

ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A RESOLUTION TO ANXIETY. A PSYCHOANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FACE OF THE OTHER

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ABSTRACT. Our perspective aims to fathom to what extent Emmanuel Lévinas's philosophical and Talmudic texts deliver a manner of assuming anxiety or a resolution of anxiety. To achieve this, we propose the Lacanian concept of the Name of the Father, and we use a reading of the Lévinasian corpus aided by the theoretical developments offered by mainly Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. We analyze the relation to the Face as a condition for the occurrence of the Other in his transcendence, from his height, as well as the interdiction against killing. The Face is simultaneously gaze and voice. We analyze the Lévinasian responsibility in relation to the Face as a resolution in the symbolic order of the radical anxiety in front of the Face of A-Elohim, in a face-to-face relation which could be a face-to-face relation with the text of the Torah that is the written trace of Infinity.

Key words: Other, Face, gaze, voice, anxiety, Name of the Father, Symbolic.

Introduction

In the context of 20th century phenomenology, considering the answer that the human being must offer to the interpellation made by the Other, Emmanuel Lévinas, influenced by his own background of phenomenology and Talmudic readings, proposes a horizontal, infinite responsibility of the human being, assigned and assumed upon entering subjective history, in response to a vertical call. Our interpretive perspective aims to fathom to what extent the Lévinasian text delivers a manner of assuming or a resolution of anxiety (*angoisse*), and to achieve this we propose the Lacanian concept of *Name of the Father*, and we use a reading of the Lévinasian corpus aided by the theoretical developments offered by mainly Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. While Lévinas constructs an entire "éthique

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comme philosophie première”, for the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan the ethical problem is structured around the subject’s orientation towards the real. Not limiting ourselves to highlighting a correspondence or merely simple conceptual analogies between the two, we analyze the relation to the Face as a condition for the occurrence of the Other in his transcendence, from his height, as well as the interdiction against killing. The Lévinasian Face is simultaneously gaze and voice. Therefore, our hypothesis is to interpret the Lévinasian responsibility in relation to the Face as a resolution in the symbolic order of the radical anxiety in front of the Face of A-Elohim, in a face-to-face relation which could be a face-to-face relation with the text of the Torah that is the written trace of Infinity.

By exploring the Lévinasian corpus in order to elucidate the notion of the *face*, within the conceptual delimitations of the Face in relation to the *Illeity* and the infinite responsibility of any human being that sets out on the Abrahamic quest of his own subjective history in answer to an original call, we see how the gaze and the voice, as conceptualized by Lacan, are in the register of the object, in the sense that the subject’s enigmatic desire is correlative of a *beyond* in the symbolic order. There is a fundamental lack in the relation between desire and object, which is constitutive to the latter; in this sense, the face is gaze, but not just attached to the domain of the sight; likewise, it is voice or expression that speaks in silence, not being attached to any acoustic dimension. Thus, the Lévinasian face becomes the conjunction of gaze and voice as an empty space, as a limit of what could be thought or expressed in speech.

The Face as Gaze and Voice

Our hypothesis is that the infinite responsibility in front of the Face of the Other is a resolution within the Symbolic order of a radical anxiety, which Lacan calls Aleph¹, in front of the Real of the Face of A-Elohim.

Within the field of the visible, the Lacanian object *a* is the gaze. The subject experiences the object *a* as a desiring subject because *a* is an “object cause” of his or her desire. This object appears in the moment, in the fugacious gaze, it is something that fades in the very instance of its appearance. It is a lack of jouissance of the subject of desire and, at the same time, a *plus-de-jouir* that is attributed to the Other. The gaze as object *a* pertains to the lack and, given the fact that the gaze is reduced to the object *a*, it is also evanescent. It is impossible for the subject to catch the gaze because the gaze cannot be subjected to, nor

¹ Jacques Lacan, *Les Noms du Père*, lesson of November 18, 1963.

assumed by any subject. It is this situation that Lacan translated by the formula of the phantasy²: the phantasy is the inmost content of the subjective, yet, paradoxically, it is not accessible to the subject's experience. The gaze, as object *a*, is not the subject's gaze, but a gaze upon the subject. Where there is vision, there is no longer gaze and it is in this manner that the constitutive division of the visual field is founded. The scission between the eye and the gaze – in which the *scopic* drive is manifested – covers the scission between the register of the imaginary and that of the real. Visual perception, on the one hand, although supported by the symbolic, pertains to the imaginary and is produced also in the mirror. The *jouissance* of the gaze, on the other hand, pertains to the real. The subject feels observed, seen by the other whom he himself cannot see, and that is an embarrassing experience. Starting from such a conceptualization of the gaze, we shall try to read the Lévinasian Face, whose expression is “you shall not kill”, which comes from its defenseless eyes.

In his seminar about “transference”³, Lacan already announced that anxiety manifests by relating in a complex manner to the desire of the Other, in such a way that the anguishing function of the desire of the Other is that the subject does not know what type of object *a* would himself be for that very desire. But this is fully articulated in the human desire as function of the Other's desire only at the *scopic* level. It is this level that Lacan developed in his tenth seminar about anxiety⁴ and later in his eleventh seminar about the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis⁵.

An anxiety linked to the fact of not knowing what object the subject is for the Other – anxiety that Lévinas solved through his conception of infinite responsibility – only works at the *scopic* level. Because, at the *scopic* level, the Other is a radical Other and there is a veil hiding a voracious desire of the Other, to which the subject is under no circumstances linked because the Lévinasian subject is in the register of the Same that is always inhabited by the Other as exteriority. The Lévinasian subject is only linked to the human other, to his neighbor. And thus, the residue, the object *a* of an anguishing “I do not know what object I am for the Other”, is essentially unknown. Not knowing what *a* is in

² In his fifth seminar, *Les formations de l'inconscient*, Lacan constructs his graph of desire and defines phantasy (*fantasme*) as the mask of desire. Then, during the next year, in the seminar *Le désir et son interprétation*, phantasy is placed between the two levels of the graph of desire: either above the message of the symptom or under the enigma of the desire.

³ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre VIII: Le transfert*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire: Livre X. L'angoisse*, Seuil, Paris, 2004.

