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DENYING THE PROBLEM. DEFLATIONISTS AND THE LIAR PARADOX

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ABSTRACT. Deflationary theories of truth had two different types of responses to the Liar. A first class of deflationists considers that this paradox does not represent a problem for their theories. On the other hand, other deflationists find the Liar to be a serious issue. This article focuses on the first class.

Both Grover and Gupta consider that the Liar does not represent a problem for a deflationary theory of truth. For Grover, the paradox is demolished through the construction of the theory and for Gupta, the Liar is not the problem of the deflationist, but rather it concerns a specialist.

Dorothy Grover (2005) is an advocate of the prosentential theory of truth. This theory considers that truth works as a prosentence. The sentence resulted by adding the truth predicate to a referring expression has the same content as the sentence picked out by the initial referring expression. A prosentence does not have a meaning by itself; it takes its meaning from its antecedent. Grover considers that the truth predicate used in the Liar fails to pick up an antecedent, thus it does not have operative meaning. The operative meaning comes from using a word in a specific context.

Gupta (2005) considers that a specialist – not a deflationist – should give the proper answers to the paradoxes. A deflationist should not be concerned with how the paradoxes can be avoided. His only interest is how the T-schema should be interpreted in order to give the meaning of the truth predicate and how the deflationary conclusions are reached. Paradoxes do not count in as an issue for deflationists, because they are able to answer to their main questions without facing paradoxes. Therefore, the Liar is not a real issue for the deflationist.

The main aim of this article is to offer some counterarguments for these two views. Grover's difference between dictionary and operative meaning seems to make a distinction between accepted and restricted sentences. This distinction is needed in order to escape the problem of paradoxes. If this is the case, the Liar is an issue, but it is solvable. This is quite different from what Grover claims. On the other hand, Gupta's approach may ease the deflationist's work but it might destroy his theory.

***Key words**: truth, paradoxes, the Liar paradox, the prosentential theory of truth, D. Grover, A. Gupta*

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Introduction

Different truth theories tried to offer a solution to the Liar paradox. This paradox is a semantic and self-referential one. A paradox is a sentence or inference that seems sound, but leads to a contradiction. Self-reference is utilized to denote a statement that refers to itself. Semantic paradoxes rely on the semantic notions, in this case, on truth.

The Liar antinomy may have different forms. The most common one is (L) 'This sentence is false'. If we assume that the sentence is false we will have: if (L) is false, then because of what it said, it is true, thus (L) is true. Therefore, starting from the assumption that (L) is false, it is determined that (L) is true.[1] On the other hand, if it is assumed that (L) is true, then, again, because of what it said, it is false; hence (L) is false.[2] Consequently, starting from the assumption that (L) has a certain truth value; the conclusion is that it has the other truth value.

The self-reference is preserved even if, for example, Epimenides, who was a Cretan, said: 'All Cretans are liars'. In this form, the antinomy is solvable if we assume that the statement is false. If the statement is false, and Epimenides is lying, there must be at least one honest Cretan. That one Cretan does not have to be Epimenides. If he is lying, while knowing at least one honest Cretan, the sentence is false.[3] In order to have a paradox there should not be an honest Cretan. If it can be ascertained that there is at least one honest Cretan, then Epimenides' utterance is not paradoxical anymore, it is just false.

However, the antinomy may be slightly changed, thereby not allowing this kind of simple solution. For example, a form of the Liar that cannot be resolved in the way presented above is: 'What I am saying now is a lie'.

Another[4] contingent Liar paradox can be found in Field (2008, p. 24), and has the following form:

'What is being said by the person in this room with the lowest IQ
is not true'.

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[1] $(\sim L \supset L) \supset L$

[2] $(L \supset \sim L) \supset \sim L$

[3] 'All Cretans are liars' can be formalized using the universal quantifier:

$(L_C)\ (\forall x)(Cx \rightarrow Lx)$

In order to invalidate this sentence is sufficient to validate the following sentence:

$(\sim L_C)\ (\exists x)\ (Cx\ \&\ \sim Lx)$

There is no need to validate a sentence of the form ('All Cretans are honest'):

$(H)\ (\forall x)\ (Cx \rightarrow \sim Lx)$

[4] The original version presented above – the one involving Cretans – is also a contingent one.

