

A DELEUZIAN INCURSION INTO KANTIAN CRITICISM. ABOUT THE DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THEIR INTEREST

CLAUDIA MARTA*

ABSTRACT. A Deleuzian incursion into Kantian Criticism. About the Doctrine of the Faculties from the Perspective of their Interest. Deleuze describes the doctrine of the faculties as a complete system of permutations. These faculties are analyzed in part according to their own interest: speculative or practical. Each faculty has a superior form through which it is *realized*. Deleuze's question is to what extent a faculty becomes able to achieve its own interest and bear the legislative burden for another. *Reflective judgment* generally makes it possible to move from the faculty of knowledge to that of desire, from speculative to practical. These are also questions concerning the free agreement of our faculties with the contingency of Nature's own accord with them.

Keywords: *reason, speculative, practical, transcendental reflection, reflective judgment*

Introduction

In order to outline a wider picture of the Deleuzian approach towards Kantian criticism, perhaps one should start from the hardest kernel: the notion of 'intellectual intuition'. In Kant's view, this is something that we can never have – and any scholar of Kant is bothered by this impossibility. Although frequently understood as standing for the passive intuitive reception of Noumenal reality, which forever eludes us, 'intellectual intuition' might as well designate a kind of 'faculty' of its own, rooted in the active synthesis of transcendental imagination. The key to this deadlock is to conceptualize schematization starting from its limit: the exception of a free act. If we start from this point, we can see that Kant's main concern is to prescribe for

* PhD candidate, Doctoral School in Philosophy, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. E-mail: claudiamarta222@gmail.com

each constitutive faculty its own specific interest, operating by limitation, so that one does not err, or at least to save oneself from transcendental illusions. This also describes the shift from a *Critique of Pure Reason* to *Critique of Practical Reason*. The two 'Critiques' are in fact descriptions of the same inner reality of a constitutive subject, but the two-folded approach is necessary because Kant is very well aware that *a free act simply cannot be schematized*. We cannot integrate a free act in our experience, and even if we try to do so, all we get are some misrecognitions.

This paper is trying to deploy an understanding of this shift from the speculative interest to the practical interest of Reason by considering the separation introduced by Kant between the phenomena, transcendent Noumena, and the transcendental object in general, as they are touched upon in Deleuze's incursions into the subject. This separation also circumscribes Reason's relation to sensibility: it is a pure critical decision to mediate this relation through intellect and imagination, which imposes limits on intuition. The topic of 'intellectual intuition' will soon appear as most problematic once we put in discussion the insolvable fracture of thinking and being, by posting a different conceptual synthesis of Reason and sensibility.

Understanding and illusion

Kant begins with our cognitive capacity – a Self characterized by unity, synthetic activity and a constitutive emptiness. This Self is affected by the Noumenal, and through its active synthesis, organizes impressions into phenomenal reality. However, the result of this critique of knowledge is an ontological one: the distinction between phenomenal reality and the Noumenal world of things-in-themselves. Deleuze, in *Kant's Critical Philosophy. The Doctrine of the Faculties*¹ starts precisely from this development of the transcendental method.

This is an immanent critique of reason- the application of reason onto itself, in order to determine the true nature of its interests and ends. But is also a question about how this interest may come to be realized. Deleuze delimits the two ways in which Kant refers to the concept of 'faculty': different relations of representations in general, but also a specific source of representation in particular. These two are again doubled in compliance to reason's interests: speculative or practical. Between this two stays the hole problematic of a necessary determination of knowledge vs. freedom as that which is completely irrational.

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy. The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam, The Athlone Press, 1984.