⁵ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, Seuil, Paris, 1973.

the economy of desire is the reason why at the scopic level – where the structure of desire is the most developed in its fundamental alienation – it is the most hidden and, therefore, the subject is the most protected from anxiety.⁶ Thus, the trace of object *a*, from the moment of its constitution, must be searched someplace else than at the scopic level.

For now, we shall refer to the face of the neighbor, as Lévinas conceptualized it, as gaze and voice. The transcendence is expressed in discourse and the voice can be seen without an image, therefore in the passing from the visible of the world to the audible of the language, the voice of the Almighty embodies itself. The translation into French, by André Chouraqui⁷ of the verse following the ten commandments speaks of the voices that the Jews see on the mountain, while the rest of the translations are rich in images, although the texts speak about voices, in plural, to which the voice of the *shofar* is added. So, the tension of that text lies in the fact of seeing the voices, not in listening to them.

Gaze

We shall first discuss the concept of “gaze”. In his tenth and in his eleventh seminar, Lacan speaks about the function of the eye and of the gaze in the structuring of the human desire. In the mirror stage, the idea is that through *i(a)* the image of the subject in the Other is without a residue, the subject cannot see what he/ she loses because in the framed image there is a beautiful shape, an *agalma* object. Yet, it is a shape that contains a trap because the place of the object *a*, reduced to a zero-point, is the “grain of beauty” that looks at me, says Lacan.⁸ In the scopic drive, more than elsewhere, the subject is trapped in the function of desire because the object is a stranger; *a* is the eye which in Oedipus’s myth equivalates to the organ of castration, while in the scopic drive, in which the Same meets the world as a representation that possesses him, we are talking about a lure and the subject is forced to confront something that is not the true *a*, but its complement, namely *i(a)*, the specular image which seems to fall from him.⁹

Yet, sometimes there is something in the gaze of the other or the neighbor, in Lévinas’s words, that looks at us – for example the inert eye of a thing – and it is then that anxiety emerges in the place of the desire that *a* used to

⁶ Cf. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of July 3, 1963, p. 376.

⁷ *La Bible*, transl. by André Chouraqui, Desclée, Brouwer, 1985, URL: [http:// nachourachi.tripod.com/id91.htm](http://nachourachi.tripod.com/id91.htm).
Here is the French translation: “Tout le peuple voit *les voix*, les torches, la voix du shophar, la montagne fumante. *Le peuple voit*. Ils se meuvent, et se tiennent au loin” (Exodus 20, 15, emphasis ours).

⁸ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of May 29, 1963, p. 293.

⁹ Jacques Lacan, *Noms du Père*, unique lesson of November 20, 1963.

command. What is essentially lacking from desire is nevertheless masked, that is the object *a* which cannot be specular or grasped in an image. It is in this very point that the relation between anxiety and desire is presented at the level of the eye in a masked shape that is linked to the luring functions of the structures of desire. Then the eye of a seeing subject appears to the Other the way it really is: impotent and weak.

The Lévinasian philosophical project is related to the Face because the Face is the condition for the Other to appear in its transcendence, from its Height, as well as condition for the commandment “you shall not kill”. The face gazes at me and concerns me, at the same time, if we were to translate the French verb *concerner*, that would be that “the Face gazes at me” and “calls me into responsibility”. In Hebrew, both in Biblical literature and in rabbinic commentaries, the grammar of the word “face (*panim*)” has only the plural form of “faces”, the same word being used for the “faces of the Thora” as well. The faces of the Thora resort to the uniqueness of each person along generations, to be able to exist as they are stateless and foreign. Therefore, only the biblical verse or the face of a person can create in the human being the metaphysical desire, as Lévinas names it, without him being led towards the verse or towards the other by any prior intention. The Name of God – or the first Saying – has an exceptional signification in the very traces that it leaves as verses and faces. The interruption of a discourse by the trace of Infinity (formations escaping discourse, holes, places of inscription of the Saying) is not equivalent to the end of words, but it reminds us of the fact that language, as language of the verse or language of the face, exceeds the possibility of conceptualization, it “escapes from any theme”¹⁰ and at the same time renews it. With *each* face that gazes at me, the commitment is also renewed; a commitment which traditionally is renewed by the shofar. And this shofar has the function of object *a* as well: the shofar must remind God of His promise against a total jouissance. Lacan says that the shofar has the function of barring the divine jouissance. Claiming culpability by means of the shofar is what in Lacanian psychoanalysis is called *demand*: in its despair, it evokes the Other. It is a demand that, with Freud, is oriented towards transference love and towards the great Other who could answer. There we can see the agalmatic dimension with its inherent goodness.

The transcendence of God may seem so far away that, for Lévinas, it becomes a feeling of absence. “His presence is expressed in His absence, beyond any nomination”¹¹. What is left, then, is only prayer and the practice of

¹⁰ Emmanuel Lévinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, Vrin, Paris, 2001, p. 236.

¹¹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *A l'heure des nations*, Minuit, Paris, 1988, p. 57, about the Name of God and the testimony.

commandments (*mitsvot*) in front of God and in front of the people. But Lévinas also searches why and how God still comes to those who do not study and who ignore the meaning of prayer and *mitsvot*. And this happens in those miraculous moments – that cannot be explained by any causality – when man finds himself in a state of awakening in front of the vulnerability of the face of the other to whom he immediately answers: “God is not withdrawing Himself from the world, but man is closing himself in front of God, be it by a blink of an eye when he interrupts with the black of the suspension points the light of [God’s] vigilant gaze”¹². Then how can a man get to hear the infinite obligation as being the best answer that God gives him? Lévinas takes into consideration the story of Job in the menacing horizon of human suffering, especially in those moments when a human being, like Job, is betrayed by everyone, abandoned to his own despair until the edge of the abyss. It is such a life that is called to pray for the other: “Then you shall call, and the Lord will answer; you shall cry, and He will say ‘Here I am’ (*Hinneni*)” (Isaiah 58, 9). It is the same *Hinneni* that man, being called to responsibility, will say when he is in a face-to-face situation with the Face of the Other. “In our cultural heritage, the love for the other accompanies our religious life. This is the reason why it is only the second commandment, right after that of loving God”¹³. It pleads for a “directness of the impetus without return to self”. But Job also said “yet in my flesh I shall see God”¹⁴.