In this case the antinomy arises only if the one who says the sentence is the person with the lowest IQ in the room and that is all that is said by that person. The antinomy can also be obtained by multiple sentences.

Even more, there are forms of the Liar that do not imply self-reference at all. Yablo's paradox (Yablo, 1985, 1993) is such an example. Yablo's paradox has the following structure:

S_1: For all m > 1, S_m is false.
S_2: For all m >2, S_m is false.
S_3: For all m > 3, S_m is false.
…
S_n: For all m > n, S_m is false.

There are two main deflationary attitudes towards the Liar. One is claiming that the Liar does not represent a real problem for a deflationary theory of truth. On the other hand, some deflationists accept that the Liar raises a serious problem for their concept of truth. Grover's (2005) and Gupta's (2005) responses are included in the first class. Horwich (1998, 2010) is among the deflationists that accept that the Liar represents an issue. His approach, the minimalist one, considers the Liar a problem for the theory and tries to solve it without rejecting the aim of the theory (i.e. deflating truth). This article will be focused exclusively on the two already mentioned approaches that reject the Liar as being a proper issue for their theories.

Denying the problem

Dorothy Grover is an advocate of the prosentential[5] theory of truth[6]. According to this theory, truth is not a property-ascribing predicate (Grover, 2005, p. 196), it is considered a predicate which has a prosentential function. The role of prosentences is quite similar with the role of pronouns. For example:

(1) Mary is at the grocery store. *She* is buying apples because *she* believes *they* are delicious.

[5] The structure of the theory's name is following the structure of other anaphors, as, for example, pronouns. Pronouns are used to refer to previous used nouns, in the same way as 'true' is going to be used to refer to previous sentences.

[6] The theory was first presented in (Grover, Camp, Belnap Jr., 1975)

In this case, 'she' stands for 'Mary'; respectively 'they' stands for 'apples'. The meaning of those anaphors is not fixed, it is relative. In the already presented example, the meaning of 'she' and 'they' is taken from the previous nouns used in the sentences. It seems that the same situation is applicable for 'true' and 'false'. When truth is added to a referring expression it does not add anything more than the reiteration of the sentence or sentences picked out by that referring expression. Let us consider 'S' (the referring expression) the name for 'Snow is white' (the denotation of the referring expression). According to the prosentential theory of truth, 'S is true' means nothing more than 'Snow is white'.

In order to provide a concrete example, we can imagine a conversation between Andrew and Anna. Andrew states 'Snow is white'; then, Anna says 'This is true'. In this situation what Anna is saying – according to the prosentential theory of truth – is nothing more than exactly what Andrew said, that is 'Snow is white'.[7] This means that 'this is true' has the role of a prosentence and it inherits its content from the antecedent statement, in the same way as a pronoun takes its reference from the previous singular term (or noun). This theory is considered a deflationary one because 'x is true' and 'x' always have the same content. This means that those anaphors do not have a content of their own. Neither pronouns nor prosentences have a meaning without a specific context in which they are used.[8]

According to the advocates of this theory, it is the Liar that fails to pick a specific antecedent, for this it is neither true nor false. As it was already mentioned, a prosentence takes its content from its antecedent. Thus, (L) has content only if its antecedent does. In this case, because (L) is its own antecedent, it has content if and only if (L) has content. But prosentences do not have independent content, in

[7] The prosentential theory of truth can easily be extended to falsity. In this situation, 'This is false' is also referring to an antecedent sentence and it has the same (semantic) content as the denial of that sentence. Keeping the same example, if Anna would have said 'This is false' she would have meant that 'Snow is not white'. Thus, Anna's sentence has the same (semantic) content as the negation of what Andrew said.

