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THE PROBLEM OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY*

KÁROLY VERESS¹

ABSTRACT. *The Problem of Interdisciplinarity.* My paper analyzes the manifold meanings and practices of interdisciplinarity, isolating and identifying the approaches of modernity and postmodernity. Finally, I attempt to interpret interdisciplinarity as a particularly hermeneutical phenomenon, referring also to its effects on the relationship of philosophy and specialized disciplines.

Keywords: *disciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, science, hermeneutics, philosophy, in-between sphere*

1. References to interdisciplinarity are prevalent these days throughout studies, research projects and reports, or dissertations. Mentioning it is sometimes simply proper, but often a necessity. It seems that “interdisciplinarity” has indeed become a sort of trendy term in academic language and the assessment of research results. Nevertheless, experts of the field claim that there is much more to it: interdisciplinarity is a key factor in contemporary life.² Therefore it should not be a futile enterprise to delimit the phenomenon as accurately as possible and avoid, as much as possible, its incorrect uses.

One might often find that there are some who, intentionally or not, abuse this concept and the possibilities it offers. They instantly refer to it, more or less superficially, as soon as it can be proved that the methods or results of two or more disciplines have been called into research. Again, it often appears in reports or assessments as a means to improve scientific quality. The more this practice

* This paper is an edited version of the opening lecture delivered at the Conference of Doctoral Students organized by the Doctoral School of Philosophy of Babeş-Bolyai University on 10 May 2013.

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² Cf. Julie Klein: *Interdisciplinarity*. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1990. 3. [Interdisciplinarity is a key factor in their contemporary life.]

spreads, the more the term gets eroded or devalued. The real problem however lies somewhere else: the meaning of interdisciplinarity is meanwhile considered *self-evident*. It does not even occur to us how we should understand it.

2. Current research on interdisciplinarity has shown that the unifying use of the term often blends together various points of view and elements of meaning. In effect, however, the term is a meeting point of meanings and uses of various origins and ends. The term “interdisciplinarity” is therefore far from being unitary; it is highly differentiated both in terms of its meaning and use. The failure to acknowledge it may lead to misunderstandings or sometimes even misuse.

One of the most important requirements both for understanding the phenomenon of interdisciplinarity and the appropriate use of the term is the distinction and identification of the viewpoints of modernity and postmodernity.

3. Seen from the perspective of *modernity*, the problem of interdisciplinarity is part of the issue of *disciplinarity*; the actual problem is in fact the problem of disciplinarity.

Disciplinarity is a *historical* category. The formation of scholarly disciplines is a historical process. The normative division of the fields of reality, the delimitations and solidification of the boundaries of disciplines was built on the “natural” order of reality. The disciplinary division of natural sciences, economics, political science, sociology and the institutional structures and university faculties established for disciplinary work maps the division process of the natural world, the social world, the sphere of politics and economy.³ Standard models were formed thus to ensure for a long time the independence and stability, homogeneity and strong foundation of single areas of knowledge.

Later, as the horizons of knowledge broadened and aspects and reflection criteria increased, new and varied areas of research started to develop, delimited and divided by particular methods of observation and application. The result of these processes was the compartmentalization or fragmentation of research areas, entailing their limitations or unilateral and extreme specialization. Traditional disciplines fit less and less into their historically formed boundaries. The need for boundary crossing, integration and productive cooperation is increasingly present.⁴

Interdisciplinarity appears in this respect as a sort of (self)reflective and (self)critical dimension of disciplinarity, which leads to the clear experience of, and insight into, the possibilities and limits of single disciplines. As such, it brings about

³ Cf. Reinhold Hedtke: The social interplay of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity – Some introductory remarks. In *J SSE – Journal of Social Science Education* 2006. Vol. 5 (2). 1–9. 2.

⁴ Cf. J. Klein: *op.cit.* 3.

a serious methodological change of perspective in recognition of the fact that the subject of one discipline cannot be endlessly researched with the given methods, that research is methodologically restricted, the truth is limited, but inexhaustible in its limitedness. Interdisciplinarity remains here within the frames of disciplinarity and it actually serves – by drawing the borders of positivistic scientific immodesty – the strengthening of disciplines and their adaptation capacity to the new circumstances.

All these however are far from exhausting the essence of interdisciplinarity as a current need.

4. On the basis of those said above, the definition of interdisciplinarity primarily starts from the direction of *disciplinarity*, and it mirrors not so much the new phenomenon, but the needs and quests of disciplinarity. According to a classical definition, interdisciplinarity is some form of dialogue and interaction between two or more disciplines.⁵ This seemingly overly broad definition is later narrowed down to include the permeability of disciplinary borders, and the actual or reflective crossing of disciplines.⁶

In this respect the starting point of the definition is the discipline. The notion of *discipline* implies in fact a network of meanings: disciplines, discipline, disciples. Therefore it refers at the same time to a research area, the normative/methodological discipline, regulation of research and the training and practice gained in a certain research area and methodology. Belonging to a discipline means to be attached to a certain subject of research and thus to the use of certain strict methods and terminology. In contrast, interdisciplinarity (and transdisciplinarity) implies various boundary crossings and disciplinary work division. The body of knowledge exceeds disciplinary borders and normative constraints.⁷ In this context interdisciplinarity means the sum of steps taken against the restrictive structures of disciplinary knowledge, the researches which leave the closed, strict, tight boundaries of disciplines for the sake of epistemic efficiency and optimal adaptation to market demands.⁸

Such a definition is however too restricted and it also draws attention to a frequent definition error: the opposition disciplinarity–interdisciplinarity is often likely to be identified with the opposition closed–open or homogeneous–heterogeneous. However, disciplinarity does not involve closure, or transition to new forms and methods, or the exclusion of innovation. Therefore belonging to a particular discipline does

⁵ Cf. Joe Moran: *Interdisciplinarity: The New Critical Idiom*. Routledge, London, 2001. 19.

⁶ Cf. R. Hedtke: *op.cit.* 1.

⁷ Cf. Andrew Barry, Georgina Born and Gisa Weszkalnys: Logics of interdisciplinarity. In *Economy and Society* Volume 37 Number 1 February 2008. 20–49. 21.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 22, 26.

not necessarily imply a given object, theory, methods, practice, or attachment to a common language or institution.⁹ Furthermore, the disciplines are not necessarily homogeneous, but are often heterogeneous and internally divided, and the multitude and variety of subunits also brings about a variety of research directions. Heterogeneity is not necessarily a source of instability. In regard to a discipline, its historical development causes heterogeneous relations between research subjects, problems, theories, methods, texts and institutions. Therefore the boundaries of disciplines are not rigid, but much rather prone to mobility and transformation.¹⁰

The literature identifies three modes of interdisciplinarity: the *integrative-synthesis mode*, accounting for the integration or synthesis of disciplines coming into contact; the *subordination-service mode* in which one of the disciplines becomes a subordinated component in a hierarchical relation of disciplines; and the *agonistic-antagonistic mode* when interdisciplinarity consciously comes in opposition with traditional disciplinary knowledge and practice, and is critical about the intellectual, ethical and political limits of disciplines and traditional academic research in general.¹¹

Definitions more complex than these distinguish between the theoretical and practical application of interdisciplinarity. The theoretical application keeps in mind the epistemological aspects of the integration of disciplines in the universe of knowledge; the practical applications focus on the *application* of the viewpoint of interdisciplinarity, the integration of disciplines in education in one common project. It is a frequent experience that the *applicational* meaning of interdisciplinarity formed during its practical application in education is also projected onto its theoretical-methodological notion as well.¹²

5. In a *postmodern* perspective, tendencies of interdisciplinarity derive from the great rearrangements in contemporary scholarly knowledge and practice. The positivistic universalism of modern science is questioned in several respects. First, the unitary/unilateral application of the universal viewpoint of natural sciences in all scientific disciplines becomes questionable, and this entails the *differentiation* of the paradigms and perspectives of scholarliness; the resistance of social and cultural sciences to the methodological domination of natural sciences reveals the “other”, “concealed” paradigms of scholarliness and justifies their survival. In addition, the need for particularization, regionalization and application in the cultivation of science is also high. Theoretical researches need to be

⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 26.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 27.

¹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 28.

¹² Cf. J. Klein: *op. cit.*, 4.

approached to applicative-practical tasks. Since the practical environment of the life-world does not fully conform with theoretical models, and always seems more multifaceted and unpredictable than these, the ambitions to exceed the primacy and domination of simplifying and generalizing theoretical models come to the forefront. This goes together with disenthraling the creativity lying in individual viewpoint, experience or knowledge, and harmonizing the educational curriculum with practical criteria and expectations. Thirdly, the new scientific models recall the notion of systems, webs, networks and emphasize historical change and dynamism. They increasingly focus on transgressing discipline boundaries, integrating disciplines, cooperating productively, and also on the interdependence of the cognitive and social environment, or everything that bears the marks of *complexity*, *non-linearity* and *heterogeneity*.¹³ Interdisciplinarity in this context is a kind of *uncertainty condition* of scientific research.

The new, untraditional way of making science appears, in a postmodern context, in the transformation and restructuring of disciplinarity. It has several characteristics: the grand narratives of disciplinary tradition collapse; endeavours appear to transgress discipline boundaries, paradigms or narratives; research increasingly leaves behind the homogenizing conceptual frameworks and methodological restrictions of traditional disciplines; non-traditional disciplines are integrated into the body of disciplines; the horizon of research also comes to include phenomena which cannot be researched in a disciplinary way. These changes have a twofold effect on disciplines. On the one hand, there is an increasing prevalence of disciplinary particularities in opposition with the traditional harmonizing tendencies of scientific universalism, displaying the differentiation of purposes, notions, methods, individual experiences, implicit capacities, value- and aesthetic judgments. On the other hand, the disciplinary isolation and narrowed approaches have a simplifying effect on the rich reality of research subjects/topics. Therefore it is necessary to relax the strict, rigid disciplinary boundaries.¹⁴

The critique of scientific universalism and the methodological homogenization of disciplines do not mean the elimination of disciplines. It signals rather that the disciplines enter a new knowledge situation and face new experiences of research and knowledge.

From a postmodern perspective, it is possible to reveal two aspects of interdisciplinarity: the integrating and integrative modes of achievement. Integrating interdisciplinarity happens as the integration of various contents, abilities, procedures of

¹³ Cf. Julie Thompson Klein: A Platform for a Shared Discourse of Interdisciplinary Education. In *JSSE – Journal of Social Science Education* 2006. Vol. 5 (1). 10–18.

¹⁴ Cf. M. Nissani:(1995). Fruits, salads, and smoothies: A working definition of interdisciplinarity. *Journal of Educational Thought* 1995. 29(2). 122.

other disciplines into another discipline, therefore it broadens the limits or complexity of that discipline from within. In contrast, *integrative* interdisciplinarity means stepping out from the limits of a discipline, transcending disciplinary limits in order to make knowledge more truthfully unified and coherent. Therefore it stresses interactions, the interactive harmonization of disciplines, and pursues to include personal relevance and cooperation into interaction. As opposed to traditional approaches, the integrating and integrative aspects are equally supported by arguments intellectual (the enrichment of certain fields of research with the methods of other fields of research), practical (approaching the knowledge of the real world to everyday experiences) and pedagogical (transgressing disciplinary fragmentation) alike.¹⁵

6. The current practice of interdisciplinarity raises more general questions as well: are disciplines always necessary for the structuring of science? Do the boundary changes of a discipline necessarily involve that entire area of science? Is it only the limits between disciplines that are changing or is it also the limits between science and society?¹⁶

Research on interdisciplinarity clearly reveals that the logic of interdisciplinarity is a novel logic of the organization and making of science, which can be dismantled to at least two ingredients: the logic of innovation and the new logic of responsibility.¹⁷

Interdisciplinarity is not so important in itself (*per se*), but in its relation to *innovation*. Many people see the transgression of discipline boundaries as a risk to the independence of research and the autonomy of the university, which may also be a risk for innovation. Autonomy is traditionally associated with disciplinary research. Therefore there is an attempt to resist scientific policy extended to interdisciplinarity. However, disciplines are not infallibly autonomous and inventive, just as the autonomous forms and possibilities of the organization of science are not strange from interdisciplinarity. Actual interdisciplinarity leads to new subjects and practices of knowledge, which cannot be traced back to previous disciplines, and it opens new ways to innovation, connected to the new practice of responsibility.¹⁸

Interdisciplinarity results in a new logic, technique and culture of account and *responsibility*. This is most evident in how interdisciplinarity takes part in the overall restructuring of the connections between science, technology and society. Nowadays the capacity of interdisciplinarity to ensure the necessary practical knowledge for governments, institutions and utilization, and to open relations

¹⁵ Cf. Sandra Mathison–Melissa Freeman: *The Logic of Interdisciplinary Studies*. Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, 1997.

¹⁶ Cf. Armin Krishnan: *What are Academic Disciplines? Some observations on the Disciplinarity vs. Interdisciplinarity debate*. ESRC National Centre for Research Methods. NCRM Working Paper Series 03/09. January 2009. 5.

¹⁷ Cf. A. Barry at all: *op.cit.* 31, 32.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 24, 33, 42.

between scientific research and business innovations becomes ever stronger. It seems that interdisciplinarity is able to give the necessary answers to the questions of the integration of science, society and economy.¹⁹

The social construction of research subjects and disciplines is organized into two systems these days: the system of sciences and the system of training (education). These are traditionally defined by institutionalized disciplinary structures. The complex problems of the real world, the general competences for understanding the social world become fragmented in a disciplinary framework, it becomes harder and harder to understand the multidimensional social reality on the basis of traditional disciplinary structures, the knowledge restricted by strict disciplines is less and less sufficient.²⁰ This way the reassessment of disciplinarity and the acceptance of the alternative of interdisciplinarity are becoming more urgent.

7. We cannot avoid some conceptual clarifications about interdisciplinarity and related terms such as multidisciplinarity, pluridisciplinarity, crossdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity. These terms are often overlapped or considered analogous even in the literature, although they express completely different techniques, procedures or phenomena.

Several authors unanimously understand multidisciplinarity as an unintegrated juxtaposition of various disciplines and methods. The single disciplines remain untouched and unbroken, the relationship of cooperative disciplines is characterized by parallelism and complementarity, they cooperate in the framework of disciplinary standards. By contrast, interdisciplinarity integrates and synthesizes the perspectives of various disciplines for the sake of deeper understanding and correct pondering.²¹

Transdisciplinarity and unidisciplinarity are the two endpoints of interdisciplinarity. *Transdisciplinarity* assumes the various disciplines as ready beforehand. By the transgression of disciplinary boundaries, it helps bridging between disciplines, it helps new procedures of knowing and understanding overarching limited disciplinary viewpoints, and it may help the fusion of disciplines in the long run. *Unidisciplinarity* is the other endpoint, as it embodies the radical criticism of traditional disciplinarity and aims at the restructuring of knowledge, in which process the various disciplines join together into a new, complex discipline.²² In this case it is perhaps more appropriate to speak about *postdisciplinarity*.

¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.* 21, 22.

²⁰ Cf. R. Hedtke: *op. cit.* 3, 5–6.

²¹ Cf. J. Klein: *op.cit.* 3,5; A. Barry at al: *op. cit.* 27; Clinton Golding: *Integrating the Disciplines: Successful Interdisciplinary Subjects*. Centre for the Study of Higher Education The University of Melbourne, 2009. 3.

²² Cf. J. Klein: *op. cit.* 5, 6; A. Barry at al: *op. cit.* 27; Julie Thompson Klein: *Humanities, Culture and Interdisciplinarity*. The Changing American Academy. State University of New York Press, 2005. 177, 190.

8. It is now clear that the meaning of interdisciplinarity is not unitary. The term appearing in various theoretical and methodological contexts marks various methods and practices of interdisciplinarity. So it is perhaps more correct to say that there are paradigmatically determined notions and concepts of interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it should also be emphasized that the practice of interdisciplinarity does not merely mean the occasional crossing of borders, but an attempt to eliminate the often arbitrary boundaries between disciplines in the spirit of productive cooperation.

The fundamental question to ask then is this: should/must interdisciplinarity be understood from the direction of disciplinarity or as a new (group of) phenomena, from its own direction? Does it derive from disciplinarity or is it a new phenomenon of science going beyond, placed next to, and exceeding disciplinarity? Differentiated theoretical approaches emphasize the validity of interdisciplinarity within disciplines (verification of basic concepts, methods, etc.), in the modernization of disciplines, as well as outside disciplines, which aims at a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of complex reality.²³

However, there is also an opinion which emphasizes the importance of the approach to interdisciplinarity from its own possibilities (that is, going beyond disciplines). The question is whether interdisciplinarity is the practice of knowledge in the spirit of a missing paradigm? And what kind of special capacities are needed for this practice?²⁴ Interdisciplinary research is often described as the integration or synthesis of various perspectives on a particular field of research, which has no unitary, settled paradigm. Literature mentions “regulative” and “constitutive” abilities, “interpretative” attitude and “intellectual community” as special features.²⁵

Such approaches start from the presupposition that the interdisciplinary perspective or attitude ensures more comprehensive and fundamental possibilities of knowing and understanding. Not only because it integrates the ways of thinking and understanding of several disciplines, but because in such cases research opens up in a direction in which disciplines – precisely because of their limitations – cannot possibly move, which exceeds their authority. This raises the question whether this movement happens towards “in-between” disciplines or outside disciplines? Interdisciplinarity by its name refers to in-between disciplines, to what happens in knowledge between disciplines. This is also highlighted by the interdisciplinary dialogue theory, focussing on taking out the collective from the in-between of various fields and incorporating it into one special category.²⁶

²³ Cf. D. B. Ackerman: Intellectual and practical criteria for successful curriculum integration. In H. H. Jacobs (ed.): *Interdisciplinary curriculum: Design and implementation*. pp. 25–37. Alexandria, VA, 1989. 27–29.

²⁴ Cf. Don Rosenblum: In the Absence of a Paradigm: The Construction of Interdisciplinary Research. *Issues in Integrative Studies*. 1997. nr. 15. pp. 113–123. 115.

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁶ Cf. Vahid Amani Zoeram–Mohammad Agus Yusoff–Fakhreddin Soltani: Inter-Disciplinary Education: A Pattern for History and Sociology. *Journal of Education and Practice* Vol 3, No 16, 2012. 105.

Based on these, it can also be noticed that there are several current opinions on, and theoretical approaches to, interdisciplinarity which point to a kind of *hermeneutical opening*.

9. The practice of interdisciplinarity is undoubtedly connected to the hermeneutic turn of recent decades in scientific research. Early research has already turned the attention to the hermeneutical character of interdisciplinarity, emphasizing that instead of claiming the possession of truth, it drives to questioning and consensus.²⁷

Interdisciplinarity as a particularly hermeneutical phenomenon is actually revealed if we look at the inter prefix in the term. The approaches focusing on previously existing disciplines tend to stress “disciplinarity” and try to include the phenomenon of interdisciplinarity into a discipline-centred perspective. The turn is triggered by the fact that, under a phenomenological and hermeneutical pressure, there is a rising interest in the in-between sphere which fills in the space between “subjects” forming in a conceptual horizon of modernity. The essence of the phenomenological-hermeneutical turn is that it reveals the primacy of the in-between in the face of any (subject)centrism, ontologically proving that in-betweenness is not formed between subjects assumed as centre, but such subjects emerge from in-betweenness and are defined by it. The following thought signals this very well: words like “interculturality”, “intersubjectivity” and “interaction” are nothing else than empty words as long as the “inter” prefix becomes a subject of independent scrutiny, taking it to a between-sphere which questions any centre as starting point.²⁸

From this point of view in-betweenness does not mean the space between ready-made disciplines, but an ontic field open for research, the field of dynamic changes and complexity, the “negativity” in which the living movement of knowledge has not yet structured in a disciplinary way. Disciplines emerge from the play of this malleable medium and also drop back into it. The disciplines forming in an interdisciplinary field are not as consolidated entities as traditional disciplines, but rather clusters of viewpoints, loafs of methods clumping together and coming apart, which follow the movements of dynamic problem fields and the interplay of methodological horizons. It is never the ready-made disciplines that fuse or integrate in the medium of “inter”, only various kinds of concepts, horizons or

²⁷ Cf. Jean-Paul Resweber: *La méthode interdisciplinaire*. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1981. 10.

²⁸ See Bernhard Waldenfels: Answer to what is Stranger. Sketches of a Responsive Philosophy. In *Topographie des Fremden. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden I*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1997. (A lecture delivered at the Hungarian Philosophical Society in Budapest in November 1996).

method options. What comes to life this way is precisely the *truth in the event*, the *new* and *collective* creation of the participants, which cannot be traced back to any previous discipline.

Interdisciplinarity is thus characterized by an *epistemological alterity* compared to traditional disciplinarity. This is a *completely different* situation of knowledge and research in which the subject-centrism of disciplines weakens and disappears, the decisive features of traditional disciplinarity are drawn into the free interplay of questioning and criticism, and become creators of new content. This way a new medium of cognition is created which belongs to no previous discipline, but which does not leave unaffected previous disciplinary researches. It creates a new situation of research and education, it mobilizes other kinds of skills and abilities, and essentially changes the structural elements and institutional constructions of knowledge. Interdisciplinarity needs a radical *change of perspective and attitude* from the participants. This cannot be done with a disciplinary perspective and attitude.

Interdisciplinarity also has its effect on the relationship of science with economy, society and culture. Therefore it is also a valid question from a practical perspective: how can one conduct research in the medium of “inter” if there are no ready-made disciplines? The new processes of cognition entail the spreading of scientific communication and the significant restructuring of science policies. In the medium of “inter”, a *new mode of being* of science is developing.

10. Lastly, one can also ask how interdisciplinarity should be understood in the interaction of philosophical and specialized researches. It seems that interdisciplinarity can have different particularities in relation to specialized disciplines, and also if specialized disciplines meet philosophical reflection.

The rigid separation and frequent confrontation of specialized disciplines and philosophical reflection has become a practice also in the context of disciplinary tradition, which has also entailed, not to a little extent, the disciplinarization of philosophy. However, specializations and philosophies do not meet in the context of “inter” as ready-made subjects, but as the interplay of cognitive, critical and reflective horizons which interact in the new formation of knowledge. This complex process brings into play philosophical presuppositions as well as the inclusion of empirical data in philosophical reflection, or the extension of this to the field of empiricism, the construction of facts. This way neither presuppositions remain in the horizon of reflection and speculation, nor facts remain simply on an empirical level. Real interdisciplinarity joins the particularity of presuppositions and the original philosophicality of factual constructions in a mutually inspiring and constructive creation.

The true “applicability” of philosophy, the fact that “applied” philosophy can be nothing else than interdisciplinary research can happen and manifest itself precisely in the medium of “inter”. And this is also where the extreme alienation of specialized researches from philosophy can be exceeded and science can present itself in its pure essence and meaning as philosophical creation.

(Translated by Emese Czintos)

LA CONSCIENCE DE SOI ENTRE LE RÉEL ET L'IDÉAL. DE L'IMMÉDIAT AU MÉDIAT

HORAȚIU-MARIUS TRIF¹

ABSTRACT. *The Self-Consciousness between the Real and Ideal.* The self-consciousness is the „topos” where identity and difference coincide. A concept about this coincidence would tell us that there must be a perfect identity in order to have its coincidence with its opposite. But pure identity has no relation, not even to itself. $A \equiv A$ is, thus, inapplicable where this pure identity appears. Pure identity is merely absolute immediate, no difference may present itself within its „premises”. This is what the concept of Real would contain.

However, speculative logic gives us the path towards a different result in what concerns the pure immediate. Thus, through its own lack of difference, difference is constituted. But that brings us within mediation and this is the sign of the instituted identity where the consciousness lies – the Ideal.

Keywords: *self-consciousness, identity, difference, immediate, Real, Ideal*

Introduction

Un des plus grands problèmes de la philosophie hégélienne est le commencement.² Par quoi la science doit-elle commencer? – est une des questions fondamentales qui jalonnent autant le commencement du savoir dans la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*,³ que l'identité et la différenciation de l'être absolu abstrait et du néant absolu immédiat dans la *Science de la logique*. Comme Hegel fait remarquer, le problème du commencement a beaucoup entravé la philosophie lorsqu'on pense le commencement absolu, car dans l'idée qui fait régler ce problème, il y a un paradoxe

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² *W III, W*, pp. 59-74.

³ G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, traduction de Jean Hyppolite, Tome I, éd. Aubier, 1941, pp. 65-77.

qui bloque toute entreprise assumée pour faire le passage. Si on cherche à dire que le commencement absolu se situe quelque part, alors on ne comprend pas comment y est-il arrivé. Car le commencement est défini par la nouveauté, donc, par la différence, donc, par le changement, alors qu'avant ce changement ou avant cette différence il dût ne pas y avoir eu que le pur indifférencié. Donc, si on doit penser ce commencement on tombe immédiatement dans la contradiction: trouver le point du commencement absolu présuppose une réduction absolue du multiple, des instances différenciées, de tout ce qui a été développé en tant que conséquence d'une origine qui ne peut plus être elle-même quelque chose de développé, de différencié. Donc, le commencement a, en tant que seuil de son départ, de son début fondamental, en tant que point absolu d'initiation, l'immédiat pur ou l'indifférencié absolu. Mais, l'indifférencié n'a pas de différence ce qui signifie qu'il n'a pas de fin, ni de variation, ni de changement. Pourtant, pour avoir le début, le commencement proprement dit, l'indifférencié donc, doit prendre fin ou il doit obtenir par quelque part sa différence pour entrer dans le commencement, c'est-à-dire, dans le changement de l'indifférencié. Mais, s'il n'y avait que l'indifférencié, l'immuable pur, on ne peut guère comprendre par où est la différence entrée, par quel moyen ou par quel endroit fût l'immuable introduit dans le changement, car chacun des deux paires d'opposés s'exclut mutuellement et on pense de ne pas pouvoir avoir de la différence dans l'indifférencié. Donc, pour avoir le commencement, on doit avoir le non-commencement; mais, parce que le non-commencement interdit par lui-même le commencement en excluant de soi-même l'idée même de différence qui devrait s'actualiser pour faire le début, il faut que le non-commencement n'y ait plus, toujours pour avoir le même commencement en tant que but de notre démarche. Résumé: pour avoir le commencement il faut avoir et ne pas avoir, en même temps et du même côté, le point de départ du commencement, point qui n'est pas commencement, mais clôture absolument scellée en elle-même. Mais lorsqu'on arrive par réduction absolue ou, ce qui est ici la même chose, abstraite,⁴ au non-commencement, le commencement est complètement bloqué et toute différence ou chaque développement, tout „quelque chose” concret disparaît au même instant dans les ténèbres pures du néant indifférencié. Dans la pure auto-annulation singulière et dépourvue de toute liaison ou continu.

Bien sûr, c'est la place pour indiquer déjà que dans cet abyssal effondrement dans le gouffre absolu sans dimension on peut trouver la vraie solution pour l'aporie. Et c'est Hegel celui qui déjà envisage ou plutôt proclame nettement la sortie de ce cercle absolu de l'impotence pure.

⁴ *W III*, *W*, pp. 77-89; *W IV*, *W*, pp. 30-37.

Le problème signalé par Hegel est dans une forte correspondance avec le principe de l'identité et avec celui de la non-contradiction. Est-ce que dans la pure tautologie du même on peut penser la différence de l'autre? Par quel moyen peut pénétrer la différence dans l'identité? Comment peut-on penser l'altérité là où il n'y a que du même? D'où vient-il ce mystérieux „autre” qui fait vaciller ce qui n'aurait pas de variation puisqu'il n'a pas de différence?

La réponse hégélienne est donnée en deux places de ses œuvres fondamentales: dans la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* autant que dans la *Science de la Logique*.

Dans la Préface de la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* Hegel explique:

„En général, puisque la substance, comme on l'a exprimé ci-dessus, est en elle-même sujet, tout contenu est aussi la réflexion de soi-même en soi-même. La subsistance ou la substance d'un être-là est son égalité avec soi-même, car son inégalité avec soi-même serait sa dissolution. Mais l'égalité avec soi-même est la pure abstraction, et cette abstraction est la **pensée**. Si je dis »**qualité**«, je dis la déterminabilité simple; au moyen de la qualité un être-là est distinct d'un autre, ou est justement un être-là, il est pour soi-même ou il subsiste moyennant cette simplicité à l'égard de soi-même. Mais ainsi il est essentiellement la **pensée**. – C'est ici qu'on conçoit que l'être est pensée, ici se trouve à sa place cette façon de voir qui tente d'éviter les discours habituels privés de concept au sujet de l'identité de la pensée et de l'être. – *Du fait maintenant que la subsistance de l'être-là est l'égalité avec soi-même ou la pure abstraction, elle est l'abstraction de soi-même, ou elle est elle-même son égalité avec soi et sa dissolution — sa propre intériorité et son mouvement de se retirer en soi-même – son devenir.*”⁵ [Notre souligné – H.M.T.]

Dans la *Science de la Logique* on peut trouver les fragments correspondants dans la célèbre Section I, Chapitre I de la *Logique objective*.⁶

Nous essayerons à faire un commentaire pour ces fragments. Car il est clair que le commencement ne peut pas avoir d'autre soi que ce qui est donné immédiatement et sans différence car il part de cet immédiat et il ne peut guère prendre un **autre** contenu au point fondamental où il n'y a point d'autre surtout ayant en compte que c'est précisément lui-même, le commencement, qui doit assurer cet autre. Donc, cela revient à dire que si nous arrivons à avoir quelque chose de différencié, quelque chose de médiatisé, cette différence ou ce négatif doit nous parvenir de cet immédiat même. Paradoxalement, la différence apparaît de „l'intériorité” de l'indifférencié même. Au même point où on ne peut guère trouver aucune intériorité tout juste comme on ne peut trouver une extériorité non plus.

⁵ G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, traduction de Jean Hyppolite, Tome I, éd. Aubier, 1941, pp. 47-48.

⁶ *W III*, *W*, pp. 77-129.

C'est-à-dire qu'on commence, réellement et paradoxalement, toujours avec ce qui est ici-présent, ici-donné.⁷ Le point du début est celui qui ne s'est pas encore différencié par ce qu'il n'y avait point quelque chose commencé. Le début, l'initiation manifestent le même irrationnel passage à la limite que la soudaine compression de ce qui est pure im-médiation:⁸ qu'on conçoit l'oubli qui tenait son ombre au-dessus de tout et qui se tenait à l'ombre, comme pure stase du continu ou comme simple „surface” du néant, c'est-à-dire, de soi-même, s'avère être ici la même chose car le non-différencié ne peut jamais rien commencer et il n'y a rien à dire sur ce qui ne s'est jamais mis en question par ce qu'il n'y est rien d'autre pour soi. Mais, précisément parce que cette immédiation pure, cette stase absolue ébranlée dans le non-contenu d'être ses propres confins qui n'existent pas parce qu'il n'y a aucun contenu qui

⁷ Le point de début est présent partout dans la philosophie hégélienne. Le commencement est toujours vu en tant qu'immédiat puisqu'il est parfaitement logique qu'un début originaire ne soit point dans un rapport de conséquence avec quelque chose qui lui serait antérieur. Mais Hegel a la position unique parmi les philosophes d'avoir vu avec clarté l'unité du commencement avec la fin, de l'immédiat avec le médiat, de l'indifférencié avec le différencié, de l'identité avec son autre. Voir Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Știința Logicii [Science de la Logique]*, trad. D.D. Roșca, éd. Academiei Socialiste România, București, 1966, p. 49. Dans cette position, Hegel montre les racines théologiques de sa philosophie et celles particulièrement chrétiennes. Sur ce propos voir Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, *Hegel. Système et structures théologiques*, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2006, pp. 120-126; Bernard Bourgeois, *Hegel. Les actes de l'esprit*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 2001, pp. 203-230; Emilio Brito, *Hegel et la tache actuelle de la christologie*, traduit par Th. Dejond S.J., Éditions Lethielleux, Paris, 1979 et, par le même auteur, *La Christologie de Hegel*, traduit par B. Pottier S.J., éd. Beauchesne, Paris, 1983. Aussi, Octavian Florin, *Spirit și Totalitate*, 1. Prefață. 2. Ontologia Infinitului. Partea I. Doctrina ontologică a Infinitului. Cap. Infinitul absolut, [*Esprit et Totalité*, 1. Préface. 2. L'Ontologie de l'Infini. Partie Ière. La Doctrine ontologique de l'Infini. Chap. l'Infini Absolu], Castalia. Anuar de arte speculative. Vol. I. Tema numărului: Infinitul [Castalia. Annuaire des arts spéculatifs. Vol. I. Le thème du numéro: l'Infini], éd. Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 3; Virgil Cîmoș, *Timp și Eternitate [Temps et Éternité]*, éd. Paideia, București, 1998, pp. 9-10.