Thus, our constitution is in such a way that we have just one faculty for reception, that of sensibility, and three active faculties: imagination, intellect and reason. From the first sense of the world 'faculty', which is the relationship of the representations in general, we distinguish as many faculties as relations there are:

In the first place, a representation can be related to the object from the standpoint of its agreement to or conformity with it: this case, the simplest, defines the faculty of knowledge. Secondly, the representation may enter a causal relationship with its object. This is the faculty of desire: the faculty which, by virtue of its representation, becomes the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations. [...] Finally, the representation is related to the subject, in so far it affects the subject by intensifying or weakening its vital force. This third relationship defines the faculty of feeling of pleasure and pain.²

What concerns is not if these faculties can be deduced from one another, but if they are capable of having a *higher form*. We can say that if a faculty finds in itself the law of its own application, it is perfectly autonomous. Knowledge, first of all, is a synthesis of representations. We make a certain assertion about the represented object, but said assertion is not contained within it, in the way of an *a priori*, or a *posteriori* statement. As long as the synthesis remains empirical, it finds its law in experience and not in itself, so only the *a priori* synthesis defines a higher form of knowledge: 'the object itself must therefore be subjected to the synthesis of representation: it must be governed by our faculty of knowledge and not vice versa'.³ This determination of the higher form also stands for the determination of an interest of reason.

Kant says that reason has a natural speculative interest for objects as they appear, or phenomena, because while *a priori* synthesis is independent of experience, it applies only to the objects of experience. Here Deleuze, as many others, must take in consideration that, if it were only for the speculative interest of reason, Kant would have never made a distinction between phenomena and the noumenal Thing-in-itself. So: is the higher faculty of desire a key to this deadlock? Deleuze's emphasis is on the fact that, although this faculty also has *a priori* representations, they are linked to objects which determine pleasure or pain. In order to arrive to a higher form, we must consider only the representation of a *pure form*: 'in the moral law, it is reason by itself (without the intervention of a feeling of pleasure or pain) which determines the will. There is thus an interest of reason

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

corresponding to the higher faculty of desire: a practical interest.⁴ So, what we see is that interest of the same reason may differ in nature. But we have no answer yet of what kind of objects are to be subjects for this practical synthesis.

Let us consider the second sense of the word ‘faculty’, that is of a specific source of representations. Here representation means more like appearance, an active taking up of that which is presented, as ‘from this standpoint we no longer need to define knowledge as a synthesis of representation. It is representation itself which is defined as knowledge, that is to say as the synthesis of that which is presented.’⁵ Intuition, Concept and Idea are the faculties constitutive for our knowledge as Kant outlines them in the section of ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Here intuition means a particular representation which relates immediately to an object of experience, having its source in sensibility. Concept is a representation which also relates to an object of experience, but only through other representations. Its source resides in understanding. Idea is something that goes beyond the possibility of experience and is found in reason.

The main concern is how does an interest of reason realize itself taken in consideration all this demarcations: ‘we can see that once a faculty in the first sense has been defined so that an interest of reason corresponds to it, we still have to look for a faculty in the second sense, capable of realizing this interest, or of supporting the legislative task. In other words, there is no guarantee that reason itself undertakes to realize its *own* interest.’⁶ For example, regarding knowledge, reason abandons everything to understanding. Nonetheless, this is in no way an obstacle for Kant to prescribe, in his ‘Critiques’, an original role for each faculty, orchestrating a complete system of their permutation. Deleuze calls this the transcendental method: systematic variations depending on which interest of reason we consider.

So, the first Critique first. Because it is not in the limit of this paper to expose all of Deleuze’s inquiries, let us consider the copernican revolution as consisting in

That which is presented to us in such a way to form a Nature must necessarily obey principles of the same kind (or rather, the same principle) as those which govern the course of our representation. The same principles must account for our subjective moves, and for the fact that the given submits itself to our moves. That is to say, the subjectivity of principles is not an empirical or psychological subjectivity, but a transcendental subjectivity. [...] Transcendental qualifies the principle of necessary subjection of what is given in experience to our *a priori* representations, and correlatively the principle of a necessary application of *a priori* representations to experience.⁷

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.13.

We can see that this submission stands for the idea of a harmony between subject and object and the presupposition that Nature conforms, through its ends, with the ends of our Reason. Phenomena are not mere appearances, but a product of our activity, and they can be subject to us because they are not things in themselves. In a way, they are known only when internalized.

