

THE ELUSIVE RELATIONSHIP OF STATE POWER AND SOCIETAL PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE OF KOSOVO

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ABSTRACT. Twenty years ago, NATO's intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), taking place without the approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC), challenged the sovereignty and non-interference norms the UN had perceived as international peace and order, until that moment. While the military action served to question existing principles, it simultaneously examined the effectiveness of non-authorization. Moreover, the Kosovo case stimulated one of the most important UN reforms that transformed the concept of sovereignty from right to responsibility. Conceptually, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has largely advanced since then. The transformation shifted the attention from political to sociological peace making society, gender and victims of conflict at the focus of peacebuilding and peace sustaining processes. The juxtaposition of state and societal peace continues in post-conflict Kosovo with both approaches being intermingled: the security debate covers attempts for a peace-building agenda, whereas the formation of a national army is pursued.

Keywords: Kosovo, UN, Responsibility to Protect, sovereignty, women, human rights

Introduction

United Nations (UN) peace operations have gone through multiple changes and have constantly faced challenges as well as scholarly criticism for not being able to produce a well-developed theory on peacekeeping. Many

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factors have affected the transformation of these operations, starting from the impact of emerging powers to a widening space for individual initiatives. Yet, from a critical theory perspective, these initiatives and reforms are only a way to treat the dysfunctions of the global politics but that don't change the overall framework and order (Pugh, 2007). Incapable of testing the relationship of UN reforms and its reflections to all member states, we first made two decisions. First, we focused on the primary principle of UN which is peace and how it is developed within the UN structure. Second, we picked Kosovo as one of the most influential and disputable cases in the elusive relationship of UN with peace.

The analysis is guided by the question of how the concept of peace within the UN is reflected in the case of Kosovo, by also considering the interplay between theory and practical applications. This paper incorporates UN evolution of peace and power relationship in the case of Kosovo while looking into three different stages: the process of peacemaking; peacekeeping and peacebuilding. By so doing, it displays that the case of Kosovo has embraced two perspectives: 1) a combination of the liberal and somehow critical *approaches* as reliant on international norms (i.e., resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security), with the individual being in focus, and 2) the *national power approach* based on the so-called hard power with the state at the center. Concretely, the case of Kosovo reflects the conceptualization of power as an element generating global outcomes, while being constrained and determined by the state's fate.

The three main phases of peace are adapted to the case of Kosovo as a reaction to the conflict before the intervention, during the intervention, and the institutional response in the post-conflict peace-building phase. The combination of the theoretical lenses with the practice of UN peacekeeping missions has two dimensions: first, it presents insights on how these theoretical lenses can be practically applied to better understand UN peacekeeping, and second, it provides practical examples of how theories can be applied to a specific policy issue (Oksamytna and Karlsrud, 2020). These practices are best mirrored in two opposing directions, the veto power system, and the human rights dimension.

The choice of Kosovo as a case study is multiple. Firstly, it challenged the previously established norms and practices in the UN. Also, it caused a debate on the intervention and triggered many changes within the organization itself. In fact, before the intervention, the UNSC's resolutions restated the sovereignty of the FRY and with this, non-intervention was considered a norm to be respected by all members. To be said otherwise, before the military action, the UNSC was the responsible organ for peace maintenance. Yet, with the aggravation of the situation and following the refugee crisis in the FRY's former province, this principle was questioned. Overall, the military intervention in Kosovo represents

a precedent: it was legitimate although non-authorized due to humanitarian causes (Teson, 2009). Furthermore, the Kosovo case impacted peace at three levels: the regional, the European, and the global one (Cottey, 2009). To start with the regional level, it ended *de facto* a nationalist war in the Balkans. At the European level, it impacted NATO's and the EU's enlargement eastwards with Romania and Bulgaria joining the Union. As for the global level, it affirmed the western power, the liberal values, and the humanitarian cause for intervening in the first place. Concretely, with a look at the latter aspect, the case of Kosovo questioned the principles adopted previously by the UN. Otherwise said, it reflected the way sovereignty was perceived and challenged the effectiveness of non-intervention. In other words, the respect for the sovereignty of a state was to be reevaluated and transformed into R2P. In short, sovereignty had its costs, thus meaning that if the state failed to fulfill its responsibilities towards its citizens, it lost its significance.

Additionally, the Kosovo case can best explain the embodiment of realist, liberal and critical approaches to peacekeeping. On the one hand, Kosovo has been shaping an agenda pursuant to the UNSCR 1325 mandate to promote women and security, while addressing different needs. On the other hand, it established a national army 18 years after the end of the conflict, by emphasizing national interests.

