in other localities in the county) and automotive (more than 4300 employees, most of them concentrate in Ploieşti, in a sector strongly dominated by multinationals like Yazaki and Calsonic Kansei). Given the strong manufacturing, freight transportation and car dealing and repair are major activity in the county (more than 4200 employees in Ploiesti and 3300 employees elsewhere in the county). As opposed to the rest of the county 20% of the labour force in the private companies from Ploieşti are working in professional services, while elsewhere only 10%.

The three cases can be read through the lens that Călăraşi County offered. Ploieşti is a part of the Bucharest hinterland and was capable of becoming a significant manufacturing center through the pre and socialist industrial platform and the network of small industrialized sounding cities sites. These cities were once used for micromanaging the oil pits, now are sites for better recruitment from rural labour pools enrolled in the manufacturing. Cluj works similarly but on another scale. It dominates economically the county by suburbanizing its globalized manufacturing sites and commanding the smaller manufacturing towns. Also the labour force is suburbanizing in new neighbourhoods the cheap surrounding villages. It is a service city in the same time and works as a command and control city for the whole region and a major site for global services outsourcing. Harghita county, with its bipolar city system and rich natural resources, is an instance of using the entire landscape for creating a local economy linked with the global fluxes.

The local economies formed around the urban-hinterland nexuses are negotiating their position directly in the global fluxes (see also Simionca, this issue). These trends are far from being specific to Romania. On the contrary, such arrangements can be read easily through the well-known lens of the city/regions scale jumping directly in the global fluxes of capital (Sassen, 2012; Smith, 1995). The national scale is becoming merely an instance that facilities or hinders the direct connection of the local economy to the global fluxes of capital. During socialism, is a similar vein with other Fordist capitalist arrangements, the national was the main scale for where the global was assembled while localities were actors in the balanced accumulation on the national scale. Such a reading has it virtues, but may easily permit a simplistic opposition between the actually existing socialism and actually existing capitalism. The temptation is exactly to put the socialist accumulation strategies in the great schemata of modernist rationalism and simplification operated from afar - an analytical move against which already I raised objections. Without doubt, the national level has already lost its role of main resource for investments, but still it has retained very important functions in this direction with a multitude of instruments and financial resources that are redistributed from European Union through the nation state. More importantly, any dichotomous framing might obscure the great importance of local level strategies in co-opting and recruiting local energies and workforce in the accumulation processes driven by local power alliances forged in the scalar tensions. In the next section, I will review the process of urban-rural border renegotiation through (partial) proletarization.

Rural neoliberal proletarization

Since accumulation has adjusted in socialism and the two postsocialist decades its cycles to the locally available resources, also workers participation or exit strategies from the circuits of production has been linked to the available (non)commodified means of subsistence that can be mobilized in the circuits

of reproduction. I will follow here two types of resources that offered non-commoditized food for the former socialist workforce: agricultural land and livestock.

Take Cluj and Mureş, parallel with the dramatic fall of employment in the 1990s in both counties there is an important increase of the surface used for vegetables. In 2003 the percentage rose in Cluj to 183%, while in Mureş to 143%. This increase is linked with an important migration from cities like Cluj-Napoca and Târgu-Mureş to the rural areas and also to the extended families ties of the double dwellers. However, the use of the rural household resources for vegetable production was not the strategy to be used in Călăraşi County. The workers that left Călăraşi city used their agricultural lands to cultivate wheat and rye that could be sold, given the profile of the area. If the surface with vegetables decreases with 37% by the end of the first postsocialist decade, the area cultivated with wheat and rye increased 140%.

Table 9.

Areas cultivated with wheat, rye and vegetables

Crops	County	1990	1995	2000	2003
Wheat and rye					
	Călăraşi	90111	132%	140%	94%
	Cluj	51571	66%	55%	52%
	Harghita	21811	74%	58%	60%
	Mures	58481	82%	62%	56%
	Prahova	39755	90%	82%	54%
	România	*2297658*	*109%*	*85%*	*76%*
Vegetables					
	Călăraşi	10328	47%	37%	24%
	Cluj	4646	102%	164%	183%
	Harghita	1107	108%	133%	118%
	Mures	4940	115%	124%	143%
	Prahova	4174	111%	129%	110%
	România	*216009*	*99%*	*108%*	*112%*

Source: Table AGR108B, TEMPO INS (retrieved: November 2013).

However, household wheat and rye cultivated on household's the beginning of 2000s in Călăraşi because major companies started to buy or lease land. By the end of 2000s the county was the home of 16 farms from the top 100 biggest owners of agricultural land in Romania. Almost 90 thousand hectares from the total 425 thousand hectares of agricultural land were owned by these 16 private companies. Also, most of the household's land started to be leased, vast areas of land started to be used for intensive production. Not surprisingly, the terms of the agribusiness are not set by these big farms. They follow the lead of the companies that are storing and buying the production of the cereals for grains, most of them with headquarter in Bucharest. In the top ten of biggest trade

cereals companies in terms of Turnover seven are multinationals. Călăraşi agribusiness is strongly linked to the global chain of production. Yet, the positions of the region and of the similar regions in Romania in global networks are very fragile ones, depending on the whims of the multinationals.

The major transformation of the logic of land cultivation from the first to the second postsocialist decade had an important impact on everyday reproduction of people. The land become in the last decade a highly important commodity. Some similarities with actually-existing-socialism can be seen: the agricultural land both then and now is used as an important tool in the logic of accumulation. However, in socialism the rural population was participating in the accumulation as unremunerated producers in cooperatives that could benefit partially from the surplus produced. Now, in the last decade, the population in itself is becoming a surplus, an unneeded labour force. Most of the exploitations are done intensively through high mechanization, with few employees. The average number of employees in agribusiness in Călăraşi is 10, while the top 16 land owners in the county have an average of 112 employees. These figures are very high compared with other counties or similar companies from Romania[10]. Călăraşi is the county with the biggest population employed in agriculture in Romania, i.e. 16% from the total employees in private companies[11]. Nevertheless, they are revealing in terms of the fact that the new type of agriculture is not using any more extensively the labour as in socialism, but actually it needs just a small fraction of the population. At the same time, the land cannot be anymore used by the household as a means of survival to produce wheat and rye for the market as in the first postsocialist

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[10] In 2012, Călăraşi County had 4102 employees working in private firms with an agricultural profile and it came second in the national ranking after Timişoara, which had 4996 employees. Călăraşi, in the same year, was the third county in terms of turnovers with 447 million Euros, after Bucharest with 850 million euro and Timişoara with 499 million Euros. Bucharest's leading position is due to its command and control centre for all the trade firms that have headquarters in the capital city. The same order holds for profits. The total profits of all the firms in Călăraşi County sums up to 34 million euro, placing the county on the third place after Bucharest (68 million euro) and Timişoara (58 million euro). Timişoara ranks second in total turnover and total profits after Bucharest, because it is the home of some cereal trading firms. Nonetheless, in terms of turnover and profit the differences between Timişoara and Călăraşi are not so large. The significant differences refer to the degree of concentration of capital, which is larger in Călăraşi: 490 firms in agribusiness as compared to 1030 firms in Timişoara. All the data comes from LFR2012.

[11] In this issue Anca Simionca discusses the way the economic is split into a development schema and a denegated undeveloped part of the society that cannot catch up with the true capitalist rhythms of accumulation. Indeed, agriculture is rarely mentioned as a relevant feature of the cities in the interviews conducted through the SPAREX program (see editorial forward). Instead, the sole hero of "economic development" in the narratives of the main policy makers is still the manufacturing sector or the services provided for it (i.e. engineering, industrial maintenance, law and business counselling). While discursively nearly invisible, agriculture appears through the analysis of firm level data as a major economic force and the driving engine of Călăraşi. More than 40% of the total turnover of the private companies in the county comes from agriculture situates, this being the largest figure in Romania (source LFR2012). This fact is, however, obscured by relegating agriculture to a communist past that is equated to underdevelopment and not to the developed capitalism.

decade. The land became a commodity to be sold (2650 Euro/ha, the average price in Romania being 2000 euro/ha) or leased (the most popular option). That creates an important pressure on the local population.

Land is not used only for household crops and vegetables, but also for keeping animals. Therefore, the transformation in the last two decade of the use of the land had an important impact on the volume of the different animals and life strategies of the people dependent on them. In the last decade of actually-existing-socialism, the volume of household livestock was almost equal with the volume of cooperatives and state farms livestock (see table 10 the value for the 1990). Household livestock was a key resource for the partial proletarization population, an important source for cheap food for the double dwellers and the extended rural-urban families. Also, animal and animal products were collected at fixed prices by the state enterprises as raw materials for the food industry. That offered also some revenue for the rural families, beside the paid jobs in the urban industries.

The former members of the cooperative in 1991 and 1992 were given the livestock. This transfer of property doubled the number of cattle, pigs and sheep owned by the population household in some counties. Nonetheless, by the end of the 90s in most counties the number of animals got back to that of the end of socialism. Weather this livestock was consumed or conserved it was a meter of available food resources. In counties with rich arable land, like Călărași there was a clear tendency to keep the livestock given the available cereals and available land to supply food for the animals. Also, that happened because an important influx of population from the urban to the rural and the need to keep animals in the new extended households.

By the end of the 90s the few farms that were still operating were completely disconnected by the local land economies operating almost entirely of fodder imports. On the other hand the types of animals kept in households at the end of the 90s are becoming increasingly linked to particularities of available lands in each county and locality. Data suggests that household cattle were kept in areas with pastures and meadows. Household pigs and poultry are kept in areas with arable land. The household sheep were kept in areas with pastures. Yet sheep owned by households are becoming from the 90s, even more than in socialism, a business correlating with the livestock kept in Firms (see also Torrens, 2011). In the face of crumbling industry, the localized strategies of animal husbandry became attuned to the local land resources.

Table 10.

Livestock, by main animal category by ownership form, in 1990 and 2000

County	Cattle		Sheep		Pigs		Poultry	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
Number of household owning livestock (thousands units)								
Călărași	17	181%	156	93%	48	174%	999	156%
Cluj	90	106%	355	74%	142	98%	1108	100%

County	Cattle		Sheep		Pigs		Poultry	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
Harghita	70	89%	184	74%	111	52%	481	85%
Mures	55	118%	296	94%	157	94%	1268	115%
Prahova	52	122%	168	71%	78	97%	1508	100%
Romania	*2389*	*96%*	*8714*	*96%*	*3471*	*91%*	*43059*	*104%*
Mean county	*58*	*65*	*213*	*178*	*85*	*90237*	*1050*	*1322*
(std. dev)	*(34)*	*(29)*	*(76)*	*(82)*	*(33)*	*(41837)*	*(391)*	*(689)*
Firms and farms owning livestock (thousands units)								
Călăraşi	96	3%	197	9%	550	10%	1737	39%
Cluj	67	4%	80	4%	232	35%	2718	5%
Harghita	53	1%	82	1%	35	4%	1226	4%
Mures	130	5%	125	2%	156	16%	1748	0%
Prahova	52	3%	99	5%	168	8%	3209	14%
Romania	*2992*	*4%*	*5348*	*3%*	*8532*	*12%*	*78319*	*19%*
Mean county	*71*	*3*	*127*	*4*	*203*	*24*	*1865*	*346*
(std. dev)	*(34)*	*(3)*	*(84)*	*(5)*	*(215)*	*(28)*	*(1051)*	*(452)*

Source: National Institute of Statistic, Table AGR201B, Tempo database. (Retrieved: November 2013). Author's computations for means and standard deviations.

The second postsocialist decade meant an important transformation of animal husbandry; it became once again linked to the accumulation processes. The socialist fodder factories were bought by important global players (DSM Nutritional Producs, Cargil, Toneli Nutrition, InVivo NSA), and also major local player appeared through privatization (Nutrinientul, Nutrimold, GandM Group). New animal factories were opened on the sites of the former socialist entreprises or invested in new sites located in areas with fodder factories and arable land. This new interest can be attributed to the fact that major clients for diary, meat and other animal products appeared on the market. Important multinational bought the former socialist processing factories in various sectors, like milk processing (i.e. Friesland, Danone, Lactalis), meat products (Campofrio, Caroli Foods, Angst) and canned meat (i.e. Orkla Foods, Hame, Mandy Foods). Also, local capitals were redirected towards the agribusiness investing in the former socialist factories and infrastructure (i.e. Albalact, Covalact, Aldis, Criss-Tim, Scandia Romania, etc.). New capital concentration strategies produced by the end of 2000 complex networks of ownership: major animal farms were linked with fodder suppliers, cereals producers and slaughter houses.

Parallel with these transformation two important processes took place at the level of the household economy. On the one hand, from the outset the meet and animal products processing relayed on a local network of rural household suppliers. Yet, as new regulation[12] were put in place along the 2000s, it became

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[12] State regulation followed the CODEX for food safety and some regulation was self-imposed through the generalization of the certification systems (ISO and HACCP).

increasingly difficult to be a supplier without some investments. New farms emerged in a process of constant rescaling[13]. For example, the entire Transylvanian Plateau (Cluj and Mureş especially) transformed into major clusters of cattle farms and cooperatives (cf. LFR2012). By the beginning of 2000s, most of these farms became increasingly uncoupled from the local food resources and industrialized the processes, relaying more and more on fodder. On the other hand, increasingly more households were put in the position in which it was more difficult to sell animal products given the regulations. Also, as seen above, the land became an important resource for agribusinesses. Deprived of the possibility to use both the land and the animals in any productive way expect from household-consumption, a growing mass of the population was put in the difficult position to rely only on small household agriculture deprived of any revenue. The effect was a major labour force surplus. Some became engaged in transnational labour migration (Anghel, 2012; Stan and Erne, 2013; Troc, 2012). Others continued the state socialist practice of commuting for the minimum wage in the nearest city or engaged in the expanding construction sector.

Conclusions: the rural-urban divide as a resource for capital accumulation

In disdain with the autocolonial reading that free-market capitalism will clean and civilize the postsocialist city, the present analysis points at another direction. The capitalist strategies for accumulation are not so different from the previous socialist ones when it comes to the way labour force is integrated across the rural-urban divide. In both cases accumulation systems a partially proletarized workforce played an important role. In the actually existing socialism, accumulation was linked to the role played by the primary sector in the whole process of transferring the surplus into industrial investments. The labour force in agriculture played the role of unremunerated workforce enrolled in cooperatives or informal small-scale household production. The rural labour force was also a major resource as a double dweller or partial urbanite in the industrialization process. In the 2000s actually existing capitalism, agriculture became a business linked to the global networks of cereal production and animal farming. It ceased to supply the industry with investment resources; it became a source for its own capital accumulation. At the same time, it produced a mass of surplus labour force through partial enclosures. An important part of the rural labour migration abroad was recruited from this surplus mass, yet rural populations still remained important pools of labour force for the peripheralization of capital investment, as played out in rural Romania. The figure of the double dwellers also re-enters the urban scene.

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[13] Here the importance of state aid for the local producer cannot be understated.

In a strange irony, the figures of the socialist partial urbanite and double dweller return, but they are dressed in much more precarious clothes. The cities in search for cheap labour force are using three strategies to recruit them for their economies, yet not necessarily for their cosmopolitan urban communities. One is the strategy of suburbanization. Cities such as Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Iași, Timișoara, Arad, and Ploiești are turning into "metropolitan areas" and using the first and the second rings of localities to externalize production on new industrial platforms. Ploiești in itself became a hinterland for Bucharest. Cluj-Napoca plans for another suburban industrial platform (Tetarom IV), along the already built ones (Tetarom 2, Nervia Apahida, Arc Dej). These facilities are all using employees from rural areas, most of the time paying the minimum wage. This type of movement is possible exactly because of the processes described above, in which the production of household affordable food becomes possible only as a strategy of subsistence and any monetization is very difficult without higher investments in means of production. Land and livestock became also objects of agribusiness. The suburbanizing capital moving out from the cities towards the hinterlands meets a partially proletarized population, tied to their rural households with little chances of rescaling themselves outside of the subsistence economy. On the other hand, the rural hinterlands became important sources through agribusiness for the companies that use as inputs their products.

A second strategy is to recruit commuters from rural areas to the major cities. Multinationals in the car industries in Cluj-Napoca and Ploiești are heavily recruiting employees from the rural hinterlands. In alliance with local authorities, multinationals (i.e. Fjikura, Ekerle or Emerson) and major local companies offer subsidized transportation, while relying exactly on the subsistence economy to offer the minimum wage. For example, Cluj-Napoca has a sizable workforce employed in the private security business (the 8th most important contingent in Cluj-Napoca, under the NACE classification). A very important fraction of this labour force is paid with the minimum wage and combines this job with a rural household and subsistence agriculture in order to be able to make ends meet, and the time schedule of working 24h in a row followed by two days off indeed allows them to engage in agricultural activities as well. The effect of this dual dweller strategies on the whole manual labour market sector, especially the unskilled or semiskilled, is very significant. The urban labour force that cannot combine the rural resources through the extended family transaction is put in a dire situation, being unable to compete with the cheap labour force from rural areas – especially if they have to rent their apartments in the increasingly expensive housing market of the city.

A third strategy is the dispersed production facilities in the corridors between some major city centres. Probably the best illustrations are the channels formed around Timișoara-Arad, Bucharest-Ploiești-Brașov or, the much smaller clusters around Odorheiul-Secuiesc and Miercurea Ciuc in Harghita county. Such a strategy invites to participate in the capital accumulation processes not only the

working class, but also produces a cheap service class. Ploieşti has aside the manufacturing jobs also a significant number of professionals (21% of the employees working in the private service sector – LRF201). Arad that has the most important contingent of professionals working in multinationals (28% of the professionals were working in firms with foreign capital during the 2008 economic boom). Similarly, in Ilfov, Bucharest's first hinterland ring, more than a quarter of professionals are working in firms with private capital[14]. These relocations are not surprising, given that the labour force is cheaper in smaller cities due to the existence of non-commoditized means of subsistence, such as cheaper food produced by the peasants and sold on the local markets[15]. In the quest of searching cheap labour, a new urban hierarchy is re-inscribed in space through processes of outsourcing and hinterland making.

The reworking of the urban-rural divide also produces a new type of repositioning of labour in the village and in the city. The partial capitalist enclosures in the rural areas are producing less and less chances for monetization, as discussed at the second strategy presented above. Lease land rarely produces money, most of the time the companies prefer to play in products. If one chooses to work the land, there are little chances for avoiding loses – given the tight prices imposed by the multinational buying crops. The same goes for animal husbandry, which is difficult without rescaling the production through investments. And the possibility to work as an employee in agriculture is very dim, the total employees needed in mechanized agriculture decreased dramatically. The rural economy is becoming constantly less monetized putting in peril the complex local transactions. There is a great variety in which this demonetization is done given the forces that are at work in producing partial enclosures. Nonetheless, the effect is that those who cannot rely on subsistence strategies offered by property or some accumulated wealth are put in the direst situation. Here the rural Roma population is probably the most vulnerable (see this issue for case studies).

The suburbanization strategies of capital are producing an important pressure on the urban manual workers that are in the difficult position of having to fully cover their reproduction costs. The pressures on the urban or suburban wages are very high since rural workers have some part of their reproduction ensured by the rural household. Urban labour, scarcely unionized expect from the state sector and autonomous public companies (railways, post, local transport etc.), is losing its bargaining power and the pressure on employers to increase wages is in a general downturn. Once again, arguably the most vulnerable are the Roma, with low educational qualifications and strongly prejudiced by potential employers, take systematically to the undesirable jobs. Moreover, it is even harder

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[14] All information cited here are from FOM104F, Tempo INS, except when specified.

[15] The costs of the basic food are cheaper in Arad than in Timişoara, Ploieşti as compared to Bucharest. See table PPA101A, Tempo INSE with the monthly and yearly average price of the products sold in agro-food markets in cities and towns.

to compete with the disposable labour force and other members of the reserve army when racial profiling is still a major mechanism of sorting who is deserving job and what kind of job (see Simionca in this issue).

Finally, given the demonetization pressures on the local economies in rural Romania, the most vulnerable populations cannot earn their living anymore from informal rural local economy, and migrate towards the outskirts of larger cities. The new shanty towns that have appeared in the last two decades accommodate arguably the least protected workers, recruited for the growing yet still largely unregulated and informal industry of waste recycling.

To sum all this trends, there are important continuities between real existing socialism and neoliberal capitalism in the way reproduction costs are integrated in the accumulation machine: partial proletarization is still a mean to produce low wages. However, the way the primary sector and secondary sector couple in the accumulation mechanism has changed dramatically. This produces a contradictory effect in which we witness today an increase in the enclosure of farming land. The effects are growing demonetized subsistence farmers and growing proletarization. However, the effect of these contradictions (partial proletarization vs. proletarization) can be superseded always by the capital's hopping strategy. When the costs of the wages are growing due to the commodification of the means of subsistence, capital can always choose to search another area on the globe where households still control their means of subsistence and are in need for wages.

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DEVELOPMENT, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND IMPOVERISHED ROMA COMMUNITIES. A CASE STUDY OF HIGH-LEVEL VISIONS AND AGENDAS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN URBAN ROMANIA

ANCA SIMIONCA[1]

ABSTRACT. This paper takes as a starting point the imaginaries guiding the development of the city and the labour market as they become visible in the discourses of some of the institutions producing policies at the level of municipalities. Relying on the multi-levelled ethnographic empirical material that was gathered within the SPAREX research project, this paper seeks to describe the ways in which the current hegemonic discourses of economic development (centred on attracting foreign investment to cities) and that of the neoliberal subject (the worthy entrepreneurial autonomous and creative individual) dovetail with the existing stereotypes of the ethnically Roma. It is a tentative explanation of the ways in which the particular nodal points of the dominant vision of development further creates the basis for the definition of certain actors and possible alternatives, excluding from the onset entire categories of people when attempting to manage and to better the life of the cities.

Keywords: imaginaries of development, underdevelopment, impoverished Roma from Romania, neoliberalization, racialization

Introduction[2]

Spatial segregation of the poor in urban areas that lack most basic facilities is an outcome of various structural forces operating at levels ranging from global capital flows and fixes to the aggregated individual racist views and practices. Convincing arguments have been made showing the fact that urban slums concentrating the poor (who many times share a certain ethnic or racial background) had been formed under interwoven system-level causes such as deficient redistribution, housing policies, commodification of commons, neoliberal market policies. Complementing the other articles of this issue, that reveal many

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of the particular ways in which the situation of multiple deprivation of such areas has been consolidated in successive waves, this paper takes as a starting point the imaginaries guiding the development of the city and the labour market as they become visible in the discourses of some of the institutions producing city level policy. The positive visions of city growth, development and integration that these institutions operate with are only occasionally and marginally discussing poverty itself and are not explicitly acknowledging the damaging effects of ethnic prejudices and latent racism. Yet they have an immense impact on the spaces of possibilities opened and closed for the disadvantaged through the fact that they are the very setting of the limits between desirability and non-desirability, normality and abnormality, worthiness and unworthiness.

Relying on the multi-leveled ethnographic empirical material that was gathered within the SPAREX research project, this paper seeks to describe the ways in which the current hegemonic discourses of economic development (centred on attracting foreign investment to cities) and that of the neoliberal subject (the worthy entrepreneurial autonomous and creative individual) dovetail with the existing stereotypes of the ethnically Roma. It is a tentative explanation of the ways in which the particular nodal points on which the dominant vision of development operates creates the basis for the definition of certain actors and possible alternatives that excludes from the onset certain categories of people when attempting to manage and to better the life of the cities.

Within the SPAREX project, interviews were conducted with inhabitants of marginalized impoverished settlements, NGOs, politicians, representatives of local authorities and social workers, as well as with a set of representatives of decentralized institutions that are not particularly focused on the urban poor, but have an important role in shaping the economic future of the cities, namely the County Agencies for Labour Force Employment (AJOFM)[3] and the County Commerce and Industry Chambers (CCI)[4]. The idea behind including the latter

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[3] For example, the mission of the Agency is described by its Cluj branch: "As specified in the law, AJOFM insures the implementation of measure of unemployment prevention, measures for the stimulation of labour force occupation, social protection of the persons seeking employment. To this end, the Agency cooperates with the public administration authorities, NGOs, civil society, private providers of employment and social partners." Source: *http://www.ajofmcj.ro/* (Accessed: November 2013). Author's translation.

[4] For example, CCI in Cluj offers the following description of its mission as a legal entity that is an organization of public interest and utility, non-governmental, autonomous: „CCI represents a force that: proposes (CCI CLUJ is a laboratory of ideas for local development, taking part, for example, in the formulation of the annual and long term development programs), represents (because it defends and supports the interests of the business community, making available practical and informational tools for enterprises), formation (through the courses it organizes, where it attracts specialists from the academia as collaborators) and implementation (through its examples of clear, successful initiatives, through its presence at the local, regional, national and international level, through its economic missions abroad, the participation of the CCI Cluj representatives in Local Administration structures, representatives of the business environment in the administrative boards of hospitals)." Source: *http://www.ccicj.ro/* (Accessed: November 2013). Author's translation.

category of interviewees in the sample was on the one hand to have the opportunity to access more detailed factual information about the main parameters of the local economy and employment. On the other hand, the interviewees were rightfully expected to be able to provide an important insight into the imaginary of development and of the desirable future for the city as a whole, therefore allowing us to gain a different perspective over the situation of the urban poor by placing it in the wider context of the cities in which they live and the type of problems, struggles and solutions that are sought.

The main "speaking actors" in this analysis will therefore be the representatives of AJOFM and CCI from the five cities included in the SPAREX field research (see *Guest Editors' Foreword* in this issue), whose interviews are used primarily for discourse analysis. The factual information that they provide and that is included here as such has been cross-checked with statistical data. While limited in their comparability across cities, public documents produced by these institutions (missions and vision, reports) have also been analyzed in order to arrive at the most recurring themes and to be able to place the narratives of the interviewees in a more general discursive context. Also, the interviewees' assessment of various situations concerning the people living in the communities was confronted with the multiple accounts gathered through the discussions with the people themselves. The point was not, however, to assess the accuracy of the information provided by the representatives of the two institutions, but exactly to gain some knowledge about the main gaps between the representations that the officials operate with (when putting together reports and strategies for development) and the experiences of the people themselves.

The questions that guided the discourse analysis presented here were: 1) how are the past of the city and the desirable direction for the future represented, 2) which are the more concrete ways in which achieving this direction is sought for and 3) who are the actors and which are the features of the actors that appear as important in making this vision feasible? I will show that departing from a communist past and becoming progressively entangled in the global fluxes of capital through the attraction of foreign investors is the backbone of all the visions of desirable development of the cities. This vision of development comes with a certain definition of the actors capable of successfully operating in this dynamic world, which is the entrepreneurial flexible and autonomous employee. While certain important mutations of this dominant visions can be documented, the commonality lies in the way in which responsibility is shifted to the individual level. The underprivileged living in the segregated Roma communities fall outside of the limits drawn around the world with the potential of normality. The widespread prejudice and stereotypes surrounding the image of the ethnically Roma makes it possible for this exclusion to be normalized and rendered invisible.

The five cities included in the SPAREX study provide the necessary diversity for analyzing the recurrence of nodal points of the dominating vision of development, growth and employment. They are county level capital cities,

both from Transylvania and from the Southern part of Romania, of different sizes and ethnic composition (see Vincze and Petrovici, this issue).

There are two main dimensions on which cities differ, and that could have a significant impact upon the ways foreign investment figures in the visions and discourses of the authorities. The first one is *the diversity of the industrial profile of the city before 1989*. This dimension has the potential of introducing important differences in the type of situation the city is confronted with: in case of monoindustrial background, the crumbling of one industry can easily lead to the overall paralysis of the entire production, while a more varied profile can result in different paths for parts of the economy. The second one is *the current level of foreign investment*. We could have expected that it is those cities that have a strong share of foreign investment that place such a great importance on them, while those more unsuccessful are coming up with alternatives. Or, on the contrary, that those cities which have a high share of foreign investment might be more skeptical with the actual positive impact they may have on the city economy. Călăraşi and Ploieşti were the two cities in the research that could be best described as having a single industry profile before 1989, while Târgu-Mureş, Cluj-Napoca and Miercurea-Ciuc had a more diverse economic background. Categorizing a city as monoindustrial does not imply that only one industry was operating in these cities, but that the core of the productive activities were represented by one plant or platform and that most of the remaining production was at least in part linked to it. For example, in January 1990, Călăraşi had 100,000 inhabitants, out of which one third (30,000) were employed on the Iron and Steel industrial platform laying on the Western part of the city with a total surface of 700 hectares. Apart from the Iron and Steel Plant itself, there were several other connected industries functioning: the Heavy Equipment Enterprise, the construction branch of the plant as well as some food industry units which were functioning using the heat power produced (sugar factory, milk and dairy factory and bread factory). From this entire industrial compound, it is only the bread factory and a small part of the iron and steel industry that are still operating at the moment. Despite the fact that the vast majority of people were employed on this platform, there were several other smaller industries working. For example, the smaller Prefab Factory or the Pulp and Paper Mill were working together with the company that would gather and transport the cereal straws from the fields, making high quality paper products. Another industry that was developed during socialism is the Clothing factory, which was the main employer for women (2,000–2,500 employees before 1989, a remaining 1,000 in the present). For a longer period of time right after 1989, unemployment was heavily unbalanced for men and women exactly because this factory was still working. Similarly considered here a single industry city, Ploieşti, had the Astra Oil Rafinery, which both employed most of the working force and provided the backbone for the other satellite industries operating. The other three cities had a significantly more varied profile (see Petrovici, this issue).

In what the second dimension is concerned, Ploieşti, Cluj-Napoca and Târgu-Mures are all examples of city currently having relatively high levels of foreign investment. Situated immediately after Bucharest in the ranking of cities, the CCI in Ploieşti enumerates a long list of well-known foreign companies operating there:

> In what the presence of foreign investors as a factor of dynamism for the economy of the city, Ploiesti is known as a leader in the volume of foreign investments – important foreign companies having established here their operational center in Romania - OMV Petrom, Unilever South Central Europe, Timken Romania, Cameron Romania, Toro Industries, Lufkin Romania, Johnson Controls, Yazaki, Apa Nova, Calsonic Kansei, Petrotel-Lukoil, Viking, Holcim, Yunchen Plate Making, Cramele Halewood, Coca Cola, British American Tobacco, Smart, Bergenbier, Oztasar. Part of these investors are located in the Ploiesti Industrial Park, which is the largest industrial park in Romania, providing extremely attractive conditions, that have already proven one of the best economic results. (Extract from the *Institutional Report of CCI Ploieşti.* Consulted by the author at the CCI Office, 2013).

Similarly, Cluj-Napoca and Târgu-Mureş are hosting a large number and variety of either units of production belonging to multinationals or smaller firm with a significant share of foreign capital. On the side of the cities with less foreign investment is Călăraşi, which is the clearest example of a city whose crumbled industry has not been replaced by any alternative massive investment in high scale production. While similarly missing an impressive share of foreign capital, Miercurea-Ciuc is a more peculiar example on both dimensions. While it had a rather varied industrial profile during socialism, it also had a rather lower late of proletarization than the other cities. Currently, it does not have a high rate of foreign investment, but it has a rather varied sector of production, in contrast to Călăraşi (see Petrovici, this issue).

Development as moving away from socialism

Up to 1989, the relationship between the two sides of the Wall has been a mutually constitutive one. For the capitalist world, the radically different system that was (at least thought to be) functioning in its close vicinity was a landmark against which it needed to constantly justify its superiority, as well as a convenient depiction of an enemy it needed to defend itself against. The claims made by the socialist regimes could not be left without any engagement, and the defenders of capitalism had to put forth at least some justifications on why it is that the private interest alone is the one that makes the world go round. At the same time, those wishing to criticize capitalism from within were using the example of socialism (socialist principles) in order to formulate their claims. For the other side of the Wall, capitalism had been used as the means to criticize actually existing socialism. Especially the market was one of these

devices that was put forth in a number of instances in order to react to the perceived malfunctioning of the actually existing planned economy (Bockmann, 2012). Nonetheless, Romania under Ceaușescu did trade with countries outside of the Soviet bloc, most notably with West Germany (Chirot, 1978) and refused to enter the Visedgrad group, maintaining also a marginal (and at times divergent) position within the COMECOM (Delletant, 2007).

The moment when the Berlin Wall crumbled could be easily interpreted as the last proof needed in favour of capitalism: it might not be the perfect system, but it is for sure the only viable one. Its only adversary had just empirically proven its unsustainability (Fischer, 2011; Bockman, 2012; Kalb et al., 2000; Ganev, 2009). The end of actually existing socialism was also read as an empirical demonstration of the superiority of the capitalist mode of production. While the context of the early 1990s was rather ambiguous as some of the new elites in Central Europe were still experimenting with ideas of reforming the socialist economy in a neoclassic key, which allows for a plurality of forms of property besides the private one, the neoliberal vision gained its prominence quickly (Bockman, 2012). A new hegemonic vision over normality and desirability was established: private property, minimal state and liberalization of foreign trade. The way for this vision to be attained in reality was by engaging in programs of reforms and intervention that would remedy the problem of local non-capitalism.

The normality that was being sought is a target to be reached, but even more importantly a situation to gain distance from. The nodal element of this hegemonic imaginary is the economy, depicted as a dynamic process in itself, and as creating dynamism outside of it, in the whole of society. The neoliberal vision manages to channel and redirect the critique that was accumulated towards the functioning of the economy of shortage (Kornai, 1979) and to channel them in such a way as to legitimize a new vision. This new vision implies complete privatization (Pasti, 2001), minimizing state capacity and intervention and the full insertion into global flows of exchange and capital as the solution. Therefore, the market becomes central: an impersonal mechanism that is objective and is able to organize productive activities and make the subsistence and prosperity of society possible. Much more than this, however, it is viewed as the very mechanism that coordinates human energies in such a way as to also produce the effects of just and meritocratic distribution of resources and rewards. The economy and its tool – the market – become the starting point for any solution sought for either material or non-material problems identified in the society.

CCI and AJOFM are two institutions involved in the process of formation, consolidation and dissemination of the visions about the desirable direction of development of their localities. The representatives that were interviewed held privileged positions being able to offer insights into the diversity of motivations and justifications surrounding the various imagined directions for development. The level of justifications in which actions are embedded is a crucial one for the very functioning of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Therefore, the

hegemonic imagery of development and progress as a general direction to be followed is, despite its generality and vagueness, fundamental in the configuration of the possibilities it leaves open and the alternatives it closes through the formulated and implemented policies. The remaining of this article describes the commonalities and variations expressed by the representatives of AJOFM and CCI in what the possible and desirable direction of the future of their city was concerned. The underlying purpose of this inquiry is to make visible the ways in which segregated impoverished (and racialized) areas and communities factor into these imaginaries. Grasping the particular ways in which major splits between normality and abnormality, potential and lack of potential, worthiness and unworthiness are drawn contributes to a better understanding of the causal constellation that drives an increasing amount of people into such situations of segregated deprivation.

The general parameters in which the interviewees describe the past and future of their localities are indeed predicted by the arguments made earlier in this section. The overall narrative is that of a grandiose unsustainable industrial past, whose crumbling leaves cities with lower productivity rates, unemployment and the need to seek alternative productive arrangements. Another commonality refers to the fact that the centralized and large scale industrial project that constituted the backbone of the socialist economy is unsustainable on a longer run and that it is only the market (as the aggregation of private interests) that can overcome its shortcomings. Further, in the three cities that have been successful in attracting foreign investment, the transition between the two models is a clearly positive one, highlighting the imperative and the advantages of, on the one hand, large scale investments and on the other hand, entering global circuits of production and consumption. On the side of cities with a less successful project of insertion in these circuits, it is rather the degree of optimism that differs than the desirable vision itself.

Variations in Călăraşi

The director of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry from Călăraşi offered me a detailed and comprehensive description of the economic activities that were operating before 1989, a brief history of their crumbling and selective survival, as well as the main parameters of the newly emerging activities after 1989. Having worked for many years for the Iron and Steel Plant as an engineer, then as a clerk in the economic department of the County Party Committee, then in the media, in public administration, professional training and finally working for the Chamber of Commerce, she had a very clear understanding of the local economic dynamic, as well as a clear vision of the possibilities that the city had for the future.

In the well informed opinion of the director of CCI, the only real source of dynamism in the local economic landscape was brought by the few multinationals that decided to invest here. The problem with Saint Goben, for instance, a company

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that produces glass and intends to expand its production to a new kind of securitized glass, is the fact that it needs few employees, because its level of automation is high. Also, the type of labour force it could employ would be engineers and generally highly qualified people, to whom it would offer good salaries. However, the youth have left the city in search of better opportunities either to Bucharest or to other bigger cities in Romania or abroad.

> During the last years, we could say that the economic activity has been revived slightly, due to the arrival of a series of multinationals, which settled here and gave the place a bit of a fresh breath. It's actually more that they gave a bit of faith and a bit of horizontal industrial development. By this I mean that some little local firms could be established that handle some of the maintenance, cleaning, many things… producing or repairing parts, the things that a big company doesn't do itself, but employs others (Director of CCI Călăraşi, 2012).

The alternative to the development via foreign investment is present in the vision of CCI, who is actively involved in organizing professional reconversion classes and entrepreneurial trainings. Also, they are compiling tops of successful firms, awarding those that are new on the market or the small investments that manage to be sustainable over a longer period of time. While it could, at first glance, look as if there are two envisioned alternative paths towards the development of the area, the further explanations added by the director put things into perspective: the local business cannot mobilize enough capital and cannot develop the tools through which to have a real impact on the future of the city itself and its prosperity. They are actually two subspecies of the same solution: the small firms' possibility to operate is actually the direct consequence of the existence of large investments that need their services and therefore create a market niche.

Therefore, despite Călăraşi being a clear-cut case of a city that is currently not embedded substantially in circuits of global capital, this model of development is still the yardstick against which its situation is measured. The interviewee is a rather atypical case in what her evaluation of the past industrial development is concerned, as it becomes visible in her discussion of the past production of paper and the current situation of the factory.

> It was a national level policy of making good use of the cereal straws in the agricultural areas and of reed for producing paper. After '90s, they suddenly thought it's very difficult to gather the straws, although there was already this enterprise that was doing exactly this. So, they started either burning the straws or using them as bedding for animals, and the paper factory bought new equipment which worked with wood. It's exactly what they were trying to avoid earlier, namely to cut down forests for making paper […]. Anyways, from a landmark production unit which was producing high quality diversified paper – printer, photocopy, special paper – that was 30% of the national export of paper during communism. Of course, I can't tell to what extent these figures were real, but that's what they were saying. So from there, now the factory is producing toilet paper and some wrapping paper… (Director of CCI Călăraşi, 2012).

She is critical of the current private management and their incapacity to preserve a mode of organizing and making economic and sustainable use of natural resources. On the contrary, the socialist practice of guarding the less easily renewable resources and making use of otherwise wasteful materials in order to produce high quality end products is being set as the correct alternative. This type of juxtaposition, in which it is the production during socialism that has a positive connotation and not its contemporary privately led alternative, is rather an exception. However, her discourse regarding the future possibilities is structured along the same line of attracting massive investments from abroad, which would also create the possibility for local smaller business to operate.

Variations in Cluj-Napoca

The main justification for the need of attracting foreign investment is the expected subsequent creation of jobs. This means that in order to provide its citizens with the possibility of employment, a city needs to be eye-catching for investors. The case of the Nokia investment and subsequent leaving in Cluj (Zincă, 2011) forcefully draws everyone's attention, however, towards the fact that there is little leverage that the local administration has in making sure that once seduced by an attractive city, the multinational remains engaged in a long term relationship with it, for better or worse. For the AJOFM of Cluj county, an institution that was very much involved in negotiating the parameters of the multinational's leaving, the strategy of simply proving an attractive offer for capital grows into more nuances and a case is made for an alternative path for securing employment for people.

Therefore, the AJOFM Cluj, after the Nokia case, has much more nuanced view on the limits of such development. In an interview explaining the idea of social economy, the director clearly shows the divergence of the private interests of foreign investors and the ones of potential employees: while the labour force would need security and high wages, the investors seek to minimize the costs of labour and to have a flexible workforce. Drawing from examples such as the projects aiming to reintegrate on the labour market the former employees of Nokia, the AJOFM director is well aware of the fact that the situation is very complex and, in order to provide for long term employment, there are a number of structural factors that need to be taken into account.

The case in which the alternative vision becomes clear is that of the Association that was put up in order to handle the situation of massive unemployment resulting from the closure of the main employer in one of the smaller cities in Cluj county, Câmpia Turzii. Following an unsuccessful privatization, a previously productive factory was shut down and people made redundant. Given the fact that the factory was the major employer in the city and that most of the employees were past their 40s, after having spent most or all of their productive life in this industry, AJOFM accessed EU funds for a pioneering project in the

region. Described as a project for the disadvantaged (redundant people from mono-industrial areas), this initiative concerns more than 200 of the people who were made redundant. They would be given vouchers of 15,000 EUR, which would be the equivalent of shares that people had in the new production facility (interview with the director of AJOFM Cluj).

The Romanian state, represented by its institution AJOFM, signed a contract with a foreign firm that has given technical advice on purchasing the productive equipment and that would facilitate the contacts to ensure a market for the distribution of the products for four years. Unlike the situation in the classic scheme of attracting foreign investment, this contract had different terms: the means of production would belong to the employees themselves, and the firm was contracted in order to supply for the skill and capacity that the people were missing: it would have been unrealistic to expect workers having been employed in one industry to be able to acquire the knowledge on how to make contracts in order to sell what they produce overnight. Therefore, the externally contracted firm would buy and further distribute on the global market the products; its gain would be the fact that it could continue its business even though it lacked the capital to invest in an actual production facility. At the end of the four years, the members of the association would still own all their means of production and would have gained the knowledge and experience necessary to continue the business and make decisions together with the partner company on distribution and further investments.

"This project is somewhat in between capitalism and socialism", the director of AJOFM Cluj said. This in-between-ness would, in his opinion, solve the problem of the potential lack of engagement of individuals in the welfare of the business, through the "collective control" of the fact that individual behaviour affects goods that belong to all. The "socialist situation" he refers to, in which it is the state and not the people themselves owning the business, encourages free rider behaviour. The "capitalist way" has another problem, namely the fact that it is in the interest of the owner of capital to control the labour in such way as to minimize the damage and to maximize production and not so much in the interest of the employees. This mid-way situation offers the best incentives for involvement and collective control over the process and the outcome.

The understanding of the structural tensions between the interests of the global capital and that of the local population translates not only in the realization of the need to think of solution outside the simple scheme of attracting investors, but also to the inclusion of terms such as "association", "ownership of the means of production", "cooperative" and "disadvantaged workers" into the core of the institutions' understanding of its role. This is indeed a crucial mutation that opens up actual possibilities for starting to rethink the strategy of the city in a way that takes existing structural disadvantages as the starting point. However, when the narrative of the interviewee shifts from the description of the macro problem to the level of who are the people who would be the beneficiaries of this program, a

similar move is not made. The beneficiaries of the program are by default (and also in the definition of the fund awarding EU agencies) considered to be disadvantaged: they are unemployed as a result of the closure of a factory they had worked for most of their active life, in a city that does not offer alternative employment. They are also people passed their youth, which is added to the list of their disadvantages on the labour market alongside their specialization in an industry that is no longer needed. However, given the fact that only 200 of them would benefit from this program, the criteria used for defining who is worthy needs to become visible. This example is one of the few in which the structural factors behind the exclusion and marginalization of some categories of people are recognized in order to justify the very legitimacy of the program. Due to this, the criteria of inclusion employed by those taking the standpoint of the prosperous centre of the productive world become explicit. The following section will discuss the way in which the margins of the productive world and the productive worker are re-drawn or shifted so that to include some of those previously defined as outsiders.

Underdevelopment and the non-productive worker

Through their discussion about the spirit of capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) draw our attention to the fact that the normative visions about a desired social order operate with two central figures: that of the *Great* person, the person as one should be and that of the *Little* person, the one that does not manage to acquire the desirable features. I have briefly sketched above the dominant visions about the ways in which economic development and social prosperity could be achieved: through the foreign investments, that would bring the necessary capital and would offer people the infrastructure in which to invest their energies and yield positive outcomes both for themselves (employment and the subsequent standards of living) and for society. However, this infrastructure is not the only ingredient for success. Something else is needed, namely the right people, or the people with the right attitudes, knowledge and skill that would be able to transform the existing resources into the desired outcome benefitting everyone.

The productive, economically developed capitalist world that is desired has, therefore, its heroes: the *Great* people, those who are worthy, knowledgeable, disciplined and hard-working, those who are autonomous, entrepreneurial, creative and flexible. Once the investments have been made, and once the productive infrastructure exists, it takes a certain type of subject to make it work. The story of the vision of prosperity is not complete without the description of the right type of subjectivity, the one which, if everyone managed to mould themselves into, society would function normally. The capitalist hero can prove its worth especially by growing different from the image of the socialist, dependent on the state, passive and disinterested subject. The behaviour and attitudes of the future beneficiaries of the agendas of development are under constant scrutiny and they need to prove they are not the *Little* people not having managed to rid themselves of the old "socialist mentalities" (Simionca, 2012; 2011).

Therefore, the agenda for progress is not fully articulated in structural terms (attracting capital and investment) but also in subject-making terms (making sure that individuals are fit to participate in the new arrangement). One of the most frequently recurring criterion along which the inhabitants of a city are evaluated by their planners is the degree of their flexibility, their capacity and willingness to adapt to the ever-changing conditions of the dynamic economy and labour market. One of the institutional responses that both the CCIs and the AJOFMs have in this respect is the increasing numbers of training and re-training courses that they offer. The underlying assumption of the need to have flexible careers and individuals in order to maintain a flexible economy (Binkley, 2009) is clearly echoed by the interviewees. All the CCI representatives I have interviewed offered me very similar versions of the same narrative: it is no longer reasonable to expect to be working in the same domain for one's entire life, because the economy is dynamic, production is volatile and restructuring is permanent. Therefore, individuals need to be able to reinvent themselves and their skills accordingly in order to be employable (Binkley, 2009; Ten Bos and Rhodes, 2003; Sennett, 1998).

The *Great* people are the ones who manage to understand the premises of the new structural requirements and to adapt. The *Little* ones are those who "expect everything from the state, just like during communism, without exiting their comfort zone a bit, without doing their share" (AJOFM representative, 2012). These institutions, therefore, imagine their role to be double: create the structure of opportunities and create the right type of subject. This type of binary was present also in the situation of the otherwise innovative project put forth by the Cluj AJOFM regarding the cooperative for the former employees from Câmpia Turzii. The right type of subject is, in the institution's vision, capable of adapting, with internalized control, responsibility and mastering a high variety of skills. The people who would be part of the group of beneficiaries needed to prove not only their potential of learning new technical skills, but also their leadership qualities. In order to eliminate the potential of corruption and to maximize the probability of success for the project, the people from the target group (the former employees of the factory) were administered several computer-led tests. The major concerns about the selection were whether the people would be able to adapt themselves and learn a brand new occupation and also to adapt themselves to their new status of co-owners of an enterprise. The non-interference of human "subjectivity" was insured through the computer tests, the objectivity of which was beyond any doubt. Apart from the selection, there were several other major concerns about the well-functioning of the factory once it would be set up, all of them related to the labour control and responsibility. The hypothetical situation of a worker coming to work drunk was mentioned, and the solution was thought to come from the common ownership and individual interests of all those involved.

The representatives of AJOFM and CCI were asked during the interviews to help us put together the economic and labour market history of their locality, as well as to give us as detailed of a description of the current situation as possible. They were invoked as experts on the global situation of the city. However, they were also introduced to the overall aims of the research and to the fact that our interest focuses on the situation of the segregated impoverished Roma communities that live within their cities. We expressed our interest in understanding how their institution views their situation and their own role in dealing with the shortcomings of these communities' livelihoods. The reaction of one of the CCI directors to this framing of my request was, while singular, rather telling:

> Madam, our business here is development, not... underdevelopment! What could I tell you about poverty?! Go to... Social Work, it's them who deal with such things (CCI director, 2012).

In this straightforward account, "underdeveloped" and "developed" are not two states of the same variable, but two completely distinct realities, with a different set of institutions responsible for their management.

How does it happen that an institution whose aim is to foster the growth and the consolidation of a prosperous productive environment is thought to have nothing to do with the very failure of its aim? It is not that examples of various types of failure of their attempts to better the situation in their cities were absent in the discourses of the officials interviewed. On the contrary, I was offered several analyses of situations in which foreign investors cannot be attracted due to various (objective or not) reasons, of small firms that do not manage to keep afloat due to the competition or to the weak markets they operate in, or of individuals that do not manage to become integrated on the labour market even after having completed training for different jobs than before. However, all these are happening in that part of society that has, for the dominant view, at least the potential of development, the potential of success. The impoverished segregated Roma communities are not part of the limits drawn around the world with the potential of normality. Their situations of poverty, of unemployment, of precarious living conditions are not recognized as failure of the activity of these institutions because they are from the onset and by definition belonging to a different reality and are, therefore, not even considered.

These institutions are primarily operating with those people that can at least in theory be transformed in "Great people" of the new order, who have the potential of being the flexible desirable subjects. Within this category, there is failure and success: there are people who manage to put their potential into practice and those who do not manage. People participating in a course on how to become an entrepreneur may open successful businesses, may be able to keep them for long, or they might fail to do either. There are, however, other people that are from the beginning outside of this category.

The Roma and productive work

The extent to which the entire population of Roma ethnicity was seen by the interviewees as being outside of the world endowed with potential for normality depended greatly on the degree of open racism that they had. I will briefly refer below to the most recurring types of descriptions I was offered in regard to the ethnically Roma in relation to work.

In one of the interviews with a representative of AJOFM I was explicitly told that while their institution does have some programs like the "Job fair for Roma", in his opinion all these attempts are doomed to fail and are a waste of precious resources of time and money.

> What to say about the Roma's employment? They are unemployable, that's what they are, let's stop being polite about it (AJOFM director, 2012).

When I confronted him with the counterfactual of the socialist period, in which it is a well-known fact that many of the ethnically Roma were successfully employed, for example, in various position in factories all over the country, his city included, he replied that:

> They were forcing them back then, that's why it was happening. It's not because they wanted to! There, with a broom in their hands or stealing, that's all they're good at! (AJOFM director, 2012).

Apart from this straightforwardly racist account, which this official had no problem openly giving to me (an outsider coming from the academia), most of the replies I got were more nuanced. When asked about the range of jobs open to, or currently taken by people belonging to the Roma ethnicity, the first employment that was mentioned was the one for the city cleaning company. Clearly confirmed by the various discussions we as researchers had with the people in the community, working in the city cleaning industry was the major option for formal employment. Another commonality in the discourses of officials and that of the people themselves was the fact that this opportunity for employment was really an opportunity to be cherished and be enthusiastic about being able to have. The difference most of the times, however, comes from the degree to which the officials on the one side and the members of the vulnerable community on the other side think it is a widely available one. On the officials' side, the very scarcity of these positions is not a salient feature: as these jobs are available and they do not exclude ethnically Roma from them, it follows that if all people living in marginalized impoverished community actually wanted to have jobs, they would be able to get them. On the community's side, it becomes clear that this is hardly the case and that having a job in these companies is actually a hassle, going way beyond their willingness or ability to take up a job with a structured schedule that requires discipline. Reportedly, access to these jobs is also conditioned by offering bribes (around 200 Euro in Ploieşti, for example) to the middle-management in charge of personnel selection.

It was only in one of the cities where the city cleaning company was described by the authorities as an employer in the same way in which the other, more "productive" employers were described. In this case, I was explained that since 2007, when the company was taken over by a new owner, it also delivers high quality employment opportunities: adequate work protection gear and machinery. This came out as a duty of the employer. In the other accounts, the companies providing services of cleaning for the city were depicted by the authority almost as a branch of the social work benefits available to the poor: the fact that they offered jobs for those unemployable by others is a service that the company provides intrinsically to the city. The fact that these companies operate within the same logic of profit and that they are far from being in the position of distributing benefits to the poor was completely ignored.