D'une autre part, Hegel est plutôt opposé au discours qui cherche à faire l'économie du développement, n'importe lequel: „*Le premier surgissement est initialement son état immédiat ou son concept. Aussi peu un édifice est accompli quand les fondements en sont jetés, aussi peu ce concept du tout qui est atteint, est le tout lui-même. Quand nous désirons voir un chêne dans la robustesse de son tronc, l'expansion de ses branches et les masses de ses feuillages, nous ne sommes pas satisfaits si l'on nous montre à sa place un gland.*” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, traduction de Jean Hyppolite, Tome I, éd. Aubier, 1991, p. 13. Pour des développements autour cette deuxième attitude, on recommande Christophe Bouton, *Temps et Esprit dans la philosophie de Hegel. De Francfort à Iéna*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 2000, spécialement pp. 239-243.

⁸ Cette modalité d'écrire le terme de l'im-médiation n'est pas nouvelle; on peut la rencontrer déjà en Martin Heidegger, „*La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*” de Hegel, texte établi par Ingrid Görland, traduit de l'allemand par Emmanuel Martineau, éd. Gallimard, Paris, 1984, p. 90.

devrait être borné, *est sa propre fin*, après les mots de Hegel lui-même,⁹ le début fait son jaillissement par rompre les bornes inexistantes d'un non-commencement inexistant¹⁰ et scellé en lui-même.

Le Réel

Ainsi, le commencement est toujours im-médiatement issu de soi-même: la compression fondamentale et absolument dépourvue de différence qui est le manque de contenu ou de tout développement.¹¹ Cette pure compression en elle-même, en effet, par ce qu'elle n'a pas d'extériorité – rien d'autre ne pas être possible à y avoir été pris dans la pure indifférence de ce début – est un non-accomplissement pur en soi, un soi qui n'est rien et qui se tient silencieux dans sa

⁹ *W III, W*, pp. 77-79.

¹⁰ Le dédoublement que suppose le manifeste, ce qui est donné au dehors de soi ne peut pas se trouver „dans” cette immédiation pure. Or, l'existence suppose déjà pas seulement ce qui est donné à l'extériorité visible empiriquement ou logiquement dans les déterminations intelligibles, mais aussi le Fond absolu de l'Être, c'est-à-dire, une sorte de limite quelle conque sur laquelle on pourrait s'appuyer en tant que donné ou fait absolu, radical de la présence, de l'identité. Or, déjà tous ceux sont des présupposés dérivés de quelque chose car tiennent de la partition de l'essence (*W IV, W*, pp. 7-37), donc d'un rapport irréductible de l'identité envers soi même. Or, l'identité, même en tant que continu sans césure et sans relation extatique ou extérieure, suppose déjà un contenu. Bien sûr, la présence du contenu nous porterait vers la distinction entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur. Mais, dans ce cas, on peut nous rappeler que la notion d'*Infini Actuel Absolu*, tout en étant l'intérieur éminent, par excellence, paradoxalement, n'a pas d'extériorité. Ou, mieux, son extérieur n'est que soi-même. Voir Oskar Becker, *Fundamentele matematicii [Les fondements de la mathématique]*, trad. Alexandru Giuculescu, Ed. Științifică, București, 1968, pp. 314-321 pour la référence à la conception mathématique cantorienne à ce genre d'infini; et 355-358 pour les antinomies russelliennes qui reflètent la relation de la totalité à soi. En résumé: l'identité éminente suppose d'ores et déjà un contenu même pour le cas où on ne saurait pas lui reconnaître aucune extériorité.

Pourtant, le pur et absolu commencement ne peut pas être admis même comme *Infini Actuel Absolu*, comme intériorité absolue sans extériorité. „Dans” l'Immédiat pur et radical on n'„a” que la non-surface adimensionnelle du non-contenu jamais eu mais absolu scellé „en lui-même”. On ne saurait quoi lui pourrait mieux correspondre que le concept de l'impossible ou, si nous voulons nous rappeler l'équivalence lacanienne de l'impossible, on pourrait bien le nommer comme „le Réel”. Toutefois, comme on va le montrer tout de suite sur les traces de la doctrine hégélienne, le Réel contient déjà en soi sa propre différenciation, son propre commencement et il ne pourrait pas être ce qu'il est sans la différence ou le commencement, tant la différence et le commencement appartiennent à sa „définition” que l'indifférence même.

¹¹ Voir Sf. Maxim Mărturisitorul *Capete gnostice. Despre teologie și despre iconomia întrupării Fiului lui Dumnezeu [Les Bouts gnostiques. Sur la théologie et sur l'iconomie de l'incarnation du Fils de Dieu]*, trad. Walther Alexander Prager, éd. Herald, București, 2008, 1.69, p. 40.

réduction infinitésimale.¹² Rien ne lui manque, parce qu'il n'y a pas de limite, de différence en soi-même, tout comme on n'y aperçoit aucune vacillation, aucun murmure – donc, il est absolument libre en étant, à la fois, absolument pris dans son inébranlable arrêt abstrait et vide. Mais, justement, cette pure im-médiation indifférente et aveugle se met elle-même pour elle-même sa propre limite car son exhaustion est réalisée par le simple fait de son être comme immédiat: sa non-consistance est accomplie purement et cela avant même qu'elle en jamais eut le besoin.¹³ C'est un pur accomplissement d'antécédence envers soi, accomplissement du non-accomplissement même si on n'est guère encore au point qu'on puisse dire qu'il y jamais eut de soi. Le soi est quelque chose. Le spectre infinitésimal de la pure im-médiation n'est qu'absolu rien. Et ce rien s'avère être sa propre marge puisqu'il n'y a rien d'autre dans ce rien que ce rien. Et son accomplissement n'est plus soudainement achevé.

Par cela, le spectre du non-commencement s'avère être limite, négation – sa propre négation et, par conséquent, son pur mouvement comme commencement du non-commencement. Et il n'y a aucune différence entre cette pure im-médiation scellée du non-commencement et son éclat dans la lumière de son ineffable différenciation. Il n'y a aucun moment où cet infinitésimal spectre ne soit par soi sa contradiction absolue: la différenciation. Étant son propre spectre de fin absolu par exhaustion d'un contenu jamais eu, la différence **est partout** dans ce spectre, **est** ce spectre, **est** ce fil ébranlé en soi-même, cette ligne inavouable pour aucun œil qui ne résiste à l'aminçissement des ténèbres d'une éternité infiniment plus étroite que son propre manque.

On peut voir cette torsion absolue et initiale dans les fragments qu'on vient de citer dans la *Science de la Logique* et qui nous montrent comment cette coïncidence de l'Être et du Néant en tant que pur vide de l'intuition pure nous donne leur absolue et totale différenciation dans eux-mêmes et leur opposition et devenir.

¹² *W VI, EnL*, pp. 3-11.

¹³ Dans la philosophie hégélienne on trouve l'Être et le Néant coïncidant dans une totalité qui se contient en tant que développement absolu de soi avant tout rapport privatif. (Voir G.W.F. Hegel, *W III, WL*, pp. 77-79.) La privation ne paraît pas être dissociée chez Hegel de la négativité en tant que la division du Principe donne l'impression de signifier aussi, simultanément, sa passion, son défaut. Mais à chaque moment de suppression et de conservation on peut observer la présence ultime d'une dimension de l'identité indélébile car tout mouvement négatif présuppose, comme Hegel l'observe dans des nombreux endroits, la notion irréductible de vérité et de la coïncidence fondamentale en soi de chaque détermination, d'une part; de l'autre, il y a partout dans le système cette position d'arrière plan qui permet de voir l'enjeu des oppositions dans leur engagement réciproque et dans la détermination que les moments particuliers apportent à l'entier. Ce n'est pas la place de développer ici le problème; nous le signalons seulement avec la note qu'il sera nécessaire dans le futur de s'occuper de ce problème.

L'im-médiation du non-commencement absolu scellé dans sa propre clôture absolument étroite qui se barre dans le pur impossible est, donc, l'absolue différenciation en soi-même, l'absolue ouverture de soi-même pour soi-même envers soi-même, le pur jaillissement du Nouveau dans la craquelure impassible du Même. Le non-commencement est le commencement. Et le commencement est le non-commencement. L'immédiation absolue et la médiation absolue sont le Un absolu reflété et identique: identité absolue de l'identité absolue avec sa propre différenciation absolue.¹⁴

La différence de l'immédiat et la vie de la conscience

Cette vérité qui nous provoque à la contemplation nous transporterait immédiatement dans la sublime théologie. Si ce n'était pour le travail dur du négatif que le sujet doit accomplir pour avoir le privilège de tenir pour soi le nécessaire résultat de la certitude obtenue par l'angoisse extrême du doute.

Pour le sujet déterminé il n'y a pas de privilège dans l'im-médiation. En effet, c'est exactement ce dont il lui est absolument impératif de se méfier. Cela surgit du fait que notre pensée ou notre subjectivité même est structurée par – c'est-à-dire qu'elle contient déjà – le divers ou la différence préalablement pour l'avoir ordonnée et rangée d'une façon ou d'une autre. Le grand pari de la philosophie du moment où elle prend acte de cette subjectivité est de la dépasser. Autrement, si on commence à se cantonner dans les effets de la constitution de la subjectivité en tant que résultat, on lui tombe comme prisonniers.

La question de l'identité et du commencement deviennent des pièges pour le sujet, n'importe combien pourrait-on lui reconnaître son transcendantal. En effet, deux issues apparaissent comme points circulaires et sans issue pour le sujet marqué par la quête de son institution et de son rapport légitime à soi et à quelque chose ou à quelqu'un d'autre:

1. Le fait que son être n'est pas absolument originaire, mais dérivé au même temps où la différenciation qui le ferait surgir en tant que sujet lui apparaît avec la stupeur suprême que tout manque de rationalité – c'est-à-dire, de rapport, de *ratio* entre deux ou plusieurs éléments – engendre, car la question de la différenciation nous donne des contradictions, comme nous l'avons vu, auxquelles s'ajoutent les

¹⁴ La célèbre formule de Hegel par laquelle montre-t-il comment l'abîme ou le gouffre de l'Être et du Néant compénètrent leurs identités, mais cette identité est tout de même opposition pure et absolue (*W III-IV-V, WL*, pp. 79-108). Voir aussi Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, *Hegel et l'Idéalisme Allemand*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1999, pp. 234-241.

difficultés que l'être subjectif trouve encore une plus radicale discontinuité par rapport à l'indifférencié du non-commencement. Cela résulte du fait que le sujet n'est plus une négation absolue en tant que coïncidence immédiate avec le non-différencié, résultat pur, absolu et immédiat de la division originaire; même si la détermination et le fini sont des véritables négations de l'indéterminé et de l'infini que suppose l'autodifférenciation du non-commencement.

2. L'entier processus de pensée par lequel le sujet s'adresse-t-il aux interrogations fondamentales, donc à la philosophie et à la légitimité de ses interrogations, paraît être circonscrit à la présupposition entendue en tant qu'aveugle et circulaire du **principe de l'identité**. Cela apparaît de manière encore plus acute lorsqu'on aperçoit que la légitimité de l'identité circulaire de la pensée apparaît elle-même du même gouffre de l'impossibilité pure de la division du non-commencement comme l'individualité ontologique du sujet.

L'impossibilité du sujet déterminé de s'emparer de l'origine immédiate de sa propre différenciation individuelle nous apparaît d'autant plus forte lorsqu'on essaierait à faire la réduction empirique du rapport subjectif à sa propre institution.

Ce dont il prend néanmoins conscience tout court lui parvient d'une façon brutale, presque, mais sensible au même temps. Parce que ceci est donné, il est; donc j'en suis sûr; mais, toutefois, il me rejette soudainement et d'une façon tout aussi brutale qu'il survient, mettant, par l'immédiateté pure par laquelle il s'ébranle envers moi, la différence de son aveugle soi et par là s'avère-t-il comme brutal refoulement de son propre continu et contenu fondamental. Car ce qui est ici comme pur immédiat se met en sa propre limite et comme instantanée limite en soi, ceci est déjà fissuré par soi et il comporte en lui-même la pure perception empirique.¹⁵ Empirique, comme frontière, de *εμπειρισμός*, mais un empirique dont je ne saurais rien s'il n'y avait un recul de moi-même dans la différence commune que *Ceci* porte avec soi et en soi et que je peux saisir parce que cette différence se porte déjà en moi-même. Je trouve, alors, en moi-même le ressort de ce rejet puisque le *Ceci* qui me cogne avec cette instantanéité se rend dans sa pure compression pas dans un mouvement aussi absolu et infini qu'il n'est soudain, mais dans une mesure, dans la pulsation qui me

¹⁵ Il conviendrait ici de rappeler le premier chapitre de la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* dans lequel on peut suivre avec une forte rigueur l'exposition de la différenciation de l'immédiat. Partout où l'ontologie de l'immédiat – soit-elle empiriste ou intuitionniste – proclame la vérité de l'objet en tant que pur être qui détient par soi même la référence sans reste du savoir, Hegel fait montrer comment cette immédiation se trouve divisée et le manque s'insinue dans le champ de l'être en tant qu'Universel du *Ceci*, *Maintenant* et d'*Ici*. Voir G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, traduction de Jean Hyppolite, Tome I, éd. Aubier, 1941, pp. 81-92.

montre qu'il est déterminé et qu'il me parvient avec un autre.¹⁶ Mais le recul que j'ai dans cet autre par la différence de l'immédiat dépasse l'autre extérieur, puisqu'il est la détermination de l'immédiat mesuré. Moi, je dois me trouver, alors, au-delà de l'immédiat et de sa négation mesurée — mon immédiat m'ouvre déjà l'autre de l'intériorité par le simple manque qu'introduit l'Universel. Mon immédiat est d'autre sorte comme d'autre sorte doit être la différence que mon immédiat engage par son ébranlement en soi même.

De l'autre côté, lorsqu'on essaye à trouver tout simplement la raison de la raison, en d'autres mots, la légitimité du principe d'identité, on fait recours à une contradiction: le principe d'identité est lui-même l'expression fondamentale de la légitimité. La définition de la légitimité concerne l'origine et le rapport d'adéquation d'un élément envers son origine. Or, le rapport suppose, simultanément, l'identité par le fait qu'il y a une irréductibilité des termes et de la relation; mais aussi la différence par le fait que celui qui provient d'une origine n'est plus l'origine.

Ainsi, l'identité paraît nier la différence, donc tout rapport parce qu'elle 1) ne concerne que le même et parce qu'elle 2) se présuppose soi-même, fait recours à soi en tant que son propre critère. Donc, même la question de la légitimité de l'identité ne serait plus possible sans l'identité même.

Pourtant, l'identité est solidaire au continu, c'est-à-dire, à tout ce qu'il y a de manifeste. Lorsqu'on parle de l'identité, même si on rejette la répétition, donc la césure entre des instants différents du même, donc même lorsqu'on la conçoit en tant que pure stase sans vacillation ou sans murmure — ce qui reviendrait à l'idée de *l'Infini Actuel Absolu* —, elle tient de ce qui se garde à soi comme soi. L'identité est, donc, purement circulaire. Et cette circularité nous porte soudainement dans les bras du gouffre de l'immédiateté pure car une circularité pure ne peut pas s'achever que dans la réduction absolue, dans la compression pure de sa superposition absolue en soi. Cela résulte par le raisonnement nécessaire:

1. L'identité en tant que pur continu sans césure est un contenu pur.

2. Mais le contenu pur, même lorsqu'il n'a plus d'extériorité de rapport et de relation extatique, tient d'un développement, d'une sorte „d'extériorisation intérieure, purement intérieure”. Le manque d'extériorité hémorragique de cette Intériorité éminente relève de son absolu.

¹⁶ Pierre-Jean Labarrière, *Le Dieu de Hegel*, Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 42, n° 2, 1986, dit à p. 237: „L'autoconscience n'est elle-même que lorsqu'elle parvient à avoir — à être — »l'unité de soi-même dans son autre«; alors le sujet se trouve arraché à tout solipsisme possible. »Je, qui est l'ob-jet de son concept, n'est en fait pas **ob-jet**, mais l'ob-jet du désir est seulement [comme] **indépendant**, car il est la substance universelle indestructible, l'essence fluide égale à soi-même«. »Point tournant« pour la conscience : elle n'est pas plus livrée à »l'apparence colorée de l'en deçà sensible« (objectivisme conscientiel) qu'à »la nuit vide de l'au-delà suprasensible« (subjectivisme autoconscentiel).”

3. Pourtant, ici on a la demande que ce qui est développé, même en tant qu'éternel, révèle son point absolu de départ – on souligne que l'éternité d'un tel continu lui assure une simultanéité qui le fait sortir au dehors de toute relation déterminée, donc, du temps aussi.

4. Le point du départ ne peut être visé ou atteint que par la réduction de l'*Infini Actuel Absolu* même à sa racine non-développée et non-commencée.

5. Ainsi, le principe de l'identité s'avère être le résultat le plus pur: il est sorti immédiatement et circulairement du manque absolu de fondement.¹⁷ L'identité ressort absolument en tant que résultat auto-instituteur et auto-légitimateur de l'Impossible pur, en effet, en tant qu'Impossible auto-commencé ou auto-différencié.¹⁸

¹⁷ Il convient ici de rappeler la doctrine mystique de Maître Eckhart qui concevait une distinction entre *Got* et *Gotheit*, c'est-à-dire, entre la Trinité (*Got*) et Sa Source (*Gotheit*). Voici un fragment typique pour le style paradoxal de Maître Eckhart: „Dieu et la déité sont aussi différents l'un de l'autre que le ciel et la terre... Dieu opère, la déité n'opère pas, elle n'a rien à opérer, il n'y a pas d'opération en elle, elle n'a jamais eu aucune opération en vue. Dieu et la déité diffèrent par l'agir et le non-agir.” Meister Eckhart, *Sermon: Nolite timere eos...*, cité par Jeanne Ancelet-Eustache, *Maître Eckhart et la mystique rhénane*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil; (Bourges: impr. de Tardy), 1956, p. 55. Il faut, bien sûr, mentionner aussi St. Denys l'Aréopagite qui parle du Néant qu'est l'Essence divine éminente – Sfântul Dionisie Areopagitul, *Opere complete. Și scoliile Sfântului Maxim Mărturisitorul [Œuvres complètes. Avec les scholies de St. Maxime le Confesseur]*, trad. Pr. Dumitru Stăniloae, ed. Paideia, București, 1996, *Despre Numirile Dumnezeiești [Sur le Noms divins]*, Cap. XIII, §1-3 (pp. 174-175); *Teologia mistică [La théologie mystique]*, Cap. I-II (pp. 247-249). C'est, sans doute, lui qui a catalysé dans la contemplation spéculative chrétienne ces motifs de la distinction d'origine, apparaît-il, plotinienne entre la *Déité* et *Dieu*. Pourtant, il y a une différence importante entre la *Déité* comme source de la *Trinité*, dans le Christianisme, et l'Un plotinicien par rapport à l'Intellect: la *Déité* et la *Trinité* sont **Un** – comme nous venons de montrer par l'analyse ci-dessous, le non-commencement et le commencement sont Un; en tant que pour Plotin, l'Intellect est ontologiquement différent et subordonné à l'Un, en étant une descente privative par rapport à son Origine. N'importe quelles autres différences de détail pourraient être établies entre eux, tous les penseurs chrétiens qui ont fait valoir ou ont remarqué la „distinction” *Déité* et *Dieu* gardent fondamentalement cette union entre les deux aspects — on peut songer aux Pères Capadociens, à St. Jean Chrysostome ou à St. Siméon le Nouvel Théologien pour l'Est, ou à J. Scot Erigène, Nicolas de Cuse, S. Franck, Angelus Silesius ou Jakob Böhme, dans l'Ouest. Pour ces derniers, voir David König, *Hegel et la mystique germanique*, L'Harmattan, 1999, pp. 22-23.

Toutefois, on peut mentionner aussi un auteur asiatique qui parle de la même manière sur l'Originnaire: „...indicable, incommensurable, informel, indifférencié, inexprimable, et Cela respandit de sa propre Lumière” – Shankara, cité par David König, *Hegel et la mystique germanique*, L'Harmattan, 1999, pp. 18-19.

¹⁸ En fin de compte, cela ne peut correspondre qu'à l'engendrement du Fils par le Père dans la théologie dogmatique chrétienne.

Mais par cela l'identité qui est en tant que principe véritable de l'intelligible, de la raison se révèle dans les ténèbres lumineuses de la pure irrationalité.¹⁹ C'est l'abîme convoqué à faire raison à la raison. Le principe de l'identité se révèle en tant que différence pure et absolue de l'antériorité absolue et pure de la compression ontologique fondamentale du non-commencement. Dans le Même de l'identité nous apparaît la silhouette surprenante de l'Autre. Dans la présentation pure de l'Être nous trouvons l'ombre du dédoublement du Néant.²⁰

Le seul problème est, alors, que c'est un sujet fini et déterminé, qui n'a pas accès à l'institution radicale de son être, qui est convoqué à légitimer sa raison, donc son principe de l'identité au même moment où il ne peut guère que le présupposer. Il est tenu à produire sa légitimité par rapport au non-commencement, à l'immédiateté pure sans qu'il ait accès immédiat à elle. Il ne peut pas justifier sa différenciation car il doit se trouver „dedans” l'immédiateté pure pour pouvoir la différencier dans le résultat de sa propre individualité. Sauf qu'il n'a aucunement accès à cet immédiat. Le sujet est, par définition, médiat.²¹

Je trouve en moi-même, alors, cet autre, comme dédoublement: un autre qui se révèle au-delà de la craquelure que nous, moi et l'immédiat sensible, gardons ensemble. La différence entre moi et l'immédiat est celle que mon immédiat ne reflète jamais son autre en soi même pour se situer en tant qu'en soi dedans cet autre, qu'il devienne entièrement cet autre et puisse se contempler soi-même par la vision que cette différence lui ouvre sur soi-même. Moi, je le reflète parce que je suis moi-même un autre pour moi-même et je garde aussi un autre de moi-même que je ne peux jamais prendre comme déterminé, comme complètement livré pour moi. Chaque fois que je regarde envers moi-même il y a toujours aussi un autre qui regarde avec moi. Et je sais qu'il est et qu'il n'est pas moi-même en même temps.

¹⁹ Pour la question de la lumière et de l'abîme, voir Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, *Hegel et l'Idéalisme Allemand*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1999, pp. 55-74.

²⁰ Néant qui ne peut plus, alors, être privation, impossibilité comme impotence, *nihil privativum*. Et *nihil negativum* non plus. Un *nihil* dans le sens commun de l'expression ne peut rien engendrer. Il est bloqué en „soi-même” parce que sa différenciation ne lui appartient plus. Elle doit lui être donnée d'autre part ou – ce qui est la même chose – par quelqu'un d'autre, un autre qu'il ne peut pas contenir, car le *nihil* n'a pas de contenu, tout comme la mort pure n'a pas de vie.

En tant que l'Impossible du non-commencement originaire appartient à Sa propre différenciation, tout comme Sa différenciation lui appartient à Lui. Dans l'Originnaire, les deux sont superposés exhaustivement, sans qu'il y ait aucun développement. Son Autre est réellement (imp(o)assiblement) Lui-même.

²¹ Résultat conservé dans la même théologie chrétienne par le principe que la créature n'est pas consubstantielle avec Dieu, mais elle peut participer au Principe par la Gloire éternelle. Voir Antoine Lévy, *Le Créé et l'Incréé. Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d'Aquin. Aux sources de la querelle palamienne*, J. Vrin, Paris, 2006, pp. 71-128.

Cette différenciation me fait être ce que je suis: un être qui n'a aucune certitude immédiate de l'immédiat, car, pour tout immédiat je suis donné comme son autre car il y a toujours un mystérieux autre qui se donne avec moi.²² Dans cette perpétuelle donation invisible de la limite, de la différence qui ne disparaît jamais, qui peut être ignorée mais qui ne peut pas être effacée car elle survient dans l'immédiat même, ce que j'appelle „la conscience” ou, peut-être, encore mieux, „esprit” vient se dévoiler et apparaître peu à peu dans son intérieur toujours divisé par cette présence ultime, irréductible et parfois secrète de l'autre.

Si cette différenciation était à se faire tourner envers soi-même, c'est-à-dire se différencier d'elle-même puisqu'il lui devrait se mettre au-dessous son propre jugement, on pourrait voir surgir par là la confirmation de sa vérité dans sa négation: en prenant la présence de la différence, de l'autre comme quelque chose qui nous est donné comme immédiat, on aboutirait à poser la question qu'il y aurait un tout autre dans ce tout autre – c'est-à-dire, on aboutirait à la présence de cet autre en soi. À cet autre même que je ne peux pas avoir complètement car il se donne toujours différent de tout ce que j'aurais à mettre au dessus la main.

Autrement, je me trouverais dans la bizarrerie où je confondrais leur différence avec quelque chose différent d'eux-mêmes ne pas m'apercevoir que la source de cette différence est toujours cet autre pris dans l'entièreté de son altérité – car l'altérité se prend soi-même par soi-même, c'est-à-dire, qu'elle doit convenir à son concept. Mais alors, l'altérité ou, encore mieux, la différence, s'avère **être identique à soi-même**. Ainsi, la question de la certitude est hissée et résolue par le négatif. Le négatif du moi est toujours présent à l'intérieur du moi et le moi connaît la certitude de sa propre existence seulement par l'expérience de ce négatif qu'on peut voir maintenant comme la racine du **doute**.

Le doute s'instaure dans ce que je me suis accoutumé de nommer „le moi”. Mais, ce doute ne s'arrête point au dehors de ce „moi”, mais il guette aussi par la fente de mon origine, de mon début qui ne m'appartient guère, même cette certitude donné du „moi”. Qui est-il ce moi? Que veut-il? D'où vient-il? Mais, le plus important encore, ce „moi” aussi m'apparaît comme différent: je le vois ou, mieux, le „moi” se voit mis dans des états différents comme les émotions, les états d'esprit, les passions, le réveil et le sommeil et, finalement, ce que je nomme la pensée elle-même. Alors, d'où puis-je savoir qu'est-ce que c'est pour le vrai ce „moi” et quelle pourrait être la certitude que ce „moi” n'est-il pas une sorte d'illusion, un spectre qui se trompe, qui, en d'autres mots, prend pour vrai être qui ne l'est pas?

²² G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, traduction de Jean Hyppolite, Tome I, éd. Aubier, 1941, pp. 145-192.

Il lui devient, alors, évident à ce „moi” que le doute est sa propre confirmation. Mais, pas une confirmation extérieure d'un fait. Pas du tout. Ici le „moi” s'avère comme douteux et confirmé dans ce doute par sa propre substance qui elle-même n'est rien d'autre que ce doute, que ce négatif mis au travail. Le „moi” n'est plus une substance qui sait d'elle-même par le fait d'un mouvement qui surgit dans son contenu et qu'on appellerait traditionnellement „la pensée”; le „moi” s'avère ici être lui ce mouvement pur, cette vacillation sans repas, aucun moment ne pas étant une sorte de contenu „plein” en soi, une sorte d'aveugle continuum, d'un substrat des états. Mais le „moi” s'avère être cette fente de murmures qui ne lui appartiennent pas, non-lieu des rencontres et qui, lui, rencontre par la médiation de l'autre qu'il aperçoit au-delà de tous ses moments immédiats, les moments qui ne seraient autrement distincts si l'autre de chaque moment ne se refoulait à l'instant où surgit ce moment immédiat. Par cette dialectique perpétuelle de la différenciation qui est ici, pour le sujet déterminé, le principe fondamental de son être – par opposition à l'Originnaire où le principe était l'identité par la réduction ultime au non-commencement – l'identité revient en force en tant que pur présupposé fondamental et spéculatif de la vie du moi. Car tout doute qui apporte avec soi le fil négatif de l'altérité pour „tester” à chaque pas comment chaque moment du moi n'est-il pas fondamental parce qu'il pourrait être autrement ou autre chose de ce qu'il est déjà, ce que je suppose chaque fois est précisément le critère qui constate cette négativité. Ce critère est l'identité qui est comme retirée en soi-même par son antériorité pure à soi, donc qui n'est pas manifeste, qui n'existe pas, qui ne peut pas se constituer en tant que substance ou comme substrat autoréférentiel. Et, toutefois, c'est la même identité qui tient l'intelligibilité des actes du moi, les profilant dans la lumière de son reste qu'elle institue par sa rétraction pure.

C'est la découverte du sujet.

De l'analyse et de la synthèse

Il ne nous est pas indifférent comment on apprécie la démarche par laquelle on peut procéder avec notre raison vers les questions de la connaissance que nous allons rencontrer sur ce chemin. On connaît que la pensée peut être égarée par les concepts qu'elle utilise sans leur faire une critique suffisamment rigoureuse. Mais, toutefois, la pensée marche vers son objet poussée par des lois inexorables. Elle vise son objet parce qu'elle le voit différent d'elle-même, mais elle sait que l'objet n'est rien que sa propre réflexion en soi car c'est avec elle-même, avec sa structure intelligible qu'elle juge et s'approprie son objet. Mais la loi fondamentale de la pensée et celle qu'elle se tient identique avec elle-même au moment où elle se perçoit

comme différente. C'est la raison pour laquelle la pensée a dedans elle-même la différence et l'identité²³. Par la différence, la pensée échappe à tous les termes qu'elle engage dans ses jugements – ainsi, la pensée est pure (par cela on entend qu'elle, au bout d'un scrutin rigoureux, s'avère être non-déterminée puisqu'il lui faut dépasser toutes les déterminations de propriétés catégorielles qu'elle engage dans ses jugements), mais cette pureté lui donne la concentration de l'identité. Par l'identité, la pensée se trouve étant elle-même, elle s'avère être identique. Mais, toutefois, la pensée est différente d'elle-même et elle ne peut pas se donner le point final de la réalisation de son identité puisque la différence ne lui appartient pas, la différence lui vient d'autre part – ainsi, elle est ce qu'elle est: réflexion sillonnée, donc, partout par l'aliénation catégorielle. Selon Kant la responsabilité de cette réflexion appartiendrait à l'unification comme telle.²⁴ Cette unification serait une propriété substantielle de l'aperception, une sorte de substrat déjà assez abstrait pour lui donner une consistance métaphysique.

Ici, les concepts visés par la critique dont nous parlions sont ceux d'*analyse* et de *synthèse*.

