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# The Correspondence: The Order of Heavens and the Order of the Earth

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ABSTRACT. This epistemological paper may be thought of as a joke. Still, its aim is serious enough: to show the meanings of an almost taboo topic taken in its double *metaphorical* sense, indicated here by capital letters: relations between the Heaven(s) and the Earth. These meanings appear as a result of a "multi-disciplinary" philosophical approach that, far from confusing us, emphasises, first of all, the different criteria of approaching the relationship between the two "types" of order mentioned in the title. These criteria are metaphysical, epistemological, logical, linguistic, and historical. However, after shedding light on the outlooks these criteria open, the meanings, according to their common metaphorical understanding, appear to be more critical.

**Keywords:** cosmos, heaven, earth, and Heaven(s) and Earth, human society, meanings, criteria, metaphor, irreversible, justice, *telos, ordo amoris*.

#### Instead of introduction: history of the site of spirits

Not after the humans have imagined that the surrounding things are impregnated and moved by spiritual powers, but rather after religions became institutionalised, the site of spirits in their beautiful hierarchy that ultimately posited a chief at its head became the heaven. Beyond the world of humans – the Earth – and indeterminately far away from it, no matter if the path to this place was a concrete mountain hiding its heights in impenetrable clouds. In the former animist period of the primitive Weltanschauung, the spirits were (were conceived of as

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beings) everywhere in a unitary system of the entire world, somehow close to the everyday life of humans and to all of them. But after the institutionalisation of religions, the spirits with their generative and dominant power – and becoming also a transfiguration of the early leadership segregation in the human groups – were located in a new place, above the humans.

The former *holistic* frame of thinking became a *dualist* paradigm, of absolute separation and imagined hierarchy between humans and the non-human spiritual power.

Actually, the human communities transposed in their imagined site of gods their own more or less hierarchical organisation. Anyway, their hierarchy was, first of all, "professional" – namely, a well-ordered division of labour and services tasks – although in principle all members could do the majority of these tasks, and the elites (as the potter, then also the blacksmith, the medicine man/woman, the manager of reserves, the strategist in hunting, the strategist in fighting other groups, and even the priest who implored the spirits to help the group and its exploits) have long received only the privilege in the group's common meals<sup>2</sup>. But then, the elites became not only hereditary but thus, also with much larger hereditary privileges, and the chief warriors, managers and priests separated themselves from other elites, constituting a dominant stratum over the group, and even though all of the other elites had a relative privileged place in the social architecture.

This social hierarchy was thought to ensure the social order and coherence, it was a centralised manner to control the material and human resources, to collect taxes just in order to preserve and support the dominant stratum with its nucleus (the palace), and although sometimes the taxpayers chose to leave this domination-submission organisation (Claudia Glatz et al. 2024), in fact it perpetuated and strengthened due to the power of masters: of both the physical and the manipulative power of the conscience of all members of the group(s). And all the problems of the social hierarchy were felt by humans who experienced it on its two versants of the power relations.

Anyway, this experience was transposed into abstract explanations subtending the legitimising stories with *concrete fabulous* personages: the *dualist* explanations of order *and* chaos, light *and* darkness, good *and* evil, man *and* woman, opposite forces (as rarefaction and condensation in Anaximenes) or abstract concepts (as *apeiron/the Boundless*<sup>3</sup> and the elements, in Anaximander).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> As in the special egalitarian megasites of the neolithic egalitarian Cucuteni–Trypillia cultures (Frank Schlütz et al. 2023; Robert Hofmann, Nils Müller-Scheeßel, & Johannes Müller. 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See also the Hawaiian *Ianiākea* (immeasurable, immense land).

#### The cognitive periplus between the real and the ideal

This historical introduction was necessary in order to simplify the real *context* of the *cognitive processes* briefly noticed in this paper. It already suggested that, in the same cognitive process, *first*, the humans – that is to say, the masters of the *narratives of legitimation* of the group identity and organisation, and thus of the group's general conscience – have transposed the real social order, and especially, though not only, the *real* hierarchical order into an *imagined* picture of the Heavenly spirits, of their early and mature monotheistic personification. So, from the real to the ideal / *real* ideal.

But then, and obviously just in order to exercise their power, the dominant stratum of spiritual controllers made their way back, "transposing" the supposed ideal order into the real social one: ideal real. And it's not important here that this transposition was legitimated through the promotion of a beautified ideal – the Heavens as the place of perfect truth, justice and beauty, in a word, of perfect love of these holy values personified as Gods and then, God – as a generative factor and trigger of a more just worldly society, based on this love (of neighbours as of yourself (Matthew 22:37-39): for this reason, for the human society, God's kingdom was the model, having to be followed by all imperfect human creatures, "your kingdom come, / your will be done / on earth as it is in heaven" (Matthew 6:10).

Starting from the pattern of *ideal*  $\rightarrow$  real in this well-known content example ("on earth as it is in Heaven"), the aim of this paper is *epistemological*.

However, before its deployment two still epistemological explicative notes must be added.

1. The above-mentioned contraries generated a "natural"/pre-philosophical dualism. Day and night etc. were simple and at hand appearances, their existence making easier credible the *myths* which *personified* them. But the *first philosophers* were interested in the foundation of the dual appearances, and this foundation could be but *one*: "The uncreated, indestructible reality of which these early thinkers tell us was a body, or even matter, if we choose to call it so; but it was not matter in the sense in which matter is opposed to spirit" (Burnet 1908, 16). In other words, for philosophers, the *abstract*<sup>4</sup> *principles* of movement and rest, of unity and diverse plurality had not yet a different (and opposite) site from that of the earthly movements and rests etc.: they did not yet know the Heavens and the Earth; everything was "earth", namely the *unique multi-faceted reality* that they had to understand: in the pragmatic manner that starts with the results – the world in its appearances – and arrives at the constitutive causes/principles, then stopping from professional interest at them.

Which were no longer personified, as in myths. They became abstract concepts., specific to philosophy.

2. Therefore, for humans the *relations* between the earth and the heaven were firstly of common appurtenance to nature and, actually, equally mysterious. Then, and as the earthly aspects became more and more intelligible, everything mysterious was transferred "outside", and where? in Heavens, the world of spirits. The mythical Gods were otherworldly creatures directing and explaining the world: and thus, the ritualic worship became a necessary habit of the humble humans. However, then, the philosophers "have transformed" the godly creatures into abstract principles: the worship disappeared, remaining the explaining power of wordsvectors of reason challenging the human intelligence.

And from now on, these words-vectors have become and structured a special Heaven: of *spiritual human creation*. What was/is its connection with the everyday early problems? Does this spiritual transfiguration correspond to the earthly problems it reflects? Do its suggestions please us, even though it is not a copy of our intentions? The *strict epistemological* direction and line of thinking – giving all sorts of materialism and idealism in the human worldviews – have developed just from this difference and separation between the Earth and the Heaven(s).

The other direction and line of thinking, issuing from the same difference and separation between the Earth and the Heaven(s) is *sociological*: giving to them – thus to their meanings linked to cognition – the supplementary meanings of asymmetric interhuman relations and definitely transforming the difference and separation into an eternal and unquestionable constitutive pattern of reality.

