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FOREWORD

This volume comprises a number of articles and reviews by members of the English Department of the Babeş-Bolyai University. Reflecting the wide interest in poetics and related areas, some of them explore the structure of fictional works by English and American authors using the conceptual framework of narratology or critical theory (Virgil Stanciu, Marius Jucan, Sanda Berce, Mihaela Mudure). Others discuss issues relating to the genre of the fantastic and the way it was affected by politics in communist Romania (Liviu Cotrău), or aspects of the relevance of free indirect discourse to narrative theory (Ştefan Oltean). One article focuses on poetry (Liliana Pop). Despite their diversity, which is quite natural given the complexity of the literary area, the articles have been amassed under the more general rubric of poetics. Finally, three other articles tackle the problematic of literature from widely different perspectives: that of its reflection of harsh realities (Phillip B. Middleton's paper on Nuruddin Farah's Somalia), that of psychoanalysis (Ioan Creţiu) and, respectively, of cultural studies (Radu Adrian).

The volume will be of interest to those who work in the field of criticism, narratology, poetics, literary theory, literary history, as well as stylistics. Also, I hope that its coverage ensures that the reader has a perspective of the preoccupations of the professors in the English Department of the Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj.

Ştefan Oltean

STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, XLI, 3-4, 1996

THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF NARRATIVE DISCOURSE IN F. SCOTT FITZGERALD'S *THE GREAT GATSBY*

VIRGIL STANCIU

REZUMAT. Dimensiunea cognitivă a discursului narativ în *Marele Gatsby* de F. Scott Fitzgerald. Articolul propune o relectură a capodoperei lui F. Scott Fitzgerald, *Marele Gatsby*, prin prisma unor concepte ale şcolii franceze de semiologie, încercând să argumenteze că planul intelectual al romanului, ascuns sub cel faptic, are o contribuţie hotărâtoare la realizarea funcţiei de cunoaştere simbolică a romanului.

Unlike Hemingway, who praised him lavishly in *A Movable Feast*, F. Scott Fitzgerald was a rather mediocre manager of his literary talent, as he himself admits in *The Crack-Up*. His career is often used as a negative example: it epitomizes the way in which a great talent can be wasted away. Hemingway's prediction - "if he had succeeded in writing such a good book as *The Great Gatsby*, I was convinced he would write an even better one some day" - never came true. Fitzgerald did not surpass himself in his next books, but the novel he published in 1925, though disparaged at the beginning as being no more than an ephemeral anecdote, a "book for a single season", came to be appreciated not only as a writing that was emblematic of the period (the celebrated "Jazz Age"), but also as a literary text of great artistic value, only matched in its well thought-out perfection by a three or four novels written by his contemporaries. Lionel Trilling said of *The Great Gatsby*: "It keeps fresh because it is so specifically conscious of its time. Its continuing power comes from the courage with which it grasps a moment in history as a great moral fact."[1] He adds that the novel seems to have gained new meaning and to furnish new revelations with the passing of time. One of the reasons for its longevity is certainly its symbolical value, or, seen from another angle, the way in which autobiography was converted, through symbol and essence, into allegory. Interpreters have gone so far as to find in this novel a statement on the American psyche, divided between money power and dreaming. Edith Wharton found fault with the way in which Fitzgerald had conceived Gatsby, because his too vaguely sketched life-story made the protagonist, in her opinion, appear elusive, impalpable; but it is, I think, this very indeterminacy of the character that lends him his force; the question of his credibility seems immaterial when weighed against his high

[1] Lionel Trilling, *F.Scott Fitzgerald*, in "Arthur Mizener" (ed.), *F. Scott Fitzgerald: A collection of Critical Essays*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., p. 4.

symbolic relevance. However, the novel could not function so smoothly were it not perfectly structured, along ingenious lines. The problems of narrative technique posed by *The Great Gatsby* have activated the explanatory zeal of many an interpreter, from Edmund Wilson and Kenneth Eble to a host of present-day scholars. The temptation to look behind the gilded face of the clock, at the mechanism that makes it tick perfectly, is even greater in this sorry age of deconstructivist obsessions. An attractive technical commentary, which places our author in a double perspective - that of his own becoming and that of the general context of American literature between the wars - belongs to James E. Miller Jr., who calls our attention to the fact that the very changes Fitzgerald's views on the novel underwent from *This Side of Paradise* to *The Great Gatsby* illustrate the extremes of the famous argument which, in 1915, opposed two great novelists, Henry James and H. G. Wells.[2] Briefly, Wells was in favour of a "total", all-embracing, discursive novel, which could serve at once as a vehicle for transmitting ideas and as an imaginative medium for their discussion. This was called "the novel of saturation". H. James maintained that, on the contrary, the novelist's duty was to operate a very strict selection and to provide for each piece of fiction a "governing idea", a "centre of interest" or a "firm intention", around which the selected details could be well organized in a harmonious whole. The course subsequently taken by the modern (not by the postmodern) European novel proved H. James to be right. But things were not at all clear at the beginning of the century, when Fitzgerald found "inferior models" (Leslie Fiedler) like Compton Mackenzie and H. G. Wells, on which to mould his writing. That's why, in L. Fiedler's view, *This Side of Paradise* has "every fault and deficiency a novel can possibly have. It is not only imitative, but it imitates an inferior model, *Sinister Street*".[3] Later, however, Fitzgerald's orientation shifted towards the other pole, towards Conrad and Willa Cather, both followers of James. The result was *The Great Gatsby*, a model novel of selection, ranged with *Heart of Darkness* or Cather's *The Lost Woman* among the best examples of the kind. Fitzgerald resorted to very few "facts" in the organization of *The Great Gatsby* - in fact, as he showed in the "Introduction" to the 1935 edition of the novel, the material he left out would have sufficed for another novel. He then imitated Conrad in using an actor-narrator and the first person narration that can best create the illusion of verisimilitude.

Starting from the premise that this new conception on organization, together with the careful structuring of plot and incident, accounts for the outstanding literary quality of *The Great Gatsby*, we shall endeavor to point out some ways in which the novel generates knowledge for readers (meaning knowledge of people and events involved in the story). The theoretical contribution that has prompted this research belongs to the French school of semiology and is a study of the cognitive dimension of narrative discourse undertaken by A. J. Greimas and J. Courtes.[4] In his *Principles of Literary Criticism*, I. A. Richards speaks

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[2] James E. Miller, Jr., *The Fictional Technique of Scott Fitzgerald*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1957, pp. 67-82.

[3] Leslie Fiedler, *The End of Innocence*, reproduced in "Artur mizener", *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[4] A. J. Greimas and J. Courtes, *The Cognitive Dimension of Narrative Discourse*, in "New Literary History", vol.VII, No. 3, Spring 1976, 99. 35-49.

of two primary functions of criticism: to account for value and to explain how that value is communicated. The arts, according to Richards, are the supreme form of communicative activity, even if the artist (in our case the writer) is not as a rule consciously concerned with communication, but rather with achieving an aesthetically perfect artistic product (recent writers have displayed an increased preoccupation for this dimension of their work, often resulting in a premeditated increase in communicative difficulty). Granted, communicative efficiency cannot be equated with aesthetic excellence, since the most effective ways of imparting knowledge are the most direct and aesthetically the least satisfying. Communicative sophistication, on the other hand, may serve as a mere smoke screen, concealing a lack of motivation and a feebleness of intent under the varnish of modernity. *The Great Gatsby* is a masterpiece precisely because Fitzgerald found the natural, organic organization of his communication process, the one that his story demanded. He knew how to imitate the usual channels through which information about events, people and their psychology reaches us. Lionel Trilling observed that in his case form is not rigorously and minutely elaborated beforehand, but is rather the result of the grasp of inner necessities of the story to foster the idea.[5] Fitzgerald knew how to make very deft use of the elements of "generic stories": the American success story, the detective thriller, the love romance. Melted thoroughly in the smooth amalgam of his novel, these elements belonging to well-established narrative sub-species yielded a new fictional product: a complex, intriguing story, as rich in suggestions and ambiguities as it seems deceptively simple when read for the first time.

In the first sentence of the novel, "In my younger and more vulnerable years, my father gave me some advice that I've been turning over in my mind ever since"[6], certain linguistic signs, particularly verbs and pronouns, seem to refer to the producer of the discourse. The "I" of the text seems to be the same as the "I" of what Greimas calls *enunciation proprement dite*, i.e. true enunciation, but we soon realize they are actually different, as the producer of the true enunciation is the author, while the producer of the uttered enunciation (*enonciation enoncee*) is one of the characters, Nick Carraway. So, one of the actants of narration occupies, from the very beginning, a privileged position between the two actants of communication, the author and his readers. But Nick is an ambiguous element, as his role in the story is not so much to act, as to gather knowledge about the real actants, Gatsby, the Buchanans, the Wilsons and, to a lesser extent, Jordan who, as we shall see, is subordinated to Nick in much the same manner as Nick himself is subordinated to the author. These are, so to speak, the three points on which the narrative turns. Knowledge about Jay Gatsby's life, about his baffling personality and about his misty past will reach the reader through these actants of communication, who are also the subjects of knowing, as it is through their more or less concerted efforts that stranded pieces of information are gathered and fitted into the jig-saw puzzle which will eventually turn into a coherent explanation of the motivation of Gatsby's outlandish behavior. Of the three instances involved, the author pretends he is the least informed: this is obvious from the very

[5] Lionell Trilling, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[6] F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953, p. 3. All subsequent references to this edition.

beginning, when he transfers all responsibility on Nick Carraway's shoulders, by conferring to him the role of actual enunciator. Wayne Booth sees in Nick Carraway a dramatized narrator with a measurable (though rather limited) influence on the course taken by the events.[7] But even if, at times - as when he arranges the meeting of Gatsby and Daisy - his meddling in a plot the strands of which he can only divine does lead to unforeseen and probably unwanted developments, his primary function is that of collecting information which none of the other actants of narration could possibly gather, as their position (either too central, or too marginal) and limited understanding of events prevents them from doing so. So, the reversal of roles, in this case, is not a mere ploy, but an organic necessity: in addition to a mediator between himself and the reader, the author needed a "relay centre", i. e. somebody to establish and maintain links between constituted pairs of actants: Daisy and Gatsby, Myrtle and Tom Buchanan, Jordan and the two Buchanans and so on. Nick functions, therefore, as a kind of data-processor toward which all the information is funneled. If he failed to witness a single incident, the consequences on the organization of the story would be incalculable. By placing Nick Carraway at the core of a close-knit, logically woven web of human relations, by turning him into a sort of trustworthy confessor on which the actants of narration depend for their peace of mind, by thinking out good excuses in order to have him witness all the key moments of the plot, Fitzgerald obtains the best possible vantage point for the telling of Jay Gatsby's story, while managing at the same time to convey it with a great deal of situational realism. His great achievement in *The Great Gatsby* is that he knew how to make a contrivance of intricate complexity appear natural.

Through the novel, the reader is constantly pushed into two-fold comparisons: between Nick and Jay Gatsby, on the one hand, and between Gatsby and the world of the Buchanans, on the other. (A third possible comparison, between Fitzgerald and Carraway, which is in a way the object of this paper, only concerns people of our ilk; the rank-and-file reader is not even aware that it could be made.) But, no matter how we may turn the novel in our minds, Nick seems to occupy the central position, and it is a matter of some surprise that most assessments of the book have built their case on the assumption that Gatsby, rather than Nick, is the more interesting personality. This, of course, can be explained by the predominant interest in thematic aspects shown by most commentators of the novel, leading to an over-emphasis of the symbolic-ideatic value of the book (Jay Gatsby as the prototypal American, as adolescent America, still able-bodied but rotten at the core, the embodiment of the corruption of the American Dream, of the unlikely fusion of visionarism and materialism in the American character) and down playing its technical accomplishment. To our purpose, contrasting the two can be very useful, especially if we lay the stress on the difference in psychological insight, in emotional and intellectual maturity, in the degree of accumulated knowledge of human nature fostering different philosophical stands, with Nick, the commiserating skeptic, coming on top every time.

Nick Carraway describes himself as "one of the few honest people I have ever known", clearly with a view to enhancing the reader's trust in the fiduciary contract. His

[7] Wayne C. Booth, *Retorica romanului* (translated by Alina Clej and Ştefan Stoenescu), Editura Univers, Bucureşti, 1976, p. 224.

concern for accuracy in relating events is, indeed, remarkable. At one point in the narrative, he says: "It was Gatsby's mansion", only to hasten to make the necessary correction: "Or rather, as I did not know Mr. Gatsby, it was a mansion inhabited by a gentleman of that name"[8]. In presenting the Buchanans to the reader, he sticks to verifiable facts. Later, when he has spun the story to some length, Nick is worried that his narrative may have acquired exaggerated proportions, so he warns the reader against getting the wrong impression: "Reading over what I have written so far, I see that I have given the impression that the events of three nights several weeks apart were all that absorbed me. On the contrary, they were merely casual events in a crowded summer ..."[9] In addition to his basic honesty, which is absolutely essential in order to preserve de fiduciary contract, Nick has another quality that makes him the ideal agent of knowledge: he is exceptionally suited as confidant, being endowed with the kind of curiosity about people characteristic of a good listener and having, at the same time, a reserved communicativeness, accompanied by an inclination to reserve all moral judgements. Nevertheless, even though at the beginning of the story he says he prefers to pass no moral judgement on the people he comes in touch with, he breaks that promise at the end, probably in keeping with the reader's expectation to be confirmed in his belief that Gatsby, the "rogue male", is morally superior to the "respectable" Buchanans. Paradoxically, Nick the observer and the confidant, informs us at the beginning of the story that when he came East he wanted "no more riotous excursions with priviledged glimpses into the human heart."[10] He makes an exception for Gatsby, however: " Only Gatsby was exempt from my reaction - Gatsby, who represented everything for which I have an unaffected scorn. If personality is an unbroken series of successful gestures, then there was something gorgeous about him, some heightened sensibility to the promises of life (...) an extraordinary gift for hope."[11] By motivating his exemption in this manner, Fitzgerald probably made a tactical mistake: he anticipated his "reserved moral judgement" and in doing so reduced the essential mystery of the character by providing the enunciatee with a piece of information which makes him better informed than the actants of the story. We disagree, in that respect, with Wayne C. Booth, who sees in this early revelation a pact between enunciator and enunciatee, meant to open the way for dramatic irony.[12] While this passage lets us know that Nick is different from the detatched observers in that he gets emotionally involved in the plight of the characters observed, it also gives out a piece of information before the reader has been prepared to receive it, being quite uncharacteristic of the way in which Nick is subsequently going to conduct his inquiry into the life of Gatsby. It is also true that this partial revelation whets the reader's appetite for more details about the protagonist and that the very tone of the narrative betrays, from the opening pages, the side Nick is going to take.

Nick Carraway is helped in his acquisition of knowledge by Jordan Baker, who

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[8] Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[11] *Ibid.* p. 9.

[12] Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

acts in the book as a cognitive agent of the second order. It is she who supplies Nick with the details of Gatsby's courtship of Daisy Fay in Louisville before the war and of Daisy's marriage to Tom. She also informs him of the existence of Tom Buchanan's mistress, Myrtle. Certain things are worth noticing here. The two agents of knowledge - the one principal, the other subsidiary - are both passive characters, mere observers. However, Nick intervenes in the unfolding of events, in a crucial manner, twice. The first time is when he mediates the meeting of Daisy and Gatsby in his house. The second time when he becomes the subject of doing is when he withholds from Tom the vital information that it is Daisy who has run over Myrtle, not Gatsby. Otherwise, the plane on which the two act is parallel with the one on which Gatsby, Daisy and Tom act and it functions as a kind of sub-plot of the novel: Nick's half-hearted courtship of Jordan and their few common exploits, among which Gatsby's party. The fundamental difference between them is that Jordan is basically dishonest, but she does not break the fiduciary contract either. Also she is less involved in the events than Nick is and she certainly does not side with Gatsby. Had it been told by her, the story would certainly have made Gatsby appear as a ridiculous fool, while a combination of the two narrative viewpoints, Nick's and Jordan's, would have made the story more intellectually challenging (Faulkner-like), but certainly less sharply focussed.

Nick's other sources of information are Gatsby himself, Wolfsheim and Henry C. Gatz. Gatsby is primarily the subject of doing and the object of knowing and what reflexive knowledge about himself he is willing to impart is either confused or deliberately misleading. By taking into consideration the opposition between *being* and *appearing*, Greimas and Courtes show that the knowledge of the enunciator, being projected into the discourse, can bring into view four different *cognitive positions* from which the characters' doing and being are observed. While Nick and Jordan's positions are mostly *true* (being coincides with appearing), the positions of the other informers are either *false* (being is different from appearing), or *delusive* (not being and appearing). Gatsby's position is *secret* (being and not appearing). With the help of these categories of knowledge or false-knowledge it is possible to characterize states of being and to determine the truthfulness of characters and events. From the very beginning, the narrator (and subject of knowing) has an almost total knowledge of events, as he intimates from the first, already quoted, paragraph, which enables him to position himself on a true cognitive position. However, as he has gathered this knowledge piece-meal, he prefers to retrace his steps and share his information with the reader parcimoniously, revealing each item in the context in which it was unearthed. Such a manipulation of knowledge is meant to create a powerful illusion of reality. The narrator also communicates the false or delusive information that has come his way, using a delaying strategy that is very efficient in enhancing the curiosity of the reader. Thus, for the first two chapters, the object of knowledge remains almost hidden, as he exists, but does not appear; his name is mentioned twice, and then Nick has a glimpse of his silhouette, as he stands on the lawn of his mansion. His presence begins to be felt only beginning with Chapter III, when we are given all sorts of false information about him, so that his position as an object of knowledge becomes elusive: he is not what he appears to be - Kaiser Wilhelm's nephew, a German spy during the war etc. This false information has a calculated artistic function: to insert in the reader the same kind of speculative curiosity that

the minor actants of the plot have about Gatsby. "It was testimony", Nick comments, "to the romantic speculation he inspired that there were whispers about him from those who had found little that it was necessary to whisper about in this world."[13] Then the delusion turns into sheer falsity when Gatsby deliberately tells Nick a tall tale, pretending to be the rich heir of a Mid-Western family, educated at Oxford and having spent his youth in the great capital-cities of Europe. Nick, extremely sensitive to every nuance of meaning, quickly recognizes falsehood and comments: "My incredulity was submerged in fascination now: it was like skimming hastily through a dozen magazines."[14] Then, as he uncovers more and more significant details about Gatsby's real life and its grand design, the object of knowing moves closer to becoming true - appearing for what it is - even though Nick never learns the entire truth about his neighbour and something about the essential mystery of the character is permitted to remain untouched.

It results, from this brief analysis, that *The Great Gatsby* is, in Greimas's words, a complex narrative, in which the distribution of knowledge becomes an important organizing principle. Therefore, of the types of literary interests mentioned by Wayne C. Booth, in the case of *The Great Gatsby* the intellectual one is clearly predominant. We crave to find out the facts of the case, the simple material circumstances, as well as the psychological truth that explains the acts of the subject of doing. The novel's excellence is to be sought in the manner in which it knows how to enhance our intellectual curiosity and quench it in the end, by offering us final knowledge, mostly of a psychological and moral nature. The novel has been described either as Nick's experience of Gatsby, or as Gatsby's life seen by Nick. The seamless web of observation and experience creates an osmosis which we accept as artistically perfect, due to the convincing impression of a life seen through layers of observation which are masterfully handled in order to convey a feeling of genuine experience.

[13] Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 62.

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THE FANTASTIC: THE POLITICS OF A GENRE

LIVIU COTRĂU

REZUMAT. Fantasticul: Politica unui gen literar. Studiul de față, o versiune revizuită a comunicării susținute de autor la Convenția MLA din decembrie 1991, în San Francisco, încearcă mai întâi să răspundă la întrebarea: de ce nu avem literatură fantastică în perioada 1945-1964? Întrucât fantasticul, prin metastabilitatea sa semantică, era perceput ca un mod subversiv, antirealist, antimimetic. Iată că antinomia fantastic-miraculos/fabulos se poate totuși susține prin recursul la factorul politic; căci realismul socialist, prin proiecția unor personaje idealizate, prin polarizarea binelui și a răului, prin tonul didactic, corespunde întocmai exigențelor structurale ale basmului. În a doua sa parte studiul se constituie într-o re-lectură a textelor critice românești și străine asupra genului fantastic.

Despite allegations as to the rational (i.e. Latin) character of Romanian literature,[1] the *fantastic* has been one of its permanent if subsidiary aesthetic categories ever since Dimitrie Cantemir's *Istoria ieroglifică* (1705) and the Bogomilic and astrological legends in the *Rojdanice* and *Zodiace*.

Poised between the lure of Gothicism and the much stronger claims of a fabulous Oriental folklore, the Romanian fantastic strove hard to strike an original note, a difficulty compounded by the absence of a 'group aesthetics', unlike in Germany or France, for example, where such initiatives were buttressed by the comforting illusion of generic identity. This goes some way to explaining the peculiarly magical character of the Romanian fantastic, nourished by a mixture of ancient pagan rites and Christian myths.

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[1] In Al. Philippide's opinion (1936), "our inadequacy toward the fantastic is a profound and organic phenomenon... Eminescu being the only brilliant and inimitable exception" (*apud* Sergiu Pavel Dan, 1975:9). Statements to the same effect were also made by Pompiliu Constantinescu (1936), George Călinescu (1941), Petru Popescu (1970), Adrian Marino (1973). Petru Popescu, for example, argues that "in Romanian literature, purely fantastic works are scarce... because the Romanian writer, by virtue of his intelligence, in fact rejects 'fiction' (a reaction typical of the Southerners and Mediterraneans). He studies and exploits reality, for which he has a special calling. Not lack of imagination but rather a preference for the concrete world... makes the Romanian writer essentially a realist" (1970: 97-98).

The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries still paid tribute to a Balkan sensibility laden with anacreontic lyricism and the narrative motifs of post-Byzantine alexandrinism. With Mihai Eminescu and Ion Luca Caragiale, however, there was an original absorption of foreign models, mainly Germanic. Their oneiric or conversely grotesque fantastic drew its inspiration from Ludwig Tieck and E.T.A. Hoffmann and even from Edgar Allan Poe whom they both translated.

Eminescu typifies the Romantics' interest in folklore and esoteric writings, *Sărmanul Dionis* being a blending of superstition and Sanskrit metaphysics against the backdrop of German idealistic philosophy. It is precisely this kind of doctrinaire fantastic that set the tone for most twentieth-century fantastic productions.

Another orientation, a more robust and prosaic fantastic, darkly humorous and wildly grotesque, originates in Ion Luca Caragiale's tales, and it was pursued by down-to-earth realistic writers such as Cezar Petrescu and Liviu Rebreanu,[2] who brought to the genre a sense of the tragic and a remarkable degree of vraisemblance.

The course of Romanian fantastic literature was cut short by the political changes in postwar Romania. During what has come to be known as the 'dark decades' of Stalinist dictatorship original productions ceased altogether.[3] The explanation could be that the fantastic, just like Dadaism or Surrealism, was perceived as an alternative discourse to the then dominant modes of realism and psychologism, whose relative stability it was meant to challenge; and like all non-mimetic, non-realistic modes, the fantastic came under heavy attack and was utterly discredited since fantastic evasions into the realms of the mysterious and the absurd were officially regarded as dangerous deflections from a Stakhanovian representation of reality known as *socialist realism*.[4]

Why would fantastic literature pose any threat to socialist realism, given the fact that socialist realism, as Geoffrey Hosking remarks, "never defined a genre, a style or school, but rather a 'method' "(1980:9)?

For one thing, socialist realism performed a radical methodological reduction by excluding both psychological complexity and the possibility of tragedy, or as Marc Slonim observes, "Socialist realism negated human limitations and avoided the problem of death and the human condition in the universe. Literature was made into a political tool, its mission being that of instilling in the readers a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence" (1977:167). It was this spirit of robust faith in the socialist future that animated Chernyshevsky and Gorky in their fleshing out of the classic profile of heroes and heroines sprung from among workers, peasants and party cadres, with their faces set

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[2] It is perhaps ironic for a hard-line realist like Liviu Rebreanu to cherish most his fantastic novel *Adam și Eva* (1925).

[3] Not a single fantastic work was published in the interval between 1945 and 1964 (cf. Sergiu Pavel Dan, *Proza fantastică românească*, 1975). Laurențiu Fulga's case is probably typical: *Straniul paradis* came out in 1942 and his next fantastic novel, *Doamna stăină*, twenty five years later.

[4] Horia Bratu (1965) rightly observes that "Historically speaking, socialist realism did not come into being at the (First Soviet) Writers' Congress in 1934, but twenty years earlier...in the works of Pilnyak, Blok and Esenin."

toward the future, fully determined to put an end to the present fallen world, possessed by their utopian vision of life as it ought to be and bound to the closely-knit group that shared their vision.[5]

For such a project, however, which would have to account for what Katerina Clark has called *homo extraordinarius* (1985:147), writers needed fabulous forms such as fairy-tales. But it could be argued that with its appropriation of such 'marvelous' features as idealized characters, polarization of good and evil, didacticism, socialist realism in fact tended to dis-place and re-place the class of Märchen, thus moving ever farther from the conventions of the fantastic proper.

In Continental theories of the fantastic, the opposition between the 'marvelous' (*merveilleux*) and the fantastic proper seems to have the force of an axiom. It was Ion Biberi, a psychologist, who first drew attention to it. In his essay on the fantastic literature, he considers that "The marvelous has a moral axis, a system of beliefs, while the essence of the fantastic must be sought in the categories of sensibility. The feeling of enchantment, wonder and mild surprise in the former is replaced by fear, terror, and horror in the latter" (1945:99-113).

The two modes are also incompatible because the fantastic, unlike the omniscient, monologic discourse of the marvelous, speaks a language of difference, a language which undermines our notion of consensus reality. And again, unlike the language of socialist realism, which proclaims authority, truth and certainty as transcendental categories of literature, thus pushing the reader toward greater political, social and historical awareness, the language of the fantastic, through its emphasis on doubt, uncertainty and disorientation, conveys a sense of fear and despair arising from the contemplation of physical or mental disintegration or death. The fantastic is, as Rosemary Jackson observes, "a literature which attempts to create a space for a discourse other than a conscious one and it is this which leads to its problematization of language, of the word, in its utterance of desire" (1981:62).

In a more general sense, the relegation of the fantastic to the margins of high culture is a significant ideological gesture, one which is equivalent to the silencing of madness. Its subversion of dominant structures is re-constructed into allegory or magical romance. From a rational, monological world, 'otherness' cannot be known or represented except as foreign and irrational. It is either rejected altogether or assimilated into a 'meaningful' narrative structure, re-written or written out as romance or a fable.

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The early 1960s brought a long-desired relaxation in Romania's political and cultural life. Gheorghiu-Dej's tentative reforms created favorable conditions for a re-examination of the role and function of literature "now that the pre-Copernican certainty of Stalinism was over and man had to face those challenges of modern existence which

[5] When asked to define socialist realism, George Călinescu, Romania's greatest literary critic and a fine novelist himself, responded curtly: "We all know what socialist realism is."

had long been shoved under the rug".[6] With greater openness toward the West came a diminished role for Marxist ideology, reduced censoship and increased freedom for artistic creativity. In 1963, the Maxim Gorky Institute - the centre for Russian studies in Bucharest - was closed and the current affairs magazine *Timpuri Noi* - a translated version of a Soviet magazine - was replaced by *Lumea*. A growing number of formerly banned literary works, including Eugene Ionesco's plays, began to circulate. The removal of the Stalinist poet Mihai Beniuc, Zhdanov's Romanian counterpart, from the presidency of the Writers' Union in 1965 put an end for a while to socialist realism in literature.[7] As Vlad Georgescu notes, "by 1965, the Russian influence on culture disappeared almost entirely as the party prudently permitted the gradual recovery, rehabilitation, and dissemination of such traditional values as posed no direct threat to its authority" (1991:252).[8]

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The new political climate allowed for a resurgence of the fantastic, which, far from being a democratic genre, owes its existence, like all subversive literature, to both a discourse of authority and power (which it defies) and a context of ideological permisiveness. Ştefan Bănulescu's *Iarna bărbaţilor* (1965), with its vernacular language, portraying an uncanny and yet familiar landscape, was widely acclaimed because, apart from its unquestionable artistic merit, it heralded a new vision in the stale landscape of Romanian realistic prose. This novel was soon followed by A.E. Baconsky's *Echinoxul nebunilor*, Vladimir Colin's *Pentagrama* and Laurenţiu Fulga's *Doamna străină*, all of them published in 1967. The fantastic-ironic poetry of Leonid Dimov, Petre Stoica and Mircea Ivănescu, the parodic-absurdist lyrics of Marin Sorescu, the oneiric tales and novels of Sorin Titel, Dumitru Ţepeneag, and Matei Călinescu's *Viaţa şi opiniile lui Zacharias Lichter* were further evidence of the vitality of the genre. Mircea Eliade, who had made his début as a writer of fantastic literature back in the 1930s, continued to write in this vein (and always in Romanian) even after his self-imposed exile in France and from 1957 in the United States. In Romania, however, his name only re-emerged in 1969 with the simultaneous publication of *La ţigănci şi alte povestiri* and *Maitreyi Nuntă în cer*.

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[6] George Bisztray, *Marxist Methods of Literary Realism*, New York: Columbia UP, 1978, p. 43.

[7] In Julian Hale's opinion, "what finally killed 'socialism realism' was socialist realism. A well-written novel or poem is not desirable in the censor's eyes in some abstract, aesthetic sense. But a work of real quality delivers the goods in terms of national prestige ... The pride of Romania could no longer afford the absurdities which socialist realism brought in its train" (1971:125)."

[8] Soon after he came to power Ceauşescu made a speech at the Writers' Union calling for experimentation and free expression of individual talent.

The upsurge of fantastic literature in the late 60's encouraged theoretical reflection on the genre.[9] Briefly stated, the general pattern of critical discourse has been by and large to counteract inflationary description with overexact definition, or even better, to skip the business of genre definition altogether and focus on structural and thematic properties as evinced by the fantastic texts themselves.

In his attempt to account for E.T.A. Hoffmann's fantastic novellas, for example, Al. Philippide argues that "the fantastic fares better in an atmosphere of shadow, twilight, mist and darkness." But further on he concedes that "the 'shadowy atmosphere' is not a necessary, even less sufficient, prerequisite of the fantastic since a contemporary masterpiece of French literature, Jules Supervieille's *L'enfant de la haute mer*, occurs in broad light... and some of Kipling's stories... and Galaction's *Moara lui Călifar*... also take place on a hot summer afternoon" (1970:85).

This type of muddled argumentation certainly compounded the frustration of those literary theorists, particularly in the academic quarters, who were in search of a more rigorous discourse. Add to this a persistent and yet most inappropriate question: what is the *essence* of the fantastic? I say inappropriate for, as Karl Popper warns us, all 'what is' questions must be avoided because they only lead to sterile verbalism.

The essentialist assumption, as old as Aristotle, encourages the search for properties that are both necessary and sufficient. As N. M. Visser points out, "necessary properties are quite easily identified, while it is seldom if possible ever to discover a property or set of properties that are both necessary and sufficient." Why? Because "the properties listed are either mere accidental features or the list specifies so few features that it allows in more objects than the category is intended to admit, or simply the list is so detailed and extensive that it virtually eliminates objects thought properly to belong to the category" (1978:102). Nevertheless it took the literary critics a long time to get rid of their essentialist assumptions.

Since Jean-Paul Sartre's confident assertion that "le genre fantastique, comme les autres genres littéraires, a une essence" (1947:150), belief in essentialist definition has gradually eroded, culminating in Louis Vax's pronouncement: "Mais pourquoi définir le fantastique?...S'il est utile que le critique précise, dans une note liminaire, le sens qu'il entend donner au terme, il me parait ridicule et vain qu'il prétend décrire l'essence de la chose" (1979:47).

Irina Bădescu's article, *Préliminaires pour une étude du fonctionnement du fantastique* (1969), is such an attempt to avoid the trap of essentialist closure by seeking structural features which might provide a more precise definition of the fantastic.

Acknowledging the difficulty of defining the fantastique as an aesthetic category, Bădescu focuses on its 'functioning'. The cue is provided by A. J. Greimas's semantics, which maintains that an actual repetition of semes (minimal semantic features) can yield correct readings. Such repeated semes in the text make up the

[9] The interest in the fantastic literature was boosted by the Romanian translation of Roger Caillois's *Antologia nuvelei fantastice* (1970), V.I. Propp's *Morfologia basmului* (1970) and *Rădăcinile istorice ale basmului fantastic* (1973), and Tzvetan Todorov's *Introducere în literatura fantastică* (1973).

classemes, which are largely responsible for the coherence of texts. Moreover, the repetition of classemes enables the reader to identify a certain level of coherence or what Greimas, probing the jargon of physical chemistry, has called an isotopy.