On trouvera ici une coïncidence entre un des concepts pris en questionnement et celui de critique même. Critiquer signifie mettre de côté toutes les déterminations variables d'un terme quelconque et lui trouver ce que tient de son invariance. L'analyse, si on regarde avec plus d'attention, tient aussi de la division, de ce que nous trouvons des „craquelures” dans le terme, c'est-à-dire, les fissures de sa composition, et on le divise avec insistance jusqu'à ce qu'il nous donne le réel au-delà duquel on ne peut plus aller. Alors, soit qu'on met de côté les déterminations, soit qu'on pénètre dans le contenu du terme, l'analyse nous porte vers ce qui serait d'apodictique dedans ou au-delà de lui. Puisqu'on pourrait se rendre compte du principe du terme, l'apodicticité serait ce que nous donnerait aussi l'intelligibilité du terme et sa lumière qui nous éclaire. Ainsi, l'analyse serait ce que divise, différencie le terme pris dans sa propre crise.²⁵

La synthèse paraît être ce qu'est déjà donné par la simple identité ou le simple fait d'être ou d'exister. Ainsi, le terme serait donné par ce simple fait, par ce qu'on pourrait nommer *la factualité* ontologique, de sorte qu'il nous apparaît d'une manière indiscernable à propos de son origine qui le fait surgir comme pure

²³ Voir Virgil Ciomoș, *De la experiența sublimului, la starea de excepție [De l'expérience du sublime, à l'état d'exception]*, ed. Paideia, București, 2006, pp. 26-40. Aussi, à lire l'Introduction de la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* de Hegel – traduction de Jean Hyppolite, Tome I, éd. Aubier, 1991, pp. 65-78.

²⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique de la Raison Pure*, trad. par Alain Renaut, éd. GF-Flammarion, 2006, pp. 195-205.

²⁵ En grec le mot κρίσις signifie *pouvoir de distinction, de séparation, de choix, de décision* et, pas dernièrement, *le pouvoir de jugement ou le fait de juger*. Il paraît qu'il s'agissait d'une racine commune de l'étymon puisqu'on la trouve aussi dans κριτική qui signifie *le jugement en tant que discernement*.

apparition. Le terme serait, donc, ce pur étant que ma conscience trouve dans l'extériorité de soi-même comme simple „quelque chose” ou comme simple „chose” donnée. Son identité serait ce substrat invariable du terme qui ne disparaît point étant donnée sa variance; mais, pour saisir cette identité, il me faudrait appeler à l'analyse.²⁶ La synthèse aperceptive est elle-même réalisée par étant donnée, puisque ce qu'est l'activité proprement dite de l'entendement et qui peut être suscitée par la volonté du sujet, déjà suppose l'existence d'une unité aperceptive qui est seulement trouvée en acte sans pouvoir donner, à ce niveau, que des spéculations au-dessus sa nature et origine et qui nous offre les conditions proprement dites des actes noétiques que nous engendrons dans notre foyer discriminatoire:

„Le principe suprême de la possibilité de toute intuition [...] consistait [...] en ce que tout le divers de l'intuition se trouvait soumis aux conditions formelles de l'espace et du temps. Le principe suprême de cette même possibilité, relativement à l'entendement, consiste en ce que tout le divers de l'intuition se trouve soumis aux conditions de l'unité originaire synthétique de l'aperception. Au premier de ces principes sont soumises toutes les représentations diverses de l'intuition en tant qu'elles nous sont **données**; au second, en tant qu'il leur faut pouvoir être **liées** dans une conscience; sans quoi en effet rien ne peut être pensé ou connu, parce que les représentations données n'auraient pas en commun l'acte de l'aperception: **je pense**, et que, dès lors, elles ne seraient pas saisies ensembles dans une conscience de soi.”²⁷

L'analyse paraissait être solidaire avec ce qu'est la division de l'entendement, en tant que la synthèse est traditionnellement vue être solidaire avec ce qu'est l'aperception et à l'intuition comme elle fût comprise et décrite par Kant.

La synthèse est dépendante de ce qui reste comme invariable, du fait qu'au-delà de toute variance qu'un terme ou un autre peut subir, il nous reste quelque identité donnée par-dessus chaque occurrence. En effet, la synthèse de l'objet serait déjà donnée pour nous comme pure possibilité de son unité découverte et réalisée dans la réflexion aperceptive. La multiplicité objectale serait, ainsi, l'effet de la différence que la réflexion révèle dedans l'aperception même et ce défaut aperceptif serait, ainsi, responsable de notre incapacité d'appréhender le Réel tel comme il est en soi. Par cette différenciation l'entendement serait l'articulation des modes par lesquels la réflexion se rapporte à elle-même en tant que l'intuition serait ce qui regroupe les modes par lesquels la conscience se rapporte à l'objet.

²⁶ On peut observer qu'on se trouve ici en pleine doctrine de *l'Essence*, selon Hegel: nous faisons distinction entre ce qui serait essentiel et ce qui serait dépourvu de signification. Voir Philippe Soual, *Intériorité et réflexion. Étude sur la Logique de l'essence chez Hegel*, préface de Jean-François Marquet, éd. L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000. pp. 21-36.

²⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique de la Raison Pure*, trad. par Alain Renaut, éd. GF-Flammarion, 2006, p. 201.

Une telle supposition a comme fondement la prémisse qu'au-delà de tout divers il y a le Tout lui-même comme indifférence pure, qu'il s'agissait d'un principe de la plus pure, immuable et immédiate nature. Il s'agissait du *principe de l'identité*.

L'Idéal. Conclusion

La philosophie a déjà traité le problème de la différence qui est donnée dans l'identité et par l'identité même.²⁸ On a constaté que l'identité est une négativité pure²⁹ par le fait qu'elle exclut d'elle-même ce qui est différent, mais que par ce moyen même s'avère-t-elle être en différence avec soi. Ainsi, la différence qu'on trouve dedans l'identité est censée être vue par sa définition envers ce qu'elle exclut, envers ce qu'il lui échappe.

Contre ce genre de criticisme on a hissé l'objection que ce dédoublement de l'identité en elle-même nous est dû car il reflète **notre** position de réflexion déterminée vers la fondation non-diverse de la Totalité.³⁰

Ainsi, le principe de l'invariance pure serait dans une transcendance absolue, étant donné comme une irréductible factualité ontologique, comme pure indifférence en soi; notre position est celle des êtres déterminés par l'irruption que nous subissons contre cette indifférence radicale, ce que nous bloque la réduction ontologique de notre être déterminé vers l'origine de laquelle nous avons fait jaillissement.

Nous faisons opposition à cette doctrine traditionnelle.³¹ Parce que l'espace de cet ouvrage ne nous permet à développer nos idées d'une manière exhaustive, nous essayerons à en faire une courte esquisse.

La réduction ontologique radicale nous met dans la présence spéculative dans l'articulation de l'étant de la dualité fondamentale qui régit notre pensée et qui transparaît dans le contenu de deux concepts fondamentaux: identité et différence

²⁸ Voir G.W.F. Hegel, *W IV, WL*, pp. 32-37.

²⁹ On rappelle ici les fragments hégéliens qu'on vient de citer ci-dessus. Hegel parle dans ce cas de la loi de l'Essence qui cherche à établir ce qui reste comme fondamental dans tout changement et qui ne peut pas se donner qu'au moment où cette essence se différencie en deux sens: comme manifestation et comme retirement en soi. Voir sur ce propos Philippe Soual, *Intériorité et réflexion. Étude sur la Logique de l'essence chez Hegel*, préface de Jean-François Marquet, éd. L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000, pp. 65-70.

³⁰ Apud Vlad Mureșan, *Triplul regim al Totalității [Le Triple régime de la Totalité]*, dans Castalia, Anuar de arte speculative, vol. I, ed. Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, pp. 106-107.

³¹ Bien sûr, cette opposition n'est point nouvelle. Elle a été hissée aussi par Hegel même. Heidegger aussi la prend à son tour dans toute sa philosophie. Mais le premier qui en fit sa doctrine, fût Platon dans le célèbre dialogue *Parménides* dans lequel on peut voir pour la première fois dans l'histoire de la pensée comme la factualité pure du pur être de l'Un absolu aboutit à se différencier en soi-même et à donner sa propre négativité absolue par sa véritable définition.

ou unité et altérité ou un et multiple. Au-delà de cette dualité principielle, pourtant, on trouve le Principe du Même Absolu, l'Identité Qui dépasse toute dualité et Qui se dévoile comme „lieu” (ou, peut-être, encore mieux, en tant que *non-lieu* entendu pas comme **ouk topos**, mais en tant que **meta-topos**) de la coïncidence continuelle du discontinu. Mais voyons le parcours de cette réduction dans un autre texte, puisqu'il y en a un qui en parle beaucoup mieux que nous:

„La finitude et la détermination sont un. La finitude a été surprise comme double délimitation intérieure et extérieure de l'objet par identité et altérité. Par l'identité la finitude est contenu ontique affirmatif, car l'identité est fondamentalement solidaire avec la présence. Par l'altérité la finitude est surprise d'une manière négative en tant que limitation de la présence affirmative, en tant que limitation du contenu ontique de l'objet. Donc, la finitude qui qualitativement est la même chose avec la détermination, dévoile son double caractère, affirmatif et négatif en rapport avec la double délimitation par l'identité et l'altérité. L'identité et l'altérité sont les figures de la détermination, car, dans la finitude, dans la détermination, l'identité et l'altérité, la présence et l'absence, l'affirmation et la négation sont solidaires.

La compréhension de l'Être³² comme infini total, absolu, en tant qu'**Apeiron**, doit avoir lieu dans l'horizon de la suppression et du dépassement de la détermination.

Pour la contemplation métaphysique du Être il est nécessaire à faire la séparation de ce qui est solidaire dans la finitude. Ce n'est qu'au moment de la séparation de la présence de l'absence, de l'affirmation de la négation limitative qu'on pourra pénétrer les sens fondamentaux de l'indétermination, de l'**Apeiron**.

L'absence de la détermination peut être comprise dans un double sens: en tant qu'absence de la limite et en tant qu'absence du contenu. En tant qu'absence de la limite, l'**Apeiron** se dévoile étant pure Affirmation, car la limite ne peut guère être fondée sans négation, sans absence. En tant qu'absence du contenu l'**Apeiron** est néant, il est le vide pur. Par le démembrement de la détermination dans ses constituants élémentaires on voit que les sens de l'**Apeiron** se positionnent dans une altérité radicale qui va se dévoiler être d'un tout autre ordre que l'altérité parmi les objets déterminés.”³³

Comme on a pu lire, on nous a montré que l'Identité est la référence totale d'une Présence qui se trouve en tant que factualité fondamentale³⁴ au-delà de toute consistance déterminée et déterminable. Toutefois, cette transcendance absolue de

³² Il s'agit là du verbe à l'infinitif, „être”, pas du substantif „être”. L'infinitif nous porte vers l'indétermination totale, c'est-à-dire, vers ce qu'est au-delà de tout objet ou sujet (com)pris dans sa propre contingence ontologique, en tant que dérivé d'une origine qui ne peut pas lui appartenir, qu'il ne peut pas maîtriser. Le substantif, au contraire, exprimerait exactement le statut de la contingence ontologique et trouve son occurrence dans le texte cité sous le concept de finitude ou détermination.

³³ Florin Octavian, *L'Ontologie de l'Infini*, 1^{ère} Partie. La Doctrine ontologique de l'Infini. 1^{er} Chapitre. L'Infini Absolu, dans Castalia, *Anuar de arte speculative*, vol. I, ed. Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 20. (La traduction nous appartient.)

³⁴ *Idem*, pp. 14-21.

la déterminabilité est un paradoxe qui situe dans la pure coïncidence l'intuition pure d'une présence inébranlable avec la différence totale de toute détermination. Mais, comme on verra, la vision fondamentale que nous discutons ne s'arrête pas là puisque cette identité transcendante s'avère être en tant que pure présence indéterminée d'une factualité pan-topique et elle est disjointe de la pure Absence.

Comme on vient de le montrer ci-dessus, on ne peut pas reconnaître dans un Infini qui est au-delà de toute disjonction, de toute dualité que la pure intériorisation de ce que peut rendre compte de l'unité du divers pur et absolu. Bien sûr, jusque là, il faut mettre en lumière les raisons pour lesquelles nous sommes obligés – d'une manière apodictique, c'est-à-dire, ce qui nous donne la nécessité intérieure, qui est intelligible et s'avère être comme pure liberté, par différence de la nécessité extérieure qui n'est que contingence aveugle, c'est-à-dire, la négation de l'idée de nécessité même – à concevoir le Réel comme une diversité absolue.

Ce que nous voulons dire c'est que toute identité qui se révèle par la loi inexorable de $A \equiv A$, est une identité dérivée – même si elle paraît, pourtant, fondamentale – pas une identité pure et absolue. Car, comme on le sait, tout continu d'un élément quelconque n'est rien que la préservation, c'est-à-dire, la perduration d'un élément. Il n'est pas du tout nécessaire que cette perduration soit conçue dans une diversité temporelle, ou même qu'elle ne soit pas même conçue guère. Il nous suffit qu'elle soit posée en tant que continuité ontologique avec elle-même.³⁵ Car, lorsqu'on dit $A \equiv A$, on voit bien qu'il y a un véritable rapport entre l'identité et elle-même. Mais, s'il y a un rapport, alors, l'identité ne fait, par sa propre maintenance dans l'invariance, qu'exclure de soi-même le moment du négatif. Mais, en l'excluant, elle s'en sert et, par conséquent, elle le confirme pleinement, c'est-à-dire qu'elle fait preuve d'y être relative et de le contenir dans sa propre essence définitoire puisque son intégrité y passe comme par un moment nécessaire, apodictique.³⁶ Cela nous porte vers une conclusion tout aussi certaine qu'elle est ostensible: tout élément donné dans son immédiateté ontologique, dans sa continuité sans variance est un produit qui ne révèle pas ses principes d'au-dessous soi-même, que par l'analyse qu'on doit lui faire. Il nous apparaît avec une carte d'identité par laquelle il ne nous explique pas quelle est son origine et qu'est-ce qui fait que sa carte d'identité soit légitime.

De ce côté, nous devons lui demander quelle en est l'origine. Et le résultat qui nous s'y impose ne peut être que **A** a une institution infinie en soi-même: à chaque niveau de l'analyse qu'on y entreprend, on va trouver un **A** quelconque qui sert comme fondement pour les **A** qui lui suivent. Ce qui signifie que nous n'avons pas le

³⁵ Voir pp. 10-12 du présent étude.

³⁶ G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, § 902-903, Blackmask Online, 2001, p. 66. Aussi, David Gray Carlson, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 9-13.

moyen de pénétrer dans l'institution absolue de **A**, lui-même. Car à chaque niveau où nous découvrons un élément substantiel, qui *est quelque chose* en lui-même, c'est-à-dire, qui détient une coalescence substantielle quelconque, on trouve, en effet, déjà l'unification des termes déjà différenciés en eux-mêmes, des éléments qui ne sont que des effets de la différenciation originaire.

Mais ce que nous voulons trouver, c'est précisément l'origine même de cette différenciation, le portail par lequel est introduite la cohérence ontologique qui articule le contenu de toute présence véritable.

Au lieu de trouver cela, l'analyse de chaque élément concret, ici-présent, devient infinie elle-même et elle n'aboutit jamais à atteindre le bout de sa différenciation. En d'autres mots, la différenciation de l'analyse trouve encore une altérité constitutive qui est à chaque instant au-delà de chaque institué. Par cela, le Réel que nous avons trouvé en tant que référent fondamental de tout ce que peut être dit, se montre à notre esprit en tant que diversité absolue, infinité de la différenciation qui n'aboutit pas à sa fin. Ou, mieux, dont on ne peut pas dire qu'aurait une fin.

La seule sortie de ce cercle vicieux est celle de penser la différenciation en elle-même: il nous vient immédiatement à l'esprit qu'il n'est pas du tout possible que la différenciation soit une absence continue et qu'elle reste en tant qu'absence. En effet, la continuité de l'absence même lui accorde la fin absolue de sa division infinie: elle s'avère être rien que présence absolue. Car la différenciation ne peut pas différencier si elle-même n'est pas réelle. Mais, au moment où elle est réelle, elle se montre en tant que présence ou identité. À cet instant précis on peut comprendre comment la fission infinie de la diversité pure du Réel est courtement coupée et parcourue instantanément ainsi que le Réel se trouve lui-même dans sa propre différenciation avec lui-même.

Par cela, le Réel n'est plus le réel du début, celui qui n'a que soit des différences, soit des instances d'identité tautologique dans la négation. Le Réel dévoile par ce parcours anabatique aussi son immédiateté avec soi-même, mais dans le *soi* dans lequel l'unité se trouve immédiatement et de façon immuable que différenciation pure et immédiatement reposée en elle-même.

L'Idéal est révélé ici par la même présence de la différence entre le Réel et lui-même: car si le Réel est différent de lui-même et identique dans cette différenciation, alors le Réel est identique à ce qui le nie en lui-même – le Réel est identique avec ce qu'on pourrait appeler comme i-Réel. L'i-Réel est la pure négativité en elle-même, la pure nouveauté révélée dans l'horizon pur de la craquelure de l'identique. Ce sont les ténèbres illuminées de la présence absente ou de l'absence présente dans laquelle toute variation est absolument contenue comme absolument impassible. Par cela, l'être n'est plus une pure stase d'indifférence en soi-même, mais

aussi concept ou idée: réflexion de l'indifférence en elle-même. Par cela, l'être s'avère en tant que présence différenciée mais unifiée par cette différence qui est portée vers sa référence finale lui assurant l'essence par la simplicité d'être en tant que différence.³⁷

La conscience de soi se rapporte inconsciemment en elle-même à ces deux instances de son origine. Elle trouve sa subsistance en elle-même par le rapport essentiel et incontournable avec l'immédiation pure vers laquelle tout ce qu'il y a doit avoir à faire car tout ce qu'il y a se fonde sur cette irréfragable présence d'une institution absolue et infinie de A. Mais, au même instant, la conscience prend garde vers son propre être qu'elle contient en elle-même en tant que connaissance vraie de soi-même et en tant que savoir de sa présence immédiate. Mais la conscience ne contient point sa référence à elle-même en tant qu'immédiateté et en tant que différenciation par moyen du savoir d'elle-même simultanément. C'est-à-dire qu'elle ne peut pas se donner l'identité de ces deux moments de son ontologie et elle les trouve toujours séparés dans leur effectivité. Par cela, la conscience de soi se trouve déchirée et manquant sa propre consistance: elle n'y peut jamais apercevoir comment pourrait elle avoir accès à son origine puisque l'origine la rejette toujours d'elle-même à son insu par le fait simple d'avoir inscrit en elle-même la différence, par sa propre définition. Comme ça, la conscience se trouve jetée d'un endroit à l'autre, en passant d'un moment ou d'une détermination à l'autre sans jamais comprendre son contenu, sauf qu'elle se prend à s'analyser elle-même par le moyen de la philosophie.

Mais l'analyse philosophique lui dévoile tout ce tableau de la question de l'instauration du médiat par le recours à soi-même de l'immédiat. Donc la conscience arrive à savoir que, si elle veut l'union par laquelle puisse-t-elle dépasser sa propre impotence unificatrice, elle doit faire recours à cet immédiat éminent même, à l'instance fondamentale qui régit le déploiement de la détermination et de ses rapports avec la transcendance dont elle dérive.

Mais la solution qui s'ouvre ici n'est qu'une seule: celle de la raison spéculative par laquelle on peut dépasser les antinomies qui limitent l'usage de la raison en ce qui concerne son fondement, d'un côté ; de l'autre, celle de la mystique en tant que voie pratique et contemplative mise en liaison avec la spéculation de la raison philosophique.³⁸

Mais cette nouvelle voie demande l'effort d'une autre étude.

³⁷ Pour la différence entre le Concept de l'identité de l'identité avec la différence, et l'Être de cette simultanéité, voir Ph. Soual, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

³⁸ Voir David König: *Hegel et la mystique germanique*, L'Harmattan, 1999, spécialement pp. 90-102.

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THE ISSUE OF COGNITIVIST MODELS OF METAPHOR COMPREHENSION

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ABSTRACT. *The Issue of Cognitivist Models of Metaphor Comprehension.* Metaphor is one of the most controversial phenomena of the last few of decades, and connected to it are some very interesting methodologies propounded in philosophy, literary studies, and more recently cognitive science. In this paper we will discuss some of the most viable theories coming from the field of cognitive science, in an attempt to tease out some of their merits and shortcomings and to list some of the key issues they propose regarding the comprehension of metaphor. In view of this, we have chosen three of the most representative cognitivist models, all of which put forward a different mechanism to account for the comprehension process: George Lakoff and Mark Turner's *conceptual metaphor* model, Sam Glucksberg's *interactive property attribution* model and Dedre Gentner's *structural alignment* model.

Keywords: *metaphor, comprehension, concepts, categories, comparison*

In his book *Understanding figurative language* (2001), Sam Glucksberg suggests an analysis scheme which he applies to cognitivist models of metaphor comprehension, in order to establish how well they each fare. He hypothesizes that any model of metaphor understanding must account for the following phenomena: the recognition of metaphor, the difference between literal sense and figurative sense (if the model presupposes such a difference), the selection of properties, the nonreversibility of metaphor and the possibility for metaphor to be paraphrased. We believe that Glucksberg's method is one of the most systematic and encompassing, and for this reason, we should like to adopt it in this study, if perhaps, with different results than his own.

The first model to come under scrutiny is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's *conceptual metaphor* model, which remains controversial among cognitive scientists to this day. In this theory, metaphor is the glue that holds the human conceptual system together by establishing connections between the different concepts. It is a

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descriptive and explanatory mechanism whereby a concept which lacks a structure of its own – referred to as the abstract concept or the *target* – is understood by recourse to a concept with a more available structure – the concrete concept or the *source*. Therefore, in a nutshell, the essence of metaphor is that of understanding and experiencing one domain in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003).

Defining metaphor in this way changes the perception of the distinction between literal sense and metaphorical sense. Firstly, metaphorical sense will gain precedence as a foremost component of thought. Secondly, the literal sense will acquire a new meaning, in accordance with the definition of metaphor: if metaphoricity describes the concepts that are *seen indirectly*, then literality refers to concepts that are *seen directly*. And with this, the first requirement of Glucksberg's schema, i.e. that a distinction be made between literality and metaphoricity, is covered.

A second notion of Glucksberg's schema is metaphor recognition. This issue is not dealt with in a direct fashion by Lakoff and Johnson, but the answer is easily retrievable. Seeing as the chief claim in the book is that metaphor is ubiquitous in conventional language, without the speakers being aware of it, the answer is that metaphor is not recognised at all. The authors' main thesis is that many of the expressions considered literal are in fact metaphorical, and if this be true, it is evidence of people's inability to recognise metaphors.

The third of Glucksberg's criteria, property selection, is usually applied only to feature matching models, which operate by comparison. During this process, a possibly infinite number of identical properties are identified, and as such there arises the need for a mechanism that can filter out the irrelevant ones but still retain the pertinent ones. Although the conceptual metaphor model is not a matching model, it still needs a system that can hamper the application of the entire set of source properties to the target. Lakoff and Johnson are aware of this problem and their solution is that only those properties of the source fixed in conventional expressions are attributed to the target. For instance, in the metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, only expressions referring to the outer structure and foundation will be considered acceptable, like *construct* and *foundation*. A term like *gargoyles*, on the other hand, is not part of the conventional language about theories and thus is less fitting in a metaphor. However, the parts of a concept that are not used in conventional expressions can be utilised to construct novel metaphors, and therein stands the potential for creativity in Lakoff and Johnson's theory.

Property selection is not completely dealt with, as there remains one problem astutely pointed out by Gregory L. Murphy (1996). The abstract concept's lack of internal structure affords the projection of the entire set of source properties onto it. If the abstract concept does not have at least some „semantic primitives” or rudimentary elements of meaning, then it will become completely indistinguishable from the concrete concept.

The next analysis criterion is the nonreversibility of metaphor. This problem is not tackled, so that an answer must be inferred. The scholars speak of metaphors only in the forms of „X is Y“ or „X as Y“, with the abstract term always being X and the concrete term always being Y. The reason why the terms are never reversed might be related to the role that they each play in the metaphor. It has been well established that a metaphor must contain an abstract domain and a concrete domain, with the former always being made accessible through the latter. This suggests that metaphor fulfils a linguistic need, namely, that of explaining concepts that would otherwise be obscure. And since abstract concepts will always be abstract, they will always occupy the position of term *a*. In the same vein, there is no reason to believe that concrete concepts would ever become less comprehensible, and have to take on the position of the target.

Last on Glucksberg's list of criteria is the possibility for metaphor to be paraphrased as comparison, which has very little weight for this model. As we have already seen, metaphor consists of correspondences between domains and not of the linguistic material in which it is embedded. This means that the names given to metaphors, of the forms „X is Y“ or „X as Y“, are only mnemonics, and should not be mistaken for the actual metaphors.

Thus, whenever I refer to a metaphor by a mnemonic like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, I will be referring to such a set of correspondences. [...] Names of mappings commonly have a propositional form, for example, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. But the mappings themselves are not propositions. If mappings are confused with names for mappings, one might mistakenly think that, in this theory, metaphors are propositional. They are anything but that: metaphors are mappings, that is, sets of conceptual correspondences.²

Consequently, if metaphor is not propositional, then its designation is of little consequence. We believe that it would not make much difference if metaphors were called „X is like Y“ instead of „X is Y“, because the important thing is that the two domains be put in correspondence. However, we must keep in mind that the conceptual metaphor proposal is closer to a categorisation model than a matching model, and as such, comparison is not part of its repertoire. Thus, we must not assume that comparison and metaphor are interchangeable here.

On balance, most issues related to comprehension leave the conceptual metaphor model unscathed. And this is because it is actually not a model of metaphor comprehension. As it can be surmised, Lakoff and Johnson do not to describe a thought process, but reconstruct a map of the human conceptual system. Metaphor

² George Lakoff, *The contemporary theory of metaphor*, p. 207.

playing only a static role in the system, its comprehension will entail the passive recovery of a conceptual mapping. Once the mapping is in place, the metaphorical expressions become immediately comprehensible.

Also, by placing so much emphasis on thought, the conceptual metaphor model relegates language to the background. Although this is common to all cognitivist models of comprehension, Lakoff and Johnson do not take notice at all of the linguistic aspect of metaphor. To further compound matters, the scholars no longer refer to linguistic expressions by the term „metaphors”, but by „metaphoric expressions”. And the term “metaphor” is reserved only for the mental correspondences existing between domains.

The second model to be analysed, Sam Glucksberg’s *interactive property attribution* model, is defined by opposition to models that define metaphor as comparison, which are called *matching models*.

Glucksberg constructs his theory around the notion of categorisation, which, according to him, presents many advantages over comparison. As a result, metaphor becomes a class-inclusion statement, whereby the *topic* concept is included in a category suggested by the *vehicle* concept. However, comparison is not completely dismissed either. Glucksberg keeps it as a term of reference for metaphor, albeit in reversed form: comparison is an extended metaphor. As a result, the theory remains extensively reliant upon an idea which it ostensibly rejects.

Even though at first glance, this mutation might seem inconsequential, the benefits are actually numerous. First of all, it has an important part in establishing the difference between literal and metaphorical sense, the gist of which is that the closer a statement is to a categorical assertion, the more metaphorical it is. From this it follows that comparisons are metaphorical if they can be paraphrased as class-inclusion statements and they are literal if they cannot. For example, the comparison *Man is like a wolf* is metaphorical because it can be transformed into the class-inclusion statement *Man is a wolf*, while *Copper is like iron* is literal because it cannot be changed to *Copper is iron*. Glucksberg further elaborates the distinction by delineating the notions of metaphor and literal class-inclusion statement. In this case, again, dissimilarity is established by recourse to paraphrasability: metaphors have this property, while literal class-inclusion statements do not. Therefore, the metaphor *My lawyer is a shark* can be paraphrased as *My lawyer is like a shark*, but the literal class-inclusion statement *Copper is a metal* cannot be transformed into *Copper is like a metal*. And to complete the picture, the difference between metaphor and metaphorical comparison is that in the case of the former, the relation between terms is established at an abstract level, while in the case of the latter, the level is literal. To elucidate, in the metaphor mentioned above, *My lawyer is a shark*, the vehicle *shark* is considered at an abstract level, while in the metaphorical comparison *My lawyer is like a shark*, the topic is compared to the literal *shark*.

Thus, the distinctions are aptly made, and they do seem to hold the system together. But there arises a shortcoming. It is evident that paraphrasability has an essential role in demarcating some of the key distinctions articulating the system. As mentioned above, it is only if a comparison can be paraphrased as a class-inclusion statement that it is metaphorical. But metaphor already looks like and is a class-inclusion statement, so why would we need to change it into a comparison in order to establish its metaphorical nature? Not to mention that it would actually lose some of its metaphorical character by the transformation. Therefore, paraphrasability seems to fall short exactly in the case of metaphor.

The notion of categorisation will also bring about the adept resolution of many difficulties. As mentioned earlier, categorisation is the process whereby the first term of the metaphor – the *topic* – is included in a category abstracted from the second term – the *vehicle*. The category is sometimes conventional, and therefore easily accessed. At other times, it must be created ad hoc. For instance, in the metaphor *Cigarettes are time bombs* there is no conventional category associated with the vehicle. The vehicle category, which must be abstract enough to include not only explosives but also cigarettes, could be defined as containing „things that explode at some unpredictable time in the future and cause a lot of damage”.³ Once abstracted, the topic can be included in it, and have its properties projected onto it. And as a result, cigarettes will come to be understood as things that cause damage at an unpredictable time in the future.

With such categories, things are further compounded by the lack of appellation. Having been created ad hoc, they do not have a name of their own and will be referred to by the vehicle term. Glucksberg explains that this principle is borrowed from languages that do not have names for superordinate categories⁴ and fulfil this need by using prototypical members of these categories. A corollary is that the term will have a double reference: it will refer on the one hand, to the abstract category of which it is part, and on the other, to the literal category that is already lexicalised. To illustrate, we should like to quote an extensive paragraph from Glucksberg:

Unlike English, however, ASL has no single-word name for the superordinate category *furniture*. Does this mean that ASL signers cannot refer to this category? Certainly not. *Furniture* in ASL can be referred to by using basic-object signs that are prototypical of that category, as in *house-fire [+]* lose all **chair-table-bed, etc.**, but one left, bed. [...] The sequence *chair-table-bed-etc.* is signed rapidly with the et cetera sign crisply executed, unlike the same sequence when used to list or enumerate three separate

³ Sam Glucksberg, *Understanding figurative language*, p. 38.

⁴ For instance, American Sign Language (ASL).

entities. In addition, signing *one left, bed* to complete the assertion makes clear that the sign for bed has a dual reference function. It is used to refer to two different things. The first bed is used as part of the name *furniture*, the second as the name for the individual object, *bed*.⁵

Glucksberg uses the notion of dual reference not only to define all metaphors, but also as one of the clues whereby metaphors are recognised.

The problem of property selection affects categorisation models differently from matching models. As in the case of categorisation, comprehension starts with the extraction of a category from the vehicle which is then applied to the topic, the question is: how can the vehicle suggest different categories if there is indeed no contribution from the subject? And Glucksberg's answer is that the subject has a selective role whereby it chooses only those properties that are compatible with its dimensions of attribution. For example, in the metaphors *My lawyer was a snake* and *The road was a snake*, different properties of *snake* are elicited. According to Glucksberg, this happens because in the first metaphor, the subject's dimensions of attribution – skill, ambition, temperament, experience and cost – will choose different properties than will those in the second – shape and surface.