In fact, these lines of thinking were/are *interdependent*. And their evolution concerns the understanding of *relations* between the multifaceted different *orders* of things, as both "order" of words about things and "order" of things themselves. The present paper tends only to put a little order in the epistemology of the combination of lines of thinking about Earth and Heaven(s).

## Around the concept of order

The concept of *order* (Bazac 2023) has an "absolute" anthropomorphic fragrance: its criteria and features reflect our human points of view related to and depending on our concrete cognitive and social position in the world. This does not mean that order is only subjective, since once the criteria of analysis declared they can be scientifically verified (reproducibly measured) in the real world. However, this means that the easiest and most rapidly done definition of order we can give is the *negative* definition: how a state is *not* dis-ordered, how it is opposed to disorder. It's easy to understand why: because in the process of cognition, the humans have focused on a specific thing they were interested in and they "cut out" that thing from its surroundings, at the same time differentiating it (identifying it) from both these surroundings and opposite things in these surroundings.

If so, *order* is not *out of order*, that is, it is *not* defectiveness, corruption (in the etymological sense), scattering, confusion, waste, derangement in structures (damage, defectiveness) and spiritual states (trouble, anxiety, displeasure, annoyance, upset etc.).

Accordingly, order is both a *functional* and a *teleological* concept. It describes states which respond to the criteria of (stable) identity, permanence, endurance and fortitude of structures, at the same time corresponding to the aims and views of humans: the more so it specifies the realm it considers.

Here it takes over the meanings of the realm it describes. Therefore – as in the game sketched in this paper – the *order of Heaven(s)* is not tantamount to the *order of heaven*; it describes the meanings of the cultural metaphor *the Heaven(s)* that refers to the epistemological and sociological points of view about the cognitive-linguistic mediation of human actions and about the domination-submission pattern of the human relations, while the *order of the Earth* contains besides the order of human relations, the order of nature because it is sealed by the human relations.

Actually, the meanings of these concepts always contain – and the English expression *in order for* illustrates – their reason-to-be: always given by human points of view constituted from within the inter-human relations.

## Κόσμος as order, and as a good order

Yes, the mentioned *content example* ("on earth as it is in Heaven") was transposed by philosophy into a philosophical outlook given by abstract meanings of words:

• κόσμος<sup>5</sup>, introduced in philosophy by Anaxagoras and Anaximander, was for the *ancient Greeks*: *order*, good order, propriety/fairness, discipline, organisation and construction; (and from these, *order of the universe*, even the universe as such being thus κόσμος at Pythagoreans and all the philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle; κόσμος was the *material infinity of reality, given by Necessity controlled by Reason* (Plato 1925, 48a), while in Stoics, κόσμος was the soul of the universe (Bailly 2023, 1364) imposing order and meaning on the wholeness of the perishable matter).

Burnet, ibidem, 32: "The later word κόσμος bears witness to the growth of scientific ideas. It meant at first the marshalling of an army, and next the ordered constitution of a state. It was transferred from this to the world because in early days the regularity and constancy of human life was far more clearly seen than the uniformity of nature. Man lived in a charmed circle of law and custom, but the world around him still seemed lawless. That, too, is why, when the regular course of nature was first realised, no better word for it could be found than δίκη".

But why and how was κόσμος tantamount to order, more exactly, to good order?

A) First of all, the Universe or "the whole Heaven, or Cosmos" (Plato 1925, 27d), was an undetermined wholeness. As the surrounding existence is for the newborn. But the humans want to know because they want to give determinations, meanings to reality: otherwise, they cannot survive, live.

Consequently, they use their sensations and opinions based on sensations and arrive to the understanding of the materiality of  $\kappa \acute{o} \sigma \mu o \varsigma$ . And they continue to investigate these things, because they need this investigation precisely to live as humans, for without it they only react to the ephemeral as the animals do.

Thus/then, two lines of reasoning are constituted.

- (a) In non-philosophical thinking: By already being familiar with the idea of cause from their reactions to the material surroundings, they walk from cause to cause until the last one, that epistemologically "must be", the deity from/of things, Gods or God.
- (b) In philosophy: Their investigation of causes develops abstract concepts and reasoning from abstract concepts: they arrive to think the difference between the being of material things and this being proved to be permanent, despite the many material transformations (and they experienced this) and on the other hand, the process of becoming of material things, and thus of their being as such. Here, they are stuck by the incredible intuition of contradiction between the being and the becoming, just because the being as such has no beginning and remains stable despite the transformations of the material things, while the becoming means just that there is beginning and transformation. Once more, these extraordinary ideas occur related to the Universe, surpassing the analyses of concrete parts/t hings (Plato 1925, 27d and 48a).

And a similarly extraordinary idea competing with (a) or, rather, surpassing it, appeared: because Gods themselves had functions/reasons-to-be and these could be transformed into abstract concepts, at the level of abstract thinking the *causes* personified as Gods were no longer enough and they were devoid of the *persons* of Gods, the entire reasoning being now deployed – but without annulling the (a) line as such – at the level of *abstract concepts*, with them: "everything which becomes must of necessity become" (Plato 1925, 27d), Necessity and Reason becoming the abstract principles governing the strange result of the being-becoming mixture:

"this Cosmos in its origin was generated as a compound, from the combination of Necessity and Reason. And inasmuch as Reason was controlling Necessity by persuading her to conduct to the best end the most part of the things coming into existence, thus and thereby it came about, through Necessity yielding to intelligent persuasion, that this Universe of ours was being in this wise constructed at the beginning" (Plato 1925, 48a).

Actually, if the abstract concepts were constructed and arrived at and by the cognitive process, they were explained by Plato (and Aristotle) precisely in this way. The famous difference between *doxa/opinion* and *well-grounded cognisance* was made just in order to explain that

- § the material things can be understood via sensations generating, ultimately, efficient opinions for the everyday endeavour but "alterable by persuasion", not stable, not profoundly truthful partaking to "every man" (Plato 1925, 51e) but,
- § surpassing this imperfect knowledge grasping the transient, there are also the "objects of Reason only" (Plato 1925, 51d), "immovable by persuasion" (*ibidem*), just because they represent the grasping of the stable and permanent, the "being".

And if the objects of Reason/ their knowledge partake "only the Gods" and "a small class of men" — who, obviously, have opinions but moreover the science of analysis and penetration into the concatenation of causes and determinations — this means two things:

- Ø that this science can be learned by "every man", also because men (the wise ones, but they actually represent the humans as such with their latent capacities) can imitate the "godlike" patterns of thinking, arriving to the knowledge of stable essence from the ever-varying and unstable phenomena<sup>8</sup>;
- Ø and that through learning, the humans become able to discern between different types of persuasion: between the good one happened during learning, and the bad one based on interests outside of learning.
- B) So far, we saw that  $\kappa \acute{o} \sigma \mu o \varsigma$ , because it already was understood beyond its immediate material constitution, was *order*: reason (alone, Plato thought) is that which deploys the Universe and its understanding in a coherent, ordered way; through abstract causes which "must be" since the world looks the way it does

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> *Ibidem.* (But wasn't this manner to express the never-ending complexity of abstractly thinking the never totally fathomable reality, comparable to Kant's thing-in-itself?)