This brings us to the difficult question of understanding. 'All Reason can achieve is a kind of Kantian critical delimitation of the proper sphere of Understanding; in other words, it can only make us aware of how, in our daily lives, we are victims of necessary ('transcendental') illusions'.⁸ This statement can be read against Deleuzian claims that see in the *Critique of Pure Reason* only the description of the good nature of our faculties.⁹ All that Deleuze describes is a necessity of submissions, but the Hegelian approach of Žižek sees in understanding, that is – its analyzing aspect, the force of tearing the unity of a thing apart.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, understanding is a synthesis too, but this is not all. We might consider both apprehension and reproduction such synthesis, but the fact is that Deleuze simply confuses the legislative use of understanding with the description of the intellect as a faculty. So, the transcendental inquiry into the construction of our knowledge is on the one hand the discovery of the faculty which gives us the possibility to understand *a priori* concepts – which is that of the intellect, and on the other, the simple application of this faculty in experience – which is understanding. In doing so, understanding may sometimes take into account objects that are not for him to synthesis, and against this 'transcendental' use Kant warns us again and again. Nonetheless, as again Žižek points out:

It is Kant himself who actually defuses the antinomies. One should always bear in mind Kant's result: there are no antinomies as such, they emerge simply out of the subject's epistemological confusion between phenomena and noumena. After the critique of Reason has done its work, we end up with a clear and unambiguous, non-antagonistic, ontological picture, with phenomena on one side and noumena on the other. The whole threat of the "euthanasia of Reason", the spectacle of Reason as forever caught in a fatal deadlock, is ultimately revealed as a mere theatrical trick, a staged performance designed to confer credibility on Kant's transcendental solution. This is the feature that Kant shares with pre-critical metaphysics: both positions remain in the domain of Understanding and its fixed determinations, and Kant's critique of metaphysics spells out the final result of metaphysics: as long as we move in the domain of Understanding, Things-in-themselves are out of reach, our knowledge is ultimately in vain.¹¹

⁸ Slavoj Žižek, *Less than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism*, Verso, 2012, p. 269.

⁹ Cf. Deleuze, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰ Cf. Žižek, op. cit., p. 276.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

Interesting enough, the ontological region that stand in the limit of our intuition and the intellect might offer a partial answer to what stands topologically between the same intellect and Reason. We are talking about the *transcendental reflection*, called upon to clarify the applicability of each of the faculties to its domain. This reflection stands for the fact that our affectivity, sensible intuition, returns to us as an *experience* and not as an ‘intellectual intuition’.¹² So it prevents the confusion of *appearance as phenomena* with a *transcendental appearance* that would constitute a mere illusion. If this was not difficult enough, we let open the question if we can submit to the Žižekian thesis that our knowledge is in vain, considering that:

Not so much the analytic of the forms of our knowledge is Kant interested in, but more of how for this ‘pure’ forms (of thinking, for example) nonetheless some content corresponds – even if its objective (namely, in terms of knowledge, and not simply as a formal thinking). Transcendental deduction can pass as a simple hypothesis that privileges pure thinking in relation to knowledge indeed – it can appear just as a ‘hypothesis’ (and not a thesis) of a *quid jury* in relation to a preceding *quid facti* – things are not so, Kant warns. Even though our forms of knowledge are ‘given’ only through experience – that is, *a posteriori* –, they become in this context, by retrofitting, an *a priori* condition for ... experience itself. The ambiguity of our experience – a *a posteriori* cause for the *a priori* of its own ... possibility – is, perhaps, the most difficult hermeneutical point of criticism because it appears to reveal a ‘vicious circle’, when in fact, it is a simple consequence of a quasi-reflexive amphiboly, meant to keep it away from (dogmatic) traps of transcendental realism – for which there is a perfect reflexivity (i.e. non-lacking) between the *a priori* of the experience and its (counterpart) *a posteriori*, but also from the narcissistic presumption of a subjective idealism – for which the issue of objectivity – the central theme of *Critique of Pure Reason*, as Kant himself emphasized – is not even put.¹³

So how are we to distinguish between phenomena and the thing in itself? Are they two separated worlds affecting each other, or a variation of the same object? This is a question only experience can answer Kant’s conclusion is that, given the distinction of thinking and understanding, the legitimate use is only empirical and immanent. The principles of the intellect cannot be used for *pure* intelligibility because this would apply to the thing itself. Thinking progresses through *categories* which relate only to *objects in general*, but this is still insufficient for us to have

