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THE VIRTUOUS CITIZEN: REGIMES AND AUDIENCES[1]

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ABSTRACT. The purpose of the present paper is to sketch the possibility of an audience theory specific to virtue argumentation taking as a starting point what Aristotle has to say about political audiences in the context of specific political constitutions and building on insights offered by the New Rhetoric argumentation theory of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and the responsibilist virtue epistemology of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.

***Keywords*:** Aristotle, constitutions, rhetoric, audience, virtue argumentation

I. Introduction

Political animals come in many shapes and sizes. One of the first instantiations of this can be observed in Aristotle's writings, where one can discern a certain link between his works on biology and his works on politics. For instance, we can imagine that one of Aristotle's purposes in his *Politics* was to classify (and to define) the different kinds of the political fauna; thus, the genus *zoon politikon* would be divided into *zoon oligarchikon*, *zoon democratikon* and so on. The fact that for Aristotle, from such an angle, there is more than one type of man, of political animal, and that the types of men are specific to the kinds of states that exist and their respective constitutions and institutions, is clear: "The citizen (...) differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states" (*Politics* III, 1, 1275b2-4[3]). Now, there are also many ways in which political communication that involves argument with these different

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[3] All translations from Aristotle are found in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (Barnes 1984).

species can be achieved. We only need to know their particular *frequencies* in order to get the message through, as we can find out in *Rhetoric* I, 8. There we read some lines that link the difference between citizens to the difference between arguments adapted to the different audiences that are composed of the mentioned different types of citizens:

> (F1) "The *most important* and effective qualification for *success in persuading audiences* and speaking well on public affairs is *to understand all forms of government* and to discriminate their respective *customs, institutions, and interests*. For *all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest*, and *their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order*. Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of government are four – democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these government powers." (*Rhetoric* I, 8, 1365b22-1365b31, italics mine)[4]

This fragment seems to indicate that, because there are different kinds of governments, we may have different species of proper arguments adapted to the different contexts. This way we should think that certain discourse types work well in specific regimes (say, debate works best in a democracy while praising speeches work well in a tyranny etc.). More specifically, we have different kinds of citizens which make up for different kinds of audiences. This difference seems to be shaped by the difference in interest (which varies according to government, what is implied by the "the maintenance of the established order" being different in each case). At first sight it seems simple enough: the orator needs to know the interest(s) of his audience in order to exploit that interest towards the achievement of his own goal in legislation (either its maintenance or its change). However, there is more to this than meets the eye. First, knowing your citizens is a question of character which in turn is a question of knowing their dispositions (i.e. virtues and vices). Secondly, it is not just a question of producing arguments, but also of being able to examine arguments produced by others.

[4] It can be surmised that the short *Rhetoric* I, 8 is a later addition to the corpus of the text (Kennedy 2007, 72). Its placement at the end of the discussion on deliberative rhetoric and before the discussions dedicated to epideictic and judicial oratory, can lead us to think that the theoretical insights provided in the chapter are better suited for argumentative encounters in deliberative contexts.

My purpose in this paper is to sketch the possibility of an audience theory specific to virtue argumentation (VAT) and applicable in a political context, starting from what Aristotle has to say about citizens as audiences in the context of political deliberation. After presenting what Aristotle has to say on the matter and after considering the New Rhetoric as a candidate to understand these matters, I will insist that VAT may also be a suited to offer an audience theory that actually may incorporate insights from the New Rhetoric and in the same time developing new specific insights, taking into account also a responsibilist view on virtues, such as the one developed by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski in virtue epistemology.

II. Regime types and citizens in Aristotle

In the political context had in mind by Aristotle, the audience was composed of citizens who also had a say in the process of government and this was an essential feature since, by means of it, the conservation of the state and its political constitution became possible. This audience was already predisposed in a certain manner, and this was different from one regime to another because even the abstract concept of regime preservation can take different form when considered in particular instances: conservation of liberties in a democracy, wealth in oligarchies, the survival of the tyrant in tyrannies and so on. In these circumstances, what could count as a virtue or vice for the democratic citizen audience may very well be a vice for the audience in a tyranny. In what follows I will first present the theoretical context of political morphology (or classification of regime types) from the perspective of which I will consider virtues and vices of the citizens, discussed in the context of the interests specific to each regime type.

