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CONTENT – SOMMAIRE – INHALT – CUPRINS

ŞTEFAN BOLEA, Sartre's Violent Man as a Gnostic Nihilist..... 5

ZSUZSANNA MARIANN LENGYEL, On Imagination and Understanding.
Gadamer and Criticism of Kant's Aesthetic Imagination..... 15

CORINA DONDAŞ, MAGDALENA IORGA, ION DAFINOIU, The Art of Hypnosis:
How to Reduce the Affective Dimension of Pain. A Literature Review 29

ATTILA KOVÁCS, The Other is Dead39

IOVAN DREHE, The Virtuous Citizen: Regimes and Audiences59

VLAD-LUCIAN ILE, Saint Augustine's and Dante's Models of History.....77

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SARTRE'S VIOLENT MAN AS A GNOSTIC NIHILIST

ȘTEFAN BOLEA¹

ABSTRACT. Sartre's description of violence from his often-neglected *Notebooks for an Ethics* can be analyzed from a psychological point of view in relationship with other negative "passions" like hatred, fury, pain and sufferance. Literary characters such as Seneca's Medea or Anouilh's Antigone seem to embody this fundamental characteristic of violence: the alliance with an ontological striving for destruction. In this paper we provide an interpretation of the Sartrean portrait of the violent man, analyzing its connections with his existential doctrine from *Being and Nothingness*, and its affinity with modern nihilism (Nietzsche and Cioran) and Gnostic dualism (Catharism and Manicheanism).

Keywords: destruction, freedom, transcendence, facticity, Gnosticism, nihilism, existentialism

The Destructive Constitution of Violence

One of the special forms of bad faith is, according to Sartre, violence. The French philosopher observes in his *Notebooks for an Ethics*: "The violent man is ... a person of bad faith because, however far he carries his destructions, he counts on the richness of the world to support them and perpetually to provide new things to be destroyed."² This provisory definition gives us two key words: "the world" and "the thing". One must say that, in Sartre's analysis, the violent man refuses *In-der-Welt-Sein* because violence targets the destruction of the very world he lives in. Regarding the "thing" or the object, we note that the destruction of a tool can be seen as an attack against the tool's artisan. Moreover, violence is redefined in the

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² Jean-Paul Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics*, translated by David Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, p. 175 (henceforth NE).

terms of the Hegelian theory of the look³ from *Being and Nothingness* as a “refusal of being looked at”: “The artisan, the engineer, the technician look at me across the tool that they made for me. Consequently, to destroy the tool is symbolically to destroy this gaze.”⁴ Violence has a particular “anti-creative” value, being unable only to produce the objects: “[V]iolence, being destructive, cannot produce an object. It can only remove the obstacles that conceal it.”⁵

Hence, we can see the double intention of violence: on one hand it wants to “destroy everything”, on the other it desires to find new material its destruction. If we wished to reconstruct the definition of violence, we would find in its composition not only anger, fear and desire to be esteemed (notions which Sartre does refer to⁶), but also hate, pain, resentment and dissatisfaction. The existential philosopher observes that violence “implies nihilism”⁷. We should probably understand nihilism as a psychological state, comprised of alienation, an impulse towards destruction and a deep ambivalence between revolt against the world and a “declaration of war” against the self.

From a psychological point of view, this dissatisfaction has three sources:

a) It is almost impossible to destroy the universe through individual means, therefore the process of destruction is infinite.

b) Each moment new objects and tools are being created. The violent man must keep up with the continuous cycle of production.

c) It is highly probable that the final goal of destruction is the very *Dasein* that created violence in the first place but the biological wisdom of the instinct of conservation projects the destructive impulse to other subjects and/or things.

According to André Glucksmann, the hatred that fuels violence is “a fundamental striving for destruction”⁸. The French philosopher extensively quotes from Seneca’s

³ “I grasp the Other's look at the very center of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities. In fear or in anxious or prudent anticipation, I perceive that these possibilities which I am and which are the condition of my transcendence are given also to another, given as about to be transcended in turn by his own possibilities. The Other as a look is only that – my transcendence transcended” (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, Methuen, London, 1958, p. 263) (henceforth BN).

⁴ NE 176.

⁵ NE 174.

⁶ NE 189.

⁷ NE 171.

⁸ André Glucksmann, *Discursul urii [Discourse of Hatred]*, translated by Ileana Cantuniari, Humanitas, București, 2007, p. 41.

Medea to emphasize on one hand, the connection between violence, rage and hatred and on the other, the link between the explosive nihilism of certain dramatic characters and contemporary terrorism. Following Seneca's text, one remarks the interdependence between hatred, pain (or grief) and wrath: "Again my passion [*dolor*] waxes and my hatred [*odium*] boils; the old Erinyes reaches for my unwilling hand. Where you lead, wrath [*ira*], I follow"⁹.

Coming back to Sartre, one notices that in the construction of the concept of violence, we encounter, besides fear and fury, hatred (a "striving for destruction", which basically intends "[t]o hurt or demolish"¹⁰) and also pain and suffering [*dolor*]: "just as doubt is considered methodical when Descartes states that uncertain opinions are 'false', pain becomes methodical when it chooses itself as wholly radical"¹¹). Moreover, following a hint from Robert Solomon, one finds that resentment is constitutive of violent wrath, taking into consideration that its intent is to "to destroy one's enemies, all of them, and to be in a position of indisputable and unmatched power and importance"¹² and that, according to Max Scheler, "[t]hirst for revenge is the most important source of *ressentiment*"¹³.

All of the constituents of violence, from wrath [*ira*] to suffering [*dolor*] share a common thirst for destruction: from the universal one, which targets the *In-der-Welt-Sein*, to the particular one, often hidden, which targets the *Dasein*. "[V]iolence is a meditation on death. To have everything, right now, and without any compromise, by leaping over the order of the world, or to destroy myself taking the world along with me"¹⁴.

Sartre quotes from Jean Anouilh's *Antigone*¹⁵, but he could easily refer to Seneca's *Medea*: "I can be quiet only if I see everything overwhelmed along with my ruin. As you go down it is a satisfaction to drag others with you"¹⁶. The French writer continues to define violence in terms of destruction: "Violence [is] appropriation by destruction"¹⁷ This definition of violence conceived as *appropriation* shows that

⁹ Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Medea*, translated, with an introduction by Moses Hadas, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, New York, 1956, p. 37.

¹⁰ Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions*, Anchor Press/ Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1976, pp. 325-327.

¹¹ André Glucksmann, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹² Robert C. Solomon, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-5.

¹³ Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. William Holdheim, New York, Schocken Books, 1961, pp. 45-6.

¹⁴ NE 174.

¹⁵ Jean Anouilh, *Antigone*, *apud*. NE 173 n.: "I spit on your happiness! I spit on your idea of life".

¹⁶ Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁷ NE 175.

through the destructive process, we also take the objects into our possession: before obliterating them, we put our own destructive stamp upon them. Hence, the violent man could be portrayed as an aesthete-owner, who both assumes and gives up possession through appropriation¹⁸. The absolute gratuitousness of his properties does not bother him: he is not interested in gathering capital, he wants to make it go away.

The Portrait of the Violent Man

One finds in Sartre an almost lyrical portrait of the violent man:

I am at the origin of the nothingness of the world, I am the *Anticreator*, I dream of a *continuous destruction* ... To put it another way, it is my *facticity* that I symbolically destroy by way of the world. I want to be pure *nonbeing*. But to be pure nonbeing is not to be. It is to be a pure nihilating power, pure freedom. Violence is unconditioned affirmation of *freedom*.¹⁹

The emphasized words deserve special consideration:

a) *Anticreator*. If Sartre had characterized the violent man through the Romantic notion of the “destroyer”, his definition would be unambiguous. In this case, his expression refers to a combination of destruction and creation: the violent one creates while destroying. The image of the destroyer who appropriates the objects or the world in the moment of annihilation is reminiscent here. In addition, the Nietzschean notion of “unbuilding” [*zugrunde richten*] is relevant on this occasion²⁰. At this point, we also remember Bakunin’s description of “creative destruction”²¹ and Nietzsche’s percept (“only as creators can we destroy!”²²). Therefore, violence

¹⁸ We remember here the “renunciation of the fruits of action” from Indian philosophy.

¹⁹ NE 175 (italics mine).

²⁰ Ioan P. Couliano, *The Tree of Gnosis. Gnostic Mythology from Early Christianity to Modern Nihilism*, Harper Collins, New York, p. 250. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, KSA, 13, hrsg. von Colli/Montinari, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1999, pp. 59-60: „Der Nihilismus ist nicht nur eine Betrachtungsweise über das «Umsonst!», und nicht nur der Glaube, daß Alles werth ist, zu Grunde zu gehen: man legt Hand an, man richtet zu Grunde ...”.

²¹ Sam Dolgoff (Ed.), *Bakunin on Anarchy*, Vintage Books, New York, 1971, p. 57.

²² Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrain del Caro, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 70.

should probably be understood as counter-creation rather than basic destruction. One can say that an authentic nihilism always contains an anti-nihilistic teleology.

b) *Continuous destruction*. Cioranian nihilism proves eloquent in the portrayal of the numinous element of destruction: "Nobility is only in the negation of existence, in a smile that surveys annihilated landscapes"²³. Romantic and Post-romantic poets such as Byron, Shelley, Jean Paul, Leopardi, Swinburne, Rollinat, and Lautréamont have examined this feeling of personal or collective apocalypse. In the Romanian literature and in a philosophical tradition consubstantial with Cioran, Mihai Eminescu provides the best descriptions of the "annihilated landscapes":

May death expand its colossal wings upon the world:
Only darkness is the coat of buried waste.
A lingering star extinguishes its small spring.
Deathlike time spreads its arms and becomes eternity.
When nothing will persist on the barren landscape
I will ask: What of your power, Man? – Nothing!"²⁴

c) *Facticity*: Until now, Sartre has been using potent symbols of the nihilist discourse. Moving on, he connects the portrait of the violent man to his existentialist theory from *Being and Nothingness*: "Just as my nihilating freedom is apprehended in anguish, so the for-itself is conscious of its facticity. It has the feeling of its complete gratuity; it apprehends itself as being there for *nothing*, as being *de trop*."²⁵ Facticity can be briefly defined as "the resistance or adversity presented by the world that free action constantly strives to overcome"²⁶. The *Dasein* can be characterized through a combination of facticity and transcendence. If the facticity of our existence were obliterated, only pure transcendence would remain; and this could be the intent of the violent man: to go beyond the objective, given conditions of the existence, obtaining an absolute freedom, not unlike the divine being.

"Without facticity consciousness could choose its attachments to the world in the same way as the souls in Plato's *Republic* choose their condition. I could determine myself to 'be born a worker' or to 'be born a bourgeois'."²⁷ From birth

²³ E.M. Cioran, *A Short History of Decay*, trans. Richard Howard, Arcade Books, New York, 1972, p. 36.

²⁴ Mihai Eminescu, *Memento mori*, edited by Al. Piru, Editura Vlad&Vlad, Craiova, 1993, pp. 125-126, translation mine.

²⁵ BN 84.

²⁶ Gary Cox, *The Sartre Dictionary*, Continuum, London, New York, 2008, p. 77.

²⁷ BN 83.

onwards, facticity dictates its terms: I am born with certain physical features (tall or short, with dark or blonde hair, and so on), in certain spatial and temporal dimensions (Middle Ages, Asia), in a certain social class. If our conditions were controllable in the absence of facticity, our destiny would touch the divine identity of essence and existence. More exactly, without facticity the human being could be entirely programmed, without defects and congenital arbitrariness.

From the Platonic *Republic* to the dystopian paradigm of Huxley's *Brave New World* it is only a slight step. Without facticity, we could design a society of alpha men and women, with heightened intelligence, supreme health and exceptional physical qualities. The program of genetic enhancement, of mass producing *Übermenschen*, removes the accidental feature of facticity. From another perspective, such an absolute escape of facticity can be compared to what Sartre in another context calls *Cartesian freedom*:

The God of Descartes is the freest of the gods that have been forged by human thought. He is the only creative God. He is subject neither to principles – not even to that of identity – nor to a sovereign Good of which He is only the executor. He had not only created existents in conformity with rules which have imposed themselves upon His will, but He has created both beings and their essences, the world and the laws of the world, individuals and first principles.²⁸

Coming back to Sartre, the destruction of facticity intended by the violent person is a simultaneous affirmation of pure transcendence and freedom.

d) “Nonbeing”, “freedom”: Sartre claims that “nonbeing” is not “not to be”. Nonbeing must be understood as an annihilation of being-in-itself, whose main traits are, according to the description from *The Nausea*, pure being, absurdity and contingency: “The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who exist let themselves be encountered, but you can never deduce anything from them”²⁹. Freedom, another negation of the being-in-itself, is the defining characteristic of the being-for-itself:

²⁸ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, translated from the French by Annette Michelson, Criterion Books, New York, 1955, p. 182. See also René Descartes, *Letter to Mersenne*, 15.04.1630, *apud*. Jean-Paul Sartre, *op. cit.*, id.: “The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been established by God and are entirely dependent upon Him, as are all other creatures. To say that these truths are independent of God is to speak of Him as one speaks of Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him to the Styx and the fates ... It is God Who has established these laws in nature, as a king establishes the laws of his kingdom ...”.

²⁹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, translated by Lloyd Alexander, New Directions Publications, 1964, p. 131.

Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the *being* of "human reality." Man does not exist first in order to be free *subsequently*; there is no difference between the being of man and his *being-free*.³⁰

Gnostic Violence

Sartre goes on to describe violence through two references from the history of religions. He claims that "violence is Manichean. It believes in an order of the world that is given yet concealed by bad wills. It suffices to destroy the obstacle for this order to appear... The violent man is a pure man. A Cathar"³¹. Considering that Catharism and Manicheism belong to the Gnostic nihilism, a movement comparable to existentialism according to Hans Jonas, we should further investigate this argumentative direction. "The whole of Cathar religious practice was directed toward releasing the soul from the body"³² because, according to them, the body was conceived by a lower demiurge identified with Satan, only the soul being divine. Their key terms for Catharism are purity (a desire to escape the miserable prison of the being-in-the-world) and the rejection of the body (which, at Sartre, is the realm of facticity). The ascetic rejection of the "flesh" reminds us again of the modern Gnosticism of Cioran:

The flesh spreads, further and further, like a gangrene upon the surface of the globe. It cannot impose limits upon itself, it continues to be rife despite its rebuffs, it takes its defeats for conquests, it has never learned anything. It belongs above all to the realm of the Creator, and it is indeed in the flesh that He has projected His maleficent instincts ... Pregnant women will someday be stoned to death, the maternal instinct proscribed, sterility acclaimed. It is with good reason that in the sects which held fecundity in suspicion—the Bogomils, for instance, and the Cathari—marriage was condemned; that abominable institution which all societies have always protected, to the despair of those who do not yield to the common delirium. To procreate is to love the scourge—to seek to maintain and to augment it.³³

³⁰ BN 25.

³¹ NE 174.

³² Lindsay Jones (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion*, Thomson Gale, 2005, vol. 3, p. 1457.

³³ E. M. Cioran, *The New Gods*, translated by Richard Howard, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003, pp. 10-11.

At the root of Manicheism we find a “merciless analysis of the human condition, a pessimism largely common to all forms of gnosis and to Buddhism”: human beings are “prey to evil, forgetful of their luminous nature as long as they remain asleep and dimmed by ignorance in the prison of matter”³⁴. The desire to go beyond the realm of the Satanic world (of overcoming both the *Dasein* and the *In-der-Welt-Sein* – the intention of the violent man as well), can be found in a text from the Manichean doctrine:

Liberate me from this deep nothingness, from this dark abyss of waste,
which is naught but torture, wounds unto death, and where there is no
rescuer, no friend.

There can be no salvation here, ever!

All is darkness... all is prisons, and there is no exit”³⁵.

Couliano, in his *Tree of Gnosis*, clearly explains the connections between violence, nihilism and Gnosticism. While Nietzschean nihilism fights against the transcendence represented by the Bible and Christianity, Gnostic Manicheism and Catharism want to escape the false transcendence³⁶ of this world (seen as an inferior production of an evil demiurge), and to destroy it in order to evolve to the realm of the real divinity. As we have seen, the Sartrean violent man (who is both existentialist and nihilist) “believes in an order of the world that is given yet concealed by bad wills”³⁷. Therefore, he revolts against this world and the diabolical bad wills that conceal reality.

We see the same kind of impulse in the destructive violence of Gnosticism. This world, “a black iron prison” (as Philip K. Dick³⁸ has put it) and our bodies are regarded as inferior products which must be destroyed. Just as the violent man, the

³⁴ Lindsay Jones (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion*, Thomson Gale, 2005, vol. 8, p. 5652.

³⁵ *Parthian fragment T2d.178 apud*. Lindsay Jones (Ed.), *op. cit.*, *id*.

³⁶ Ioan P. Couliano, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-3.

³⁷ NE 174.

³⁸ See Richard Smoley, *Forbidden Faith. The Gnostic Legacy from the Gospels to the Da Vinci Code*, Harper Collins, New York, 2006, pp. 183-4: “1. Ignorance (Occlusion) keeps us unaware of this & hence unresisting prisoners. 2. But the Savior (Valis) is here, disincorporate; he restores our memory & gives us knowledge of our true situation (1) and nature (4). 3. Our real nature – forgotten but not lost – is that of being fallen or captured bits of the Godhead, whom the Savior restores to Godhead. His nature – the Savior’s – and ours is identical; we are him and he is us. 4. He breaks the power which this world of determinism & suffering has over us. 5. The Creator of this world is irrational & wars against the Savior who camouflages himself & his presence here. He is an invader.”

Gnostic nihilist rebels against the *Dasein* and *In-der-Welt-Sein*. He wants some kind of purified *Über-Dasein* unstained from the misery of this world. The Heideggerian notion of *Verfallen* might be a fit description for this “fallen” and degraded world (an inconvenient truth concealed by the bad wills who designed this debased creation). One can arrive at this point, after seeing both the Gnostic and modern nihilist account of violence, at a suspicion regarding the idea of transcendence: is transcendence the real cloth of divinity or is it only a camouflage of the empire of the evil demiurge, a veil that conceals our condition of eternal prisoners? We might think that the goal of the violent person as a transgressive being is to destroy the idea of transcendence as such.

ON IMAGINATION AND UNDERSTANDING. GADAMER AND CRITICISM OF KANT'S AESTHETIC IMAGINATION*

ZSUZSANNA MARIANN LENGYEL¹

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I would like to investigate how Gadamer explores the hermeneutic potential of Kant's aesthetic theory in the third *Critique* with regard to the notion of imagination. For the first time, by making some references, Gadamer discussed the question of imagination in his *Truth and Method* of 1960, and we can read as a further substantial contribution his essay entitled „Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit“ (*Intuition and Intuitiveness*) published in 1980. Although Gadamer's approach was influenced by some Heideggerian impulses, he offered another alternative that is completely different from Heidegger's one. I shall argue that even if the question of imagination is not so much stressed by Gadamer, it proves important to the development and ontological basis of the Gadamerian hermeneutics in *Wahrheit und Methode*. My hypothesis is that through the themes of intuition and education (*Bildung*), the imagination is concerned with the human understanding and our interpreting work, thus, its significance transcends the scope of aesthetics.

Keywords: philosophy, aesthetics, Kant, Heidegger, Gadamer, imagination, understanding, thinking schemes, world, culture

Introduction

From the beginning of Ancient times, several thinkers have written about the various aspects of imagination, not to say that this issue is present as a reference point for philosophers, theologians and scholars also today, even though it has never become a centre problem in the history of European thought.

