ON DOUBLE – WORKING OF THE VERBAL DIATHESIS IN THE JUDGEMENTS. THE NECESSITY IN ESTABLISHING A JUDICATIVE DIATHESIS INTO THE VERB FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

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ABSTRACT. Starting with the statement that the "Being is what-it-is," we have a new dilemma when we want to express something through a philosophical sentence. We will try to find out and to show how the structure of the verb, correlated with the judgement dresses up a double form: a passive one, and a reflexive one. We think the direction of transformation starts with the passive form and change into a reflexive one. This *double loop* of the verb, and the recent studies in judicative phenomenology, makes us to establish two new diathesis on the mental-structures of the verb: the judicative-diathesis and the pre-judicative-diathesis. Finally, in the construction of the verbs "being" and "is," still persists the double fulfillment of the passive, and reflexive, to whom we can add the active form, because in ontical plane, the verb is let to activate something- the Being. The manner on how 'Being' is activated in judgement, is double: a pre-judicative way, and a judicative way.

Key-words: verbs, transitivity, intransitivity, passive diathesis, reflexive diathesis, judicative-diathesis, pre-judicative diathesis, pre-judiciary verbs.

Introduction

Starting with the predication "Being is-what-it-is," we have a new dilemma when we want to express something through a philosophical statement. It will be necessary to distinguish between the phenomenological sentences and formal sentences (formal). We will try to show that the structure of one verb correlated to the judgement plays a few forms: a passive form, an active form and one which

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is reflexive. The metamorphosis of the verb should start with the passive form and go towards the reflexive form when we affirm something about Being. Even the cognitive structures of the verbs to be or is persist in the double fulfillment between reflexive and passive with some active valences, because in the ontically plane the verb "to be" is forced to activate something- the Being as to be.

1. The necessity of establishing a judicative diathesis[1] into the verb from a phenomenological point of view

Starting with the hypothesis that the judgement has an important role in the discourse (language), we can say that acts and actions indicated by verbs have an uniqueness which coordinates the entire discourse. But action is not the same with the expressed act of the verb, as the structure "S is P" cannot be identical with the representation of the object in intentional plane. The verb means a correspondence between the action of the verb and the objects associated with. When we pronounce "to read," the act of the judge thinks to the object named "book." Due to the action of the verb, this conjuncture of the judgement and the matter of the object makes possible the existence of the temporal moments in which the judgement is affected, and far more the verb can be connected with the thought's acts. From this point of view we think we can open a judicative approach on verb and verbal diathesis. The verb itself cannot exist whitout temporality, the diathesis cannot exist without temporal conditioning too. The verbs have more temporal aspects depending on the ending moment of one action (active, passive, reflexive). We dare to propose a judicative diathesis of the verb only from a hermeneutic-judicative point of view.

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[1] This observation belongs to the author. After studying an intense course in *Judicative Phenomenology and Hermeneutics* with prof. univ. dr. Cernica Viorel (Faculty of Philosophy of Bucharest), the author saw some similarities between the logical predications and the structures of the verbs. Starting with some common sentences, as "The tree is green" or "That is a non-tree", the author want to show that, beside these affirmations, exists an intermediary form of thinking the verb, which is of one side active, on the other side passive, but it needs something to unify them for the conscience. The way we receive them in conscience is the judicative diathesis' mood. Starting with such observation, we can develop a new field of research in the linguistic and philosophical field too. For more details, we must consult Viorel Cernica, *Judecată și timp. Fenomenologia judicativului (Judgement and Time. The Phenomenology of the Judicative)*, European Institute, Iași, 2013 and Willard Quine van Orman, "On What There Is". *Review of Metaphysics* (1948) republished in 1953 in *From a Logical Point of View*. Harvard University Press, Harvard reprinted in 1953.

What is this judicative diathesis when the form of the verb provokes the judgement and the conscience?It is a diathesis specific for the conscience itself, and not for some temporal forms as present, past, active or passive. It is something which unifies them into the internal structure of the apperception[2]. Inside conscience exist some active semantic-forms with "ontological remains," and precisely those remains can be judicative treated.

From a phenomenological perspective, a verb cannot be always active, or passive too, because there exist active verbs from an ontically perspective because their action implies something to establish in the process of the Being. It is necessary to investigate how they function in the ontological plane: the active form of the verb is closely linked to reflexive form. The active and passive forms are subordinated to a *judiciary reflexivity*[3]. The sentence "I read the Quaran" has a verb/ predicate which forces me to set up my judge on discourse, maintaining the weight on verb, and the predicate becomes something captive in my judge thus establishing the judicative. This "judicative"-form is the unity between the ontological "remains" of the judgement. In fact, it brings in co-plane the naturality and conventionality of the things expressed through verb.

