ANUL L **2005**

S T U D I A

UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ–BOLYAI

PHILOLOGIA

4

Editorial Office: 400015 – Cluj–Napoca Republicii no. 24, Phone: 0264-405352

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

GREEK AND FRENCH ELEMENTS IN THE ENGLISH LEXICON

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ABSTRACT. The vocabulary of English is, undoubtedly, heterogeneous and diversified. The Romans, the Danish and Norwegian invaders, the Norman French conquerors, the prestige of the ancient Latin and classical Greek, contacts in multilingual situations, or the great colonizing nations have contributed a lot to the English vocabulary. In this article we attempt to delineate briefly two foreign elements that have influenced the building of the English lexicon.

I. The Greek Element

The influence of Greek on English has been chiefly indirect, therefore it is practically impossible to separate Greek from Latin or French. Words of Greek origin: a) have come into English by way of Latin, b) have been borrowed directly from Greek writers, and c) have been formed in modern times by combining Greek elements in new ways. However, almost always it was by way of Latin (and even French) that words of Greek origin came into the English lexicon through scholarly, technical or scientific usage[1]. Initially, the outflow of Greek elements into English was limited and predominantly religious but the noteworthy flow of such elements was in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The affluence of Greek scientific and philosophical terms in the English lexicon is undeniable, so nobody can question the continuous formation of classes of technical words. Bradley (1948:99) put it as follows:

In all the departments of science that were known to the ancient world, the Greek technical vocabulary is marvellous in its lucidity and precision. It is therefore not wonderful that the greater part of has been adopted into all the modern European languages. So well adapted is the structure of the Greek language for the formation of scientific terms, that when a word is wanted to denote some conception peculiar to modern science, the most convenient way of obtaining it usually is to frame a new Greek compound or derivative.

We have stated above that many loans of Greek origin have come into English through Latin; because of this, the Greek element has been exposed to the creation of hybrids. Still, because many loans, such as *diuretic, politic*

[1] Although perceived as inaccessible, secret, or mysterious, Greek has been the culture from which the substance and significance of Roman civilization evolved. In many specific areas of study Greek has supplied the majority of technical terms; additionally, compound words of Greek origin tend to be more self-explanatory than those of Latin origin.

resemble their originals, and others are similar in form with them, e.g. *dogma*[2], the results of being filtered into English through Latin, as well as the formation of hybrids have not been noted. A word like *analytical* is of Greek origin, but it ends with a suffix of Latin origin[3]. Some Greek elements have been adapted in English (e.g. *phone, graph*) for new technical inventions, such as *telephone* (*tele-* 'far off' and *-phone* 'sound')[4] or *phonograph* ('sound-writing'). Other examples of words coined without actual knowledge of Classical elements are *Dictaphone (5)* (in which the first part is Latin), or *appendicitis* (in which the first part is Latin and the suffix is Greek). Many of these Greek technical terms have become familiar and are widely used today (often with extended meaning): *acrobat, atom*, *character*, *chorus*, *cycle*.

Philosophical and other related terms have taken the same route, starting from Greek via Latin to the English lexicon. A *peripatetic* teacher (L. *peripateticus* < Gr. *peripatetikos* < *peripatein,* to walk about)[5] is merely a technical term, although it appears now and then in more popular writing. *Phenomenal* (an adjective derived from Gr. *phainomenon,* 'to appear' and the Latin suffix *–al*) is thoroughly a technical term used in philosophy, meaning 'apparent to or perceptible by the senses', has become in journalistic and popular language a synonym for 'extremely unusual, extraordinary, highly remarcable', as in 'phenomenal car'.

By the end of the Middle Ages, the English lexicon had gained a lot of elements from Greek, e.g. *academy*, *atom*, *Bible*, *diphthong*, *harmony*, *ecstasy*, *nymph*, *tragedy*, *tyrant* and *theatre*. The sixteenth century supplied words like *irony*, *alphabet*, *drama*, *elegy*, *dilemma*, *caustic*, *chorus*, *basis*, *pathos*, *larynx*, epic and *theory*. The next century provided: *orchestra*, *pandemonium*, *museum*, *hyphen*, *dogma*, and *clinic*; the eighteenth century supplied *bathos* and *philander*. Words like *agnostic, acrobat, phase*, or *pylon* were provided in the nineteenth century. Many of the words mentioned here came into the English lexicon by a route passing through Latin or French.

Greek words, like those of Latin origin, are sometimes so deeply incorporated into English that they can form new constructions by adding English suffixes and prefixes; by analogy, Greek prefixes and suffixes may be attached to English words. In *anti-British* and *hyper-sensitive* we identify the Greek prefixes *anti-* (against, hostile to) and *hyper-* (above, over, more than the normal).

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[2] Diuretic [ME. diuretic < LL. diureticus < Gr. diouretikos] Politic [ME. polytyk < MFr. politique < L. politicus < Gr. politicos]; Dogma [Gr. dogma]

[3] It is an adaptation of Latin *–alis.*

[4] A term adopted by Bell (1876) after use for other sound instruments.