Aristotle's six-fold classification of political regimes seems to have been the most influential at least during antiquity and High middle ages[5]. According to this classification, there are six forms of government, each with a specific constitution (*Politics* III, 7):

[5] A classification of this type has been called a "political morphology" (Bereschi 2009). The classification into six regime types does not seem to have been without issues (for this see Blythe 1992; or for the particular problems regarding the distinction between democracy and oligarchy Drehe 2016b). Also, for its later influence and reception (Blythe 1992; Bereschi 2009; Bereschi 2016).

Table 1.

Number of rulers	True form	Perverted form
One	Kingship	Tyranny
Few	Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Many	Constitutional regime	Democracy

From the perspective of the quality of the regime, the classification into "true" and "perverted" forms relative to the interest of the rulers, i.e. citizens who have a say in state decisions. If the government has in mind the common interest, then it is a true form, if the pursued interest is private, then it is perverted (*Politics* III, 7, 1279a28-30). These common or private interests seem to take different forms according to each particular regime.

Abstractly, the general purpose of a political regime is, in Aristotle's view, to resist constitutional change, i.e. to conserve itself. Thus, the conservation of a tyranny will be a constitutional conservation, but will take a different shape in comparison with the conservation of a democracy or of an aristocracy, because the fundamentals of the constitution are different in each case and different kinds of change can affect each of them. This "principle of constitutional conservation"[6] is essential here and, in short, it stresses the fact that a regime cannot last if there is an incompatibility between the type of the regime and the type of its citizens, because democratic men are not inclined to live in a tyranny, oligarchical men in a democracy and so on; and therefore Aristotle takes for granted the following: "the portion of the state which desires the permanence of the constitution ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse" (*Politics* IV, 12, 1296b14-17)[7].

Constitutions may change and this happens when a law that is incompatible with the constitution is passed. This is why every new proposal should be checked, in order to avoid this outcome (e.g. *Politics* II, 9, 1269a29-34; cf. *Politics* IV, 1, 1289a 11-27). If this verification does not happen, then there is a risk that a regime could

[6] For a discussion of this concept and the usage of the corresponding phrase please refer to (de Luise 2015).

[7] Of course, political regimes and constitutions may suffer change in the form of destruction because of other causes as well, external in nature, such as natural catastrophes or wars (e.g. *De caelo* I, 3, 270b19-20; *Meteorology* I, 3, 339b27-28; *Metaphysics* XII, 8, 1074b10-12; etc.); however, here I have in mind cases where a certain body of citizens exists in order to engage in specific political activities.

change into another as is, for example, the case of an aristocracy that changed into an oligarchy because positions that were temporary given to individuals by means of elections at regular intervals were transformed into perpetual ones (see *Politics* V, 7, 1307a40-b19). This happened, as in many cases, by the citizens accepting the argument of the "revolutionaries", because they thought that the changes will not affect their constitution. This means that each citizen, before consenting to what is supposedly proved in an argument, should know his best interest in the matter, in this particular case, the purpose of the state he considers himself citizen of:

> (F2) "We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. *The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant*. It is clear, then, that we must *distinguish the particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the end of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends*. But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps the speaker convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the character of each form of government, for the special character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it. We shall learn the qualities of the governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them." (*Rhetoric* I, 8, 1366a3-1366a17, italics mine)

The worst form of government also uses the means specific to the other corrupted forms; for example, tyranny uses wealth acquisition and maintenance, particular to oligarchies, in order to ensure the protection and the luxurious life of the ruler, or from democracies it borrows the means to destroy political opponents (e.g. *Politics* V, 10, 1311a9-1311a27). This means that instruments of persuasion specific to democracies or polities appear in all regimes, and they are used to convince the ruled of something that is for the common good or for the good of the ruling class. If this is the case, then knowing about citizens or the ruled (their "particular customs, institutions, interest" as in F2 *supra*), should be one of the priorities of the orator who wants to persuade them in regard to law institution, maintenance or rejection. And not just this, but he also needs to know about the dispositions (virtues or vices) of the respective citizens, which are, in a certain manner and to some extent, determined by those customs, institutions and interests.