Another recurrent story that the people in the various communities that were visited during the SPAREX fieldwork brought to surface was the fact that getting such jobs was in many cases made very difficult by the existence of a type of entrepreneur: people either working in the companies or just having close ties to them, who operated a market in which the goods were the jobs themselves. This means that in many cases people had to pay the equivalent of one, two or even three months' salaries in order to become employed legally. Far from being the regular capitalist "selling one's labour force for the salary", these jobs were seen and exploited as the bunch of other benefits that they bring along: the fact that in order to get unemployment benefits, medical insurance, retirement benefits, one needs to have been employed for a number of months. The salary becomes secondary. None of these complications were on the radar of the authorities, who viewed the labour market niche of the cleaning sector as an open, transparent and equitable one.

This image of openness, fairness and transparency of a business that is actually rarely so in practice is very instrumental in solidifying a certain image of the Roma worker. If the business is available and fair, and there are still people who are unemployed, it follows that it is their direct individual responsibility and failure. The explanation that is quickly mobilized is that of the stereotypical lazy, undisciplined and unwilling to work Roma, who tries to get as much benefits from the state as possible, avoiding the socially acceptable and desirable ways to earn a living by putting in effort through work. None of the interviewees qualified collecting iron or plastic bottles as work, or as an activity that requires self-control, sustained effort and will. These qualities are considered essential for a person being able to hold a job, and they are completely separated from the image of the "petty activities" undertaken by people in these communities. The same categories are internalized and used by the people themselves, who also mention only the formal employment that they hold as being "work", while the rest of the working activities that they are involved in are indexed as "doing what we can to have something to eat".

Another occupational niche that was presented by the authorities as being frequently occupied by ethnically Roma was the informal sector of cleaning, especially the staircases from block of flats. This is, however, a much worse scenario, because their status as employees is not legally recognized and, consequently, it does not qualify the workers for health insurance or other type of benefits. The conditions of pay are also left to the individual negotiations and therefore the (in the majority of cases) women doing this kind of work have a very vulnerable status and very little job security. Even the representative of CCI that most eloquently described the vulnerability of such position to me, proving a real awareness of the shortcomings of the situation, finished this account by presenting it in a positive light: "they can do it, however, it's an opportunity that is out there for them, people seek their services" (CCI director, 2012).

Most of the discourses of the officials interviewed are rather ambiguous in placing the blame for the situation of exclusion in which the impoverished Roma from the segregated communities we were interested in were living. The main rhetorical tool that organizes this ambiguity in such way that the stereotypical image of the lazy and unwilling to work Roma can be still mobilized is the well-known distinction between the "good" and the "bad" Roma.

The "good" Roma are those who managed to become "integrated" into mainstream society, by which most of the time is meant that they exhibit individual traits that make them worthy: willingness to put in effort and discipline into a job, to "make a living". The people living in the communities we were interested in rarely qualified in this category. The examples I was given were those of people who, despite the fact that they might have a Roma ethnic origin, manage to have "normal" jobs: hairdresser, selling in a shop or working in the factory. These examples are mobilized to prove an individualistic argument: there is hardly anything different in the type of challenges in getting a job that people have regardless of their ethnicity, the difference lies in the type of attitude that individuals have towards success; and the examples of those who made it are there to prove this point. In addition to this, I was told several times that it is not the Romanians who are racist, but it is the Roma themselves who use the card of discrimination in order to make excuses for themselves.

A discussion I had with one of the representatives of AJOFM is very telling in regard to the way in which the distinction between the good and the bad Roma operates. After I was told that the main reason why workers of Roma origins are not sought by employers is the bad experience they had in the past with people who were not disciplined enough to carry on work, I asked whether the implication of this is the standard meritocratic one: regardless of their ethnic background, it is people with the best qualifications and work discipline that succeed in finding and keeping good jobs. The answer was an affirmative one: "of course, many of them have gone through schooling, or they have a particular skill and they could work at any given point, of course. I didn't mean that if they're

Roma they're incapable of working" (CCI director, 2012). And, in order to make the argument about the lack (or shallowness) of racism clearer, I was given the example of a very successful Workshop organized especially for the professional qualification or re-qualification of Roma. Unlike what I would have expected, the success of this event came not from the fact that people managed to find a job afterwards (indeed, none of them had, to the knowledge of my interlocutor), but from the fact that the participants were disciplined enough to go through the classes and they showed the willingness to better themselves and put efforts into increasing their chances of finding formal employment.

Although this story was actually about ethnically Roma people who do not manage to secure a formal working position even after going through the trainings, the person from AJOFM presented it to me as a case of success. What would have been otherwise reported as a failure of such a program was in the case of the impoverished ethnically Roma considered a success because they had managed to enter the category of those who have the potential of being successful. The fact that they did not achieve the actual purpose of the program – that of increasing the employment rate among the participants by means of professional training – becomes less significant than the fact that a process of disciplining was carried out.

This discussion shows one of the mechanisms that contribute to the invisibility and normalization of racism, achieved through double standards of success: while unemployment is a failure generally speaking, it can still be a success in the case of ethnically Roma in case they have managed to prove that they are "employable" unemployed, owning the attributes that could make them worthy of a labour contract. This image of elevating people from their state of complete lack of employability presumably due to individual traits making them unfit for formal employment would not be possible unless the actual work that people from these communities do on a regular basis for their survival would not be dismissed as unworthy.

There were the interviews conducted with the spokes persons of the County Level Police Departments that made even clearer the ways in which the impoverished Roma living in the segregated communities belong to the area of jurisdiction of different institutions, being made into altogether different types of entities. While CCI and AJOFM are only in special conditions preoccupied with the situation of the Roma, the Police take them as a particularly important for their activities and mission. "Ethnicity" cannot be used as an official category in the Police departments' reporting of crimes, therefore no statistics are available for the past years indicating the proportion of different types of criminal activities that have been undertaken by ethnic Roma. However, the lack of statistical data is compensated by the informal knowledge of the employees and, in most of the cases, the impoverished segregated communities that SPAREX was interested in had a special place.

ANCA SIMIONCA

The Police spokesperson from Călăraşi and Miercurea-Ciuc were very surprised to find out that I was interested in their institution's experience and problems with the people living in the impoverished segregated communities in their cities. While politely answered to all my questions, I was also repeatedly reminded that the type of petty offences they were routinely involved in did not constitute "the real Roma problems". The "real" problems were in the rural areas and I was encouraged to redirect my interest to those situations. In the Harghita county, for example, some violent incidents involving ethnically Roma villagers had been widely known and documented by the media, and it was to them that I should have referred to. After reaffirming my interest in these particular communities, I was first told that "no, the Police has no problem with them" (female, 45 years old). However, my more targeted questions (regarding the situations we had learned about from different sources, like begging, stealing iron, prostitution, illegal usage of carriages) were answered affirmatively.

Discrimination and racism become less visible in this apparently benevolent discourse that defends the urban Roma from the accusations of being "truly" delinquent. By this discourse, however, a certain degree of crime is normalized for any person of the ethnically Roma. In the definitions of the Police, the "good" Roma are those that are involved only in petty offences (that are, consequently a "normal" feature for this population), while the "bad" Roma are only those that are violent or involved in large scale trafficking of people or drugs.

The situation of the impoverished segregated communities falls completely out of the self-definition of institutions such as CCI and AJOFM. These institutions are conceptualized as the agents of development, of implementing positive and constructive projects. Only those situations in which the unemployed have passed a test of meritocracy and have earned their right as an insider are taken up as belonging to their area of jurisdiction and are made into their own failures. Their "work", that is the "productive" activities they are involved in, are rather the jurisdiction of the police. Gathering plastic bottles or iron (and sometimes transporting it with carriages that are illegal in the city) being "non-work", it becomes assimilated to the category of petty crime, which falls under the interest of the police as an institution. The fact that the recycling is done mainly through the hard work of hundreds of people who barely manage to live out of the money earned is not visible in most of the discourses. Neither the public utility, nor the individual effort, discomfort and discipline inherent in these activities are recognized. The lack of these dimensions is, however, used exactly to exclude these people from the world of those having the potential of being productive, those who are the target of the programs and policy envisaging the well-being of the city.

The SPAREX project's core inquiry focused on the spatial aspect of the marginalization and exclusion of the poor. One of the implications of the arguments I have made so far is that the housing areas or the spaces where the reproduction of the "undeserving labour force" takes place are excluded from the "normal city" in a similar vein to the ways in which particular categories of work, labour force

and economic activities are excluded even from the chance of becoming potential subjects for development. Consequently, these spaces are not imagined as belonging to the potentially normal housing conditions and are subjected to actions ranging from non-interventionism to eviction and elimination (Vincze, this issue).

Concluding remarks

I have described the ways in which policy actors' imaginaries are centred on the neoliberal ideals of a flexible economy and subsequent outsourcing of risks and responsibility at the individual level. Foreign investors, who are seen as the rational actors seeking to increase their profits through the fair and objective mechanisms of the market, are viewed as the solution for development and for ensuring large scale yet flexible productive activities that would allow the worthy subjects to be employed and therefore make a living. This imagery draws much of its force from the fact that it is juxtaposed to the socialist world and economy, which is most times viewed as being inefficient and unsustainable on the long run, bringing along much more sources of dissatisfaction than advantages. At the individual level, the fact that employment was available to everyone presumably encouraged a lack of personal involvement, and lack of responsibility on the employees' part, which ended up expecting everything from the state.

The starting point of my argument was the vision guiding the development of the city and the labour market as they become visible in the discourses of CCI and AJOFM, two of the important institutions producing city level policy. The positive visions of city growth, development and integration that these institutions operate with are only occasionally and marginally discussing poverty itself and are not explicitly formulated in racial terms. Yet they have an immense impact on the spaces of possibilities opened and closed for the disadvantaged through the fact that they are the very setting of the limits between desirability and non-desirability, normality and abnormality, worthiness and unworthiness. While not in themselves development agencies, CCI and AJOFM are two institutions that shape in a crucial manner the process of formation, consolidation and dissemination of the visions about the desirable growth direction of the cities. While several mutations have been documented, the backbone of their vision is clearly congruent to a vision in which providing the infrastructure that would make the operation of the free market possible is the main aim.

What makes individuals worthy of entering the area of concern of these institutions is their having the potential of being a productive worker. I have attempted to show how none of the activities and ways of making a livelihood, available for the poor living in the segregated communities, are understood as belonging to the latter category. In most of the cases, working for the cleaning companies is conceptualized closer to being welfare beneficiaries than full-fledged workers. Collecting plastic or scrap metal is thought of as petty illegalities at

hand rather than hard, precarious and exhausting work. Further, making a living by these means is naturalized as a cultural or ethnic preference of the Roma. The contradictions that arise from the examples of people of Roma ethnicity who earn their living in ways that are closer to the mainstream (formal employment in other areas than city cleaning) are alleviated through the distinction between "the good" and "the bad" Roma. They are further used as arguments to show that it is indeed a matter of personal discipline and will rather than institutionalized racism that traps certain people and communities in situations of deprivation, exclusion and poverty.

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ON SOME ETHNIC HOUSING AREAS OF CĂLĂRAŞI

CĂTĂLIN BERESCU[1]

ABSTRACT. The paper makes a general description of poverty areas inhabited by Roma communities in Călăraşi, Romania and tries to put them into a general context of urban geography. In particular it aims to illustrate the urban setting, the housing conditions of the dwellers, the dynamics and the formation of three ethnic and poverty enclaves that display to a various degree the characters of an urban ghetto (Oborul Nou, Doi Moldoveni and Livadă) using mainly first-hand accounts of the inhabitants, analyzing the spatial policies of the authorities and the ways in which people deal with territory and housing issues. The analysis highlights the specificities of spatialization of Roma communities and racialization of poverty in small size Romanian cities, where segregation policies are rarely explicit, physical distances are less relevant, but the spatial exclusion process is no less visible and defined rather by substandard infrastructure, poor access and unfriendly limits.

Keywords: urban geography, slum areas, Roma communities, housing deprivation

Urban geography[2]

Territorial, Historical and Urban Context

Călăraşi is the capital city of the Călăraşi County and it is situated in the South Eastern part of the Romanian Plain (Cîmpia Română), more precisely the Bărăganului Ialomiţei, a major agricultural domain, stretching about 150 km along the North bank of the Danube. The two main *municipia* of the county, Olteniţa and Călăraşi, both situated along the river, are the major landmarks of the border with Bulgaria for this sector of the river and place Călăraşi in an important geographical inflexion point that marks the entrance of Danube on the Romanian territory and the line of separation between Wallachia and Dobrudja, the presence of the Turkish Roma in the region having to do with this historical heritage. The city is situated

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on a secondary branch of the Danube named Borcea and dominates both a vast flooding area and a huge agricultural territory, the abundance of food resources and the geographical and morphological situation that allows for the development of a relatively large size port being strong determinants in regards with the huge investment programmes that took place here in the late communist years. Many of these developments were never fully finished and their abandonment has now major consequences not only in economical but in territorial terms as well; the industrial belt of the city, largely abandoned, matching the area of the city itself.

Though relatively small in demographic terms the city has, and it always had, a significant importance as a transit point to the Balkans, the very name of the city originating from „călăraşii ştafetari", the couriers that were delivering messages to Istanbul and for whom this was an important station (Ştiucă, 2006). The connection is done by ferryboat to Silistra, Bulgaria but recent plans, launched during the last electoral campaign are planning for a bridge over the Danube.

Fig. 1. Călăraşi county map.
Source: Google Maps.[3]

The relatively long distance to Bucharest, around 130 km, is no obstacle for an intense relation with the capital city, many inhabitants commuting daily to the capital for various reasons. The connection is even better now through the highway to Constanța and it is likely to change the direction of the development of the city. The very weak development of the settlements situated in the hinterland of Bucharest places the capital in a hegemonic position, being able to draw resources from a vast territory composed of agricultural land where people live in small villages and are a constant source of cheap work force. This major misbalance is responsible for the weak territorial cohesion of the southern territories and for a lack of polycentric network in the area. Despite the fact that Călărași is the capital of the county its cultural, economic and political importance is much smaller then of the cities situated at the North and West of Bucharest and it actually marks the limit of territorial influence of Bucharest. In the particular case of Călărași there is a historical explanation, the city itself being until 1852 in the property of the important Bucharest based Colțea Monastery, from which the citizens bought it by public subscription. The emancipation episode was followed by major urbanistic interventions that still give the eclectic character of the centre: large boulevards with relatively large plots of land on which you can still find stylish houses with small beautiful gardens that belonged to the local merchants, public buildings of a modest scale but carefully placed in order to define a small city with a distinct personality and a strong option for an emerging modernity.

A different layer was added during the forced industrialization era and that leaded to the creation of mass housing and densification in a typical socialist city scenario which culminated with the creation of a Civic Centre, part of the late 80's campaign initiated by Ceaușescu but here with a less devastating impact on the historical core.

The rapport with the neighbouring villages evolved in time in the sense of an incomplete assimilation of former rural areas which lead to a particularly elongated shape of the city, built on two main roads from East to West, which now starts and ends with quite long areas that are still characterized by low density and lack of urban equipment. There is a recent, incomplete development towards North, which is now the major connection with the highway and that will probably become more important in the near future. One of our study areas, Oborul Nou is situated in that direction and their relocation has to do with this major change of the direction of the development of the city.

The brownfields are located both North and South and equal or even exceed the territory of the city determining a particular geography of access, the East penetration being guarded by several kilometres of spectacular industrial ruins. Some of our areas are directly connected with this form of strong division between the suburbs, or the edges of the residential areas and the abandoned sites.

Fig. 2. Călăraşi –Siderca, the company that was supposed to be the largest steel factory
of Europe at its time and for which a port was built, was never completed
and now guards the exit road to Bucharest for about two kilometres.
Demolition works took place in the last twenty years and are still ongoing.
Source: Author's photo.

Demography

The last census of 2011 confirms an accelerated descending trend,
Călăraşi having now 57.000 inhabitants[4], 19% less then in 2002 when the 70.000
inhabitants were still 10% less then the 77.000 of 1992. The decrease has a strong
logic if we are to follow the date for the previous twenty years before 1989 as for
1977, which was before the humongous industrial development programmes, the
city barely reached 50.000 inhabitants. Since the demographic raise was based on
the migration of industrial workers it is only logical that the dramatic restraint of
the industrial capacities of the city would lead to a reverse of the phenomenon. This
has a lot to do with two of the areas we surveyed, typical urban ghettos formed in
former worker's dormitories that were either sold to the inhabitants or transformed
into social housing and that are now struggling with huge rates of unemployment,
disconnected from utility services, overcrowded and facing insecurity and violence
issues. Self declared Roma are just 2051 and the Turks are 412. According to
estimates made by local Roma experts the real figures are much higher.

Urban ghettos

The way different actors names, or refuse to give a name to these areas
tells a lot about how these territories are represented in the collective imagery

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[4] The census took place in 2011 and the results were published in 2012 but a recent correction from
2013 counts 65181 permanent inhabitants. The extra figure of 8500 persons might indicate the
ones involved in the circular migration that is characteristic to the city and in particular to its Roma
inhabitanst. The correction was applied for the entire census in a heavily politicisised context.

and how they achieve their place and meaning in a political discourse and less about them as physical places. Naming is part of a continuous negotiation that allows a particular actor to interact with a partner of discussion and less an analytical term, let alone a technical one that the administration would use to classify an area, the practice of using the term ghetto in particular shows that this may be sometimes more or less of what that place really is.

The very fact that in Romanian these places are rarely called ghettos and that there is no other specific term for this particular form of rundown areas might be an indication of: a) the fact that authorities do not perceived them as a category but just as particular places, as accidental insertions in a normal urban tissue and b) that there is a policy of making their character invisible through a policy of ironic labelling (Dallas, The Merry Neighbourhood, NATO, Columbia, etc.) or of giving them a *no go area* status by stressing the dangers and difficulties that are associated with Roma communities perceived as homogenous groups that are ruling over a territory where different rules apply. The uncertainty of terminology and the complexity and ambiguity of the processes that take place in such areas are illustrated in the literature by the ghetto-banlieu debate (Wacquant, 2008) the absence of the State (Bourdieu, 1993), the segregation as a general mechanism to "deviate" a particular group (Maurin, 2004), the slum perspective: being it global (Davis, 2006) third-world (Lloyd, 1979) or a self-build defence as a right to be into the world (Turner, 1972). Regardless if we put the emphasis on squatting and the struggle to come out of the shadow (Newirth, 2006) or on general informality, as structural part of the formal (Laguerre, 1994) we have valid theoretical perspectives that can identify many of the elements that can be found in our particular examples. However, when it comes to frame the very complex and fluid reality of the small size Roma neighbourhoods in the Romanian urban context we might find out that the combination of ambiguous policies, internal dynamics and the sheer size of the places provides too little mattery and of too diverse nature to allow the use of major theoretical instruments. At a glance, Doi Moldoveni is a *banlieu* that has a ghetto inside it, Livadă was born as a squatter settlement but has little to do with the mechanisms that established Kibera or Dharavi and Obor is a slum born out of a relocation of another slum in a manner that can be considered a slum upgrading programme but with strong elements of a ghetto. The choice to use mainly the term *urban ghetto* in this study is based on an attempt to highlight a phenomenon of spatial exclusion largely based on ethnicity and that is the result of local policies, but within a context of general racist attitudes, aiming to confine *the Roma* and *the poor* and especially *the poor Roma* on certain territories.

The various neighbourhoods of the city appear to have a strong identity in the view of the people we talked to, the borders are clearly defined and the name of the area is used as a marker of personal identity. There is also fear to cross some territories though the antagonism is mostly virtual and not associated with major violent episodes:

"Now it is ok, because it's daytime, but if you come in the evening and see what's in here you'll get really scared! I'm afraid to go into the neighbourhood during the night!"

Fig. 3. „Doi Moldoveni" (Two Moldavians) as seen from the railway and over the abandoned land that separates it from the Spoitori neighbourhood, FNC-Livada.
Source: Author's photo.

There are several areas that could be technically labelled as "disadvantaged housing areas", some of them inhabited exclusively by Roma while some others, though predominantly Roma are to some extent mixed. The process of spatialization and racialization of poverty can be traced through individual stories but it is also present in the narratives and in the official papers of the City Hall. The areas are mostly located on the edges, fact of symbolic importance here as the size of the city makes the physical distances less relevant for segregation but they are defined by poor access and surrounded by impermeable or unfriendly limits. However, we should take into account that due to the overwhelming presence of industry and because of the peculiar development of the city alongside two main parallel roads that connect a city and two villages surrounded by industry this is the case for many other neighbourhoods. The poor and the Roma are, in principle, distinct categories that are strongly overlapping in all the locations we visited, the areas being trapped in between a central spine of a small city and a fading industrial belt.

Five Călăraşi, N6 aka "The Phantom"- approximately twenty families live here, in a block disconnected from sewage and all other utilities and that is proposed for demolition. "The worst places in town are Doi Moldoveni and Cinci Călăraşi, there you can find gangs of pimps that are strongly related to Spain, it's better not to speak with anybody from there." (male informant from Oborul Nou, around 40 years). Actually many people work with legal forms, some of them for the City.

Fig. 4. Five Călăraşi, N6 aka "The Phantom".

Source: Author's photo.

In addition to the difficult access the areas have uncertain legal status, are under-equipped in terms of utilities and infrastructure and have substandard housing. In order to have a general view of poverty housing in Călăraşi we listed all the seven areas in which the team conducted research but will describe just three of them in order to illustrate different typologies.

The poverty areas in which the Sparex research was conducted are the following: Oborul Nou, Cărămidari, FNC – Livadă, Doi Moldoveni, Cinci (Five) Călăraşi, Măgureni (Cireşoaia, Muncei, Ostrovului), Prelungirea Bucureşti (Fundătura Cazărmii).

Oborul Nou**,** Doi Moldoveni and Cinci Călăraşi are undoubtedly ghettos, respectively zones surrounded by strong symbolic and physical boundaries that are inhabited by communities that were formed through a process of social and economic exclusion that has deep roots in the current anti-gypsy attitudes. Whilst the first one is a recent urban development of individual houses the later are „classic" urban ghettos that follow a common pattern that can be found in the postcommunist city – former workers' dormitories, *ab initio* precarious, now degraded and abandoned or administered in a strictly reactive manner using strategies that vary from brutal evictions followed by radical refurbishments and change of population to brutal restrictions of access to utilities followed by educational programmes run by NGOs, with EU money and in partnership with the same local administration that was the most active actor of the initial exclusion.

Fig. 5. Călăraşi, City map - Roma housing areas – with the exception of Five Călăraşi, placed near the main boulevard behind an important monument, all the other areas are peripheral.

FNC-Livadă is a territory that was taken into possession by a group of *Spoitori*, a compact community of blood related people with a long history of autonomy, an ethnical enclave in which aggregation and segregation are equally important. In Măgureni, Prelungirea Bucureşti and Cărămidari we can observe a traditional form of *mahala*, more ethnically mixed, with living conditions that are modest but mainly decent and in which you can find people that are exposed to different forms of housing vulnerability.

Oborul Nou

The area takes its name from the animal fair (Obor) and it is the result of a systematisation process that aimed to transform a former dumping area for construction debris into a housing area for a dislocated community of Turkish Roma. It was established in 2001 as an *urban development*, i.e. a type of urbanistic operation that is in perfect accord with the dominant ideology of the Romanian political class which, despite any right-left divide is in essence neoliberal. Urban development is naturally seen as *sprawl*, as new residential areas that would group families with a similar economic status that are largely autonomous in residential terms, able to manage their houses in every aspect and happy to live an individual life. The functional division of the modernist planners that consisted of working areas, leisure areas, residential areas etc. is still conserved as a manner of planning the city but aims to blast the socialist collective buildings by replacing them with an American suburb.

Fig. 6. Oborul Nou – The green area is the former location of the community, they have been removed from there since the Street Prelungirea Slobozia became the main access road to the city as a connection to the highway.

Fig. 7. Oborul Nou. Typical view after rain.

Source: Author's photo.

Oborul Nou is placed in a marginal position beyond the peripheral road (str. Rocadei), separated by a heavy traffic road by the Sf. Lazăr cemetery and by an empty field that is crossed by the so called street Prelungirea I.L. Caragiale, a dirt road of about 300 m that is bordered by debris, illegally dumped in the area. There is another access road on the opposite side, passing by several small industrial facilities and connecting the community with a boulevard that ends in the nearby farm and that separates them from a small housing area with modest houses. The third access is a very long and very narrow pedestrian passage measuring about 200 meters in between the animal fair and a deposit, never used by women and children after sunset. All the properties that have a common boundary

with the area have tall, opaque, concrete or iron sheets fences, some topped with barbed wire. The opposite side is an empty plot of agricultural land, Bucovinei Street that can be found on the map is does not exist while Jiului is a dirt road boarded by three houses. The usual access is defined by a series of spatial events that follows the sequence: abandoned silo, cemetery, truck road, dirt road boarded by debris, Oborul Nou, nothing (city border).

This „Turkish" neighbourhood is a municipal initiative to allocate plots of land to poor families that were living in Cărămidari in a place that was *beautified* and replaced by a park. The relocation of the community is in relative spatial and historical continuity with the *mahala* of Cărămidari, the area of the park being used by the inhabitants as a clay pit, the name, which in Romanian means „brick producers" being a clear indication of the local trade of the people. According to local accounts produced by the *Spoitori* the place was filthy and dangerous, full of miserable shacks, mud and garbage, populated with angry people whom nobody wanted to deal with. The perspective of the former inhabitants is much calm, extreme poverty, no electricity and hard work. The houses were demolished; the land was levelled and turned into a park. Most of the people were given plots of land on a piece of land behind the graveyard that was established at the same time with the Roma neighbourhood. Later on, the graveyard was further extended towards the houses, using a last piece of empty land.

Fig. 8. Oborul Nou and its neighbouring areas

Source: Google Maps.

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The 110 plots are relatively large, measuring in between 300 and 350 square meters and are granted for 49 years, the annual fee being from 400 to 500 Euro. Around seven families are sued every year in order to recuperate old debts, some of them never paid and the amount of debt for ten years is now overwhelming for many inhabitants. The situation is similar in Livada where there is an even larger amount of debt. The apparently generous idea of granting young families a piece of land on which they would be able, using their own means, to build a house, is here severely constrained by the limit imposed by the subsistence economy, by the general lack of education, actually by the high level of illiteracy and functional illiteracy and of the high level of exclusion from the labour market which affect even the few qualified Roma.

The piece of land selected for the new neighbourhood was previously occupied in part by an orchard, the rest being used as a dumping area for construction debris. Some inhabitants accuse the softness of the soil, claiming it is unstable for constructions and there are many places where you have landfill, however it is hard to be recorded as fact in the absence of a geological survey and taking into consideration the very poor structural quality of the houses, particularly that of the foundations that actually creates the instability. The orthogonal grid is simple, with plots and streets properly sized and shaped, with sidewalks but without pavement or drainage system. There is little infrastructure besides electricity, water is provided by three pumps but recent works almost completed a water supply system that goes around the margins of the community and might provide in the future individual access to water. For the moment there are only a handful of houses that have individual water supply. There is no gas or sewage, nor public transportation in the vicinity.

Locating a residential area behind a graveyard and an animal fair is a planning gesture that indicates an urban policy oriented towards active exclusion. It is nevertheless a common urban policy in terms of housing: individual housing in private property has a highly valued symbolical value that opposes the communal buildings, the blocks of flats with social houses that are seen by many as an absolute evil, as an error of the former regime. The stigma that is associated in post communist Romania with living in common premises and the overrating of individual housing leaded to an uncontrolled expansion of the suburbs, an urban sprawl ideologically coloured as "development" and that was produced by the most dynamic members of the society. The imposition of the same model on poverty communities is not a logical fallacy but a cover-up for the creation of ghettos. There is little difference, both in urban planning terms and in the political discourse between that particular for of slum relocation, that transforms it into a real ghetto, and the *Villagio dela Solidarita* from Rome, where informal camps from the inner city were relocated 30 km away from the centre in order to insure better housing conditions or the French *village d'insertion*, a modern form of prison for some of the Roma in Aubervilliers. This form of ghetto is a well concealed form of institutional racism that can be seen as a failure of a modernisation process that was done in good

will by the authorities but lacked the full support of the inhabitants. The tangent position is here by no means the expression of a development that could not take place in a too dense urban centre but of an intentional choice to hide the unwanted population behind a set of different barriers.

That has to do with the identity of these people, as Ali, their leader says: „We are Turkish, not Horahane or Gypsies, I mean... our elders came from Bulgaria so we are Bulgarian Turkish Roma!" The inhabitants of Obor have different origins and some use different identities. It is fair to assume that out of the approximately 600 inhabitants of Obor just the 412 self declared Turks are indeed Turks and the others have different origins; some Spoitori, some Cărămidari, some Horahane from Medgidia and Babadag and several Romanians. For all the areas, except Livadă, we can observe that mixture is significant and can end up being the main rule, like in Măgureni where most families are mixed. The order of identities in the self-description and the number of ethnonyms used is relevant for the dynamics of identity, actually a formula that traces back the history, the culture, the race and the current social position.

Ali is somehow in between a leader and a mediator in Obor, not really qualified or interested in performing any of the functions but able to give to the Mayor some grip, presumably electoral, on the community. He is now employed by the City as a cemetery administrator, position that makes his neighbours refer to him as „The Mayor". He is Turkish, he has a brother in law in Istanbul where he worked for several years and where one of his sons is born. During the last elections he supported the contender, not in an open way but for sure in an effective one for now he has a position in the City. „When the Mayor needs us, he just calls, we go there and he tells us what to do." This is the job description of what he does, he never complains about his neighbourhood, he actually managed to buy a larger piece of land across the street, not far from the land he received from the City and which he sold it to another Turkish family. Though he lives just 200 meters away from his former place and has access from the same street as all the other inhabitants people say he doesn't live in Obor anymore but in the „Romanian part".

External accounts of identity are also meaningful for the definition of the very low position of the Turks on local level. When asked if amongst the Spoitori there are people that are as poor as the Turks, their leader, Meraru answered:

> The Turks?! Have you been there? They are better now then how it was, in the place that is now a park there were some frightening pits and wild vegetation. You were afraid to go there by night because someone, of course some of them, would hit on you. These Turks are *Ţigani*... that sort of *şogori*[5]. We don't get into

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[5] *Sogor* is a Hungarian term that means brother-in-law and has an ironical conotation in the south, mocking up the way Hungarians speak. Here it is used totally unrelated to the Turks but in order to outline the major difference between them and the Spoitori.

their way, they don't get into ours. Because our kin is the most gentle in Walachia, they are well behaved and fearsome. The Spoitori are slow [i.e. measured], fearless and humane. I can see how the Turks live because I have a house of one nephew of mine there, he's away and we rented to two individuals and now they are ten, because they don't have where to live. You can stay there is you wish, just sleep one on top of the other! (Leader from the Spoitor community, Călăraşi, May 2012).

Fig. 9. Oborul Nou after the rain.
Source: Author's photo.

The lack of water creates a serious vulnerability to fire; one of the houses situated in the immediate vicinity of the community centre was rebuilt with some help from the City (emergency funds) after a fire that claimed the life of three children, aged in between seven months and four years, left alone by their mother. The case was presented with lots of details by the media and one inhabitant declared: „Nobody cares about us; the nearest water supply is one kilometre away. Our Mayor only invests in churches and parks; he only needs us when elections come!" Another case happened in 2007, for which we couldn't find reports, but according to Terrance, the leader of the community centre, a four years old boy died while his sister escaped through the window. They lost the house and they tried to buy a new one, the cheapest that could be found being at that time in Doi Moldoveni, a single room apartment with no bathroom in a four stories high prefabricated block of flats at a cost of around 5000$. When asking for a house he found out that many of the actual inhabitants of Obor don't have legal papers and that some of them have received eviction orders. This is an indication, and not the only one, that further research might show that there is a significant part of dwellers that are actually renting or sub-letting the houses.

According to Valentin, a former inhabitant of Doi Moldoveni who now lives in the community centre run by Terrance, some people in Obor arrived from the centre of the city as a result of the retrocession process:

It's not like you mention about Cluj (I told him about the forced evictions in Coastei case), they were not sent to the garbage pit but here, near the cemetery, just to remind them where we all have to end up. I see here some racism, a way to put together people of same ethnicity in an enclosure. That fence that you saw was even bigger, they cut that alley that is so scary that children, and almost nobody uses it and the Cemetery was smaller and now it is extended to the margins of the neighbourhood. On the other entrance all sort of people and businesses are throwing their garbage. One day I saw children with syringes of veterinary use in their hands, I made a complaint to the Police, I also took photos, but nobody answered. The dogs are also a big problem, especially in the morning, previously I was picking up children from home but now, after so many attacks, I prefer to give a call to their parents. If I would change something in this neighbourhood, and I wouldn't speak about mentality, I would take the dogs and the garbage away and put at least some stone on the roads. (Valentin, male, 37 years old, former inhabitant from Doi Moldoveni now livind in Obor Nou, interviewed in May 2012, Călărași).

Fig. 10. Oborul Nou after the rain: a typical dwelling with closed veranda.
Source: Author's photo.

The dwellings of Oborul Nou are quite typical for the entire south of Romania, most of the poverty houses being developed under a very simple scheme; a single room unit, usually almost square and of a length that varies in

between three to four meters receives a second room, with a separate entrance and a small veranda, first opened, then closed and used as a kitchen. The veranda faces the South and its major role is to protect the entrance against the extreme continental climate with very hot summers and very cold winters. This particular house is a work in progress of a very young family with two kids, and it is a typical overlapping of layers of works that are executed after every return of the husband from Italy. Most of the houses in Obor use just several stones as a foundation and the walls are made of adobe bricks. The work is done by paid workers; it is rarely the case when a family has the skills and physical strength to execute a house for them. Despite the fact that the informal market of construction works is extremely cheap, it still does not work very well, at least in terms of regularity. Actually, what I noticed during the years was that there were sudden, major outbursts of constructions which contrasted to long periods of very low activity and chronic lack of maintenance. There is no steady progress; just random periods of furious investment for the family that manages to get some money.

Fig. 11. Inside the homes from Oborul Nou.

Source: Author's photo.

The room is tidy, the flooring (the cheapest laminated parquet) lies directly on the ground, the inventory is modest, an expandable couch, a small table, a stove and a mirror. The veranda/kitchen hosts a recycled cupboard filled with several objects about which the woman says: "if you leave the door opened, somebody would steal even these".

Fig. 12. Yard and veranda in Oborul Nou
Source: Author's photo.

The entrance alley is done with broken pieces from the prefabricated concrete fence of the graveyard. The roof is covered with metal sheets that lay on a thin, rare structure made of the cheapest wood available, the very gentle slope of the side that covers the hall posing serious threats in case of heavy snow.

Fig. 13. Inside a house in construction from Oborul Nou.
Source: Author's photo.

„I would like to have some parquet in here, if God helps!", said the owner of the house in construction pictured in Fig. 13. It is often the case that the second room is unfinished, even when done it is rarely used otherwise then a deposit for the stuff they might have. In rural Romania it is called "the good room" or "the big room". However, considering the fact that heating and maintaining a second room is not affordable we can hardly attribute the important number of unfinished room to tradition. Actually, the percentage of unused/unfinished rooms might be a very good indicator of housing deprivation in a poverty area.

Fig. 13. The designed interior of a home in Oborul Nou.
Source: Author's photo.

This particular family was interesting to follow for its dynamics, a more recent visit showing an impressive advance in finishing and furniture on the basis of some money that came from Italy; she managed to get her parquet and nice blue walls but there was no stove inside, nor money to get one before winter. However, this achievement came with a price, her twenty one years old husband had his brachial artery and nerve sectioned, a major injury with possible permanent mobility and sensitivity effects, in an event that was not revealed, she just present it as "heart problems". Considering that the extended family was involved in a violent attack with "swords" (long makeshift knives, a machete type that is very popular in places affected by insecurity) and that his work in recycling does not require sharp tools it is likely that this was the result of a violent episode.

It is hard to know to what extent the remittances have a positive impact on the living conditions for the majority of the families involved in the process of circular migration and how many people really take advantage of their work, our survey did not get much evidence for successful migrants in Oborul Nou, most of the success stories being located in the Spoitori neighbourhood, FNC-Livadă.

FNC-Livadă

There is a certain preference of the people of Călărăşi to use acronyms and names that contain numerals (Doi Moldoveni = Two Moldavians; Cinci Călăraşi = Five Călăraşi; Zece Niveluri = Ten Stories etc.); in this case FNC means "Fabrica de nutreţuri combinate" (Combined Forage Factory), an industrial objective that is a major landmark in the Northen brownfields while "Livadă" means orchard, which was the former use of a part of the land on which the Spoitori settled starting with the la 90's. It is to be supposed that this sort of toponymy is a marker of the rapid development on a flat territory that lacks major historical, cultural or geographical references. This sort of strategy still keeps the flavour of the pioneering groups, heterogeneous groups of colonists that were rapidly settling on a cultureless territory in a military manner and with no interests to bring an ethos other then the one of efficiency and production.

Fig. 14. Livada, Călăraşi.

Source: Google Maps.

Due to the different cultural status of the *Spoitori* group, their attempt to constitute a settlement *ex-nihilo* follows a different political path, in an attempt of the authorities to create a site-specific area several streets are named after famous Roma personalities: the actor Ştefan Bănică, the violin player Ion Voicu etc. Livadă is a bottom-up initiative, a case in which a community with a strong identity, a particular dynamic and a long history in the area is appropriating a territory in order to defend its livelihoods and lifestyle.

Fig. 15. Livada, two of the industrial limits of the neighbourhood towards FNC, one towards Doi Cocoşi, the other that ends with a small empty area and a motel.

Source: Author's photo.

Livada and Doi Moldoveni are separated by the railway, the ruins of a former industrial area and a graveyard. The place is full of debris and aggressive stray dogs. Children and old people are under constant attack from the dogs but they don't care much, their ability to fight back keeps the balance. Livada stretches in between the truck road, the FNC, the Doi Cocoşi neighbourhood (to the South, practically indistinguishable from Livada) and the railway.

The area has a peri-urban character, the gardens are too small to be productive and people don't have too many animals but the infrastructure, the public space and the public equipments are minimal or missing. Due to the particular process of formation the street network is unevenly developed and sized,

there are a number of dead ends that are not suited for auto access. Local shops are well supplied and the merchandise on the shelves is an illustration of an almost urban type of consumption, with little to no presence of fresh food – typical to periphery shops where this is supplied by local production, sometimes some more expensive alcohol, all sorts of detergents and personal care products. The way the products are arranged and the advertising show that the shops are connected to the main networks of distribution. However there is an important variation of the stock, sometimes just one of the two shops works and the diversity can disappear overnight and be replaced by the usual minimal list of products that are characteristic to a poverty area shop – bread, beer, oil, sugar, very cheap sweets, matches and maybe some canned meat products. Proximity shops in that sort of areas are an excellent instantaneous indicator of the economic level of a community, the Metaxa cogniac that was there during the wedding season is now replaced by a long list of debtors, all waiting for some money from Italy. Not everybody is "on the notebook", the sums are small and the repayment time is short, sign of a relatively good economic situation of the community. In comparison, in Obor very few people can get food from the nearby shops on credit.

A brief history of the Spoitori

The community has a dramatic history of relocations that started in 1981, at the apex of Ceaușescu's programme to build new civic centers for every county capital and to systematize rural areas. For twenty years the community was splitted in several villages around Călăraşi, finally they managed to reunite through a spectacular agregation process that involved buying properties, squatting and negotiating with authorities like a real political body. The interview with nea Costică "Meraru" (Tudorache Constantin), the leader of the Spoitori, brings not only the story of relocations but a wealth of other informations about the lifestyle and livelihoods of his group. He was born in 1935 in Mircea Vodă, at that time when the commune was not part of the city. According to an observation that I owe to the late Nicolae Gheorghe, Meraru is a live history book of the community, an oral register of the kinship relations having a fundamental functional role in regulating the weddings, the economy of respect and hierarchy or the cohesion in front of common threats. This is how what explains his position as a leader; he is obviously not the wealthiest or the strongest but the keeper of the collective memory. This was striking during the interview, many events, though happened more then 30-40 years ago, were mentioned with the exact date and most of the persons were mentioned with their full name. His narrative technique is not only well polished through practice but also built on innate qualities like the pleasure to share with you various stories but still keep to the topic, the care for details that is associated with a sort of balance and respect for persons and that is elegantly laid upon events that were probably not as dignifying as they look now. However, the construction of the discourse is almost invisible; his goal is to act as an objective source that represents historical events from a

mature perspective, the narrative has an ethical role, more like a captain's log then of a contemporary blog. This is not to say that the narrative has a technical or neutral style but that the usual overwhelming personal references that are common for non-professional communicators are not here. His discourse had the political function of a report; I was introduced to him by somebody from the City Hall and he also knew that I am from Bucharest so he imagined that he can deliver some messages. Meraru is a gentle gatekeeper that knows the general geography of power and is also able to connect it to the local, minor leadership or with the somehow active but still loose structures of the Roma Party (Partida Romilor):

Sometimes Nicu Paun (Roma MP) comes, we make a meeting, he asks us what we need, tells us what we have to do. He is almost more powerful then the Mayor!

(…)

[About the "communist times":] The world was fine then, the old ones were educated, how to say, less able to communicate. We had cattle, two, three, some even ten, my parents had twelve and were providing for the officer's kitchen here, at 23, 20 and 5 Călăraşi on a regular basis. Down the valley there was a grazing field as large as you could see with your eyes and the animals were separated in two herds, the ones that could give milk and the non-productive. We had a good life, the calfs were on contract with the state, we had money. The houses were small, with two rooms, or two rooms and hall, the land was in between 250-300 sqm. The families were not too large, there were two to five children and, at that time there were no separate rooms for children, like they have now even as early as seven month old but until the child was two he was sleeping in the arms of his mother. After four or five he was given his own bed.

(…)

After a while, what happened; the wetland was cultivated with corn, with grains, that's the way Ceauşescu was, greedy, he wanted to cultivate all the land, anyhow, it was better then now. You were free at your home, with your money, you were safe! When the pasture disappeared we gave the animals to the state company. The community was not more different then today, about 400 families, now we are 600, I counted them, more then 3000 people because today people have lots of children, five, six, even seven, even the dumbest has at least three.

(…)

In 1981, the 21st of July, we were demolished and moved, some at Cuza Vodă, some at Ceacu, others at Roseţi, some others at Tonea, we split. They needed our land which was in between Călăraşi and Mircea Vodă; we were in the middle and we were told that we are illegal. Some got some land from the cooperatives, the ones who got money bought houses in the village and then we spent 14 years there, in Roseţi and Tonea. From Roseţi we draw back to Tonea, you know we, the Roma, are like sheep, if one jumps into a well all the others will jump too! The Bulibaşa was one of my uncles, Leca Constantin, he did not agree with the demolition, he tried to contact Ceauşescu, but the Mayor and other people from

the City finally did that and we had to move from here to there until we spotted this empty piece of land an we moved here in 1996. (Leader of the Spoitor community, Călăraşi, May 2012).

I also asked him to give details about the process of settlement and about their current legal status:

I have papers for the land, me and my neighbours, we bought it from somebody but the rest live on the municipal land under a concession contract, they don't pay for the house, it is considered a garden. This land belonged to mr. Tărăcilă, he inherited it. When the City saw us on the land, with no papers, no permits, they made an exchange, they gave him 25 hectares in the agricultural area in exchange for his land here. We were very content because we were allowed to build houses, we particularly liked this mayor, Mr. Dragu, we voted for him twice because he made us this service. He said: `Do what you have to do but don't take more then 250 sqm. If you have children and they are married it's a different family, so they will also get 250, so we put everybody in line and we distributed as it should, 500 for one, 1000 for another, the smallest was 150 because I told them, sometimes in the future we'll have to pay for it. We also let streets in between us, we need streets. People gathered here, in the centre, it took about a week but I would only need a single day if they would have been at home all at a time, it was simple because they listen to me, they love and respect me, I am their leader since 1973, the month of August, on the 16th and I was their leader in Roseţi and Tonea as well. I have reached a certain age, people saw I take care of them, I never need a *bacşiş* (i.e. tip), and nobody can say he gave me even a bottle of beer. (Leader of the Spoitor community, Călăraşi, May 2012)

Fig. 16. House for sale in the Spoitor community from Călăraşi, the contact number written with paint on the wall is Italian.

Source: Author's photo.

„These are the children that left for work!" House for sale, the contact number written with paint on the wall is Italian. It is not the only one, several houses have their doors and windows blocked with panels or masonry, a clear indication of the fact that the inhabitants are away for a long period.

Călăraşi has a strong connection with Naples, so strong that people in Naples think that all Romanian Roma are from Călăraşi, local authorities claiming that there could be as much as 5000 people in the city and its suburbs. Meraru gives us one of the reasons for their massive migration:

> Some others that left for Italy came back and demolished the old house that was smaller, modest and made a better one, with a nice fence, aligned with the street. The new houses are different from the old ones. When the evaluator from Bucharest came, Mr. Persican Dumitru, we agreed at a price, first it was 20 Euros, then 15 but we settled at 10 Euro/sqm, people pay the rent but some have already the contracts to buy it. Everybody wants to buy but if you have 200 sqm you have to pay 2000 Euros, many have to lend the money, in our community you have to pay interest, for 2000 in five to six month you have to pay 2-300 Euros more. People get along very well, they help one another, it is most likely that more then half of them will buy the land. Here, in the city there is no work, maybe from our kin, the Spoitori, of which we might be 1200 families, only about forty have a job, but only stinky jobs: night-guard, street sweeper, longshoreman, garbage man at the pit. But we used to have a good life with the cattle! (Leader of the Spoitor community, Călăraşi, May 2012).

The relation with the City is not always smooth; there are problems that arise from the lack of legal status and sometimes from the many weddings that are taking place in the public space.

> There was a water pipe here, on the main street, when the Romanians had their gardens, when they left the pumps remain, now we are promised that we will also have water and the roads are good, when we came here there was mud all over the place, we are content with him (the Mayor) because he provided... Before him there was another one, who did what he did: there were three very poor men, two brothers in law and a brother and they made some shacks that were so small and poor that you were ashamed to go in and Mr Mayor Mîţan came with a bulldozer and knocked them down. He said: you are not allowed to build, you don't have permits. Then Mr Dragu came and said: Do what you can, but I don't want to hear any noise, no conflict, nothing in Tribunal or at the Prefect, I don't want to have troubles. Make your houses as you like it but keep them in line, the street should look nice and we'll see what we do further! People got that and everybody respected the rules. The largest house here has six rooms for like six individuals. The smallest, the houses of the poor have two rooms and a hall. The biggest problem here is the

lack of sewage. Until now it was not even possible because of the railway but now there is sewage on the nearby boulevard and we hope to be connected. (Leader of the Spoitor community, Călăraşi, May 2012).

Fig. 17. Livada – normal density of housing, small courtyards with some chicken and few fancy rooftops that were quickly labelled as "palaces" by the visitors.
All houses are only ground level.
Source: Author's photo.

Doi Moldoveni

Migration during socialist times was important but after the 1977 earthquake and during the vast construction programmes of the 80's it reached unprecedented levels. An important part of it was based in Moldova (the Romanian historical region, not the actual Republic of Moldova) and alongside with it came the stigma associated with the Moldavians as poor, uneducated, violent, noisy etc. Nobody really knows why the neighbourhood is named Doi Moldoveni (Two Moldavians) but it is for sure that many Moldavians came to live here when Siderca, the metallurgic company was under construction. The symbolic hierarchies place the Moldavians at the bottom and the ideas that are associated with the populations of recent migrants were close to racist stereotypes in those years (more fertile then average, promiscuous, dirty, barbarians that destroyed the local culture etc.)

Fig. 19. Doi Moldoveni, Călăraşi.

Source: Google Maps.

The name „Doi Moldoveni" is nothing else but the fixation of this relation between the locals and the migrant other, in this case in the form of an ironic mythology of two Moldavians about whom nobody can tell if they were friends or foes but about which pretty much everybody thinks it has to do with a pub. This is no different from the most important ghetto of today in Romania, Aleea Livezilor in Ferentari, Bucharest where the informal name used by some policeman was ȚMȚ (țărani, moldoveni, țigani) – PMG (peasants, Moldavians, Gipsies), a formula that describes with sociological accuracy both the social and ethnical composition and the local hierarchy (Berescu, 2011).

We are accustomed with the idea of a ghetto that has strong and visible physical boundaries however, though some of the limits of urban ghettos are easy identifiable some others are more loose and permeable. For the block of flats typology there is rarely the case when there is a ghetto surrounded by an average standard neighbourhood; always the ghetto is a part of a larger poverty area with which it trades its symbolic boundaries. An exterior perspective, of an occasional visitor of a an inhabitant of a distant area of the city is usually taking into account an extended area and collects fears and stereotypes (e.g. Ferentari in Bucharest or Brixton in London as problematic neighbourhoods). Coming closer to it there is a larger poverty area with substandard but functional houses and where access is non problematic. Then there is a ghetto that defines its limits in accordance to where your informant lives; for some their own place is the worst, for others is always the neighbour who is the You know you are in a ghetto when people start to ask you: What are you doing here?

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Fig. 19. Doi Moldoveni. Block of flats in a very bad shape, families still dwelling there. **Source:** Author's photo.

The neighbourhood is situated at the end of a larger zone of blocks of flats that is mainly composed of four stories buildings made of prefabricated concrete panels, typical urban planning of the 70's on following the principles of the Athena Chart, a totally non-site specific approach that is disconnected from the neighbouring urban tissue. A common unintentional irony that can be found in many other ghettos makes it start where the street Belşugului (The Wealth Street) ends[6]. All the units that are affected by poverty have a similar structure: one staircase with single room apartments most likely a typified project of IPCT Bucharest (The Institute for Typified Constructions).

Besides interviews with the inhabitants of Doi Moldoveni we had the chance to meet Valentin B, 37 years, a former inhabitant of Doi Moldoveni, now recruited by a team of Christian missionaries to work and live in the community centre in Oborul Nou. His story is important because he lived from the late 80's in various places in Doi Moldoveni then he left in 2012 from an apartment that he still owns; now he lives in the centre with his wife. His personal trajectory is in a way particular, for he is raised in an orphanage, but then again his relation to the

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[6] Some other examples are: The Springtime Street in Miercurea Ciuc, by the sewage plant, Nadejda (Hope), one of the largest ghettos in Europe in Sliven, Bulgaria, The Landscape Street in Bucharest or Fakulteta in Sofia.

place is illustrative for the process that changed the area. During communism he graduated high school and was employed in the steel works factory. Alongside with that he received a room in Doi Moldoveni but only after few month, in the aftermath of the Revolution, he lost his job and was thrown out – „last to come, first to go!". For about one year he had to sleep in various places, he rent, he slept rough in the railway station or in the park, until one day when he decided to ask for a meeting with the director of the company. He was employed again and got a room that he eventually bought after the privatisation. The house was bought with the money he received as compensation – six monthly salaries, around 240 million lei in 1998, out of which the price of the house was 200 millions, roughly 4500 E. Today the cheapest price for a piece is 2,200 Euro for a legal purchase but to occupy a room that is free it only costs 20 million (2,000 lei – 450 Euro).

> My struggle was to get a room in the block by the military headquarters that was the cleanest, there was a very good administrator there, a Hungarian woman, Venera, very tough woman, maybe a little racist because she was not taking gipsies in the block. It might be that I could not get there, I am dark haired, dark skinned (Valentin, male, 37 years old, a former inhabitant of Doi Moldoveni, now living in Obor Nou, interviewed in May 2012).

Valentin witnessed the dynamics of change of this worker's dormitories neighbourhood whose inhabitants were predominantly young males, some living three to four in a 19sqm room that had a sink and a small hall used as a kitchen, with common toilets on the corridor. Using the existing sewage some of them equipped their rooms with private toilets and showers.