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The term “imagination” can be traced back to the name “Phantasie” of Greek origin, which played a key role with its own intermediate position among the human faculties (but, especially between *aisthesis* and *noesis*) in the third part of the third book of Aristotle’s *De anima (On the Soul)*.² “Phantasie” was originally translated into Latin with the term *visum* (things seen) or *visio* (sight), but, its later Latin translation: namely the *imaginatio* that came from the Latin word *imago* (picture, effigy and counterpart etc.) is better known nowadays, and the expressed using of this new concept appeared in Latin only later, first by Saint Augustine from the 5th century.³ During the period before Kant, the power of imagination was discussed as a process of *Vorstellung* (abstract representation or idea-forming); in this aspect, it has already been put at the heart of interest in the Cartesian tradition. Imagination is here nothing else than our own sight potency (or power of vision) how we can comprehend the reality, the world as a whole. In other word, it was conceived as one of modes of perception derived from „seeing”, thus, imagination was a derived skill, which depended upon the sensory perceptions.

According to *Deutsches Wörterbuch* published by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, the German words “Einbildung”, “Einbildungskraft” themselves with their first definitions were introduced by Christian Wolff. ⁴ Kant first succeeded in setting out the conceptual foundations of question and its decisive philosophical function, thus, his reflexion is always a reference point for other philosophical approaches. Kant did not work out a unique theory on the power of imagination, at the same time he articulated it in his several works (such as for example in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Judgement* of 1790, the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* of 1766 and the *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View* of 1798).

Period after Kant’s *Critiques* can be regarded as a flourishing age of thinking about imagination in the 19th century, however, even in that time the philosophical significance of imagination died away slowly, while its epistemological function was discredited and then the whole problem gets into the scope of psychology and aesthetics. As Matthias Wunsch notices, the reason is why Heidegger’s Kant-book

² Aristotle, *De Anima*, book III.3, trans. D. W. Hamlin. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 427a18–429a9.

³ Eva T. H. Brann, *The World of the Imagination*. (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991) 20.

⁴ Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. (16 Bd. Leipzig) 1854–1961; Cf.: Trede, J. H. 1972. “Einbildung, Einbildungskraft (I)”. In Ritter, J. (Hrsg.): *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Darmstadt 1972, Bd. 2, 346–348., here: 347.

of 1929 (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*) is an important volume that he can firstly overwrite the psychological understanding of the Kantian notion of imagination by means of his criticism of Neo-Kantianism.⁵

In our everyday approach, it is firstly associated with the works of art; however, my present contribution will be about how we can describe the power of imagination related to the human understanding and thinking. What is the meaning of imagination in a philosophical sense? However, if we seek common points among divertive responses attempted by philosophers who believe in the existence of imagination, we may say that in the first place, they endeavour to unravel the “logics” and “grammatics” of imagination. For them, it raises the question how it is possible to get an insight into our own imaginative work or our imaginative ability and its eidetic moments. Therefore, in summary, how can it be reached the human qualifying for and training (*Bildung*) in power of imagination?

Gadamer seems to be most of all committed to Heidegger and the German idealism: especially to Hegel and ancient philosophy, at the same time according to Gadamer, Kant is not a peripheral or minor importance thinker in several important respects. In volume entitled *The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer* composed on occasion of his ninety-fifth birthday, where – in addition to the analyses, critiques and contributions of contemporaries – can also be found the philosopher’ replies to their interpretations, Gadamer was exactly who missed the mention of the significance of Kant in his thought.⁶

In his famous Kant-book of 1929, Heidegger focused on Kant’s theoretical philosophy and on the Schematism chapter in his critique of reason. Heidegger explored how far Kant had reached in the field of metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in this respect, the humanness of reason, i.e., the finitude became essential. He saw the very core of Kant’s ontological sight in the chapter on Schematism. The task of Schematism is to describe how knowledge of being is generated by the interplay of two complementary faculties of understanding and sensibility (*Verstand, Sinnlichkeit*) or concept and intuition/ perception (*Begriff, Anschauung*). While the synthesis of knowledge clearly traces back to the activity of understanding in the

⁵ Wunsch, Matthias, *Einbildungskraft und Erfahrung bei Kant*. (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 22.

⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Reply to Francis Ambrosio”, in Lewis E Hahn (ed.) *Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer: Library of Living Philosophers*. (Illinois, Chicago, La Salle: Open Court Publishing, 1997) 274.: Gadamer writes: „But I am missing the name of Kant here)”. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Reply to David Detmer”, in *Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer...* 287.

chapter on Transcendental Deduction of Kant, on Heidegger's view, synthesis emerges from the operation of schematism by dissolving the intuition and thinking in a "common root". It is the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) that is responsible for this schematism operating in experience as a „common root". Imagination does not appear as an accidental activity but rather as a fundamental form of our relation to being, and as such, it proves more decisive for life than rationality. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant distinguishes the ways of the poetical, mathematical and transcendental imaginations, however, transcendental imagination has only pivotal and absolute philosophical relevance, for it is the condition of the possibility of finite human knowledge. It is the outcome of the operation of imagination that there is Schematism, in other words: the Schemes are emerging and forming by and along which we can think at all. What Kant called Schematism, it is the process of *world-forming* (*Weltbildung*) in his Kant-book of Heidegger. By means of imagination operating in Schematism Heidegger described the *world-forming* character of our finite human being, which was nothing else than uncovering the transcendence. For Heidegger, the operating of imagination was not just another name of the human subjectivity or a new human skill, but a way of avoiding the concept of subjectivity itself.

Gadamer and his Criticism of Kant's Aesthetic Imagination

In contrast to this above-mentioned Heideggerian interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy, Gadamer read Kant from the viewpoint of his moral philosophy and his aesthetic theory. Gadamer's initiating point seemed to be aesthetic imagination in the *Critique of Judgement*, but Gadamer's attention must be directed toward that was not clearly achieved by Kant,⁷ insofar as something

⁷ Hans-Georg Gadamer, „Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit", in *Gesammelte Werke 8. Ästhetik und Poetik I*. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993) [a hereafter: GW 8] 199. Bibliographical note: Gadamer's complete works are cited with the abbreviation GW (*Gesammelte Werke 1-10*. Tübingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) from 1985 to 1995). followed by volume number, comma and page numbers. Other works published outside of the *Gesammelte Werke* are cited with full bibliographical data at their first occurrence, then with abbreviations. All emphasis is original unless to quotations otherwise specified. If there are references to both the original German text and the corresponding English translation, they are separated for example as follows [GW 1, 376; in English: 364.].

remained unspoken in the Kantian critique of reason what is the importance of practical philosophy for our knowledge and for the theoretical issues of metaphysics.⁸ It is Gadamer's hermeneutical ground thesis that against historicism, the theoretical knowledge substantially requires to apply the logic of question and answer for tradition. We come to understand our tradition only if the preliminary question can also be reconstructed to what it is the answer itself. In Gadamer's eyes, any mere critique of the tradition itself is no other than "pure shadow boxing" (*reine Spiegelfechtere*),⁹ and yet he does not proclaim the self-evident domination of tradition, but promotes a critical mindfulness turning to the truth of tradition. If there is any common point in Heidegger's and Gadamer's approach, it is that both they concentrate on the same themes of Kant, which make it possible for them to enhance the historical experience and the aspects of finitude in hermeneutical experience. According to his recollection entitled *Philosophische Begegnungen*, Gadamer was a great impressed by Gerghard Krüger's interpretation on the Enlightenment and Kant's moral philosophy (especially Krüger's two books are remarkable: *Philosophy and Moral in the Kantian Critique [Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik]* of 1931 and *Freedom and World Relation [Freiheit und Weltverwaltung]* of 1958).¹⁰

For the first time, Gadamer discusses the question of imagination in his *Truth and Method* of 1960 by making some references,¹¹ furthermore we can read as a substantial contribution an essay "Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit" (*Intuition and Intuitiveness*)¹² published in 1980, which already implies the development of imagination with special regard to the concept of intuition and the traditions of *Bildung*, exploring this question more thoroughly. In context of these two texts, Gadamer clearly expressed his encounter with Kant. The significance of this hermeneutical Kant-Critique lies in the fact that, in introducing the English edition of the volume entitled *Heidegger's Ways*, Dennis Schmidt called "igniting philosophical imagination" concerning

⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Kants »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« nach 200 Jahren » Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus« (1981)", in GW 4, 336–348., here: 348.

⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke 1: Hermeneutik I. Wahrheit und Methode*, (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1990) [a hereafter: GW 1] 376.; Translation: Idem, *Truth and Method*, Second edition, translated and revised by Joel Weisheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (London, New York: Continuum, 2006) 364.

¹⁰ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Philosophische Begegnungen", in GW 10, 373–440., here: 415.; cf. Ibid. 417.

¹¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 1, 52.; 64.; 68.; 77.

¹² Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit", in GW 8, 189–205.

both Gadamer and the young Heidegger's 'Aristotle Introduction'.¹³ It means that Gadamer goes far beyond an exegetical comment on Kant's doctrine of the imagination in relation to poetry.

After that Heidegger had made some remarks in his workings on art from the beginning of the 1930s, Gadamer was the first who provided a systematic introduction into the hermeneutical importance of the *Critique of Judgement* (1790), where Kant had dealt with the question of self-knowledge or the knowledge on Self through the theme of reflective judgement. Naturally, he does not follow the canon of the regular interpretations on Kant, which saw the power of judgement as a synthetizing point of human reason and as a fulfilment of Kant's critical enterprise. Rather, Gadamer regards the emerging problem "as a permanent challenge to our thought" (*eine bleibende Herausforderung unseres Denkens*).¹⁴

According to the Kant-chapter in *Truth and Method* ("Subjektivisierung der Ästhetik durch die Kantische Kritik"),¹⁵ the *Critique of Judgement* meant a turning point for emerging the modern aesthetics, because Kant's aesthetic theory reinforced the separation between aesthetics and epistemology, and so, it represents the subjectivization of modern aesthetics. Later thinkers such as Schleiermacher, Boeckh, Droysen or Dilthey were also working further under the influence of this approach.¹⁶ The test for Gadamer is to recast the Kantian aesthetics in a less subjective direction. Nevertheless, the primary target of Gadamer's critique first of all was not the Kantian aesthetics or the theory of art, but the process what caused the emergence of the idea of a pure aesthetic consciousness.¹⁷

"The radical subjectivization involved in Kant's new way of grounding aesthetics was truly epoch-making. In discrediting any kind of theoretical knowledge except that of natural science, it compelled the human sciences to rely on the methodology of the natural sciences conceptualizing themselves. But it made this reliance easier by offering the »artistic element«, »feeling«, and »empathy« as subsidiary elements."¹⁸

¹³ Dennis Schmidt, "Introduction", in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) xv.

¹⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Kants »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« nach 200 Jahren. ..." in GW 4, 348.

¹⁵ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 1, 48–87.

¹⁶ Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Orientierung und Tradition in der Hermeneutik: Kant versus Gadamer", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 41. (1987) 3, 408–420., here: 408.

¹⁷ Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 1, 94.

¹⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 1, 47. (In English: 37. f.)

This traditional aesthetic account of art tried to grasp the art as a pure aesthetic feeling (*Erlebnis*) and aimed at the delight of the artwork, therefore aestheticians assumed that the art has nothing to do with the deeper knowing of reality, produces no knowledge, after all, it is out of validity of every truth and lie.

By contrast, Gadamer says: “art is knowledge and experiencing an artwork means sharing in that knowledge”, also “the experience of art is a mode of *knowledge*”.¹⁹ In the finishing part of his main work based on Platon, but sporadically also related to Hegel, Gadamer explored the art no longer within the category of aesthetics, but in the frame of the metaphysics of beauty.²⁰ From this viewpoint, beauty is not a pure subjective felt or a matter of taste, but the “objective” feature of the existing things. Gadamer does not restrict the Beauty to the realm of aesthetics conceived in terms of feeling, but he attempts to retrieve the Beauty in its ancient transcendental sense. Due to the fact that the horizon of work of art entirely transforms, and following Hegel in attacking Kant from this Gadamerian perspective, the beauty of work of art appears as “the sensuous *appearance* of the Idea” („das sinnliche *Scheinen* der Idee”).²¹ Hegel’s remarks on the “*Scheinen*” have two meanings in its original sense: 1. firstly, the term “*Scheinen*” means something that is misleading, not corresponding to the reality; 2. secondly, the “*Scheinen*” can also be described as a sensuous appearance of the reality, where an essence is shining forth in its full disclosure.

In the finishing part of *Truth and Method*, Gadamer’s interpretation moves toward the latter second meaning, so the “*Scheinen*” is not connected with the untruthfulness, fiction and delusion. Rather, the “*Scheinen*” pertains to the Beauty, the “*schön*”, not to say, through the Beauty to the truth. The foundation of the interconnection of beauty and truth means that Beauty is identical with the un-concealment of truth ($\alpha\text{-}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ as an *Unverborgenheit*). The appearance of truth in the work of art is nothing else than – the Beauty itself. Gadamer’s view is fundamentally linked to Heidegger’s reflections on art, which he thoroughly elaborated

¹⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 1, 103.: “Kunst ist Erfahrung und die Erfahrung des Kunstwerks macht dieser Erkenntnis teilhaftig. ... Und ist nicht die Aufgabe der Ästhetik darin gelegen, eben das zu begründen, dass die Erfahrung der Kunst eine Erkenntnisweise eigener Art ist...?” (In English: 84.)

²⁰ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 1, 149; see further Ibid. 481. ff.; 164.

²¹ See István M. Fehér’s analysis: „»Az eszme érzéki ragyogása«. Esztétika, metafizika, hermeneutika”, in István M. Fehér –Ernő Kulcsár Szabó (eds.): *Hermeneutika, esztétika, irodalomelmélet (Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Theory of Literature)* (Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 264–332., especially: 289. ff. see further Hegel, G. W. F., *Esztétikai előadások (Lectures on Aesthetics)*, translated by Dénes Zoltai, (Budapest: Akadémiai Publishing, 1980) I. Vol., 114.

in his later writings two times: in his ‘Nietzsche-Lectures’²² and in his 1936 work titled *The Origin of the Work of Art*.²³ It is not accidental that at the request of his master, even Gadamer wrote an introductory study to Heidegger’s account of art.

Gadamer revived the Heideggerian initiatives of the happening of truth as a hermeneutical *Erfahrung*. Along philosophical achievements of Heidegger and Gadamer – our notion of truth has essentially undergone a transformation. Of course, Gadamer did not only take over the Heidegger’s understanding of truth as un-concealment, but he provided further important and original recognitions to the hermeneutics of art beyond the range of Heidegger’s ideas. According to Gadamer, it is important to what extent parallels can be drawn between the *metaphysics of Beauty* and the event of language (the productivity of *language* for human thought). By means of the rehabilitation of the rhetoric character of language (by Aristotle and Saint Augustine’s theory of Incarnation in *De Trinitate*), Gadamer highlights that the ontological structure of Beauty is applicable to the realm of intelligible, too. The work of art has to be comprehended in terms of language (and understanding). From a hermeneutical perspective, our experiences of reality are *interpretative*; however, it does not mean that hermeneutics should be defined in terms of relativity. Rather, it means that in Gadamer’s terms, truth becomes accessible to us in a *dialogical* form: first of all, in this way, we have possibilities for understanding the domains of reality that were regarded as marginal fields by the methodology of positivistic sciences.

This is the case with the experience of art, too. Our knowledge is irreducible to the field of the natural sciences. This notion of truth goes beyond the truth understood in the sense of *adaequatio rei* (as a *Satzwahrheit*) presented by Thomas Aquinas. In opposition to Kant’s cognitive approach to aesthetics, hermeneutics endeavours to do justice to a concept of truth that is not an act of subjectivity, not merely a private process or an epistemological configuration, but also a public process. In this model offered by Gadamer, truth exists in a *conversation* with others (*Gespräch mit...*). This position places an ontological priority on the meaning that is rooted in a dialogical interchange made possible by language itself. The *phenomenological idea of play* stands as a model for Gadamer’s hermeneutics in

²² Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*. I. Bd. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961) especially see: 245.; 228.

²³ Martin Heidegger, *A műalkotás eredete (The Origin of the Work of Art)*, trans. by Béla Bacsó. »Mérleg sorozat« (Budapest: Európa 1988). Translation: Idem, “The Origin of the Work of Art (1935–36)”, in *Off the Beaten Track* trans. Julien Young and Kenneth Haynes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–85.

that he describes the truth as a happening oriented to the human community and the tradition.

Modelled on the mode of play, Gadamer demonstrates that understanding cannot be regarded as a subjective *Erlebnis* within the experience of art; it has a “medial” nature. As Nicolas Davey writes, the imagination is central in Gadamer’s hermeneutical aesthetics, insofar as it means an essential motif for hermeneutical integration of the experience of art, for it pertains to the ontological basis of Kant’s aesthetic judgement in Gadamer’s view. Gadamer’s hermeneutic aesthetics could not function without an appeal to the imagination.²⁴

Beyond Method: Imagination and Intuition – Imagination and *Bildung*

Avoiding the use of the term „fantasy”, the notion of “imagination” as *Einbildungskraft* is situated within Gadamer’s discussion of intuition and *Bildung*. As Alberto Carillo Canan puts it, Gadamer introduces the expression “*cognitio imaginativa*”, in order to describe the interconnection between intuition and imagination.²⁵ Through the term “*cognitio*”, Gadamer asserts that art is a mode of knowledge, but it does not mean any conceptual knowledge. On the one hand, the concept as a counterpoint is excluded from Gadamer’s “*cognitio imaginativa*”, on the other hand simultaneously, it is also a deciding factor that Gadamer distinguishes the term “*imaginativa*” from Baumgarten’s expression of the “*cognitio sensitiva*”: from that sensory knowledge we get to know in a sensuous mode. It is the term “*imaginativa*” that allows us to increase the scope of intuition.

Following Heidegger, Gadamer criticizes the narrower traditional model of intuition understood as a “sensuous intuition” (*sinnliche Anschauung*) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and he uses a broad phenomenological notion of intuition (this is the *kategorische Anschauung* by Husserl and Heidegger), in order to render knowledge and truth within the experience of art and beyond the natural sciences.

²⁴ Vö. Nicolas Davey, “Hermeneutic Aesthetics and the Problem of Imagination”, in *Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the Art of Conversation*, ed. By Andrzej Wierciński (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2011) 339–352., here: 339 ff.

²⁵ Alberto Carillo Canan, “Gadamer’s Leveling of the Visual and the Verbal, and the »Experience of Art«”, in Anna Teresa Tymieniecka ed. *The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay between Philosophy, Literature and Reality*, (Analecta Husserliana Vol. LXXV) (Springer, 2002) 199–210., here: 200. ff.

For this reason, “intuition” is not only a sensuous-visual perception, but “intuition (representation) without the presence of the object, too”.²⁶ Gadamer’s argumentation leads us from a model of intuition as a sensory perception to that of intuition as imagination. In opposition to the former, this *imaginative* intuition or intuition *via* imagination (*through* imagination) is regarded as *geistige Anschauung*²⁷ and *Anschauung des Geistigen*.²⁸ In this way, intuition is not related to a given object. In Gadamer’s terms, the Kantian concept of intuition (*Anschauung*) here means nothing else than the “representation of imagination” (*Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft*) in the *Critique of Judgement*.²⁹

In Kant’s approach, intuition is the critical counterpoint to the concept, it may be grasped as a correlative to rationalist metaphysics. This means that Kant rejected the doctrine of “intellectual intuition”, and all of this is a part of Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysic knowledge (by Leibniz and Wolff), consequently, the Kantian notion of intuition stands not in the context of aesthetics, but in the centre of epistemology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Similarly to Kant, Gadamer also rejected the existence of „intellectual intuition”, however, intuition as imagination by Gadamer is not restricted to its function in theoretical knowledge, but it becomes a general capacity to have an intuition (*Vorstellungs*) even without the presence of objects. As Gadamer formulates, “the sharp distinction between intuition and concept, as it is established by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was no longer acceptable”.³⁰ From a hermeneutical perspective of Gadamer, one may say that we miss the place where the problem is located, if it is the perception in a traditional sense that we conceive as a starting point for imagination. Imagination must not be confined just to the *co-operation* of cognitive faculties, i.e. to being in service to theoretical knowledge, but is also present in the *free play* of faculties of knowing. The art theoretical problem of intuition is not equal to the epistemological inquire, but is rather related to the broader area of imagination.