Even with this improvement, Dedre Gentner (2005) believes that the problem is not solved. The scholar observed that starting the comprehension process with the base puts a considerable amount of pressure on a person's mind. Having to evoke and maintain active all the categories of the vehicle before moving on to the subject would put too much of a strain on the memory. For this reason, Gentner believes that categorisation cannot be used in the comprehension of metaphor.

The nonreversibility of metaphor will also be explained by the notion of categorisation. Thus, reversing the terms of a metaphor engenders either a change or a complete loss of meaning, because the new vehicle will suggest a different category from the first one. For instance, in the metaphor *My surgeon is a butcher*, the category evokes the notion of cutting flesh sloppily, while in the inverse form *My butcher is a surgeon*, the category refers to the idea of cutting flesh skilfully. But this obtains only in the rare situations when the metaphors have sense in both forms. A second type of metaphors has no apposite category associated with the vehicle, but meaning is still produced. For such exemplars, further explanation is required. If we reorder the terms of one of the metaphors mentioned earlier and we obtain *Time bombs are cigarettes*, we can see that the only category that can be selected is „the category of things that produce damage at an unpredictable time in the future”. Since this is the same category that was abstracted in the original order, only one conclusion can be drawn, that the interpreter has reversed the terms back.

⁵ Sam Glucksberg, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

And finally, for metaphors that have no discernible meaning, two explanations can be supplied. Either the vehicle is not apt, or it is ambiguous. Regarding the question of aptness, there is ample stress placed on the vehicle's prototypicality. By this Glucksberg means that in order for a metaphor to be meaningful, the vehicle must be a prototypical member of the category it indicates. For instance, a metaphor like *Not even Einstein's ideas were all platinum* is not apt because *platinum* is not a prototypical member of the category of valuable things. Only with the prototypical member, *gold*, does the metaphor make sense: *Not even Einstein's ideas were all gold*.

The second explanation involves the notion of vehicle ambiguity. According to this criterion, if the vehicle concept suggests only one or two categories, it is non-ambiguous and therefore produces few interpretations, while if it can point to a wide array of categories, with no single one in particular, then it is ambiguous and engenders a possibly infinite number of interpretations. And, if the vehicle is so ambiguous that no specific category can be identified then this might be the cause for the lack of meaning.

This latter explanation is not entirely reliable, as further in the text Glucksberg makes a rather different statement. He says that if an appropriate context is provided, ambiguous vehicles become more readily interpretable:

We anticipated that all of the metaphors would be equally comprehensible, regardless of topic or vehicle type, because, given an appropriate context, [...] ambiguous vehicles become disambiguated. [...] Similarly, the ambiguous vehicle *icebergs* is unambiguous in the context of the metaphor *some offices are icebergs*.⁶

Prima facie, it seems that, in this quote, Glucksberg adds a new element to this model, the context, which might indeed have been able to elucidate an ambiguous vehicle. But at a second glance it becomes clear that the context he is referring to is the metaphor, not the discourse situation, as one might have expected. In this case, ambiguous vehicles can still retain their character when used with low-constraining topics, which are topics that have few dimensions of attribution. With two terms with indefinite meanings, the metaphor might indeed be difficult to interpret.

And finally, as concerns the recognition of metaphor, he suggests a solution based on the notions of dual reference and paraphrasability. As mentioned above, the notion of double reference refers to the vehicle's ability to refer at two levels of abstraction at the same time, and according to Glucksberg, this is one of the things that signal the presence of a metaphor. However, dual reference will not be enough

⁶ Sam Glucksberg, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

to distinguish between literal and metaphorical sense, because this notion is involved whenever the term has an additional general reference⁷. In order for it to be metaphorical, the vehicle must suggest a category that also has salient properties to be attributed. It is not enough that it simply include a member in a category. And secondly, the metaphor must be recognised as an expression that can be paraphrased as a comparison.

Thus, according to Glucksberg, people realise that they are dealing with a metaphor when they recognise the vehicle's dual reference and the possibility of transforming the expression into a comparison.

Although this proposition is predicted by the interactive property attribution model and is a logical consequence of the hypotheses, we suggest that it has two difficulties. First, as mentioned above, the metaphor's paraphrasability does not seem to have a justifiable role, and second, as the recognition process seems very complicated and strenuous, it is unlikely that it could happen on the spot.⁸ And if paraphrasability fails, then the distinction between literal and metaphorical fails. Accordingly, Glucksberg's model falters exactly where it is most needed: in the case of metaphor.

As we have seen, the interactive property attribution model is not the best choice in terms of metaphor comprehension. But it is still feasible on many accounts. And it is because of this that Dedre Gentner develops some of its main mechanisms and incorporates them in her own theory.

Dedre Gentner's *structural alignment* model is up for inspection next. It is essentially a matching model, like the ones criticised by Glucksberg, but also contains elements peculiar to categorisation models. The reason for this amalgamation is that the scholar recognises the problems of both types of models and suggests that only a synthesis of the two could constitute a truly comprehensive method. And indeed, her model offers viable solutions to all of the problems related to metaphor comprehension.

The literal-metaphorical dichotomy is suitably accounted for, although Glucksberg accuses the scholar of failing to do this. In the structural alignment view, the difference between literal and metaphorical is a natural consequence of the definition of metaphor. If metaphor approaches two terms from different domains (e.g. *A child is like a snowflake*), then literal comparison statements and literal categorisation statements approach two terms from the same domain (e.g. *A mallet is like a tool* or *A mallet is a tool*). As we can see, the types of statements that Gentner

⁷ For instance, the term *Xerox* machine can be used to refer both to dry-paper copiers of this brand and in general.

⁸ Especially since another of Glucksberg's theses is that metaphorical language is comprehended just as fast as literal language.

uses are similar to those of Glucksberg. But, one chief difference is that in this case, there are only three instead of four: literal comparisons, literal class-inclusion statements and metaphors. Not surprising for a theory of feature matching, it has coalesced metaphor and metaphorical comparison into one.

Being a hybrid of comparison and categorisation, the structural alignment model contains elements of both. It begins with an *alignment* stage, wherein the representations of the target and base are confronted and commonalities are sought, and continues with a *projection* stage, when properties of the base are carried over to the target. Two optional phases can follow, and they are the *rerepresentation* of the terms with a view to improve the alignment and the *abstraction* of a common schema.

Property selection takes place during the alignment stage, which is „blind and local”⁹ and identifies only identical properties. The matches selected are then combined into consistent clusters, called *kernels*, which are in turn collected into a global interpretation. The key detail regarding this process is that the properties that cannot be connected to the global interpretation are dismissed. For instance, in the metaphor *Dew is a veil*, both *dew* and *veil* are inanimate, but this property will not survive the selection, because it does not relate to the general interpretative schema.

Having adequately accounted for property selection, the structural alignment model must now provide a mechanism for the matching of non-identical properties. Non-identical property selection is a problem only matching models must deal with and it is for this reason that it is mentioned only now. Matching models begin the interpretation with the search for identical properties, and this constitutes a difficulty when there are no such properties to be found. The next logical step would be to move on to similarities, but how is similarity to be ascertained? Gentner proposes relational functions as a starting point, whereby higher order commonalities are sought instead of the more readily available local matches. For instance, in the metaphor *Socrates was a midwife*, the predicates *realize*, extracted from the target, as in „Socrates helped his students realize ideas”¹⁰ and *give birth to*, extracted from the base, as in „A midwife helps a mother give birth to a child”¹¹ are neglected in favour of „to produce”, which is more general and can be predicated about both (Gentner, 2005).

Gentner’s suggestion is compelling enough, but not all-encompassing. One issue it neglects is what happens when properties and not predicates need to be conveyed. In the example above it is a predicate that is identified and not properties. But in cases like *Man is a wolf* it seems more likely that properties (e.g. predatory) and

⁹ Dedre Gentner, *The career of metaphor*, p. 196.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

not relations are attributed. And since Gentner herself has pointed out that the way in which man is predatory is different from the way wolf is predatory, there seems to be an insurmountable barrier between the terms. In such a situation, how are the terms to be compared?

For the nonreversibility of metaphor the solution is based on the „given-new” convention, a principle also proposed by two precursors of Gentner, Amos Tversky (1977, cited in Glucksberg, 2001) and Andrew Ortony (1979). By the „given-new” convention it is assumed that the target is interpreted as the given information, while the vehicle is seen as the provider of new information. And for this reason, properties would only be projected from the vehicle to the target. However, Glucksberg (2001) has observed that the „given-new” convention explains only the asymmetry of the two terms and not the nonreversibility. And indeed the principle provides no hindrance to the inversion of the terms.

The final matter on the list, the recognition of metaphor, is not brought into question at all, and for this reason Glucksberg believes that the structural alignment model is not suited for metaphor comprehension. However, Glucksberg’s position seems a bit extreme even by his standards, as he, himself demonstrates that it is quite common for people not to recognise metaphors (2001). Furthermore, in another place in the book he says that the mechanisms for interpreting figurative language are the same as the ones used for literal language, so then is it really that imperative that metaphors be recognised?.

Dedre Gentner’s theory is especially valuable as it contains a proposition for the reconciliation of the two types of models discussed. Gentner purports that both comparison and categorisation are equally valid mechanisms of comprehension, but that they apply to different types of metaphors. Categorisation would be more suitable for conventional metaphors, which have a conventional category associated with the base, while comparison best fits novel metaphors, which do not have such a category and consequentially require the complete processing of properties. The conventional category that is the source of distinction between conventional and novel metaphors is connected to the idea of metaphor as a species of analogy, which presupposes that comprehension relies on the abstraction of a convergence schema containing elements from the target and the base. Once this schema has been extracted, it will increase in salience and, if on subsequent uses, the same schema is yielded, it will come to be associated with the base. And if such a meaning is available, it will most likely be accessed.

This synthesis of elements is indeed appealing, and as we have seen, puts forth some very persuasive precepts. Gentner manages to overcome some of the most troublesome obstacles that beset other models of metaphor comprehension. As we have seen, she provides apposite answers to the questions regarding property

selection, non-identical property selection, the difference between literal and metaphorical sense and the nonreversibility of metaphor. But although it seems to be the most comprehensive of all the cognitive models, Elisabeth Camp still imputes the following things to Gentner. Firstly, by placing so much emphasis on higher order matches she leaves unexplained some of the very concrete features that metaphor can convey. Secondly, metaphor can attribute to the subject properties that are taken neither from the source nor from the global interpretative schemata, but result from the combination of several properties of the source or appear mysteriously from the interaction between the target and the vehicle.

Therefore, if there is one thing that can be said about all the models that have been analysed, it is that neither of them solves all of the difficulties regarding metaphor comprehension. According to Elisabeth Camp, it is hard to conceive that such algorithmic models will ever be able to fully replicate the way in which metaphor is understood, as it involves some of the most creative processes connected to human imagination. However, they are not to be dismissed, if only for the reason that philosophers stand to gain a lot by considering them. Confronted with such theories, they would have to refine their instruments for matters which have heretofore been treated superficially, like the distinction between literal and metaphorical or the issue of similitude.

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THE SENSUAL INTELLECT*

PÉTER MÓNKA¹

ABSTRACT. The Sensual Intellect. In my paper I wish to point out that in the case of works of art the intellect itself is always sensuously organized so we can receive the truth of the work only by the reflection of aesthetic perception. I wish to prove that the picture possesses a particular kind of logic since its delotic logos, that is its nature of showing the thing itself but otherwise in the same time, cannot be grasped conceptually or by language translation. The picture is such a sensual energy, sensual intelligence carrier that reveals only for perception, the seeing view. Therefore in the discourse about understanding art we need to avoid the interpretation of the senses as sheer receptors, since the sight itself always has a meaning generating nature.

Keywords: picture, re-recognizing/seeing view, sensual intelligence, logos, legitimacy

At first glance the title of the study might seem paradoxical because it connects two concepts that are often positioned against each other in the philosophical thinking. While among our cognitive abilities the conceptual, cognitive understanding leads to certain knowledge, the perception and cognition appear to be an uncertain partner, as something that needs to be supplemented and corrected by reason and conception. Since Plato the perception and also the polemic against vision has been seen through the history of philosophical thought, however due to the fact that he questioned the theoretical values of various arts, these arts were suspected of trickery and deception.

This issue is linked to the nature of art that is to the spiritual and sensual side of duality. The fact that there is a part that deals with the spirit, the rational understanding and another side that deals with the senses and these two cannot exist without each other. However this problem is closely related to the still relevant

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successively renewed questioning of works of arts justification. In fact, during the centuries of culture it has constantly been clarified the role of various arts in people's lives, is it useful or it's considered more harmful? The justification of art could have been warranted by only one side, namely the spiritual, reasonable side but the art thinkers constantly had to face the problem of the sensual, in fact inextricable aesthetic side's presence. The issue is that despite the fact that art's legitimacy has constantly been challenged what is that something that still kept alive, that ensures the constantly challenged legitimacy?

Based on Gottfried Boehm's pictorial sense of concept, in my study I wish to point out that in order to understand works of art, we need to understand that its aesthetic, sensual effect plays an important role. The understanding and interpretation it is born in the process of sensory experience. In the justice of works of art we can only partake through the aesthetic perception's reflection. The work of art cannot be identified with any ideal quality and it's nothing else than the free play of intellect and perception. I wish to prove that the picture has such a particular logic that cannot be captured by conceptual terms or translation, since the picture, the painting is such a sensual energy, carrier of a sensual intelligence that it reveals only for perception, the active artistic vision. In the case of works of art the intellect is sensory organized therefore in the discourse about understanding art we need to avoid the mere interpretation of sensory reception. Mitchell W.J. Thomas in his *Iconology: Image – Text – Ideology* titled work pointed out that the concept of the picture has a very complex semantic content, however he made a distinction between the picture and the image. The image is the reflection of the supposed reality, that is no different than a similarity, an illustration and as such it's destination stands in depicting the illustrated things. Contrarily, pictures do not work as simply as mirrors or illustrations, but contrarily to image they possess an extra value as well.²

However this distinction determines the approach of the receiver. The reflection, the image is always contemplated referentially, that is the illustrated thing's real physical nature is not secondary compared to its representation. That is why we need to consider what the representation refers to when we contemplate the image. In order to consider an image good, it needs to change to reality. Thus the image also functions as a tool and as such it terminates itself by fulfilling its role, that is identifying its pattern. Contrarily, the picture lives longer than the image, by the fact that the depicting function is dominant and it doesn't direct the attention to the model, but the approach is directed only to the item showed by the picture.³ For this reason in the case of the picture we can rather talk about self-referentiality than referentiality.

² Cf. Mitchell, W. J. Thomas, *What is an Image?*, in *Iconology: Image – Text – Ideology*, by Mitchell, W. J. Thomas, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 31.

³ Cf. Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Truth an Method*, London – New York, Continuum, 2004, pp. 130-138.

When I use the term picture in my study I do it in the second sense. Namely the picture, the painting is the emphatic example of sensory organized intelligence, however it clarifies that in the artistic understanding the perception, the sight becomes essential. However I believe that this active, interpretive vision is required not only by the pictures, but also by patterns, photos, but due to the shortage of frame in this work I confine myself to understand only picture.

The so – thought picture – distinction entails the separation of perception and types of vision. This turnaround was done by Max Imdahl in his Giotto essays,⁴ when he separated the seeing view and the recognizing view. The recognizing view is made for identifying things, it is nothing more than an object identifying perception, this is what we use in everyday life. In the case of picture understanding the result of the recognizing view can only be the grasping of the content of picture intelligence and picture semantics. Contrarily the seeing view endures an meaning creating aspect, the picture is seen in its own way that is we are able to perceive all that a picture can offer us. The picture is considered such a sight – occasion by Imdahl that cannot be replaced by no off-screen visibility (*Sichtbarkeit*).⁵ The pictures in addition to showing themselves, they also reveal something else the recognition, identification is completed by our ability to perceive the recognized one in a new way.

This thought is carried further by Gottfried Boehm when in his *The Picture Description* titled study, following Imdahl makes a distinction between stated perception and self-realizing view. The stated perception's discretions are language and concept like and thus can be described, contrarily this self-realizing view opens visual opportunities while it cannot be depicted linguistically. It does not conclude but rather engages the viewer in a process that does not only perceives the visible but rather grabs a meaning dimension that becomes visible through the pictures.⁶

Furthermore we can say that the image primarily aims at the stated and recognizing view, in contrast the picture opens up for the seeing view that is for the self – realizing view. The picture is rather a realization⁷ than reality thus it shows itself only for the senses, the seeing view „images »proper« are not stable, static, or permanent in any metaphysical sense; they are not perceived in the same way by viewers any more than are dream images; and they are not exclusively visual in any important way, but involve multisensory apprehension and interpretation”.⁸

⁴ Imdahl, Max, *Giotto. Arenafresken. Ikonographie – Ikonologie – Ikonik*, München, W. Fink, 1996.

⁵ Cf. Imdahl, Max, *Gondolatok a kép identitásáról*, Athenaeum 1/4 (1993), p. 112.

⁶ Cf. Boehm, Gottfried, *A képleírás. A kép és a nyelv határaitól*, in *Narratívák 1. Képelemzés*, ed. Thomka Beáta, Budapest, Kijárat Kiadó, 1998, p. 23.

⁷ Cf. Bacsó Béla, *A művészet szemlélete és a művészettörténet. Az esztétikai tapasztalat rehabilitációja a kép példáján*, in *A megértés művészete – A művészet megértése*, ed. Bacsó Béla, Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1989, p. 141.

⁸ Mithell, *What is an Image?*, p. 14.

This self-realizing view gets a more emphatic role in understanding the modern arts that appeared in the 19th century, namely the purpose of modern works of art is not limited to depicting the real things but rather they wish to impress the senses. Gottfried Boehm in his *To the Picture's Hermeneutics (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes)* titled study formulates that the Renaissance painting created the picture surface appearance and its elementary task was to provide some insight to the reality. Such a picture perception is closer to illustration, to image but the traditional art is not limited to the depicting function. Contrarily the 19th century modern art almost entirely renounces of „reproductive semantics” and denotation thus the picture might seem novel and also foreign.⁹

In the case of modern works of art the host is forced to recognize a meaning that is not based on compliance to things. „The pictures reveal a meaning that surpasses the idea of external reality and look for renewal in the never – did – happen.”¹⁰ By this the modern art, in understanding the picture, underlines the role of perception and vision in the sense that modern, abstract pictures portray a meaning that does not show any recognizable analogy with reality.¹¹ Therefore on the whole of art theory, in relation to the understanding, the rehabilitation of perception and vision becomes indispensable. So the picture, it's reception extorts the modification of reason's visual side.¹² The vision is not merely recognizing, a depicting sensory method but has a comprehension generating nature.

We may ask what is the picture's, the painting's special nature? What makes a picture a work of art? Why does it require a different kind of view if pictures often represent things, objects we can also find in everyday life? We are dealing with issues that were propounded constantly in the history of works of art and it is still relevant today. It is considered that the artistic nature of a work is due to the author's nameplate. But what if we abolish the author's signature, if we „annul” the author?¹³ Thus the work loses its aesthetic value?

I believe that a picture or a literary work becomes a work of art when it is able to show things otherwise, then we have seen it in the real world. The pictorial representation is able to visualize, to make perceptible even the invisible. This is why cult images were considered powerful, since they showed something that could not be grasped directly by the senses.

⁹ Boehm, Gottfried, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), Athenaeum 1/4 (1993), p. 88.

¹⁰ Boehm, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), p. 89.

¹¹ Cf. Boehm, Gottfried, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, Neue Hefte für Philosophie. Heft 18/19. Anschauung als ästhetische Kategorie, Göttingen, p. 124.

¹² Cf. Bacsó Béla, *Érzéki ráeszmélés és a kifejezés megértése. Mit értünk, amikor látunk valamit?*, in *Ön-arc-kép. Szempontok a portréhoz*, ed. Bacsó Béla, Budapest, Kijarat Kiadó, 2012, p. 281.

¹³ I am thinking of Roland Barthes's *Death of the author* titled work when he formulates that „the language speaks, not the author” so the way phrasing happens and its content becomes relevant.

So, the pictures are such representations (*Darstellungen*) that are „beyond our real present existence”.¹⁴ Boehm says: „Pictures are not only colored but they *are* painted” – we could also say that the pictures are not only *depicted*, but they are painted, they are not merely sensuous illustrations, copies, but through the pictorial representation and context they are saturated with an additional content.

The thing’s actual and representative identity is not the same. The representation’s pictorial field and the things belonging to real perception’s horizon are formed completely differently.¹⁵ The identity of a real thing is based on the fact that its existence and appearance can be separated. All this is possible because a real thing’s categorical stability retains its priority beyond the variable manifestation forms. Contrarily the identity of a painted, represented thing is organized completely differently. The object from a picture can never be separated from the place or context of its appearance. If this would happen the consequence would be a completely new, different picture. The changing of some kind of property of the picture would lead to the picture’s entire changing. This is why the existence and the phenomenon are inseparable in the case of the picture.¹⁶

Boehm’s example of this case relied on the tree. The actual tree belongs to the same category, regardless of its appearance form, contrarily the tree painted by the same painter can seem different depending on the context it is located. For example Claude Lorain’s *A view of the Roman Campagna from Tivoli* titled painting has trees that are located in edge position however at first sight they may create a feeling of mystery, solitude and jeopardy. This is also increased by pictorial elements, the threatening approach of clouds and the disappearance of light. Contrarily in his *Hagar and Ismael in the desert* titled painting the trees are in a central position and their connection might cause an image of togetherness and protection. The figures presented in resting position and the angelic figure also suggests this. In picture representation the existence of a thing constantly shifts to phenomena thus in the case of the picture we can also talk about „appearance existence”.¹⁷

The picture is not depicting, but makes visible everything, that would not be visible without picture representation. The picture cannot be confused with the represented one; it is based on a difference. Therefore the representation does not substitute the thing it reveals. It is simultaneously more and less. Provided that it trusts the canvas and the color it falls short what the represented one was or could be. However, by giving a permanent vivacity status to an absent or a deceased one, outperforms it.¹⁸

¹⁴ Boehm, Gottfried, *A képleírás. A kép és a nyelv határaitól*, p. 26.

¹⁵ Cf. Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 128.

¹⁶ Cf. Boehm, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), p. 92.

¹⁷ Boehm, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), p. 93.

¹⁸ Cf. Boehm, Gottfried, *Az élő toposza. Képtörténet és esztétikai tapasztalat*, in Paul Cézanne, Montagne, Sainte-Victoire. Válogatott művészeti írások, by Boehm, Budapest, Kijarat Kiadó, 2005, p. 145.

So the power of pictorial representation stands in the fact that the visualized itself, beyond itself can also be something else and at the same time it can make the invisible omnipresent.

In the picture not only the individual things appear but they simultaneously occur by their representative system. Through Cézanne painting Kurt Badt formulates that imagery is nothing else than „the world of the densest conjunction” in which the individual things exist in themselves.¹⁹ This conjunction lends such an existence growth to the picture through which the picture becomes the element of recognition by getting rid of its depicting function. The pictorial elements cannot be separated from each other hereby the possibility of a one-time experience would be lost.²⁰ The pictorial sense itself burns in the relationship between the parts and the interaction with each other.

The constating or recognizing view creates the possibility of managing things objectively. Contrarily the purpose of the picture is not to remind the viewer of everyday things, but to „offer an intellectual structure that has a linguistic nature”.²¹ Between the other things picture is a specific language this is due to the pictorial form, the existence of the represented thing cannot be isolated from its manifestation.²²

As we have seen the elements of the picture are linked together and therefore their content cannot be reduced in a language definition. The complexity of pictorial contexts, the pictorial sense intelligence itself can not be expressed neither conceptually nor linguistically. Therefore the picture requires a visual form that can move beyond constating, but can also detect the picture’s dynamic coherence.²³

So the pictures have a specific and typical language. Following Boehm by logic we mean the organization of sense through pictorial tools. This pictorial logic won’t be expressed verbally but it materializes through perception.²⁴ „The picture is neither a thing nor a linguistic sense of the word or phrase it can be considered much more as an appearance process in which the moments of life always appear as a phenomena.”²⁵ The world and its things are characterized by the existence of constant change. This change, the things cannot be grasped verbally – as we have seen in the example of the tree – we can only identify in the categorical sense. Contrarily the pictures grasp this altering nature of things. Take the example of impressionist painting that serves

¹⁹ Badt, Kurt, *Die Kunst Cézannes*, München, 1965, p. 139.

²⁰ Cf. Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 131.

²¹ Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 128.

²² Cf. Boehm, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), p. 99.

²³ Cf. Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 125.

²⁴ Cf. Boehm, Gottfried, *Jenseits der Sprache? Anmerkungen zur Logik der Bilder*, in *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen. Die Macht des Zeigens*, ed. Boehm, Berlin, Berlin University Press, 2008, p. 34.

²⁵ Boehm, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), p. 93.

no other purpose than to present the changing of sensual impressions that is the reality unfolded in perception data and the existence of things in change. Contrary to the language, the picture is able to make perceptible the fleeting, the non-recurring, the 'here and now' moment and the uniqueness of the conjunction of moments.

So in the case of the picture we are dealing with the unique representation of existence. Boehm calls this 'iconic density'. This „iconic density” isn't linguistically mediated as the picture always shows more than we can put through words. The picture really represents a mute or silent language, not because it cannot find the words but because the perfection of its logic lies in it.²⁶

Therefore the picture interpretation doesn't need to verbalize its content, but since it is dealing with a visual area, it has to be captured sensually. So the picture is nothing else than a „sensory process”²⁷ and as such it is revealed in the eye's cognitive aspect, the active vision.²⁸ The pictures, the works of art convey meanings that are „sensory organized intelligence and have no equivalent in the concept of language”.²⁹ Everything that appears in the work of art cannot be linguistically restored, the grasping through conceptual terms would also mean the reduction of intellect.

The self-realizing view develops such a meaning from the painting components' system that is not the depicting of reality but still, it is able to capture it by establishing a visual evidence that might be called the language of the picture. The picture is trying to fulfill the need to say something more, otherwise and newer. This is the picture's specific logic, its language or logos.

The pictorial sense itself conveys a logos that cannot be translated by language. Boehm draws attention to the fact that logos cannot be confined to the language but covers a much wider area: 'Beyond the language there are the incalculable spaces of reason, the unpredictable spaces of visual, sound, gesture, facial expression and movement. We do not need words to correct or justify them afterwards. The logos is not only preaching, verbalism or language, but it covers a considerably wider area.³⁰

The logos of the picture addresses to the receiver by glancing at the picture. This invocation is not by means of verbalization, it is not the onomotical logos, that is the appellation through words, but rather the delotic, that is the showing logos is determining. This also entails that the sense conceived by the receiver doesn't come from the author or title but from the delotic logos of the picture, that is from the always different showing nature of things that gives birth to the visual sense.

²⁶ Boehm, *A kép hermeneutikájához*, (Zu einer Hermeneutik des Bildes), p. 98.

²⁷ Boehm, Gottfried, *A képleírás. A kép és a nyelv határainál*, p. 34.

²⁸ Boehm, *A képleírás. A kép és a nyelv határainál*, p. 26.

²⁹ Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 119.

³⁰ Boehm, *Jenseits der Sprache?*, p. 53.

The silent logos of the picture isn't totally full of the logos of speech, but they „both belong to the common universe of shadowy sense where understanding never comes to an endpoint”.³¹ The privileged nature of logos stands in the fact that it is able to present the thing according to the situation which is why we cannot speak about a sense that is reserved in a final language but the intellect always constructs from the thing.

Approaching from this point of view we can say that there is no adequate language translation for picture visibility. In the case of the picture material becomes intellect³² and this process can only be grasped in the act of contemplation. Pictures are only addressed to sight, blinks which can realize them visually.³³ The sight is nothing more than a meaning creating act that is able to open new meaning aspects through the visual details and joining elements.

The seeing view is not based on concept driven cognition but it depends on its own activity. The eye with its own sensual energy travels around the „iconic difference”. The glance, the ways of the vision form such relationship models, along a specific direction, that evoke the sense itself in such a way that even the image-like, recognizable elements are approximately independent.³⁴ The way of the viewer's meaning creating glance is not random but it is always managed by indicators found in the picture.³⁵ The process of sight consists of simultaneous and sequential phases, so its impressions are nothing but the elements of a visual system. The simultaneity and correlation of succession that appear in the picture lead to a sensual meaning.

The originality and uniqueness of pictorial sense are not due only to the specific logical structure, but also to the specific sensory experience form that is able to suit the structure.³⁶ In fact fine art requires a special type of knowledge while it provides such a unique reality experience that we can only gain by identity of contemplation, sensuality and sense.

The pictorial sense itself is created by the seeing view, the eye becomes a component part of the work's structural context.³⁷ The power of the picture stands in being able to open the eyes, to show.³⁸ Only view can access the sensual saturation the sensual sense of the picture. The act of seeing makes the picture present however

³¹ Boehm, Gottfried, *Sehen. Hermeneutische Reflexionen*, in *Kritik des Sehens*, ed. Ralf Konersmann, Leipzig, Reclam Verlag, 1997, p. 279.

³² Cf. Boehm, *Jenseits der Sprache?*, p. 52.

³³ Cf. Boehm, *Sehen. Hermeneutische Reflexionen*, p. 279.

³⁴ Cf. Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 132.

³⁵ Cf. Boehm, *Jenseits der Sprache?*, p. 42.

³⁶ Cf. Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 132.

³⁷ Cf. Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 119.

³⁸ Cf. Boehm, *Jenseits der Sprache?*, p. 42.

from the meaning constitution's point of view it is decisive to revive the act of seeing in the picture. Only the seen picture is truly and fully a picture.³⁹

That is why the viewer has to raise to the picture. He should see the picture as a picture, this is due to the synthesis operation of the eye. At every work of painting can be shown the ability to see it as a picture, in its complexity 'to see inside' in fact it never meant anything else but the re-reversal of the eye's synthesizing abstraction activity.⁴⁰

Therefore as a conclusion we can say that the picture is honorable because it is able to always show otherwise the thing itself beyond its own appearance form by the pictorial context and also by processing. Therefore the existence and phenomena in the case of the picture cannot be isolated from each other and this togetherness can be captured only by the sight.

The privilege of the sight stands in being able to realize the reality of the picture. The glance synthesizes, grasps the work of art as a whole, the language isn't capable to do this, since the picture itself or the interplay of the parts cannot be grasped ever by the description of pictorial moments. The sensuous intelligence provided by the picture, the delotoc logos of the picture cannot be translated linguistically it only opens up for the senses and the sight.



1. Claude Lorrain:

A view of the Roman Campagna from Tivoli



2. Claude Lorrain:

Hagar and Ismael in the desert

I've started my study with the problem of the work's of art's legitimacy since I believe that perception, the sight rehabilitation can assure the always questioned legitimacy. If perception is no longer considered as illusory or as an uncertain mode of cognition but we recognize its meaning creating nature it becomes clear that work of art is not an uncertain copy of reality but it's a special presentation. In the case of works of art, intelligence is always organized sensually.

³⁹ Boehm, *Jenseits der Sprache?*, p. 49.

⁴⁰ Boehm, *Bildsinn und Sinnesorgane*, p. 124.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF BETRAYAL

TANKÓ ÉVA¹

ABSTRACT. *The Philosophy of Betrayal.* We are on the grounds of political philosophy, more precisely we are trying to analyze the relation between politics and truth from the perspective of treason. This study concentrates on the examination of the mechanism of treason, and specifically political treason, with the help of two specific analyses. The first connects to George Orwell, the second to the political situation in Romania before 1989. The philosophy of betrayal links to the political way of thinking more closely, but let us admit, that it is present at other segments of social life, too.