The virtues of the political audience are used in belief formation or belief revision in accordance with the right course of action in a practical context. In the case of political deliberation regarding laws, for example, this translates, with belief formation or revision that is consistent with the constitution of the regime, i.e. its purpose, supposing that the citizens of that regime have purposes conducive in that direction. So, the citizen of an oligarchy will aim to form his beliefs in relation to the values (if we are to speak in terms of the New Rhetoric, see *infra*) specific to that regime type and eventually will reject something that goes against that set of values. In regard to the way an audience evaluates an argument proposed by an arguer (rhetorician or orator), Aristotle makes an interesting point in *Politics* III, 11. The context here refers to political argument in a polity, the uncorrupted counterpart of democracy, and considers a view, not necessarily Aristotle's, on the way the many can be better than the few:

> (F3) "The principle that the multitude ought to be in power rather than the few best might seem to be solved and to contain some difficulty and perhaps even truth. For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought." (*Politics* III, 11, 1281a40-1281b6)[8]

The same idea is repeated in *Politics* III, 15, using the same analogy:

> (F4) "any member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual." (*Politics* III, 15, 1286a28-31).

[8] Cf. At a certain point in Plato's *Protagoras*, in the context of a discussion on the teachability of virtue, the sophist Protagoras expounds a myth in which Zeus imparted the political virtues (πολιτικὴν τέχνην; cf. Aristotle's view of *τέχνη* as an intellectual virtue. Also, we read in the *Statesman* that "dishonor, vice, injustice" go against political art or virtue 296c) (i.e. the respect for others and justice) equally to all citizens (*Protagoras* 322c-d). This is an interesting point: each citizen needs to posses the needed political virtue for the community if the peace is to be possible and durable. This was the purpose of Zeus when he sent Hermes with those gifts: to avoid the destruction of the human communities. In this case too, citizen meaning someone who, to some extent, partakes to decision-making in the city-state.

Aristotle exemplifies this with the cases where the many are better judges such as in music or poetry evaluation (1281b7) or that in a work of art, where better qualities, which exist separately in reality, are brought together (1281b10-15). Aristotle states clearly that he is not certain if this is applicable to every kind of political assembly (1281b15-16). Why is it important to give some kind of power to the multitude, since the individual members of it (even though they are free and they are citizens) lack wealth, merit, knowledge or honesty (1281b25-27), features essential for the ones who should hold office? The answer is simple: in order to ensure stability and to preserve the constitution (cf. *Rhetoric* I, 8, 1365b22-31, quoted *supra*). This is because a majority is needed for stability (*Politics* IV, 12, 1296b14-17) and if a good deal of citizens are left outside the governing process, it may cause social instability or, as Aristotle says, "a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies" (*Politics* III, 11, 1281b29-30). This majority, then, is given a role that is mainly evaluative in its nature, mainly electing and assessing elected magistrates (1281b31-32). One principal problem encountered here by Aristotle refers to the counterargument that says that the educated man, the expert is much better suited for passing judgment on such matters (e.g. the doctor in medical matters, the mathematician in mathematical matters etc.) and the multitude has no quality to recommend it in this direction. Against this, Aristotle found the following as acceptable: if the people are not completely degenerated they have a chance to better judgment as a group and in certain cases the results of an art can be recognized, judged and appreciated by those who make use of those products, i.e. the same way a person can sometimes appraise a house better than its builder, the same way a simple citizen can appraise better the work of those who hold office and by their action determine the city he lives in (1281b39 sqq).

However, citizens should be able to act as individual audiences too. And as individual audiences, they need to possess at least certain virtues. If this is not so, then it would be impossible to bring about an acceptable collective decision since there is nothing to add up towards it. In this respect Aristotle says the following:

> (F5) "Practical wisdom is the only excellence peculiar to the ruler: it would seem that all other excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The excellence of the subject is certainly not wisdom (φρόνησις), but only true opinion (δόξα ἀληθής); he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute." (*Politics* III, 4, 1277b25-29; cf. *Politics* I, 8, 1256a4-7; *Politics* I, 10, 1258a19 sqq. and *Eudemian Ethics* VII, 13, 1246b11)