For the first time, the term “intuition” and “intuitiveness” were used for the mystic’s vision of God (*Gottesschau*). From this antique lexicological background, it becomes visible that intuition here is not related to the sensuality, the interpretation of it as a sensuous givenness misleads the modern thinking. Intuition understood

²⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 189.

²⁷ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 192.

²⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 201.

²⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 189.

³⁰ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 202.

as an immediacy of givenness is a pure border concept, an abstraction from the moment of mediation. In the artistic problem of intuition as imagination, we cannot apply Plato's distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, in fact Kant also avoided it insofar as he spoke of the *free play* of faculties of knowing in § 3 and 4 of the *Critique of Judgement*. This area is not limited to the visual objects, but the linguistic work of art, above all poetry also consists an essential dimension of it. As a matter of fact, the real home of "intuitiveness" resides in the use of language, since so to speak, what is not such as seen, but is only told in a description and a narration, we can literally see "before us" ("vor sich").

The operating of imagination here is present not in the immediacy of sensitive givenness (*Unmittelbarkeit sinnlicher Gegebenheit*), but it is nothing else than the *process of bilden or constructing* of intuition (*Prozeß des Bilden der Anschauung*).³¹ In Gadamer's language, the German expression "imagination" appears as *Einbildungskraft*, which, of course, includes the world "education", *Bildung*. Imagination becomes a process of *Bildung* (cultivation and qualifying) on which all the artworks are based. In Gadamer's words, "the object of aesthetics as an artistic theory would be appropriately called *cognitio imaginativa*",³² that is to say, the experience of art cannot be understood in the realm of *cognitio sensitiva* (sensory knowledge and sensuous givenness). The original direction of questioning was reduced by the Kantian presuppositions where art was related to the beautiful, the problem is that within this view it is impossible to explore the art as a mode of knowledge. In Gadamer's workings, art appears as a happening of truth, that is why Kant's analytic of the beautiful cannot satisfy the needs of art theory, and Hegel's *Aesthetics* remains closer to Gadamer.

He criticized Kant, however, Hegel provided him points of references. The former provoked him, the latter inspired him, but both represented deep impact on Gadamer. Gadamer pays a great attention to what only becomes a real problem in the field of the linguistic. The "intuitiveness" of the narrated texts cannot be identified with images evoked by words, much rather it is similar to *the process of education (Bildung)* or to *the training process*, which manifests with and in understanding of the texts. In the realm of art, intuition as imagination is not allowed to restrict to the aesthetic concept of value, but in Gadamer's eyes, the power of intuition

³¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 192.

³² Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 192.

(through imagination) can get into motion where one experiences the conceptual understanding or the symbolic in a special empathy.³³

The *imaginative* intuition is not a secondary moment, but is a real part of understanding of art and our world in a privileged sense. It does not only mean that in opposition to the sciences, arts also possess a special truth, insofar as the free play of power of imagination lead us to knowledge, but it is more important that the inner intuition – which is operating here through imagination – makes the world intuited (and not only the objects in it). Hegel quested for this way of world-intuition in his *Lecture on Aesthetics*.

As a starting point, the positive significance of the intuitiveness lies in the fact that it first became possible us to anticipate the interrelation between productive imagination and understanding. The purpose of foundation of Kant's aesthetics is to dissolve the subordination of art from the conceptual understanding, at the same time; Gadamer claims that the difficulties of Kant's notion on natural and artistic beauty can be found at this point. The distinction of the objective art from the nature without object seems to be a failed alternative, because according to Gadamer, freedom from object is also present in the art and in its truth. In the case of art, Kant related the free play of imagination to the concepts, however, Gadamer indicated that, in the realm of the work of art, especially of the linguistic art – imagination is not depend on the limitations of concept, but belongs to the human understanding, beyond concepts. In this way, the free play of imagination is not simply an associative flow of mind, but its free play "implies a real *Bildung*".³⁴

Conclusion

Investigating Kant's aesthetic theory in the *Critique of Judgement*, Gadamer focuses on the artistic beauty in his works. It is noteworthy that in this extensive context of hermeneutics, Gadamer's interest in imagination was guided by the problem of understanding of art, but it goes beyond aesthetics, because it is the encounter with the *Critique of Judgement* that allows Gadamer to elaborate the notion of a dialogical understanding through the realm of art experience.

³³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 195.

³⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer, GW 8, 197.

In his essay entitled "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem" of 1966, placing the free play of imagination in a public and dialogic frame is an essential thought of Gadamer. Concerning the problem of method, the imaginative process already appears *as questioning* and *as ability to explore productive questions* through a dialogical interchange made possible by language. Gadamer formulates so that:

"it contains an indirect answer to the question of what it is that really makes the productive scholar. That he has learned the methods. The person who never produces anything new has also done that. It is imagination [Phantasie] that is the *decisive* function of the scholar. Imagination here naturally has a hermeneutical function and serves the sense for what is questionable. It serves the ability to expose real, productive questions something in which, generally speaking, only he who masters all the methods of his science succeeds."³⁵

³⁵ Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem" in GW 2, 227.

THE ART OF HYPNOSIS: HOW TO REDUCE THE AFFECTIVE DIMENSION OF PAIN. A LITERATURE REVIEW

CORINA DONDAȘ¹, MAGDALENA IORGA², ION DAFINOIU³

ABSTRACT. Interest in hypnotic treatment for pain conditions seems to be on the rise. Recent evidence shows that hypnotic analgesia interventions result in substantial cost savings following medical procedures. Experimental studies suggest that hypnosis can differentially modulate the sensory or affective dimension of pain, depending on the nature of the suggestions. However, there have been few systematic approaches to quantifying this effect across literature and less attention has been given to the specific procedures and suggestions used in hypnotic treatment in research. The present paper evaluates the magnitude of the effect of hypnosis on the affective component of pain. A scientific background presents the usefulness of a hypnotic approach that uses emotion-specific wording that would elicit prior positive experience to intervene at both the sensory and affective dimensions of pain. Such an approach would enable patients who cannot effectively dissociate from the sensation of pain to diminish their affective response. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for future hypnosis research and for the clinical applications of hypnotic analgesia.

Keywords: hypnosis, pain, hypnotic suggestions, hypnotic analgesia

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Introduction

Interest in hypnotic treatment for pain conditions seems to be on the rise and recent evidence shows that hypnotic analgesia interventions result in substantial cost savings following medical procedures (Lang et al., 2000). Among the benefits from hypnosis treatment, in addition to decreased pain or an increased perceived control over pain, there is also an increased sense of relaxation and well-being, and decreased perceived stress (Jensen et al., 2006).

Many experimental studies suggest that hypnosis can differentially modulate the sensory or affective dimension of pain, depending on the nature of the suggestions (Rainville, Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell & Duncan, 1999). However, there have been few systematic approaches to quantifying this effect across literature and less attention has been given to the specific procedures and suggestions used in hypnotic treatment in research. Some experimental studies (Price & Barber, 1987) and a few neuroimaging studies (Rainville et al., 1999) suggest that it is the affective dimension of pain as processed in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that is most associated with suffering and autonomic arousal. On the other hand, pain-related emotions and expectations modulate pain perception and associated pain affect.

The sensory component of pain provides basic information concerning the location and the sensory quality of the pain, such as whether it is sharp, dull, burning, tingling or aching. The affective component of pain provides information concerning how bothersome or distressing the pain is, and determines the overall experience of suffering (Barber, 1996, p. 10).

Jensen and his associates performed a study in 2006 during which they queried 30 patients who had participated in a case series of hypnotic analgesia treatment. Most participants reported satisfaction with hypnosis treatment, even when the targeted symptom, pain intensity, did not substantially decrease. In a quantitative follow-up study performed by Jensen et al. (2008) including 26 people, only 20% of them reported substantial and long-term reduction in average daily pain, yet 81% of them reported still using the self-hypnosis skills they learned during the study. A potential explanation for their findings could be the fact that the distinction between the sensory and the affective component of pain is still underappreciated because, as other studies have shown, subjects that are not so "hypnotically gifted" because they have a low hypnotisability can reduce the affective component of pain as well as subjects with hypnotic responsivity (Price & Barber, 1987).

Whereas traditional hypnosis focused on techniques that would enable individuals to dissociate from the sensation of pain, future directions of hypnosis research should focus on facilitating dissociation or on managing the affecting component of pain. This way, the studies of Rainville et al. (1997, 1999), Price and Barber (1987) and Jensen et al. (2006, 2008) demonstrated that, even though people might report little change in the sensation of pain, they would be less distressed by it with the help of hypnosis.

Future research should focus on introducing a practical hypnotic approach to pain management that would target the affective as well as the sensory dimension of pain, because this way, many individuals who cannot effectively dissociate from the sensation of pain might benefit from approaches to diminish their affective response.


The aim of the present paper is to perform a systematic review of available research literature regarding the impact of hypnosis on the affective dimension of pain. We will evaluate the magnitude of the effect of hypnosis on the affective component of pain as it is presented in the scientific literature. We will point the usefulness of a hypnotic approach that uses emotion-specific wording that would elicit prior positive experience to intervene at both the sensory and affective dimensions of pain. Such an approach would enable patients who cannot effectively dissociate from the sensation of pain to diminish their affective response. The main question is: "Does hypnosis reduce the affective component of pain?"

Material and Methods

The terms used for this research are "affective dimension of pain hypnosis" and two databases were considered: ProQuest and Elsevier (Science Direct).

The ProQuest database returned 1249 results, but after we added a few filters that would help our search process become more specific (full-text papers, peer-reviewed, studies done on humans, articles from ProQuest Psychology Journals) we obtained 9 studies published between 1994 - 2014.

The Science Direct database returned 241 results, but after we added the same filters we used for the results obtained when we searched through the ProQuest database (full-text papers, peer-reviewed, studies done on humans, articles from psychology journals like PAIN, International Journal of Psychology, Clinical Psychology Review, European Journal of Pain) we obtained 6 studies.



We did not have any duplicates, so 15 studies remained in our analysis. Those 15 studies were grouped into two categories: experimental studies (6 studies) and literature reviews (9 studies).

A number of three studies were excluded from the six experimental researches. Two were eliminated because they only analysed the affective dimension of pain and they did not use hypnosis in their experiments and another study, because it did not really measure the affective dimension of pain.

Three studies were eliminated from the 9 literature reviews: one because it was a theoretical paper on pain, one study because it was a literature review on kids and adolescents and one because they also included in their review studies on animals. Therefore, we targeted six studies in this category. We kept in our analyses nine studies, three experimental studies and six literature reviews.

Results

There is conclusive evidence that these two dimensions of pain, one relating mainly to sensory-discriminative aspects and the other relating to the affective-motivational characteristics of pain perception, can dissociate, and that the affective-motivational component is strongly modulated by context and cognitive appraisal of pain.

This affective-motivational dimension can be determined at two stages of processing.: the first stage which comprises the immediate affective response to a noxious stimulus (pain unpleasantness), while the second stage is reached when pain is of longer duration and it is associated with more complex emotional reactions such as frustration, depression and anger. The first stage of affective pain processing is believed to be passed through while experiencing acute pain, while the second stage only becomes relevant in chronic pain (Horn et al. 2012).

Authors, year	Subjects	Method	Results
Röder et al., 2007	7 healthy subjects with high levels of hypnotisability	hypnosis with suggestions for pain reduction	The nociceptive response was less intense in cortical regions associated to both sensory and affective component of pain.
Rainville et al., 1997	The number of subjects is not mentioned.	hypnosis with suggestions for dissociation from the sensory and affective aspects of pain	The hypnotic suggestions were efficient in reducing the emotions associated with pain.
Rainville et al., 1999	11 subjects	hypnosis with suggestions for reducing the sensory and affective components of pain	The pain dimension on which the hypnotic suggestions had a significant effect is influenced by the content of the instructions and not by hypnosis itself.

Melzack and Casey (1968) have described pain as a complex multidimensional experience that contains sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective and cognitive-evaluative components. This theory added a (cerebral) extension to the gate control theory emphasizing the fact that cognition, with its components such as distraction, attention, expectancy, catastrophizing and emotion, plays an important role. In addition, Melzack and Wall (1982) completed the gate theory they proposed in 1965 by saying that certain emotional and cognitive factors like anxiety, attention and expectations can have a special influence on pain perception. This theory suggests the fact that factors like the level of attention to pain, the emotions associated with pain and experiences related to pain would play an important role in pain perception.

Yet, while the pain model proposed by Melzack and Casey in 1968 (Figure 1) is circular by nature and all its components are interdependent, another model of pain proposed by John Loeser (Figure 2) is linear by nature. This begins with the presence of a physiological (nociceptive) stimulus that leads to pain (sensory) that results in suffering (affective). The outer circle represents pain or the behaviours of diminishing it.




Figure 1. The motivational component of pain: sensory, affective and cognitive. All three components of pain interact to provide perceptual information that influences the motor mechanisms characteristic of pain.




Figure 2. Loeser's model of pain

It is a well-known fact that hypnosis can significantly modify the degree of sensory awareness and cognitive processing and it has been used to alleviate the perception of pain in many clinical circumstances (Lang et al.). Lately there has been a real explosion in understanding the basic mechanisms of pain, but despite all these discoveries in physiology, pharmacology and psychology, the studies show that unalleviated pain remains a very widespread problem.

In a study performed by Price and Barber in 1987, the researchers found that highly responsive hypnotic subjects were able to reduce the sensory component of thermally induced pain. However, subjects with low hypnotic responsivity were as able to reduce the affective component of pain, as were subjects with high hypnotic responsivity. In other words, you could say that there is more involved in reducing suffering than reducing the sensation of pain and hypnosis might be of value in doing so even for those not hypnotically gifted.

This way, as demonstrated in the experimental studies of Jensen et al. (2006, 2008), Price and Barber (1987), Rainville et al. (1997) and Rainville et al. (1999), it is quite possible that many individuals who cannot effectively dissociate from the sensation of pain might benefit from approaches to diminish their affective response.

Experimental neuroimaging studies (Rainville et al., 1997; Rainville et al., 1999) indicate that hypnosis can reduce pain affect or pain sensation based upon the wording of the suggestions, with a corresponding reduction in activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).

Considering the agreements presented, we are proposing some future directions:

- if virtual approaches are to be useful, more comparison is needed between hypnosis delivered by a clinician and that applied through technological means.

- more brain imaging research will be useful in pinpointing areas of the brain impacted by both hypnosis and the different types of pain, and to provide more information on the theoretical underpinnings of hypnosis,

- research needs to be carried out on how to improve the efficacy of hypnosis for chronic pain and providing hypnosis in the context of multidisciplinary chronic pain programs. it would be particularly useful to determine whether hypnosis has additive effects to multidisciplinary care,

- more research is needed on the use of manualized hypnotic approaches to determine the type of suggestions being used and the characteristic demands of the situation; few interventions are standardized at this point,

- post-hypnotic suggestions need to be specific to the pain problem and the dimension of pain (affective or sensory) to be addressed. More randomized controlled clinical trials are necessary to enhance the efficacy of hypnotic analgesia.

Conclusions

Hypnosis can differentially modulate the sensory or affective dimension of pain depending on the nature of the suggestions. The research findings suggest that hypnotic approaches that focus on the affective dimension of pain may be more effective with more people than the traditional approach that emphasizes relaxation and the dissociation from the sensation of pain. The results also emphasize the utilization of positive state-dependent learning (Rossi, 1986), advocated by Milton Erickson, who advised practitioners to “discover their patterns of happiness” (Parsons-Fein, 2005).

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THE OTHER IS DEAD

ATTILA KOVÁCS¹

ABSTRACT. The question is whether we can even speak about alterity in our current world, whether the meeting of the other is possible at all, and if it is, whether it should be discussed in an ontical-ontological, an ethical (Lévinas), or a social (Baudrillard) framework. In the “ecstasy of communication” (Baudrillard), the Other appears not as an autonomous person carrying an existential message, but as one of the elements of the system bridging the gap between the communicating parties. As soon as the world becomes a transparent network, the Other loses his transcendent character and is reduced to an insignificant hub in the network that unites the world. We cannot speak of authentic alterity in such a network-like world, as otherness has become an element within an arbitrarily shaped electronic system. An authentic Other is not even possible, since alterity can always be arbitrarily modeled with the necessary technological instruments in the playing field of production. Hence, the Nietzschean dictum “God is dead” receives a new interpretation in this context.

Keywords: self, other, alterity, communication, ecstasy, Baudrillard, Levinas

The phenomenology of otherness is not, and cannot be, satisfied with the reductionist definitions of classical anthropological conceptions that identified human essence with rationality, morality, createdness, or the possibility of moral and aesthetic improvement. The monolithic definition of human essence according to uniform criteria seems one-sided and outdated today. The parallel prevalence of cultural diversification, the pluralization of political regimes and social systems, and multilingualism have directly and unavoidably confronted us with alterity and strangeness. Thus, one could even say that we can comprehend our own identity primarily through the experience of otherness.

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The issue of otherness was overlooked by the paradigms of modernity. Developed from the scholastic theological approach, the modern outlook was exclusivist, intolerant, and radical. Insofar as it thought in precise value categories, it excluded the possibility of opposing values, solutions, and alternatives. However, one cannot speak about alterity in a culture without alternatives.

In this paper, I will argue that our selfhood is not a self-enclosed and hermetic reality that we could exhaust with epistemological, ontological, and anthropological categories, but an open and dynamic world endowed with the potential for change. Furthermore, I will also present the relevant paradigm of contemporary phenomenology, according to which our postmodern world does not view alterity as a heterogeneous sphere separated and opposed to my selfhood, but conceives of human identity amidst its possibilities of confrontation with alterity. In this respect, it is problematic to what degree alterity preserves the fact of strangeness rooted in the separateness from my own self, as is the extent to which we can still speak of an autonomous sense of identity in the context of this humanistic consubstantiality. The appropriated and ontically and ontologically assumed character of otherness opens up the space for a new type of identity constitution, as the uniformity and internal cohesion becomes problematic, since *the infiltration of alterity into the self-identical is burdened with the suspicion of the schizophrenic self*. At the same time, we also have our contemporary world with the “extases of communication”, which put the issue of alterity into a completely new perspective. In fact, the question is whether we can even speak about alterity in our current world, whether the meeting of the other is possible at all, and if it is, whether it should be discussed in an ontical-ontological, an ethical (Lévinas), or a social (Baudrillard) framework.

Historical occurrences of otherness

From a historical-philosophical point of view, the issue of otherness had the most interesting development among the problems of philosophy. As a matter of philosophical principle, alterity was a priori excluded from Greek cosmogony. Greek philosophers discussing the relationship between the *One* and the *Many* always sympathized with the *One*, banishing multiplicity and the changeable/change to an

illusory world, or subordinating it to the idea of a holistically understood *Oneness*.² Transitory being, or any existence deviating from the norm of unity, did not have a substantial ground of being, and as such was unworthy of philosophical reflection.

Aristotle, however, was less faithful to the pre-Socratic and Platonic theory of oneness. In his *Metaphysics*, he takes the first step from existence toward beings on the road of Western thought, fraught by the “forgetfulness of Being”. When saying that we can speak in four ways about being, he implicitly refers to the heterogeneity of existence. Nevertheless, Western philosophy did not deal with the obvious fact of alterity for centuries.

Otherness had no place within the monolingual, hermetically constructed Greek civilization. The significance of the Greek-barbarian duality was rather ethical and cultural-theoretical than phenomenological. Medieval Christianity did not only ignore the issue of alterity, but also excluded any standpoint divergent from the official canons.³ However, even modernity was not any more indulgent with otherness. In its exclusivist rhetoric built on great narratives, it brought into discussion mutually alien categories claiming exclusive validity, which could not contain each other according to their essential nature.

Nevertheless, the ignorance of alterity within certain cultural topoi is not as clear as it might seem. More specifically: we can only identify in these topoi the lack of a well-defined experience of otherness. We cannot speak of an assumed alterity until otherness is included by Western consciousness in the category of the “radically different”. According to the value categories built on dichotomies, the opposite of a certain category should not be viewed as the alterity of the former, since it lacks the consubstantiality on the basis of which these ontological differences can be established. Consequently, in the modern period, man could not be viewed as the alterity of God, in the same way in which good was not treated as the alterity, but as the mere opposite of evil. The disjunction of man and God, respectively of good and evil represented a radical opposition, and thus did not permit for the emergence of value categories associated with thinking through one of the members of the pair and stemming from it, but referring to the other member of the pair.