In Bădescu's view, the fantastic consists in the oscillation between a positive and a negative isotopy. The candid reader, she claims, usually starts out with a set of positive assumptions, but when reading a fantastic text she soon grows alert to events which contradict her initial assumptions. As the mysterious and inexplicable events take over, she must acknowledge the existence of a different order, governed by a different logic (isotopy). In Vasile Voiculescu's *Schimnicul*, for example, the story is set in a perfectly intelligible albeit unusual human environment (an Orthodox monastery), but after a series of unaacountable events or what Greimas would call conflicting classemes (human vs animal), the story concludes with their strange fusion in a parasememe: the hermit has become a wolf (the motif of lycanthropy). It should be noticed, however, that in a story like Kafka's *Metamorphosis* the ground rules never turn since the story in fact begins with a fantastic occurrence, i.e. the discordant parasememe (man-cockroach), which defuses all fantastic suspense and expectation.[10]

Despite its practical utility, Bădescu's application of Greimasian structuralism is a case of what I would call overexact or reductive definition. Terms like positive and negative isotopy are obviously too general to be able to account for the variety and complexity of fantastic texts. Moreover, they seem to inhere in the very semantic structuring of any kind of narrative. Jonathan Culler is right when, in *Structuralist Poetics*, he observes that "it is extremely important for a theory of discourse to be able to account for readers' abilities to choose among alternative readings and establish levels of coherence," but, as he points out, "the process involves some rather complex notions of *vraisemblance* and appropriateness which cannot be rendered, it would seem, by a list of classemes which appear more than once in a particular stretch of text" (1975:102).

Conversely, a case of lax definition is Sergiu Pavel Dan's *Proza fantastică românească* (1975), "the first synthetic approach to Romanian fantastic literature," as the author himself recommends it, as yet unsurpassed in breadth of scope. To quote Louis Vax, the reputed French analyst of the fantastic, "C'est vraisemblablement à Pavel Dan que nous devons la classification la plus méticuleuse des motifs de la littérature fantastique écrite" (1979:42).

According to Sergiu Pavel Dan, "it is impossible to draw a rigid barrier between the marvelous and the fantastic; rather, the two genres are contiguous, with the marvelous providing "food" for the fantastic."[11] Also for Eric S. Rabkin "the fantastic has a place in any narrative genre, but that genre to which the fantastic is exhaustively central is the class of narratives we call fantasy" (1976:29). David Clayton goes as far as

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[10] This initial fusion of conflicting isotopies poses serious problems to Tzvetan Todorov's theory (see his *The Fantastic. A Structural Appproach to a Literary Genre*, pp. 169-75).

[11] This view is also shared by Ann Swinfen (1984:5): "The essential ingredient of all fantasy is the 'marvelous'."

to say that "every work of literature will contain some quantity of fantastic discourse, no matter how attenuated its proportion" (1982:61). In truth, it must be acknowledged that Sergiu Pavel Dan's theory is not so liberal after all. In fact the author concludes the matter with an equation: *the fantastic = x (normal) + y (supranormal)*. His theory, however, provides no formal criteria for determining what is *normal* and what *supranormal*, the implicit assumption being probably that the reader of nice perceptions will always manage to draw the line.

The issue is further complicated by the author's penchant for classification: in Romanian fantastic literature there are *four* fantastic situations: (1) the fantastic as the unacceptable reversal of verisimilitude; (2) the doctrinaire fantastic; (3) the fantastic as the will-to-mystery; (4) the absurd fantastic. It turns out that they are not some more or less 'objective' structures but the product of careful discrimination: "After a long effort of pruning the inessential from the essential, our research has arrived at the conclusion that the following situations must be taken into account" (108-109).

The fantastic themes are then classified in *three* sets: themes of fantastic interaction, mutation and apparition. The first set is broken down into five groups, the second into nine and the third into two, each group being further on divided into subgroups. Fantastic doubling, for example, contains ten such subdivisions. As Louis Vax remarks, "Cette minutiae ne va pas sans quelque artifice" (1979:43). Indeed, thematic catalogues bring to memory V.I. Propp's complaint, made in 1928, about the folklorists' general practice of accounting for the structure of folk tales simply by compiling *ad hoc* lists of motifs, a complaint more recently reiterated by Tzvetan Todorov and Christine Brooke-Rose. "Such lists," Christine Brooke-Rose notes, "exhibit the same mental habits. Many categories overlap, and there is also a confusion in levels of abstraction. They are also open-ended, that is, one could add more motifs as one finds them. An empirical list of specific features cannot be sufficiently abstract to cover all the possibilities. In short, it does not construct a theory" (1981:18).

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With the reversion in the mid 1970s to a hard-line Communism, reminiscent of the goals, value systems and methods of the '50s, the intellectual climate in Romania greatly deteriorated. Some of the best professional cadres, artists, literary critics, and scholars, eager to pursue their intellectual aspirations, chose exile in the West, at a time when the cult of the dictator had reached grotesque proportions and his incessant calls for ideological purity thwarted any serious attempt at originality. Significantly, a four-year plan for the "development of literature" was adopted in 1981, perhaps in emulation of the abortive Five-Year Plan novels initiated by the RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) in the 1930s. Much to the credit of Romanian writers this plan was stillborn. But the moral and cultural effects of such gross acts of ideological infringement have been incalculable. This is not to say that after almost a decade of 'freer' thinking all genuine creation and experimentation suddenly came to an end, but rather that under the censor's vigilant eyes and in the context of Romania's ever growing

political and cultural isolation, intellectual and artistic life lost much of the exuberant vitality it had previously displayed.

Literary criticism was in no better position, as the list of indexed authors was, either through defection or dissidency, growing from day to day. Eugene Ionesco was again a forbidden name, but surprisingly Mircea Eliade's was not, probably a recognition of his relatively moderate political stance and so, besides some of his scholarly works, a fine collection of his most recent fantastic tales and novellas was published in 1981 under the title *În curte la Dionis*, with a preface by the author and a postface by Eugen Simion.

That the general interest in the fantastic was, however, on the wane, due to the scarcity or poor quality of original productions, can be detected in Eugen Simion's final remarks in the postface: "The reader of this book has the chance of becoming acquainted with a prose that is rather unfamiliar to him. Nevertheless a prose which continues the Romanian literary tradition founded by Eminescu's *Sărmanul Dionis* and I. L. Caragiale's enigmatic stories" (1975:660).

There are at present clear signs of change in the intellectual climate. The monologic "wooden" discourse of the party cadres, reiterated *ad nauseam* in public meetings, official gatherings and in the mass media, but privately an object of derision, is now being openly deflated, making room for a sparkling, witty, even slanderous, political confrontation. The literary scene has also undergone a dramatic change. Freedom of speech has made publishing a profitable business. The privately-owned publishing houses seem to fare a lot better as a result of their quick adjustment to public taste, for after decades of relentless political indoctrination and strict censorship, there is now an urgent demand for productions in the formulaic genres. The market is literally flooded with spy novels and erotic fiction (e.g. Ion Creangă's "corosive" tales, printed by Roza Vânturilor Publishing House). D.H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, long banished, has benefited from two simultaneous translations,[12] and Henry Miller's unorthodox sex novels enjoy unprecedented publicity.

Besides a legitimate concern for exposé or samizdat literature (Paul Goma, Ioan Ioanid, Virgil Ierunca etc.), whereby the horrors of communist concentration camps and prison system are recuperated by historical memory, there is also a renewed interest in the 'lighter' genres of sf and the fantastic. In a top released by the Academy Bookstore, Mircea Eliade's newly-published *Nouăsprezece trandafiri* scored best, and many other fantastic works, among them Dumitru Ţepeneag's *Zadarnică e arta fugii*, Sorin Titel's *Clipa cea repede* and *Femeia*, Ştefan Bănulescu's *Iarna bărbaţilor*, have captured the lucrative genius of Romanian publishers.

If, as Lance Olsen suggests, "the fantastic generates a dialectic that refuses synthesis, explores the unsaid and unseen, and rejects the definitive version of 'truth', 'reality', and 'meaning'," and if, indeed, its function as a mode of discourse is, as he puts it, "to surprise, question, put into doubt, produce anxiety, make active, disgust, repel,

[12] As Bob Ashley remarks, exactly two decades ago the best-selling paperback in the United Kingdom was *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, with sales totalling three million copies in the first three months after publication (1989:2).

rebel, subvert, pervert, make ambiguous, make discontinuous, deform, dislocate, destabilize" (1987:116), I see no reason why, in the ongoing era of postmodern fabulation and generalized fantasy, Romanian literature should refuse to capitalize on this extremely mobile and fecund mode. In all likelihood, Romanian critical discourse will join in the general offensive against the ethnocentric positions of mimetic modes.

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HISTORY AND FICTION IN A POSTMODERN SPACE. A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION

SANDA BERCE

"Is history to be considered the property of the participants solely?"

REZUMAT. Istoria şi ficţiunea într-un spaţiu postmodern. O problemă de interpretare. Lucrarea este o încercare de definire a relaţiei istorie-ficţiune (din perspectiva naraţiunii), aşa cum se regăseşte ea în forme ale romanului britanic contemporan. În aceeaşi măsură, redefinirea 'metaficţiunii istoriografice' se face prin analiza unor momente de referinţă în istoria filosofiei şi filosofia istoriei, care au condus la textualizarea istoriei; pe de altă parte, se au în vedere procesele configurative care generează specificitatea textului literar, văzute în raport cu structura triadică a imaginarului. Demersul teoretic este exemplificat prin analiza unuia din romanele care au declanşat discuţia teoretică şi critică, în jurul conceptului denunţat anterior, în arealul anglo-american.

'Ficţionalizarea' istoriei şi 'istoricizarea' ficţiunii sunt văzute ca două procese ce se intercondiţionează în spaţiul romanesc postmodern.

Undoubtedly, the consistent, through varied thematization of history with so many British writers is caused by a certain "urgency" immanent in their works and synthesized by Malcolm Bradbury as the strong sense of an "either ambiguous or disastrous" progress of history at a time "when writers feel they come toward the close of an epoch, near the end of history, as it seems, many contemporary writers do"[1].

The meeting of history and fiction is no novelty and so much the less an invention of the 20th century. The novel has always been "a form of history", but what we really understand by history - the means by which we construct significant histories and we relate them to our understanding - are constantly in change. And what the changes have brought about is the paradoxical acknowledgement of an undesirable equivalence existing between the writing of fiction and the writing of history. In Frank

[1] Bradbury Malcolm, *The Modern British Novel*, London: Secker & Warburg, 1993, p. 432.

Kermode's[2] view writing novels is more like writing history with the relationship between events, the selection of incident, the validity of procedures and assumptions. In the like manner, history and real events never present themselves to us in the form of a story, writes Hayden White, and do not narrate themselves; it is the historians who do that which explains why, beyond the surface level of the historical text, there is a deep structural and latent content that is generally poetic and specifically linguistic in nature[3].

As far as the question of the nature of history and of history writing is concerned, a short survey would have to consider the changes that have shaped the western European thinking since the age of the Enlightenment. The rationalism of the 18th century admitted three kinds of historiography: the fabulous, the true, and the satirical. The difference between the first two was obviously the one between pure invention and what Pierre Bayle, a forerunner of the French Encyclopedists, considered to be "the soul of history", i.e. "truth"[4] itself; even though Voltaire's definition of history - i.e. "facts represented as true - may appear as highly questionable to a late 20th century consciousness. However, for the 18th century consciousness there was a clear-cut distinction between "history" and what Voltaire called "fable". "History, he said, is the recital of facts represented as true. Fable, on the contrary, is the recital of facts represented as fiction"[5].

Bayle's amendment regarding the relationship between truth and history - "the truth itself being likely to take on the aspect of a calumny"[6] - is also liable for being considered a 'brèche' in the rigidity displayed by the concepts of the age. However, there are two philosophers whose conceptions break away from the general assumption of the age - Giambattista Vico and Immanuel Kant. In the Italian's view, the problem of history is "that of determining the extent to which a purely «fabulous» or «mythical» apprehension of the world might be adequate, by any criterion of rationality, as a basis for understanding a specific kind of historical life and action"; in other words, the problem would be "to uncover the implicit rationality in even the most irrational of human imaginings"[7]. Vico's attempt to recuperate the irrational/"the fabulous"/"the mythical" as useful (or even necessary) for the study of the historical problem is a definite step beyond the limits imposed by the obsession with rationality of the 18th century thinking. With Kant, the philosophy of history supersedes its own age in a totally different way. Firstly, Kant's conception of the historical process is, so to say,

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[2] Kermode, Frank, *The Sense of an Ending*: Studies in the Theory of Fiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, passim.

[3] White, Hayden, *Metahistory*: *The Historical Imagination in the 19th Century Europe*, Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, passim; This deeper content – the metahistorical element – indicates what an "appropriate" historical explanation should be.

[4] Bayle, Pierre, apud Hayden White, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[5] Voltaire, *Works: A Contemporary Version*, apud Hayden White, *op. cit.*, p. 51 and passim.

[6] Bayle, Pierre, apud Hayden White, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[7] Vico, Gianbattista, *Principes de la philosophie de l'histoire*, Paris: Colin, 1963, p. 70.

threefold; he is able to conceive it in no less than three different ways: eudaemonistically (i.e. history as a continuous progress), terroristically (i.e. history as a continuous degeneration from the original state of natural and spiritual grace), and abderitically (i.e. the movement we perceive as history is nothing more than a redisposition of primitive elements and not a fundamental alteration in the condition of human existence at all; things only appear to develop)[8]. Secondly, and this is even more important, Kant's conception of history writing goes far beyond that of his age in that he considers the three kinds of historiography at work at the time as being equally "fabulous" and equally "fictive". He perceives them only as evidence of the mind's capacity to impose different kinds of formal coherence on the historical process, or as different possibilities of its emplotment; ultimately, they are the products of different aesthetic apprehensions of the historical field bearing certain moral implications. Although, Kant's theory is restricted within the confines of the historical field it nevertheless questions the grounds on which a particular kind of writing (be it historical) can be granted absolute value to the detriment of another one since no kind of such writing is based on an epistemological understanding of the world. And it is precisely this 'permissiveness' of the German philosopher's theory that allows for its principle to re-emerge at the end of the 20th century and to ground the discussions concerning the writing of history in close relation to the creating of fiction. However, what the 19th century chose to inherit from Kant was the moral side of his philosophy of history. For all the rest 19th century Realism operated with what might be regarded today as an epistemological reduction and relapsed into the rigidity of the opposition true-false, only this time enlarging the field and including literature in it.

As Alison Lee has pointed out, the dichotomy was now "lying" literature versus "true" history, the latter considered to be "accessible as pure fact"[9]. History was apprehended as "a synthetic, self-structure body of pure, non-linguistic fact", the perception of which was "unmediated by language"[10].

Hayden White, in "The Fictions of Factual Representation", provides an explanation for the distinction between literature and history in the 19th century consciousness. He argues, in a passage quoted by Alison Lee, that a particular historical event, such as the French Revolution, with its "excesses and failures" was to be blamed for the new view on historiography. The violent historical quake and the "mythic" thinking, which was believed to have triggered it, had immediate repercussions in the thinking of the age: the need was felt "to locate some standpoint of social perception that was truly «objective», truly «realistic»"[11]. Consequently, historical discourse was to

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[8] Kant, Immanuel, *On History*, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963, passim.

[9] Lee, Alison, *Realism and Power*, Postmodern British Fiction, London and New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 29.

[10] Idem, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[11] White, Hayden, *The Fictions of Factual Representation*, in Angus Fletcher (eds.), The Literature of Fact, New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, p. 25.

provide the theoretical basis for such an attitude by making accurate statements about a realm of events which were (or had been) observable in principle.

The 20th century Modernism proclaimed the indisputable supremacy of art: fiction was considered superior to history as the latter was perceived to be "a mode of writing limited to the representation of the contingent and the particular"[12].

With Postmodernism, however, the question of history and writing, strongly re-emerged. The problem was now reconsidered not only from the perspective of history, but from those of literature and language too. Thus, the latest theories in these three fields of knowledge have concurred to challenge the traditional "realist" approach of the problem concerning the nature of history and history writing. And they have done so by questioning the very essence of the issue - the opposition fiction-history. Both the writing of history and that of fiction are accomplished by language and the idea of history as discursive practice is informed by the linguistic theories. They challenge the traditional position that language is transparent, and that the word is the direct means to the thing it represents[13]. Henceforth history cannot be conceived anymore as pure facts which are accessible to us through "transparent language". Moreover, history cannot be conceived anymore as "independent of individual perception, ideology, or the process of selection (H. White, 1976: 28); and all these elements are markers of the process of creating a written narrative, mediated by language; they are all inherent in any written narrative, be it historical or fictional.

An important (if not the most important) premise for blurring the fiction-history dichotomy is the postmodern assertion that our knowledge of the past is strictly limited by our access to it; that is, the only way we can claim to know the past is through the historical text. Historiography is but textualisation of the past - a point that is emphasized by both historians and literary theorists - and historiography as a text is shaped by the same creative process involved in the writing of fiction.

For Paul Veyne history is "a true novel"[14] and the two genres, i.e. history and fiction, share the same conventions: selection, organization, diegesis, anecdote, temporal pacing, emplotment. They also use the same conventional literary structures: "Historical situations", writes H. White, "are not inherently tragic, comic or romantic. They may all be inherently ironic, but they need not to be emplotted that way. All the historian needs to do to transform a tragic into a comic situation is to shift his point of view or change the scope of his perceptions. In any case, we only think of situations as tragic or comic because these concepts are part of our generally cultural and specifically literary heritage. How a given historian's situation is to be configured depends on the historian's subtlety in matching a specific plot structure with the set of historical events that he wishes to endow with a meaning of a particular kind. This is essentially a

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[12] **Hutcheon, Linda,** ***A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction*****, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 108.**

[13] **Lee, Alison,** *op. cit.*, **passim.**

[14] **Veyne, Paul,** *Comment on écrit l'histoire*, **Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1971, p. 10.**

literary, that is to say fiction-making aspiration"[15]. As to the end for which both kinds of narratives use much the same means, it is obviously the imposition of meaning. And, as Linda Hutcheon puts it, history and literature, though not "part of the same order of discourse", they "exist since we constitute them as the object of our understanding (L. Hutcheon, 1988: 111).

Theorists of history provide arguments for theorists of literature while the latter reinforce the theories of the former through their own theories; and this consistency goes even beyond the theoretical discourse to encompass postmodernist fiction, as illustrated by what Linda Hutcheon calls "historiographic metafiction"[16], which is the 'empirical' demonstration of the latest theories concerning the relationship between history and fiction.

Problematization of history, and, ultimately, of the possibility of historical knowledge imposes upon the novels of historiographic metafiction a certain characteristic treatment of the past. Conceived and approached both as "a reference to the «real» past and as a text or discursive construct"[17], history is also to be seen in the light of the problematised relationship between reality and language. Historiographic metafictions are primarily novels that rethink the past and its relation to the present by conceiving history as "a human construct".

As Malcolm Bradbury remarks, there is no doubt as to the fact that "exploring past and recent history [...] did become a central theme of Eighties fiction" (M. Bradbury, 1993: 40). Thematisation of history and of its relation to our present is to be found with a great number of contemporary writers[18] - Peter Ackroyd, Julian Barnes, Salman Rushdie, Rose Tremain, and, of course, Graham Swift, to mention only a few names.

As far as Graham Swift's work is concerned, Malcolm Bradbury's remark about the general tendency of the age is perfectly accurate. None of the writer's novels has, so far, left untackled the problem of history in its various manifestations.

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[15] White, Hayden, *The Historical Text as Literary Artifact*, apud H. White, op. cit., 1973, p. 81 and passim.

[16] There are at least two terms, apart from Hutcheon's "historiographic metafiction", at use in contemporary literary theory to refer to very much the same type of fictional texts. Christine Brooke-Rose's "Palimpsest History", although implying "the notion of history as itself a fiction, is quite ambiguous if one bears in mind the connotations of the phrase as apparent in Orwell's "1984"; while Brian McHale's "apocryphal/alternative history" is rather restrictive in its meaning, although comprehensive in its denotation. ("Magic realism" is an equivalent of these terms but it is mostly associated with South American fiction and with the notion of 'realism' as a literary convention).

[17] Hutcheon, Linda, *Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox*, New York and London: Methuen, 1984, p. 14.

[18] The problems raised by their novels range from questions like Rushdie's "Is history to be considered the property of the participants solely?" to those like Barnes's "How do we seize the past? Can we ever do so?".

The questions haunting Swift's fiction are invariably connected to our relation with the past: What is history? How are we, 20th century people, probably living at the "end" of history or even in its "aftermath", to know the past and why? All of Swift's novels are, whether explicitly or implicitly, close analyses of man's attitude towards history which is always acutely perceived. Subjects or objects of history, the characters, are for ever confined into an ambiguous and paradoxical state of being 'within' and 'without' at the same time. History has many ways of manifesting itself; history in itself can be either explicit or implicit; but whatever it is and however it is apprehended, history's ultimate characteristic is to be potentially perplexing.

Graham Swift is the writer who was the 1983 nominated for the Booker Prize with "Waterland". Almost ten years later, at the 1992 Cambridge Seminar of British Contemporary Literature he said that history and literature are so interrelated because "real history coincide and penetrate with life to such an extent that the interest in the past becomes an important generational process in which the author is there, as a participant, in the first person, in a rather dynamic way"[19]. "Waterland" is Swift's one novel that epitomizes the 'avatars' of history dispersed in individual subjectivities bound by an undermining collective subconsciousness. And any reading of the novel is backed by the writer's other belief that "Fiction does in a specialized, concentrated way what we all need to do: to enter into our minds - experiences other that our own, which is no small or simple thing - as all our moral and social pretensions rest upon it."[20] In this process imagination is recognized to bring him up against certain things that are his peculiar territory, conceived by the writer as a process of discovery and not of preconception. An experience of 'outrage' and 'violence' of the last decade[21], progressively turned the 'human form' into plurisignificant 'other' forms, that is from temporal into spatial, from historical into ontological. Such a response 'to the void' is explicitly manifested in all the arts. Literature is only one other image wherein man as the measure of all things is replaced by "homo significant", a creature who determines the universe by symbols of his own making. Under their pressure, the public world dissolves and facts and fiction blend, as history is degraded by media into happening. And yet, there is with some literature works a sense of temporality in which existing realities are always prone to being rendered unreal presents, as there is also a sense of temporality in which the study of the past, no matter how exhaustive it is, can be used as a firm foundation from which to control the direction of the future. It is most likely a new novel form, that we intend to define further ahead as a narrative of causality, from the past to the future, opening up a realm of human action in the present. It is not that human action may change the past; but as an act of planetary (i.e. spatial and not temporal) overview, some narrative may turn 'history' into 'historia', both 'story' and 'inquiry' on mutability. "Waterland" is a narrative of causality, from the past to the future, and it definitely is an overview that changes our sense of temporality. Moreover,

[19] Swift, Graham, *The Cambridge Seminar of Literature* (lecture), July, 1992.

[20] Idem, 1992.

[21] Hassan, Ihab, *The Postmodern Turn*, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1987, passim.

it is a challenge of the literary over history or the particular role that the literary plays in our understanding of history.

The development of the narrative centers on the Fen country of East Anglia, but the writer's concerns are not exactly local. It represents individuals living in a present burdened at each moment by an invisible web of dense history: history of local memories, Tom Crick who is a history master living in London with his wife Mary, a childhood sweetheart from the Fens, Europe's history enacted in memories about the French revolution, the two world wars, and the England of the British Empire. The narrative in the present is wound in three strands: Mary's bareness (outcome of abortion in her teens when Tom made her pregnant); Tom being dismissed as head of history department on grounds of rationalizing the curriculum and because 'there is no more need of history teaching'; and the story focusing on Price, Tom's pupil and a child of the age of 'forms', 'symbols' and 'virtual reality', who not only questions the value of studying history but who is also a member of the Holocaust-Club, founded on the assumption that 'history is about to end'.

The construction of the novel shows the inevitability of narrative in any account of the past (i.e. history) as the textuality and narrative with historical studies confirm the argument that "history of history" discloses the revenge of literature in what history and literature share - the imaginative. In "The Tropics of Discourse", Hayden White argued against 'scientific historians' who try to purge their histories of all 'fictional' elements. The present day experience of 'fictionalization' of history, he writes, is for the sake of unprejudiced 'explanation "for the same reason that we experience great fiction as an illumination of the world that we inhabit along with the author"[22]. Put it differently, in point of fact, history - the real world as it evolves in time - is made sense in the same way by the poet or novelist who tries to make sense of it: it endows what originally appears to be problematic and mysterious with the aspect of a recognizable, because familiar, FORM. In this case it does not matter whether the world is conceived to be real or it is only imagined: the way of making sense of it - 'story' vehicled - and ulterior story telling is the same. Graham Swift reminded historians of such similarities between the constructs of history and literature on the ground of individual nature and habit: "the desire to hear and to tell stories is our natural and fundamental state of mind"[23]. "Waterland" is part of his project; to demonstrate that historical writing does have fictional components. Whether fictionality is an important component of the scientific method because a hypothesis is, after all, a fictional construct that awaits testing by experimentation is not worth to be further demonstrated. And it is not such case with "Waterland". What is challenged in this novel is the notion of mimesis because the hypothesis, the experiment (i.e. the experience) and the result are formalized, shaping out a new tradition in novel writing - the disclosure of "as if". The novel, for that matter, not only challenges the notion of mimesis, it also breaks away with the Aristotelian notion of literary imagination. For Aristotle, imagination

[22] White, Hayden, *The Tropics of Discourse, Baltimore*: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, p. 155.

[23] Swift, Graham, *Waterland*, London: Picador, 1983, p. 35.

gives the contingent world of history shape and form, but the fictional form of such a novel as "Waterland" grows out of a different sense of temporality and a modern sense of reality in which passage of time undermines the possibility of universal truths. What for Aristotle is a revelation of truth, for Graham Swift and such like writers seems to be an imposition of form on reality; it means that Swift's novel might serve a non-Aristotelian function. It may make strange or defamiliarize given ways of organizing the world. It may also bring new forms into existence rather than relying on familiar ones which is why the novel's problematic is the fragile frontier between two forms of appropriation and construction of reality: historiography and fictional discourse. In the like manner it is obvious that Swift has used the text in order to place the past in a critical relation to the present and the present in a critical relation to the future, but relevancy leads to a more secure confinement in the present, outlighting the only tension dramatically experienced by any individual: the tension between past and present.

An analysis of the temporal mode would explain what really makes a literature text to work out such a problematic perspective on the present. Evoking Aristotle, Frye argued that the historian is concerned with what 'happened' as the poet is concerned with what 'happens'[24]. In a literature text, events have not happened, but are in a perpetual state of happening. It means both re-presentation and performance, the Iserian "Darstellung"[25]. In this particular case representation is not a mimetic but a performative act. It does not imitate something that exists or existed, but it can stimulate the emergence of new ways of organizing the world (W. Iser, 1978). The way in which it allows something to happen perpetually is related to the reflexive aspect of the narrative and the language of the text is opened to the constructive (i.e. imaginative) abilities of the reader. Mimesis is both active and dynamic - 'mimesis praxeos' - contextually defined (childhood and adolescence, life in the 1980's via the history of the Atkinsons and the Cricks on the Fens of East Anglia, in the novel). It also implies imagining a plot that re-presents the action of history upon people (the French Revolution, the two world wars, India of the British Cultural - and not only - Empire) and organizes the meaning of history, backwards, as an ulterior reality. The novel is also 'mimesis logou' - representation of the word that gives form and shape to everything imagined, reason and praxis - changing the novel from a marginal 'petit narrative' into a center of the universe, an individual manifestation of the sense of order. "Waterland" frames out the 'heterotopos'[26] wherein Swift writes out the 'Geschichte' - a story and history at the same time, because reality changes as time changes while the narrative simultaneously imitates and produces the contingent reality of history. In Ricoeur's terminology, it is an act of configuration of what is already figured in the human mind[27].

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[24] **Frye, Northrop,** *The Secular Scripture*, **Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1976, passim.**

[25] **Iser, Wolfgang,** *Identity of the Literary Text*, **Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1987.**

[26] **McHale, Brian,** *Postmodernist Fiction*, **London: Routledge, 1991.**

[27] **Ricoeur, Paul,** *Mimesis and Representation*, **1981, apud Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative,** vol. III, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988.

The special function of form in "Waterland" is to challenge the reader to cross boundaries of existing modes of constructing reality, a boundary crossing that is signalled by the interplay of various discursive systems that are selected and combined in the novel dialogically. It is not the purpose of this paper to further investigate this aspect. However, the systematic usage of old narrative norms that are both the vehicle and the form used by the writer to frame out the world of the novel highlight the fact that the beginning and the end of everything is the 'story' because it helps humanity to bind existence from out its own remains. The 'story' catalyses characters, events, symbols in an inconsistent "abortive mimesis"[28] and becomes an important generational process of a new novel mixed form, conceived dramatically as 'teatrum mundi': a performance of the human relationship with time (history) and contextualized time (i.e. existence: historia). Whether it is an enactment or a new emergence of the 'oracular' form is a matter of another investigation; and not only because it is mythologizing logos reflecting another logos in a world in which everything becomes the sign of another sign. It is rather the type of approach on the human condition in history, in a novel that writes about historical change and mutability, about revolution and its impact on the individual destiny, only six years before important European and world changes. Our interest goes with how the text works rather than with what it means. Everything, in this novel, is assimilated by performative re-presentation: the individual, human relationship, the world and the grand experience of life; it is the revelation that the meaning of the world is in 'Historia' and not in 'History'[29] and the novel form complies to its meaning. Living in 'Historia' is experiencing or living cyclically, transgressing from the individual and the species to humanity and eternity; it is not the mere quantitative time of 'History', but the qualitative time, in Saint Augustine's terms, or the significant relationship between the present, the past and the future, circumscribed to the 'instant' or "the present of the past events, the present of the present and the present of the future"[30]. It is what the novel accomplished: it escaped chronicity but it is not a deviation from the norms of temporality in historical narrative. It imitates historiography, reduplicating history, in a narrative in which 'order' is not succession but interconnection of mutually implied parts which are conditioned by the whole. It fictionalizes history and it is permissive with the 'simultaneity of the mutually exclusive'[31]. It is a justification, in terms of content[32] of the shift from 'great narratives' to 'petit narratives', with the emergence of the aesthetic value of the banal, the symbolic value of the real and the grandeur of the trivial. While consciousness becomes perplexed

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[28] **Mepham, John,** *Narratives of Postmodernism*, in Edmund J. Smyth (eds.), Postmodernism and Contemporary British Fiction.

[29] The novel's motto is a dictionary definition of 'historia': Historia, ae, f. 1. inquiry, investigation, learning; 2. a) a narrative of past events, history. b) any kind of narrative: account, tale, story.

[30] **Saint Augustine,** *Les Confessions*, Paris: Gallimard, 1983.