Conceptualizing Peace within UN: From Political to Sociological Perspectives

The formulation of the idea of peace within the UN, before the Kosovo crisis, relied on two main existing frameworks: the UN Charter and the Agenda for Peace. The essential reason for the foundation of the UN, after the Second World War and the failure of the League of Nations was to maintain peace and save generations from war and conflicts. Therefore, it was viewed as crucial "to practice tolerance and live together in peace" and "unite [...] strength[s] to maintain international peace and security" (United Nations, 1945). The understanding of maintaining peace was based on fighting peace-threatening issues, using peaceful methods to resolve conflicts, and applying international norms (Article 1, 1). According to the UN Charter, peace relied on the following principles: order at the international level, self-determination, non-intervention, sovereignty, and respect for international law and security. The UN was founded on a *state-centric approach* reflecting realism (Falode, 2009). The Charter openly specifies that all member states should respect the sovereignty of other members (Article 2, 1), refrain from intervention, and be determined

to maintain peace and security, to promote and respect human rights and dignity, to support justice, social and economic progress for all peoples. Somehow, the state and the respect for its sovereignty gained importance. In this way, nations are invited to build amicable relations with each other and respect the self-determination of their people. All states are equally sovereign (Article 2, 1) and they have responsibilities of membership (Article 2, 2). In achieving peace, peaceful methods should be used (Article 2, 3) such as investigation, mediation, negotiation, etc. (Chapter VI, Article 33, 1).

Power and force should not be pursued, and states have to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other (Article 2, 4). Article 2, 5 gives all the authority to the UN as the responsible entity in taking any action, with all the member states in need of assisting the organization. All other countries, which are not UN members, are also requested to respect all the international norms to achieve peace (Article 4, 1). Article 2, 7 prevents the interference of the UN in the internal affairs of the states. According to Chapter VI, in case peace is threatened, the Security Council evaluates, makes suggestions, and decides on the actions to be taken. Among some measures, blockage and demonstrations or operations by land, sea, and air are envisaged (Chapter VII, Article 42). Furthermore, Chapter XI, Article 73 states that the members of the UN having under their administrative responsibility the people with no self-governing body, have the duty to respect their interests and protect them.

While until now the discussion of security and peace has centered on the state level, the UN Charter refers to human rights in some cases. First of all, its preamble reaffirms trust in human rights and the self-esteem of the individual. States are requested to cooperate and respect human rights without distinction of color, race, gender, or religion (Article 1, 3). The General Assembly should engage in researches for the promotion and implementation of human rights (Article 13). UN shall promote respect for human rights despite differences of race, gender, ethnicity, or religion (Article 55/3), which at the same time leads to stability and well-being. In Article 62, the Economic and Social Council can start an investigation or make a recommendation to promote human rights. In addition, the well-being of those people who have not yet achieved self-government is to be respected, their protection together with social, economic, and educational rights are to be ensured (Article 73). This is an understanding in line with the outlook over peace and security of the Charter. Likewise, Article 76 refers to the inhabitants of trust territories, their economic, educational, social, and political rights, and promotion of their human rights in general. Nevertheless, for a long period of time, human rights remained outside the span of the Security Council (Security Council 2016).

Yet, UN peace and security understanding is not derived only from the UN structure and principles. UN reflects also how its member states view what constitutes a threat and what maintains international order. Thus, the discourse between security and human rights was a result of the growing conviction that in order for states to be at peace with their neighbours, they must be at peace with themselves (Barnett, 1995). The maintenance of peace through non-intervention and respect for sovereignty was more a form of restoration of peace after it had been violated, rather than a process of building peace.

At the state level, Galtung (1996) defines positive peace as a different state from negative peace .i.e. being the absence of war/ conflict. Positive peace relates well-being, dialogue at the individual level and acceptance of peace at a cultural level. Furthermore, peace is not the opposite state of war. The process of constructing positive peace requires different structures and reforms from the process of ending a war (Boulding, 1978).

The sociological approach to peace covers the personal world of the person, together with the social, historical and political structure he is part of. Peace itself is social because of social interactions in social situations (Souto, 1986). Civilizations have their own way of constructing peace as the westerns are more externally oriented and the eastern world is more internally oriented in their understanding of peace (Galtung, 1981). Nevertheless, peace processes, understood from a sociological perspective reflect three tracks: the substantive, the conceptual and analytical (Brewer 2013). The substantive track considers processes of peace that lead to peace agreements and focuses on society, gender, religion, citizens, emotions, victimhood. The conceptual tends to expand the understanding of processes of peace while focusing on the political and social processes of peace. On the other hand, the analytical deals with disciplinary perspectives of processes of peace like conquest, military involvement, map making or changes of map, compromise and giving up the cause of conflict.

Looking at closer lenses at the conceptual track, it is easy to identify that it covers both the political and the social processes of peace. The political process refers to democratic institutions, reforms, laws, improvement in the voting system etc. Presence of justice, law, and order promotes social peace (Medina, 2020). The social side of peace rests in the improvement of relations, sharing duties and responsibilities as part of the same community. Adding to this trust, forgiving, and making empathy with members of the community, the sociological peace processes approach peace by emphasizing the relations between members of the community after conflict. In practice it refers to strategies such as compromise while interacting and engaging in common public spaces, building trust and forgiveness through religion, and education (J. D. Brewer, 2018). In a few words, it refers to any post-conflict process that channels the society

towards peace. All things considered, reconciliation involves both the political combined with the social peace process. The political process opens the way to social healing and they complement each-other. This social healing deals with social transformation which translates into positive peace. It is similarly as important that politics consults with studies on mixed societies like multiethnicity, or migration (Bade and Anderson 1994) at such a phase.