¹² cf. Virgil Ciomoș, *Conștiință și schimbare în Critica Rațiunii Pure. O perspectivă arhitectonică asupra kantianismului*, Humanitas, 2006, p. 136.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 154–155. (own translation).

knowledge. The logical possibility of a concept is not the same as the transcendental possibility of a thing, so we need the intermediate role of the object in general = X. The restriction is placed within immanence itself and also the Self:

In fact, knowledge implies two things which go beyond synthesis itself: it implies consciousness, or more precisely the belonging of representations to a single consciousness within which they must be linked. Now, the synthesis of the imagination, taken in itself, is not at all self-conscious (CPR A78/B103). On the other hand, knowledge implies a necessary relation to an object. That which constitutes knowledge is not simply the act by which the manifold is synthesized, but the act by which the represented manifold is related to an object (recognition: this is a table, this is an apple, this is such and such an object). These two determinations of knowledge are profoundly connected. My representations are mine in so far as they are linked in the unity of a consciousness, in such a way that the 'I think' accompanies them. Now, representations are not united in a consciousness in this way unless the manifold that they synthesize is thereby related to the object in general. Doubtless we know only qualified objects (qualified as this or that by a diversity). But the manifold would never be referred to an object if we did not have at our disposal objectivity as a form in general ('object in general', 'object = x'). Where does this form come from? The object in general is the correlate of the 'I think' or of the unity of consciousness; it is the expression of the *cogito*, its formal objectivation. Therefore, the real (synthetic) formula of the *cogito* is: *I think myself and in thinking myself, I think the object in general to which I relate a represented diversity.*¹⁴

This three perspectives account for the difference between *a priori* and transcendental, and also for the reality of the transcendental subject. Transcendental qualifies the principle of necessary subjection of what is given in experience to our *a priori* representations, and the necessary application of *a priori* representations to experience. Unlike space and time, which are the object of an 'exposition', the categories as concepts of understanding are objects of a 'transcendental deduction', deduction called upon to solve the special problem of subjection of phenomenon. What Kant understands through categories is 'both representations of the unity of consciousness and, as such, predicates of the object in general.'¹⁵ And, furthermore, 'the category provides unity for the synthesis of imagination without which it would not procure for us any knowledge in the strict sense. In short, we can say what depends on understanding it is not synthesis itself, it is the unity of synthesis and

¹⁴ Deleuze, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

¹⁵ *Idem.*

the expression of that unity.¹⁶ Such strong correlation stands for the fact that the Noumen simply exceeds even the transcendental subject, so what we encounter are two different instances of indetermination. First there is the transcendent indetermination of the noumenal, second, a transcendental indetermination of the subject correlated with the object in general. More precisely, the transcendental object is something that indicates the noumenal indetermination that is exterior to the subject: the indeterminate form of an object that describes another indetermination: the indeterminate intelligible cause of a simple object.

For Kant, we internalize an exterior indetermination of the noumenal and formalize it. Understanding is, in a way, tormented by the fact that thing in themselves are not known to us. So, Kant constantly talks about internal illusions and illegitimate uses that occur when understanding abstracts itself from its relation to the imagination and neglects its own limits. 'All Critique can do is to exorcise the effects of illusion on knowledge itself, but it cannot prevent its formation.'¹⁷ We have, indeed, two ways in which illusion appear 'naturally'. In the

transcendental use, understanding claims to know something in general (therefore independently of the conditions of sensibility). Consequently, this something can be the thing as it is in itself; and it can only be thought of as suprasensible ('noumenon'). But, in fact, it is impossible for such a noumenon to be a positive object for our understanding. Our understanding does indeed have as a correlate the form of the object in general; but this is an object of knowledge only precisely in so far as it is qualified by a diversity with which it is endowed under the conditions of sensibility. Knowledge of the object in general which would not be restricted to the conditions of our sensibility is simply an 'objectless knowledge'. 'The merely transcendental employment of the categories is therefore really no employment at all, and has no determinate object, not even one that is determinable in its mere form' (CPR A247-8/B304). The transcendent use consists in the following: that reason on its own claims to know something determinate. (It determines an object as corresponding to the Idea.) Despite having an apparently opposite formulation to the transcendental employment of the understanding, the transcendent employment of reason leads to the same result: we can determine the object of an Idea only by supposing that it exists in itself in conformity with the categories (CPR Dialectic, 'The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason'). Moreover, it is this supposition that draws the understanding itself into its illegitimate transcendental employment, inspiring in it the illusion of a knowledge of the object.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Idem.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