Although Lévinas agrees with Vilna Gaon’s criticism against Hassidic enthusiasm, he displaces the site of the trace of Infinity in the nudity of the face of the other man. Far from searching the enigma of the trace in the signs of a creating power, he speaks about the “opening of an abyss in proximity” or as a moment in which “when the face approaches, the flesh becomes verb and the comfort – Saying”¹⁵. This Lévinasian formula is different from that of the Book of John: “and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1, 14). A flesh that becomes verb is a face that unpredictably imposes itself as word to a subject who was only thinking about himself. Lévinas describes the Face as an “epiphany” or a “revelation”, meaning an event which necessarily surprises any subject.

Yet, it can also surprise him as *Unheimlich*: for example, the most restful Face, the most soothing shape, the divine statue that can only be divine, would

¹² Emmanuel Lévinas, *Du sacré au saint*, Minuit, Paris, 1977, p. 101.

¹³ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Le Temps et l’Autre*, Paris, PUF, 1991, p. 106.

¹⁴ Job 19, 26. According to Hieronymus, who translated from Hebrew the *Vulgata* version and emphasized the prophetic dimension of these two verses. The Hebrew interpretation, to which Lévinas himself agrees, is that starting from what is hidden in one’s flesh, he or she can know and understand the height and greatness of God.

¹⁵ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence*, Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1974, p. 120.

suddenly become animated, it could reveal itself as desiring. That would be an alarming strangeness. Sometimes, we can read in the Lévinasian Face the intuition of an appearance of this *Unheimlich*. And then the subject claims that responsibility is “coming” from the eyes of the Other. But the object *a* is born some place else, before the screen capture that hides it: the psychoanalytic praxis supposes the field of desire and this is born from the relation between the subject and the Other, an operation which leaves the object *a* as a residue.

Voice

The structure of the Other is linked to the void of his lack of guarantee. In this void resonates the *voice*, a voice articulated as imperative, which demands subjection or conviction. Therefore, the voice is not something that can be assimilated, but only incorporated.¹⁶ This is why it has the function of shaping the void and it is at this point that we must discuss about the shofar, that ritualic instrument from the synagogue which dates back from Abrahamic times. Its meaning is the possibility that for a moment it can substitute the word, thus shaping the place of anxiety, but only after the desire of the Other becomes commandment. In this way, it can bar the *jouissance* of the Other. And because it shapes the place of anxiety, the shofar can play its eminent function: solving anxiety as Lévinasian culpability; or forgiveness. The shofar is the claiming of culpability and what is important at this point of the relation between the subject and the face of the Other is something linked to the desire of the Other. The sacrifice is neither offer, nor donation, but its purpose is to capture the Other in the web of desire. And this is exactly what we can see in the ethical plan of an infinite responsibility in front of the Face.

The shofar – in relation to which we have put object *a* as voice – dates back from the Abrahamic story of the binding of Isaac, where the residue was precisely the roar of the ram that was sacrificed instead of him. Roar of the primordial beast, of all the “Elohims” ancestors of Abraham from the sixth day of creation onwards. The roar of the ram was not translated into commandment and written to the Tablets of the Law. Lacan puts the function of the voice as object *a* in the area of that part of *jouissance* which cannot enter in the symbolic order of the signifier. Although the Other is not completely deserted by the roar, its full of meaning law must not be accounted for this roar – because if it should, then it would truly be ferocious. The project of the Superego is precisely the instauration

¹⁶ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L'angoisse*, lesson of June 5, 1963, p. 320.

of an Other supplemented by the voice¹⁷, to recover what escapes the Other so that the voice would represent a void in the Other. And this void makes possible the Saying that Lévinas refers to when speaking of the “expression” of the Face of the Other, the expression in his eyes. Because it is situated in the void of the Other, the voice of the Superego is mute, and yet it is the voice of an ethical subject, at least in Lévinasian texts. It is the voice of culpability of the hostage who bears an infinite responsibility, for instance the figure of an Other who demands the sacrifice of *jouissance*, which is a commandment impossible to fulfill.

It is here that both gaze and voice meet. It is the gaze of Isaac in front of the face of A-Elohim. In his interrupted seminar *Noms du Père*, Lacan says that anxiety appears at the level of the scopical drive – the subject sees that the Other wants to pull out his gaze – because the imaginary web, in which the subject wove his desire by seeing himself as a desiring subject in the gaze of the Other, is being torn off. The fact that the web is being torn off reveals the fundamental structure of the subject with object *a* and, therefore, reveals the radical anxiety, Aleph, which no longer has an object, not even an undetermined one. Isaac’s eyes are affected by what he sees when placed on the altar of sacrifice – and it is an event that would remain the source of his vision difficulties that led him to be deceived when giving the blessing to his son. Isaac sees the real face of A-Elohim and, by virtue of this, he moves farther than his father Abraham because in Abraham’s situation the symbolic overpasses the real, in a topological manner. Abraham’s anxiety is articulated in the symbolic register and Lévinas takes on the metaphor of a journey with no return which is the subject’s answer to the original call: the implications lead to infinite responsibility, hostage culpability in front of the call of the voice of the Superego coming from the face of the neighbor. At a different level, Isaac’s anxiety is without object, the real is perhaps more powerful than the truth, while at Abraham’s level the symbolic wins over the real and makes an inassimilable residue.¹⁸ In both the sacrifice of Isaac and the breaking of the bread a space is created, an empty space where the symbolic register can appear.

Lacan introduces the voice as object *a* as prior to the gaze with reference to hallucinated voices. In his seminar “Les formations de l’inconscient”¹⁹ there is already the voice of the Superego because there Lacan says that the place of the Superego is the place of the voice. By identifying voice and Superego, Lacan is

¹⁷ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XVI: D’un Autre à l’autre*, lesson of March 26, 1969.

¹⁸ Cf. Muriel Mosconi, “La ligature d’Isaac. Une référence de Lacan”, in EPFCL, *Mensuel*, no 47, Dec. 2009, 51-57.