Social peacemaking can be both a form of negative and positive peace. The negative sees civil society as the main actor, or mediator in occurrences of violence and conflict. The positive version of peace considers civil society in the perspective of social transformation, healing before and after peace agreement. Social peace prepares the grounds for political agreement and vice versa. Political agreements enhance grassroot social transformation. However, it is apparent that formal peace processes still focus more on security issues and less on social peace (Lee, Mac Ginty and Joshi 2016).

Johansen (1991) uses the term '*democratic security*' to emphasize that security must serve the people and not to maintain patterns of state behavior that serve the international order. This approach contrasts the old concept of security based on 'balance of power' as natural arrangement or the 'default setting' that nation states must operate inside to handle their disputes (Johansen, 1991).

Yet, the existence of the veto power in the UN demonstrates that realism still dominates, and the national interest of the state prevails in the relations among peers (Hanhimaki 2015). The balance of power is regarded as being both a manner of maintaining peace, but also one that causes many wars (Waltz 1979). As the familiar philosophy of international relations would state "If you want peace, prepare for war" (Johansen, 1991).

On the contrary, for liberals, nations' interests do not consist of military and security issues only but involve the economic, environmental, social, and cultural interests of the state as well (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2008). The growth in the number of liberal democratic institutions should in itself reinforce peace. Democratic states do not expect, prepare for, and wage wars at least against other democratic states (Russett et al., 1995). Liberals consider that not only states, but organizations are important actors too. Thus, the UN itself - as an international organization - is seen as a crucial institution in solving matters between states and maintaining their cooperation.

In short, while realists regard force and security issues as central, liberals point that human rights, economic and social development are of great importance (Akoko, 2013). Since its foundation in 1945 the UN has tried to maintain a balance in the international order, despite conflicts emerging from time to time like the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, the Cold War, and the post-cold war conflicts. Yet, one thing is certain: the permanent members in the UNSC have

used their veto power, by pursuing their national interests. This *modus operandi* has blocked the UN's ability to act unanimously in solving core international issues.

The key issue in looking at peace evolution within the UN is how it positions itself in relation to order and principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Thus, the debate within this article does not cover all UN references of peace solely, but those that impact the interplay between state-centric and international norms approaches. In this regard, the second framework, within the UN, referring to the notion of peace is *The Agenda for Peace*, a document addressing peace in a changing world since the formation of the UN. Decolonization paved the way for the creation of new states. Calls for nationalism and new regional and continental alliances have led to discrimination, racism, and exclusion⁴. Other sources like famine, poverty, and disease have been recognized as factors destabilizing peace⁵. *The Agenda for Peace* attributes to the state its sovereignty. Yet, it does not recognize it as an **absolute** one, because it considers that sovereignty and self-determination should be balanced. Besides that, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities are among the core conditions for the solution of problems related to peace.

Also, *the Agenda for Peace* addresses three main phases of peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding (United Nations, 1992). Another important concept in the realm of achieving peace in the international order is *preventive diplomacy*, which aims to countermove disagreements among parties before the eruption of violence. Otherwise said, it also opens the way to UN institutions to react and address the source of the conflict before it escalates. Concretely, building confidence among parties through the exchange of information, and/or experience in military missions, and the collection of information by a special mission representing the organization are key areas of preventive diplomacy next to humanitarian aid. This also includes the development of a system of identification of early warnings, being a threat to peace, as the movement of refugees, famine, etc. Throughout this phase, *the Agenda for Peace* emphasizes that humanitarian aid should be given independently from any circumstance, differences in race, ethnicity, gender, or even geographical location.

⁴ Note: The declaration is in accordance with the principle of non-interference as it addresses those countries which are recognized as independent states and have territorial integrity and are sovereign. Nevertheless, the section is ambiguous in the point where these governments really represent all their *people*, which may have racial belonging and religious beliefs.

⁵ Note: The Human Security approach that targets famine, poverty and disease as factors destabilizing peace have been firstly introduced in the 1994 global Human Development report by UNDP which then led the GA to adopt a common definition of this concept in 2012. The 1994 HDR became prominent of its two major components of human security: 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. (UNDP, 2018)

Peacemaking aims to resolve conflicts through mediation or the negotiation process with the parties reaching an agreement. The Security Council has the prime responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Mechanisms like arbitration or reliance on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are also used in the peacemaking process. Additionally, assistance is offered to the displaced, economic sanctions can be used, and even military force recurs when peaceful ways of resolving the conflict fail.

The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was established by the Permanent Council in October 1998 and closed in June 1999. It aimed to ensure that Serbian and Yugoslav forces were abiding with the UN October Agreement, which called for the end of crimes in Kosovo, the withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo, and the observance of a ceasefire. Although KVM was mostly focused on peacekeeping, its mission also included some peacemaking components, i.e. when agreements were established between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav army and police to separate the parties in a place like Malisevo (Duncan, 2001).

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), one of the UN's smallest and modest missions, was established by the Security Council (1244, 1999) despite a political impasse. The primary purpose of UNMIK was to keep peace after the war but it transformed with an agenda of how to consolidate peace. That raises the important question of how can a peacekeeping mission prevent return of the conflict? For that, the next sections aims to present in more detail the role of UNMIK and note how it advanced into a unit working for political solutions to conflicts and producing integrated strategies that influence both national and regional levels (Sharma, 2020).

