

The “Philosophical Objects” Project: Practical Philosophy Through Experimental Research Pathways

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ABSTRACT. The «Philosophical Objects» (PhOs) project concerns the organization of a research procedure where the basic paradoxical problem refers to the possibility of determining an object as philosophical. Through this effort, it is not only a philosophy of object that is at stake but also a conception about the determination itself of philosophical in function of its possible relation to the object. Moreover, it is progressively disclosed how such a project could be recognized as genuinely related to practical philosophy if the latter is interested in exploring the modes through which philosophy can encounter nonphilosophical ways of thinking and acting by thus revealing its practical potency and its experimental character.

Keywords: “Philosophical Objects” (PhO), object, practical philosophy, experimental concept, research

Emerge, discover, create, transform

The «Philosophical Objects» (PhOs)¹ project concerns the organization of a research procedure in which the basic paradoxical problem refers to the possibility of determining an object as philosophical, the subsequent re-conceptualisation of the object itself, the modalities of an object to be apprehended as philosophical, and

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the possible philosophical quality to be associated/interwoven with the concept and the modes of such an object.

As slowly the objects emerge unfolding enigmatically their world, across conceptual cuts and seams and construction efforts, perplexities and weaknesses are also discovered (if PhO is not but a probationary, not pre-established, recognizable, rather non existing but imaginable entity-as long as its principles, presuppositions, restrictions, characteristics are progressively molded). Nevertheless, this very entity as *a priori* attributed with the name of philosophical, by this very act of naming, is unescapably invited to prove the features carried by this particular attribution; so, the PhO, is, from scratch, a problem and an exercise that because of its main constituent concepts (philosophical & object) it refers to a philosophical process which is not about creating, representing, translating a concept to an object (and vice versa) or about materializing the abstract or producing an art object. It is instead about the disclosure of an experimental intermediary zone between the concept and a material which establishes its own world unreachable by the same subject who lies behind this procedure. Finally, both subject and object seem to always be in retreat. The philosophical uncertainty creates a fluid within which objects and subjects glide –the PhOs seem like encrypted, hidden entities. The method issue here becomes an internal, even innate, constituent of the philosophical activity– that is, this latter goes along with or through its method, it is its method or, inversely, its method and methodology cannot but be the way of this activity to be philosophical.

On an initiatory level, its aim would be a certain sensibilization to the recognition of the philosophical element through its probable appearances or disappearances, manifestations or deviations (in the way of an experimental² attentive formation itinerary). The PhO are proposed as a mode of existence, a gesture of establishment and deinstallation of (something like an) an object interwoven with the thinking that it arises it– even if this is not about objects that are given, definitive, as part of a material culture, nor the provocative manifestation of a concept or the deficient materialization of a conceptual nucleus, not even corresponding to any pre-defined, exemplary figure. In contrast, they are not proposed (or they propose not themselves) as the confirmation of a truth (that the spectator/audience/interlocutor should discover, reconstruct, confirm within a symphonic sharing of multiple points of view).

² Cf. the Foucauldian sense of experimentation, «from which one comes out trans-formed» in order not to think in the same way as before, contrary to a theoretician's attitude who wants to build «a general system either [...] of deduction or of analysis in order to apply it uniformly to different fields» (Foucault, 1994, 41, 42).

Moreover, the project, as it develops since 2015, includes, as a substantial moment of it, the organization of an event of exhibition through a particular philosophical curating, which consists in the dynamic depiction of the creation/construction/invention of new objects or the modification/transfiguration of objects already existing³, which henceforth will have the possibility to be determined /put forward and mainly questioned as 'philosophical objects'⁴, from the conception of the object to the investigation and then its realization as exhibit, from the collective reflection and the exchange of comments within the research group to the development of ideas, from the reading of texts to the discussions, from the exhibition to a sort of philosophical metacognitive relaunch leading to a re-conception of the whole itinerary so far in function of the initial aim and intermediary synergies (even more if the objective of the exhibition of 'objects' could not prejudge nor the final exhibition could validate an affirmative position in relation to the initial questions of research).

Thus, by selecting, developing, making present, creating, fabricating an object (objectum, ob+iacere, αντι-κείμενον), precisely, at the same time, as an object (as appearing or conceived) and as a PhO as well, because it is produced, lying hereafter in front of us, in this very perspective, we would like to restate every time the question of a strong, but not definitive, understanding of the philosophical itself, in a modality, primarily, operational, through numerous attempts. Even more, for these reasons, to propose a follow-up of gestures developing an experimental course of practical philosophy⁵.

³ Could possibly the PhOs be transported and exhibited again, elsewhere and otherwise, as PhOs or simply as objects (without any specific quality or aim) or even could be reconstructed as other PhOs, but equally be disappeared (as not having any more a reason of existence) or destroyed aftermath exhibition, or archived as traces? Because being an object, «means that it is standing in front of us, only because it is observable: situated, that is to say, directly under our hand or gaze, indivisibly overthrown and re-integrated with every movement they make. Otherwise, it would be true like an idea and not present like a thing. It is particularly true that an object is an object only in so far as it can be moved away from me, and ultimately disappear from my field of vision. Its presence is such that it entails a possible absence» (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, 103).

⁴ The signs surrounding this word (simple English inverted commas with an elevated comma) are intended in a way to raise them slightly at both ends, as if by two little ties, to make them stand out, to raise them a little above the text or the act, to give them a fleeting visibility. It's not a question of emphasis or highlighting, but rather a gesture of tact that pulls the word towards a light accentuation that can always escape attention. It's a gesture analogous to an unaccented beat. It is just a way to re-mark the entity of the 'philosophical object' vis-à-vis or within the world of possible objects (but also, internally, the 'philosophical' itself vis-à-vis the possible philosophical entities or the other possible determinations of an object and the 'object', related as it is to the determination of philosophical, vis-à-vis the 'non-philosophical' objects), in a move upward or of detachment: it is an «as if», an unfinished step, hesitantly and perhaps ironically emerged.

⁵ For the theoretical frame and methodology of this project, s. Théodoropoulou, 2019 and 2020b.

Hence, the aim is to create, invent, highlight or recreate, modify or transform an object capable of being perceived/recognized as philosophical, to make visible⁶ the philosophical dimension of it (an endeavor though which it constitutes also a basic philosophical question). More conventionally, one could supposedly think about the existence of a PhO, each time when philosophy transforms its object of interest to something to what it wants to concentrate its attention and reflect more systematically about it (thus, we could say that a PhO is, for example, any concept that a philosopher creates or elaborates in a philosophical way). In fact, this specific attention refers to (or presupposes) the existence of a gaze which would be philosophical, willful and capable to recognize and define each time an object as philosophical.

