

## ARGUMENTS FOR A KIERKEGAARDIAN REREADING OF POSTMODERNITY AT THE LEVEL OF A KEY-(ARCHI)TECTONIC SHIFT: THE KAIROS<sup>1</sup>

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**ABSTRACT.** The present study attempts to legitimize a re-reading of postmodernity's utter confusions and con-fusions (modern man's loss of the sense of the Self, his weird panic attacks, his dissipations, his loss of personal and collective magnetisms [of faith], his parapsychological and crypto-phenomenological impels to disengage from his objective boundaries) at the level of that special type of vortical dynamics induced by Kierkegaard's notion of leap (kairos). The accumulated pain coming towards us from the tension of the eternal human incompleteness (constant para-archi-tectonic inconsistency, impossibility to complete cycles, ontological instability and resistance to total representations) of paradoxes proves itself to be the very "fuel" necessary in the enactment of the leap (of the kairos) from one existential level to another. In essence, it is a chaos-filled transition towards the origin of chaos and of creation, towards the uncreated as generous-potency-to-be-apprehended and internalized by the stellar desirer and by the stellar seducer. Every kairos is a personal (and heavily personalized) spiritual exercise for re-enacting the primal movement of the uncreated towards the fragile intricacies of creation. It is an enthroned heterogeneity with its crown made of the fertile plasma of all boiling homogeneities.

**Keywords:** *Kairos, the uncreated as generous-potency, Kierkegaardian re-reading of postmodernity, paradox, vortex, chaos*

The paradox within which the Danish dialectician Søren Kierkegaard conceived the issue of anxiety (*sympathetic antipathy* and *antipathetic sympathy*), in the earliest days of modernity, advanced at the time a vision that we could call today (in the light of Zygmunt Bauman's and Jean Baudrillard's theories) *a fluid or a liquid structural*

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*night-vision of a reality ruled by anticoagulant instabilities* (growing disturbances which prevent entities and configurations from reaching their coherence, cohesiveness and chiasm) and “protoplasmatically” *traversed by steepish and ironish opposite tension currents* that bore, hole and invaginate their deep, slow and hard (nerve-pressing) whirlpools all across the psychosphere.

In other words, in Kierkegaard’s work as in Postmodernity, there is no chiasm and no synthesis between the authentic and the inauthentic, only a demented tension between the two, a tension which summons all of man’s energies in order to prepare a leap (a *kairos*) from one existential level (stage) to another (Kierkegaard speaks of three such stages: ethical, esthetical and religious). *The anxiety is anxiety experienced in front of the void / vacuum (with its whirlpools, vortexes, maelstroms and vertigos) that we have to overcome by “jumping” (from one existential level to another), but it is also the tensioning element that (by the medium of the strong contractions of despair and of the panic attacks) prepares our springs for this big “anti-gravitational” displacement (because we in fact “jump” over our own inner nothingness).* In this regard we offer two passages from Mădălina Diaconu’s book – *Pe Marginea Abisului, Søren Kierkegaard și nihilismul secolului al XIX (On the Edge of the Precipice, Søren Kierkegaard and the Nihilism of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century)* – that perfectly synthesize the entire issue at stake in here:

1. “(...) Kierkegaard mentions the fact that man represents a synthesis between body and soul, synthesis in which the element of mediation is represented by the spirit, and that before the Fall [*author’s note*: before fallibility] the spirit was absent, its place being occupied by the dread-generating Nothingness. The commentators are unanimous in interpreting human anguish as actual dread experienced in front of the nothingness of one’s own liberty, in front of one’s own possibilities of action, unknown to the individual himself. It is not simply a ‘response to the unknown, to what is not identified’ (Rotenstreich, 446<sup>3</sup>), because, as shown by Hans Rochol, anxiety is not the dread of the exterior, objective nothingness, but the dread of the *not-yet nothingness*, of the nothingness of one’s own spirit that is just about to be placed [*author’s note*: enacted]. The Nothingness which generates anxiety is not absolute, but only temporary, ‘a simple *not-yet nothingness*’ (*ein blosses noch Nichts*) (...) (Rochol, XXXII<sup>4</sup>). It is still a ‘*for the time being* [*author’s note*: up to now] *absolute nothingness*’ (**noch gar Nichts**), since the future self involves a radical act of creation [*author’s note*: a “jump”], the subject

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<sup>3</sup> Mădălina Diaconu’s reference: Rotenstreich, Nathan, *Love and Leap. Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s Approaches to Philosophy*. In “Kant-Studien”, 74 (1983), Heft 4.