[8] At this point, the prosentential theory of truth seems quite similar with the redundancy theory. Even if the first theory claims that there is no difference in the semantic content between the two already mentioned sentences, the theory considers that there is a pragmatic difference. In this case, if Anna, instead of saying 'This is true', would had said 'Snow is white', then she would have said the same thing semantically. On the other hand, pragmatically, she would have not acknowledged Andrew's previous sentence. Instead, using the prosentence, she expressed her agreement with what Andrew said. In this case, the main difference between the prosentential theory and the redundancy one is that the first one claims that there are cases when the truth predicate cannot be eliminated without loss. In the already presented example, the loss would be Anna's acknowledgement of what Andrew had said.

this situation, (L) lacks content. Thus, the relation between an anaphor – in this case a prosentence – and its antecedent is a non-reflexive one; therefore, it holds only between two distinct things.

When it comes to the Liar, Grover considers that "there is no threat; there is nothing to resolve" (Grover, 2005, p. 177). In order to sustain her point, she makes a distinction between dictionary meaning and operative meaning. The dictionary meaning is based on the history of uses of a specific word.[9] On the other hand, the operative meaning is "the use that a token of a word has in its context" (Grover, 2005, p. 183). This means that if a word (or sentence) is not used in a specific context in a communicatively significant way, it does not have an operative meaning, even if that specific word (or sentence) has a dictionary meaning.

Grover states that the Liar is not used in a communicatively significant way. Even if its component words have dictionary meaning and it is well-formed, this does not contribute to its operative meaning. This means that the sentence that expresses the Liar is not used. The token 'it is false' can be used. But to be in accordance with the prosentential theory of truth it can be used only with a correlated antecedent. That specific antecedent must be different from the prosentence, because, as it was already mentioned, this relation holds between two different things. This means that 'this is false' may be used only to refer to another sentence with the aim of affirming the negation of that specific sentence.

In order to be able to determine if the Liar has operative meaning, one must know something about the context of the discourse in which such a sentence was uttered. Grover based this part of her argumentation on the distinction between formalized and natural languages. Even if both of them were created by humans, they have different purposes. The natural language has an openness and flexibility that formalized languages lack (Grover, 2005, p. 179). The formalized languages are used for specific tasks and they are not suitable for an everyday use. In this situation, the Liar, being a part of the natural language, should have a meaning when it is used in a specific context. It seems that when the Liar is uttered in the natural language it is not properly used, it is only mentioned. In this situation, it does not have an operative meaning.

There might be some counterarguments against Grover's point of view. For example, she mentioned the Kripkean risky cases and the use of the Liar in inferences (Grover, 2005, starting with p.185).

[9] As the name suggests, this is the meaning that can be found in a dictionary.

It might be argued that the Liar might be used in inferences[10], such as (Grover, 2005, pp. 185-186)[11, 12]:

1. L= 'L is false' (stipulation)
2. L is false v L is true[13] (classical logic)
3. *L is false* (hypothesis)
4. 'L is false' is false (3, substitution)
5. 'p' is false iff ~p (falsity schema)
6. 'L is false' is false iff ~(L is false) (5, substitution)
7. ~(L is false) (4,6, classical logic)
8. L is true v L is false (classical logic)
9. L is true (7,8, classical logic)
10. L is true & L is false (3, 9, classical logic)
11. *L is true* (hypothesis)
12. 'L is false' is true (11, substitution)
13. 'p' is true iff p (truth schema)
14. 'L is false' is true iff L is false (13, substitution)
15. L is false (12, 14, classical logic)
16. L is true & L is false (11, 15, classical logic)[14]
17. L is true & L is false (disjunction elimination, 1-15)
18. (L is false) & ~(L is false) (5, 13,[15] 17, classical logic, substitution)

[10] Grover drew a sharp line between inferences in natural languages and in formalized ones. An inference in a natural language is more complex than just a syntactic structure that is required by a formalized language.

[11] A similar demonstration is given for the Strengthened Liar. For more see (Grover, 2005, pp. 191-192)

[12] The content of the demonstration is the same with Grover's; however, I changed the form of the demonstration in order to make it easier to follow.