Ibidem, 51e. Here is the difference between Plato and Kant: in the latter, all men are able to think transcendentally (reasoning from abstract concepts all the way, and not only from empirical concepts), even though they have to be taught to exercise this faculty. Nevertheless, we do not know whether Plato just observed that in the ancient society only men devoted to contemplation and analysis can arrive to abstract theoretical knowledge or apodictically concluded that's how things are. Au fond, he showed that Meno's slave was able to discover correlations and to deduce conclusions because the mind itself is in a state of learning and "recollects" "true opinions" (Plato 1967, 86a).) Even though the example concerned geometry that was rather empirical. However, Plato added "he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge" (85e, underline added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Plato 1925, 47c: "by imitation of the absolutely unvarying revolutions of the God we might stabilize the variable revolutions within ourselves".

(causes "governed by Necessity") (so, if the ideal is such, the real must be such, too  $/ ideal \rightarrow real$ ); and, once more, order proven by the existence as such of  $\kappa \acute{o}\sigma \mu o \varsigma$  (so,  $real \rightarrow ideal$ ).

But on what basis would the Universe be good order? The presumption that the ideal as such is good leads us to speculation, and Plato felt this. Because the objective ideal (the Forms) may be absolute perfection, but the human knowing, even at the level of Reason, is only an imperfect means. Accordingly, not the simple abstract thinking of "objects of Reason" is good/leads to good, but the *determination* of these objects as "uniform", respecting the Forms/Ideas of uniformity, constancy and indestructibility, is/leads to good. In fact, the respect of these Forms/Ideas "must of necessity be beautiful" (Plato 1925, 28a and b). This beauty of the order of κόσμος gives it the quality of being good (ideal->real).

And this beauty of the cosmic order assures, in fact, that, on the one hand, we all can understand this – because men have seen "the stars or the sun or the heaven" and, concretely, the rhythms of their movements: and not only at the level of empirical knowledge, but also at the one of abstract notions as the number and Time, and thus, men passed from the empirical knowledge to the "means of research into the nature of the Universe" (Plato 1925, 47a), and to beholding "the revolutions of Reason in the Heaven and use them for the revolvings of the reasoning that is within us" (ibidem, 47b) (real-ideal).

And on the other hand, the beautiful order of  $\kappa \acute{o}\sigma \mu o\varsigma$  is the stake and model of our own endeavour to decipher its *meanings*: "by imitation of the absolutely unvarying revolutions of the God we might stabilize the variable revolutions within ourselves" (*ibidem*, 47c) (*ideal* $\rightarrow$ *real*).

We can compare, yet the realms are different. But if so, we must clearly specify the *ends*, *criteria* and *limits* of our comparison. And in this frame, we must be careful with the *language* we use: we must not multiply the words designing something (*ibidem*, 50c), and we must make accurate deductions as we specify the meanings of the words we use.

*Methodologically,* Gods are *personification* of causes/of explanations. *Concretely,* they are personification of *concrete* causes/moments/aspects/human forces of the understanding of the real.

## An ex-centric explanatory note of the *non-metaphorical* sense of κόσμος

Why ex-centric? Of course, because the perspective of this paper is epistemological – thus, about the conscious subjectively mediated meanings of things / the subjective/cognitive mediation of things – while the note reminds us the *independence* of things from this subjective detour.

As it is known, Heidegger was attentive to grasp how does the human search for the world. But if in this search the world does *appear* – and just this appearance is the ground of the meanings he, the human and we, the interpreters can arrive at – much more important is the first sense of this appearance: that the world *is* as basis of all grounds, that appearances and meanings are only secondary towards the fundamental Beingness, and result just in our clash with and within this Beingness.

And that philosophy – and more, the humans – must emphasise "the Primordial" (is my word)/Primary Substance (Burnet 1908, 13) that thus, is *independent* of the appearances which only they shine sending us meanings. The subject who questions the appearances is *sub-ject*, thrown *under* the Primordial *ob-ject* that is thrown to/in front of this *sub-ject*.

Accordingly, the first problem of philosophy is – and was, because philosophy separated itself and circumscribed from the mythical solving – *ontology*, namely, the question about and discussion of "the Primordial" *ob-ject*, the Being as such. Extracting the solving from the Pre-Socratics, Heidegger discovered that the Being meant the "immortal and ageless" (Burnet 1908, 12) φύσις – *the whole boundless* around us and encompassing us – and it was *tantamount* to *A-lētheia*, the permanent un-concealment of the the "primordial openness" that "does not do away with concealment; rather unconcealment is invariably in need of concealment" (Capobianco 2017, 315), thus of openness that always contains at the same time the "mystery" (let's use Blaga's term) of the two-way partiality of concealment and un-concealment. In front of this two-way partiality, were the Greeks the wonderful original children wondering of the world and being open to the world, respecting it (as Nietzsche and Marx observed).

Therefore,  $\phi \dot{\omega} \sigma_{i} \zeta$  is truth, truth is  $\phi \dot{\omega} \sigma_{i} \zeta$ , because what do the humans – via philosophy – understand and acknowledge is always depending on that which is given to them, and not only appearances, but also and basically as that which gives permanence to the given.

More: Being as φύσις and/or truth is not simply the given, but – obviously arising from but beyond the practical cosmological measurement – already the determined given: as ordered and ordering everything: κόσμος  $^9$ . Borrowing from the cosmological image, κόσμος is anterior to all meanings: "(it) is the 'measure' that is not made by us" (Capobianco 2017, 317), it is independent of the subject (Capobianco 216).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Burnet, *ibidem*, 32, note: "the term κόσμος seems to be Pythagorean in this sense. It was not familiar even at the beginning of the fourth century. Xenophon speaks of 'what the sophists call the κόσμος' " (Mem. i. 11)".

In the trail of Pre-Socratics, Heidegger's stance is the repudiation of "any human-centric position—including a strict transcendental-phenomenological position—that holds that Being 'is' only insofar as the human being is". (This means that "The later Heidegger is not a phenomenologist in this strict sense" (Capobianco 2017, *ibidem*). He is phenomenologist, I add, only in the accredited "existentialist" sense of deployment and understanding of the world as it appears to the "first person").

We can conclude: since for Heidegger "the subjectivism in the contemporary age has cut us off from our 'source', physis" (*ibidem*, 314) – *subjectivism*, that is not the Kantian subject-centred epistemological outlook, but the removal of human criteria from the world – then he substantiates in his habitual allusive manner that the ontological, objectivist perspective, *from the Earth to the Heaven of ideas*, is the first that put expressly the problem that man/ humankind is determined by the Being.

In this, he strengthened the Kantian warning: that the *epistemic mediation* – and thus, *limit* of the world – is not tantamount to the subjectivist ontological principle. The world is not our meanings but, on the contrary, our determining fate which we must observe: namely, to respect it. To what extend does this respect mean subordination to the order of social world or rather attentive inquiry of it is an open problem.