² In Plato’s cosmology, perfect being is an emanation of the Demiurge’s goodness. Since this is unitary, it excludes otherness. Thus, the androgynous ancestors of humans could not have had any knowledge of the suffering associated with the I-You difference in an imaginary prehistoric state.

³ From a different perspective, one could say that it was these closed civilizations that most spectacularly included alterity, although in a negative regard, as a group of phenomena radically different from their essence and normativity, which they sought to eliminate.

Alterity only emerges where the acting and creating consciousness becomes aware of itself as a relational being in its projection into the Other. Thus, alterity is always based on the projection of my selfhood into the gaze, the words and the acts of the Other, or in the recognition of my own essence within the identity of the Other.

Alterity is rooted in my selfhood: it is a reality stemming from my essence, or at least representing itself on the level of self-understanding as an elemental constituent of my self-knowledge, or even of my entire identity.

Modernity was not only incapable of dealing with the issue of alterity, but also increasingly distanced itself from its essence.⁴ Although the diversification of cultural possibilities, the encounter of alien civilizations, and the boom of abstract thinking confronted European man with the *Other*, it did not clarify the phenomenality of *otherness*. In other words, up until Nietzsche, Western man was incapable of processing the identity of its selfhood projected within the Other.

The explicit occurrence of otherness in Nietzsche

Alterity gradually became a central problem for 20th century philosophies. The issue was essential for French phenomenology, but it first reached prominence in Nietzsche's philosophy in a different context, which is also significant for our present research. In his *Gay Science*, he interprets our true identity under the category of the "mask". According to Nietzsche's own account, the issue of the actor preoccupied him for a long time.⁵ This actor is not someone alien to me, but an attendant of my everyday identity, the Other who lives inside me, through whom I can better understand myself and who offers me a mask that I can wear in order to appear before my own self.

The otherness in ourselves has perhaps never had such a great philosophical echo as it did in Nietzsche. The "mask" reflects the hypostases and developmental moments of the spirit for us, unique, but many-faceted humans. It suffices to refer here to the spiritual development of the "strong-willed individual" from *Zarathustra*, who reaches his or her own reality through the hypostases of the "camel", the "lion", and the "child". Nevertheless, this individual's reality contains an inborn potential, essentially belonging to her or him. The spirit could not proceed

⁴ My arguments here proceed from the paradigms laid down in the essay collection entitled *Figures de l'altérité* (Jean Baudrillard–Marc Guillaume: Descartes et Cie, 1994).

⁵ See E. Bertram: *Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology*. University of Illinois Press, 2009. 134

along this triple path, if its pre-given identity would not contain the potential developmental levels of all three states. The metaphysics of the self-transcending man would rest on poor soil, if the “herd man” would not always already contain the developmental potential of “growing” into a child.

What is the conclusion that can be drawn from the progression of the spirit as described by Nietzsche? Based on the metaphor of the “mask”, we may conclude to the mirror-like character of our selfhood and to the ontological compulsion of its inherent alterity’s development. Due to the possibility of the exponential development involved in his potentials, which are hidden in the depths of his selfhood, man is rather that which he can become. This conclusion, however, does not only carry an existential, but also a phenomenological relevance. The “mask” is the *Other* inherent in myself, who can manifest itself at any time, who raises obstacles before my self-understanding, and through whom I can ultimately come to understand myself. **My selfhood is ultimately developed through the labyrinth that lies at its heart.**

Hence, consequently assumed self-understanding has to welcome the possibility of becoming someone else. *The Gay Science* examines the forces involved in the creation of the transformed man. Modern man is, for Nietzsche, a mask-wearing being, but one who is not conscious of this fact. In the same way in which the masks used in Greek drama materially manifest essential existential situations, the aesthetic quality of the modern man is expressed in poetry and Wagnerian music (which is a topic for another discussion). From the largely implicit Nietzschean interpretation of otherness, we can infer to the peripheral position to which this metaphysical fact was relegated in the modern age.

Modernity’s reluctance toward alterity was paradoxical in the context of a pluralist Europe. Quite likely, the exhaustion of the human dimension through mutually opposed ontological and anthropological categories removed our selfhood from the assumption of inherent otherness. Insofar as Western man thought of himself within the rigid antithesis of the categories “us” and “them”, he held himself at a distance from the recognition of the qualitative aspects of alterity and from the understanding of the potential heterogeneity of his selfhood. The recognition of our identity’s many-faceted character is a merit of postmodernism, which builds upon diversification. Reversing the ancient metaphysical paradigm of “unity in multiplicity”, it eliminates to a certain measure the modern idea of a unified, historically given and largely unchanging selfhood. And to what result? Is it for a harmonious selfhood, or a many-faceted, schizophrenic consciousness that is almost incapable of harmonizing the mosaic aspects of alterity? I will attempt to answer this question in the following chapters of my essay.

The phenomenological aspects of the Ego/Alter ego in Lévinas

Whenever our self turns in on itself, subjecting its identity to criticism, it views itself along with an *alter ego*, coexisting with, but separated from it through its corporeality and spirituality. Through the differentiation of our personal identity from the other, the original experience of the *self* and the *other* represents one of the basic problems of phenomenological thought. As soon as I recognize the ontological separateness of myself from others through perceiving the other, I also simultaneously realize my anthropological kinship with the other, and the problem of *alterity* becomes a valuable touchstone for understanding my own identity.

The personalist phenomenology of Emmanuel Lévinas is about the role of the other in approaching my own personal self and the effects of the “me-you” dialectical relationship on my selfhood. Lévinasian personalism deduces all aspects of the phenomenal manifestation of human identity and its actual and potential attitudes to God and his likeness, the other man, to the ontological totality, to the rationality and institutions of Western culture, and to the metaphysical dimensions (time, death, and the transcendental) from the dialectical character of the “me-you” relationship.

Lévinas conceived of the relationalist approach of human essence within the philosophical contribution of the “me-you” relationship, without subordinating it to the ontological dimensions. Going beyond the naivety of the epistemological and metaphysical dualism of the *cogito*, he viewed the individual not merely as thinking and contemplating being, but as a dramatic being-in-the-world that directly participates in the flow of life events. According to Lévinas, what we think and feel is an authentic and direct creating factor of our identity.

Each person is the exclusive creator, experiencing subject and reinterpreter of her own life story⁶, experiencing the personal character of her own relationship to the world through the modalities of being together. I exist through my awareness

⁶ The main theses of Sartre’s existentialism are quite close to Lévinas’ own ideas. If we deduct the idea of “absolute freedom is absolute responsibility” from Sartre’s philosophy of freedom, we encounter the categories of choice, self-interpretation and the search for identity. The essential difference between the views of these two philosophers consists in the way in which they interpret the effects of the Other upon my identity, as well as in the openness of the individual towards transcendence. While for Sartre “hell is other people”, and he views our contemporary world, similarly to Heidegger, as the age of vanished gods, lacking transcendent values, the ontology of Lévinas carries the hope of rehabilitating transcendent authority.

of the other, letting his person delimit my ego, since my confrontation with otherness does not usually carry any threat constraining my ego, but on the contrary, a perspective for self-understanding. The hermeneutically relevant idea of the meaningfulness of alterity as a starting point for interpreting my selfhood and its instrumental functionality repeatedly appears in the works of Lévinas. To put it briefly: paradoxically, otherness represents the mirror in which I can understand my own being through the awareness of differentiation. In the phenomenology of Lévinas, when on the way to my selfhood, I have to repeatedly stop at the alterity reflected in the gaze of the Other, representing, in fact, my own otherness.

Man is the being capable of understanding the value in the uniqueness of other persons. Our potential or actual relationship with the other hides the intention to understand otherness, transcending the competence of our everyday interpretive skills. First of all, beyond mere curiosity, any approach towards alterity also requires sympathy and love. Furthermore, we even have to realize the fact that we cannot hold possession of the other as a pure concept. He is given in the modality of existence, and as such, he is also relevant. Thus, we unfold our relationship to otherness as we are letting be the original separateness and autonomy of the other; through removing the metaphysical exclusivity from Heidegger's *Sein-lassen* ("letting-be") and turning it into a touchstone for approaching alterity (otherness) in the Lévinasian sense.

Lévinas' theory of alterity is also interesting from the perspective of the epistemology of selfhood, since it leads us to questions such as: how can I come to know myself in the mirror of the Other's identity? What does the autonomy of his being represent beyond its ontological dimension? And how can I go beyond the conceptuality covering its essence in my understanding of alterity?

These questions are treated by Lévinas through discussing issues such as the gaze, the identity, and the ethics of the Other, as well as by means of addressing the metaphysical reality of death. What does it mean to understand the Other? It is to assume his gaze and to talk to him. Addressing someone puts me in an original relationship that does not subject the realized uniqueness of the Other to the authority of rigid concept, but represents the condition of the communion in the vicinity of her existence. The relationship to her has the necessary character of addressing someone. It is impossible to relate to the Other while making abstraction from the linguistic articulation of his thoughts. Through expressing my ideas, I enter the world of

collectively recognized and accepted meanings, becoming the common subject of a community based on a common semantic content.⁷

The ontological characteristics of our attitude towards otherness also impose ethical conditions upon the potential relationships. Originally, alterity is exposed to my will. I can deny it violently, take possession of it, or examine it. Our interpersonal selfhood represents a qualitative effect of the dynamics involved in our relationships with the Other. Consumer selfhood is almost instinctively intent upon ownership. This possessing mode of existence always denies, to a certain extent, any entity taken as a whole. Thus, the owning relationship objectifies and degrades entities to the level of inert instrumentality that is to be owned. We expect from the object that we own to surrender itself and to stand at our disposal, in order for us to exert power over it. Nevertheless, objectual existence lies far from the nature of personhood. It is true that sight also has a subordinating and expropriatory effect, but insofar as the object assumes the uncoveredness of standing before my gaze, I no longer own it.⁸

This is how Lévinas characterizes the understanding of the Other's openness: He does not enter entirely into the opening of being in which I already stand as in the field of my freedom. It is not in terms of being in general that he comes toward me. Everything from him that comes to me in terms of being in general certainly offers itself to my understanding and my possession. I understand him in terms of his history, his environment, his habits. What escapes understanding in him is himself, the being. I cannot deny him partially, in violence, by grasping him in terms of being in general, and by possessing him. The other is the only being whose negation can be declared only as total: a murder.⁹ One can also observe deniability of the Other's denial, stemming from his proximity to my being: I can only relate to the existence of a subject with a gaze in the full sense of the ontological relation's possibility. Insofar as I look into the eyes of the Other, I meet his essence, or the human value hidden in the depths of his identity that I

⁷ The communitarian consequence of the commonly held semantic dimension radically differs from the pathological mode of existence that denies community and destroys common values. In this respect, only a socially balanced selfhood can become the eminent subject of the ontology of alterity.

⁸ There is a serious metaphysical difference between the Gaze and observation. The observed thing remains in the hiddenness of its ontological dimension, maintaining its mysterious character before conceptual thought, as the observed entity is degraded into an ontically existent object brought before rational theses. The person cannot be objectified even by psychology.

⁹ Emmanuel Levinas: *Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-other*. The Athlon Press Ltd, 2006, 18.

relate, even unwittingly, to my own selfhood, and I can disregard its value even in the mode of the most radical denial. The denied Other is an annulled existence, during whose destruction I also ravage a certain sphere of my own human dimension. However, I cannot deny the Other within the face-to-face relationship, and this is why dialogues have a community-constituting value.

The Other's gaze also offers the possibility for the experience of seeing, hearing, and addressing someone. We already know that the encounter of the gaze, i.e. the authenticity of the Other's personhood eliminates the destructive impetus directed at his or her destruction, but it also casts doubt upon the ontical consequences of perceiving the gaze. How can I appear as a gaze for myself, and in what sense do we understand our relationship to the other as a potentiality opening itself towards totality? Lévinas concludes his essay entitled *Is Ontology Fundamental?* with the following statement: the human only lends itself to a relation that is not a power.¹⁰

Through dealing with the issue of the Ego, Lévinas has transcended the classical stances of the philosophy of the ego and the Cartesian theses arriving at subjectivity from the *cogito* that loses its Ego-constituting basis, as he deduces the Ego from the play of discourses unfolding within the interactive world of alter-Egos. We can also recognize the self existing as an individuality within the relational existence: To seek the /as a singularity within a totality made up of relationships between singularities that cannot be subsumed under a concept is to ask whether a living person does not have the power to judge the history in which he is involved...¹¹

Through the communicative factors of language,¹² reason, and the gaze, selfhood conceived of as individuality brings to the surface the *common* reality (and values) of the individuals existing in ontical separation. In order to gain expression, these values make use of our openness towards otherness, as well as of our inherent alterity and duality. The transcendental character of the recipient and the possibility to transcend the closure of language implies the linguistic communication of persons existing as individuals. As individuals, we are ontically isolated entities, but as beings endowed with speech we are also members of the community of speaking beings. "The Self is inexpressible, since the most emphatically speaking being is

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. 33.

¹² This recalls Heidegger's famous dictum, according to which we are not speaking a language, but are speaking from within language, and are capable of doing so because we have always already heard the speech of language. See Martin Heidegger: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 243.

responsive and responsible. The Other as a purely communicating party is not a subject who is known, qualified, and rendered perceptible from the perspective of a general concept and subjected to it. He has a face and refers only to itself."¹³

For Lévinas, the gaze reveals and interprets. I open myself up in front of the other without risking the emptying out of my Self during the discussion; on the contrary, I acquire the meaning of my identity's hidden potential amidst alterity. The other originally contains me as well.¹⁴ In Lévinas' philosophy of identity, the symmetrical content relationship of the communicating parties implies the spheres of love, morality, and the relationship that can be established with God.

The encounter of the Other brings the problem of ethics to the foreground – encountering otherness, I immediately become responsible for it.¹⁵ Of course, the relevance of responsibility transcends here its legal and moral range of meaning. The meeting of each other's gaze manifests the love that touches upon the essence of our being, the destiny that is revealed within the naked gaze, and the inherent human value of the Other. My approach to the Other expresses itself more adequately as attention toward the personal life course conceived of as destiny than in acting in accordance with formal ethical principles. Impersonal and universalizing moral principles are foreign to the dualistic phenomenology of "me-you", as the moral standard is already contained in the unnamable character of our individuality. Lévinas does not discuss the formal moral requirements, since he deduces ethics directly from the individual. Relational selfhood already contains morality.

In the phenomenology of Lévinas, the place of ethical and legal discussions is occupied by the Gaze endowed with a metaphysical function. My gaze directed at the Other ultimately represents the path leading to my own selfhood. In his interview entitled *Philosophy, Justice, and Love*, Lévinas invokes certain aspects of the original metaphysics of the Gaze.¹⁶ It is the Gaze that reveals the essence of the

¹³ Ibid. 34.

¹⁴ C. G. Jung makes a similar point in his psychoanalytic analysis of love: given the tight and symmetrical relationship of the parties involved in the relationship, one could say that they contain each other. The Jungian thesis according to which we can speak of their mutual containment only if their sympathy is mutual is also worth to be emphasized. The cosmological idea of Plato's *Timaeus*, according to which the individual unfulfillment that begins with the division created by sexuality, could be cited as well in this respect.

¹⁵ The Lévinasian over-emphasis upon responsibility is an interesting anachronism within the irresponsible society of individualism. The personalism of responsibility is evidently a parallel train of thought to the postmodern ethics of the kind represented by Alasdair MacIntyre.

¹⁶ E. Lévinas: *Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-other*. The Athlon Press Ltd, 2006. 109-128.

Other, who thereby manifests himself as an identity speaking an original language. However, the letting-be while observing alterity should not be regarded as a moral normativity, because, similarly to the anthropological view of Gadamerian hermeneutics, man is an originally open being, who makes use of his openness in the acceptance of alterity, thus actualizing his own openness. Consequently, the ontological aspect of openness is stronger than its ethical dimension.

As I have already emphasized, the Gaze is both the symbol and the criterion of the accepting and understanding relationship of “letting-be”. My respectful attitude is associated with the depletion of my selfhood’s ontological potential in the Gaze. Since the Gaze represents openness, it cannot be related to other kinds of looking at alterity.¹⁷ Viewing as inspecting or staring is not the Gaze, and is also far removed from the heightening of my self-consciousness through encountering otherness.

Since the Gaze is the result of a certain kind of human behavior, it would be unreasonable to extrapolate it to everybody. The murderer and the executioner, or even the victim lost in a narcissistic closure does not have a true Gaze. The reason for this fact can be found in Lévinas’ answer to the question: “What is the meaning of the Gaze?”: a pictorially represented form based on an asymmetrical relationship with the other. Our attitude towards the Gaze is an attitude towards our own weakness, as I directly glance at my own alterity within the Gaze of the Other. The affirmation of my Ego does not yet entail the experience of alterity, as Martin Buber stated, but at best the absolute validity of the injunction against killing. Based on the principle of the “asymmetry of intersubjectivity”, the other’s state is dependent upon my responsibility. In other words, my own moral values are laid down in my legally secured attitude towards my peers. The Gaze is always something more than a reviewing inspection, carrying the weight of my responsibility for other’s being.

The epiphany of the Gaze confronts me with the culture of responsibility for others within the face-to-face encounter of acting agents. It brings me into contact with the carrier of the conceived Gaze, tearing me out of my narcissistic isolation and leading to the establishment of the *community* formed through discussion and the interaction of different transactions. In this sense, the assumed publicity of the Gaze carries a serious praxeological significance as well.

¹⁷ I have already referred to the difference between Sartre’s and Lévinas’ conceptions of identity. For Sartre, the Other’s Gaze alienates me from myself and manifests itself as a potential danger that can at any time deprive me of my intimacy (see the motif of the “voyeur”), while Lévinasian *Gaze* returns me to my original state that is endangered by social alienation and formalism.

The Other is another human being. Lévinas underpins the transcendental character of alterity with a theological reasoning: God as the identity of the Father and the Logos existed as a pure Gaze before Cain. When questioned about the whereabouts of his brother, Cain tries to avoid responsibility. He does not perceive the personal involvement of the Gaze presented as a hierophany and, reacting with a childish spontaneity to God's question, denies that he should be "his brother's keeper", avoiding the responsibility of ethics and invoking the (incorrectly) supposed independence of his being. In Lévinas' interpretation, Cain affirms pure ontology: *I am me, and he is he*¹⁸; in fact, I have nothing to do with him. However, Cain is very much mistaken in his presupposition of this ontological difference, since I always meet the Other within the horizon of finiteness.

The encounter of other people's mortality awakens me to the realization of my selfhood's most private potentialities for existence. As a result of experiencing death, I realize that the Other's destiny is related to the issue of my own ethics and of life's meaning, since my indifference towards others' destiny can incriminate me before my own conscience because of my responsibility for his death. Thus, I have the obligation not to leave the other alone in the face of death.¹⁹ The questioning Gaze that appeals to my being makes me realize that I have to treat the Other as the *asymmetrical otherness* of my selfhood within my assumed responsibility.

Nevertheless, the issue of finiteness carries an autonomous metaphysical significance, the in-depth exploration of which lies outside the scope of the present paper.

According to the aim of this discussion and to the ideas outlined above, the basic idea of Lévinas' phenomenology of identity could be expressed by saying that the Other represents the path through which I can access the intersubjective sphere of my own selfhood and understand myself as a subject of the culture of responsibility. The Other manifests himself before me as a Gaze using an individual language that I can affirm (through the asymmetrical relationship unfolding itself during the projection of my identity into otherness) or deny it (relating indifferently to the Other's death and thus becoming complicit in his demise).

¹⁸ The logic of intersubjectivity eliminates precisely this hermetic separateness of subjectivity.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 152.