Moreover, even if we choose or re-construct an object which, according to our understanding, carries a philosophical dimension, we still don't know how it would be perceived by the other⁷ (participant, interlocutor, spectator/ listener) that is to say, it is always possible for the object to be liquated within an indeterminacy, even passing presumably to the situation of a 'litter'⁸, as to

⁶ Cf. «Making things visible is just one of the effects of a practice approach to the co-constitution of visibility and materiality: of not thinking 'visuality' as simply observation, nor considering the 'material' purely as 'solid matter'. The question of what is made visible are critical to analyzing using this approach» (Gillian, Tolia-Kelly, 2012, 4). In fact, «The Visuality/Materiality approach [...] is about claiming collective possibilities as well as embodied and phenomenological, whilst decentering the capturing, objectifying eye». In these terms, «the visual is an embodied process of situation, positioning [...] re-memory [...] encounter, cognition and interpretation». In contrast, the materiality «does not assume solidity of object and fixity of meaning [...] but incorporates the poetics of rhythms, forms, textures and the value of memory-matter engagement [...] the sensory affordances of materials can also incorporate a pluralistic account of reactions and interpretations that link to histories, memories and ecologies of seeing, feeling and perceiving» (*ibid.*, 5). This is then about an approach where «Visuality/Materiality is an emergent orientation of research practice that is inevitably critical and constantly reflexive of the power play between representation, text, practice and technologies of production, display and performance [...] The critical argument at its heart is that the 'visual' and the 'material' should be understood as in continual dialogue and co-constitution» (*ibid.*, 3-4).

⁷ «Othering, the constitution of an 'Other,' entails an indebtedness to the 'Other', who is irreducibly and materially bound to, threaded through, the 'self'—a diffraction/ dispersion of identity. 'Otherness' is an entangled relation of difference (*différance*). Ethicality entails noncoincidence with oneself [...] Ethics is an integral part of the diffraction (ongoing differentiating) patterns of worlding, not a superimposing of human values onto the ontology of the world (as if 'fact' and 'value' were radically other). The very nature of matter entails an exposure to the Other» (Barad, 2010, 265).

⁸ Cf. the Joycean word-play between "letter" and "litter" (s. Dixon, 1961, 89) and the 't' added by Lewis Carroll (Carroll, 1893) to the word "literature" (thus becoming "litterature"), «thereby comparing the text to trash» (s. Marret, 1996, 9, cited in: Kirstin, 2004, 153-153). The constructed relation between «letter» and «litter» contains the suspicion that the convention, the canon carries

something that «falls wide of meaning», that «lies outside meaning»⁹. In that sense, by choosing, developing an element in order to show it/put it as ob-ject, notably a philosophical one, we want to try to reveal (or at last contest) its philosophical dynamics and we appeal the others to see it abruptly or to see it (or not) repeatedly as a philosophical presence/appearance. In a way, we constitute and establish it as a philosophical one (but at the same time, a gap, a discrepancy, an error seems to be always left to remind the possibility of a collapse of the whole project itself—because in fact the PhO was never a PhO). This is about an open and permanent invitation to consider the objecthood as an exercise (a *non finito*): the object as an entity discovered, perceived, invented/constructed, touched, deconstructed, invisible, immaterial, discussed, inner and outer (without the inner being the opposite of the external¹⁰). The object though is not to be stuck in a deadlock exteriority - it becomes a limit for the perception, but it is not defeated by any “beyond” which surpasses it like an obstacle destined for disappearance. It’s about a structure of resistance for every movement on both sides but on the same plane, in a deep luminosity¹¹.

That’s why, the act of the r(a)ising pro-duction installation, from the moment of the object’s rising in space, results in the reiteration of a doubt: i.e., the tendency towards an early reification of these research objects which could not, therefore, neither fall into the state of availability and that of the usual educational materials,

ineluctably its own rubbishness, the possibility to turn into something worthless: «Jacques Lacan [Lacan, 1966] rightly noted that *Finnegans Wake* is peppered with derivatives of the words “letter” and “litter”, the appearance of which are always intended to blur the distinction between the two and to put the entire canon of literature into question by rubbishing the conventionality and the very “literary-ness” of its code. As Joyce wrote: “With lines of litters slittering up and louds of latters slettering down [...] where in the waste is the wisdom?”» (cited in Kirstin, 2004, *op.cit.*).

⁹ As Lacanian ‘Lituraterre’ [s. Lacan, 2013, 29-38] is a neologism «formed from the word ‘literature’ to designate that part of literary activity that falls wide of meaning» (cited in: Gutermann-Jacquet, 2015, 43). This is a core (kern) of literary Being lying «at the heart of literature, as at the heart of the analytic discourse» which is the «unreadable, the not-for-reading, the sign that has become trash [...]» (*Ibid.*, 45).

¹⁰ In Kandisky’s words (in his article, «Painting as a Pure Art», 1913, 349-50): «For the content, which exists first of all only “in abstracto”, to become a work of art, the second element—the external—must serve as its embodiment. Thus, content seeks a means of expression, a “material” form’ [...] Thus the work of art is an inevitable, inseparable joining together of the internal and external elements, of the content and the form» (cited in: Henry, 2009, 22).

¹¹ By creating models internally and by operating on clues and variables, scientific thinking is always in an admirably active way, ingenious, negligent, treating every being as «an object in general», simultaneously, as if it were nothing and nothing more than something predestined for our artifices—this is a thinking of the object—for this mode of thinking there is not a preliminary “there is” on the site, on the grounds of the sensible world (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 159)- «Science manipulates things and gives up living in them», (*Ibid.*, 159).

nor into the precarious immobility of objects at exhib/pos-ition. In that way, a practice associating the visual with the oral, the body with the action could be inaugurated. Else ways, the project is not developed while keeping a distance and making a distinction between subject and object, it is not limited to the sitting and still posture, nor limited to reflection and discourse. Seizing, conceiving, elaborating and forming the objects, the recognition and hermeneutics of their traces, their absence or inexistence (by weaving a web of support(ment) but also a thread of connection with every other object and among all the various objects, equally though by provoking interruptions, denials, recessions to a possible collapse of objects and their subjects)¹² - there is, seemingly and ironically, a persistent effort to not let the project to fall into an objectlessness. By being a such process, the performative element is raised and the project sometimes grows as a performance: persons need to realize and somehow 'see' their connection with the(ir) object manifest itself and probably this manifestation engage and move their bodies.