Responsibility to Protect

Events occurring during the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st fuelled a vivid debate in the UN on how to effectively respond to mass atrocities. UN peacekeeping missions prioritized the need to avoid the relapse of war, i.e. negative peace, but were unprepared to treat the deep sources of conflicts and ultimately recognize them from a multiparty approach. The genocide in Rwanda, the one in Srebrenica, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo displayed the fragility of the international community to defend civilians as well as questioned the political will and the authorities to be responsible for taking such action (Bellamy, 2013). These events led to a change of the idea of security based on the nature of threats to this security.

A more secure world: our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (United Nations Secretary-General 2004), presents a new perspective on security and the range of security threats. The report recognizes as security threats many factors and the solution to these threats is to prevent them from evolving. These threats include both old and new emerging ones; they are interconnected to each other and cannot be faced as isolated cases. This means that security can be endangered by social and economic problems, conflicts between states and within the state, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and organized crime. The understanding of collective security presented in this document encompasses three key elements. Firstly, threats that come to security cannot be limited to state borders. Secondly, these threats are related to one another and finally, they need to be targeted at both national and regional levels (United Nations Secretary-General 2004, 15). In a way, development, human rights, and security are linked to each other. For instance, the report emphasizes that poverty, famine, illness create suitable grounds for civil wars and in this way indirectly they are a threat to security. Recognizing these as threats, the conceptualization of security and peace becomes a more comprehensive one.

Security is understood both at the state and human levels. This said, the threats to this security come from both state and non-state actors. One of the main conclusions of the report is the idea that states are still recognized as the main actors in the response given to threats. Being so, states should be supported to improve and build capacities. The document voices the possibility to prevent a state from executing its citizens. The non-intervention principle should not be tolerated when there are cases of genocide, violation of humanitarian laws, ethnic cleansing, and mass executions. The report shifts the discourse from intervention to a responsibility of the state to protect (United Nations Secretary General 2004, 56). Nevertheless, response to threats using military force have to be applied under certain conditions after considering the gravity of the situation, exact aim, last resort, equitable means, and consequences.

The second important report that paved the way to R2P is *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, which reaffirmed the importance of human rights as one of the three main objectives of the UN next to development and security (UN Secretary-General, 2005). For this, the main responsibility for the protection of human rights rests on national states. It is also addressed as part of the commitment gap by states. In this regard, empowerment is envisioned as two-fold: empowerment of citizens and empowerment as a responsibility of states to protect human rights (Article 36, 37).

These discussions resulted in the notion of the R2P, which varies in its aim, preconditions, and instruments of responsibility (Kunadt, 2011). The 2005 World Summit's report served to address the concept of the responsibility to

protect, which was conceptualized as the responsibility of a state to defend and protect its citizens (UN General Assembly, 2005). R2P encapsulates a strategy with 3 main lines: **protection** of citizens, **assistance** to states to fulfill their responsibilities and capacity-building, and **collective actions** to be taken in case the state is incapable to fulfill its obligations (UN General Assembly, 2013). These are the main pillars that support the notion of *responsibility to protect* and have equal importance. Thus understood, responsibility falls both to the individual states to protect their civilians and to the international community when these individual states are either unable or unwilling to protect them (Breakey, et al. 2012).

First and foremost, states are the main responsible authorities for the protection of their population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The international community encourages states to implement such responsibilities, and when a country fails to protect its citizens, the international community can interfere via diplomatic means, or by initiating other forms of assistance for the civilians in need. Assistance to states can be given with the consent of the involved state and these states can decide on different agreements. However, measures that are related to R2P can surpass the consent of the concerned state in cases when the United Nations Security Council acts based on Chapter VII of the Charter (Nambiar, 2016). Pillar three refers to an array of tools that can be used collectively by the international community: peaceful means, intimidating measures, and cooperation with other regional actors.

At this point, the notion of sovereignty takes another dimension. Concretely, it is here understood as *the responsibility* of the states to fulfill their obligations and duties towards their citizens. This responsibility takes three forms: “to prevent”, “to react”, and “to rebuild” (Gagro, 2014). The first form of responsibility seeks to find solutions to the roots of the problems threatening the civilians while the second stresses the fact that responses can be in the form of help and support; can serve to build capacities and ensure protection (UN General Assembly, 2014). Effective prevention measures cover economic, legal, political, and military aspects. It means that different preventive measures can be applied, from diplomatic measures like mediation to economic sanctions and deployment of troops. In addition to this, prevention is seen from two perspectives: minimalist as direct and short-term action, and maximalist as structural, planned and organized attempts that aim at the source of conflict (Williams, 2011).

Reaction can be from economic encouragement to sanction, mediation to diplomatic cut of relations, arbitration to cases referred to International Courts (Evans, 2008). Assistance can be offered legally by setting certain standards, enforcing national capabilities, and offering expertise. A variety of actors are important in this stage. The UN assists The Human Rights Council, The Security

Council, The Peacebuilding Commission and through a variety of programs, funds, and instruments. Different international actors, networks, and civil society are brought together. Thirdly, reconstruction is a phase where the responsibility weighs upon rebuilding. These three pillars have been elaborated as six main concerns: indication of assurance to defend civilians, prevention as the main feature, a wide range of responses, accepting the possibility of recurrence, regional cooperation, and the international dimension of R2P (UN General Assembly, 2015).