We are not affected only by the empirical objects, but also by the real of the Noumena, which makes our experience not just epistemological, but also ontological. Kant's explicit justification of why we need to introduce noumena is inscribed in a traditional ontology with its distinction between appearance and true reality, appearance simply cannot stand on its own, there must be something behind them which sustains them. The unavoidable illusion that haunts our knowledge comes from the fact that, in the speculative interest of Reason, he abandons everything to understanding: 'speculative reason would never have been interested in things in themselves if there were not, primarily and genuinely, the object of a different interest of reason.'¹⁹

Freedom and intellectual intuition

Let us be said from the start that, for there is a practical interest of Reason, it still stands for a sort of failure. The discord between our knowledge and our practical engagement is irreducible. In the second 'Critique', that is of the 'Practical Reason', Kant again limits our access to the noumenal domain because that

would deprive us of the very 'spontaneity' which forms the kernel of transcendental freedom: it would turn us into lifeless automata, or, to put it in today's terms, 'thinking machines'. The implication of this passage is much more radical and paradoxical than it may appear. If we ignore its inconsistency (how could fear and lifeless gesticulation coexist?), the conclusion it imposes is that, at the level of phenomena as well as at the noumenal level, humans are a 'mere mechanism' with no autonomy and freedom: as phenomena, we are not free, we are a part of nature, a 'mere mechanism', totally subjugated by causal links, a part of the nexus of causes and effects; and as noumena, we are again not free, but reduced to a 'mere mechanism'. Our freedom persists only in a space *between* the phenomenal and the noumenal. It is therefore not that Kant simply limited causality to the phenomenal domain in order to be able to assert that, at the noumenal level, we are free autonomous agents: we are only free insofar as our horizon is that of the phenomenal, insofar as the noumenal domain remains inaccessible to us.²⁰

The higher form of the faculty of desire, as we mentioned before, must be an *a priori* practical synthesis of the free will with a form - the moral Law, in order to not be contaminated by the *a posteriori* injunction of pleasure and pain. It is a

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁰ Žižek, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

synthesis because the moral Law, that is an Idea of speculative reason, does not contain in itself the concept of freedom. Practical reason, in giving the concept of freedom an objective reality, legislates in fact over the object of this *concept*:

The moral law is the law of our intelligible existence, that is to say, of the spontaneity and the causality of the subject as thing in itself. This is why Kant distinguishes two kinds of legislation and two corresponding domains: 'legislation by natural concepts' is that in which the understanding, determining these concepts, legislates in the faculty of knowledge or in the speculative interest of reason; its domain is that of phenomena as objects of all possible experience, in so far as they form a sensible nature. 'Legislation by the concept of freedom' is that in which reason, determining this concept, legislates in the faculty of desire, that is to say, in its own practical interest; its domain is that of things in themselves thought as noumena, in so far as they form a suprasensible nature.²¹

Law gives intelligibility to our existence in two ways: as a legislation by natural concepts – that were outlined above in regard of our understanding, and secondly, as a legislation by the concept of freedom, concerning the noumenal as they form a suprasensible nature from the standpoint of the practical interest. Even more, the domain for freedom is, for Kant, the perfect coincidence of the already free subject and the agent giving itself the law of its own freedom²² – that is in form of a necessary free causality. Reason determines practically a suprasensible object of causality, and determines causality itself as a free causality, able to form a nature of our own, by analogy. 'A free cause never has effect in itself, since in it nothing happens or begins; free causality only has sensible effects.'²³ There are indeed two types of legislation, but only one terrain, that is of experience: 'the paradox of method in a *Critique of practical reason*: a representation of an object can never determine the free will or precede the moral law; but by immediately determining the will, the moral law also determines objects as being in conformity with this free will.'²⁴ As in the speculative interest, Reason has, again, a special link with the sensible. But now it's not a

²¹ Deleuze, op. cit., p. 31.