### The frame of different systems

Therefore, we see here the  $real \rightarrow ideal$  transposition, and then the meanings in the human world have become the meanings of a still real realm, but exterior to the human society and so far away from it, and that could serve as an all-comprising " $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$ ", not a simple "receptacle" or "nurse" of things which are perishable (Plato 1925, 27d) but, because of its everlasting and thus generative specificity, their matrix 10 and thus, the matrix of the human order.

However, and more – including because not long ago,  $\kappa \acute{o} \mu o \varsigma$  was filled with Gods – the universal order was a legitimating argument of the order between humans. Somehow as according to the *ideal* $\rightarrow$ *real* pattern of explanations.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, 50d and 50e: a substance devoid of all forms since it will receive all of them; 51a: called both according to the senses which perceive it as "Mother and Receptacle of this generated world" or "earth or air or fire or water, or any aggregates or constituents thereof", and according to our reason as "a Kind invisible and unshaped, all-receptive way of partaking to the intelligible"; clearer, it is (52a and b): "ever-existing Place, which admits not of destruction, and provides room for all things that have birth, itself being apprehensible by a kind of bastard reasoning by the aid of nonsensation, barely an object of belief".

Consequently, the epistemological problem raised by the content example of order on Earth as in Heaven is that of the peculiarity of *comparisons between* and *analogies of* two *different* types of systems.

#### What do comparison and analogy mean?

Here, *comparison* is the operation to put together two things, based on the supposition of some common features they would share. In principle, we can compare the most disparate /intuitively disparate things, the only condition to its validity being the clear specification of comparison *criteria*. Actually, comparison is one of the first cognitive strategies, because in order to know a new thing it was posited in front of the already known things. The meaning of the known was/is that it is legitimate, as "true", truthful, and the humans tried to understand the new unknown thing on the basis of the already legitimate, truthful ones.

The *result* of comparison does not always lead to the *legitimacy* of the comparison, because the two things prove to not meet the requirement of some common features according to the assumed criteria. But nevertheless, comparison leads to a larger knowledge about the new not yet known thing and about the already known one: that there are common peculiarities, but also *differentiae specificae*; that the specific traits make the thing to be known, but that they never exist "purely" but always covered by concrete and random veils and mixed with features common to other things; that there are many criteria to compare, according to the many different types of systems considered; and that the failure of a criterion to generate truthful knowledge does not lead and is not tantamount to ignorance/false knowledge according to other criteria. Comparison lies at the basis of cognitive creativity.

In its turn, *analogy* is either the already result of comparison, as *similarity* of things/systems considered, or it advances their supposed *similarity*. If comparison happens under the question mark, analogy is marked by certainty, by the apodictic point showing completion of judgements.

But in fact, both comparison and analogy are cognitive procedures *in progress*, related to other cognitive procedures and being only moments of the whole demarch to acquire knowledge of the things we focus on (Bazac 2025a and 2025b).

If so, comparison and analogy as defined above are *formal* cognitive frameworks and structures of thinking. They are – let's talk in Kant's terms – transcendental. They are abstract methodological frames/patterns which *we* can understand by judging from concepts (and not from experience, because experience gives always the concrete content) and which even exist in the cognitive architecture as a methodological abstract layer, helping the layer of logic.

[Indeed, Kant showed that this methodological – called transcendental/pure intellect – layer of reason was absolutely necessary, because without the *rules* given within it, the understanding of the information given by senses cannot occur (Kant 1998, 264 (B166)), namely, without which the experience as such is not possible, because the experience inherently involves thinking (*ibidem*, 224 (B126)).

The *rules* unfold as "principles of the possibility of experience" (*ibidem*, 265 (B168)), or conversely the principles are the rules of the objective use of categories (which are pure concepts of the understanding, applying to the objects of intuition (*ibidem*, 212 (A79/B105; 220 (B116)); and, knowing that the objects of intuition are the objects of experience, the principles are the rules of the objective use of categories applying to the objects of experience (*ibidem*, 254 (B146)). The principles as rules emphasise how "subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity" (*ibidem*, 222 (A90)), giving "unity in the synthesis of appearances" (*ibidem*, 282 (B196/A157)). And these principles as rules of thinking are: axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, *analogies of experience* and postulates of empirical thinking in general (*ibidem*, 285 (B200/A161)).

Concerning the analogies of experience, that interest us here, their principle is: "As regards their existence, all appearances stand *a priori* under rules of the determination of their relation to each other in *one* time"/ "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (*ibidem*, 295 (A176/B218) and 296 (B219)). The analogies as such "do not concern the appearances and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but merely their *existence* and their *relation* to one another with regard to this their existence" (*ibidem*, 297 (A178/B220)).

Analogies are qualitative relations of existence,

"an analogy of experience will therefore be only a rule in accordance with which unity of experience is to arise from perceptions (not as a perception itself, as empirical intuition in general), and as a principle it will not be valid of the objects (of the appearances) constitutively but merely regulatively" (ibidem, 298 (A180)).

And "these analogies have their sole significance and validity not as principles of the transcendental use of the understanding but merely as principles of its empirical use, hence they can be proven only as such; consequently, the appearances must not be subsumed under the categories per se, but only under their schemata" (*ibidem*, 298 (A180-A181/B 223)).

"These principles, therefore, justify us in compounding the appearances only in accord with an analogy with the logical and general unity of concepts, and hence in the principle itself we make use of the category, but in its execution (its application to appearances) we set its schema in its place, as the key to its use, or rather we set the latter alongside the former, as its restricting condition, under the name of its formula" (ibidem, 298 (A181/B224, p. 298))].

And thus, the picture of *formal* transitions from *real* $\rightarrow$ *ideal* and back, from *ideal* $\rightarrow$ *real*, and again  $\rightarrow$ *ideal*, in endless movements, is understandable and efficient. But *we cannot legitimise content analogies by the formal legitimacy of analogy as such*. In the concrete formula discussed here, the concept of order of Heaven is an *idealised real* (as a concept, it is the *ideal* that *covers* the richness and contradictory real state of both the *physical* Cosmos and the *mythical* one) that is prescribed to be the model of the *terrestrial real* that, in fact, itself conceived a so-called desirable model to follow. Actually, if the formal analogy is possible, legitimate, from the standpoint of contents, the analogy is *ab initio* considered as a metaphor, fuelled by "earthly" interests.

### Isn't this a joke?

The humans know the world through the mind's processing of the information provided by senses. Accordingly, it would seem that the trajectory is always from *ideal*→*real*. But, as Kant said, "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (*ibidem*, 193-194 (B75/A51)), and content is given by senses from reality: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding no object would be thought by us" (*ibidem*, 193). This means that from the standpoint of the *formal* cognitive process, we cannot reduce it to either of the two models (*real*→*ideal* and *ideal*→*real*).

But the two models refer to the *content* given by the cognitive process, and concretely, to the content arisen from or suggested by more than comparison, the analogy of necessary similarity of the earthly order with the celestial one. In the *content* cognitive process, not the *neuro-physiological*, psychological (Cassam 2019) and *formal epistemic* means and patterns are important, but the *meanings* arisen from analogy and from the role and weight of the compared systems.