Keywords: *politics, truth, betrayal, treason, deviance, justice, ethics*

1. Notion

On analyzing the connections between politics and truth, we come across the problem of betrayal, which seems to be a kind of consequence of political action, thus seeming inevitable. The goal of political thought isn't for a fact a search for the truth, but the running of certain systems of power, with definite political tools. These so far are in concord with Ludwig von Rochau's definition of real-politics, which puts politics under the laws of authority, and thus makes the understanding of political circles dependable of the knowledge of this authority.

Real-politics were looked upon as a synonym of Machiavelli's politics, and it is this kind of political thought, that had to face the accusation of betrayal.

One of the most complex analyses of betrayal were laid down by Nachman Ben-Yehuda, in his work entitled „Betrayals and Treason, Violation of Trust and Loyalty”. According to his definition, betrayal equals deviancy, which is set apart from normal and expected behavior, going against an imaginary or real bargain with a group. The traitor commits the treason being part of a group or fictive part of a group, the term group here meaning couples, also.

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The definition of treason goes along social points of view, dividing into two main categories. Thus treason may be committed on (1) individual level – here we are talking about relationships, like marriage or friendship. Here we apply the synonyms of betrayal, treason, treachery. Or (2) it may be done on a collective level, here we are looking at high treason, spying, desertion, political misuse, or pacts crossed over by the state itself, (without the fullness of enumeration).

Treason done on a collective level may also have many aspects, on specified fields as economy, politics, science. Amongst the definitions of treason, even seen through psychological view, there is talk about letting down some kind of an agreement, which made up a certain amicable relationship inside of the given group. It is in fact the violation of trust and faithfulness, that leads to betrayal, trust, may that be formal or presumed, resting upon loyalty. Sticking to the rules of trust means normality, going against it means deviancy. The tolerance of behavior, that differs from habitual or understood may change according to particular cultures, the same deviant behavior being tolerated in one given environment, and rejected in the other.

Nachman Ben-Yehuda searched for typology and made categories, which he illustrated through cases. It is important that he touched upon the relation of betrayal and truth, inasmuch as betrayal includes the will for misleading, and the cover-up of truth, and is a kind of secret-keeping. The truth can be a starting point towards examining treachery, because we admit, that reality has parameters, that are true, authentic, original.²

Nachman Ben-Yehuda defines a confiding relationship with interaction, which is true, authentic and original. This is in connection with honesty, and it may be so, as long as deviancy consists of lies, theft, betrayal, and the concealing of truth. On individual level we can pinpoint the moral attributes, because loyalty is an ethical notion, and it lays upon truthfulness, which is also an ethical notion. In his analysis he highlights the importance of moral codes, and explains the harsh reactions towards betrayal, when these moral codes are being grossly crossed over. But betrayal explained only on moral grounds, and the reactions towards it as such seem far-fetched, and at this point Yehuda's explanation is not enough. On social scale it is understandable, as harsh reactions can mean public uproar. But brought down to personal level, there appears the traumatic aspect of having gone through betrayal.

It was Jennifer Freyd, who first used the concept of trauma in context with treachery, and this is the trauma of the victim in psychology, which sheds light to the problem from this angle, and which was given a direct clinical description by Jennifer Freyd.

² Hence, in some profound sense, discussions about trust and its violations assume that there are some parameters of reality that we all accept as true, as genuine, as authentic. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *Betrayals and Treason Violations of Trust and Loyalty*, Westview Press Colorado, 2001, p. 6.

We learn, that the trauma caused by treachery is ever bigger as the victim was connected more strongly, personally to the traitor. The trauma of having been betrayed appears also in connection with higher authorities, if someone was persecuted though innocent, or thrown into prison.

There is a sociology of betrayal, and a point of view seems to be contouring, namely, that letting down a person basically defines his/her whole life, having psychological, social, biological consequences.

On returning to the social aspect, we must not disregard two basic attributes of treason, the moral dimension and the component of authority, which we may imagine as two columns of treason.

Treason is mainly moral deviancy, as it goes against accepted ethical rules, and the personal set of values of the individual are being set on a different perspective as well. The aspect of authority is more relevant on collective level, when the traitor pushes his authority over a group, and is able to have this group act in a certain way. This authoritative aspect may come with the knowledge, that the traitor can commit the treason, that this stands in his power, and thus is able to manipulate.

If we consider money, as the goal of action, then we might deal with the two columns, too, in most cases. The spring of action may be revenge, on the basis of actual or imaginary wounds.

We saw, that treason is a fairly elastic notion, but there might be set up a typology, and we can render different categories as to its actual examples. Going back to truth, we must add, that it has utmost importance in uncovering treason, as much as – quoting from Ágnes Heller about the philosophical truth – the true knowledge means knowledge, that has been examined.

Only with the help of such an examination we are able to understand treason in general, and treason as a case of political action. For better understanding we will attempt two analyses, the first relating to George Orwell's observations, the second to the political actuality in Romania, before the 1989 Revolution.

2. George Orwell and the betrayal

George Orwell, that is, Eric Arthur Blair wrote in his autobiographical work „Homage to Catalonia” his memories about the Spanish Civil War, namely, how had he enthusiastically fought side by side with the Spanish POUM³ communist-anarchist workers, against the fascists of general Franco, having faith in the victory of the worker-revolution, and then realizing, that alongside the movement, there is a contrary propaganda going on political level, the revolution is reduced to a simple fight, and the division he had fought in is finally named Franco's fifth division.

³ Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, POUM, in Catalan: Partit Obrer d'Unificació Marxista.

It is understandable, that Orwell felt betrayed, and had in his days in Burma expressed his disappointment in the British colonialism, and neared towards the working class.

We must not forget, that Orwell served as a police officer in Burma, and his mind was open towards investigative thought. Analyzing the situation more closely, Orwell and the POUM were betrayed, having been named traitors. The expression „the fifth column” belongs in fact to Emilio Mola, Spanish Nazi party general, who attacked Madrid in 1936 and experienced as the nationalist sympathizers from Madrid backed him up in his fight.

Thus, the „fifth column” was made up of saboteurs, traitors, sympathizers, who stood on a common ground with the enemy, and who were capable to surrender the country, and its political leadership to the enemy`s hands.

The expression was assumed by the British, too, and referred to the Nazis. The expression „fifth column” was introduced in the US by Hemingway, who wrote a play with this very title, but it were the Nazis, who used the expression in their propaganda, naming by it the opposition, the sympathizers and minorities in the countries to be occupied by them, thus legitimizing the attacks by this invented act of sabotage.

Using the accusation of treason, there were whole nations and groups of people to be punished, despite the fact, that it was proven sooner or later, that no treason was committed in most of the cases, and innocent people were condemned, were forcedly sent back to the countries they had left, or even executed.

We understand Orwell`s reaction, as much as he witnessed the imprisonment and execution without trial of certain POUM members. Orwell himself was quite a character, having played during his life the role of the betrayed, as well as that of the traitor.

His observations connecting to the Spanish Civil War illustrate betrayal on a collective level. He witnessed as political discourse was transformed into propaganda, regardless of parties or nationalities. Instead of weapons, his division was given a megaphone, and propaganda discourse was transmitted through it day and night with surprising effect as to joining the side of the enemy.

The megaphone, like the horn is a device used for amplifying voice, and it is a powerful symbol of propaganda or media, the generator of political image. The omnipresent loud voice or music has a key role in his novel, „1984”, too.

The twofold thought „doublethink” takes its roots from this experience, and in fact gathers the process of accepting and learning propaganda, the continual denial of the truth, the method of interiorizing lies. And what is the price of this? The answer is given by O’Brien’s mirror, and Smith is set afraid of what he has become.

The speech from the megaphone increased the willingness of the starving enemy for desertion. Desertion, which fits into the category of collective treason, in military terms. Though it is a personal drive, this treason includes the whole of the army, not only one person. Here applies the expression AWOL, – „absence without leave”, which comes from US army slang, and means collective treachery.

From Orwell's analysis there is only mutiny left out in spite of collective treason, inside of a given military group, or in certain other situations, say the rebellion of the crew on a ship. For these kinds of treason, there were given the harshest possible punishments, before military martial court.

Let us now return to England, where Orwell is disappointedly reading the newspapers, which regardless of political direction, and except for a left-wing Manchester paper, are transmitting the same political discourse. The journalists have not been in the trenches, they didn't see the filth, the poverty, yet were able to give an opinion and judgment about the Civil War, that begun in 1935 in Spain. This was the falsification of facts, after the politicians now being rendered by the media.

After having named the POUM „the fifth column”, which was to be taken for an army militia formed by anarchistic workers armed to their teeth, Orwell had to face internal or foreign general opinion, which propagated the same misleading judgment.

This experience comes back in his novel „1984”, as the falsification carried to perfection of the history and the past. For this to be done, there isn't enough only political change, there is need for the media, and means of forwarding propaganda. Spreading the political discourses is being done by civil servants and writers, people, who are experts of the media, yet whom have never been to the trenches. This is so far lying, the falsification of history, and treason begins, where the planning for the future comes into light.

This discourse had basically set a trap situation. First there is a war to be won, and then we will see about other things – this was the first sentence of the speech, the door of the trap, which had to be swallowed by soldiers fighting in Spain. Going further, than this opening phrase, the premise had been accepted, that war has the first hand, prevalence, and there could already be cloudily understood, that the expectations that lead to the war, would never become real.

Using the technique of putting off, on looking back to the beginning or the causes, it becomes obvious, that in the context of the Spanish war, they did not even want to win it, the deal had been done on political level, and those, who did not become aware of this, were the fighting soldiers.

In this bargain, the role of the traitor was given to the POUM. On personal level, in the „1984”, Smith commits treason, when he asks, that instead of himself, his lover, Julia be put to torture. The treason happens, when he sacrifices the other for himself to live, when he sets up a bargain, selling the other. In the „1984”, there was life given for life, but political treason sells lives for interests: for money, political

favours, or power. It is the state itself, that becomes a traitor, because the state authority uses terror as a tool, and the crossing over of human rights becomes its means of acting.

Treason may take these forms, and for this it is not necessary, that a state become totalitarian. In so-called democratic states, there is betrayal also possible, towards minority groups or ordinary people, through the misuse of law towards them.

Nachman Ben-Yehuda categorizes acts of terrorism and hurting human rights as collectively committed treason, which was sponsored by the state.

Orwell served as a police officer in Burma, and knew the way secret services worked. But before sanctifying him, we must examine the case of the light-blue copy-book, which contained 135 names, belonging to writers, stars, and less known persons. After each name Orwell added comments as to whether the person was positive about left-wing feelings, or about their trustworthiness. On his part this was the treason of the intellectual. He reduced the list to 38 names, and handed it over to the British Intelligence Service.

From our point of view, that was denunciation, but the British public did not condemn him for this. We know, that the British Intelligence, and the group M-16, which was an anti-Soviet organization, gave information to newsmen and writers, who carried those before public opinion under their own names. Having been emotionally lead, Orwell himself became a snitch.

Returning to Ágnes Heller's thoughts, if politics renders as obvious its version about the truth, then it is sliding towards totalitarianism. She adds, that political discourse has value of truth as long as it is falsifiable. As if she were implying, that we should not look for truth in politics, as the goal of a political discourse isn't the truth.

On going back to our previous chain of thoughts, truth has a role in uncovering treason. The examination of facts, the analysis of statements and their level of truth can only lead us to discovering treason, basically in given situations and moral contexts.

As long as treason is felt as a trauma by the victim, then uncovering the truth means a kind of healing. Truth may be accepted as therapy, despite the fact, that there is given the danger of reliving traumatizing emotions during the development of an explanation. However, this kind of grasp of the truth is not complete, as it cannot fulfill the whole value of the notion in point. Our knowledge may be partial or cloudy, and we can only state very few times that we exhausted the truth.

The final motif or goal may easily be missed, the trap of treason might be hiding behind every political action, as long as the priority is not providing for real social benefits, regardless of nationalities or religion, since we might expect this from decisions of political authority, but on short term the safekeeping of power, and reelection, and thus those steps are set on fire, that might guarantee general well-being on longer term.

As political thought, and from philosophical point of view this is acceptable, as it seems, that this is the natural way of exercising authority. If it is impossible to completely know the truth, then we obviously tend to accept the most trustworthy discourse, one of many of the kind. But power is in advantage, its financial means, its logistics will overthrow personal defiance.

If a single leader stands in front of the political authority, the democratic set of values becomes more vulnerable, fact, which we may perceive, as normality, and it is through the violation of these values there appears the overwhelming progress of authority, the deviancy.

The machinery of bureaucracy, the army of state officials, the leaders will grant for politicians. Political discourse does not possess the requirements of philosophical discourse. It is in fact impersonal. Image Orwell's Big Brother is a poster, the person was never seen by anyone, but everybody speaks in his behalf. The political discourse allows for generating the birth of power through the bureaucratic apparatus.

If we are talking about philosophy, then we are connecting discourse to philosophers, given persons. No matter how explicit may a philosophy be, it lacks the means of power, unless it becomes a political ideology.

We may conclude, that in this context truth is connected to an actual person. The person is stating something, and the truth will not be the object, but the verb, the statement. The truth will not be statically present, but will manifest itself through the action, on two levels. On the level of communication, in the act of it, and on the level of a statement. Contrary to this, in a political discourse things are not always working like this. In fact, political discourse is invented by nameless clerks, who then will analyze it grammatically, following the indications of professionals, who on their turn are paid for this.

The individual, who signs the discourse, will seldom learn it. It is also true, that political discourse will follow a certain political ideology, and it is handling those manipulative tools, which will guarantee its acceptance. So, the discourse cannot be connected to the person. If we look at this from the angle of the statement, it has a base of truth, if the level of cognition is satisfying, if the knowledge to be transmitted, is enough.

If a professional wrote the speech, then probably we may talk in a bigger proportion of its truth value, because the professional will concentrate – with the means of his knowledge – at transmitting the political message.

Talking about the role of the media, it delivers the political discourse to the public, and in theory it is free, but defined by taking sides. The media, and this is bright as the sun, since Orwell, may depend on the authority. Establishments lack personality, though their color reflects their leader's color. At the division of power,

the chess-player, who has a leading role, will decide. The political color of the man put in front of the establishment, will decide for the color of that institution, and the more the civil service is involved in politics, the further this goes. Mass media isn't an exception. The authority can have media in its pocket. The political discourse degraded to being propaganda may be evaluated as an understatement from the angle of both subjective and communicative values. The same applies, if at the process of cognition, the learned knowledge is not enough or it is disappointing. The philosopher is a person, for whom the analysis and learning of the truth is valuable even if this is possible in segmented or cloudy forms. From the angle of political discourse, truth isn't vital.

3. The aspect of betrayal in politics before the 1989 Romanian Revolution

The examination of treason in order to discover the truth, even if it is therapeutic, and vital from philosophical point of view, seems not to be enough. Another context, in which the phenomena of treason may be analyzed, is the political situation before the 1989 Revolution in Romania.

For the understanding of this, there is needed a broader notion from the field of ethical philosophy, namely that of justice. John Rawls considered justice to be the virtue of social institutions. No matter, how effective, or evolved institutions may be, if they can't guarantee the protection of every individual, then they will have to be changed, or be disposed of. Rawls states that the wellbeing of the entire society cannot be more important, than the inviolability of the individual. With the help of the notion of justice, Rawls wants to relieve the individual civil law, grabbing it from the sphere of political games.

Justice may be defined as equitable, as something, that gives equal chances to everyone. Justice is important, but in our context the decisive factor is the lack of it, and the appearance of injustice.

The Romanian political regime before 1989 was defined by injustice, and the Hungarian minority living in Transylvania was subject to this, as much as they were tied up linguistically as well as culturally, not to mention about other civil rights.

Using the suppressive methods of totalitarian states and dictatorships, the regime before 1989 fell into the category of collective treason. It was against this regime, that there tried to raise voice certain citizens, representing different sects of ethnicity or religion, subjecting themselves to the laws of this state, they wrote petitions, or they choose to go against them, spreading leaflets or other illegal written media, or they criticized the unfair regime.

The whole political system became deviant, and it literally stepped onto its citizens' civil rights. At the same time, inside the regime, deviancy became basic and thus those hurting this deviancy became traitors.

As every single treason might have opened a hole in the body of general deviancy – let us only mention Free Europe Radio –, the functionality of which depended on these holes, there becomes understandable the role of informants, or snitches, who were enrolled by the authority.

Both kinds of treason – being a snitch or a collaborator – are specific forms of collective treason, the first was a kind of business, something for something, the second was originally voluntary, and had a positive connotation. Snitching and collaboration were the main means of earning a living under the Romanian communist dictatorship. They were also done voluntarily, probably in order to exercise power, but mostly for money, or due to constraint.

The imprisoned captives were being at least asked to collaborate by the secret service, the „Securitate”, and there were plenty, who were broken. Cold, starvation, and uncertainty had done their jobs.

But one thing was the treason or the lying of the state authority – the refusal to keep certain oaths, when having taken over the power, for example in the case of minority rights –, and another thing was surrendering allies or close friends in the same context.

Ernő Borbély,^{4 3} who was a philosophy teacher in Miercurea-Ciuc, recorded his observations onto camera, the experience of him being betrayed. He had to interrupt the recording many times. He was an expert in political discourses, but he could not help crying. He was a political prisoner, and the officer of the secret service had shown him his dossier. In the film recording, he does not mention the name of his traitor, but his recognition was hurtful even after years have passed. He had considered the traitor his friend until then. But it was the recognition of the traitor's identity, that was a turning point for him, as he found out the undeniable truth.

Uncertainty had been worse, and finding out a piece of the truth was a solid point for him under persecution. Treason on individual level here caused a trauma, that had put a stamp on every aspect of the victim's life. Alongside the trauma, there were legal connotations also to be suffered. As a consequence of this, the social, biological, psychic and personal parameters of his life were changed. There remained only his bare life, as he would stay alive.

Although philosophy means a profound thinking, the feeling of Heureka of the cognition was not lost even if that knowledge was hurtful and unpleasant. The actual people and their deeds are related to the truth and/or its understanding, and

⁴ Borbély Ernő died on 20th December 2011.

political discourse, no matter how important it becomes, and goes beyond the classical meaning of action, it has to deal with the facts at some point.

Hannah Arendt in her „Between past and future” tries to match truth to facts in politics. Facts are neutral, thus they can be politically colored at free will. They may be even denied or disposed of.

Returning to the philosophy of betrayal, the fact of betrayal itself becomes redefined, and falsified. In the dossier to be read later, the name is painted on with black, it is not readable anymore or if there is the signature of the traitor, it may luckily lead somewhere.

Treason became an ordinary thing to do in the Romanian communist dictatorship, every apparatus had their snitches. Every institution had their undercover men, with the roles of snitching, and everybody could give everybody up. This state of affairs was considered a kind of loyalty towards state authority, or a form of national awareness or patriotism, which still exists to this day in the world. There have always been collaborators everywhere. The snitch or informant, who gives up a person or a group, gives or sells information for something.

The problem is that this piece of information contains knowledge about one or many people, which should not be made public, and which make the subject vulnerable. The use of given information against the betrayed man may cause his ethical or physical destruction. And the consequences go beyond the concept of trauma. The question arises how justified may treason be? The traitor may say, that he only told the truth. But treason has a specific component, which implies either lying or concealing the truth, and which contains a kind of trickery.

Treason implies awareness, not always with negative connotation, as in most cases the traitor believes, that he is doing the right thing, and that the goal sanctifies the means.

As in ancient Roman law, where there were no public prisons, only private ones, or even earlier, when state authority had not assumed the right to punish, and when private judgment was commonplace.

The statement itself, that the traitor tells the truth, is problematic. As if a liar would say, that he’s telling the truth. How can we tell the truth about somebody or something? When or knowledge is basically fragmented and cloudy? When knowledge about our own selves is fragmented? How much can a person judge, or at least know another person? When can a person say about another, that he knows him perfectly?

From this point of view, the traitor can only sell information. Truth is impossible to be sold, it can only be given away. Treason hides behind factual communication in vain, as it is in connection with the person. In a paradoxical way, treason or the credibility of bespoken information depends on the person, who is the traitor, as he had been the ally of the victim, his mate, friend or confidant.

On examining the Romanian communist dictatorship, there arises the question, how much can the treason of the regime be pointed upon, or brought to book for. In order to be fair, the question stands the ground. If there happens something unfair, then we may suppose, that there exists a base of truth, in connection with which the unfairness or injustice is deviant.

If we take as basis the wounds of the suppressed Romanian citizens, we realize, that there had been a constitution even at that time, which were to be applied, then the measure of justice, even if it hadn't been satisfactory, at least it would have been fairer.

But there was a communist political elite, which ruled and took advantage of their situation, there were political decisions made, and contradicting Rawls, politics suspended private freedom in the name of the majority.

If we take the case of the minorities of Transylvania, there was an accord signed in 1918 in Alba Iulia, which was also disregarded. The Romanian penal law is in application since 1969, and it was so under the communist regime.⁵

The special part of the penal law book, just as it was during the communist regime, begins with crimes committed against state safety. In every country, high treason is being punished.

The title of the nr. 155 article is: „High treason”. If we would list in this study the various forms of treason, we would find in almost every case how it is punished by law. We could follow the case in point in treason categorized under collective level, but there are booked crimes at individual level, too. If we are looking at adultery, one of the most personal forms of treason, then we'd have to refer to the 304 article, the military treason as crime is being dealt with in the article nr. 331, including the mentioned desertion, under article nr. 332-354. Then we find crimes against humanity and peace, until article nr. 360, which ends the Romanian penal law, that is being enforced.

If treason has so many forms according to penal code, including collective and individual aspects, treason with the help of state authority, the question is, how come, that treason is accepted in certain cultures, and why is deviancy accepted, that appears in political discourses?

Penal law applies even to those representing state authority, because even as a simulation, the terror-state has to lay down a kind of justice, too. Injustice is a sign of deviancy, and yet it is accepted as real-politics or as psychological trauma, hiding under the cover of some kind of social passivity. May be for the costs of lawsuits, or the lack of knowledge of laws, fact is, that most of the society handles treason as

⁵ In 2014 February 1st came into force a new Romanian penal law (Legea nr. 286/2009) which enacts also „High Treason” amongs the other forms of treasons already incriminated under the previous law.

unimportant. Still, people will have to become aware, that there are powerful means of the law, which may punish or reduce in number the more serious forms of treason, and no matter how odd it seems, this is guaranteed by state authority with the help of civil or international law.

It is the state authority, the politics of power, that makes civil law impossible, with the help of leading politicians, who turn justice into a means of politics. But, as political casting and needs are changing very fast, it so happens that they themselves become persecuted by law. There are unfair laws, and political decisions, but for these to gain space, they must cross civil rights, and we could say, that there always exists a written or tacit agreement, compared to which the crime is deviancy, and can be pinpointed.

After the communist regime was overthrown, there were formed many parties, many by those politically persecuted by the former regime. But on following party congresses, many of the founders were forced to leave. This could happen because thinking on political terms means logic of power: it must not be divided, it must be a whole, even if in reality it is not.

Spokesmen exist to forward the point of view of the Party, the Government, and give an image to it. We do not talk about persons anymore, as persons become parts of an institution. Maybe the only way to going backwards on this is holding these persons responsible, as law works under premises of equality.

The revolutionaries were in some cases replaced by the former men of the communist regime, the new generation, which was not revolutionary, nor communist, and the founders slowly disappeared. Treason works this way inside parties. But the party, as a political actor, must represent the rights of common people, and work for their wellbeing.

This cannot always be done. Due to the finality of the time dimension of political thought, it must serve the narrow objectives in short periods of time. Being comfortable is a delicate notion, as it operates as a long-term goal, but till it becomes reality, it goes through changes, and as such many political alternatives must be considered.

The political discourse can account for every step, showing democracy or comfort as a final goal. The public opinion, like a hung-up carrot in front of a donkey, drags the wagon along, in which there are sitting the real owners of power, and who may rob the cargo any time.

The philosophical discourse in this case carries the notion of the vulnerability of the individual. It is aware, that knowledge to be called truth means its vulnerability, and the deeper the knowledge, the bigger this nakedness, and if the power is totalitarian, it can control every segment or aspect of social life. Treason makes people defenseless, on individual, group or community level.

„Doublethink” invented by Orwell works, because people tend to accept political discourse, even if they are skeptical about its truth. Thus treason is palpable, definable and analyzable, and even can be put to answering in front of the law.

As a conclusion, we must emphasize, that every language has their notions referring to treason, and these are sometimes impossible to translate, but there are keywords, that are accepted internationally. The different methods of treason are defined formally or informally, thus making it difficult to understand the notion, but they are at the same time colored and interesting, too.

Nachman Ben-Yehuda proved, that it is possible to grasp the structure of treason, on collective and individual level, on the moral and authoritative definitions. It has been proven, that beyond its social, biological and psychological parameters, it can be touched upon by public/criminal law. Despite of these, or knowing all these it is definable philosophically with the notions of truth and justice.

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THE HERITAGE OF HOBBSIAN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY WITHIN CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES. THE COVENANTAL LEADERSHIP

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ABSTRACT. *The Heritage of Hobbesian Social Contract Theory within Contemporary Organizational Theories. The Covenantal Leadership.* This paper proposes to identify the fundamental concepts of the hobbesian social contract theory, with the aim of demonstrating its applicability in the contemporary organizational medium, in which the accent falls upon the organizational management style, on the qualities of a good or ideal manager, on the values and principles which must dominate his organizational behavior and upon his relationship with the employees. Although the essential hobbesian concepts can be found in any kind of organization, the original contractualist governance model is impossible to be applied exactly, at the level of a moral organization, defined as a shared micro-community and based on covenantal leadership.

Keywords: *social contract, hobbesian sovereign, covenantal leadership, morality, ethics, effective manager*

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes' theory regarding the social contract is considered to be one of the most important political theories amongst Philosophy of Law. This theory, regardless of the fact that it is elaborated in the 17th century, is also valuable for the contemporary organizational medium, in which the accent falls upon the manner of leading an organization, on the qualities of an effective manager and upon his relationship with his employees. The basic concepts of this contractualist theory, which are available for the organizational theories centered on leadership, are: social contract, association of individuals, contractual clauses, personal interest, common good, compromise, consent, general will, equality, positive freedom of association, constraint

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of remaining associated, the sovereign concept, his role in the state and the absolute power, always right and unbeatable, which he owns. The problem which occurs in this context, takes into consideration the incompatibility of the exact transpose of the contractualist governance model at the level of an organization created like a shared community and focused on covenantal leadership. In this kind of organization, morality is the fundament on which is built the organizational covenant between the manager and his employees, as equal parts, based upon an open and honest communication, respect, understanding and mutual trust, in the virtue of attaining the organizational goal, shared by each member (the organization's progress and prestige, which also includes the acknowledgment of every member's professionalism).

The applicability of the contractualist model at the organizational level, in its original form in which was developed by the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, can be found amongst an organization focused on an authoritarian and egocentric manager, who has an absolute and always right power (like the contractualist sovereign), in the virtue of which the occurrence of his personal idolatry is justified. Between manager and his subordinates there is no collaborative relationship, because they are reduced to the status of simple tools, with no right to express their opinions and perspectives about a situation or problem. The manager uses them to fulfill his personal interests and to obtain the material profit set as a unique existent goal.

In order to reach an ethical leadership, specific to an organization in which the values and the moral principles, as well as professional deontology are indispensable, an inner change at the managerial level is being imposed. This change refers to the manner in which the manager reports to his subordinates, but also to the values and principles which must define his organizational behavior: the respect given to each employee as a human being with rights and unalienable liberties (humanity as an essential value which guarantees the efficient collaboration at the organizational level and which assures the accomplishment of the initially fixed goal); the avoidance of personal idolatry/the avoidance of over-evaluating personal capacities and abilities; the open-mindedness to the others, the acceptance of various perspectives (these are generating the emergence of the manager's objectivity and impartiality, and the improvement of his own capacities of critical reflection); the importance of personal and professional integrity (the harmonious connection between personal ethics and the professional one), the manager's role as educator and ethical behavior model.

1. A conceptual analysis on the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes claims in his works „Elements of Law, Natural and Politic” (1640), „De cive” (1642/1647) and „Leviathan” (1651), the necessity of a social contract, as an instrument, with the help of which the individual's state of nature

changes to the state of society, through the means of establishing a sovereign, who has to protect the individuals' rights and liberties. The assumption from which the English philosopher starts his political theory, takes into consideration the individual's existence in the state of nature, defined as a pre-political state, in which people are autonomous, they are their own masters, their only worry being that of preserving their life and of procuring that which is necessary for living. The natural state is a permanent state of war, because all the individuals are equal, because there is no coercive authority and because there is no definition of what is absolutely good and absolutely bad, each one considering good what he likes and bad what he dislikes. The state of war is the result of the domination of personal interests, which are not constrained in any sort of way and which are amplified by the existence of the natural and inalienable right of self-preservation, through which individuals have the liberty of harming one another, if by this action they will protect their integrity and existence. The natural individuals, being governed by passions (selfishness, pride, fear, envy),² will over-appreciate themselves, will want to break the existing equality, to be admired and feel superior in front of the others, but specially will want that their superiority to be acknowledged.³

In connection with this natural state, that is harmful to the individuals, Michel Foucault will emphasize in his work „Society must be defended“, the fact that we are not referring to war in the genuine meaning of the word, but to a state of war, in which there is no direct confrontation between individuals, no blood spiller, no dead, there are just representations, signs, emphatically expressions, craftiness, misguiding. Foucault mention in this context, the initiation of forces between individuals: each one tries to hide his fear and to destabilize the other, through intimidations.

The hobbesian theory consider that each individual have the capacity to be conscious of the necessity of getting out of the conflictual natural state.⁴ The first step is the recognition of the natural laws defined as fundamental moral percepts, which restrain the liberty of each individual. The purpose of these natural laws is to maintain

² The natural human being is governed by six passions: appetite (the desire to obtain an exterior object in order to conserve our own being), aversion (the obliteration of objects which harm us), love, hate, pleasure and pain.

³ „Each one waits for his fellow to cherish him as much as he cherishes himself and at every sign of disrespect or contempt, he obviously tries, as much as he dares... to obtain the recognition of a greater value from those who disdain him, by hurting them; and from the others, through the example he offers.“ Zarka (2005), 125.

⁴ „In order to avoid a universal war which would lead to the obliteration of the humanity, people perceived the necessity of passing from the natural state to the social state, from war to peace, which is actually produced through the juridical shift of the equality principle: the recognition of equality becomes consequently a natural law produced by rationality, without which peace become impossible.“ Geledan (2007), 208.

the peace and to develop harmonious relationships between individuals, focused on respect, on loving one another and on the absence of personal idolatry. The quintessence of these laws is represented by the moral values and principles promoted by God's Ten Commandments.