¹⁹ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre V: Les formations de l’inconscient*, Seuil, Paris, 1998, lesson of April 16, 1958, p. 333.

Freudian. But the Superego is an imperative which is detached from the symbolic laws of language. It is the law, but in an interrupted form. Moreover, this interrupted and parasite discourse can be assimilated with the voices. Nevertheless, *jouissance* is at the inmost of this imperative: “the Superego is the imperative of *jouissance*: *Jouis*”²⁰. And the subject’s answer can only be “*J’ouïs*”²¹. Here is a definition of the voice from the fifth seminar: “In the fully articulated signifier, there is always a passage, that is something beyond the articulated elements which, by their nature, are fugacious, dissipated. This passage from one another is the essence of the chain of signifiers. This evanescent passage becomes voice – I do not say significant articulation because it is possible that the articulation remains enigmatic, but [I say] that the voice supports the passage itself”²². Although in Lacan’s fifth seminar the voice is not yet isolated as object *a*, it still is an unassimilable residue that supports the passage, therefore it is essential to any articulation of the signifier.

But Lacan states that this commandment – “*Jouis*” – is impossible to fulfill because the Superego is a word, or, in the times of the fifth seminar and of the graph of desire, the equivalent of “*Jouis*” was the “*chevouoi?*” (“what do you want of me?”). The “strong voice” of this commandment has different values for the neurotic’s Superego on the one hand and for the psychotic’s hallucinatory delirium on the other hand. “When the Superego is formed, the strong voice operates as an Other manifested as real. Is it the same voice in the voice of the delirium?”²³

The French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Jean-Jacques Gorog wonders what would the voice on the Sinai be without the Tablets of the Law. Instead of producing a divided subject, that voice would not leave the subject another option than to obey; consequently, when people who hallucinate are asked whether what the voice says is true and why they feel so compelled to obey they do not feel at ease precisely because it is a voice whose real existence cannot be contested.²⁴ The Superego, as Lacan described it, not only commands, but also urges to submission whenever the ideal advises silence. The ideal would be: “end

²⁰ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XX: Encore*, Seuil, Paris, 1999, lesson of November 21, 1972.

²¹ *Ouïr*, in ancient French or in ironic expressions, means “to hear with one’s ears, to catch”. See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of December 19, 1962, p. 96.

²² Lesson of April 22, 1958, p. 343.

²³ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre VI: Le désir et son interprétation*, Seuil, Paris, 2013, lesson of May 20, 1959.

²⁴ Cf. Jean-Jacques Gorog, “Le surmoi freudien composite et la *jouissance* selon Lacan”, *EPFCL, Mensuel*, no. 51, 2010, p. 23. We shall add here a definition of *akedia*, meaning “to reject the joy that can be produced by the *jouissance* of God to the point where one can obtain *jouissance* from this rejection. This is the peak of vice, vice of all vices, none other than that of the Superego, the obscene and ferocious voice”, see Michel Bousseynroux, “Le vice du vice”, in *L’en-je lacanien*, 2/2009, pp. 17-28.

with the symbolic, say nothing. What is that demonic force that propels us to say something, to learn, I begin to believe that it is the Superego²⁵. The subject complains about it, but, at the same time, it is the reason why psychoanalysis can be carried out. The lack of Superego in psychosis would explain the difficulties that these subjects have, while for the neurotic the Superego stays the same.

Face-to-Face

The face of the other, of the neighbor, becomes in Lévinas's texts an "object" point that meets the subject and links him to his own desire, but at the same time the face is the impossible meeting with the gaze, it is the framed gaze, like in the window of the phantasy or in the way a veil conceals the lack (that is: what is not there to be seen); it is the distance between the defenseless eyes of the other and his gaze that can become a point of anxiety. The subject's relation to the face of the Other as gaze is mediated by the veil concealing the real, as the field of vision is bound to three realms: the imaginary of the mirror, the symbolic of the perspective and the real of the topology. In this sense, the scopic field always has a cross-cap structure, a topological surface that shows the real of the subjective structure in which the subject finds itself in an internal exclusion with respect to its object.

Moreover, the face is the one that calls, but this interpellation, arising from an immemorial past that calls to responsibility, produces a type of experience in which we say that the subject itself is called to answer while not yet being a subject, and therefore to enter the human order. This call occurs in an original opening – *Bejahung*, that contains the *ja*; "yes, I assume!", yes to a condition of possibility that exceeds the subject; we note that the opening is a donation – an opening in which the subject is chosen (*élu*), but at the same time it has to make a choice regarding its subjective structure – because the psychic structure emerges in the posture that the subject assumes in relation to the origin, the place assumed by the subject. For Lévinas, the subject enters the no-return Abrahamic journey by answering in the affirmative to this call: "here I am!", in a primordial face-to-face relation to Language, although by virtue of its answer and, therefore, in order to establish itself as an *I* after being interpellated as a *you*, it is necessary for the Other to withdraw, to become a *he*; whence Lévinas's concept of Illeity, or trace of the Infinity who in its almighty height commands, while being simultaneously weak and helpless in the guise of the poor, of the widow or of the orphan.

²⁵ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aïlle à mourre*, lesson of February 8, 1977.

The function of the face-to-face relation is to veil, to hide the gaze and to sustain a presumed existence and co-existence of the Other for it to remain a warrant of the subject. Because, Lacan says, there is a lack in the Other, there is a void made by its lack of guarantee, or the lack in the Other is a window to the unnamable real, to the signifier of the lack of the Other, which we find in Lévinas's Talmudic lessons by the name of Yahweh, unpronounceable because its vowels are missing, having been repressed. But this name has a name, Adonai, just like a nomination is also made by the symbolic, and Lévinas offers, in the admirable pages of *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* or *Éthique et infini*, a resolution to the radical anxiety through responsibility as uniquely assumed culpability following an equally unique call.