The fact that a citizen has specific virtues, is stressed by Aristotle when he says that a good citizen should not be considered the same as the good man, because they may have different virtues (*Politics* III, 4, 1276b34-35) and the purpose of the regime, as seen above, determines the virtues a proper citizen should have (*Politics* III, 4, 1276b20-33). There, of course, a case in which the virtues of a good man and the virtues of the good citizen can be the same, i.e. they should both have practical wisdom: the case of the constitutional regime (*Politics* III, 4, 1277a14-15). Why does the ruled citizen need to have true opinion as a virtue? This may be interpreted that he needs true opinion in order to be able to identify himself in the position of the one who is persuaded by a practical reasoning process into action. Another way of seeing this is that true opinion is needed in relation to the specifics of the constitution of his city-state in order to be able to detect whenever the ruler acts against it. And, of course, several more ways of interpreting this are possible, inclusively that he needs true opinion in order to be able to practice his art (i.e. job) properly as it is important for the community, this being directed by the practical wisdom of the ruler. However, to choose between these versions of interpretation without proper textual support would be inappropriate. What interests us here is that citizens, as ruler-ruled audiences have certain virtues which may influence political decision making. At an initial phase this decision may be individual, but in the end, collectively, another, possibly better, decision may emerge. So, we can consider the two contexts where the virtues of the political audience are at work: individual and collective, and in each of these the way they assess arguments is based on the virtues they have, which in turn can be determined by the values they adhere to.

In order to understand the way argument works in political context, we should, as one would expect, appeal to the rhetorical explanations present in both in Aristotle's works and in the exegesis dedicated to the subject. But the purpose in this case is to understand what is the role of virtue and to understand this from the perspective of an argumentation theory. At this point, the best suited argumentation theory for the job seems to be the New Rhetoric, developed by Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.

III. Audiences and values

The essential role of the audience in argumentation was recognized since antiquity, but was brought back to the fore in the 20th century by the New Rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958, 1969 eng. tr.). From the perspective of the

New Rhetoric, audience is the entity that the arguer wants to influence by gaining their acceptance and the argument is something that should be tailored to the values held by that audience:

> (F6) "we consider it preferable to define an audience, for the purposes of rhetoric, as *the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation*." (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 19)

As we can observe, the focus here is on the arguer as persuader of an audience and the audience as a critical receptor of the argument, or rather rhetorical argument. Audience is classified into particular and universal (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 28-35 etc.). In short, what should be underlined here is that the audience from the perspective of the New Rhetoric is not described in terms of its dispositions (virtues or vices) that would ensure or not the critical acceptance or rejection of arguments, but from the perspectives of the values it adheres to in relation to the persuasive purpose of the arguer. These values are the equivalent of the "customs" an audience has and the purposes it has. These values are arranged into hierarchies by means of *loci* (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 83-85 etc.) and are of two kind: abstract and concrete (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 74-79 etc.). If we are to consider political audiences from this perspective, we can imagine that there are audiences that have democratic values, aristocratic values and so on.

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, virtues seem to be certain kinds of values (e.g. see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 199) and in the New Rhetoric it seems that there are categories of virtues, their distinction being the result of the relations they have with concrete or abstract values. For example, justice is linked to abstract values, while a virtue such as loyalty is related to concrete values (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 77). In this case, the exact nature of the relation between values and virtues is not pursued further, although it is clear that the audience is predisposed to evaluate the argument in a certain manner depending on the what values it holds[9]. In what follows I will try to explore the relation between virtues and values and to show, building on a responsibilist view, that there actually is a closer relation between certain virtues and values, in the sense that values may be "in-built" or "incorporated" into virtues as virtues of a motivational kind.

[9] However, this does not seem to translate directly into "what virtues it has" because the fact that you hold a virtue in high esteem (i.e. you "value" it) or a vice in contempt this does not mean that you automatically possess them or not.