Thus, we are forced to unite the "active" with the "reflexive", we wonder if we can speak about the "constitution of the judiciary diathesis" on the verb, a diathesis capable of unifying the active elements of the verb with those "remains" from the ontological plane. Even the action of the verb that affirms "I read something" obligates me to apply on the verbal action the reflexivity corresponding to my judgement, and in this way the verb would deliberately or forcefully, or potentially, take reflexive elements from the reflexive diathesis. In the assertion, "the art album is on the table" the verb "is" has passive diathesis, but the same verb also provokes the ontological being of "is" - as such it involuntary belongs to a reflexive diathesis passing through the constitutive structures of the judicative.

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[2] First, Aristotel in *Peri Hermeneias*, had considered that the apperception is the unity between the natural things and the thoughts about things. In "Introduction" to *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 9,we can see the following paragraph: "Kant centers his argument on fact that our experience can be ascribed to a single identical subject, via what he calls the "transcendental unity of apperception," only if the elements of experience given in intuition are synthetically combined so as to present us with objects that are thought through the categories. The categories are held to apply to objects, therefore, not because these objects make the categories possible, but rather because the categories themselves constitute necessary conditions for the representation of all possible objects of experience."

[3] We use the idea that the action of "to reflect" implies the judicative rests of the judgements.

This valuable diathesis on each verb can be conventional named *judicative diathesis*. There is always something ahead of the judicative, that is a pre-judiciary form, which is possible before a judicial diathesis, so-called *pre-judicial diathesis*[4], or a diathesis established in the judgement before my judgement may have made synthetic and analytical operations.

The verb cannot be thought in a limited way because it has some deeply ontological structures, and it is not something which finishes an action; in phenomenological plane it receives multiple determinations from thoughts. When I read a book, I can read it, but in the same time I can think on how the book is, too. Even a verb is written to present time, it imposes this ontological establishment of the verb- "is". If someone reads the sentence "I read the book" after few hours, that person is unified with the present time of the narrator who wrote "at that time" that statement. What works behind each verb is the very unlimited dynamics of the reflexivity of judgement. The verb cannot be thought as "limited", even if the verb mentions different verbal times. It's just a formal temporality. Based on these descriptions, we can pursue the evolution of judiciary structures in relation to verb actions.

At some sentences' level, such as the affirmative statement "Being is what-it-is," or the infinite judgement "Being is un-determined," we observe that same object (Being) is the "aim" of both synthetic and analytical thoughts, and these modes of thinking are part of transcendental logic. From a transcendental analysis, we can say that a judicative diathesis is validated. Even if Being "seems" to be limited by a certain verbal diathesis, she receives infinite determinations to which my judgement is "summoned" to observe them and to discover them in order to correlate them with the acts of consciousness. Affirmation of an ontological bill (the statement which affirms that something "it is") keeps traces of the inter-subjective-judicial[5] experience that often carries on a support of a representation. When such representation is made, it is desirable to step out of inter-subjectivity in order to receive a more objective, or a more real representation.

Many aspects of the verb are deceptive when we set aside the grammatical rules to make phenomenology. For example, passive diathesis is that verbal form that shows us a verbally self-acting action or an action which usually will not have

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[4] *N.a.* Judicative diathesis and pre-judicative diathesis are the forms of diathesis following the comparisons between judicative and pre-judicative in the conscience's field. Transpositioning this idea on verbs, we can see that we can make some new observations on how diathesis functions: everything starts in my conscience as a thinker of the language. So, we can assume a pre-judicative and a judicative diathesis of the verb, enriching the linguistics' field theory with these two new terms.

[5] *N.a.*

a purpose, or a motion: "The book is on the table. " Reflexive diathesis is a verbal form which forces us to meditate on the verb involved in the sentence, but also to establish a meditative action to the entire sentence, as in the Heideggerian example of "Being is what-it-is."[6]

This analysis seeks to demonstrate that the verb "is" departs from the structures of the judiciary. And it often transits from a passive form to a reflexive one, or from an active one to a reflexive one. For these reasons, we will use several arguments from Martin Heidegger, because, from a phenomenological point of view, we find them the most relevant in our investigation. We believe is necesary saying the diathesis of a verb provokes us to a reflexive dimension. We cannot confuse this reflexive dimension with the reflexive diathesis of the predicate. Many times the verb "is" will lead a double fulfillment of diathesis- (1) the passive one and (2) the reflexive one as in the sentence "The Being is-what-it-is." But let us not forget that, from the perspective of Heidegger and Ricoeur, the Being is possible through language, through discourse. If Being has this ontological start from the beginnings, then she definitely has an active diathesis, because she *acts*, and it "is" something.

From the need for objectivity and subjectivity, we are permanently encapsulated in the area of reflexivity, the judgement who tries to think itself; then why would not be the verb's diathesis reflexive too? The in-determinancy of the verb Aristotle told, provokes us to endless judgements and acts as a possibility, and then the verb receives these infinities. The in-determinancy is the one that opens the judgement to multiple ways of manifesting itself in reflexivity, for which reason non-determination is linked to subjectivism.