In the well-known *dominant* message, the order of Heaven(s) is the model, it is mandatory because it is supposed to be the best, and thus the profane order must copy it. The order of Heaven is like a Plato's Idea: it is perfect/represent perfection, and the worldly order has only the choice to copy it if it wants not to fade away (becoming dis-order, in other words, anarchy). Therefore, from the standpoint of *content*, the dominant message doesn't suppose the physiological

and epistemological formal versant *real* $\rightarrow$ *ideal*; it begins directly with the precedence and primacy of the *ideal* $\rightarrow$ *real* versant. The two *loci* of order, Heaven and Earth, can be compared and are compared in terms of the order that must be similar. The Earth must copy the heavenly order, and thus its order arrives to be similar to its transmundane model.

Once more, the two types of order are of different order. The known order/order as it is known is not tantamount to the real order. The first – the known order – is the tableau of words and images: and it strongly interferes with and influences the real<sup>11</sup>. When expressed as order as it is known, this known order arrives to even change the Heaven of the rational traditional meanings until now assumed both officially and really by the majority of humans. The feelings, emotions, beliefs, intentions, anticipations were articulated according to experience and generated experience precisely through articulation. In this process, the order – logical, necessary and pleasant, desired – was the universal value: "the struggle for justice is universal, and meaning comes from committing to that struggle, whatever the costs, with no exceptions" (Glazebrook 2025). When this universal order is destroyed, destruction is a war against human meaning.

Actually, there is never a unilateral direction from words to the real, but always a *two-way relation between them, complicated by feedbacks*: for example, the real geopolitical relations and positions change and thus, also their geopolitical articulation.

"The world that existed in 1991-2022 does not exist anymore. It's not coming back. You can just invade your neighbor. You can just fire missiles at international shipping lanes. You can just threaten to annex members of your military alliance. 'You can just do things', as the techbros like to say. The mirage of a post-historical order that only has to be policed from time to time but is never seriously challenged has disappeared. What did you think cancelling the End of History meant?" (https://x.com/RWApodcast/status/1877120997427654660).

As a result, the dominant ideological ideas change too: they are no longer the *universalism* that tempered the power asymmetry, and not even democracy and human rights, since neither the form is the same, and it is not respected anymore, but the "sovereign" right to attack, the *individual and group survivalism*. Well, letting

See for instance the power of words – functioning as *fulfilling prophecies*, both individually and socially. (Bargh, Chen, Burrows 1996. The words become memes, but they are advanced in asymmetrical social relations and thus they need to be rationally analysed with arguments all the way; otherwise, their creation, circulation and evaluation deviate from their reason-to-be. (Medish 2025).

aside this rather abstract expression, we nevertheless can mention that now it's about the system crisis phase of capitalism in new geopolitical conditions (see only Pacini 2025), and an open aspect of the old relations and language (Blinken 1987): the present dis-order continues the traditional dis-order in only relatively new forms, but in incredibly savage contents.

#### Science intervenes

However, and despite the power of the word(s), the humans arrive to consider them with circumspection. They turn the words upside down, extract the concepts and judgements and try to see their consistency, their internal logical proof. But this procedure proves to not being sufficient and thus, they go *beyond words, into reality*. They decompose it according to the Aristotelian causes, and its objective characteristic begins to shake the "no alternative to the Word" promoted by the dominant message.

Actually, the rationalist verification took place only with the help of the scientific outlook of objective causes, and the words – "theories" based on concepts and judgements – became thus similarly objectively given, necessarily decomposed in the same scientific manner as nature. In this manner, the rationalist inquiry of concepts and judgements was not a superfluous repetition of "tautologies", and science and rationalism became really complementary, surpassing the autonomously regarded language-centred functions and relations. (Even though not in the endless philosophical quarrels outside a dialectical holism that nevertheless seems to become today prevalent sans le dire; although this dialectical holism is not devoid of partisan attacks promoting different types of particularisms).

Science used comparisons and analogies, of course, but they should not be superficial, as Hegel warned, because in this way the disclosure of causes abandons the verification *all the way*. And in the case of this superficial deviation, to it a formalist speculative interpretation corresponded: that later was opposed by science and the philosophy of dialectical holism founded in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as dialectical historical materialism.

Science used forms to understand contents, and its object was precisely the contents. Philosophy – that considered theories – used forms to understand the formal aspect of theories, and its object was precisely the forms of theories. For this reason, science treats the order of heavens like any object, scientifically (Azhar and Butterfield 2018), emphasising the causes and historicity of this order, and the biunivocal relationship between the subjects of the theory of order of heavens and the theory as such. Philosophy could but follow science, and thus the command that

the earthly order follows the heavenly order can be interpreted both *epistemologically* and *historically-socially*.

### The meanings

If in the *formal* cognitive process both the real and the ideal have each of them only one meaning – *the real* being the real world of experience and *the ideal* being the ideas about it, and concretely, the Heaven being the ideal/mental construction of perfection and, obviously, the world being the real world of experience and not the cold inanimate cosmos – in the *content* cognitive process things are more complicated.

Because the humans have discovered new and new meanings related to new and new experience, they did not only construct new words but also transferred the new meanings to the existing words. In this way, the *literal* and *figurative* meanings appeared:

- Ø the *first*, explanatory and exact, denoting in the main the object to which the speaker(s) referred to habitually, and also another object to which secondarily the speaker(s) arrived to refer habitually and thus the connotative sense from the second literal use of the word arriving to become a denotative sense that formerly belonged only to the first literal use of the word; but the connotative sense, including in its becoming denotative, appears only in relation with other (non-problematic) objects <sup>12</sup> and
- Ø the *second*, suggesting an object with words which designate other objects, thus *comparing* them *as if* showing that they are similar; but the words designating other objects are not even similar but emphasise a "colour"/
- $\varnothing$  rather nuance of the intended object, which misses in the literal use of words for this object.

And the humans arrived to use all of these meanings without confusing them and with an ever-greater pleasure. But the use of words takes place in judgements/ arguments/discourse (speech acts) which put face to face the emitter and the receiver, and thus the literal and figurative meanings were developed according to the levels of intentions and cognitive elements comprised in judgements and discourses. In this way, the levels of intentions – thus, of meanings – are according to the emitter and the receiver, and they coexist, just opposite to the literal and figurative meanings which are mutually exclusive.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Literal: eye; eye of the cyclone.

The meanings according to intentions are: the *locutionary*, "constative" (Austin 2005, 3), descriptive, ostensible, and thus *literal* meaning; the *illocutionary*, that is not a simple neutral *figurative* meaning, but involves a distortion of the locutionary<sup>13</sup>, promoting the speaker's *intention* to suggest his/her meanings apart from the literal ones, thus giving them new truth values but covering the speaker's intention; and there is also the *perlocutionary* meaning, that which is the (may be unintended) *effect* on the listener, so external to the performance of an utterance.