IV. Virtues of the audience

We can already find VAT scholarship that deals or touches on the issues of the virtuous audiences or that of political argument. The topic of audiences was already introduced by Daniel Cohen several years before VAT emerged (see Cohen 2003). Cohen argues for the need to incorporate the audience as an important factor when thinking about arguments in the context of the three possible "root metaphors" about argumentation: 'arguments-as-proofs' (logic), 'argumentation-as-war' (dialectic) and 'arguing-as-making-a-case/arguing-as-presentations' (rhetoric) (Cohen 2003, 114). Out of these, the last one includes audiences as an essential part of the argumentation process, the context being performative and the purpose being rational persuasion. Apart from the general conditions that should be met (e.g. validity of argument), one has to consider the need for an "idealized model interlocutor" and a "idealized audience" (Cohen 2003, 116-117). Two years later, Cohen proposed a focus not just on the arguments or the arguer but also on the "correlative concepts of Ideal Audiences and Ideal Interlocutors" (Cohen 2005, 64). In this case the Ideal arguer can be of three types: ideal protagonist, ideal antagonist and ideal audience (Cohen 2005, 65). In the context of VAT, this can be called "the virtuous audience". However, it also has a counterpart, the less than ideal (or "vicious") audience, examples of it being the "Deaf dogmatist" or the "Eager believer" (Cohen 2005, 61). Another interesting discussion on the virtuous audience, inspired by Perelman, is provided in (Al Tamimi 2016). The virtuous audience is seen as an active part in the argumentative process, i.e. not only listens and receives, but influences the actual process and this happens because the argument should be adapted to it. This can posses certain virtues which can help it to reject bad narratives. Al Tamimi also provides a list (picked out from Aberdein 2010, 175) of virtues that the virtuous audience should cultivate such as being communicative, faith in reason, insight into persons, insight into problems, fair-mindedness etc. to which Al Tamimi adds the fairness of intention and critical trust (Al Tamimi 2016, 6-7). Also, VAT has already been shown as a suitable and useful medium to understand argument in a political context. For example, topics such as that of argumentative vices in modern democratic debates (Kock 2013; Zarefsky 2013) or argumentative virtues in revolutionary discourse (Aonuma 2013, Noonan 2013) were already discussed.

When considering audience from the perspective of VAT, we should bear in mind that in every argumentative encounter, those engaged in argument production and appraisal have specific purposes, apart from the general goal of the discussion, as can

be observed in the classification of dialogue types and goals to be found in (Walton & Krabbe 1995, 65). One issue that maybe has not been given enough thought is the goal of the audience. The goal of the arguer in a persuasion dialogue is plain and simple, as seen in (Walton & Krabbe 1995, 66), "to persuade the other party". But what about the other party? To resist persuasion? Not really, because what the audience is to be persuaded about might be true (or something else that is relevant) and then the audience will miss out on a great deal. To be persuaded? Even less likely. These two purposes might be the ones had by what Daniel Cohen called "deaf dogmatist" and "eager believer", mentioned above. What then? The audience wants to be informed about something (or does not want to be left in the dark). The audience wants to be informed about the best course of action (or not to be mislead). The audience wants to understand. The audience wants to be entertained (or not to be bored), having enjoyment as a goal. The audience wants to be inspired (or not discouraged). The audience wants to gain (not to be cheated - e.g. a trader engaged in negotiation). The audience wants to be praised (not blamed - e.g. a tyrant). While in the case of arguers in some circumstances the goals can be different of these (e.g. the arguer might want to intentionally mislead his audience), in the case of audiences there is no choice between two opposite goals - i.e. one does not ponder whether he would prefer to be misled or to be told the truth. While as arguers we might want to deceive, or not, as audience, under normal circumstances, there is really one way of seeing things. Thus, a further distinction can be operated in the case of the "participants' goal" category, at least in some cases: the goals of participants as arguers and as audiences are different in nature. The aim of the arguer considered in this light is *purpose-open* while the aim of the audience is *purpose-locked*. For example, in the case of persuasion dialogue, the purpose of the participant as arguer is to persuade rationally or non-rationally the other party, while the aim of the participant as audience is to avoid persuasion in the situations where non-rational factors might determine it[10]. Considered from this perspective and the fact that in a dialogue interlocutors may change roles, we can say that the general aim of the dialogue remains the same, but a change from arguer to evaluator/audience may bring about a change in the nature of the personal aim.

[10] This distinction is needed because non-rational factors do act upon argumentation in actual encounters and specific dispositions such as virtues of argument can help arguers to altogether avoid or to mitigate their influence, while negative dispositions such as those named argumentative vices make the agents involved in an argument more susceptible of committing errors (cf. Drehe 2015; Drehe 2016a, 391-393).