Another important dimension of R2P deals with the increase of the accountability of states to prevent violations of human rights (UN General Assembly, 2017). This accountability ensures a point of contact between what has been formally stated on R2P, and what effectively challenges the civilians. In this understanding of accountability, states are regarded as legally, morally, and politically responsible. Also, the empowerment of women and the equality of genders are prioritized. Overall, the R2P tried to overcome the obstacles caused by state sovereignty in the cases when civilians were endangered, but it still is dependent on the states' political will (Lea-Henry, 2018).

Overall, RtoP enlarged the perspective on how humanitarian intervention is conceptualized and eased the tension between respect for the sovereignty of a state of non-interference and respect for human rights (Francioni and Bakker, 2013). Sovereignty understood as responsibility has become a norm. In this context, sovereignty does not favor the state over the citizen but brings accountability to the state. With RtoP the question is not only whether to intervene or not but to decide how to intervene and who should be in charge of all this. Read differently, R2P promotes prevention and not intervention (Hamann and Muggah, 2013). Nevertheless, cases like that of Libya have fuelled even more debates on the principle. The third pillar of R2P, which gives permission to military operations over the aggressor, even though used as a last resort means, was perceived as an attempt for neo-colonial ambitions (Brosig, 2013). Taken together, such principles are dependant on the intentions and will of the actors that use them.

Cycles of Peace in Kosovo: State and Society as Actors

From 1999 until 2008, the international community focused on building peace and stability in Kosovo. This period was characterized by numerous disputes about Kosovo's status and legitimate governance between local Kosovo Albanian actors, as well as between Serbian and Kosovar groups (Deda, 2010). The case of Kosovo displays all the 3 cycles of peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building.

Period 1- UN Peacekeeping process/ Reaction to the Conflict

UNSC resolution 1160

The first UNSC resolution (1160), adopted on 31 March 1998, called the parties concerned to enter into dialogue while imposing an arms embargo. A committee of the Security Council would report on the measures taken. The deployment of humanitarian organizations followed, and all states, especially the neighbouring ones, were requested to cooperate. Failure to do so would have implied the adoption of additional ones (UNSC, 1998). Under this resolution, there is a continuous request for a political solution, and no responsibility is attributed to the FRY.⁶ The grave humanitarian situation is condemned, and support for the rights of the Albanian community in Kosovo is provided. (Ibid, Point 5).

UNSC resolution 1199

The second resolution (1199) was adopted in September 1998, because of the great concern regarding casualties and the flow of refugees in neighbouring countries. Alarmed by the grave humanitarian situation, the following measures were undertaken: a dialogue between the parties involved, the safe return of the refugees, and the solution of existing problems by political means. Should these measures have not been implemented, further ones were to be explored to bring stability to the region (UNSC, 1998). Repeatedly, a great concern is shown for the situation of the displaced. Yet, no responsibility is attributed to the Serbian authorities for the massacres. Nevertheless, it was requested that no repressive action was to be undertaken towards any community in Kosovo. In the meanwhile, a greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo is asked for as a possibility to move towards a political solution to the case.

UNSC resolution 1203

UNSC resolution 1203, adopted in October 1998, after recalling the previous resolutions on the case, reaffirmed the cruciality of the Security Council as responsible for international peace; emphasized the importance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); committed itself to acknowledge the sovereignty of the FRY; requested the cooperation of the parties with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and with NATO's verification missions while urging upon the members to provide humanitarian assistance (UNSC, 1998). Through this resolution, the UN restated

⁶ FRY- by this time referring to the republics of Serbia and Montenegro

its role as a primary agent in maintaining peace and stability, by stressing that the respect for the sovereignty of FRY was to be considered. Interestingly enough, the FRY (point 8) is called to be responsible for the security of the foreign personnel and welcomed for its dedication to this commitment (point 9). Yet, no such enforcement is expressed for the protection of Albanians or other communities in Kosovo.

The first three resolutions mentioned above refer to the *UN Charter* when they call for the respect of the sovereignty of FRY, and to the *Agenda for Peace* when they request for political dialogue and the imposition of an arms embargo. Furthermore, these resolutions display, on the one hand, the dominance of the realistic approach, by emphasizing the respect for state sovereignty. On the other hand, they showcase a liberal attitude, when referring to the cooperation of OSCE and NATO's verification missions. What characterizes this approach as liberal is that it still does not question the primary role of state, but calls for states to cooperate with international institutions as a way to further enhance peace at all levels. In other terms, whether the concepts of order and sovereignty, as part of the peace conceptualization, have not changed, non-intervention has developed from the idea of political dialogue and arms embargo (UNSC, 1994) to international and institutional cooperation (UNSC, 1998). Also, the self-determination of Kosovo has evolved from an understanding of self-administration to greater autonomy.