From a hermeneutical-judicative view, we intent to see the verbs in other way, especially the diathesis, or the form in which the verb does or does not fulfill the action of the act of the judgement of that action. As such, we will observe that from a hermeneutic view, each verb "takes" the form of a reflexivity and often transits between the active and the passive to infinity only through the acts of judgement. Therefore, we cannot limit a verb as "being" to a single diathesis when we refer to its effect on our thought. Instead, from a linguistic exercise, for slighting grammatical task, a rigid classification of the three types of diathesis was made. From a phenomenological point of view, they cannot be thought separately and that is precisely what this will point to our analysis throughout this article.

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[6] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time. A Translation of 'Sein' und 'Zeit'*, New York Press, New York 1996, p. 6: "Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being-one who questions-transparent in its being. Asking this question, as a mode of being as a being, is essentialy determined by what is asked about it-being."

2.a (i). The establishment and the constitution of the judicative diathesis

Starting from with difference between verbal and judgement act, we enter into the sphere of the judicative diathesis. We believe that we can relate this judicative diathesis to the originality of intellectual intuition, because it brings together the synthetic and the analytical elements. "What is the target of the intuitive intellect, are the uninterrupted acts,"[7] that are, precisely those acts corresponding to the infinite (reflexive) judgement, or the flow of bergsonian consciousness:

> Thought that thinks itself is beyond any possibility: it is pure act. Hence the fact that error, "fatigue" of thinking (for the situation in which thinking is in power) loses any justification. But what such thinking thinks of itself produces the imperfection of any thinking that does not (just) think of itself, such as human thinking. So thought thinking of -self is self-fulfilled thinking and the purpose of any other thought.[8]

The auto-refexive thought is a pure fulfill act and it revelates us many forms of the things between what-it-is, and their parmenidian[9] reverse- what-is-not-is. Regarding the verb (or the predicate), judicative diathesis consists in a distortion of the official meaning of the "diathesis." As such, in the judgemental-plane, any verb is the bearer of this judicative diathesis, which sums up both the temporality and the non-temporality of the verb. Non-temporality enters into the existential plan.

Besides, verbal temporality, the judicative diathesis includes the act itself of the judgement, but also the ontological "remains." Apparently, the predicate affirms that "something it is", but, on the other hand, in the reflexive plane it opens the possibility to think *what-can-it-be* or *what-cannot-be*. Going on this idea, there are those non-judicative contexts belonging to experience, and to our existence outside my

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[7] Viorel Cernica, „3.1.2.3. Originaritatea intuiţiei intelectuale" / "The originary of the intellectual intuition", *op. mentioned*, *Judecată și timp / Judgement and Time...*, p. 144.

[8] *Ibid.*, 145. For details, please consult the entire page 145.

[9] Parmenides, *On Nature*, Poem "The Way of Truth", Poem taken from John Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy, 3 rd ed. (London: A & C Black, 1920)paragraph (4,5): "The first, namely, that It is, and that it is impossible for it not to: This is the earliest instance of λόγος in the sense of (dialectical) argument which Sokrates made familiar. He got it, of course, from the Eleatics. The Herakleitean use is quite different, be, is the way of belief, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that It is not, and that it must needs not be,—that, I tell thee, is a path that none can learn of at all. For thou can't not know what is not —that is impossible—nor matter it; for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be." PDF version http://www.platonic-philosophy.org/files/Parmenides%20-%20Poem.pdf, accessed on 15 august 2018.

speech. I, as a thinker of my sentences, I have to distinguish between their formal logic and transcendental logic[10]. Thus, Kant has imposed a clash in negative thinking, by choosing to put aside such statements as "The soul is not mortal*.* This negative article -"not"- would have completely limited the sphere of the soul and, implicitly, the indeterminate action of the verb in the judgement's plane.

2.a (ii). On the multiple aspects of the verb "is" in the sentences with infinite judgements, or the levels of abstraction in the judicative diathesis

Starting with the idea that verb "is" with reference on Being, is a verb which forces the Being to establish something in the ontically plane, and in the linguistic plane too, we have an active diathesis of the "being" of the Being. When we affirm "Being is-what-it-is," we talk on various forms of abstract thinking, and speech figures. When the verb "is," is repeated many times, but in different Being's