As said in a previous section, in the case of political argument, at least in that of the one specific to Classical Greece in the time of Aristotle, dialogue types such as persuasion, deliberation or eristic might all be part of more complex encounters and so political argument can be seen as a mixed dialogue type comprised of persuasive, deliberative or eristic sequences. Usually in these cases the audience is composed of citizens who have a say in lawmaking or law application. And these citizens have a specific goal when they listen to an argument. This goal is the motivation component of their virtues as an audience and it is actually determined by the values they adhere to. I have in mind the motivation component as in the case of the responsibilist virtue epistemology. For example, virtue is defined by Linda Zagzebski in the following manner:

> (F7) "A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, *involving characteristic motivation* to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end" (Zagzebski 1996, 137; italics mine)

Understanding audience from the perspective of the motivation component is important and it can show that an arguer qua audience is different from an arguer qua argument producer because the motivation component in the case of the audience is, or it should be, under normal circumstances, always fixed: in the sense that while the argument producer may be motivated to argue correctly or not, an audience will always be motivated to interpret and evaluate an argument correctly, as also stated above. So, *purpose-open* here translates into *motivationally-open* and *purpose-locked* means *motivationally-locked*.

Having this in mind, a possible view on audience from the perspective of VAT, also based on the consideration that argumentational virtues are instrumental, and that the way they are used in argument evaluation by the audience is determined by the specific purposes of the audience has, i.e. its values, can be conceived. These are actually manifestations of other virtues, which I called teleological, and by this I understand that some virtues may act as motivation component to other virtues. In a paper that dealt partially with the nature of argumentational virtues I distinguished between instrumental virtues and teleological virtues, comparing this with the relation that exists in Aristotle between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. There I said that argumentational virtues are instrumental, while other virtues such as ethical or epistemological ones are teleological (see Drehe 2016a, 390). Now, a fairly obvious thing is that virtues as internalized normative dispositions do not usually act alone

and their activations, so to say, does not exclude automatically the activation of other dispositions. In other words, whenever my virtue of humility works this does not necessarily exclude my virtue of fairness in evaluating arguments[11]. This also holds of virtues that are considered more as skills, i.e. the virtue of knowing the rules of reasoning. And when a virtue such as the sense of fairness works along the virtue/skill of knowing the rules of reasoning, it actually provides a motivation component to the skill-virtue. In other words, at least two types of virtues work when we argue or evaluate arguments: skills (intellectual virtues), motivations (moral virtues). Both of these can be active or not. The following table collects the possible combinations:

Table 2.

	Intellectual virtue / Skill component	Moral virtue / Motivation component	Result
Argument producer	Active	Active	Valid argument
	Active	Not active	Sophism
	Not active	Active	Paralogism or accidental valid argument
	Not active	Not active	Paralogism, accidental sophism or accidental valid argument[12]
Argument evaluator	Active	Active	Valid evaluation
	Not active	Active	Paralogistic evaluation or accidental valid evaluation

If we see the working of virtues in this manner, then in the case of audience, the open-locked distinction becomes plausible: while in the case of argument producer the motivation component may change (e.g. the virtue of knowing the rules of reasoning motivated by virtues or by vices, i.e. active or inactive moral virtue; as Plato would say: experts are the best liars), in the case of the audience the virtuous

[11] Although it might be interesting to find virtues that whenever they are working exclude the workings of others.

[12] When the arguer manages to construct the right seemingly valid argument for the argumentative context he is in, the we can call that an „accidental sophism", in the other cases either he fails by using the wrong invalid argument (paralogism) or he argues validly by chance (accidental valid argument). Cf. Plato's *Lesser Hippias* 366a-369a where Socrates determines his interlocutor to concede that expert is the best liar as he can tell the truth or lie whenever he wants, while the ignorant can do so only accidentally. A more detailed discussion on this classification of possible results when one or more virtue are activated will be developed in a future paper.

motivation component is hardwired in the use of the virtue-skill, because nobody as an audience would want to interpret and evaluate arguments incorrectly. If this is the case, then from the perspective of the audience only paralogisms are possible, i.e. unintentional errors in interpretation[13]. This holds most true of individual audience, and what Aristotle has to say about "true opinion" as a virtue can be speculatively interpreted from this angle.

The issue about how people act as audiences, individually and/or collectively, is important here. While what has been said in this subsection applies more to an individual audience, the case of collective audiences should be more nuanced because the deliberative process of an audience involves the switching of roles, the arguer-qua-audience becoming arguer-qua-producer having the purpose of correct collective evaluation. What Aristotle had to say about the greater chances of the collective audience to evaluate an argument correctly (F3, F4, v. *supra*) can be considered in this light. Individuals are more predisposed to paralogistic argument evaluation when evaluating alone, while in a group, as long as the virtues of the members complement each other, the chances of paralogistic evaluation are lower.