> I see an enormous difference since 1993, when I first received a room, at that time there were a lot of Moldavians, of course, and very few Roma. There were problems with the Moldavians at that time, they were getting drunk and then... At that time life was not that bad, the place was green, and there was tranquillity. Starting with '95 the Moldavians started to leave and the plant closed. During the closing procedures there was a guy who was distributing rooms and I witnessed how many Spoitori started to sell their apartment in the city and move in here. This way they could have some money but still own a house. (Valentin, male, 37 years old, a former inhabitant of Doi Moldoveni, now living in Obor Nou, interviewed in May 2012).

Near the military headquarters one of the blocks, previously used for high school students, was refurbished and the former inhabitants removed. One of the rooms at the ground level hosts a local police office.

> Since various people came I feel insecure. They only care about the interiors of their house but the exterior space is a disaster. The Spoitori have very nice houses on the inside but several years ago I was afraid to look on the window, such a general mess there was, a lot more dirty than today. We had to close the common bathroom; everybody made his own toilet and

shower. There were lots of rats, bugs, mosquitoes, dogs, once I saved a woman from a violent attack of a pack of dogs. I would never live in Doi Moldoveni and raise a child there but I could live here in Obor among these people, I would make myself a house out of containers and I would be fine, here is less dangerous. I though about it a lot, there I am an owner, I have furniture, the house might worth 300 million lei (6,700 Euro), it has a shower and air conditioning but I would never go back. I saw families that moved there because there was no other choice and in several month their children, that were first very respectful where 'touched' by the zone. Prostitution is flourishing, even the wife of the pimp who attacked me came to me to offer a girl, and that was during the day! Prostitution is not only local, the main activity takes place at Podul 4 (Bridge 4), even in Obor sometimes you can find during the night expensive cars, you wonder what they do here and you see girls that maybe, don't came at age that are dressed in a very provocative way. But here, in Obor, things are not so visible; in Doi Moldoveni even the persons who should do their duty... I don't want to tell, I am scared of the thought that I might live there again! (Valentin, male, 37 years old, a former inhabitant of Doi Moldoveni, now living in Obor Nou, interviewed in May 2012).

Vasile I., the leader in Doi Moldoveni, a former leader of the Roma Party that now leads an NGO, comes from a Spoitori family with eleven brothers. Kinship explains as much of his local power as his native intelligence and diligent attitude: he is an author of a book that he hopes to publish soon and his interests and knowledge about Roma issues is way above average. He is a polemic individual, the common blaming of the leaders being pushed by him up at a higher level, as he accuses the central leaders and the main figures of Roma activism for the general bad situation of today. Though he is a very good speaker, he is not too much liked by municipality officials. His leadership has more to do with the administration of the block of flats. Actually, like in any neighbourhood of blocks of flats, there is no community of interest beyond the staircase.

Policy Discussion and Conclusions

Urban policies

The urban and spatial policy of the municipality is in line with the practice in most of the Romanian cities but it can be argued that it is actually being one of the softes positions towards Roma. The process of segregation – aggregation is not driven through active policies but is based on past events and follows inherited trends. Segregation comes in steps; it is built on innate vulnerabilities and covered by a discourse about development. Two of the actual neighbourhoods, Doi Moldoveni and Livadă are a result of both communist policies and neoliberal transition trends. During communism, it was argued through the voice of

Ceauşescu himself that the collective housing estates were the best way to spare more land for agriculture, in fact that was the way to concentrate the workforce needed for the megalomaniac industrial programmes. We witness today an opposite turn, as well ideologically driven and idealized through a discourse that values the suburban house as the „normal" way of living and as the cradle of the anticommunist middle class, the real driving force (or in a conspiracy theory terminology „the agent with a hidden agenda") being in that case the real estate market, precisely that part that speculates on land and houses in order to take advantage of the „property bubbles". The disintegration of public spaces has to do with the strong flow of inhabitants towards periphery, a major source of environmental damage for most cities. This post-revolutionary middle class dream is not what drives the Roma communities towards the edge of the city but the values on which it is built are in use when it comes to relocation plans.

The development of new residential areas for young families' works actually in the case of Obor as a process of spatial exclusion of the poor, even when some of the initial conditions were properly established; in this case, decent size individual plots placed on a correct grid of streets. The failure to achieve the relative success of the new residential areas composed of individual housing is not just a temporary stage of a development process that is just lagging behind but a permanent condition of a group excluded on ethnic and economic basis. Like in many other cases, the improvement of infrastructure or any other real advance in the living conditions, less likely to happen on the edge of the city, will only lead to a change of population like in any other gentrification process.

In order to give an answer to the failures of individual housing but to further keep it alive and valid as a model in the long run, authorities and civil society are employing the very popular strategy of building community centres, institutions that are primarily dedicated to children and have the main goal to discipline them and teach them hygiene. The focus on children, hugely popular amongst NGO's, morally comfortable and practically less challenging then any other type of intervention is a disguise for a general, old style soteriology of saving the poor by educating their children, institutes a noble report between the benefactor and the *beneficiary* (*sic!*, this is the current terminology for any person that receives any sort of attention from an institution) but hides the permanent and enduring exclusion of their parents. Oborul Nou has two of them, one based on a Christian missionary mission and the second build with European funding and now administered by the municipality. This highlights the ghetto character of the neighbourhood no less stronger in a place like Doi Moldoveni, where you have ethnical mixture but less poignant in Livadă, a case that is at the end of the scale of segregation which is beautifully balanced with a very strong process of aggregation.

Identity as a segregation tool

The question of identity in regards with the build environment is always central in shaping attitudes and behaviours, ultimately urban policies, and points to a certain type of well established vision on Roma, essentialist in nature. The power practices it on the assumption that the lifestyle and the housing needs of Roma are different from the majority. This way they can capitalise on the general racist attitude and use it as a political argument when it comes to improving or maintaining housing conditions and the infrastructure. There is a strong political logic that draws from the fact that the majority is racist so the policy measures would not contradict this and eventually stabilize it in more or less subtle forms of institutional racism. Despite their apparently good intentions Roma support programmes are often shaped in this manner; traditional trades, traditional way of life, preserving the customs etc. Moreover, there is an activists' national project (Matei, 2012) that envisages the emancipation of Roma through reconquering their identity and unifying the past, easy to use by any form of power to treat disadvantaged groups as a radical alterity apparition that can be subjected to a different treatment then the majority. In addition, from the academic world, we have a long established line of Romani studies that tend to focus their investigations on the central question: What is a Roma? and to bring into the discussion a lot of knowledge about the differences between the Roma and the Gadje. As far as this may illustrate very well issues related to various everyday life and general activities that are generally labelled with the term *culture* it is less relevant in terms of architecture and even settlements structure – the classic terms urbanism or urban planning would be misleading in this context – and this is especially valid for the Romani ghettos. The inference is the following: the more poor the dwellers are, the less ethnic identity you can find in their build environment. It's only the rich Roma that can afford to invent/construct/perform identity and it is predominantly poverty, not ethnicity that shapes the physical aspect of the ghettos. It is very hard to find issues related to space use in housing, or urban setting (public space, common space) or any other spatial aspect (landscape, territorial usage, courtyards) that would be specific to Roma and not the others, especially in a settled (i.e. non-nomad) culture like that of the Romanian Roma. Even the very popular "Gypsy towers", of which one can find some miniatural versions in Livada, "towers" that are so popular among photographers are not exactly a Roma creation but a part of a vernacular culture in which the Romanian neighbours play a major part. Vividly coloured houses can also be spotted in Livadă but this is not common only for Livada and, despite the stereotype of colourful Roma houses can be attributed by large to an increased availability of colour paint – a major DIY shop that covers the entire county was built and with a sudden drop of the price in the late 2000's.

Ghetto Governance

The main policy issues that are related to the administration of these areas, and the reinforcement of their ghetto character, are related to the the lack of civil society and the feudal character of local leadership. The *state of exception* character of the policies that have to do with Roma and the the *emergency help* policy are adding to the *no go area* status that is ruled by strong leaders and can only be administered through middlemen. Călăraşi is a small city with virtually no active civil society (i.e. NGO, independent media, non-partisan critics, public intellectuals etc.). This has to do with the much accused communist heritage, or even with a longer line of historical determinants as nowadays Romanian intellectuals like to point out and with the general framework of decentralisation that shapes the behaviour of the administration. Due to the limits of our study it is not our goal to challenge the concept of „cultural heritage of communism" or to find out if the media term „local barons" is illustrative for the Mayor or the local Prefect. Nonetheless, our discussions with the inhabitants revealed several issues. First, the inhabitants' perspective on power is massively dominated by the figure of the Mayor. When the Mayor doesn't deliver they take into consideration „going to Bucharest", never quite clear where to but to some superior forum. Otherwise he has it all: everything that has to do with decisions, from the big issues to the individual access to social canteen („He didn't even give me the canteen!"). Thus he is able to capitalise on every current activity of his administrative apparatus. Second, the experience with power is limited to the interaction with few middlemen (mediators, Roma experts, juridical personnel). Many of the poor Roma are illiterate or functionally illiterate so they have to rely on their leaders and on the mediators, sometimes named, ironically, „our Mayor". All these are regarded to a large extent as leaders and held accountable correspondingly. Third, the internal leadership of the communities is restrained to very few functions; it is vague and not always soft. Leadership has its benefits, largely exaggerated by the poor, always ready to present their leaders in the back as profiteers, slick and ruthless exploiters of the unfortunate, mainly the ones that got rich by keeping for themselves most of the things that were supposed to be distributed to the members of the community.

Roma leaders in poor communities are always secondary figures; they either lack real power or do not have minimal skills to act as political actors, or both. Their role is decorative for the administration, they are occasionally invited to round tables or used as a "portavoce" (i.e. voice amplifier) by the Mayor. There is no leadership in Cinci Călăraşi, Măgureni or Prelungirea Bucureşti, but some forms in the other areas. For Livadă, *Bulibaşul* Meraru is a classic figure of a patriarch with soft leadership skills that were acquired through practice, although his position is inherited through kinship. His power comes from the unity of the *neam* (kin) of Spoitori, whose behaviour is predictable.

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The messages he has to deliver to the community are simple instructions to keep the order and how to vote, whilst the messages he is delivering from the community to the administration are simple and reasonable requests for improving the living conditions of his community. The individual requests are dealt by the mediators like for example DS, local Roma expert that has a relatively short history of dealing with Roma issues. According to his own story, he rarely used his Roma identity before 1989; he was fully integrated in the Romanian society, having a Romanian wife and working as a taxi driver until relatively recently. His organizing skills and polite behaviour made him the leader of the local branch of the Roma Party (Partida Romilor). It is a relatively important position since the MP cabinet of the Roma Deputy is situated in Călăraşi. However, not speaking the Romani language and not being part of a compact community puts him into a particularly vulnerable position as there is a strong critique of many Roma responsible against the "Kashtalii" (the ones who don't speak the language, from *kasht*, wood). He has to stick to the "technician" position and point out his commitment and hard work for the Roma whenever discussing with those who make a distinction between "the real Roma" and the Kashtalii. He is dark skinned and has an impeccable suit, all the details of his appearance, from postural attitudes to the objects that he carries with himself shows he is an official person. The way he describes the situation and the communities is predominantly form an outsider's point of view. At our first meetings, I had the impression that we are both coming from far away , from a different world: he was constantly using the word "they" when referring to the Spoitori and accounted various non-compliant behaviours of the inhabitants of Obor. Only later I found out that he actually lives 300 meters away. His status as an employee is uncertain, as after openly campaigning for the former Mayor he had difficulties in gaining the trust of the new Mayor. A somehow similar story has NA, a school mediator that runs the Community Centre in Oborul Nou. He has a degree in social sciences and lives in a social housing neighbourhood that is far from Obor so, at first, he appeared to be an urban activist that works for a community on programme based projects. Initially not speaking the language he learned it and became a professor of Romani, a job that was later passed to his wife, a native speaker. We later learned that his father actually lives in Obor and that he used to be a leader of local Roma for a while. NP, an older and more politically experienced Roma expert has a different history: he was always a "Spoitor", not only a native speaker of Romani but closely related to many of the inhabitants of Livada.

We have to notice that "Roma expert" here is a generic term, the function as such does exist. However, all our actors use the syntagm as a title. There is another school mediator, a Romanian men working with the Spoitori, excellent speaker of Romani as acknowledge by the community and a sanitary mediator that, in theory has to deal with the entire Roma population of the city estimated in between 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. They always use the words "them", "they

don't understand", and patronising phrases like "no matter what you do for them they will still be discontent". People also have a clear distance, their position is judged with the words "they don't do what they are supposed to do" and "they don't provide". Despite the bellicose tone on both sides when it comes to concrete topics there is a very neat collaboration, the Roma experts are indispensable both to the City and to the inhabitants.

The Roma experts are indispensable both to the City and to the inhabitants. Their status as secondary political actors is a perfect match of the processes that turns the ethnic housing areas into ghettos and of that type or governance that pushes and then keeps the poor, the Roma and especially the poor Roma together in urban slums.

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MAPPING ROMA MARGINALIZATION IN LOCAL CONTEXTS[1]

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ABSTRACT. This article is built on the final Romanian long report about the contextual inquiry "Faces and Causes of the Roma Marginalization in Local Settings" (2013)[12] with the aim to illustrate with further cases the phenomenon of the spatialization of Roma exclusion, the very topic of the SPAREX research which this issue of *Studia UBB Sociologia* is dedicated to. The final report structured the vast empirical material collected in 25 localities in six chapters, broadly discussing local administrative, developmental and institutional contexts, issues of school education, employment and Roma participation and political representation, and

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[12] *Faces and Causes of the Roma Marginalization in Local Settings. Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011, focusing on Hungary, Romania, Serbia,* conducted between December 2012 and June 2013. A joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Open Society Foundation's Roma Initiatives Office (RIO) and the Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma Inclusion program, and the Central European University/Center for Policy Studies (CEU CPS), implemented in Hungary by the Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in Romania by Desiré Foundation from Cluj, and in Serbia by the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University. Between July 2013 and June 2014 this contextual inquiry continues with a further, qualitative phase conducted in three localities of each of the participating countries (see *http://cps.ceu.hu/research/roma-marginalization,* accessed on 21.11.2013).

presenting an overview on the formation and current situation of deprived "Roma segments". The present article is focused on the latter issue, yet describing their local economic and housing context, and revealing how trans-local phenomena such as the lack of labour opportunities in the Romanian economy and the deficiencies of development policies shape/restrain the prospects of Roma communities to make their living on the localized stages of complex power relations. Following Nancy Fraser's approach on recognitions and redistribution, the conclusions set forth a three dimensional model of empowerment for marginalized and underprivileged Roma groups, including social inclusion, cultural recognition and political representation.

***Keywords*:** Uneven local development, precarious labour; housing deprivation; differentiation of "Roma segments", three-dimensional empowerment

Introduction

The research *Faces and Causes of the Roma Marginalization in Local Settings. Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011* identified a series of intersecting factors functioning in and across the targeted localities from Romania that (re)produce the ethno-spatial segregation or separation of Roma, intersected or not with economic deprivations or extreme poverty. Through analyzing the data collected from 25 settlements, grouped in five clusters from five out of the eight developmental regions of the country, our aim was to offer an insight into the way in which, at local level, advanced marginality created economically deprived and excluded (Romani) communities.[13]

In the construction of the Romanian sample we aimed at finding a compromise that – on the one hand – satisfied the principles proposed by the research coordinators (localities should be selected from the 2011 UNDP survey[14]

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[13] This approach follows the definition of Wacquant (2008), according to whom advanced marginality is the new form of social exclusion in neoliberal regimes, characterized by accumulation of economic penury, social deprivation, ethno-racial divisions, and public violence in the same distressed urban area. This type of expulsion does not stem from economic crises or underdevelopment; it is rather the resultant of economic restructuring and its unequal economic effects on the lowest faction of workers and subordinated ethnic categories.

[14] The UNDP/WB/EC survey was conducted in May-July 2011 on a random sample of Roma and non-Roma households living in areas with higher density (or concentration) of Roma populations in the EU Member States of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and the non-EU Member States of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova and Serbia. In each of the countries, approximately 750 Roma households and approximately 350 non-Roma households living in proximity were interviewed. The survey was carried out by the UNDP and World Bank (funded by the European Commission – Directorate General for Regional Policy (funded survey in the EU countries), UNDP and the Nordic Trust Fund at the World Bank), accessible at *http://europeandcis.undp.org/data/show/D69F01FE-F203-1EE9-B45121B12A557E1B* - accessed on 21.11.2013. Parallel with this a FRA Roma pilot survey was conducted on some EU member states (those included into the UNDP survey, and France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain).

sample, each of them should include one small city and four villages, and they should act as a cluster) and – on the other hand – it responded to the realities of Romanian territorial administration. Because at local level the biggest territorial administrative unit in Romania is the county (*județ*), we decided choosing our clusters in a way, which resulted in the selection of the composing localities that belonged to the same county; despite the fact that regions in Romania do not act as administrative units, they function as so-called developmental areas and reproduce the disparities between the historical regions of the country – this is why we decided to choose localities/clusters/counties belonging to different developmental regions. As a result of these concerns, we conducted the research on the sample presented in Table 1 (data on this sample is also reflected by our maps presented in *Annex 1.* The spatial distribution of ethnic Roma population in the five counties and 25 localities as mirrored by the 2011 Census):

In the localities from above we could observe that the process of Roma marginalization is undergoing at the crossroads of structural conditions characterizing the different regions, counties, urban and rural settlements, and neighbourhoods, but as well as of the institutionalized power relations and mentalities about (non)belonging at local and trans-local level. Among the "structural conditions" producing marginality in our contextual research we focused on: economic under-development of the closer and larger area, among others the acute lack of job opportunities due to economic restructuring; precarious housing circumstances belonging to territorially isolated zones with extremely reduced access to quality public services and goods; and the lack of political will and/or technical competency of elaborating and implementing evidence-based, inclusive and cohesive development policies. As far as the "institutionalized power relations and mentalities" are concerned, we could highlight: the historically embedded inter-personal and inter-group relationships sustained in several domains of life (school, labour, administration etc.) between people identified on the base of their social status and ethnic belonging; some cross-generationally transmitted cultural conceptions about cohabitation of differences that matter at particular levels (in particular social status and ethnicity).[15]

In what follows this article describes the broader economic and housing context of the localities scrutinized by our contextual inquiry, and afterwards briefly presents the differentiation of Roma segments in these environments. Moreover, recognizing the complexity of the factors creating Roma marginalization, our conclusion also highlights the need for a three dimensional empowerment of poor Roma consisting of social inclusion, cultural recognition and political participation.

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[15] More details on the whole contextual inquiry in Szalai (2013), and on the Romania-related conclusions in Vincze (2013b).

Table 1.
Description of clusters

Cluster	County (historical region)	Locality	UNDP 2011 sample	Distance to the cluster's urban setting (km)	Ethnic Roma (%)	Risk of poverty in the Develop-mental Region
1. Iași cluster	Iași (Moldova)	Târgu Frumos	Yes	-	9.59%	50% (North-East, highest in Romania)
		Mironeasa	Yes	76	8.24%	
		Lungani	No	15	33.85%	
		Stolniceni-Prăjescu	No	32	7.21%	
		Ciohorăni	No	50	24.54%	
2. Arad cluster	Arad (Banat)	Curtici	Yes	-	11.81%	32% (Vest)
		Covăsînț	Yes	52	25.33%	
		Șiria	Yes	45	12.15%	
		Pilu	Yes	48	12.78%	
		Macea	No	6	8.81%	
3. Dolj cluster	Dolj (Oltenia)	Calafat	Yes	-	4.62%	42% (South-Vest Oltenia)
		Bârca	Yes	62	24.44%	
		Cetate	Yes	29	19.55%	
		Negoi	Yes	42	43.32%	
		Sadova	Yes	100	23.02%	
4. Alba cluster	Alba (Transilvania)	Aiud	Yes	-	6.45%	28% (Center, second lowest in Romania)
		Lunca Mureșului	Yes	25	11.91%	
		Unirea	No	16	17.93%	
		Hopârta	No	15	17.86%	
		Sâncel	No	42	9.39%	
5. Călărași cluster	Călărași (county with the second highest % of Roma in Romania, 8.1%)	Oltenița	No	-	8.79%	41% (South Muntenia)
		Frumușani	Yes	40	22.02%	
		Spanțov	Yes	17	32.75%	
		Chirnogi	Yes	7	21.40%	
		Curcani	No	15	36.23%	

Source: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, UNDP/WB/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011, and authors' field research in selected localities.

Mapping the localities of the clusters

As *Annex 2* shows (*Cartographic representation of social development in Romania*), according to the indicator of local social development (IDSL, composed of 26 sub-indicators) the most impoverished area of Romania is situated in the Danube Delta (including villages with value 11). Localities with an IDSL under the value of 30 are confronted with major problems of isolation, and are faced with marginalization at national, regional, but also at county level. In the case of our clusters, some individual villages composing the communes belong to this category: Ursița from Mironeasa (Iași cluster), and Pitigaia from Frumușani (Călărași cluster). Deciles 30-40 are specific for poor localities situated within counties with an average

indicator of development. In our clusters this is the case of some component villages of our communes, such as Turdaş, Silivaş, Ciugudu and Măhăceni from Alba county, or Schitu Hadâmbului, Goeşti and Zmeu from Iaşi cluster. In-between values 40 and 60 there are those localities that are having a medium development profile reported to the average medium level. This is the case of communes Negoi and Sadova from Dolj, Hopârta from Alba, and Mironeasa and Ciohorăni from Iaşi. But as well as of the village of Postăvari from commune Frumuşani (Călăraşi cluster) that even if further from the city of Olteniţa, compared to the commune center, is the closest locality from Călăraşi county to the country capital Bucharest. The localities with a value of local development over 60 are the most dynamic ones of the Romanian sample, being in the spatial proximity of urban centers: among them Macea from Arad county, Lunca Mureşului and Sâncel from Alba cluster, Chirnogi from Călăraşi.

Using an indicator of local social development based on five sub-indicators (such as *stoced* – educational stock of the community; *hizolat* – accessibility of the villages to basic services; *hdempot* – "biological capital" of the community; *hqubild* – level of technical development of housing; *hdevsat* – a global indicator that besides the indicators above also refers to supplementary information about the human capital), *Annex 3* places the localities of our clusters on the map of Romania, offering a typology of community development, including five types.

Type 1 (very law community development indicator, with big deficiencies at all the categories of our analysis): also named poverty pockets („*pungi de sărăcie*"), 13 localities of our sample are faced with multiple deprivations, being isolated villages even at the level of the commune where they belong to, without paved road to the commune center, where usually a compact Roma community is settled: Silivaş (Hopârta, Alba), Pitigaia (Frumuşani, Călăraşi), Urşiţa (Mironeasa, Iaşi), Zmeu (Lungani, Iaşi), Moreni (Cetate, Dolj). One locality as commune center is situated in this type of settlement that is Ciohorăni from the Iaşi cluster, however is positioned slightly better than the former isolated villages, which are having a very underdeveloped stock of housing and low educational capital. Exception to this rule is the village Piscu Sadovei (Dolj cluster), which places into this type of level of community development due to its distance over 30 kilometers to a medium-sized or a big city, and due to its demographic aging resulting from the migration of the population.

Type 2 (high indicator of community development, with an average demographic potential): 12 localities of the Romanian sample are situated marginally within the influence area of big cities, but with access to means of transport, their majority being placed in Arad county. In the case of of Iaşi, Călăraşi and Dolj one may meet settlements belonging to this type only in the communal centers selected in our clusters (Lungani, Spanţov, Cetate), while in counties of Transylvania the type also occurs at the level of individual villages, such as Vărşand from commune Pilu (Arad) or village Panade from commune Sâncel (Alba).

Type 3 (low level of community development with an average educational stock) is the most spread type of locality within the Romanian rural environment, characterizing more than one third of the country's villages, which also reflects a territorial polarization between the urban and rural areas. The villages belonging to this category, posses a housing stock similar with the national average, but they are quite isolated territorially so their access to urban-like services is much reduced and the level of their economic development is very modest, however the educational stock in these localities is very close to the national average. 11 localities of our sample are fitting into this type, and excepting Arad cluster, they are dispersed across all the other four clusters. In the case of communal centers, their profile shows disparities if compared with the county average, being part of isolated territorial aggregates in the relative closeness of the county's centers (like Mironeasa from Iași, Negoi and Sadova from Dolj). In the case of other three localities, the distances to an important urban center are above 30 kilometers. The rest of localities of this type, even though they are individual villages with a development indicator that is lower than the county and national averages, benefit of the proximity of a city and of a commune with a community development level higher than the national average (Brătești and Cozmești from the commune Stolniceni-Prăjescu, Iași; or Postăvari and Orăști belonging to commune Frumușani, Călărași; Iclod in commune Sâncel from Alba cluster).

Type 4 (very high level of community development compared to national average) includes the most developed rural areas of Romania and as well as urban environments. In the case of the counties selected for our study, the occurrence of such localities depends on the level of community development of the whole county. Only five settlements of our spatial clusters fulfill the criteria of this type of community development: Macea and Covăsînț (Arad), Lunca Mureșului and Sâncel (Alba), and Chirnogi (Călărași). The absence of such localities in Dolj and Iași clusters suggests that these counties include territorial structures struggling with huge disadvantages compared to the center of the county and these areas of Romania are characterized by strong spatial disparities (otherwise belonging to the development regions showing high levels of poverty risks).

Type 5 (high level community development, but with deficiencies of educational stock) includes localities well integrated into the larger county or regional structures, mostly communal centers advantaged by a proper degree of socio-professional diversity. However, usually situated nearby urban centers, they might be also encountered in more or less isolated areas of the counties in particular due to their demographic growing. One may affirm that this type of localities with reduced level of educational stock is specific for Călărași and Dolj counties. Nevertheless, out of the six localities of our sample that might be placed into this category we find examples across almost all the clusters: Stolniceni-Prăjescu (Iași), Curcani and Frumușani (Călărași), Șiria and Macea (Arad), and Bârca (Dolj).

Economic units

As *Annex 4* on the number of employers reflects, the total number of employers with over five employees in the localities of Alba cluster amounts to 127 (out of which 112 are located in the cluster's city, Aiud), of Arad cluster is about 53 (out of which 24 in the city of Curtici), of Călăraşi cluster is 145 (135 located in the city of Olteniţa), and of Iaşi cluster is up to 36 (all of them functioning in the city of Tg. Frumos). Checking the list of firms available on the internet we could further notice that in Alba cluster out of the 15 companies located in the communes eight were placed in Unirea, five in Sâncel and two in Lunca Mureşului , and none in Hopârta. In Arad cluster the distribution of firms in rural areas is as follows: 16 in Şiria, eight in Macea, four in Covăsînţ, and one in Pilu. In Călăraşi cluster, out of the ten companies from the four communes three are in Curcani, three in Chirnogi, three in Frumuşani and one in Spanţov. And last, none of the companies functioning in Iaşi cluster are located in the selected communes. However, realities encountered during the fieldwork conducted in these localities looked slightly different, in many cases we could not fulfill the requirement to collect data from the specified number and types of companies as we will present in more details in chapter IV of our report. Moreover, *Annex 5* to this Report displays the spatial distribution of business turnout at the level of the 25 localities of the Romanian sample.

There are more similarities than differences among the localities of **Iaşi cluster** in terms of accessibility of jobs on the local labour force market, and they are linked to the chronic absence from the settlements of the potential employers. Shortly after December 1989 all the former big industries and factories absorbing physical labour force collapsed and disappeared. After a period of real estate boom (artificially created by the financial-banking system and real estate speculations) when there was a need for labour force in constructions, today the majority of the unemployed population applies for social benefits, or tries to make a living out of daily labour in different domains, including agricultural work, petty commerce, informal or formal.

In the city of Curtici (**Arad cluster)** the big employer is the Agro-Industrial Combinat built on the ruins of the agricultural cooperatives in 1991 and placed in the so-called Free Zone nearby the state frontier. The latter has a total of 90 hectares, out of which 75 hectares are in the area of Curtici. Over 2500 land owners are associated into this, and their basic activity is the cultivation of vegetables and animal farming. This functions in close relationship with S.C. IAC S.A, which assures the production of beef meat and dairy products, and sells the products through their own shop network belonging to S.C. Agroindimpex S.R.L. The manager of the Combinate is an engineer who has been in a leading position before 1990, too. The difference between the number of employers registered into official statistics and what we found at local level might be explained by the fact that the majority of companies that are active here are only having a working

point here, even though they are the ones that absorb to an extent the local labour force. In the rural areas of our cluster things look differently. There the major employers are the local public administration and schools. Commune Pilu reflects well this situation – there we could find no employer with more than five employees. Network Trading S.R.L. is a non-governmental organization functioning in Şiria that has an income generating part trying to assure funds for the organization running programs for the Roma community. In the case of communes Macea and Covăsînţ the situation looks the same, the labour force market offers much reduced opportunities to the population, so those who are having a job are commuting to Arad, Curtici, or Şiria. We could not find any signs in these settlements that people try to create associations or to initiate some business.

The economic development of the whole **Dolj cluster** is strongly linked to agricultural activities, the use of land in past being predominantly characterized by cultivating cereals. Commune Bârca before 1989 had two agricultural cooperatives, and two related mechanical state companies, in commune Cetate an agricultural cooperative and a canning factory functioned, while in Negoi and Sadova agricultural activity was also organized in cooperatives. After 1990, when cooperatives were abolished and private property over lands was restored, slowly the small pieces of land were sold to big local entrepreneurs or the agricultural terrains were leased by a few firms who started to cultivate them in a mechanized way, so they did not use the local labour force for this reason. Exception from this rule is represented by commune Cetate, whose agricultural-cereal economic profile is completed by initiatives on the domain of tourism (in particular by the investments of a famous cultural and political intellectual into the local harbor) that also implies the development of commercial activities. In what regards the city of Calafat, agricultural terrains are patronized by Italian investors, and the former industrial profile of the locality was completely restructured (majority of factories were closed, today only a factory of clothes, one of plastics, and one producing soda are still in function), so the number of available jobs is much more reduced than it was before, however it is larger than in the rural areas of the cluster.

Economically, all the localities of **Alba cluster** were affected negatively by the abolishment of the former factories of the nearby industrial zones (such as Întreprinderea Metalurgică Aiud, Fabrica de Sodă Ocna Mureş, Salina Ocna Mureş, Mechel Câmpia Turzii). In our days in the city of Aiud there are some big companies (with approximately 500 employees) in the domain of construction and pre-fabricates, and some smaller employers (hiring 50-200 workers) in domains such as clothing and footwear. In commune Unirea we could find two big employers (in the domain of zoo-technique with 70-85 employers, and in the domain of pre-fabricates hiring 50 workers). In commune Lunca Mureşului the major employer is Societatea Agricolă Dreptatea, with 20 employees. In Hopârta, one of the identified employers is an educational center with six employees who offer educational support services for Roma children enrolled to school. In commune Sâncel we could only find small private firms with 2-4 employees.

In Olteniţa of **Călăraşi cluster** there are few private companies, medium sized, which hire couple hundred persons. Their profile is diverse. Two of them work in textile industry. One produces clothes and sell in United Kingdom, the other an Italian company spins the wool for export in Italy. One of the biggest companies, in terms of jobs, is Turbon with 689 employees. The company is remanufacturing used toner cartridges. Other companies that refused the interview are working in paints, toners for printers and copier, and agricultural fertilizer. The unemployment rate is not significantly different from the region. The majority of the population is working in the aforementioned companies or are small entrepreneurs.

Sources of income

As already mentioned, today the majority of the unemployed population from **Iaşi cluster** applies for social benefits, EU food aids, or tries to make a living out of daily labour in different domains, including agricultural work, petty commerce, informal or formal.

Generally speaking, in the localities of **Arad cluster**, people try to combine their incomes earned as employees in local companies and the incomes resulted from agricultural activities. Those who are hired are mostly working in the school system, in local administration or in the Agricultural Combinate from Curtici. Even on the markets of neighbouring counties, people from Arad are famous as good agricultural workers. In the case of Roma population the picture looks slightly differently. There is a trend of trans-national migration among the communities from Curtici, Macea and Covăsânţ for seasonal work in agriculture (Curtici), or in commerce (Covăsânţ), or even in construction (as in the case of Roma from the village of Sânmartin, commune Macea). The way in which it is practiced today in the area, agriculture cannot become the major source of income for the local population.

Forms of employment in the city of Calafat (**Dolj cluster**) are permanent jobs, or seasonal work or day labouring (among others on the base of contracts signed with the city hall for a period of maximum 90 days per year). But Roma are also working in the informal economy, most importantly they are looking for source of income abroad, or they are doing business with second-hand cars, iron recycling, commercializing wood, or with usury. In rural areas there are two main types of activities performed as sources of income: work abroad (chosen by the majority of local Roma), and iron recycling (made by a small number of the poorest Roma from Bârca, Cetate, Negoi and Sadova). Due to the character of the local agriculture (cultivation of cereals by mechanical means done by main investors who are leasing large pieces of lands), Roma cannot find work as day labourers on this domain. In a very few cases they are owners of lands, but in the majority of the cases they sold out their small lands immediately after 1990 realizing that they cannot cultivate these as a source for living. The majority of families without jobs or pensions are trying to make a living out of the social benefits and children's allocations.

In the city of Aiud (**Alba cluster**) we could not obtain information on income generating activities. From the conducted interviews we realized that the majority of the population of the city was employed at IMA, but as a result of dismissals a lot of them are now unemployed, or work at smaller firms mentioned in the above section. Those who were having relatives and lands in the nearby settlements returned to agricultural work. Roma encounter different situations. Only a few of them were hired at IMA and a very few of them are registered unemployed receiving unemployment benefits. Some of them work in construction, in viticulture, or are collecting scrap iron, generally without legal forms. In Lunca Mureşului, Unirea, Sâncel and Hopârta, the majority of employed persons are working in domains such as constructions, cabling, zoo-technique, and prefabs. In Lunca Mureşului approximately 300 persons are enrolled into Societatea Agricolă Dreptatea, a society that holds the commune's lands after the dissolution of socialist agricultural companies. Roma do not have lands and are not part of this society.

In the last ten years all the localities of **Călăraşi cluster** faced a continuously decline of the local economy. In Olteniţa small and medium sized companies disappeared and new smaller ones appeared, mostly family oriented businesses. Here, the Roma and poor non-Roma are working in informal economy as unqualified. The poorest population is collecting scrap metal, as in the case of inhabitants of Turol and Olfil blocks of flat. A big portion of the population from the cluster is commuting for work to Bucharest and Olteniţa. In the rural localities the agriculture is practiced by the inhabitants more in Curcani and the least in Frumuşani. In Curcani people are practicing agriculture for self-subsistence and in Frumuşani this practice was taken over by enterprises. In Spanţov the agricultural activity is the lowest. Day labouring constituted for many poor people an important income. In the last four years the farmers could not afford to hire day labourers and started to associate with other farmers for the agricultural works. The Roma that earned their existence by practicing the daily basis works faced an extreme pauperization. In Spanţov 200-300 Roma are working in Bucharest for Romprest, a sanitation company from the capital. The transport of the employees is provided by the company. In Frumuşani most of the population is working in Bucharest and Ilfov County within different factories (bakery, pastry, hypermarkets, storages etc.). Added to this, some Roma from Frumuşani and Curcani are selling vegetables in the local markets in Bucharest. In Curcani, the researchers found three Roma small entrepreneurs in public transportation, but were not available at that time for an interview and have less than five employees. In none of the four rural localities poor Roma hold land or other properties.

Labour migration

In localities of **Iaşi cluster** Roma people migrate from their residence mostly during warmer seasons, looking for jobs in different settlements of Romania at agricultural farms or in construction. These working places are

sometimes close to the localities of our cluster, but in other times they are at quite a long distance (mostly in the case of people from Mironeasa). During cold seasons they migrate less. From the settlements of our cluster people rarely migrate abroad. The "*ursari*" Roma from commune Lungani (village Zmeu) many of them musicians, started to migrate for seasonal work to Italy. Roma from village Crucea mostly prefer staying home, they are raising animals. In the city of Tg. Frumos Roma who are conducting commercial activities, legally or informally, are going to Bucharest or Suceava to buy their merchandise, and one may say that it is uncommon to them to go abroad.

We encountered quite often in the narratives of people from **Arad cluster**, both from the city and the rural areas, stories about migration looking for jobs. For quite a long time after 1990, commune Pilu was well situated in terms of commercial activities nearby the state frontier with Hungary, but nowadays the directions for looking for work are towards Chişineu-Criş and Ineu. In the case of Curtici, Roma target agricultural work on seasonal bases. In what regards Macea, in particular the village of Sânmartin, we had the case of an incipient labour migration in the domain of construction, and in Covăsînț we encountered a massive transnational migration to France, Italy, Spain and Ireland, which leaves behind empty palaces (symbols of richness) that are hardly used once a year.

In **Dolj cluster** labour migration is an intense phenomenon among the Roma population who prefer for this reason Italy, Spain, Belgium and France. Those families, who are having members left abroad to work, are having an improved quality of life. Among the first labour emigrants were a particular group of people ("*neam de cositorari*"), who are doing business in commerce with used cars or by usury. The other major Roma group ("*neamul de rudari*"), who are the poorest just started to try looking for opportunities abroad. The same aims and directions are followed by the Romanian population, too. Labour migration abroad is considered as a main source for making a living.

In the localities of **Alba cluster** we could not obtain official data about migration, but our interviews and discussions revealed that people usually migrate internally to work to Alba Iulia and Sebeş (approximately 15-20%). We only identified three persons who commute weekly to work to Cluj-Napoca in construction. Circa 25-30% of people from Unirea commute for the same reason to Câmpeni or Alba Iulia. Out of the Roma, according to the local authorities' estimations approximately 5% commute for work targeting the same cities. From commune Lunca Mureşului, as representatives of city hall estimate, 90% are commuting for work to Alba Iulia or Cluj-Napoca. A percentage of 3% is estimated by the same people among Roma doing the same. Approximately 80% of the total number of employees from Hopârta is working in Aiud or Alba Iulia, none of them is ethnic Roma. Commune Sâncel sends out 60% of its employed labour force to Blaj or Alba Iulia, out of whom only cc 2% are Roma living outside the compact Roma communities (employed at the sanitation company Weber Blaj). In all the localities, but mostly in Unirea (15%), Sâncel (10%) and Lunca Mureşului (5%) we

met the case of seasonal labour migration towards Germany, Spain and France, out of whom the majority approximately 90% are ethnic Roma according to local estimates. We could not obtain similar information for the city of Aiud. The population from this cluster is more alike to commute for work to Bucharest, Oltenița or Giurgiu than to migrate trans-nationally.

The migration abroad in **Călărași cluster** is considered to be for people that can afford to pay an expensive transport fare, which is equal to a minimum wage in Romania. In Oltenița, the Roma "*spoitori*" is continuously emigrating to Italy for work with contracts. A small part of the rural population is tending to emigrate. In Chirnogi the school director mentioned few cases of pupils who went abroad with their parents looking for work, amongst them Roma parents. The retired persons, pensioners, are considered financially stable.

(Un)employment

Table 2 from below (a *data compilation after statistics provided by the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, May 2013)* offers a comparative hint about the degree to which the active population of our localities aged between 15-64 years is employed on the labour market.

Generally speaking, at the level of the five counties the median of unemployment indicator for 2011 is situated around 9%, which is close for the figures applying to the whole Romania. (The *Diagram of unemployment rate* is presented in *Annex 6).* The highest unemployment rate (40%) is known in Dolj county (commune Vela), and the lowest in commune Andrieșeni (Alba county). At the level of the 25 localities selected into our clusters, the maximum value of unemployment is reached in commune Negoi of Dolj cluster (35%), and the minimal in the city of Curtici from Arad cluster (2%).

Table 2.

Employment and unemployment in the selected localities

County	Localities	Average number of employees, 2011	Number of active-aged population (age 15-64 years), 2011	Percentage of employees out of active aged population (%)
Alba	*Total in county*	*73983*	*260876*	*28.35*
-	Aiud	5464	19163	28.51
-	Hopârța	42	668	6.28
-	Lunca Mureșului	70	1677	4.17
-	Sâncel	70	1652	4.17
-	Unirea	227	3267	6.94
Arad	*Total in county*	*111434*	*321304*	*34.68*
-	Curtici	1770	5653	31.14
-	Covăsînț	252	1810	13.92
-	Macea	834	4771	17.48
-	Pilu	225	1390	16.18
-	Șiria	949	6013	15.78

County	Localities	Average number of employees, 2011	Number of active-aged population (age 15-64 years), 2011	Percentage of employees out of active aged population (%)
Călărași	*Total in county*	*40611*	*207131*	*19.60*
-	Oltenița	5976	20052	29.80
-	Chirnogi	943	5161	18.27
-	Curcani	217	3404	6.37
-	Frumușani	197	2865	6.87
-	Spanțov	128	2989	4.28
Dolj	*Total in county*	*115041*	*484327*	*23.75*
-	Calafat	3209	12628	25.41
-	Bârca	107	2257	4.74
-	Cetate	135	3345	5.09
-	Negoi	66	1296	5.09
-	Sadova	189	5287	3.57
Iași	*Total in county*	*134640*	*569152*	*23.65*
-	Târgu Frumos	2078	10339	20.09
-	Ciohorăni	64	1285	4.98
-	Lungani	145	3281	4.41
-	Mironeasa	138	2746	5.02
-	Stolniceni-Prăjescu	152	3589	4.23

Source: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, authors' compilation.

Iași county shows unemployment rates that are similar with those at national level, while commune Mironeasa and Stolniceni-Prăjescu know a little bit higher level (almost 20%) if compared to the median figures of the five counties where our clusters are situated. Before 1990 they assured labour force for the socialist industries, but since 1990 could not go through a professional reconversion. It is to be mentioned that in this county the impact of hidden agricultural unemployment is more intense which lowers the real figures of unemployment.

In **Arad county** the four communes are having unemployment values that are lower than the national median, excepting commune Pilu where unemployment goes above 14%. The lowest level of unemployment in this case, too is registered in the urban settlement of the cluster. Moreover, city of Curtici is characterized by the lowest level of unemployment if compared to all the other localities of the Romanian sample. With the occasion of the fieldwork we could observe that despite the fact that official statistics show a more positive picture regarding unemployment, in reality we deal with many-many cases of individuals who do not have jobs, but are not registered at the relevant public institutions, because they are unemployed for a long period of time. In what regards the Roma population, their situation is even more particular, because many of them never had a job and this makes even more difficult to them finding one. We may also observe that out of those who retired in advance after 1990 some could have become unemployed today, but instead they are registered as retired persons.

Dolj county knows the highest levels of unemployment and it shows a stronger division between the urban and the rural areas. Paradoxically, in communes such as Negoi, Bârca and Sadova people with secondary education are more readily becoming unemployed know (losing their jobs from the nearby factories), while in other contexts they could have been registered as agricultural workers. The proximity of a small city might also play a paradoxical role, if it cannot act any more as an attractive labour force market for the population from the nearby villages: people from communes like Cetate are not any more industrial workers commuting to the city, but unemployed persons. In the localities of Dolj cluster we could observe the effects of the acute lack of jobs across the whole county. The city of Calafat – once an attractive industrial pole even for commuters from nearby villages – now does not function as such either for the local population. Rural areas are dominated by employment in the public sectors, or by the occurrence of some small family associations with very few employees, or by the appearance of big companies that are leasing the lands of the locals who cannot afford working their properties and that altogether do not need physical labour force in the mechanized cereal cultivation. According to estimates, the percentage of employed ethnic Roma is under 1% at the level of the whole cluster. No wonder that this context produces a big appetite for migration abroad.

In **Alba county,** from the point of view of unemployment, all the communes of the cluster are situated over the median figures of the counties where our localities belong. The highest level of unemployment is known in commune Hopârta (18%). It is to be mentioned that figures for unemployment in rural environments might be distorted due to hidden forms of unemployment, in particular to the agricultural unemployment (because those who are having land, are not considered unemployed, but workers in agriculture). In the city of Aiud unemployment is situated around the value of 5%. Here, the economic restructurings of the 1990s were reconciled with a reorientation of socio-professional groups towards the tertiary sector of services, commerce, banking, administration. In the cases of communes from the proximity of small towns, whose population provided physical labour force in the industries that collapsed after 1990 we are dealing with the situation in which the labour force formerly focused on very particular professions from the primary sector could not find job alternatives in other domains (communes Hopârta and Lunca Mureşului). In the localities of Alba cluster we could not obtained official data on unemployment, and in the city of Aiud we were not even offered estimates around this. According to the estimations received at the city halls, in Unirea şi Hopârta 40% of the population is unemployed, this percentage being a little bit lower in Lunca Mureşului (30%) and in Sâncel (25%), while people talked about a total unemployment among the Roma population.

In **Călăraşi county**, differences in the unemployment rate are visible if observed at the level of the county. On the extremes, commune Curcani knows an unemployment rate that goes close to the threshold of 25%. Values under 10%,

which show a similar behavior with the rest of the national average, are specific for urban areas (Oltenița from our cluster), respectively for rural zones that are integrated socio-professionally in the proximity of urban centers, such as Chirnogi and Frumușani. In the case of Spanțov the relatively low level of unemployment results from the already mentioned phenomenon of hidden unemployment in agriculture.

Housing stock and utilities

In what regards the evolution of housing stock we managed to collect official data from 2002 and from 2011, so their comparison might give us a sense of where and how many houses have been built during the past ten years. The biggest growth of housing stock is shown in the county of Iași (7%), while at the level of the five counties where the localities of our selected clusters are situated the indicator correlates with the national average. From this point of view, Dolj county is situated on the last position as reflected by the table from below.


County	Number of dwellings in 2002	in 2011	Absolute increase	Percentage increase
Alba	141138	146001	4863	3.4
Arad	184732	193853	9121	4.9
Călărași	114807	118611	3804	3.3
Dolj	272003	276505	4502	1.7
Iași	270033	289053	19020	7.0

Fig. 1.The evolution of the number of dwellings in the five selected counties between 2002 and 2011 (Census Data)

At the level of the cluster, the evolution of the number of new houses is dictated by the position of the localities relative to bigger urban centers. This might explain why, between 2002 and 2011 the housing stock in Frumușani commune (close to Bucharest) grow with over 20%. The involution of housing stock is associated with the selective migration of the population, or with its demographic aging, like in commune Hopârta from cluster Alba, or communes Bârca and Sadova in Dolj county. The extremely negative values might be explained also by special situations in which, due to administrative reorganization, some communes lost villages that belonged to them previously (like city of Curtici from Arad).

The evolution of housing stock in itself does not reflect the improvement of the quality of life in the studied localities. That is why we followed other indicators as well, such as the percentage of dwellings connected to public water supply.

	Number of dwellings in 2002	dwellings in 2011	Absolute increase	Percentage increase
AIUD	9637	9729	92	1.0
HOPÂRTA	681	677	-4	-0.6
LUNCA-M.	902	940	38	4.2
SÂNCEL	910	963	53	5.8
UNIREA	2066	2078	12	0.6

	Number of dwellings in 2002	dwellings in 2011	Absolute increase	Percentage increase
TG.-FRUMOS	3912	4153	241	6.2
LUNGANI	1472	1583	111	7.5
MIRONEASA	1119	1190	71	6.3
CIOHORĂNI	618	629	11	1.8
STOLNICENI-P.	1808	1899	91	5.0

	Number of dwellings in 2002	dwellings in 2011	Absolute increase	Percentage increase
OLTENIȚA	9481	9657	176	1.9
CHIRNOGI	2226	2305	79	3.5
CURCANI	1517	1536	19	1.3
FRUMUȘANI	1724	2085	361	20.9
SPANȚOV	1412	1514	102	7.2

	Number of dwellings in 2002	dwellings in 2011	Absolute increase	Percentage increase
CURTICI	3225	2830	-395	-12.2
COVĂSINȚ	1032	1047	15	1.5
MACEA	2170	2403	233	10.7
PILU	751	789	38	5.1
ȘIRIA	3671	3020	-651	-17.7

	Number of dwellings in 2002	dwellings in 2011	Absolute increase	Percentage increase
CALAFAT	6668	6974	306	4.6
BÂRCA	1575	1553	-22	-1.4
CETATE	2902	2368	-534	-18.4
NEGOI	873	877	4	0.5
SADOVA	2819	2723	-96	-3.4

Fig. 2.The evolution of the number of dwellings in the selected localities between 2002 and 2011 (Census Data)

As *Annex 7* reflects, in **Alba county** this accessibility is distributed more or less equally, however in commune Hopârta only 12% of dwellings are connected to the public water system. In the city hall of Aiud we did not obtain data regarding

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these aspects of the quality of life. Respectively we were told that there were no problems in this sense in the city, excepting the case of Roma living in dwellings from the city center that were supposed to be regained by their former owners. In communes of Unirea, Lunca Mureşului and Hopârta, representatives of the mayor offices considered that the only buildings improper for living are those inhabited by Roma families. In Sâncel, local authorities do not perceive a problem in the communes the housing stock or equipment with utilities.

In **Arad county** (see *Annex 8*) there is a difference between communes situated on plain, and those placed on hilly areas, while the city of Curtici is doing better in this sense and the mostly aged commune Pilu being the less developed. Excepting the very impoverished area of the city of Curtici and the Roma palaces zone from Covăsînţ, in the Arad cluster the dwellings of Roma are in the same line with the dwellings of local non-Roma inhabitants. Local authorities in commune Macea forbid the construction of Roma palaces.

Călăraşi county (see *Annex 9*) belongs to the group of counties that is characterized by a lower quality of housing conditions in terms of access to public water supplies. In the case of the majority of communes from this cluster less than 40% of households are equipped with internal water installation. With the exception of commune Frumuşani, one may observe that in this cluster there is a big discrepancy between the city of Olteniţa and the selected rural settlements. The situation of the public utilities is similar in three communes (Curcani, Chirnogi, Spanţov). Each of them has a paved main road, and the most a second road paved with asphalt. The rest of the roads, alleys, are paved with stone. The running water exists in all the communes, but the problems are related to the access of the population to this service. All the localities have electricity, but the Roma communities' access is still an issue. The Roma communities that do not have electricity are the ones from Frumuşani partially, *Rudărie* Vale form Chirnogi, and *Rudărie* from Olteniţa partially. None of the localities from the cluster have access to natural gas. The housing situation is different in Frumuşani due its proximity to Bucharest. The land was sold to people from Bucharest, where new houses were built up. The interest of the local authorities to pave the roads and extend the running water and sewage systems increased. Thus, in 2007 the mayoralty raised money from PHARE funds for implementing this.

Dolj county is marked by the disparity between the county center (city of Craiova) and the other settlements, while cities of Calafat and Băileşti are playing a secondary role as urban environments. According to *Annex 10*, the impact of urbanization in the sense of access to running water is more felt in the city of Calafat and commune Cetate, and less present in the case of city of Segarcea (not in our cluster) and commune Bârca. In the urban settlement of Dolj cluster the dwellings of Roma are individual houses, the percentage of those living in blocks of flats is very low. Initially individual homes were settled in the center of the city.

Roads in Calafat are asphalted in 90%, and paved with gravel to 100%. According to the information that we were given at the city halls, access to public water supplies is about 90% in the city, and under 40% in rural areas, while the access to sewerage is under 10% in communes, and around 90% in the city of Calafat.

The same mechanisms are shaping the relationship between the localities of the **county of Iaşi**, too (see *Annex 11*). Furthermore, at the level of the Iaşi cluster, in the majority of the communes less than 20% of dwellings are connected to the public water system and even more, in the case of two communes, Lungani and Mironeasa this threshold goes under 10%. The only exception from this rule is commune Ciohorăni, advantaged not by urban proximity, but by the nearby river Siret. On the field we could observe a big difference between the four communes and the city of Tg. Frumos. If in the city the number of the newly built dwellings is higher than that of the older buildings, in the case of communes approximately 25% of households are living in new or renovated dwellings, the rest are old ("*case bătrâneşti*"), made out of the old-style adobe ("*chirpici*"). Excepting Tg. Frumos, the communes are not at all connected to sewerage system. Since the gas provider companies privatized, the extension of access to gas is decided by them. As a result, even in Tg. Frumos there are still streets without gas even if the inhabitants would prefer it and could pay for it. The communes of the clusters are almost totally lacking access to gas, with the exception of commune Ciohorăni with a single village, which has a gas network that covers 70% of the dwellings.