The phenomenological construction and destruction of “otherness”

In his *Introduction* to the essay collection entitled *The Faces of Alterity*, Marc Guillaume states that otherness has become an obsessive theme of current European thought. Its frequent occurrence can quite likely be explained by the everyday confrontation with strangeness, difference, and xenophobia (occurring in the quasi-propagandistic context of social philosophy). The genesis of the problem of alterity is associated with the theoretical acceptance of an alterity which, although not understood, is responsibly related to our selfhood.

The newly-gained dominance of this issue within the self-understanding of European thinkers can be regarded as an important turn. While in the exclusivist centuries of modernity philosophers sought to access truth by the way of introspection, contemporary thinkers attempt to grasp the given state of humanity through *different* cultural topoi and through the comparative interpretation of *diversity*.

At the same time, this can also be regarded as a new approach and as a hermeneutical turn within our Western tradition. As against the thinkers of the past, who sought to relegate otherness to the domain of strangeness, sometimes even with xenophobic overtones, nowadays we seek to understand ourselves through the assimilation of the originality and individuality entailed in the Other's being. *Strangeness* and *diversity* cease to be represented as alienating/differentiating categories and become hermeneutically productive factors.

The theses associated with alterity often have to reckon with the category of radical otherness. The issue of alterity is far from being exhausted by diversity, but also hypostasizes the Other as the personified concretion of alterity, since otherness (*autrui*) lurks behind any specific Other (*autre*).²⁰ The surrender of the Other to the massification and leveling effect of alterity has become a common practice within our Western tradition, blinded by the forgetfulness of Being. If hitherto alterity was used in a general ontological sense, without establishing any special qualitative determinations, attention will now be turned to the Other as a being independent from myself, who nevertheless plays an essential role in the constitution of my own selfhood.

²⁰ The French word '*autrui*', according to its dictionary definition, signifies the totality of people different from ourselves, or, more simply put, 'others'. The semantic differentiation of the term '*autrui*' from '*autre*' is not self-evident. The Romanian translation does not differentiate between the two terms, using the words '*altui*' and '*celălalt*' for both. Nevertheless, a certain differentiation of the semantic nuances is indispensable for understanding Baudrillard's and Guillaume's text. In this respect, it should be noted that the term '*autrui*' does not have a plural form, and can only be applied to people.

At this point, we can complement and correct one of the observations of a previous chapter: modernity recognized alterity, but was unable to autonomously thematize the Other. It could even be said that modernity represents the process of assigning the individuality of the Other under the authority of otherness. It is true that alterity represents, in fact, one of the consequences of the intellectual achievements of the modern age, but it was unable to unfold thematically, since it manifested itself from the beginning under the aspect of an existentially stifling reduction.

The modern reduction of the Other to otherness means something more than the usual conceptual turn; we have to see something more in this suppression than an attitude of modern people toward that which is new. It is the intellectual understanding of the Other's identity that constitutes here the historically undesirable dominance of otherness. Under the impact of various meta-narratives and worldwide political ideologies, the Other becomes an enemy of the *Ego*, a nemesis of the established power, and a representative of the incomprehensible otherness. Ideological conflicts raised unbridgeable barriers between people, rendering any communion impossible from the very beginning.

What happens with the Other in a heterogeneous and pluralist, postmodern culture? Does the Other find its due social and ethical status in the postmodern age, so proud of its tolerance and openness toward diversity? Can our society, as it is structured into various subcultures, even offer the exploration of the values inherent in the Other's specific person, or, on the contrary, does the Other become a victim of the undifferentiatedness involved in axiological juxtaposition? For now, we can only speculate about these issues. I will offer an overwhelmingly negative response to these questions in the last chapter of this essay, insofar as – following Baudrillard – I see the individual in the age of anonymous openness as a victim of spectral culture, viewing him as a being who lost his ability to open himself up to otherness.

In his *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre discusses a certain impatience and closedness that is inborn in us all and closes down the paths leading to the recognition of the Other. On the one hand, "hell is other people", while, on the other hand, Sartre also recognizes that the path toward our self-identity presupposes the stations of the Other's recognition. The dimensions of our Ego that are most isolated from the social sphere can also not avoid the directly self-manifesting aspects of alterity. As M. Guillaume says in his *Introduction to The Faces of Alterity*, we continuously encounter the facets of otherness in the social sphere, appearing under the guise

of delinquency, economico-political challenges, and cultural gaps. In our postindustrial world, the continuously emerging reality of pathology, religious conflicts, and technological terror repeatedly question the ethical boundaries of the Other's acceptance. The occurrences of alterity, often neighboring on abnormality, naturally cast doubt upon the ethical groundedness of our attitude as adjustable to the mere phenomenality of the Other. When our faith in the Other's trustworthiness is shaken, we immediately include it in the category of an alterity that is threatening.

The expansion of Western cultural idioms and the incorporation of formerly unknown, exotic stereotypes eventually led to the acceptance of unknown models, considered to be inferior to European norms. The culturalization of the Other simultaneously symbolizes, beyond its economic aspects, inequality and progress, as well as the sacrifice of the factors left unknown on the altar of knowledge.²¹ If, under the influence of political, economic, or military factors, I reduce the Other to alterity, then I will risk the projection of my own alterity within the essence of the Other. Essentially, alterity is the result of the projection of my current Self against the Other's *Ego*. This is where the great error of metaphysics related to the issue discussed here becomes clear, as metaphysics radically opposed alterity to self-identity, treating it as a heterogeneous quality compared to a given identity.²²

The principled suspension of the perception of alterity as inconvenient strangeness can be expected from the elimination of the alienating and essence-distorting function of otherness. According to Guillaume, the conceptual relationship between alterity and distortion can be broken through the step from the *Autre's* authority toward the world of the *Autrui*. This is nothing else than a humanization process which attributes a well-defined place and role to man within the world. So we can see that the issue of otherness somehow leads to a strong definition of the essence of "Man".²³ The essence of the alterity included in my identity points to an ethical concept of "man". As soon as my identity is constituted through the Other's

²¹ See R. Guidieri: *L'abandonance des pauvres*. Seuil, Paris, 1984, 189.

²² The misunderstanding of alterity in the modern age, conceived of as heterogeneous from my own identity, stems from the unilateral application of the rules of classical logic. We hardly begin to understand our own selfhood when transcending the requirements of bipolar logic that bursts the unity of the ontological sphere, as we begin to pay attention to the logic of Being according to the Heideggerian model, since its structure does not necessarily contrast our selfhood with alterity.

²³ Postmodernist humanism, assuming that one can speak of such an orientation, proceeded in the opposite direction, by developing a weak definition of human nature and by removing from it the world-centeredness of the axiology and the ethics of the modern age.

presence, there is an attitude that determines my selfhood that lies behind my attitude toward others. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the concept of *alterity* and *altruism* have the same root: “altruism is the moral value that has to enable the shortening, or even the elimination of the distance between the Ego and the Other...”²⁴

The cultural experience of otherness is context-dependent to the extent that the experience of the Other can even be regarded as a representative cultural topos, functioning as a measure of the openness and tolerance of individuals. Every historical age had its own characteristic modality of the historical experience of alterity. The attitude of humanity toward alterity changed according to historical age, race, and nation. During some historical periods, people viewed the Other as an incommensurable being that is irreducible to one’s own world of experiences, manifesting toward it the extreme attitude of brotherhood or xenophobia, while our current society conveys rather the experience of permissivity, indifference, and the dissolution of otherness within a misunderstood pluralism.

The breakdown of cultural and communicational barriers paradoxically delayed the intellectual acceptance of otherness. Moreover, it even seems that the openness toward alterity shows a decreasing tendency with the increase of the maneuver space in the other direction. Considering all these factors, we can draw the conclusion, along with Baudrillard, that alterity is a quite rare phenomenon in our contemporary world.

Searching for the phenomenological idea of alterity, we can realize that it is essentially an abstraction. Today, we are unable to grasp otherness as the people of modernity once did. In the mirror of the dichotomous thinking of modernity, alterity was a quality category that could be separated from and contrasted with a specific quality. Currently, it is the totality of the potential world interpretations, or, in an ontic context, of the identities that can be arbitrarily assumed by my selfhood.

The ontic status of the Other’s alterity becomes uncertain within the world of the “ecstasy of communication”. It is precisely the self-understanding of our own selfhood in the light of otherness that becomes problematic in the realm of open communication. While the dialogue with the Other was once viewed as a fortunate transcending of the *Ego*’s mechanism of self-enclosure, we have come to regard it today, in our world of communication, as a phenomenon generating the implosion process of consciousness.²⁵

²⁴ Baudrillard–Guillaume: op. cit. 11.

²⁵ See *ibid.* 62–65.

Our current social processes seem to demonstrate that, in parallel with the unfolding of the openness toward alterity, we can also witness the increasing internal loneliness and the emptying out of isolated individuals, as quality relationships also tend to become shallower. This growing isolation hides in its background the paradox of communication: the qualitative/technological enrichment of communicative relationships implies the impoverishment of the communicative situation's content aspect. One could even say that openness leads, paradoxically, to alienation, if we interpret *alienation as a break in the vital relationship with reality, ending in an unnatural and pathological self-enclosure; although, as we will shortly see, even alienation was not really granted to us.*

At this point, it is worth to mention Baudrillard's consideration,²⁶ according to which, in the age of satellites, our world is reduced to a transparent marble, whose points can be traversed over in any desired sequence, and which hardly contains any novelty or unknown element. In such a transparent world, alterity as something differentiated from my personal identity loses the natural message value and the challenging character that are hidden in strangeness.

In the ecstasy of communication, the Other appears not as an autonomous person carrying an existential message, but as one of the elements of the system bridging the gap between the communicating parties. As soon as the world becomes a transparent network, the Other loses his *transcendent* character and is reduced to an insignificant hub in the *network* that unites the world. We cannot speak of authentic alterity in such a network-like world, as otherness has become an element within an arbitrarily shaped electronic system. An authentic Other is not even possible, since alterity can always be arbitrarily modeled with the necessary technological instruments in the playing field of production.²⁷ The Nietzschean dictum "God is dead" receives a new interpretation in the context of the ecstasy of communication: *the Other is dead.*

Our contemporary world, so proud of its openness, has in fact limited the outlook opportunities of the individual: *if you are permanently outside (ek-stasis) you have nowhere to look out to.* That is the meaning of "ecstasy of communication" and this is how the meaning of the idea according to which everyone lives in their

²⁶ Cf. Baudrillard, *The Ecstasy of Communication* in: *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*. 147.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 146.

own cell²⁸ has to be understood, and not in the sense of closing in upon oneself. In this context, the confrontation with the Other is both socially (Baudrillard) and ethically (Lévinas) questionable.

In my essay entitled *Selfhood at the Fragile Border of (Ab)normality* I “call for a paradigm shift in the interpretation of abnormality and especially schizophrenia, which we have so far interpreted as alienation and a break within the vital relationship to reality.”²⁹ „Because of the basic character of our age, we have to look for the framework of interpretation for schizophrenia within the consciousness processes described by passive synthesis and the “thrownness into the world” of Dasein. In our times, the openness of consciousness and Dasein has become limitless: we are all too open to everything, and we live too close to everything, without any borders to delimit and define our selfhood.”³⁰ “We can say then: the Other, or more exactly, what’s left of it, has been degraded into the consequence of mental functions, having a heterogeneous content. In this “absolute proximity” and “total instantaneousness” of the Other, as a result of original nondifferentiation...³¹ *We approach too closely everything, while we constantly move farther away from ourselves. There is no value-carrying alterity, no objectuality, only stage, vision, space which incorporates the interdependent elements of the network, and, not least, the intrusive mass of images.*”

The reduction of alterity from proper spatial relations to internal, cognitive and cerebral functions leads to the atrophy of imagination.³² The widening of the village into a metropolis and the shrinking of the formerly impenetrable world into a traversable “marble” rendered imagining the enchantment of alterity, that was rooted in its inaccessibility, obsolete. It could even be argued, with only a slight exaggeration, that alterity which is easily accessible and producible is not authentic alterity at all. If establishing the contact with strangeness does not encounter any

²⁸ Baudrillard, *L'autre par lui-même*. Editions Galilée, 1987.

²⁹ Attila Kovács: *Selfhood at the Fragile Border of (Ab)normality*, *Studia Universitatis, Philosophia*, 3/2016, 20.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 20.

³¹ *Ibid.* 21. “The use of the concept “original” seems somewhat strained here, since there is a difference between the original openness to the world made possible by disposition and the schizophrenic openness which stems from the specifics of our time. Although the former kind of openness can also be called schizophrenic, since it recognizes the existence of an effect, or “affection”, which takes place within ourselves, but is not initiated by ourselves, respectively, it also acknowledges our “confrontation” with that which simultaneously transcends us, the two concepts differ from each other from the perspective of originality.”

³² Cf. Baudrillard: *L'autre par lui-même*. Editions Galilée, 1987.

obstacle, the need to address the Other weakens. What is the use of the effort directed at imagining strangeness if one only has to activate the necessary element of the worldwide *web*? Communication, virtual reality, and social media have eliminated the Other in the sense of the virtual as imagination and potentiality: “others do not exist virtually anymore”. At the same time, paradoxically, the Other only exists virtually, but now in the sense of the artificial, simulacrum world that is created through digital technology.

Thus, as a final conclusion, we could cite Thomas Mann’s sentences, in which the words “love” and “faithfulness” could easily be replaced with Otherness (and also with Selfhood): “And he circled with watchful eye the sacrificial altar, where flickered the pure, chaste flame of his love; knelt before it and tended and cherished it in every way, because he so wanted to be faithful. And in a little while, unobservably, without sensation or stir, it went out after all. But Tonio Kröger still stood before the cold altar, full of regret and dismay at the fact that faithfulness was impossible upon this earth.”³³

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³³ Thomas Mann: *Death in Venice, Tonio Kroger, and Other Writings*. German Library, 2003, 15.

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THE VIRTUOUS CITIZEN: REGIMES AND AUDIENCES¹

IOVAN DREHE²

ABSTRACT. The purpose of the present paper is to sketch the possibility of an audience theory specific to virtue argumentation taking as a starting point what Aristotle has to say about political audiences in the context of specific political constitutions and building on insights offered by the New Rhetoric argumentation theory of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and the responsibilist virtue epistemology of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.

Keywords: Aristotle, constitutions, rhetoric, audience, virtue argumentation

I. Introduction

Political animals come in many shapes and sizes. One of the first instantiations of this can be observed in Aristotle's writings, where one can discern a certain link between his works on biology and his works on politics. For instance, we can imagine that one of Aristotle's purposes in his *Politics* was to classify (and to define) the different kinds of the political fauna; thus, the genus *zoon politikon* would be divided into *zoon oligarchikon*, *zoon democratikon* and so on. The fact that for Aristotle, from such an angle, there is more than one type of man, of political animal, and that the types of men are specific to the kinds of states that exist and their respective constitutions and institutions, is clear: "The citizen (...) differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states" (*Politics* III, 1, 1275b2-4³). Now, there are also many ways in which political communication that involves argument with these different

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³ All translations from Aristotle are found in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (Barnes 1984).

species can be achieved. We only need to know their particular *frequencies* in order to get the message through, as we can find out in *Rhetoric* I, 8. There we read some lines that link the difference between citizens to the difference between arguments adapted to the different audiences that are composed of the mentioned different types of citizens:

(F1) “The *most important* and effective qualification for *success in persuading audiences* and speaking well on public affairs is *to understand all forms of government* and to discriminate their respective *customs, institutions, and interests*. For *all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order*. Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of government are four – democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these government powers.” (*Rhetoric* I, 8, 1365b22-1365b31, italics mine)⁴

This fragment seems to indicate that, because there are different kinds of governments, we may have different species of proper arguments adapted to the different contexts. This way we should think that certain discourse types work well in specific regimes (say, debate works best in a democracy while praising speeches work well in a tyranny etc.). More specifically, we have different kinds of citizens which make up for different kinds of audiences. This difference seems to be shaped by the difference in interest (which varies according to government, what is implied by the “the maintenance of the established order” being different in each case). At first sight it seems simple enough: the orator needs to know the interest(s) of his audience in order to exploit that interest towards the achievement of his own goal in legislation (either its maintenance or its change). However, there is more to this than meets the eye. First, knowing your citizens is a question of character which in turn is a question of knowing their dispositions (i.e. virtues and vices). Secondly, it is not just a question of producing arguments, but also of being able to examine arguments produced by others.

⁴ It can be surmised that the short *Rhetoric* I, 8 is a later addition to the corpus of the text (Kennedy 2007, 72). Its placement at the end of the discussion on deliberative rhetoric and before the discussions dedicated to epideictic and judicial oratory, can lead us to think that the theoretical insights provided in the chapter are better suited for argumentative encounters in deliberative contexts.

My purpose in this paper is to sketch the possibility of an audience theory specific to virtue argumentation (VAT) and applicable in a political context, starting from what Aristotle has to say about citizens as audiences in the context of political deliberation. After presenting what Aristotle has to say on the matter and after considering the New Rhetoric as a candidate to understand these matters, I will insist that VAT may also be a suited to offer an audience theory that actually may incorporate insights from the New Rhetoric and in the same time developing new specific insights, taking into account also a responsibilist view on virtues, such as the one developed by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski in virtue epistemology.

II. Regime types and citizens in Aristotle

In the political context had in mind by Aristotle, the audience was composed of citizens who also had a say in the process of government and this was an essential feature since, by means of it, the conservation of the state and its political constitution became possible. This audience was already predisposed in a certain manner, and this was different from one regime to another because even the abstract concept of regime preservation can take different form when considered in particular instances: conservation of liberties in a democracy, wealth in oligarchies, the survival of the tyrant in tyrannies and so on. In these circumstances, what could count as a virtue or vice for the democratic citizen audience may very well be a vice for the audience in a tyranny. In what follows I will first present the theoretical context of political morphology (or classification of regime types) from the perspective of which I will consider virtues and vices of the citizens, discussed in the context of the interests specific to each regime type.

Aristotle's six-fold classification of political regimes seems to have been the most influential at least during antiquity and High middle ages⁵. According to this classification, there are six forms of government, each with a specific constitution (*Politics* III, 7):

⁵ A classification of this type has been called a "political morphology" (Bereschi 2009). The classification into six regime types does not seem to have been without issues (for this see Blythe 1992; or for the particular problems regarding the distinction between democracy and oligarchy Drehe 2016b). Also, for its later influence and reception (Blythe 1992; Bereschi 2009; Bereschi 2016).

Table 1.

Number of rulers	True form	Perverted form
One	Kingship	Tyranny
Few	Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Many	Constitutional regime	Democracy

From the perspective of the quality of the regime, the classification into “true” and “perverted” forms relative to the interest of the rulers, i.e. citizens who have a say in state decisions. If the government has in mind the common interest, then it is a true form, if the pursued interest is private, then it is perverted (*Politics* III, 7, 1279a28-30). These common or private interests seem to take different forms according to each particular regime.

Abstractly, the general purpose of a political regime is, in Aristotle’s view, to resist constitutional change, i.e. to conserve itself. Thus, the conservation of a tyranny will be a constitutional conservation, but will take a different shape in comparison with the conservation of a democracy or of an aristocracy, because the fundamentals of the constitution are different in each case and different kinds of change can affect each of them. This “principle of constitutional conservation”⁶ is essential here and, in short, it stresses the fact that a regime cannot last if there is an incompatibility between the type of the regime and the type of its citizens, because democratic men are not inclined to live in a tyranny, oligarchical men in a democracy and so on; and therefore Aristotle takes for granted the following: “the portion of the state which desires the permanence of the constitution ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse” (*Politics* IV, 12, 1296b14-17)⁷.

Constitutions may change and this happens when a law that is incompatible with the constitution is passed. This is why every new proposal should be checked, in order to avoid this outcome (e.g. *Politics* II, 9, 1269a29-34; cf. *Politics* IV, 1, 1289a 11-27). If this verification does not happen, then there is a risk that a regime could

⁶ For a discussion of this concept and the usage of the corresponding phrase please refer to (de Luise 2015).