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[10] Immanuel Kant, chapter "Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements", second part, division I, book I, chapter I) *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 207-208: "Likewise, in a transcendental logic infinite judgments must also be distinguished from affirmative ones, even though in general logic they are rightly included with the latter and do not constitute a special member of the classification. General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if it is negative), and considers only whether it is attributed to the subject or opposed to it. Transcendental logic, however, also considers the value or content of the logical affirmation made in a judgment by means of a merely negative, predicate, and what sort of gain this yields for the whole of cognition, if I had said of the soul that it is not mortal, then I would at least have avoided an error by means of a negative judgment. Now by means of the proposition "The soul is not mortal" I have certainly made an actual affirmation as far as logical form is concerned, for I have placed the soul within the unlimited domain of undying beings. Now since that which is mortal contains one part of the whole domain of possible beings, but that which is undying! the other, nothing is said by my proposition but that the soul is One of the infinite multitude of things that remain if I take away everything that is mortal. But the infinite sphere of the possible is thereby limited only to the extent that that which is mortal is separated from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining space of its domain.a But even with this exception this space still remains infinite, and more parts could be taken away from it without the concept of the soul growing in the least and being affirmatively determined. In regard to logical domain, therefore, this infinite judgment is merely limiting with regard to the content of cognition in general, and to this extent it must not be omitted from the transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgments, since the function of understanding that is hereby exercised may perhaps be important in the field of its pure *a priori* cognition."

contexts, it behaves like antanaclasis[11], a speech-figure which consists in repeating some predications as "Being is indeterminacy," "Being is Being," "Being is-what-it-is." The predicate "is" has valences of antanaclasis, but it changes in antimetathesis in the Kantian sentences with infinite judgements as "The Being is non-mortal." Of course, we can go on the idea of non-Being[12], and we also manage to remove the item of negation in order to maintain our position in an affirmative sentence. Besides that, between passive and active diathesis, "activity and passivity presuppose being-for-itself, hence non-being."[13] We remember Aristotle when he mentioned the idea of non-being. He mentioned that "the full and the the void" are associated with Being, and the "void and the rare with non –being."[14]

Further on judgement, Aristotle said "everything which is object of reflection and intuition, is affirmed or denied by thinking."[15] The Being is an object of reflection and subject of the sentence-discourse, which can be affirmed or denied. But Being cannot be or not be at the same time. We must find a proper way. From a kantian point of view, is a way with infinite judgements. Here's what Aristotle said:

> But neither it is possible that any thing can fullfit between contradictories; for it is necessary either to affirm, or deny one thing of every thing which is one. This, however, will be manifest, by first of all defining what the true is, and what the false. For to say that being is not, or that which is not is, is false: but to affirm that being is, and that non-being is not, asserts that which is

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[11] Gheorghe N. Dragomirescu, *Mică enciclopedie a figurilor de stil*, (*Small Encyclopedia of the Speech-Style Figures*), Romanian Edition, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publisher, Bucharest, 1975, p. 39. For details, see Kenneth Rothwell, "Structure in Literature", *College English*, vol.24 (8), 1963, pp. 602-607.

[12] The idea of the "non-Being" had opened a new field of research in phenomenology named meontology. The meontology wants to find how the non-Being exists and how it functions in the transcendental structures of the Being. We recommend for details, John Llewelyn, *Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2002, p. 6. "Levinas agrees with Hegel that meontology is the mirror image of ontology. They ocupy the same logical space, the space of the Same. So too does the neutral third value between being and nothingness, for which Levinas employ the expression *il y a*, the there-is", *apud* Emmanuel Levinas, *Difficile et liberté: Essais sur la judaïsme*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1976. From a meontological point of view, in Romanian "non-Being" means "non-Ființă," which is different from "Neființă".

[13] Llewelyn, *op. cit*., p. 5.

[14] Aristotle, *The Metaphysics of Aristotle*, a translation by Thomas Taylor, Book I (A), chapter 4, London, 1801, p. 13. On the first page, the book has the mention "this book forms part of the original library of the University of Michigan bought in Europe 1838 to 1839by Asa Gray."

[15] *Ibid*., Book IV(Γ), chapter 7, pp. 105-106.

true, or that which is false; but neither asserts of being, nor of non-being, that it is not or is. Again, if there is something between contradictories, it will either be, as is a dark color between black and white; or as that which is neither men, nor horse, between man and horse.[16]

Accordingly Kant, Aristotle had mentioned- "there will be a progression to infinity,"[17] because denying the Being means to accept the non-Being. Denying would be the cancelation of the reflexive diathesis (when we are saying "The Being is not something"). If the reflexive no longer existed, part of the judgement would remain truncated, and the experience too, and the judicious diathesis no longer fulfills its purpose, that of pure act of thought.