[31] **Iser, Wolfgang,** *The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

[32] **White, Hayden,** *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

to the extreme, cognition turns into a progressive inner acquisition as frontiers between facts and their consequences disappear. Such unstable frontiers change the novel into a parabolic accumulation backed by a prototype of a whole generation; the generation of the 1980's British novel that supported the new 'cultural policy' by fictional diversity for that matter. The absence of a 'dominant style' and, moreover, their simultaneous development in all arts increases the difficulty of approach. And yet such novels encourage the experience of "historicizing" when they are read from the 'horizon of expectation' of the present. For Graham Swift 'historicizing' about history has integrated the apocalypse with atonement and redemption and 'aevum' as well as a bearer of necessary degradation to become change and mutability. In matters of form this novel is such degradation of historiography because every story that works out the novel becomes a parable of survival through utter change, a return to a new beginning. "I told you", says Tom Crick, the history master to his pupils,"that though the popular notion of revolution is that of categorical change, transformation - a progressive leap into the future - yet almost every revolution contains within it an opposite if less obvious tendency: the idea of a return. A redemption, a restoration. A reaffirmation of what is pure and fundamental against what is decadent and false. A return to a new beginning"[33]. Etymologically the term 'revolution' implies movement both forward and backward in time. "Revolution", Crick argues is the notion of "a return to a new beginning", although the popular meaning of the word is that of "categorical change, transformation - a progressive leap into future". Indeed the study of the French Revolution confirms the opposite tendencies contained within the same notion; it nourished the promise of the future idealized society, based on the model of a past idealized (i.e. ancient Rome). Distanced in time, Swift's point-of-view, challenged by the ulterior reality, is that "history is the record of decline, what we wish upon the future is very often the image of some lost, imagined past" (G. Swift, 1983: 123). Circularity, reflection and equilibrium are the features that, according to the narrator's theories determine, characterize and explain the way of history. Contradicting Heraclitus (i.e. 'we cannot step twice into the same river'), history for both the narrator and the writer "repeats itself, [...] goes back on itself, no matter how we try to straighten it out. [...] it twists, turns [...] it goes back in circles and brings us back to the same place" (G. Swift, 1983: 123). When contextualized, history becomes "the fabrication, the diversion, the reality-obscuring drama" (G. Swift, 1983: 34). History is problematically evaluated in relation to both reality and fiction. The re-evaluation is accomplished under the pressure of reality and because of the concomitant, powerful challenge of fiction. Furthermore, the triad Reality-History-Fiction is analyzed according to the postmodern view that "we can only know 'reality' as it is produced and sustained by cultural representations of it" (15). The notion of the past can never be available to us in pure form, but always in the form of 'representations' opens the way to the opinion that the text is "a space open to the imprint of history" (16). Such notion of 'space' of the text is backed by the iserian notion that the 'fictive' and the 'imaginary' are two constituents of literature and that the

[33] Swift, Graham, *Waterland, op. cit.*, p. 119.

former is intentional and the latter is spontaneous and defies any definition. However, the imaginary is an "ars combinatoria" and manifests itself in different ways. Apparently it is both the 'fictive' and the 'imaginary' that history (as human construct realized in language, which translates 'knowing' into 'telling' in the FORM of a NARRATIVE) and fiction share in common. Furthermore, the triadic structure is a principle around which all the constructions of reason and of the imaginary revolve. The human mind is an imprint of the triadic structure which is projected according to circumstances; when such an interpretive strategy is applied to the contemporary novel, the triad the Real (existence)-the Fictive (history - as translation of 'knowing' into 'telling') and the imaginary (the 'fictional') opens further commentary on the idea that the 'fictive' brings about the 'imaginary', operating along the borderlines between the 'real' and the 'imaginary' so that both become contexts for each other, in different ways (W. Iser, 1993: passim.). With "historiographic metafictions" (L. Hutcheon, 1988) of "Waterland" type there is interplay between the 'fictive' and the 'imaginary'; it activates three fictionalizing acts: with selection different values meet and work upon each other to a point of intersection whereto an area between fields of reference opens up, with their respective distortions in the text. This is read and interpreted as a 'coherent deformation', denoting nothing and connoting almost everything. With combination, intertextual boundaries are crossed and the result is interaction of textual segments (the French revolution, the wars and the individual destiny); with self-disclosure, a boundary marked by the "AS IF" convention (a borderline between the empirical world and its shift into the 'fictive') is crossed. The narrative is 'programmed' to unfold ambiguities in the text that run counter to existing realities. And yet, the 'as if' convention equates the reader's "seeing as" when "the object is identified with the aspect of it that is being perceived" (W. Iser, 1993: 212). Basically, the Iserian minimal definition of the literary text as "an oscillation [...], a basic play movement of back and forth" (W. Iser, 1993) is displayed in "Waterland", as in almost all contemporary novels of this type. It is a movement of play that issues into configurations, all of which being programmed to change.

Ultimately history, as thematized by historiographic metafictions such as "Waterland", is a question of interpretation; the evaluation of the past has become a matter of personal and often intimate interpretation permitting the coexistence of simultaneous histories and, consequently, truths.

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ON FICTIONALIZATION IN HENRY JAMES'S TALES

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REZUMAT. Despre ficţionalizare în povestirile lui Henry James. Analizând relaţia de ficţionalizare în povestirile lui Henry James, autorul pune în evidenţă atributele modernităţii prozei jamsiene, aducînd în prim plan caracterul novator al acestei relaţii pentru concepţia despre ficţiune ca artă promovată de Henry James. Avîndu-şi originea în Poetica aristoteliană, relaţia de ficţionalizare iluminează asupra modalităţilor din ce în ce mai complexe folosite de Henry James în procesul de reprezentare al ficţiunii literare.

Fictionalization may be regarded as a pragmatic modality of constituting and producing fictionality. The wholeness of the connections illustrating fictionalization may be considered to emerge within the framework of a work of literary fiction, where fictionalization acts under specific circumstances. A possible definition of fictionality describes the concept as a "*pragmatic convention, historically established, making rules for the evaluation of the text on aesthetic criteria*"[1], the determinant role being enacted by the aesthetic function, which in many instances diminishes the convention of the factual evaluation[2]. Commenting on Schmidt's views concerning fictionality, Şt. Oltean emphasizes the risk of radicalization of some antagonistic opinions concerning fictionality. Thus, S. Schmidt considers that the specificity of fictionality lies within the communicative interplay. For J. Searle the authorial intention must be regarded as being answerable for the very status of fictionality, but may be viewed as debatable when it comes to pinpoint the overburdening role of the author, as a producer of texts, neglecting thus, the interplay of other factors. The danger of a biased approach resulting on one hand out of the ontological fallacy, and on the other out of en overemphasized dimension of intertextuality, may yield into an unbalanced interpretation of literary fiction. Commenting on some distinctive elements that should restrain as much as possible the emergence of a theoretical deadlock, Şt. Oltean points out that both Currie and Ryan but also J. Searle[3] consider the authorial intention of producing fiction as

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[1] Oltean, Şt. - *Ficţiunea, lumile posibile şi discursul indirect liber*, Ed. Studium, Cluj-Napoca, 1966, p.23.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *Ibidem.*

pivotal to the concept of fictionality, and subsequently distinguishes relying on their views the circumstances the case when a work is fictional and when it is regarded ar fiction[4]. One may followingly consider that a work in prose cannot truly achieve the status of being fictional unless we take into account the intention of creating fictionality.

Regarded by a long impressive critical tradition as a writer who endeavoured to reveal the hidden and sometimes obscure aspect of "representing" fiction, or to the rank fiction among the other arts, Henry James disclosed as the source and aim of this tales, the relation of fictionalization. The recurrent instances of the Jamesian "authors" and "interpreters" of a "work in progress", which happens to be a work of fiction, a painting but also the webbing intentions, hopes, remorses which may be figured in a lived-life, give account for the writer's predicament in representing reality, of which the writer did not make a secret. The thwarting questions of representation in fiction were not avoided by Henry James, rather on the contrary, as it is well known, they constituted a problematic and sometimes boldly, innovating approach to the matter. For H. James, fictionalization deals with the very essence of literature. Seeing the dynamic relation between tradition and innovation in literary fiction, it becomes essential not only to perceive the importance of the author's impact in the pragmatization of the concept of fiction, not forgetting that literary fiction is a unique, original artistic product, but also to accept that the representation of reality in a work of fiction and its perception as well, must be regarded as a process which is subjected to modernization. H. James is one of the first modern writers who substantially elaborated on fictionalization, not only pragmatically, but also critically, when referring to the question of the available image ("l'image disponible")[5]. Being primarily exemplified as a problematic and often impairing condition of the artist, fictionalization rests then at the very centre of H. James's epic creation, as a fundamental attribute of valuating intersubjective knowledge.

For K. Hamburger fictionalization must find its source in the conscious process through which a fiction author is aware of and consequently represents "the free play" between reality and fiction reality of his fictional work, a "reality" marked by the characteristics of being stylised (symbolical) and substance-less[6]. The motion of the "free play" becomes more relevant as far as K. Hamburger equates it, as a first instance with the humour with which the author of the 18th century literary fiction had made known to his reader that the representation of this narration had only an illusory reference. *Aesthetic humour* was for K. Hamburger one of the first attitudes through which fictionalization was pragmatized. By this, the literary theorist meant a conscious strife on the part of the author to point, (while building the representation of reality in fiction) that the "truth" of the correspondence between fiction and reality itself was an illusion, and only by the means of an illusory referentiality could the author refer to Truth. In other words, a writer of fiction must consider the aesthetic relation to reality,

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[4] *Ibidem.*

[5] James, Henry, *Preface to the Portrait of the Lady*, Norton Critical Edition, N.Y., 1973.

[6] Hamburger, Kate, *The Logic of Literature*, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloominton, 1973, p.162.

which for K. Hamburger means a renewed interpretation of the Aristotelian principles exposed in his "Poetics". The disclosing of the illusory referentiality is to be met not only in comic or humouristic works of fiction, but in all works of fiction where the concept of *Aesthetic humour* renders the awareness on the part of the author that fictionalization in an intentional and intensional process. By the term "free play" K. Hamburger does not describe the limits of the degree of freedom an author may have as fictionalization is regarded. The same lack of a precise designation is to be mentioned as the manipulation of the "stylised, substance-less" epic matter in a work of fiction is viewed on, but this certainly signals that "the free play" conventionally points to the modalization of fictional intention and to the fruitful exploring and use of the authorial strategies. So, also a first manifestation of fictionalization, aesthetic humour ascertained the suspension of disbelief, by enabling the reader to perceive a greater amount of freedom in the representation of fictive reality. It is important to notice that for instance, in the great works of fiction of the 18th century in English literature, the reader was offered a certain status of "superiority" in perceiving the illusory resemblance between real humans and characters in works of fiction. The reader is given sufficient reason to admit the illusory referentiality of fiction in change of a permissive attitude induced by the attitude suggested by the aesthetic humour. The transactional character of fictionalization is to be clearly remarked since this very stage, though in the course of time, considering the complexity and sophistication of the techniques of fictionalization it toned down, so that fictionalization does not require any longer for the present-day reader a sustained effort to be perceived as such. Aesthetic humour introduces not only elements that soften the reader's disbelief, but also a certain amount of digression, a short prolonged parting from the presentation of the course of narration. By diverting the attention of the reader and leading him to the parallel path of a digression, the author induces more easily the representation of the work of fiction, putting into practice the so-called "free play" above mentioned. Digressions, either short or long, do not only interrupt the main course of the presentation of narration as a whole, compact unit, but bring into effect the fact that *the story* is represented by *sequences,* and it is by sequences that the author builds up the representation of the whole narration. Digressions create discontinuity, and the discontinuity of the fictional work is rendered not only in space but also in time. Digression are not always humouristic, as they expose more boldly this reflective nature which alternates with an ironical view on the events represented by the fiction. Modern authors got involved in presenting conspicuously reflective digression which created differentiation and interruption within the main course of the presentation of the narration. By leaving and then by returning the main course of the narration, by digressions, modern authors especially relied comfortably on fictionalization. Reflective digressions at their turn changed fiction, by a greater concern shown[7] to psychic life. The process of subiectivisation undergone by the character was greatly amplified so that the narration got centred within an *I-origin,* K. Hamburger considered to be best represented in the work of J. Joyce. Psychic process

[7] *Ibidem,* p.168.

are rendered in a presentational form[8], as well. Referring the Musil's character, "the man without qualities", K Hamburger notices that the form of representing these processes relies mostly on the so called verbs of "inner action". Analysing the occurrence of these verbs of inner action, K. Hamburger points that in the case of Ulrich (Musil's hero), the general remarks of the hero are also of the *narrator's as author,* what leads to another distinctive criterion belonging to fictionalization, namely that we do not deal with the representation of a narrator of an action but with the *narrative act itself.* In a fictional context, fictionalization equates the interpretation (presentation) of psychic processes with psychic processes themselves. In the same course of underlying the subjectivization of fiction, included by fictionalization, the dialogue emphasizes the role played by the *I-originarity* of modern epic. The conspicuous differences between narration and dialogue are formalised by K. Hamburger in a statement that describes fictionalization as fluctuant[9].

Fictionalization may be also looked upon as a process of weakening of the supreme, absolute values occurring in representing reality. Starting from Nietzsche's and Heidegger's definitions of nihilism, G. Vattimo states that nihilism refers to "something totally different than simply to man"[10], and followingly, nihilism stands for the reduction of the being to its value of change. Considering G. Vattimo's demonstration, we may remark that the meaning of nihilism is rendered by "the consummation of the value of use in the value of change", in other words, G. Vattimo points to the fact that the human being got dissolved in the "dis-course of the value", by the indefinite transformations of its universal equivalence. The consequence of the vanishing of the supreme value (the death of God) and the superfluity of the final values changes dramatically the perception of reality (world) dramatically, namely the eternal, fixed hierarchies of the world, diminish and fluctuate into a "story". Exploiting what Nietzsche described as a consequence of the death of the supreme value, the changing of the world into a story, Vattimo and other thinkers of the difference (Deleuze) are of the opinion that once the world is equated with the story, the latter acquires the attributes of "seriousness" and "glory" of the former, including credibility as well. The "real" world becomes less real, than unique and primary, as its interpretation becomes more and more accessible and varied. Possibility in interpreting reality (the world) effaces the rigid ierarchies of an "objective" existence of reality; the simultaneous angles from where the observer may consider reality shatter down the uniqueness of an only view. The "story" acquires more and more power, showing that narration works as vehicle of knowledge.[11]

The dissolving of the being in the notion of value, as well as the changing of the concept of the world in a *story* (fabula), stands for a weakening of the power of reality (the power that was conferred to reality). This cannot appear as unique, supreme

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[8] *Ibidem*, p.172.

[9] *Ibidem*, p.176.

[10] Vattimo G., *Sfârșitul modernității*, Ed. Pontica, 1993, p. 25-26.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 22-23.

and absolute, and consequently the perception and then the representation of reality is de-centred by the perception of other "realities" as those of the dreams, hallucinations, illusions, intentions. The relativization of the concept of reality (world) is quite noticeable with H. James, the writer for whom reality in his fictions stood for a comprehensive process of modalization of the character. At the same time, one must not conclude that the weakening of the power of the hierarchies of the real, bring about a complete dissolution of any value. The weakening of the power of the real, enables fictionalization to emerge as the main support of modern literary fiction. Referring to the degree of the above mentioned relativization and to the limits conceived for the "free play" of fictionalization, we may find a suggestive prescription in N. Hartmann's concept of *de-realisation*[12]. Making a distinction between aesthetical ethical values, the philosopher states that the value of some aesthetic objects cannot be but a value of derealization. The aesthetic values are always "captive" within something real, having nothing else created as precedence in comparison with the ethical ones. We do not have to test the "power" of aesthetic values, but their representation. The aesthetic values are the ones wich being values of derealization are constituted very far from reality. It is worth underlining that both N. Hartmann and G. Vattimo, though separated by a great span of time do not consider fiction being totally separated from referentiality, though this connection holds true only on a general level. Derealization stands for Hartmann for the freedom of creation, pointing that within a possibility-necessity relationship, the possibility wins over necessity. N.Hartmann also shows without elaborating too much on this aspect, that within derealization "there exists a possibility without the precedence of a causative necessity", that is derealization does not only on the "closed circuit of real conditions"[13]. The philosopher proclaims the negative liberty of the possibility, on whose standpoint the thinker believes that art is "the power" of making emerge things that do not exist.

Considering the pragmatization of the concept of fictionality, H. James examines the scarcity of the credible premises to be found in the "reality" of the work of fiction, trying to lay bare the obstacles that may influence the perception of the real; in other words, showing that the writer's task is not to imitate but to represent reality, giving the fictional work intensionality. At the same time, the obstacles found by H. James in the earlier stages, became pivotal points from where the author acquired a greater freedom in fictionalising. The progressive complication of the techniques of fictionalization used by the writer is illustrated by the dimensions of the Jamesian phrase, which placed H. James among the last great Victorians, creators of a mandarine English, it has become evident that the writer himself endeavoured to expand the network of the ambiguous, possible interpretations of the reality (world) in his tales, an increasing difficulty which paradoxically made the epic work of H. James's stand the test of time. Nevertheless, in spite of a sometimes declared intention to create ambiguity, the writer succeeded in proving that fictionalization may expand its limits

[12] Hartmann N., *Estetica*, Ed. Univers, Bucureşti, 1974, p. 397.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 398-399.

without impairing the sense of realism. It is within an irreversible change of realism that H. James strove to ascertain in his tales the existence of a *"minimal and limiting verisimilitude"*, which acted similarly with the principle of the sufficient reason and with the concept of iterativity in the description of a possible world[14]. H. James acknowledged in his epic creation, that by the use of fictionalization the relation between what was considered real and non-real becomes critical, that is open to interpretation and change. The characteristics limiting and minimal enable verisimilitude within the fictionalization relation to expand over that had been considered an outmoded cliché (the presence of the ghost in H. James's tales), manipulating successfully in building up epistemic dilemmas. The violation of reality so conspicuous in *The Turn of the Screw,* though relying on quite a melodramatic cliché, stands as a solid piece of evidence in showing the expansion of fictionalization, in that H. James's technique heralded the "free play" of literary motives, organised in different patterns. It is within this dimension enhanced by fictionality, that the motive of the double (doppelgänger) appears devoided of its originally Romantic sense, being employed to increase the dramatism of the crisis of identity, which at its turn reflects the decomposition of the hierarchies of the real. The relativism of the physical and moral scale of man illustrated by Swift's hero may be discovered in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, the modern reader being offered without precautionary steps (as in the case of Swift, the voyage, the political and moral allegories), the chance of dealing only with the representations of fictionalization. H. James remains a still very surprising author, who (at the peak of his creation which may be situated around the turn of the century), was obviously involved in representing the expanding relation of fictionality, aiming at creating ambiguity and not obscurity, constructing and deconstructing the interpretation of the events [15]. Fictionalization introduces a problematic realism. Once verisimilitude is limiting and minimal, the reader is demanded by the hypothetical vistas opened by the author to cooperate in building his own evaluating, problematic representations; the original "disbelief" of the reader may be questioned as well, whether while undergoing the impact of a different kind of fiction, did not alter its main meaning, that of establishing a referential code. Once the author knows "less and less about his hero [16]" verisimilitude appears to be more and more an illusory suggestion, a problematic interpretation of the form of verisimilitude and of its true/false model of probing the reality of the unknown in order to make it familiar. The reader's disbelief becomes actually a secondary question since the relation possible/impossible substitutes the true/false relation in defining reality. Fictionalization creates a hypothetical space accommodating both the reader and the characters from where the authorial strategies enable them to believe they control the way in which reality is perceived.

[14] Pavel, Thomas, Fictional Worls, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989, p. 60-62.

[15] Mathiessen, F.O., *The Notebooks of Henry James*, Oxford Press, 1947, p. 105, also p. 178-179. see also Edel L.a Gordon R., Henry James and H.G.Wells: *A Record of their Friendship, their Debate on the Art of Fiction and their Quarrel*, Urbana Illinois, 1958.

[16] Todorov, Tzvetlan, *Categoriile narațiunii literare*, în *Poetică și Stilistică*, Ed. Univers, 1972, p. 370-400.

"Consciousness", the magic, expanding circle within which reality is figured out represents the centre of illusory references. The Jamesian tale does not have a rigid designation[17] since "reality" points to the ever-changing intentions and wishes (an erotetic context)[18] of the character.

Considering the digressive feature K. Hamburger finds to be fundamental to modern fiction, we should mention that in H. James's tales, fictionalization is represented in a number of cases by a "theoretical" approach to the action of the narration, a modality by which the author underscores the secondarity of fiction to reality. At the same time, "theorising" while getting away from the main course of the narration and then returning to it, represents a way of enacting the "free play" in fiction, anticipating or viewing back events or sequences of the action. Fictionalization focuses explicitly or implicitly on the relation of causality on which the author built the representation of his narration, prediction and viewing back modalizes the event itself, by placing in under a *subjectivized* and *subjectifying* perspective. The digressive commentary of the past (the notion of the past is very elusive with H. James, being projected under the thin and transparent layer into the present moment) enhances the writer's capacity of exploring temporally fictionality. Both future and past co-exist with the present moment, which enables fictionalization to represent the time in the displaying of the sequences of the story, and furthermore as K. Hamburger underlines, in modern fiction, the representation of time overrides the representation of narration. As the relation between time and narration a prominent feature of fictionalization developed in H. James's tales, - time gets narrated while arranging the narrative sequences in a temporal order -, one must notice that the time of the narration and the time of the digression do no not coincide, though apparently they overlap. The time of narrated time in a represented action is different as compared to the time of the digression, which as I have already mentioned underlines the discontinuity and atomisation of Time. As the two types of time diverge, or simply differ, another time type of time emerges within fictionalization, namely the time of the reading which modalizes fictionality. It is the time which sets fiction as a temporal output of fictionalization. This specific type of time which enables the reader to make the necessary distinctions of the temporal scale of the narrated events (sequences) points to the weakening of the causality to be found at the source of every representation of an action[19]. Considering what B. Russell said ("the old law of causation must be regarded as a pre-scientific ancestor of the concept of function")[20], we way benefit of a different view on the question of causality, inherent to the representation of any action[21]. Still, there is an unabridged distance between the explanation and the same understanding of cause in the field of the philosophy of sciences and the same aspect in fictionalization.

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[17] Eco, Umberto, *Limitele interpretării*, Ed. Pontica, 1996, pg. 163-172.

[18] Parret, Herman, *Le sublime du cotidien*, Amsterdam, 1988, pg. 125-135.

[19] Wright, G.H. von, *Explicație și înțelegere*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 55.

[20] *Ibidem*.

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 56.

Nevertheless, we are going to point only to the general-global aspect of the question, which in underscored by von Wright as well, when it is said that the debate on the relation of causation highlights on a kind of "proto-type" for the idea of cause, in the relation between determinism and freedom[22]. Von Wright shows that for Russell the notion of cause (causation) was substituted by that of function, but this one can be substituted at its turn by the notion of *condition*[23]. Thus a phenomenon may be a "necessary and sufficient condition for another phenomen".

The notions of action and causation, as notions that put the systems into work, are not incompatible with the relation of fictionalization. Elaborating on the analogical and metaphorical character of the notion of cause (the original use of the term points to its juridical source), von Wright shows that behind the notion of cause there is always an implicit manifestation of a belief in an "invisible force"[24], and that to act, that is to make things happens, it means to *cause* other things happen too, that is to fulfil the minimal and sufficient conditions of their existence. When one states that a cause produces an effect, we understand (taking into consideration Wright's statements) that that due to the fast *it happens*, a cause may be brought into effect. The concept of causation presupposes the concept of liberty, as von Wright pointed out, namely that it is only through the idea of making things happen that we may grasp the ideas of cause and effect[25]. Followingly, fictionalization regards the modality of making by an intensional relations some represented actions happen for the reader. The reader is no longer compelled to find the causal roots of the events presented either because the sequence of events underlines that the reader's disbelief does not claim any other further ascertaining (since the values of verosimilitude are minimal and limiting), or because these are only the embodiment of a condition, a possible condition for a *space of being*[26]. Commenting on the description of the world as it is viewed in Wittgenstein*'s Tractatus*, von Wright is of the opinion that the state of things are the only ontological units of the world under study and that Wittgenstein's world may be defined by stating for each member of it a certain space-of-being in which each member of the world can or cannot fulfil certain changes. Extrapolating, we may suppose that within the relation of fictionalization, the achievement of some conditions representing the modality in which the epic event happens is sufficient to "suspend" the reader's disbelief. The illusory referentiality does not cover only the aspect of the "parallel" realities, the reader follows when admitting of fictive reality, but also the question of the determinacy (cause) of events (action) in fiction. Fictionalization states its "free play" between determinism and freedom (lack of any previous and present constraints).

As any action or condition of an action is modalized and undergoes deistic location, the reader's participation to the act of reception of any epic work was carefully

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[22] *Ibidem*.

[23] *Ibidem*, pg.57-58.

[24] *Ibidem*, p.82.

[25] Wright, G.H. von, *Explicație și înțelegere*, Ed. Humanitas, 1995, p.97.

[26] *Ibidem*, p.63.

considered by H. James. The writer favoured a certain modalization of the **rhythm** by which reality was represented, interpreted, by the suggestion of a certain slackening of the above mentioned rhythm (until the development of epic sequences come to a standstill) letting only the appearance of an expectation of an action or of a remorse that something had happen, emerge in the impersonal digression. The slowing down of the speed by which the "story" dwells in Jamesian tales, may be annihilated by relations that dramatically overthrow what was formally considered as an established track towards the denouement. In other words the reader's participation depends on the change of rhythm by which action in represented. The change introduces the expectancy of a dramatic stop (end) which would reveal and connect all the others "sides" of the epic action that were not completely shown. But we should remark that the illusion of the dramatic accumulation claiming for an end cannot be precluded but within a slackening of the rhythm in which narration is represented. The potentiality of changing the speed (the revelation interrupts the slow and steady accumulation of represented narrative sequences) emphasizes the sudden anticipation of the end which "surprises", rewarding him as U. Eco noticed[27]. Fictionalization fundamentally aims at creating the illusion of an approaching end as the narrative sequences are ordered on a temporal scale, an end that would dissolve the tension existing between the sequences of the fictive reality of a narration. The slow or accelerated rhythm with which some of the Jamesian characters contemplate the end (anticipating it or trying to prevent its untimely arrival), is one of the aspects of fictionalization from whose angle, it is not the beginning of an action that matters, but the way it ends, as the and of a tale (as it is seen in progress) may be eloquent for its global perception. Similarly, since the end is anticipated or prevented, verisimilitude diminishes as reality is discovered, known and interpreted progressively and the expectancies of finding contradictory interpretation are not to be overlooked either. The Jamesian characters grasp the changing rhythm of an approaching end of their actions by being preoccupied with the recording of the passing of time (spent usually entertainingly when travelling) in their letters or diaries. Letters, diaries, comments an social occasions, visits are all the manifestation of the change of rhythm of action represented fictionally, as a condition for a preceding end. The Jamesian reflector, either personalized or impersonalized points in his digressive reflection to the underlying expectation that an end should stop the events presented; whether the end is feared or wished, ironically foretold or simply neglected by on already resignated character, it does not bear a great deal of influence on the main aspect fictionalization represents in this concern: the representation of an end in primordial from whose perspective the "story" in the tale may be rearranged differently. The expectation of an end infers the illusion of a certain "depth" in time, either when anticipating a wished end or when regressing from before an unwanted end. So, fictionality brings into effect its own illusion of time, that complicate the euristic enigmas of the Jamesian ghost-stories, for instance, where the overlapping between time and reality seems to be at its best. The "reality" of apparitions is closely connected to the time when theses apparitions are noticed by the observer. Similarly, the motive of

[27] Eco. Umberto, *op. cit.*, pg. 341-342.

the double *(The Jolly Corner)* cannot be perceived without the memory of the youth of the character. Other developments may be deducted from the fictionalised time in H. James tales. The "reality" of absence or of presence is temporally conditioned, also.

Another essential feature of fictionalization as it appears in H. James's tales is the conflictual relationship between the aesthetic and the ethic, and the inherent compulsion of choosing one element to the detriment of other, as the Jamesian character (reflector) seems to understand or to claim other should perform this. Pointing to the existence of a parochial and provincial homeland, the James pilgrim embarks on a quest for other more satisfying aesthetic values. It is noteworthy to mention that the Jamesian pilgrim becomes "conscious" of the differences separating America from Europe out of aesthetic reasons and comes to look, in America, for the pristine, naive ethic values, which he found profoundly viciated in Europe. This primary stage of the conflictual contradiction between the aesthetic and ethic values was followed by another one, within which, the artist either successful or not grows aware of the sacrifice one should submit to whether following one way or the other (art versus life as in *The Author of Beltraffio).* Finally reality itself may become ar aesthetic or an ethic representation. The overwhelming aesthetic "reality" surrounding the Jamesian pilgrim travelling in Europe weakens ostensibly the presence of a powerful reality (strongly determined by political, social factors). Reality is constraint to exist in a symbolical and symbolising form. As for as the ethic is regarded, the free play of innocence and imitiation may be put into the question, since both innocence and innocence are "states" (stages) that are supposed to develop, that is to be transitory. The ethics of innocence and initiation that was quite popular theme in approaching H. James's tales is usually confronted with a choice for aesthetic values. Beauty needs a sacrifice, and being rigorously ethical in the entangling social comedy of the high-life depicted in H. James's tale would mean an estrangement from any human contact, a complete reclusion (as many of the Jamesian characters would choose after getting to "know" the world). It is not as important as it may seems to point , which of the two possibilities is the more righteous one, what seems noteworthy to us, is the illusion of an option in order to have acces to a "righteous" existence. The dilemmatic counterposing of beauty with vice, or of peaceful harmony (in a group or in a couple) with egoistical interests and furthermore, the need of becoming a personality (the would-be artist), by imposing egoistical drives against the others will stand for an unquestionable proof that the Jamesian character (the reflector as well) is figured as being prone to such dilemmatic choices. Actually the underlying conflictual relation (which ascertains the representation of the narrative sequences) may be described between reality as such and its forms of representation either "aesthetic" or "ethic". As it has been shown by a rich critical tradition H. James did not favour aestheticism, nor did he acclaim the first manifestation of literature written under the supervision of an ideological programme[28]. Thus the priority aesthetic and ethic hierarchies H. James represented in his tales, are conflictual in the sense that they stand for the forms of figuralizing reality. The representation of "real" life, for which H.

[28] Shapira, M., *The Collected Essays of Henry James*, Mc Graw Hill Book Company, 1965, pg.240-265.

James was so often accused to be deficient of in his epic works, cannot be enough real, unless the form selected consistent. So much the more, the protest against aestheticism (dandyism) and programmatic literature single out H. James as a writer preoccupied to grant fictionalization an open field of intercourse with reality.

Fictionalization draws near, in one of the most fruitfully exploited issues, the character (the reflector) with the reader, in the sense that the character is also modalized as a reader[29]. The relation of identification of the character as a reader is explicitly shown in *The Turn of the Screw,* where the young governess once arrived at the mansion, reads in spite of her puritanical education Fielding's Amelia. By drawing near the reader to the character, but obviously avoiding their confusion, H. James takes the first step towards the ascertaining of recognition as the way of granting fictionalization artistic attributes. Both Pavel[30] and Eco[31] mention in their statements about the fictional worlds the "joy" or "pleasure of the reader, once he admitted of the suspending his disbelief. Though from different angles, the two critics of the possible worlds rely on the principle of recognition, even when the transgression reality and its representation achieved by fictionalization would raise a simple but pertinent question: what do we recognise when saying that recognition still maters in modern fiction? For Aristotle recognition influences the soul of the spectator, the influence of recognition remaining unspecified. The most complex recognition is accompanied by a change in peripetia[32] (Oedipus King). The mentioning of the Aristotelian concept of recognition in central to understood thet the reader's expectancies relation. Chapter IX of the Aristotelian *Poetics* is dedicated to the quality of the creator seen as an "inventor", though the philosopher specifies that the author is not an inventor of verses but of subjects[33]. The modern component to be found within Aristotelian concept of rscognition may be located in the manner which it is stated that things may happen for the creator *at the limit of the credible and of the necessary.* The conjunction between the necessary and the credible points out that nobody and nothing will compel the creator of fiction to prove "the whole truth" of his work (in the sense of its similarity to reality as to make possible the recognition occur). The representation of the "truth" of a resemblance may only supposedly diminish the reader's disbelief. As the creator does not "imitate" men, but actions, the recognition must be directed towards the action represented. Following a precise course in the display of narrative sequences, fictionalization tends to give the reader the possibility to "recognise" reality parallely to fictions reality. In this respect, I will refer, first to the tale *The Story in It* (1902) in which fictionalization focuses on the double identity of characters - readers of three characters who debate the contrast between real life and fiction. The characters express their opinions according to which

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[29] Special reference is made to the tales *The Turn of the Screw, The Story in It, In the Cage, Maud-Evelyn.*

[30] *op.cit.*, p.289.

[31] *op.cit.*, p.242.

[32] Aristotel, *Poetica,* Ed. Academiei, 1965, pg. 64-65, 67.

[33] *Ibidem*, p.66.

fiction would allow everyone's life a greater degree of freedom and a more complet personal fulfilment. It is only through fiction that Maud, the feminine character, woul make known her feelings, and though that would reveal the truth about the relatio between the other two characters, apparently respectable friends. In the ampler tale *I the Cage* (1989) the unnamed character comes to fictionalize spending her life amon the upper-class representatives she happens to meet with in the room of a post-office The risks of coming in real life across the man of a poor, underpriviledged girl's dream are as profound and morally hurting as the sudden awareness of the distance betwee reality and fiction. In *Maud-Evelyn* (1900), H. James is interested of modalizin fictionalization in a world supposed to "live" beyond reality.

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THE POETICS OF MARGARET ATWOOD'S DYSTOPIA

MIHAELA MUDURE

Motto: *"To see things plainly, you have to cross a border."*
(Salmon Rushdie)

REZUMAT. Poetica distopiei lui Margaret Atwood. Lucrarea analizează distopia creată de Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale *(Povestea slujnicei)*, din perspectiva accepției date de Pavel referențialității și de Rorty adevărului. Epistemologia specifică utopiei, respectiv distopiei, aceea de a nega și afirma, în același timp, o localizare în lumea reală, aceea de dincolo de discurs, capătă valențe deosebite în cazul unui scriitor din spațiile post-coloniale. *The Handmaid's Tale (Povestea slujnicei)* exemplifică cu farmec și suspense această complexă relație.

The theoretical premise of our analysis of Margaret Atwood's world successful dystopia, *The Handmaid's Tale,* is Thomas G. Pavel's approach to fictionality in his essay *Possible Worlds in Literary Semantics* (1975). According to Pavel, fictionality is a global strategy of texts and as such it secures the autonomy of a fictional universe. Instead of describing fictional worlds as worlds diverging at certain points from the actual world, fictionality is rather considered a kind of *cordon sanitaire* which binds together the constituents of the fictional world. But this does not mean that the fictional world is without link with the real world. This link with the real world and consequently, its "true" value is not based upon photographic copying but rather on the relation of "talking about" that Rorty (1982) has in mind. Discourse creates an object that exists in some logical, discursive space and which allows us to refer to it and make true assertions about it. Consequently, the truth standard derives from the laws in operation in that universe of discourse. There is no standard, universal truth.