⁷ Of course, political regimes and constitutions may suffer change in the form of destruction because of other causes as well, external in nature, such as natural catastrophes or wars (e.g. *De caelo* I, 3, 270b19-20; *Meteorology* I, 3, 339b27-28; *Metaphysics* XII, 8, 1074b10-12; etc.); however, here I have in mind cases where a certain body of citizens exists in order to engage in specific political activities.

change into another as is, for example, the case of an aristocracy that changed into an oligarchy because positions that were temporary given to individuals by means of elections at regular intervals were transformed into perpetual ones (see *Politics* V, 7, 1307a40-b19). This happened, as in many cases, by the citizens accepting the argument of the “revolutionaries”, because they thought that the changes will not affect their constitution. This means that each citizen, before consenting to what is supposedly proved in an argument, should know his best interest in the matter, in this particular case, the purpose of the state he considers himself citizen of:

(F2) “We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. *The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant.* It is clear, then, that we must *distinguish the particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the end of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends.* But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps the speaker convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the character of each form of government, for the special character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it. We shall learn the qualities of the governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them.” (*Rhetoric* I, 8, 1366a3-1366a17, italics mine)

The worst form of government also uses the means specific to the other corrupted forms; for example, tyranny uses wealth acquisition and maintenance, particular to oligarchies, in order to ensure the protection and the luxurious life of the ruler, or from democracies it borrows the means to destroy political opponents (e.g. *Politics* V, 10, 1311a9-1311a27). This means that instruments of persuasion specific to democracies or polities appear in all regimes, and they are used to convince the ruled of something that is for the common good or for the good of the ruling class. If this is the case, then knowing about citizens or the ruled (their “particular customs, institutions, interest” as in F2 *supra*), should be one of the priorities of the orator who wants to persuade them in regard to law institution, maintenance or rejection. And not just this, but he also needs to know about the dispositions (virtues or vices) of the respective citizens, which are, in a certain manner and to some extent, determined by those customs, institutions and interests.

The virtues of the political audience are used in belief formation or belief revision in accordance with the right course of action in a practical context. In the case of political deliberation regarding laws, for example, this translates, with belief formation or revision that is consistent with the constitution of the regime, i.e. its purpose, supposing that the citizens of that regime have purposes conducive in that direction. So, the citizen of an oligarchy will aim to form his beliefs in relation to the values (if we are to speak in terms of the New Rhetoric, see *infra*) specific to that regime type and eventually will reject something that goes against that set of values. In regard to the way an audience evaluates an argument proposed by an arguer (rhetorician or orator), Aristotle makes an interesting point in *Politics* III, 11. The context here refers to political argument in a polity, the uncorrupted counterpart of democracy, and considers a view, not necessarily Aristotle's, on the way the many can be better than the few:

(F3) "The principle that the multitude ought to be in power rather than the few best might seem to be solved and to contain some difficulty and perhaps even truth. For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought." (*Politics* III, 11, 1281a40-1281b6)⁸

The same idea is repeated in *Politics* III, 15, using the same analogy:

(F4) "any member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual." (*Politics* III, 15, 1286a28-31).

⁸ Cf. At a certain point in Plato's *Protagoras*, in the context of a discussion on the teachability of virtue, the sophist Protagoras expounds a myth in which Zeus imparted the political virtues (πολιτικὴν τέχνην; cf. Aristotle's view of *τέχνη* as an intellectual virtue. Also, we read in the *Statesman* that "dishonor, vice, injustice" go against political art or virtue 296c) (i.e. the respect for others and justice) equally to all citizens (*Protagoras* 322c-d). This is an interesting point: each citizen needs to possess the needed political virtue for the community if the peace is to be possible and durable. This was the purpose of Zeus when he sent Hermes with those gifts: to avoid the destruction of the human communities. In this case too, citizen meaning someone who, to some extent, partakes to decision-making in the city-state.

Aristotle exemplifies this with the cases where the many are better judges such as in music or poetry evaluation (1281b7) or that in a work of art, where better qualities, which exist separately in reality, are brought together (1281b10-15). Aristotle states clearly that he is not certain if this is applicable to every kind of political assembly (1281b15-16). Why is it important to give some kind of power to the multitude, since the individual members of it (even though they are free and they are citizens) lack wealth, merit, knowledge or honesty (1281b25-27), features essential for the ones who should hold office? The answer is simple: in order to ensure stability and to preserve the constitution (cf. *Rhetoric* I, 8, 1365b22-31, quoted *supra*). This is because a majority is needed for stability (*Politics* IV, 12, 1296b14-17) and if a good deal of citizens are left outside the governing process, it may cause social instability or, as Aristotle says, “a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies” (*Politics* III, 11, 1281b29-30). This majority, then, is given a role that is mainly evaluative in its nature, mainly electing and assessing elected magistrates (1281b31-32). One principal problem encountered here by Aristotle refers to the counterargument that says that the educated man, the expert is much better suited for passing judgment on such matters (e.g. the doctor in medical matters, the mathematician in mathematical matters etc.) and the multitude has no quality to recommend it in this direction. Against this, Aristotle found the following as acceptable: if the people are not completely degenerated they have a chance to better judgment as a group and in certain cases the results of an art can be recognized, judged and appreciated by those who make use of those products, i.e. the same way a person can sometimes appraise a house better than its builder, the same way a simple citizen can appraise better the work of those who hold office and by their action determine the city he lives in (1281b39 sqq).

However, citizens should be able to act as individual audiences too. And as individual audiences, they need to possess at least certain virtues. If this is not so, then it would be impossible to bring about an acceptable collective decision since there is nothing to add up towards it. In this respect Aristotle says the following:

(F5) “Practical wisdom is the only excellence peculiar to the ruler: it would seem that all other excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The excellence of the subject is certainly not wisdom (φρόνησις), but only true opinion (δόξα ἀληθής); he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.” (*Politics* III, 4, 1277b25-29; cf. *Politics* I, 8, 1256a4-7; *Politics* I, 10, 1258a19 sqq. and *Eudemian Ethics* VII, 13, 1246b11)

The fact that a citizen has specific virtues, is stressed by Aristotle when he says that a good citizen should not be considered the same as the good man, because they may have different virtues (*Politics* III, 4, 1276b34-35) and the purpose of the regime, as seen above, determines the virtues a proper citizen should have (*Politics* III, 4, 1276b20-33). There, of course, a case in which the virtues of a good man and the virtues of the good citizen can be the same, i.e. they should both have practical wisdom: the case of the constitutional regime (*Politics* III, 4, 1277a14-15). Why does the ruled citizen need to have true opinion as a virtue? This may be interpreted that he needs true opinion in order to be able to identify himself in the position of the one who is persuaded by a practical reasoning process into action. Another way of seeing this is that true opinion is needed in relation to the specifics of the constitution of his city-state in order to be able to detect whenever the ruler acts against it. And, of course, several more ways of interpreting this are possible, inclusively that he needs true opinion in order to be able to practice his art (i.e. job) properly as it is important for the community, this being directed by the practical wisdom of the ruler. However, to choose between these versions of interpretation without proper textual support would be inappropriate. What interests us here is that citizens, as ruler-ruled audiences have certain virtues which may influence political decision making. At an initial phase this decision may be individual, but in the end, collectively, another, possibly better, decision may emerge. So, we can consider the two contexts where the virtues of the political audience are at work: individual and collective, and in each of these the way they assess arguments is based on the virtues they have, which in turn can be determined by the values they adhere to.

In order to understand the way argument works in political context, we should, as one would expect, appeal to the rhetorical explanations present in both in Aristotle's works and in the exegesis dedicated to the subject. But the purpose in this case is to understand what is the role of virtue and to understand this from the perspective of an argumentation theory. At this point, the best suited argumentation theory for the job seems to be the New Rhetoric, developed by Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.

III. Audiences and values

The essential role of the audience in argumentation was recognized since antiquity, but was brought back to the fore in the 20th century by the New Rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958, 1969 eng. tr.). From the perspective of the

New Rhetoric, audience is the entity that the arguer wants to influence by gaining their acceptance and the argument is something that should be tailored to the values held by that audience:

(F6) “we consider it preferable to define an audience, for the purposes of rhetoric, as *the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation.*” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 19)

As we can observe, the focus here is on the arguer as persuader of an audience and the audience as a critical receptor of the argument, or rather rhetorical argument. Audience is classified into particular and universal (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 28-35 etc.). In short, what should be underlined here is that the audience from the perspective of the New Rhetoric is not described in terms of its dispositions (virtues or vices) that would ensure or not the critical acceptance or rejection of arguments, but from the perspectives of the values it adheres to in relation to the persuasive purpose of the arguer. These values are the equivalent of the “customs” an audience has and the purposes it has. These values are arranged into hierarchies by means of *loci* (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 83-85 etc.) and are of two kind: abstract and concrete (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 74-79 etc.). If we are to consider political audiences from this perspective, we can imagine that there are audiences that have democratic values, aristocratic values and so on.

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, virtues seem to be certain kinds of values (e.g. see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 199) and in the New Rhetoric it seems that there are categories of virtues, their distinction being the result of the relations they have with concrete or abstract values. For example, justice is linked to abstract values, while a virtue such as loyalty is related to concrete values (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 77). In this case, the exact nature of the relation between values and virtues is not pursued further, although it is clear that the audience is predisposed to evaluate the argument in a certain manner depending on the what values it holds⁹. In what follows I will try to explore the relation between virtues and values and to show, building on a responsibilist view, that there actually is a closer relation between certain virtues and values, in the sense that values may be “in-built” or “incorporated” into virtues as virtues of a motivational kind.

⁹ However, this does not seem to translate directly into “what virtues it has” because the fact that you hold a virtue in high esteem (i.e. you “value” it) or a vice in contempt this does not mean that you automatically possess them or not.

IV. Virtues of the audience

We can already find VAT scholarship that deals or touches on the issues of the virtuous audiences or that of political argument. The topic of audiences was already introduced by Daniel Cohen several years before VAT emerged (see Cohen 2003). Cohen argues for the need to incorporate the audience as an important factor when thinking about arguments in the context of the three possible “root metaphors” about argumentation: ‘arguments-as-proofs’ (logic), ‘argumentation-as-war’ (dialectic) and ‘arguing-as-making-a-case/arguing-as-presentations’ (rhetoric) (Cohen 2003, 114). Out of these, the last one includes audiences as an essential part of the argumentation process, the context being performative and the purpose being rational persuasion. Apart from the general conditions that should be met (e.g. validity of argument), one has to consider the need for an “idealized model interlocutor” and a “idealized audience” (Cohen 2003, 116-117). Two years later, Cohen proposed a focus not just on the arguments or the arguer but also on the “correlative concepts of Ideal Audiences and Ideal Interlocutors” (Cohen 2005, 64). In this case the Ideal arguer can be of three types: ideal protagonist, ideal antagonist and ideal audience (Cohen 2005, 65). In the context of VAT, this can be called “the virtuous audience”. However, it also has a counterpart, the less than ideal (or “vicious”) audience, examples of it being the “Deaf dogmatist” or the “Eager believer” (Cohen 2005, 61). Another interesting discussion on the virtuous audience, inspired by Perelman, is provided in (Al Tamimi 2016). The virtuous audience is seen as an active part in the argumentative process, i.e. not only listens and receives, but influences the actual process and this happens because the argument should be adapted to it. This can possess certain virtues which can help it to reject bad narratives. Al Tamimi also provides a list (picked out from Aberdein 2010, 175) of virtues that the virtuous audience should cultivate such as being communicative, faith in reason, insight into persons, insight into problems, fair-mindedness etc. to which Al Tamimi adds the fairness of intention and critical trust (Al Tamimi 2016, 6-7). Also, VAT has already been shown as a suitable and useful medium to understand argument in a political context. For example, topics such as that of argumentative vices in modern democratic debates (Kock 2013; Zarefsky 2013) or argumentative virtues in revolutionary discourse (Aonuma 2013, Noonan 2013) were already discussed.

When considering audience from the perspective of VAT, we should bear in mind that in every argumentative encounter, those engaged in argument production and appraisal have specific purposes, apart from the general goal of the discussion, as can

be observed in the classification of dialogue types and goals to be found in (Walton & Krabbe 1995, 65). One issue that maybe has not been given enough thought is the goal of the audience. The goal of the arguer in a persuasion dialogue is plain and simple, as seen in (Walton & Krabbe 1995, 66), “to persuade the other party”. But what about the other party? To resist persuasion? Not really, because what the audience is to be persuaded about might be true (or something else that is relevant) and then the audience will miss out on a great deal. To be persuaded? Even less likely. These two purposes might be the ones had by what Daniel Cohen called “deaf dogmatist” and “eager believer”, mentioned above. What then? The audience wants to be informed about something (or does not want to be left in the dark). The audience wants to be informed about the best course of action (or not to be misled). The audience wants to understand. The audience wants to be entertained (or not to be bored), having enjoyment as a goal. The audience wants to be inspired (or not discouraged). The audience wants to gain (not to be cheated - e.g. a trader engaged in negotiation). The audience wants to be praised (not blamed - e.g. a tyrant). While in the case of arguers in some circumstances the goals can be different of these (e.g. the arguer might want to intentionally mislead his audience), in the case of audiences there is no choice between two opposite goals - i.e. one does not ponder whether he would prefer to be misled or to be told the truth. While as arguers we might want to deceive, or not, as audience, under normal circumstances, there is really one way of seeing things. Thus, a further distinction can be operated in the case of the “participants’ goal” category, at least in some cases: the goals of participants as arguers and as audiences are different in nature. The aim of the arguer considered in this light is *purpose-open* while the aim of the audience is *purpose-locked*. For example, in the case of persuasion dialogue, the purpose of the participant as arguer is to persuade rationally or non-rationally the other party, while the aim of the participant as audience is to avoid persuasion in the situations where non-rational factors might determine it¹⁰. Considered from this perspective and the fact that in a dialogue interlocutors may change roles, we can say that the general aim of the dialogue remains the same, but a change from arguer to evaluator/audience may bring about a change in the nature of the personal aim.

¹⁰ This distinction is needed because non-rational factors do act upon argumentation in actual encounters and specific dispositions such as virtues of argument can help arguers to altogether avoid or to mitigate their influence, while negative dispositions such as those named argumentative vices make the agents involved in an argument more susceptible of committing errors (cf. Drehe 2015; Drehe 2016a, 391-393).

As said in a previous section, in the case of political argument, at least in that of the one specific to Classical Greece in the time of Aristotle, dialogue types such as persuasion, deliberation or eristic might all be part of more complex encounters and so political argument can be seen as a mixed dialogue type comprised of persuasive, deliberative or eristic sequences. Usually in these cases the audience is composed of citizens who have a say in lawmaking or law application. And these citizens have a specific goal when they listen to an argument. This goal is the motivation component of their virtues as an audience and it is actually determined by the values they adhere to. I have in mind the motivation component as in the case of the responsibility virtue epistemology. For example, virtue is defined by Linda Zagzebski in the following manner:

(F7) “A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, *involving characteristic motivation* to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end” (Zagzebski 1996, 137; italics mine)

Understanding audience from the perspective of the motivation component is important and it can show that an arguer qua audience is different from an arguer qua argument producer because the motivation component in the case of the audience is, or it should be, under normal circumstances, always fixed: in the sense that while the argument producer may be motivated to argue correctly or not, an audience will always be motivated to interpret and evaluate an argument correctly, as also stated above. So, *purpose-open* here translates into *motivationally-open* and *purpose-locked* means *motivationally-locked*.

Having this in mind, a possible view on audience from the perspective of VAT, also based on the consideration that argumental virtues are instrumental, and that the way they are used in argument evaluation by the audience is determined by the specific purposes of the audience has, i.e. its values, can be conceived. These are actually manifestations of other virtues, which I called teleological, and by this I understand that some virtues may act as motivation component to other virtues. In a paper that dealt partially with the nature of argumental virtues I distinguished between instrumental virtues and teleological virtues, comparing this with the relation that exists in Aristotle between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. There I said that argumental virtues are instrumental, while other virtues such as ethical or epistemological ones are teleological (see Drehe 2016a, 390). Now, a fairly obvious thing is that virtues as internalized normative dispositions do not usually act alone

and their activations, so to say, does not exclude automatically the activation of other dispositions. In other words, whenever my virtue of humility works this does not necessarily exclude my virtue of fairness in evaluating arguments¹¹. This also holds of virtues that are considered more as skills, i.e. the virtue of knowing the rules of reasoning. And when a virtue such as the sense of fairness works along the virtue/skill of knowing the rules of reasoning, it actually provides a motivation component to the skill-virtue. In other words, at least two types of virtues work when we argue or evaluate arguments: skills (intellectual virtues), motivations (moral virtues). Both of these can be active or not. The following table collects the possible combinations:

Table 2.

	Intellectual virtue / Skill component	Moral virtue / Motivation component	Result
Argument producer	Active	Active	Valid argument
	Active	Not active	Sophism
	Not active	Active	Paralogism or accidental valid argument
	Not active	Not active	Paralogism, accidental sophism or accidental valid argument ¹²
Argument evaluator	Active	Active	Valid evaluation
	Not active	Active	Paralogistic evaluation or accidental valid evaluation

If we see the working of virtues in this manner, then in the case of audience, the open-locked distinction becomes plausible: while in the case of argument producer the motivation component may change (e.g. the virtue of knowing the rules of reasoning motivated by virtues or by vices, i.e. active or inactive moral virtue; as Plato would say: experts are the best liars), in the case of the audience the virtuous

¹¹ Although it might be interesting to find virtues that whenever they are working exclude the workings of others.

¹² When the arguer manages to construct the right seemingly valid argument for the argumentative context he is in, the we can call that an „accidental sophism”, in the other cases either he fails by using the wrong invalid argument (paralogism) or he argues validly by chance (accidental valid argument). Cf. Plato’s *Lesser Hippias* 366a-369a where Socrates determines his interlocutor to concede that expert is the best liar as he can tell the truth or lie whenever he wants, while the ignorant can do so only accidentally. A more detailed discussion on this classification of possible results when one or more virtue are activated will be developed in a future paper.

motivation component is hardwired in the use of the virtue-skill, because nobody as an audience would want to interpret and evaluate arguments incorrectly. If this is the case, then from the perspective of the audience only paralogisms are possible, i.e. unintentional errors in interpretation¹³. This holds most true of individual audience, and what Aristotle has to say about “true opinion” as a virtue can be speculatively interpreted from this angle.

The issue about how people act as audiences, individually and/or collectively, is important here. While what has been said in this subsection applies more to an individual audience, the case of collective audiences should be more nuanced because the deliberative process of an audience involves the switching of roles, the arguer-qua-audience becoming arguer-qua-producer having the purpose of correct collective evaluation. What Aristotle had to say about the greater chances of the collective audience to evaluate an argument correctly (F3, F4, v. *supra*) can be considered in this light. Individuals are more predisposed to paralogistic argument evaluation when evaluating alone, while in a group, as long as the virtues of the members complement each other, the chances of paralogistic evaluation are lower.

How does paralogism appear in a situation of this sort? We should ask ourselves about the role of purpose in the context of individual and collective argument evaluation? Let us take the case of an oligarchy, where wealth, its acquisition and its conservation, is the main purpose of the regime? How will the oligarchic citizen (and here I mean only the ruling class of the few, in the classical sense) evaluate arguments? Will his evaluation be influenced by his purpose? More specifically, does this affect his in-built disposition of *the will to evaluate the argument correctly* (which should not be confused with his *ability to understand the argument correctly*)? The answer should be no (maybe with the exception of people too blinded by their interest), only the disposition/ability to properly understand an argument might be affected. And in this case paralogistic argument evaluation is possible.