And sometimes or even many times, the illocutionary meaning reflecting the intentions of the *emitter* is denied by the perlocutionary one: this denial gives a new, awakened meaning resulted from the divergence between the exposed locutionary meaning which is, in fact, perlocutionary, and the reality known by the *listeners*.

This happens because the speaker does not take responsibility for the holding of the conditions of his intentions: if the perlocutionary meaning exudes insincerity, it is because the speaker does not subordinate his/her sentence to the illocutionary rule (Alston 2000) of correspondence between reality and his intention to depict this reality according to his/her views. If a politician, for example, invites to be voted because he/she is the only one who could lead the country toward a good evolution, but his/her entire political activity denies this illocutionary meaning, the perlocutionary effect is quite opposite to the illocutionary meaning (which is a directive speech act, suggesting and requesting and ordering).

Concretely, the formula of the two different orders – that of Heaven(s) and that of Earth – provides a complex set of meanings, and not a simple locutionary one: yes, we, readers or listeners, must be aware of the simple *locutionary* meaning of the formula, that the model of the terrestrial social order is/must be that of the Heavenly order; so, from *imagined ideal* (and not from ideal as the objective mental construction as selective reproduction of and from the real)  $\rightarrow$  real. But just the utterance as such discloses that the imagined ideal is *subjective* in two senses:

- the one of a *speculative and hidden* order of the Heavens as a valuable/desirable model for the human social order: on behalf of the *creators* of the formula;
- and the one of an *irreal* Heavenly order as an absurd proposition to humans, because "the Heaven" has countless contradictions and problems both in the *mythology* of quarrels of gods etc. And we, readers or listeners, know that these divine quarrels etc. are narratives (ideal transpositions) of mundane social relations and in the *reality* of a cosmos that is not the welcoming home that provides endless comfort to the human beings which pollute, waste, exploit it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> There is a "difference between saying something and meaning it and saying it without meaning it", (Searle 1969, 3).

The *perlocutionary* sense of the formula – just opposite to the illocutionary sense of the intentions of speakers – transforms the imposed locutionary expression into a bombastic, ridiculous and outmoded pronouncement. And the scientific analysis, preserving it as an element of history and culture, reverses it and gives it a metaphorical use: from the *real* Earth when the anthropogenic waste and disorder is removed  $\rightarrow$  the *real* Cosmos considered in the same responsible manner. And both the mental ideal and the imagined one serve this new relation whose demiurge is no longer situated in Heavens but on the dusty Earth.

#### The logical non-correspondence

The Heavenly order as more than a model for the untrustworthy humans, as a "kingdom" encompassing the subjects in a mesh of dependencies and promises, had the logical function of *explanans* for the uncertain human settlement always shaken by unforeseeable actions, thus for what had to be put in order, namely, be explained: for the *explanandum*. But although the *logical* scheme is *explanans explanandum* (because...there is.../we have...), the *pragmatic* field may well impose reversals: as here, from *explanandum* – that which eventually explicates (the heavenly order) – to *explanans*, that which has to be explained.

Thus, here *explanandum* is the premise: but not of a deduction that follows from it. The prescriptive formula – *order on Earth as the order in Heavens* – is not, or at least not directly, an explanation. *The apodictic propositions involve the value of truth.* Or, here the value is *not* truth, it is not resulting from the logical form. The prescriptive formula is wrapped in normative – and, through repetition – imperative propositions, denoting a *command* transfigured as a *desire*, as an ardent *aspiration*. Their value is more than the *possible* (Lukasiewicz 1930, 53), it is the non-Aristotelian – thus, *non-demonstrable* – *necessity*. This value does not result from an analytical deontic logic, but from an assertion of a will, from a judgement of this will. The prescriptive formula – the conclusion in Matthew 6:10<sup>14</sup> – does not result from the theses asserting the will. Thus, the value is indeterminate, the simple expression of the will. Linguistically, this expression involves both the subjunctive and the imperative moods, they once more showing that it's not about truth/false, thus not about explanation.

Accordingly, even though in the logical scheme of the prescriptive formula the order is reversed (*explanandum*  $\rightarrow$  *explanans*) towards the logical scheme of the normal apodictic propositions (*explanans*  $\rightarrow$  *explandum*), the entire fragment dissolves the logical scheme of relationship between that which explains and that which has to be explained. "The order of Heavens must be the order of the Earth. Why? Because we wish".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> "your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven".

#### Let's put order

Until now.

- 1) We have the *formal* schemes of relations between the ideal and the real, according to the intuited meanings of the Heavens (the ideal) and the Earth (the real): consequently, we distinguish between the *formal* schemes and the *content* example (the relation between the Heavens and the Earth), but we relate them (actually, our discussion started from the content example decomposed as above)
- 2) We understand that the relations between the real and the ideal involve these relations between different types of systems, but *formally*, always the real and the ideal have each time only one meaning given by the criterion specified when taking the systems we relate
- 3) For the content example, we add a concrete reference to cosmos as order, as a basis for the formal patterns of the ideal and the real
- 4) We have the epistemological meanings of the ideal as a *cognitive* transfiguration of the real: both at the level of concepts as the ideal level, and at the concrete level of Heavens as an idealised concept
- 5) We mention that to this cognitive processing and reproduction, different figures of speech correspond and especially comparison and analogy
- 6) The model function is formalised in the two patterns (*ideal→real, real→ideal*) which are two interrelated versants of the relations between the real and the ideal
- 7) The model function applies to the content example(s), and *from the content standpoint*, the model involves each time many meanings of the real and the ideal
- 8) We have the historical/cultural explanation of the real, and also of the precedence of the real towards the ideal (the precedence of the real historical human subjects towards their ideal constructions)
- 9) But also, we have the *concomitant* independence and precedence of the ideal constructions towards the real world of humans
- 10) We have thus the (dialectical/tense) correspondence concerning the two related lines of problems: between the ideal and the real, and between the order of Heavens and the order of the Earth
- 11) We have the logical non-correspondence of the order of Heavens and the order of the Earth.

Therefore, we pointed the real and the ideal, and respectively, the order of Heavens and the order of the Earth mutual relationships at *conceptual* [metaphysical (distinguishing the form and the content), epistemological, logical, linguistical, historical] level. This level constitutively supposes that, with all the strong process of independence and precedence of concepts, not they are the subject positing their different places and meanings, but are the creature of the real subject, the humans.

As we know from philosophy, knowing is determination of things. The above-mentioned aspects of the conceptual level shed light on the *relationships* which, as we also know, are the ultimate determinants of things.

## Do not forget

However, before coming closer to conclusions, let's stop a moment on the *ontic* level of technical relations as "matter-to-matter" connection.

#### 1) Earth-heaven connections

The GPS/ Global Positioning System is a connection – through radio waves – between satellites and ground stations, and is based on Earth-centred location solution. And it confuses us concerning the priority in earth-heaven relations: on the one hand, satellites are man-made earthly objects, but on the other hand, the direction of transmission is from satellites/heaven to Earth. The order is given, nevertheless, by the Earth, by calculating the time between the transmission of the signals (with their data of position and time) to their reception in the ground stations, and according to this by calculating the four-dimensions positions of the GPS users: on Earth.