<sup>4</sup> Mădălina Diaconu’s reference: Rochol, Hans – In: Søren Kierkegaard – *Der Begriff Angst*. Übersetzt, mit Einleitung und Kommentarhrg. Von Hans Rochol, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1984.

not being determined or conditioned by something present; between the state of paradisiacal innocence and that which follows after the committing of the first sin we have no continuity, but only a leap that our thinking can only approximate with the help of psychology, and it will do so without being able to understand it or to find a sufficient reason for it. The nothingness of the primeval, Adamic anxiety, is a 'noch *gar* (s.n.) Nichts', because freedom will establish the self from [*author's note*: out of] nothing<sup>5</sup>, freedom being devoid [*author's note*: free] of cause. The same interpretation is to be found at Stack as well, in the definition given to anguish as 'dizziness that can be felt by someone in front of the sheer, precipitous possibility.' (Stack, 1977, p. 155)."(Diaconu, 1996, pp. 120-121, our translation)

2. "Anxiety represents an ambiguous phenomenon par excellence, difficult to assess in terms of the existential imperative. (...) *It precedes the fall into the original sin and any new sin committed by man, but, at the same time, it also prepares the leap into faith* [*author's note*: our italics] (...). It can be said about the anxiety that it is contaminated by the condition of the interval in which the human existence unfolds, with its face turned simultaneously towards sin and towards faith. (...)." (Diaconu, 1996, p. 123, our translation)

And the "state of affairs" where there is *no chiasm and no synthesis between the authentic and the inauthentic and where one is forced to literally "jump" over his disarticulations* is basically post-modernity's condition à la lettre (for further insights into this type of ontological danger [i.e. that of not being able to perform the "jump", the "leap"], please see Emil Cioran's essay on "the disarticulation of time" and on the "falling out of history and out of time") – hence the precise relevance of a Kierkegaardian reading of our contemporaneity (a period marked by a liberty devoid of cause and of ontological support and by a suspension in hesitation [indecisiveness] and in the nothingness of an eternal middle ["middle" used also with the sense of "insufficient"] position<sup>6</sup>):

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<sup>5</sup> Mădălina Diaconu's footnote: "The fact of becoming a self is, according to Rochol, 'a self-creation out of nothing'." (*eine Selbst-Schöpfung aus dem Nichts – ibidem*, XXIII)."

<sup>6</sup> "*author's note*: Anxiety] places the individual 'in the nothingness of the middle position' (*im Nichts der Mitte*), therefore in a suspended existence, (...) or, as the spirit in Kierkegaard's writings is essentially activity, becoming with the help of choice and of decision, the stiffness [*author's note*: the rooting] in indecision cannot mean anything other than missing the possibility of becoming a self. Anxiety represents an ambiguous phenomenon par excellence, difficult to assess in terms of the existential imperative. (...) *It precedes the fall into the original sin and any new sin committed by man, but, at the same time, it also prepares the leap into faith* [*author's note*: our italics] (...). It can be said about the anxiety that it is contaminated by the condition of the interval in which the human existence unfolds, with its face turned simultaneously towards sin and towards faith. (...)." (Diaconu, 1996, p. 123, our translation)

“Modernity is best characterized not as an already established ‘structure’, nor as something which clearly has the capacity to become structured and coherent, but rather as a fruitless attempt to achieve structure and coherence. Everything leads us to the conclusion that structures are being ‘destructured’ even before they have gained a coherent internal stability. They are then integrated within new systems which themselves are already threatened by contradictions and negativity. Everything leads us to the conclusion that it is impossible to represent the ‘world’ as having a realizable structure and a possible stability.” (Lefebvre, 1995, pp. 187-188)

In post-modernity, this structure-disabling, structure-subverting and structure-disempowering tension meant to define *the indefinable (the ineffable) or the edge between the inner and the outer darkness*, through the personalized magnetisms of faith (“foi”)<sup>7</sup>, reinforces the vacuous but also highlights better the reasons feeding the deadly-paralyses of despair: the fear of losing one’s faith (“foi” or intuition of the ineffable) and of remaining a prisoner of the immediate (of the infamous / notorious “croyance”).