Towards this strange “ ‘philosophical’ ‘object’ ”

If, according to Deleuze, «things possess a structure only in so far as they maintain a silent discourse, which is the language of signs» and «since one does not recognize people, in a visible manner, except by the invisible and imperceptible things they themselves recognize in their own way»¹³, one could recognize on the PhO some of the criteria of structuralism as «the positing of a symbolic order, irreducible to the orders of the real and the imaginary, and deeper than they are»¹⁴, the local or positional criterion, the symbolic elements having «no extrinsic designation nor intrinsic signification, but only a positional sense»¹⁵, the criterion of the Empty

¹² «Objects are not originally or even ordinarily contemplated objects, they are the objects of our movements. In this sense, it is true to say that the original being of things is not a *Vorhanden* but a *Zuhanden*. Moreover, by asserting the original relationship of the being of things to our movements, by saying that objects are not first represented, but immediately lived by the powers whereby we are related to them, we do not claim to inaugurate any primacy of the hand over sight, for example; we rather insist that vision is a knowledge of the same type as manual prehension or motor touch, i.e., a knowledge which is not an intellectual or theoretical knowledge, which is not a representation. After all, it is effected by the body, because it is a bodily knowledge [...] we must place ourselves interior to the powers which it unfolds in order to understand the nature of the world which our body knows. Indeed, we are truly placed interior to these powers» (Henry, 1975, 99).

¹³ Deleuze, 2004, 171.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁵ If according to Levi-Strauss, in his discussion with Paul Ricoeur, «sense is always a result, an effect: not merely an effect like a product, but an optical effect, a language effect, a positional effect», there is, Deleuze continues «profoundly, a nonsense of sense, from which sense itself results [...]

Square [La Case Vide], a «wholly paradoxical object or element» enveloped in the structure, «eminently» symbolic, called «Object = x, the riddle Object or the great Mobile element»,

always displaced in relation to itself. Its peculiar property is not to be where one looks for it, and conversely, also to be found where it is not. One would say that la case vide «is missing from its place» [*il manque a sa place*] (and, in this, is not something real); furthermore, that it does not coincide with its own resemblance (and, in this, is not an image); and that it does not coincide with its own identity (and, in this, is not a concept)», «is it and must it remain the perpetual object of a riddle, the perpetuum mobile¹⁶.

The object, existing either physically in space (i.e. «un object of perception», «a real object»¹⁷) or, initially, as a mental image, an «imaged object»¹⁸, it starts to take its significance when «revealed by consciousness»¹⁹. This relation between the object in its various forms and the intentional conscience is essential for the project because it is based on the subject's will and capacity to recognize, elaborate, invent, and materialize objects²⁰. The moment of the emergence/'appearance' of the object, when it comes to be seized or it is prepared to be materialized-visualized/represented/re-created/re-constructed, is exactly a moment in an endless²¹ and relentless, almost

For structuralism, [...] there is always too much sense, an overproduction, an over-determination of sense, always produced in excess by the combination of places in the structure» (*Ibid.*, 175).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 184, 185, 187.

¹⁷ Sartre, 2004, 180

¹⁸ Or, in the frame of the Sartrean phenomenological ontology, as an «imaging consciousness»: «an image is nothing other than a relation. The imaging consciousness that I have of Pierre is not a consciousness of an image of Pierre: Pierre is directly reached, my attention is not directed at an image, but at an object» (Sartre, 2004, 7). In other words, the image cannot but be an act, i.e. an intentional consciousness (*Ibid.*, 183), «an act that aims in its corporeality at an absent or nonexistent object, through a physical or psychic content that is given not as itself, but in the capacity of analogical representative of the object aimed at. In the case of the mental image the content has no externality. One sees a portrait, a caricature, a spot: one does not see a mental image. To see an object is to localize it in space [...]. However, my mental images do not mix with the objects that surround me [...]. In fact, the mental image aims at a real thing, which exists among others in the world of perception; but it aims at it through a psychic content. No doubt that content must fulfil certain conditions: in the image consciousness we apprehend an object as an 'analogon' for another object» (*Ibid.*, 52).

¹⁹ Barnes, 2002, 36.

²⁰ «Consciousness is not a being but the activity whereby a human being recasts an impersonal universe in the form of the human life world. Its revelation of being is a creative revealing, but consciousness never becomes its creations» (*Ibid.*, 24).

²¹ Cf. «The artwork is not the occasion for the subject to complete it; instead, what Adorno calls its truth content is the open-endedness of an object at rest within its lack of completion. Its content is not something, especially not some truth, to be deciphered by the subject. The artwork is instead

ineluctable, procedure-chain of acts directed to the final phase of materialization, the creation and exhibition of PhOs.

Even more, if there is no a possible, separate, clear category of objects recognized absolutely and at some extent generally as ‘philosophical’—because the work of philosophy is not to ‘produce objects’—even though this very work can be related to objects in various senses (like, for example, the written language itself or an object-thing presented in the frame of a philosophical analysis, the jar-thing in Heidegger or the mirror in Merleau-Ponty, or the Plato’s ring of Gyges, live teaching etc.)²². Unless if someone explicitly indicates that, in some way, an object ‘is’ or ‘could be’ a philosophical one: then, one need to understand in what way the philosophical feature is attributed to the object; in other words, it seems that the PhO cannot but be the issue-scope of a procedure of attribution and determination²³; that’s why is highly significant, within this project, this determination to be supported by an evolving, stepwise philosophical research and study. In that sense, the questions ‘what is philosophy’, ‘what philosophy and philosophers can do’, in ‘what way philosophy and philosophers work’, ‘which are the works and objects of philosophy’ are relevant to this project as it is developed. The subjects participating in the project need to understand in some degree why and in what way their objects are PhOs and which are their distinctive features, because exactly this understanding give to these objects their ephemeral (even contestable, arguable) character as PhOs.

an occasion for the subject to liken itself to a state of unfinishedness» (Huhn, 2004, 8, cited in: Robins, 2014, 126).

²² Cf. Harman contention: «all objects are equally real, but that they are equally objects [...]» defending «a new metaphysics able to speak of all objects and the perceptual and causal relations in which they become involved» (Harman, 2011, 10-11).

²³ Even though PhOs could be intentional objects, as objects of thought, they could not be characterized as ‘nonexistent objects’. «Intentional objects are, by definition, those things in the world which we think about; or those things which we take, or pretend, or otherwise represent to be in the world; or which we merely represent in thought. If there is such a thing as thinking about ‘things’ (in these various senses of ‘thing’) then there are intentional objects [...] thought about the non-existent is best construed [...] in terms of thought about *nonexistent intentional objects* [...]» (Crane, 2013, 4). All of these are *objects of thought*: «We think about objects, events, kinds, states, facts ... all of these can be objects of thought [...] An object of thought is just something thought about. Since we can think about things that do not exist, then some objects of thought do not exist» (*Ibid.*, 13). Likewise, the PhO, as an hypothesis, an experimental concept, could not (on the basis of the fact that, firstly, is conceived/imagined as a possible type of object and, consequently, it seems to lack for concreteness, its character needing to be argumented and then put in a certain form), be understood as an ‘abstract’ object (cf. «Let us assume, for the sake of brevity, that [abstract objects] they are not concrete entities (nor mental entities, if conceived as clearly different from concrete ones)», Falguera & Martínez-Vidal, 2020, vi).