²² Cf. Žižek, op. cit.: 'The central tenet of Kant's transcendental idealism is that it is the subject's "spontaneous" (i.e., radically free) act of transcendental apperception that changes the confused flow of sensations into "reality:" which obeys necessary laws. The point is even clearer in moral philosophy: when Kant claims that moral Law is the ratio cognoscendi of our transcendental freedom, does he not literally say that necessity is conceived freedom? In other words, the only way for us to get to know (conceive of) our freedom is via the fact of the unbearable pressure of the moral Law, of its necessity, which enjoins us to act against the compulsion of our pathological impulses.', p 149.

²³ Deleuze, op. cit., p. 40.

²⁴ *Idem*.

delegation to understanding in order to know them – but *realize* them. Do so, it is necessary to *want* the action of realization of a good, and this ‘wanting’ is supplemented by faith in the Good Sovereign. It is made in the perspective of an infinite progress, through the intermediary of an intelligible author of sensible nature, God as the moral cause of the world. Through this, Kant clearly subordinates the speculative interest to the practical one:

But are the postulates the only conditions for a realization of the suprasensible in the sensible? There must still be conditions immanent to sensible Nature itself, which must establish in it the capacity to express or symbolize something suprasensible. They are presented under three aspects: natural finality in the content of phenomena; the form of the finality of nature in beautiful objects; the sublime in the formless in nature, by means of which sensible nature itself testifies to the existence of a higher finality. Now, in these last two cases, we see the imagination take on a fundamental role: whether it is freely exercised without depending on a determinate concept of the understanding; or whether it exceeds its own boundaries and feels itself to be unlimited, relating itself to the Ideas of reason. Thus, the consciousness of morality, that is to say the moral common sense, not only includes beliefs (convictions), but the acts of an imagination through which sensible Nature appears as fit to receive the effect of the suprasensible. Imagination itself is thus really part of moral common sense.²⁵

Indeed, we now understand that there is a being that has free causality. Through faith it expresses the synthesis of the speculative and practical, but this synthesis is necessary only if we want to give a determination in the sensitive world. For Kant the existence of the world could not acquire a worth from the simple fact of its being known. Its worth comes from its *end*:

Final end, indeed, means two things: it is applied to beings which ought to be considered as ends-in-themselves, and which, on the other hand, should give sensible nature a last end to realize. The final end is thus necessarily the concept of practical reason, or of the faculty of desire in its higher form: only the moral law determines the rational being as end in itself, since it constitutes a final end in the employment of freedom, but at the same time determines it as the last end of sensible nature, since it commands us to realize the suprasensible by uniting universal happiness with morality. [...] The speculative interest finds ends only in sensible nature because, more profoundly, the practical interest implies the rational being as end in itself, and also as the last end of this sensible nature itself.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

In this sense it may be said that 'every interest is practical, and the very interest of speculative reason is only conditioned and is only complete in the practical usage'.²⁶

Kant makes it clear that antinomies result from the misapplication of categories, and that they disappear the moment we clarify this confusion and respect the gap that separates noumena from phenomena. He nonetheless has to insist that this misapplication is not a contingent mistake, but a kind of necessary illusion inscribed into the very functioning of our Reason. Therefore, the key to understanding the passage from the speculative interest to the practical one is to see the subject of moral law as something that was always already free, it just didn't realize it. This passage is discussed in detail by Žižek when he writes:

This is how one should read the key statement that understanding 'limits' sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing, at the same time sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories. Our understanding first posits noumena as the external limit of 'sensibility' (that is, of the phenomenal world, objects of possible experience): it posits another domain of objects, inaccessible to us. But in doing so, it 'limits itself': it admits that, since noumena are transcendent, never to be an object of possible experience, it cannot legitimately treat them as positive objects. That is to say, in order to distinguish noumena and phenomena as two positive domains, our understanding would have to adopt the position of a meta-language, exempt from the limitation of phenomena, dwelling somewhere above the division. Since, however, the subject dwells within phenomena, how can it perceive their limitation (as Wittgenstein also noted, we cannot see the limits of our world from within our world)? The only solution is that the limitation of phenomena is not external but internal, in other words that the field of phenomena is in itself never 'all' complete, a consistent Whole; this self-limitation of phenomena assumes in Kant the form of the antinomies of pure reason. There is no need for any positive transcendent domain of noumenal entities which limit phenomena from outside phenomena by their inconsistencies, their self-limitations, are 'all there is'. The key conclusion to be drawn from this self-limitation of phenomena is that it is strictly correlative to subjectivity: there is a (transcendental) subject only as correlative to the inconsistency, self-limitation, or, more radically, 'ontological incompleteness' of phenomenal reality. The moment we conceive the inconsistency and self-limitation of phenomenal reality as secondary, as the effect of the subject's inability to experience the transcendent In-itself the way it 'really is' the