Argument evaluation in political context needs to consider especially collective audiences and developing a view on what a collective audience means involves the need of a clearer picture on the working of argumentational virtues in the case of individual audience. The individual-audience is purpose-locked in a certain manner, while

¹³ Here I refer only to the process of argument appraisal and the conclusion formed in the mind of the audience by the argument, not to the verbally expressed judgments about the argument, because in it the possibility of sophistry appears as the arguer-qua-audience becomes arguer-qua-emitter who already argues for or against the argument.

the collective audience in another. The individual audience is predisposed to evaluate argument correctly, the collective political audience is predisposed to conserve the political status-quo, i.e. the constitution by means of evaluating arguments correctly. In this case, this acts as a second motivation component that adds itself to the first: individual political audience has a direct motivation component (the intention to evaluate argument correctly) and a second, indirect motivation component (the will to preserve the political constitution). There are cases where the second motivation component may eclipse the corresponding ability to the first motivation component, by deactivating it, as described earlier. But group deliberation, if the conditions are proper, then it is possible for the ability (i.e. the intellectual virtue or the skill component) to be reactivated. The fragments F3 and F4 from Aristotle's *Politics*, quoted above, can also be understood in this manner.

This can be translated into other contexts too, where collective audiences exist and their purpose is to conserve a certain type of community. For example, we can imagine epistemic or economic communities where the collective purpose of conserving the communities and their specific purposes is not threatened by overly individualistic aims (such as an extreme adversarial predisposition, i.e. vice, in argument for epistemic communities, where colleagues are actually seen as adversaries who need to be completely silenced or, in an economic context, extreme cupidity that pursues the utter ruin of one's economic partners, who are seen as adversaries). However, more consideration on these situations is not the purpose of the present paper¹⁴.

V. Concluding remarks

A view on audience that is considered from a rhetorical perspective is too restrictive for virtue argumentation theory: it involves only an audience that has the arguments fitted to its needs, or, more exactly, to its views. In real argument, this is not a general rule and we can identify many instances where the arguer, or the producer of arguments, does not model his discourse according to the audience.

¹⁴ Of course, this can at some point be adapted to modern regime types which are more complex. E.g. from an economic point of view, the citizen of a communist regime should be predisposed to accept easily a certain type of propaganda, while the citizen in a capitalist country should be more susceptible to consumerist advertising. All this for the conservation of the status quo. Please note that I am not saying that citizens should be so an so predisposed. I am only underlining the fact that in each political regime the ones in power consider a certain kind of citizen best suited for the conservation of the regime and this is based in a significant part on the mental configuration of the citizens.

At this point, it is hard to develop an audience theory specific to VAT that is not tributary in many ways to the views exposed in the *New Rhetoric*. And this happens because it is hard to distinguish between a universal audience (and its standard of reasonability) and an ideal virtuous audience, or to discern exactly how do certain types of virtues differ from values. This paper is exploratory in its purpose, and a sketch of the way in which we can incorporate the value theory from the *New Rhetoric* into a responsibilist, following Linda Zagzebski's take on virtue epistemology, was attempted; such a view on virtues considers the values of the arguer (either producer of arguments or audience) as the motivation component in argumentational virtues. The motivation component translates on the interference of teleological virtues into the workings of the instrumental virtues such as are the argumentational ones. There are still a lot of unexplored aspects of this responsibilist view, with incorporated values, on argumentational virtues, with a specific focus on individual argument evaluation by the audience and on collective argument evaluation, especially from the perspective of the way individual argument evaluation determines collective argument evaluation and vice versa. This distinction between argumentational virtues specific to the arguer considered as an individual audience and those virtues specific to an arguer as part of a collective audience will be eventually developed in future research.

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SAINT AUGUSTINE'S AND DANTE'S MODELS OF HISTORY¹

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ABSTRACT. In this paper I will try to analyze St. Augustine's and Dante's views towards history by showing how their visions can be articulated into particular models of history, i.e. a particular schema that describes the unfolding of history with its specific focal points, and to what extent this model differs from one author to another. If in Augustine's case, by exploring his division of sacred history in component parts, that can be found throughout his work, I will argue for a Christocentric model, in Dante's case, by analyzing his work on political philosophy, *De monarchia*, I will argue for a teleological model of history.

Keywords: St. Augustine, Dante Alighieri, models of history, eschatology, apocalypticism, *De monarchia*;

Introduction

In the existing literature on St. Augustine and Dante we can find many studies which are trying to analyze separately their views towards history, assessing their historical context, doctrinal content and eschatological implications. As a matter of fact, this method is quite adequate since the corresponding historical considerations were developed at a distance of almost nine centuries apart, in different contexts, with different means, by two different kind of writers. Nevertheless, by addressing this subject separately, we can easily lose ourselves in details without managing to grasp which are the specific elements of their view and in what way they are articulated in a general picture. To achieve this goal, I propose a comparative study that will try to

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describe St. Augustine's and Dante's views towards history in contrast, under the concept of a model, i.e. a particular schema that describes the unfolding of history with its specific focal points.

As I will try to show, from the following introductory remarks, Augustine's and Dante's views towards history are from a starting point different, in spite of a similar crisis scenario that could be traced in their intellectual climate. Their particular considerations can be distinguished in terms of purposes, sources, types of history to which they subscribe and intensity of apocalypticism.

Augustine of Hippo, one of the most important fathers of the Christian Church, writes in a place and a period that should not be marginalized, especially when we try to understand his conception of history. Starting in Thagaste, then in Madaura, Cartagina, Roma, Milan and Hippo Regius, Augustine lived on the territory of the Roman Empire. Already from the very beginning of the Christian era, the vast Roman area suffers a series of changes that affects its population. In this sense, we can speak about a pre-Constantine era and a post-Constantine one³. The difference between these two consists of an entirely different way in which the secular power related to the Christians. If in the first era we are faced with the persecutions of Christians made by Nero, Maximus Thrax, Decius, Diocletian and Galerius, after Constantine I and the Edict of Milan, the attitude of the Roman Empire is gradually changing from one of oppression to one of acceptance and favor towards Christianity. This state of affairs does not have only a historical relevance, but most importantly a hermeneutical one, inasmuch as this change of attitude is one of the main factors which transformed the manner in which the Christian apologists relate to their own history and religion⁴. Afterwards, as Christopher Kelly⁵ is pointing out, the Roman Empire does not seem to have such an optimistic future. Starting with reign of Constantine I, until the death of St. Augustine, the Empire can be generally depicted as being in a situation of crisis. The internal destabilization, the continuous division of the Empire and the external imminent threats are factors of this state of affairs, that will culminate in the end with the conquest and sack of Rome in 410 by Alaric's forces.

In this troubled period of the 4th-5th centuries, we encounter, two types of historical narratives: secular history and sacred history narratives. The first one is usually used by pagan historians such as Eutropius, Festus and Ammianus Marcellinus.

³ See Geir Hellemo, *Adventus domini: Eschatological Thought in 4th-century apses and catecheses*, Brill, 1989, pp. 131-138.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ See Mark Vessey, *A companion to Augustine*, Blackwell, 2012, pp. 11-24.

Although they present a pessimistic vision of history, the eschatological theme, the theme of an historical ending, and especially of an apocalyptic eschatology, does not appear. The second one is used in general by Christian writers and is described as a narration based on the Scriptures that comprise a group of events, which lay at the foundation of Christian faith. In this sacred history, the Christians see the manifestation of God's might for the benefits of the chosen people in his acts, which will come to a fulfilment through Christ⁶. Regarding St. Augustin, he distances himself from the tradition of secular history, and from a specific way of making sacred history narratives that has the intention to correlate sequences of the secular history with those of the biblical one. In his case, the division of history and the considerations regarding each moment of history in part are made in the framework of sacred history, described in the authoritative texts of Christian religion, the Sacred Scripture. In so far as the sacred text is considered to be of revealed and inspired nature, it is the basis of the Christian religion. Observing that Augustine in *Of True Religion* describes this basis as "the prophetic history of the dispensation of divine providence in time—what God has done for the salvation of the human race, renewing and restoring it unto eternal life."⁷, namely as an inspired narrative which contains all the necessary means offered by God for the salvation of man, every narrative of sacred history will be for the sake of knowing the Christian truth. As we will see, this catechetical dimension of his sacred history will cause a preference for a model of history in which the Christic episode takes precedence over the eschatological moment, eliminating the possibility of an apocalyptic eschatology.

Regarding the eschatological aspect, in recent studies we find a conceptual difference between: general eschatology and apocalyptic eschatology or apocalypticism. The first kind denotes any sort of beliefs or statements about the end of time and the ultimate fate of the individual soul, while the second kind denotes the belief that the end of history is imminent and will entail a series of crises, followed by the defeat of evil and the triumph of the chosen⁸. Regarding apocalyptic eschatology, Bernard McGinn⁹ is emphasizing that its origins can be traced back to the Judaic

⁶ For both kind of history see R. A. Markus, *Saeculum: history and society in the theology of St. Augustine*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 1-16.

⁷ J. H. S. Burleigh (ed.), *Augustine, Earlier writings*, Westminster John Knox Press, 2006, Augustine, *Of True Religion*, VII. 13, p. 232.

⁸ See Brett Edward Whalen, *Dominion of God. Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 237, note 2, and Richard K. Emmerson, Bernard McGinn, *The Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*, Cornell University Press, p. 20.

⁹ See Richard K. Emmerson, Bernard McGinn, *The Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*, Cornell University Press, pp. 4-7.

texts of the second temple's period (530 BCE - 70 CE). They describe a vertical revelation of the universe and secrets of the paradise, and a horizontal one, a revelation of the historical sense and of the world's end¹⁰. The knowledge of the divine plan through these revelations determines a search for "the signs of the time", which can reveal a relation between contemporary events and the final end. Nevertheless, the same author points out that the vision of history from these texts does not admit the idea of progress; the end is presented as an eruption of the divine element and not as an effect of human efforts¹¹. As far as Christianity is concerned, it slowly moves away from this kind of interpretation of the end, especially in the East. Origen, Dionisius of Alexandria, Methodius of Olympus, are maintaining a spiritual understanding of Apocalypse¹². But in the West, as Hieronymus is reporting, some Latins like Tertullian, Victorinus, Lactantius, and also Greeks like Irenaeus¹³, are advocating for an *ad litteram* interpretation of the final book of Scripture. In spite of this diversity, one thing seems clear, that the post-Constantine period brought a relaxation of the apocalyptic eschatological view. As Geir Hellemo is indicating, in the 4th century we can observe a reconfiguration of the meaning of sacraments. They stopped to be viewed from the perspective of the finality of human beings, becoming a representation, an enactment in front of God, of the historical processes that have taken place for the redemption of the human being, having at the same time a catechetical purpose¹⁴. The eschatological conception of St. Augustine can be understood within this framework, in a perspective about the finality of the universe void of apocalypticism.

If in St. Augustine's case we have to deal with a type of writing that has as its main purpose the clarification, explanation and apology of the Christian religion in an era of doctrinal and political turmoil, in Dante's case, although the context is still tense, the premises are quite different.

From the perspective of the socio-political context, starting with the first parts of the medieval period, arises a new type of conflict, that between the secular power represented by the emperor, and the spiritual power represented by the pope. These two parties found their respective supporters not just in the bigger medieval kingdoms, but also in the small but powerful city states of Italy.

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 10.

¹² Ibidem, p. 18.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 19.

¹⁴ See Geir Hellemo, *Adventus domini: Eschatological Thought in 4th-century apses and catecheses*, Brill, 1989, pp. 131-138.

Initially, the Ghibellines and Guelphs, and then the White Guelphs and the Black Guelphs. The conflict between powerful families and factions with opposed agendas was a reality from which Florence, the home city of Dante, makes no exception. It's a well-known fact that starting with the last decade of the 13th century until his exile around 1302, Dante occupied administrative and political functions in a turbulent city and that in this period he was a moderate sympathizer of the pro-imperialist faction. But, after the conflicts between the White and Black Guelphs, that took place at the very beginning of 14th century, in which Pope Boniface VIII intervened through the Cardinal Matthew of Acquasparta for the victory of the last faction, and which resulted in Dante's exile, it results naturally that for him, a peaceful outcome for his city cannot come from the papal institution. Consequently, Dante's only hope for peace in Italy and, as we will see in *De monarchia*, in the entire world, rests in the secular power, and for a brief time in the person of Henry VII of Luxemburg¹⁵. The preference for a non-spiritual or secular solution for the mankind's well-being will determine a model of history that doesn't have its base in the sacred history of the Bible, but in the Aristotelian tradition of political philosophy.

From the perspective of the socio-doctrinal or spiritual context, starting with the 12th–13th centuries success of the mendicant orders, arises a new set of values and beliefs. The ideals of poverty and of a spiritual renewal of man in accordance with the Christic model, become the desiderata of the Franciscans. One particular faction of this order, the spiritual Franciscans, also known as rigorists or conservators, took this idea to an institutional level or even to a historical one. Inspired by Joachim of Fiore's division of history and eschatological considerations, Gerardus de Borgo San Domino is frequently considered to be one of the first Franciscans who paved the way for a new interpretation of history and of the role played by the friars in it. He identifies the order of the just which will reign in the last period of history, the age of the Holy Spirit, with the Franciscan order. Consequently, for the last period of history to take place, when the perfect peace will reign and the true will be revealed, a reformation of man and human institutions through Franciscans spiritual effort are necessary¹⁶. It is a known fact that Dante has studied the Franciscan doctrines at Santa Croce. This very same place was frequented at the end of

¹⁵ For more details about Dante's political life see Jay Ruud, *Critical companion to Dante. Literary Reference to His Life and Work*, Fact on file, 2008.

¹⁶ For more details see Jay M. Hammond, Hellmann, Goff, *A companion to Bonaventure*, Brill, 2014, p. 16-17.

13th century by spiritual Franciscans like Jean Pierre Olivi and Ubertino of Casale¹⁷. Although, Dante rejects Ubertino spiritual interpretation of the Franciscan rule in the *Divine Comedy*¹⁸, he puts Bonaventura, Francis of Assisi and even Joachim of Fiore at a high praise. Moreover, he seems to share the same perspective with the spiritual Franciscans on the current status of papal institution. In some cantos of the *Divine Comedy*, e.g. *Inferno 19* or *Purgatory 32*, the Pontifical power is being described as corrupted and being in a state of decay. As we will see in his political text, *De monarchia*, Dante seems to have similar historical expectations like the spirituals but which will be accomplished by different means: a state of peace and knowledge obtained through a secular reign of one absolute monarch.

These being said, we already have noticed some general differences between Augustine's and Dante's view towards history. If the former has the intention of consolidating the Christian doctrine by offering a narration of sacred history in which the final end is of no specific importance, the latter, being concerned about the political fate of his state, will engage in a consideration of secular history in which the final end plays a very important role. Taking this into account, the rest of my paper will try to establish their corresponding models of history as follows.

In the first part of the paper I will try to show that St. Augustine's periods of history, that are defined throughout his work, are defined relatively to a unique event, that gives meaning to the entire history, the first coming of Christ. For this reason, I will argue that his model of history will lose its eschatological tension and consequently is void of apocalypticism. Under these terms, I will explain that in the case of Augustine we can speak about a Christocentric model of history.

In the second part of my study I will try to point out that Dante's political view from *De monarchia* describes a model of history in which the focal point is the final secular goal of the human kind, the universal peace, obtained through the complete actualization of the human intellect. The orientation of history towards a distant end that can be achieved through the human united progressive effort, will allow Dante's view to be described in an teleologic model of history, one with some apocalyptic and millennialist implications.

¹⁷ See David Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans. From protest to persecution in the century after Saint Francis*, The Pennsylvania State University, 2001, pp. 46-48.

¹⁸ Allen, Mandelbaum *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Paradiso*, University of California Press, 1984, Canto 12, 124-127.

Augustine's periods of sacred history

Augustine's vision of history can be best noticed in his division of sacred history into component parts, that is repeatedly taken into consideration under various forms throughout his works, but with a certain constant, the centrality of the Christic figure. In what follows, I will analyze some particular recurrences of this division, to determine the model of history to which it pertains.

In his commentary on some propositions from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, *Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistola ad romanos* (394), Augustine analyses the status of the human being over different periods of sacred history. The emphasis is put on the possibility of man to follow the divine will and to avoid sin. Here, Augustine operates on the basis of the Pauline distinction between the three periods of history, a division of the four states (*gradus*) of man:

And so, we can distinguish these four states of man: before the law, under the law, under grace, in peace. Before the law we follow the eager desire of flesh, under the law we are dragged by it, under the grace nor do we follow it, nor are we dragged by it, in peace there is no eager desire of flesh. Therefore, before the law we don't fight <it>, because we not only desire and sin, but we even approve the sins. Under the law we fight, but we are bound; for we admit that what we do is bad, and by admitting that it is bad, we certainly refuse to do it, but we are outdone, because the grace doesn't exist yet. In this status, it is shown to us how we lie down, and as long as we want to rise we fall, how we are crushed with heavier things.¹⁹

The states described in this fragment captures the different relations of the body-soul duality through the sacred history. Before the law, i.e. after the fall of man in sin, the body and its desires are prevailing in the relation to the soul, under the law the soul tries to oppose the body but without success. After the coming of Christ and consequently of grace, the status of man is restored, so that the soul can prevail against the body. In peace, after the final judgement, the corporal status will change, so that it will be no more opposed to the soul and implicitly to God's will:

¹⁹ Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologia latina*, Vol. 35, *Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistola ad romanos*, 12.13-18. The translation from Latin to English belongs to me.

therefore, comes the grace, which will forgive past sins and help the ones who try, grant charity to justice and remove the fear. When this will happen, even if some desires of flesh, as long as we are in this life, are fighting our spirit to lead it into sin, still, the spirit that is not consenting to those desires stops sinning, because it was fastened in the grace and charity of God [...] but because those desires, which we get from the first sin of the first man, are born from the mortality of flesh, from which we are carnally born, those will not end, unless by the resurrection of the body we will earn that change, which is promised to us, where will be perfect peace, when we will be in the place of the fourth status. But the peace will be perfect, because nothing will oppose us of those that opposes God.²⁰

The third state, which is established after and because of the first coming of Christ, represents for man the restoration of free will, because “before the grace free will does not exist”²¹. This means that now, the human being does not have only the possibility to sin as under law but also the possibility to avoid the wrong doings: “*for the sin will not be dominant in you, for you are not under the law, but rather under the grace*, certainly concerns now that third state, where the man with the mind serves now the law of God, although with the flesh he serves the law of sin”²². The spirit of man is changed with the beginning of the third state, the body is changed only in the fourth²³. In virtue of this renewal of the spirit, the most important event is the historical incarnation of Christ, the beginning of the third status, and not the end of history, the renewal of the body. The end of the sacred history does not represent a necessary condition for the salvation, such as the first coming of the Christ does.

The same idea of a historical centrality of Christ can be found in *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* (379). Here, the units used for periodization are not those of the states of the human being (*gradus*), but rather those of time (*saeculum, tempus*):

for after the entire age of the human birth, the third time is that in which the grace of the Christian faith was given; the first is before the law, the second under the law, the third under grace. And because the fourth remains thus far, we are to come to the most satisfying peace of the heavenly Jerusalem, towards which stretches whoever entrust rightly in Christ²⁴

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Ibidem, 27.35

²³ Ibidem, 45.53

²⁴ Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologia latina*, Vol. 40, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, 61.7.

In *De catechizandis rudibus* (403), Augustine uses a division of sacred history into seven periods. Every stage of history is put in direct correspondence with a specific day of creation:

Five ages of the world, accordingly, having been now completed (there has entered the sixth). Of these ages the first is from the beginning of the human race, that is, from Adam, who was the first man that was made, down to Noah, who constructed the ark at the time of the flood. Then the second extends from that period on to Abraham, who was called the father indeed of all nations[...] For the third age extends from Abraham to David the king; the fourth from David to that captivity whereby the people of God passed over into Babylonia; and the fifth from that transmigration down to the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ. With His coming the sixth age has entered on its process; so that now the spiritual grace, which in previous times was known to a few patriarchs and prophets, may be made manifest to all nations;[...] in this sixth age the mind of man may be renewed after the image of God, even as on the sixth day man was made after the image of God.²⁵

Now, on the subject of this rest Scripture is significant, and refrains not to speak, when it tells us how at the beginning of the world, and at the time when God made heaven and earth and all things which are in them, He worked during six days, and rested on the seventh day. For it was in the power of the Almighty to make all things even in one moment of time. For He had not labored in the view that He might enjoy (a needful) rest, since indeed He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created; but that He might signify how, after six ages of this world, in a seventh age, as on the seventh day, He will rest in His saints;²⁶

The idea of the centrality of the sixth period, which is equivalent with the third period and state of the previous division of history, can be easily observed. The first five historic periods, from Adam until the advent of Christ, do not bring anything essential for the change of the human condition and implicitly for the salvation of man. Only in the sixth period, the grace, i.e. the necessary condition for redemption, will be shown to all nations and the mind will be restored to its initial state, that of resemblance with God.