Via satellites – a detour in the heavens – people can *localise* their own positions within a space that is either unknown, because Terra is large enough for little vulnerable beings, or too fragmented to be known by everyone. Of course, in a dry post-modern managerial expression, the quest for localisation reflects the need for security, efficacy, and intensification of one own's existence (Razac 2005). And obviously, the amazing technology of space and time control can make more vulnerable the beings who use it as their own prosthetic organs. And thus, these beings become they themselves objects of control: "the desire for security is also a desire to localise disturbing desires... the desire to be localised requires the localisation of desires" (ibidem, 383) and people cannot resist. They can't run away. There is no "extraterritoriality" (Jeanpierre 2005) that is anyway a juridical fiction, even though the movement, the shift, the displacement might have uncomfortable consequences and significances for the controllers.

There is rather a unidirectional manner to approach even the distant objects from cosmos: that from the Earth, making them virtually present (Bazac 2022).

## 2) Redefining from heavens the order of the Earth

Opposed to the supposed continuation of the social Heavens command on the earthly problems, this short note emphasises only the top-down material influence of the cosmic order on the subordinated material organisation on Earth. And not the well-known old human orientation according to stars (to the North Star) is mentioned, but an apparently strange orientation of inferior animals. The Bogong moths in Australia seasonally *migrate* from the hot summer southeast to the Australian Alpes – and in autumn return – with the help of a "compass" already written in their genes and that is genetically instructed by the starry night sky as a pattern of sky orientation. However, it's true that the command of stars converged with the earthy magnetic field: the pattern proved to be a mixture of top-down and bottom-up influences (Dreyer et al. 2025).

The metaphorical use of (correspondence between) the order of the Heaven(s) and the order of the Earth

There are quite enough metaphorical uses of our motif, the correspondence between the two types of order. Let's see some of them.

1) From a juridical point of view – reflecting and reading the capitalist point of view – the "cosmic justice" means a justice that would be *universalisable*, but since on Earth there is no such thing, we must apply only a justice that considers all members of society *formally* equal (this is equality before the law). So, the historical injustices are only conditions, not direct efficient causes of facts which are sanctioned by the law.

The earthly justice, some ones consider, forbids "putting particular segments of society in the position that they would have been in but for some undeserved misfortune they are not" (Sowell 1996, 15).

However, the principles of the modern law as such do not exclude social reforms to correct the "undeserved misfortune". Of course, today the positive discrimination of some groups in college admissions is absurd, but also the fact that pizza is not delivered in some dangerous neighbourhoods. No one is excepted from exams of college admissions, and from the standpoint of the owner of the pizza shop, it's normal to not accept delivery in places where the personnel could be

harmed. But would it not be better to *prevent* these situations by assuring high quality education and social messages to all the candidates to admission, and decent social conditions to all neighbourhoods?

The universalisability of principles of justice reflects the spirit of justice of the human mind, but they are not absurd. If they are only 200 life preservers when a boat with 300 passengers is sinking, the just solution is yes, unfortunately those who have no life jackets will die, but the life jackets have to be used by the 200 people. Because the universalisability of justice involves the least loss, the least harm. On the contrary, the quoted author's perspective is that of justice in a minimal state that assures through a formal equality before the law, the perpetuation of injustices. This is why he gives the above-mentioned examples, and no other ones, graver. But the content cannot be legitimated with the formal/legitimacy of the formal.

2) The impassable distance between the humans' genetic limit to know "in real time the significance of the time we happen to be living in" (Medish 2025) and the idea that this significance exists and can be known: and thus, dealt with.

Here, outside the order put by humans – because knowledge is order, moreover it is its basis – there is nothing. There are no Heavens which would assure the comprehensiveness of the time in its deep holistic meaning. And thus, in order to manage their life in the big context comprising them as an *an sich* space – about which, being a "thing-in-itself", one can say nothing, as Kant demonstrated – people have only "metaphors": which, because of their inherent selectivity and despite their realism and ability to signify more than their direct locutionary expression, "are grossly over-written and over-determined relative to the complexity and contingency of what we should know is out there. They become dogma" (*ibidem*). Clearer, the different outlooks materialised in conceptions about the ordering of the entire world become rather corsets imposing the only fashionable truth.

It seems that we are destined to have "limited thoughts" because of their constitutive contradiction between the intention to refer to an encompassing domain, inevitably vague because of its scale and, on the other hand, the expression/conception that inevitably reduces/selects according to the inherent points of view (Priest 1995); fragmentariness is, therefore, the feature of thoughts, because otherwise they simply cannot deploy/cannot be expressed (Priest 2023), but in this way the domain intended is different (ineffable) from the conception that, effable, nevertheless is part of or rather approaches us to and familiarise us with the domain.

However, beyond that cognitive and logical contradiction – *sine qua non* for the scrutiny of the consistency of theories – there are the ontic determinants / social conditions of their coherence. These determinants explain that the shortcomings

in the communication process and its epistemology, observed in 1980<sup>15</sup>, were not corrected in fact, and that even today the "many voices" of the Earth tend to be reduces to the one voice of "the Heaven".

Obviously, we cannot forget the *ontic* determinants – the power relations, namely, the class domination-submission relations – which give a very contradictory image of the principle of free elections coexisting with the insidious but also visible brutal interference within them.

Therefore, the Heaven(s) of thinking is not tantamount to the Heaven(s) of taboo decisions of the powerful. To equate the "antinomies of reason" – both in the Kantian precise meaning 16 and also as a metaphor for the ideal Heaven of the thought, of the untouchable life of words, language and the ideal entities created by our mind – with the social contradictions means to *embrace the moral relativism* in the name of gnoseological and ontic relativism. It means to swim in an ocean of paradoxes and to save ourselves only by climbing on alternate planks which, coexisting, disturb each other and that the solution would be the destruction of those which are weaker than "we who are successful" (implying that "since only the successful are representatives of the humankind").

# Order as *telos*: the metaphorical Heaven and the metaphorical Earth deviate the *telos* of order

Our representation of the order of things cannot ignore that the origin of order is the *human subject*: in its plural, multitude guise of *human species*. Otherwise, there are only *relations* and *processes* determined by physical, chemical and biological forces. But *harmony*, *symmetry*, *cadence/regularity/repeatability*, *rhythm*, thus *coherence* and *predictability* are grasped and *conceptualised* by humans. The  $\kappa \acute{o} \sigma \mu o \varsigma$  is, indeed, *human-made*<sup>17</sup>.

International Commission.... 1981. See the General comments (Sergei Losev, 279-280; Mustapha Masmoudi, 280-281; Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Juan Somavia, 281).

These antinomies consist in the disproportion between *reason*, as ability to think the dialectical complexity of things, and *the intellect* that grasps only the formal, the inherently abstract in empirical appearances. The cunning thinking "solves" this disproportion by the extension of categories: let's say of concepts, so annulling *la propriété des mots*, the correct denomination of things according to their real existence and meanings resulted from the relationships with other things.