The individuals' transition from the state of nature to the state of society is accomplished by a social contract, which does not allow the existence of the individuals' liberty to withdraw from the association. The social contract as the instrument of the foundation of a civil society represents an agreement between individuals, whose aim is to protect everyone's life and assets.⁵ The consequence of the social contract is the establishment of a sovereign.⁶ This sovereign is a unitary, singular, indivisible human being, with an absolute, unlimited and always right power. This absolute power is legitimated by the consent, freely expressed by each natural man and by the necessity of a constraint applied by the civic laws (which also include natural laws), through which is assured the impossibility of individuals' fall into the conflictual natural state.⁷ The sovereign is not a part of the social contract, because he has the obligation to be impartial and objective when he applies the law. He is situated above the law, being judged only by God, who punishes him for his immoral actions through: diseases, enemies, downfall and poverty. The citizens can't doubt the correctitude of his actions and the righteousness of the civil laws which he has proclaimed, because the will of the sovereign is based on the personal will of each individual. Thus, the accusation of the sovereign is considered to be a self-accusation.⁸

2. Critical review addressed to the contractualist theory of Thomas Hobbes

First Argument: The awareness of the necessity of surpassing the natural state and reaching the social state through the association of all natural individuals, does not come out, as it would be expected, from the individuals' desire to live together with the others, but as Loren Lomasky notices in „Contract, Covenant,

⁵ „More natural individuals, forced by mutual fear and by the will of preservation, have associated into a single, unique, civic person, which we have named stronghold (state).” Zarka (2005), 174. „A lot of people are unified into a mutual power for peace, protection and everybody's advantage.” Hobbes (2005), 91.

⁶ „I am authorizing this man or this assembly of people and I give him my right to be self-governed.” Boucher (2008), 160.

⁷ „Without an absolute human power, a human community will always slide towards violence, because nature's laws are the opposite of our natural passions... and the contracts without a sword are just words and they have no sort of force of constraining somebody.” Avramescu (1998), 41.

⁸ „The individual who complain about a prejudice made by the sovereign, is actually complaining about something whose author he actually is.” Boucher (2008), 160.

Constitution”, natural men are constrained to accept any saving solution, because each individual is focused on his own personal interests, because everyone wants to conserve his life and to protect his goods, which are threatened by the conflictual natural conditions.⁹ Owing to the threats from the state of nature, each individual will realize that life in this state cannot be lived for a long period of time and would accept the association with other people, as it is in his personal advantage to have safety, protection, to conserve his life and to live not in a state of war, but in a state of peace.¹⁰ Thus, we cannot talk about a free understanding amongst individuals, but more likely about an understanding under the pressure of a constraint, under the pressure of a context which threatens the individuals’ existence. In the virtue of that which was said, the contractualist state cannot be considered to be a natural creation, but only an artificial one, created in a constrained situation, which needed an urgent remediation.

Second Argument: The hobbesian social contract is constituted through the unification of the individuals’ wills into a single one, through the promise of obedience to the civic laws and through the transfer of natural rights to a sovereign, in exchange for the life’s protection and safety. The problem which occurs when it comes to the instituted sovereign is related to the absolute power, always right, unlimited and irrevocable, which he owns and which is considered to be a constraining sword, but necessary, being the only means through which, the citizens could be forced to respect their consent given at the establishment of the social contract. This absolute power is legitimized on the basis of the belief which states that people promise to respect the civil laws, but, nothing guarantees that they will actually obey them, because promises do not contain forces of constraints, just moral obligation.

This kind of power can transform the contractualist relationship into an inequitable one, just as the relationship between a master and his slaves. In this relationship, the master has the power, he is above the law, controlling everything and the citizens are obligated, constrained to respect, apply and never doubt the rightness of his rules, because the correctitude of the master’s actions and the laws which he sets, spring from the free consents of obedience, expressed by them. This sort of rationality doesn’t take into account the possibility of cancelling the social contract, because that would be possible only if the civic laws were against the

⁹ „That is why we do not seek naturally, the association with other just for the sake of it, but because we could acquire appreciation and advantages from it.” Socaciu (2001), 149.

¹⁰ „There is no man can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from destruction without the help of confederates (wherein everyone expects the same defence by the confederation that anyone else does).” Palmer (2011), 246. „He also anticipates that each individual would, on prudent, self-interested grounds, prefer peace to war. Thus, each human being would have an individual preference for living a life in accordance with the moral precepts inherent in the laws of nature, rather than to endure the miseries of war.” Ostrom (1980), 87.

natural laws and against the common good. This situation, according to the contractualist theory, is not admissible. The paradox found in this context refers to the subtle specification of the existence of this possibility of cancelling the social contract,¹¹ even if the sovereign's absolute correctness is strongly sustained. If the sovereign were fair in every circumstance, why would he need the God's monitoring (as the only sovereign of the sovereign),¹² who would judge his actions and punish him if he deviates from his role in the state?

Thomas Hobbes admits, as we have seen in the early analysis, that the major force and the constraint are the means through which the individuals are transformed into subjects and also through which the sovereign makes sure that the citizens will respect their promise/consent.¹³ The fact that, only through constraint the citizens could be obedient, it raises signs of doubt about the state's liberalism. The state is not the master of the citizens. It is a creation of them, a guarantee of their liberty. Private citizens do not become slaves as a consequence of the establishment of the social contract, they do not have an inferior status, but they must be perceived as equally self-determined agents (with consciousness and rationality), who abandoned their natural state and formed a society.¹⁴

Third Argument: The hobbesian theory strongly sustains the eternity of the contractual obligation, from the very moment when the individuals gave their consent to transfer their rights and natural liberties, without taking into consideration the possibility of cancelling the social contract. It happens because the state is considered to be the only place where the individual's safety and security could be assured.¹⁵ The problem which occurs regarding the eternity of the hobbesian contractualist obligation, takes into consideration the omission of the fact that the

¹¹ „While sovereigns cannot commit an injustice in Hobbes's theory, he does recognize that they can commit »iniquity«". Ostrom (1980), 88.

¹² „He sees no way that sovereigns can be held accountable to others without the creation of some new sovereign who would exercise ultimate authority. As a result, he contends that sovereigns can be responsible only to God." Ostrom (1980), 88.

¹³ „A Commonwealth by Acquisition is that where the Sovereign Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear and death, or bonds, do authorize all the actions of that man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power." Lomasky (2011), 52.

¹⁴ „Rather, they are self-determining agents who have exited the state of nature and formed a civil order through an exercise of their own wills." Lomasky (2011), 50.

¹⁵ „The first decision the individual is obliged to make, if he does not wish to renounce all concepts of right, will be to adopt the principle that one must abandon the state of nature in which everyone follows his own desires, and unite with everyone else (with whom he cannot avoid having intercourse) in order to submit to external, public and lawful coercion. ... In other words, he should at all costs enter into a state of civil society. ... Anyone may thus use force to impel the others to abandon this state for a state of right." Lomasky (2008), 187.

liberty of the individual's association, also involves the liberty of dissociation. These two liberties are interdependent and they guarantee the rational individual's integrity.

Even though, this impossibility of cancelling the social contract is substantiated on the sovereign's correctness and on the monitoring of his actions by a divinity, these are not credible enough to guarantee the maintenance of the state on a right course and to ensure avoiding the fall of it into anarchy.¹⁶ Thus, we could ask ourselves: what happens if the state would no longer wish or could no longer offer security to individuals? In these conditions, the obvious thing to do would be the abolishment of the social contract.¹⁷ The existence of this situation, proves that the social contract cannot be considered as an eternal obligation, no matter how things would turn up to be, because nothing guarantees the correct and the fair way which the sovereign will follow. The promise of assuring peace and safety to the citizens, cannot be considered to be a fully obligation, because its fulfillment remains, as any promise, at the level of the individual's morality. The contractual obligation cannot be an eternal one. Every contract should allow the possibility to reaffirm the initial consent, because in time, the individual changes his vision upon the world, upon events and situations he is confronted with.

In a state in which the citizens' rights and liberties are being respected, in which the common good is guaranteed, as is the meaning of the contractualist state, the liberty of association, as well as the liberty of dissociation must be taken into account, because the absence of any one of them is considered to be a way to subjugate the individual's autonomy. The positive liberty of association is defined by Loren Lomasky in „The Paradox of Association“, as being the power to associate oneself with other parties in an shared activity or status. This sort of liberty appears in the contractualist state of nature and is manifested as the individuals' autonomy to decide the transition toward the social state and the establishment of a sovereign. This positive liberty is absolute when it is manifested as an empowered association, legitimized to be brought to life by the parties which want it, even if there are also parties which reject it. The positive limited liberty is defined as mutual association between contractualist parties, based on consent and understanding. In the case of the analyzed contractualist theory, we are talking about the positive liberty which is limited, because the Hobbes' theory does not specify the existence of some

¹⁶ „States may be a technology necessary for the maintenance of peace, but it does not follow that all juggling of their components is a mortal threat to security.“ Lomasky (2011), 55.

¹⁷ „The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished.“ Lomasky (2011), 50.

individuals who would not desire to associate with the others, just because their own existence is in danger.¹⁸ The negative individual liberty to dissociate represents the personal and rational liberty of an individual, to withdraw from an association, from which he doesn't want to be a part anymore, on the basis of any reasons. The negative liberty is fully when one is able to get out of an association without asking for the consent of the others, without being influenced by others' opinions and consent. Negative liberty is limited when the subject, who wishes to get out of an association, needs the consent of the rest of members in order to do so. When it comes to the contractualist theory, the liberty to dissociate is impossible, because the individuals' life and protection is assured only in the state and because at the social agreement, the natural individuals transferred to the sovereign their right to be their own masters.

3. The applicability of the hobbesian contractualist model of governance at the organizational level and its incompatibility with a moral organization

The applicability of the hobbesian contractualist model at the organizational level, in its original form, in which it is being developed by the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, can be found in an organization centered on an authoritarian manager, which has an absolute power (just as it was the case of the contractualist sovereign), in the virtue of which the occurrence of personal idolatry (the over-evaluation of his own capacities and abilities) is legitimated. The relationship between the manager and his employees is not a collaborative relationship, because they have no right to express their perspectives about a problem and also, they are reduced to the state of mere tools, which help the manager to fulfill his personal interests and to obtain the material profit, considered to be the unique existing goal.

The critique addressed to the hobbesian social contract theory, which was realized by the means of the three arguments stated above, highlights the incompatibility of this model with a moral organization, even if the key concepts are the same in both models of governance. Thus:

The concept of covenant as an association of individuals can be found at the organizational level, under the form of a pact of collaboration, viewed as an agreement between the employees and the manager. The aim of this collaborative pact is represented by the organization's well-being (the common good as it appears in Hobbes's theory), which includes the well-being of each organizational member (the personal appreciation of its members and the recognition of their professional

¹⁸ „At least one association is mandatory for those within civil society: the universal association that is the political order itself. For all those located within borders, aliens as well as citizens, obeisance to the social contract is not open for negotiation.” Lomasky (2008), 187.

value). In contrast to the hobbesian individuals who are constrained to accept the social association and to transfer their natural rights to a sovereign, because their life had been threatened, the organization's members decide to collaborate, to be dedicated involved in the fulfillment of their professional activities, with the purpose of helping the organization to progress. Obviously, personal interests can be at stake, because each member accepted to sign the organizational pact, in order to obtain the material resources with which one can look after oneself. Nevertheless, in a moral organization, material benefits shouldn't be considered as the ultimate goal. More important must be the personal accomplishment, acquired from achieving a quality work, which would be appreciated by co-workers and customers. If in hobbesian social contract is mentioned the transfer of natural rights to a sovereign for peace and personal safety, in the organizational theories this transfer will not occur. However, this doesn't mean that there will be no necessity of a compromise (tolerance, the acceptance of individuals' diversity and the open-mindedness to other alternatives and visions) between the manager and his employees. In the absence of this compromise, there can be no efficient collaboration, no open and honest communication and the initially set goal cannot be reached. The passions which govern the natural individual (selfishness, envy, the desire of breaking the equality, the wish to feel superior to the others and to be recognized as superior), must not exist in a moral organization, because the manager, as well as the employees, shouldn't forget what is the essence of their role in organization and the fact that the organizational interests must be more important than the personal ones.

The relationship between the hobbesian sovereign and the citizens, as well as the power which the contractualist sovereign holds in the state, cannot exist in an organization centered on ethical leadership. The manager, even if he is in front of the organization, must not abuse of his power. He should be an example for his employees, he must regard them as equals, he must not favor somebody in the detriment of others (elements which can be found in the hobbesian contractualist theory under the name of the sovereign's responsibilities for the citizens), he must be aware of the responsibilities he has for the organization and for his employees and he must not forget that only by collaboration and by open and honest communication with his subordinates, the organization could progress and reach its goals.¹⁹ If the

¹⁹ „...the most effective leader recognizes the essential equality of everyone (and everything) even while he continues to sing his own unique song.” Pava (2003), 109. „A leader recognizes other's capacities and he allows them to be manifested. The leader realizes that he cannot do everthing by himself and he should not even try it. Even more, a leader should never assume all the merits, but he should recognize those of the people who had actually worked. The new leader does no longer fight to win the fame of reaching first on the top of the mountain. In fact, he finds the glory when the entire team reaches on the top and then everyone returns to the camp, in order to plan the celebration of victory.” Winget (2012), 172-173.

contractualist sovereign is always right and his actions are always just, the citizens couldn't ever doubt his correctness, in the case of the organizational theories, the manager has no right to consider his vision upon the problems and upon the organization's functioning manner, as being the only correct way of thinking. He must be open-minded towards the others and he must accept the existence of different alternative visions, which might be better than his own.²⁰ This change is not a sign of the manager's professional weakness, but it is an ethical quality, which facilitates the collaboration among organizational members and guarantees the success. By these means, the manager has the possibility to develop professionally, to learn every day new things, to increase his skills and to become more competent in his working field.²¹

If in the hobbesian contractualist theory, the sovereign uses constraint and force in order to assure the obedience of his citizens, when it comes to an organization, the manager must not use constraint to involve his employees in their working duties. Respect, the avoidance of personal idolatry, open and honest communication, as well as effective collaboration, guarantees the fulfillment of quality services offered by the organization and assures the existence of a common goal, which is shared by each organizational member. If in the case of contractualism, the contractual obligation is eternal, the social contract being impossible to be dissolved, at the organizational level, each member must have the freedom of association (the liberty to be able to aspire to the status of member in that certain organization), as well as the liberty to dissociate (to be able to get out of an organization, to quit, on behalf of any considerations). At an organizational level, it is possible also the other alternative, that in which the individual could be fired anytime, if is considered that his work is no longer valuable or useful for the organization, or if he might have broken a contractual clause.

4. The covenantal leadership of an organization

Moses Pava, in his work „Leading with meaning: using covenantal leadership to build a better organization”, proposes seven interdependent steps, which a manager must correctly follow, in order to reach an ethical leadership, through which the fulfillment of the organizational morality level is assured. These steps are: humanity as the manager's essential value; the avoidance of personal idolatry (the avoidance of over-evaluating personal capacities and abilities); the manager's

²⁰ „Diversity is a competitive advantage. Different people approach similar problems in different ways. While this has always been true, diversity becomes increasingly important for those companies doing business globally.” Pava (2003), 102.

²¹ „Successful managers don't follow the crowd, but they do learn from everyone.” Pava (2003), 89.

personal and professional integrity; the manager's moral imagination; the ideal leading model and the manager's role as an educator and example of an ethical behavior; the manager's professional responsibilities. The accent falls on the manager, upon the qualities he needs to possess, on his way of taking actions and upon his relationship with the employees. It happens because, first of all, the organization's morality and the direction towards which it heads to, depend on him.²² The study of Moses Pava is thought as a practical guidebook for building a moral organization, which must be governed with wisdom. This kind of organization is not intended to be a machinery, conceived exclusively for material benefits, but a micro-shared community, established on an organizational pact or a voluntary agreement, between two equal and independent parts (the manager and his employees), in which the organization's well-being and its progress are essential.

The path of humanity and the path of no illusions

The path of humanity is the fundament which guarantees the accomplishment of the covenantal leadership, on which depends the transformation of a simple organization into a moral one. The concept of humanity, as the manager's essential principle, refers to the moral values which must govern his personal and professional life. The humanity understood as a focusing on people, underlines the necessity of the existence of some harmonious relationships among the organization and the importance of all members as equal parts, for an efficient collaboration, for an open and honest communication, everything in order to reach the organizational goal.²³

One important obstacle, which endangers the way to ethical leadership, is the manager's personal idolatry. This is thought to be a serious contemporary problem, which occurs frequently in the business medium and which is considered to be a source of moral evil, that springs from the manager's inner, out of the desire of being superior to the others (to his subordinates). This passion (if we talk in hobbesian terms) represents an illusion, which means the shift of the relative into the absolute,²⁴ manifested as a certainty, which sprang on the background of an uncertainty (I have the power, I'm the one who promulgate the laws, thus I can break any rule, because

²² „Covenantal organizations require covenantal leadership.” Pava (2003), 4.

²³ „You can conceive, project and built the most wonderful place on earth, but you need people in order to transform the dream into reality. ...and our leaders will be the ones who will act as guides and mentors, to bring out the best of people, so that our dreams come true.” Winget (2012), 169.

²⁴ „Idolatry not only persisted as an important problem, but was the source of all wrongdoing and moral evil. Idolatry is the absolutization of the relative; it is absolute devotion paid to anything short of the Absolute. The object of idolatrous worship may be, and in fact generally is, some good; but since it is not God, it is necessarily a good that is only partial and relative.” Pava (2003), 31-32.

nobody will punish me).²⁵ The transformation of personal idolatry into a certainty, for the one who owns it, requires the becoming of this illusion into a group phenomenon, meaning that it should be shared by more than one individual. The employees' recognition of the manager's superiority and absolute rightness in any circumstance, strengthens his unrealistic beliefs about himself. At the managerial level, personal idolatry occurs in the moment in which the manager becomes selfish, egocentric, when he over-evaluates his capacities and abilities and when his attitude toward his subordinates becomes defiant, superior, arrogant and cynical. In this context, the employees are being treated not as equal partners in the realization of the organizational goal, but as means through which the manager fulfills his personal needs.²⁶ The subjects who are dominated by the self-idolatry become incapable of making the difference between the reality and the product of their own imagination.²⁷

The path of integration and the path of moral imagination

Integrity, seen as an organic unity, does no longer represent a concrete fact, a simple state of being, but it is perceived at the organizational level, as an essential value, which ties the humanity and the avoidance of idolatry, to the other values comprised by the ethical leadership (moral imagination, moral growth). The integrity of an organization refers to the sum of rules, ethical values and principles which define the organization and which must be internalized by each member, so that amongst the organization, each one's ethical and professional behavior should prevail. The internalization of this organization's ethical values and principles, means the symmetry which should exist between an individual's personal ethics (the values and principles based on which the individual interacts with others and lives his life) and the organization's professional deontology. This kind of interiorization and the quality work provided by every member, is facilitated by each individual's morality in extraprofessional life, because a man who loves the truth, the rightness, the

²⁵ „The illusion of idolatry is set in motion by an attitude of certainty in a world best described as uncertain. Idolatry begins when the ambiguous environment overwhelms the idolater so much that he is willing to embrace the illusion of certainty against all odds.” Pava (2003), 34.

²⁶ „Idolatry begins precisely when individuals and social entities begin to treat the man-made as something other than a human creation, no matter how valuable the creation.” Pava (2003), 32.

²⁷ „Ultimately, all idolatry is worship of the self projected and objectified: all idolization is self-idolization. In exalting the natural vitalities of life, we exalt and lose ourselves in the vitalities of our own nature. In absolutizing the collectivities or movements of which we form part, we but absolutize ourselves writ large. In proclaiming as ultimate the ideas and programs to which we are devoted, we are but proclaiming the work of our minds to be the final truth of life.” Pava (2003), 34.

correctness, will work devotedly, with pleasure, he will not perceive the organization's internal professional deontology as a constraint and will not let himself be dominated by his personal interests.

The organizations which are based on the covenantal model, on efficient collaboration between two equal and independent parts (the manager and his employees), which have the same status and the same beliefs, needs an integrative leadership. The integrative leadership is found rarely in contemporary society and it refers to the internalization of the organizational ethics and to the manager's ability to match the practices and the old deontology with the new ones. This connection between old and new, between past and present, attests the manager's creativity, his professional experience and his implication in finding the ideal leading style, which should help the organization to make progress and to become an innovative one.

Imagination and morality are interdependent and lead to successfully solving the moral organizational dilemmas, which, if are not corrected, can endanger the entire well-being of the organization. Moral imagination is defined by Moses Pava in his work „Leading with meaning: using covenantal leadership to build a better organization”, as an essential quality which characterizes us and which through its existence, it determines us to be better,²⁸ to act justly so that through our actions we do not harm the others. More precisely, it refers to the ability to put ourselves in the place of another, to accept the existence of alternatives (to open oneself to the others), to take a distance from personal implications and to make a step backward.²⁹ By critical reflection of the organization's functions and of the current problems which affect it, the manager has the possibility to take ethical decisions and to select the best leading style.³⁰

²⁸ „There is no attempt here to formally define moral imagination other than to say that it is what allows us to continue to be who we always were, only better.” Pava (2003), 74.

²⁹ „It allows one to step back from one's situation and view it from another point of view. In taking such a perspective a person tries to disengage herself from the exigencies of the situation to look at the world or herself from a more dispassionate point of view or from the point of view of another dispassionate reasonable person.” Pava (2003), 79. Objectivity is the ability to „imagine other values and points of view and to change one's world in light of possibilities revealed by those alternative viewpoints.” Pava (2003), 82.

³⁰ „Moral imagination is not a panacea, but it does help to remind one to look beyond the status quo, to seek out additional perspectives, and to recognize the centrality of community. At minimum, viewing an ethical problem through the lens of moral imagination might help one see that what seems a clash of interests is actually an opportunity to enlarge the community.” Pava (2003), 92 .

The path of the role model

The role of the ethical behavior model refers to certain qualities, values and professional principles which a manager should own and which are generated by the unification of the personal ethics with the professional deontology. In order for the manager to be a good example for his employees, he should take into consideration the following generally aspects, regarding the leading of any sort of organization:

a) The correct vision about the organization and the means through which the set goals would be achieved:

The organization must be seen as a micro-community, built around the abilities and skills possessed by each member. It is based on a voluntary organizational covenant defined as a mutual agreement between the employee and the employer, as agents with different visions, but equal and independent, unified for the achievement of a common goal (the organization's progress and prestige, which include the recognition of each member's professionalism). The organization's value is not an inherent one, but it is accredited by valuable results, with benefits for the client, which must be in concordance with the organization's aim, with its structure, design and obviously with the leading model used by the manager. The moral organization defined as a micro-community refers to its specificity to be shared. This specificity means conceiving the organization as a consensual frame, in which each member's professional development is facilitated. This development is realized through the honestly and open exchange of different visions that each one possess about an organizational problem.³¹ The organization must rely on close relationships between the employee and the manager, on respect and mutual trust. The organization's members, no matter of their professional status, are the key-pawns in achieving the initially set goal.

b) The manager's ability to select the organization's staff,³² according to the ethical values and principles which are dominant inside of it:

Each organization's member must have a certain ethical behavior and certain qualities. Some of these qualities are being developed before the individual become a part of the organization: his values and principles which define him as a human moral being. The other qualities, the professional ones, will be developed in time, through an active implication of the individuals in the work tasks. In the selection process of the future members of the organizational

³¹ „The act of organizing is thought of as a voluntary agreement among independent but equal agents to create a shared community. At their best, such covenantal agreements provide a stable location for the interpretation of life's meanings in order to promote human growth, development, and the satisfaction of legitimate human needs. Creating and sustaining such organizations is hard and subtle work. Covenantal organizations require covenantal leadership.” Pava (2003), 95.

³² „The best leader is that who knows to choose the people capable to achieve that which he wants and, afterwards he knows how to restrain from interfering in their work.” Winget (2012), 181.

team, the manager must pay attention to the motivation and determination of each candidate. Then, the manager should analyze these elements, making comparisons with the ideal employee whom he is looking for, thus making sure that the candidate is adequate for the vacant position and that his joining in the team will contribute substantially to the organization's progress.

c) The manager's ability to continuously train his subordinates and his own openness to professional improvement:³³

The manager's role as a model and educator for the employees, takes into consideration his ability to train them, to help them to grow professionally, through mutual communication between these two covenantal parts, through training sessions or by professional counseling meetings.³⁴ The manager must encourage each individual's independent thinking and should not try to impose them his own point of view. He must use the dialogical relationship with his employees, for perfecting himself and becoming more competent in the field he activates. This process of bidirectional education, contributes to the maintenance of harmonious relationship, based on respect and mutual trust.

The path of moral growth³⁵

The implication of covenantal leadership depends also on the morality, which must be dominant in any organization and according to which, any action and any behavior must be guided. In order for the organizational members' actions to be based on morality and for the organization to be though as a shared micro-community, it is necessary that the manager fulfills the stage of organization (when the organization is formed) and the stage of institutionalization.

³³ „Specifically, the following objectives underscore the belief that we choose to organize ourselves not only to produce goods and services, but also in an attempt to explore values, to examine beliefs, to learn new skills, to relate to others, to be with others, and to enlarge our understanding of what it means to be human among other human beings. In other words, role models guide all of us in the search for meaning in organizations.” Pava (2003), 98.

³⁴ „At the very heart of those organizations that are today self-consciously following the covenantal model is the idea that organizations can and should foster human growth and development. Organization members satisfy not only material needs, but organizations, conceived of as living communities, can help individuals satisfy higher-level needs, including the need for social interactions, the need for self-actualization, and spiritual needs. Great leaders are continually growing; great covenantal leaders, satisfying the role model criterion, must strive to create organizations that are big enough for every organizational member to grow.” Pava (2003), 107.

³⁵ „First and foremost, successful leaders of the future will have to learn how to guide their organizations along the path of moral growth. In the absence of a well-articulated view of the moral development of organizations, leadership is a dangerous game to play.” Pava (2003), 130.

An organization is not formed out of the blue or accidentally. There should be well-established purposes, different reasons because of which the organization is being created, a basic mission, a manager and a group of employees, who are willing to collaborate for the organization's progress and for the accomplishment of the set goal.³⁶ When this first stage is realized, the organization must accede towards morality, which is initially manifested through the systematic thinking of values and ethical proceedings, which guide the proper organizational functioning. Each institution which respects itself and which respects its employees, must lay down a code of ethics and professional deontology. This should be a guide, an example of ideal organizational behavior, which each member of an organization must respect, internalize and obviously apply in his work tasks. The code of ethics and deontology defines the organization's professional identity, it accredits the members' professionalism, it guides their activities and guarantees the quality of the services offered to customers.

The code of ethics and deontology, as an indispensable instrument for an organization's or institution's well-leading, contains a bunch of internal moral values, principles, norms, moral laws, imposed by constraints, through administrative and disciplinary sanctions, with the scope of taking the best decision, for assuring a socially and professionally integrated life, for the well-being of the institution's members and implicitly, for their relationship's prosperity. The aim of adhering to the implementation of a code of ethics and deontology is that of preventing the appearance of non-ethical behavior and practices into organizations. These practices affect the organization's reputation and leads to the loss of sponsors and clients, because nobody wants to be associated with an ill-famed organization, because of the scandals, the poor quality products and services offered or because of the lack of professionalism among employees.³⁷

³⁶ „Founders not only choose the basic mission and the environmental context in which the new group will operate, but they choose the group members and bias the original responses that the group makes in its efforts to succeed in its environment and to integrate itself. Organizations do not form accidentally or spontaneously. Instead, they are goal oriented, have a specific purpose, and are created because one or more individuals perceive that the coordinated and concerted action of a number of people can accomplish something that individual action cannot.” Pava (2003), 112-113.

³⁷ „The managerial goal is here that of preventing the non-ethical behavior and eliminating the costs connected to it, meaning those behavioural practices which affect the organization's reputation, such as scandals, the poor quality of services achieved, or fraud. It is known that a good ethical reputation attracts investors, as well as consumers –who have become more and more attentive to the ethical details (for example to the correct labeling of products), because the beneficiaries want to be respected in their quality as buyers.” Mureşan (2009), 47.

The value of the organizational code of ethics refers to his effective implementation on an organization. The code's implementation is being done by informing the organizational members about its existence, by creating brochures which contain the code's explication or through trainings. All these modalities have the goal of making each member realize the important role that this instrument plays at an organizational level and the necessity of a correct understanding of its stipulations.³⁸

The code of ethics and conduct doesn't have legal value, so we could not speak about juridical sanctions for breaking certain rules. In this case, the sanctions are only disciplinary: reprehension, demoting, salary cuts, or dismissal. In a moral organization, there is a local organism which researches the cases of code's violation and proposes disciplinary sanctions. This local organism is an ethics committee and is formed by moral experts, by specialized people who have an ethical training and the necessary experience for taking moral decisions. The responsibilities of this committee are: the elaboration and development of the organizational code, the periodical evaluation of the institution's politics, the establishment and maintenance of the institutional culture, moral aid and the protection of the organizational member's rights, safety and well-being.

Integration and the manager's new responsibilities

The Jewish professor Moses Pava in „Leading with meaning: using covenantal leadership to build a better organization”, strongly rejects the dominant belief of modernity, according to which religion must represent a personal and private practice, which does not have and also shouldn't have any connection with the organizational medium. Religious education has no direct connection with the business medium. However, it can have a positive influence on the individual, as it is a sufficient condition (but not an absolute one), in order to reach the morality level at which an organization aspires. The fusion between the personal ethics (essentially based on religious morality) and the professional deontology, defines the individual, helps him to grow up and to become a man of moral integrity, sustains the quality of his professional activities and the dialogical relationship between the organizational members, based on collaboration and respect as key values.

The manager must sustain the religious liberty of each organizational member, in the virtue of his existence as a human being with unalienable rights and liberties. The employee must not be constrained to give up at his religious beliefs and to adhere to another religion, which is agreed at the organizational level. Religious

³⁸ „Such programs are meant to familiarize employees with the company's code of ethics, to emphasize the central role that ethics plays in the organization, to clarify the distinction between organizational ethics and personal ethics, and to help employees anticipate problems before they arise.” Pava (2003), 121.

discrimination endangers the well-being of the organization and it affects the open dialogical relationship, which exists between its members and which is strengthened by the organizational covenant. The antipathy for a religious cult, appeared from personal considerations, cannot and should not be an argument for judging a man or the quality of his work.³⁹

Compromises occupy an important place in an organizational team, in which each member is different than the others, each have a different background of knowledge. That which brings everyone together is the passion for the working field in which they activates, the motivation and the inner will to become better, to help the organization to progress and to achieve the set organizational goals. These compromises are born out of the respect for the other and out of the acceptance of each member's different visions about any organizational problem or situation. Without compromises, tolerance and open-mindedness for diversity, there can be no efficient collaboration and no open and honest communication, so the set organizational goals cannot be achieved. Making compromises does not mean giving up one's own beliefs, but detaching from subjectivity, from egocentrism, opening to others and accepting the diversity of perspectives and visions.

Conclusions

The contractualist theory of Thomas Hobbes is valuable for the political philosophy, but also for the development of contemporary organizational theories based on leadership. The key concepts of this contractualist theory (social contract, association of individuals, contractual clauses, personal interest, common good, compromise, consent, general will, equality, positive freedom of association, constraint of remaining associated, the concept of sovereign, his role in the state and the absolute power, always right and unbeatable, which he owns) can also be found at the organizational level, in any sort of institution or organization. However, the original contractualist governance model is being applied perfectly only in an organization centered on accomplishing the material benefits and on fulfilling the authoritarian and egocentric manager's personal interests. The manager, just like the contractualist sovereign, has an absolute, unlimited and always right power. In the

³⁹ „If we argue for organizations to allow their members to express their religious beliefs and convictions even inside the organization more freely, we must also accept the demand that organization members will embrace a high degree of personal responsibility for their professed beliefs. In other words, we have a responsibility to identify with and take ownership of our actions, even when we believe that such actions are demanded from a religious perspective.” Pava (2003), 139.

virtue of this power conferred by his organizational status, the manager will feel legitimized to over-evaluate his own capacities and abilities. The employees, just like the contractualist citizens, have no right to express their opinion or to doubt the righteousness of the manager's actions or perspectives. This sort of relationship which exists between the authoritarian manager and his obedient subordinates, is not based on collaboration, on interactive communication, or on mutual exchange of information, because the manager imposes to his employees, his own perspectives, visions, points of view. The contractual obligation is not eternal, as it is the hobbesian social contract, because it can end at any moment, if the manager decides this, based on any sort of considerations.