The differentiations of "Roma segments" in the local contexts

Despite of the differences between the localities of our clusters, resulting among others from the fact that they are placed in different counties respectively regions knowing different levels of economic (under)development (phenomenon reflecting the uneven spatial distribution of resources or territorial divisions across Romania), we could observe that – with the exception of cities of Curtici (Arad) and Calafat (Dolj), and of commune Frumuşani (Călăraşi) from the proximity of Bucharest – the locally identified multiple "Roma segments" belonged to economically more or less disadvantaged larger territories, while showing different degrees of poverty and exclusion.

Named as distinct neighborhoods of the localities of **Iaşi cluster,** *Nucărie* and *Pieptănari* (Tg. Frumos), *Brustureţ* and *Frunziş* (Mironeasa), or *Pe Muchie* (Ciohorăni), or representing whole villages like in the case of *Crucea* and *Zmeu* (belonging to commune Lungani) or in the case of village *Cozmeşti* (from commune Stolniceni-Prăjescu), our team identified on the field several Roma communities living in marginal areas, separated from the non-Roma population. These communities are the poorest, the vicinities where they are placed are having the worst infrastructure (excepting the schools), and are having a weak representation and participation at the level of local administration. This cluster belongs to a

county with the highest indicator of risk of poverty across Romania. The lack of paved (asphalted) roads and streets of its localities is a big problem. Even more, when a village is paved in the center, usually the peripheries where poor Roma communities are settled do not benefit from this. Large cities such as Tg. Frumos are also having completely unpaved areas, such as the vicinity called *Nucărie*, which also lacks connection to the public sewerage, water supply and gas system. Other communities of the clusters are also performing very badly on this domain. Commune Lungani has no asphalt at all however it reports that 90% of the streets are paved with gravel, while Stolniceni-Prăjescu and Mironeasa have a few miles of paved roads. Ciohorăni commune is an exception in this sense, as far as 80% of the commune composed of one village is paved with asphalt.

In commune Covăsînț of **Arad cluster** people make a distinction between the up-town Gypsies ("*țiganii de sus")*, the poor ones, and the down-town Gypsies, "*țiganii de jos"* (the better-off). The component village of commune Macea, *Sânmartin* is mostly populated by poor Roma. In the economically much better-off city of Curtici, the area called *Livezilor* is the very space of a poor Roma community knowing, besides the residential, also school segregation. Roma from Pilu and Șiria are mostly assimilated, and are having a living standard similar with that of the mainstream population (which is generally poor). This cluster from the Vest Development Region belongs to the group of four Romanian regions that know lower risk of poverty (Bucharest-Ilfov, Center, Vest, North-Vest: below and around 30%) comparative to the group of the other four regions with a risk of poverty above 40% (South-Muntenia, South-Vest Oltenia, South-East and North-East). Despite of this, the roads are generally in very bad shape, even the cluster's city has side streets that are not paved. This is a concern in all the municipalities, and city halls seem to be preoccupied accessing infrastructural development funds. Curtici is the only settlement from Arad cluster where people mentioned that they are struggling with public transport related problems. But none of these settlements do actually possess a public transport network however people use the buses that cross the localities heading towards the county center Arad. In addition to these, the so-called private "sharks" (practicing high prices) assure legally or informally the transport between neighboring localities.

In **Dolj cluster** economically the city of Calafat is much better placed than the rural locations, but unfortunately it lost its potential, since the 1990s it does not function as a point of attraction for labour force. Its Roma communities are located in two separated areas, in the district of *spoitori* live the better-off and in "*rudărie*" the poorer. In commune Cetate Roma are divided into two territorial communities called "*Banat*" and "*Vale*". Commune Negoi knows the distinction between two groups practicing the same craft, brick-making, but one of them kept, while the other lost their cultural traditions, so they never intermarry. In commune Bârca we met houses of Roma families on almost every street in the village, but Roma lived concentrated in two areas, called "Gypsyhood" („*Țigănia"*)

and "*Drăgălina*". Commune Sadova has an area called *Gheţea* where Roma live, while a composing village of it, *Sadovei Peak*, hosts the poorer Roma community. This cluster belongs to a county with the third highest indicator of risk of poverty across Romania. One may say that no wonder that the public transport is not properly assured in all of its composing localities. Thus, in the city of Calafat there is no local public transport at all, but this is due to the small distances that need to be traveled. Ties within the county and with the whole country are assured by private transport companies that use minibuses or coaches. Waiting time for transport within the county is 30 minutes, and for buses to Bucharest takes up to four hours. The local railway station is under restructuring, so there is only one train daily connecting Calafat with the county center Craiova. In rural areas the situation is similar to this. Generally speaking, the lines of communication are upgraded, and some development projects recently there have been undertaken. Roads are paved in the city of Calafat in 90%, but in the belonging villages (*Golenţi* and *Ciuperceni*) the rate of paved streets hardly goes up to 10%. In rural areas a share of 90% of the streets are cobblestoned.

In each of the selected locations of **Alba county** we could identify at least one residentially segregated compact Roma community. These are: the composing village *Silivaş* of Hopârta commune hosting two different Romani groups; the composing villages of Sâncel commune, *Luncii* and *Iclod;* and the almost Roma-only village *Unirea 2* or *Vinţ*, composing Unirea commune, or the *Lăutari* poor community situated in the commune itself. City of Aiud displays the phenomenon of forced evictions (*Poligon* community) or that of the administrative unification of formerly separated units (village of *Feleud*, or *Aiudul de Sus*), due to which segregated areas inhabited mostly by ethnic Roma are created. Commune Lunca Mureşului hosts three Roma communities, living on *Dealul Ţiganilor, Drumul Ţării* and *Gostat.* Our fieldwork identified impoverished and severely excluded Roma communities in this cluster however the latter belongs to a county that knows the second lowest percentage of risk of poverty in Romania after the capital. Despite of this, according to the estimations of the representatives of the mayor's offices in Alba cluster, the proportion of paved roads in Aiud is 40%, in commune Unirea is 45%, in Lunca Mureşului is missing, while 40% of streets in Hopârta and 31% in Sâncel are paved (which not in every case means asphalted). In Aiud there is a railway station and there are buses connecting the city to Alba Iulia, Sibiu, and Cluj. In Lunca Mureşului, Unirea and Hopârta there is also a railway station and there are buses circulated on the routes mentioned before. There is no train-stop in Sâncel, but buses stop and provide access on the route Iclod-Sâncel- Blaj-Teiuş-Alba Iulia.

In city of Olteniţa from **Călăraşi cluster** there live almost 4000 Roma, organized in two segregated communities: *Spoitori* and *Rudărie,* the later being the poorer one, while *Spoitori* displays a stronger sense of belonging and a higher self-esteem. In commune Curcani Roma constitute more than 50% of the total

population, and are organized in two separate communities, out of which the *Zavragii community* is the wealthier, to where the Roma mayor of the settlement also belongs. Commune Chirnogi has three Roma communities: *Rudărie*, *Țigănie* and *Teveu*, the later segregated at the outskirts, while Țigănie is benefiting of developmental investments. The poorest locality of the cluster, commune Spanțov has two Roma communities *Clinciu* and *Stancea*. Commune Frumușani hosts three Roma communities: Țigănie Frumușani, Țigănie Satuc and Țigănie Pasărea, the latter being integrated, and the biggest one, Țigănie Frumușani, counting more than 2000 inhabitants. Altogether, Frumușani commune acts quite differently relative to the other localities of the cluster since it is in the area of attraction of the country capital. Private transport companies assure the connection of Oltenița to Bucharest. The minibuses running in each quarter hour, are passing through Curcani and Frumușani. People from Spanțov and Chirnogi use other routes, but also through Oltenița. In Oltenița, the urban locality, almost all the roads are paved but are in a bad condition. In the rural localities there are maximum two roads paved with asphalt and the rest of the roads paved with stone. The main route for transportation is toward Bucharest.

Patterns of the formation of "Roma segments"

On the base of the descriptions from above, one may identify eleven patterns of "Roma segment" formation across our clusters, which – with the exception of cities of Curtici (Arad) and Calafat (Dolj), and of commune Frumușani (Călăraşi) from the proximity of Bucharest – is placed in economically more or less disadvantaged larger territories. These patterns occur in different combinations across and within the localities of the clusters and display diverse degrees of marginalization (social exclusion combined with material deprivation and cultural stigmatization), which are manifested amongst others in territorial divisions, and are produced – along with other factors – by the unequal spatial distribution of resources:

(1) Roma separation resulted from historical divisions are intersecting with current unequal territorial development policies increasing the disadvantages of Roma segments living in an isolated neighborhood of a city or in a poor composing village of a larger commune (Iaşi, Dolj, Arad, Alba).

(2) Poor Roma groups sharing territories with impoverished Romanians in a disadvantaged commune (Arad).

(3) Restricting assimilated and impoverished Roma to the under-developed margins of the city or to the less developed composing village(s) of a commune, by the means of housing and school policies (Arad, Dolj, Iaşi, Călăraşi, Alba).

(4) Forcibly evicting impoverished Roma groups from centrally placed urban areas and relocating them to the margins of localities, usually in polluted and isolated territories (providing or not alternative, but always substandard housing), or from the communal center to a less developed composing village (Alba).

(5) Unifying neighboring villages (inhabited by different Roma groups with different financial capabilities) with a city and, by this, transforming them into under-developed urban outskirts (Alba).

(6) The same Roma "nation" (*neam)* might be split into two or more groups and residential areas separated by the frontiers of composing villages, within each village, though, occupying marginal spatial positions (Dolj, Alba).

(7) The ghettoization of particular urban residential areas (usually substandard blocks of flats), inhabited by the poorest Roma and non-Roma, perceived at local level as Gypsyhood (*țigănie*), characterized by the lack of any sense of belonging (besides that of living in poverty) (Călărași).

(8) Historically formed Roma segments are re-enforced by the voluntary separation of better-off traditional Roma groups who, being placed in central areas of the localities, benefit from infrastructural development (Arad, Dolj, Călărași).

(9) Better-of Roma groups living in informal residential areas from the outskirts of the locality, but placed in the proximity of important urban centers and due to this benefitting from sources of income and social mobility (Călărași).

(10) Better-of traditional Roma living in segments shared with Romanians, which communicate with the outside world and facilitate social mobility (Călărași).

(11) Roma groups belonging to the same "nation" (*neam*) classified into two or more different group, are placed differently on the local socio-geographic map of the locality on the base of their financial capabilities, the poorer sub-group being the most stigmatized and inferiorized (Dolj, Călărași).

Conclusions: the need for a three-dimensional empowerment

While in this article we viewed the formation of spatially and socially separated or segregated Roma segments in their local contexts, one has to also note that these area-based constellations are happening on the broader stage of the post-1990 Romanian political economy.

When we talked about "marginalized Roma communities" in local areas, we refered to groups of persons or (extended) families residentially sharing a place demarcated from the rest of the municipality by locally meaningful signs

and practices. They are characterized by different types of deprivations and reduced opportunities to live a decent life, while in the locality there is a consensus about naming them as "Roma neighbourhoods" or "Gypsyhood" (translated by us with the term "Roma segments"). In the 25 scrutinized settlements we could observe poor Roma communities that were accepted by their broader, but also economically deprived environment, so that their social marginalization was not necessarily connected to ethno-spatial segregation; or we encountered poor communities in better-off surroundings connected to the societal life of the locality on precise matters (such as schooling) but disconnected on other affairs (such as labour and housing), so that in their case social marginalization and ethno-spatial segregation partially overlapped; or we met poor communities severely excluded into segregated peripheries who were not even in the game of local negotiations on who deserved just redistribution or reciprocal recognition.[16]

Besides the structural factors described in this article, the place/position that these economically deprived (Roma) communities occupied on the socio-geographic map of the settlements, were largely dependent on the niches through which their members participated on the formal and informal economic life of the locality and were appreciated as such, or on the formal and informal mechanisms and forms of participation and representation of Roma in the local public life. Moreover, their position was also shaped by the internal stratification of the local Roma society: while constructing a hierarchy, different groups of different social status and economic wealth identified each other also in ethnic terms differentiating among Roma groups with different occupations, traditions and connectedness to the broader environment. These demarcations driven from within were frequently mistreated by the mainstream society in order to justify the differentiated treatment of the so-called "deserving" and "undeserving" Roma, and became, in this sense, a factor of reproducing the exclusion of a severely deprived category of people who did not benefit of any developmental investments or even human considerations nor from the mainstream, or from the better-off ethnic fellows.

As a result of this research we could learn that – in the particular context of local economies and administration, which showed important differences across but also within the clusters – what mattered most in placing "Roma segments" and "Roma communities" in the socio-geographic map of the localities was, on the one hand, the way in which Roma and non-Roma could find their complementary niches on the local markets, and – on the other hand – the internal cohesion of Roma groups that could provide individuals with a sense of dignity, belonging and solidarity. "Assimilated Roma", who lost their community ties due to their socialist-way of integration into the labour market and after 1990 lost their social function

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[16] In making a distinction between poor and excluded, as two forms of marginality, I am following here the approach of Nancy Fraser (2004, 2007), according to whom "those who are marginalized or subordinated can still participate with others in social interaction, although they cannot do so as peers. Those who are excluded, by contrast, are not even in the game" (Fraser, 2007: 306).

in the local communities due to economic restructuring, are having more difficulties in coping with current challenges of marginalization. On the basis of our analysis we might conclude that those Roma groups could impose their interests in the local societies and could acquire a higher degree of acceptance from the mainstream population, who managed acting as a cohesive group possessing a sense of dignity. This is in accordance with the conclusions of previous inquiries: Stewart (1997, 2002), Ladányi and Szelényi (2004), Fosztó (2009), Troc (2012), Olivera (2012), to name just a few. Different groups of "traditional" Roma, raised in the spirit of independence from the majority but also in the spirit of providing services to them while nurturing a sense of internal tradition, or different groups of Roma adhering to neo-protestant churches while creating new ties within and across the boundaries between them and the majority, were capable of finding more internal sources and external solidarities than the "groups" that were bonding only through their shared experience of poverty.

This might somewhat explain why social inclusion policies on their own without being completed by dignifying cultural recognition and political representation, fail placing Roma individuals/families/groups into the larger local communities in positions from which they might act as powerful agency negotiating on rules of cohabitation. Willingly or not, social inclusion policies – on the one hand – reproduce the association of Roma with social problems (poverty), and – on the other hand – regenerate the belief according to which the social system in which Roma live is acceptable, and it is only Roma who need to be changed in order to fit into the perfect system. In addition, by identifying how marginalization happens and what does it mean in the case of different Roma groups, our research calls the attention of decision-makers at national and local level to conceive inclusive and rights-based development policies that carefully respond to the heterogeneity of (local) communities shaped by both the (power) relationships between ethnic majority and minority, and those between different Roma groups.

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
ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

**The spatial distribution of ethnic Roma population
in the studied counties and localities**

Source of data: 2011 Romanian Census
Maps made by Daniel Tudora

Spatial distribution of Roma population in Arad County

Spatial distribution of Roma population in Călărași County

A N N E X   2
CARTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF "COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT"

Romania and the five clusters (represented on the map by the names of the five municipalities acting as county residences: Iaşi, Arad, Craiova, Alba Iulia, Călăraşi),

*Source of data: Commission for combating poverty and promoting social inclusion (CASPIS), 2007/2008*

ANNEX 3

THE TYPOLOGY OF "COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT" IN ROMANIA

Source of data: CASPIS data from 2007-2008

Agenda of the map from below showing types of "community development":

■ Very low
□ High, with a medium demographic potential
□ Low, with a medium educational potential
■ Very high
□ High, with deficiencies of the educational potential

TIPOLOGIA DEZVOLTARII COMUNITARE IN ROMANIA

Ponderea claselor

Localitati urbane

■ foarte scazut
□ ridicat, cu potential demografic mediu
□ scazut, cu stoc educational mediu
■ foarte ridicat
■ ridicat, deficiente ale stocului educational

hdevsat
stoced
hizolat
hdempot
hqbuild

Sursa datelor CASPIS 2007-2008

Efectuat cu PhilCarto, http//philcarto.fr

ANNEX 4

NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN THE CLUSTERS AND LOCALITIES

Source of data: The List of Firms from Romania, Borg Design, 2011

IASI	Companies with number of employees between 1-10	Total number of companies
Tg frumos	128	145
Lungani	9	10
Ciohorani	5	5
Mironeasa	4	4
Stolniceni- Prăjescu	7	7
Total	153	171

ARAD	Companies with number of employees between 1-10	Total number of companies
Curtici	63	88
Covasint	13	14
Pilu	10	10
Siria	39	44
Macea	25	25
Total	150	181

DOLJ	Companies with number of employees between 1-10	Total number of companies
Calafat	118	133
Barca	11	15
Cetate	11	12
Negoi	10	10
Sadova	15	15
Total	165	185

ALBA	Companies with number of employees between 1-10	Total number of companies
Aiud	284	338
Unirea	26	28
Lunca Muresului	10	10
Hoparta	3	3
Sancel	12	12
Total	335	391

CALARASI	Companies with number of employees between 1-10	Total number of companies
Oltenita	419	481
Chirnogi	42	43
Frumusani	22	24
Spantov	9	9
Curcani	19	22
Total	511	579

Employees with over 5 persons employed

Source of data - www.totalfirme.ro

| Cluster	Number of employers from the small cities of the clusters	Number of employers from the communes of the clusters	Total number of employers from the cluster
Alba	112	15	127
Arad	24	29	53
Calarasi	135	10	145
Dolj	51	10	61
Iasi	36	0	36

ANNEX 5

THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE BUSINESS TURNOVER AT THE LEVEL OF THE LOCALITIES OF THE FIVE CLUSTERS, 2006

*Source of data: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2011*
*Maps made by Daniel Tudora*

Alba county

Arad county

Spatial distribution of turnover at communal level (2006)

Călărași county

Spatial distribution of turnover at communal level (2006)

Dolj county

Iaşi county

ANNEX 6

THE DIAGRAME OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

*Source of data: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2012*

AB: ALBA
AR: ARAD
CL: CĂLĂRAȘI
DJ: DOLJ
IS: IAȘI

Localities of **Alba cluster** (with red bullets) compared to other clusters (left column), to other localities from Alba county (middle column), and to other localities from other clusters (right column)

Localities of **Arad cluster** (with red bullets) compared to other clusters (left column), to other localities from Arad county (middle column), and to other localities from other clusters (right column)

Localities of **Călărași cluster** (with red bullets) compared to other clusters (left column), to other localities from Călărași county (middle column), and to other localities from other clusters (right column)

Localities of **Dolj cluster** (with red bullets) compared to other clusters (left column), to other localities from Dolj county (middle column), and to other localities from other clusters (right column)

Localities of **Iaşi cluster** (with red bullets) compared to other clusters (left column), to other localities from Iaşi county (middle column), and to other localities from other clusters (right column)

ANNEX 7

## ACCES TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY, ALBA COUNTY

Source of data: 2011 Romanian Census
Maps made by Daniel Tudora

ANNEX 8

ACCES TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY, ARAD COUNTY

ANNEX 9

## ACCES TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY, CĂLĂRAŞI COUNTY

ANNEX 10

ACCES TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY, DOLJ COUNTY

ANNEX 11

ACCES TO PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY, IAȘI COUNTY

BARE PERIPHERIES: STATE RETRENCHMENT AND POPULATION PROFILING IN SEGREGATED ROMA SETTLEMENTS FROM ROMANIA

CRISTINA RAT[1]

ABSTRACT. The text aims to explore processes of state retrenchment in contemporary Romania, as endorsed by the historically embedded profiling of the Roma as a "distinct and subversive" population in conjunction with the racialization of extreme deprivation as a "Gypsy problem", which ultimately led to the formation of "bare" (Agamben, 1998) peripheries where state policies merely exercise population control and citizenship is disentangled. Taking inspiration from Thorburn's (2012) distinction between *identification*, *surveillance* and *population profiling*, it examines the adverse inclusion of the Roma in the course of civil identification, in the context of strong and historically enduring profiling of the Roma as a "category of suspicion" (G.T. Marx, 1985) and weak state capacity to exercise surveillance. These processes are depicted with the help of ethnographic fieldwork and interviews with welfare workers, Roma counsellors and mediators in four Romanian cities: Cluj-Napoca, Miercurea Ciuc, Ploieşti and Târgu-Mureş.

Keywords: Roma poverty, state retrenchment, surveillance, adverse inclusion

Introduction[2]

The text aims to explore processes of state retrenchment in contemporary Romania, as endorsed by the historically embedded profiling of the Roma as a "distinct and subversive" population in conjunction with the racialization of extreme deprivation as a "Gypsy problem", which ultimately led to the formation of "bare" (Agamben, 1998) peripheries where state policies merely exercise population control and citizenship is disentangled.

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State retrenchment is not an equivalent of complete state withdrawal: state surveillance remains cast over the margins, yet only selectively and discretionary, and resources are channelled to enable population control, but not the enactment of citizenship. Marginalized and concentrated "Gypsy colonies" in Romania are containers of "bare life", emptied of political agency, resembling Agamben's "camps", where law and fact are indistinguishable and the state of exception becomes the rule[3]. Indeed, recent scholarship on the situation of Roma migrants from Eastern to Western Europe insightfully employed Agamben's theory on biopolitics, state of exception and the camp (see Marinaro, 2009, for Italy and Cames, 2013, for France). While acknowledging their input, I argue that the state-abandonment by their native Romania, experienced by the underprivileged Roma in segregated settlements, does not fully correspond to the Agambenian encampment. The excluding-inclusion of these settlements is neither consistent nor stable, but fluctuates following an ambivalent, manifold and non-monolithic state, with barely coordinated and sometimes conflicting apparatuses, challenged by non-state actors. In this sense, I find more adequate Wacquant's conceptualization of the *ghetto,* as defined by "(i) stigma, (ii) constraint, (iii) spatial confinement, and (iv) institutional parallelism" (Wacquant, 2011:7). The state that creates the ghetto and, simultaneously, the means to dissolve the ghetto, is essentially incongruous and diffuse: border-reinforcing mechanisms colonize social policies designed for "inclusion", and informal-networks corrupt or emancipate, i.e. ultimately erode the bureaucratic boundaries in charge of exclusion.

From the multiple manifestations of state-control, I look at its processes enacted through welfare measures, as entrenched in or mirrored by the development of segregated and severely deprived Roma settlements. Taking inspiration from Thorburn's (2012) distinction between *identification*, *surveillance* and *population profiling*, I examine the adverse inclusion of the Roma in the course of civil identification (the baseline for citizenship and the conversion from physical existence to political being[4]), in the context of strong and historically enduring profiling of the Roma as a "category of suspicion" (G.T. Marx, 1985) and weak state capacity to exercise surveillance.

More specifically, I argue that regulations over obtaining identity papers and their intertwining with social citizenship constitute key-mechanisms of population sorting (Lyon, 2002; Hintjens, 2012) within a larger biopolitics (Foucault, 1978; Agamben, 1998) conducive to effects of adverse inclusion for the most impoverished Roma. They are rendered by these policies as a subaltern

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[3] "The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule. [...] The camp is a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable" (Agamben, 1998: 96).

[4] In Agamben's words, from "bare life" (*zen*) to "politically qualified life or good life" (*eu zen*) (Agamben, 1998: 11).

population subject to profiling and sorting, while their *individual identifications as citizens* and protection by the surveillant welfare state are seriously hindered or denied.

Assuming the perspective of an informed outsider, yet moving closer to those experiencing these policies through ethnographic fieldwork, I try to reveal some of these processes in contemporary Romania by combining social policy output analysis (investigation of existing laws and regulations) with a qualitative examination of the implementation and effects of these policies in four cities with sizeable segregated Roma settlements, namely Cluj-Napoca, Miercurea-Ciuc, Ploieşti and Târgu-Mures, visited in 2012 within the SPAREX project described in the *Guest Editors' Foreword* of this issue.

Dividing identifications

Following Thorbrun (2012), I differentiate between state actions of *identification,* defined as the regulation over individuals identities so as to guarantee their consistence across time and space; *surveillance* as systematic gathering of specific information about people's activities and whereabouts and *profiling* as „an attempt to give specific content to what particular persons or classes of persons are like – their preferences, their practices, their personal histories, etc. – in order to anticipate future behaviour" (Thorburn, 2012: 6). While conceptually distinct, in practice these three forms of state action are often tightly connected and the fear that identification-actions might lead to profiling and sorting, and further on to increasing surveillance, is legitimate: „[g]overnments often try to elide the important distinctions between these three practices and to introduce elements of surveillance and profiling under the cover of an identification scheme" (Thorbrun, 2012: 6). Routine actions of registering "body-badges" (Lyon, 2002) in order to issue identity documents, the obligation to prove an address of residence, and most of all the extensive use of personal identity numbers for a full range of public and private matters (from health insurance to social benefits, from work contracts to tax duties, from banking to communication services etc.) opens the room for tracing down individual action through complex data-linkage schemes that basically suspend the private nature of these actions. While much scholarship and public debate was devoted to research on the existing and potential dangers of a "surveillance-society", including excessive and humiliating identification and surveillance schemes operated over Roma migrants in Europe, less attention was driven to the problems of dual-standards identification that allow implicit or explicit population sorting and selective non-surveillance.

By dual-standards or *dividing identifications* I mean the institutionalization of a substantial differentiation between identity papers *of the same sort* (e.g. national identity cards or passports) through *the incorporation of a social difference* in the very *form* of these documents, and consequently creating or reinforcing a social division (Anthias, 2001). While phenotype (bodily-appearance), biological sex and age are regularly recorded and may subject persons to stereotyping, discrimination and even harassment, these differences nonetheless do not prohibit access to identity documents of the same quality, at least not in modern democracies. Similarly, there are some differences of social status (marriage, parenthood) required to be registered in one's identity documents, which do not alter the nature of these documents. Contrary to these, dividing identification means that persons belonging to a certain social category obtain a recognizably different identity document, officially of the same sort, yet with altered rights and duties attached to it. Diplomatic passports constitute a widely-known example to this, but, closer to our topic, we should recall the example of "black-identity papers" issued in 1950's Hungary for the "wandering populations" (*kobor* in Hungarian, the equivalent in the official jargon for traditional Roma living in marginalized settlements, sometimes following an itinerant lifestyle) and withdrawn eventually on charges of ethnic discrimination in 1962 (Purcsi, 2004; Saghi, 2008; Varsa, 2010). I argue that *provisional identity papers* issued by the Romanian government largely perform the same function of population sorting, as they create a "category of suspicion" (G.T. Marx, 1988) of those who cannot prove an address. Roma from segregated, impoverished settlements from both rural and urban areas are often in this situation.

In Romania, the national identity document is materialized in a paper& plastic hard *card* that contains the personal identification number (assigned on the birth certificate), the series and number of the card, a colour-picture of the holder, both parents' first names, place of birth, address, place of issuing, period of validity, and a coding for bureaucratic purposes. The *provisional identity paper* is made of paper&cardboard (without a plastic cover-layer), therefore it can be easily damaged by water or inattentive handling; it has the same content as the identity card, except from the address-line, where it states: "lacking residence" (*lipsă spațiu).* Although at face-value provisional identity papers allow homeless persons (supposedly a rare and temporary status) to hold identity papers and enact their citizenship rights, de facto they compensate for the restrictive and (as I will further argue) discretionary conditions of proving one's residence in order to qualify for the "proper" identity card. According to national regulations, residence should be proven with ownership, renting or hosting documents and a certificate about the legal status of the dwelling and the land it stands upon (*extras de carte funciară*). When these are lacking, but the claimant does reside in a dwelling, s/he may write a declaration and request local authorities to verify through a field visit this residence, according to the specifications of Annex 14 of the law. However,

local authorities differ in the implementation of this particular prerequisite: whereas in Ploieşti most of the families visited during our fieldwork in the impoverished Mimiu neighbourhood declared that they obtained identity *cards* with the help of the Annex 14, in Cluj-Napoca this possibility had been never used for the inhabitants of the Pata-Rât and Cantonului areas. Moreover, the official web page of the municipality fails even to mention the legal possibility of proving one's address in this way. In Târgu Mureş and Miercurea Ciuc local authorities used a different strategy: they turned a blind eye to the fact that several families from the Valea Rece/Hidegvolgy and strada Dealului/Hegy utca (Târgu Mureş) and Somlyó utca (Miercurea Ciuc) used the same legally registered dwelling in order to attest their residence, or allowed families to take in concession public agricultural land and thereby attest their residence (again, the case of Valea Rece, Târgu Mureş). The situation on the spot was slightly different from the situation in the bureaucratic files, but the solution seemed to be a reasonable compromise for both local authorities and claimants, who defined national regulations as external constraints that they cannot remove and should handle somehow.

Holding an identity *card* comes with different entitlements than holding a provisional identity paper. The *card* is valid for ten years for adults, allows the holder to register as a self-employed, to claim heating subsidies during the cold season (from November to March) and to travel without a passport within the EU-area; the provisional version is valid only for a year and it allows none of the above. But most importantly, the *provisional* version generates immediate suspicion: whether it is a valid document at all, and if so, what kinds of occurrences prevented the holder from obtaining a "proper" card? All our interviewees who possessed provisional identity papers declared that they were declined at job interviews as soon as they showed their papers. Getting regular identity cards emerged as a priority-concern throughout the conversations in all segregated settlements except from Mimiu - Ploieşti, where the issue was apparently solved. However, it is difficult to assess the scale of the problem at the national level, as statistical data on provisional identity papers are not reported by public authorities.

Surveys on the situation of Roma and non-Roma from deprived areas address the question over having or not identity papers, but they regularly ask about different *sorts* of documents (birth certificates, identity papers, passports) and do not differentiate between *provisional* and regular national identity papers. According to the latest UNDP/WB/EC Regional Roma survey of 2011, around 95% of the Roma from deprived, marginalized settlements hold identity papers, but it is unclear what the share of those who only possess the *provisional* version is.

In the case of the four segregated settlements from the Pata-Rât and Cantonului areas of Cluj-Napoca, the 2012 participatory assessment of the UNDP and UBB found that only around 65% of the inhabitants of Cantonului, "Dallas",

and the hill near the landfill possess regular identity cards, whereas 28% in Cantonului, 11% in "Dallas" and 18% of those living near the waste dump have only provisional identity documents (see Table 1). The situation of families evicted from Coastei street is very different: 90% hold identity cards, mostly issued for their former rented social housing in the inner-city.

Table 1.

**Identity papers of the inhabitants above 14 years old from the four settlements in the Cantonului and Pata-Rât areas, Cluj-Napoca (*Percentages of inhabitants by settlement)*

Identity papers of inhabitants above 14 years old (*Percentages*)	Canton	Dallas	Colina (Coastei)	Landfill
Identity card with address from Cluj	62.3%	64.1%	87.2%	19.1%
Identity card with address in another county	3.4%	6.0%	2.6%	45.8%
Temporary identity document, without domicile	28.8%	11.4%	6.8%	18.3%
None, but remembers having CNP and birth certificate	4.7%	14.1%	3.4%	6.9%
Never had identity papers	0.8%	4.3%	-	9.9%
Total	*100%*	*100%*	*100%*	*100%*

Source: UNDP and UBB, 2012.

The fact that more than a quarter of persons living in Cantonului street hold provisional identity documents (the largest share among the four settlements) is not arbitrary: the families from Cantonului were evicted there by the municipality in several smaller waves between 2000-2003, or moved themselves as a consequence of financial scarcity that did not permit them to pay the increasingly expensive rents in the city. Although several families received one-room container-houses from two non-governmental organizations and could certify their residence in these very basic accommodation facilities, the containers as such were placed on a terrain belonging to the National Railway Company, contravening the law on the minimum distance between the railways and people's homes, and no proofs on the status of dwellings could be issued by local authorities (as mentioned before, these proofs, called *extras de carte funciară,* should be presented when applying for identity cards). Similarly to the national average, on Cantonului street 5.5% lack identity papers, as compared to almost 18% in both "Dallas" and the waste dump. Most tellingly, 10% of those living next to the landfill had never possessed identity papers: they are Romanes speaking Roma belonging to the larger group of Calderash, who used to live in improvised tents in the forests near the other edge of the city, but were moved to the landfill by the Police in 2003. Their current living conditions in improvised shacks do not differ from those pictured in the annexes of the 1977 study of the National Commission for Demography (Comisia Națională de Demografie, 1977).

Sorting-out, moving away, and watching over

"Categorizing persons and populations – or *social sorting* – is now a key to understand surveillance" (Lyon, 2002: 3). The issuing of provisional identity papers opens the door for stricter surveillance of both individuals and populations, yet much more resources are necessary to create the "dispositif" (Foucault) that may enact it. The capacity of the Romanian state to perform bureaucratic control has been limited even under the period of socialist central-planning, and it was regularly contested and arguably weakened after the change of the political regime. The already mentioned 1977 study of the National Commission for Demography, and the 1978 report of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) on the "problems raised by the Gypsy population in our country" attest not only the indeed worrying social and economic situation of "traditional" Roma[5], but also the incapacity of the state to handle this "problem". The measures recommended in the study[6], which were to a large extent included in the PCR document as well, propose de-segregation, workplace integration, education, and improving access to health-care services. Eventually, the underlying principles and headline recommendations are very similar to those of current *National Strategies for the Roma,* except from the fact that the letter also emphasises the cultural rights of the Roma as an ethnic group. But few of those goals had been achieved: the late 1970s economic crisis, the decreasing profitability of the heavy industry (a much more important segment of the Romanian economy than in the cases of the Visegrad countries), Ceaușescu's grandomany and the ambition to pay back all Romanian foreign debt emptied the national budget and the "Gypsy problem" was put aside. After 1989, as it has been largely documented by now, the situation of the Roma worsened and the social division between majority populations and those labelled as "Gypsies" deepened (Ringold, 2000; Fleck and Rughiniş, 2008; Fosztó, 2009; Vincze and Harbula, 2011; Berescu, 2011).

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[5] The term "traditional Roma" is a misleading cliché without any conceptual value. Therefore I use the term in-between quotation marks to indicate a *discursive device* that labels Roma families who kept the Romani language, social practices, elements of lifestyle and revenues from informal activities. They might belong to different Roma groups, may speak different dialects of Romanes, and most importantly may perceive themselves as having nothing in common with other Roma or "Gypsies" (see Martin Olivera, 2013).

[6] The manuscript of the study mentions no individual authors, but biographical information reveals that one of the contributors was Nicolae Gheorghe, of Roma descent himself, at that time a young top-of-the-class graduate of Sociology within the Faculty of Philosophy at the Bucharest University, who later wrote an anonymous letter to the Radio Free Europe disclosing the hardship faced by the Roma during the Ceausescu regime; a similar letter was written shortly after by another young Roma intellectual, Vasile Burtea (the letters were published by Andreescu and Berindei, 2010). After the change of the regime, Nicolae Gheorghe became one of the leading voices for gaining rights for the Roma as a European minority and improving their situation throughout different nation states, serving at the OSCE – ODIHR Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues between 1999-2003 (see http://www.theromanielders.org/elders/2/5/).

As elsewhere argued (Rat, 2005; 2011), a significant role in the deepening social division between the Roma and the non-Roma should be attributed to the mechanisms of adverse inclusion embedded in the Romanian social protection system, which not only fails to redress poverty due to the inadequately low and under-targeted benefits, but also stigmatizes recipients and blames them for their own poverty. Objectives of population surveillance undoubtedly colonize social protection schemes, that became vehicles of state control (Culpitt, 2001) particularly so in the case of prejudiced ethno-cultural minorities such as the Roma (for a study on the instrumentalization of child protection in Hungary between 1950-1960 with the purpose to control and "discipline" Roma mothers, see Varsa, 2010). In Romania, the bureaucratic workload (of both social workers and beneficiaries) necessary for providing social assistance benefits and services is simply not justifiable from a cost/benefits calculus perspective, under the assumption that they indeed serve social protection purposes. The highly surveillance-demanding nature of programs such as the Minimum Income Guarantee (Law 416/2001, updated, MIG) and state allowance for needy families with children (initially Ordinance 105/2003, modified by Law 277/2010), indicate quite convincingly that they perform population surveillance purposes as well. In the case of MIG, beneficiaries ought to submit the proof from the County Labour Force Office that they did not refuse any job offer or vocational training course, and also to perform community work (with the exception of women taking care of children below age 7 or other dependent family members). The support-allowance for needy families requests the proof of school attendance to be submitted at the welfare office each month, and in case of more than 20 absences per semester a financial penalty is applied to the whole family, while for over 40 absences the whole benefit is cut, regardless of the proper school attendance of the other children from the family (see also Rat, 2011 and 2012).

Table 2.

Percentage of Roma and non-Roma families living in their proximity who received social benefits in 2011

	Roma	Non-Roma
Earnings from labour or economic activities	44.0%	48.9%
Unemployment benefits	2.1 %	2.6 %
State pensions (old-age or invalidity)	27.5%	66.0%
Social assistance benefits	26.8 %	6.9%
Child allowance	68.4%	32.6%

Source: UNDP/WB/EC Survey 2011. Author's calculations.

**Social assistance benefits received by the families from
the Pata-Rât and Cantonului area, Cluj-Napoca (October 2012).**
Estimated numbers of families from the UNDP-UBB (2012) survey

Receiving social benefits according to the law on the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) and in-kind benefits from the municipality social canteen		**Does not receive MIG**	**MIG beneficiaries**	**Total: 273 families**
Canton	Social canteen beneficiaries	5	**18**	23
	Not receiving social canteen	86	1	87
	Total	*92*	*19*	*111*
Dallas	Social canteen beneficiaries	1	**2**	3
	Not receiving social canteen	61	1	62
	Total	*62*	*3*	*65*
Colina (Coastei)	Social canteen beneficiaries	1	**7**	8
	Not receiving social canteen	37	2	39
	Total	*38*	*9*	*47*
Landfill	Social canteen beneficiaries	-	-	-
	Not receiving social canteen	50	-	50
	Total	*50*	*-*	*50*

Source: UNDP and UBB 2012 dataset. Author's calculations.

Table 4.

**Child benefits among families with children below 15 years old
in the Pata-Rât and Cantonului area, Cluj-Napoca (October 2012).**
Estimated number of families from the UNDP-UBB (2012) survey

Child benefits among families with children below 15 years old		Canton	Dallas	Colina (Coastei)	Rampa	Total
Universal child allowance	**Not receiving**	**12**	**15**	**2**	**20**	**49**
	Receiving	65	36	32	24	**157**
	Total	*77*	*51*	*34*	*44*	*206*
Means-tested allowance for needy families with children	**Not receiving**	**70**	**50**	**30**	**44**	**194**
	Receiving	7	1	4	0	12
	Total	*77*	*51*	*34*	*44*	*206*

Source: UNDP and UBB 2012 dataset. Author's calculations.

Statistics from the UNDP-UBB (2012) area-based survey on welfare receipts among Roma families, as well as those from the UNDP/WB/EC (2011) regional survey, indicate that only a small segment of Roma families from marginalized settlements is covered by these programs. In other words, they have little contact with the welfare offices in charge of protecting and controlling the

subaltern category of the needy. Similarly to the communist period, child protection workers are the most frequent visitors embodying the authority of the state, who evaluate parenting performance and may request the removal of the child from the family[7]. Otherwise, the state is absent, leaving "bare" these peripheries. It may show up at times of Population Census, which is nonetheless a routine account of the *population,* not an instance to enact and reinforce citizenship[8].

In her study on undocumented migrants in the UK and France, Hintjens points out that state's *selective non-surveillance* of marginal and vulnerable groups highlights exactly their "unwantedness", and it may be applied to full citizens as well (Hintjens, 2013: 89). Our fieldwork revealed that this non-surveillance within settlements, that suspends basic citizenship rights such as personal safety and property, combined with high-surveillance of the inhabitants once they go outside "in the city", weakens irrevocably any trust in local authorities. This is not to say that authorities, most notably the police, do not intervene at all in order to settle conflicts within the settlements; rather, that they hardly prevent these conflict to occur. However, we also encountered cases when the police protected relocated Roma families from the hostility of non-Roma and ensured their safety. When the Municipality of Târgu Mureș evicted the families living in social housing in the Rovinari/Ady Endre neighbourhood in order to renovate the estate, they faced a harsh situation: the place selected by the Municipality to allow them to settle and build their barracks was rapidly surrounded by locals, who attacked the Roma families and demanded them to leave. The relocated families were protected by the head of the local police, who finally settled them on the Shore of Mureș River.

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[7] Family bounds are very strong in all visited settlements, and parents fear from having their children taken by authorities and moved into state-care, as they are well aware of the improper living conditions and the threat of being accused of child neglect, especially in the case of small children. Therefore, typically at winter-time, they hospitalize their infants so as to protect them from the harsh home environment and ensure somewhat better nutrition for them (personal conversations with Roma mothers from segregated settlements and local welfare workers, 2012 and 2013).

[8] Aggregated statistical data about the *population,* the scope of population censuses, does not need individual identifications in order to fulfill its purpose of informing policymakers. The irony of the slogan used at the 2011 Romanian Census, „Because everybody counts" (*Pentru că fiecare contează)* is that, in order to *count* for the Census, each person should be de-personalized and sorted in a certain statistical category. The request to fill in the census questionnaire one's personal identification number was highly contested as contravening the confidentiality of individual census interviews, and serving only the need to complete and correct census information later on, as the institute in charge of data collection was incapable of carrying out properly its tasks (Ghețău, 2013). It is noteworthy that back in 1983, the German Constitutional Court decided that its newest population census was anticonstitutional, as it violated the constitutional right to "informational self-determinacy" and did not sufficiently differentiate between population data and personal data (Thorburn, 2012: 26).

This absence of the state from the lives of generations of persons living on the edge of subsistence is possible and manageable on the long term only as long as these persons remain out of sight, marginalized, controlled and kept apart by physical and symbolic boundaries, and de-humanized as an inferior race. In this sense, Roma settlements do function as *ghettos,* although they differ in many important ways from the Jewish and Roma ghettos created by the Nazi and Fascist regimes. It is noteworthy that even Wacquant, who otherwise employs the concept of "advanced marginality"[9] in order to investigate the "logic of urban polarisation" (Wacquant, 2000), acknowledges that: "if there is one category whose experience deviates sharply from this pattern to veer toward ghettoization, it is the Roma of eastern Europe" (Wacquant, 2011: 19). Our ethnographic work in Târgu Mureş, Miercurea Ciuc and Cluj-Napoca (though less so in Ploieşti) revealed that local authorities were not worrisome by-standers unable to prevent the formation and expansion of impoverished "Gypsy" settlements, but they actively contributed to the escalation of problems by forcibly evicting and relocating to compact, segregated, peripheral and polluted areas Roma families lacking economic resources for making ends meet. The recent relocations of families from the Craica settlement in Baia Mare to the former metal factory CUPROM, possibly contaminated with dangerous chemical substances, follow the same pattern. Our assessments were also supported by the results of the UNDP-UBB survey in the Pata-Rât and Cantonului areas from Cluj-Napoca:

Table 5.
The reasons of moving to Cantonului or Pata-Rât, Cluj-Napoca.
Figures indicate *number of respondents speaking on behalf of their families*

How did you move to this area/which were the reasons of your moving here? *Open-ended question, answers categorized for the analysis.*	Canton	Dallas	Colina (Coastei)	Garbage dump
The municipality moved us here, but without providing us social housing.	38	1	12	13
The Municipality moved us here in social housing.	-	-	31	-
Evicted from the city of Cluj-Napoca.	17	2	-	-
We were in need, and moved here to work on the dump.	-	12	-	30
My partner was living here.	9	9	-	-
My relatives were living here.	4	13	1	1
We could not afford paying a rent in the city.	25	9	3	2
I was born and/or raised in the Pata-Rât area.	1	8	-	1
My parents/relatives sold our house.	10	3	-	1
I got a job at a nearby company.	1	3	-	-
Other	5	2	-	-
Don't know/Refuse	1	3	-	2
Total	*111*	*65*	*47*	*50*

Source: UNDP and UBB, 2012: 6.

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[9] "Discrimination and even segregation is not ghettoization, [because the concentrations of urban poverty...] are not the product of institutional incasement of the group premised on rigid spatial confinement" (Waquant, 2000: 115).

The processes of urban polarization depicted in the SPAREX project point at state actions that "render invisible" (Agamben, 2004) populations profiled as being "unfit" for the city, while at the same time ensure the visibility and recognisability of each person *as belonging to these populations*, by means of divided identifications (provisional identity cards), by making public the lists of welfare beneficiaries who should perform community work, and by refusing to upgrade the infrastructure so as to provide basic supplies (tap water, sewage, electricity) that allow a proper hygiene and to "appear in public without shame" (Sen, 2000).

Pata-Rât can be seen as a radical example of this invisibility: although the Pata-Rât street exists and there are some relatively well-off Romanian families residing at the beginning of the road, the area is disconnected from the public transportation system and registered as an industrial zone in the development plan of the municipality. The street was not included in the register of the Cluj County School Inspectorate[10], therefore (as in Romania there is a residential system of school registration) parents should sign up their children only at those schools that have places available after the first-round of registration. Given the large distance from the inner-city, Internet companies refuse to expand their services to Pata-Rât. There is only one bus line approaching the edge of the Pata-Rât settlement and running along the slum-area of Cantonului street, on working-days only; the other bus, that the majority actually use, stops 800m away, after one crosses the railway and climbs over the security embankment. Moreover, the whole area of Pata-Rât, although relatively close to the busy main road heading from the city to the airport, becomes discernible only after turning well down the road, towards the municipal landfill (see also Vincze, this issue).

Perversely, free of charge public facilities are provided for those who comply with the relocation to peripheries in "temporary" substandard housing provided by the municipality, which tend to last years and years. The families evicted from the Rovinari/Ady Endre neighbourhood from Târgu Mureș and relocated to container-houses on Băneasa street had free water and electricity, and they resided there from 2006 to 2012. In Miercurea Ciuc, the families evicted in 2004 to similar container-houses to Primăverii/Tavasz street near the city sewage cleaning plant receive for free water and electricity, and they are still living there at the moment of writing. Other informal settlements are provided only with street water pipes that they can use for free: the cases of Pata-Rât "Dallas" and Cantonului street in Cluj-Napoca, Somlyó street in Miercurea Ciuc, Mimiu in Ploieşti, Dealului/Hegy utca in Târgu Mureş.

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[10] See "Circumscripţii şcolare ale învăţământului de stat" [Public School Areas Inventory], Cluj County School Inspectorate, *http://www.isjcj.ro/* (August 2013).

On Primăverii street, because the containers belong to the municipality, it is my obligation to provide them water and electricity free of charge, and that is why many families would prefer to move there. On Somlyó street, they only have water... (...)

[About the people from Roma settlements] They just kept on coming, the corridor was full with them... So I said that only a representative should come, because all of them were coming, one couldn't manage with them... So I told them that until I was paying for their water [the water in Somlyo utca is paid by the municipality] they should be so kind to come here clean, I was not obliged to bear their smell. They either washed themselves, or I would cut the water off. And since then, the situation is slightly better (interview with the head of the Municipal Welfare Office, Miercurea Ciuc, August 2012).

Out at the peripheries, dwellers of these settlements are expected by local authorities to "organize themselves", to elect representatives, to refrain from any "disturbing" activity in the city (such as collecting recyclable waste from trash bins or begging), and to "wait" until local authorities will manage to solve "their" problems. Appeal to any "outsider", especially international organizations, and disclosing the situation is sanctioned as a shameful betrayal.

[The people from the settlement on Primăverii street, near the sewage plant] don't know what others do behind them. There was a case, when the RomaniCriss [Roma-rights NGO from Bucharest] sued us... They sued the municipality, in the name of the people from the settlement, because it was written "the undersigned" followed by a list of people; but the people did not know about that! And there were some people listed who were not even living there at the time! And when I asked the representative of the settlement to come to my office, the person who maintains there the order, he did not know about anything... And the people were willing to sign a document that they don't ask for any compensation and that they were not consulted regarding the trial. Look, here is the other document, a request for the withdrawal of charges, signed by the people... They said that they only wanted to be left alone (interview with the head of the Welfare Office, Miercurea Ciuc, August 2013).

[Discussion with the representatives of the Roma office from Târgu Mureş about a Red Cross volunteer, who married a man from Valea Rece and organized several charity activities in the settlement]

Roma representative 1 (R1). She never came to me and ask whether what she was doing was right or wrong. Once she started giving food packages to the people and several persons came to me asking "Why do I receive nothing? Why did the other guy receive [a food package]?" And then I went personally to her and told: "If you don't stop doing this, you won't be staying in Târgu Mureş for long!" I haven't threatened her, but she indeed stopped giving food packages. But she did good things as well: she helped the children with school equipment and clothing, brought them to summer camps... (...) It happens sometimes that out of goodwill who do bad things as well.

Int. More concretely, what was not ok from what she did?

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Roma representative 2 (R2). First and foremost she should have got in touch with us.

> R1: Yes.
> R2: The first, the very first thing... Whoever comes to Valea Rece, or any other aria of Târgu Mureş inhabited by Roma, I and my colleague should be the first ones to know. Then, we have representatives in each aria. So one should start doing things only after that. What would happen if each foreign person from abroad would contact a family, take them pictures every week, post them on the Internet, so that others would feel pity of them, and collect funds for each family? ... There should be some organization, isn't it? (Interview with the two representative of the Târgu Mureş Office for the Roma, September 2012, Târgu Mureş,).

At the same time, internal surveillance of the settlement is delegated to the "leader", elected by the dwellers or appointed by authorities or Roma organizations, but it any case endorsed by local authorities.

> They [the municipality] put a good kid as responsible for Primăverii street... (...). And now they put another for Primăverii 2 [Pork City] as well... (...) A young guy, he moved here from Vásárhely [Târgu Mureş/Marosvásárhely] some years ago, he married here. So, allegedly he keeps there the order well enough... So therefore I told those responsible for Somlyó utca [another segregated Roma settlement] that if they failed to maintain the order there, I would put the same guy to be in charge of Somlyo utca too. The fact is that they are afraid of this guy, because he says that „you should not steal, otherwise I will complain about you at the Police!" So this is not a bad thing... It is not nice to betray one other amongst ourselves, but in such cases it is the right thing to do, I think. (...) Because if one steals, all of them [the whole community] will be blamed... or if one does something else, starts a fight... But this guy stops the fights as well, they say (interview with the Roma counsellor of Harghita County, August 2012, Miercurea Ciuc).

> But let me tell you something: not even him [the Roma counselor from the county Roma office] goes alone to the Roma communities. He goes with the representative of that community... So they have very clear hierarchical rules. They stick to their own representative: *Rudar, Ursar, Lingurar,* whatever group they belong to. They listen to him. And the law is something... [that does not matter] (interview with the head of the Ploieşti Municipal Welfare Office, August 2012, Ploieşti).

> I don't think and you cannot provide any evidence that you encountered children begging in the city or doing other bad things. We have taught the people from there to work, so as to demonstrate everybody that we can indeed work. That we can gain our daily bread even from waste. We did not go to beg! (speech of the leader of the old Pata-Rât settlement known as "Dallas" at the public debate between the candidates at the election of the mayor of Cluj-Napoca, organized by Lobby for Cluj in April 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

For outsiders, they are gatekeepers that protect the inhabitants from abuses of journalists or "money-hungry NGOs" that "exploit the plight of the Roma". For local authorities, they are the "trustworthy and civilized", who know how and what to speak about the "community", i.e. how to *represent* the *population*. The opinion of those living in the settlement, as our fieldwork revealed, is much more nuanced, mixed, and twisted by tensions. Nonetheless, there is little they can do about the emerging power-structure in the settlement *as citizens.*

Those who provide work and earnings, even if on the informal market, gain a power-position that allows discretionary actions, that sometimes materialize in helping out the inhabitants, at other times in exploiting their vulnerability:

> There used to be a *patron* [employer] here, who tried to help the Gypsies. But he went to prison. He has been released recently. But he was not a wicked man. (...) He gave work for the people, brought food, lent money to the needy, but not for usury... During the feasts, he brought cookies and refreshments, so that poor people had something to put on the table. [He was not like] the plastic-waste collector *patron* from Somlyó street, who lends money for usury and then obliges people to collect plastic bottles for him. He provided work for the people, took them to work at the countryside...
> *Int: But he is not a Gypsy?*
> No, but he has never said "Gypsy" to anybody. While he was working here, the people respected the order, because they were afraid of him, they respected him (interview with a resident from Pork City, woman in her 30s, August 2012, Miercurea Ciuc).