What then makes an object philosophical & moreover a PhO, exactly if the PhOs are (probably) not but a way to see/understand or name an object (in fact the PhOs existing by virtue of their conceiver and nomenclator and disappearing if this conception caves in)? This imminent existence and hesitant conceptuality is it related mainly to the fundamental difficulty of a genuine linguistic philosophical element to be materialized-represented through objects, without the philosophical element to be jeopardized or the object turn to a rather aesthetical object? Even more, if this possible materialization cannot but be mainly arbitrary and suspiciously not philosophical in itself²⁴: unless if it would be philosophical, just to the extent that the artistic object is, as it conveys a philosophical dynamics/content? It's interesting to see how the question of objects and their philosophy, their appearance and their ways, the exhibition device, the innate or explicit conception about philosophy and practical philosophy, the pedagogical horizon and educational perspectives, the way that the public is implicated, the relation between the behind the scenes and the exhibition part, the Museum effect, the research-experimental movement, the way to include the history of philosophy, the subject-object relation, the question of experience, the relation of objects with philosophy and other folds of an approach that tries to connect in some way philosophical thinking with practical aspects of it²⁵,

²⁴ The examples possibly given to the participants in the project concerning the interrelation between object and philosophy thus creating for them a sort of frame and a pool (the main issue being not to provide them a kind of manual or encyclopaedia but to encourage them to think, comment, open new ways of understanding of the core questions of the project) cannot be considered as unique or incontestable. The notion of 'example' itself is not paradigmatic-normative but functional: this is not about the presentation of a model needed to be imitated or reproduced (because they would be based on a given, pre-existing definition of the PhO) but the examples carry a certain, finite point of view which should be discussed, they constitute a challenge for thinking. They represent the experimental aspect of that which could be a PhO providing occasions of thinking—in other words, the examples as material are to be further elaborated in order to reveal repeatedly the PhO as a research object, that is to say as an object to be. Consequently, this act of 'exemplifying' can include also anti-paradigms or even simulations which function rather as provocations -trial objects- because the paradigm or the original itself does not exist or we don't know (yet) exactly what it is – thus examples can function as traps. In fact the material presented needs to be discussed in order to be decided if finally can constitute a probationary example of what it could be or not a PhO - analogy, metaphor, simile are possible relations to the material uploaded. We could say that, in this frame, a 'material' could serve as a potential example, if it provides us with three at least data: 1. a theory about the object, 2. a carrying philosophical dynamics, 3. the construction and implementation logic of an object. Whereas the material can be scattered pieces of images, words, texts, objects, art works, carrying the suspicion of this relation that interests the project, the 'example' is a possible, synthesis of them to a certain, tendentious though, form.

²⁵ As about the relation (gap or bond) between the image [object] and the text, but even more about the use of another work or pieces of it in order to construct another object or idea, cf. the idea of Joseph Kosuth about the art as tautology: «A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of

can create, through their specific conceptualization, development and interconnection, a whole separate world which defines and differentiate projects with, apparently, similar motivations and references²⁶.

the artist's intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art» (Kosuth, 1993, 153 / s. also *Joseph Kosuth's Tautologies*).

Within the movement of conceptual art, Kosuth adopted a radical position: the idea behind the artwork corresponds already to an object, which, therefore, can be visualized.

«[...] While Beckett often addresses the uninterpretable, Kosuth, conversely, attempts to visualize the emergence of meaning» (Undo.net, 2011). In the same spirit, Kosuth had also remarked about another exposition of his: «I support all kinds of contradictory theoretical entities and I have no problem with it [...] I took cartoons such as *Blondie*, *Wizard of Id*, whatever, and I blew them up and silk-screened them on laminated glass with neon in L.A. Then with that are quotes by [Gottfried Wilhelm] Leibniz and [Søren] Kierkegaard. I spent a long time putting together the right cartoon with the right philosopher». And when some Hollywood lawyers, asked him if he had get the «permission to use these cartoons?» he replied that he «didn't get permission from Kierkegaard either». Then, he «pointed to the cartoon» saying, «That's not my work». And then he pointed to the quote and he said, «That's not my work either. Those are props. My work is the gap between the two. It's the surplus meaning that goes together to create» (Interview of Joseph Kosuth by King, 2018).

As about the relation between the work and the meaning, s. Joseph Kosuth's gallery installation (at Gallery 669 in Los Angeles, 1968), titled *A.A.I.A.I.-Art as Idea as Idea* (An interview with Joseph Kosuth by Morgan, 1994). Kosuth systematically visualizes philosophy or literature or art theory texts and «most of the selected excerpts are closely related to the specific place where the works are presented. These works also make it clear that the work is only given meaning when actively perceived by the observer. Kosuth's artistic results do not present themselves as artifacts, but rather as descriptions of an artwork, aided by texts, diagrams, plans, photographs and films» (Undo.net, 2011).

²⁶ Cf. in this sense (i.e., with an ostensible similarity with the PhO project), the organization of the *German Philosophy Museum (DenkWelten)*. Generally, as it is explained on the relevant website, it is about bringing «philosophical ideas to life. We have philosophy you can touch and experience: fun, interactive exhibits with scientific claims. The basic idea of DenkWelten is to create a museum of philosophy, not a museum of philosophers. Its aim is to illustrate philosophical ideas, with exhibits that are surprising, have inherent artistic value and, where appropriate, can also be interactive. The museum aims to substantially broaden the visitor's understanding of philosophy [...] The artistic assertion of the exhibits creates an intersection in the often-hidden aesthetic qualities of any philosophical reflection. Using practical examples, the worlds of thought displayed are intended to create a direct connection to everyday experiences in order to clarify the ongoing relevance of philosophical ideas». In this frame, the curating follows a methodology connecting, among other elements, references to primary sources, brief biographical and cultural-historical backgrounds, accompanying texts, exhibits professionally presented and documented, chronological and thematic focus for exhibits, reference to the names of philosophers, a visit beginning «in an anteroom, in which the fundamental question: "What is philosophy?" prepares access to the actual exhibition», doors opening to a practical or theoretical approach to philosophy determining the order of the exhibits in the exhibition, works arranged in chronological order according to the date of publication. The selection of works to be exhibited, «is explicitly not inspired by historical philosophy, but was made for pragmatic reasons [...] It is also suggested that all visitors be given a simple object (e.g. a platonic solid apple or a wooden apple), with different objects corresponding to different guiding questions