In the contemporary society, the majority of organizations have as a primordial purpose the quick obtaining of material profit. These types of organizations centered on a manager seen as a sovereign, are deficient and rarely they succeed in attaining their set goals. Those organizations in which the manner of leading is an authoritarian one, forget the importance of morality in the accomplishment of the organizational set goal. In this context, appears the necessity of transforming the idea of an organization based just on obtaining material benefits, in a moral organization, which lays its foundations on covenantal leadership. The fundamental concepts of this kind of moral organization are represented by the key concepts of the hobbesian theory, but here they receive a different valence. The moral organization is conceived as a shared micro-community, based on a voluntary pact of collaboration, between two equal and independent parts (the manager and the employees), united in the virtue of reaching a common goal. This new style of organizational leading is guaranteed by respecting and applying the moral rules, values and principles, established by each organization, in its own code of ethics and deontology. At the managerial level, respect as the key moral value, implies the avoidance of personal idolatry, subjectivity, preconceptions and personal aversions, which should be replaced with objectivity, impartiality, critical analysis and the manager's open-mindedness towards his subordinates. In order to become a model or an example for his employees, the manager must be a man of moral and professional integrity.

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MIRCEA DJUVARA AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

ION DANIEL SFÎRNĂ¹

ABSTRACT. *Mircea Djuvara and Philosophy of Law.* There are many ways that you should look for a more accurate description of how it arose and developed Mircea Djuvara's *general theory of law*. In this paper we will focus on three aspects that we configure this issue: 1) Mircea Djuvara's humanist spirit – we will analyze its consequences in specific early twentieth century, and later in the context of interwar period; 2) methodological approach of Mircea Djuvara, because his concerns to the theory of knowledge and epistemology are relevant for all his work; 3) the substantiation of „juridical knowledge” and „the idea of justice”, in terms of Kant's theory of knowledge, and other philosophers.

Keywords: *juridical law, philosophy of law, Kantian, juridical knowledge, the idea of justice*

1. The Rise and Development of Mircea Djuvara's Philosophical Thought

Born in 1886, in Bucharest, Mircea Djuvara reaches intellectual maturity just before the First World War. In 1913 he successfully defended his doctoral thesis in law at the Sorbonne, its title being *The Fundament of Juridical Phenomena. Some Thoughts on the Logical Principles of Juridical Knowledge*. In 1920, following docent examination is appointed lecturer at the Faculty of Law in Bucharest and not long after is appointed professor.

These two biographical details shows that in the early interwar period he was a true intellectual and its influence on the intelligentsia of the time results from the fact that he was involved in politics, serving in turn functions of the Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, during 1933-1936, Minister of Justice, dated August 22, 1936 until February 23, 1937, and minister without portfolio. It seems that politics has

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dropped from an inner conflict occurred in institutional action incompatible with his thinking, considering, according to Eugeniu Sperantia, that „true conscientiousness and rectitude are not comfortable with political transactions”.²

The interwar period shown in our cultural imagination as a true „golden age”, but she noted the excesses rather than by political and ideological balance. Marta Petreu notes that the two ideological extremes captured Romanian intellectuals of that time: „In Europe and in Romania, the interwar period brought to the fore *communities* or *totalities* at the expense of the individual or individuality. The far-right and far-left have relied both on *totalities* to use Rădulescu-Motru’s formula.”³ Although Romanian intellectuals were enslaved to these extremes, Mircea Djuvara, despite the fact that he held important political positions, there remained in the consciousness of culture as an extremist; his case is quite ignored until now, because he was not defined by any remarkable excess.

This situation of the interwar period is described by the historian Lucian Boia, which contextualizes Romanian situation and notes that „almost everywhere in Europe, *democratic* manipulation of the masses was to ensure the triumph of totalitarian and nationalist solutions (generally combined totalitarianism and nationalism was fed by the same ideal of unity). Romanian excesses were conformant within the European development.”⁴ From the writings of Mircea Djuvara transpires a balance that characterized his work, its origin being a real concern for the possibility of an objective juridical knowledge.

Mircea Djuvara had an outstanding national and international career. The complexity of his juridical and philosophical work favored his way for important political positions and distinctions which defined his personality. He held an important activity in Western European intellectual tradition in higher education and the philosophy of law. He was professor at the Academy of International Law in Hague and lectured specialist in Rome, Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Marburg.

The career and philosophical work of Mircea Djuvara has developed from a humanistic spirit and Kantian criticism based both on the accumulation of other trends in the early twentieth century philosophy and the knowledge of the law, aesthetics and science, assimilated, largely before World War I, from the first greatest teachers in the country and at the universities of France and Germany.

From the studies published in scientific journals, some being brought together in *Contemporary Philosophy and Law*, an edition supervised by Adrian Michiduță and published by Grinta Publishing, we see his concern for methodology

² Eugeniu Sperantia, *Mircea Djuvara*, in *Universitary Figures*, București, Editura Tineretului, 1967, p. 78.

³ Marta Petreu, *The Devil and His Disciple: Nae Ionescu – Mihail Sebastian*, Iași, Polirom, 2009, p. 27.

⁴ Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, București, Humanitas, 2011, p. 107.

and general ideas underlying its legal theory. In this context, titles like „The Spirit of Kantian Philosophy and Juridical Knowledge” or „The Idea of Justice and Juridical Knowledge” gives Djuvara’s approach vector, which rises from the *general ideas* from the hottest meaning of this phrase, to a juridical theory that aims ultimately, to solve particular problems.

In the introduction to the first study that we mentioned a paragraph expressing meet personal motivation, coupled with rational argument, the author in adopting Kantian philosophy in development of any system of thought based on a number of *ideas*: „You will certainly seem strange to hear a lawyer talk about Kant. I was attracted early in life, when I studied philosophy, Kant’s conception of unique splendor. I came to examine it more closely following scientific belief that I acquired that in the entire law and therefore the entire life of any nation worth the name and even the general civilization of mankind, must stand the idea of justice.”⁵

This suggests that the Romanian philosopher is the prerequisite not only is the idea of justice, but the *idea* itself, causing thus a method that will be adopted and subsequently expose in the same study, in logic terms, starting from a main premise around which builds a concept based on Kantian philosophy. Mircea Djuvara states further: „I could not find in other philosophy any explanation of this idea, nor its justify as steadfast ideal mandatory action, I could not recognize its real appearance as imposing to any real soul, but only on the basis of Kantian criticism.”⁶

Philosophies in which Romanian author claims that he didn’t find the necessary resources for that „ideal steadfast and binding action” are not scarce and some influenced him in a small way, at least at the methodological level, as we will see later on.

The first objective of our paper is to reveal, on one hand, the main premises of philosophy of law in Mircea Djuvara’s vision, and on the other hand, his methodology adopted in exposing these premises and in their process of development.

Djuvara was not only interested in the ideas of Kant, but pursued and new approaches which arose with the scientific revolutions of the early twentieth century, writing essays like „Two Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy”, „New Methods in Philosophy: Pragmatism”, „Henri Bergson. Science and Philosophy” or „From the Philosophical Principles of Science”.⁷ From these writings of the Romanian philosopher we can observe that he was familiarized with concepts like

⁵ Mircea Djuvara, *Contemporary Philosophy and Law*, supervised by Adrian Michiduță, Cluj-Napoca, Grinta, 2005, p. 128.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Ibidem.

„phenomenology”, „analytic philosophy” or „logical empiricism” given and his affinity for areas like logic and mathematics. So Mircea Djuvara was interested not only in Kant’s theory of knowledge, but also in issues of epistemology necessary equally for its initiative of establishing a „juridical knowledge” and a „sense of justice”.

In his study „The Spirit of Kantian Philosophy and Juridical Knowledge”, Kantian problems are analyzed by means of Kant, but *critical* in the Kantian sense, and compared, which shows that Mircea Djuvara uptakes the method and not a mechanical application of the principles. When he questions the problem of *universals*, Djuvara makes a journey into Greek philosophy and notes that the discussion is rooted in Plato and the Academy have mathematical method as a starting point and it started from general, while „Aristotle who started out as a doctor, was used mainly by biological method enlarged induction, relying on individual”.⁸ It is well known the effort of „logical empiricism” (School of Vienna: Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl etc.) and of the epistemology of the early twentieth century to impose induction as an alternative logical in the area of scientific knowledge.⁹ This is an extra argument for the synchronization of Mircea Djuvara, at least in terms of methodology, the philosophy of his time.

His rigorous spirit and his dedication to epistemology led him to continually seek objectivity in law and therefore Djuvara will be aware that law, like all other sciences, has evolved over time, and the historical factor is a significative one. This is another side to which we refer in the present approach. In any science, there is a set of general principles and specific law suite each subject, but ideological and political changes have influenced also the development of law, in our case, and thus represent freedom and human values that any system law must protect.

Philosophical approach of Mircea Djuvara starts and develops from the significance of law in human social life. Thus, the foundation of general principles is only possible through a totalizing discipline. The analysis of theories about the nature of law emphasizes the idea that any science of law is built on a general philosophy, and Mircea Djuvara is a philosopher who fully shares this idea.

⁸ Idem, p. 135.

⁹ An excellent book in this regard is that of Peter Godfrez-Smith, *Philosophy of Science. A Critical Introduction to Modern Theories*, București, Herald, 2012. The book contains summaries of the main methodological debate forward by the philosophy of science to explain scientific developments. Approaches are analyzed authors of „ School of Vienna” or reference some authors as Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn.

2. The Substantiation of Juridical Knowledge and the Idea of Justice in Mircea Djuvara's Vision: *The Law of Nations*

The objectives of this study are developed on two levels: 1) the foundation of juridical knowledge and the idea of law in Romanian culture and in the work of Mircea Djuvara; 2) the identification of a specific national context surrounding ethnocentric tendencies during World War and prolonged in interwar period.

The first problem is in the field of *theory of knowledge*, encouraging a systematic thinking and methodology; all subsumed and assumed to philosophy, in the very meaning of the term, as far as the tendencies – since Kant – have been in the direction that any discipline must be philosophically sustainable.

The second problem is also considered in the same philosophical angle in extension of Enlightenment, pre-romantic and romantic period, but it is also necessary here an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary attitude, as far as the historical and anthropological perspective are very important in this regard. The problem of national character has been in the spotlight for the entire Romanian intelligentsia, with both famous debates in philosophy, where the national character was supported by most important voices, as well as essays and literary criticism, for example, where opinions were more evident divided. That is why we consider as necessary the contextualization and a comparative approach to the work of authors such as Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, Mircea Vulcănescu or Constantin Noica. Considering the criteria of diachronicity and synchronicity and realize that the study entitled *The Law of Nations* not only precedes the thought of that time, but differs in reasoning and objectivity of the need and applicability in a field such as law, where thinking must adapted to the needs of a given society.

Juridical knowledge must be analyzed in context of a system from the field of the theory of knowledge, and in the case of Mircea Djuvara the best approach is the from the perspective of the Kant's theory of knowledge. The substantiation of knowledge is achieved by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but it becomes functional only with *Critique of Practical Reason*. The way begins this second treaty, a crucial foundation of practical knowledge which underlies the practical problem solving. The first definition of Kant states: "Practical principles are universal judgments that include a determination of the will, which are subordinate to several *practical rules*. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is considered valid only subject to his will, but are objective, or practical laws when the condition is recognized as objective that is valid for any will of a rational being."¹⁰ Therefore, juridical knowledge is determined by the rational dimension of being, but also by its membership to a society and the individual membership of nationality.

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, București, IRI, 1999, p. 49.

Mircea Djuvara gave special attention to this problem. In his study *Law of Nations*, published in 1915, Romanian philosopher observed that „just as objects coexist, so a person must be in contact with another person as a practical matter, a legal question to be put. An isolated individual can have absolutely no legal rights and obligations, for I who would have to have them or who to coerce or who are constrained”.¹¹ How Djuvara builds further definitions proves Kantian principles that we quoted. There are two conditions for the establishment of legal knowledge, the first is deductible from Kant's theory of knowledge, and the second comes from individual membership in the first phase of a society in general, and in the second phase of a particular nation and specificity of this nation becomes a determinant one: „The company is therefore a condition of existence practical world, and therefore of the law. In each society people are delimited in terms of their rights and obligations through practical: so, the theoretical, physical things, objects are delimited by space and time. As, furthermore, the combined game of space and time, in which multiplicity arises is meant by causality (in a general sense), all such rights and obligations are inconceivable without *independent will*.”¹² We emphasize that the Romanian philosopher avoids ethnocentric excesses and through a rationalist approach leads to theoretical and abstract question without nominate, but to access a set of first principles that argue the possible existence of a law of nations. As we see, both in Kant's definition and the Romanian writing generator will is practical thinking and therefore legal knowledge. Important is how it will be channeled for good relations with each other. Djuvara does not start from a statement which demonstrates but from several premises following which reaches conclusions.

To understand the fundamentals of Djuvara's thought, a good way is, as we stated in the first part, which is to establish its Kantian roots, and in this case, the role that will play in the process of knowledge. Djuvara ends his argumentative chain as follows: „This will is what law as a discipline it is called a person capable and responsible. It is a rational will, for well known idea and it therefore has a choice between the pure motive and the reasons dictated exclusively empirical interests.”¹³ This fragment contains the key terms for juridical knowledge, conceptual phrases that are aimed to support „the idea of good”.

¹¹ Mircea Djuvara, *Law of Nations*, in *Studii Filosofice*, vol. VIII, fasc. I, 1915, p. 6.

¹² Idem.

¹³ Idem.

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The fundamental idea is that Djuvara's system is conceived as a law to regulate the coexistence of freedoms and rights that limit the freedom of a paradox, but just by this apparent limitation is accomplished individual freedom. It follows that the concept that coordination and harmonization of moral action freedoms everyone faces the moral law, is one of the very moral purposes. Thus defined, and the idea of justice in relation to morality, for the moment it becomes immoral, justice turns into force controlled by interests that break harmonious previously invoked.

Mircea Djuvara was concerned to convey specific area of law both as reality and as a cognate discipline. The place it occupies in the two aspects is difficult to establish the right foundation, but are equally important complementary since one can not function without the other. Law is conceived as a basic right of any society, as a condition of communion in a given historical reality, and this reality is not possible without a specific knowledge and virtual modes of cohabitation, while cognitive field needs empirical data from that reality.

In *Philosophy of Law or Law as Philosophy*, Ion Craiovan notes: „the correlation between right and obligation as constituting a specific dimension of law is irreducible to social facts, in a sociological perspective, to establish the existence (*Sein*). Law contains a normative element, the idea of justice which does not exist in sociology.”¹⁴ This means that one of problematic to be made is precisely delimit two dimensions / manifestations of law and the relationships between them.

Ion Craiovan says that law differs from the natural realities of four reasons: 1) laws of nature are inviolable, while the norms of morality and the law are violated by their very nature; 2) legal and ethical rules are not dissolved by the facts that violate them; 3) a legal norm may not have as a rule the impossible; 4) natural phenomena can not be subject to the law only to the extent of the work they put people in society.¹⁵ In fact, the author states that the laws of nature are not subject to morality, there is no right or wrong, but balance or imbalance. Thus, there are correspondences between the two levels of reality and law even assumed the responsibility to protect the laws of nature by protecting nature and by developing a new environmental legislation.

So there are two dimensions that build possibility of legal knowledge: analysis of social facts, and the idea of justice as „pure legal directive logical truth”, hence resulting specific nature of reality distinct legal entities. As we pointed out in the previous paragraph, juridical knowledge can be extracted from the experimental data that have a juridical character. It should be added that legal expertise is achieved

¹⁴ Ion Craiovan, *The Philosophy of Law or the Law as Philosophy*, București, Universul Juridic, 2010, p. 220.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

whenever a social activity is invested with a legal assessment. It is important to note how this process takes place: it operates a selection of social facts that are analyzed in terms of what is fair or not.

The juridical judgment of the facts gives them a juridical value. One of the problems that arise with this process, which seems incomplete unless it is seen off the context of the theory of knowledge and epistemology, is whether legal assessment can have objective value. Mircea Djuvara confirms the objective truth of applying the idea of justice. His justification coalesces into a system of original thinking with theoretical achievements and articulates the methodological approach undertaken. Thus, objectivity is due to a creative, dialectical stating that an action is fair because its purpose is not in conflict with the purposes other actions of anyone. But others' goals must also be morally validated, which requires a deep knowledge of the human being and his willingness to live in a community.

Mircea Djuvara states „Legal values” and demonstrates how they can be established and distinguished these values of the other. He states: „Juridical value is thus a normative value from a particular point of view which is the righteousness of an action. It is not a normative value of existence, as these obligations, we say it's true that a person is required or not do something, and it's true that its action or not.”¹⁶ But this statement is too general to answer the question we raised previously.

Romanian philosopher owes not a solution substantiating the link between philosophical and logical default moral, legal values and their adherence to reality. This will reveal the lawfulness and legal autonomy, once he define its specificity:

„It is observed that legal rational values are ultimate values. In this sense justice requires by its own authority. She has listened to himself and itself without reference to any other purpose, for there can be no higher purpose them. Rational beings, as they are in society, i.e. as actions and their interests can be achieved, choir has to obey, unable to conceive of a higher authority.

In reality, however, agreement on the legal assessment of the facts by reason can not be unanimous because originality pronounced more or less of any individual.

In these circumstances it lays an average of legal understanding of people in society and this average is positive law attaches him with social authority. The trend is just the right progress in raising the average understanding through elite.”¹⁷

In the same work Djuvara makes a statement from which we deduce that motivated to advance such a theory that holds and a conclusion to the issue of legal

¹⁶ Mircea Djuvara, *Rational Law. Its Roots and Positive Law*, in *General Theory of Law*, București, All, 1995, pp. 440-441.

¹⁷ Idem, pp. 441-442.

values: „Law is thus a unitary and complex practical knowledge in a Kantian sense, so rational and objective and therefore necessary, in any case, however, it can not be reduced to a theoretical knowledge.”¹⁸

3. Prolegomena to a Juridical Science

Philosophy of law as a discipline appears in Romanian culture simultaneously with systematic tendencies of philosophers like Mircea Djuvara, Eugeniu Sperantia and Petre Pandrea. In the same period it comes to cleavage between theory and international experience and the theories and local realities and needs. Thus, the first truly outstanding period for the development of Romanian legal philosophy is the interwar period when Romanian philosophy in general, gave his work defining the periods that followed were reported.

In such conditions, an important aspect is how Mircea Djuvara developed a philosophy of law within his general thought. He theorizes juridical phenomenon being influenced by Kantian philosophy. He emphasizes the idea of natural law, dividing it in positive law and rational law. To the question *What is law?*, Djuvara explains the concept of starting, from philosophy: „...the great concepts about life, and comparing them with the results of science, seeks to achieve its results”¹⁹ stating that „the law would be to establish the rights and obligations regarding social activities externalized, it would look like the acts allowed, prohibited and enforced in society based on the idea of justice”.²⁰

One of the fundamental boundaries in his thinking is the rational of the positive law, which defines them as philosopher: the *rational law* is defined by the fact that “all these judgments that we find justice in society actuations formulated in their independent of positive law”.²¹ The whole work of Mircea Djuvara is based on essential concepts, rational law being one of them. There is a clear distinction between rational law and positive law.

The initial premise is that we are the right objective dialectics as a creative thinking through the idea of justice that seeks consistency purposes in society activities, and by knowing the legal existence of its own reality, without confusing the

¹⁸ Idem, p. 442.

¹⁹ Mircea Djuvara, *General Theory of Law*, supervised by de Marius Ioan, Introduction by Barbu B. Berceanu, București, ALL, 1995, p. 30.

²⁰ Apud Adrian Michiduță, *The Basis of Juridical Philosophy of Mircea Djuvara*, in vol. Mircea Djuvara, *Contemporary Philosophy and Law*, quoted edition, p. 19.

²¹ Idem.

force with the law. Mircea Djuvara is an idealist who offers a significant role to dialectics in acts of thought and knowledge without neglecting the experience, explained everything in terms of objective dialectic thinking.

To do a thorough research on the concept of law, Mircea Djuvara believes that first made a rational explanation of the real value rational and objective. It must be remembered that his demonstrations come from the bosom of a critical approach which he called „Metaphilosophy”.

There are therefore many directions you should look for a more accurate description of how it was born and developed *general theory of law* in Djuvara vision. We will focus on three issues in order to configure his philosophical thought.

1. Mircea Djuvara humanist spirit – all attributes analyzed its consequences in specific early twentieth century, and later in the context of interwars period;
2. methodological approach of Mircea Djuvara – his concerns to the theory of knowledge and epistemology are relevant for all his work;
3. the substantiation „legal knowledge” and „sense of justice”, in terms of Kant’s theory of knowledge, and other philosophers.

All three aspects must be considered from the angle of „Metaphilosophy” that we mentioned it in the previous paragraphs. At this point in our analysis, we put the following legitimate question: What is law for philosophy? It is one of the key themes or is an object / phenomenon which the reason is reflected?

In this context, one of the goals is to identify all those conditions that make law, as in other sciences, a theoretical construct based on objective truth, whereas in the work under review, any legal knowledge to be strictly scientific must consider „all possible observations without any arbitrarily remove whatever order relationships that belongs, whether it be about the facts of material nature, whether psychological or social, or even logical considerations”.²²

The legal knowledge must, in their structure, many elements of which logic plays a major role. The logic underlying any system, be it analytical or metaphysical. The logic underlying all those legal judgments are made out of any positive rule of law. Djuvara’s conception is an error of principle, if one accepts that the legal research, apart from positive law can not be identified and other legitimate sources on which we can evaluate different facts under consideration. Despite the positive rules are acting always in society there are many cases where people appeal to certain legal considerations, alone, without the need for recourse to an explicit positive law. For such an assessment is relevant quote below: „Any normal person would have happened to a robbery soon feels outraged the conscience which states

²² Mircea Djuvara, *General Theory of Law. Its Roots and Positive Law*, București, ALL BECK, 1999, p. 500.

that such act is unfair found: that protest occurs before that it issues to think about law, only then he can have the opportunity to investigate criminal law texts to see if the act falls precisely in its provisions ...".²³ There are such arguments and a set of assumptions such anthropological and even sociology, and ethics. You accept that premise that any social acts of certain legal assessment, which means that everything that happens in society is able to undergo legal judgments that are made out of positive rules. This perspective gives us a filter of our deeds.

A natural tendency of the individual comes from its ability to logically analyze social facts, which leads him to always deliver on their value judgments, without, necessarily, refer to any special legislation. This is to follow what Djuvara reveals, namely, that these judgments are not made arbitrarily but even if their value always depends in a decisive way, the level of culture of which it issues.

We want to emphasize that legal judgments that are made independently of any positive law, is based on a chain of reasoning and logical consistency must be confirmed in relation to judgments unanimously accepted as true by a community of specialists at a time: „...but two contradictory statements made on justice of the same action, one must necessarily be true and one untrue, we can not think that the same action is and just and unjust, everything we believe in this regard must therefore be able to linked logically by deduction and induction, we get such generalizations, the statements must therefore aims: in the sense that each of them finds a truth. The right to speak in its entirety, is, in other words, a rational character.”²⁴

Sociological perspective is important in this regard. To what extent were the interwar Romanian societies, legal judgments? What disciplines or fields were such problems? Certainly philosophy was concerned with legal issues.

So, we can talk in general about legal science arose with the three persons whom I have mentioned: Eugeniu Sperantia, Petre Pandrea and Mircea Djuvara. When an issue is raised or a legal phenomenon, we must consider its genesis, historical evolution, structure and functions.

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IDENTITÉ MÉLANCOLIQUE ET BLESSURE COUPABLE CHEZ KIERKEGAARD¹

FLAVIU-VICTOR CÂMPEAN²

ABSTRACT. *Melancholic Identity and Guilty Wound in Kierkegaard.* The kierkegaardian melancholy deploys itself confusingly from the self-reflective eroticism of the „pure” aesthete to the kenotic pain of the religious fulfillment. In all of its occurrences, it falls under the identity perpetually (re)constructed of the individual – the only ones that seem to overcome it are the superindividual knights of faith. But the identity, either a metaphysical incognito or an abstract representation of the (non)relation between body and soul, is melancholic as such because it incorporates the secret of an originary wound. The nostalgic reenactment of this enigmatic trauma by way of writing prevents the self-annihilation of the secluded and despaired subject – always guilty of itself –, whereas it also sentences him to the confinement of his inadequacy in terms of religious truth.

Keywords: *melancholy, identity, wound, guilt, nostalgia, impossibility.*

*La solitude essentielle, l'extrême de la raréfaction des êtres...
Personne d'abord; et puis, moins que personne...
Paul Valéry*

Introduction. L'idée d'une identité mélancolique

Parler d'identité chez Kierkegaard comporte en permanence le risque de se miner, que la communication indirecte et l'irreprésentabilité de la donation de la vérité mêmes sous-tendent. Mais la précaution envers tout artifice euristique peut être gardée si, renonçant à tout noyau intégrateur, nous partons de la supposition d'une „identité” mélancolique „pré-textuelle”, qu'on ne peut confondre ni à la mélancolie de l'expérience vécue, ni à celle de l'écriture, à cause du fait qu'elle n'a aucun contenu –

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pas même une négativité absolue du point de vue idéal comme celle de l'ironie socratique, de manière si percutante anti-hégélienne. Ainsi, son inscription négative comme distance de la séparation par rapport au sens peut être thématifiée à peine dans un deuxième temps, rétrogressif (comme l'angoisse de l'innocence et le rien de „L'esprit rêveur” du *Concept d'angoisse*), de l'expérience vécue et de l'écriture, comme blessure, désespoir silencieux ou hystérie de l'esprit qui s'auto-perpétue existentiellement. L'impossibilité de son appropriation dédouble la distance par rapport à l'originaire, traçant le contour de ce que nous pouvons imaginer comme une topologie de l'abysse dans l'abysse, similaire, comme nous verrons, au désespoir sur le péché. Or, l'identité kierkegaardienne se reconstitue dans les stades existentielles précisément parce qu'elle est déjà blessure, plus précisément parce que chaque individu est déjà mélancolique, c'est-à-dire à la fois „doué” et responsable (plus drastiquement que dans l'acception psychanalytique) par son propre trauma: coupable/ non coupable sur le fond d'une mélancolie „atmosphérique” comme péché „*instar omnium*” qui survient au niveau existentiel par l'angoisse et le désespoir. Mais le désespoir et l'angoisse sont, dans ce contexte, „assignables” à des catégories (registres) existentielles qui peuvent être „convenablement” thématifiées phénoménologiquement (conceptualisables „psychologiquement” dans l'acception de *Vigilius Haufniensis*) ou encrées commodément dans la démarche déconstructiviste (voir Derrida et Deleuze), d'autant plus que leur „héritage” coupable se transmet historiquement et „génétiquement” conformément à une dialectique spécifique. Par contre, la mélancolie, qui d'ailleurs alimente la figure de l'individualité exceptionnelle (*den Enkelte*) – celle-ci rompant, selon l'expression de Taubes, l'eschatologie hégélienne d'inspiration gnostique dans „la fin de l'intériorité” – demeure un „impensable”, indicible et interdite à tout idéalisme spéculatif de même que, on pourrait dire, à tout „réalisme” phénoménologique. Celle-ci, quoiqu'elle ait dans certaines occurrences l'apparence d'une identité dans la différence similaire de manière surprenante à l'actualité hégélienne (*Wirklichkeit*), et d'autres fois, par sa double ambiguïté terminologique (*Tungsind – Letsind, Melancholi*) semble classée en rubriques incompatibles de l'immédiateté phénoménale, quelle que soit la perspective (esthétique, éthique ou éthique seconde)³ adoptée. Implicitement, l'identité comme telle non plus ne peut pas être chez Kierkegaard une catégorie philosophique ou discursive comme l'angoisse, l'ironie, l'humour ou, à la limite, le désespoir, mais indiquerait, si l'hypothèse est correcte, le nexus entre la mélancolie vécue et la mélancolie de l'écriture. Dans ce sens on peut lancer l'idée de la présupposition

³ Pour la thématification implicite d'une éthique seconde v. *Kierkegaard vivant*, 1996, spécialement *Colloque Kierkegaard: Groupe de discussion*, pp. 232-237 et *Deuxième séance de table ronde*, pp. 281 sqq.

d'une identité mélancolique silencieuse, „non prononcée”, autopathie de la souffrance⁴ dont le danger est suppléé par le dépliement corrélatif symptomatique même du vécu et du textuel mélancolique, d'ici la variation des „définitions” de ceux-ci, compliquée surtout par les perspectives des pseudonymes. Autrement dit, l'identité mélancolique peut se traduire par la dialectique de l'intériorité (*Inderlighed*) s'ouvrant vers une non-philosophie et vers une non-théologie de la vérité religieuse inaccessible à l'emprisonnement „coupable” non religieux. La dialectique de l'intériorité, sur laquelle nous donnerons seulement quelques indices, ayant en vue les dimensions et les buts modestes de cet essai, se développe comme une optique de l'incognito et de l'isolement nostalgique créatif, pour laquelle la mélancolie est, paradoxalement, à la fois moteur (par exemple par la jouissance esthétique sur un *diletto* *male* à la Pétrarque) et obstacle (par son côté égotique et démoniaque). Dans le contexte de l'impossibilité quasi piétiste de la communication directe, dans le monde, de la vérité religieuse, la réitération nostalgique permet d'assumer indirectement le rien originaire de l'identité humaine, une identification par incorporation à la nudité de la blessure „inaugurale”, empêchant le mouvement mortificateur du démoniaque et l'écroulement sous le poids de la culpabilité. Le spécifique de la mélancolie kierkegaardienne doublement référente se situe entre l'isolement (la solitude) absolue et l'exigence impossible de la réalisation de la vérité religieuse. Non dernièrement, ses particularités la rapprochent de la mélancolie psychanalytique telle qu'elle a été formulée, sûrement, en contextes différents, par Freud, Melanie Klein, Lacan, Kristeva et autres, ce qui légitime une approche de l'affinité „non philosophique” entre les deux.

La mélancolie atmosphérique et son impossibilité

Pour désigner une identité mélancolique de manière rétrogressive, la présente démarche suppose une phénoménologie préalable des hypostases superposées de la mélancolie, telles qu'elles apparaissent liées aux stades existentiels: c'est précisément la schizoïdie souvent contradictoire de celles-ci qui constitue le jeu (mélancolique) des masques et de l'incognito païdétique qui garantit un rapport authentique et lucide à la formation de la personnalité (*desideratum* éthico-religieux récurrent de l'assesseur Wilhelm). Ayant en vue le fait que les stades sont interprétés par l'exégèse récente comme des „tendances”⁵ qui n'impliquent pas nécessairement un devenir ou un survenir événementiel au niveau phénoménal, „les rubriques” existentielles mélancoliques ne peuvent pas être traitées comme

⁴ Syntagme inspiré du *Post-Scriptum*, OC 10, p. 234, ainsi que de Jacques Caron, *Angoisse et communication chez Søren Kierkegaard*, 1992, p. 108.