*Postmodernity is a historical period whose dreaded “crusade” and quest is that of trying to re-discover, re-establish and re-live its lost faith – hence its catastrophic disarticulations.* Paul Ricoeur, following Kierkegaard’s “trail”, highlights the poison that substantiates the ground between secularization and utopia’s ideologies (the fatal side of the Hegelian legacy), while reinforcing the idea that personal faith alone can redeem an individual from his acts of succumbing to moral and spiritual degradation, and that any attempt to transcribe it in other registers of social action or of social thinking demagnetizes (spoils) its force of coagulation or, even worse, invests it with a fatally-misinterpreted attraction towards destruction and termination:

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<sup>7</sup> In what concerns the Kierkegaardian (af)filiation of this idea and mystical credo, one should not overlook the strange irony that gave birth to its decisive existentially-personalist twist in the first place: “In effect, Kierkegaard takes seriously the ironic taunt of David Hume who, after demolishing all rational grounds for a belief in miracles, remarks that anyone who still has faith ‘is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience’ (David West’s citation: Hume, David: *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, [1777]. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902, p. 131.) In purpose, Kierkegaard seeks to found religious belief on the subjective truth of personal experience. His claim is that, through faith, a truth can be approached which is far more important for our lives than either the theoretical truths of science or the speculative system of philosophy.” (West in Goodin ad Pettit, 1995, p. 52)

“Does the man really live in a secularized world, or merely survive? The profanity – can it really exist without profanation (desecration)? Does the political transcription of the absolute still maintain the function of deliverance of the latter? Asking these questions is not only breaking away from a deadly oscillation, but it is re-finding (recovering) the reasons why faith escapes the alternative of ideology and of utopia, while ruining what Hegel called the 'causality of destiny'” (Ricoeur in Castelli, 1976, p. 60, our translation)

And, to even better justify our decision to re-read postmodernity through Kierkegaard, (besides the previous appeal to Ricoeur) we can't forget to mention that Jean-Paul Sartre's lifelong partner, Simone de Beauvoir, can be said to have acquired the communicable substring of her body of work only by further drawing on Kierkegaard's distinction between objective and subjective truth in the general equation of Christianity – a distinction mentioned in the section entitled “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” of his *Philosophical Fragments*, where he states that *how* one believes, his luring devotion and the sincerest depth of his compelling passion are much more important when it comes to summoning a transcendental force than *what* one believes in, than his manic but obtuse (lacking sensitivity and quickness of perception) and desolate chase of a harmonious relationship with “the right object”, or of a flawless correspondence with “an independent reality”. *To betray the spirit of the historical game* is to be tyrannically-dishonest and to incline the otherwise unavoidable dialectical (intertwined) relationship between the subjective free-will and its historical context in favour of the latter, thus submitting to the overpowering force or yielding to the overwhelming pressure and to the fatally-endemic colour of the accumulated detritus and cinder of history (according to Kierkegaard, honesty and the intensity of dedication, in their relationship to history, but mostly to a truly a-historical hot nucleus, can only come from one's courageous direct relationship with anxiety [which is, has always been and will always be the truest and the fiercest untreatable and unstopable principle of human evolution and perdition]):

“(…) it is no doubt impossible to approach any human problem without partiality: even the way of asking questions, of adopting perspectives, presupposes hierarchies of interests; all characteristics comprise values, every so-called objective description is set against an ethical background. Instead of trying to conceal those principles that are more or less explicitly implied, we would be better off stating them from the start.” (Beauvoir, 2009, p. 16)

In Kierkegaard's perfectly- / ultimately-synthesized terms, these situations translate the fear of losing contact with totality (with one's fabulous hot centre of coagulation and magnetic endurance), and of being reduced to circumstances, that is,

to “the particular thing in the particular instance” (i.e. of being dissipated, confused and in full process of disintegration because deprived of a gravitational centre [of a testifiable inner ground]):