So, whereas one can assume safely what is possible to give to an object the complexion of the philosophical nature (taking for granted that concepts, theories, arguments, texts are acceptable as philosophical 'objects', as par excellence centers of interest for the philosophical thinking action), the idea that this very object could take a form other than the linguistic forms that convey par excellence the philosophical meaning, creates a persistent uncertainty blurring the project of PhOs. This very uncertainty looks like a retreat, a kind of disorientation, a monstrosity, a surrealist gesture or a barocco, an irony or a joke, a gap, a discrepancy, a symbolism, an ersatz, a quasi-²⁷ a surplus, a compound, a pleonasm, a useless even though imaginative representation, a pedagogical tool, a popularization, an anomaly, an assumption, a pagan idol, a metaphor, an incarnation, a heretical provocation, a retreat before the common sense²⁸. But the PhO does not intend to be a construction inspired

and exhibits being labelled with corresponding objects. This "guiding object" could also serve as an entry proof [...] At the end of the exhibition, the original question is repeated in an interactive installation [...]» (*Das Museum-Konzept*, <https://www.denkwelten.net/konzept.html> [our translation]).

²⁷ Cf. this abounding world of things in Serres & the crucial significance of the *quasi-object* as a ground for objects and subjects and the intersubjectivity between them: «This quasi-object is not an object, but it is one nevertheless, since it is not a subject, since it is in the world; it is also a quasi-subject, since it marks or designates a subject who, without it, would not be a subject [...] A ball is not an ordinary object, for it is what it is only if a subject holds it [...] The ball is the quasi-object and quasi-subject by which I am a subject, that is to say, sub-mitted. Fallen, put beneath, trampled, tackled, thrown about, subjugated, exposed, then substituted, suddenly, by that vicariance. The list is that of the meanings of *subjicere*, *subjectus*. Philosophy is not always where it is usually foreseen. I learn more on the subject of the subject by playing ball than in Descartes' little room [...] This quasi-object that is a marker of the subject is an astonishing constructor of intersubjectivity. We know, through it, how and when we are subjects and when and how we are no longer subjects [...]» (Serres, 2007, 224-7).

²⁸ In fact the project of PhOs, explicitly or implicitly, willingly or unwillingly, refers to a bunch of concepts and themes opposed and interrelated forming the conceptual environment of the object and of its connection with subject and problematizes «an a priori distinction between persons and things, matter and meaning, representation and reality» (Henare, Holbraad, Wastell, 2007, 2). It is a project bending also towards the possibility of a «thinking through things» as a method consisting «to take 'things' encountered in the field as they present themselves, rather than immediately assuming that they signify, represent, or stand for something else [...] exploring a more open, heuristic approach to analysis that allows things', as and when they arise, to offer theoretical possibilities [...]» As «*things might be treated as sui generis meanings*» and «meanings are not 'carried' by things but just are identical to them», Henare, Holbraad and Wastell choose the term of things instead of this of objects, because «they carry minimal theoretical baggage» and this «denuded usage of 'things'» signal the «transformation of 'thing-as-analytic' to 'thing-as-heuristic' [...] the difference between an analytic and a heuristic use of the term 'things' is that while the former implies a classificatory repertoire intended for refinement and expansion, the latter serves to carve out things (as an appropriately empty synonym for 'objects' or 'artefacts') as the field from which such repertoires might emerge. Analytics parse, heuristics merely locate». In this frame, «Conception is a mode of disclosure (of-metaphorical-'vision') that creates its own objects, just because it is one and the same with them, so to 'see' these objects is to create them [...] So, if the first step to 'ontological breakthrough' is to realize that 'different worlds' are to be found in 'things', the

from a specific philosophical idea, which, as an inspirational source, would attribute to it the value of a successful analogy (not bothering the philosophical pretention), but it would incorporate a heretic will: to be itself a vehicle of philosophical thought and not to take the value of a reminiscence, a reflection, a shadow, a parcel of this thought. Notwithstanding, a hesitation and mistrust accompany the PhO by rendering it a lisping entity that cannot but be philosophically weak or incapable of constituting an authentic vehicle of philosophy—if there is one.

Consequently, seemingly, the contention that a PhO can include seeds of philosophical thinking or is expected to be capable to mobilize philosophical thinking does not make PhO to be in itself philosophical—rather, at last, it figures as a quasi-philosophical entity, a hint, a spurring or an incomplete incarnation. The speculation about the PhOs seems anyway to be much more complicated than the respective one regarding the ‘aesthetic object’ (since the PhO could be similar to this one or altogether ‘be’/become an aesthetic object). Thus, the PhOs cannot exist but under certain conditions and while they can have a certain concreteness, their philosophical determination is precarious as closely related to a particular intention, gaze and criteria that they have in the first place formed it; once these parameters change or don’t stand any more, then the PhOs cease also to exist. They become remains of a performance, empty costumes, in some cases quasi-aesthetic objects, debris of images and sounds, enigmas, palimpsests, wondering objects and finally, thus, probably, they become again, in absentia, and in another way, ‘philosophical objects.’

So, is our thinking which intuitively in the beginning, sits upon/touches an object²⁹, by risking in that way to predefine it or which pushes an object, in the view to emerge as another object or under another light, reorganizing it, this time as a philosophical one (referring to a philosophical idea) or which creates new philosophical objects departing from philosophical or other thoughts³⁰. The philosophical question

second one is to accept that seeing them requires acts of conceptual creation—acts which cannot of course be reduced to mental operations (to do so would be merely to revert to the dualism of mental representation versus material reality)» (*Ibid.*, 2-15).

²⁹ Merleau-Ponty had emphasized the act of seeing as a way «to enter a universe of beings which *display themselves*». «In other words: to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it [...] I can therefore see an object in so far as objects form a system or a world, and in so far as each one treats the others round it as spectators of its hidden aspects and as guarantee of the permanence of those aspects» (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, 79)

³⁰ Nevertheless, the existence of objects in the frame of the PhOs project or this critical reference to the concept of object (objecthood/thinghood), are far from the study of the proliferation of everyday things, their salience and their exhibition (see: ‘thing studies’, thing theory, material culture or object studies) often as obsession with «stuff—things, ephemera, paraphernalia and possessions» (*A philosophy*

seen as inherent or hidden within the object which comes to /is called to come to light or the philosophical idea as added to the object through an intuition/hermeneutical act on behalf of the subject watching the object, constitute possible courses for the designing of the project³¹. As the object is gradually implemented, the philosophical question evolves equally or rather the object is implemented making evolving the philosophical question and vice versa. The PhO could correspond to the philosophical question; it can put the question or be a kind of answer or finally put another question as a development of its own construction. The philosophical question though, as the PhO is exhibited, will stay unseen and unutterable, as almost inexistent (even if it lies within/behind the object giving him somehow strength and substance). Contrarily to the educational act, the construction of the PhO does not include an already known recipient—it is not constructed with the intention of a learning goal to be achieved³². It is constructed in the name and for the sake of the philosophical question.