Period 2- UN Peacemaking Process/Means of Intervention

After the adoption of the first three UNSC resolutions above, many attempts have been undertaken to reconcile actors through an international agreement. Under these circumstances, Kosovo's leadership and the Serbian authorities participated in the Rambouillet talks. The main aim of the agreement was to: declare a ceasefire between the parties, establish peace and democratic self-government in Kosovo, and reassure the respect for human rights (UNSC, 1999). Additionally, the parties were required to cooperate, as requested by the UNSC resolution 872 (1993) with the International Criminal Tribunal for investigations. However, mediation failed as the then-president Milosevic did not accept Rambouillet's proposals, and consequently, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was bombed by NATO's forces on the 24th of March 1999.

The consecutive resolution (1239), adopted after the initiation of NATO's airstrike, recalled the previous resolutions on Kosovo and stressed the importance of coordination under the authority of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) to provide assistance and relief for the displaced (UNSC,

1999). Resolution 1244, adopted in June 1999, authorized *de facto* the international presence in Kosovo. Concretely, it reaffirmed that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace. Also, it expressed its commitment to the sovereignty of the FRY. Similarly, like previous resolutions, it recalled the self-administration of Kosovo. Moreover, it requested the withdrawal of the Serb military and police forces and decided about the deployment of the international presence to establish a secure environment (UNSC, 1999). Overall, the core of this resolution was the deployment of the military forces with a substantial NATO's participation and guided by the principle of a unified command. This resolution was put on stage after NATO's bombing stopped, and it served to restate that the UN was the central authority in stabilizing the region. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), pursuant to UNSC resolution 1244 (ibid), enabled for a safe return of refugees, the withdrawal of the military, and the deployment of the international community. It focused on resolving the situation in a post-conflict phase, by filling the *vacuum* of power created with the withdrawal of the Serbian forces. It reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to the safeguard of the FRY's sovereignty. At the same time, it re-stated the idea of self-administration for Kosovo. Additionally, it authorized the international presence to be responsible for the security of the whole territory.

All the resolutions mentioned above share some commonalities: the call for a peaceful solution to the conflict, the restatement of the UNSC as the main responsible authority for the maintenance of peace, the emphasis on the sovereignty of the FRY, as well as the protection of civilians and the safe return of refugees. They were adopted with either Russia's or China's abstention, excluding the last one (1367), which ended the arms embargo with unanimity.

During the period 1992-1999, there were continuous warnings on the FRY, which might be seen as the result of the international community's *liberal approach* on the matter (Skrpec, 2003). They aimed at finding a solution all parties involved could benefit from. Concretely, the way out saw international organizations acting as conflict managers and recognizing the preeminence of cooperative norms and rules.

Period 3-Post-Conflict-UN Peace Building

Pursuant to the *Agenda for Peace* (1992), once the objectives of the peacekeeping and peacemaking phases would have been accomplished, the peace-building stage would have followed, while addressing social, economic, and humanitarian issues. Concretely, peace-building aims at preventing the recurrence

of the war, by targeting its roots. Otherwise said, peace is here supposed to be built on durable foundations. Galtung (1976) is credited with coining the word “peacebuilding” in his book “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding”, Galtung maintained that apart from peacekeeping and peacemaking structures must be established that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where conflicts may occur. This can be perceived as the basis for today’s understanding of peacebuilding as an effort to create a stable (or sometimes lasting) state of peace, primarily defined by Kenneth Boulding in 1978 as “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.”

In the case of Kosovo, peacebuilding was based on the process of state-building and the phase of the final status. Before the proclamation of independence on the 17th February 2008, UNMIK was the highest executive structure, NATO KFOR was in charge of the security, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) was supposed to *monitor, mentor, and advice* the competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the rule of law (including a customs service), while retaining certain executive responsibilities (OSCE, 2008); the OSCE was responsible for the reconstruction of state institutions, and the EU for the economic reconstruction (Gërxhi, 2017). After the declaration of independence, despite other challenges, Kosovo started its long path towards gaining its recognition, integration in the UN, and membership in regional and international organizations (Brovina, 2017).

After Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, the international community shifted its focus toward the functionality of the new state’s institutions and the rule of law. The EU increased its presence in the country, taking over a series of structural issues which required a strong focus to be resolved (Deda, 2010). The status of Kosovo remained disputable between Kosovo and Serbia as well as within the EU and international community. Due to the lack of consensus about the status of Kosovo as well as the widespread corruption within the public sector, the state-building process was significantly hindered. EULEX faced enormous challenges in addressing organized crime and corruption in Kosovo due to their coordination problems and interactions with national political elites in the country (Martin & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2019). On the other hand, the EU-facilitated dialogue aimed at normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia and contained a strategy toward its achievement. Although both Kosovo and Serbia’s governments were not initially compelled to join the dialogue and repeatedly emphasized their unwillingness to change their stance on Kosovo’s status, the EU found the necessary means to persuade both parties to join the dialogue (ibid).

Initially, neither the international community nor the government in Kosovo did not place emphasis on a more inclusive approach to the peace-building processes. The EU did not completely grasp the local context, and a more inclusive approach would have enabled it to conduct a more rigorous and dynamic review of the community, identify pertinent stakeholders, and match them with its goals across several policy domains (ibid). On the other hand, UN Women in 1999 started advocating for women's involvement in decision-making, conflict resolution, and access to justice with governments and the general public in Kosovo. In Kosovo, UN Women continues to work together with the government, civil society, and women's organizations to support initiatives and programs that promote humanitarian action, peace, and security. The gender dimension put forward by the UNSC Resolution 1325 is brought into action as a key factor for building peace. Adopted in 2000, this resolution prioritizes issues related to women, by focusing on prevention, protection, relief, and recovery. It is based on the principle of respect for women's rights, by emphasizing the importance of a *gender-based approach* and stressing the significance of a gender perspective in peace-oriented programs.