[13] This seems rather an instance of bivalence, which is not generally accepted as a principle of classical logic. The law of excluded middle is such a generally accepted principle. Both (2) and (8) are rather instances of bivalence, not of the law of excluded middle. The problem may be solved, because (2) and (8) may be deduced from the law of excluded middle, bivalence and modus ponens. I have to thank Matti Eklund for the discussion we had on this demonstration.

[14] This seems to be obtained similarly to (10), through the rule of conjunction introduction. Thus, (16) is obtained from (11) and (15) using classical logic.

[15] (5) and (13) are the lines of the truth schema and the falsity one. Grover decided to use them even if they were part of the sub-proofs. This does not represent a problem, because they could have been reintroduced at any line.

According to Grover, in order for the Liar to be able to lead to contradiction, it must have operative meaning. Stipulating 'L is false' in the inference does not imply it has operative meaning. In order for it to have such a meaning, it must not only be used, but also the terms that compose it have to be used in the way they have been used historically in other contexts (Grover, 2005, p. 187). Only if those conditions are fulfilled, it can be said that (L) has operative meaning in (1)-(18).

In this situation, accepting both (1)-(18) and that (L) has operative meaning, leads to contradiction. The solutions – according to Grover (2005, pp. 189-190) – are either to reject a line from (1) to (18), or to reject that (L) has operative meaning. All the lines from (1) to (18) are based on rules of classical logic; in this situation they are generally accepted. The only remaining strategy is to deny that (L) has operative meaning. Going even further, this means that at least one of the words in the Liar is used in a new way, differently from how it was used in other past contexts; or that (L) is not properly used in presented inference. Grover adopts the second alternative. Thus, (L) is not used; this means that it does not have operative meaning.

If it had been accepted that (L) has operative meaning, it would have also been accepted that the syntactic structure reflects the semantic structure. Because Grover claims that syntax can outstrip semantics, she denies that the Liar could have operative meaning (Grover, 2005, p. 190). The Liar paradox may be associated with division by zero. If either the Liar or division by zero is used in a natural language, it leads to incoherencies. Thus, Grover concludes:

> "We do not regard division incoherent on the ground that inconsistency would seem to threaten if we were to counterfactually assume we could divide by zero. So, also, we should not regard truth-talk incoherent on the ground that inconsistency would seem to threaten, if we were counterfactually to assume the liar could be used in inferences." (Grover, 2005, p. 201)

An anaphor is considered ungrounded if there is not an appropriate antecedent. In this situation, as it was already said, the anaphor fails to have operative meaning. The Liar is supposed to affirm the contradictory of its antecedent, but it is its own antecedent. This means it is ungrounded. This happens because there is no proper antecedent with operative meaning. Because the Liar cannot be used to say anything, it does not represent an issue for the prosentential theory of truth.

Let us conclude what Grover achieved so far. She answered the first possible counterargument for her theory: the use of the Liar in inferences. Her answer is twofold. She showed that the Liar is not used in inferences not only

from a prosentential perspective, but also from a property-ascribing perspective.[16] From both perspectives the whole criticism is built around the fact that the Liar does not have operative meaning.

Risky cases represent another possible counterargument for the answer the prosentential theory of truth provided to the Liar. Grover focuses on this risky case:

> "It is said that Russell once asked Moore whether he always told the truth, and that he regarded Moore's negative reply as the sole falsehood Moore had ever produced. (…) Yet he apparently failed to realize that if, as he thought, all Moore's *other* utterances were true, Moore's negative reply was not simply false but paradoxical." (Kripke, 1975, p. 691-692)

Grover's answer to this kind of situations is that even Russell would clarify his assumption, or that it was a mistake. In the case of mistakes, most of the time, the context provides enough information for the audience to be able to figure out what a speaker intended to say. The fact that one is able to guess what a speaker really wanted to say, despite his mistake, does not imply that his words had operative meaning. Applied to the situation presented by Kripke, Russell's words lacked operative meaning.