²⁵ *On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed*, translated by S.D.F. Salmond. *From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1303.htm>, 22.39.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 17.28.

From the passages exposed above, we can observe that in Augustine's division of sacred history the central event is the incarnation of Christ, and consequently, the rehabilitation of human nature. This event marks on one hand, in a universal sense, the beginning of a new period of history in which the grace is offered to the human kind, and on the other hand, in an individual sense, marks the beginning of a new state for each individual, in which his soul or mind is restored to its likeness to God. In as much as the salvation of each man becomes possible in the sixth period²⁷ of history, just because of Christ, the event of his first arrival becomes in history a transcendental cause of salvation. The renewal of man in this period, is not an effective cause of salvation, because it does not save, but only offers the possibility that was not available before, that every individual can reach it. Therefore, if the renewal of man by Christ can be considered a transcendental cause of salvation, and if in this historical event takes place the essential transformation of man, then, the end of history will lose its importance, becoming an event that eventually will take place at an unknown time. Consequently, the central point of Augustine's model of history is the first coming of Christ, when the status of man himself is changed.

Up to this point we have seen that Augustine's model of history has the Christic event as the central point and that the eschatological moment takes places in the period of history that follows the first coming of Christ. But the apocalyptic tension of placing the end now, in the sixth period of time (or the third according to the short division), is diminished by the impossibility of the human being to know exactly when it will happen. In *De civitate Dei* (426), Augustine employs once again the analogy between the days of creation and the periods (*aetas*) of sacred history to stress this aspect:

This Sabbath shall appear still more clearly if we count the ages as days, in accordance with the periods of time defined in Scripture, for that period will be found to be the seventh. The first age, as the first day, extends from Adam to the deluge; the second from the deluge to Abraham, equalling the first, not in length of time, but in the number of generations, there being ten in each. From Abraham to the advent of Christ there are, as the evangelist Matthew calculates, three periods, in each of which are fourteen generations—one period from Abraham to David, a second from David to the captivity, a third from the captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. There are thus

²⁷ Or the third according to the short division.

five ages in all. The sixth is now passing, and cannot be measured by any number of generations, as it has been said: *It is not for you to know the times, which the Father has put in His own power.*²⁸

That the last judgment, then, shall be administered by Jesus Christ in the manner predicted in the sacred writings is denied or doubted by no one, unless by those who, through some incredible animosity or blindness, decline to believe these writings, though already their truth is demonstrated to all the world. And at or in connection with that judgment the following events shall come to pass, as we have learned: Elias the Tishbite shall come; the Jews shall believe; Antichrist shall persecute; Christ shall judge; the dead shall rise; the good and the wicked shall be separated; the world shall be burned and renewed. All these things, we believe, shall come to pass; but how, or in what order, human understanding cannot perfectly teach us, but only the experience of the events themselves. My opinion, however, is, that they will happen in the order in which I have related them.²⁹

What Augustine is saying here, citing the *Acts of the Apostles 1.7* and discussing about the events of the Last Judgment is that the length of the sixth period of the sacred history remains unknowable for humans or, in other words, that the human being cannot know when the event of the second coming of Christ will take place. This restriction on the human mind towards the end is powerfully contrasted with the accessibility of the same mind towards the event of the first incarnation of Christ and the restoration of man.

Besides the unknowable character of the end, Augustine adds the rejection of millenarism, namely of that form of apocalyptic eschatology which anticipates a reign of a thousand years of Christ on earth. The rejection is made on one hand by sustaining that the future change of man will be merely a corporal one and will take place in the seventh state (or the fourth according to the short division), which will not be in this life:

If his spirit, which awaken Jesus Christ from death, lives in you; the who awaken Jesus Christ from the death will bring back to life your mortal body also, by the Spirit which will live in you, now he is pointing out to the fourth status of that four which we have distinguished above. But this status is

²⁸ Translated by Marcus Dods. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1201.htm>, XXII, 30.5.

²⁹ *De civitate Dei*, Op. cit., XX.30.5

not coming in this life. For it pertains to hope, by which we expect the redemption of our body, when this corruptible <body> will put on the incorruptibility and this mortal <body> will put on the immortality. There the peace is perfect, because the soul does not suffer of any troubles regarding the body, which is now brought back to life and change according to divine nature.³⁰

On the other hand, the interpretation of the *Revelation 20* is done from a figurative perspective, according to the hermeneutical principles exposed in *De doctrina christiana*, and constitutes a departure from millenarism. 1000 years, the period in which the devil will be bonded, the period in which the millenarists are hoping for a reign of God on earth, does not represent for Augustine a determined period of time. The number 1000 is a *numerus perfectus*, a complete or perfect number which signifies the undetermined time left until the end of the world. All this time, the devil is bound. This binding on earth does not represent the reign of Christ, but the fact that the devil does not have the same power over the people like in the previous state³¹. Consequently, any reference to a temporal reign of God is destroyed. The ideal of an earthly abundance and universal peace seems to be omitted. The reign of God will take place in the last stage of sacred history, after the consumption of the secular history, and after the events of Apocalypse. Here, the saved individuals with their renewed and perfect bodies will eternally stand in the contemplation of the beatific vision of God.

From the considered passages, we can observe first that the history in St. Augustine's thought is understood as sacred history, as the manifested history of God's divine plan for the salvation of the world. In as much as the secular history is implicitly embedded in the sacred history and represents merely the contingent aspect of the divine plan, it is of low significance. Secondly, from the examination of the sacred history division we can observe the existence of a Christocentric model of history, since its main event is the first coming of Christ. Because this moment can be considered the transcendental cause of the salvation of human being, the sacred history finds its justification and meaning in it and not in the final moment of history, the apocalyptic end. This placement of purpose in the event represented by Christ determines a homogenous unfolding of history, void until the end of the idea of a universal progress. Thirdly, we can ascertain a depreciation of the eschatological moment made negatively, by Augustine's Christocentric model,

³⁰ *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, op. cit., 43.51

³¹ See *De civitate dei*, op. cit, 20.7

and positively, on one hand, by his claim of inaccessibility towards the time of and ways in which the end will take place, and, on the other hand, by placing the reign of God and the corporal change of human being in the afterlife. Given these articulations of Augustine's perspective on history, we can safely acknowledge that his considerations cannot be labeled as being apocalyptic.

Dante's teleological model of history in *De monarchia*

So far, we have seen how Augustine's view towards history can be understood as a Christocentric model. In this part, I will argue how Dante's political philosophy from *De monarchia* contains a model of history that is very different from the previous one.

First of all, we must note that *De monarchia* is not preoccupied at all with offering a narrative of history of any kind. We can find only a few references to historical events, which are used by Dante's adversaries in the argumentation of the absolute jurisdiction of the Pontiff and which ultimately will be debunked by him. The main purpose in his work is to justify the necessity of the monarchical absolutist regime and to establish the autonomy of secular power in front of the ecclesiastical one. Consequently, the treatise itself is devised according to these intentions. The first book will demonstrate that the monarchy is necessary for the well-being of the world. The second will point out that the Roman Empire, the embodiment of his vision, has obtained the office of monarchy *de iure* and that, because of this, reached its maximal potential. And the third book will separate the monarchic and papal institutions rejecting the subordination of one by the other. Seeing Dante's main objectives, his model of history will then merely be an implicit consequence of his political view. For the former to be clarified, first of all we must understand the latter.

Dante's political thought is developed inside the framework of Aristotelian political philosophy. First of all, politics is a science and, being as such, it is rather preoccupied with the universal cause of things than with the particular ones. Although God, the most universal cause, has a certain importance in his historical view under the concept of providence, here He has a secondary role, in contrast with Augustine. Secondly, being a practical science, the concern for the universal cause

is not merely for speculation but also for action³². The particular understanding of politics as being destined to actions has an important role, because it will determine Dante's commitment to a teleological perspective, namely to a view in which his only concern is the final cause. The function of the efficient cause or the principle of movement and of the formal cause are both included in the final cause, because "in things pertaining to action the principle and cause of all things is the final end (because is that end goal that first moves the agent)"³³. But to whom pertains the final end or the final cause of politics and how ought to be understood? Dante's response is quite straight forward: since in politics we deal with the most universal cause, it must belong to the most universal entity, the human genus or the totality of humanity. By exercising progressively its proper function or essence as a whole, i.e. the actualization of the possible intellect, the human genus may achieve its final goal, towards which all its actions are ordained, the universal peace and implicitly temporal happiness³⁴. By setting a single natural and universal end for the entire humanity, Dante is preparing to argue for the necessity of one single ruler, the monarch, under one single regime, the monarchy, also named temporal monarchy or empire. The rest of the first book, chapters 5-16, will try to demonstrate how the monarch and the monarchy are the best way to achieve the final end of humanity, the peace and the temporal happiness. Although the arguments vary from chapter to chapter, and here is not our purpose to explore each of them, we must note that they share in common the Neoplatonic principle that the unity is better than the multiplicity. The preeminence of the one over the multiple, the whole over its parts, God over its creation, etc. form a series of analogies that culminate in the preeminence of the monarchy in front of the other traditional political forms of government that are based on a large or small multiplicity. Consequently, justice, peace, charity, good actions and even the resemblance to God are all better under one monarch, because the one universal entity (the human genus) will be driven by one common nature (the progressive actualization of the possible intellect) towards a single universal goal (peace and common good) under the direction of one single ruler.

In Dante's argumentation, the monarchy or the universal empire is not so much of a utopian state as it appears to be on first sight. In the second book, although idealized, he offers a historical model of his political form of government, the Roman

³² See *De monarchia* text in Anthony K. Cassell (ed.), *The Monarchia Controversy*, The catholic University of America Press, 2004, I.2.6-7, p. 112.

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ Ibidem, I.4.5, p. 115.

Empire under the reign of Augustus. Challenging indirectly the Augustinian position on the Roman Empire, Dante's arguing by two types of arguments, based on reason and based on Christian faith, that the Romans have justly acquired the monarchic status according to the will of God. What is interesting for our purpose, is the way in which Dante's using the Roman case to exemplify how his teleological model is working in the fulfilment of the final goal of humanity. At the core of his argumentation, he states that "the Roman people in their subjugation of the earth attended to the public good"³⁵. The public good or the peace is the final end of the human genus. But as we already know, from our perspective, not all actions with a good final goal are just or good, so the argumentation for obtaining justly the status of empire by the Romans could fail. To surpass this problem, Dante is clarifying a specific function of the final cause that is functioning in nature and can be found in politics too:

it is absolutely clear that someone who directs his thoughts to the end goal of right must be directing his thoughts by the right.³⁶

since, therefore, there exists an end for mankind and some necessary means of reaching nature's universal end goal, nature must direct her attention to this.³⁷

The main idea is that, like in nature, in politics, the final cause contains its own means of achieving itself. Once the final goal of mankind dictated by its nature has started to be followed by the human genus, the final goal, through the very same nature, starts to move the human genus to a progressive completion of it. The same reasoning is applied in the argumentation for the justice of the Roman Empire: the Roman Empire attended the ultimate justice, by attending the ultimate justice its actions were directed by the ultimate justice in fully achieving it, so its actions were just. As we will see, this circular movement between the humans and their final goal will play a significant importance in Dante's historical model and its apocalyptic potential.

In the third and last book of his treatise, Dante is not only refuting some arguments from faith and reason which support that the jurisdiction of papal power stretches over the secular one, but tries to demonstrate the autonomy of the Imperial power by deriving its authority directly from God. In doing so, Dante

³⁵ *Ibidem*, II.5.18, p. 137.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, II.5.23, p. 138.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, II.6.5, p. 139.

offers new considerations on his teleologic model that brings him dangerously closer to the so called “doctrine of the doubled truth”, resembling in some parts with the secular Averroist discourse of someone like Boetius of Dacia³⁸. His main argument starts with a consideration of the human being: “For man, if he is considered according to both his essential parts, that is, his body and his soul, he is corruptible; if he is considered only according to one, namely, the soul, he is incorruptible”³⁹. By putting man between the corruptible and incorruptible realms, he seems to make some sense of the traditional Augustinian point of view where the human being has a double nature. There is also a point of departure. In Dante’s case, for each aspect of the human nature there is a legitimate final goal:

the blessedness of this life, which consists in the functioning of his own powers and is figured by the earthly paradise, and the blessedness of eternal life that consists in the enjoyment of God’s countenance to which man’s powers can ascend only by the aid of divine light; and this blessedness is made intelligible by the celestial paradise.⁴⁰

The earthly paradise and the heavenly one, are two different final goals for the two different aspects of the human nature. Consequently, they can be achieved by two different sets of means. The first one “through philosophical teachings provided we follow them by acting according to the moral and intellectual virtues”⁴¹ and the second one “through spiritual teachings that transcend human reason, provided we follow them by acting according to the theological virtues, namely, faith, hope, and charity”⁴². For a dual nature with a dual final end, there must be also a dual guide established by the Providence in achieving it. On the one hand we have the Emperor who will guide the human kind to temporal felicity according to philosophical teaching. On the other hand, we have the Supreme Pontiff who will guide the same human kind to the eternal life with the aid of spiritual teaching⁴³. Each institution has its own specific function with its own separate domain of activity. The monarchy must bring the human genus by secular means to a secular and historical end, the papacy must bring the human kind by spiritual means to a spiritual and trans-historical end. Although boundaries between the secular and

³⁸ See *De sumo bono sive de vita philosophi*.

³⁹ *De monarchia*, op. cit., III.16.4, p. 171.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, III.16.7, p. 172.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

spiritual realm are set quite clearly, there are certain relations between them that need to be explored. This fact is pointed out by Dante's last paragraph, where he states that "the happiness of mortal life is in some way ordered towards eternal happiness" and that the Emperor needs to show reverence to the Pope, so that he can be blessed by him to enlighten the whole globe. As we will further see, Dante's concern only for the secular power will betray, both a trans-historical expectation from the absolute monarch and a profound disappointment towards the papal institution, which teleological speaking has lost its function.

So far, we have seen that Dante's political philosophy from *De monarchia* consists broadly of an argumentation for the necessity of a universal secular monarchy, for the secular final end of the human kind to be progressively achieved. We have also seen that, in doing so, he is describing a circular movement between mankind and the final end as follows: mankind is establishing its final end, and the final end is offering the means to mankind towards the historical realization of it. But, because the final end, the universal peace is the supreme goal according to the very nature of human beings as a whole and is obtained only through a progressive development of the human mind, i.e. philosophy, and it is not only an extrinsic historical desideratum. If the final end brings mankind closer to achieving it by its offered means, mankind, by the collective activation of the passive intellect⁴⁴, is bringing the realization of the final end closer. In this way, a historical and secular end is subtly carrying an interior and spiritual aspect: the change of man through philosophy under monarchy will cause the fulfilment of history. This kind of teleologic model seems to surpass the limits of historical or philosophical discourse and tends to approach the prophetic one. This point has been noted by some scholars. W. H. V. Reade⁴⁵ is considering that Dante's view of history should be called "vision" because it's not rational enough to be considered a proper philosophy of history. Regarding this position we can note that, on one hand, it appears to be a little bit exaggerated, since Dante is using in most of his treatises traditional philosophical sources and he is employing logical argumentation. On the other hand, it seems to be true, but for a different reason, since in *De monarchia* we cannot find an explicit theory of history but only an implicit one. Charles T. Davis uses the same name but for a different purpose. He thinks that Dante's consideration of history should be called "vision" to suggest "the immediacy and intensity of Dante's perception of God's providence acting through

⁴⁴ Ibidem, I.3.

⁴⁵ For summary of Reade's point of view see Charles T. Davis, "Dante's Vision of History", in *Dante Studies*, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society, No. 93 (1975), pp. 143-160, p. 144.

his chosen people among the gentiles, the Romans"⁴⁶. He even goes so far as to name Dante a theologian of history⁴⁷. At the core of his observations seems to stay a particular paragraph of *De monarchia*, maybe the one with the highest apocalyptic implications:

All the above reasons we have set forth bear witness to one unforgettable event: to wit, the state of mortals which the Son of God either awaited, or decided to bring about himself when he was about to become man for man's salvation. For, if we reflect upon the conditions and the ages of man, from the Fall of our first parents, which was the first wrong turning point of all our aberrations, only under the monarch, *Divus Augustus*, when a perfect monarchy existed, will we find tranquility throughout the world. And that mankind lived happily in the tranquility of universal peace at that time all historians and all illustrious poets and even the scribe of Christ's compassion deigned to bear witness. [...] The time and all temporalities were indeed full because no agency of our happiness was without its minister.⁴⁸

Here, Dante offers an unfinished argument through analogy where the second term is missing but is implicitly suggested. If Jesus himself waited for the condition of man that was achieved only in the time of Augustus, the only time when the universal monarchy has been acquired, or he offered that condition in that time, then, the next Christic event will take place only after the establishment of the new universal monarchy, i.e. after the universal peace and the achievement of the full intellectual potential of mankind. His option for a secular eschatology with spiritual implication is obvious. The fulfilment of history with its apocalyptic implications is expected to come from the empire and not from Church. On one hand, the ecclesiastic institution is confronted with corruption, which Dante is pointing out throughout his works. On the other hand, even with a perfect institution, the Pope jurisdiction is only spiritual, and consequently Christian, while the monarchic one is universal, transgressing the doctrinal differences between people, as Donna Mancusi-Ungaro⁴⁹ is emphasizing.

From this perspective, the teleologic model of history found in *De monarchia* presents quite a few eschatological and apocalyptic implications. The realization of the final goal understood in a double sense, as an external historical goal (universal

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p.154.

⁴⁸ *De monarchia*, op. cit., II.16.1, p.127.

⁴⁹ See Donna Mancusi-Ungaro, *Dante and the empire*, Peter Lang Publishing, 1987, p.5-6.

peace) and an internal spiritual one (the full potency of the human intellect), can take place only under a universal monarch in a universal monarchy. Only under this political form the mankind can progressively reach the perfect state that triggers the Christic event and implicitly the fulfilment of the universal history. The guarantee for his model is the idealized Roman Empire under the universal monarch Augustus.

Conclusion

In this paper I tried to show how Augustine's division of sacred history and Dante's political philosophy from *De monarchia* have at their core two different models of history. In Augustine's case, we have a Christocentric model of history, where the focal point is the first coming of Christ. Understood as a transcendental cause for the salvation of man, i.e. the cause for the renewal of human spirit and consequently for the possibility of salvation, the Christic event makes the Augustinian model free of apocalypticism and millenarism. The final end will take place in an undetermined future, the reign of God and the renewal of body will happen in the afterlife. In those terms, the unfolding of history after the focal point is linear, void of significant progress and of any relation between the human effort and the fulfilment of time. In contrast, in Dante's case the situation is quite different. In sustaining a teleological model of history, the focal point of the historical process is the final goal or end of mankind, the eternal peace. This can be achieved only by the collective use of human intellectual powers, under the rule of one universal monarch. The universal monarchy or the empire will then represent the condition for the fulfilment of history to take place. Employing an idealized example for his vision, Dante causally connects the secular realization of the monarchy under Augustus with the first coming of Christ, offering an apocalyptic aspect of his view. If the human genus only under the universal monarchy can obtain its final goal by means of gradual perfection through philosophy, then it depends on mankind when the fulfilment of time will take place. Put this way, the implicit vision of history from *De monarchia* is describing a progressive unfolding of time, in a rhythm that depends upon mankind's collective effort, with a climax in the full realization of the universal monarchy. In this final moment the human genus will be at its perfect status and the end of history will take place.

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