⁵ *Apud*. Ana-Stanca Tăbărași, *Introducere*. In Søren Kierkegaard, *Opere II/1*, 2008, pp. 42-43 sqq.

des structures temporelles-spatiales en vertu de quelque *Urstiftung* qui les alimente. De plus, aucune approche historique de type heideggérien basée par exemple sur la facticité ne peut contribuer à une interprétation proprement dite des „typologies” mélancoliques vers un *GrundBefindlichkeit*, parce que celles-ci s’affirment comme *pathos* de l’intériorité de manière indépendante de toute institution, soit-elle symbolique ou ontologiquement fondamentale: même Ludwig Binswanger avait ponctué la résistance de l’*éidos* mélancolique à la phénoménologie heideggérienne de l’étrangeté: „mais la mélancolie, bien que nous la qualifions de »dysthymie« (*Verstimmung*) triste ou sombre et de manière générale de psychose affective, ne se laisse jamais comprendre [...] à partir de l’humeur, de la disposition affective ou du sentiment de la situation (*Befindlichkeit*), bref à partir de l’émotionnel ou d’une »stratification« de la vie émotionnelle.”⁶ D’un autre côté, sans développer ici le détachement de Kierkegaard du romantisme et la critique afférente, il faut ponctuer aussi que ce que nous dénommons „mélancolie atmosphérique” chez Kierkegaard ne peut être subsumé à l’immanence nihiliste spécifique d’un *mal(aise) du siècle*, bien que, selon certains commentateurs, la nostalgie de la divinité qui caractérise le tempérament de Kierkegaard ait initialement une résonance romantique.⁷ La mélancolie atmosphérique, prise comme horizon du pressentiment religieux, peut être similaire plutôt à ce que Schelling appelle *Sehnsucht* – apogée de la *Schwermut* –, proto-représentation vitaliste du désir associé selon Maldiney à la gravité nostalgique du Fondement, que le mélancolique ressent comme un poids vide à cause de son naufrage sentimental.⁸ Le danger du narcissisme romantique (qui est d’ailleurs un narcissisme *prima facie*, qui ne s’apparente ni à l’abîme du démoniaque, ni à l’auto-érotisme réflexif de Johannes du *Journal du séducteur*) consiste dans l’identification contemplative du soi avec Dieu, ce qui sape la différence qualitative infinie.⁹ Ce „panthéisme” du *Weltschmerz* (et même de la *Schwermut* schellingien dans son acception ambiguë) promu par le romantisme est d’ailleurs ironisé par l’assesseur Wilhelm dans *La valeur esthétique du mariage* par le jeu de mots entre *Tung sind* et *Letsind*, en invoquant aussi le courage d’obéir et de commander que la mélancolie, soit-elle „à tendance égoïste ou sympathique”, a ôté aux hommes de cet âge¹⁰.

⁶ Ludwig Binswanger, *Mélancolie et manie*, 1987, p. 39.

⁷ Jacques Caron, *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 22 *sqq.*

⁸ Henri Maldiney, *Penser l’homme et la folie*, 1991, pp. 13-16 *sqq.*, spécialement le passage suivant: „*Aller au fond* a ici le double sens de couler bas et de descendre vers l’ultime et primordiale profondeur sur laquelle tout *repose*. C’est à la fois s’abîmer et se fonder (au sens de prendre fond), les deux en un.” Dont nous retenons l’ambiguïté de la *Schwermut*.

⁹ La radicalité du *mysterium tremendum* est développée en filiation kierkegaardienne, à partir de *Crainte et tremblement* par Derrida aussi dans *Donner la mort*, 1999, *passim*.

¹⁰ Søren Kierkegaard, *L’Alternative*, OC 4, p. 22.

Par conséquent, la référence initiale à l'identité mélancolique reste déjà sous le signe de l'impossibilité de la réduction à quelque signifiant, soit-il du pathos affectif (*Stemming/Stimmung* de souche romantique), parce que seule la souffrance vécue comme abandon de soi, comme c'est le cas d'Abraham, de même que de la religiosité B, peut jouer le rôle de la „réduction phénoménologique” par un disloquement définitif de la jouissance narcissique de soi, comme le remarque Emmanuel Housset.¹¹ L'impossibilité de la vérité chrétienne (scandale et offense pour l'éthique, devenue vers la fin de la vie de Kierkegaard „vérité persécutée” dans *L'Instant*) peut être dans ce sens traduite comme impossibilité phénoménologique d'une authenticité spirituelle qui garantit l'exceptionnel supra-identitaire de la grâce. Dans le même ordre d'idées, la mélancolie peut être „identifiée” dans une première instance comme un „symptôme sotériologique de la présence de l'éternel perdu”¹² dans le „sillage” éthico-esthétique de l'humain, impliquant l'échec de l'esthétique dans son immédiateté érotique. D'ici l'idée d'une „atmosphère mélancolique”¹³ spécifique à l'esthétique, qui s'acutise comme désespoir sur le parcours des trois „stades érotiques immédiates”: Cherubino (pour lequel „l'objet du désir est au-dessus du désir”), Papageno et Don Juan, „identités spirituelles-esthétiques” qui languissent de manière quasi-romantique d'une absolve de l'esthétique dans la frénésie de nature platonicienne – à cet égard Kierkegaard assimile le paradigme platonique (et néo-platonique) de la folie divine de Phèdre, pour que par Faust il récupère aussi le paradigme (pseudo)-aristotélique du génie mélancolique (*Problemata XXX*). Mais l'intérêt est ici de tracer le lien inextricable entre la thématization indirecte d'une mélancolie atmosphérique, esthétisée et à la fois esthétisante, et l'impossibilité de l'inscription de l'esthétique dans une identité:¹⁴ voué à l'échec de son absolve contre le général, celui-ci n'a que deux alternatives qu'il peut imiter: l'angoisse substantielle et démoniquement sensuelle de Don Juan ou celle faustienne du reniement de l'Esprit; dans les deux transparaît déjà la blessure (on peut même dire la coupure originaire) de l'identité par

¹¹ Emmanuel Housset, *Témoignage et intériorité selon Kierkegaard* in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 2002/2, Tome 86, p. 224.

¹² Apud. Simon D. Podmore, *Kierkegaard and the Self Before God. The Anatomy of the Abyss*, 2011, p. 49.

¹³ Selon Jacques Caron „La mélancolie est l'atmosphère de l'esthétique qui est désespoir.” *op. cit.*, p. 151. L'auteur parle lui même d'une mélancolie qui est à la fois atmosphérique et chronique. Notre propos est quand même différent puisqu'il concerne la possibilité de thématiser l'identité mélancolique qui englobe les deux dans la vie et dans l'écriture de Kierkegaard, sans qu'on puisse toutefois les distinguer nettement, *V. Infra*.

¹⁴ L'échec autoréférent de l'esthétique est similaire au déficit de l'intersubjectivité authentique et, de manière corrélative, de l'altérité phénoménologique que Maldiney lie à „l'appel-délire” de „l'écceité” mélancolique: „Que vaut son identité *Moi = Moi* quand les pièces d'identité qu'il produit y compris l'acte de naissance sont aussi un mandat d'arrêt? Sous cette identité du moi perce un étrange soi en non-personne dans lequel elle est prise et qui se subroge à elle.” *op. cit.*, p. 69.

laquelle, psychanalytiquement parlant, l'individu est privé de manière catastrophique au début même de la castration de l'objet du désir comme „petit a”.¹⁵ Dans quelle mesure cette incomplétude de la castration porte le poids ou, pour mieux dire, le vide d'une responsabilité personnelle dont le mélancolique ne peut „guérir” – dans le sens où toute impulsion de la guérison apporte une réduplication de la mélancolie, parfois par l'illusion même de l'absolvement – c'est l'enjeu qui guidera l'analyse de la mélancolie chronique en ce qui suit.

Mélancolie chronique et incorporation de la culpabilité

L'exhortation de Wilhelm à l'adresse du „séducteur” de se choisir éthiquement, c'est-à-dire de choisir le désespoir comme forme de „rédemption” par rapport à la mélancolie de l'esthétique¹⁶ semble ouvrir la possibilité d'une cure pour la maladie de l'époque, du moins en ce qui concerne le dandysme et le flâneurisme: des „désespoirs finis” bloqués dans la révolte contre l'esprit sont „on ne se moque pas, car il te lie dans les chaînes de la mélancolie”.¹⁷ Mais, exactement comme dans le cas de Néron devenu „énigme pour soi”,¹⁸ même après la neutralisation du danger de la perte de la personnalité et lorsque la vie devient „la plus calme, la plus paisible, la plus harmonieuse”, un peu de mélancolie demeure, le reconnaît le fonctionnaire

¹⁵ Voir Marie-Claude Lambotte, *Le discours mélancolique. De la phénoménologie la métapsychologie*, 2011, *passim*. L'auteure soutient que la mélancolie de Freud et de Lacan est une structure différente de la névrose de même que de la psychose, une pathologie narcissique spécifique telle qu'elle a été amorcée initialement par Freud et qui est alimentée par le vide de la disparition subite (du suicide selon Lacan) de l'objet, comme une catastrophe perpétuellement réitérée dans le contexte de l'incomplétude de la castration. Pour une perspective contraire sur la psychose mélancolique, voir Frédéric Pellion, *Mélancolie et vérité*, 2000 et Anne Juranville, *La mélancolie et ses destins*, 2005.

¹⁶ La communauté des *Sympanekromenoi* représente l'apogée de l'aspiration à l'indépendance qui mène paradoxalement à l'auto-anéantissement, de l'esthète pur, ayant une résonance renaissante, et non pas romantique! Dans ce sens, selon László Földényi, „Il a été donné au mélancolique de la Renaissance d'être parfaitement autonome, mais le prix en est l'anéantissement intérieur qui, en dernière instance, rend impossible le choix de l'autonomie”, László Földényi, *Mélancolie. Essai sur l'âme occidentale*, 2012, p. 13.

¹⁷ *L'Alternative*, OC 4, p. 181.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 165. & Jacques Caron, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-149. L'auteur considère que la mélancolie infinie à laquelle se réfère Wilhelm comme impossibilité du sens de la propre mélancolie et qui culmine comme désespoir par la mélancolie énigmatique de Néron est une *catégorie mélancolique*, contrairement à notre opinion (v. *Supra.*, p. 2): „La catégorie de mélancolie a donc sa source dans la mélancolie (vécue), celle-ci formant comme les structures natives de celle-là [...] l'Assesseur Wilhelm, réfléchissant sur la personnalité de Néron, globalise et projette la mélancolie à l'infini. L'infini de la mélancolie [...] c'est en premier lieu l'impossibilité de répondre à la question: pourquoi suis-je mélancolique?”

ultraconservateur.¹⁹ L'importance de ces fragments ne se laisse pas sous-estimer car il permet d'induire une mélancolie chronique qui assimile l'atmosphère mélancolique purement esthétique („l'amie la plus fidèle" mentionnée dans *Diapsalmata*²⁰) de la perspective du continuum éthico-religieux et, à la fois, la refigure comme „péché *instar omnium*"²¹ par l'évocation circulaire du péché cardinal de l'acédie dans un contexte hostile envers la modernité²² – la digression sur Néron marque ainsi le manque de transparence qui se chronicise fatalement. Seule la mélancolie dans son acception chronique („le désespoir infini d'être/ de ne pas être soi" et „la maladie mortelle" reviennent à ce référent) rend possible le rapport authentique à une expérience religieuse dans le sens kierkegaardien, comme celle-ci sera articulée plus tard tant par Johannes Climacus de même que par son „jumeau" supérieur Anti-Climacus. S'autosaisissant comme pécheur (ou tout simplement comme coupable de la perspective éthique) et comme Esprit captif (ici on a affaire à une analogie presque parfaite entre les paires angoisse-liberté²³ de Vigilius Haufniensis et mélancolie-Esprit) dans la relation catastrophiquement erronée âme-corps, l'esthète peut faire dans ce sens le choix éthique du désespoir „profond et vrai" comme remède de la mélancolie qui, quoiqu'elle persiste, semble dans sa dimension chrétienne d'assumer le péché plutôt une „homéopathie" quasi romantique qu'une „autopathie" de la souffrance. Mais cela seulement à une première évaluation car, non seulement par l'intermédiaire de Wilhelm, Kierkegaard refuse le vitalisme esthétique de même que ce que l'on pourrait nommer le „vitalisme éthique" de l'époque, se détachant même de la mélancolie bourgeoise de l'intériorité baroque qu'Adorno lui impute.²⁴ L'exemple le plus éloquent à cet égard est l'échec perpétuel de la répétition (authentique)²⁵ pour Constantin Constantius, comme limite de l'éthique d'offrir

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 167-168.

²⁰ *L'Alternative*, OC 3, p. 19.

²¹ *L'Alternative*, OC 4, p. 168.

²² Des multiples approches sur l'acédie dans le contexte de la problématique de la mélancolie (liée à *tristitia et taedium vitae*) nous retenons ici l'ouvrage de Giorgio Agamben, *Stanze. Parole et fantasme dans la culture occidentale*, 1981, spécialement le chapitre *Le démon du midi* et, corrélativement, Anne Juranville, *La mélancolie et ses destins*, 2005, pour la continuité paradigmatique entre l'acédieux médiéval et le mélancolique moderne, pp. 25-27.

²³ V. Søren Kierkegaard, *Le concept d'angoisse*, OC 7, *passim*.

²⁴ T. W. Adorno, *Kierkegaard. Construction de l'esthétique*, 1995. Voir aussi Eliane Escoubas, „Adorno lecteur de Kierkegaard" Subjectivité et individualité, *Tumultes*, 2001/2-2002-1, no. 17-18, pp. 45-46.

²⁵ Le recours perpétuel du mélancolique à l'éthique peut être comparé, suivant Maldiney, à l'immanence de la présence à soi de la plainte mélancolique délirante: „Réduite à une identité immédiate ou le pouvoir-être s'épuise dans une intégration autistique, l'existence mélancolique a recours à l'intégration idéelle pour se médiatiser elle-même. Or, cette intégration n'est qu'une image de la première dont elle devrait délivrer. [...] La présence mélancolique est une présence en échec elle-même.", p. 71.

des solutions thérapeutiques. D'un autre côté, la persistance de l'esthétique dans l'éthique qui a comme conséquence „forte” l'impossibilité du saut direct de l'esthétique au religieux²⁶ désavoue ce que Hegel thématise comme *Sittlichkeit* (d'ailleurs, Hegel de même que Schelling, les cibles de prédilection de Kierkegaard, concentrent la mélancolie en abstraction, respectivement en éros pur.)²⁷ On pourrait donc parler, à la limite, d'une mélancolie du religieux anticipé et mise en mouvement dans l'éthique comme un contrepoids (compensation, suppléance) de la mélancolie esthétique, thématizable dans l'expérience vécue et dans l'écriture à cause de ce mouvement de chronicisation qui dévie l'autopathie atmosphérique du désespoir esthétique. Ce qui ne suppose pas la thématisation d'une mélancolie religieuse comme telle,²⁸ tout comme la nostalgie de Dieu non plus ne dépassait pas la sphère des résonances romantiques dans l'écriture de Kierkegaard.

Mais la conséquence qui intéresse ici est le fait que seulement des positions éthiques (dans les conditions où l'éthique n'exclut pas, mais au contraire, peut accroître la jouissance esthétique [de la douleur]) la mélancolie peut être incorporée dans la direction paradoxale d'une modulation de l'intériorité non-mélancolique – celle chrétienne du *Salighed*²⁹ (en même temps béatitude, ivresse et folie chrétienne) dont le prototype est évidemment Jésus – qui implique le dépassement de l'alternative „Ou-ou”; d'ici la remarque au passage de Wilhelm conformément à laquelle „ceux dont l'âme ignore complètement la mélancolie sont ceux dont l'âme aussi ne soupçonne aucune métamorphose”.³⁰ La mélancolie chronique traverse l'expérience comme désespoir actant et implique une incorporation de la culpabilité originale (dans le

²⁶ Pour une perspective radicale (parce qu'elle refuse toute autonomie à l'éthique) dans ce sens voir Harvie Ferguson, *Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity. Søren Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology*, 1995: „But there is no 'short cut' out of melancholy; we cannot move directly into the religious sphere. Indeed it is the persistence of melancholy which is the most convincing sign that we have not yet left the 'aesthetic'. The 'leap' into the ethical discloses only another version of the aesthetic.” p. 94.

²⁷ V. Lorraine Clark, *Blake, Kierkegaard, and the Spectre of Dialectic*, 1991, pp. 88-89.

²⁸ Parmi ceux qui soutiennent une distinction nette entre mélancolie esthétique et mélancolie religieuse chez Kierkegaard, nous mentionnons Vince Mccarthy, qui se base sur l'emploi alternatif des termes *Tungsind* și *Melancholi* – *Apud* Simon D. Podmore, *op. cit.* pp. 56-57: „McCarthy suggests that both words, commonly translated by the single English word 'melancholy' signify two degrees of the one mood: '*Melancholi* being lighter, having a certain sweetness and the associations of passivity which the word also has in English; *Tungsind* being deeper, heavier, more intense, closer to brooding, and with an element of reflection present to it'.”

²⁹ La racine scandinave ancienne du mot a donné aussi le terme *silliness* en anglais, ce qui est très relevant pour l'exclusion (même l'exclusivité) du chrétien du monde en qualité de mélancolique religieux.

³⁰ *L'alternative*, p. 172.

sens psychanalytique thématifié initialement par Ferenczi, repris par Karl Abraham,³¹ Freud³² ou Maria Torok³³ et qui se différencie de l'introjection névrotique) dont on peut déduire la valence thérapeutique véritable (et non pas celle illusoire, de la jouissance narcissique mortifère) de „l'épine dans la chair" paulinien. Du point de vue de l'œuvre écrite „de la main droite", c'est-à-dire des *Discours édificateurs*, Kierkegaard invoque explicitement le pacte de larmes avec Dieu – le *penthos* chrétien – et le repentir d'inspiration luthérienne (*metanoïa*). Du même coup, la prononciation contre la conviction mélancolique de la damnation de soi est accentuée dans les *Quatre discours édificateurs* de 1844, qui reprennent la co-extensivité ambiguë „légèreté" (*Letsind*) et „lourdeur" (*Tungsind*) de l'esprit dans l'horizon d'une identité mélancolique dont le trauma constitutif se chronicise par sa réactualisation symbolique, dont la seule „conquête" possible est „la lutte avec Dieu" (dans le sens de la lutte de Jacob avec l'ange) dans la prière. Quant à la „solution" de la mélancolie proposée de la main gauche – par Victor Eremita, alias Wilhelm – celle-ci implique une sublimation (de la vision mortificatoire du malheur autarchique liée aux *Symparankromenoi*³⁴) par „le travail créatif" – qui, quoiqu'il ait une charge sociale concrète, concorde plutôt avec la *technè* heideggérien qu'avec le modernisme marxiste de l'extériorité. Ce n'est pas la place ici de nous prononcer sur l'efficacité (l'effectivité dans le sens hégélien de *Wirklichkeit*) d'une telle sublimation ou sur sa fonction de pivot païdérique de ce que Kierkegaard appelle „personnalité" en contraste avec la léthargie et la paralysie de son époque. Mais le fait que la mélancolie chronicisée laisse apparaître le pressentiment caché et, corrélativement, la culpabilité, justifie la conclusion de notre essai par une brève réflexion sur la nostalgie de la blessure incorporée et des mécanismes de sublimation ou de suppléance en vertu de la lecture psychanalytique de la mélancolie – d'autant plus que Kierkegaard lui-même demeure en quelque sorte „pétrifié" mélancoliquement entre l'éthique et le religieux: „L'élément destructeur

³¹ Karl Abraham, *Selected Papers*, 1927, *passim*. L'introjection-incorporation de l'objet perdu, allant jusqu'aux fantasmes de la dévoration qui impliquent la régression vers la première étape du stade oral en vertu de la douleur archaïque, est restée une acquisition valable même pour la psychanalyse post-lacanienne. Pour une approche ample de l'introjection-incorporation, inspirée par l'introjection pathognomonique de Ferenczi, voir René Ebtinger, „Mélancolie: ombre et absence", *Figures de la psychanalyse*, 2001/1, no. 4, pp. 9-18.

³² Pour le trajet freudien en ce qui concerne la mélancolie et pour le mécanisme de l'incorporation voir René Ebtinger, *supra*, et Béatrice Ihtier, „Heurs et malheurs du modèle mélancolique", *Revue française de psychanalyse*, 2004/4.

³³ Pour le mécanisme mélancolique de la crypte voir Nicolas Abraham, *L'Écorce et le noyau*, 1978.

³⁴ Le passage suivant de Maldiney sur la dialectique Maître-Esclave et sur l'identité mélancolique du maître semble caractériser parfaitement la jouissance mortifère de la société des comourants: „Mais le maître existe-t-il? Il n'existe qu'à s'identifier au maître absolu: la mort.", *op. cit.*, p. 27.

dans la mélancolie tient à cet écartèlement entre des extrêmes qui demeurent sans réconciliation, sans compromis. Tel que le sujet est pris dans la »contradiction douloureuse entre le désir d’accomplissement et le désir d’anéantissement«.³⁵

Conclusions. L’infini impossible de l’identité mélancolique

La culpabilité a chez Kierkegaard, au-delà de la doctrine révolutionnaire „anti-théologique”, une dimension de l’ipséité malade pénétrée par sa propre génétique du péché qui trouve sa concentration maximale dans l’ultra-commentée figure de l’Antigone moderne, celle qui connaît et incorpore le secret du père. Puisque la réflexion du tragique antique dans le tragique moderne peut être assimilée comme une non-relation de la tradition occidentale de la castration entre Œdipe et Hamlet, l’Antigone de Kierkegaard, celle qui a compris la culpabilité et a dédoublé sa douleur, est déjà une anticipation approximative de l’„entre-deux-morts” lacanien,³⁶ ou entre une castration terminée (Œdipe) et une réinitée – on pourrait même dire répétée dans le sens kierkegaardien – (Hamlet). Quoique identifié par beaucoup de modernes avec la figure d’*Ou bien... ou bien (L’Alternative)* par le prisme de l’échange (réfléchi) de mélancolie avec le père, décrit laconiquement, mais de manière insistante dans beaucoup de passages du *Journal*, dans le *Point de vue explicatif de mon œuvre d’écrivain*, de même que dans le célèbre passage d’*Étapes sur le chemin de la vie* qui illustre „la compassion” du père envers le „sourd désespoir”³⁷ du fils, Kierkegaard ne bénéficie pas de cette „exceptionnalité”³⁸ parce que „le réel” de sa culpabilité ne peut pas s’inscrire entre deux points (de capiton); de plus, la mélancolie vécue ne lui a pas permis de „mourir pour le monde”, empêchant de la sorte la métamorphose de l’unique (et du solitaire) religieux. Le tremblement de terre et la condamnation familiale due à la malédiction des collines de Jutlande (héritage de Kierkegaard, dit Lacan,³⁹ on pourrait ajouter héritage de la catastrophe mélancolique) le font la proie d’une nostalgie jamais sublimée et d’un deuil jamais achevé; „l’hémorragie narcissique” dans le sens freudien, dont l’expression éloquente

³⁵ Anne Juranville, *La mélancolie et ses destins*, 2005, p. 17.

³⁶ „C’est pour autant qu’ANTIGONE mène jusqu’à la limite l’accomplissement de ce qu’on peut appeler le désir pur... le pur et simple désir de mort comme tel... c’est pour autant qu’elle l’incarne.” In *L’éthique de la psychanalyse (S7)*, p. 620.

³⁷ Søren Kierkegaard, *Étapes sur le chemin de la vie*, 1975 (trad. Guignot-Prior), p. 165.

³⁸ „L’épreuve de la castration dans sa radicalité est le corrélat du désir pur. En ce sens, Antigone peut être envisagée comme une héroïne *mélancolique* par excellence. Le rapport à l’absolu à quoi ne renonce pas le mélancolique [...] reste la visée du désir vers un objet »élevé la dignité de la Chose«”, Anne Juranville, *op.cit.*, pp. 146-147.

³⁹ „Mais l’héritage du père, c’est celui que nous désigne KIERKEGAARD, c’est son péché.” In *Fondements de la psychanalyse (S11)*, p. 18.

est le concept de *Indesluttethed* (fermeture, repliement sur soi, encapsulation) qui caractérise non seulement le démoniaque, mais aussi la mélancolie „de second degré”, similaire de manière frappante au *déni de la dénégation*⁴⁰ de Julia Kristeva parce qu’il réunit deux négations dissonantes) lui confère le statut de martyr de la douleur d’exister – écran mélancolique contre la mort,⁴¹ conformément toujours à Kristeva – qui s’identifie à l’objet déchu *a*, précisément le père mort, sans réaliser lui-même „la personnalité” clamée dans l’œuvre. D’ici aussi l’hypocondrie spécifique (dont Kierkegaard est entièrement conscient) de l’impossibilité mélancolique (hystérie de l’Esprit), dont on peut énumérer plusieurs symptômes, par exemple le cri „Donnez-moi un corps!” ou le refus de visiter le roi de Danemark sous le prétexte du manque de „l’assiette du corps”:⁴² „L’hystérie de l’esprit marque alors le repli lourd sur le corps, la matière, la captation morbide dans la pesanteur de la *Schwermut*.”⁴³

L’incorporation de l’impossibilité phénoménologique (même d’une *Bejahung* dans le sens freudien)⁴⁴ le guide vers cette „non-philosophie” symptomatique – et (de manière perverse) systématiquement mélancolique dans son acharnement anti-spéculatif – de l’évidement de soi. Le tout sous l’empire de l’identité mélancolique qu’il se crée en écrivant, par rétrogression, „liant” ainsi la mélancolie vécue comme nostalgie ambivalente par rapport au père - dans chaque occurrence journalière, le rapport à celui-ci est toujours dans les mêmes termes de culpabilité-douleur et d’innocence-tristesse dans lesquels est présentée aussi „la pseudo-dialectique” entre l’antique et le moderne (*Zwiespalt* de la mélancolie si on peut paraphraser Benjamin), ce qui dénote une nostalgie de la blessure coupable comme on l’a esquissée au début de cette essai: le secret qu’encapsule Quidam de *Coupable/ Non coupable*⁴⁵ indique le rien contenu par l’identité mélancolique qui

⁴⁰ Pour le *déni de la dénégation* voir Julia Kristeva, *Soleil noir*, 1994, pp. 54-55 *sqq.*

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 61: „Cette douleur affective, résultante du déni est un *sens sans signification*, mais elle est utilisée comme écran contre la mort.”

⁴² *Apud.* Rodolphe Adam, „Kierkegaard, amoureux de sa plume”, *Savoirs et clinique*, 2007/1 n° 8, pp. 67-72, p. 68.

⁴³ Anne Juranville, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Dans ce sens voir Yves Depelsenare, *Une analyse avec Dieu. Le rendez-vous de Lacan et de Kierkegaard*, 2004, p. 63: „Niant le corps propre [...] ne semble viser qu’une expulsion qui permettait le rétablissement d’une coupure, d’une hétérogénéité primordiale de ce réel qui occupe le sujet. Mais comme le formule Jean-Pierre Bauer »la *Bejahung* symbolique est incorporation réelle de l’effet castrateur de la parole«.”

⁴⁵ *Apud.* David Brézis, *Temps et présence. Essai sur la conceptualité kierkegaardienne*, 1991, p. 275: „Ce que contient son renfermement sur soi, il (le Quidam) ne le dit jamais. On peut supposer que sa mélancolie ne contient rien de tout. Pour autant qu’il existe, le secret kierkegaardien ne recouvre rien qui s’offre au dévoilement.”

soutient l'œuvre et la vie de Kierkegaard („Mais qui suis-je donc? [...] Je suis l'être pur et donc à peu près moins que rien. [...] à chaque instant je cesse et continue d'être.")⁴⁶ rendant possible la dissimulation et le déguisement de la mélancolie qui „attend patiente” le retour du solitaire – possiblement évocatrice de l'émergence de Napoléon du rien de sa tombe.⁴⁷ Le seul remède (au Réel de la mort de la psychose mélancolique) est la constitution (nostalgique) d'un „corps de l'écriture” (personnalité „poïétique”), déplaçant ainsi le secret de mort de l'héritage familial et réalisant à la fois la castration en écriture par l'intermédiaire de Régine, passant par un amour mort⁴⁸ dans la direction d'un bien de second degré, comme l'explique Lacan: „... *c'est pas par hasard que KIERKEGAARD a découvert l'ex-sistence, dans une petite aventure de séducteur. C'est à se castrer, c'est à renoncer à l'amour, n'est-ce pas, qu'il pense y accéder. Mais peut-être qu'après tout – pourquoi pas? – Régine elle aussi, peut-être ex-sistait. Ce désir d'un bien, au second degré, qui n'est pas causé par un petit(a) celui-là, c'est peut-être par l'intermédiaire de Régine qu'il en avait la dimension.*”⁴⁹ Cette suppléance de l'infini impossible de l'identité mélancolique, qui fonctionnera d'ailleurs jusqu'au départ de Régine de Copenhague, constitue „l'absolvement” créative (le „comment” de la liaison entre la blessure nostalgique et la nostalgie de Dieu comme pur néant en acception kénotique), parce que, suivant Yves Depelsenaire, se faire l'âme de Régine est une manière d'être l'âme de Dieu en acception lacanienne: „Kierkegaard se fait en réalité quelque chose comme l'âme de Régine, dans le même mouvement où il se fait l'âme de Dieu, il fait le sacrifice de Régine, mais pour autant qu'elle n'est pas perdue...”⁵⁰ En concluant, on doit laisser l'écriture témoigner de cette aspiration mélancolique vers l'indéterminé par laquelle l'identité de Kierkegaard joint le narrateur de *In vino veritas* qui est „moins que rien” et le „luteur” qui se réduit à rien dans sa prière pour que Dieu puisse s'imprimer en lui. C'est pourquoi la dernière phrase est réservée aux *Discours édifiants*, pour illustrer une jouissance mystique impossible sous l'emprise du „fil d'Ariadne”⁵¹ décrit par l'identité mélancolique, mais aussi pour faire l'éloge de la correspondance dans *l'aparté* de l'écriture – pour paraphraser Sylviane Agacinski⁵² –

⁴⁶ *Apud.* Yves Depelsenaire, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁴⁷ Søren Kierkegaard, *Le concept d'ironie, constamment rapporté à Socrate*, OC 2, p. 17.

⁴⁸ Sur la relevance psychanalytique de la renonciation à Régine et l'aveu de l'impotence érotique de castré en liaison à l'analyse lacanienne de l'amour chrétien, de même que sur le masochisme luthérien corrélatif (*se faire l'âme de Dieu*) voir Françoise Gorog, *Coupable, non-Coupable?* in *Des mélancolies*, 2001, pp. 152-158.

⁴⁹ Jacques Lacan, *Encore (S20)*, p. 78.

⁵⁰ *Apud.* Rodolphe Adam, *art. cit.*, p. 70.

⁵¹ Jacques Caron, *op. cit.*, pp. 158: „La catégorie de la mélancolie découvre donc comme un fil d'Ariadne allant de l'imagination à la réflexion.”

⁵² Sylviane Agacinski, *Aparté, Conceptions et morts de Søren Kierkegaard*, 1977.

entre l'abysse mélancolique et celui kénotique, que seul un protestant jutlandais nostalgique de Dieu pouvait articuler en son temps: „Quand la mer dechaîne toute sa force, elle ne peut pas réfléchir le ciel et elle ne peut rendre purement même le moindre mouvement. Mais quand le calme s'établit, et que la mer redevient profonde, l'image du ciel s'abîme dans son néant.”⁵³

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⁵³ Søren Kierkegaard, *Dix-huit discours édifians. Epreuve homilétique*, OC 6, p. 362.

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