“The least inconsistency is a prodigious loss, for with that a man in fact loses consistency; that same instant the charm is perhaps broken, the mysterious power which bound all powers in harmony is enfeebled, the spring loses its tension, the whole machinery is a chaos where the forces fight in rebellion against one another, to the injury of the self, and therein there is no accord with oneself, no momentum, no impetus. The prodigious machine which in consistency was so compliant with its iron strength, so pliable with all its power, is in disorder; and the more excellent the machine was, all the more frightful is the confusion. – The believer, who reposes in and has his strength in the consistency of the good, has an infinite fear of even the least sin, for he stands to lose infinitely. The immediate men – the childlike or the childish – have no totality to lose, they constantly lose and win only the particular thing and in the particular instance.” (Kierkegaard, 2013, pp. 427-428)

*As stated previously, the accumulated pain coming towards us from the tension of this incompleteness (constant inconsistency) proves itself to be the very “fuel” necessary in the enactment of the leap (of the kairos) from one existential level to another. In essence, it is a chaos-filled transition towards the origin of chaos and of creation, towards the uncreated as generous-potency-to-be-apprehended and internalized by the stellar desirer and by the stellar seducer. Every kairos is a personal (and heavily personalized) spiritual exercise for re-enacting the primal movement of the uncreated towards the fragile intricacies of creation. It is an enthroned heterogeneity with its crown made of the fertile plasma of all boiling homogeneities.*

What Kierkegaard does when engaging the method of kairos is to *bring back to the table and to re-establish existentially and pre-phenomenologically* Plato’s vision on transition from the dialogue Parmenides, an ancient work which is also the building-block for Heidegger’s later phenomenological valorization of the notion of kairos under a new denomination, that of the *Augenblick* (the moment of vision, of transforming novelty, of revelation). In this regard, Koral Ward interprets the notion of “kairos” as “fitting time for action”, as decisive turn / step, as action of revealing (what Heidegger would call later the essential opening within the Dasein), as restoration of the self on its authentic (healthiest) coordinates, and as emerging redemptive novelty:

“The Greek concept of kairos or the fitting time for action underpins the Augenblick, it denotes a decisive, critical point dependent on one who has the skill and wherewithal to act.” (Ward, 2012, p. xii)

“NU is ‘one of the two most common words for «new» since the classical period’; the other, *kairos*, whose derivation is uncertain, means ‘new’ in the sense of ‘what is new and distinctive’ in relation to other existing things.” (Ward, 2012, p. 8)

“ ‘happiness’ has its roots in the Old English ‘happen’ meaning ‘a stroke of fortune’ or ‘an opportune time’ and this allows us to make a connection with the Greek concept of *kairos*, as an event which comes at the appropriate time. Hence we can think of the ‘happening’ of this historical event as such a stroke of fortune for human being that has an effect felt into eternity.” (Ward, 2012, p. 12)

Yet it is the French exegesis that, in the logic sought by us in here, gave the decisive necessary twist to the notion, by relating the entire discussion around the phenomenon of *kairos* to “the rhetor’s ambition to both find and be challenged by truth (...); to become a *transformative professional*<sup>8</sup> (...)” (Couture, 1998, p. 132) capable to truly communicate his critical identity (i.e. to make the necessary transition [“leap of faith”] from Cronus [the god of the “normal” time] to Kairos [the god of “the right time”<sup>9</sup>, of the befitting time or, in corporatist postmodern “slang”, of “the timely opportunity to leverage convergence trends”]). *It is precisely here that the mouth of the vortex incarnates itself in the mouth and in the voice of the Death-Theorist (Kierkegaard’s truest “professional” label):*

“*Kairos*, which is translated into Latin by *opportunitas*, in French by *chance*, reveals the nature of things: the state such as the feelings of a crowd, the health of a patient; but it also points to a know-how: the knowledge that a rhetorician has of the time when one could swing an audience, and the knowledge that a doctor has of the moment when he must give the drug in order to reverse the situation. It is still a time, but one which is out of the duration; it is the fugitive but essential moment, subjected to hazard but linked to the absolute. (...) *Kairos* makes us think about the string of events happening in the world, about hazard, about the unpredictable course of things, but it also sends back to a previous knowledge. *Kairos* is nothing without the knowledge that allows us to recognize it; it is but an event among others for the one who does not know. But, for the one who knows, it is what reveals to him his own knowledge, by the shock of reality which reveals itself as significant.” (Pigeaud in Guillermit, 2001, pp. 18-19, our translation)

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<sup>8</sup> One of Postmodernity’s professional obsessions.