It is clear from Aristotle's quote that the negation of Being is another symmetrical object in the ontological plane, that is, Non-Being. Therefore, we believe denial of Being at the predicative level would violate the principle of non-contradiction when we affirm that "Being Is Neither Being" because logically it would not be possible. Aristotle says that "indeed there are immutable beings (and that they are those beings who do not change and cannot be but they are)"; therefore, their natural condition is to "be" simply. They "are" because they cannot change. This effect of the impossibility of changing them demonstrates that the verb "being" always has passive elements encapsulated into the reflexiveness of thought. The "Being" *is* simply because, according to Heidegger, it cannot be determined even by a predicate:

> And in a similar manner with respect to incompossite essences: for we cannot be deceived about these. All of them are in energy too, and not in capacity. For, if they are in capacity, they would be generated and corrupted: but now being itself is not subject either to generation or corruption. For it would be generated from something. But with the respect to such things as are beings and in energy, about these it is not possible to be deceived, but they are either intellectually aprehended or not.[18]

The natural condition of things themselves is simply "to be." They are because the cannot change. This impossibility of change's effect of them demonstrates that verb to be always has passive eleemnts encapsulated in the reflexivity of the thought. The Being simply is, because according to Heidegger, it cannot receive determination by predicate not even imposed- "Being cannot actually be understood as being. *Enti non additur aliqua natura*. Being cannot be defined by attributing

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[17] *Sqq.*, p. 106.
[18] *Ibid.*, Book IX (θ), chapter X, p. 221.

beings to it."[19] Through the dimension of temporality, the Being is related to the judicative, because temporality is the first condition of the existence of judicative. When we have the infinite judgement according to "Being is Non-Time," we do not necessarily introduce a limitation, or a determination, but we attribute it a property with temporal valences. The contradiction between non-Time and Being, somehow the similarity introduced by the verb "is," clearly indicates that one can speak of antimetathesis, and antimetalepsy,[20] two thinking abstract figures. But this contradiction induced by the verb "is" places the assertions about Being to entimema,[21] another judicative's style figure. However, we note, verb "is," is in the situation in which it cannot be equated with anything other than "is." We can say it is an elliptical verb of synonymy. To replace it with "to exist," would be to detract from the meaning of "Being is what-is," because this preface would turn into "Being exists what-it-is." Therefore, we see that metamorphosis into "exists" leads to a non-sense.

But there is a place where thinking ceases to think only on the subject, and the discourse. There is a place where thought begins to be *self*-reflective. The place where thinking is self-judged is pre-judiciary - the place where verbal diathesis can self-refine itself is also pre-judiciary (pre-reflective)- here is where we clearly have the distinction between the phenomena that go to themselves and phenomena *per se*:

> Considering the determined verbal forms of "being" does not bring with it the opposite of an elucidation of being. In addition, she faces a new difficulty. Let us compare the infinitive "to say" and the base "I say," with the infinitive "to be" and the base form "I am". "Be"and "am" <"sein" and "bin"> prove to be different words,in respect to their root. Different from both in turn are the "was," and "been" (<"war" and "gewessen">) of the past forms. This brings us to the question of the different radicals of the word being.[22]

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[19] Heidegger, *op. cit*.,"1. The Necessity of an Explicite retrieve of the Question of Being," pp. 2-3.

[20] Gh. Dragomirescu, *op. cit*., p. 40.

[21] *Loc. cit.*

[22] Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim, Montilal Barnasidass Publishes, Delhi, 2005, p. 70. We recommend to see the original text, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1953, pp. 53-54: „Die Betrachtung der (...) Verbalformen von «sein» bringt das Gegenteil einer Aufhellung des Seins. Sie führt überdies vor eine neue Schwierigkeit. Vergleichen wir den Infinitiv »sagen« und die Grundform «ich sage» mit dem Infinitiv «sein» und der Grundform «ich bin». Hierbei zeigen sich «sein» und «bin» als stammesmäßig verschiedene Worter. Von heiden verschieden ist wiederum das »war« und «gewesen» in der Vergangenheitsform. Wir stehen vor der Frage nach den verschiedenen Stammen des Wortes »sein«."

Heidegger had identified three radicals of the verb "to be" which originates from Sanskrit relating it to life, the one in Greek "bhoú" that relates it to nature and naturality, and the third, "Sein", related to the idea of a passivity of " dwell, stay."[23] For these reasons, the thesis which we have started from is validated. We have seen that Heidegger had brought a new perception of the verb "to be". We suppose that these radicals of the verb "to be", carefully explained by him, could be a *pre-intuition* of a judicative-diathesis. Therefore, we are talking about the "triple fulfillment" of the active-passive-reflexive pronunciation in the structure of the verb "is" about Being. As example, in words as "is" and "Being" exists an active opposition, in due to the "active-latin-deponent[24]," which is charged as soemthing active, but passive too, and that's why we ar more justified to establish the judicative diathesis, or so-called, *anti-passive deponent*.