Individual communication between dwellers and authorities, as discussed above, is limited to matters of social assistance and sometimes personal safety, while all other issues (including the health and education of children) are rendered as problems of the "community", i.e. as *population* matters, and discussed through the "leaders" or through the state-appointed "Roma mediators" for health and schooling. The latter do not necessarily reside in the settlement, but even if they do, their internal authority is very limited, as they do not participate in the economic networks providing revenues for the inhabitants (occasional work in construction, reparations, selective waste collection etc.), they are known to have stable employment at state-authorities, and they are usually younger and often women (the case of health-mediators) in a still very patriarchal society. Moreover, they lack the legal and material resources to operate substantial improvements in the matters they were assigned to *mediate* between authorities and the marginalized population.

> *Head of the welfare office*: There is a Roma counsellor at the [Ploiești] Municipality whom we collaborate with.
> *Social worker from the welfare office*: Or the health mediators who stay in touch with citizens, come here and help them out with these forms that they cannot understand. I will give you an example: the application for social aid is very complex. Therefore,

on days when the office is open for the public, the health mediators come and help them to fill in the forms (Interview with representatives of the Ploieşti Municipal Welfare Office, August 2012).

In Agamben's words, health and school mediators should *mediate* between "law" and "bare life" in order to produce the "biopolitical body" of the stat – i.e. to prevent the ghetto from turning into a "camp"[11], while keeping its boundaries "safely" intact for the comforted outsiders. When taking up this task, they often discover that "bare life" has been already captured by and chained into circuits of economic exchange and exploitative informal labour going sometimes as far as human trafficking and sexual exploitation. Or, that "bare life" has been already tamed by non-governmental or religious organizations building a different sort of "biopolitical body", with a different ideological commitment.

> ... together with mister N. [the head of the foreign faith-based NGO active in Pata-Rât] we have tried [to improve] the small improvised houses of the people... Mr. N. had been very much involved there in the community. Small houses were built, electricity was introduced, we have water. We have done all these things without you [i.e. the candidates in the election of the mayor of Cluj-Napoca, 2012]. We have done them with the help of God. As a Christian from Pata-Rât, the Old Colony, we have tried to support the people living there, so that they don't have to steal, don't have to beg on the streets (speech of the leader of the old Pata-Rât settlement known as "Dallas" at the public debate between the candidates at the election of the mayor of Cluj-Napoca, organized by Lobby for Cluj in April 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

> ... we are here, we have leaders in each area, Pentecostal churches in each area, and I think we obtained the trust of the Roma people. (Interview with a representative of the Mureş County Office for the Roma, September 2012, Târgu Mureş; one of them is the vice-president of the local branch of the Roma party and the son of the Pentecostal pastor serving in the settlement).

All these agents create a power-structure inside the settlement that branches out from the ghetto and may challenge but also reinforce its boundaries. For example, the faith-based charity organization active in the Pata-Rât area at the same time connects the dwellers to an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991) of the baptised "brothers and sisters" and facilitates exchanges between Pata-Rât and "outsiders", yet it consolidates an internal leadership that uptakes the roles of gatekeeping and representation, and it literally confirms the ghetto by

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[11] „Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation. This is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and *homo sacer* is virtually confused with the citizen" (Agamben, 1998: 96-97)

posting warning signs of entering the "Dallas private neighbourhood"[12] where taking photos is strictly prohibited. Nonetheless, by privatising the location, the organization is capable to provide dwellers documents attesting their residence and thus obtaining regular identity cards and subsequent citizenship rights. Peculiarly, yet typically for the eroded citizenship under commodification flows, the inhabitants from Pata-Rât became visible for the state as individual citizens only after their settlement was turned into the private property of an NGO that granted their *ownership* of the place.

Conclusion

What prevents the *ghetto* from turning into a *camp*? A bitter question that points much further than the empty ambition of conceptual oversophistication. The *camp* is given by the sovereignty to transform discretion into rule by merging law and violence, which involves a monopoly over turning violence into law that exceeds the monopoly over using lawful violence and the violence of the law. This vision of sovereignty resembles Weber's definition of the state[13] as "the sole source of the 'right' to use violence" (Weber, 1919), yet expands it by adding the Foucauldian dimension of *biopolitics.* "The sovereign decides not the licit and the illicit, but the originary inclusion of the living in the sphere of law... [and imposes] ... the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it" (Agamben, 1998: 13-23). The ghetto has not turned into a camp because there is a constant struggle over the sovereignty to define the biopolitics that should /include/incorporate/assimilate/ignore the "bare-life" of the peripheries.

As argued throughout this paper, the state is not one coherent apparatus capable to enact extensive and intensive surveillance, but rather a weakly-tied assemblage enacting policies of dividing identifications and population sorting, boundary-setting and unfavourable inclusion, but ultimately unable to control the ghettos it creates. State biopolitics confronts the biopolitics of economic entrepreneurs aiming to incorporate inhabitants of segregated settlements into exploitative labour relations, the biopolitics of faith-based organizations with energetic conversion and community-building programs, the biopolitics of NGOs promoting discourses and practices from a supra-national level that often replace citizenship-conditionalities with the universality of human rights etc. These biopolitics do not regularly converge, although may have cumulative and reinforcing effects of building boundaries for ghettos or, on the contrary,

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[12] "Cartierul Privat Dallas"/"Dallas Private Neighbourhood" is made up of wooden and brick houses built by an international faith-based charity organization on private land bought by the organization on the very spot of the decades-old Pata-Rât settlement near the waste dump of Cluj-Napoca.

[13] Although Agamben makes no reference to Max Weber, neither in *Homo Sacer,* nor in *State of Exception.*

demolishing them. All of these agents have their own identity and membership project of shaping "bare life" into "politically qualified or good life" (Agamben, 1998: 11), be it that of the labourer, the faithful, the global citizen with universal rights, etc.; but none of them is able to exercise monopoly over the structuring of an ultimate frame of reference.

The shallow presence of the state at the margins cannot be separated from the general state-retrenchment that leaves increasing room for neoliberal economics and merely corrects market failures. Thus the abandonment of "bare" peripheries cannot be separated from the abandonment of the citizenship project, which was seen as emancipation from population policies.

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FAMILY AS A MEANS OF SURVIVAL.
FORMATION AND INSIDE PROCESSES OF A ROMA GHETTO
IN ŞUMULEU CIUC

HAJNALKA HARBULA[1]

ABSTRACT. The present article was written in the framework of a larger study on different forms of residential segregation. It is based on ethnographic fieldwork and interviews carried out in Şumuleu Ciuc/Csíksomlyó, a village from central Transylvania connected with the city of Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda and having a Hungarian majority. Using this case-study, the article shows how spatial segregation and isolation are produced, and also the role segregation plays in shaping formal and informal everyday strategies in a context where Roma, a minority group, lives at the periphery of the Hungarian majority in this part of Transylvania.

Keywords: family, spatial segregation, subsistence economy

Introduction[2]

This paper describes the historically formed connections between a Roma family and their residential space in Miercurea Ciuc, whom I met and interviewed repeatedly during the fieldwork done in the framework of the broader SPAREX project (see *Guest Editors' Foreword,* this issue). The original couple who formed this multigenerational. Extended Roma family moved to Şumuleu-Ciuc[3] in search

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[3] Şumuleu Ciuc (Csíksomlyó) belongs to Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda) since 1959. Locals, including local Roma (who hardly speak Romanian) use the names of these settlements in Hungarian language that is why my article uses the Romanian and the Hungarian geographical names interchangeably. The settlement lies on the bank of river Somlyó at three kilometers distance from the city center in northeast direction. Interestingly, Somlyó knows its first historic documentation earlier (in the 14th century) than Miercurea-Ciuc (16th century) that incorporated it six centuries later. The city of Miercurea Ciuc had only around 950 inhabitants in 1850, which grew up to 3701

for work at the end of the 1950s. In 2012, they lived in the settlement in 34 households[4] together with their 14 children (now adults) born here and the families of their descendants.

The SPAREX research project had not initially regarded "kinship" as a central category. However, the case presented in this paper can illustrate the following processes: (1) how does spatial segregation and the concomitant isolation from the outside world shape the life of an extended family, and vice versa, how is the extension of the small family into an extended family transforming the space, i.e. how it creates the space of the colony around the original parental home; (2) what is the role of segregation in the formation of formal and informal labour strategies people rely on and use in a context that denies them access to decent employment; and (3) how is a (poor) Roma family living in an environment where Hungarians represent the majority population. My article discusses these topics through the description of kinship relations pertaining to individuals living in the extended family. It is drawing a genealogy in a vertical sense through the stories of at least one representative of all generations listed on a temporal axis.[5] So the whole analysis is based on interviews with members of the extended family comprising four generations.

The starting point of the family history is represented by the moment in which parents moved to Şumuleu Ciuc in the second half of the 1950s. Through their, and their children' stories one may trace on micro level those factors and processes that produce a residential space and the way in which people's lives are shaped by such an environment. Reducing the scale of the analysis to a kinship-based community does not represent an analytical deficit. It is rather an opportunity for approaching large issues (such as spatial exclusion) through the "small facts" of a family's everyday life (Geertz, 1973; Gullestad, 1989; Eriksen, 1995). Systemic economic and social changes and local level processes of the last fifty years, including patterns of labour, schooling and housing might be traced through people's lived experiences and memories narrated to us, outsider researchers who by the

in 1910 and to about 11900 in 1956. Due to socialist urbanization and industrialization its population increased to 46228 for 1992, since when it knows a slow decrease (the last census from 2011 registering 37980 inhabitants). Csíksomlyó is a pilgrimage site since 1567, when the Hungarian king wanted to convert the Székely population of the upper Csík to Protestantism, but they refused to abandon the Catholic faith and resisted. They entered into a battle on a nearby field before Pentecost, from which they emerged victorious, and saw this as a sign of the care of Virgin Mary. Beside its religious importance, the pilgrimage has also become a community event demonstrating cultural and linguistic unity of Hungarian people living in and outside the historical region of Transylvania. Nowadays local businesses on tourism are flourishing exactly due to this event and to the ethnic significance of the place, a strong symbol of proudly assumed Székely identity.

[4] According to a social worker who used to be employed by the Town Hall, and who is now retired, there were 34 families in this zone in 2012. Only two of these families were not related to the extended family.

[5] The description of the family-tree is available in a previous working paper, see Harbula, H (2013): The family tree of the Roma community from Şumuleu Ciuc. *Sparex Working Paper. http://sparex-ro.eu/wp-content/uploads/ŞumuleuŞumuleu_csiksomlyo.pdf*

means of their interpretations construct linkages between different levels and dimensions of socio-spatial marginalization.

I have met this family during our SPAREX fieldwork conducted in 2012 on different sites inhabited by the ethnic Roma of Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda: Primăverii/Tavasz street, near the city sewage plant known as *Szargyár* (i.e. "Shit Factory"); the informal settlement near the landfill known as *Bánya* (i.e. "The Mine"), which was closed in the summer of 2012; *Pork City* (named as such by locals) in the vicinity of Primăverii street; the social housing from the block of flat on Gyermeksétány street 9; and Şumuleu Ciuc /Somlyó street, or *Somlyó utca,* as locals call it. While the extended family nowadays living near the waste water treatment plant was settled into that location due to administrative measures (being collectively evicted and relocated by the City Hall), and while the Roma inhabiting Pork City (the town's former informal animal farm) belonged to different Roma groups and voluntarily settled down in that area, the Roma colony of Şumuleu was a result of a two-directional process. As a group stick together by kinship ties – on the one hand – it occupied informally a whole street by its gradual enlargement as an extended family, or as a result of biological reproduction. But – on the other hand – the formation of this colony was also a consequence of lacking alternatives or of the exclusionary mechanisms that kept them apart as a group from the mainstream society, or made them to return to this colony after the individual failures in making a living outside the family and its original space. This is why the broader SPAREX research question (on the relationship between society and space in the case of Şumuleu Ciuc Roma) transforms into an interrogation of the way in which the triangle of the residential space, the small society of the family and the broader society creates a case of spatialized and racialized exclusion. In their case spatial exclusion is produced at the intersection of the biological reproduction of the family and the social reproduction of its marginality happened as a process that transgresses different political regimes.

The present ethnographical case study aims to build a comprehensive understanding of the situation of Şumuleu Roma by describing it and by revealing the local meanings of family, spatial segregation, and subsistence economy. Moreover, I am also addressing this particular case as an instance of a wider phenomenon in order to obtain a better general understanding of it, and this is why my analysis is situated at the intersection of the intrinsic case study and instrumental case study (Stake, 1995). Eventually, besides a contribution to the scant knowledge on residential segregation and ghetto formation and functioning in particular settlements, the present study contributes to the understanding of some more general patterns of these phenomena, because by presenting the case of Şumuleu Ciuc one may provide a look on the powerful realities shaping everyday life in a segregated and impoverished area.

The first part of my analysis, focusing on housing segregation, seeks an answer to the question how does the spatial segregation shape the life of an extended family, respectively how the space is being transformed by the colony

that has formed due to the extension of a nuclear family into a 34-household-site. The next subsection of the article, dealing with forms of labour, enlists the formal and informal everyday strategies evolved as a result of housing segregation in an environment where the Roma community lives among a Hungarian majority. The latter aspect regarding inter-ethnic relations is discussed in the third chapter of the article entitled Roma community in a Hungarian majority environment.

Housing segregation

Our community resides in Şumuleu Ciuc/Csíksomlyó, which is part of Csíkszereda since 1959. According to the 2011 census 37,980 people are living in the city. Roma families are settled in slum-like environments of different types, such as: (1) slums integrated spatially into the locality, inhabited mostly by Roma (an example in Miercurea Ciuc is the social housing block of flats located at Gyermeksétány no. 9, a central area of the city); (2) colonies/sites at the periphery of the city created by the local government for Roma (Primăverii street/ "Shit Factory"); (3) semirural communities (such as Pork City, and the Şumuleu Ciuc colony, subject of the present study); and (4) families living at the dumpsites ("The Mine"). All the colonies mentioned above are harshly separated from the rest of the city, characterised by an unhealthy environment and the lack of decent living conditions, job opportunities and infrastructure.

The studied community from *Somlyó utca* is organized along biological kinship, but this is a community formed as a social reaction or accommodation to the external, exclusionary reality. In the 1950s a Roma couple moved into the old two-room brick slaughterhouse located on the bank of Şumuleu brook, at Şumuleu Ciuc no. 33. In time they gave birth to fourteen children. The family arrived to Şumuleu Ciuc and moved into the ran-down slaughterhouse as a result of occupational mobility that involved changing the family residence. Following their settling at Şumuleu, the Şimoneşti- and Odorheiu Secuiesc-originated couple had been employed at the public sanitation company for several decades as street sweepers.[6] Currently, the third generation are raising their children in the plank houses built next to the old slaughterhouse, which has been transformed since then with improvised walls, its roof being in a very bad shape.

The initial establishment of the first couple took place in a formal, legal way. The council allocated them the site located at three kilometres distance from the central spot, at the outskirts of the village (becoming in 1959 a district of the city of Miercurea Ciuc). The expansion of the family has drifted the members of the extended family more and more towards informality in terms of housing. "There weren't so many of them. Cause, cause the young... so there wasn't enough place for them to be so many" the social worker explained. Next to the former

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[6] "These, these very poor people who have after all come to Miercurea Ciuc around the 60s, and have worked for the public sanitation company. So they have all been working people here" (former social worker, Miercurea Ciuc, August 2012).

brick house, one after the other, plank houses have been built, for which the electricity supply is provided through improvised wires drawn from the initial (now shared) electricity meter. The water supply of the slum is provided by the one and only public pipe located at the entrance. The buildings have deteriorated, the site is overcrowded. Their position „outside of the society" is also indicated by the situation of the housing environment: they live at the outskirts of the urbanized village, far from the city centre, in a semi-paved dead end street without sewerage.

In the middle of the 1990s only three or four families were living in the slum. But starting with the second half of the 1990s the younger families that moved out before, have returned to Şumuleu Ciuc. This movement or return to the initial family space talks about the impact of economic changes on people's labour opportunities, which are more and more restricted and precarious (Vincze et al., 2011). According to the former social worker the reason was that the „social assistance law" taking effect in 1996 stated that benefits should be claimed at the mayor's office one belonged to according to their permanent residence: "And these people have returned from Rovinari, Târgu Severin, that is from different parts of the country, because their identity card had the same address, Şumuleu Ciuc no. 33" (former social worker, Miercurea Ciuc, August 2012).

Though in terms of public administration Şumuleu Ciuc belongs to Miercurea Ciuc, therefore being an integral part of the city, at present it still has an essentially rural character. During socialism, some of those living here in the slum migrated towards cities, while at the beginning of the 1990s, following the collapse of large urban industrial plants, the migration reversed its direction and people moved back from the cities to the slum located at the periphery of the village, and the segregation became more and more evident. As shown in the next parts of the present study, rural traditions (rural, agricultural traditions-based working models) are not characteristic of the Roma living in this slum, but they do not possess either traditional urban resources. Their social problems (unemployment, exclusion from the primary care services, access to segregated schools, making a living out of informal economic activities etc.) occur in a concentrated way.

The inner development of the colony in the past half century resulted in the formation of a larger spatial structure: the nuclear family that once moved into the abandoned building of the pig farm has extended into 34 households by now. The fact that the site is located on the outskirts of the village determinates the relation between the Roma living here and the representatives of the majority society: the spatial segregation also means social segregation. One feature of spatial segregation in the present case is the closed structure of those living in a block, preserved consequently by the representatives of the majority society throughout their everyday interactions, or by the bad quality of the road leading through the site that is paved until its half and then is turning into a field path. This spatial arrangement reflects the local social hierarchies between the poor Roma and the better-off Hungarian families: while in the case of the former large families are living in small rooms, the majority population lives in big houses in

nuclear families. The exclusion is not only social, but it also has ethnic meanings. The city as a whole does not provide jobs, decent housing and education for those living in the "Gypsy ghetto". All their sources are being shaped by racial exclusion: their job consists of collecting scrap iron or plastic bottles, their houses are improvised wooden stalls, their education takes place in a segregated school called locally as "*cigány-iskola*" (Gypsy school).

Formal and informal labour

Family and relatives living together and their mutual support is a fundamental pillar of anthropological research, but neither anthropology nor other social sciences possess an exclusive definition of the concept of family. The latter and as well as the functions of family has a wide variety of definitions (Stewart 2003), but in the case of the present study the utmost relevant definition is the commonly used anthropological approach, according to which kinship is the relation between individuals formed on the basis of consanguinity, marriage or adoption (Viazzo-Lynch, 2002).

Belonging to a family or to relatives regulates the relationship between people, defines the different forms of co-operation and the organization of social life. The break-up of the large family, as a phenomenon, was highlighted by a number of research areas in the last decades, but several studies also point to the opposite: the surviving of the family supports the system. Examining this, Bereczkei states that turning to a first or second degree relative when in need becomes characteristic, "the help received from relatives in most cases does not follow reciprocation...", "the direction of altruism is largely dependent on the age of the participants... and the aid is usually about financial resources, flowing from the older to young people" (Bereczkei, 2009: 26-27).

In the case of the large family investigated by me, the support within kinship is also specific, but this is primarily to be understood as a non-financial support. The colony living in nuclear families take care of the children whose parents can no longer perform their tasks. This is how the oldest boy in the family takes care of the deceased sister's two children, and a grandmother takes care of the two minor children whose parents are working abroad. It also can happen that during the time of punishment of a crime, the relatives have to take care of the children.

> This is a kind of child-rearing, because they took the bigger children away from my son, he had six weeks and I took care of him, he now goes to school. He was small when his mother went away. He doesn't even recognize his mother. We speak on the phone. The biggest child, he loves his father and his mother too. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 46 years old, the 3rd child of the family, August 2012).

These commitments are mostly formalized, both families receive state aid for the care of the children. However, there are cases, when parents arbitrarily decide to informally take away the supervision from the younger children. In

these cases, decisions are usually made, in a large family, by older men, the younger women are not questioning these decisions, they abide the decisions made by the fathers. This is the case in the following story, when the father took away the first child of his 13 year old daughter.

> My father took my child away. I held him many times, but mostly my dad because he forbade us a bit, because he said that they wanted to take me to the orphanage. I told the girl, before my father was dead, he always said that "your mother wanted to take you to the orphanage".
>
> And the girl is calling me by name. She says, "If you wanted to take me to the orphanage, I will never do anything for you." And then. Because I didn't have the chance to raise her and did not know how to raise a child. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012)

The case relating to child rearing shown above exemplifies that the decisions made by women living in the community from Şumuleu have narrower limits than the decisions made by men. Not only decisions regarding their children, their household, but also who they choose to live with, they cannot take independent decisions.[7]

The degree and frequency of support, and as well as the familial space in the case of the Roma from Şumuleu Ciuc is of vital importance. The way in which they managed to adapt to the larger system, or one of the conditions of their survival, as we shall see later on, is their coexistence. This is illustrated by how, during the socialist era, adapting to the outside world and the challenges, they migrated towards the cities, and then, after 1990, adapting to the postsocialist economic changes they started returning to the original site.[8] The parents worked from the 1950s at the Miercurea Ciuc public cleaning company. Some of the children have also found work at the public cleaning company, but others migrated and sought work elsewhere. The majority of the members of the family made it to Târgu-Jiu, worked, until the changes in 1989, at the railroad company.

> I also worked at the railroad company. Well, it was ten years ago, when I worked there. I also worked in the Ceauşescu regime. Just not here. In Turnu Severin. (...) Her husband was from there too.(,,) No he was not from there. He was from

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[7] Regarding the choice of who they live with, they told the story, when the parents do not accept the decision of the young, the men from the family physically assaulted their daughter's future husband, "they beat him up, they took him to the police station and the police asked: do you love him? And I said, yes, I do. Okay, then they do not say anything. But .. they didn't accept him" (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012).

[8] Concerning migration during communism, Sandu states that "it appears as a process which can be controlled at macrosocial level, through the controllability of processes which determine it" (Sandu 1981: 14), and he differentiates the types of migration on the basis of local communities of origin and of destination, setting up thus the following migration types: rural-rural, urban-urban and urban-rural.

Brasov. (Well, how did he get there?) Well, after my husband. (When was this?) Well, I do not know, 'cause... Well, to change the bars from the railroad, ... There was a collision ... so we had to go to work even at night. (And your husband? what did he do?) At the same place. When... And they fired us and we came back to the parental house. (And then, when they fired you, and you came back, did you find a job at home?) No. Because I would have worked, of course, because I had worked for so many years, so I can receive my pension as the other (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012).

As a result of the dramatically sudden disappearance of jobs starting with the 1990s, the family members went back to their extended families of origin. This was an urban-urban type of migration that did not ended in finding secure jobs or sources of income, or in gaining economic independence by individuals, but was a movement that socially (re)created the biological kinship as a collective adaptation strategy. Nowadays, the income of the 34 families living in the colony basically comes from collecting plastic bottles for recycling.

Well we collect plastic bottles, we just started. Well, he goes [the husband] to collect bottles too and then I'll stay home with the children, and I clean up the house. This is what I do. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 48 years old, the 3rd child of the family, August 2012) casual jobs (we also worked in Tusnád, we gleaned potatoes, and in a low percentage the income is from other jobs (one has retired, he has a pension, and there are two or three families, where there are children relatives, foster care. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012)

Research examining the migrant labour force in Romania found that the country is on the first place among the source countries, that a large number of workers are without qualification, as well as that a large number of them work in construction and agriculture (Feischmidt-Zakariás, 2010: 157). The people from the Hungarian majority from around Miercurea Ciuc were working abroad, since the 1990s, their destination in most of the cases was Hungary, where they travelled due to their ethnic ties, but strongly motivated by economic reasons.[9] This ethnic migration and basically the economic reasons affected the occupational mobility of the Roma from Şumuleu Ciuc: they also tried their luck in Hungary. Their narratives about their migrant experiences are based on a single negative experience, but this is a defining experience for them, so they did not try to find any work neither in Hungary, nor somewhere else. This experience has not brought any economic growth or prestige for the Roma from Şumuleu Ciuc.

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[9] Feischmidt-Zakariás distinguishes three types of ethnic migration; within the first type of displacement, the target country is chosen due to its "cultural attractiveness", in the second case the motivation basically is an economic one, while in the third case "the failure to integrate the minority is the reason why members of a minority try to make their living somewhere else"(Feischmidt-Zakariás 2010: 152-153).

Int: And do you go to work abroad?

Hungary. Yes. Well, I have never been there. I'm here...with the children. And those who were in Hungary, what did they do? No. They worked somewhere with pigs, they cut pigs. And worked in the slaughterhouse. But then they came home without money ... Well, the boss didn't pay them. Every gypsy went there, and they came home without any money.

Int: And when was this?

Well...

Int: Six or seven years ago? Four or three years?

Yes, three years ago.

Int: And after that nobody dared to go?

Since then, no. And then they have no IDs (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 46 years old, the 3rd child of the family, August 2012).

But I would have gone, but I don't have a normal ID.

Int: You never had one?

No (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012).

Concerning their work abroad, the memory of the community so far overrides any positive personal experience (only one family working in Italy for several months). Working abroad is made impossible by the above mentioned fact that the residents of the colony have a temporary ID card. The temporary migration abroad, which only meant temporary work for the only family who went to Italy, was created along the local networks. The one who created this network, married into the community, and had exterior connections.

Well, he was small, when his mother went away. He doesn't even know his mother. Sometimes we talk on the phone (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 46 years old, the 3rd child of the family, August 2012).

Int: And there in Italy, where are they?

Benevento. Well, they went to Brasov, they are still there, and the one who took him, took his wife too. They took them with a minibus. One hundred Euros. They had to pay one hundred Euros. Well, they got a credit, and then they gave it back when they were there (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012).

Well, yes, with the cigarette tobacco, they work with cigarette tobacco. Well, in June, she has to come back, because of the children in order to make the children passports. She wants to take the children too. Yes, because the boss gave them a house. And the boss wants to make them IDs (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012).

By the gathering and the occasional work or by the means of participating only in the informal sector sometimes they cannot secure the minimum revenues needed to live even from one day to another. For the members of the extended family living in the slum, labour options are limited. One of the consequences of

parents' uncertain position on the labour market is the lack of participation in the educational system of their children: in this way disadvantage and exclusion is transmitted from one generation to another.

> How many children go to school out of the fourteen? Well, not one. Not one. (...) There was one that went to school, but he died. He was able to read and write. F. can also read a little, just a little bit, he can read. Well, back then we had no opportunity to go to school, not like now. You had to pay for school, you had to buy the books, all sorts of things, and for thirteen children, my mother could not get all of these things for all of them.
> *Int:* But back then, was there a school in the village?
> Yes. Yes, but in was a Hungarian school, not a gypsy school. But there was one school where both Gypsies and Hungarians went. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012)

About a similar situation reports a research on Roma women's and men's access to decent work[10] consisting of a survey conducted in the city of Iaşi, Bucureşti, Timişoara, Cluj-Napoca and some surrounding villages on a sample including 1003 persons, in qualitative case studies made in Timiş and Cluj counties, and in a labour force study applied in the county centres from the Romanian Western developmental region (Vincze et al., 2011: 43), which concluded that the low participation of parents in the educational system is reproduced in the case of their children. 65% of the interviewees was poorly educated, 21,6% of them only took part in primary education, and about 7.1% of the research respondents were not taking part in the education system at all. In the case of the colony living in Şumuleu this ratio was much higher in 2012. Out of 14 children only one went to school. The members of the second generation could have gone to a local, majority Hungarian school, but as it is clear from the interview cited above, that was only a nominal, not a real option for them. The third generation is still absent from the educational system. Although the economic activity in the "village" in the last period consisted mostly of land cultivation, those who live on the site, without land ownership, did not get integrated into this type of work. They mostly participate at the autumn harvest, working as day labourers. Their remuneration consists in this case in money and crops. The earned crops are placed in holes dug into the ground in the middle of the rooms. This also shows that the rural options, joining small production works, as an existential climb, are not available for the Roma colony living in Şumuleu. Neither under state socialism nor in the decades of transition could they be integrated into the local agricultural economy. Another pillar of their double

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[10] The research was conducted between 2009 and 2011 within the project *Equality through difference. Roma women's access to the labour market.* The description of the project and its main results can be consulted on the web page of the conducting institution, the Desire Foundation: *http://www.desire-ro.eu/?page_id=27* (Accessed: 30.11.2013) and also in Vincze et al. (2011).

exclusion is that the city does not provide them with public employment programs and a livelihood. Their employment opportunities, without or only with low qualifications, schooling, and proper personal documents are limited to informal economy and precarious jobs.

The examples presented above clearly outline that whereas before 1989 the adaptation strategies for members of the extended family were mostly defined by legal employment (they moved from one place to another to be legally employed in the public cleaning company and at the railroad company), with the beginning of the 1990s, the informal labour strategies started characterizing the community. Legal employment is difficult to find, and irregular work in the shadow economy appears as the only option. Due to the accumulated penalties and because of the bureaucracy[11] few families receive state social aid, they do not work in agriculture, because do not own land and there are no jobs in this domain, and raising animals is also not typical in their case.

In association (two-two families together) raise a pig, they have horses, which they use for drafting. Their basic livelihood comes from the gathering recyclable waste, such as the *vasazás* (iron collection), *flakonyozás* (collecting plastic bottles), *tallózás* (*gleaning),* and occasional informal work. Some forms of gathering are permitted, such as the *gleaning*, carried out with the approval of the peasants, but most of them are prohibited by local authorities. The collection of iron and plastic bottles for example, since the appearance of the selective waste collection, requires the development of specific strategies such as bargaining with employees of different catering units about not throwing the plastic bottles into the containers specially designated but handing them over to the Roma on their request, or collecting plastic bottles from street dustbins. Children also participate in these works. Collecting plastic bottles from the garbage cans, begging on the streets and begging in the church, constitute subsistence-labour that children are used for. As Șumuleu Ciuc is a semi-rural district of the city of Miercurea Ciuc , it does not have the resources (such as landfill, broken down factories) that would allow the gathering, so communities living in this settlement are forced to collect waste from other, more distanced parts of the city. However, this is made difficult not only by the local system of selective waste collection, but also by the fact that they cannot enter the city with their horse carriages, so it is hard to transport larger quantities of collected bottles. Collecting waste, as a subsistence economy activity, is discussed in literature through many research experiences. But in this case, as shown by the outlined livelihood strategies, this activity does not aim at supplementing income, but rather to ensure daily survival. Consistency is not typical for them, and their incidental character also confirms the insecurity of existence.

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[11] Those living in the colony transport plastic bottles and iron collected in the town and in the surroundings by horse-drawn carts. Since thus they infringe traffic rules and do not pay fines received due to the pasturing of horses on others' land, they are not entitled to state allowance.

Roma community in a Hungarian majority environment

The majority of Miercurea Ciuc – Şumuleu Ciuc population are of Hungarian ethnicity. The encounters between the extended family living on the bank of Şumuleu brook and the majority population, as well as their mutual representation are drawn through individual stories. The actors involved in the "emancipation" efforts appear episodically in their lives, and then they leave the same way. If someone from the outside is trying to play a role in their lives, s/he is accepted, but the number of those instances when they themselves initiate the crossing of the symbolic border between them and the majority population are very rare.

A good example for this contact initiative is the border-crossing attempt of the powerful Roman Catholic church from Şumuleu Ciuc, a popular place of pilgrimage for Hungarians from Transylvania but also from Hungary: a priest serving there has opened up towards the community living on the slum, but his successor turned away from the community after his departure. For a short period, the role of the Catholic church was taken over by a representative of the Orthodox church from Miercurea Ciuc. At present, representatives of the neo-protestant religions have also made their appearance in the community.

> There are also children who go begging. Church became forbidden at the time we had been begging. [12]
> *Int:* Have you been begging at the church as well?
> Sure, I am not ashamed of. We have been living upon that... we collected a little money and bought things. At High Mass. Every Sunday, at Pentecost, New Year's Eve. Yeah, but not anymore. Yep, yep.
> *Int:* And who had forbidden that?
> Well, the priest. And the police. That begging was not allowed. ...policemen came and they fined the parents (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 46 years old, the 3rd child of the family, August 2012).

> Sometimes we go in, and then when we are coming out, we behave well inside, when we are coming out they slam the door, and then the reverend scolds hem.
> *Int:* How do you call this reverend?
> We don't know. Well we don't know this young one, who has been sent here in place of the old reverend.
> *Int:* And when the old reverend was still here, did you go to church?
> I went to my first communion. Old reverend was kind hearted. He even helped, and at Christmas time he brought us stuffed cabbages. He brought food. Yeah. He brought chocolate, and he said: had you been bad? And we said: no! Sometimes his father came as well. But not anymore. Nobody helps anymore. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 46 years old, the 3rd child of the family, August 2012)

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[12] Begging was forbidden in the church.

Since a few years, Oliver, a French man is a regular character in the life of the Roma community of Şumuleu Ciuc. He arrives during summers, buys planks and pitch-paper to assist the reparation of the houses, or helps the men to add new premises for new family members. The Roma accept his help, moreover, they are waiting for his arrival from spring already. His role of as a helper became a myth in the community's remembrance. They say that the French boy is the only child of rich parents, whose father left him his fortune with the condition that he would use it to help the poor. They could not say how he had got to Şumuleu Ciuc. Part of the community knows him, but the newly moved family members know only the myth around him, so they took my colleague, who was doing research there, for Oliver.

School is also an important social factor in the lives of Şumuleu Roma. Currently, children living here attend a segregated school. The primary educational system awaits students with classes specially conceived for Roma students. Children over the age of ten go to a school at the periphery of the city.

> Children get free meals, on the condition, of course, that they attend school, if not, they won't get anything. So they get it at school. At the beginning of the year we buy them shoes, buy them clothes, so they get a certain amount of money, that again we use this way- because the first time the money had been given to the parents to buy those, ... In Miercurea Ciuc there is a Roma school. But the situation is that it is for the primary classes, generally. There in Topliţa-Ciuc children attend 5 to 8 grades too, true that by the eighth grade their number decreases a lot. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012)

The majority of the community's adult population is illiterate. This fact makes it difficult for them to obtain even the daily subsistence.

Local police periodically inspects the site. As the representatives of the authority, they speak Romanian language. Contact with them is being kept by the member of the extended family who speaks best the language of the country.

> He is in charge. Well, because he is a little better than others. He doesn't drink, he's not a drunkard, and he understands folks. If we need to clean up the yards, then we all set about to work.
> *Int:* Since when had he become the boss? Since your father had died, or even before that?
> Before. A month before.
> *Int:* Until that your father had been the... Aha. Which one?
> And he resigned and passed it over to his brother. Well, he resigned because he didn't really speak Romanian. And he couldn't quite communicate. And he couldn't communicate well with the cops, he couldn't communicate with them. Well, if they came and spoke Romanian, he wouldn't understand anything. And even if they spoke Hungarian, they wouldn't speak Hungarian [with us]. They would speak Romanian. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012)

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Apart from the police, on behalf of the government merely the social worker visits the community. Given that the majority of the community are illiterate, they do not speak Romanian language and are not capable to make it out through the web of bureaucratic systems. Thus the social worker's presence plays an important role in the lives of the community members. Of the former, now retired administrative employee of the local Welfare Department, the community memory preserves a positive image, as a person who often visited them, helped them manage their different affairs. However, they have a different opinion regarding the current social worker.

> Well, how many times have we visited the council, asking for help. They never helped at all. Well X.Y., he visits us, he only asks: did the children go to school? He only says that, and then he leaves by the car. (interview with a woman, resident from Şumuleu Ciuc, 30 years old, the 14th child of the family, August 2012)

Attempts of the above mentioned social organizations could not bring closer the colony residents and the members of the majority population. They live as a tolerated group in a well-defined space, with clear boundaries, the community members' and the majority population's children attend separate educational institutions. They maintain periodic working relationships with one another; the only permanent wage employment relationship with the Hungarians was maintained by a woman who, through marital assimilation, had moved into a family house owned by Hungarians in the vicinity of the colony, but even that was also in the urban area.

> And I don't ask for it. I'd rather ask from the shop. Then I know that it is from one Saturday till the other, 'cause my husband gets two and a half millions per week [they still use the old currency in conversations, i.e. 2,5 mil old lei ROL equals 250 new lei RON], and that goes, that doesn't... So I get little, and the family [?]. Well, I once worked for the shop, I made the cleaning up. In the city. And then they helped me out with food. They didn't give me money, but they gave food.
> *Int:* Didn't they give you money for the cleaning up?
> No, 'cause they gave food. And I understood that it is better than money, that we would spend... We had bread and everything. Well, in the winter I worked throwing away the snow and sweeping in front of the shop. That. And so they gave bread, chicken giblets, what I needed. Onion, potatoes, these were all good for me. (interview with a woman moved in Şumuleu after living in another part of the city, August 2013).

Due to illiteracy and the lack of serious work by community mediators, they fail to access even the social support provided by the current Romanian welfare legislation for the socially disadvantaged families:

> But, being illiterate, they cannot keep record whether their identity cards are expired... so they need permanent [surveillance – n.n.]... I am not saying mothering or tutoring, but definitely permanently keeping contact, personal

contact with them. Follow up. And sometimes telling them that now you need to go here, you need to do that, consumes more time and energy than going and arranging it instead of them. (interview with the former social worker, female, 40 years old, Miercurea Ciuc, August 2013)

All this is made more difficult by the centralized bureaucracy:

> While he obtains one paper, the validity of the other expires, so they need to gather so many papers, and continuously provide proof of the nothing... for the circumstances these people are living in, and in those 20 years they only drifted downwards, no progress has been made. Thus, if they don't have any income, they need to present a certificate from the Finances, if they have a penalty unpaid, they won't get the certificate. Many of them were dropped out [from the welfare system] for that reason. Because the way the social assistance is being bureaucratized at present, everybody is getting powerless. Not only those provided with assistance... (interview with the former social worker, female, 40 years old, Miercurea Ciuc, August 2013).

Conclusion

Şumuleu Ciuc is a settlement with a strong rural character, however since 1959 administratively is a district of the city of Miercurea Ciuc that, at its turn, grew as an urban settlement during socialist industrialization, becoming the centre of a county created in the Romanian administrative-territorial system in 1968. The difference between the two settlements is mainly due to their historical occupational structure and architecture. The former village was historically specialized mainly in agriculture and kept hosting individual houses, while the town's economy was specialized on some industrial domains (having a textile, a tractor and a beer-factory) and its architectural landscape became dominated by socialist blocks of flats. The urbanization trends prior to 1989 aimed at unifying Şumuleu Ciuc with the integrative town, changing its occupational structure by transforming peasants into workers.

The initial couple of the presented family settled in Şumuleu at the end of the 1950s while looking for urban employment, and they were workers indeed up until their workforce was needed. Once the local community did not need anymore their labour force, it ignored them entirely. Under these conditions, the Roma community tries to mobilize its own resources (including different kinds of informal family support) while adapting to the new situation in order to ensure their living. As a sole possibility, the family members moved back to the colony that, as a result, started to occupy informally a more and more extended space around the initial parents' home, and although they live in a semi-rural or a semi-urban environment, by lacking any property and employment forms, they make use of their ultimate earning possibilities (collecting waste, plastic and scrap iron), the last niches left open to them by the local economy.

My analysis demonstrated that due to spatial segregation, the only solid basis of the large family's everyday living was the aid received from the relatives, as authorities did not support them in solving their social problems (unemployment, dropping out from basic supplies etc.). Moreover, it showed that, due to housing segregation, their economic activities are not activities ensuring surplus revenues, but are means of everyday living, in an environment with a Hungarian majority population, where neither decent homes, nor right to work or right to public education (not segregated one) is ensured to them.

The village council in Șumuleu Ciuc allocated to the Roma family who moved in the settlement in the 1950s a building on the settlement's periphery. This building was an old, decayed one that lost its function as a residential dwelling. The fact that the building was situated at the periphery of the village, three kilometres away from the city centre, had defined the special isolation that the family has never succeeded to overcome. Neither before 1989, nor after it were there conditions created for these Roma to reduce the degree of the already produced territorial separation. Spatial segregation has defined their economic relations and position on the labour market: the barracks they built are still illegal, since the Mayor failed to legalize them. Consequently, the people living there do not have official papers on their dwellings, and as a result they cannot obtain regular identity cards (only temporary papers). This is why they can only engage in a limited number of occupations (recyclable waste collection, occasional work), and this is why they do not have access to social benefits, and cannot even go abroad to work. Therefore their experience with labour is saturated primarily by experiences of exploitation.

The analysis also speaks of the fact that adaptation strategies have changed as part of the regime changes. While before 1989 more or less legal, formalized work defined these adaptation strategies, starting with the beginning of the 1990s informal adaptation opportunities have become the rule for the community. But collecting recyclable waste and occasional work, in other words participation in informal economy, cannot always ensure the minimum for living from one day to the other. The extended family is constrained to living on the periphery of local society, with limited opportunities of moving out from marginality. Social actors in emancipation projects are an episodic presence in their life. They go as they come. Members of this community welcome the actions of actors from outside their community, but there are few occasions when they initiate the transgression of the symbolic and physical boundaries between them and majority society.

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ANNEX:

THE MAP OF SEGREGATED ROMA COMMUNITIES IN MIERCUREA CIUC

PERFORMATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY. THE CASE
OF THE PATA-RÂT GHETTO

ADRIAN-OCTAVIAN DOHOTARU[1]

ABSTRACT. Developed within the larger domain of engaged anthropology, performative anthropology uses Boal's notion of *spect-actors* (Boal, 2008) and creates experiences of contradiction (sometimes intensified by artistic endeavours) that reveal deeply embedded social inequities. As compared to linear discourses, it stipulates more concisely and strikingly social and political agendas, and furthers participatory research and activism projects. The article describes the method with the help of three illustrative public street performances organized by the civil society organization gLOC in Cluj-Napoca, aiming to raise awareness and strengthen the political voice of underprivileged Roma living near the landfill of Pata-Rât.

Keywords: performative anthropology, engaged anthropology, activism, spect-actor, democracy

Context[2]

> In order to understand this poetics of the oppressed one must keep in mind its main objective: to change the people - 'spectators', passive beings in the theatrical phenomenon - into subjects, into actors, transformers of the dramatic action (Augusto Boal, *Theater of the Oppressed*, 2008: 97-98).

At the margins of the Cluj-Napoca landfill, three relatively distinct settlements emerged gradually after 1989, as a result of periodic evictions from the city and labour migration towards selective waste collection on the landfill: "Dallas", Cantonului street, and a shanty-village of shacks near the landfill. In

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2010, the fourth and the only formal settlement of "social housing" was raised by the municipality and, right before that years' Christmas, 76 families were relocated there from the inner-city Coastei street, and their former homes demolished in a fortnight. At the moment of writing, around 1,500 persons live altogether in the four settlements, most of whom are Roma (UNDP and UBB, 2012). Slightly over 40% of these families ended up in Pata-Rât or Cantonului after being forcibly evicted from the city, whereas the rest came there mostly purposefully, in order to work and gain a living from the expanding recycling business (UNDP and UBB, 2012).

The last decades of the communist period had already witnessed the appearance of a small-sized informal settlement near the waste dump, that grew year by year in the context of mass-scale unemployment during the transition period, the persistent racialization of the Roma minority and the perpetuation of negative prejudices against them. Due to the expansion of the consumer culture in the early 2000s, the waste recycling market developed around the landfill, demanding labour power. It can be ascertained that this privately managed landfill area saw the growth of an aggregation phenomenon specific to peripheral neoliberal systems where profits are externalized and social and environmental costs are eluded by states and the market. This phenomenon is intensified in Pata-Rât by state non-intervention, resulting in the precariousness and deregulation of labour for hundreds of people who work without a contract on the landfill, the absence of health and social insurance, inadequate housing, spatial isolation and invisibility for the mainstream population. These are features of an economic system based extensively on the demand-offer supposed equilibrium, while social or environmental costs are sidelined, and the state retreats from its previous social and economic functions, as a regulator and supplier of public services and goods.

According to the Wacquant's typology of urban marginalization, Pata-Rât is a "ghetto": it is ethnically homogenous; it has an autonomous structure and stigmatized collective identity which disconnects the inhabitants near the landfill from the inhabitants of the city or from the Someşeni neighbourhood (a former village in its close vicinity, now part of the city). The ghetto should not be categorized in analogy to immigrant enclaves or urban slums of precarious workers, but rather to a sort of imprisonment (Wacquant, 2012: 24). The term "ghetto" can be traced back to 1516, when the Venetian Senate orders that Jews are ascribed to an area called the "New Ghetto", an island surrounded by high walls and guardsmen who locked the gates at night. Jews were punished if they left the area at night, even though during daytime they were allowed to carry out their economic and financial activities despised by Christians in a period when politics where strongly influenced by religious dogmas, in spite of the fact that the Venetian state was among the most laic regimes of the time. The religious

separation was translated in moral conservative terms of taste and distaste, of purity and impurity, of cleanliness and unclean minds and bodies (the heretic Jews being portrayed as likely carriers of syphilis, as sensual and still corruptive through an immoral conduct). This stereotypical portrayal strikingly resembles that of the Roma people nowadays. According to Wacquant, the model of the ghetto, which spread to other parts of Europe as well, contains four defining elements: stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional parallelism. Ghettoization is a process of segregation along racial and class lines, that are historically intertwined. The role of the ghetto is „to maximize the material profits extracted out of a category deemed defiled and defiling, and to minimize intimate contact with its members so as to avert the threat of symbolic corrosion and contagion they are believed to carry" (Wacquant, 2012: 7). But "ghetto" is not just a concept, but also derogatory term heavily used in journalistic and everyday discussions to name a dangerous place marked by high rates of criminality, urban disorder, poverty or segregation.

gLOCalisation

Through a technique that I later called performative anthropology, which is in fact a subdivision and a form of expressing engaged anthropology, which involves citizen activism, participatory action research (PAR) and artistic street performance, academics and activists tried to raise awareness on the social and economic processes that led to the ghettoization of Pata-Rât and also to empower its inhabitants to request their citizenship and human rights. The Working Group of Civil Society Organizations (gLOC)[3] emerged from these initiatives, following the forced evictions of dwellers from Coastei street on the 17th of December 2010. gLOC is mainly an umbrella organization initiated by the anthropologist and activist Enikő Vincze from Desire Foundation and by human rights activist Pavel Doghi from the Roma association Amare Prhala. It does not have a legal autonomous status and it aims to promote adequate, integrated housing for deprived Roma families in the city of Cluj-Napoca. gLOC campaigns consisted of manifestations, petitions, articles, round tables, advocacy campaigns, the formulation of public policies and strategies and negotiations in order to desegregate Pata-Rât. Although there were previous civic actions concerning the issue of evictions and the situation in Pata-Rât, these succumbed under the widespread anti-Roma sentiments of both public authorities and ordinary citizens. The development of gLOC and the sustainability of its campaigns were fostered by the dense network of civil society organizations in the city, also well connected to national and international networks, as well as by the central role of the university in the life of the city and the commitment of social science

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[3] See Working Group of Civil Society Organizations, *www.gloc.ro* (30.11.2013).

academics and their students to the cause. gLOC organized its first street action on the 17th of January 2012 and spurred public attention because such a Roma civic protest against injustice, backed by academics and activists, was unprecedented.

From the beginning, the gLOC campaign developed a "glocal" message (following the by now commonsense dictum of glocalization, "Think Globally, Act Locally") and a structural discourse on Roma segregation, that attracted the support of international civil society organizations such as Amnesty International (AI), the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), the Open Society Foundations (OSF), but also larger supra-national institutions such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Regional Development Directorate of the European Commission. These organizations put pressure on local authorities, in various ways, to recognize the problem of forced evictions to Pata-Rât and adopt the vision of social justice, asking for public desegregation policies and measures to repair the damages of forced evictions.

The thick description of the three performative events in the following sections and the self-reflective contextualization of the movement aim to illustrate the potential of a novel technique, *performative anthropology,* inside the larger framework of engaged anthropology. It should be acknowledged that the practice of performative anthropology is hindered by the supposed detachment and neutrality of academic research, rejecting personal or a political engagement, the limits of generalizing intense participatory experiences, the lack of funding for controversial, conflictive and emotional street manifestations (Low and Merry, 2010). But even though these obstacles are real, the three cases described below indicate that the technique of performative anthropology can be an efficient emancipatory pedagogic tool to build citizenship and participatory democracy. I initiated performative anthropology as a "serious game" after I saw with disappointment that few people can be mobilized to demonstrate in the street for social justice and the desegregation of Pata Rât: actually, our protests have never gathered more than two hundred persons. I considered also that academic articles, petitions, boycotts of official events, invitations to dialogue or debates, though relevant, still gave little room for the expression of Pata-Rât people and did not attract enough media and public official's attention. Or, if these events attracted their attention, the attitude was wry. Something was needed to break the tension and ease the fatigue, so I decided to embrace a playful approach, which captures attention without burdening participants with the full weight of the problem, yet fosters civic engagement through the face-to-face encounters with those who suffer the injustice.

Towards performative anthropology

Participatory Action Research (PAR), which by definition collective and engaged, is more self-reflexive in relation to academic research than other methods. Through multiple and collaborative interactions in the field, the so-called "object" of knowledge turns into a "partner-subject" of the investigation. In this sense, the staged performances were innovative responses to the needs of the people from Pata-Rât to give shape to what they perceived as abuses coming from local authorities. According to the anthropologist Alice McIntyre, who was influenced by feminist research and the radical pedagogy of the South American Paulo Freiere, PAR principles involve:

> (a) a collective commitment to investigate an issue or problem, (b) a desire to engage in self- and collective reflection to gain clarity about the issue under investigation, (c) a joint decision to engage in individual and/or collective action that leads to a useful solution that benefits the people involved, and (d) the building of alliances between researchers and participants in the planning, implementation, and dissemination of the research process (McIntyre, 2008:1).

An engaged anthropology does not dichotomize the academic retreat of research and the relative disengagement as compared to the commitment of citizen activism, but focuses on a continuous play of distance and proximity which embraces a strong sense of reflexivity, duality of our *persona*, empathy, self-questioning of our own perspective, of our moral passion and of the role played in the field. It is based on the fact that anthropologists are not "pure scientists" and the almost literary reflexivity of their writing "is constructed based on the psychological concept of catharsis and the autobiographical pact" (Nazaruk, 2011: 81). The most important part of my performative anthropology is the spectacular practice of the political-artistic avant-garde, with three affiliations close in time, related to the protest movements of the sixties: situationism, counterculture and arte povera. The major stake of the situationists was "destroying art as separate sphere of life and the integration of passion and art's beauty in everyday life" (Chelariu, 2009: 31). The proposals of *detournement* and *dérive*, often in the street, meant, as noted by Guy Debord in the *Report on the Construction of Situations*, the qualitatively superior momentary transformation of an apolitical and utilitarian temporary ambience. The idea was not to do an "artistic" event for aesthetic consummation, neither a protest without protesters, but to create "emotionally provocative situations" in order to galvanize the ideas and anger of Roma people from Pata-Rât in a no man's land of art and politics (Debord, 2006).

A deviation from the daily standards of behaviour specific to the technique of performative anthropology implies a conceptualization and thematization of the situation meant to attract a certain amount of public attention in order not to be perceived as an artistic distraction from the daily assignments or a socially,

even philanthropically, camouflaged cultural event. The modalities to avoid mass-media buffoonery or an incomprehensible aesthetic approach might be fixed through (1) the meticulous relationship to the subjects exposed to the public, (2) the proposal of a passionate situation for the adequate illustration of a conflict and (3) the undertaking, by the researcher or activist, of a secondary role, even if the media or the classical spectators tend to focus on authorized and familiar voices. Thus, these constructions of performative situations act as empowerment of those who suffered injustice, but through a cultural and social distillation that goes beyond the noise and excitement of street protest or direct action; even if these are important methods, they can consume their resistance resources if they are abused or if they are used by too few people.