The adventure of the subjectivity of the Same, about which Lévinas says that he sets out towards the Other on a no return journey – just like the adventure of the translation of the Torah from Hebrew to Greek – is like the testing of Abraham who also stands up and leaves “from his house” in response to a call. The test of the sacrifice of Isaac is also a response to a call, but in this test, Abraham meets God in the real, and this God is signaled by the only non-deceptive affect which is anxiety. The voice of the Other demanding the sacrifice of Isaac resonates in the void of his lack of guarantee. However, for Abraham the symbolic wins over the real, entailing a rest that is unassimilable, a trace of the Infinity as Lévinas calls it, but in this precise meaning of the radical anguish, this trace is the Face of the other. We can see here to what extent the early Lévinasian concept of *il y a* pertains to the real and how it can be encountered, though always veiled, at the level of the face.

The Text as Veil

Lévinas says that “the fact that Moses spoke to God face-to-face means that the Master and the disciple were both bend over the same Talmudic lesson, say the wisemen”²⁶. Thus, for Lévinas, the face-to-face relationship, the proximity of the Creator is proved neither through an immediate encounter, nor through some Hassidic enthusiasm, but in an ephemeral manner necessitating infinite study. But this kind of study cannot be reduced only to erudite science, but it will place together the word of the master and the word of the apprentice because both the Thora and the Talmud can be received only by means of incessant questioning. For Lévinas, answering is something specific to Occidental philosophy, while questioning is specific to Talmudic study. If the verses are abandoned by men, forgotten on the shelves of a library and no longer questioned, then not even the angels can save them. Only

²⁶ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Difficile liberté*, Livre de Poche, Paris, 1976, p. 47.

beings of flesh and blood can grow the Word from the fragile Biblical verses by continuous questioning, a questioning that is nourished with human joys and sorrows. It is always a question of language. And therefore, Lévinas maintains that face and verse are one and the same. With this, we are fully submerged in the symbolic register, in an undefined expansion of the time for comprehending, the second of the three instances of what Lacan calls *logical time*.²⁷

The Talmud begins with the register of listening²⁸ and the space of Talmudic discussion begins after the withdrawal of God which leaves an empty space where all interrogations can originate. There must be an empty space for the symbolic register to appear.

The veil is the text. The central place in the Temple is divided in two spaces that are separated by the veil: one side is the hidden space, the Holy of the holies, where only the high priest could enter once a year on the Yom Kippur day; this hidden space is where the Ark of the Covenant is placed, the place of one of the names of God, that which is unpronounceable, the Tetragrammaton; on the other side, the space where people could enter, a place for the name Adonai. A thick veil separates the two spaces, a veil that supports the abyss between holiness and alterity, between writing and reading, between the written Thora and the oral Thora. The analogy that we propose is that between the veil of the temple and the veil of the phantasy. When looking at the veil “with skillfully embroidered cherubim” (Exodus 26, 31), what one can see is at the same time visible and invisible, like the text.

Even if the text as such does not necessarily hide, under the word lies the invisible, under the Said there is the Saying. The meaning appears without appearing, manifests without manifestation, like the Face does. It dwells enigmatically the text, it is a withdrawal of the presence. The text contains more than it contains and the distance separating the visible and the invisible is infinite and manifested as transcendence. Hence the veil places the subject in a continuous attitude of interrogation.

In Talmudic tradition, the Midrash is the third of the four levels of study of the Thora, four traditional methods of exegesis in Judaism: the level of interpretation, meaning *commentary* in its traditional definition. In the story of the four rabbis, this level is represented by Ben Abouya, *A’her*: The Other or the heretic.²⁹ He who estranged himself from Judaism, who moved outside, is, in fact,

²⁷ Jacques Lacan, “Le temps logique et l’assertion de la certitude anticipée. Un nouveau sophisme”, in *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, pp. 197-213.

²⁸ Cf. Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *Séminaire*, unpublished, URL: <http://www.idixa.net/Pixa/pagxa-0509110911.html>, lesson of October 17, 2004.

²⁹ The story of the four rabbis (Ben Azzay, Ben Zoma, Ben Abouya and Akiba) who entered Heavens, corresponding to the four levels of interpretation of the Thora; see Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *Lire aux éclats. Eloge de la caresse*, Quai Voltaire, 1989, pp. 11, 29, 327 *passim*.

most suitable to interpret what lies inside. The study, the relation between man and book, is incarnated by A'her, the subject of in-between. Interpreting, the human being is installed in a continuous movement, but without return to the starting point, between being (*être*) and "unbeing" (*désêtre*), a distance between two words: one which was already there and another which will be invented in interpretation.

The Talmudic controversy opens only when between the two interlocutors a void opens from which God withdraws because such a void is the origin of all questions. Here, in this space, the question is always open, it does not wait for an answer; here the world opens again, originally, as if each day were the day of revelation.³⁰ We propose to link the veil of the text with the gaze, since both are supported by a void, the abyss between the two interlocutors.

At the scopic level, which is the level of the phantasy, we are dealing with the power of the Other, with the Height from which the Lévinasian Face looks at me, although this is the mirage of the metaphysical desire which, nevertheless, is an indestructible desire.³¹

The scission of the subject which is divided by castration will affect the field of vision and the reality which is constituted as a veil hiding both the phallic lack and the gaze that evades any perception. The visual reality of the neighbor is supported by his face, a veil which hides, as well as by the lack in the Other that is conjugated with the presence of the gaze. The signifier of the lack is called by Lacan the Name of the Father.

The Void

If the visual field can be seen in the three registers – the imaginary of the mirror, the symbolic of the perspective and the real of the topology –, if visual perception is in the register of the imaginary supported by the symbolic, and if the Face of the other, of the neighbor, relates to the impossible encounter with the gaze, being the framed gaze, then the Face is the distance between the eye and the gaze, the face of the neighbor is an object point which meets the subject and links him to his own desire, it is an analogue of the veil, of the veil of the temple. The scopic field has, at the same time, a cross-cap structure, which is a topological

³⁰ Cf. Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *Tsimtsoum. Introduction à la méditation hébraïque*, Albin Michel, 1992, p. 114.

³¹ The hole of the gaze on the face is at the same time brightness and hole of jouissance where, for the subject, the place of the Other can be found. And the iteration of the scopic drive – to see and be seen – has a Moebius structure which is articulated with the castration in the Other, where the scission of the subject is an effect of the scission of the eye, scission between eye and gaze. See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, lesson of February 19, 1964, pp. 65-74.

surface showing the real of the structure where the subject is in an internal exclusion with its object.