Therefore, the additional predictive element (the predicative name with dual formation from demonstrative pronoun and the interrogating pronoun - "what-it-what-it-is") from the statement "Being is what-it-is," is a speech-part, which expresses an "attribute of the subject name or complement, not only by semantic agreement or congruence, but also through the verb (predicate), as if it were a copulative auxiliary."[25] This has been true since the 19th century, because the copulative part has attributive[26] functions if it is found in infinitive, participle, less supine. Accordingly to Gh. Dragomirescu's remarks, the nominal part has a "omeosis or nominal catachresis[27]" status. Omeosis is "a figure consists in using the verb, possibly accompanied by its determinants, by virtue of a similarity between phenomena."[28] More, Pierre Ouellet says that "those different levels of language give an access to the sensitive and categorial perception underlying the schematization of our experience."[29] Thus, the experience is related to language through perception. This similarity between verb and phenomenon is not synonymous with intentional acts of thinking. Patricia

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[23] For details see pages 54-57 from Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, „Die Etymologie des Wortes «sein»".

[24] Emanuela Marini, "L'opposition "actif" vs. déponent et la persistance du "moyen" en latin", *Langage.* Présupposition et Présuppositions, nr.194, Armand Collin, Paris, 2014, p. 49.

[25] Dragomirescu, *op. cit*., p. 136.

[26] For details, Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, translated by N. Findley, Routledge, London and New York, 2001 (2008), p. 332.

[27] Patricia Parker, chapter "Metaphor and Catachresis," book *The Ends of Rethoric: History, Theory, Practice*, edited by John Bender, David Wellbery, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990, pp. 60-61.

[28] Gh. Dragomirescu, *op. cit*., p. 166.

[29] Pierre Ouellet, "Perceptive Metaphors. Mental Imagery and verbal images", *Langage. Présupposition et Présuppositions*, nr.137, Armand Collin, Paris, 2000, p. 122.

Parker is considering catachresis a speechfigure as "abuse in abusio,"[30] which makes me think on the violation[31] of the subject "Being," according to John Caputo. In this regard, we will turn our attention to the Husserl's "Fourth Investigation."[32] According to Husserl, these are „existential-sentences"[33] of pure logic which distinguishes between common sentences and the knowledge's matter itself, both part of the judgement.The pure form of meaning is not identical to the object itself-there are distinctions between "intentional and true objects"[34].

For this reason, we believe that the forms of judiciary work with this pure logic that Husserl mentioned. The pure form of the verb "is" will not be identical to what he has as representation in the ontological plane, because the act itself is not identical to the act of representation. The act of representation would rather be tied to nominal function of "what-it-is". Accordingly to Husserl, the verb "is" gets connotations from the spatial, physical, psychic, existential plane etc., like any other object with "undetermined representations"[35].

3. The pre-judicative diathesis of "is" between the psychological predicate and psychological subject- another level of indeterminate representation (between nominal position and judgement)

Each statement is made up of two fundamental units or segments: one representing the word or the group of words present in the speaker's mind before speaking – which is the well-known element (the determinate), the subject (placed at the forefront), and the other unknown before you associate (the determinant), which we call the predicate.[36] Starting with Alexandru Philippide's observations, it is obvious that the subject in our case 'Being' lies in the mind of the speaker (that is, in his conscience and judgement), and that the predicate that follows will stick to these *judicious* structures in order to be validated. For example, Paul Hermann

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[30] Patricia Parker, *op. cit*., p. 61.

[31] We recommend, John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics*, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1987, p. 65: "In *Being and Time* the recovery of Being or Dasein is necessarily a deconstruction of the traditional overlays, even as violence toward the tradition is not a violation of it but a natural violence which wrests free its primordial contents."

[32] For details, see *Bibliography*.

[33] For details, Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, pp. 166-167.

[34] *Ibid*., p. 174.

[35] *Sqq.*, p. 188.

[36] Approximate citation, Alexandru Philippide., *Istoria limbii române. Principii de istoria limbii* (*History of Romanian Language. Principles on Language History*), Polirom, Iași, 2011, p. 126.

observed that both the subject and the part of the predicate lies in the speaker's mind, and then in the mind of the person who accepts the statement, the lecturer: "It is not to be supposed that in such phrases there floated in the speaker's mind the unexpressed infinite of a definite verb"[37]. The representations of the objects described by the words are "indissolubly connected with other objects in the speaker's mind"[38].

Some speech units, such as verbs (which have predilection functions) are closely related to the acts and objects of the acts being spoken. Their processing is usually done by forms and structures of judgement, and only then by forms and structures of consciousness. For example, what we are receiving from a statement such as sensations, perceptions, synesthesia, images are processed by judgement, but they are also included in experience, they have experiential, therefore subjective, contents. Due to Dan Zahavi, "there is an experimental difference between hearing something that someone does not understand, and hearing and understanding the same sentence."[39] Understanding is related to judgement. The judgements will formally call them judicious meanings. These judicious meanings are meant to cherish the new meanings of preaching, but also those meanings with ontological origins. Judgement processes the material received from the statements (data, affirmations, negations, actions, meditations). This judicial process will make it move to sense judgement that usually has a double format, from Husserl's point of view. He calls it "thinking expression"[40].