I could have hardly imagined the configuration of the idea of performative anthropology as a technique to express people's concerns without previous attempts of spectacular politics of the 1960s, without a readjustment to the Society of Spectacle manipulations and emotions. The counterculture of the 1960s and of the 1970s used the spectacular society, cornered by business, media stars and the political environment (with an attentive segregation of actors from public), introducing Augusto's Boal "spect-actor" from *Theatre of the Oppressed* (Boal, 2008: 97-98), the black, the (feminist) woman or the worker. The performances of the Roma people and activists in solidarity with them may be read as press conferences of the excluded; these people do not have any chance whatsoever of being exposed to a larger audience through the simulation of a conventional conference. On the other hand, a street event can instigate the racist, the xenophobe, the indifferent bystander. And the practicing of specific egalitarian values is a conclusive barometer to evaluate the more or less niche impact and support inclusive ideas might have. The street press conference contracts time, which becomes emotional, captivating and sensational, but at the antipode of media commercialism. The performance synthetizes the problem and stipulates the conflict in a dramatic form. Dramatization has the role of bypassing, through challenge, a sclerotic social body appealing to (1) *empathy* and solidarity with the citizen characters (a classical quality of Aristotelian poetics) but also to (2) *critical distance* (coming from Brecht) through the refusal of a soporific convention, and a clearer reproduction, through ex-centrism, of the fissure between centre and margins. The dramatization tends to surpass these two perspectives, one classical another one modern, through the so called spect-actor (Boal, 2008).

I also got encouraged by *Arte Povera* to discover the aesthetic and conceptual possibilities of using simple and "poor" materials (Celant, 1967), lacking validation from the "high" artistic market of galleries and museums, using readymade objects re-signified for here and now, beyond the dichotomy of art in public space versus objects with utilitarian and non-aesthetic purposes. Arte Povera was also necessary in a strictly adaptive sense, in a context of citizen urgency exceeding the sluggish rhythm and bureaucracy of NGO financed projects.

In the next sections, I present three performances concerning Pata-Rât segregation, which are based on the epistemology of engaged anthropology, specifically PAR, backed by my activist experience and interest in the post-modern counterculture of the 1960s. All three examples are based on field interactions and problems revealed by people from Pata-Rât themselves. These were staged afterwards as street performances in order to multiply the impact of other conventional activist tools such as petitioning, awareness raising, civic disobedience and openly criticizing authorities for their disregard of problems from Pata-Rât. The three street events are described in reverse chronological order, The technique developed through fieldwork interactions, during the interviews and after finding better alternatives to rather unsuccessful street mobilization. In each case, I first describe the problem we wished to address, and then the corresponding performative anthropology event.

The precariousness of work

Raul[4] from the "New" Pata-Rât, i.e. the families relocated from Coastei street, has been working at a supermarket and, incidentally, found himself in an office where the managers were checking CVs from several people, among whom many residing in Pata-Rât. When they saw the address, the managers said they would not hire them because they were "filthy gypsies"; next, they threw away the CVs. They did not realize that Raul was from Pata-Rât too, because:

> I'm lucky, my face is somewhat whiter and [they] did not know I was living there, because there's another address listed on my ID card… But you see that, if they see any mention of Pata Rât, they won't hire you, it's worse (Raul, relocated from Coastei street to Pata-Rat, interviewed in 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

For this reason, the people who were relocated from Coastei Street to Pata-Rât asked successfully to the authorities that the name of the street in their ID cards should be changed, so that they have a chance when they look for a job. Maria and her partner Răzvan describe the impact of the stigmatized Pata-Rât on the precarious level of employment; they recall some happier times before the economic crisis, when they lived on Coastei street and the employers would come to offer them work in constructions, in a period when Cluj went through the greatest property boom at the national level:

> *Răzvan:* It's true, on Coastei, as bad as it may have been, at least there were many people who came to the guys to offer them work.
> *Maria:* [Approving] Yes.
> *Răzvan:* All the time.
> *Maria:* There's no one coming here, no way in hell.

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[4] All names are fictive, in order to protect the identities of interviewees.

Răzvan: I mean, you'd always have something to do. (...)

Maria: I've told you, he's a house painter.

Răzvan: I was in Florești and finished an apartment in two days, but I brought some of my tools at home. The man had been at the countryside to spend the Easter holidays, and he came to Pata-Rât with his wife and [when he saw Dallas] he said it couldn't be true. I said, wait I minute, I live farther away… It was in vain, you see, people get scared… I mean, this man whose apartment I'd painted, they are Gypsies, too. Well, it's in vain. When his wife saw it, [she] said she can't believe it. […]

Maria: On Coastei, the employers would come gladly. They'd talk over a beer, a cup of coffee, we'd chat; there's no one coming here. I mean it, there's a huge difference.

Interviewer: And are you employed?

Răzvan: It's unreported, mostly unreported. I worked with an employment contract the last year.

Maria: And that's why I want to find something to work again, the winter is coming, I should at least be able to send the kids to school, to be able to afford the paying the utility bills.

Interviewer: Yes, it's a must, otherwise…

Maria: What can I do? That's it.

Răzvan: Well, the crisis also had a huge impact on the constructions. On everything. The earnings now are very low, as compared to what we earned before... The money was alright back then.

Maria: Back then, he'd bring 10 million [ROL, old Romanian lei, equal to 1,000 RON] each week, I give you my word, each and every week. […]

Răzvan: Yes, it was different, until we were moved here. And there were many people who came to us when we lived up there; and when we moved here, I was still working for that man, [prosecutor] He came after us, but I couldn't bring him up here. And I went to meet him at the railway [1.5km away]. I didn't want to bring him up here (interview with Răzvan and Maria, relocated from Coastei street to Pata-Rât, 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

Angel has a company with two employees and an accountant. Every now and then he gets a contract, and during wintertime he works in Italy as a tractor driver, while his wife works in tangerine harvesting. He undertook a proposal to the city hall regarding services for the maintenance of green spaces, for the self-sustainability of the people in Pata-Rât and for a cleaner aspect of the "New" Pata-Rât, once the landfill would be closed. Part of the profit earned from contracts with the municipality, which are otherwise barred because of the competition with large companies, could be invested in educational, social and environmental activities (tree planting, cleaning etc.) of the Coastei Roma Community Association. The idea of planting (fruit) trees is also shared in Dallas, the neighbouring "Old" Pata-Rât, as symbol of a harmonious community, perhaps also with biblical reference, as many inhabitants belong to a neo-protestant church:

> What can you do in your spare time? There's not much you can do. I have some space here, I'm cleaning it, I'm sweeping it, I've also planted a tree, I thought there should be something to change the air around here. (Dweller from Dallas – Pata-Rât, 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

With the lapse of time, fewer and fewer families moved out from Coastei still hope for a quick transfer from the area; this is why, in their accounts, they have stopped emphasizing the element of victimization and they have started highlighting the opposite, the desire to improve their current housing conditions:

> If I had a word in it, I mean, in what I could do for this community. Well, first, I'd modernize the road, because there's nothing you can do when you don't have a road of access. Second, I'd have some means of transportation. Third, I'd let people build of the same colour, with the same materials, extent, create a home to the best of their possibilities, but according to the necessities of the family. Do you know what I mean? I'd help people from the upper side, I'd have a connection to electricity and documents certifying that the city hall allocated housing or land, so that they can build a home. Gas supply would be high priority; with gas supply, you can take a bath, you can have fire, heating, you can do almost anything (Dweller from "New" Pata-Rât, who submitted a partnership proposal to the city hall of Cluj-Napoca on March 18, 2013).

The memo provided that the company, partnering with the Coastei Roma Community Association, would create, under a contract with the municipality, a social enterprise that would generate...

> ...employment for the people of Pata Rât; use part of the profit (the part that would not be reinvested) for the improvement of the housing conditions and of the green space quality around the modular homes in Pata Rât, as well as for the maintenance of the Association's community activities; provide services to the people of Cluj-Napoca, Pata Rât inhabitants included, which should contribute to a greener, cleaner city (extract from the Memorandum submitted to the city hall of Cluj-Napoca, March 18, 2013).

The award of public works contracts to this small company (that eventually did not occur) would have meant an affirmative measure, but also a symbolic recognition of the fact that people wanted to "work and take part, as an earnest partner, in the life of the city" (Memo towards the Cluj-Napoca municipality, 2012). Back in 1976, the Vancouver Habitat Conference concluded that social housing funded by the state should be constructed with the involvement of beneficiary communities. Similarly, the wide scale construction of social homes was proven insufficient, and therefore communities should receive assistance to formalize (get authorisations for) previous "illegal" dwellings: gradual construction of homes which involves the residents, collective organization within the community for the improvement of infrastructure etc. (Hernandez and Kellett, 2012: 11).

Performance with a mannequin: "Work is not a luxury. It is a right!"

In order to give voice to ideas shared by the interviewees from Pata-Rât during SPAREX research, and back the association's memo, we planned the performance "Work is not a luxury. It is a right!" to take place on the 18th of March, 2013, downtown, around noon, to facilitate the presence of the media. We notified the media that:

> during the street performance in the inner-city invaded by ostentatious brands., the participants will try to put a dummy, dressed as a worker, in the (window) displays of firms representative for consumer capitalism (banks, luxury shops, coffee shops etc.) in order to draw attention to the right to decent work (extract from press release of gLOC, 16th of March 2013, Cluj-Napoca).

We had messages such as, "Economy for the society, not for corporations!", "The right to work is granted by the Constitution of Romania", "Social economy creates employment!", "We are working, not begging!", "We are working for social economy, are you?" etc., which we placed in a shop's case. We specified that the gLOC measure of solidarity went beyond the borders of the Pata-Rât ghetto to reach out mainstream society, such as , "the workers laid off from Mechel Câmpia Turzii, as well as other people whose right to a proper workplace is breached".

The mannequin was a "blue-collar worker", dressed in blue overalls, wearing a cap. The manager of a store gave us the dummy, for free, for several hours, and a nearby teahouse allowed us to use their window to display the mannequin and the messages. The idea of placing the dummy in the public space relies on the fact that the downtown is confiscated by images of happy customers and cosmopolitan brands, without reference to our quality as citizens and virtually excluding those who are not white collars. Some thirty people participated at the performance, and half a dozen journalists. Before arriving at the teahouse, where we already had an agreement on displaying the mannequin, we also entered a bank and an upper-class clothing store, acting as if we were trying to convince them to display the mannequin as a symbol of the right to decent work. Obviously, these attempts generated tensions: but the idea of the performance was precisely to uncover the symbolic violence of the inner city that excludes blue-collar workers, combining incisive (and somewhat embarrassing) encounters with cosmopolitan shop managers with the playfulness and humour of walking with a huge dummy. At the clothing shop, we were told that the mannequin would not suit in the display, since their products were of another kind. At the bank, our proposal was turned down in a formal manner, on grounds that journalists were filming and taking pictures, affecting the confidentiality of the relations between the bank and its clients. We were told to submit a written request, which would be answered by the bank management within the next few

days, but for the time being we were not allowed to place the worker in the display window. The reactions of shop assistants and managers were surprise, perplexity and mistrust, although their verbalizations became diffident when they realized the presence of the media. The dialogues were absurd, although polite, and relied on replies such as, "Can we put a worker in the showcase near ads with satisfied customers and brands?", "I'm sorry, but there's not enough space". At the third attempt, at the teahouse, the people relocated to Pata-Rât, members of the first Roma "grass roots" association from Cluj, were accepted. Social messages were posted in the window next to the mannequin, and journalists took photos of Solomon from Pata-Rât standing still and holding a banner. I saw a similar action that was carried out later by a Danish union that placed in the display of stores attended by white-collar workers who could not find work during the crisis, as a method of public awareness-raising (Stool, 2013). In front of the display, the people from "New" Pata-Rât gave interviews on the services offered by the company and the actions of their association in order to improve the housing conditions and work opportunities. The passers-by would stop to see what was happening; some of them would take picture of the blue-collar worker. Police arrived, asked questions about the action, about "authorization", asked us for our ID cards, as it happened with all previous gLOC public actions. Once they heard we would carry the memo to the city hall, they accompanied us for "protection" reasons.

Despite our hopes, Pata-Rât stirred the extremist imaginary; therefore, the reception of the action in media comments is mainly racist and local publications do not censor the insults, as in this way traffic increases on their websites. On *Ziua de Cluj*, one of the most popular local media sites, there were five anonymous comments, all of them racists and blaming authorities for not doing enough to stop the migration of "Gypsies" abroad; the comments on *Stiri de Cluj* and *Foaia Transilvană* (both of them with medium traffic) were even more extreme and they wouldn't have passed any moderated forums of older democracies. Expectedly, the city hall did not answer the memo within the legal term of 30 days.

The precariousness of housing

The dwellers we have interviewed in Pata-Rât refuse to look at their location as a ghetto and prefer to use to terms such as "slum" or "colony" ("țigănie", „colonie" or "mahala" which are usually present in people's narratives). Their general feeling was that they were "thrown away", rejected by local authorities and abandoned by the mainstream society and left to lead their lives in humiliating conditions, "like animals". In Pata-Rât, there are many accounts of people who, when they first neared the landfill and saw the barracks, thought they were "sties".

Local authorities created in full awareness a ghetto at Pata–Rât. Roma families living a semi-nomadic life at the peripheries of the city, in the Făget forest, were constantly harassed by the police and finally, in 2003, brought and settled down by force near the landfill. Other families lost their properties due to speculative financial activities or as a consequence of long-term unemployment and family dissolution, and settled on Cantonului street, located right next to Pata-Rât. The ProRoma Foundation bought some land in the "Old" Pata-Rât and built several wooden houses; they wanted to negotiate with local authorities (owning land there as well) to buy more land and build more homes, but they stopped the negotiations back then after being asked to accommodate not only the Roma from Pata-Rât, but also other families that the authorities intended to relocate from the city. Later, around 270 persons were evicted forcedly from Coastei street to Pata-Rât, without knowing where and in what conditions they would be relocated. Forty-six families received one room each, while thirty families did not receive any housing, but an informal "promise" that they are allowed to build themselves a house there, up on the hill in Pata-Rât. They were pressed to sign the relocation documents otherwise they would have remained without a home. When they look back at the eviction, people can recollect the extreme cold (-15 centigrade), their children crying, their things gathered in a haste, the authorities' threats to move their things as quickly as possible, otherwise they would be lost to the bulldozers.

Solomon, retired on grounds of ill health, believes that, since the "solution" of eviction had been chosen, despite the fact that one third of residents were renting social housing in Coastei street, the Roma should have been relocated not in the same place (and particularly not in Pata-Rât), but in several locations throughout the city. He stated that they were willing to put a shoulder at building houses, since most of them have experience in constructions. He described the improper housing conditions in 16-18sqm. one-room apartments, the shared bathrooms for scores of people, without a separating wall between the water closets, the poor quality of the construction, the bad smell floating in the air and the damp walls:

> Can you image, 18 square meters and 12 people. How can those men even sleep there? With their children? And in that room we cook, we wash, we bathe; we do everything in the same room, because the restroom they gave us, that's nothing. You're merely using the water closet. You cannot take a bath, there's only cold water running (Solomon, retired, evicted from Coastei street, currently living in the "New" Pata-Rât, interviewed in 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

Ana, involved in several public awareness-raising events, misses Coastei street because of urban infrastructure and the proximity of the school attended by her children:

In this room, there are usually eleven of us. I have four children, there's my partner, my brother, his wife and their daughter, my mother, now you've seen that woman, that's my mother-in-law, she also lives here, because she didn't receive anything, she's staying now with me, then she's going to stay with her other child and so on and so forth. It's very difficult. – And how can eleven of you sleep in here? – We sleep on the floor, the kids in the beds and we, the adults, on the floor (Ana, evicted from Coastei street, currently living in the "New" Pata-Rât, interviewed in 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

Raul, also from the "New" Pata-Rât, tells about the difficulties of obtaining social housing, particularly since, in Cluj-Napoca, the assignment of houses favours those who have completed higher education studies. The institutional imaginary is that attached to the construction of a bourgeois city, where the working class is not a priority. Thus, for doctoral studies an individual who applies for municipality social housing receives 40 points, while for one child they receive only one point. Raul intends to obtain social housing through his employer, who guarantees informally for the employee's honest quality and who knew people in the management of the institution that assigns the homes. The clerk tells him:

Indeed, you've benefited, you had the right to receive that house, you had all the documents, you had everything required in the file, the file was complete, but because you did not appear on the corresponding day, the apartment was given to a police officer's son. That was hush money, she admitted it. Bribery. And then I said: OK, so a police officer's son got it simply because he was a police officer's relative, only one individual, he does not have a family, does not have kids, and got a social home, and I have two children, a paralyzed father, who depends on me; I won't receive anything? And my file had been submitted since 1994, I was eligible for that apartment and yet I did not get it…. (Raul, evicted from Coastei street, currently living in the "New" Pata-Rât, interviewed in 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

There was a stirring episode in the SPAREX research, when my fellow researcher Hajnalka Harbula shared with a man from Pata-Rât the memories of a state-socialist bloc of flats where both of them dwelled for several years, in one of the city's working-class neighbourhoods.

Int: And where did you live before Coastei?
I lived with my parents, in Mănăştur, on Clăbucet street.
Int: On Clăbucet, really?
Yes.
Int: I lived on Clăbucet too, 13 years I lived there.
I lived in the first 4-storey building, right near the forest.
Int: Me too, in 9. The last one.
Did you live on the second floor?
Int: No, third entrance, fourth floor.
3rd entrance.
Int: There's four entrances there.
At the ground floor, there was Mrs…
Int: The fatter lady, Mrs. Ciupe.

Yes, yes.
Int: She died two years ago. Where did you stay?
In the first building. Forth floor.
Int: And how long did you live there?
I lived there for… many years. I lived until I was 18.
Int: And when did you move?
In 1996. And they gave away their apartment, and the family was torn apart.
Int: Why did you sell it?
My father. With the Caritas. He placed his money there, all of it, and didn't get the chance to take it. Caritas went bad. And they took our apartment. And for a while, [he] lived in a rented room (interview with a man in his 30s currently living in Pata-Rât, 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

The people formerly living on Coastei street hope at least at symbolic compensations and at the city hall undertaking responsibility for the error of relocation: "because they generalized", says Ovidiu, and thought that the Roma's place is at the landfill, where Roma individuals are working. In his opinion, the relocation is a punishment for their "uncivilized" neighbours (they would burn tires to extract the copper, they'd make a mess and disturb the other dwellers), but also a contradictory measure of the authorities, despite the formal integrative speech:

 [the authorities]They're trying and design all sorts of programs for the integration of the Roma in the society, they say we don't want to be integrated, that they [the authorities] try in vain, I've seen it once on TV, that it's very hard to integrate the Roma... But can you call that integration? Well, if you're not giving me anything, but what am I talking about, you're not offering me anything, because I'm not begging, but since you took me from a place, where I was already integrated and things were OK and we were happy and didn't worry about the future, and then you're moving me on this hill near the land fill, this is what you call integration? I don't know, maybe if they relocated us elsewhere… (Raul, evicted from Coastei street, currently living in the "New" Pata-Rât, interviewed in 2012, Cluj-Napoca).

Performance for decent housing: "We too belong to the city!"

As researchers involved in activism, we tried to seek modalities to give a more powerful voice to the people from Pata-Rât, particularly since media-manufactured discourses are invariantly stereotypical. gLOC organized a series of events organized on the 17th and 18th of December 2012 under the heading: "Pata Rât. Roma pushed to the margins", among which a performance called "We too belong to the city!", an exhibition, and a public debate with the Pata-Rât residents[5].

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[5] The exhibition "Is there no place for the Roma?", initiated by Attila Torday in the contemporary art space of *tranzit.ro*, would reproduce in plaster a 16 square meter house, which would render as powerfully as possible the absence of the space required for living and for storage. And the debate at the Faculty of Political Sciences would emphasize possible solutions to the issues of the Pata Rât residents.

The role of the street performance was to inspire people, to introduce them to a fast-moving, touching and surprising pace and to stipulate resonantly the conflict between the authorities and the evicted, in a manner otherwise inaccessible to the exhibition or to the debate. The general message of the events was that, by virtue of the obligations that ensue from treaties such as the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination* and the *Revised European Social Charter*, Romania "should make sure that the right to proper housing, including the right of protection against forced eviction" (detailed in the Public Statement of December 18th, 2012, signed by Amnesty International, by the Coastei Roma Community Association, by the European Roma Rights Center and by the gLOC).

I got the idea of the performance while I was reading about the Vietnam War and about the protests of the hippie counterculture, mostly of its political component. During the biggest anti-war protest that had occurred by that era, at the Pentagon, in 1967, a minority of the protesters had announced the American media that they would surround the Pentagon, the world's largest building. They would form a human chain, they would chant a mantra and they would have the building levitate in order to exorcize it from any evil spirits, from the war demons and from the dominating aura created around the American society by the Pentagon, of which protesters thought it is an institution of an essentially repressive nature. Since such a farce matched media propensity for the spectacular, the group's message was disseminated, despite the fact that they were only a minority in a mass of serious, suit-wearing, moderate demonstrators. In Cluj, although the media did take over the message, there was even a conflict between the participants' solemn expectations and the projected, but unsuccessful scenery. Altogether two hundred people took part, including Roma from Pata-Rât and around 30 members of Amnesty International from Austria. Amnesty International contributed with an impressive display of candles and faces of the people that were evicted that wrapped the candles and that were put in front of the City Hall at the end of our joint street action.

The symbolic message of the performance was that, since authorities would not take responsibility for the systematic evictions to Pata-Rât, we should move the city hall, through levitation, to the landfill. The time the city hall would appear on the landfill would be suggested through the beginning of a projection on the city hall building, picturing images from Pata-Rât.

The projection would take place from a bar across the way, including pictures of people from Pata-Rât to whom the city hall would speak symbolically. The bar manager, aware that the event had not been "authorized", had asked us for a statement, the strangest we have ever given, relating to the undertaking of responsibility for "the activist magic performance that will make the Cluj city hall

levitate", signed together with the anthropologist Enikő Vincze, gLOC coordinator. The problem was that, despite the power of the projector, there were too many street lights in the evening, and the windows hindered the projection, hence the impact was much lower than expected. There were even parody situations where the fake mantra *Chica Laca Chichi Cea/ The City Hall's mine* was repeated continuously by several participants while waiting for images that could not be seen on the city hall building. The participants were puzzled, they did not know why they couldn't see the images, despite the rehearsals from previous days where the photos were visible; they did not know either why a pointless sentence kept being uttered, when in fact it should have lasted only about 20 seconds, like some sort of starter. Obviously uneasy about the situation, participants from Pata-Rât said that more powerful, dissenting slogans were required; these had been deliberately avoided, as we did not notify authorities about the protest in order to keep away the armed special police, whose presence would have ruined the peaceful and friendly atmosphere intended for the event. Organizing a mass-scale march or protest for the cause was also unrealistic, due to the general low turn-up at such events, and the still persistent lack of empathy towards the situation of the Roma. At any rate, there was a risk that the reiteration of protester organization methods would not interest the media or even the participants, always seeking news and tangible results. Then, consideration was paid to the threat of general disappointment caused by a failed protest to which the authorities would simply not respond, a risk which grows as compared to a performance where passions are distilled artistically. Furthermore, there was a fear of eviction in case of a non-notified protest and of problems caused to the acquaintance who owed the coffee shop from where we had attempted to make the projection.

The academics and the adults evicted from Coastei Street did not take part to the mantra; the children were the only ones who had screamed their lungs out. The reason for the non-participation is simple considering the inadequacy of the shouting for people holding vigil candles. Since the images with the landfill area were absent, the event relied on the loudspeaker delivered statements of Claudia Creta from Pata Rât; they concerned the necessity that the city hall undertakes responsibility for the eviction abuse; the event also relied on the interviews given to the media by the Roma and by the supporters. The Austrian Amnesty International activists revealed boxes with thousands of support letters from all over the world, addressed to the local authorities. Next, we placed 200 commemorative candles in front of the city hall and went marching to the *tranzit.ro* exhibition. As shown by the city hall representatives who had confirmed their presence to the debate at the Faculty of Political Sciences and, eventually, did not appear, the city hall building did not levitate.

Those who select the waste of Cluj

"We completed a new stage that draws us closer to the actual implementation of the new waste management system. We trust that we will succeed, by July 2010, to complete the works and the inhabitants of Cluj will benefit from these services", stated optimistically the president of the Cluj County Council, in September 2009. Nevertheless, the landfill has been operating illegally since then, above the legally allowed capacity, as recognized by the authorities, without taking into account the informal work of several hundreds of people at the landfill. And until the opening of the new pool of selective collection, the waste will be disposed of at Pata-Rât. The completion of the new landfill has exceeded considerably the initial term because the bid was challenged and later one of the contracted companies became insolvent; moreover, the choice of a swampy land increases the estimate price and duration of the construction. Despite the closing announced by the authorities in 2010, the landfill will most likely be closed during 2014.

> For Cluj, it's important what people are doing at Pata-Rât, unfortunately in miserable conditions when they could be engaged in this work in some another way. Given the state of things, they could be employed in the chain of collection from the population. It's not normal that they end up working on the landfill (former Chief Commissioner of the North-West Regional Environmental Agency between 2005-2009, chemist engineer by profession, May 2013, Cluj-Napoca).

According to the former Chief Commissioner of the North-West Regional Environmental Agency, from the waste brought to Pata-Rât, 20 to 30% is collected selectively because of their work. This knowing that official statistics show that in Romania, in 2011, only 1% of the waste was recycled, as compared to the 25% average of the European Union, a figure that goes up to 40% recycling if compost is also taken into account (Eurostat, 2013). At times, one may smell the garbage dump even from the airport, located just two miles away from the landfill. The inhabitants of Cluj-Napoca believe that the filth of the Pata-Rât landfill is imprinted on its residents.

Dallas is the oldest Pata-Rât community, dating back to the beginning of the 1990s. Since the authorities tolerated the presence of people on the landfill, and the waste disposal companies benefited from their work and from the increase of consumption in the city, Dallas kept growing, counting at present around 130 families. Most of the people who came in Dallas were the first victims of post-communist transition. They had lost their jobs in APCs or in industry; others had been thrown out from nationalized houses given back to their former (interwar period) owners. Many of them had lost their jobs in the 1990s and were unable to find a new workplace. All of them worry about the closing of the landfill. "I'm telling you, there'll be a lot of pain and hunger", says Anca, who earns between 20 and 50 lei per day in the landfill. She is 28 years old, she has a husband on the landfill, a child and she attends part-time the ninth grade. "If we go to ask for work, they reject

us when they see we are gypsies. They say, you are gypsies, and whatnot. And they mock you when they ask about your education, when they hear you went to school only 2 or 4 years". Nevertheless, she does admit that the Roma are not the only ones facing these issues, because: "if you have only 8 years of study, it's not enough, there are others who finished their high school and they still can't get a job". She collects PETs, cartons, anything that can earn her some money. And she is really glad when she finds metals: iron, copper, aluminium, although this happens less and less frequently. I ask her, "Do you still have time to go out in town?". She answers, laughing, that "we're going today, on Sunday we're going after juice. They're giving juice for these caps with prizes that we can find in the landfill". She cannot chat any longer, the trucks are arriving at noon to unload. Several hundred people are working constantly in the landfill, in day and night shifts. Among them, every now and then, one can see many children. The waste resembles a shaky mountain, and children run towards the trucks as soon as they appear on the road across the landfill. There is competition for the best places of waste disposal, and in the general cram accidents occur at times, particularly with the teenagers who show-off by jumping on the tip lorries.

Decebal is 35 years old; he has strong arms, but they are marked by self-mutilations in jail. He is already a grandfather. He has three children and he comes from a family with 12.

> I've nothing against anyone, but if the landfill is closed, what will we do, will we kill each other? Listen to me, that's what will happen. I don't have anything, I'm hungry, I'm going in the street and I'm killing someone. And then I'll put food on table for my children (Decebal, 35 years old, picker on the landfill living in Dallas - Pata-Rât, 2012).

... he says candidly and slightly drunkenly. He does not know what he will do when the landfill closes and does not want to leave Dallas because this is where he was born and raised. He hopes to buy a cart and a horse because he heard about another waste dump some tens of kilometres away from Cluj-Napoca and maybe he would have a chance to work there.

When she first came here, Lisa thought the runty settlements were some peasants' sties. Things changed gradually through the Dutch ProRoma Foundation. The foundation bought more than 5,000 square meters of land and built around 35 wood and glass wool barracks, which provide better insulation to the semi-improvised homes. She has been living in Dallas for 15 years and she arrived at the landfill because she could not find a job. Her story is typical: all pickers live near the landfill, in Dallas or on the nearby hill. They do not have contracts, unlike the formal employees of the private waste disposal company, who are nonetheless also mainly Roma (at least according to the director, interviewed in the local media). Lisa studied 11 years in a regular public school and she has six children. She does not like working on the landfill because people argue over the waste and, in the rough-and-tumble, accidents occur, just like it did to her when the bulldozer caught her leg and she had to be admitted to a hospital.

I really can't say what will happen when the dump closes and I'm scared, because I have many children and I don't know where else to go. It will be hard with the jobs, there's nowhere we can work and earn a living. What can we do? Go away and get employed, I could, I can go, but what about the kids? Should my husband go? He didn't go to school. Who'll take him? (Lisa, in her 30s, picker on the landfill, living in Dallas – Pata-Rât, 2012).

Lisa sighs. For the time being, she can manage her family, as the landfill can generate between 300 and 1,000 lei per month, provided that she works all day long, no matter the weather. There's also the soup kitchen for children. A man comes up, Lisa's neighbour, who tells me he would also want to say something, but my intention to write a book (Dohotaru, 2012) is useless, because I cannot help him and the authorities "won't move a finger for us". These kinds of reactions generated the turn towards performances and manifestations, because book writing, although respectable in Pata-Rât, had been already deemed unsuccessful and useless. In any case, it did not provide to the Pata Rât residents a platform that they could express their complaints and stipulate their conflicts.

Performance "I am a waste picker, too"

I have described this first performance regarding Pata Rât, "I too am a garbage collector", in the volume *Protestararul (The Protester)* (Dohotaru, 2012: 260-267). The event is based on the interviews with residents of Dallas, the oldest community of Pata Rât, as well as on informal conversations with them.

Amidst the civil fatigue of the spring of 2013, emerging from the disappointment with the lack of results following the sustained anti-government demonstrations, we had the idea to set up the public performance *I am a waste picker too,* inviting residents from Dallas, directly effected by the closure of the landfill (Dohotaru, 2012: 260-267). The performance took place on a warm day of Friday, March 23rd, 2012, at noon. Organizing the performance was easier, because it did not involve a large confrontation – the Roma were at work on the landfill; the emphasis was placed on a non-conformist and suggestive message that should bypass the conventional protest based on ample mobilization.

The mobilization took place as a Facebook event; there were around 25 participants, among them being 5 from Pata-Rât and 10 journalists who joined it to report. The gLOC mobilization texts had a concise structure (why, what we are doing, what we want, who, where, who we are). The pattern of events is available to anyone who notes and then wishes to stipulate in a creative manner various social conflicts. Reading the old "news" that county authorities were running a waste management project worth millions of euro, we called the County Council to find out about the impact of the project on the area. But the representatives of the institution told us that there wasn't any consideration paid to the manner in which the new disposal stations would influence the Pata-Rât community, which would be left without any source of income and without the provision of other

places of work. Therefore, together with the Dallas residents, we made the decision to emphasize as clearly as possible the conflict fault[6].

Initially, we were supposed to gather in Unirii Square (in the city-centre), but the police had a parallel manifestation of which we were not aware. We wanted to run the event there, letting them know we would not interfere with their activities and that our performance would last approximately 15 minutes. An interesting state of things was caused by the arrival of the Roma in the square, carrying a banner: were immediately approached by the police and asked to state the reason of their presence. We were asked for an authorization, but the chief of police was duly told that Law 60/1991 on the organization and development of public meetings stipulates at article 3 that the notification of the authorities is not required in case of cultural events. The chief of police grew more and more anxious, told us "you'd get in trouble" if we tried to run our event in parallel with them. He was sending us to an article of the law that stipulated two simultaneous manifestations are not allowed. The atmosphere was tense, the journalists were paying attention to see whether it could aggravate, the participants were embarrassed. We specified again that this was not a protest, but it was an artistic event, with social implications.

Another police officer asked for our ID data and asked me about the type of "performance" [he translated the English word performance as "performanţă", in the sense of athletic performance]. I told him it was something similar to a happening. He looked at me mistrustfully, but amiably because the press was there. I added it was a cultural event and he was left speechless. Then he asked us what we would do, I replied we would search through garbage. He then frowned.

Surrounded by scores of police officers gathered for the Police Day, who would have intervened in force if we chose to keep the performance in the Unirii Square, we preferred to relocate to the Memorandum monument, on Eroilor avenue, about one hundred meters farther. The police escorted us. They told us to move even farther away, because they did not want their manifestation appearing by chance in any of our photo or video materials. We did not want to move. I reassured him emphatically that we did not pose any threat to state and police security. The people who had arrived from Pata-Rât rolled out a bed sheet, supported on two rods, on which they had written "We want jobs", they answered interviews and explained to those present the difficulty of earning a living in case the landfill is closed, while we were collecting selectively the garbage we found: PETs, paper, bottles.

We had bags, plastic gloves and e were dressed elegantly, precisely in order to emphasize the dignity of a work which is otherwise ignored or despised. Passers-by were stopping us on the street asking why we were searching through the garbage bins. Faced with the answer "we pick garbage to recycle", they were puzzled: cleaning up the waste of the city's consumerist body seemed the dirtiest

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[6] For details of the action, see www.gloc.ro [30.11.2013].

possible of the jobs, far from dignifying. The Roma that lives near the landfill feed, allegorically speaking, on the bodies of the consumer society. Of course, not all of them and our action concerned only those that tried to earn a living from waste collection. Waste is transfigured, revived, reinserted in the exchange circuit. Despite of that, their role is not acknowledged. The so-called market economy from the classic liberal paradigm relies on the demand and offer mechanism; social and environment costs are secondary, if not even fully removed from the collective mindset. The environmental service that a large number of Roma provide in informal conditions in Romania are the obligation the Romanian state and the corporate producers, according to the EU "polluter pays" principle, should regulate considerably more efficiently; but such obligations are eluded by multinationals through forged reports of waste recovery or through the negotiations of disposal rates as small as possible, as illustrated by an activist who had worked for a producers' waste collection association:

> In general, the manufacturer knows that, if they sell 1 million plastic bottles, which means 200 tons, and their target is 40%, they should collect 80 tons on a given month. The manufacturer assigns this responsibility to the collective association, which, in its turn, does not actually carry it out, because we are talking about a five-employee office company. Thus, they choose a specialized plastic garbage collector or a waste disposal company and tell them, 'mate', I need 80 tons, can you? 'I can't'; 'okay, then how much do you have?', 'six', 'okay here's the money for 10 and you say it's 80'. It's a win-win, the manufacturer pays for 10 although on paper they've reported 80, the waste disposal operator collected six, but they are paid for 10 (Green activist from Cluj-Napoca, 2013).

Given that Romania collects selectively considerably less than the European average, the remaining disposal, beyond statistics, which gets us close, perhaps, to this EU average, is carried out by the society precariat, most of whom is Roma. Owing to this contribution, they are *de facto* Romania's ecologists; and I do not mean by that the ecologists of the corporate social responsibility projects that elude through generous sponsorship (green washing) the more important social obligations of the companies stipulated by international and national laws.

After the performance, the Roma left back to work on the landfill in Pata-Rât, while we went with the collected bags at the County Council to meet some representatives of the institution. While before they told us the project was "technical" and there were no jobs for the Pata-Rât Roma, now they were talking about a few dozen of jobs and perhaps training classes so that the people living near the dump should find a workplace at the new selective landfill.

Conclusions

Developed within the larger domain of engaged anthropology, performative anthropology is an expression of the intellectual and moral commitment to human rights, that we tried to enact in several public manifestations, focused mostly on the right to housing and decent work. With its use of Boal's notion of spect-actors, the method of performative anthropology creates experiences of contradiction

(sometimes intensified by artistic endeavours) that reveal deeply embedded social inequities. As compared to linear discourses, they stipulate more concisely and strikingly social and political agendas. But the stage of performative anthropology is street activism, rather than Boal's more conventional forum theatre. Similarly to engaged anthropology, it furthers participatory research and activism projects, such as photo voice or online streaming.

Despite it apparent playfulness, performative anthropology is a „serious game": it is a technique of empowering the oppressed and a creative device that can unblock other channels to enhance participation and change the definition of the situation.

Performative anthropology also changed me. When I wanted to leave the cause of Pata-Rât desegregation because it seemed above my powers to contribute to a significant change, and the misery and plight of the people I encountered was intolerable to face, I found resources to carry on this struggle through this creative enactment of engaged anthropology. While the short term results may seem minimal, there were positive shifts in the public attitude towards Pata-Rât and the political commitment to address the problem of segregation and multiple deprivation on the long run, seeking justice for those dispelled near the landfill.

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SOCIO-SPATIAL MARGINALITY OF ROMA AS FORM OF INTERSECTIONAL INJUSTICE[1]

ENIKŐ VINCZE[2]

ABSTRACT. This article addresses the spatialization and racialization of social exclusion in the post-socialist Romania incorporated into the neoliberal global regime of the 2000s, by analyzing the social and cultural formation of Pata-Rât from the city of Cluj as a case of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2008) alongside with references to other instances of Roma marginalization identified by the means of the SPAREX research. Since I am addressing social exclusion as a form of injustice including material deprivation, cultural stigmatization and denial of social participation, the analyzed cases allow me to contribute on theorizing about how – in a post-socialist order, due to processes of neoliberalization and racialization – economic injustices (such as exploitation, marginalization, deprivation) interlink with cultural/recognition injustices like cultural domination, non-recognition, stigmatization and disrespect (Fraser, 2004), and how they are related to the political dimension of justice that is representation (Fraser, 2007), or to the way in which particular categories of people, like marginalized Roma are excluded from decision-making and from the political and social body of the city/country. In line with the general approach of the SPAREX research, my analysis is a contextual inquiry and instead of describing advanced marginality through "Roma characteristics" it addresses processes of ghettoization.

Keywords: advanced socio-spatial marginality, accumulation of capital by dispossession, intersectionality of economic, cultural and political injustices, poor Roma from Romania, neoliberalization, racialization

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Introduction

This article addresses the spatialization and racialization of social exclusion in the post-socialist Romania incorporated into the neoliberal global regime of the 2000s, by analyzing the social and cultural formation of Pata-Rât from the city of Cluj as a case of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2008) alongside with references to other instances of marginalization identified by the means of the SPAREX research. Moreover, as form of engaged anthropology, the analysis discusses about socio-spatial marginalization as intersectional injustice that incorporates a whole range of problems belonging to the economic, cultural and political dimension of justice (Fraser, 2007), and that functions as a context within which different axes of subordination (like class, gender and ethnicity/ "race") intersect one another (Fraser, 2003). Besides identifying some structural forces resulting in the uneven development of particular urban areas, linked at their turn to the accumulation of capital (Harvey, 2006) – such as the privatization and financialization of the Romanian housing sector, or the manipulation of economic crises as a result of which the Romanian state transforms itself into a minimal state administering austerity measures – I am also going to uncover the discursive ways of constituting "the poor" and "the Roma" as particular class of people "naturally" belonging to socially and spatially marginalized places.

The analysis of the empirical material resulted from in-depth interviews and participant observations, and from collecting local and national policy documents within the SPAREX research, enriched with my experiences embedded into activist work[3] and as well as borne out of several instances of co-operation with inhabitants of the Pata-Rât area, is structured in this paper in five major chapters, framed by an introduction and a conclusion. In a first step it highlights how are people and places excluded into marginality at local level, and how is this process shaped by factors of the broader context like housing policies that favor the accumulation of capital by dispossession. Afterwards, the paper locates the four "communities" of the Pata-Rât area of Cluj-Napoca on a scale of marginalization by comparing them according to the

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[3] This included, since 2010, initiating, organizing and participating on different types of actions directed against forced evictions and residential segregation, and for the territorial desegregation of marginalized areas, among them street protests and performances, community programs for children, (inter)national seminars and workshops, policy recommendations towards stakeholders at local, regional and national level, as reflected on the websites of involved civic-academic organizations (www.gloc.ro, www.desire-ro.eu, accessed on 20.10.2013). Due to this type of involvement into community life, being aware of the fact that I was part of defining and addressing "the problem", and in this sense had a contribution to the creation of the subject on which I did the research (a state of affairs that otherwise is always part of the participation-observation-based inquiries), in this case activism was informed by research, and vice versa, while altogether shaped not only my understandings but also the intersectional position from where I acted and through which I was perceived by the community.

sense of (not) belonging to the landfill nurtured by the inhabitants. In its next step, the analysis interprets the cases under scrutiny in the light of urban regeneration processes that dislocate the "non-citizens", being underlied by the racialization of ethnic Roma. Eventually – before its concluding remarks about how neoliberalization and racialization interact in producing such an order – the further section of the article frames the phenomenon of socio-territorial (Roma) marginality as form of intersectional injustice produced at the crossroads of poverty, stigma and non-existence. [4]

My paper argues that nor spatiality, or poverty are the ultimate explanatory factors of the formation of advanced urban marginality, or of instances when people dispossessed of their homes, citizenship and humanity are forced to experience the cumulated deprivations of an excluded life. However, at their turn, encapsulated spaces and precarious living conditions produce exclusion, and vice versa, ultimately it is the intersection of processes of neoliberalization and racialization, which, under post-socialist condition, create economically, culturally and politically the "Gypsy ghettos", as spatialized and racialized forms of social exclusion whose inhabitants are subjected to multiple and disempowering forms of injustices. In order to repair this condition there is a need to re-politicize it on the public agenda, and – while exploring the best legacies of politics of culture and politics of rights – to transcend the stage of policies for social inclusion towards a politics of social justice.

People and places – excluded into marginality

As Wacquant demonstrates (1999), the ethnically homogeneous enclosed spaces (the African-American ghetto) in the US and the working-class peripheries in France (the *banlieue*) were two distinct socio-spatial constellations, resulting from different urban histories and modes of "sorting" the population, in the front of which the phenomenon of advanced marginality characteristic of the current

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[4] Without denying the existence of a multitude of strategies, projects and programs, and as well local, national and international (Roma and non-Roma) actors that address (and create) "the Roma question" (which could contest my argument about the invisibility and non-existence of the issue on the public stage), I am arguing that the socio-spatial exclusion of Roma as part of the broader neoliberal form of advanced marginality is hardly questioned by them. The analysis of this fact, respectively of the way in which Roma politics and policies, including actions of governmental and non-governmental organizations or political parties contribute to understandings and practices regarding Roma should be the topic of another paper (following van Baar, 2011; or Sigona and Trehan, 2009, see an outline in *Constructing "Roma ethnicity" by politics and policies for Roma*, available at *http://sparex-ro.eu/?p=847,* accessed 22.10.2013). Here I only would like to suggest that the mode of thinking about "Roma as vulnerable group", or about "Roma poverty", or about "Roma inclusion", or further on about the role of non-governmental organizations *versus* that of the state, or about "development" in general and "community development" in particular, had its role to play in the (re)production of advanced marginality and ghettoization of impoverished ethnic Roma.

neoliberal regime is a new development.[5] In post-socialist Romania, the formation of instances of advanced marginality (like the socio-territorially excluded urban housing areas under our scrutiny) started with the 2000s and became more visible since 2008, however they did not appear from nowhere: they were preceded by the transformations of the housing domain undergoing during the 1990s, and also by the impoverishment of the working class districts in the context of the communist shortage economy characterizing mostly the 1980s.

Viewed in the context of the distinction between the "ethnic ghetto" or ethnic segregation, and "underclass enclave" or social segregation, one may say that the current Romanian instances of advanced marginality (the creation of the disadvantaged residential areas inhabited by the excluded poor (self)identified as Roma – like the Pata-Rât area of the city of Cluj) unify these two types of enclaves: they are racialized forms of spatialized social exclusion. Geographically marginalized urban areas, usually placed in polluted environments (former industrial zones, landfills, wastewater treatment plants, etc.) and disconnected from the rest of the locality (due to physical distance, lack of public transport, dangerous boundaries like the railway) are started to be used as semi-illegal residential spaces both by people dispossessed of secure jobs and homes and excluded from participation on social life, and by local authorities administering "urban regeneration" programs targeting "undesirable poverty pockets". The economic processes of exclusion (that deprived people of material, social and human resources, which would be necessary to connect to the mainstream society characterized by particular understandings and practices of standards of living) are justified by the naturalization of the association of "particular people" with these "particular places". In the due process these "particular people" are constituted as people deserving to be poor, people who do not like to work, who cannot cope with the entrepreneurial norms of current society, and who do not deserve social protection (being a burden on the state and/or on the mainstream society). Moreover, the imaginary of the city (nurturing a sense of university-based and elite municipality) excludes people living on the margins from the category of citizens, or even from the category of humanity (placing them into a realm of sub-humans, comparing them to animals or to trash). The process of de-humanizing the poor culminates with the racialization of the de-humanized: since they cannot be the "authentic" ethnic and/or civic Romanians – who, even if poor constitute

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[5] According to the author, advanced marginality is the new form of social exclusion in neoliberal regimes, having characteristics such as accumulation of economic penury, social deprivation, ethno-racial divisions, and public violence in the same distressed urban area. This type of expulsion does not stem from economic crises or underdevelopment; it is rather the resultant of economic restructuring and its unequal economic effects on the lowest faction of workers and subordinated ethnic categories, as Wacquant (2008) cogently describes.

the desired ethnic and social body of "us" –, they are transformed into a category embodying inferiority and primitivism, named as "Gypsies". The story of the eviction of 76 families from Coastei street of Cluj-Napoca in December 2010 and their relocation in some modular houses built by local authorities nearby the city's landfill illustrates the process described above.

Persons evicted from Coastei street perceive themselves as "integrated Roma", i.e. as Roma living "like Romanians". In this discursive context, the phrase "like Romanians" refer to a particular lifestyle that included before 1990 having a job and an apartment distributed by the employer, enrollment into the army in the case of men, attending school and getting qualification for a vocation, speaking Romanian language, being accepted by neighbors and by work-place fellows. The majority of elders from former Coastei belonged to an old Roma community settled in Bufniței street (somewhere vis-à-vis the Terapia factory) that was cleared during the 1960s according to the vision and rules of the communist social engineering: families were dispersed across the city (the city's other peripheries) in one-story buildings, but in time they got apartments in the newly built blocks of flats of the enlarging workers' districts, including on Coastei street belonging to Mărăști district (which till the end of the 1990s was not considered a valuable real estate zone of the city).

Parallel with the gentrification of Coastei street (where a new housing area and a new civic centre was developed, including villas – among them that of mayor Apostu – and the residence of the county council and of the county library, but as well as of offices of multinational companies) the area of small houses (on which people paid a monthly rent to the municipality) and of the informally extended improvisations became visible different from its immediate environment and started to be classified as "non-aesthetic", "dirty and noisy", "dangerous". By March 2010, representatives of the local authority initiated an "urban generation" plan in Coastei street, and tried justifying their action by "explanations" such as: "in order to find a solution for the circa 1500 Roma who live on Cantonului and Coastei, respectively in Pata-Rât, the leaders of local administration consider the zone from the proximity of the landfill from Pata-Rât" (deputy mayor Attila László's press release from March 2010); "the level of high insalubrities and the many complains coming from the citizens of the area makes necessary to move out the families from Coastei street" (the Account of the Department of Patrimony and Evidence of Properties of the Municipality of Cluj-Napoca, Nr. 64778/451.1/25.03.2010); "in order to relocate the persons who live illegally on Cantonului and Coastei streets the Local Council approves the procedures for identifying land in the Pata-Rât area" (Decision Nr. 127/ 30.03.2010 of the Local Council of the Municipality of ClujNapoca); "starting

the land exchange procedures between the Mayoralty and the company S.C. Strict Press S.R.L., on the base of which the latter received 300 square meter land in Nădășel street and offered in exchange 3000 square meters in Pata-Rât area" (Decision Nr. 197/ 11.05.2010 of the Local Council of the Municipality of ClujNapoca); "the eviction from Coastei street was made due to the fact that the way of life generated a lot of controversies for the inhabitants of the area and for the companies from the area and for everything that the city meant – later they were moved in a zone from Pata-Rât" (press declaration of mayor Sorin Apostu from May 2011, in the context of offering in a regime of free use the land on Coastei street to the Orthodox Arhiepiscopie in order to build there a campus for the Orthodox Theology Faculty of Babeş-Bolyai University). Besides this new destination, the space emptied in a hurry during winter time, in the summer of 2011 became the location of a children's playground, when the online magazine Napoca News welcomed these actions by stating: now that the Gypsyhood was removed where it belongs, our Romanian children might play here in a civilized manner[6].

The case briefly described above is not singular – one may find many similar instances across cities, countries and continents in which the urban gentrification process is undergoing by the means of excluding the poor from inner city areas or from areas whose real estate value increases. In the case of Cluj-Napoca, and other cities of Romania, all this is happening in the larger context of post-socialist changes and of the current neoliberal practices supported, among others, by the state. Racism (as "cultural justification") underlies these administrative actions, trying to explain, why are poor Roma deserving inhuman treatment (why can they be evicted during winter time, why people might be left homeless, why do they deserve to be relocated near the landfill). If one looks on this case and on similar cases (for example in Baia Mare, Piatra Neamt, etc.) he/she might observe how the mayors – after circulating electoral promises regarding the abolishment of areas inhabited by poor Roma – justify the clearance of city slums or "poverty pockets" (or the eviction from these locations) by suggesting that they want "to integrate Roma", while in reality, even if the infrastructural conditions of the new homes would be slightly better, these "solutions" create the whole range of negative consequences of residential segregation in the urban (mostly polluted and stigmatized) peripheries.

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[6] See: *http://www.napocanews.ro/2012/09/vezi-cum-arata-str-coastei-din-cluj-napoca-la-doi-ani-de-la-evacuarea-tiganilor-ilegali-civilizatie-ordine-si-spirit-romanesc-foto.html* - accessed 15.08.2013

Homes and policies – accumulation of capital by dispossession

As shown by EUROSTAT data,[7] in 2010 Romania has been on the first place among the member states of the European Union regarding the percentage of homeowners (97.5%). Although apparently a positive situation, this indicator does not refer to high-level quality housing. Quite on the contrary, it shows that the once celebrated popular governmental measure implemented in 1990 has proved to be a trap for the population, being actually a measure that has diminished state responsibility regarding citizens' housing needs and refurbishing the old socialist blocks of flats. In the same year, the rate of overcrowded housing was also the highest in Romania (54.9%, compared to 17.6% in EU27; a percentage that was even higher in the case of those under the risk of poverty, 65%), and the percentage of those who lacked toilet in the dwelling was 40.8% (compared to the European average of 3.4%). Further, in 2010 Romania's population confronted the highest level of severe housing deprivation in the EU (indicator that measures financial access to dwelling, physical proximity of local services and access to housing): compared to the 5.7% average in the EU27, 26.9% of Romanian citizens were confronted with this problem.

Housing policies had an instrumental role in the process of regime changes from socialism through post-socialist transition to current neo-liberalization that included complex and intersected transformations of the state, the society, and the market. They are not exception to the rule,[8] i.e. they are form of discursive power with heavy material consequences, they are not neutral instruments of solving problems, but are ideologically informed means of any power regime to name, regulate, control, define problems and their solutions. Policies are discursive formations that – while defining the problem and identifying solutions for the problem – produce subject positions, subjectivities and social hierarchies, are tools in the hands of policy-implementers to reproduce or change the socio-economic status quo, and might be vehicles of empowerment, or contrary of reproducing inequalities. In this way (housing) policies are actors of the broader socio-economic stage: they actively support the major social-economic trends (which nowadays are privatization, financialization and marketization), and by neglecting to tackle the negative/ exclusionary/

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[7] *http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/ data/database* (last update 18.10.2013; accessed 19.10.2013).