This might be the case. The real difficulty seems to be the other example Kripke (1975, p. 691) provided:

> (1) Most of Nixon's assertions about Watergate are false. – Said by Jones
> (2) Everything Jones say about Watergate is true. – Said by Nixon

If Nixon made an equal number of true and false sentences about Watergate and all that Jones said about Watergate is (1); both (1) and (2) are paradoxical. In this example, both Jones' and Nixon's statements seem to have operative meaning. They both imply a prosentence and they also both have a proper antecedent from which they take their meanings. In this case, from a prosentential point of view, it must be accepted that they have operative meaning. In this situation, it seems that Grover's argument fails.[17] It might be suggested that there is no proper antecedent at least for Jones's statement because it implies another prosentence. If

[16] In other words a 'property-ascribing perspective' means a substantive theory of truth. Such a perspective accepts truth to be a genuine property of sentences.

[17] If this is the case, her argument fails when it comes to formulations of the Liar based on multiple sentences and also to Yablo's paradox.

this is the case, then, similar situations that do not imply paradoxes should be rejected. For example:

> 'What Anna says right now is true' – said by Andrew
> 'What Andrew says right now is either true or false' – said in the same time by Anna

In this situation, there is no paradox involved. I assume that an advocate of the prosentential theory of truth would accept such a situation. If she accepts this, it means she accepts that prosentences used in it have operative meaning. If this is the case, on what grounds she could reject a similar situation that involves paradoxes? If the paradoxes are the cause, then the Liar is far from being inoffensive for the theory. It seems then that they have to solve it. If the Liar is not the cause of rejecting these situations, then they must accept that those situations – paradoxical or non-paradoxical – must be rejected based on the fact that the implied prosentences do not have operative meaning. In this case, it seems that their theory leaves outside a lot more than it intended and that it is quite restrictive. The theory is restrictive also because it requires that the antecedent should be different from the prosentence – banning sentences as the Truth-Teller.

In conclusion, it seems that Grover's arguments have their weak points. I think that her answer might work – with some further distinctions in order to avoid being too restrictive – if it is accepted as a solution to the Liar. If the distinction comes outside the scope of solving the Liar, it seems that it might be too restrictive and it seems to be arbitrary. On the other hand, if it is taken to reject only the paradoxical situation, then I found it to be quite plausible. But in this situation the Liar must be accepted as a problem for the theory. This problem might have quite a satisfactory solution through the distinction between the dictionary and operative meaning.

According to Gupta (2005) paradoxes do not represent a special threat to deflationism. A deflationist does not have to try to solve these paradoxes. He can and should let them be the specialist's concern.

The T-schema represents the central claim of many deflationary views about truth. Gupta argues that the Closure principle implied by the T-schema is undoubtedly true. Therefore:

> "The Closure principle: The following two rules of inference, TI and TE, hold for categorical affirmations:
> (TI) A; therefore 'A' is true
> (TF) 'A' is true; therefore A" (Gupta, 2005, p. 134)

This principle does not hold in the case of hypothetical reasoning. Because of its weakness, the principle does not yield inconsistencies when it comes to paradoxes. If the Closure principle was not restricted to categorical situations, it would definitely imply inconsistencies. Supposing 'The Liar is not true' would imply 'The Liar is true' and the other way around. But this is not a categorical context, it is a hypothetical one. Consequently, Gupta claims that:

"The Closure principle ought, therefore, to be respected by all theories of truth, deflationist and non-deflationist alike." (Gupta, 2005, p. 135)

In order for the Closure principle to work, a notion of weak truth is needed. Assuming this notion of truth, the two sides of the biconditional have always the same truth value. If A has a specific truth value, ''A' is true' has the same truth value.[18] In this situation the biconditional is correct for the unproblematic instances. When it comes to the paradoxical ones, Gupta considers that there are enough reasons to accept both of the possibilities: the biconditional may or may not be correct. This is because the Liar has a special type of semantic instability. According to Gupta:

> "The Liar remains puzzling even after we recognize that its T-biconditional is not true. Our attitude towards the Liar paradox is quite different from that towards other popular puzzles and paradoxes. With the latter, our perplexity disappears completely once we concede that some crucial idea or presupposition that we brought to the puzzle is false. But with the Liar this is not so." (Gupta, 2005, p. 136)

It seems that a possible solution could be to reject the T-schema for the paradoxical situations.[19] The problem with this solution is that, if some instantiations of the T-schema are considered illicit, then the truth predicate cannot stand anymore for its generalization function. Gupta argues that a theory of truth needs all the instantiations of the T-schema, thus, the previous solution is rejected. The only remaining[20] solution is to accept all the instantiations of the truth biconditional. This might be realizable through a better understanding of the connective 'if and only if'. The solution should sustain the Closure principle. It should also imply the material biconditional for non-paradoxical instances and should not imply contradiction.[21]

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[18] For example, if A is true, then ''A' is true' is also true. On the other hand, if A is neither true nor false, then so is ''A' is true'.

[19] This solution was the one that Horwich endorsed. For more see Horwich (1998, 2010).

[20] Gupta also rejects the Inconsistency View. This view wants to keep the intuition that the instances of the T-schema are correct. In order to do so, this kind of approach states that the principles governing truth are inconsistent. (Gupta, 2005, pp. 137-138)

[21] This means that the instantiation of the T-schema for the Liar should not imply the corresponding material biconditional. (Gupta, 2005, p. 139)

Deflationists consider that the T-schema fixes the meaning of 'true'. Meaning may be understood as extension, intension or sense. The first one is considered a weak manner of understanding meaning. The second one is an intermediate way. Finally, the last one is a strong understanding. It seems that deflationists take the meaning in a relatively weak sense. The problem is that if one takes meaning as extension, he cannot point the objects of which the predicate is false. This issue develops if the predicate is gappy or n-valued.

Gupta introduced the Signification thesis.

"The Signification Thesis: The T-biconditionals fix the signification of the weak notion of truth. Or, more fully, given the non-semantic facts that obtain in the actual world, the T-biconditionals fix the actual signification of truth." (Gupta, 2005, p. 140)

This means that the instances of the T-schema fix the total extensional information about a term. It includes the extensional meaning, but it is richer. This thesis should also be preserved by a theory of truth and paradox. From this point, if a deflationist wants to adopt a stronger reading of meaning, he does not have to worry. Paradoxes – according to Gupta – do not threaten the Signification thesis, thus they also do not threaten meaning taken as intension or sense. If Gupta's claim is accepted, then the Liar does not represent a problem for the deflationary claim that T-schema fixes the meaning of the truth predicate.

Gupta claims that a theorist of truth and paradox should not let the Liar dictate him a specific logic. Such a theory has to be given from a neutral position regarding logic. Moreover, Gupta says:

> "(…) an account of the paradoxes (…) should not attribute a special logic to sentences containing 'true'. Logical resources (e.g. negation, conjunction, and quantification) should interact with 'true' in just the way that they do with the other predicates. In our ordinary reasoning with sentences containing 'true', we do not hold them to be above the usual logical laws." (Gupta, 2005, p. 143)

Thus, the author points out some desiderata which have to be satisfied by truth theorists. To sum up, those are:

1. T-schema and its instantiations are correct and they fix the meaning of true.
2. The instantiations of non-pathological sentences imply the corresponding material biconditionals.
3. The Closure principle must be maintained.
4. The instantiations of the T-schema must not imply contradictions.
5. The instantiations must be logic neutral.
6. The logical rules of the language apply uniformly to sentences containing 'true'. (Gupta, 2005, p. 144)

In conclusion, Gupta's approach sustains that deflationists have to be concerned only about the interpretation of their claim. They need an interpretation that establishes the conclusions they reach for. Also they have to verify if the initial claim is correct, assuming that specific interpretation. The paradoxes and the list of desiderata mentioned above are not their problem. The specialist should try to give answers to those.