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

subject (as autonomous-spontaneous) becomes a mere epi-phenomenon, its freedom becomes a 'mere appearance' conditioned by the fact that noumena are inaccessible to it (to put it in a somewhat simplified way: I experience myself as free insofar as the causality which effectively determines me is inaccessible to me). In other words, the subject's freedom can be ontologically grounded only in the ontological incompleteness of reality itself.²⁷

So, in this regard, we might as well reverse the topology of Reason and understanding. If we have to want to realize an act of moral good, that which is in conformity to the Law, understanding might come first, and Reason, with its unconditioned deviation towards antinomies, simply does what it *doesn't know* as if there were a different truth that has to be announced. The speculative interest bears upon phenomena insofar they form a sensible nature. The practical one, upon rational beings as things in themselves and together acknowledge for a suprasensible nature that is, in this regard, the proof of the incompleteness of reality as such.

The faculty of feeling, the last we have to take account, has no proper domain, neither phenomena, nor things in themselves because they do not express the conditions under which a special kind of objects must be subject, but solely the subjective conditions for the exercise of all of our faculties. This faculty, as Kant understands it in the *Critique of Judgment* presuppose a pure subjective harmony where imagination and understanding are spontaneously exercised. It describes the conditions under which each faculty enter resonance - so they are free and also in accord with each other. Judgment cannot be even considered a proper 'faculty' because 'when we consider nature's material aptitude for producing beautiful forms we cannot deduce from this the necessary subjection of this nature to one or another of the faculties, but merely its contingent accord with all our faculties together.'²⁸

The operation that intervenes in judgment consist in subsuming the particular under the general. Either general is already given and need an apodictic employment or determining judgment, or the general poses a problem and calls the need to *create a reflective judgment*:

A first mistake would be to believe that only reflective judgment involves inventiveness. Even when the general is given, 'judgement' is necessary to do the subsuming. Transcendental logic is undoubtedly distinct from formal logic in containing rules indicating the condition under which a given concept applies (CPR Analytic: 'Transcendental Judgment in General'). But these rules cannot be reduced to the concept itself: in order to apply a concept of the understanding

²⁷ Žižek, op. cit., pp. 282–283.

²⁸ Deleuze, op. cit., p. 54.

we need the schema, which is an inventive act of the imagination, capable of indicating the condition under which individual cases are subsumed under the concept. The schematism itself is also an 'art', and the schema, one of 'cases which come under the law'.²⁹

As we can see, in reflective judgment there is always a decision implicit. The exceptional status of this type of judgment resides in the fact that it makes visible how Nature imposed into itself something like a determinate judgment, that is from general to the particular, in order for us to be able to do the counter movement, of ascending from the particular to general, aesthetically or teleologically. Judgment can only reflect where nature already specified. This is an implicit character of Nature when we consider it as something with a final unity, with an end. An end implies the existence of something *as an end*, for which only *man* can grasp. Deleuze says that 'The only being which could be called a "last end" is one which has the end of its existence in itself: the idea of a last end therefore implies that of the final end, which exceeds all our possibilities of observation in sensible nature and all the resources of our reflection.'³⁰ But reflective judgment is something that mirrors³¹ a process that only an archetypal understanding is capable of: seeing the individual in the general, as in an intellectual intuition:

Every law requires necessity. But the unity of empirical laws, from the standpoint of their particularity, should be conceived of as a unity which only an understanding other than our own could necessarily confer on phenomena. An 'end' is in fact defined by the representation of the effect as motive or foundation of the cause; the final unity of phenomena refers to an understanding which is capable of serving as its principle or substratum, in which the representation of the whole would be cause of the whole itself as effect (archetypal intuitive understanding defined as the supreme intelligent and intentional cause). But it would be an error to think that such an understanding exists in reality, or that