<sup>9</sup> “If there is only one way to do things the right way, there are many manners to miss them. (...) One of them consists in making too early or too late what should have been done later or earlier. The Greeks have a name for distinguishing this coincidence of the human action and time, which makes it so that the time is right and the action is good: this is the *Kairos*, the favourable occasion, the opportune time.” (Aubenque, 1976, pp. 96-97, our translation).

This is also the “realest” meaning of the technical action derived from divine intervention – an impetuous instance denoting the moment when the mouth of the vortex acquires a human expressiveness and *enacts a complete transmogrification* (the highest possible answer to a divine elicitation *understood*, in the context of our present essay, *as ascending dark inner sap*<sup>10</sup> *into the light of creation*<sup>11</sup>, *through a decreation* (Simone Weil’s term<sup>12</sup>) *followed by a re-creation which has adjudicated [ab-sorbed] the strength of the vortex*):

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<sup>10</sup> Direct reference to Nick Land’s dark fluidity which, according to the author, exists at the roots of our nature and evilly, archaically and primordially rebels against (and undermines) the security of *terra firma*. “Nick Land writes: ‘A dark fluidity at the roots of our nature rebels against the security of *terra firma*.’ (Land, 1990, p. 107) Land goes on to note how reason acts as a salve against the fluidity of nature. The chapter where Land has this discussion is entitled ‘Fanged noumenon’, and, as the title implies, Land argues that noumena cannot be an epistemological limit but rather are an ontological fact. In other words, noumena are fanged because they do not remain harmlessly domesticated in the cage of Kantian categorization, but rather, damage and determine us and our thinking by their very nature.” (Woodard, 2013, p. 31) *In other words, the breaking and the fraying of the identity in modernity re-installs the vortical at all ontological, aesthetic and phenomenal levels* “(...)not only (...) as an indeterminate object but as the edge of a disastrous object (...); vortexes that in themselves are objects with a minimal boundary (...)” (Woodard, 2013, p. 33) – the science-fiction, the diabolically and violently-fractal and edgy forms of modern painting, the outburst of neo-nihilist lamenting theorizations (which reached their peak with Baudrillard) and other forms of extreme art, being but testimonies (symptomatic reverberations) in this regard, and also unforgiving and blood-thirsty redemptive nails in the coffin of Kantianism.

<sup>11</sup> In a commentary on Pindar, Romeyer-Dherbey perfectly highlights this capacity of *kairos* to generate (or to unleash) an outburst of transformative divinizing light, one capable to absorb the darkest, the cloggiest, the most demonically viscous and the thickest fluidities into its infernal aureole: “The sudden eruption of *kairos*, that is to say of a time visited by the god, is generally marked in Pindar’s writings, by the appearance of light. (...) When the storm has consistently darkened the earth, suddenly the wind drops, the rain stops, the clouds are half-open - and this is the upturn, a light-glade suddenly, in a place of desolation. The man felt the passage of the god, and that is the *kairos*. (...) The *kairos* is a second of eternity.” (Romeyer-Dherbey, 1999, p. 10, our translation)

<sup>12</sup> “Decreation: to make something created pass into the uncreated. Destruction: to make something created pass into nothingness. A blameworthy substitute for decreation. Creation is an act of love and it is perpetual. At each moment our existence is God’s love for us. But God can only love himself. His love for us is love for himself through us. Thus, he who gives us our being loves in us the acceptance of not being. (...) Relentless necessity, wretchedness, distress, the crushing burden of poverty and of labour which wears us out, cruelty, torture, violent death, constraint, disease – all these constitute divine love. It is God who in love withdraws from us so that we can love him. For if we were exposed to the direct radiance of his love, without the protection of space, of time and of matter, we should be evaporated like water in the sun; (...) Necessity is the screen set between God and us so that we can be. (...) There exists a ‘deifugal’ force. Otherwise all would be God. (...) Renunciation: Imitation of God’s renunciation in creation. In a sense God renounces being everything. We should renounce being something. That is our only good. (...) We participate in the creation of the world by decreating ourselves.” (Weil, 2003, pp. 32-33)