[8] This conception about policies is informed by the theory according to which policies are forms of power that together with other forces "organize society and structure the ways people perceive themselves and their opportunities", and have a contribution "to empower some people and silence others" (Shore and Write: 1997, 7); and by the approach elaborated by Wedel, Shore, Feldman and Lathrop (2005), who sustain that policies shape the society, create new categories of individuals to be governed, connect desperate actors in power relations, and most importantly masks the political under the cloak of neutrality.

discriminatory consequence of such developments they substantially contribute to the creation of social inequalities and exclusion. Housing inequalities and housing exclusion are crucial part of the neoliberal socio-economic order, while housing policies are supporting the accumulation of capital on the side of residential entrepreneurs and the dispossession of the poor transforming them into homeless (or homeowners on the margins), excluded from the socio-political body enjoying citizenship rights.

In the post-socialist Romania, housing policies are focused overwhelmingly on promoting homeownership, a tendency that is strongly linked to the general public concern constructed around the right to private property on the expense of the social right to affordable and adequate housing for all (the latter being considered as part of the egalitarian, denigrated communist past). As part of this tendency, restitution of private property on buildings and lands nationalized by the socialist state reflected the fact that the agenda of post-socialist justice-making was highly valuing privatization. Related processes promised to empower the individual in the front of an oppressive state (such as the former socialist one, which nationalized private property). Throughout the process starting from the promise of "no oppression" and ending at the reality of "no protection" (on the domain of housing) the post-socialist state became an ally of the "free" residential market (and the property rights of its major actors, such as real estate entrepreneurs and banks) against the socio-economic needs and rights of its citizens. On the other hand, by a decree from early 1990 the state proceeded to the privatization of public housing stock, as a result of which all the inhabitants of apartments from state-owned blocks of flats could by their homes.

Parallel with the legislative acts from above, and despite of the tiny, but existing regulations regarding its responsibilities on the housing domain, the state effectively withdrew from the role to allocate public budget for the constructions of social or necessity homes. It is only in the Law for Preventing and Combating Social Marginalization (Law 116/2002) that it is promising to financially support, through the County Councils, the construction or the buying of homes by youth under the age of 35, who cannot afford acquiring a house from the market on their own. On the other hand, the Housing Law (Law 114/1996) suggests providing social housing for the most vulnerable and to support that from the public budget, but the Law of Public Administration delegates the right to define the criteria for distributing social houses to the local councils and mayoralties, which, even if in a reduced number, but administer the construction of new homes, is not always supporting the most disadvantaged because this does not fit into their imaginary of the desired urban development (or their ideas about who should own or who should belong to the city).

The role that the state played in financing the housing sector in Romania is illustrated by the acts and programs of the National Housing Agency (Agentia Națională de Locuințe, ANL) established in 1998, and subordinated today to the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration. ANL[9] was the first institution from Romania offering housing credit and it was the main promoter of the country's mortgage market. At the beginning, the Agency built new houses or refurbished older ones, which were sold through mortgage. In 2003 the Agency established public-private partnerships with several banks, so today its mortgage program is solely financed by banks. Since 2001, ANL also implemented a program for constructing houses dedicated to youth under the age of 35, which are distributed by local councils. Owners might first rent, and after one year might buy these apartments. Altogether, ANL made a huge confusion between social housing dedicated to vulnerable groups, and homes affordable by those who could benefit of a bank credit, or generally by better-off people.

Dedicated to middle class youth by the means briefly described above, likewise the Romanian politics of housing as a whole, ANL was also promoting homeownership, while local authorities practiced a system of distributing the low number of social houses that not necessarily served the interests of marginalized categories. The housing market, especially since and when the bank credit system flourished, became a very profitable domain also for local and national political "entrepreneurs" who were not interested in regulating this market for the sake of the disadvantaged categories, but contrary, were interested in deregulation and speculation, while enjoying the privileged positions from which they were informed about the lands to be privatized and/or from which they could decide on developmental investments that increased the value of particular urban areas.

As a reaction to the work of the structural forces described above, impoverished people move to residential spaces where the living costs are lower and where they might find a source of living (e.g. garbage dump). On the other hand, post-industrial Romania knows the formation of impoverished (inner city) slums in different ways. First, the abandoned former workers' dormitories as a consequence of the collapse of socialist industries, disconnected from utilities and devastated, are occupied by impoverished families. Second, the extension of the initially formal settlements with informal housing improvisations, or of the always informal settlements due to the natural growth of families whose new generations could not afford moving out or buying homes on the housing market, thus added improvised extensions to the old buildings. Thirdly, in cases in which there is interplay of interest between

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[9] See *www.anl.gov.ro* (Last accessed: 18.10.2013).

real-estate companies, and multi-national or national firms and banks in occupying these areas, local authorities get rid of their "poverty pockets" by evictions, hiding the forced nature of such interventions by intimidating and manipulating the dwellers.

Briefly put, the residential market, by the support of the state, became a territory for capital accumulation, while citizens, especially the excluded and the marginalized, were dispossessed of their rights to an adequate and accessibly housing. Even more, in cases of forced evictions these impoverished categories were dislocated from their homes without proper alternatives given, while the buildings where these homes were, got privatized or were demolished and the lands on which they were located were offered to "honourable" investors. Additionally, the dislocated people became homeless, or were relocated to improper city margins, so underwent an act of dispossession that increased the degree of their exclusion and their inability to enhance their own human capital (Harvey 2006), while they were strongly blamed for failing to integrate into the majority society. As shown above, at the turn of the 2000s, through its national housing agency, instead of supplying social housing for those in need, the state acted as an actor of neoliberalization, if we accept the definition of neoliberalism according to which this "puts governmental technologies developed in private and business spheres to work within the domain of the state, so that even key functions of the state are delegated to private providers and run like a business… and the enterprise model are disseminated over the entire social body" (van Baar, 2011: 168).

Scales of marginalization – the sense of (not) belonging to the landfill

By the end of 2013, selective waste collection hardly started in Cluj-Napoca, so the city and its surroundings are still relying on the labour force of people working on the landfill, who are carrying out waste selection since the 1970s under precarious conditions (Vincze 2012, 2013a). This landfill is recognized as a polluted urban site in the documents and projects targeting investments into a new, ecological "waste management centre". These are considered by decision-makers as technical projects without any social dimension, and – probably also due to the interplay of interests linked during the past decades to the traditional waste industry – are troubled by reciprocal political contestations.

But not all the inhabitants of the Pata-Rât area are working on the landfill, and exactly this, their relation with and attitudes towards it is one of the factors that they use to differentiate themselves one from another. The dwellers are basically grouped in four "communities" in four distinctive zones: the Garbage Dump, Dallas or old Pata-Rât, Cantonului street, and Colina Verde

or "New" Pata-Rât. These are different in terms of their histories, grade of disconnectedness from the city, group dynamics, cohesion and modes of self-organizing, chains of exploitation, attention paid to them by local authorities, degree and complexity of exclusion, or scarcity of material resources (housing conditions, water, electricity, and heating). Out of the total inhabitants, circa 42% were relocated to this site with the beginning of the 2000s by local authorities on individual base, or in smaller groups of families, or collectively in bigger groups; the rest settled on this site "voluntarily" (but constrained by economic conditions, or by looking for cheap housing and resources of living). About half of the residents constructed their improvised homes by their own or bought their barrack from other families (by informal acts of buying and selling), approximately a quarter of them were provided wooden or plastic container houses by charity organizations, while the late-comers (evicted in 2010 from the city) were moved into modular houses built by local authorities. The perception of differences between the four different groups by the inhabitants themselves are reproducing the mainstream discourse that makes a distinction between deserving and undeserving poor, and associates Gypsyhood with the wasteland. These might be deciphered from statements such as: "they deserve living here near the landfill because they cannot do anything else, but we are integrated Roma, our place is not here" ("new" Pata-Rât inhabitants about "old" Pata-Rât dwellers); or "authorities considered rightly that because we are Gypsies we are trash and our place is near the wasteland" (self-ironically interiorizing the logic of blaming the poor, or of the "argument" that "we, the Gypsies", even if integrated, are not good enough for the city).

The "refugee-camp": the Garbage Dump

People looking for sources of income and cheep living conditions were allowed to settle down right near the landfill starting with the end of 1960s and to carry on informal labour (waste selection) on the landfill as this met the interests of waste industry actors. People were transformed into an exploited labour force by sanitation companies collecting unselectively the trash across the city, by selected waste (scrap iron, pet, paper) collection firms, and by the informal pretty entrepreneurs of the place (who secured their living from this activity). During 1970s-2010s the garbage dump's population gradually enlarged due to the following: mostly after 1990, the increase of the number of people across the city and the country, forced by their economic conditions "to choose" precarious forms of labour and housing (circa 15% declared that they moved here between 1990-1999, and 78% declared that this happened since 2000); networking of local pretty entrepreneurs across many counties of Romania in order to attract further labour force and to facilitate the settling down of newcomers on this site; relocation of about 13 homeless traditional Roma

families from the city to this marginal spot by local authorities. Today approximately 250 persons are living within this neglected and life threatening territory in 50 improvised barracks. They were told that they were tolerated and they should be merciful, as if this was a humanitarian act on the side of authorities and sanitation companies towards them. But the truth is that, being totally dispossessed of housing and labour-related rights and of human dignity, and due to their dependency on this informal settlement, their labour force functions as a source for capital accumulation for the entrepreneurs of waste industry. The latter do not have to provide anything in exchange, people's precariousness (and lack of alternatives) is the very source of their capital accumulation. This precarious labour (unsecure, unprotected, life and health threatening, and underpaid), involves no costs for those who exploit it, likewise the substandard housing conditions in this unsecure and informal settlement does not involve any public or private investment on the side of institutions.

The "private Roma neighborhood": Dallas

Grown into an informal settlement since the end of the 1960s when the first five-six families settled on the site of the oldest garbage dump of the city. Later on this moved ahead with about one kilometer, while the former wasteland was covered by soil, and improvised barracks and shelters started to be constructed. Since 1990 foreign charity and religious non-governmental organizations (from Austria and from The Netherlands) provided the ecologization of the terrain, water pump, and a little bit improved homes, or food and medicines. Nowadays, one of them (the Dutch Pro Roma Foundation) bought the terrain and started to re-construct "Dallas as a private Roma neighborhood that people might be proud of". Circa 320 persons are living here in 70 barracks, including old and new, out of whom 18% declared that they were born here, and 10% that they lived in Dallas before 1990. A community centre running pre-school educational activities is providing care for children. A patron-client-like financial and social dependence mingles the community together, while there is a fine line between security and support provided by the charity organization and between exploitation directly administered by grassroots pretty entrepreneurs, former workers of the garbage dump. Usury and informal commercialization of electricity completes the complex picture of control and discipline, while people experience a strong dependence on the place that offers housing for free and labour opportunity, but also a sense of belonging, even if marked by everyday suffering and humiliation. The reliance of men, women and children on this landfill is tough, because, with the exception of few children attending school, they are totally disconnected from the city and from the society, without the capacity to even imagine any alternatives.

The "reckless area": Cantonului street

Starting with the end of 2002, the mayors' office has relocated to Pata-Rât area (more precisely to Cantonului street) – one by one or in small groups – families evicted from other parts of the town (Byron street, NATO block of Gheorgheni, Hangman's House, Cipariu Square, the basements of blocks in Mănăştur, former working class neighborhoods, etc.) by administrative measures. With the approval of authorities, circa 50 wooden houses and plastic container houses were provided by foreign charity, religious organizations in 2004 and 2005. Today, more than 130 families live on Cantonului street, which hosted only 5 families at the beginning of 2003. Above those settled here by authorities, over half of the families established there informally and "voluntarily", some of them from outside of Cluj, many through various underground economic networks. The population in Cantonului colony is very heterogeneous: it is grouped and fragmented according to nuclear or extended families and kinship ties, while the latter are not providing real support and does not result necessarily in cooperation; it is characterized by tensioned, even violent relations of cyclical mutual contestation; it knows a high level of mistrust regarding any kind of internal or external organization susceptible of intervening in the inner order; it is marked by relations of financial dependence related to usury, prostitution, and informal commerce with electricity; it produces a deep sense of insecurity and danger, but also fear of moving out due to lack of resources. People from Cantonului street express ambiguous practices and senses of belonging and of not belonging to the place at the same time: while children and adults are partially connected to the city, but since they are there for about ten years, willingly or not, they accommodated to the challenges of the place and the social network that inhabits it.

"The non-belonged": Colina Verde or "new" Pata-Rât

"Colina verde" (Green hill – as authorities cynically named the place) is at about 800 meters from the landfill and 200 meters from a former chemical/pharmaceutical waste deposit. The inhabitants of the ten modular houses built by the mayoralty, whose eviction case was already mentioned before in this paper, nurture a strong sense of non-belonging to the area marked by the landfill. Out of the 76, mostly Roma families (whom all were demolished and relocated with a single action in December 2010), 40 were offered alternative housing through a procedure that is not at all the usual practice of distributing public housing in modules that offer living conditions far below the acceptable standards (one room of 16 or 18 square meters given for one family with up to even 12 members, sharing one bathroom of 6 square meters). The rest of the families were informally given small pieces of nearby land with the cynical

invitation to build their houses as they usually do, i.e. illegally. The way in which local authorities made a distinction between them (between those with contracts, the legal ones, and those without contracts, the illegal ones), even if this recreated the community's former status, potentially included the risk to disjoin it in its new location, however, people fostered their sense of solidarity due to their collective eviction and as well as due to shared attitudes by which they delimited themselves from the older residents of Pata-Rât (those who were always illegal, those who work on the landfill, those who never did anything else, or those who does not know what it means belonging to the society).

Through each of these cases, named by the analyst on the base of several meanings attributed to them by complex processes of self- and hetero-identifications, one might discover that space or spatiality is not the ultimate explanatory factor nor of people's situation (poverty, marginality or excludedness), or of their actions. The spatialization of exclusion is a process resulting from and part of the whole societal order, and the way in which people of excluded spaces act strongly depends on the complex power relations on which they are part of, and as well as on the way in which they construct the meanings of these spaces and through this, the meanings of their own actions by which they re-shape the space that they inhabit. The complexity of the Pata-Rât area demonstrates that even if "the landfill neighbourhood" looks as a homogenous space and it might have a homogenizing effect, it exists through a multitude of everyday (spatial) meanings and practices. [10]

Three years after their eviction from Coastei street, many community members have the strength to transform the space that they do not identify with into a territory where they would like acting as if they would not be in the vicinity of the landfill, or in a neighbourhood that they do not want to belong to. By this they kind of act against the mainstream logic of the segregated and dehumanizing space (which would mean, in the dominant perception, or adaptation to this space – in their words "starting to act as people from Cantonului street or from Dallas" – or resistance to it, in their word "focusing solely on claiming relocation from Pata-Rât"). Similar stages of the process of signaling (not) belonging to the space of the landfill could have been occurred in Cantonului street as well in the past (stages that we could not witness today due to the timing of our current research). However, there is a huge difference between the two "communities": one of them was placed in Pata-Rât as a more or less coagulated group from an urban space that empowered them to imagine themselves as part of the city; while the other

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[10] By putting the issue in these terms, I am following the suggestions regarding the need to overcome the binary opposition reproduced by the "neighborhood effect" model of urban poverty, i.e. the rigid distinction between accommodation and resistance to spaces of poverty that act over their inhabitants, to move "beyond the space-as-container ontology", and "conceptualize space as a social construction that shapes social action and guides behavior" (Gotham, 2003: 723).

was formed during years at that very location as a mosaic of different groups and persons, so that the latter do not even have a shared memory about how Cantonului street was or how it was used before the predominant model of adaptation to this environment of poverty demobilized abilities to imagine living there differently or to imagine escaping from there.

The way in which I arranged the four "communities" on a scale of marginalization in this chapter, untruly reduces them to some predominant shapes by which they are (self)-perceived. However it is to be mentioned that each of them knows different combinations of trying to overcome the dehumanizing effects of the "landfill neighbourhood" and of desperately giving up resistance while surviving from one day to another.

Urban regeneration – the dislocation of racialized "non-citizens"

After 2000, similar to the case of people from the Coastei street of Cluj-Napoca, in many cities of Romania local authorities tried "solving" the situation of slums inhabited mostly by poor (Roma), or the constituted "poverty pockets" through administrative measures backed up by decisions of local councils, such as: building up concrete walls around the Roma-inhabited neighborhood (e.g. Piatra Neamt, Baia Mare); in case they were located in the inner city, demolishing the slums inhabited by smaller or larger groups, or evicting individual families, and turning people into homeless and/or relocating them into marginalized and toxic neighborhoods, sometimes in "social houses", other times in "necessity houses" or in metal barracks (e.g. Cluj – Coastei street moved to Pata-Rât; Miercurea-Ciuc – families moved near the wastewater treatment plant; Călăraşi – the Obor district of Turkish Roma; Tg. Mureş - families from Mureş river,); where ethnic Roma count in the demographic map of the city (e.g. for electoral reasons) the city halls relocate whole communities into newly built and better-shaped neighborhoods (e.g. Călărăşi – the spoitor district) or improve the housing stock of the area inhabited by them (e.g. Tg. Mureş - Valea Rece neighborhood, and Dealului street); totally neglecting informal settlements around garbage dumps (e.g. Cluj, Miercurea-Ciuc), letting people moving and living there (at least till these need to be closed) due to deals with sanitation companies and/or waste management companies.

During our research we could observe that local authorities use different strategies towards different Roma communities from the same city (some are more "privileged", and others more disadvantaged, according also to their power interests and deals with Roma representatives, and increasing in this way the internal material and symbolic differentiation within ethnic Roma). These strategies recreate the unsecure tenor status of people affected by them, and for many times generate dependencies within which they are strongly controlled by authorities, being threatened and intimidated if they dare complaining.

Cases of eviction, respectively the related public discourses might be placed on a scale of classifications that evolve from defining the relocated ones as people who generated "controversies" and created "discomfort", to comparing them to street dogs.[11] We could see: supposedly their lifestyle, the fact that their neighbourhood lacked elements of a civilized housing, and the increased amount of garbage around, but most importantly the assumption that all these factors disturbed the others, "the normal people and companies", justified their eviction, demolition and relocation administered by local authorities. In this way, without any proper interventions against poverty, the latter ended up championing a war against the poor by which they supported both real estate interests and their own political and economic capital. These are cases in which authorities justified their actions by referring to the need of "slum clearance", or "urban generation", or "urban development programs". But their attempt to "rationalize" went even further: they, as elected representatives of the cities, put one against the other "The people" who deserved being served by the local governance and those who were not worthy of this. Even more, they sanctioned the distinction between those who merited belonging to the city, and those who did not. In addition, while legitimizing the housing and territorial exclusion of the latter, they even excluded them from humanity by associating them with trash, by relocating them to polluted areas that endangered their health and life, and by comparing them to animals. In none of these cases, "urban regeneration" meant the improvement of housing conditions of the dwellers of these areas in a way that they could support them living a proper human life while remaining there and become integrated into the desired urban landscape. But in each of these cases, the way in which and where they were relocated or left homeless increased their material deprivations, territorial separation and cultural stigmatizations, strongly damaging their human dignity and social relations. This is a strong evidence of the fact that these poor people are not imagined by decision-makers (and by the mainstream population) as being part of the urban space, which needs to be regenerated and developed, but they are at the most tolerated on the margins, or on territories that are tried to be made invisible or non-existent and, as such, do not require or deserve administrative attention or socio-economic development. Simply put: by these measures, public authorities construct a physical and symbolic bond between people regarded as non-humans and spaces regarded as non-territories (such as landfill, chemical deposits, wastewater treatment plants or other toxic environments).

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[11] More details about this in Vincze (2013c): The war against (poor) Roma in populist discourses and practices in Romania, SPAREX Working Paper, *http://sparex-ro.eu/?p=839* (accessed 20.11.2013).

The arguments of local authorities for performing evictions, demolitions and relocations, were also referring to the illegality of the respective human settlements. In some cases this meant that people were let to stay informally there since ages and now this consensus was disrupted unilaterally by authorities. And in other cases it meant that people renting their homes on those areas, were evicted together with the informally settled and/or those who did not posses legal documents of any kinds, being pushed together, as "the group that deserve such treatment", out of their citizenship status. In each of these cases, relocation meant that people's access to resources of a life defined by our society as normal for a citizen belonging to a member state of the European Union, or their access to the means of living accepted as legal in the same world, became even more restricted. Consequently, their effective access to citizenship or to fundamental human rights including the right to life was dramatically hampered.

Dispossessed of their houses, of their citizenship and even of their humanity evicted people continued living in their home countries and cities as undocumented immigrants do live in a foreign country or as refugees live during times of war. Or they tried going abroad, in the economically more promising member states of the European Union, where they continued to experience the fact that they were unwanted, they were non-citizens, they were non-humans, and on this base they continued being subjected to evictions and deportations across countries.

The assumed processual perspective (Harvey, 1997) enables us to understand how the material and administrative creation of a deprived socio-territorial area near the municipality's landfill is intersected with its symbolic/discursive/cultural constitution as a space 'naturally' inhabited by a particular class of poor people (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992). While the majority of the first inhabitants of Pata-Rât (those settled in "Dallas" and right near the landfill, "*rampă*" in Romanian) were fixed in the urban imaginary as Gypsies (associated with a culture of poverty and primitive life-style), the whole territory – physically shaped by the city's wasteland – was designated as a space "naturally" inhabited by Gypsies. From here there was only one step to discursively constitute the (poor) Roma as a class of people (defined by skin color and physiological characteristics) whose natural environment is the landfill, who deserve and chose and like living and working on the wasteland (*rampa de gunoi*), and who, eventually, is subjected as a social waste, trash (*gunoi*), a leftover (*deşeu*), an excess, a surplus, or an unwanted (dirty, black) element of the desired/clean (white) city. Since developed, this racializing imaginary tries to justify the relocation of Roma evicted from different urban sites to Pata-Rât (as an act, which administratively reiterates that was already socially and morally consecrated).

Addressing this phenomenon in the Romanian ethnic context, one may conclude that relations between Roma and non-Roma are functioning as ethnic relations in cases in which there is a consensus among people on both sides that ethnicity matters in the way in which people perceive/classify themselves and each other. In the Romanian ethno-political context ethnicity is defined through shared language, history and culture. But Roma groups are not necessarily recognizable by the use of Romani language or by following a common set of cultural norms – however some elites are trying constructing the "Roma nation" by nurturing Romanes and Romanipen. Instead, the majority mostly identifies Roma by physiological and social features, such as "their" supposedly shared racial characteristics (darkness of the skin), and specific attitudes and behaviors regarding schooling, work and social benefits, and socio-economic status (poverty). There is a public consensus around the supposition that these features are deeply rooted in some sort of biological and/or cultural "Gypsy essence" and that eventually all Roma are the same regardless of the "nation" (*neam*) to which they belong to. Therefore, at the most of the times, Roma are not considered as the "ethnic other", but as the "other race" that is radically different from "us", ethnic Romanians, Hungarians or Germans, so in their case one may witness the racialization of ethnicity or of othering.

Moreover, even though predominantly Roma were defined discursively in the way from above across all the sites of our research, we could also observe that they were practically treated according to their proportion, acquired wealth, and ability to place themselves in the political economy of the larger communities. Nonetheless, if non-Roma tried justifying why should Roma be considered on or ignored from the public agenda, or when they aimed at explaining why Roma are wealthy or on the contrary why are they poor, or why one needs them or on the contrary should get rid of them, for the majority of the times they made appeal to racialized arguments, such as: "Roma are having many children"; "they are a large community, so they are important voters and are important in assuring the existence of schools"; "Roma do not like to work and that is why they deserve living in poverty, or Roma do illegal activities to get rich"; "we have to clean our cities and villages of Roma who are embarrassing and dirty elements, or we may use the cheap labour force of Roma because they are ready to do anything".

Intersectional injustices – poverty, stigma and non-existence

Forms of advanced urban marginality encountered by us during the SPAREX research in all of the five scrutinized cities are functioning at the intersection of geographically and socially marginal spaces and of the new class of precariat that only have access to scarce housing and labour conditions. Precariousness is characterized by insecurity, low quality standards of life, reduced or totally missing (legal, social or personal) protection, decreased

level of expectations and confidence, lack of stability needed for transformative self-organizing. People constrained by structural factors to live and work in the precarious conditions of urban marginality not only do not benefit from just redistribution or reciprocal recognition, but most importantly they do not even count. They are not "only" poor, but they are excluded, which is a state of socio-economic and cultural affairs that is reproduced trans-generationally. Using Fraser's (2007) wording, they "are not even in the game", they are not on the stage of (political) representation where others are deciding who makes a difference, who counts, whose life is worth living. They are the "kind of people" who are classified as non-citizens or even as non-humans inhabiting a non-territory that does not matter in the urban landscape.

The briefly presented cases of advanced marginality, are illustrating instances in which poverty and social exclusion are acting both as causes and as consequences of territorial and housing exclusion, while exclusion leads to poverty and vice versa. Most importantly, one needs to make a difference between being poor and being excluded, since the latter are not only poor (whom might be considered by the system as being worthy of social benefits and services supporting them to overcome their condition), but they are excluded from the realm of citizens and even that of humans (so they do not even count or exist). Following Nancy Fraser's three dimensional approach towards forms of subordination (2007), injustices and social movements, one may more easily understand how, in the case of poor Roma, three factors are acting simultaneously in the process of their exclusion: class inequalities that are excluding them from resources distributed across the society; status hierarchies that lead to their cultural misrecognition and racial inferiorization; and political exclusion, which makes that they do not count as members of the political body and they do not participate on the negotiations regarding who should benefit of just redistribution and of reciprocal recognition. The case of poor Roma, subjected to processes of marginalization and exclusion, are not only discredited as citizens and as humans by the means of political discourses and administrative actions, but are also transformed into the dangerous racial other than threatens the "normal mainstream".

Conducted in parallel with the SPAREX research, another investigation on the faces and causes of Roma marginalization[12] convinced me about the fact that – in the particular context of local economies and administration –

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[12] *Faces and Causes of the Roma Marginalization in Local Settings. Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011, focusing on Hungary, Romania, Serbia.* A joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Open Society Foundation's Roma Initiatives Office (RIO) and the Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma Inclusion program, and the Central European University/Center for Policy Studies (CEU CPS), implemented in Hungary by the Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in Romania by Desiré Foundation from Cluj, and in Serbia by the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University.

what mattered most in placing "Roma communities" on the socio-geographic map of the localities was, on the one hand, the way in which Roma and non-Roma could find their complementary niches on the local markets, and – on the other hand – the internal cohesion of Roma groups that could provide individuals with a sense of dignity, belonging and solidarity (Vincze, 2013b). "Assimilated Roma", who lost their community ties due to their socialist-way of integration into the labour market and after 1990 lost their social function in the local communities due to economic restructuring, are having more difficulties in coping with current challenges of marginalization. On the base of this one might conclude that those Roma groups could impose their interests in the local societies and could acquire a higher degree of acceptance from the mainstream population, who managed acting as a cohesive group possessing a sense of dignity. Different groups of "traditional" Roma, raised in the spirit of independence from the majority but also in the spirit of providing services to them while nurturing a sense of internal tradition, or different groups of Roma adhering to neo-protestant churches while creating new ties within and across the boundaries between them and the majority, were capable of finding more internal sources and external solidarities than the "groups" that are bonding only through the shared experience of poverty. This might explain a little bit why social inclusion policies on their own without being completed by dignifying recognition and representation politics, fail placing Roma individuals/ families/ groups into the larger local communities in positions from which they might act as powerful agency negotiating on rules of cohabitation, or on who counts in just redistribution or reciprocal recognition (Fraser, 2007). Willingly or not, social inclusion policies – on the one hand – reproduce the association of Roma with social problems (poverty), and – on the other hand – regenerate the belief according to which the social system in which Roma live is acceptable, and it is only Roma who need to be changed in order to fit into the perfect system. In addition, by identifying how marginalization happens and what does it mean in the case of different Roma groups, our researches call the attention of decision-makers at national and local level to conceive inclusive and rights-based development policies that carefully respond to the heterogeneity of (local) communities shaped by both the (power) relationships between ethnic majority and minority, and those between different Roma groups.

Conclusions

Cases of marginalization and exclusion discussed in this paper are not singular – one may find many similar instances across cities, countries and continents, in which the urban gentrification process is undergoing by the means of excluding the poor from inner city areas or from areas whose real estate value increases. In the case of the mentioned Romanian cities, all this is happening in the larger context of post-socialist changes and of the current neoliberal

practices supported, among others, by the state. Racism (as "cultural justification") underlies these administrative actions, trying to explain, why are poor Roma deserving inhuman treatment (why can they be evicted during winter time, why people might be left homeless, why do they deserve to be relocated near the landfill).

One of the major macro-structural determinants of the formation of advanced marginality, is the fact that public authorities redefine their role on the housing area, and in this way they are produced as public actors/subjects by the neoliberal regime, while they also contribute to the formation and consolidation of the latter: they support the privatization and marketization of the domain of housing (by legislation and policies); they sustain a non-interventionist housing policy (for many times being materially interested in housing entrepreneurship); they positively value those who are able to adapt to the "free housing market", act as "responsible" and "active" citizens, and are not dependent on social welfare and protection; they negatively value those who are not competitive on the market economy and are living under poor conditions, being dependent on social welfare. Directly and indirectly, they foster the elimination from the proximity of the city the informal settlements and residential areas characterized by poor living conditions, especially if these are inhabited by poor ethnic Roma.

In particular, my analysis described how a space formed as a municipal landfill was transformed into a territory of advanced social marginality characterized by physical isolation, material precariousness and cultural stigmatization. I demonstrated that this process was shaped by broader economic, social and political changes during socialism and after its collapse, underlied and justified by shifting cultural conceptions about state, market, citizenship, rights, or development, and – at its turn –, once fixed, such excluded space re-creates and justifies multiple deprivations and stigmatization, becomes one of the factors of advanced marginality. Parallel with this, I showed that these structural processes are completed by the discursive creation of the "undeserving citizen". The excluded poor is a category of people subjected to socio-territorial marginalization by socio-economic and cultural-symbolic exclusion, or by two intersecting processes that produce racialized and spatialized advanced marginality, which are neoliberalization and racialization.

Marginality produced by neoliberalization

Prepared during the "post-socialist transition" of the 1990s (that brought to the Romanian citizens the promise of democratization and the liberation of the individual from state oppression) and accentuated since Romania became a member state of the European Union (being connected in this way to global neoliberalism), the reality of market economy sustained by state politics and

the related ideology of the "minimal state" are generating forms of advanced marginality. This process includes many steps, among them: discrediting the socialist-collectivist-egalitarian policies, rights and development; the construction of a neoliberalized state that sustains its own reform besides the reform of the society (a reform that is about supporting capital accumulation by marketization and privatization) and makes appeal to ideologies of meritocracy, undeservingness and the minimal state; the process of privatization and financialization; the extending principles of business, such as efficiency and competitiveness on every domain of life.

My analysis showed that the capital accumulation through dispossession as a multidimensional process was facilitated by privatization and financialization of the housing sector, and was accompanied by the formation of the "precariat", a social category that has access only to unsecure and underpaid jobs, is deemed to be undeserving, and is socially and spatially marginalized in an exclusionary way (forgotten, invisible, neglected, de-humanized, at the best kept in the promise of temporariness). It also observed, that advanced marginality is characterized by both the disconnectedness from and connectedness to the macroeconomic development of the city, because: on the one hand, the growth known by the city does not improve the living conditions of the marginalized by exclusion, and – on the other hand – the development of the city (including urban regeneration through "slum/poverty pockets clearance") resulted in the dispossession of people deemed as undeserving to belong to the city.

The creation of Roma by racialization

During socialism Roma were not recognized as national minority: traveller Roma groups were forcibly settled, and settled Roma groups were dispersed across cities in the working class neighborhoods. Both of them became part of the working class, the human resource for socialist industrialization and urbanization, and underwent a related assimilation and universalization process. During times of the collapse of socialist industries, recognized as ethnic or national minority, Roma are racialized, perceived not as ethnic, but as a racial, ultimate Other, associated with darker skin color and particular/inferiorized behavior towards school, labour, or social benefits. Parallel with this, poor Roma are also affected by the distinction between the "deserving" and "undeserving" citizens according to the extent to which they manage to become competitive enough in the market economy, and in particular on the "free housing market". In due process, the stigma of poor intersects with the stigma of being Roma, eventually "Roma" is associated with poverty and most importantly with "undeserving poor", and/or with a physical and symbolic threat in the front of whom public authorities has the duty to protect the first hand citizens, first of all the entrepreneurial individuals, but also the poor with a majority background.

Consequently, there is a growing popular consensus around Roma deserving living in isolated and environmentally hazardous areas, which is a manifestation of anti-Gypsy racism: racism is used to explain and legitimize the status quo in which ethnic Roma are represented among the poor in a higher percentage than the majority population; moreover, racism is constitutive of neoliberalism, similar to the way in which racialization is part of neoliberalization. Sustaining that poor ethnic Roma do not want to work and expect the state or private actors to help them, authorities enforce within non-Roma citizens the idea that a responsible, deserving citizen should not act as Gypsies do (for example by being "socially assisted"). By evicting Roma and/or relocating them into segregated areas, public authorities have a contribution to creating the sense of moral superiority even among the non-Roma poor who might gain in this way a feeling of being a "normal citizen" who deserves belonging to the city.

"The poor", "the Roma" and the marketizing state

Pushing out from the city those people whose presence in the town is considered as disturbing or embarrassing, equals with trying to deny or make invisible the fact that the last decades of socio-economic changes produced conditions and situations that failed being handled by public authorities, and/or by public policies. The latter proved to be unsuccessful in implementing remedies for the inequalities produced by market economy, and by a public administration totally neglecting the visions and practices of a cohesive and inclusive development that could have avoided the formation of poverty pockets or the creation of a social class of precariousness dispossessed not only of material resources, but also of human dignity. In front of these institutional inabilities, authorities try justifying their actions by an urban imaginary which is in tone with the desires of the mainstream population: this is about nurturing the ideal of a civilized, European city inhabited by highly skilled professionals where nobody is "socially assisted". But how can be this imaginary sustained by the working poor or by people benefiting of social allowances and services? This is the point where this logic requires the appeal towards an inferior class of people, or more properly said, of an inferior class of non-humans, who threaten the formation of a desired territory of "our own" inhabited by the desired community (by "us") composed of people who deserve belonging to it.

In addressing the situation of the communities subjected to such actions of local authorities, there are always confusing associations made between "Roma" and "people living in poverty", while the appeal to ethnicity is for the most of the times ambiguous on any sides. Asked about their ethnicity, majority of people living in the targeted disadvantaged residential areas assume Roma identity, while – in their effort to make themselves acceptable and "integrable" –

they are trying to hide this, proving that they want to be "like Romanians" (which does not only mean claiming citizenship rights, but it is also about the self-denial of their own language, music or different forms of traditions that might recall in one's eyes or ears their marginalized status). On the one hand, the public imaginary of the city predominantly defines the areas where they are relocated as "Gypsyhoods" (*țigănie*), while the mainstream society and/or the authorities try denying that inhabitants of these zones became inhabitants because they were excluded by different means from other spaces due to the way in which their ethnic background was perceived.

People undergoing such experiences, are displaced from other locative spaces by several factors and mechanisms among them socio-economic (lost of jobs and homes), urban regeneration-related consequences and administrative measures. At the same time they witness that this displacement and their dispossession of basic human rights is justified by cultural "arguments" about "Gypsyness" and its "natural" belonging to the landfills or other toxic and segregated environments. The stigma attached to the place is associated to people inhabiting it, and cynically both of them are considered "deserving" their precarious condition, and up to all this, people are inferiorized and essentialized both as poor and as Roma, while their juxtaposition is also naturalized. In this context, racism is instrumental about justifying, and in this sense producing today's inequalities: Roma are not conceived as dignified "ethnic other", but as "inferior race" acting by the means of "culture of poverty" while the latter is even juxtaposed with "Roma physiology". Transcribing poverty into an inferiorized "Roma essence" is a necessary conceptual step towards starting and conducting a war against poor (Roma) while continuing to claim that "our" democracy guarantees fundamental rights for all *humans*, and without addressing the systemic causes of poverty or the need – otherwise rhetorically assumed by the European social agenda – of reducing/eliminating poverty.

Unfortunately, the promised post-1990 Romanian democratization did not bring to Roma the opportunity to participate as equals or as dignified ethno-cultural minorities on societal life, including governance, whereas marketization and privatization affected negatively their socio-economic status, and – in the name of inclusion – they were subjected by different political forces as manoeuvrable masses of voters. This is why my conviction is that politics and policies addressing Roma at different levels should combine the perspective of just redistribution with that of cultural recognition and political representation/ participation. Most importantly, they should transcend treating "Roma poverty" and "Roma as vulnerable group" by the means of project-based development programs conceived as technical interventions, towards a more political conceptualization of advanced marginality as produced at the intersection of economic deprivation and racial inferiorization, which might have a transformative potential.

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ANNEX:
THE MAP OF SEGREGATED ROMA COMMUNITIES IN CLUJ-NAPOCA

Romanian Sociology Today

Editorial Note:

This is a special section dedicated to research articles from the field of Romanian sociology.

WORKPLACE RELATIONS IN A TRANSYLVANIAN CLOSED VILLAGE COMMUNITY. NOTES ON FIELDWORK

VERONICA M. MATEESCU[1] AND LUCIAN T. BUTARU[2]

ABSTRACT. This article shows how organizational studies could benefit from using theory and methodology from cultural anthropology. Based on field research in rural Romania's emergent small-scale industrial sector in 2006, it explores the influence of ecological factors on labour relations and how the manipulation of ethnic stereotypes and traditional rural values managed to hide the asymmetrical relations between employers and employees, placing them in the realm of a "natural" order. Our findings were consistent with the anticipation that in a closed village community work relations are socially embedded and strong moral norms govern over the authority and obligations of the (male) "patron" towards subaltern workers.

Keywords: personal connections, adaptive strategies, organizational culture, workplace relations

Introduction

In schools of management, the texts on research methods in Economics seem to be gaining legitimacy (and popularity) in so far as they reproduce the bureaucratic prescriptions. So, we can observe a preference for everything that is immediately quantifiable (Jung et al., 2009; Aycan, 2000), for everything that can attain universal character and can be instrumentalized (Mateescu, 2009) or, at least, for everything that creates the impression of a systematic work, valuable by means of being difficult and in the traces.

At first, in our research[3] we tried to follow the desiderata of the domain, but the effort was disproportionate to the results we obtained. As a consequence, we abandoned the endeavour, opting in favour of the method used in cultural anthropology. Hence, by following its rule of thumbs, we made use of personal

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[3] The research regarding the intercultural management practices was occasioned by a PhD thesis defended in 2008 at the Paris-Est University.

connections in order to facilitate our access[4], choosing each time the easiest way into following our interests (Bernard, 2006: 356-357). The results were unexpectedly rich for the amount of time spent in field[5]. For the same reason, the most qualified informants, who gave away even sensitive information, proved to be the closest in our network of personal connections. Because of that, excerpts from their interviews had more weight in the final text. The rest of the interviews were mainly used for coloratura, or if they revealed idiosyncrasy in the case of the main informants.

Keeping the same logic, the surveys handed out to all of the employees were also less used. An additional reason for neglecting the survey results emerged from an interesting discovery: the next day after filling them out, we saw an employee (mentally challenged) imitating the manager's voice dictating questions from our survey. This finding meant that, in the best case, the questionnaires had been filled out collectively. We did not have control over the administration process of the survey, because, with one exception[6], the access to the establishments was limited and supervised, lest it would interfere with the production process. Therefore, in this company, we did not use participative observation and the interviews were done outside of the establishments; usually we talked to the employees at their homes.

One event forced us to take one step further in our attempt of simplifying our work, with surprising results. The voice recorder had broken. Hence, one of us took notes and the other conducted the interview. This is how we started selecting right then and there the information, reducing the boundaries between the collecting, analysing and interpreting data from our interviews. Therefore, almost all fieldwork notes became part of the texts prepared for publication.

On the other hand, the consequences of this event made us understand why we kept losing interest every time we arrived at the part "analysis of qualitative data" in the majority of methodology texts: the artificial distinction between "methodology" and "theoretical paradigms" conceals the inevitably ideological component of any interpretation. There is no distinct moment dedicated to the "analysis" of "collected" data, as the analysis of some data requires collecting further data to place them in a horizon of significance – let it be that horizon one built by induction, let it be the horizon of a theory that recommends what data should be collected in order to undertake the empirical check of some hypothetical patterns or interconnections. In our study, the recurrent moments we found "adaptive strategies" (Bennett, 2009: 14-16), on both sides, led us into placing the problem in the horizon of Cultural Ecology

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[4] One of the authors participated in the research as a facilitator. Parenthetically, we can say that studying in your home village can be a good therapeutic process.

[5] All summed up, the time we spent doing fieldwork did not exceed one month.

[6] At another company, where the executive manager was a former high school classmate.

Theory. So, in order to understand why employees that had resigned in the past came back and were happily accepted, we started to collect data related to the present infrastructure, but also to practices and customs of the close past, so as to see whether the present ones are not in some degree "survivals" or "legacies" of the past. We replenished the neo-evolutionist analysis with complementary aspects from various branches of post-functionalism[7], because we found patterns of behaviour that would be labelled "rational" by economists intertwined with those that would be labelled "rational" by sociologists (Granovetter, 1985: 506). The recurrent moments of conflicts of interest or "manipulation of symbols" (Bailey, 2001: 83) inspired us to follow how stereotypes, traditional values and more are instrumentalized in the eclectic cultural universe of the village, where Jesus Christ peacefully lives nearby Jean Claude Van Damme.

Short presentation of the company

The study took place in a semi-rural place in Maramureş (North-West Romania), that looked like the outskirts of a town where the habit of raising pigs in the backyards reduced considerably during the last years, many lodgings had double glazing and central heating, many streets were asphalted, public transportation was replaced by hitchhiking and the cinema was transformed into a neo-protestant church.

At the margins of the village, standing in the place of a former agro-industrial company bankrupted after 1989, was the company we will talk about. The company is from the category of SMEs, with 99% Italian capital and 1% Romanian capital belonging to private investors. The company was established in 1993, its main activity being raw wood processing. The beneficiaries of semi-finished products (chipboards, hardwood floors, briquettes) are five Italian companies, which have been permanent clients from the beginning. In 2004, the annual turnover was between 100 – 500 thousand Euros. The company's organizational structure consists of 1 Italian owner, 1 Romanian associate, 1 accountant, 2 supervisors and 41 manual workers[8], the majority of them unskilled.

The company's creation at times when foreign investors regarded Romania with reluctance can be explained by the fact that the Italian investor had already been present here from the communist era, owning a business in

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[7] "Post-functionalism" is constructed in the same manner as "Post-structuralism". It refers to various attempts to transcend functionalism.

[8] According to the information provided on the site of the *Exchequer* for year 2005 (*http://www. mfinante. ro/contribuabili/link. jsp?body=/bilant. do*, consulted on the 17th of August of 2006). As we will see, the officially declared number of employees doesn't correspond to the number declared by the Romanian associate.

a different domain. After 1989, he had been looking for new investment opportunities, choosing this place due to low costs and the presence of plenty raw material (wood). He obtained the information on the region's potential from a personal connection. Low labour costs and lack of competition favoured furthermore his decision to invest in opening a company in Maramureș.

At the beginning, the company's share capital was entirely Italian. But, as the laws did not allow foreign investors to obtain ownership of the land, and the company needed to register an office in Romania, the investor gave 1% of shares to the company's secretary, making her an associate. The company is registered as a family business, but the investor's daughter, who is an official associate, in reality is not at all involved in management.

The managerial approach in relation to cultural difference

The analysis of intercultural management elements showed the kind of managerial approach that values cultural differences, i.e. an approach sensitive to local particularities. This perspective may be influenced by the Italian investor's previous business experience in Romania. A study carried out among human resource managers shows that the human resource management (HRM) practices of companies with more international work experience are more various, attuned to the local and regional particularities, while companies with less international work experience are more ethnocentric in human resource practices, considering that a single type of practices would be universally accepted (Schuler et al., 1993: 752-753). Even though the companies in question have no formal HRM department, we could observe that the conclusions of the above mentioned study also apply to them.

The personnel's recruitment, selection and integration processes are influenced to a great extent by the region's specificity: public announcements occur directly amidst the employees, asking for new personnel and airing advertisements on the local television. These methods result from region-specific tight social networks.

The first method of recruitment takes into consideration the traditional community character of the district, in which the information travels through an informal communication system, based on personal connections. This system could also be considered as a prolongation of older practices, when access to important information was assured by being part of an extended network of personal connections. The great majority of personnel got employed in this fashion. For example, the Romanian associate, initially employed as a secretary, had heard talks about the company from "someone she knew", and the questionnaires answered by the employees indicated personal networks as the predominant source of information. Some of them "had passed by" the

company and had asked the Romanian associate (having previously inquired about who ran the company) if work was not needed.

> After '89, I used to work at Carom, but it shut down. Carom was near the Italian's company [...] I went to talk to Florina (the Romanian associate) [...] I knew her mother, we used to commute together (during the communist era) to Baia Mare (Maria, female, 55 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006).

Therefore, informally, a sort of "database" with potential employees was created. Recruitment via advertising on the local television is only used when the desired number of employees hasn't been reached. This situation is determined by intense emigration of the labour force – Maramureş is one of the most important "sender-counties" of labour force to EU countries (INS, 2011) – and by the lack of the infrastructure necessary for the commuting of workers from the surrounding villages. Furthermore, there is also the competition with other companies in need of unskilled workers. The first method of recruitment is strongly bound to the main selection criterion: personal relations.

> There are many selection criteria, but if you need him, you have to recruit him, even though him being an alcoholic, just based on the fact that you know him [...] Women are more serious (than men) (Florina, female, 29 years old, manager, company's office, August 16, 2006).

"Reliability" does not have a clear definition, but it is highly valued and represents a source of prestige. We met it, in the sense of keeping promises, in association with national stereotypes, negative or positive, in the case of all of the three companies we studied.

> Naturally, there is a big difference between an Italian, a German and a Hungarian compared to a Romanian. If they promise you something, they keep their promise. Here, there's much talk but nothing is done (Florina, female, 29 years old, manager, company's office, August 16, 2006).

It is again noticeable how the more general negative stereotype regarding Italians' lack of dependability (as revealed by the interviews with workers from the three companies with Italian capital analysed in the applied component of the PhD dissertation, of which the present case study has been selected) is contradicted, but is transferred to the Romanians. The speech of the Romanian associate can also be interpreted as a manifestation of the positive valorisation of "the Occident", echoing a largely spread attitude in the post-socialist Romania.

A common practice in the company is informal labour. Nevertheless, this doesn't seem to bring out the negative national stereotype regarding the "dependability" or the lack of "humanity" of Italians. The situation is justified by the workers involved in this kind of labour by the management's lack of

interest towards the wellbeing of workers (in general, not only inside the company they are working for). Another possible explanation could be the rational consideration that governs the employer-employee relations within this company, as for some workers it pays off to work informally (more details will be provided in the section on HRM practices of the company).

The integration of new employees is, at its turn, influenced by the traditional community character of the village: when entering the company, the new worker already knows, directly or indirectly, many of his co-workers. There are, as well, cases when several members of the same family work at the company (brothers, mother and daughter, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law). The Italian investor made no explicit recommendation in this sense, and when the company had to cut back personnel, he chose to fire the younger ones, motivating this decision by the fact that it would be harder for the older ones to find new jobs. A particular case we came across was when the management agreed that the mother-in-law (even though retired, legally she could still work part-time) should divide working hours with her daughter-in-law, so that both of them could be paid wages and should be able to care for the education of the son of the latter.

In what regards the decision making process, even though the Romanian associate declares that all decisions regarding the company are the result of the consultation between her and the Italian manager, in another moment of the interview she declares that the latter has the final decision: "After all, he is '*cappo di tutti capi*' (boss of all bosses), justifying as well, through gender stereotypes: '[...] he's a man and has business experience." The workers consider that the one actually running the company is the Italian investor, even though they most of the time interact only with the Romanian associate. The Italian investor lives in Romania, but a few miles away from the area and only spends a few hours a week at the company.

The interviews with workers and our personal observations indicated a low authority of the associate among the employees, one of the main reasons given by the workers being her lack of professional qualification/competence, doubled by the presumed love affair between her and the Italian investor. Professional competence appears as an important source of prestige. So, the foremen are the most respected ones by the workers. Furthermore, them being respected is also due to the fact that they know "how to talk to the people" and their "kindness". As we saw, this last quality is appreciated in the case of the investor and the associate as well. Another possible explanation for the lack of authority of the Romanian associate could be her age (29 years); the majority of the workers are older. A more commonly met norm of behaviour is the respect granted to the elderly, starting from the premises of a moral/professional prestige given not by their professional competence or personal

qualities but from their so-called life experience. The age difference takes, many times, the form of difference in mentality between those who worked during the socialist era and those who started working in the post-socialist era.

Another source of prestige comes from how "morality" is perceived. The Romanian associate is perceived as having an intimate relation with the Italian investor, which provided the base of her unjustified promotion", because" she knows nothing on the wood-business". Besides, she is perceived as being "arrogant" and "having forgotten where she started from" (Ana, female, 31 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 17, 2006).

> Poor Florina [the Romanian associate], everybody gossips about her: that she puts on airs, that she thinks she's smart, that she's proud [...] She got here (being made associate) because she's the Italian's mistress [...] He keeps her because she's stupid: he doesn't take her out, she goes to the seaside by herself. You almost pity her seeing her like that (Ana, female, 31 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 17, 2006).

The way how sanctions work is obvious. This company is a small-scale replica of the village community, structured around kinship, morality, and normative vigilance. So, gossip and rumours and the dual attitude towards morality are the main ways of communication and socialisation. Nevertheless, while the associate's behaviour is criticised, being one of the favourite topics of gossip, there are also little erotic games / flirts between the female workers and one of the foremen, during work hours. But they do not always escape moral sanction: one of the female workers involved chose to quit her job, ashamed by the reproaches of one of her gossiping female co-workers. The topics of conversation among workers are, mainly, of personal nature. Nevertheless, regardless of a somewhat quickly created sort of familiarity, we could easily say that the relations outside of one's kinship and childhood friends remain mostly impersonal, with clear distinctions between the members of a family or a group and the others.

A common practice within the company is that of arranging a pool for various personal/family events (baptisms, weddings, funerals), and everybody should "voluntarily" contribute with a certain amount of money. In general, the management is expected to provide a larger amount of financial support for these occasions, but also to credit employees in case of emergencies:

> If you need something, for example going to the dentist, Florina [the Romanian associate] gives you money and then withdraws it from your pay check, she's a nice woman [...]. When someone dies, we raise money. The boss, the Italian, puts one million lei and the rest of us put as much as we can; he's a good man (Maria, female, 55 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006).

The investor's decision to fire the younger members of a family was also regarded positively by many of the workers, who took it as a proof of his "good heart". From the interviews, it is obvious that the Italian investor himself uses the "kind heart" argument in his discourse: "You think elsewhere is better. You see, if I were bad man, I would not take you back." (Viorica, female, 64 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 18, 2006), retelling what the boss said to one of the workers that came back).

Another source of prestige we identified is "popularity". It reminds of charisma in a certain way, but it is mostly related to the disregarding of social distance imposed by the hierarchy by those on higher positions. This kind of disregard is viewed by the employees as a sign of respect and genuine concern towards them. The Italian investor talks to his employees during his visits at the factory, shows interest for their problems, both professional and personal ones, and some of them even admitted they felt more at ease talking to him than to the Romanian associate. Furthermore, informal gatherings are held, on different occasions, with a relaxed atmosphere between workers.

> We celebrated the end of the year in our dear assembling hall. The company paid everything. We received Italian gifts bought at Metro's [...] There weren't many appetisers. We had folk music played on a computer. I went with my little girl. Sergio [the Italian investor] dances with everybody; he's very popular (Viorica, female, 64 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 18, 2006).