The gaze as object a – one of the five forms of object a that Lacan conceptualizes: oral, anal, phallic, scopic, vocal – is the most appropriate to prove the agalma of the “object cause” of desire. The agalma shines in the light, it is a point reflecting the light, it deceives the eye, hence the expression at Isaiah 6, 9: “keep on seeing, but do not perceive” – which is later resumed in the Book of Matthew and in the Book of Acts. But the gaze is object of anxiety whenever the scopic drive reveals itself as death drive, if we carefully read Lacan’s tenth seminar. The gaze bears a mortifying jouissance. The two sides of jouissance – on the one hand pleasure, on the other hand too much pleasure, impossible to endure – make the object gaze both a somehow pictorial jubilation and object of anxiety, just like the two sides of the Gaze of Medusa: we know that it eventually petrifies. The verse “God has given them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see” (Romans 11, 8) indicates the fact that it is not necessarily for the eyes to be pulled out, as Oedipus did because he wanted to pass to a scopic level in an authentic and mythical way. Oedipus’s sin was that of willing to know and this is something that must be paid in horror since what he eventually sees are his own eyes, a , on the ground.³² This would be the meaning of the expression “eyes that they should not see”. The gaze is always present in the feeling of anxiety. Freud speaks about scopic anxiety where the subject finds himself looked at by the Other of the Superego and cannot hide from that gaze.

The agalma of the signifier on the one hand, the signifier of lack in the Other, on the other hand, because agalma is always supported by a lack. What Lacan calls $-\phi$ ³³ gives an agalmatic shine to all objects of desire and hides the

³² See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of July 3, 1963, p. 384.

³³ What does $-\phi$ mean? The transfer of the libido through the mirror is not-all (*pas-tout*), says Lacan, because there is always a residue, a ; but this residue is only lack and cause of desire. Yet, on the other side of the mirror there is another lack: the lack in any specular image which is characterized by the phallic lack $-\phi$, that is the one which polarizes, stimulates desire and has a function of attraction as well; the absence, the white of a desired image, is commanded by an elsewhere presence: at the level where a is. But this object a is not representable in a mirror. But when an object appears where there should be a lack $-\phi$, when the lack is lacking, it is what we called an alarming strangeness (*Unheimlichkeit*). But why the minus? Because $-\phi$ remains that part of the libido which was not put into an image, which remains as a reserve. Or, remaining is a reserve is proper to primary narcissism. Therefore $-\phi$ did not enter in the imaginary because it stayed at the level of the real of the body as organism, as a reserve. This $-\phi$ can be found in any virtual image as an attractive image. Or, what is lacking from the specular image is, in fact, that which makes it attractive and erotizes it: it is erotized only because what is lacking is that part of the libido which is hidden on the other side in real space. Thus, $-\phi$ stands for two things: on the one hand, for the fact that “not-all” libido is transferred in an image and, on the other hand, the fact that the image is “not-all” libidized.

horror of their real. Beyond the fully shaped agalma, there is a void that Freud did not conceptualize and that Lévinas only partially thematized, because the safety of the phantasy is fading, it is unraveled through the window towards the real. Since we are no longer in the context of “having” an agalmatic object, the gaze, but in that of the loss of being, the subject passes from the demand for a gaze in the phantasy to the becoming of the lost object, the voice. The agalma that made the object of the phantasy shine does no longer operate, the residue is cleaned by the shining of any phallic packaging in order to leave room for the cause of desire. Lacan links the object of the gaze with the object of the demand – be it educational – because the only place from where the object can fade is the gaze. And the analogue of the object of the demand is the concept of *trace*.

The void of the window is the lack in the Other – the lack as window towards the real, a hole through the subject’s relation to the world –, it is the hole left by the gaze as lost object. It is here that the subject places the mirror or the veil of the phantasy. The hole of the phantasy is equivalent to the hole of the real because the mirror always hides the gaze, while the phantasy shows it. Yet, the problem is that they are both deceiving since they both hide the hole in the Other and support a supposed consistency and a desired existence of the Other as warrant for the subject. But the void of warranty of the Other is linked to the void of memory of God, who could forget. This is the reason why the sound of the shofar is necessary, because it shapes the place of the subject’s anxiety after the desire of the Other took form of commandment – “you shall not kill” or “I am the Lord God”. It is why it can fulfill its function of solving anxiety as culpability or forgiveness.³⁴

“As if not”

For Lévinas, the Face is the impossible conjunction between the subject and that something that is the cause of his desire, but which withdraws because it pertains to a past that was never present. The face veils something that we wish to see but is impossible to see. Just like the atonement cover or the veil of the temple. The presence of the Face is correlative to the Saying that arises before any Said because it is something that was not lived, the fundamental trauma – which is the entry of the subject in language – is an experience without a subject, but which comes back as a *return*. Freud said that the trauma goes back to a prehistoric time, that it resides in the structure, and that what comes back as a return is the rest of the trauma, which was never apprehended in the discourse or the interpretation.

³⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire. Livre X: L’angoisse*, lesson of June 5, 1963, p. 320.

The division of the subject in its Pauline form bears on the “as if not”³⁵, and the speaking subject has an indeterminate temporality underlying any determined temporality. For Lévinas, the ultimate test of the alterity of the Other, as a pulsation of the Other in the Same, derives from the structure of this temporality as a gap in the chronological continuity, and leads the subject to its unicity consisting of an infinite responsibility for his neighbor, as both stares Zosima and rabbi Amos affirm. But it also is a universal culpability, for all the others and for their mistakes, the source of this culpability lying at the level of the constitution of the phantasy and of the subject’s relation to desire. This subjective responsibility occurs in a logical time that is subsequent to the constitution of the subjective structure in answer to the original call which the radical Other addresses to the subject and to which the latter answers “Here I am”.