What is, then, the poetic value of the "Romania' trope in Margaret Atwood's dystopia *The Handmaid's Tale,* against this theoretical background? What is the Romania from the dystopia? Can this reference world be automatically identified with the actual world? As the fictional world is not a modal extension of the actual world, but rather a world with its own modal structure, once one accepts the fictionality of Atwood's work, the world projected by her dystopia belongs to an ontological sphere different from the Romania under Ceausescu as recorded in the historical documents of those years. If we accept the consequence of Rorty's pragmatism (1982) that reference is a discursive procedure dependent not on extralinguistic essences of objects but on the

semiotic convention that discourse constructs objects, what are the poetic consequences of Margaret Atwood's "use" of Romania? As this proper name (Romania) was, at the moment when the book was written, historically connected with some descriptive characteristics (totalitarianism, perversion of consciences, complete domination of female body, etc.) the "Romania" trope establishes a link with the WORLD.

Margaret Atwood tries to "envelop" this allusion to Romania in convincing semiotic conventions in order to give it more verisimilitude, according to already reinforced expectations in the European/American literary tradition. Margaret Atwood combines the Romantic motif of the found manuscript with the political message. The found manuscript is set in a scientifically ironic mise-en-abîme. The manuscript is presented at a scientific conference. Professor James Darcy Peixoto, director of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Archives of Cambridge University, England makes a scholarly analysis of the manuscript. It belongs to the early Gilead era. Romania, one of Margaret Atwood's dystopia targets, is mentioned in a complex system of double links with reality. "Romania, for instance", says Professor Peixoto, "had anticipated Gilead in the eighties by banning all forms of birth control, imposing compulsory pregnancy tests on the female population, and linking promotion and wage increase to fertility" (287). Within *The Handmaid's Tale* there is a double mirror game: an imaginary mirror (the Gilead period) mirroring real entities (Romania, on the one hand, an excessively liberal society, on the other side).

The introductory part of the book, which is the frame of the dystopia is both tragical and ironical. This frame goes beyond the literary convention, it turns into a meditation upon History. It is both tragical and ironical that the pains and torments of the people depicted in the manuscript are revived as a pretext for social events at a conference. Before the new session of the Gildean Research Association (where the Handmaid's manuscript will be analyzed) there are "a few announcements. The fishing expedition will go forward tomorrow as planned, and for those of you who have not brought suitable rain gear and insect repellent, these are available for a nominal charge at the Registration Desk. The Nature Walk and Outdoor Period-Costume Sing-Song have been rescheduled for the day after tomorrow, as we are assured by our own infallible Professor Johnny Running Dog of a break in the weather at that time" (281). The present and its trivial but normal, natural needs are overwhelming. History itself proves, in fact, to be a discourse of the present for the present. There are NO HISTORICAL OR HISTORIC TRUTHS.

Romanian totalitarianism pushed to its own extremes is "talked about" as the national component of this dystopia. The Canadian writer depicts an Orwellian world, a highly hierarchical state. At the top there are the commanders and their Wives incapable to have children. The Eyes are the political police. They are helped by the Guardians. The country is defended by the Angels. The biological future of this society is ensured by the Handmaids, a kind of breeding women. "We are for breeding purposes: we aren't concubines, geisha girls, courtesans. On the contrary: everything possible has been done to remove us from that category. There is supposed to be nothing entertaining about us, no room is permitted for the flowering of secret lusts; no special favours to be wheedled, by them or us; there are to be no toeholds for love. We are two-legged

wombs, that's all: sacred vessels, ambulatory chalices" (128). The Handmaids are guarded by the Aunts because "the best and most cost-effective way to control women for reproductive and other purposes" is "through women themselves. For this there were many historical precedents; in fact, no empire imposed by force or otherwise has ever been without this feature: control of the indigenous by members of their own group" (292). The Marthas are the housekeepers.

This Byzantine, highly hierarchical society has also created a colour code for its members'clothes. The Handmaids are always dressed in red and the Marthas are always dressed in green. "Rita is in here, standing at the kitchen table, which has a top of chipped white enamel. She's in her usual Martha's dress, which is dull green, like a surgeon's gown of the time before. The dress is much like mine in shape, long and concealing, but with a bib apron over it and without the white wings and the veil. She puts on the veil to go outside, but nobody much cares who sees the face of a Martha" (9). The poor people's wives, the Econwives, are despised because they are obliged to fulfil all the feminine roles, they have to be Handmaids, Wives and Marthas, at the same time. (It is to be hoped that the Econwives will disappear in the future.) Prostitution is only admitted for the Commanders. On the outskirts of this society, there are colonies where people deal with necessary but looked down upon activities, such as agriculture and radioactive dump.

Such a "wonderful" society needs to be surrounded by a Wall. Foreigners seem to belong to a completely different species. "A group of people are coming towards us. They're tourists, from Japan it looks like, a trade delegation, perhaps, on a tour of the historic landmarks or out for local colour. They're diminutive and neatly turned out; each has his or her camera, his or her smile. They look around, bright-eyed, cocking their heads to one side like robins, their cheerfulness aggressive, and I can't help staring. It's been a long time since I've seen skirts that short on women" (27).

The Handmaid's Tale society is provided with specific devices (the Domestic Science Room or the Soul Scrolls) meant to instil psychological terror and manage the control of its members. But what is worse than anything? As in any totalitarian system, and unfortunately, reality has already taught this to us all too well, self-censorship. "The Republic of Gilead, said Aunt Lydia, knows no bounds. Gilead is within you" (23). All sorts of devices are meant to impose the feeling of guilt that you, as well, together with all the members of the society submit to the rules of such a society . You do this because everybody does this. And if everybody does this, your guilt is smaller. The Soul Scrolls, for instance, are offices where you can "order" your prayers. "The machines talk as they print out the prayers; if you like, you can go inside and listen to them, the toneless metallic voices repeating the same thing over and over. Once the prayers have been printed out and said, the paper rolls back through another slot and is recycled into fresh paper again. There are no people inside the building; the machines run by themselves" (157).

The Romanian model is obvious. Everything is rationed. "Like other things now thought must be rationed" (7). In the houses of the Commanders there is still real coffee. Communism is a religion in the open. "From each, says the slogan, ***according to her ability; to each according to his needs***. We recited that, three times after dessert. It

was from the Bible, or so they said. Saint Paul again, in acts" (111). The popula festivals are meant to introduce a new calendar of obedience, humiliation, show-off anc pretence. "I glide with Ofglen along the sidewalk; the pair of us, and in front of u another pair, and across the street another. We must look good from a distance picturesque like Dutch milkmaids on a wallpaper frieze, like a shelf full of period costume ceramic salt and pepper shakers, like a flotilla of swans or anything that repeat itself with at least minimum grace and without variation. soothing to the eye, the eyes the Eyes, for that's who this show is for. We're off to the Prayvaganza, to demonstrat how obedient and pious we are" (152). Children are the result of a conscientious patriotic activity meant to "produce" more citizens. (How terribly familiar these Englis lines seem to a Romanian reader!) Having children has nothing to do with love. "What' going on in this room, under Serena Joy's silvery canopy is not exciting.It has nothing t do with passion or love or romance or any of those notions we used to titillate ourselve with. It has nothing to do with sexual desire, at least for me and certainly not for Serena Arousal and orgasm are no longer thought necessary; they would be a symptom o frivolity merely, like jazz garters or beauty spots: superfluous distractions for the light minded. ...This is not recreation, even for the Commander. This is serious business. The Commander, too, is doing his duty" (89).

The realities of the totalitarian Romanian society and those of a too liberal society are pushed to their extremes in order that the reader should become more aware of their dangers. A too liberal society is not safer either. One can recognize some of the safety problems of present-day United States in this passage. "Women were not protected then. I remember the rules, rules that were never spelled out but that every woman knew: don't open your door to a stranger, even if he says he is the police. Make him slide his ID under the door. Don't stop on the road to help a motorist pretending to be in trouble. Keep the locks on and keep going. If anyone whistles, don't turn to look. Don't go into a laundromat by yourself, at night. ... Now we walk along the same street in red pairs, and no man shouts obscenities at us, speaks to us, touches us. No one whistles" (24).

In her novel *Bodily Harm* Margaret Atwood said that the international approach "is an act of amputation: you may become free-floating, a citizen of the world... but only at the cost of arms, legs or heart" (23) In the case of this dystopia, the international, universal approach coincides with the inquest on woman. You "amputate" the painful links of the story with some national spaces and you get a meditation upon woman. Is the woman free? Is womanhood reduced to maternity? What is the relationship between freedom and motherhood? Femininity seems to be a mask imposed upon natural behaviour, a mask that is meant to attract, by all means. "The skirts reach just below the knee and the legs come out from beneath them, nearly naked in their thin stockings, blatant, the high-heeled shoes with their straps attached to the feet like delicate instruments of torture. The women teeter on their spiked feet, as if on stilts, but off balance; their backs arch at the waist, thrusting the buttocks out. Their heads are uncovered and their hair is exposed, in all its darkness and sexuality" (27). Womanhood is deconstructed. Each aspect of womanhood is embodied in a different genus: the social woman (the Wife), the house-keeper (the Martha), the whore, the breeding woman (the

Handmaid). Patterns are clearer as such. Both the dangers of aggressive, exclusive feminism and of an idealized relation between women are set forward. The author does not seem to agree with the arrogant feminism that hurts, despises, and, in fact, is nothing but inverse misogyny. "I don't want a man around, what use are they except for ten seconds'worth of half babies. A man is just a woman's strategy for making other women" (114). But the other extreme, "the hive", is as exaggerated as the above mentioned "solution". "Women united for a common end! Helping one another in their daily chores as they walk the path of life together, each performing her appointed task" (148). Which is the solution? Is it always hard or is it hard because the main character belongs to a "transitional" generation? Margaret Atwood tries to convince us that the answer lies in the epiphany of man-woman relationship. This epiphany can never be destroyed. It appears again and again like the eternal triangle. "So there it was, out in the open. His wife did not understand him. That's what I was there for, then. The same old thing. It was too banal to be true" (129).

Margaret Atwood's dystopia is a nowhere place which, however, allows/makes us talk about societies with ... paradoxically, a precise geographic location. This dystopia does not give absolute truths, but rather creates truths in the discourse, which can also be "applied" to the real WORLD. The dystopian/utopian technique is complex and, somehow, deceptive. It implies simultaneous ascertainment and negation of a local identity. All dystopian/utopian writers have considered themselves to be "displaced" in their own societies. Writing such texts has always been offering another option. This displacement is more actual than ever in post-colonial literatures. These literatures have been "built" upon the imposition of a European culture upon a foreign land whose own native culture, oral, in many cases, is disregarded and even repressed. The imported language and the native alien landscape often clash. After the inial act of survival in a foreign land, the Canadian writer, for example, faces other historical problems: the delimitation from the American model. Consequenty, it is only natural that the Canadian writer asks himself/herself rather "Which am I? " and not so much "Who am I?". It becomes extremely difficult for the writer to be a namer. Utopia, which simultaneously asserts and denies a location, seems a textual solution convenient for a post-colonial writer's own problems: placing himself/herself in a geographical or mental, cultural space. This is also Margaret Atwood's case. The nowhere to be found world is a solution that helps the writer "bear" the complexities of the cultural post-colonial situation more easily. On the other hand, we, the readers, cross its borders, colonize it with our thoughts and rediscover its links with the real World and the same old questions in an inter-national, even trans-national form.

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THE POETIC THEORY OF NARRATIVE AND FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE[1]

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REZUMAT. Teoria poetică a narațiunii și discursul indirect liber. Articolul analizează rolul discursului indirect liber în elaborarea teoriei poetice a narațiunii propuse de unii cercetători americani, axată pe funcția constitutivă a limbii. Sînt indicate particularitățile sintactico-semantice care stau la baza acestei conceptualizări și se discută șansele teoriei poetice într-un moment în care predomină demersul de tip comunicațional.

1. This article proposes to examine the relevance of free indirect discourse (FID) for the *poetic theory of narrative*, which accounts for the structure of literary narrative on the basis of language's *constitutive* function or *poetic* function, distinct from its *communicative* function or "statement function" (Mary Galbraith 1995: 27) defined by saying something to someone about something. The remainder of this section sums up in a nutshell the issue of delimiting what constitutes FID, without dealing in detail with what distinguishes it from "normal" indirect discourse (ID) and direct discourse (DD) (see, for this matter, Susan Ehrlich 1990; Brian McHale 1978; Stefan Oltean 1995). The following section goes on to discuss how the analysis of FID has supported a tendency to question the validity of a basic assumption of narrative theory, namely that all literary narrative as an aspect of linguistic performance is grounded on language's communicative function, that is, it represents an instance of verbal communication.

Unlike other modes, FID - which is used most often in literary narrative for the representation of verbal events, and of verbal or non-verbal mental events - displays an atypical structure, preserving the original syntax of direct discourse (DD) (it is "free", showing signs of syntactic autonomy, as illustrated in [1] by the subject-auxiliary inversion), but undergoing tense and person marking like indirect discourse (ID). Its "blended" nature (Kuno 1986) has challenged and constantly baffled linguists and stylisticians, being responsible for a great variety of approaches. The following is an example of FID (italics):

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[1] The first two sections contain some material on the description of free indirect discourse from my articles "A Survey of the Pragmatic and Referential Functions of Free Indirect Discourse", *Poetics Today*, 14: 4, 1993, 691-714; and "Free Indirect Discourse: some referential aspects", *Journal of Literary Semantics*, XXIV: 1, 1995, 21-41.

(1) *Why should the curate's children inevitably take precedence over her ow children...? It was education and experience*, she decided. (*The Rainbo* p. 10)

Its marking in the immediate verbal context can include inquit formulas c parentheticals containing verbs of saying or communication (*to say, to answer*, etc. inquisitive verbs (*to ask, to wonder*, etc.), various psychological verbs (*to think,* i *decide, to realize*, etc.), verbs of perception (*to see, to feel, to hear*, etc.), "worl creating" verbs (*dream, imagine*, etc), or verbs of exclamation (*exclaim*). Thes expressions are, however, external to the FID structure, being separated by commas (*sh decided* in the last sentence of [1]) or even by parentheses:

(2) *But this question of love* (she thought, putting her coat away), *this falling i love with women.* (*Mrs Dalloway*, p. 37)

Such "controlling" predicates can also occur in adjacent sentences, sustainin sentence connectedness and enabling point-of-view interpretation of FID. Th parenthetical structures can be dislocated in sentence medial or final position, and a statements or commentary about the represented verbal or mental events they car among other things, block the sentence from being interrogative. However, question are allowed in the FID portion - which is evidence of its syntactic autonomy -, or ca mark the entire sentence if dislocation is in sentence medial position. This also suggest that parenthetical formulas are not part of the FID[2], but external to it. True imperative appear to be barred from FID in English, or at least their discourse mode is ambiguou in that they may just as well be in DD. Consequently, (3) and (5) are unacceptable a FID sentences (they ought to be declarative; [5], however, would be acceptable as DD ignore the absence of quotation marks), (7) has an ambiguous discourse mode statu (imperative in FID or rather - consider the impossibility of co-indexing the pronominal - in DD), while (4) and (6) are acceptable:

(3) **What would he think when he came back*, did she wonder?

(4) *What would he think*, she wondered, *when he came back?* (*Mrs Dalloway* p. 41)

[2] But see Kuno (1986), who, contrasting Japanese "blended discourse" with English "quasi indirect discourse" ("free indirect discourse"), tends to treat the contiguous contextual indice in English as part of the quasi-indirect discourse. See also Ehrlich's (1990) account of FID where the role of parentheticals is reassessed from a discourse analytic perspective.

(5) *How did she$_i$ manage these things in the depth of the country*, ask her*$_i$/j.[3]

(6) *How did she$_i$ manage these things in the depth of the country?* he asked her$_j$. (*To the Lighthouse*, p. 119)

(7) *Well then let her$_i$ go and be damned to her*, she$_j$/*$_i$ told herself.

2. The accounts of FID differ depending on the weight given to various categories of features in its constitution. The *syntactic accounts* define FID purely on the basis of linguistic characteristics, the major features being represented, in this view, by the peculiar person and tense marking (third person of the personal pronoun with first person deixis, special tense system based on past tense forms with possible present and future time deixis - indirect discourse features), and by the occurrence of idiosyncratic lexical elements (e.g., colloquialisms, slangy words), or of lexical items belonging to various (nonliterary) registers. The presence of specific deictic and indexical elements (e.g., *this*, *here*, *now*) in conjunction with the past tense verb forms has also been considered, as well as the occurrence of emotive language, exclamations, and interrogative subject-auxiliary inversion (direct discourse features). They cannot be attributed to the narrator, since they evoke another voice or perspective. However, as Fleischman (1990: 228) remarks, the past tenses and the third-person pronouns indicate the translation of such facts "into the discourse of the narrator". It is this special blend of linguistic elements that she associates with the marking of FID, considered a "subcontext within the narrative, in which certain of the expected grammatical features of diegetic discourse are not found" (*Ibidem*)[4].

But how would the syntactic approach account for (8), where the purely linguistic criteria do not provide reliable guidelines for identifying the discourse as FID? In (8) "*Escape!*" can be construed as FID only with the support of the subsequent sentence "*She must escape!*", otherwise it would be interpreted as an imperative having "you" as grammatical subject, standing for another person - the hearer - or for the speaker's other self, in the case of inner speech; so, broader verbal context is necessary for several sentences to be interpreted as FID (see Ehrlich 1990, who emphasizes the role of discourse context, of discourse means, especially of inter-sentential linguistic features in demarcating FID and in making it hang together as a distinct textual unit or episode; see also Oltean 1993). The difficulties with which syntactic accounts are confronted in handling phenomena of this kind indicate the need to expand the scope of the approach in order to cover semantic and contextual features as well, which is done within the framework of *semantic and pragmatic accounts*.

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[3] The subscript letters mark the possibility or impossibility of co-indexing specific pronominals in the main clause structure with pronominals in the parenthetical structure, i.e., they mark the identity and the nonidentity, respectively, of their reference. In the first case (identity), we have sentences acceptable as FID; in the second case (nonidentity), sentences unacceptable as FID.

[4] For more detailed presentations of the syntactic accounts of FID, as well as for critical comments, see, e.g., Ehrlich (1990), McHale (1983), Oltean (1993), Ron (1981).

(8) She stood up in a sudden impulse of terror. *Escape! She must escape!*

Not long ago, S.-Y. Kuroda (1976) and Ann Banfield (1982) addressed this issue from the standpoint of the semantic and pragmatic relevance of syntactic evidence.

Kuroda considers the *performative hypothesis* and the way in which it can be put to use to the analysis of FID, and argues that the latter is a *nonreportive* mode of language, that it does not report verbal or mental events. This claim is in contradiction with the assumptions of the syntactic theories, according to which original discourse (external or internal) underlies the derived modes (*indirect speech*, FID). On the basis of the performative hypothesis Kuroda formulates the *performative analysis*, which undertakes to derive FID from an original DD utterance by incorporating the communicational aspect of linguistic performance in order to account for the shifts of perspective so typical of FID. Indeed, if every sentence of language conforms to the communicational model then it should have the following performative sentence: "[I_i (addresser/narrator) tell you (addressee/reader) that ...."

Let us consider (9) in terms of performative analysis:

(9) Her cousin sat motionless. *Somehow she was aware that his face was red. She could feel him.* (*The Rainbow*, 108).

In this case, performative analysis would suggest an underlying structure of the following type for the derivation of the first highlighted FID sentence:

(9a) [I_i (narrator) tell you (reader) [I_j (Tilly) am somehow aware [His_k face is red]]].

However, between the assertion "His_k face is red", and the point of view part "I_j am somehow aware" in (9a), there is an instance of semantic slippage in that the former is posited as true of the character, while "somehow" in the latter produces a strong modalization of the mental act of perceiving that character's physical state. This slippage may invalidate the formalized sentence as an objective assertion (versus the content of another character's point of view). The alternative possibility would be to postulate the entire structure [I_j (Tilly) am somehow aware [His_k face is red]] as proceeding from the point of view, which would presuppose the new point-of-view expression: "I_j (Tilly) know/am aware". However, this would raise similar difficulties because the structure [I_j (Tilly) know/am aware [I_j (Tilly) am somehow aware [His_k face is red]]] also entails "His_k face is red" being true of the character.

The next step consists of deriving the intermediate indirect discourse structure from (9a), by applying the requisite tense and person agreements:

(9b) [I_i (narrator) tell you (reader) [that she_j (Tilly) was somehow aware [that his_k face was red]]].

This would be a more or less syntactically acceptable ID version with (9a) as underlying structure, but (9b) is likewise different from (9), because it formalizes the narrator's point of view (his act of realizing an event, his inference with regard to the character), rather than the character's. Now, in order to derive the FID structure via performative analysis, we need to delete the narrator's performative part, namely, the pronouns "I" and "you" - representing the narrator and reader - and the verb of communication, "tell", and the expression of the character's (Tilly's) point of view, already embedded (9b) in the narrator's discourse. As a result, we would have

(9c) His face was red.

This is appreciably different from the sentence in (9) because here it must be attributed to the narrator (even if deleted from the surface structure, his "I" exists in the deep structure), while in (9) this sentence expresses a narrative agent's point of view. Furthermore, the derivation (as well as the function of "somehow" in [9]) is left unexplained. If this element is to remain in the surface structure, then only the narrator's performative part, "I (narrator) tell you (reader)", must be deleted. In this case, however, "Somehow she was aware that his face was red" would have to be construed as ID, with the narrator as performative subject, which is empirically inadequate. In other words, the entire question of the character's point of view and of how it is constituted by this sentence would be left unanswered.

It follows that the derivational model can hardly be applied successfully to (9), since the output is a different sentence from the one that informed us of the mental event in the first place. Consequently, its account of FID leaves performative analysis with serious syntactic and semantic difficulties[5]. So, FID cannot be treated as a derived structure, in this account, being a *nonreportive* narrative style that actualizes the *nonreportive* mode of language. In this capacity, it is the "direct narration of a character's subjectivity", which is represented by the text without an intermediary narrator (see Oltean 1993).

Banfield (1982) also argues that FID is not a derived structure. She separates, on the basis of the presence or absence of various syntactic and lexical features (e.g., expressive elements, such as exclamations, repetions, questions, etc., personal

[5] The performative analysis, which incorporates the communicational aspect of linguistic performance, is also faced with other major semantic problems. Gennaro Chierchia and Sally McConnell-Ginet (1990: 184-185) argue, in this respect, that the postulation of a performative utterance in the underlying structure of a sentence entails a change in the assignment of truth conditions for that sentence. The truth conditions for "Grass is purple" are different from those for "I say to you that grass is purple", given that to utter the latter is to say something true (the verb "to say" represents an intensional context), while the same cannot be said of the former. It follows that the two sentences are not semantically identical.

pronouns, deictics, tense, particular lexical expressions), the sentence of *represented speech and thought* or FID (noncommunicative, expressive) from that of *narration* (noncommunicative, nonexpressive) and *discourse* (communicative, expressive), and labels the first two types *unspeakable sentences* (see also McHale's 1983 critical survey of Banfield's conceptualization).

Consequently, while in this account narration is neither a communicative use of language (the use defined by the *I/you* relation), nor an expression of subjectivity[6], FID - a literary phenomenon in her opinion[7] - is "expressive", but speakerless, since the "subjective" elements or "expressions" are coreferent with a third person "subject-of-consciousness" (Banfield 1982: 18), and not with a speaker, whose marking would have to be an *I*. So, the essence of narration is given, in this conceptualization, by sentences that contain no *self*; they are not structured as a communication and create the reality of the story world. FID sentences are not structured as a communication either; they are representations of the character's consciousness and are therefore expressive, but not oriented toward the reader.

It follows that both for Kuroda and Banfield FID is a nonreportive mode which, given that it does not conform to the paradigm of verbal communication in terms of speaker and hearer, is ascribable to the *constitutive* or *poetic* function of language, not to its *communicative* function. Such sentences display a *nonassertive* structure, since they do not quote or report the discourse (external or internal) of an original speaker and do not issue from any addressor (see the difficulties encountered in the derivation of [8], above). Moreover, they are not grounded on an intentional mental act of judging on the part of the character, which would require a first-person marking, but merely represent a state of mind (including its expressivity) or an intermediate level of consciousness, namely, *spontaneous, non-reflective consciousness*. In other words, they *create the knowledge of an event* (i.e., a character's action, his/her inner state, but lack "semiotic motivation" (see Ron 1981), since they do not have any marking for a (real or imaginary) transmitter.

This spontaneous, non-reflective consciousness is associated with mental states or events - usually a perception, or recognition of events that "merely happen to us" (Bertrand Russell, cited in Henry H. Weinberg 1984: 767-68) - of which the subject has only a "subconscious awareness" (*ibid*; see also McHale 1983: 20; Banfield 1982: 196-99). By extending the considerations about this level to the expression of other states (Weinberg 1984: 767), the two scholars elaborate an interpretation according to which the semantic peculiarity in question is indexical of FID sentences: narratorless or speakerless, they merely enact a state of mind, something unspeakable that cannot be

[6] See McHale (1983:19), who indicates that Banfield's pair *narration-discourse* is based on a reinterpretation of Benveniste's (1966) distinction *histoire* vs. *discours*.

[7] There seems to exist a consensus among scholars on this point. See also Cohn (1978) and Fleischman (1990), who are of the opinion that FID, although not restricted to the literary, is a phenomenon characteristic of narrative fiction.

cast into a communicational framework[8]. Even when FID expresses external speech, it does not do so as a report of speech but as a transcription of the "perception" of someone else's utterance, assimilable to the representation of the preverbal level of consciousness, argues Banfield (1973). For illustration consider (10):

(10) It is a French recipe of my grandmother's, said Mrs Ramsay... *Of course it was French. What passes for cookery in England is an abomination* (they agreed). (*To the Lighthouse*, 154)

By extrapolation, Kuroda extends the conclusions to the very constitution of narrative discourse[9] and, more generally, to that of verbal performance in general, whose new conceptual unity is granted by the poetic function of language.

3. But how do speakerless sentences function or signify if there is no communicative intention in this case? At a time when most scholars propose accounts of meaning grounded on the communicative intention (see e.g., John R. Searle 1969; Paul H. Grice 1971; van Dijk 1972), Kuroda opts for an *intensional*[10] (i.e., not *intentional*) approach based upon the *objective function* of sentences (1976: 130), which is opposed their *communicative function*, and explains narrative and language in general on the basis of the former, i.e., the poetic function, which is raised to the status of

[8] The rejection of the communicational model and the claim that FID sentences are limited to one consciousness have elicited intense critical reaction -- see McHale (1983), Ron (1984), Weinberg (1981, 1984). For McHale, Banfield's model is proscriptive and empirically less adequate than communicational and traditional models, since, among other things, it contends that FID is univocal, and it cannot give a correct account of irony, nor can it handle such evidence as the occurrence of dialectal terms and pronunciations; it is also sentence-based and restricts the role of context, missing its disambiguating function in the case of syntactically unmarked FID sentences. For Ron (p. 26-27) FID can be speakerless only in a trivial sense: it may lack "semiotic motivation" (marking of the speaker as part of the pragmatic context), but not "epistemic motivation" (the representation of "quasi-utterances" or specific "speech-, thought- or perception events" presupposes a "thinker" or "focalizer", or a speaker. For Weinberg (1981, 1984), the non-communicational accounts, with their associated claim of univocality, would disqualify FID as a vehicle of the ironic function; however, irony is central to this discourse mode and so is bivocality, which irony often presupposes (see also Ramazani [1988] for a convincing account of the ironic function of FID).

[9] But see Ron (1981:30), who suggests that narrative sentences remain communicational even in the strict framework of Kuroda's conception if they can be said to represent "acts of judging" not by the narrator, but by the author with regard to their appropriateness in the fictional work.

[10] The intensional account is grounded on the notion of *intension*, which corresponds to Frege's (apud Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990: 58) *sense* and is opposed to *extension* or *reference*. The extension of a name is an individual, while its intension is an individual concept (e.g., *the morning star* takes as extension planet Venus, and as intension the "concept of the star that disappears last in the morning" [*Ibidem*]); the extension of a predicate is a set of individuals, while its intension is a property (e.g., *is Italian* has as extension the set of individuals that are Italian, and as intension, the property of being Italian); the extension or reference of a sentence is its truth value, and its intension is a proposition.

synthesis, of conceptual unity of the two functions. The objective function consists in the capacity of a sentence to evoke a meaning or an intensional object in the consciousness that is attentively conscious of the actualized sentence, while its communicative function is characterized by the speaker's intention to evoke a certain meaning in the hearer with a view to influencing his/her system of wants, knowledge, beliefs for the purpose of practical interaction in the actual world. According to Kuroda's conceptualization, in the communicative use of a sentence, the objective function, which creates the knowledge of the event by the hearer/reader, is an aspect of the communicative function, it being grounded on the speaker's communicative act. The sentences of narrative fiction, however, as entities in the actual world, exert their objective function on the reader's consciousness and create, by getting their sense activated by the reader, a *fictitious reality* or an *imaginary world*: "We might [...] say that the objective function of the sentences of the narrator story, with the help of the faculty of imagination, which puts them in an imaginary communicative setting, creates the *fictitious reality of the story*" (1976: 132). But their objective function is not accompanied by their communicative function (they merely have a communicative potential)[11]; if it were, the reader would consider the narrative as a *personal* message addressed to himself/herself, which is assigned a truth value in the actual world. It follows that in Kuroda's opinion fictional narrative is not communication, being grounded on language's poetic or constitutive function. As a result, narrative theory, too, should not be based on the communicative function, but on the poetic function, thereby becoming a *poetic theory of narrative*. By extrapolation, the poetic function is made to provide the basis for all acts of verbal performance, subsuming the communicative function.

4. The tenability of this conceptualization of narrative depends both on the acceptation given to the communicative function of language, and on the relevance of the empirical evidence (syntactic and semantic) invoked by the two scholars for what constitutes FID and, respectively, the essence of narrative. As Galbraith (1995: 30) has indicated, what Kuroda and Banfield mean by communication is something that echoes the Jakobsonian model, in which "all language is structured by an addresser > message > addressee paradigm". Now, Kuroda and Banfield argue that in fictional narrative there is no addresser (no *I/You*), and that language in narrative is structured by the model "subject of consciousness > representation of consciousness" (Galbraith 1995: 30) or "objective narration > representation of the story world" (*Ibidem*). The major evidence is linguistic: it comes from the language of such narrative modes or structures as FID[12], which differs in several ways from the language of communication.

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[11] A similar conclusion is expressed by Felix Martínez-Bonati (1981: 181), who maintains that literature represents the development of the communicative situation immanent to the sentence, a situation devoid of any additional determination.

[12] Kuroda also considers another phenomenon characteristic of the language of narrative in Japanese.

Without the consideration of these particular aspects, one may be tempted to object to this conceptualization on the grounds that by definition all language and all narrative is communicative. The two scholars (as well as others who had earlier advanced similar views: Käte Hamburger 1968 [1957]; Émile Benveniste 1971 [1966])[13], however, do not deny "the pragmatic reality of the author and the reader" (Galbraith 1995: 31), so that narrative, given that its meaning is realized through the act of reading, *is*, in a different sense, communicative, even in this account. They only highlight specific features of narration (e.g., those inherent in the phenomenon of FID) that make it different from the usual communicatve use of language.

The question of the relevance of the empirical evidence that comes from FID for the constitution of FID in particular and the poetic theory of narrative in general is of a much greater complexity. Basically, it hinges upon the tenability of the "no speaker" conceptualization of this mode, as well as on other aspects closely associated with it, such as irony (see e.g., Vaheed Ramazani 1988; Weinberg 1984). The accounts according to which FID contains speakerless sentences have been challenged by scholars who argue that the tense and person agreement (past tense and third person, in English), so typical of this mode, sustain a formal speaker, the narrator, while the evaluative vocabulary, exclamations, intensifiers, questions, etc. mark the personal perspective of a character. This brings in the issue of the double-voicedness or bivocality of FID, consisting in the fusion of the narrator's and character's language (see e.g., Mikhail Bakhtin 1973 [1929]; McHale 1978 and 1983; Ramazani 1988; Moshe Ron 1981; Oltean 1993)[14]. Irony, a major characteristic of FID (see Ramazani 1988), is closely related with the issue of double-voicedness and its functioning presupposes an *ironic intention*, ascribable to a speaker (e.g., the narrator). These are indeed phenomena that represent major challenges to the no speaker accounts of FID and the non-narrator theories of narrative.

The ideas of the advocates of the poetic theory of narrative contrast those of other narratologists. They are, nevertheless, inciting and reveal phenomenologically relevant aspects of the constitution of narrative fiction, such as its possibility, as Galbraith (1995: 32) has pointed out, to say "many things without anyone (fictionally) saying them".