In this way, we understand that the affirmative predicate is not often an independent statement, because in order to establish a sufficient judgement for itself, it must also offer other judgements the built on the first trial. This multiplication does not change the material of the content of the judgement, but determinates, in the linguistics plane, the notable differences between the psychological subject and the psychological predicate, between the verb transitive or the other, between the active and the passive verb diathesis. However, at court level, as we have shown so far, judicial diathesis retains the same material for processing acts as it works in will. True judgements, can function in a certain way- as being in direct relation with the subject[41]. In order to create true preaching, it is

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[37] Paul Hermann, *Principles of the History of Language*. Translated from the second edition of the original by H.A. Strong and M.A. LLd., Editeur Longmans, Green, and Co 1891, London, p. 360.

[38] *Ibid.*, 1891, p. 80.

[39] Dan Zahavi, chapter "The Self as Experiential Dimension" in *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, Cambridge, 2005, p. 118. For details read the pages 119, 120, 121.

[40] Husserl, *Logical*..., vol. II, edited by Dermot Morat, 2001, p. 191.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 66: where whole statements are nominalized so as to appear in the subject-position.

necessary to subordinate attributive sentences (subordinate attributive) to main predictions in order for subject to be able to receive their determination from personal experience (hence the subjective character) and from *objectual* determination. An example of such a sentence would be "Being is immortal existence". The adjective "immortal" radically changes the nominal position of the Being: in the act of "being", it is part from experience. The experience has the purpose of removing subjectively the object from its object, in order to give it the objective determinations necessary for being.

The pre-judicative would be that judgement that retains its non-judiciary valences, but also encompasses the judiciary ones. In this sense, pre-judging hermeneutics on the verb "is", is validated. Intersubjectivity cannot be phased out (according to Husserlian opinion it would not be possible), but there is also objectivity. For these reasons, the judgement cannot self-isolate from everything that is the subjective experience of the self (ie the one who thinks the psychological subject and receives the psychological predicate); therefore, not being able to isolate the subjectivism, it maintains it even when it wants to objectify, or obey a total logic. It isolates it, but it does not remove it from the intentional content of judgement!

According to V.S. . Khrakovsky, "the verbal category or verb division limits the series of facts," and "the inner voice of the verb is manifested intra-linguistically."[42] In a linguistic perspective (a formal-logical one), the verb's diathesis is something limited but the inner lingual expression of it intra-linguistic manifested (*the selfhood of the verb*[43]), it manifests in interiority of the verb, and that is why we reach the constitutive judgement's structures in a verbal form. According to Thomas Givon, the stages of verbs are ordered according to the principle of "reflexive-intransitiive-passive and reflexive again."[44] Usually, passive verbs are most exposed to a higher degree of reflexivity. The verb "is" is based on an intangible, passive verb, because it apparently does not extend to all objects and has no direct complement, but paradoxically he works in all objects subordinated to our judgement stating that one thing "is", or "is not," and then, to this level of the "accomplished act of consciousness, it also becomes transitive."[45]

Diathesis has to do especially with an original interpretation of the verb, with the originality of intellectual intuition. By applying a reduction to the verb, or a tightening of experiences, we can obtain logical judgements for anyone through verb.

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[42] V. S. Khrakovsky, "Diathesis" in *Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, tom 29 (3-4), Akademiai Kiado, Budapesta, 1979, p. 289.

[43] The term is proposed to designate the verb's conjuncture in which it thinks itself or it establishes itself into the judgement, and therefore in discourse.

[44] Thomas Givón, S*yntax: A Functional-Typological Introduction,* John Benjamins Company, Amsterdam, 1990, 602-3)

[45] *N.a.*

For example, if we put outside the sentence "Being is what-is", the pre-judicial meanings of a diathesis appear before the verb completion. Judgement shapes what we receive from the external world, but pre-judicative is the one who works in pre-trial action: there is something fated to judgement to be active in consciousness, and these "remains" of judgement are called conventionally *judiciary*. The judicative has these ontological origins which transfers to the action expressed by the verb, often felt as active diathesis. In case of an affirmative judgement which says something "it is", but this "it is not," is stoling to the object the nominal determination, but also proposed to it an indeterminate representation (if we use Husserl's concepts):

> *The tree is non-pink.*
> *The Being is non-Time.*

In this predication, the predicate is stealing from the "tree" the access to "pink", and from the "Being" the access on "time". Through limitation, other possibilities such as white or green, or n modes are offered. This infinity of possibilities is what makes me think of things before they are set up. The assignment of other assets to the tree makes it rich at the level of meanings and representational meanings, but not at judicative level, because judegement has a predicative character.[46] In this way, the verbal diathesis of the verb is not affected by what it receives, but it only is a basis from which only in phenomenological way the sense multiplies the assigned meanings. At the statement level, the tree (subject) and the verb "is" (which is the act of judgement) - are two forms of speech entering the judiciary, and verbal diathesis is also part of the judiciary.