The resolution addresses the concept of security from a civilian perspective. Given that most of the victims in conflicts are/were civilians, threats to peace do not come solely under a military form. Peace is also threatened when human rights are denied, when violence takes place and when there is poverty. Security is not only economic, political, and environmental, but personal and community-related as well. Resolution 1325 portrays human security as a crucial dimension of peace and stability. Overall, human security and a gender-focused approach enable and open the way to a variety of initiatives. As conflicts can affect genders differently, the protection needs are not the same (Article 41). Displacement brings women to face different challenges, forms of violence included. Conflicts sharpen their social and economic problems (Article 46).

Non-solely does the resolution recognize the difficulties women face, but at the same time, it emphasizes the potential they have. The solution envisaged by this document consists of a long-term strategy that would serve to improve women's *status quo* and empower them (Article 52). It seeks to be applied on three levels: to answer the needs; to stop the roots of discrimination towards women, and to acknowledge their potential (Article 53). In times of conflict, women are highly defenceless, and their needs are under-estimated. On such occasions, discrimination and violence towards women is only a reflection and reproduction of the violence they endure in times of peace. This means that the position of women in society is insecure, even when there is peace. Most of the civilians that are affected during conflicts are women and children. Res. 1325 focuses on two main points: (1) the inferior status and position that women

have in society and at the same time (2) the fact that women participate as warriors in these conflicts (Article 64, 65). At this point, the resolution proposes that the position of women in society should be reconsidered, and they should be given legally the same rights as men. To implement it, the resolution foresees a *3p* approach, namely: “protection, participation and prevention” (Article 73). It deals with protection from conflicts, participation of women, and inhibition of discrimination. The UNSC calls states for action plans at a national level to implement this resolution. Protection is understood in legal, social, and economic terms (Article 252). Participation is conceptualized mainly in politics, the economy, and the decision-making sphere (Article 299). Women can take part in various projects of development, peace programs, governance, etc. Equal rights at a legislative level would ensure protection from discrimination (Article 272) and politically, women’s participation would be achieved through the development of a culture of peace. Practically, some significant changes have led to the inclusion of more women in the Kosovo Police, however, traditional approaches to gender roles have left women in Kosovo underrepresented in decision-making at all levels, including the security sector.

In post-independent Kosovo, peace, and security needed to be reconsidered, as the decision to form a national army has caused a debate on whether to respect international norms or to pursue the state’s interest. External efforts of the UN with UNSC Resolution 1325 to build a sustainable peace were confronted with more realistic internal attempts to see peace and security at risk, by forming the national army. Its creation was contested though, with the Albanians looking at it as their right, and the Serbs as a threat (DW, 2018). Though, evidence shows that peace processes that are more inclusive have a better chance of success (Dumasy, 2018). In the Kosovo case, the engagement of different local stakeholders at various levels in the peacebuilding processes, including the dialogue, might have led to greater support for the reached agreements and a more sustainable outcome of the process.

Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Kosovo

a) Gender-based equal participation in policy-making

Women’s participation in decision-making is an important factor in democratic societies as it contributes to positive changes in laws, policies, services, institutions and social norms that affect women and others. However, women’s participation in policy and decision-making, including leadership positions in governments, local councils, conventions and other institutions,

still did not reach the satisfactory level in the country. In 2014, the Government of Kosovo with the support of UN Women – one of the key actors in implementing UNSCR 1325 – has adopted *the National Action Plan* for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on WPS (Agency of Gender Equality, 2014). The plan was launched by the Agency for Gender Equality (AGE) and it foresees three outcomes: increasing women’s participation in decision-making and peacebuilding processes; introducing a gender perspective in the security sector and increasing the number of women in security structures; and providing access to justice to survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. Both governmental and non-governmental institutions are responsible for the implementation of the resolution. However, the execution of standards for gender and security is not successful in the practice.

Gender-equal participation in policy-making is still a big obstacle for the institutions of Kosovo. Subject to a substantially advanced *Law on Gender Equality* (LGE)⁷, the Kosovo institutions have repeatedly failed to reach the legal benchmarks. The LGE 2014 lays down a range of steps aimed at achieving gender balance at the legislative and political levels. At the political level, for all legislative, executive, and public institutions, the law determines a fifty (50) percent gender quota (LGE, Article 6.8). At the policy level, it establishes a systematic mechanism for gender mainstreaming throughout various stages of policy-making. However, public institutions have consistently neglected to incorporate gender experiences into their policy formulation and to implement substantive policy changes based on gender-disaggregated results (Farnsworth, et al. 2018).

b) Gender participation in the security forces

Traditional perspectives on gender roles in Kosovo have underestimated women at all levels, including the security sector. The participation of women is essential for effective and sustainable peace. Women have led the peace movement and promoted the reconstruction of post-conflict communities, but they are almost completely overlooked in peace and reconstruction negotiations. This alienation limits access to recovery opportunities, human rights abuses justice, reformed laws and the establishment of public institutions.