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[13] Kuroda invokes Aristotle among the forerunners of poetic theories, given that the Greek scholar opposes *poiesis* "epic poetry" or fictional narrative to *logos* "speech", "discourse" ("speaking in one's own person" [Galbraith 1995: 31]), an opposition that parallels the distinction between *poiein* "make", "create", and *legein* "speak".

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T. S. ELIOT'S POETIC AND RELIGIOUS SYNTHESIS

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"I cannot see that poetry can ever be separated from something which I cannot see any reason for refusing the name of belief, unless we are to reshuffle names together."
(T. S. Eliot)

REZUMAT. Sinteza poetică şi religioasă a lui T. S. Eliot. Lucrarea abordează cele două dimensiuni esenţiale ale ultimei opere poetice a lui T. S. Eliot, Patru Cvartete: dimensiunea religioasă şi cea poetică. Însăşi complexitatea acestei opere constituie motiv de controversă privitor la valoarea sa artistică. Încercăm să demonstrăm că dimensiunea religioasă a acestei opere poetice nu este supraimpusă şi nu diminuează valoarea sa artistică; dimpotrivă, printr-un continuu efect de reflectare, o amplifică, asigurându-i statutul de unicat în lirica de limbă engleză.

In 1928 Eliot declared himself "a Classicist in literature, a Royalist in politics and an Anglo-Catholic in religion". These allegations will remain valid for the rest of his life and literary career. This paper will try to elucidate some of the subtle aspects of Eliot's "classicist" doctrine and his "Catholic" creed as they are practiced and expounded in the *Four Quartets*, the extent to which they support one another, their convergence, the extent to which their collocation produces a new poetic idiom. The double nature of this enquiry can best be epitomized by the Eliotian diptych word / Word.

We shall start, emulating Eliot, by showing what the *Quartets* are not about. Eliot's classification of religious literature is helpful here[1]. There are three kinds of religious literature: religious literature through the field of its interest, just as we can speak of historical literature or biology literature. It is significant for Eliot's position that

[1] "Religion and Poetry", in *Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot*, (ed.) Frank Kermode, Faber and Faber, London, 1975.

he accepts the discussion of the Bible only in such terms, and definitely refuses its interpretation on the grounds of its literary merit[2].

The second type includes literature whose restricted area is praising God, "devotional" literature, such a restriction of interest being responsible for its being often considered "minor" literature. Such literature more or less stopped being written a long time ago. And, finally, literature written for the purpose of advancing a certain doctrine, belonging to the field of propaganda. But there are also the poets of great religious poetry, poets of "great awareness", such as Dante, Racine, Corneille, who write great religious poetry even when they do not speak about specifically religious matters. About this last group of illustrious poets, to which Eliot obviously belongs, he makes another important remark[3]: it is not important for the reader to adhere to their doctrine in order to appreciate such poetry as literature, and neither is it essential, for that matter, for the poet himself to share the philosophical / religious doctrine from whose vantage point he writes[4], although there are obvious advantages if he does. Eliot did.

In a book dedicated to this relationship[5] Vincent Buckley distinguishes two lines of religious poetry, depending on their concern. There are poets like Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Whitman, Yeats, Lawrence or Dylan Thomas, whose motive-power is to redefine God's action in the world in such a way as to create a quite new sense of God and man's relation with him: who seek to create a tradition and record the action of God; their feelings are amazement, inadequacy, a need to speak and even to expound. There are, on the other hand, poets like Smart, Hopkins or Eliot, whose motive-power is to recreate God's action in the world in such a way as to reinforce a sense of its presence and urgency; they seek to redefine a tradition and practice the presence of God; their feelings are worship, sinfulness, a need to address and be heard.

The music analogy confers great rigour on the composition of the *Quartets*. At the same time the musical analogy is a persistent symbolist ideal in Eliot's poetry. Music is itself, for Eliot, representative of three distinct qualities: musicality of the composition, rigour of an abstract pattern and correspondence between the arts. The composition of the *Four Quartets* is not Eiot's first use of musical titles: he had written the "Preludes", "Rhapsody on a Windy Night", "Five - Finger Exercises". This is the first "composition" with a programmatic structure.

When Eliot started to write the first Quartet he had been writing religious poems for ten years, and thinking about religious issues for even a longer time.

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[2] "... the Bible has had a literary influence upon English literature not because it has been considered as literature, but because it has been considered as the report of the Word of God. And the fact that men of letters now discuss it as 'literature' probably indicates the end of its 'literary' influence".

[3] In "What Dante Means to Me", *To Criticize the Critic*, Octagon Books, New York, 1980.

[4] "... there is a difference between philosophical belief and poetic assent.[...] In reading... you suspend both belief and disbelief." ("Dante", in *Selected Prose by T. S. Eliot*, p. 221).

[5] Vincent Buckley, *Poetry and the Sacred*, London, 1968.

Eliot had come to religion, to Anglo-Catholicism, after being trained in philosophy and after becoming the leading poetic voice of his time. The "waste land" that he discovered around himself and in himself had to be replaced by a condition that should lead to something different from mere biological extinction. In other words, he came to religion through his intellect, and not through mystic experience. Eliot had tried mystic experience in his youth[6], but mysticism is a phenomenon / state that depends too much on chance, and cannot be sustained. It cannot be organized as Eliot's temperament required. What Eliot needed to sustain him was the rigour of a church, ritual, exercise (prayer) and, above all, dogma. Except for the saint, "for most of us, there is only the unattended / Moment, the moment in and out of time, / ... / ... and the rest / Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action" ("The Dry Salvages" V).

In his poetry he needed shape, the rigour of classicism. This was not a new creed with Eliot. Even in the whirlpool of his *Waste Land*, the "images" that he "shore[s] up against [his] ruin" are classical images. And maybe Eliot's allegation of being "a classicist in literature" should be nuanced as a "neo-classicist", an Augustan[7]. Eliot was a great defender and discoverer of neo-classical values, sometimes expressed as an attack upon Romantic values. If he succeeded in reinstating monuments of English literature, he also succeeded in demolishing others[8]. In his becoming a convinced classicist the most telling evolution is, perhaps, the change in his attitude to Milton. The distinction that I want to make between classical values and neo-calssical ones is important for understanding Eliot. Eliot did not uncritically take for granted the whole classical literature and mythology. He had marked preferences. His essay on Virgil is illustrative of his shared inclinations[9]. It is a remarkable essay on Virgil. But we learn more from it about Eliot than we do about Virgil. Eliot discusses Virgil's famous *4th Eclogue* [- in which Virgil announces the birth of a child to a friend of his -] and he sees in it, besides its poetic beauty, what the theologians of the 11th century saw in it: a prophecy of the coming of Christ. In the discussion of the *Georgians* and *The Aeneid* Eliot's Virgil / Aeneas just comes short of a perfect Christian ideal: his life is guided by the principles of *pietas, labor, fatum*. Moreover, his piety has an ingredient which makes him very nearly a Christian hero: humility. ("The only wisdom we can hope to acquire / Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.", "East Coker", II) If only he had had amor, he would have been a perfect Christian. Dante was right to take him on his trip.

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[6] See in this respect Cleo McNelly Kearns' article in *The Cambridge Companion to T. S. Eliot*.

[7] One of the most severe criticisms to Eliot's stance in his poetry is the lack of sympathy with the whole human segment between the martyr and the saint. Thinking of him as a Neo-Classicist concerned with man, not with men, might attenuate this drastic view.

[8] Shelley is the most drastic example.

[9] So is his title: "Virgil and the Christian World" (*On Poetry and Poets*).

It is through the same essay that we learn why Eliot was almost as displeased with the ancient Greeks as he was with the contemporary characters of his *Waste Land*[10]. The word "instinctively" should be stressed because, in spite of all the metamorphoses his poetry underwent, from "Symbolisme" through High Modernism Eliot was always a classicist at heart. One of the most shockingly "modern" traits of Eliot's writing, his allusions and quotations spring from the respect for the Ancients [read "monuments of existing literature"] that the neo-classics had. For them there was only one way to write good poetry: to try to imitate, as best they could, the "dead masters": ("... what there is to conquer / By strength and submission, has already been discovered / Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope / To emulate - but there is no competition - / There is only the fight to recover what has been lost / And found again and again", "East Coker",V). The poet who emulates his predecessors must have humility in common with the "Christian hero". Imitation *Imitatio Jesu*, is also one of the favourite spiritual exercises of the Christian mystics, the imitation of Jesus, the master who died and is not dead.

Unlike *The Waste Land*, which meets all the critics' approval, the *Four Quartets* is even nowadays a highly controversial poem. Critics can't come to an agreement whether it is a masterpiece of concentration or a very unequal work, that fills the spaces between beautiful lyrical passages with dull, prosaic, even dogmatic anti-climaxes.

In the *Quartets* Eliot abandoned his former distrust of the discursive. They combine the introspective philosophical discourse with the conversational and the lyrical discourse. It is this presence of the conversational, prosaic side of the *Quartets* that provoked the mistrust or even fierce attack of many critics or fellow poets[11]. We have, as in all instances of his work, an oblique statement of his own view of the *Quartets*, in his critical work. In 1948, i.e. six years after the completion of the *Quartets*, Eliot wrote the essay "From Poe to Valéry". Poe influenced directly and in different ways the three French poets whom we think of when we define modern poetry. Consequently, runs Eliot's argument, we indirectly accept Poe's principles. Although Eliot acknowledges his merits, he disagrees with the principles Poe laid down in the "Philosophy of Composition". He disagrees with the interpretation of this critical tour de force as a valid ground for appreciating the quality of poetry. As he often did in his own case, Eliot states that no poet can write about any poetry but the one he himself practises: "No poet, when he writes his own *art poétique*, should hope to do much more than explain, rationalize, defend or prepare the way for his own practice: that is, for

[10] "Virgil and the Christian World" appeared only in 1951. The *Waste Land* characters we are referring to are:Tereus, who raped Philomel, and, above all, Tiresias. The patronyms of those two characters of dubious trade, Madame Sosostris, the "famous clairvoyante", and of "Mr. Eugenides, the Smyrna merchant" also come to mind. Nor do I think that the collocation of "Athens" among the fallen cities is a matter of chance.

[11] If, for instance, Donald Davie does not think Eliot is on the right tack with the composition of the Quartets, Karl Shapiro is outright vehement. [see their articles in *T. S. Eliot: Four Quartets*, (ed.) B. Bergonzi].

writing his own kind of poetry."[12] The most annoying tenet of Poe's "Philosophy..." is the necessity of writing poems whose length should not hinder the sustained tension. Eliot's response is quite trenchant: "What we have to bear in mind is that he himself was incapable of writing a long poem." What for Poe was an ideal, the achievement of a single effect, the cameo poem, was a shortcoming for Eliot, the poet of large vistas. "... It is only in a poem of some length that a variety of moods can be expressed; for a variety of moods requires a number of different themes or subjects, related either in themselves or in the mind of the poet." In *The Waste Land* Eliot had been a ventriloquist, speaking through many characters in the words of many poets. In the *Quartets* he chose to be just himself, in different moods, according to the different themes he tackled: professorial, lyrical, analytical, fireside conversational. The effect is a "whole which is more than the sum of the parts." Ultimately Eliot's purpose is the same as Poe's, the reader's aesthetic pleasure: "the pleasure we derive from the reading of any part is enhanced by our grasp of the whole". And here comes his defence of the so-called dull parts of the *Quartets*: "It follows also that in a long poem some parts may be deliberately planned to be less "poetic" than others: these passages may show no lustre when extracted, but may be intended to elicit, by contrast, the significance of other parts, and to unite them in a whole more significant than any of the parts. A long poem may gain by the widest possible variations of intensity." The end of the argument, that Poe is not a good example to follow, is intuited by Eliot in terms of the incompatibility between Poe and Dante: "... It is questionable that he could have appreciated the more philosophical passages in Dante's *Purgatorio*." A comparison could be made here between the *Quartets* as a whole and Dante's *Divine Comedy* in Eliot's terms. Eliot saw in the *Purgatorio* the reader's necessary moments of arduous effort in order to apprehend the beauty of the *Paradiso*. The strenuous effort of the reader as reflection of the strenuous effort of being in Purgatory. This defence of the necessity of reading and understanding the totality of the *Divine Comedy* gives us a hint of how he expects his own poetry to be read. The remarkable difference between Eliot and Dante lies in the different pattern of the three states. There is a strictly ascending order, strict delimitation of the three states in Dante's case. There is an all - encompassing Purgatory, with only glimpses of Paradise in Eliot's *Quartets* ("The hint half guessed, the gift half understood", "Dry Salvages", V). The *Inferno* is not present in the *Quartets*. It had found its poetic expression in *The Waste Land*.

Eliot's view of Purgatory is that of the linear time, the historical time that we are caught up in. Along this horizontal line there are privileged moments which permit us to have glimpses of the non-advancing time, the moments of eternity. These moments can only be achieved in time. Sometimes they take place without our realizing

[12] *To Criticize the Critic*, Octagon Books, 1980, is worth quoting: "I found myself at ease with Virgil as I was not with Homer. [...] The obstacle to my enjoyment of the Iliad, at that age, [a little boy] was the behaviour of the people Homer wrote about. The gods were as irresponsible, as much a prey to their passions, as devoid of public spirit and the sense of fair play, as the heroes. [...] I instinctively preferred the *world* of Virgil to the *world* of Homer - because it was a more civilized world of dignity, reason and order."

their quality. Through memory, we may come to understand the meaning of these paradoxical moments. This paradox of time and eternity is paralleled by the spatial paradox of the movement that has a still point in its core, without which the movement itself would be impossible. The paradoxical nature of these privileged moments "in and out of time" and of these privileged "still points" is the substance of the *Quartets.*

The lyrics in the *Four Quartets* appear twice in each quartet, in the same position. They introduce the second movement and make up the entire fourth movement, which is generally in a highly formalized pattern. So the tension of the lyrical pasages relaxes in the less "poetical", discursive or meditative moments. The organizing principle of these lyrics is often a paradox, or an extended paradox in the form of a conceit.

Through conceit "the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together", said Eliot in "The Metaphysical Poets", quoting Doctor Johnson. It is also Eliot's technique in the *Four Quartets*, blending in the poetry what he had learned from the Symbolists and from the "main stream" of 17th century English literature.

These lyrics, these extended conceits made up of paradoxes, always have a Christian topic. Eliot's statement that certain forms are more fit to sustain certain thoughts, is best exemplified in these lyrics, made up of a series of paradoxes, treating of a religion based on a series of paradoxes: a man who is God, a mother who is a virgin, a death that is a birth, one that is three. Moreover, in the Metaphysical poets, Eliot found the same preoccupation with the unity between sexual love and death, with the similarity between sexual love and devotion. The divine topics of the four lyrics are: God, Christ the Redeemer, the Virgin and the Holy Spirit.

The inclusion of the Virgin in the Divine triptych is due to the mediaeval philosophers. The fact that it became an established reality of Christian belief and worship is, to a very great extent, the result of a poet's achievement: Dante. Another idea of debated orthodoxy is that of the existence of Purgatory[13]. Its acceptance is also due to Dante's audience.

The first lyric, on God the Father, opens with the symbolic image: "Time and the bell have buried the day". It is continued by a series of urgent questions about the possibility of grasping a moment "in and out of time", a "still moment", embodied in images similar in their allusiveness to those of the initial rose garden passage, in "Burnt Norton". The questions themselves are introduced by the same image that had destoyed the vision in the rose - garden: "The black cloud carries the sun away" ("Then a cloud passed and the pool was empty", "Burnt Norton"). The beatific vision ("Will the sunflower turn to us, will the clematis / Stray down, bend on us; tendrill and spray / Clutch and cling?") could also be achieved through a descent, into the dark night of the soul, on a mystical journey towards immobility (" Fingers of yew be curled / Down on us?"). The lyric ends with a vision of divine light, through reflection, and its philosophical recurrent expression: "After the kingfisher's wing / Has answered light to

[13] On the emergence of the idea of the Holy Mother as divinity and of Purgatory see Mircea Eliade and Ioan P. Culianu, chapter on Christianity.

light, and is silent, the light is still / At the still point of the turning world." Having achieved this vision of light, of the still point, this Quartet is one of the luminous ones.

The lyric of the second Quartet is an extended conceit of Christ the Redeemer who must die in order to redeem us. It starts by a series of conceits, images of illness and death in a contemporary setting: "The wounded surgeon plies the steel / That questions the distempered part: Beneath the bleeding hands we feel / The sharp compassion of the Healer's art / Resolving the enigma of the fever chart." The next two stanzas read like a rather pedantic expostulation on the same theme ("Our only health is a disease / If we obey the dying nurse / Whose constant care is not to please / But to remind of our, and Adam's curse. And that, to be restored, our sickness must grow worse.") The end-stopped lines and the rhyming of "disease" - "please" and "nurse" "curse" and "worse" give the stanza the frigidity of an argument without an issue. The next stanza is somehow relieved of the burden of this close argument, in paradoxes of physical suffering and spiritual healing, achieved through concentration: "The chill ascends from feet to knees, / The fever sings in mental wires. If to be warmed then I must freeze...". The suffering in the immobility of concentration ("frigid purgatorial fires") that can be solved into a vision of either the crown of Paradise or the mock-crown of Jesus: ("Of which the flame is roses and the smoke is briars." The last stanza, in images that evoke, to the mind, the Eucharist, has a sensorial rawness, verging on the cannibalistic: "The dripping blood our only drink, / The bloody flesh our only food". Such rawness of imagery is frequent in Metaphysical poetry. Eliot celebrated the Metapysical poets' capacity of feeling "the thought as immediately as the odour of a rose" and maintained that it had to become again part of the "direct current of English poetry"[14]. This poem, though, is not in that direct line. It is an instance of what Eliot called minor poetry, the devotional poetry of the 17th century. The end of the poem is a reconciled argument on the now explicitly theological matter: "In spite of which we like to think / That we are sound, substantial flesh and blood - / Again, in spite of that, we call this Friday good." The "substantial flesh and blood" is the lower side of the diptych, human-godly, substantial-transsubstantial (the Eucharist). The argument is reiterated as by a priest in front of his congregation, with the conclusion: (Again, ...), while the last fixed syntagm ("Good Friday") is put in a new light by the inversion of the terms. This reconciliation is the highest level that average man in his way towards divinity can accede to. The voyage itself starts on *Ash Wednesday*, between the beginning of Lent, a period of fast and prayer, concentrating on Christ's suffering and temptation in the desert, and it ends with his Passion and death on the cross on Good Friday. Eliot's poetry hardly ever permits the attainment of Easter Sunday.

The fourth Christian lyric, is a direct intercession to the Virgin: "Lady ... Pray... Repeat a prayer... / Also pray...", especially for those who are at sea, - water is the element of "The Dry Salvages" - , those related to them and those who have no

[14] "... to 'look into our hearts and write' ... is not looking deep enough; Racine and Donne looked into a great deal more than the heart. One must look into the cerebral cortex, the nervous system, and the digestive tracts." ("The Metaphysical Poets" in *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, p.66).

access to Church. The lyric itself is not the highest peak of Eliot's poetry. But its interest resides in its place in the economy of the poem. The formalized words of prayer are an exemplum of the whole of "The Dry Salvages", with its belief in the efficacy of this form of spiritual exercise. The figure of the Lady was consecrated by Dante's *dolce stil nuovo* and her role in Christianity was established by Beatrice as intercessor. Churches in the Middle Ages were given her name - Notre Dame - ("Lady, whose shrine stands on a promontory"). and she was raised to the attribute of divine mother of Jesus. Through the theological paradox of divinity she is also His daughter ("*Figlia del tuo figlio*"). The lyric is also reminiscent of Eliot's first "devotional" phase, *Ash Wednesday*, with its formal address, "Lady", and with its prayers (in *Ash Wednesday*, fragments of prayer from the Liturgy). Eliot quotes Dante and he quotes himself.

The final 4th movement lyric, the "Holy Spirit" lyric has two stanzas of five lines, each one followed by a couplet. The "dove" symbol is not the peaceful harbinger of God's word to man, but quite a menacing image: "The dove descending breaks the air / With flame of incandescent terror / Of which the tongues declare / The one discharge from sin and error". It comes after the "dark dove with the flickering tongue", the air bomber of the previous movement. The paradoxes of the "Good Friday" lyric are forced to the extreme here: "The only hope, or else despair / Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre - / To be redeemed from fire by fire.": fire of the senses or pentecostal redeeming fire. The alternative is presented in abstract, uncompromising words (hope, despair, sin, error). When the next stanza starts we are already convinced that we have been listening to a severe voice coming from the pulpit. Now the preacher becomes teacher, using catechism language: "Who then devised the torment? Love". The voice goes on to expound the dangers of sexual love, with a hint of Hercules tortured by the burning shirt, but it might as well be speaking, through the paradox established in the first stanza, of Love. The problem with this second meaning is that it is "the unfamiliar name" - maybe the Word - , that, being at a still point, it does not have movement, it does not have direction. It is intransitive. The clear expression of this internal paradox of love without a "direct object" appears in the distinction Eliot makes between what we think of as love, i.e. desire, and "love": "Desire itself is movement / "Love is itself unmoving, Only the cause and end of movement, Timeless, and undesiring / Except in the aspect of time / Caught in the form of limitation / Between un-being and being" ("Burnt Norton", V).

One way to reach love is the way of the mystic, the descent into the dark night of the soul, on the ten steps of the stair of Saint John of the Cross. ("The detail of the pattern is movement, / As in the figure of the ten stairs.", "Burnt Norton", V; "I said to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you / Which shall be the darkness of God ... the faith and the love and the hope are all in the waiting. / Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought: / So the darkness shall be the light, and the stilness the dancing", "East Coker", III).

The highly patterned form of the lyrics is a reflexion of Eliot's concern with form and pattern. The idea of pattern is often explained in the discursive passages:

"Only by the form, the pattern, / Can words or music reach into the stillness..."; "the detail of the pattern is movement" ("Burnt Norton", v).

The dichotomy pattern - movement is figured throughout the *Quartets* in Eliot's three basic concerns: art, history, faith.

Eliot's concern with producing a reverberation in his reader through the use he makes of quotations is well-known: he used them in the *Waste Land* to an unprecedented extent, he used the Biblical implicit quotation in the Ariel Poems, he used literary and devotional quotations in *Ash Wednesday*. If we think of Eliot's previous poetry, the lack of quotations, the lack of significant literary quotations is a remarkable "absence". He does use them, though, taking them from the three fields of interest for him: literature, history and religion. The few quotations in the poems are so insignificant from a literary point of view that, if it weren't for their obsolete language we coundn't hope to recognize them as citations[15]. The first appears in "East Coker": ("The association of man and woman / In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie - / A dignified and commodious sacrament. / Two and two, necessarye coniunction, / Holding eche other by the hand or the arm / Which betokeneth concorde...") and is an excerpt from a 16th century book by Sir Thomas Elyot, T. S. Eliot's ancestor, who lived in East Coker, and, who, presumably, left England from that place, to move to the United States. So this is the point of personal departure, the point of time in the flow of history when England ceased to be home for Eliot. But, by the reproduction of the 16th century spelling, Eliot suggests that moments that are so removed in history, - unlike poetry - , cannot be experienced "as immediately as the odour of a rose". They are perceived as a quaintness.

In the writings of two mystics Eliot finds patterns that fit his own choice of a way towards stillness and perfection. Besides the references to Saint John of the Cross, - the dark night of the soul figured in the spiritual exercise of descending the ten stairs - , Eliot quotes the English anchoress and mystic Dame Julian of Norwich[16]. The clear visions and the simplicity and precision of the language of this 14th-century mystic, are qualities complemented by one theological idea that is so important in the composition of the *Quartets*: the necessity of sin. By living in the time sequence sin is inherent, but it is only through time that the moment of intersection with eternity can be apprehended, so that: "To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern, / Sin is Behovely, but / All shall be well, and / All manner of thing shall be well" (Little Gidding, III).

Eliot's literary allusions, quotations and paraphrases are so flitting, so well integrated into the poem, without creating the disruption of planes that they create in the *Waste Land*, for instance, that they are barely recognizable as citations. Eliot attenuated

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[15] In La seconde main ou Le travail de la citation Antoine Compagnon explains citation through its Spanish etymology: citar - to give an appointment.

[16] Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love*. Translated into Modern English and with an Introduction by Clifton Wolters, Penguin Books, 1980.

his old technique of appropriation in favour of the "emulation". He emulates his master, Dante[17].

The second movement of the last Quartet, "Little Gidding", is "intended to be the nearest equivalent to a canto of the *Inferno* or the *Purgatorio*, in style as well as content that [he] could achieve"[18]. Eliot considered this "emulation" passage the highest point of his poetic career.

It presents, after an introductory setting of the scene and atmosphere, - London, just before dawn, after an air-raid during the second world war -, the poet's meeting a dead master, the dead master's summing up of his lifetime's experience, and the latter's final departure. The descriptive opening concentrates what Eliot had achieved as a symbolist, what he learned from the metaphysical poets, the simplicity of the poetic language he so much admired in Dante, and a climax of the lyrical passages in the *Quartets* themselves: "In the uncertain hour before the morning / Near the ending of the interminable night / At the recurrent end of the unending / After the dark dove with the flickering tongue / Had passed below the horizon of his homing / While the dead leaves still rattled on like tin / Over the asphalt where no other sound was / Between three districts whence the smoke arose". In the rhythms of Dante's terza rima, in poetic images of unprecedented poetic force, Eliot integrates the figure of the point of intersection of time with the timeless ("Between three districts where the smoke arose"), both London after an air-raid during the second world war, and the *Inferno*. The encounter is modelled on *Inferno*, XV, where Dante meets his master, Brunetto Latini. Eliot describes "the brown baked features", appropriate to old age and to the smoke-filled air, but also an interpretation of the Italian name "Brunetto". Eliot meets a "compound ghost", "both one and many." The paradoxical images of compound precision and imprecision that characterize the setting of the scene, characterize the presentation of the meeting and of the ghost. It is the same technique that Eliot uses in the description of the rose garden. There are several possibilities of identifying the ghost, the most clear one being Yeats, and indirectly Swift, there is also something of Mallarmé, indirectly Poe, Shakespeare and Milton. But most of all, the ghost is the spectral image of Eliot himself, "both intimate and unidentifiable"; "I assumed a double part and cried / And I heard another's voice cry... I was still the same, / Knowing myself yet being someone other". It is a description of the poet Eliot forever appropriating his poetic masters.

In an essay on Yeats[19], written in 1940, the year after his death, Eliot eulogizes Yeats for his continual development, for being always a contemporary. The ghost speaks to the poet in solemn words about [his] "thoughts and theory": "These things have served their purpose: let them be.[...] Last year's fruit is eaten / And the fullfed

[17] In 1950 Eliot said in his lecture "What Dante Means to Me": "I still, after forty years, regard his poetry as the most persistent and deepest influence upon my own verse" (in *To Criticize the Critic*).

[18] In "What Dante Means to Me".

[19] "Yeats", in *On Poetry and Poets*.

beast shall kick the empty pail. / For last year's words belong to last year's language / And next year's words await another voice." In the same essay Eliot praises Yeats for his play, *Purgatory*, especially for "a masterly exposition of the emotions of an old man". Yeats , like Eliot, though differently, was much concerned with the idea of old age, with the decay of the body while the desires remain the same. Thus the "gifts reserved for age, are: "First, the cold friction of expiring sense / Without enchantment, offering no promise / But bitter tastelessness of shadow fruit / As body and soul begin to fall asunder.' (Yeats had written a poem "A Dialogue of Self and Soul"). The last gift reserved for age "From wrong to wrong the exasperated spirit / Proceeds, unless restored by that refining fire / Where you must move in measure like a dancer". The passage, besides the many allusions to Yeats' own poetry ("Sailing to Byzantium", "Among School Children"), also points back and forward (in the remaining part of the Quartet) to the dance as a pattern for movement, with a still point in its center, to the purgatorial fire that is the elemental symbol of "Little Gidding", and the ending symbol of the whole sequence. There are allusions to many other poets, but just one last remark about: "Since our concern was speech, and speech impelled us / To purify the dialect of the tribe". Eliot and Yeats did share between them this responsibility for poetry in English. The lines themselves are a quotation from Mallarmé' s poem "Au tombeau d'Edgar Poe". Mallarmé brought poetry to the ideal of "pure poetry", in his words "the whole world aspires towards one book". They read very much like the closing line of the *Paradiso*, that Eliot quotes, "legato con amor en un volume". In his essay "From Poe to Valéry", Eliot perceives the affiliation from Poe to Mallarmé as an interest "in the technique of the verse."

The last Quartet, "Little Gidding", a corollary to Eliot's *Quartets* and his whole poetical work, is at the same time a corollary to Eliot's metapoetic work: it is a poem about a poem.

The Dantean figure of the dead master addresses the 'I' with a definite purpose: "To set a crown upon your lifetime's effort."
But although Eliot said in an essay that all a poet could hope for was to emulate the greatest works of the past, he added that for us, the really good works of the present were preferable to the greatest works of the past.

To conclude in a typically Eliotian manner, Eliot's masterpiece, the *Four Quartets*, is both supremely humble and proud. It professes the moral humility of the Christian, it enacts the "humility" of the classicist in front of the acknowledged monuments of literature. It breathes the pride of the Christian aware of believing in the true faith, it understates the pride of the poet who could emulate the greatest poet.

A Critical Reading List

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, XLI, 3-4, 1996

CHARACTERS AND CHARACTERLESS NIGHTS: NURUDDIN FARAH AND THE TRAGEDY OF SOMALIA

PHILLIP B. MIDDLETON

REZUMAT. Personaje şi nopţi fără personaje: Nuruddin Farah şi tragedia Somaliei. Articolul încearcă să ofere o privire de ansamblu asupra trilogiei lui Farah. Fiecare roman - începînd cu *Sweet and Sour Milk* (*Lapte dulce şi lapte acru*) şi continuînd cu *Sardines* (*Sardele*) şi *Close Sesame* (*Sesam, închide-te*) - examinează natura problemelor imense cu care se confruntă Somalia modernă în particular şi Africa în general. Nuruddin Farah este considerat în lucrare drept unul dintre marii artişti creatori ai Africii, de talia nigerienilor Soyinka şi Achebe, şi a sud-africanilor Gordimer şi Coetzee. Preocuparea sa tematică fundamentală o reprezintă politica abuzului şi a neglijării, practicată de generalul Siad Barre, care a condus Somalia cu o mînă de fier între anii 1969 şi 1991.

A persistent, agonizing scream - at times highly pitched - emanates from Nuruddin Farah's trilogy as his disparate themes come slowly and inexorably into focus. Beginning first with *Sweet & Sour Milk*, this trilogy - which the author sub-titled *Variation on the Theme of an African Dictatorship* - depicts a steady progression of characters beset by a wide range of problems, all of which stem from different kinds of power. Indeed, as one observes Farah's characters confronting the various guises of oppression that haunt their lives, one begins to see that very little distance separates his fiction from the anomy that we've seen in the actual streets of Mogadishu and Baidoa during the recent past.

Farah's characters are drawn, really, from Somalia's peculiarly wrenching history, from its clans and clashes and dark unanswerables. In *Sweet & Sour Milk*, we see a country entirely controlled by a General whose tight political and moral grip manages to strip human lives down to their most painfully elemental level. Pushed to the edge, even decent, potentially heroic characters begin to accept the demands of brutish dictatorial force. Partly this compliance seems to be a reflection of the primal desire to survive, even with only a gutted shell of a life. But a greater vision dominates Farah's trilogy: lives are set in motion by things external to the self. Consider the actions of Loyaan in *Sweet & Sour Milk*: with his twin brother having been killed, Loyaan sets out to uncover truth about his brother's violent death. Bit by bit, he finds

out more about his country's imminent collapse: people who are executed because of their political beliefs, because they can think, are laid to rest in unnumbered graves, in anonymity. "Absurd", Loyaan shouts, "No respect for the dead".

As Loyaan continues his journey into the mystery of his brother's death, he begins to see that the living suffer far more grievously than the dead. Curious symbolic questions abound. Could one, asks the narrator, search for Soyaan in Loyaan? Interpreted symbolically, this means: could one find the dead in the living? The obvious answer, yes, marks the real beginning of modern Somalia's tragic dance; it forces us, readers, to recognize that anomy itself is caused by a certain moral deadness in the human spirit. And one of the principle dancers here must be the General, whose real name can never be divulged. The General sets all the others in motion.

In *Sweet & Sour Milk*, Loyaan becomes the driving force, the investigating intellectual who sees the truth while looking for his twin brother: the General has had his brother murdered. In a society so dominated, every thought, every single moment of adulation must support the one who wields the most power. The General controls the country through deceit and by craftily shaping reality with his man creative tools (propaganda clearly being one of them); he controls the political sphere through brute force; and the religious sector he overwhelms by taking the place of Allah:

> ... People immediately, when their number exceeded five, found it expedient to sing the General's praises. For it was against the law of the land to have an assembly of more than five persons unless they were at an Orientation Centre or unless they were to chant the chorus of the General's ninety-nine good names...