of everyday things, 2011). Notwithstanding, it could be possible that a PhO concerns this phenomenon, because a such object is in fact a meta-object containing (animated by) a critical gesture of invocation and inclusion of objects/things in our perceptive and conceptual field which though in principle remains silenced, unnoticed as such –it immerses the object into its own presence, a hole in the whole that itself is, like the dough within itself. So, an exhibition/ encyclopedia of material things is impressive but things there are taken rather as close entities. PhOs go beyond the things populations because exactly they try to be inventions, in the run to take form persistently as they stand on fundamental philosophical concerns which are the reason of their existence. Their liberty is a denied liberty, because of the creator's act which germinated them but equally (and significantly) a position of liberty, because of their progressive autonomization before, during and after their exhibition, more than any other object constructed for a certain purpose (an spontaneous and unwanted–delicate-fight against their author/creator). Thing philosophy and object philosophy converge or diverge creating a crack through which or within which the PhO project is established. PhOs are no objects of the ordinary life -nevertheless are related to human experience; they are not for usage or created for a purpose; they remain mainly strange but conducive to their transfiguration.

³¹ Two possible routes can be proposed to highlight particularly the pedagogical dimension of the project: either starting from a concept initially chosen in order to be henceforward the interior thread or scaffolding traversing and supporting the conception and creation of objects or leading to this concept to be produced/emerged progressively, as objects will be created/chosen as points of convergence of different ideas presented during the preparatory workshops (object germination). A third route concerns the way in which either the passage from the concept to an object and vice versa, or the passage from concept to concept or the connection of objects with concepts and their intertwining with them are undertaken (spirally as spreading outwards-by adding/multiplying the concepts -or, inwards, following the moves of kneading dough: repeatedly, pulling the ends of the dough and fold it onto itself and then pushing the dough forward and folding the stretched dough over itself).

³² There is the possibility to conceive the PhO as a material for educational reasons, a springboard between the non-philosophical and the philosophical. But if under educational purposes, materials are agents of normativization, 'materials' as the PhO are de-normativisation factors: «As the carpenter

During a such long procedure, one cannot go straight to the object –he|she needs to fall behind, to retreat, spend time, consciously put barriers. The object is not just a figment of imagination needing to take shape; it will come up, emerge as the research goes on and the thinking is unfolding. Probably though it will not come up. Patience and attention³³ is needed in order to choose, describe, narrate, recognize, interpret, include / exclude, readapt, open passages, connect, highlight, reasoning, distinguish, understand, keep tracks, trace the history of the object, as a ‘matter of concern’³⁴. How can a PhO-heavily dependent (also in the phase of the reconstruction

notches the ends of the wooden beams, after having worked relentlessly on different beams, destroying different beams, we need to know how to notch, in order to respect the material and then, probably, create another object. But carpenters and woodcarvers, who touch the wood with their bear hands, have a relation with this wood, whereas this relation hides a certain knowledge. In other words, this living material, through a subtle initiatory training, acquires a learning value, as Bachelard has shown us ways of doing so. This, then, could be a kind of de-normativisation. Every notch, every dissection or dismantling movement being a threshold to another form, where the subject learns to (re)organize the world through such a material» (Theodoropoulou, 2021, 12). Materials are understood through an organic approach developed as a scaffolding-in-progress: «Organic because it co-creates» the material, «it accompanies it while not removing its scaffolds, but bringing them to surface» (s. Theodoropoulou, 2018). On this matter, s. also, Theodoropoulou, 2020a.

³³ Cf. the highly significant paradox created when the mode of inattentiveness and the social practices of inattention where the visual images circulate «as fleeting and unremarkable ephemera» in a «routine inattention and distraction» are not but «products of highly concentrated institutionalized forms of attention» (Frosh, in: Gillian, Tolia-Kelly, 2012, 171), whereas the «attentive fallacy», as «the seemingly self-evident idea that the significance of images—and the path to understanding them—is generated through a distinct, focused encounter between a visually immobilized viewer and a discrete and equally stationary image» (*Ibid.*, 173). On that basis, Frosh understands *inattention* (and drawn our attention to it) «as a taxonomic term that covers a spectrum of visual modes, all of which have in common brief duration and low cognitive and emotional intensity, and all of which are—like attention itself—circularity forms of connective energy between perceiving subjects and the potential objects of their perception» (*Ibid.*, 174).

³⁴ S. particularly: «A matter of concern is what happens to a matter of fact when you add to it its whole scenography, much like you would do by shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of a theatre [...] It is the same world, and yet, everything looks different. Matters of fact were indisputable, obstinate, simply there; matters of concern are disputable, and their obstinacy seems to be of an entirely different sort: they move, they carry you away, and, yes, they too matter. The amazing thing with matters of fact was that, although they were material, they did not matter a bit, even though they were immediately used to enter into some sort of polemic. How really strange they were» (Latour, 2008, 39). Specifications regarding the matters of concern: they have to: 1. matter [«Matters of fact were distorted by the totally implausible necessity of being pure stuff of no interest whatsoever—just sitting there like a mummified limb—while at the same time being able to “make a point”, humiliate human subjectivity, speak directly without speech apparatus and quieten dissenting voices», *Ibid.*, 47], 2. be liked, 3. be populated. («they have to become something that is to be explicitly recognized as a “gathering”, as Ding and not as *Gegenstand*», *Ibid.*, 48), 4. to be durable. («Endurance is what has to be *obtained*, not what is already given by some substrate, or some substance», *Ibid.*, 49).

process, when it is about the analysis-reconstruction of an object already existing) on the subject, escape the limitations and the creative and interpretative sense giving intention/authority of the subject and the burdens it imposes on the PhO? How can it resist all the symbolic load that prescribes and obscures it? But also, why even ask this question? Why does the subject itself carrying out the PhO constitute a problem for the PhO? Why in the first place should we consider this particular subject-PhO relationship problematic? Why should there be a demand of emancipation of PhOs (and not of their institutionalization)? And how can a constructed entity be emancipated once it leaves the hands of its constructor? What is the role of the exhibition phase in framing such questions? Possibly these very questions relate to the dubious nature of PhOs as philosophical and to the ensuing inquiry-and this also is their point of escape. How then is the subject disempowered/withdrawn? What processes of undoing the subject and empowering the object exist? And again: How, as Frosh put it,

is one to capture and arrest the dynamism and mobility of that which eludes or resists our focused concentration, 'the rapid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance' as Simmel puts it³⁵, to enable elucidation, analysis, critique?³⁶.