“The time of the technical operation is not a stable, unified, homogeneous reality that the consciousness could grasp; it is an acted time [*author’s note*: in the sense of God’s destined time to act – here, the divine decisiveness<sup>13</sup> signifying directly a fullness of time “sealed” by a God who acted once for all time], the time of the opportunity to seize, of *kairos*, this point where the human action comes to meet a natural process that unfolds at its own pace [*author’s note*: that develops in the rhythm of its own duration]. The craftsman, in order to be able to intervene with his tool, must appreciate and wait for the moment when the situation is ripe, he must know how to submit himself entirely to the occasion. Never should he leave his job, says Plato, if he doesn’t want to let the *kairos* pass and see the work wasted [*author’s note*: *alternative translation*: as this could result in letting the *kairos* pass and in seeing the entire work spoiled].” (Vernant, 1969, p. 242, our translation) \*

If the personalized (limited and exhaustible) name of *tension* is “*despair*” [*Fortvivelse*], its *phenomenal* (impersonal), trans-dimensional (trans-contextual) and infernally purifying name is “leap” (the acme moment of the unleashed *nameless* forces of transition and transformation). In the very moment of this leap, man leaves (or, better said, is brutally expelled from) both the ethical and the aesthetical stages, and finds himself, like Abraham (alone in front of “God”), alone and “naked” (deprived of any possible membranes or protective middle-positions that could filter for him this unprecedented impact) in front of this massive force of creation and destruction (now, for him the time stands still and creates an infernal-eternal [interminable] second):

“In Kierkegaard’s view, the ‘leap’ of faith constitutes entrance into the religious sphere and the highest form of individuation. Here, the operative categories are neither pleasure and pain, as in the aesthetic sphere, nor good and evil, as in the ethical, but sin and grace. The model is Abraham, who in the story from Genesis was ready to sacrifice his only son in obedience to God’s command, notwithstanding the Divine promise that the old man would be the father ‘of many nations’. The temporal dimension of this extraordinary event is the ‘instant’ wherein this ‘infinite’ movement is made. The categories of the ethical are suspended in response to a divine command addressed to Abraham alone by name. In this sense, the motives for the actions at the religious stage cannot be generalized as the ethical requires. In other words,

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<sup>13</sup> Romeyer-Dherbey for example, explains this divine decisiveness with direct reference to man’s illumination through fortune, i.e. *through the pulsatile trace (now acting as Heidegger’s “Heim”, as dwelling-place) left “behind” by the passage of a pure and infernal energy*: “*Kairos* (...) is a gift, and the gift is a *kairos*; the intervention of God in the fate of the mortals alters the temporality, and we now understand that one of the meanings of *kairos* has designated the fleeting moment when everything is decided, when the duration takes a turn favourable to our wishes.” (Romeyer-Dherbey, 1999, p. 9, our translation)

the religious individual is 'beyond good and evil', in Nietzschean terms, and accordingly can be considered to be acting immorally [*author's note*: but also immortally, as he is now "powered" by the vortex of itself {of creation and destruction}]. In ethical terms, Abraham has no words by which to explain his singular action to his wife. He can rely neither on the surety of general principles nor the support of universal reason. He is alone before God – the consummate individual. Abraham stands out from such anonymous refuge (he 'exists') in the most extreme manner. As he makes this move beyond the ethical, he experiences the anguish (*Angst*) of his freedom, even as he knows the risk that this command, so contrary to general moral principles, might not be Divine in origin." (Flynn, 2006, p. 34)

Both Weils's decreation and Derrida's deconstruction<sup>14</sup> are achieved by means of a Kierkegaardian "leap", i.e. by a direct flammable violence exercised on the very ember of the previous inscription of the transcendental in our reality level; by a decisive arousal (incitement) punctured in the very delicate tip of the horn of despair (over-deceived and over-betrayed expectancy) and of virtue (merciless and stonifying [related *avant-la-lettre* to Freud's death-drive towards the mineral] Platonic intercrossing with one's predestined [unnegotiable] prototype) alike, or on the tip of the tongue of the dragon of phenomenal retribution and of reversion of ontological stakes and hungers. Derrida sees this paradoxical prolific duality enacted by means of a leap as a reformulation of creation (as a resourceful reassembling of the engine of creation) through a constant play of tensions:

"[author's note: Derrida would also invoke, at the pinnacle of his deconstructive apparatus, the leap, i.e. –] a taking of a stand when there is no adequate justification for taking a stand. In this regard, Derrida cites Kierkegaard: 'The instant of decision is a madness' – the movement of the individual as such beyond the universal. But this leap does not take us beyond the realm of law [*author's note*: or any other discipline or field of study] as such. It moves beyond previous formulations (...) but must in turn justify itself by constructing a new, more adequate system of law that will, of course, itself be subject to deconstruction. In contrast to dangerous irrationalisms (for example [...] religious fanaticism) that leave reason behind in a flood of mere will or emotion, Derrida's deconstructive approach always subjects our 'leaps' beyond one system of rational thought to the constraint of constructing a new system of rational thought. In this way, he balances reason and a sense of its limitations against one another in a constant play of tensions." (Gutting in Bunnin and Tsui-James, 2003, p. 871)

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<sup>14</sup> Weil's "decreation" being a transformation from the same phenomenal family as Lacan's "*dés-être*" (the time of the ultimate separation erupted from the desire to attain the absolute difference) and preparing the ground for Derrida's "deconstruction".

At this point, we are forced to improvise and use in a massive proportion the speculative-in-its-turn exegetical apparatus, because the Danish equivalent of the expression “leap into faith” [*Troens Spring*] is never-ever used as such in Kierkegaard’s published writings and, even stranger, is the fact that even if Kierkegaard re-installs in-between-the-lines this type of tension as the driving principle (force) of reality, he still avoids using the terms “faith” and “leap” in the same context. When he discusses (addresses) the issue of leap he simply avoids linking it to the notion of faith just as well as he refrains himself from discussing about faith in terms of leap:

“Nothing is as swift as a blink of the eye, yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal... (...). A blink is therefore a designation of time, but mark well, of time in the fateful conflict when it is touched by eternity. What we call the moment, Plato calls το ἐξαίφνη [the sudden]...it is related to the category of the invisible... The Latin term is momentum (from *movere* [to move]), which by derivation expresses the merely vanishing.” (Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 88)

That is why, our only final choice in here is to methodologically “divorce” the notion of *leap* from that of *faith* and to treat it phenomenologically, according to the paradoxical<sup>15</sup>, non-conceptual and purely transitional virtues that the notion of leap withholds (conceals)...since Plato’s *Parmenides*:

“This ‘now’ (...) lies between ‘was’ and ‘will become’, and naturally ‘the one’ cannot, in passing from the past to the future, bypass this ‘now’ (...) In the most recent philosophy, abstraction culminates in pure being, but pure being is the most abstract expression for eternity, and again as ‘nothing’ it is precisely the moment.” (Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 84)

This category of transition, this “presence without an assignable present” (“la présence sans present assignable” as Virgil Ciomoş would label the phenomenon), this being itself of conversion is perhaps best “apprehensible” in that unique celebration (and elevation) of the human gestures known as the ballet:

“(...) the figure of the ballet dancer as he or she leaps into the air and returns to the ground again provocatively mirrors the leap of faith. LaMothe, for example, suggests that the very shape of the ballet leap is itself significant for understanding (...) faith:

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<sup>15</sup> A paradox which, “incidentally” being said, perfectly defines our postmodernity: “The high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is. Baudelairean modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it.” (Foucault, 1984, p. 41)

‘The leap is a movement in which a dancer springs off the ground with one foot, hovers for a moment off the ground, and then lands on the other foot. As such, it embodies in one explosive action a double movement – a movement of leaving the earth and returning to it, like the knight of faith. In a leap, as in faith, although the two movements contradict one another (going up, going down), they appear in that act as one seamless arc, connecting earth to earth... the unity exists in the form of a singular, temporal finite act. It exists only in passing – in the flash of its occurrence.’ (LaMothe, “The Poet and the Dancer”, p. 92)<sup>16</sup>

The shape of the ballet leap, in the way that it connects earth to earth, calls to mind the bridging of heaven and earth characteristic of faith<sup>17</sup>. The balletic leap as a leap of faith thus unifies in the moment of its performance the temporal and the divine.