In the penultimate novel, *Sardines*, a number of other themes, and yet another source of nefarious power, begin to take center stage. At times, the second part of the trilogy reads rather like a handbook of Islamic rebels. The constant here - that individual will must be bent, broken and put back together by a religious adhesive - can be seen through the actions of some monstrously unethical anti-heros. One sees, for example, the abduction of a young couple, born in Somalia and naturalized as Americans, with their American-born daughter taken, circumcised and forced to remain in Mogadishu. So many horrors tighten around and restrict the movements of characters in this Somalian trilogy, that one statement made in *Sweet & Sour Milk* seems to describe the whole range of events in all three novels: "Somalia is a prison", one character observes. "We are prisoners; the Security, the Green Guards, are the jailers; and the General, the Grand Ward of them all". The Grand Warden/General, whose twisted logic controls the country's destiny, creates the very order by which the nation must exist. And unexplained deaths are signs of the General's unhappiness, and clear indications that life in Somalia cant't go on without one of society's most harmful corrosives, fear, eating away at its heart.

Inevitably, then, the twisted logic seems to be responsible for the tragic dance in Somalia's daily life: the one feeds into the other and creates a cycle, a deadly rhythm that begets another deadly rhythm. How does one change such a pattern? How does one

lessen a nation's tragic potential? Farah's characters - his heroes and heroines, at least - face such questions and move confusedly, rather like ghosts, towards the powers from which they cannot escape.

Perhaps the most confused protagonist in the entire trilogy is Deeriye in *Close Sesame*, the very religious old man who takes upon himself to challenge and exterminate the one power that haunts him constantly. Leagued with religious power, and ever mindful of its necessity for his own spiritual sustenance, Deeriye moves to break cycle which has plagued him for so long. As he looks back over the political landscape of his life, he remembers his incarceration at the hands of the old Italian colonial power; now, with the General fully in control of his immediate present, Deeriye decides to attack. But his method fails him, as he can't manage to kill the political adversary that he despises. "I have been on the fringe of madness", he says, "the past forty years: the madness of which I talk is in itself a political statement".

So he fails, this old Deeriye dies, because he can't answer absurdity with focused violence. And the tragic dance continues because of an unbroken rhythm, with potential peace being transformed into diabolical energy: Deeriye is shot so many times that he's almost cut in two. Such, indeed, is the true language of madness. Even the goodness of religious purity, which Deeriye seems to embody, collapses under the awesome weight of unrestrained power.

No, it isn't far from the fiction of Nuruddin Farah to the streets of Mogadishu and Baidoa. What one sees in one can also be seen in the other: people fumbling about with their own, and their country's destiny. Verisimilitude demands at least that much. But, likenesses aside, we have practices in literature that go altogether unnoticed in the streets. Look at Farah's trilogy and you see, first, eloquently written sentences and finely constructed "human" characters whose lives are passed in darkness - good people living while cruel, vicious leader reigns.

The first volume of this trilogy was published in 1979, at a time when General Siad Barre, who took control in 1969, was still very much in power. The two men who later became powerful warlords - the late Mohamed Farah Hassen Aideed and Ali Mahdi - had been in and out of favor with Barre for a number of years. One can only guess at what Farah was thinking at that time; but one can say with some confidence that he was aware that Somalia was beginning to disintegrate in the early 1980s, that its descent towards the *dègringolade* that we see today had already begun.

But its all here in this superbly done trilogy: the characters, the bewildering characterless nights when all morality seems lost, the abuse of religion, and the dictatorial power-lust. And there's more: we see a strangely Kafkaesque atmosphere with characters being forced into flight, a politically-inspired *angst*, and the queer Satanic dance played out to its awful end-all the themes that Farah, the novelist, saw and set down before us, tacitly suggesting that if we close our eyes, the horror will grow.

That existence of this peculiarly interesting genre, with power and its many forms as its focus, owes its success to Nuruddin Farah being at the height of its creative powers. One look at *Sardines*, the second part of the trilogy, bears this out. Here one

finds a number of issues and themes converging. "I suffer", thinks one woman, as sl echoes Cartesian metaphysics. "Therefore I am". And further:

> ... I suffer this humiliation, this inhumane subjugation of circumcision; you can never know how painful it is unless you've undergone the operation yourself. But must every woman in the world suffer this act of barbarism in order to know the suffering it entails, every woman whether she is Arab, Malay, African, American? A great majority of Africa's female population suffers complications from infibulation. It's not racial. Suffering is human...

This kind of utterance, of suffering and pain, sets the tone for the who trilogy, the focal point of which is Africa with her broken promises; Africa, with th very symbol of her fecundity, Mother Africa herself, speaking with a troubled an sickened heart.

No attempt has been made here to hide the obvious. The General in Farah trilogy is Siad Barre, the very same man who, before being ousted in 1991, committe innumerable atrocities. Brutal reality here gives thematic shape to *angst*-ridden fictio fiction here chronicles grim reality. This partly explains why in Farah's work, most c the characters seem to be both simple and symbolic: they are structurally an aesthetically fitted into the works, and they voice to the darker realities that strip the lives of the dignity that the characters themselves feel should be theirs by righ Ultimately, then, we see here a decidedly political genre, with protagonists fightin against the encroaching darkness of amoral night.

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AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE MECHANISM OF MOTIVATION IN SHAKESPEARE'S TRAGEDIES

IOAN CREŢIU

REZUMAT. Introducere epistemologică cu privire la mecanismul motivaţional în tragediile shakespeareene. Lucrarea prezintă în termeni împrumutaţi din psihanaliză un nou mod de a înţelege şi explica factorul motivaţional atât în studiul psihanalizei persoanei, cât şi în analiza personajului sau chiar a scriitorului sau a cititorului, şi anume echilibrul şi dezechilibrul ascendenţilor şi descendenţilor psihici ca mecanism al dinamicii motivaţionale.

To begin from an old saying, namely, that some things are merely 'old wine in new bottles' there is a general assumption that modern times have brought very few new things in the way of concepts and abstractisations, so it is very often that what is different from one explanation to the next is only the way things are being put. Expression as a form of linguistic competence is a form of representation for a system of thought at work. A system of thought is at the same time the personal characteristic of an individual as well as a characteristic of the general human background behind the individual. To put it abruptly, a system of thought is a number of informational elements that become coherent together - which can also mean that any number of elements which are coherent together may turn to substitute or even to be a system of thought. The system of thought is what makes people be and act differently and, again, what makes people have something in common ('unity in diversity').

According to the theory of systems, the nature of one system my be found in all systems and any system. So, to exemplify our understanding of what a system of thought is, we may refer to Osgood and Sebeok's linguistic theory[1] according to which the substance of language and thought is one and the same, only the way this substance is segmented differs

[1] Osgood, C., Sebeok, T., Editors of a Conference Report (of the *Interdiciplinary Conferences on Language* held at Indiana University) which appeared as a special supplement to the *Journal of Abnormal and Special Psychology*, oct. 1954.

from one language to another. So, indeed, it is only if we consider this substance rather from the point of view of a subject of human contemplation that the substance is and remains one and the same, and only the system of thought through which it is perceived would be, at times, different.

Another example to illustrate the nature of systems is the resemblance between the essence of all systems of measurement and the essence of all systems of thought, both types of systems being forms of computation of a given subject matter. The extant system of linear measurements would illustrate the point under consideration even better, namely, though the distance between two given points may be one and the same, it could be rendered by different digital values representing metres or feet or yards, kilometres or miles; the existence of two or more systems of measurements for one and the same thing also implies the existence of a system of translation from one system of measurement into the next. If the establishment of linear measurements marked a great step forward in the historical development of thought, an even greater step forward was marked by the development of mathematics, which at first was part of philosophy, that is, the link between thought and systems of computation was still preserved. A metaphorical description of mathematics could make a real point out of its versatility of translation from one type of values into another. But mathematics, besides the world of good that it brought along, may have distorted the inborn facility of perception of homo sapiens by diverting the weight of perception, - which is ultimately a psychic function -, onto only thought alone; (at least this is what the Zen-Buddhism theoreticians seem to reproach to Plato and the Platonic school of philosophy).

Philosophy itself may be redescribed as a system of systems or a super system of thought. But philosophy was once, at the beginning of modern civilisation, that is at the time of the ancient Greek culture, a general form of knowledge, having as complementary branches mathematics, rhetoric and logic, thus covering the whole area of human intellectual interests; it gradually lost touch with so many of the new branches and sub-branches which eventually evolved into independent sciences so that today there seems to be an ever larger need for combing back together the separate lines of knowledge into one integral whole, an attempt which has made quite a splash more or less recently under the heading of epistemological approaches. Such an approach is intended, to a certain extent, in this paper, as well, keeping the main field of concern, which is literature and literary criticism, in touch with other lines of knowledge like philosophy and, most of all, psychology.

Epistemology in a nutshell may be found in the paradoxical saying that culture is what one knows after one has forgotten everything. So, the way we may be looking for assistance into the field of psychology will not be thoroughly exhausting but simply educational.

Such a light way to touch upon adjacent fields usually dissatisfies the specialists of the main field who may bring charges of escapism to such a manner of work or who may simply pose as representatives of that main field when bringing up the above mentioned complaint. Moreover, a light epistemological approach may also be accused of the kind of shallowness that was typified by the brochures of 'popularization of science'. We are ready to encounter, not

gladly though, such risks in homage to the glory that surely lies in the field that this paper attempts a partial survey of: Shakespeare's understanding and use of such a strange but new promising notion or concept as that of 'motivational mechanism'.

A manneristic treatment usually runs no such risks, only it will remain a manneristic treatment. So, coming back to systems of thought - the more abstract the system of thought is, the more metaphorical it tends to be, which means that at times the metaphorical value of a concept in the system may be interpreted by other measure sticks than the ones intended. We incline to believe that understanding is usually a process of selection of those elements which are compatible with one's system of thought. This assumption may be illustrated with the way new foreign sounds are perceived and adapted by one's system of speech: the new sound is dissociated into the closest elements that are extant in one's phonetic system and reassociated into something that imitates the model sound, only it is not completely equivalent with the model sound. We must emphasize again that even in this example the limits of adequacy may become self-explanatory: if the sound is only slightly distorted, it may still be recognized as a variant of the sound it represents (a kind of allophone) while if it is too distorted, it is not understood any longer. This means that in the process of communication, whether linguistic or ideational, there is something that acts merely to the effect of a planned loss, that is, only so much per cent of the information is computed, the amount not computed resting partially in the metaphorical values that remain only in the mind of the speaker, owing to a lack of appropriate linguistic competence, and a part rests with the auditor who misinterprets or, rather, interprets according to his own personality part of the information; another cause for incomplete or distorted understanding would be words, that is, code elements, that may have different connotational or even denotational scopes between the speaker and the auditor which, in other terms, would be the sender and the receiver.

Systems of thought may abide together, though they may not always bridge together. One possible way to overcome that would be to redefine the conceptual meaning of terms alongside their coming into use, - a taxonomical matter.

The first term to be redefined is the concept of a system of thought. One thing must be emphasized here though, that by redefining we do not aim at obtaining new philosophical concepts, but merely at explaining the sense in which the term is used; so a system of thought is a number of informational elements which are coherent together, and it strives at representing reality as viewed form a subjective point of view.

The above tentative definition leads to a second term which calls for clarification, that is the term of subjectivity: the debate between subjectivists and objectivists reached, at one point a dilemma that has become a kind of commonplace anecdote, namely, 'said the objectivists: "red is red whether anyone sees it or not" and then said the subjectivists: "if there is no one around to see that, who cares whether red is red or otherwise"'. This little fable may work to the effect that real objectivism cannot exist as far as human nature is concerned. There are only different degrees of objectification of human nature's subjectivism and this subjectivism pertains

to human psyche. This statement does nor claim to stand up against the general truths that human civilisation and knowledge are built upon. It merely implies that the realm of natural reality that has thoroughly and considerately been researched by scientists and scholars ought to include the human psyche as integrant part of natural reality. Thus, subjectivity is the distortion of the perception of reality that is due to the characteristics of the individual.

The above statement does not infer at all that the world is not cognoscible objectively; on the contrary, it hints at how much more cognoscible the world would be, if only we knew more about the human psyche, so that we would measure even such variable distortions as subjectivity.

A study of the human psyche should not necessarily be a concern solely of psychologists and psychology alone, whose corpus, that is the human behaviour in general, is so large that it may acquire vagueness at times. The literary phenomenon is itself a representation of reality, moreover a representation that definitely bears the imprint of psychological processing and thus literature may constitute a fascinating corpus for joined psychological and literary studies.

As a matter of fact the psychological approach to literature has developed quite impressively especially through the last few decades despite the attacks of the traditional literary critics who, more often than not, indulge into psychological considerations without calling them that, or rather without admitting any debts to a psychological system of appraisal. When a traditional critic indulges into enthusiastic remarks about the impressive and touching qualities of one work or one fragment of work, he usually refers to psychic perceptions and emotions only without using a well-defined and already stated system of psychological investigation. The misunderstanding that fogs up around anything that has to do with the human psyche lies in the divergent interests psychologists have manifested for the human psyche. The traditional school of psychology deals only with the so-called conscious level, that is, with psychic processes like memory, or psychic phenomena like attention. Even well reputed books of psychology like A. D. Rosca's *Psihologie generală*[2] devote very little attention, if any at all, to the lower levels of the psyche, or, shall we say, the hidden levels. On the other hand, the people who did look into these levels usually managed somehow to arouse so many animosities of all kinds, whether political or religious or philosophical, that their entire work was branded, as soon as some of it was alleged to be faulty. Thus, names like Sigmund Freud or Carl Gustav Jung or Alfred Adler are usually so controversial that one would hesitate before acknowledging any tribute to them.

One of the assumptions that we would like to borrow from psychoanalysis is the existence within the human psyche of two levels beside the conscious one, namely the subconscious and the unconscious, whether they are termed so or otherwise. Another borrowing is the reference to psychic agencies like the Id, the Ego and the Superego, again regardless of the disputes concerning the terminology or even the concepts.

[2] Roșca, A.D., *Psihologie generală*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1975, ed. II.

The structure, schemes and diagrams used by Freud or any of his followers may be accepted in so much as there is nothing better at hand that can be used metaphorically in order to give a touch of the palpable to such abstract things like the subconscious workings of the mind and the rapports and the ratios governing those things. In order to make any possible charge of Freudism (that might be brought to this paper) fade and acquire superfluousness, we would like to emphasize that we have taken the ambitious liberty of disagreeing with Freud in some essential points, ourselves. One such point is the basic principles that govern the three Freudian agencies, namely, the pleasure principle that governs the Id, the reality principle that governs the Ego (with a view to the self-preservation of the individual) and the moral principle that governs the Superego (with a view to the welfare of the community). Looking at the Freudian structure of psychic agencies, each of the three principles that govern these agencies have been separately declared as the basic source of psychic energy, within or without the Freudian school; Freud himself proclaimed the governance of the pleasure principle; F. Nietzsche, on the other hand, advocated for the will to power in terms adjacent with the moral principle governing the Superego of the Freudian terminology; the metaphysical anthropologists, the existentialists (like Jean Paul Sartre) or even the subjectivists (like Roger Poole) have spoken about the preponderance of what may be termed in Freudian terminology as the reality principle with its due limitations. We incline to believe that if there is a prime psychic force, a 'primum movens' and if we are to accept the three psychic agencies described by Freud, than this 'primum movens' lies in all three agencies alike having something of all the three respective governing principles. We call this prime psychic force 'ascendancy'. Pleasure is an ascendancy over need (which is a rapport that starts on psychological levels and can go on to any degree of abstractization). The reality principle with its impulse of self-preservation is an ascendancy of the individual over nature, society and the universe, by and large. The moral principle is an ascendancy of the individual over his own deprivation suffered for the benefit of the race or of the community, over the primateship of his own instincual impulses. Ascendancy is a sublimation and conversion of psychological, moral, environmental, social and the like pleasures (satisfactions, joys, gratification and awes) into one another. The opposite pole of 'ascendancy' is 'descendancy' and the dynamic rapport between ascendancy and descendancy generates psychic energy (here again we took the liberty of dissociating our point of view from one of Freud's later beliefs, that the prime psychic force is issued out of the duality of the life principle and the death principle that he calls by way of personification as "Eros and Thanatos"). There may be no pleasure without a need, no survival outside the natural and social reality, as there is no individual outside this sort of reality, and no moral principle outside community. The human psyche feeds on ascendancies just like the body feeds on calories. As a mater of fact ascendancy is the keyword of any system of thought, as understood in this paper.

Alfred Adler says that: 'Prin însăși natura sa, omul este înzestrat cu organe de atac, de apărare sau de asigurare, ca și cu organe protectoare'[3]. Of course Adler includes here the psychic agencies, too, and one important mission that the psyche has is to convert descendancies, if possible, into ascendancies, or, at least, to diminish the weight of the descendancies that have been recorded by the psyche. Dreams and fantasies would work to this effect and most of the literary products cannot be viewed or understood completely outside the nature of fantasies (or even dreams, if we think of Virginia Woolf, for instance). We do not agree with the assumption generally attributed to Freud that writers write only out of sublimated frustrations or aggressions, but there must be some kind of ascendancy that the writer gets in the process of writing. So, the fictitional sublimation, though not the sole motivation, constitutes a component part of the psychological motivation of the writer.

Speaking of motivation, there obviously are lines of research that may bring in some light upon the literary phenomenon: the psychological motivation of the writer, the psychological motivation of the reader, and the psychological motivation of the literary character. These three kinds of motivation are closely intervowen, but to different extents, from one work to the next, and in our view the most important one is and remains the study of the psychological motivation of the literary character.

When dealing with a literary character that is furnished with enough features so that it should lend itself readily to a psychological analysis, the result of such an analysis ought to infer a touch of plausibility that should stimulate the psychological motivation of the reader. Where there are not enough common points between the reader, with his expectations, and the way a literary character is built, psychologically speaking, the result is that the literary product, or even the writer, may be charged with aberrational fiction by the reader. The curriculums of schools of fine arts in most countries include studies of anatomy, not that these schools would claim to yield only classical artists, but because a painter or a sculptor should not resort to surrealistic ways only because he has no proper command or knowledge of the way things really are. If the comparison is not too bold, then neither should the literary critic, or the writer, be completely devoid of any knowledge about psychological realities even if there should be no overt attempt intended at psychologism.

A psychologically oriented system of thought that grows on proper ideological and philosophical grounds may bring about, beside a sense of clairvoyance, a sense of balance and peace that is so important for the human condition. N. Margineanu says: 'Condiția umană, de asemenea privește nu numai aspectul ei conștient, ci și aspectul său inconștient. În condiția umană sănătoasă conștientul este sinteza și stăpânul inconștientului. În condiția umană bolnavă conștientul și inconștientul intră în conflict, raportul normal de determinare răsturnându- se'[4].

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[3] Munteanu, R., *Metamorfozele criticii europene moderne*, Editura Univers, București, 1975.
[4] Mărgineanu, N., *Condiția umană*, Editura Științifică, București, 1973, p. 9.

In fact psychology as known to the present days is a somewhat obtruse and speculative science, still subject to errors as the biological or physiological support of the psychological phenomenon is not fully known yet.

E. Pamfil, professor of psychiatry at the University of Timișoara, said once to his students that psychiatry should be only a side branch of the physiology of the nervous system, if the latter were properly developed and if the biochemical and bioelectrical qualitative and quantitative changes that occur in the brain were fully known.

The same attitude may seem to stand behind Bridgeman's *Thesis of Sufficiency of Atomic Analysis*: 'Most present day biologists are, I believe nonvitalists and "materialists..." So far as I can make out this is also the attitude of most psychologists... This attitude may be formulated in a very general way in the statement that it is not necessary to assume any new principles not already operative in physics and the chemistry of nonliving matter in order to explain the functioning of living matter. "Given a complete description in physical terms of any organism, then there is nothing more to give, in the sense that all the present behaviour of the organism and its future behaviour in a completely specified environment is fixed". Here what is meant by a "complete" description may be made specific by saying that it demands that the state of every atom in the organism be completely specific. It may well be that specification in such minute detail is not necessary, but going to the limit we have at least done no harm and it may be that future experiment will show that it was necessary. I shall call this "the thesis of the sufficiency of atomic analysis".[5]

Yet another surprising attitude for this thesis may be found in Robert R. Holt who says: 'I believe in arguing that psychoanalysis will ultimately have to develop new, protoneuro-physiological concepts of structure[6].

N. Mărgineanu also said: '... Structura psihologică a persoanei umane nu poate fi înțeleasă fără infrastructura biologică pe care ea se clădește și fără suprastructura socială în care ea se integrează[7]. Inferring that the human condition is best understood within a frame of biological-psychological-sociological-cultural nature. But until due progress is recorded in biology and the physiology of the nervous system, both the professional psychologists and the converted ones must continue to search for the truths, the boundaries and the nature of the human condition. And to paraphrase Samuel Johnson, who said: 'neither is a dictionary a bad book to reed' we may say: 'neither is literature a bad corpus to carry such a search on'. R. Emmet Jones writes: 'Este imposibil să subestimăm influența ideilor freudiene asupra literaturii contemporane. Începând cu jumătatea anului 1920 ideile lui Freud au pătruns în operele

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[5] Bridgam, P.V., *The Way Things Are*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1959, p. 201.

[6] Holt, R.R., editor of *Motives and Thought*, in *Psychological Issues*, vol.V, nr. 2-3, monograph 18-19, International University Press, Inc. 1967, p. 350.

[7] Mărgineanu, N., *Condiția umană*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

scriitorilor celor mai importanți și au colorat majoritatea tendințelor acestora. Sub influența psihanalizei, scriitorii care nu deschiseseră niciodată o carte de Freud, se simțeau îndreptățiți să trateze subiecte mai înainte interzise.[8]

It is interesting to note that Freudism as a cultural phenomenon has two kinds of impact: the novelty of information about the unconscious workings of the mind, on the one hand, and the side effects, on the other hand, recorded among people who have only vaguely heard of those ideas, but whose beliefs and acts have grown so wild under the excuse of Freudism that they are the ones who are responsible for what is at times called the Freudian revolution and also, for part of the animosities which are common especially among people who, again, have not had any direct touch with the Freudian school of thought.

H. Marcuse writes: 'În ultimele decenii poate că nici nu există un gânditor mai raționalist decât Freud ale cărui eforturi vizează tocmai să arate că forțele iraționale, care mai sunt încă active la om, trebuie subordonate rațiunii pentru ca relațiile umane să se poată în genere îmbunatăți și al cărui principiu 'Unde a fost Sinele (Id) trebuie să ajungă și Eul (Ego)' reprezintă poate cea mai rațională formulare imaginabilă în psihologie[9].

R. Munteanu in his chapter 'Psihanaliza și cultura' notes: 'Discursul oral sau scris constituie calea principală de comunicare dintre oameni. El implică eul locutorului în transmiterea unor informații, îl angajează în relatarea lor integrală sau îl determină în mod conștient să eludeze sau să devieze sensul unora din enunțurile sale. Discursul reprezintă astfel o formă de reconstituire a visului, de cercetare a unor mituri scrise, de exemplificare a modulului de exprimare a relațiilor interindividuale, de apropiere de specificitatea unui text literar.[10]

The world of literature offers unacountable examples of works or creators that can be approached and interpreted from psychological points of view. Such a point of view is foreworded by N. Margineanu in his chapter 'Introversiune si extroversiune' of his book *Psihologie și literatură*: 'Viața este un proces de adaptare activă și pasivă la lume cu scop de conservare și dezvoltare. În adaptarea pozitivă, ne dăm noi după lume; în cea activă, dăm lumea după noi... Cultura cu care omul se mândrește e produsul ei [n.n. adaptarii pozitive] numai că ea nu e creată de omul singur, ci în colaborare cu ceilalți oameni, deci, în societate, și anume pe baza moștenirii sociale, care valorifică experiența generațiilor premergătoare în slujba celei prezente.

Noțiunile de introversiune și extroversiune se conjugă cu cele de adaptare activă și pasivă, cu deosebirea numai că ele nu caracterizează atât adaptarea omului la lume cât conviețuirea sa socială, anume "închiderea" și "deschiderea" față de oameni.

Discriminarea dintre firea închisă și deschisă este foarte veche. Ea se pierde în negura vremilor când conviețuirea umană a fost elaborată și consolidată. Întâia conturare sistematică a

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[8] Munteanu, R., *Metamorfozele criticii europene moderne*, op. cit., p. 195.
[9] Marcuse, H., *Scrieri Filosofice*, Col. *Idei Contemporane*, Ed. Politică, 1977, p. 225.
[10] Munteanu, R., *Metamorfozele criticii europene moderne*, op. cit., p. 189.

celor două firi, cu descrierea tuturor trăsăturilor și consecințelor ce derivă din ele, o face Cervantes în Don Quijote, cu care romanul modern începe. Polaritatea celor două tipuri este reluată de Shakespeare. Hamlet este un introvertit ca și Don Quijote, iar Falstaff este un extrovertit ca și Sancho Panza...

Cele două tipuri - spune Jung - nu sunt entități metafizice, care se exclud reciproc, ci două contrarietăți care se întregesc reciproc. În această întregire reciprocă, balanța e în cele mai multe cazuri egală. În o treime din cazuri, însa, ea se apleacă spre un pol sau altul. Avem astfel tipul normal, balansat și cele două tipuri asimetrice reprezentate prin introvertit și extrovertit.

Conștiința extrovertită - adăuga el - se conjugă cu un inconștient extrovertit și viceversa. Întregiri asemănătoare există între cunoașterea rațională și cea senzorială, apoi între cea rațională și cea emotivă etc. Precumpănirea unui tip sau al altuia este în funcție de cauze ereditare. Cu ele se va ocupa biopatologia lui Kretschmer. Precum ea este în funcție și de adaptarea socială, cu care s-a ocupat Freud - în cazul extroversiunii, determinată de refulările proprii istoriei de travestire și apoi, Adler - în cazul introversiunii, care definește complexul de inferioritate, produs de diferitele frustrări.[11]

C. G. Jung made an interesting scheme of what may be called psychic agencies (only outside the Freudian terminology). He calls these psychic agencies "functions" and these functions are: thought, feeling, sensation (or perception) and intuition. The Ego migrates or floats among these four psychic cardinal points that are arranged in diametrically opposed pairs which may be represented as a cross (Jung's Cross):



C. G. Jung says: 'In the centre is the Ego (E), which has a certain amount of energy at its disposal, and the energy is the will-power. In the sense of the thinking type, that will-power can be directed to thinking (T). Then we must put feeling (F) down below, because it is in this case the inferior function that comes from the fact that when you think you must exclude feeling, just as when you feel you must exclude thinking. If you are thinking, leave feeling and feeling-values alone, because feeling is most upsetting for your thoughts. On the other hand people who go by feeling values leave thinking well alone and they are right to do so, because

[11] **Mărgineanu, N., *Psihilogie și literatură*, Ed. Dacia, Cluj, 1970, pp. 102-105.**

these two different functions contradict each other. People have sometimes assured me that their thinking was just as differentiated as their feeling but I could not believe it, because an individual cannot have too opposites in the same degree of perfection at the same time.

The same thing is in the case of sensations (S) and intuition (I). How do they affect each other? When you are discovering physical facts you cannot see round corners at the same time. When you observe a man who is working by his sense functions you will see, if you look at him attentively, that the axis of his eyes has a tendency to converge and to come together at one point. When you study the expression of the eyes of intuitive people, you will see that they only glance at things - they do not look, they radiate at things because they take in their fullness and among the many things they perceive they get one point on the periphery of their field of vision that is the hunch. Often you can tell from the eyes whether people are intuitive or not. When you have an intuitive attitude you usually do not observe the detail. You try always to take in the whole of a situation, and then suddenly something crops up out of this wholeness. When you are a sensation type you will observe the facts as they are, but then you have no intuition simply because the two things cannot be done at the same time. It is too difficult because the principle of the one function excludes the principle of the other function. This is why I put them as opposites.

Now, from this simple diagram you can arrive at quite a lot of very important conclusions as to the structure of a given consciousness. For instance, if you find that thinking is highly differentiated then feeling is undifferentiated. What does that mean? Does it mean that these people have no feelings? No, on the contrary. They say, "I have very strong feelings. I am full of emotions and temperament". These people are under the sway of their emotions, they are caught by their emotions, they are overcome by their emotions at times.

The reverse is true of the feeling type. The feeling type, if he is natural, never allows himself to be disturbed by thinking; but when he gets sophisticated and somehow neurotic he is disturbed by thoughts. Then thinking appears in a compulsory way, he cannot get away from certain thoughts. He is a very nice chap, but he has extraordinary convictions and ideas, and his thinking is of an inferior kind. He is caught by this thinking, entangled in certain thoughts; he cannot disentangle because he cannot reason, his thoughts are not movable. On the other hand, an intellectual, when caught by his feeling says, 'I feel like that' and there is no argument against it. Only when he is thoroughly boiled in his emotions will he come out of it again. He cannot be reasoned out of his feelings and he would be a very incomplete man if he could.

The same happens with the sensation type and the intuitive type. The intuitive is always bothered by the reality of things; he fails from the standpoint of realities; he is always out for the possibilities of life. He is the man who plants a field and before the crop is ripe is off again to a new field. He has ploughed fields behind him and new hopes ahead all the time, and nothing comes off. But the sensation type remains with things. He remains in a given reality. To him a thing is true when it is real. Consider what it means to an intuitive when something is real. It is just the wrong thing. It should not be, something else should be. But when a sensation type

does not have a given reality - four walls in which to be - he is sick. Give the intuitive type four walls in which to be, and the only thing is how to be out of it, because to him a given situation is a prison which must be undone in the shortest time so that he can be off to new possibilities.

These differences play a very great role in practical psychology... It is no use at all putting people into drawers with labels. But when you have a large empirical material, you need critical principles of order to help you to classify it[12].

One consideration that we would like to make about Jung's cross of the functions is that the Ego does not move mechanically its weight towards one function or the other as if gliding along some grooves or pre-set channels; so we can establish two zones of some importance namely the thought-sensorial zone which would be specific for scientific perceptions and the feeling-intuitive zone which would be specific for the artistic perceptions (this specificity not being at all monopolizing). Reality may be contemplated through either of these zones and, keeping within the limits of this scheme, literary criticism may be viewed as an agency of translation between the feeling-intuitive zone, which is the artistic zone, and the thought-sensorial zone, which is the scientific zone of perception. We tend to partly disagree with Jung in as much as the limitation of such a diagram may impose onto the principle of the unity and complexity of psychic life, but, for one thing, intuition is an important psychic agency or function.

Oriental religions, like Zen Buddhism for instance, are mostly structured on intuition rather than sensation or thought, and so is, implicitly, part of the oriental culture. Some spokesmen that took the standpoint of Zen Buddhism like Dr. Suzuki or Ikeida Daisaka seem to reproach European Culture an overemphasis laid on thought which, as they put it, and as was already mentioned at the beginning of this paper, is dated back to Plato's time and his school of thought that, incidentally, has offsprings coming down to our day, overemphasis that works to the detriment of intuition. If thought is governed by logic as a point of reference growing from the world of reality, intuition does not seem to have such a point of reference, at least not an obvious one but nevertheless intuition remains a major factor of psychic life coming to determine at times the direction that thought is put to function to. The sum total of the psychic functions may be influenced by intuition to such an extent that the logical mechanism of thought is made to serve purposes that stand astray from reality. For Othelo for instance, his intuition about being deceived by Desdemona became more real and palpable than reality itself which is not read properly any longer.

The importance of intuitive perceptions is also underlined by L.S.Vîgotski in his book *Psihologia artei* where he quotes from B.Christinsen: 'Scopul figurării obiectului în artă nu este imaginea senzorială a obiectului ci impresia fără imagine a acestuia... S-a înrădăcinat opinia că artele figurative au ca scop să slujească privirii, că ele vor să dea și chiar să intensifice calitatea

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[12] Jung, C.G., *Analytical Psychology*, Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, New York, 1970, pp. 16-19.

vizuală a lucrurilor. Cum adică, se poate ca nici arta să nu tindă către imaginea senzorială obiectului, ci către ceva fără imagine deși creează 'tablouri' și se numește figurativă? ...Analiz ne arată însă, că artele figurative, ca și scopul final al figurării obiectului este impresia fără imagine... În muzică este principal ceea ce nu se aude, în arta plastică ceea ce nu se vede și nu se simte...'[13]

Vigotski himself manages to give a convincing description of the relationship of ar with psychology: '...opera de artă în sine nu constituie în nici un caz obiectul psihologiei și nic psihicul nu este exprimat în ea. Totuși, dacă ne gândim la situația istoricului care studiază îi condiții identice... Vom vedea că o serie de științe se supun necesității de a-și reconstrui îi prealabil obiectul de studiu cu ajutorul unor metode indirecte, adică analitice. ...La fel ș psihologul nu va renunța nicicând să utilizeze cutare material deși acesta poate fi declarat c anticipație drept fals. ...Istoricul este și el aproape întotdeauna silit să folosească materiale despre care știe dinainte că sunt false și părtinitoare; și după cum istoricul și geologul îș reconstituie în prealabil obiectul de studiu și abia după aceea îl supun cercetării lor, astfe psihologul este silit să apeleze mai ales la dovezile concrete, la operele de artă înseși, și să reconstituie pe baza lor psihologia care le corespunde spre a avea posibilitatea să studieze psihologia aceasta și legile ei diriguitoare. În aceste condiții este firesc ca psihologul să considere orice operă de artă drept un sistem de excitanți, conștient sau inconștient organizați în așa fel încât să provoace o reacție estetică. Analizând structura excitanților, reconstituim natura reactiei [14].