When I say something about something, thinking or I am quiet, I draw up some "scraps" of judiciary. Our minds think of states of things before they were completed, meaning a stability of the object in relation to its temporal condition. For example, this is the case with a work of art: the work of art is stable in a museum, only the conditions of time "seem" to change: the condition that it is from the Renaissance, the condition that "preserved" 2018 and they are conditions of an apparent external temporality. The artwork will thus penetrate into another temporal dimension, that of the external time, in which it is delivered to that time, conventionally called by us, non-time.

When we say "the tree is pink" we save it from the "violence" of the subject (that John D. Caputo spoke). If we have denied everything -"the tree is not pink,"- the subject and the act itself were deconstructed and would have been blocked because the verb was "violated." In the sentence "Allah is an unconditional necessity," instead of non-necessity, we added an adjective attribute of negative value

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[46] Ed. Husserl, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 312.

to the predictive name "necessity." This adjective attribute does not violate the verb (verb) diathesis, nor the subject, nor the constitutive structures of the reflexive-judicial diathesis. Instead, the reflexive over-interpretation of the meanings of a word leads to violence. The word should be at the limit between "self-hiding and self-retreat."[47] From a hermeneutical perpective, this "violence" is something "natural" and cannot be avoided. In case of the judicative-diathesis, we put next question: Why remains the verb "is" as non-finite? Though his action in ontological plane is on active diathesis that of establishing "something." The answer would be because it has its origins in infinite judgement as we have shown throughout this analysis.

"The tree is non-pink" is an affirmative judgement with a negative predicate, and hence the role of pre-judicative is even more intense. The sentence "X is non-pink," means that x does not exist in pink's sphere, but on the other side, it exists in other indeterminacy's spheres- as green, white, brown, including everything which is out of pink. The nothingness, the non-Being are pre-judicative structures in the transcendental logic.

Reflexive diathesis is part of the pre-judicial structures because the reflections themselves on the action of the verb are still here. From pure logical point of view of Husserl, or transcendental one of Kant, reflexive diathesis is something that happens infinitely, it is indefinite. In case of the pre-judicative, it is already in a reflexive diathesis before the subject performs the action of the verb. An eloquent example would be the listener of music: when listening to music, we (as listeners / receptors) are encapsulated in the reflexive diathesis that includes in a single place our becoming as a being and the pre-idea of "being" through sounds. In music case, the sound has the same transcendental logical function, as in the case of one verb in a sentence. It is exactly the same Proustian effect as in *Swann*[48]: by involuntary insertion of meditation / reflexivity into the judgement, we are always delivering time to the song that steals us for the moment. This is the moment when we are in a non-temporal extension.

The ontic is the dimension which makes possible the reconstruction of all these things. The logic aspect is the statement which had passed into the judgement through the affirmation "the song is beautiful." But the existential meaning of "logic" is that which passes into the structures of reflexivity, therefore, implicitly into the judgements. "The act is made up and set up by the logos,"[49] or sound, because the two actions of thinking and speaking lead to the realization of the action, that

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[47] John D. Caputo, *op. cit*., p. 63. Caputo uses the terms "self-concealing, self-withdrawing."

[48] See, Marcel Proust, *In Search of the Lost Time*. *Swann's Way*, translation by Stéphane Heuet, Liveright Publishing, 2015.

[49] Viorel Cernica, *Judecată și timp*.../ Judgement and Time..., *ed. cit*., p. 26.

is to say of the active diathesis. As such, here is where the statement that "Being is what-it-is" becomes a possible form of active diathesis, because "Being" is spoken and thought in the same time, but belongs to its ontological determinations, so that it is permanently active. Starting from this point, we put two other problems: whether there is an judicative circle of active diathesis and whether there is a regular judiciary (participation, ordination, predication, pre-judgement) for each diathesis.

Conclusions

The fact that in any sentence there is a verb and time dimension, means that we already have a structure able of being judged. The verb will never disappear because time will never disappear, and neither our experience of the things we judge. In case of the work of art, we should detach the chronological appearance to enter its existential dimension. In case of sentences, we should detach us from the formal logic to access the transcendental logic (Kant) or the pure logic (Husserl). The judgement shepherds the condition of time. The subject (the pink tree) exists due to object's certainty (the tree). In this situation, "I" belongs to the conscience and to the phenomenon, and here is the place where the pre-judicative dissipates through judgement to establish the Being through discourse. Every statement (logical proposition) is filled with perceptions that generate fulfilled or unfulfilled acts, elements in potency or retention, something that pro-pose or holds something. Thus, "the tree could have been green too," or "the Being could have been indeterminacy." The perceived object and perception are not identical in essence but are similar in the reality illustrated by the acts of thought. Things seem to be easily "stucked" under the ballast of our acts always on the move. Unfortunately, an ordering of this "ballast" is not possible, because our judgement will judge forever and will always look forward new meanings.

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