As a part of the title of a work of contemporary art that emphasizes the correspondence between the human-made "micro-cosmos" and the real cosmos: Tudor Pătrașcu (1979), Untitled (Homemade Cosmos), from the series Walls, Breath, Words, produced in the expositional project Virus Diary, initiated by Dan Perjovschi at White Cuib (2), 2020. "The work consists of the photographic documentation of a temporary intervention carried out in the space of my home. On a black circular

If so, and with all the real and metaphorical mediations, the humans create the *relations* between all the types of order. Thus, all types of "heavenly" order arise from the human "Earth".

Actually, just this direction of all the relations between types of order is the *telos* of all these relations: "order is for humans, by the humans" <sup>18</sup>.

But since the human "Earth" includes the Heaven(s) of those who master the decisions on both the Earth, the heaven and the relations between all these decisions, their ground and the receivers made dependent on, would the anterior formula not be too general, thus irrelevant?

Let's see.

If the *spiritual* Heaven of articulated mediation of human relations is reduced to "words, words," – which are considered to be so relative that they dislocate any basis and criterion – then it itself is destroyed. And thus, only the "brutalist" Heaven of commands from the Up – as the Only Truth – to the slaves from the Bottom remains.

So what? Is there a demonstrated basis of the critique of domination of Heaven(s) on Earth? There is. Long time ago, continuing the voices of Greek rational empiricists Plato – yes, Plato – and Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo 19 has indicated that only if the Heaven is God – namely, the whole of infinite reason and sentiments of benevolence, fondness, compassion and help – is it the origin, keystone and light of and for a valuable and human existence. Thus, it depends on which Heaven do we consider: we must be cautious in our human choice of Heavens. The Heaven is the "siege" of moral and affective principles without which there is no humaneness and humankind: we remember the ancients' "good order": not as a cold astronomical cosmos full of cosmical objects, but as the ordered  $\kappa \acute{o} \sigma \mu o \varsigma$  as "the best" for existence as such.

Concretely, and Augustine of Hippo drew attention on an old and permanent worry, the divine Heaven generates both the different human *loves* – like the love between man and woman – since the essence / pleasure and ultimate reason-to-be of the human life is love, and the human *love* for Him, that is, *for the good/the moral principles* He represents. The old and permanent worry is how to equipoise

support are arranged various types of pharmaceutical tablets which, as a whole, create a structure that can be perceived as a representation of the cosmos. This approach speaks about the anxieties of the present, using as working material readymade products of scientific research in the field of pharmacy", https://www.facebook.com/muzeulparvan/posts/observatorexpozi%C5%A3ie-de-art%C4%83-contemporan%C4%83-curatoriat%C4%83-de-florin-bobu-delia-bulgar/909093834595664/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The formula is paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln's description of democracy ("government of the people, by the people, for the people") in his *Gettysburg Address*, November 19, 1863.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Saint Augustine. MDCCCLXXI, 92: "So that it seems to me that it is a brief but true definition of virtue to say, it is the order of love".

the two: the gentleness, ardour and trouble of earthly feelings – without which the humans are not complete – and the unwavering righteousness following the moral principles.

Well, Saint Augustine showed that the two types of emotions do not exclude each other and, more, the emotions of earthly love can be controlled. The ancient Greeks spoke about the human *reason* that can control the appetites and feelings, allowing the development of *virtuous* attitudes towards life (Heraclitus, Epicurus, Plato, Aristotle). And later on, Kant demonstrated how *reason*, indeed, can direct the human sentiments because it is able to arrive to the moral principle of not treating others only as means but always also as ends: and thus, it is able to put feelings to accommodate to this principle.

In his turn, the Bishop of Numidia Cirtensis knew that the humans have the ability to feel both their complex sentiments and their consciousness' warning about what is right and what is wrong. And in order to fit these two types of torments, God gives them the *order of loves*. Their *virtue* becomes to respect the order of loves/ *ordo amoris* (Sancti Aurelii Augustini, 107).

Actually, God is order - as infinite reason – and love: thus, order = love, and love = order. And this two-way equivalence shows that the humans – "sons of God" – can have an ordered love<sup>20</sup>, because without order – as reason – not that the humans are not complete, but they are not humans at all.

So, Heaven is the moral order, the moral *principles* – which are fundamental causes of human thinking and acting – not words devoid of any ground and emitted from the top as the Single Truth.

But do not forget: the moral order involves the concrete sentiments, it is interdependent with them, and thus this human and coloured moral constructs the trail for the development of good sentiments, goodwill, cooperation, sympathy, responsibility, and empathy.

This full of love "good order" is, au fond, the *telos* of human actions. Otherwise, *what for* the human life?

For our topic, God is a symbol and we all must explain symbols in order to understand the human life.

Let's add: as it is known, already in ancient plays, when the plot – necessarily expressing contradictions – arrived to a climax, when it seems that there would not be any possible exit from the clew of qui pro quos, a *deus ex machina* appeared, a god or unexpected personage, restoring the good order: not destructing it, as it would have occurred without this "extra-terrestrial entity". *Deus ex machina* is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Saint Augustine, *ibidem*: "love itself is to be ordinately loved, because we do well to love that which, when we love it, makes us live well and virtuously".

symbol for happy events, meeting the human needs of happiness in good human environments. Therefore, the good deity bringing only goodness was the original Heaven and the symbol of the human *telos*. While the Earth was the symbol of real human problems, sometimes even determined but anyway worsened by fake words and absurd commands of absurd leaderships.

#### Instead of conclusions

This paper shed light on the relationships between the Heaven(s) and the Earth in the metaphorical meanings of these two denominations of structures. The Heaven(s) themselves illustrate two metaphorical meanings: of the mediation of words as articulated symbols of the autonomy of this mediation in the human relationships with their human and non-human environment; and of the rulers' domination on the ruled. The rapid analysis of the relations between the three metaphorical meanings in their feedback loops showed if is there a correspondence between the structures viewed metaphorically, and what kinds of correspondence.

The *telos* of these relations is indeed the human measure (*juste mesure*) of the good, that is the good life. Accordingly: the human measure of good life of *every human being*, because otherwise – in epistemological, and not moral analysis – the good life would not be a *standard measure*, avoiding the excesses and deficiencies<sup>21</sup>. The Earth symbolises just the *telos* of good life of every human being, opposite to both the Heaven of sovereign and autonomous domination of the intangible words and their messages, and the Heaven of sovereign and autonomous contemptuous domination of human groups over the human species.

Consequently, it results that the Earth must be the criterion of relations with the Heavens in both the above-mentioned metaphorical meanings. As the Criterion, the Earth is able to erase the deviated meanings of Heavens<sup>22</sup>. And this implies, first of all, the critique of Heavens, of *their* "Good" <sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The criterion of standard measure/standard mean or, in our modern terms, the criterion, avoiding the excess and the deficiency in Plato. 1921, 283e-284d.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> "Heaven is not a future reward, but the act of doing good today" (White, 2024). Not reducing the good to compassion, but developing it as encompassing criterion of actions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> "The most insane thing about our efficiency-loving world is its prodigious inefficiency" (Rey. 2014).

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#### Artwork

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