How to avoid the «violent immobilization» that this gesture/decision of a such a project implies, «a kind of visual subjugation» accompanying the «primary act of attentiveness»³⁷?

Would then the PhOs be considered as traces? Share they the amphibolic nature of a trace³⁸? Are they traps for an amphibolic as well h(a)unting game with

³⁵ Simmel, 1997, 175.

³⁶ Frosh, 2012, *op.cit.*, 172.

³⁷ See the metaphors of critical attention and critical analysis through «seizure, capture, holding, grasping, arresting» involving the notions of «separation, distinction and judgement and of dissection or breaking down», in general of «the distinction of a body from its surroundings [...] separating the object from temporal and spatial dynamics of flux and inchoateness and detaining it before the viewer» (*Ibid.*).

³⁸ Cf. significantly the characteristics of the trace as enumerated by Krämer: 1. The absence («The presence of the trace testifies to the absence of what formed it»), 2. The performance of orientation («The attention required when reading traces that are always imperceptible at first, is therefore always is always "focused attention"»), 3. The materiality («[...]the materiality of the trace is not subordinated to the representation. Traces don't represent; they present something»), 4. The disturbance («It's only through deviations do traces become perceptible»), 5. The arbitrary («Unlike the sign we create, the meaning of a trace exists beyond the intention of the person who generate»), 6. The dependence on an observer and an action, 7. Interpretation, narration and polysemy («Something that can only be interpreted once, and can only have one meaning, is not is not a

the sense (sense of the PhO, of the project itself as a gesture of proposal of something perched on the verge between sense and nonsense, existence and inexistence, dependence and independence, anticipation and experimentation, production and interpretation, immobility and movement, attentiveness and inattention, the intentional and the unintentional, randomly and the premeditatedly (a trace as a 'mise en scène'³⁹), the trace and indication or sign, perceptible and imperceptible⁴⁰ in this very moment of their appearance⁴¹, their exhibition-before this moment or after) permitting, provoking or subverting every plan of a lecture of traces or signs as a practice of knowledge? If then being a trace (or furtively a sign) makes disappear the object as object, evaporates its objecthood, its thingness, its stubbornness, perhaps, the PhO should be always revisited; the PhO would be the detail and what is left of its own presence, rather a detail itself⁴².

Becoming-folds of practical philosophy

In general, if the PhO itself: constitutes an ontologico-esthetical gesture by its discovery and position through its own 'inexistence' (first quasi- moment/position- 'quasi', since it is proposed/arisen rather by a subject decision than by and for the PhO itself) and an ethico-pedagogical collective gesture as well, through the systematic recognition and the development of these 'objects' in time and space (second moment/position), then this project comes as a reflective gesture of critical removal of these very positions (third moment/position), while the possible meta-readings of these attempts become a fourth gesture of repetition, with a view to pull up the differences and their suspicions and thus understand the project as a movement⁴³ of practical philosophy.

trace, but rather the sign of something else»), 8. Temporal rupture («Unlike the index, which always refers to things happening at the same time without being visible at the same time, there is always a time lag between the act of leaving a trace and the act of reading it: this non-simultaneity must be conceived as the order of the trace»), 9. One-dimensionality and irreversibility («Insofar as the trace expresses something through narrative interpretation, it is a totally one-dimensional communication, in which the interchangeability of roles by "sender" and "receiver" remains excluded»), 10. Mediality, heteronomy, passivity (Krämer, 2012, 3).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁰ «At the heart of the notion of trace is therefore not only everything that is clearly perceptible, i.e. the standards that must be respected, but also that which is barely perceptible, that which lies at the limit of the imperceptible» *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴¹ «The traces are discovered or arise at the time of the act of reading»? *Ibid.*

⁴² s. Theodoropoulou, 2021, 263, 276-7 and 2020c.

⁴³ In the framework of this project, *movements* «hide a decision tendency, an intensive propensity to trial, a willingness for openings and inaugurations –they open new spatio-temporal frames for research activities, they manifest a stream of thinking [...] designate shifts of direction, movings to

The experimental character of the whole procedure imposes also the tentative character of the PhOs and their nonconformance as a power of appearance and withdrawal altogether. Consequently, the project is developed as a series of participative pro-posals aiming to the unremitting disclosure/covery and finally reformulation of paths, aporias and articulations of the whole project. Throughout the project, the relation of philosophy with the notions of construction, representation and performance are proposed and explored on the one hand revealing the polytropic and performative element of the entity of the PhO itself but also of the polyphonic procedure that brings it to light, as it appears and, simultaneously, is put into question by linking in this way the project and the PhO itself with forms of art and speech but also with a pedagogical dynamics -as an aspect of practical philosophy and public expression- which is tested in order to be reversed by folding in that way the field itself of practical philosophy.

As the project invests on the power of the sensory and intersubjective perception (as an «embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition» indicating an intentional relation to the world⁴⁴), different speeds of understanding and diverse understandings, various paths to perceive, act and knowing are developed and revealed in the sense of an «open intersubjectivity»⁴⁵ and interwoven apperceptive horizons. The development of modificative typical, among other, interferences, like the pedagogical procedure⁴⁶, the discussion workshops or

another situation, another place, another thought, another stance, another choice»; *ob-gestures* «could be disruptions or incursions but also can be bonds or passages, interstitial entities, but any way they appear with some discreteness and they have the quality of an event of advancement, a manoeuvre, a turn, as actualized in a PhO». *Tones* designate «the quality, the intensity of an ob-gesture, specify movements and gesture character details, the degree of their intensity, the way by which the world of the project is unfolded creating a general sensation about it» (Theodoropoulou, 2020b, 263).

⁴⁴ Gallagher, 2008, 163-178.

⁴⁵ Bower, 2015, 455-474.

⁴⁶ Which is not undertaken as a strategy: in fact, in the frame of educational environments, objects are usually laying passively in front of teachers and students: docile, obedient to their intentions, disposable, inert and naked under their gaze, in their hands, parts of a powerful preexisting general idea which governs and moves them, orders their appearance in this context, their usage/manipulation being the reason of their existence, pieces of something which changes characteristics according to the educational purposes -the emergence of such un 'object' into the perceptual and cognitive horizon of the viewers should be the same for everybody in order to obtain in that way the pedagogical aim, to fulfill the reason of this constructed, collective experience. Ideas, concepts, values, arguments, emotions, serve all together this well-tuned and premeditated (or limp enough to permit the enunciation of vague statements about the idea behind and before the object, about reality and the world) pedagogical performance around almost dead and in-the-process-of dissection objects (Theodoropoulou, 2021). The PhO though is a rebellious object without the guarantee of any recognized quality or feature but only of the moving strength of a will to be put as

the concept-routes (conceptualization, text and artworks research and analysis), sustain the multiplication of point of views, the polyphonic as much as polytropic procedure, meaningfully also the provocation of different experiences: every subject participates in this creation, every object agitates and forms its relation with the subject and vice versa⁴⁷. Ideally the project challenges, receives and highlights this plurality as a creational liberty and as polyphonic dialogue with objects-every object multiplies the subjects and vice versa through the interlacement of non-passive perceptions.