The generalization problem forces minimalists to deal with the Liar. In order for the truth predicate to fulfill its function as a generalization device, it has to be applied unrestrictedly. In this situation, I do not see a way out for a deflationist, except facing and trying to give a solution for the paradox. I do not think that such a deflationary theory of truth may be built around the paradox, without trying to give at least an explanation for it. I strongly believe that rejecting the instantiations of the T-schema that imply paradoxes is not the right solution for the deflationist. On the other hand, the situation when the deflationist completely ignores the paradox seems even worse. In the first case, the deflationist was able to avoid the paradox, but he lost the generalization he aimed for. The whole function of the truth predicate – according to minimalism – is its generalization function. If some instances of the T-schema are rejected, truth seems to lose its role. In Gupta's solution, the whole theory seems to collapse.[22] The theory seems to fail because if the problem of paradoxes is put aside and they are not considered a real issue, then the truth predicate will be applied unrestrictedly. However, if there is no explanation for the paradoxical sentences[23], they have to be treated in the same way as the unproblematic ones. If this is the case, according to the minimalist approach, they have to be assigned one of the two classical truth values. This would lead to contradiction. Thus, the coherence of the theory would be destroyed. In this situation, far from being perfect, any of the deflationary[24] solutions seems more appealing. The minimalist theory of truth provides two possible solutions to the Liar. The first one is to restrict the application of the T-schema to the

[22] A possible solution would be for a deflationist to accept the Inconsistency View or dialetheism. But Gupta rejects both of them. This solution was proposed by Armour-Garb and Beall in various articles. For more see Armour-Garb (2001, 2004, 2010) and Armour-Garb and Beall (2003, 2005)

[23] The explanation is given outside the theory, by the specialist – according to Gupta. This means that the core of the theory does not provide any explanation regarding the paradoxes. The problem is just ignored.

[24] By 'deflationary', here, I refer to Paul Horwich's theory, the minimalist approach. Horwich provided the first answer in *Truth* (1998). After receiving critiques, Horwich presented a development of the first answer (Horwich, 2010). Horwich's solutions go beyond the aim of this paper.

paradoxical sentences. The second one – also based on the idea of restricting the instantiations of the T-schema – applies the T-biconditionals only to grounded sentences.

Secondly, I do not fully understand what Gupta means referring to 'the specialist' that should be concerned with giving all the answers. It might be accepted that a deflationist is not interested in fulfilling all the desiderata mentioned by Gupta. But he should at least explain how his theory avoids the Liar paradox. If the theory cannot avoid it, then it should either cope with it (as the dialetheist did), or solve it.

Conclusions

Thus, in this article I tried to argue that the idea that the Liar paradox does not represent a problem for the deflationist does not seem to be sustainable. The prosentential theory of truth seems to give a solution to the Liar without accepting it as a real problem. Gupta's approach, on the other hand, aims to ignore the paradox and leaves the 'specialist' to handle it. This 'specialist' has a lot of work to do; he has to check many desiderata in order to be able to give an account of truth that solves the problem of paradoxes. The deflationist, however, is freed from this job. I tried to argue that both theories have weak points.

The prosentential theory is too restrictive, especially when its distinction between dictionary and operative meaning is going to be accepted outside the scope of giving a solution to the Liar. This would mean that the distinction is accepted without a proper scope. On the other hand, Gupta's answer is moving the problem outside the deflationary account. However, the deflationist is not able to avoid this easily the Liar.

Both Grover (2005) and Gupta (2005) consider that paradoxes are not an issue for a deflationary account of truth. I argued that their views have some weak points. Grover seems to offer a solution to the Liar, while claiming it is not a problem for her theory. Gupta considers that a minimalist does not have to worry about the Liar; the paradox should represent the problem of the specialist. It seems that deflationists have to admit that the Liar represents a problem for their accounts. The issue that rises is that they have minimal resources to solve it. However, this is a subject that may be developed on another occasion.

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