If the subject’s event of accepting before knowing – or “we will do and will obey”, an ethical act assumed following a donation – is intrinsic to the revelation as donation of the Torah, then for Lévinas this is the stake of the truth as cause, in the sense that God is set as cause of the subject’s desire, but if the latter finds it impossible to refuse the donation, culpability may settle in this field of ethics preceding knowledge because the human being is, already, in a relation to its neighbor - the only way of knowing God, as the revelation is illustrated by the practice of the commandments. Thus, the dimension of the revelation presupposes the truth bearing word, it is already discourse, and accepting before knowing relates to the liturgical reading of the scroll of Esther. We may introduce at this point the dimension of the Freudian Superego. Freud’s great invention from his second topic is the Superego, in fact the way he places the origin to the forefront in relation to the constitution of the subject. However, the imperative of the Superego is a commandment impossible to fulfill if we are in language, but it lies, as such, at the origin of everything we say by way of the notion of moral conscience.

The conceptualizing of the Lévinasian Face as *das Ding*, in the context of the subjectivity of the Other in the Same is analogous to the moment of the paradoxical and archaic menace that Freud speaks about, a normative moment which for Freud is coherent with the oedipal relation. “That which in the real suffers from the signifier” suffers so from the original relation that inscribes the man on the ways of the signifiers, inscribes itself in the Face which appears as *nihil*. Behind the phantasic veil lies the signifier of desire, something which must not be shown, because the unveiling of what is but nothing – that is the absence of what is veiled – is named by Freud’s Medusa’s head, or by the “horror” answering to the revealed absence.³⁶

³⁵ Giorgio Agamben, “Biserica și Împărăția”, in *Prietenul și alte eseuri*, Humanitas, București, 2012, p. 60.

³⁶ Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire: Livre II: Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse*, Seuil, Paris, 1978, lesson of March 16, 1955, p. 196.

In conceptualizing responsibility, Lévinas appeals to the words of the Torah in which a permanence of an unpayable debt corresponds to the superabundance of God's blessing, because the more one pays the debt, the more indebted one is. The closer the subject is to the other, the bigger his responsibility is for the other. The interiority particular to the Lévinasian subject, in a responsibility for all the others in which he is irreplaceable, pertains to a lack of repose *per se* and, therefore, to a strangeness intrinsic to any place. A stranger to himself and to his place, no man is at home and in this "*incondition*" of stranger the man looks for the other, for the neighbor he is promised to, as each man is "his brother's keeper". For Lévinas, the paradigm of the subject lies in the figure of Abraham starting out on a *no-return* adventure, the adventure of a people as well as that of subjectivity. The people that was promised to Abraham received the Torah on Mount Sinai, and the subject knows that Infinity reveals itself to those who keep themselves *behind* (*sur la trace de*) the other, just like Ruth knows she will find the silent God if she walks behind Naomi.³⁷ If the suffering of the neighbor is a call to responsibility, then Ruth is in each subject whose election took place in an immemorial past that was never present.

One of the hypotheses we are proposing is that the voice and the gaze meet in the Face, therefore we analyzed the Hebrew ritual object called shofar that presents the voice in a separate form. The commandment "you shall not kill" as an expression of the other's face is only inscribed after the anguishing desire of the Other has been tamed, and the shofar may proclaim the culpability, which means that it can shape the place of anxiety, as we stated above. The shofar and the death of the father lie, in fact, at the beginning of the economy of desire. The culpability covers the anxiety stirred by the unassimilable residue in which the voice appears in the opening of the subject and of the Other as an object fallen from the subject and from the Other.

The voice resonates in the void of the Other, and the shofar's role is to shape this void, to put a bar to the jouissance of the Other and, so, to shape the place of the anxiety. The instauration of an Other supplemented by the voice is precisely the project of the Superego since, lying in the void of the Other, the voice is mute but, however, it is a voice of the ethical, of the culpability of the hostage and of infinite responsibility, in order to remind us the image of an Other demanding the – impossible to satisfy – sacrifice of the jouissance. The voice remains a residue irreducible to a signifier, a rest supporting the passage, being, therefore, essential for the articulation of the signifier. The Tablets of the Law are essential in the human structure, because otherwise the voice on Mount Sinai would not produce the divided subject.

³⁷ *The Ethics of the Talmud: Sayings of the Fathers*, apud Catherine Chalier, "Ruth", in Lin Yael (ed.), *Lévinas Faces Biblical Figures*. Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014, p. 103.

Conclusion

In the Abrahamic test of Isaac's sacrifice, the face is gaze, gaze of Isaac face-to-face with Abraham, in Lévinas's interpretation, gaze that stops the hand which had already consented to sacrifice, because the gaze and the divine voice unite in that eminent moment. But, if in Abraham's case the symbolic wins over the real and determines a unassimilable residue, Isaac's gaze is, at the same time, face-to-face with the real of God's face. Both Isaac's sacrifice and the breaking of the bread refer to the creation of a space for the occurrence of the symbolic order, in the empty place. The voice incorporates, instead of just being assimilated, which means that it can assume the function of shaping the void, while the language acquires, for Lévinas, an expressive function. The first saying is "God", and in the face-to-face structure of faith, the subject, exposed to the Other, already answers with a "Here I am". The Name of the Father is God, and the Said is the mode in which the human being reacts against or answers to that original face-to-face in which the Name calls the human being to speak, to the Said in relation to the origin. The human is stateless, the departure of Abraham takes place in two orders, on the one hand it is a departure towards "the land I will show you", and on the other hand it is "towards yourself".

The no-return way is related to the constitution of the being of phantasy that has in desire a function of meaning of the truth. The permanence of the study of Torah is a blessing in which the depths are always given in abundance, like a "much in little" proper to the unpronounceable Name of God which leads the subject to open itself towards the unknowable transcendence that surpasses it infinitely. The Name of God allows the man to be in relation with his neighbors by following the trace of the Infinity, because man can be a witness of the name, giving testimony about it and, by it, being a martyr in his infinite responsibility. This is the Lévinasian answer par excellence to the call of the Name. Any word becomes prophetic, being correlative of the participation of the subject – the receiver of the revelation – in the work of the God without promise, the God who "becomes idea" and who, being a stranger, only occurs if He is received; this God reveals himself in the prophecy, and this is the exceptional relation linking Israel to the Torah. Therein lies the interest in the biblical ethics.