The above-mentioned ritual is also representative for showing the degree in which the Italian investor has adjusted to the local behaviour and the expectations towards a good "patron" (employer), who should carefully nurture not only professional, but also personal ties with the employees.

The impression that the company is a reduced replica of the community in question is strengthened by the gendered distribution of roles. Even though they are associates, the Italian investor is the one running the business – as we mentioned, the Romanian associate considers him to be "*capo di tutti capi*" (boss of all bosses) while the daily administrative and financial decisions go to the Romanian associate. This situation reminds us of the description that Gail Kligman (1998: 11) made in regards of another village community in Maramureș and its ways of functioning during the socialist regime; although women held big financial and administrative responsibilities within the household, the community's issues were always addressed by the men living in the village or outside.

Another example is the fact that in spite of the lavatories being unisex, cleaning was exclusively done by the women working there. This is an informal rule, never contested, and functioning as a formal one. This particular practice having been mentioned during the interviews did not come as an expression of dissatisfaction at its existence, but as a criticism to the Romanian associate's parsimony when appropriating money, in general, indicating even the money meant for cleaning products.

> Two women (employees), in turn, clean up the workers' lavatories [...] No, men do not do it [...] at first I didn't think it was OK, but I would rather do the cleaning than sit in filth [...](Ana, female, 31 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 17, 2006).

In addition, the employees we have interviewed mentioned a different payment received by men versus women for working extra hours. The associate did mention it, but based on the complexity of the work, not gender.

Analysis of the organizational culture

For our analysis of the organizational culture, we worked on the three level model proposed by Edgar Schein (1985). In order to avoid the artificial nature of an analysis that would strictly follow the proposed levels, which never appear as being so clearly separated, we will only use them as reference points.

The first level we analysed is the one of *artefacts and behaviours*. The headquarters of the company are in the buildings in which, before 1989, ran the Centre of Vegetables and Fruits (CVF). This is why it is locally referred to as: "the company where the CVF was". Unlike other local companies, where visitors have more restrictive access, this company has less strict, despite of the existence of a commissionaire's establishment (at our first visit, the entrance had no surveillance). The manner in which a space is used and kept can furnish information on the control system existing in the company. The inhabitants claim that the space has not changed much since it is property of the Italian investor.

At a first glance, the space seems abandoned; out of five buildings, separated one from the other, only three are used, but even those are poorly kept. One building serves as the hall, where wood is processed into boards and hardwood floors; another building is used for the production of briquettes; the third one is occupied by the offices of the investor, the associate and the accountant. The space reflects a relaxed control system. From the office building, the entrances of the two production halls cannot be monitored. It is understandable why, when he comes, the Italian investor spends most of his time in the production halls: he is able to keep an eye on his employees. Controlling the workers is the direct responsibility of the two supervisors. Nevertheless, such relaxed control is not supported by a fundamental belief in the "good nature of man". Man/employee is seen as "bad" by nature, and in order to do well his job, he has to be disciplined.

> Without avail we keep telling them, what and how they ought to do it, that it is not Ok the way they do it, they do as they wish. [...] usually, he who does a mistake and gets a penalisation, after two months, he'll do the same mistake. They easily forget having been sanctioned. Even if they are not paid at all, they'll still do the same; they don't learn from their mistakes [...] (Florina, female, 31 years old, manager, company's office, August 1, 2008).

Other factors that could explain the reduced possibility of control over the employees are the salaries, the difficult working conditions and minimum investment in equipment and space improvement. Also, many workers work informally. Precarious spatial organisation of production halls, lack of a designed space for meal breaks and rest, inoperative ventilation system reflect another *basic assumption* of the organizational culture of the company: workers are mere executants. Therefore, investment in ensuring better working conditions is futile. This assumption is reflected in other companies' management practices as well: the large number of those who work informally, the unpaid sick leaves of the formal employees, the working time exceeding constantly by a great margin the legal limit (working schedules between 60-72 hours per week while the legal limit provided for in the Labour Code is 48 hours per week, including overtime). Also, no procedure in case of accidents is in place, although, according to the Romanian associate, they are quite common. She nevertheless attributes these accidents to the negligence of workers without taking into account the conditions of the equipment.

> The equipment is not entirely new [...]. There is no safety; one could die before being able to get to a hospital [...]. A wood splinter wounded the hand of T. (a worker) when working with this miserable beech [...]. I was the only one worried [...]. The foreman looked at the hand of T. and gave him an Algocalmin (mild pain relief) as if nothing happened. I think, however, that if you wound your hand [...] I told him to go to the hospital (Ana, female, 33 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 3, 2008).

Another *basic assumption* of the company's management is that, in guiding the work of the employees, only rational calculation and economic interest matter. Thus, one of the principles of scientific management surfaces here: the rational-economic model, under which individuals make rational judgments based on economic criteria – the choices are made according to the potential consequences of their actions, choosing those that bring the greatest benefits (Carnall, 1995: 95).

> When you are healthy, they need you, but when you get sick, they tell you *goodbye, thanks for your cooperation* (Viorica, female, 66 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 2, 2008).

> They only come when they need some work [...] One day they might decide that they no longer want to come [...] They don't notify us, although they have phones, they don't want to waste their calls. (Florina, female, 31 years old, manager, company's office, August 1, 2008).

Besides the "need", another reason for choosing this company is the physical proximity to home. The explanation lies partly in the existing transport infrastructure that does not allow easy movement between neighbouring villages, since regular transport between them is scarce. Those working in another village use their own car (the fortunate case) or hitchhike.

One of the factors that contributed to the development of this kind of informal/ psychological contract (Lee and Faller, 2005) based on rational calculation is seasonal work (in the region or abroad), a common practice among local residents. This practice allows workers to develop short-term transactional working relations and to return with relative ease to the company that had fired them or where they resigned for a better-paid job.

The latter is the main factor for leaving a job. However, beyond better remuneration, another important factor in choosing a job is that wages are paid on time (sometimes more important than the salary itself). Of similar importance is also the legal status of the job:

> It does not matter if the payment is high or low, a pay check is a pay check. It is paid on time. You can count on this money" (Maria, female, 55 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006).

The following step in the analysis of the organizational culture's *artefacts* will focus on its name. The name refers to a potential German origin of the investor, but the Italian flag hoisted at the entrance of the company's yard contradicts this first impression. The Romanian associate does not know the meaning of the name; she knows only that it was chosen by a friend of the Italian investor. The company's name is not generally used by employees to indicate the place where they work. The most commonly used formulation is "I work at the Italian guy". As practice shows it, in the eyes of the community and the employees, the image and identity of the company are rather blurred. Another explanation for the use of the informal "at the Italian guy" is because it was among the first foreign companies to open in the village (1993), arousing the interest of the local community on the origin of the investor.

Another one of the *informal norms of behaviour*, as the interviews show, is that the workers should be standing up during working hours. Consequently, a *behaviour* has formed: during the visits of the associate and the investor's in the production halls, workers are always standing up, regardless of them working or not.

> It is forbidden to sit down; apparently work should not be done sitting down, but standing. It is most important that when S. and F. (the investor and the associate) come they not find you sitting down. Many of my co-workers pretend to be working only when they come: they pretend to be picking up something or moving stuff from one place to another (Ana, female, 33 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 3, 2008).

> It's important that when S. (the investor) comes, he doesn't find you sitting. You must work when he comes (Adriana, female, 45 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006).

Another *behaviour*, passed on by older employees to the newcomers, is that of never contradicting the Italian investor when he criticises the job done, even if his criticism is not always nicely expressed or justified in the eyes of workers. Because, even if the relations with the workers are generally seen as "good" and the investor is appreciated for his "kindness", sometimes he answers to his employees' complaints offering the alternative of leaving the company – his words are reproduced by one of the female workers remembering his dispute with one of the employees: "You don't like, out! This company mine." (Adriana, female, 45 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006)

Practices of human resource management

Selection, training and specialization of human resource.

The main criteria in the selection are personal connections and recommendation from acquaintances (parents, friends, etc.), "reliability" being taken into consideration as well. It is possible to use these selection criteria both as a result of the specificity of the village community, as well as a result of the company's job requirements, that does not need vocational qualification, the only skilled workers being the foremen. Out of the employed workers, only a few know how to work with the machines. From the interviews, we understand that they do several activities and are not specialized in some or other operation. – "What activities? Oh, any... There isn't a specific one" (Adriana, female, 45 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006).

Most of the workers are not legally employed, having no employment contract. Uncontractual labour, beyond the disadvantages of non-affiliation to the social security system, has nevertheless benefits for both the employer and employee, like avoiding paying taxes and allowing for some of the workers to keep their unemployment benefits or pensions. Under these circumstances, hiring acquaintances can be seen as a way to safeguard confidentiality over breaking employment regulations, but also of providing an additional source of income to one's relatives. However, the informal contract is not based on moral obligation, as one might expect, but on mere rational calculus. The lack of employment contracts leads to a high fluctuation of staff and very low attachment to the company.

The large number of unskilled workers and informal employment could be an explanation for the low social status of those who work for the company, since unskilled labour does not require a particularly high level of education (education is an important source of prestige in the local community) and, moreover, it does not offer a career that would lead to a higher status: „I like where I work. The atmosphere is relaxed. But the company has a bad reputation." (Ana, female, 31 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 17, 2006).

Staff training is reduced to learning by doing, but only for some members of the staff, for the reasons mentioned above. Both the specific business activity and the organizational structure provide few opportunities for hierarchical advancement. Training workers to use automated machinery is the responsibility of foremen. Nevertheless, informally, the older employees train newcomers, even though this practice has not always proved efficient.

> [The foreman] told me that the other women would show me what I must do. But I still don't know very well when a board is broken [...]. After five months of work I still don't quite understand what to do (Ana, female, 33 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 3, 2008).

> We learn from each other what we must do [...]. It's quite easy, even a ten years old child could learn. (Maria, female, 55 years old, unskilled worker, informant's home, August 16, 2006)

Motivation, compensation and evaluation of staff

Production staff evaluation system is built partly on the collective nature of the work. The basic workload is calculated either in hours worked or in cubic meters of wood, plus the overtime and the number of trucks loaded with semi-finite products every month exported to Italy (1-3 trucks per month). A truck is loaded by the team that handles all of the operations required to obtain semi-finite products for export. Therefore, this is a system of collective evaluation, each worker depending on his colleagues' performances. Even if the associate instituted a system of individual wage penalty in case of scrap, the whole team collects money to pay the penalty.

Compensation is the main instrument of positive motivation. But it can also function as a tool for negative motivation as in the case of wage penalties generally applied in case of scrap, absenteeism or non-compliance with quality standards. Another penalty on those who had not accomplished their workload is having them work outside man-hours (and besides overtime) to complete it, without compensation. No other financial or non-financial rewarding instruments were mentioned. Salary is calculated according to the standard achieved, overtime (paid differently depending on operations performed, net payment varies between 0.8 RON / hour and 1.4 RON / hour[9]) and work experience. However, the salaries mentioned by the workers do not match those stated by the associate. Workers mentioned in our interviews salaries ranging between 250 -500 RON, while the associate talked about salaries between 400-1500 RON. A possible

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[9] The field research took place in 2006, when the national minimum gross wage was 1.95 RON/hour (H.G. 1766/2005). See: *http://legislatiamuncii.manager.ro/a/108/21-salariul-minim-brut-pe-economie.html* (Accessed: 30.11.2013).

explanation for this discrepancy could be the lack of employment contracts for a large number of workers, the associate having avoided answering the interview questions regarding informal employment, social security coverage, time keeping of the working hours, overtime etc.

The interviews with workers revealed the existence of false timesheets, which the company provides in case of controls and inquiries of authorities. According to them, work time is within the legal requirements of 48 hours per week, including overtime, as provided in the Labour Code. Real timesheets also exist and are used for the remuneration of workers, where their work reaches 60-72 hours per week. Only legally employed workers sign the payroll. This may explain the reluctance of the associate to reveal the real number of the employees: sometimes 30 employees, then other times 60-70 (in various interviews). Personal observation could not establish an approximate number of employees; they were working in two teams in different shifts from 7.30 AM to 4 PM, and from 4 PM to 10 PM, while those who produce fuel briquettes only worked at night. Workers do not know the exact number of employees, the explanation they usually put forward is that of the permanent rotation of personnel and work in teams. Another explanation could be that of the large number of workers dismissed or who resign and then return to the company.

One of the main reasons for workers' intention to leave the company is the ratio between payment and workload. The associate is aware of this, but she considers the payment to be fair, and that the workers want to earn more without working more, putting personal interests above the company's. "That's like in the Romanian companies: [employees] wake up one morning and don't show up to work anymore." (Florina, female, 31 years old, manager, company's office, August 1, 2008). For example, one of the main reasons for employee absenteeism is participating in farm work or household activities. Since the socialist period work has been a matter of conflict between the socialist state and rural households, it was a fight over controlling time, energy and human resources (Kideckel, 2000: 31). A research carried out in textile companies in the central rural region of Romania has shown a high staff fluctuation during seasonal agricultural work and traditional holidays. Therefore, to reduce transport costs and provide workers with the opportunity to participate at agricultural work, small manufacturing companies in textile and tailoring industry have relocated their production to villages (Kolumban, 2004: 78, 73).

Another reason for the intent to leave work/resignations is the difficult work environment: in the production halls, it is very cold during winters and very hot in summers. It is also very dusty because the ventilation system does not work (an aspect we could observe during the visits to the company); some

workers even stated that the ventilation would actually work but they have been admonished for turning it on. However, those who had been working for a long time in the company do not comply with the ban and turn on the ventilation when the air becomes hard to breathe. The workers' explanation for this situation is the management's caution to reduce electricity costs. Working conditions are obviously difficult, one of our findings being the absence of meals/ resting areas; workers eat standing or sitting on boards in the hall where the air is hardly breathable because of the dust. Sometimes they eat in the yard (which is possible during summer).

Conclusions

Studying the work relations in this company, the most interesting practice we met was the fact that people were rehired after a resignation/ ismissal. Accustomed with a culture that favours caution and resentment, this relaxed relation (on both sides), which seems to place (economically) the stakes of continuity outside the employer–employee relation, made us think. An ascertainment that helped us make the first steps into understanding the problem was the relative disconnection of value systems and expected behaviours/social practices. Neither employees, nor employers had what they desired: in a way, the former accepted almost anything (regarding work conditions and financial advantages, etc.), and the latter accepted whoever (regarding abilities, competence, behaviour, etc.). The situation was as good as it gets, and accepted as such. Local work force was not entirely satisfactory, and the job offers were below expectations of the people wanting to work. We concluded that the local so-called "labour-market" was actually functioning as a closed repository of local workers, which could be neither concurred nor complemented by outside work force, as public transportation was lacking in the region and "importing" workers was too costly. Nonetheless, the merchandises as such participated in an international chain of commerce and production.

Treating a job in terms of a temporary labour relation can also be understood as a survival of conventional seasonal works in the rural economy – even more so because both the company's location as well as the abilities required by the employer coincide with what they were previously required to do as seasonal workers. And all of this must be looked at in the context in which the local property system drastically reduces the dependence on holding a waged-job: most lodgings are outside of the rent system and the majority of the employees may largely cover their consumption needs from growing vegetables, poultry and sometimes pigs in their rural households.

In this context, we were able to observe how the value systems present in the cultural universe of those involved are instrumentalized. We could see how legal prescriptions (employment contracts, social or health insurances, man-hours, work conditions, etc.), economic ones (labour value, efficiency, product quality, deadlines) or moral ones were negotiated. The latter have made the most consistent mixture, in which stereotypes and traditional norms regarding dependability, kindness, competence, education, age, family, gender roles, and hierarchy were instrumentalized in order to negotiate cohabitation. On the other hand, these negotiations seem to hide the asymmetrical relations between employers and employees, placing these social relations in the realm of "natural" order. So, everything seems to be flexible as long as it stays within the bulky frame set by the minimal expectations from both parties, which resisted the test of rational calculus from both sides. Our findings were consistent with the anticipation that in a closed village community work relations are socially embedded and strong moral norms govern over the authority and obligations of the (male) "patron" towards subaltern workers. Nonetheless, in the individual choices of both employees and employers these social norms were of secondary importance compared to economic rationality and opportunistic cost-benefits calculus. This was best illustrated by the high rate of workers who were hired, then left/or were fired, and then hired again: the disregard of interpersonal reliability (inherent in each act of leaving / firing) did not significantly affect one's changes of getting re-employed by the same "patron", although "reliability" was the highest valued personal attribute. In the context of scarcity of available workforce and possibility to reduce labour costs by avoiding taxation, the rational economic impetus prevailed.

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BARBIE TALES IN THE LIVES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN[1]

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ABSTRACT. According to an extensive research I have recently concluded, Barbie is one of the most popular fairy tale heroes among little girls in Romania. The present case study examines the set of values transmitted by the main characters of Barbie-films and the ways in which Barbie becomes part of girls' everyday lives. It also looks at the attitude of boys towards these films. Compared to Western Europe, in Romania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe differences between urban and rural media consumption are considerable and need further exploration. The present paper examines Barbie-interpretations of children and their parents living in a city, respectively a village in the Transylvania historical region of Romania, with the help of in-depth interviews and group activities. I mapped several factors that influence Barbie interpretations: residence (urban versus rural) crucially influences whether Barbie becomes a role model; however, media literacy and parents' education are also significant.

Keywords: sociology of childhood, role models, audience, cartoons, interpretation

Introduction

Unfortunately Barbie is taken for a model; everybody is supposed to have similarly long and beautiful hair, and everybody should be just as pretty. When birthday parties are organized, (...) little girls are dressed as princesses, wearing a crown or even a wig. I don't like this, because children have different builds, so a chubbier girl would feel disadvantaged. The others are even mocking her. (Primary school teacher, Cluj-Napoca, 2012)

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This experience was shared with me by a primary school teacher in Cluj-Napoca, whose pupils are of that "very special age", when girls become interested in dressing, make-up and feminine accessories. Parents, teachers and researchers alike have been concerned with Barbie as a fashion icon for decades. But from the beginning of the 2000s, Barbie ended being only a toy, acquiring a complex personality, thanks to the computer animated films which she is starring in. Therefore Barbie is able to become part of girls' lives through her stories as well. This study examines the relationships between the set of values transmitted by Barbie tales[3] and the Barbie interpretations of primary school-aged children.

The first Barbie dolls were marketed in 1959. The novelty of the toy consisted in the fact that it represented adult women, while earlier dolls were representations of infants. Thus playing with dolls did not amount anymore to the imitation of motherhood, but it consisted in the anticipatory exercise of adult women's roles, with dressing-up holding a special importance. Due to Barbie dress collections conceived by fashion designers, the doll became popular as a teenage fashion model, and this aspect divided parents from the very beginning. Many people objected to the fact that the doll had a developed bust; yet the observation that Barbie transmitted an unreal image of the woman body provoked most of the critics (Winterman, 2009), stating also that those girls who take Barbie as a model would have a distorted image of their own body. The ideology underlining the Barbie doll phenomenon – dynamic career, diverse women's roles in the society – is not new either. However, due to computer animated films and web pages created for girls, this ideology gained increasing significance. The male character of these cartoons also reflects current ideas about the ideal "prince" in girls' eyes – and the attitude of boys towards male characters also shows remarkable differences.

The implicit question is whether these popular characters embody the prevalent values of a society or if they offer a model to follow. This leads to the two major paradigms in audience research. *Media effects theory* approaches the examined processes mainly from the "What do media do with the audience?" question, and presumes a significant and direct influence of media. In turn, *research on media consumption* starts from the "What does the audience do with media?" question, allowing for a limited view over the influence of media messages. The former focuses on content, trying to deduce conclusions from it regarding the audience; the latter examines different interpretations taking into account the social embeddedness of consumers. The two approaches are

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[3] The use of the term "tale" throughout this study is meant to refer to a type of narrative irrelevant of its textual form. Thus, a tale can be told in a book, but it can also be a cartoon. In the present study I analyze Barbie films, and I refer to them sometimes also as "Barbie tales", when my emphasis is not on the motion-picture, but on its tale-like narrative.

discussed by many theorists, who find only some minor differences between them. According to media scholar Roger Silverstone (1994: 132-158), these two standpoints can never be entirely separated, and it would not be productive to do so anyway. Ron Lembo (2003) argues that the examination of the audience and the analysis of the content are two faces of the same reality, therefore media research should encompass both approaches. Taking this as a starting point, my study applies both approaches – from content and audience – in offering an overview of previous studies and constructing its methodological design.

Barbie as a tale hero. Different approaches of previous research about children's favorite characters

Among the text based analysis, the most relevant for my topic concern the personality of the main character, as the young public can be best addressed through the protagonist. Researches in psychology have confirmed that due to identification with the characters, tales help children understanding different situations in their own lives (Vekerdy, 2001: 44). Features of tale heroes were examined already with respect to youth novels, and the findings are partly true for today's cartoon characters. However, many differences can also be noticed. In her book *Deconstructing the Hero* (1997) Margery Hourihan treats the three main features of hero-centred stories, namely age, gender and rank, starting from the tradition of youth novels.

Concerning the age of the heroes, Hourihan (1997) states that youthfulness is an important feature of characters in classic works for children. Although entering adulthood and going through initiation are frequent topics, even in such cases the road that the characters undertake is important in itself: adult life, as soon as the wedding is celebrated, is not interesting anymore. Contrary to this, many contemporary tales focus on getting familiar with adult roles. In these tales, the characters – even if they are animals – have a well-defined lifestyle, and have different professions. Barbie appears in various roles as well: she goes through adventures sometimes as a princess, then as an actress, sportswoman or ballet-dancer – if we think of current trends, this enhances the possibility that entire series would be created of certain Barbie tales.

Among the factors analysed by Hourihan, gender brings about the most important differences between today's cartoons. The psychology of tales calls "girl factor" the fact that the main characters are more often males, while animals or other non-human characters with neutral gender have also male features. Often this is made obvious also by their name, i.e. Tom and Jerry, Mickey Mouse, SpongeBob and many others. This is arguably explained by the fact that girls are more tolerant towards boys' favourites, they are willing to watch tales about men as well, while boys are much susceptible to distance themselves from the stories with women characters (Ranschburg, 2009: 104).

According to Hourihan, this is also rooted in literature, as in the 19th century youth novels, besides becoming adult, becoming a man was also a salient topic. By today, the range of tales for girls widened significantly. There are female animal characters as well, however, these are targeted expressly at girls, as cartoon characters intended for both girls and boys continue to have more or less male features. Barbie tales, besides being intended for girls, offer an expressly contemporary prototype of women, therefore they have an extremely important role from the point of view of our topic.

Barbie tales are quite special among today's cultic cartoons also because the main character is often a princess. Perhaps children are still attracted to glamour of aristocracy, but it is also very much likely that these films appeal to a certain nostalgia for classic princess tales in order to gain the parents' sympathy.[4] Although occasionally we see modern princesses in movies, in contemporary cartoons the role within society (i.e. occupation) is much more relevant than the rank, hence the social status conferred by different occupations. In Barbie tales, the latter is closely related to the issue of gender roles too.

With respect to empirical audience research, the study of Eva Änggård (2005: 539–553) illustrates well the gender roles reflected in the hero interpretations by children in the 2000s. During the experiment conducted by the Swedish researcher, children of kindergarten age created their own stories with characters invented by them. Children took out existing narratives from their context (traditional tales, media, movies, games, their own everyday experiences), and they shaped these into stories. The resulting stories often encompassed gender stereotypes – boys' heroes were predominantly knights and dinosaurs, whereas girls' heroes were Barbie princesses –, but the re-interpretation of traditional roles could also be observed. Boys' characters were significantly marked by discourses on fighters[5], but such stories also allowed for parties to make peace after the "match", to become friends and go together to take lunch or to the swimming pool. In girls' stories, relationships gained more importance: it was with their partners that Barbies went through situations that children too experience in everyday life. Restaurants and pools appeared in these stories as well, but also the element that food was served by a female character to the male one. However, contrary to classic princesses, these characters had an active life and a dominant role. For instance, Barbie characters went themselves to search for the prince instead of waiting passively for his arrival. Although one cannot exclude the possibility that it were Barbie tales that offered inspiration for little girls, it is noteworthy however that even when they could choose freely any narrative with no matter what context, they created characters whose features are best represented by Barbie.

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[4] Noémi Szabó has a study on the role of nostalgia in convincing the parents. (Prizma 2011, 8-14.)
[5] Masculinity is usually described in terms of "the warrior" (Jordan, 1995: 69-86).

Part of empirical audience research deals also with interpretations offered by parents, as they form their opinion on tales according to different criteria. Their decisive viewpoint is whether a cartoon has a good or bad influence on children, therefore they tend to rank cartoons into two large groups. Positive attributes, like 'friendly' or 'nice' are rather given to classic tales, while modern tales are often associated with "aggressive", "stupid" or "meaningless".[6] This is confirmed by the study of Zsolt Bálint as well, which presents the rebranding of the Jetix cartoon channel (Bálint, 2009). The research finds that the channels broadcasting cartoons viewed as classics receive a positive judgment: parents generally think that Disney Channel and Minimax are good or harmless, while Cartoon Network and Jetix represent modern cartoon channels, considered predominantly as aggressive or superficial. At first sight Barbie tales belong to the modern group, therefore they are often viewed through negative stereotypes.

The psychological approach to tale heroes and their audience is also frequent, age playing a decisive role in such research. According to the psychology of tales, three main periods can be delimited. In the first period, between the age of two to five, children predominantly like those tales in which the characters (often animals) go through common events. This is followed by the period of fairy tales at the age of around five to eight years, in which wonderful things occur, and the characters often have supernatural abilities. From the age of eight-nine children again become interested in real stories, in which the characters go through extraordinary adventures, which might happen in the real life too.[7] Since there are several types of Barbie tales, from this point of view Barbie films cannot be ranked uniformly into the second or the third group; I will get back to the differences later in the analysis.

To sum up the literature on text based and empirical approaches, one can conclude that cartoons are grouped according to several interests and several viewpoints. Barbie tales raise important issues according to each of the above-mentioned criteria: they represent new – and often debated – tendencies concerning age and age-group, gender and social roles, respectively classic and modern tales. Perhaps this is also a reason why they are so well-known and preoccupy so many people.

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[6] Classic and modern are not wholly distinct terms, their meaning changes throughout the study according to the context. In my own research I ranked separately each examined film, taking into account above all the year of its production, but also its graphic design and the type of the story.

[7] This periodization is generally accepted. A detailed description can be found in Tamás Vekerdy's book (Vekerdy, 2001: 44-45).

Barbie in the lives of children from the Cluj area. The aims and the methodology of the present research

This paper is part of an extended research that examines the ways in which tale characters appear in different segments of children's lives. I carried out empirical audience research in Hungarian primary schools from Cluj-Napoca,[8] a city which is a cultural centre in Romania, and Săvădisla, a small village situated at 30 kilometers from Cluj-Napoca. First I conducted group activities consisting in drawing and projections. Second, I did interviews in forty families, separately with the children and their parents. Moreover, I also interviewed their four school teachers. Gender, domicile and age were the selection criteria in setting up the target group.[9] All conversations took place in Hungarian, the native language of interviewees and the interviewer. The urban versus rural division gained special attention in this research, as in Romania – like in most East-European countries (Fizesan, 2012: 83-99) – the social background and media consumption of children shows significant differences in this regard. Finally, I chose children attending primary school, because at this age (from seven to ten) they are still active consumers of tales, while at the same time becoming decision-makers in an increasing number of fields of their lives. Their attention is directed mostly towards children of their age (an rarely towards adults), the development of their own personality gains significance, and the imitation of models has an important role in this process (Mérei and V. Binét, 1978: 177-178). According to the periodization offered by the psychology of tales, this is the age when fairy tales are substituted with authentic stories featuring human characters. Therefore, I set up two age groups among children attending primary school.

During the interviews, I asked children about their favourite characters, their favourite cartoons, books, games, and their extra-scholar activities, while parents were talking more about the family's media consumption habits and their own attitude regarding their children's preferences. A surprising finding of the study was that, from all the tale characters, Barbie offered the widest area of representations, despite the fact that female heroes generally occur in fewer representations. I explained this with the double effect of Barbie – as a toy and as a film character. That is also why I thought that it is worth writing a case study on the Barbie-phenomenon.

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[8] Cluj-Napoca is the second largest city in Romania behind the national capital Bucharest, with a population of 309,136 people and it is the seat of Cluj County in the northwestern part of the country. Săvădisla is a village in Cluj County with a population of 1,058 people, situated at 25 km from Cluj-Napoca to the south-west (data from the census of population implemented in 2011). Both localities (Săvădisla and Cluj-Napoca) have a considerable Hungarian minority (16% in Cluj-Napoca and 90% in Săvădisla). Data were collected in Hungarian schools in both cases.

[9] Meaning that I selected these 40 families from the two elementary schools paying attention to the equal number of the groups regarding these criteria (e. g. 20 families form Cluj and 20 families from Săvădisla).

Starting from the already explored hero-representations, and taking into account the divisive attitude of parents regarding to the dominance of Barbie, I also applied a semiotic analysis of the films. Accordingly, I approached the topic from two viewpoints: 1) concerning animated films, I wanted to see what values represent the heroes of Barbie tales, while 2) among elementary school-aged children I examined the role that Barbie plays in the lives of little girls, respectively the attitude of boys toward the characters of Barbie films. Through this twofold approach I looked for connections between the tales and their interpretations, reflecting at the same time on the relationship between the content and the audience. On one hand, to what extent do children perceive the messages transmitted by Barbie? To what extent do these messages become part of their lives? On the other hand, to what extent do children modify these messages according to their own patterns? And, respectively, to what degree do they project their preconceptions on the character? By examining these issues, I would also like to reflect on the question of the moral panic connected to the Barbie-phenomenon.[10]

As this study is about children, I paid special attention to the rules of research ethics; I discussed the future use of the provided information with the parents, teachers or school directors.

Barbie as a "star" of fairytales. Semiotic analysis of the animated films

Ranking Barbie tales according to the above mentioned criteria is not easy, because there are several types of tales and several characters with different names,[11] and their being "Barbies" is marked mainly by their physical appearance. Although their features differ, their stature, especially their three-dimensional representation indicates undoubtedly their resemblance to Barbie.[12] However, there are significant differences in what concerns the types of tales: some films present classic tales, with a fictional and fairy plot, with characters who are princesses, princes, wizards and other fabulous beings. And there are stories placed in contemporary environment, where Barbie is a modern woman, and her career includes professions which are attractive for little girls (actress, fashion designer, dancer, pop star, surfer champion). These latter tales also make possible the transition to the world of fairy tales. Films tend to play

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[10] Moral panic is a frequent issue in studies related to content focusing on children. Noémi Szabó also treats the issue in her above-mentioned study (Prizma 2011: 8-14).

[11] There are several types of Barbie dolls as well, having different names, hair and skin colours. The films reflect this diversity, whose character is called Barbie only in a few cases. However, long, blonde hair is always the protagonist's important feature.

[12] In fact the first three-dimensional Barbie film was released only in 2005, but this brought about a change only from the point of view of the motion picture technology. The earlier representations of Barbie were also intended to create the illusion of the 3D form of the doll.

on these transitions: in certain cases the protagonist princess is transformed into a singer living in the ordinary world, but there are also cases where Barbie is an actress playing the role of a princess.

The personality of Barbie in different contexts

At the beginning of the 2000s, the Barbie-version of classic tales were prevailing: *Barbie in the Nutcracker* (2001), *Barbie of Swan Lake* (2003), *Barbie and the Magic of Pegasus* (2005) are genuine fairy tales featuring Barbies.[13] The protagonist is a female character with exclusively positive qualities, typical for classic tales: she is kind-hearted, just, brave, firm, kind and beautiful. The sole difference is that she's not the wife, the bride, the princess, whose favours the male hero tries to gain, but it is her who takes into her own hands her fate and goes through great adventures.

In *Barbie and the Magic of Pegasus*, the princess (Annika) sets off by herself to break the spell of the wicked wizard and frees her family. On her way she meets the male character too, who helps her, though he repeatedly succumbs to Annika with respect to faith, courage and persistence. Evidently, he stands by Annika until the end, and they rejoice together over the happy ending.

In *Barbie and the Three Musketeers* (released in 2009), not only the female roles are re-interpreted, but we get a female version of the well-known story which is in many aspects a masculine tale. Even the film's trailer begins as follows: "Barbie and her friends star in a classic tale, but they aren't ordinary princesses". The main character, Corinne, is D'Artagnan's daughter, who resolves to become a musketeer, which is "ridiculous, there aren't women-musketeers."[14] She fights together with her three friends to fulfil their dreams and to save the prince from his ill-wishers. During their fight they make use of typically feminine tools (one of the girls uses a pair of ribbons also having the function of whips, the other uses her fans as a boomerang), but their persistence and solidarity bring them success and the acknowledgement of men.

The tales that take place in a modern environment gained ground starting from 2010. In the film entitled *Barbie: A Fashion Fairytale* (2010), Barbie starts out as an actress. The beginning is delusive, as we first see her in the main role of *The Princess and the Pea*, but we shortly find out that this was a scene of shooting. After breaking up with the world of movies (and with Ken), she decides to go out into the world, and she calls on her fashion designer

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[13] Most of these animated cartoons are produced by the manufacturer of Barbies, the Mattel Company, sometimes allowing the participation of other co-producing companies; other companies too release Barbie films, but this does not bear any relevance concerning the ranking of Barbie films.

[14] Expression used more times, by more characters of the film.

aunt living in Paris. Although her earlier life falls into pieces, she collects herself and, instead of her personal problems, she focuses on the new adventure and the new challenge. Thanks to her resoluteness and with the help of the Flairies,[15] she boosts her aunt's fashion house ruined by rivals, and then generously forgives her ex-beloved too.

In *Barbie: A Fairy Secret* (2011) Barbie again is an actress, who sets off to free Ken, kidnapped by the fairies. In the final action scene she does not appeal to her femininity, but wins back her fiancé through the force of joining with her friends. In *Barbie in a Mermaid Tale* (2010, 2012) our hero, called Merliah, has a double life: on land she is a top surfer, but in the fairy underwater world she is the princess of the kingdom. By the end of the tale it is decided which is her true identity – like for her mother, who remained a mermaid forever. Merliah undertakes the responsibility towards Oceana, yet she does not lose her feet: both lifestyles are part of her being, and they are equally important to her. According to the moral of the tale, a woman of the present is able to keep balance between different roles, even if she saw that her predecessors took on the traditional gender roles assigned to women.

Male and female supporting characters

Male characters in Barbie films are present in different ways and with different importance. Most of them get only the stereotyped character of the romantic young man who helps and admires the heroine. It is only Barbie's boyfriend, Ken, who has a somewhat more complex character. He is also the one who suits the expectations of modern women, he is willing to put aside his pride and make sacrifices for the sake of love. At the same time, his male vanity is not wounded; moreover, he might become popular among boys as well, as he acts not in an exaggerated, but rather in a funny way. We can see a series of gigs of how he is trying to overcome obstacles.

In the Paris story he's almost an equal partner to Barbie. In the *Fairy Secret* he has to be freed from Princess Graciella, who wants him to be her husband, but his role is not small-minded in this film either, as his weapon is his sense of humour. However, in most tales the male character does not have such a significant role, thus his personality has less opportunities to unfold. In *Barbie in a Mermaid Tale*, the fight between good and evil unfolds on a strictly female dimension, as we see male characters only sporadically. Beside the fact that little emphasis is laid on male characters in these films, instead of men, it is women who represent male features too.

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[15] This is the specific name of the fairies that help her.

Regarding negative characters, they are also played mainly by women. Male adversaries are rare; in classic tales male antiheros are vicious and lusting for power, while in authentic stories they are rather male chauvinists and boor. See, for instance, a dialogue:

> *Director:* You know that flapping thing you were doing with your mouth just then?
> *Barbie:* You mean, expressing my opinion?
> *Director*: Yeah, that. No more of that. (*Barbie: A Fashion Fairytale*. Mattel, 2010, 5'15'')

In the case of female adversaries, who are much more frequent, the world they come from is more important. True villains exist only in fairy tales, but concerning the negative characters of everyday life, sooner or later it turns out that enviousness, frustration, perhaps misunderstanding was the reason for their behaviour. Following a great discovery, the enemies usually become friends; it is only the evils of fairy tales who always fall.

The world of motion pictures

The Barbie films released after 2010 represent a world, which, like the dolls, gave ground for negative judgment. This negative attitude is founded on two aspects: the spreading of technical tools and the interest for fashion and dressing. Barbie uses a phone similar to iPhone, with which she gathers information she needs from the internet within seconds, while her helpers have Fairy Phones, which try to create a feminine version of iPhones, larded with magic power. As an actress, our protagonist reads on online forums the malicious comments on her. "You really shouldn't believe anything on the Internet. Everyone knows it is run by secret underground mind control experts. [...] What? I read it in Yakity Yak. It's true" – Barbie's ignorant friend answers this,[16] but Barbie is highly familiar with the internet. One of the ways she uses to advance the fashion house is a "cool website".

Concerning toiletry, polished style is highly valuable, it is important to choose the right belt fitting the purse. Although the café of the shopping mall is the usual environment of her life, Barbie is a self-conscious consumer; she does not do shopping hurry-scurry. This is shown through a negative example: the fitting room of a dress shop leads through the world of fairies; the negative character tries to make the best of this situation, she grabs so many clothes that she seems to fall down under their weight, while Barbie chooses only one piece, which, of course, fits her perfectly.

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[16] *Barbie: A Fashion Fairytale*. Mattel, 2010, 7'10'' (directed by William Lau).

To sum up this presentation of Barbie tales, no matter if the protagonist lives in a fairy, a traditional or modern environment, she has virtues which are important constituents of the personality of a woman model for today's girls. For the most part, these tales transmit the same messages as those communicated by older classic tales, later by Disney-films (about the relationship between good and evil, about struggle, adventure, persistence, courage, kindness, forgiveness – and this list could continue). However, the main difference is that they advocate more modern views concerning gender roles. Yet, taking into account the diversity of friends and enemies, I would not state that the films assign certain positive or negative roles according to the gender of the characters.

Representations of Barbie in the life of the examined group. Results of the empirical audience research

One of the school-teachers in Cluj-Napoca shared with me their observation during the interview that Barbie was much more popular among girls of their present classes than among previous generations. A possible explanation could be the growing popularity of these films, which inspire the play through narratives. My aim in interviewing parents and children was above all to map the roles that tale characters have in children's everyday lives. I grouped the different Barbie representations in the following main categories.

Role model

Both parents and teachers often relate that Barbie represents a kind of model among children, who even tend to imitate her. A mother from Cluj-Napoca told me about her daughter:

> She watches the film, and she tries to imitate Barbie's gracious movements, the way she talks and behaves (Mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

Another woman had a positive attitude towards the way her daughter's interest in femininity is unfolding.

> She used to play with Barbies, true, but she rather preferred dressing them up. Now that we moved and her little friends are not with her anymore, she found a way to substitute this – now she asks me to give her my different dresses and blankets, she wraps herself with these, and she dresses for Rapunzel or Barbie or a princess. Now she wants to be the princess herself (Another mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

Some of the girls among the children I interviewed told me that Barbie was their model. When asked if there was anybody she would like to be like, a girl from Cluj-Napoca answered me the following:

> Barbies, for they are beautiful, have crowns, nice dresses, and always wear high-heeled shoes (Primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

The former opinion is quoted from a girl who spends most of her time with her grandmother, because her parents work very much. I also interviewed her grandmother (instead of the parents), who usually comes to take home the girl after school.

The different forms of plays

Children and parents talked about the role of Barbie mostly related to playing. Contrary to watching a film, playing has a rather communal feature. However, opinions tend to differ on this matter: many parents disapprove that children bring Barbies to the school, or they ask for Barbies in order to adapt. In turn, others think that the doll does not have any special influence on their child, even if they play a lot with it:

> It never occurred to her to compare herself to Barbies, to say that she would like to have Barbies' long feet or something similar. Although she has a lot of Barbies (mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

This was told by a mother who had been working from home until her daughter went to school, with the explicit intention to spend more time with her child. She also told about the girl:

> She has a friend, who came here… And when she saw that my daughter had more than twenty Barbies, as she's getting new ones all the time… her eyes started to shine, oh, I very much would like to play with these, but my mother won't let me, because these are bad dolls and ugly dolls and I would get scolded if I play with them (the same mother, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

Concerning playing, I set up two categories, role-playing and object-play. In the case of the former, usually the tale hero inspires children to perform a scene or a story:

> I often play that I'm Barbie, I play especially the musketeer-Barbie (primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

It is also an obvious possibility when children are inspired by a scene from a film, but they modify it to a certain extent:

> They used to play a lot with Barbies, and watched many Barbie tales – even today the dolls are on the way all the time, either they are in a hospital, or in the desert (mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

It also occurs that the doll is present as a toy in the children's lives, but this is not influenced by films: according to a little girl from Săvădisla, she and her friends watch Barbie tales, but concerning the dolls, they would rather just dress them up.

Commercial products

A further significant group of Barbie representations concerns different products the character is associated with, as manufacturers try to increase sale by building upon the popularity of the doll. Parents from Cluj told:

> Whenever we do shopping, and she sees a Rapunzel or a Barbie, we have to buy it (mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

> It was characteristic especially when she was in the kindergarten to say: Which Barbie do you have on your panties?... It seems she's growing out of it (mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

There are many tale heroes which are intensively merchandized, and this is true for Barbies as well.

Summarizing my explorations of different forms of representations, there is a specific age when girls are seen as experiencing a "pink period", and commercial Barbie-images intensify this through different, yet branded dolls, accessories, and media-products. These contribute significantly to the construction of mainstream femininity among primary school aged girls. As a fashion icon, Barbie can become a model in certain cases, but this also depends on the existing models and values in girls' lives.

What is new about these representations: thanks to the movies, Barbie can become part of girls' lives not only as a fashion icon, but also as a tale hero. For instance, she offers the possibility of identification and role playing, not only in traditional women roles, but in different adventure – even fighting – stories as well.[17]

Factors influencing representation

In the extended research I examined the factors influencing the representations of characters using statistical tests, which included all representations of the tale hero (a number of 292 cases) mentioned in the interviews.[18] In what follows, among the factors related to the social background of children I present in detail those which led to significant differences.

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[17] See for instance the example of the musketeer-Barbie, p. 14.

[18] In my PhD thesis I was searching for factors that influence the various representations of tale heroes. The detailed presentation of the applied methodology is included in my thesis. (Kassay, 2013: 99-100.)

Among the factors related to children's social background, gender and rural vs. urban settings have a significant impact on the preference for tale heroes.[19] In the case of Barbie, it is remarkable that 86% of the representations were found among girls who live in the urban environment. This could have several explanations. One of them is that Barbie, as a toy, is less popular in the countryside. According to a rural teacher, her pupils grew out of the Barbie-period:

> We had this topic in the first grade, "My favorite toy", and I told everyone to bring in their favourite toy. Parents wouldn't believe it, they kept asking me if it wasn't their children who in fact had invented it. Well then, most boys brought small cars, girls did not bring dolls, but stuffed toys. We were talking about this recently, and they said they were grown-ups and didn't play with dolls – dolls are too childish for them. At their age we still used to play with dolls, but it seems that nowadays children come to maturity earlier. […] Perhaps they do play with Barbies at home, in the afternoon, but I noticed they don't like talking about this, because they think it's embarrassing, though it's nonsense (primary school teacher, Săvădisla, 2012).

On the other hand, the difference in media consumption could also have contributed to this: according to my findings, children from Cluj and Săvădisla had access to broadly the same media content[20], yet different things become part of their lives. In rural areas children mentioned traditional female characters (e.g. Disney princesses) more often, but even this type of character represented a low number in the summaries. This could be related to the women's roles that little girls see in their everyday life: in the examined village most of the mothers are either public employees or housekeepers, and they usually live according to a more traditional women's role. In turn, in the urban group I examined, most of the mothers have some kind of qualification or trade, and those who stay at home, usually suspended their employment in order to raise their children.

Gender-related differences in urban and rural areas revealed in an interesting way the attitudes of children towards the opposite gender's preferences – in this case the boys' attitude towards Barbie tales. During school projections, I noticed that in Săvădisla girls showed more tolerance towards boys' heroes, while boys covered their eyes when a "yowling" Barbie showed up. This attitude corresponds to the findings of a vast part of gender studies.[21] In Cluj-Napoca

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[19] Regarding all hero preferences, gender ($\chi^2 = 61.27$, $p = 0.02$) and urban vs. rural background ($\chi^2 = 59.72$, $p = 0.01$) were the most significant factors related to the audience.

[20] Both children from the city and the village have access to the Internet, they are watching the shows of Minimax, Cartoon Network, Boomerang, RTL Klub and TV2, respectively, DVD-s with cartoons. There are some differences in media consumption, but basically, families from Săvădisla have access to the same offers of the main media companies as in Cluj.

[21] See the explanation of the "girl factor" on p. 4.

this was exactly the other way around: girls showed their contempt against "rude, scrappy" male heroes, while boys were much more susceptible to accept Barbie tales. Concerning favourites of the opposite sex, it is quite typical for children that girls do have male favourites as well, but it is quite embarrassing for boys to like female characters. However, urban environment is more receptive to changing gender roles: several little boys from Cluj-Napoca "admitted" that in fact they liked Barbie tales – but this is still not a very popular attitude among boys. For instance, a boy told me:

> Everybody laughs at me, because I like Barbie tales. I prefer them to Batman or Spiderman. 'Cause there's magic... and they are cool, not boring. They have to defeat the villains, and there're animals to help them. There're boys too, king, mermaid king and butterfly king, though rarely (primary school boy, Cluj-Napoca, Romania).

According to a girl's mother, many boys feel the same:

> It's interesting that there are boys, who like it, but this is a taboo – it's the mother who borrows the tale, who brings it back, nobody is supposed to find out (mother of a primary school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

In this respect the differences between children from Cluj-Napoca and Săvădisla are also related to the education and, closely connected to this, the media literacy[22] of parents. Barbie representations are more frequent in those cases where the level of education and media literacy of parents is higher – while the composition of the groups shows that both high level of education and media literacy are more characteristic to urban families (see Tables 1 and 2).

Therefore we can conclude that the social patterns which surround children have great influence on their attitudes towards cartoon heroes. Correspondingly, "the girl factor" is also a socially developed phenomenon, which is more prevalent in communities preserving the traditional gender roles (and in Romania these are rather rural communities, as opposed to urban areas).

According to the extended analysis of tale heroes, the education and media literacy of parents also influences children's contribution to the embodiment of their favourite characters.[23] (see figures 1, 2).

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[22] Media literacy is a complex factor I surveyed during the interviews, taking into account media consumption habits, content-related demands, parental control over media usage by children, respectively communication within the family concerning content.

[23] In the extended research I classified viewer attitudes towards tale heroes starting from David Morley's theory regarding interpretation of media content (Morley, 1992, 69-110.). In my case the three categories were: *identifying* (with the ready-made representation of the character), *modifying* (contributing to the embodiment of the hero using own patterns) and *passive* (it is not characteristic that the favorite character would become part of children's lives beyond the screen).

Table 1.

The distribution of all Barbie representations by children's residence and social background

Residence	% of Barbie representations
Cluj-Napoca	86.5%
Săvădisla	13.5%
Parents' education	
High	63.6%
Low	36.4%
Parents' media literacy	
High	59.1%
Medium	22.7%
Low	18.2%

Source: Author's research.

Note: The percentage of Barbie representations among all tale characters is 7.5%. In the cross-table the total number of Barbie representations is taken for 100%. The table shows, for example, that 86.5% of all Barbie representations were mentioned by children living in Cluj-Napoca.

Table 2.

The frequency of mentioning at least one Barbie representation by children's residence and social background

Residence	% of children
Cluj-Napoca	50.0%
Săvădisla	15.0%
Parents' education	
High	41.2%
Low	26.1%
Parents' media literacy	
High	46.2%
Medium	36.4%
Low	18.7%

Source: Author's research.

Note: The percentage of children who mentioned at least one Barbie representation is 32.5%. In the cross-table the values show the percentage of children within a given category of residence or social background who mentioned at least one Barbie representation. For example, 50% of children living in Cluj-Napoca mentioned at least one Barbie representation.

The effect of parents' education (low, high) and media literacy (low, medium, high) on the attitudes towards cartoon heroes (Identifying, modifying, passive) was tested with generalised linear models (GLM) with negative binomial error distribution. The contrasts between levels were extracted by using the *glht* function (multcomp package). Analyses were done using R version 3.0.1 (R Development Core Team, 2013).

Fig. 1.

Note: Parents' education (χ^2 = 397.12, p = 0.054).

Figure 1 illustrates the relation between children's attitudes and parents' education, taking into account all hero representations (292 cases) from the interviews (part of the extended research). It shows that in the case of parents with high level of education the proportion of the three types of attitudes are similar to the model of all representations, while in those families where the education of parents is lower, children are more often identifying with ready-made representations from the merchandising industry.

Figure 2 illustrates the relation between children's attitudes and parents' media literacy, also taking into account all the hero representations from the interviews. It shows that in the case of families with increased media literacy the proportion of the three types of attitudes are similar to the model of all representations, while in those families where media literacy is lower, the identifying attitude is more characteristic.[24] These latter families (where parents usually have lower qualifications as well) tend to be more concerned about negative influences. For example, the world of technical devices appears for many parents and teachers as alarming, although the tale itself transmits a quite fair attitude in this regard. Many people disapprove of children using

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[24] Comparing the different media literacy levels, significant differences were found in identifying, modifying and passive attitudes between families with high and low level of media literacy (low vs. high z = 2.54, p = 0.03)

mobile phones or the internet, but during my research I found that this was rather characteristic for parents who were not familiar themselves with technical tools, thus could not fully understand their functions and offer appropriate guidance for their children.


Fig. 2.

Note: Media literacy (χ^2 = 395.21, p = 0.06).

Age groups set up among elementary school-aged children did not present significant differences concerning the hero preferences or the attitudes towards the representation of the heroes. However, Barbie tales do not fit in the periodization of the psychology of tales, thus this criterion is perhaps less relevant.

Closing remarks

My study was motivated by the moral panic emerging around the Barbie-phenomenon, examined from a text-based and an empirical approach of audience research. The concern might be substantiated by the fashion-oriented world of the Barbie industry. Yet, while analysing the films, I noticed that this has virtually no decisive role in the stories, but the happy ending is always due to the protagonist's personality. From this point of view, Barbie represents a contemporary female ideal for girls. However, since no one can tell which elements of a tale would become part of a child's life, parental concerns regarding the films' styles and meanings are not unfounded either. Moreover, the

graphic style of Barbie films is not much too popular among adults either, but this constitutes already a different topic of research: in this paper, I focused mainly on the personality of characters and the role-models they convey.

Through audience research, I have also tried to find out the roles that the characters of Barbie tales have in children's lives. My aim was to elucidate whether we have a model able to induce trends and tendencies, or whether the Barbie-phenomenon reflects the mentality of a certain society embedded in an iconic character, with whom the audience can identify. My findings – especially the differences found between rural and urban areas – show that on community level the latter answer is much more likely to be adequate: that tale hero can become a model, which represents a set of values not differing from children's everyday experiences. As we have seen throughout this paper, such a character can become an example to follow: however, this process is more typical for a group where the model has already gained popularity.

Both processes – the impact of the content on the audience and the impact of the audience on the content – function simultaneously, mutually generating and reinforcing each other. It depends greatly on parents' media literacy whether their child takes over these patterns offered by the media, respectively whether they contribute actively to give meaning to media contents. In this regard, I would quote again one mother's thoughts:

> She likes Barbies very much, and we didn't prohibit her from playing with them, even though our friends fairly disapprove these toys, and I don't like them either. However, if the child – of course, assisted by us – managed to create the right set of values, then they would have just as much fun playing a role-play with a Barbie or a pony, as when they have only three coloured pencils at their disposal (mother of a primary-school girl, Cluj-Napoca, 2012).

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ERRATUM

With regard to the article, "Identity and Place in Extended Exile: The Case of a Palestinian Refugee City-Camp," by Dorota Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, published 1/2013, on p. 21, footnote 2, the following acknowledgement was omitted:

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