In addition, UNSCR 1325 emphasizes “the importance of women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security”. The introduction of gender balance in the national armed and security forces began earlier in Kosovo, with the country concentrating on enhancing gender equality capabilities. While steps have been taken to achieve gender mainstreaming in the police forces of Kosovo, questions arise in the

⁷ Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality

assessment of the degree of this participation. Even though the security sector tends to be viewed as a male domain, there has been progressing by introducing the concept of gender equality (Stickings, 2015). One of the first organizations to endorse the principles of UNSCR 1325 was the Kosovo Police (KP), which sought to consciously harmonise its policies by implementing the WPS into its framework. Another positive result is the recruitment of women as skilled soldiers and police officers, through the development of gender equality promotion institutions. Both legal procedures, such as the Police and Anti-Discrimination Legislation, and internal standards governing gender equality and banning any form of discrimination have been adopted by the KP (Odanovic and Gajic, 2013). In addition, to institutionalize gender equality policies, the KP has defined administrative guidelines through three distinct and relevant units: the Gender Equality Unit, the Domestic Violence Unit, and the Anti-Trafficking (Unit Stickings, 2015).

c) Domestic Violence against Women: Still a Concern in Kosovo

Domestic violence continues to be one of the predominant practices against women, as well as against children, in Kosovo. The level of domestic violence is likely to be much higher than the number of incidents effectively reported to the police, considering the stigma associated with sexual violence and the lack of awareness thereupon (Farnsworth, et al. 2018). Yet, addressing domestic violence as a way of gender-based violence is an important and invaluable challenge for every society's success and advancement, since it influences all its citizens: women, men, and children. Kosovo has been very effective in strengthening the structures to support and protect victims of domestic abuse. At the central level, some effort has been made in licensing the capacities of social workers and easing the procedures of social service provision. Nonetheless, municipalities continuously fail to allocate sufficient funds for social housing and capacity building (OHCHR 2019). There is a legitimate concern that key organizations are still struggling to maintain a shared understanding of their roles and obligations within the current legal structure in the battle against domestic violence. In addition, there are worries about the lack of infrastructure needed to protect and help victims of domestic abuse (OSCE 2019).

Kosovo's peace-building process: a male-led decision-making process

The gender dimension in Kosovo has not solely been neglected at the local level. Rather, the international commitment has shown signs of weakness in this regard too, leaving women completely left out from the peacebuilding

process. Kosovo's peace-building process under UNMIK, and pursuant to UNSC Res. 1244 (1999), has been largely a male-led decision-making process, with no exception in the judicial and education sectors.

EULEX, deploying on the 9th of December 2008 and effectively operational from the beginning of 2009, did not make a difference in this respect. It is the biggest and most costly operation of the European Union (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the first to be endowed with extensive executive powers. Except for Alexandra Papadopoulou, all its Head of Missions (HoMs) were male (2016-19) (Picciano, 2020).

Despite some progress, Kosovo continues to face challenges regarding gender equality in terms of political participation, leadership, economy, peace, and security and it still struggles to end violence against women. Traditional gender stereotypes and cultural norms make up the most essential factor leaving women out of the decision-making process. There is still a huge gap between the theory and the practice toward gender equality and the inclusiveness of women in leadership roles. Although Kosovo has the most favourable Gender Equality Law in the region, its implementation remains very low. All these anti-gender discrimination laws and laws aimed at increasing women's representation in local and central government, are formulated to inspire women's representation in politics, these remain mostly on paper. When laws are written but not implemented, they do not have the intended social impact which can then be noticed in the small numbers of women participating in the Kosovo political area, but even more in the number of in leadership position at local level.

Concluding Remarks

At the time Kosovo's war erupted, state sovereignty and non-intervention were considered as the key pillars of international norms. In this context, UNSC Res. 1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty of the FRY while condemning at the same time the violence against civilians. In the meanwhile, Kosovo's war occurred before the emergence of the so-called R2P asserting that sovereignty is primarily a responsibility of the state for protecting its civilians. This said the FRY would have been fully responsible for the atrocities committed at that time.

The case of Kosovo enabled the space for reflection on the existing rules on sovereignty and the state's responsibility to protect its civilians. Otherwise said, there has been a shift from state sovereignty to human rights defence. Also, addressing the impact that armed conflicts can have on women, and looking at the way they might be significantly empowered in post-conflict processes, are

two aspects that may help build sustainable peace. Additionally, the case of Kosovo serves to display the interaction between the realist and the liberal theories and the space for critical theories. The period preceding the conflict is dominated by realism with the exercise of the veto power in the UNSC, and the preservation of state sovereignty at all costs. Whereas liberalism is enshrined in the *Agenda for Peace* later on, and its attempts for mediation and cooperation. In the end, the UNSC has always been somehow trapped between the two principles (realism versus liberalism) (Bures, 2007). And the juxtaposition of these two theories and their application to NATO's intervention has generated a vivid debate. This has been maintained in the post-conflict period with both theories being intermingled: the security debate covers attempts for a peace-building agenda, whereas the formation of a national army is pursued.

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