How does paralogism appear in a situation of this sort? We should ask ourselves about the role of purpose in the context of individual and collective argument evaluation? Let us take the case of an oligarchy, where wealth, its acquisition and its conservation, is the main purpose of the regime? How will the oligarchic citizen (and here I mean only the ruling class of the few, in the classical sense) evaluate arguments? Will his evaluation be influenced by his purpose? More specifically, does this affect his in-built disposition of *the will to evaluate the argument correctly* (which should not be confused with his *ability to understand the argument correctly*)? The answer should be no (maybe with the exception of people too blinded by their interest), only the disposition/ability to properly understand an argument might be affected. And in this case paralogistic argument evaluation is possible.

Argument evaluation in political context needs to consider especially collective audiences and developing a view on what a collective audience means involves the need of a clearer picture on the working of argumentational virtues in the case of individual audience. The individual-audience is purpose-locked in a certain manner, while

[13] Here I refer only to the process of argument appraisal and the conclusion formed in the mind of the audience by the argument, not to the verbally expressed judgments about the argument, because in it the possibility of sophistry appears as the arguer-qua-audience becomes arguer-qua-emitter who already argues for or against the argument.

the collective audience in another. The individual audience is predisposed to evaluate argument correctly, the collective political audience is predisposed to conserve the political status-quo, i.e. the constitution by means of evaluating arguments correctly. In this case, this acts as a second motivation component that adds itself to the first: individual political audience has a direct motivation component (the intention to evaluate argument correctly) and a second, indirect motivation component (the will to preserve the political constitution). There are cases where the second motivation component may eclipse the corresponding ability to the first motivation component, by deactivating it, as described earlier. But group deliberation, if the conditions are proper, then it is possible for the ability (i.e. the intelectual virtue or the skill component) to be reactivated. The fragments F3 and F4 from Aristotle's *Politics*, quoted above, can also be understood in this manner.

This can be translated into other contexts too, where collective audiences exist and their purpose is to conserve a certain type of community. For example, we can imagine epistemic or economic communities where the collective purpose of conserving the communities and their specific purposes is not threatened by overly individualistic aims (such as an extreme adversarial predisposition, i.e. vice, in argument for epistemic communities, where colleagues are actually seen as adversaries who need to be completely silenced or, in an economic context, extreme cupidity that pursues the utter ruin of one's economic partners, who are seen as adversaries). However, more consideration on these situations is not the purpose of the present paper[14].

V. Concluding remarks

A view on audience that is considered from a rhetorical perspective is too restrictive for virtue argumentation theory: it involves only an audience that has the arguments fitted to its needs, or, more exactly, to its views. In real argument, this is not a general rule and we can identify many instances where the arguer, or the producer of arguments, does not model his discourse according to the audience.

[14] Of course, this can at some point be adapted to modern regime types which are more complex. E.g. from an economic point of view, the citizen of a communist regime should be predisposed to accept easily a certain type of propaganda, while the citizen in a capitalist country should be more susceptible to consumerist advertising. All this for the conservation of the status quo. Please note that I am not saying that citizens should be so an so predisposed. I am only underlining the fact that in each political regime the ones in power consider a certain kind of citizen best suited for the conservation of the regime and this is based in a significant part on the mental configuration of the citizens.

At this point, it is hard to develop an audience theory specific to VAT that is not tributary in many ways to the views exposed in the *New Rhetoric*. And this happens because it is hard to distinguish between a universal audience (and its standard of reasonability) and an ideal virtuous audience, or to discern exactly how do certain types of virtues differ from values. This paper is exploratory in its purpose, and a sketch of the way in which we can incorporate the value theory from the New Rhetoric into a responsibilist, following Linda Zagzebski's take on virtue epistemology, was attempted; such a view on virtues considers the values of the arguer (either producer of arguments or audience) as the motivation component in argumentational virtues. The motivation component translates on the interference of teleological virtues into the workings of the instrumental virtues such as are the argumentational ones. There are still a lot of unexplored aspects of this responsibilist view, with incorporated values, on argumentational virtues, with a specific focus on individual argument evaluation by the audience and on collective argument evaluation, especially from the perspective of the way individual argument evaluation determines collective argument evaluation and vice versa. This distinction between argumentational virtues specific to the arguer considered as an individual audience and those virtues specific to an arguer as part of a collective audience will be eventually developed in future research.

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