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³¹ Cf. Constantin Noica, *Două introduceri și o trecere spre idealism*, Humanits, 2018: 'While the discursive intellect explains the whole through the parts (mechanically), the intuitive one delivers the parts through the whole (organic). But if, Kant says, we want to represent ourselves the possibility of the parties through everything, according to the intuitive intellect, then, given the discursive nature of our intellect, we cannot take everything as the cause of the parties, but we take the representation of everything as the cause of the possibility of their form, that means as a goal. Thus, the reflective judgment, because it is the one that puts the goal in play, still holds the structure of our intellect, but in the light of clarifications, that is, it is the echo of the intuitive intellect in our spirit. [...] Reason can have other "ideas"; but judgment will have to have the same game.' p. 118. (own translation).

phenomena are actually produced in this way: the archetypal understanding expresses a proper characteristic of our own understanding, namely our incapacity to determine the particular ourselves, our incapacity to conceive the final unity of phenomena according to any principle other than that of the intentional causality of a supreme cause (CJ parag. 77). It is in this sense that Kant subjects the dogmatic notion of infinite understanding to a profound transformation: the archetypal understanding now only expresses to infinity the proper limit of our understanding, the point at which it ceases to be legislative in our speculative interest itself and relative to phenomena.³²

Deleuze's conclusion regarding this impossibility for man to possess an intuitive intellect is correct as he considers a general statement elaborate by Kant, namely that our finitude is constitutive for our understanding and freedom. He's last chapter deploy an understanding of nature as an insufficiency: 'it is not nature which realizes freedom, but the concept of freedom which is realized or accomplished in nature.'³³ The name of this realization is 'History':

Thus, whatever appears to be contingent in the accord of sensible nature with man's faculties is a supreme transcendental appearance, which hides a ruse of the suprasensible. But, when we speak of the effect of the suprasensible in the sensible, or of the realization of the concept of freedom, we must never think that sensible nature as phenomenon is subject to the law of freedom or of reason. Such a conception of history would imply that events are determined by reason, and by reason as it exists individually in man as noumenon; events would then manifest an 'individual rational purpose' of men themselves (IUH Introduction). But history, such as it appears in sensible nature, shows us the complete opposite: pure relations of forces, conflicts of tendencies, which weave a web of madness like childish vanity. Sensible nature always remains subject to laws which are its own. But if it is incapable of realizing its last end, it must none the less make possible the realization of this end, in conformity with its own laws. It is by the mechanism of forces and the conflict of tendencies (c.f. 'unsociable sociability') that sensible nature, in man himself, presides over the establishment of a Society, the only milieu in which the last end can be historically realized.³⁴

The only way to counteract this collective judgment of 'human species' is to start over the Kantian project by eliminating one of its strongest cores: that of correlation as we indicated in this paper. This was put forward by a new understanding of

³² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

speculative realism, but we will not go further to discuss this. If we remain in the frame of Kantian criticism, the only thing that has to be better circumscribed more than ever the status of 'intuition', even more than that of the faculties. This is something that Deleuze does not take into account, at least in this short intervention that we analyzed.

Conclusion

There is an 'objectivity' already presupposed by Kant, even before he sets out the doctrine of the faculties. It's a pure intuitive 'objectivity' that resides in the universal, necessary and a priori affection on us of space and time. This is something Deleuze does not elaborate here. The question regarding of how do we come to know what we know, of our constitution of the objective reality, is simply just human. For this stands the fact that something that is already fully consistent doesn't ask what is capable of. Our reading of Kant through the lenses of Deleuze's inquires can unfold these conclusions: there is no longer possible to talk about human nature, only about humans as a species that 'deliver' the true finality of nature through history. It is a finality that is in no way an *intention*, but a mere coincidence of two inconsistencies: that of the subject and that of reality itself. Secondly, if our knowing would be constituted by the direct intuition of an object, it's not that the experience would fall, nor that the illusion would be indistinguishable from the thing in itself, but that we would never be able to know something *a priori*.

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