Edwin Denby’s description of the leap likewise lends itself well to such a comparison of the leap and faith (...):

‘The most obvious test for the dancer comes in the descent from the air, in the recovery from the leap. She has to catch herself in a knee bend that begins with the speed she falls at, and progressively diminishes so evenly that you don’t notice the transition from the air to the ground...[t]his is the «divine moment» that makes her look as if she alighted like a feather. It doesn’t happen when she lands, you see, it happens later. After that, straightening up from the bend must have the feeling of a new start; it is no part of the jump, it is a new breath, a preparation for the next thing she means to do.’ (Denby, “Flight of the Dancer”, p. 26)<sup>18</sup>.” (Kramer in Bartley Stewart, 2009, p. 73)

*And it is indeed at the level of the tensest paradox of the kairos that Kierkegaard brings his most important contribution to the definition of man’s initial becoming; of his first step out of animality (and perhaps even out of his physical and metaphysical mineralness – if we are to recall to mind the idea from which we have started this study – the death-drive as the answer to “the seduction of terminal*

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<sup>16</sup> Nathaniel Kramer’s reference: Kimerer L. LaMothe, “The Poet and the Dancer”, in her *Between Dancing and Writing: The Practice of Religious Studies*, New York: Fordham University Press 2004. pp. 85-102.

<sup>17</sup> An extra-explanation in what concerns the ways in which dancing configures, reproduces and also produces the religious feeling, can be found in the following passage: “(...) ‘the metaphoric weight of the image [of the dancer] does not depend on an opposition of the bodily to the intellectual, the outer to the inner, or the emotional to the rational. Dancing appears as religion. It appears as a way of inhabiting religion; it engages thinking, feeling, and enacting...in Kierkegaard’s work, «dancing» has a meaning as a kind of doing that eludes the grasp of philosophical writing.’ ” (LaMothe, “The Poet and the Dancer”, p. 85, in Kramer, 2009, p. 80).

<sup>18</sup> Nathaniel Kramer’s reference: Edwin Denby, “Flight of the Dancer” in his *Looking at the Dance*, New York: Horizon Press, 1968. pp. 23-9.

calm, a slipping back into the quiescence of the inorganic, back towards the slower rhythms of geological time"<sup>19</sup> [Lukes, 2013, p. 75]), *into humanity*. Consequently we reach here what Kierkegaard ultimately labelled as “‘Christianity’s crucial criterion’<sup>20</sup> – the *acceptance of an objective uncertainty that is inaccessible to reason* but through which, with divine help, salvation is alone to be found.” (Gardiner, 1988, p. 109): “(...) human existence takes the form of a ‘constant striving’, seeking a fulfilment that lies beyond the temporal sphere and which is only attainable by our freely committing ourselves to a power that transcends objective knowledge and rational comprehension.” (Gardiner, 1988, p. 109)

But (and Kierkegaard constantly insists on this aspect) it is precisely this *inconsistency* that constantly demands the *kairos* (one that cannot be eradicated and one that constantly compromises both the ontological and the phenomenal completion of all relevant and irrelevant matters) that keeps the vacuous (and its reverberations in the human mind) active and dangerously-creative, by means of its communication medium (amniotic fluid) with the humans, which is *anxiety*.

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<sup>19</sup> Daniel Lukes’ reference for this line: J. G. Ballard, *The Crystal World* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux: New York, 1966), 111.

<sup>20</sup> We consider that the „God” that Kierkegaard speaks about in his works is not at all the canonical (be it as metaphorical and as allegorical as the holy texts may twist its meaningful appearances) God of Christianity, but primarily an *avant la lettre* phenomenological divinity – that is, *this new God is the infernally blooming tension itself of transition...* an acontextual power of the Being that turned Adam into a creature best interrogated by Herman Melville in his *Moby Dick*: “Then tell me; art thou not an arrant, all-grasping, inter-meddling, monopolizing, heathenish old scamp, to be one day making legs, and the next day coffins to clap them in, and yet again life-buoys out of those same coffins?” (Melville, 2014, p. 298)

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