The experience of the other, as a stranger, is also an experience of the strange. The subject was never present, as a subject, to the act of its election, so that the transcendence of infinity, as conceptualized by Lévinas, pertains to an irretrievable past that was never present. Therefore, the election can only be understood in terms of trace. Just that the trace as strange disturbs the order of

the world, the safety that was given to it by the window of the phantasy; it is an excess that shakes the veil hiding the unseen. The agalma of the signifier is counterbalanced by the signifier of a lack in the Other, and this happens because the agalma is always supported by a lack. The “objects cause of desire” have always had an agalmatic brilliance, the horror of their real being covered by a veil.

The lack in the Other or the void, window of the real, hole of the scopic relation of the subject with the world, is covered by the veil of the phantasy hiding the hole in the Other and offering it a presumed consistency as a warrant of the subject. The void of guarantee of the Other pertains to the lack of memory of the God who could forget about the covenant, so that the reiteration of the sound of the shofar becomes necessary, as well as its possibility to carry out its function of shaping the place of the anxiety as culpability.

The first word is the Saying, but for Lévinas this word is “the Name by which God signifies himself”. But the Saying is the one that translates the Saying into Said, and that’s how the untranslatable breaks right into the heart of the translation; the “still, small voice” which Elijah hears on mount Horeb, the original word, remains unspeakable, and the translation must be uninterrupted, just like the study. The proto-translation of the silence is Face, as trace of the passing of God whose Face is not to be seen and whose Name is not to be pronounced. “I Am that I Am” from the burning bush can provide a hint in this direction.

For Lévinas, face and verse are one and the same because the face-to-face of Moses with God doesn’t mean anything except that the disciple and the Master are looking together into the same Talmudic lessons, which means that the proximity of the Creator requires an infinite study. The biblical verses must be looked in the face, and the space of the Talmudic discussions starts from the withdrawal of God, who leaves an empty place that becomes the place of origin of any interrogation. The veil supporting the abyss between holiness and alterity, separating the Holy of the Holies from the nave, is an analogue of the text that hides without hiding, because beneath the word lives the invisible. The true face-to-face with God inscribes itself in the uninterrupted study of the written and oral Torah.

The Other, in the election, is the Saying preceding and constitutive to the Said, and in the original addressing of the Other, the meeting with the Other is not a fact of the subject, but it’s elicited by the call. The Saying has already withdrawn, leaving only its trace in the Said, but this is already a betrayal, and the problem of “in other words” is located in the passage from Hebrew to Greek. While the Hebrew bears the indelible mark of a revelation, the Infinity revealing itself in the Face of the other resides exactly in this Hebrew, original word, which the Same will never be able to translate in his own terms. The Hebrew – the scroll of the

Torah – is, in this sense, the proto-translation of silence.³⁸ The translation is irreversible also because it brings with itself a rest which is precisely the unpronounceable Name.

The Face reveals itself at the same time as a *person* and as *nothing*. In the nothing of the speaking eyes of the face, the Nothing of the infinity shows through, the brilliance of the transcendence reveals itself in the dark abyss of the eyes, which is the deepest darkness that produces blindness because of the brilliance of the Face. By way of *nothing*, desire masks the anxiety of what lacks, essentially, in the desire. The image of the face converts to the nothingness which we see in its eyes, hence its trait of *passage*, for the brighter the face is, the greater is the depth.

For Lévinas, the face talks from the nothing of its eyes, calling the subject to responsibility, on a no-return way. Also, without return is the stopping of Abraham's hand above the altar of the sacrifice, a stop according to the law of desire, which separates desire from *jouissance* and sets a covenant, reiterated by the shofar's sound. This covenant renews the original work, therefore the looking into the fragile verses, the meeting of the vulnerable face of the neighbor, the practice of the commandments, the rite and the liturgy all conjugate for the assuming of the symbolic that wins and lays a veil – in the feminine gender – over the real.

If the name of the Tetragrammaton is Adonai, if the name has a name, as Lévinas says³⁹, and if the context in which we place the Lévinasian ethical subject is that of the Lacanian Borromean knot, then, furthermore, there is a Name of the Name's Name – vis-à-vis the three Lacanian orders – as the Name of the Father takes over the function of naming *otherwise*.

The Lévinasian election pertains to the Name of the Father, that is, to a God to whose glory the subject bears witness in the continuously renewed moment of the offering. The substitution of Isaac, in the sense of the metaphor of the Name of the Father, achieves the primordial metaphor separating desire and *jouissance*. This assumes that in the cases of Abraham and of the Lévinasian subject, the symbolic wins over the real, determining a unassimilable rest. The Tetragrammaton is, in fact, the one in whose name Isaac is spared, the Tetragrammaton gives the blessing to Abraham for obeying his voice, the Tetragrammaton appears to Moses in the burning bush. "I Am that I Am" is a hole, a signifier of the lack of the Other that is, as such, unpronounceable. Moses puts

³⁸ Cf. Jean-Louis Chrétien, "La traduction irréversible", in *Emmanuel Lévinas: Positivité et Transcendance. Suivi de Lévinas et la phénoménologie*, PUF, Paris, 2000, pp. 309-328.

³⁹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Au-delà du verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques*. Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 1982, p. 150.

the name of God in the place of this hole, that lies, in fact, in the place where the Other is called to guarantee the symbolic Other. The Name of God *is* the repression, and the consonants of the Tetragrammaton make the border of the “true hole” of the structure.⁴⁰ Where the subject waits for the divine guarantee – for an Other of the Other of the symbolic – there is nothing but a hole.

But, as the thematizing of the origin of the Saying is absent, the subject needs an analogue which we call phantasy. The crossing of the veil of the phantasy is not pertaining to the Name of the Father anymore, but to the Father who names, posing the problem of a different kind of experience, which is not an object of the present paper. Although we do not believe that the Lévinasian ethics goes so far as to propose a type of subject whose desire could offer a real guarantee for the concept of anxiety, the inquiry remains open precisely because this direction concerns the phenomenology post-Emmanuel Lévinas and the psychoanalytic experience.

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⁴⁰ Cf. Michel Bousseyroux, *Au risque de la topologie et de la poésie. Elargir la psychanalyse*, pp. 55-56.

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