In a larger study entitled 'The Reception of Shakespeare's Tragedies in Romania' we have tried to show that beside a statistical account of how many plays were translated or acted on stage and when and by whom, there may also be another way of looking upon the notion of reception, namely, as a qualitative moment when one nation is exposed to a corpus of knowledge that is bound to bring about a new understanding. With Shakespeare's genius the new understanding must have been that of the notion of tragic. And once the revelation has taken place (in its epiphanical manner), there comes the analyst - in this case the literary critic - to see what exactly was it that made the new (and different) quality possible. In talking about Shakespeare's tragedies one needs tools with very fine point to penetrate into his craftsmanship - and this is where a detailed apparatus of psychologically oriented criticism may prove useful, the details suggested by us being: the dynamics of ascendancies and discendancies and the translation (or interpretation) possible between the Thought-Sensation zone and the Intuition-Feeling zone of the psyche.

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[13] Vîgotski, L.S., *Pshihologia artei*, Ed. Univers, București, 1973, p. 61.
[14] I d e m, pp. 31-32.

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ULSTER CONFETTI NORTHERN - IRISH POETICS: VIOLENCE AND REPRESENTATION

ADRIAN RADU

Suddenly as the riot squad moved
in, it was raining
exclamation marks, [...]
And the explosion
Itself - an asterisk on the map.
(Ciaran Carson, *Belfast Confetti*)

REZUMAT. "Ulster – Confetti" – Poetica politică nord – irlandeză: violență și reprezentare. Acest eseu pornește de la accepțiunea mai largă a conceptului de poetică și este, de altfel, un raport asupra faptului literar în Irlanda de Nord în contextul violențelor provocate de confruntarea dintre catolici și protestanți, respectiv dintre republicani și loialiști. Nu se putea ca această atmosferă de brutalitate cu prea numeroase sacrificii umane să nu determine atitudini diferite în abordarea fenomenului cultural.

Ideea generală ar fi că terorismul ar opri în totalitate manifestările culturale, ceea ce este contrar cu realitatea, după cum se demonstrează în secțiunea întîi. Apoi, pornind de la aceast fapt, s-ar putea crede că artiștii refuză participarea, refugiindu-se într-o comodă atitudine de neutralitate. Majoritatea lor, însă, se situează pe poziția unui militantism angajat, chiar dacă el are unele limite, mergând, de exemplu, doar până la constatarea faptelor, lipsindu-ne de numirea vinovaților sau neoferindu-ne soluții. Analiza acestei atitudini ocupă secțiunea centrală a acestui eseu, grefându-se pe o geografie spirituală a Irlandei de Nord de astăzi. Subsecțiunile sunt dedicate aici studiului prozei, poeziei și teatrului de azi, constatându-se existența unei puternice generații de scriitori angajați, într-o pluralitate de manifestări artistic literare, mergând de la un spectru politic la celalalt, de la o tabără la cealaltă.

The Trouble with This Place

When questioned about Northern Ireland the man in the street would, more often than not, run into the typical clichés so intensely and greedily stereotyped by media everywhere: Northern Ireland means but terrorism, violence, bombs, bloodshed. Sometimes with good reason. If culture has to be taken into consideration, then, according to the adage, when cannons spit fire muses should be silent; in other words: there should be no place left for the cultural phenomenon.

Therefore, the neophyte newcomer will be greatly surprised to discover that books are still sold, tickets for the theatre, opera or ballet still bought and that the Northern Irishman still goes out to enjoy an evening with his family, or friends. Because of low house prices and rates, living conditions here are high. Consequently, getting into contact with culture is something affordable: there are always visitors in exhibitions or public in a theatre in spite of the Troubles down in the street. Life must be lived, shows must go on for all the bombs and the shooting. Nothing appears to interfere with art - seemingly, inconvenience comes from traffic jams, at times caused by bombs, bomb alerts and the subsequent road chaos. Apparently everything is left outside, the artist prefers to remain non-committed, the conflict is beyond the interest of the artist as he does not take sides. We will try to prove that this is not always so and that very frequently the literary discourse, biased as it may be, reflects the political situation in Ulster.

A short examination of 1994 summer's calendar of cultural events reveals the substantiality, even the polymorphic aspect of artistic life in Ulster, in Belfast, as everywhere: *The Jungle Book* at the Lyric Players Theatre, *Romeo and Juliet* at the Arts Theatre, *A Room with a View* at the Queen's Film Theatre, Haendel's *Messiah* at the Ulster Hall, while the Duchess of York can be seen opening Castleward[1].

The military presence in the streets does not stop the middle-class culture consumer from digesting art, as in other towns elsewhere. Immunity shows its results.

The question that naturally arises is about what actually happens to the conflict, if it can be kept entirely beyond arts. The answer is frequently negative, so that when the Troubles enter the realm of arts they tend, on the one hand, to become neutral, disengaged, apolitical and, on the other and more frequently, overt, traumatic and bloody. Irish and Ulster writers often find themselves in an ambiguous situation, defined by Paul Muldoon almost in a pun:

> The trouble with this place is that if you don't engage in it, you're an ostrich (whatever engage in it' may mean). If you don't engage in it, you're using the situation as a kind of ... you're on the make, almost, cashing in.[2]

What do artists and producers do on such occasions? One option is to reflect the preferences and the views of the middle-class non-committed audience: nonchalance, or, if possible, total disregard of the matter of dispute.

Their perspective is not accidental, as Bennett points out[3] - it is part of a very pervasive and persuasive campaign, according to which students of art are taught that

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[1] Ronan B e n n e t t, *An Irish Answer*, in *The Guardian Weekend*, July 16, 1994, p. 6.

[2] P. Muldoon, in L. Jackson and E. Mahoney, eds., *Writing the City. Secondary Material*, University of Strathclyde Press, 1994, p. 28.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

art does not mean getting involved in local issues. The conflict is there, it is ugly, monstrous even, but it cannot be traced back as being anyone's fault or guilt.

Another possible explanation of this attitude is funding and fear of jeopardising certain projects affecting the respective theatre or foundations. Theatres might get involved, their productions might become political, but then such representations are likely to be biased and the theatre-goers feel offended, frustrated in their beliefs or simply bored and refuse such performances, which might turn disastrous for the box-office. The case of Lyric - a middle-of-the road theatre - (found in Bennett) is a case in point. In an interview Robert Midgley, artistic director of Lyric emphasises:

> It would be blinkered to pretend that there's no problem [in the North], but equally wrong to make a theatre reflect what is problematic [...]. It is amazing how much activity there is here, the positive qualities that are in the community. It is incredibly vibrant.[4]

The result of this non-involvement policy is that the season 1994 was dominated by classic perennials, considered safer: *She Stoops to Conquer, An Ideal Husband, The Wind in the Willows, All My Sons, The Taming of the Shrew*. Bennett finds only one play touching on the North: *Hidden Curriculum* - a revival of the 13-year-old play written by Graham Reid. But, although it explores the impact of communal violence on the young it does not interfere with contemporary conventions[5].

Many analysts (Bennett included) are of the opinion that, as far as culture is concerned, the Irish Matter is either overlooked, deliberately avoided - as shown above - or, in other cases when it is present, it is only effect, destructive, appalling, condemnable without apparent and nominated cause and with only sporadically proven culprits. Is it as simple as that? Generalisations of such attitudes would be inappropriate as the attitude themselves. It would mean to be caught in one's own net; such an approach would be biased and superficial. Accordingly, to carry this spiritual landscape through we need further arguments from fiction, poetry and drama.

Bloodying the Streets

What is true in the case of theatrical performances appears to be true in the case of fiction, as a part of it seems to be ill-at-ease with political issues, though, in this case, the reader is not so directly involved with the work of art. Here, again, the underlying idea tends to become rather conventional: the trouble has to be shown, is in fact a terrible human tragedy, a bloody slaughter where both royalists and republicans are bad, while normal people should not get involved and the writer favour any of the conflicting opponents. In this context the British presence is well-intentioned and indispensable. Some writers have made a point of personal pride that they dislike both

[4] In B e n n e t t, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[5] B e n n e t t, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

sides. Graham Reid even says: 'My view is: a plague on both sides!'[6]. We see the massacre and the opposing forces, without any parti pris, while political bias is either shy or totally absent.

Television and radio drama, as well as films reflect this same situation: the conflict, without political content is shown as a series of appalling, meaningless massacres that destroy communities and the human spirit alike. A case in point discussed by Bennett is Arthur Clarke's television film *Elephant* - made up of a series of unexplained assassinations, but what counts is death only, and not identity and motivation[7].

What is then the situation of contemporary fiction and the resulting condition of the writer?

All the above-mentioned creative territories abound in recurrent metaphors about the North: abattoir, charnel house where carcasses and blood are described to a horrified reader. Blood in the streets, bombs, killed fathers and sons are recurrent images of the committed writers at the other end of the barricade. Fiction has made special use of such archetypes of Ulster as in Bernard Mac Laverty's *Cal*, where the main hero refuses to become part of the slaughter as he refuses to work in an abattoir like his father, and, by extrapolation, to get involved with the IRA:

> He stood at the back gateway of the abattoir, his hands thrust into his pockets, his stomach rigid with the ache of want. Men in white coats and baseball caps whistled and shouted as they moved between hanging carcasses. He couldn't see his father, yet he did not want to venture in. He knew the sweet warm nauseating smell of the place and he had no breakfast. Nor had he smoked his first cigarette of the day. Smells were always so much more intensive then. At intervals the crack of the humane killer echoed round the glass roof. Queuing beasts bellowed in the distance as if they knew.[8]

This first introductory paragraph contains relevant elements that stand for generally valid symbols in an unequivocal relation: abattoir', ache', hanging carcasses', sweet nauseating smell', crack', killer', beasts bellowing'. The allegorical interpretation is unavoidable, the violence of representation strikes the reader from the very beginning.

MacLaverty's families are shattered, split like the country, as in *Cal* or in the short story *Father and Son*, where the unnamed father is torn between his impossibility to demonstrate his son that he loves him and the tormenting worry that the latter might be killed by getting involved in the Troubles. The whole story is, like Cocteau's *La Machine à écrire*, a desperate dialogue with nobody and when the inevitable comes the

[6] Quoted by B e n n e t t, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[7] R. B e n n e t t, *op. cit.* p. 6-7.

[8] Bernard MacLaverty, *Cal*, Penguin Books, 1983, p. 7.

father's whole fabric prepared for his son falls to pieces and he simply cannot believe that it has happened to him, as with many other Ulster families:

> There is a bang. A dish-cloth drops from my hand and I run to the kitchen door. Not believing. I look into the hallway. There is a strange smell. My son is lying on the floor, his head on the bottom stair, his feet on the threshold. The news has come to my door. The house is open to the night. There is no one else. I got to him with damp hands.
> Are you hurt?'
> Blood is spilling from his nose.
> They have punched you and you are not badly hurt. Your nose is bleeding. Something cold at the back of your neck.
> I take my son's limp head in my hands and see a hole in his nose that should not be there. At the base of his nostril.
> My son let me put my arms around you.[9]

Ann Devlin in *Five Notes After a Visit* is interested in another pattern: violence and its traumatic impact on the inhabitants of both nationalities: they seem to be inoculated with it, their reactions are in accordance with it, violence dominates their daily professional and family life, inter-human relationships are marred by it, people react according to programmed routines. Conversation seems to be stuck in the paradigm of Nazi cross-examinations, as in the scene at London airport:

> You were born in Belfast?' the security man at the airport said.
> Yes'
> What is the purpose of your visit there?'
> To be with my lover. Well, I didn't say that. I had written research' on the card he was holding in his hand. I reminded him of this.
> 'I would like you to answer the questions', he says.
> 'I am doing research.'
> Who is your employer?'
> Self.' I stick to my answers on the card.[10]

Communication has become difficult and life stereotyped by slogans like those painted on the gables:

> SINN FEIN IS THE POLITICAL WING OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA. [...]
> WESTMINSTER IS THE POLITICAL WING OF THE BRITISH ARMY.[11]

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[9] MacLaverty, *Father and Son*, in L. Jackson and E. Mahoney, eds., *Writing the City*, University of Strathclyde Press, 1994, p. 124.

[10] Ann Devlin, *Five Notes after a Visit*, in Jackson and Mahoney, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

[11] *Ibid.*

In a patched country where, if you are Irish, it is safer to write British under nationality and where generalisations like 'There was a bomb in Oxford Street yesterday. Some of your countrymen'[12] intersperse the daily conversational routine.

In the middle of the human despair watched over by policemen in bulletproof jackets, the woman's sympathetic remark at the end of the story conveys the whole benevolent message: 'Doesn't matter what nationality you are, dear. We all suffer the same.'[13] The message is obviously pacifist and humane, but something might be added to it, read between the lines: we know who the aggressors are, but they are not named, they are but organisations and initials. What makes things worse is that, even now they cannot be stopped and what matters is that there is always and everywhere human suffering, destruction and degradation.

Among other noteworthy writers whose writings includes psychological insights against political, often blood-stained backgrounds mention should be made of Brian Moore, Ben Kiely, and the two great friends Glenn Patterson and the Belfast novelist Robert MacLiam Wilson (author of stunning *Ripley Boggle*).

Their camaraderie, symptomatic not only for a lot of artists, but for a whole section of Ulster population, stepped over the sectarian divide, since they come from families of different faiths and political beliefs. MacLiam Wilson expresses thus their common political and artistic credo, in an interview published by Candida Crewe in *The Guardian*, February 18, 1994:

> [...] We do both believe that killing people is very bad and very naughty, and no political hope can be justified by it. We both stand by that. We're novelists, not academics, so it's emotional.[14]

Patterson longs for Belfast when he is in England and feels he would rather be in Manchester when he returns to Ulster, and writes fiction that reflects the conceptions of Union Protestant community. He is Protestant himself and grew up in a liberal Unionist family, in an estate where loyalist tendencies became very violent, especially after the events of August 1969 and the introduction of internment[15]. He confesses:

> There was a pressure to declare yourself on the estate in the early seventies, and in my early teens. I had a desire to belong, so I became a very hard-line loyalist. I think I was very stupid. My parents who had been brought up in those ever close-knit working-class communities of the thirties, were very tolerant when tolerance was in short supply, and were horrified when I wore loyalist badges. They made me take them off.[16]

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[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] C. Crewe, *Belfast slabbers pave a literary way*, in L. Jackson and E. Mahoney, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Ibid.*

MacLiam Wilson is Catholic and says of himself:

> I'm from Turf Lodge, which is right on the west of west Belfast. It's a place which is fucked over, first by appalling depravation, and then by the Troubles. I had lots of brothers who were beyond the pale. The people in Turf Lodge didn't speak to us and Turf Lodge was pretty scummy. I don't know why I didn't end up a committed republican, so many did. Maybe because I supported the English national football team.[17]

His novel *Ripley Bogle*, written from the republican perspective, shows what to be an Northern Irish Catholic writer really means. The hero, growing Ripley Bogle, comes into contact with Long Kesh and the Internment Night and develops the writer's extreme violence when expressing his acrid cynical doctrine about Ireland:

> And Ireland? What about old Ireland? I just leave it at that, can I? Before fleeting my beastly birthplace where should I have stood on that?
> We Irish, we're all fucking idiots. No other people can rival us for the senseless sentimentality in which we wallow. Us and Ulster. The God-beloved fucking Irish, as they'd like to think. As a people we are shambles; as a nation - a disgrace; as a culture we're a bore... individually we're often repellent.
> But we love it, Irish fellows. We just slurp it. The worse we are, the better we like it. We love old Ireland and it loves us. [...]
> Oh, yes, begorrah! Belfastard! Cities to use with our voicey badges of accent unIrish. Ulstermen speak in tones Scottish. [...] Kicking in the holiest face you can find. Bloodying the streets. A curious thing my country.[18]

or reminding us that it is religious rivalries that triggered the divide and the Troubles lavish in death tolls:

> Our Ireland is a lovely place,
> A supergroovy nation.
> Bigotry is her pastime
> Death her occupation.[19]

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[17] *Ibid.*

[18] MacLiam Wilson, *Ripley Bogle*, in L. Jackson and E. Mahoney eds., *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[19] *Ibid.*

The futility of the whole conflict and the painful burden of taking sides are juxtaposed in the story that closes the second chapter. We include it here as it proves MacLiam's and Patterson's conviction, as stated above. Two boys returning home late, when questioned by three assailants about whether they are Catholic or Protestant, are at a complete loss about what to say, to save their lives. Like in a Russian roulette they have only one first time and as they randomly choose to be Catholic they have to prove to their assailants that they are really Catholics by reciting Hail Mary. Which they gladly do, hoping that this was the rescuing answer. But, their option squeezes the death trigger:

> You'd guessed, hadn't you? Dontcha just love that?! The bastards actually made sure. They fucking checked! The perfect, the cynical cruelty of that moment of hope and sanguine prayer. The heartless artistry of that pause of glad incantation. Clever bastards you have to admit![20]

The One Work of Prison Art and Anarchy

The political developments after the Internment Night and the convicts' hunger strikes shook not only society and its politicians but also resulted in interesting manifestations on the cultural level. Brian Campbell belongs to that group of writers who have served time in Long Kesh and the H-blocks. Bennett mentions[21] the fact that the writer himself was in prison from 1986 to 1993, which undoubtedly contributed to the shaping of his personal voice. He was also the co-founder and the first editor of a republican prisoners' magazine *The Captive Voice*, where he mirrored interesting aspects of the inmates' life, basically their need for own means of expression:

> After the hunger strikes the prisoners had a lot of political discussions about the tactics and the consequence of the protests, but there was also a lot of creative writing going on, and in 1988 we established poetry workshops. *The Captive Voice* was aimed at giving an outlet to the creative energy in the jail. In the past others had spoken on behalf of prisoners and we felt it was time to speak for ourselves.[22]

Most of the inmates lacked education and they even developed a jargon, not quite Irish, known as Jailic. An anthology of the prisoners' best productions, rightly considered political and revolutionary[23] was published afterwards by South Yorkshire Press in 1991, in the anthology *A Selection of Poetry by Republican Prisoners*. Laurence McKeown, who was serving a life sentence in the H-blocks, thus gives

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[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

[22] Quoted by Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[23] Campbell in Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Villon-like poetic expression - in the poem *Hard Lines* - to his perception of hateful, monotonous and geometric prison life. In the poetics of H-blocks the straight lines meeting at right angles stand for extreme rigidity and daily prison routine:

> Right angles and straight lines
> they're everywhere
> and I detest their rigidity.
> Walls, ceilings, floor, straight, sharp, cold, clinically exact lines
> meeting in right angles...
>
> Robotic minds, administrators, bureaucrats
> created this world of
> geometric precision.
> Did they think it beneath themselves
> to apply their architectural skills in the humble toiled-bowl?
> The one work of prison art and anarchy.[24]

Sowers of Seed, Erectors of Headstones

In the North sectarianism has created an altogether different culture during the years of Protestant Ascendancy - that of the Protestant working class, exclusive and inward-looking (Bennett's terminology). Chronologically, this was followed by a Catholic offensive: in 1972 the Stormont, the Parliament of Protestant Supremacy, was closed down, when Ulster was ruled directly from Westminster, then the nationalists took over in Derry and Belfast. Even demographically the Catholics grew in number - now they are almost 40% of the population with good perspectives of becoming half of the indwellers in an unbroken Catholic advance. As a result, the working class Protestant culture previously mentioned was more and more isolated, a fact added to its already existing inward-looking characteristic. Therefore, it is no wonder that now writers speak of an atmosphere of suffocation:

> It is an intolerable mental world to have to inhabit. Think about it. What a weird physical sense of restriction to be trapped in a tiny corner of a small island and not feel that you are able to move about it. Most Protestants in the North would not venture across the border. What a restriction. That sense of confinement is, inevitably, reflected emotionally, psychologically, culturally.[25]

Places like Desertmartin, Portballintrae (North Antrim Coast), or like Portavogie (in the Ards peninsula) are now places 'where the spirit dies'.

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[24] In B e n n e t t, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[25] *Ibid.*

Tom Paulin depicts this sterile spiritual atmosphere in his poem *Desertmartin* (in *Liberty Tree*). He appears to be, at least at the beginning of his literary career, the author of an 'earnest, fricative poetry about an engaged Ulster'[26]. For him identity can be identified both with despair and desire merging in the space of the poem (ibid.). Paulin's Desertmartin is depicted 'At noon, in the dead centre of a faith, / Between Draperstown and Magherafelt' in a 'baked September light' with Despair as the word that may best characterise the feeling emanated by a place where even the primordial life giving Word has withered within a context identified with parched certainties and charred stubble:

> Here the Word has withered to a few
> Parched certainties, and the charred stubble
> Tightens like a black belt, a crop of Bibles.[27]

In this atmosphere 'the bondage of the letter' explodes - an overt condemnation of the unionist policy of rev. Ian Paisley, the politician and the Presbyterian minister and leader of the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party:

> [...] it shouts
> For the Big Man to lead his wee people
> To a clean white prison, their scorched tomorrow.
> Masculine Islam, the rule of the Just, [...]
> These are the places where the spirit dies.
> And now, in Desertmartin's sandy light,
> I see a culture of twigs and bird-shit
> Waving a gaudy flag it loves and curses.[28]

The vision is obviously Republican-biased with less idealistic Protestant collocations.

Our spiritual geography would be fragmentary if we overlooked the Irish scene of such classics as 1995 Nobel Prize winner Seamus Heaney, Ciaran Carson or Paul Muldoon or did not listen, tangentially even, to the voice of the new generation of poets.

Seamus Heaney's *Tollund Man* collates Northern Irish sectarian violence with sacrificial ritual murders in the preservative bog of Iron Age Jutland, where opposing poles interpenetrate: civility and barbary, present and past, male and female:

> Out there in Jutland
> In the old man-killing parishes
> I will feel lost,
> Unhappy and at home.[29]

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[26] **Neil Corcoran**, *English Poetry since 1940*, Longman, 1993, p. 212.

[27] **Tom Paulin**, *Selected poems 1972-90*, Faber, 1993.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] **S. Heaney**, *New Selected Poems 1966-87*, Faber, 1987, p. 31-2.

The narrative voice's empathy clamours in *Punishment* against the predetermined tribal rite of the adulterous woman's lapidation, a conspicuous allusion to the Bible and, unquestionably, to contemporary Ulster deaths of those who are just opposite:

> who could connive
> in civilized outrage
> yet understand the exact
> and tribal, intimate revenge.[30]

Such instances of analogical imagery abund in Heaney's poetry. In *Act of Union* the brutal, forced union of Ireland with imperial Britain in 1801 is compared with an act of rape. The poem counterpoints explicit sexual connotations with Irish historic realities, Irish geography becomes a sexual one, colonised Ireland is the assailed female who has to accept the possessing, impaling male, obviously Britain, leaving her 'raw, like opened ground, again':

> And I am still imperially
> Male, leaving you with the pain
> The rending process in the colony,
> The battering ram, the boom burst from within.[31]

The seed thus infiltrated through the act is the enemy within, clearly hinted at by the mentioning of the fifth column of the Spanish civil war:

> The act sprouted an obstinate fifth column
> Whose stance is growing unilateral.[32]

As always with Heaney the North is placed inside an outer history of a sensibility. According to Corcoran 'the result is that the matter of British and Irish political history is run along the very private lines of an interior sensibility and personality'[33].

The atmosphere of ill omen and potential violence, of excruciating expectation of unavoidable bad news is illustrated in *The Toome Road*, where the inhabitants hope in vain to be able to keep away the harbinger of misfortunes happened during the night, by keeping their doors locked. The paramilitaries originate the mourning with convoys of camouflaged armoured cars waking everyone up. The nightmare has begun, but do the inhabitants realise that? The cry of anguish reverberates against silos, gates, roofs:

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[30] S. Heaney, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
[31] S. Heaney, *op. cit.*, p. 74-5.
[32] S. Heaney, *op. cit.*, p. 74-5.
[33] N. Corcoran, *op. cit.*, p: 184.

Whom shall I run to tell
Among all of those with their back doors on the latch
For the bringer of bad news, that small-hours visitant
Who, by being expected, might be kept distant?[34]

Here, the sword of Damocles, an untoppled omphalos, hovers above everyone, irrespective of faith or belief:

Sowers of seed, erectors of headstones
O charioteers, above your dormant guns,
It stands here still, stands vibrant as you pass,
The invisible, untoppled omphalos.[35]

For Michael Longley the paramilitaries become disjointed tin soldiers crushed under the burden of history, mere marionettes in a dumb show:

I watch now through a gap in the hazels
A black face, the disembodied head
Of a mummer who has lost his bearing
or, from the garrison at Dormintree,
A paratrooper on reconnaissance.

He draws a helicopter after him [...]
As he sweats up the slopes of Slieve Gullion
With forty pounds of history after him.[36]

In *Belfast Confetti* (a poem that, by extension has obviously given the title to this essay) Ciaran Carson's Belfast, suffocated with street clashes, rioters, soldiers, guns and bullets is given textual even orthographic representation, as the burst of rapid fire is graphically represented as a hyphenated line or the alleys and side-streets as blocked with stops and colons. The common inhabitant, lost in the maze of the turmoil, literary loses his identity:

What is
My name? Where am I coming from? Where am I going?
A fusillade of
question marks.[37]

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] M. Longley, *Poems 1963-83*, Salamander Press, 1985.

[37] C. Carson, *Belfast confetti*, Bloodaxe, 1990.

The same stimulating textual invention is also used in *Punctuation*, where the sound of a machine-gun is rendered as:

> I can
> See my hand [...]
> When another shadow steps put from behind the hedge, going:
> dot, dot, dot, dot, dot...[38]

A no less impressive image of destruction is given cinematic and religious representation in *Belfast* by Louis MacNeice, in a panoramic zoom over the melancholy lough, the stained water, the marble store and the chapel with the garish Virgin. MacNeice's bereaved women pray for oblivion and not for forgiveness, since memory also kills:

> The sun goes down with a banging of Orange drums
> While the male kind murders each woman
> To whose prayer for oblivion answers no Madonna.[39]

Paul Muldoon's *The Sightseers* starts on a peaceful note, in a warm Sunday afternoon in July, when the narrator's family members and himself set out to a new restaurant at 'Ballygawley, in mid-Ulster'. The second part stands in contrast with the serene ambience of the first when violent images haunt back uncle Pat's memory as many others' - violence cannot be avoided even in one's mind:

> Uncle Pat was telling us how the B-Specials
> had stopped him one night somewhere near Ballygawley
> and smashed his bicycle
> and made him sing the Sash and curse the Pope of Rome.
> They held a pistol so hard against his forehead
> that there was still the mark of an O when he got home.[40]

Memory also hunts in *The Boundary Commission*, where we are transposed to the times when Ireland was being divided and the border, just like the Berlin Wall, ran

> Down the middle of the street,
> With the butcher and the baker in different states[41]

and people wondering about the divide, like perplexed Golightly:

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[38] *Ibid.*

[39] In Eamonn Hughes ed., *An Anthology of Modern Irish Poetry*, Belfast UP, 1995, p. 1.

[40] P. Muldoon, *Selected Poems 1968-83*, Faber, 1986.

[41] P. Muldoon, *The Boundary Commission*, in op. cit.

He stood there for ages,
To wander which side, if any he should be on.[42]

The new generation of Irish poets could not stay away from the Irish matter. Paula Meehan records in *The Leaving* the atmosphere of fear of those forced to flee because of the soldiers with heavy boots, or the figure of the Irish hero James Connoly 'strapped wounded to a chair' in *Ard Fheir*. Theo Dorgan dedicates a whole poem - *Kilmainham, Easter* - to the memory of the same Connoly:

This is the shrine our rulers keep
And today they have graced it with flowers.
Let us grant them at least their honesty,
Their naked love of prisons.[43]

An analogous cult of the heroes is presented in the poem *Nora Harkin Remembers Peadar O'Donnell*, where T. Dorgan's tonality becomes solemn:

I like to think of their indomitable forms,
Connoly, Mellows, Gilmore, Davitt, Tone,
Standing like stars on the waves, savouring the joke,
That indeed they live for ever, as you will live for ever.[44]

A New Map Is Being Made of the Whole Country

So far as drama as cultural phenomenon is concerned, the article published by *The Guardian, An Irish Answer* offers a very interesting - though considered dated sectarian and partisan[45] - cultural panorama of 1994 Ulster. Bennett underlines that in West Belfast there is no separation between art and the Troubles - here culture is secular (despite its importance, there is little or no influence of the Catholic Church), it blends traditional Gaelic and contemporary Irish influence in visual arts, writing and dance with those of modern culture. Here culture is politically aware with sometimes overt political commitment of writers or producers. In 1993 Dubblejoint Theatre Company staged a version of Gogol's *The Government Inspector*, where Tsarist Russia becomes pre-Partition Ireland and where critique of the Irish middle-class dependency of Britain is given special emphasis. The Dubblejoint Company also includes plays by Terry Eagleton (*The Green, the Orange and the Gangrene* - a presentation of James Connoly's imprisonment and execution - a pun on the Irish banner and a political play with rectilinear contemporary echoes, social and political criticism, where everything is shouted straightforwardly, bluntly, in both languages), or Marie Jones (*A Night in*

[42] *Ibid.*
[43] T. Dorgan, *The Ordinary House of Love*, Salmon Publishing, 1992, p. 27.
[44] T. Dorgan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
[45] in *The Guardian*, July 23, 1994.

November - inspired by the 1994 World Cup qualifying soccer match between Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. A few (already) historic facts need to be mentioned here: the IRA's bombing of Shankill a short time before the football match led to loyalist retaliation at Rising Sun bar in Greysteel. As a result, the events were reflected in the behaviour of the supporters and the riots that followed - a good opportunity for the writer to examine sectarianism and Protestant identity.

Among other active playwrights of today, Bennett's study[46] also mentions Gary Mitchell, who wrote mostly for the radio. He is interested in the role of the loyalist paramilitaries in working class Protestant housing estates. *Independent Voices* written in 1993 is about two naïve and optimistic lads from a loyalist area who decide to edit a free newspaper. While trying to investigate a drug problem they come into contact with loyalist paramilitaries and become aware of their activity and influence.

In Ronan Bennett's opinion[47] Derry's atmosphere is completely different from that of Belfast, as the City's local council is run by nationalists who tried not to alienate the Protestant population but reduced polarisation and kept sectarianist tensions to a minimum. The Council also promoted arts, created good surviving conditions for theatre companies such as Brian Friel's Field Day. Consequently, Derry was also established as centre of music; the place of the Northwest Music Collective. Now the Nerve Centre was set up as multi-media base for film, music, video, animation. At the same time mention should be made of the Verbal Arts Centre - the only one in Ireland devoted exclusively to writers.

Brian Friel, who stands for a whole insititution, can be integrated in the tradition of committed Derry nationalists, acknowledged as one of the most important Irish dramatists since the second World War, for whom the Matter of Ireland becomes a study case. Therefore we will consacrate this section mostly to him. His contribution to the development of Irish theatre is remarkable: besides plays where the reality of Ireland is substantial and unquestioned as in *The Enemy Within* or *Freedom of the City*, his unique dedication is the foundation, together with his friend, the actor Stephen Rea, of The Field Day Company in 1980. One of the company's commitments was to the development of Irish, as Friel believed that centrality of language is necessary for any profound political change. In this respect he wrote his own *Translations*.

Translations is an historical stage play based on reality, which proved soon to be very successful not only in Derry, but throughout United Kingdom and Ireland, which the company constantly toured. In London, in Galway and at the Gate Theatre in Dublin it was reviewed as a national classic', while Abbey Theatre's production tended to emphasise certain farcical aspects of the dramatic discourse. As the play deals with 19th century Ireland and, more exactly, with the events of mapping the country in 1833, being thus referred to as historical, it aroused a lot of controversy as to the extent to which history and fiction are complementary or exclusive, as forms of discourse. Both fiction and history configure the past by sharing the images and structures of the

[46] Op. cit., p. 10.

