To Persist is Neither to Endure nor to Perdure: Rethinking the Ontology of Persistence

Omobola Olufunto BADEJO; Adetayo Oludare ALADE

doi:10.24193/subbphil.2026.2.18

Authors

Omobola Olufunto BADEJO Ph.D., Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, olufunto@oauife.edu.ng, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2537-3650
Adetayo Oludare ALADE Ph.D., Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, a.alade@oauife.edu.ng https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7198-2975

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2026.2.18

Keywords:

Persistence, Endurantism, Perdurantism, Epistemic Pessimism

Abstract

The traditional dichotomy in the ontology of persistence is between endurantism and perdurantism. It presents a rigid conception of temporal existence. Endurantism rests on the ontological framework that entities are wholly present at each moment of existence. While perdurantism rests on the framework that entities exist as temporal extended aggregates. This paper interrogates this dichotomy and argues that neither ontological framework adequately captures the dynamics of the problem of how objects persist over time. Drawing on debates in the metaphysics of persistence, the paper argues that although the problem of persistence is a genuine metaphysical issue, understanding persistence within the confines of this dichotomy is conceptually limiting. The paper thus calls for a reorientation from the traditional dichotomy to a broader relational ontology where persistence is understood beyond endurantism and perdurantism. This paper is not an attempt to solve the problem of persistence, but to offer an ontological explanation that broadens the discourse beyond endurantism and perdurantism.

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