The object becoming PhO⁴⁸ is the arrowhead of this effort, its spur, a condensation and a displacement of a process of understanding.

An evolving map of object presences and disappearances, of instant condensations and im-mobilities, through the multiplicity of frames, conditions, contexts which explain and modify their position and situation [...] There is a dignity in the object related to this tremendous power of overcoming destruction and claiming existence one can understand (the) object as an

question and to be explored –this process needs a voluntary engagement. Fundamentally is an event without (demanding) value.

⁴⁷ The difference that Böhme distinguish between *Realität* ('the factual fact') and *Wirklichkeit* ('actual fact' – «the effect of an object in a particular presence», Böhme, 2001, 57, cited in: Bjerregaard, in: Fuglerud & Wainwright, 2015, 50) is eloquent for the conception of the relation between subject (perceiver) and object (perceived), their in-betweenness (Böhme, 1993, 113–26, cited in: Fuglerud, & Wainwright, 2015, *op.cit.*), their common reality, the Atmosphere.

⁴⁸ The multiplication of objects, this world of possible objects growing and expanding, creates an intermediary zone that persons ought to deal with, once they get conscience of it. This is not about to attribute more or less autonomy to the subject or object, nor to verify their mutual disappearance, their merging, the ones within the others «engulfed in the maelstrom of indeterminate states that currently define the living and the non-living» in the frame of a possible theoretical or artistic dialogue about the terms object/animated/inanimate/alive/semi-alive (s. *International Conference Objets Vivants*, 2021). With the project of PhO this is rather more about to push persons to obtain awareness of objects, an awareness which makes them sensible to the peculiar existence of objects and to the question about them as well, as a question related to their own self-conscience and their conscience as possible creators. Cf. Karen Barad's position on theorizing being «as much a material practice as other kinds of practices, like experimenting, to which it is often counterposed» (Barad, 2012, 154). Furthermore, if theorizing for her is related to mattering, to the not disembodied to experimenting: «Theorizing is a form of experimenting, is about being in touch. What keeps theories alive and lively is being responsible and responsive to the world's patternings and murmurings. Doing theory requires being open to the world's aliveness, allowing oneself to be lured by curiosity, surprise, and wonder. Theories are not mere metaphysical pronouncements on the world from some presumed position of exteriority. Theories are living and breathing reconfigurings of the world. The world theorises as well as experiments with itself. Figuring, reconfiguring [...]. Thinking has never been a disembodied or uniquely human activity. Stepping into the void, opening to possibilities, straying, going out of bounds, off the beaten path–diverging and touching down again swerving and returning, not as consecutive moves but as experiments in in/determinacy» (*Ibid.*).

opportunity and as a way of multiplying the world effects on oneself and vice versa by multiplying the rhythms, the gestures, the experiences, the bevels, by always creating «a new reality of being»⁴⁹ whatever their character or category/order is. Objects are an ontological riddle, [...] are challenging us, playing with our perspicacity, our open-mindedness, our clear-mindedness, our aesthetic and ethical subtlety and resistance to not yielding to their apparent easiness (or their easiness to turn something into an object with all the thrills of thinghood). Their persistence, suddenness, and transformability are qualities upon which objects can exercise our thinking⁵⁰.

In fact, practical philosophy designates the need to follow the philosophical thinking emerging in unexpected places, through unexpected materials, interfering with various ways of doing research, participating in the acts of persons, multiplying the voices and the points of view, being with the subjects within their life. This movement of philosophy upstream and downstream of creative acts, following these acts were they lead, this particular philosophical interest stimulating such a movement is practical philosophy as an experience. But still, if, as Badiou argues, «Philosophy, far from proposing ends, means always, in one way or another, to have done with ends, and even to end with the end», whilst «The greatest virtue of philosophy [...] is that, in not ceasing to conclude, it attests to the interminable imperative of continuing. It therefore requires no other means for abolishing ends»⁵¹, how this understanding affects practical philosophy? Could this one be a «maladroit» philosophy in the sense of «the non-address, the absence of address» (if «philosophy is without specific address. No community, real or virtual, is in relation to philosophy. No statement of philosophy is addressed as such to anyone»⁵²). But if there is no address, perhaps, philosophical experience could restate in some way this void.

In practical philosophy, knowledge is not an absolute end and experience is an open end. The experiment of philosophical objects repeats and intensifies the queries of practical philosophy by challenging the recurrent distances between philosophy and non-philosophy, subject and object, through the intuition of an object conceived as event—«thinking in terms of the event» [«thinking à partir de l'événement»⁵³]. Situating the object under the complex category of the event is utmost significant for its understanding as, paradoxically, the subject creates the object, becomes its spectator and then, this very event, discloses or annihilates

⁴⁹ s. Bachelard, 1994, 68, 78, 85.

⁵⁰ Theodoropoulou, 2020b, 292.

⁵¹ Badiou, 2006, 9-10.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 10. «Firstly I name 'address' not with regard to who or to what philosophy addresses itself but with regard to the subjective position that is proper to its address. Yet that which characterizes this position is purely and simply void».

⁵³ Greisch, 2014, 62.

the subject itself within/trough another aspect in a processus of constant (de)subjectification and (de)objectification. This is a risk and a problem that practical philosophy explores through a project like this particular one. How create an event from something structurally premeditated, how forget or loose this creative root, how then discover an event out of this disappearance, how let come and recognize (as) a newcomer (an event) from 'there' (elsewhere/anywhere) that which has originated from 'here' being part of the intuition and action of a subject—an event-object which desubjectifies the object that it is (or tries to be) and de-subjectifies the subject which is not⁵⁴, a murmuring (instead the threshold of a murmuring, a "mmmmmm")⁵⁵, a disruptive, hyperbolic, unpredictable, practical event.

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⁵⁴ «What is an ideal event? It is a singularity—or rather a set of singularities or of singular points [...] turning point and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, condensation, and boiling; [...] "sensitive" points [...] The singularity belongs to another dimension than that of denotation, manifestation, or signification. It is essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual [...] Singularity is neutral. On the other hand, it is not "ordinary" [...]» (Deleuze, 1990, 52).

⁵⁵ s. Nancy, 2007, 25

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