[47] R. Bennett, *op. cit.* p. 10.

narrative. Thus they bring into present what has been lost into a society's understandin of its past. Both emphasise memory, loss, human characters and events. Although it i not the aim of this essay to discuss fictionality of history and historicity of fiction, a well as the intrinsic intertextuality of such a discourse, Kevin Barry's underlining c their shared sectarianism might prove useful:

> However neither discourse understands its own authority quite differently. History cannot pretend to project itself as unreality. Fiction cannot project itself as unrhetorical.[48]

In the case of Friel the history in the play is (or should be) reality whereas h fiction is often rhetorical. The Past and past events are important to him to the exte that they can be projected into the present, although we cannot judge them in a linea one-to-one cause and effect relationship. He is interested in the Irish past in so far as proves convenient for present issues: nationhood, education, language, politics. Sa Brian Friel about the reasons that pushed him to write this play:

> I wrote *Translations* [...] [having in mind] a play set in the 19th century, somewhere between the Act of Union and the Great Famine [...]; a play about colonialism; [...] - a play about the death of the language and the acquisition of English and the profound effects that the change-over would have on a people.[49]

The scope of the dramatic discourse is wide and far-reaching; its origins a rooted in 19th century Ireland, while its apex is visible in the 20th century Ulst society. The effects of the mutation are long-lasting. In Friel's opinion the most easi noticeable is language, which explains its acquiring a personality of its own. The title the play sets from the start the inevitability of bridging between two entities: tongue characters, civilisations, past and present. The work itself is a linguistic compromise a convention; the actors on stage speak in English, but the audience has to imagine th many of the characters are speaking Gaelic.

This convention lies at the core of certain farcical interpretations of the text, it was previously mentioned. Such instance may be found in scene II, act II, a brilliant constructed one, when Yolland and Mairie express their love, as it were: neither of the can understand each other's language, though they utter practically the same ve concerned small talk, as if taken from a Teach Yourself English manual:

> Mairie: The grass must be wet. My feet are soaking.
> Yolland: Your feet must be wet .The grass is soaking.[50]

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[48] K. Barry, *Translations' and A Paper Landscape': Between Fiction and History, The Cra Bag*, VII (1983), p. 119.

[49] Quoted by Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

[50] B. Friel, *Selected Plays*, Faber, 1984, p. 426.

Almost desperately, 'the uneducated' Mairie resorts to Latin in an effort to make herself understood, while 'the educated' Yolland, representative of the superior civilisation, due, according to historical laws, to colonise and assimilate the inferior civilisation, not only does not understand a single word, but also thinks that she is using Irish.

Another memorable scene in this respect is at the end of act I, when Captain Lancey reproduces his previously well-learnt speech, which has to be translated, and is done so, by Owen, whose version is a well-trimmed summary:

> Lancey: His majesty's government has ordered the first ever comprehensive study of this entire country - a general triangulation which will embrace detailed hydrographic and topographic information, and which will be executed to a scale of six inches to the English mile.[51]

This very pompous sentence, abundantly interspersed with totally useless technical terms is preposterously and insipidly translated by Owen as:

> Owen: A new map is being made of the whole country.[52]

The whole dialogue continues on the same derisive, yet flat tonality with Owen's filtering and censoring Lancey's oration. The implication is transparent: intentions on paper totally differ from actual results.

Duality, division with constant oscillation between one end and the other is detected not only in language and the invariable necessity to translate (as in the case of Jimmy, Captain Lancey, Lieutenant Yolland and Mairie, whose sphere is always bilingual), but also in the schizoid personality of some characters (Mairie, divided between Manus and Yolland, Yolland, partly in love with the Irish landscape, 'the traitor' (?) Owen). This dualism is manifest in the characters who must painfully take sides: Owen in favour of the Irish or English, Yolland between Mairie and Ireland or England or the USA, as well as in the split personality of contemporary Northern Ireland, divided between Republic of Ireland and United Kingdom. The choice is painful and destructive in both situations; Yolland is killed, bombs and terrorism kill in Ulster. This is the teleology of the Frielean text: events in the 19th century, finality now. Who exactly are the killers of Yolland? We will never know - Not Manus, but peasant farmers who will never have names. Who are the originators and executors of today's massacre in Ulster? - They may be on either side, but will never have names.

Another topic of the play is love, in its apparently across-barriers aspect. Because *Translations* is after all a potent love story. But, unfortunately, if love can theoretically overcome, the drama shows its opposite effect: not union, but separation. Manus will have to go, Yolland will be killed, while Mairie will probably leave Ireland.

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 406.

[52] *Ibid.*

The Northern Irish contemporary projection is overt: separated families, killed fathers and sons, grieving mothers and sisters in a divided country.

Ultimately the play turns to be a profound analysis of language, seen as metaphor for the colonial penetration of people's minds.[53] Two are the actual ways of achieving this: through education and mapping and re-formation of all local place-names. The results of this colonialisation process are not beneficial, but threatening for the local community. If the immediate results are humorous, amorous and fatal the extensive effects are no less than the annihilation of a culture. Friel is very straightforward here: he cannot limit his feather to the mere presentation, sometimes droll (but laughter is also a potent weapon) of amusing situations; he has to go all the way: murder, to awake slumbering spirits. The matter is serious and tragic: destruction, annihilation, reprisal are dramatic issues and request, accordingly, appropriate tonality. Hence, the protests against the farce scenes in the Abbey Theatre productions of the play, and the questioning of how much fiction is accepted in an historical play if it deals with serious matters that involve responsibility of the writer.

Brian Friel assumes in fact full responsibility as committed writer whose aim is not to entertain, but to trigger cathartic reactions. Life on the stage is a magnified version of everyday actual life that often tends to overlook some of its problems. Oblivion is seen as dangerous and, therefore, dealing with such issues is inevitable today. Dealing with his country does not mean superficiality, non-involvement, or commercialism. On the contrary, it means participation, unveiling, responsibility and dedication to Ireland.

Beyond Confines

In spite of all adversities, bad times and trials the Protestant North has produced art - often as a reaction against bigotry, claustrophobia. Bennett mentions in this respect[54] that Graham Reid, a writer whose voice is often denunciatory and polemical, together with Glenn Patterson - whom we have already referred to in the second section - at times iconoclastic deserve special attention. The dark world of the loyalist paramilitaries has attracted little interest from writers, with the noteworthy exceptions mentioned above: Garry Mitchell or Eoin McNamee. The latter explores loyalist terror in *Resurrection Man*. But the tendency with artists from Ulster Protestantism is to move away from their native world: Stephen Rea (Oscar nominated for his role in *The Crying Game*) comes from a Protestant background, whose mental world is Irish, but who now lives in Catholic West Belfast. Kenneth Branagh, another celebrity of the theatre and film world comes from York Street Belfast and is now in search of Englishness'.[55] The reason for such migration is clearly stated by Bennett:

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[53] M. Etherton, *Contemporary Irish Dramatists*, Macmillan, 1989, p. 201.

[54] R. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[55] *Ibid.*

> To find fulfilment one has to go beyond the confines of the Protestant world. To remain is to be restricted to little more that flute bands, Orange marches and the chanting of sectarian slogans at football matches.[56]

But for all this, the Irish literary geography is very prolific and multifarious. The artists may live far from their birthplace and accept the ways of the society of adoption. Even though alienation may affect their way of thinking, the spirit is always there, instinctually tradition always takes over. It is constituted out of a disturbingly rich plurality. 'But it is only in this plurality and complexity that the modern Irish writing can be fully understood.'[57] This plurality allows either neutral, non-committed attitudes or committed, even biased perspectives. And this is what we have tried to demonstrate, so far.

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LIBRI

Susan Ehrlich, **Point of View. A Linguistic Analysis of Literary Style**, London and New York, Routledge, 1990, X + 132 p.

Point of View. A Linguistic Analysis of Literary Style proposes an examination of *represented speech and thought* (RST), a style or discourse mode used mainly in narrative fiction for expressing the character's point of view, also known as *free indirect discourse* (FID). The book furnishes a breakthrough from a discourse analytic perspective in the account of RST by giving an explicit formulation of the aspects that cannot be handled within sentence linguistics, as well as by offering a convincing explanation of how this mode functions as a semantically and pragmatically distinct textual unit. Ehrlich discusses such issues as the demarcation of RST, its delimitation from indirect discourse and direct discourse, the limitations of sentence-based approaches, and examines the inter-sentential coherence of this mode by highlighting the relevance of discourse context. In particular, she elaborates much needed tests for cross-sentential point of view coherence, and furnishes essential evidence as to how passages of RST hang together.

The literature on RST or FID differs depending on the weight given to various categories of features in the constitution of this discourse mode. The *syntactic accounts* are sentence-based and define RST purely on the basis of linguistic characteristics, the major features being represented, in this view, by the peculiar person and tense marking (third person of the personal pronoun with first person deixis, special tense system based on past tense forms with possible present and future time deixis), and by the occurrence of idiosyncratic lexical elements (e.g. colloquialisms, slangy words), or of lexical items belonging to various (nonliterary) registers.

The presence of specific deictic and indexical elements (e.g. *this, here, now*) in conjunction with the past tense verb forms has also been considered, as well as the occurrence of emotive language, exclamations, and interrogative subject-auxiliary inversion. They cannot be attributed to the narrator, since they evoke another voice or perspective. Ehrlich gives careful consideration to the syntactic features, but restricts their relevance to the intrasentential domain, given that they can only signal the "emergence" (p. 17) of another perspective, therefore accounting for the "internally marked" (p. 27) sentences of RST. The major problem is represented, according to her, by the linguistically unmarked sentences of RST, which is evidence of the insufficient reliability of purely syntactic criteria in determining the status of particular RST sentences. The position according to which syntax plays the determining role in the marking of RST or FID has not gone unquestioned, and this has given rise to *semantic* and *pragmatic approaches* in the literature, which either assign semantic and pragmatic pertinence to syntactic evidence (e.g. Kuroda 1976; Banfield 1982), or emphasize the role of context and previously supplied information in determining the RST status of given textual segments (e.g. Cohn 1978; McHale 1978). Now, Ehrlich gives the first global explicit formulation of these aspects. Especially important are, in her study, the discourse means that sustain sentence connectedness within RST passages, or coherence of point of view across sentence boundaries, since they can account for the sentences not explicitly marked as RST, i.e. the ones with a syntactically ambiguous status. Since discourse context is relevant to

such an investigation, Ehrlich proposes a discourse analytic approach which emphasizes those aspects whereby RST is demarcated as a coherent episode, most important among them being the inter-sentential linguistic features of *referential linking* and *semantic connector linking* (p. 40-57), *temporal linking* (p. 58-80), and *progressive aspect* (p. 81-94). She argues that the first three facilitate cross-sentential interpretations of RST by linking sentences that are textually cohesive with discourse containing syntactically marked sentences of RST (*explicit* coherence or cohesion), while the last (progressive aspect) may sustain point of view coherence that is only *implicit*, i.e. not textually explicit. The result is a comprehensive account of how RST or FID as a semantically and pragmatically distinct textual unit is associated with the character's personal perspective of the events. Relevant to this is, among other things, Ehrlich's contention (p. 75) that parenthetical verbs of communication and consciousness, as well as parenthetical predicates denoting characters' perceptions (so typical of RST) or even characters' physical activities are character oriented, sustaining sentence connectedness and coherence of point of view. So the analysis furnishes, too, essential evidence in favor of subsuming under RST not only the representation of verbal events and of mental events including thoughts, but also of mental states like perceptions, visions or fantasies.

Below, as an unpretentious and informal illustration, I analyze, along lines suggested by Ehrlich, a brief passage by James Joyce ("Eveline". In *Dubliners*. New York: The Viking Press, 1965), which contains syntactically unmarked FID sentences that depend for their interpretation on the discourse context:

> [a] She sat at the window watching the evening invade the avenue....
> [b] Few people passed.
> [c] The man out of the last house passed on his way home; .... (p. 36)

There is no linguistic feature in this example that would require [b] and [c] to be interpreted unambiguously as FID, since, isolated from the context, they might be attributed to the narrator. On closer examination, however, it turns out that [b] and [c] are constituted into FID by temporal linking, across paragraph boundaries, to [a], whose predicate, by designating the character's physical activity and perception, provides a reference time for the tense of the respective sentences and identifies them as reflecting the point of view of "she", that is Eveline, the protagonist. Besides temporal linking, semantic content is also responsible for the FID interpretation, since the sentence contains information accessible to the character, behaving like a semantic "complement" (p. 67) of the controlling verb. It follows that discourse context, which is essential to the cross-sentential constitution of FID, can be handled successfully in terms of cohesive relations, following Ehrlich's suggestions.

Unambiguous interpretations for syntactically ambiguous FID sentences can thereby be provided, which indicates the strength of her model.

While the book is essential for our understanding of RST, a somewhat better coverage of the problematics of this discourse mode would have been very useful. In this respect, an issue on which the book is silent is that of double-voicedness or polyvocality of RST (fusion of the narrator's and the character's language). This would imply a distinct definition of this mode (see McHale 1978; Oltean 1993), since, if RST or FID is not single-voiced, then it also undergoes a marking for the narrator, in addition to the character, and does not express the point of view of the latter unambiguously, as Ehrlich claims. Likewise, an examination of the valences of RST in

contrast with those of interior monologue-a related mode-would have yielded a clearer picture of the position of the former among the styles or modes involved in the representation of speech and thought. However, with regard to the major issues relating to how RST is constituted and hangs together as a distinct textual unit, as well as to what can be subsumed under this mode, Ehrlich's book brings, needless to say, very important clarifications, standing as an extremely illuminating and valuable contribution to the analysis of represented speech and thought, and of the way in which it expresses point of view in narrative fiction.

ȘTEFAN OLTEAN

Ruth Ronen, **Possible Worlds in Literary Theory**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Ruth Ronen, conferențiar la Catedra de Poetică și Literatură Comparată a Universității din Tel Aviv, publică, în 1994, la Cambridge University Press o interesantă analiză a noțiunii de lumi posibile în teoria literară. Lucrarea se bazează pe o bibliografie bogată și de ultimă oră, din care nu lipsesc nume deja clasicizate în teoria literară: Claude Bremond, Lubomir Dolezel, Umberto Eco, Shoshana Felman, Gerard Genette, A.J. Greimas, Linda Hutcheon, Roman Jakobson, Wolfgang Iser, Thomas Pavel, Saul Kripke, Joseph Margolis sau Paul Ricoeur. Cartea este rezultatul unei lungi perioade de studiu și cercetare, capitole întregi fiind deja supuse judecății publicului prin publicarea anterioară în reviste de mare prestigiu cum ar fi: *Semiotica*, *The British Journal of Aesthetics* sau *Poetics Today*.

Studiul dedicat de Ruth Ronen lumilor posibile în teoria literară pornește de la premisa teoretică a înrudirii celor două domenii teoretice de referință: filozofia și teoria literară. Autoarea încearcă să demonteze mecanismul împrumuturilor interdisciplinare prin acest exemplu. O lungă perioadă de timp ficționalitatea a fost privită de către teoreticienii literari ca o proprietate a textului, o modalitate de "organizare internă". Filozofii au ignorat-o sau privit-o ca o anormalitate logică. În ultimii ani, pe de o parte, teoreticienii literari merg dincolo de limitele textului literar, spre mai largi contexte culturale, pe de altă parte, filozofii, și, mai ales, logicienii au dezvoltat noțiuni care permit abordarea complexității lumilor ficționale.

Autoarea consideră că lumile posibile sunt deosebit de importante pentru teoreticianul literar. Ele sunt lumi intensionale, ceea ce le distinge de lumea reală. Pe de altă parte, ele permit considerarea lumii ficționale ca un univers al discursului care își construiește propria sa lume referențială și care are operatorul său specific. Ficționalitatea trebuie să fie, potrivit lui Ruth Ronen, obiect de studiu atât pentru logicieni cât și pentru esteticieni. Cercetătoarea israeliană nu creează noi noțiuni, ci analizează modul în care se pot folosi concepte filozofice deja existente în scopuri "literare". În cadrul filozofiei, lumile posibile sunt, de la Leibnitz încoace, o modalitate de a caracteriza accesibilitatea epistemică. În estetică, lumile posibile permit o discuție complexă a referențialității, a relației ficțiune-realitate. Ruth Ronen sintetizează complet și convingător avantajele "folosirii" interdisciplinare a lumilor posibile: se legitimează problemele referențiale, ficțiunea poate fi abordată din punct de vedere filozofic (de la Platon la

Bertrand Russell ca fiind exclusă din discursul filozofic, deoarece e considerată o succesiune de propoziții lipsite de valoare de adevăr), se "sparge" ermetismul formal și exclusiva întoarcere spre sine a literarului, se depășesc, de asemenea, metodele pur descriptive, formale atât de apropiate cercetătorilor literari într-o anume perioadă. În fine, ficțiunea nu e privită ca un fenomen excepțional din punct de vedere logic și semantic. Ca și condiționalele, propozițiile exprimând dorințe, anticipații, sau memorii, ficțiunea face parte dintre tipurile de discurs care nu se referă la starea actuală a lucrurilor în lume.

În această din urmă categorie de discursuri, Ruth Ronen introduce și miturile. În opinia noastră, un amendament e necesar aici. Perspectiva cercetătoarei israeliene e cea a unui laic. Pentru cel credincios, mitul are valoare de adevăr absolut, el nu poate fi pus alături de ficțiune.

Autoarea revine ulterior nuanțând parțial poziția menționată mai sus. Comentând deosebirea dintre mit și ficțiune, Ruth Ronen adoptă o perspectivă diacronică și predominant laică afirmând că: "textele pot fi ficționale sau factuale potrivit momentului istoric ales" (10). Se omite, astfel, bogăția și varietatea perspectivelor în fiecare felie de timp. Același text, în lumea contemporană, de exemplu, poate fi considerat mit/ficțiune de un european laic sau creștin și adevăr absolut de un aborigen, de exemplu.

Cercetătoarea israeliană regândește cu succes noțiunea de ficționalitate din punct de vedere pragmatic. Ficționalitatea nu e imanentă textului. Numai o perspectivă pragmatică deosebește, de exemplu, *Ana Karenina* de *Istoria Franței* a lui Michelet, în ciuda a numeroase elemente ficționale pe care lucrarea lui Michelet le conține. După Ruth Ronen, fiecare cultură are criteriile ei, conform cărora un text e considerat sau nu ficțional în raport cu contextul (10). Dar autoarea neglijează, pe de o parte, intenționalitatea autorului, pe de altă parte, omite că fiecare individ/cititor are și el criteriile sale, care pot fi conforme sau opuse culturii dominante și potrivit cărora un text poate fi considerat ficțional sau nu.

Opunându-se atât orientarilor "segregaționiste", care trag o categorică linie despărțitoare între ficțiune și non-ficțiune, cât și celor "integraționiste" care tind să șteargă deosebirile dintre cele două, Ruth Ronen insistă asupra autonomiei logicii și semanticii ficțiunii. Perspectiva mimetică asupra literaturii e învechită, depășită. Lumea ficțiunii nu are o lume stabilă ca punct de referință. Conceptul de *lume* eludează chestiunea mimesisului în relația ficțional/real deoarece lumile ficționale reflectă diferite convenții reprezentaționale și nu o imuabilă similitudine. În continuare, autoarea folosește aceeași perspectivă pragmatică și operează delimitări specifice privind entitățile ficționale (obiecte sau personaje), trama față de subiectul operei, focalizarea și perspectiva ficțională în raport cu structurile spațiale ale operei, sau timpul ficțional.

Atât filozoful cât și teoreticianul literar sunt de acord că entitățile ficționale sunt "incomplete". Dar caracterul incomplet al entităților ficționale e explicat în mod diferit. Pentru filozof, el e parte a unei teorii mai largi despre lumile non-existente, el e o chestiune de logică, pentru teoreticianul literar, el e parte a unei semantici generale a textului literar în care existența e o problemă de retorică. Caracterul incomplet al entităților ficționale e considerat a fi parte a strategiilor retorice de construire a lumilor ficționale. Dar deși entitățile ficționale nu există din punct de vedere logic, ele există în practica culturală, unde ne putem referi, de exemplu, la trăsăturile lui Don Quijote, și în discursurile teoretice privind natura ficțiunii. Această "realitate" pe care literatura o are pentru cititori și critici, spune Ruth Ronen, explică practica teoreticienilor literari de a separa aspectul ontologic de practica textuală care considera entitățile ficționale ca atare.

În ceea ce privește trama, Ruth Ronen subliniază că într-o succesiune de evenimente considerate a fi ficționale, cititorul caută un anume tip de coerență și

folosește o serie de convenții care îi influențează înțelegerea evenimentelor. Sintetizând cele mai importante dintre orientările în naratologie, autoarea stabilește o paradigmă a schimbărilor în acest domeniu. S-a trecut de la descrierile structurale la cele semantice. Din această perspectivă, lumile posibile permit o descriere a textelor narative ca o constelație de stări de fapt care operează diferit.

Modul diferit de operare a lumilor posibile e dat de tipurile de focalizare precum și gradul de actualizare a entităților ficționale în prezentul aici și acum al realității ficționale. Pentru Ruth Ronen focalizarea e principiul potrivit căruia lumea ficțională e prezentată dintr-o anume perspectivă. Ea stabilește trei posibile tipuri de focalizare: externă, internă-perceptuală și internă-nonperceptuală bazându-se pe locul intra sau extra diegetic al focalizatorului (focalizare internă, respectiv externă) și pe poziția statică sau dinamică a focalizatorului intern (focalizare perceptuală, respectiv nonperceptuală).

Analiza timpului ficțional relevă analogia marginală a acestuia cu timpul real (200), referințele temporale din textele ficționale operând ca niște metafore ale expresiilor temporale din contexte nonficționale.

Timpul ficțional e, pentru Ruth Ronen, un sistem temporal autonom, a cărui autonomie e manifestă în structura sa modală. Timpul ficțional nu e doar organizarea evenimentelor într-o ordine specifică dar și primplanul, cadrul povestirii.

În consecință, studiul lui Ruth Ronen este o lectură incitantă și o analiză interesantă situată în mod necesar deasupra, sau, mai degrabă, dincolo de limitările conceptuale atât ale filozofiei cât și ale criticii literare. El ar putea să fie parte a unei discuții teoretice care ar trebui să preceadă orice împrumut interdisciplinar și de care prea puțini s-au ocupat, cel puțin până acum. Lucrarea lui Ruth Ronen impresionează extrem de plăcut prin claritatea stilului și limpezimea de cleștar a exprimării, calități care aparțin doar paginilor îndelung gândite și care sunt apanajul erudiției autentice, cu respect atât față de idee cât și față de cititor.

MIHAELA MUDURE

Ștefan Oltean, **Ficțiunea, lumile posibile și discursul indirect liber**, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Studium, 1996, 137 p.

Cartea d-lui Ștefan Oltean cu titlul de mai sus, apărută în 1996, este o analiză serioasă, teoretică și aplicativă, a unui plan al vorbirii, pe cît de controversat, pe atît de interesant - stilul indirect liber sau vorbirea indirectă liberă.

Abordarea analizei funcționale a unui mod de vorbire, cum e cea indirectă liberă, presupune, mai întîi, identificarea fenomenului în diverse situații comunicative. Autorul cărții de față opinează că acest tip de vorbire este specific literaturii narative, deci narațiunii ficționale, articulîndu-și demonstrația prin luarea în considerare a teoriilor comunicaționale ale narațiunii, ale poeticii și ale lumilor posibile, considerîndu-l un indice al literarității. De fapt, DIL (sigla autorului pentru *discurs indirect liber*) e pus în evidență în literatură prin recursul frecvent la el, dar, se știe, e prezent și în narațiunea curentă sau în discursul factual, așa cum apare el notat în textele dialectale (vezi Sabina Teiuș 1980 sau *Gramatica limbii române*, Editura Academiei R. P. R., București, 1963, vol II, p. 353-355). Faptul

este, de altfel, discutat de Dan Sperber (1981), care crede că sîntem în fața unei contaminări dintre ficțiunea heterodiegetică modernă și discursul factual, în mod reversibil. De aceea, afirmația lui Ștefan Oltean de la p. 13, după care "DIL - structură narativă cu multiple valențe expresive, care nu prezintă însă o serie de mărci co-textuale specifice uzului comunicativ al limbii" trebuie privită cu circumspecție, cel puțin din punctul de vedere al vehiculării unor termeni care sînt antrenați în demonstrația de față. Aceasta pentru că termenul *co-textual* poate fi luat în sens strict diglosic - text scris, în opoziție cu cel oral, sau poate fi luat în sens generic, orice text scris sau oral, caz în care DIL ar fi prezent în oricare uz comunicativ al limbii. Înscriindu-ne în linia de conduită argumentativă a autorului însă, abordarea DIL în relație cu teoriile comunicaționale, poetice și cu teoria lumilor posibile conduce la posibilitatea ca, prin frecvență și debraiaj enunțiativ, această structură discursivă să fie reprezentativă pentru discursul ficțional. Dar ce este *ficționalitatea*?, deoarece nici retorica, nici poetica, ca, de altfel, nici teoria actelor de vorbire, nu au emis concluzii acceptabile, fiecare mulțumindu-se cu un set de caracteristici care ar putea-o circumscrie.

Autorul lucrării, după ce trece în revistă diversele opinii, unele mai permisive decît altele, crede că ficțiunea nu e numai relație, și anume, relație pragmatică de tipul emiterii și receptării discursului ficțional ca atare, sau de natură interacțională ori de intenție comunicativă, ci are și aspecte intrinseci textuale (p. 25): "Fenomenul în discuție întreține, desigur, raporturi strînse cu natura interacțiunii comunicative [...], dar intenția individuală a producătorului și proprietățile structurale (sintactice și semantic-intensionale) ale textului trebuie neapărat luate și ele în considerare, deoarece în absența lor este imposibil de specificat natura ficționalității." Poate n-ar fi fost lipsit de interes apelul la aspectul logic al problemei, în speță G. Frege, care era de părere că enunțurile ficționale au sens, dar nu și referent, părere împărtășită de toți logicienii, cu unele nuanțări aduse de N. Goodman privind caracterul nongeneralizat al acestei denotații nule (de exemplu, minciunile nu sînt ficțiuni). De aici s-a decis că doar componenta pragmatică ar putea explica ficțiunea. Aportul original al autorului cărții e că secondează componenta pragmatică cu semantica ficțională în termeni de lumi posibile, concept luat din logica modală, discutat de: T. A. van Dijk, Lewis, Winner, Martínez-Bonati, Parsons, Pavel, Dole el etc. Cea mai laxă atitudine față de lumile posibile ficționale o are T. Pavel, care în *Univers de la fiction*, Paris, 1988, consideră că nu e vorba de o opoziție între lumea reală și cea ficțională, ci, mai degrabă, e vorba de o complementaritate de lumi, mai mult sau mai puțin adevărate, mai mult sau mai puțin ficționale, concluzie la care subscrie și Șt. Oltean, prin citarea lui Lewis: "adevărul în discursul ficțional este o funcție a ceea ce este adevărat în diferite lumi posibile" (p. 36). Prin urmare, pragmatica doar însumează niște parametri în problema fenomenului ficționalității, după cum pare să se pronunțe și Warning Rainer în *Pour une pragmatique du discours fictionel*, în "Poetique", 3, 1983, p. 321-337, cînd vorbește despre o situație internă de enunțare și una externă de receptare ce ar tensiona discursul ficțional față de discursul factual, recunoscîndu-se (ca Searle) că actul enunțării e real, dar cel al ilocuției e simulat. În această problemă, atitudinea lui G. Genette (*Récit fictionnel, récit factuel*, în "Fiction et diction", Paris, 1991) e foarte apropiată de cea a lui J. Searle prin faptul că se afirmă că și în ficțiune avem de-a face cu acte ilocuționare serioase, dar indirecte, atît la nivelul naratorului (de persoana I), cît și la nivelul personajelor. Acest apel la enunțarea cu acte de vorbire serioase va trimite inevitabil la existența particularităților lingvistice, printre care detemporalizarea preteritului e cea mai la îndemînă, dar și cea mai controversată (K. Hamburger, *Die Logik der Dichtung*, Stuttgard, 1957); argumentarea autoarei merge spre acreditarea ideii că povestirea ficțională heterodiegetică este atemporală, prin

utilizarea deviantă a deicticelor temporale care funcționează exclusiv ficțional. Faptul că ficționalitatea mobilizează factori eterogeni, de natură pragmatică (intenționalitatea autorului de a crea ficțiuni), dar și de natură semantică (referențialitatea intensională a ficțiunii) a reclamat aplicarea teoriei lumilor posibile, exact cum a procedat Șt. Oltean. Dar aceasta nu e tot. Deși J. Searle nu recunoaște existența trăsăturilor sintactico-semantice specifice textului ficțional, totuși s-au decelat câteva, printre care și DIL - obiectul cărții lui Șt. Oltean - la care se pot adăuga după O. Ducrot, J.-M. Schaeffer (1996) și altele: utilizarea verbelor ce descriu procese interioare de natură psihologică (invocate și de Șt. Oltean la p. 50);

- utilizarea elementelor anaforice lipsite de antecedente (de exemplu, la Hemingway personajele sînt introduse direct prin pronume personal);

- utilizarea verbelor de situație (*a fi așezat*, *a avea o noapte agitată*, *a merge*, *a se scula* etc.);

- utilizarea masivă a dialogului mai ales acela care nu coincide cu momentul povestirii;

- utilizarea deicticelor spațiale raportate la terțe persoane (în discursul factual acestea sînt relaționate numai cu *eu/tu*) și combinarea deicticelor temporale cu preteritul și mai mult ca perfectul.

Aceste trăsături au pretenția de a realiza legătura cu focalizarea internă, constituindu-se în indici ce disting ficțiunea heterodiegetică de discursul factual.

Capitolul al II-lea al cărții delimitează această structură a narațiunii, DIL, din punct de vedere sintactic, lexical și discursiv, printre care se impune juxtapunerea polifonică (p. 56). Capitolul e din nou o mărturie a unei informații profunde și a unui echilibru în tratare demn de subliniat. Faptul că autorul acordă DIL funcție de reprezentare, ca oricare reprezentare cu agenți-personaje, iar nu funcție de reproducere, de raportare, pentru a cuprinde și evenimentele mintale neverbale, conferă acestei structuri o trăsătură atipică, în sensul că structura sintactică e identică cu a discursului direct sau a discursului direct liber, dar timpul și persoana sînt ale discursului indirect.

Un rol important îl au verbele de comunicare, inchizitive, psihologice, sentiendi, verbe creatoare de lumi, care, deși parantetice, susțin coerența discursivă și "permit exprimarea unei anumite perspective prin intermediul DIL" (p. 51).

Conceptualizările (noi le-am spune particularități) DIL de ordin sintactic, surprinse de Șt. Oltean, nu diferă de cele de natură tradițională, structurală sau generativă, dar, prin organizarea lor co-textuală, conferă literaritate narației. Tot aici, dar ca subcapitol, se impun "registrele vorbirii" cu nota lor de spontaneitate, familiaritate, datorată colocvialismelor, elementelor expresive (interjecții, onomatopee, exclamații etc.), precum și termenii de apreciere de origine epitetică. Contrastul dintre acestea și exprimarea naratorială face din DIL din nou o structură compozită, dependentă de contexte mai largi (p. 57).

Trăsăturile semantice și pragmatice ce se fixează, în opinia lui Kuroda și Ann Banfield în a nota starea mentală, dar "nearticulabilă" ce nu poate fi transpus deci în cadrul comunicațional, sînt specifice funcției poetice a DIL. Opusă acestei poziții e cea exprimată de Dorrit Cohn care reclamă, pentru identificarea DIL, contexte mai largi cu valențe stilistice, semantice și contextuale apreciabile, narațiunea psiho fiind o categorie ce-i aparține, la care se raliază și autorul acestei cărți, prin reprezentarea în DIL a evenimentelor verbale și a proceselor mintale, cuprinzînd conștiința reflexivă (verbală) și cea nereflexivă.

E semnificativ de amintit părerea lui McHale care consideră DIL ca polul extrem, tocmai prin aceste trăsături, față de diegeticul pur, recte rezumatul diegetic.

Excelentă ni se pare analiza făcută, în acord cu Susan Ehrlich, de la p. 62-63 și cea referențială de la p. 65-70, în care este antrenat conceptul de lumi posibile.

Concluzia autorului e că semantica și pragmatica DIL subliniază pe deplin rolul hotărîtor al contextului și că DIL are multiple valențe referențiale care depind de natura paranteticelor și a predicatelor cu funcție de control. Capitolul privind funcțiile pragmatice și referențiale ale DIL detaliază concluziile de mai sus prin analize pe texte foarte diverse, autorul desprinzînd, cu un indice stilistic disimulat, funcțiile integratoare, evaluativă, referențială și cea tematică.

Cartea d-lui Ștefan Oltean a pus în evidență prolificitatea teoretică a domeniului și a încercat ca pe baza structurilor logice să fie mai aproape de structurile DIL-lui, prin bivocalitate sau polivocalitate (noțiune pragmatică) și prin aspectele referențiale (vezi noțiunile de acte de vorbire și acte mintale preverbale și nonverbale).

Desigur, orice asemenea cercetare e minată de unele neîmpliniri, printre care cea mai la îndemînă ne este caracterul prea extins al comentariului asupra surselor informative, cînd o degajare și o aerisire a textului ar fi pus în evidență aportul personal al autorului.

Apoi ar mai fi analizele pe texte din literatura engleză, care transpuse în română par forțate, în timp ce textele originare românești l-ar fi servit mai bine.

În ciuda acestor neajunsuri și a altora, cartea impune un cercetător avizat, prob și riguros, mai ales în demonstrarea unor aspecte logice ale DIL.

ELENA DRAGOȘ

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