[5] Peripatetic [L. peripateticus < Gr. peripatetikos < peripatein, to walk about] 1. of the philosophy or the followers of Aristotle, who walked about in the Lyceum while he was teaching 2. walking from place to place; walking about; itinerant.

Medical science has continually borrowed words of Greek origin, e.g. *poliomyelitis, psychology, neurology, antibiotic, allergy, leukemia, chromosome, protoplasm*. Suffixes used in connection with medicine are: *-itis* (arthritis), *-oma* (hematoma), *-osis* (tuberculosis). Some bases used in this field are: *cardi-* (cardiologist), chondr- (chondrocyte), *cyan-* (cyanide), *cyt-* (cytology), *hepat-* (hepatomegaly), *melan-* (melanosis), *nephr-* (nephritis), *oste-* (osteotome), *sclera-* (arteriosclerosis), *aden-* (adenoid), *hyster-* (hysterotomy), *mast-* (mastectomy), *leuc-, leuk-* (leucoma, leukemia), *neur-* (neurosis), or *rhin-* (rhinitis). In psychology the following words have been borrowed: *schizophrenia, psychiatry, psychoneurosis,* and *kleptomania*. The following are some words from Greek mythology: *Achilles' heel, chimera, atlas, mentor, myrmidon, stentorian*. Greek culture and philosophy have also contributed to the English vocabulary: *academy, Draconian, laconic, mausoleum, meander, ostracism, solecism,* or *philippic*.

Most of the English words derived from Greek are formed from bases, prefixes, and suffixes. Greek bases (also called 'roots' or 'combining forms') appear in English derivatives without having the specific Greek endings (*-e, -os, -on,* etc.). For example, from the base *psych-* the following words have been formed: *psychiatry, psychotic, psychology, psychosis, psychoanalysis, psychopath, psychoneurosis, psychosomatic,* and *metempsychosis*. The following are some Greek bases: *bibli-, crypt-, cryph-, gloss-, icon-, pyr-,* and *cycl-*. Prefixes of Greek origin are numerous; here are some of them: *a-, amphi-, ana-, cata, dia-, dys-, endo-, ec-, en-, epi-, hyper-, hypo-, meta-, para-, pro-,* or *syn-*. Suffixes have also been used in word formation: *-ic, -ism, -al, -ist, -ics, -tics, -al, --an, -ast, -y, -ma, -sis, -logy, -nomy, -cracy, -ous, -arch, -mania, -phobia, -meter, -graph, -scope, -gram, -ize,* or *-ous*.

As far as the spelling of Greek words is concerned, we must emphasize that it has been modelled by the ortographies of Latin and French, e.g. *kalligraphia* (Greek) which becomes *calligraphia* (Latin), *calligraphie* (French), *calligraphy* (English); sometimes, however, the Greek spelling is kept, e.g. *kaleidoscope,* not *caleidoscope* and synonymous pairs occur, as with *ceratin/keratin*.

II. The French Element

Because of its geographical position and cultural prestige, France has exported a high proportion of words to its neighbours. England had assimilated the largest amount. As a consequence, many words have the same spelling in both languages; they also have in common a large collection of Latin affixes.

Before the Norman conquest a few words of French origin pertaining to the new culture and way of life were introduced into the English vocabulary, e.g. *castel, prud, coroune, tor/tur.* After the Norman Conquest, the contacts between England and France were permanent. English remained the language

of the country, but Norman French became the language of the government and was used in the Church, the law-courts, trade with the Continent, the art of war. Norman French, a variety of Old Northern French, was until the 13th century dominant in England and important in Wales, Scotland and Ireland. One result of the conquest of England was the absorption of hundreds of French words into English, and the loss of many OE words. Loanwords from the Anglo-Norman dialect of French[6] include the following: *saint, abbat, canceler, charite, cuntesse, pais, merci, olie, emperice, tresor, or table*.

With the loss of Normandy (1204), the direct communication between England and Normandy was weakened. The English and the Normans tended more and more to become one people, though it was not till the second half of the 14th century that English replaced French, becoming the accepted language for a large part of literature as well as for speech among the ruling classes. Most French loanwords from the 12th to the 14th centuries fall into one of the following categories, which are related to the political, social and economic matters of the time: art, architecture, religion, fashion, entertainment, government, administration, food and drink, law, learning, medicine, social ranks. The words in these lists are arranged by date of borrowing and not by semantic field. Here are some words borrowed from the 13th century: *barun, lampe, olive, religiun, duc, art, boilir, dame, gentil, medecine, estat, servant, faucon, musique, soper, palais, venesoun, forest, maire, peine, diner, maladie.* The 14th century saw a great increase in the number of loanwords; some examples are: *boef, carole, cote, facon, goune, pastee, perle, poete, vicare, loigne, cronicle, leisir, chacier, misterie, deien, bescuit, marchis, grammaire, peche, devin, capitaine, embusche, lattis, magique, salade, noun, pijon, toster, secret.*

In the later Middle English period the contacts with French continued through the Hundred Years War. The following words came into the English lexicon in the15th century: *bail, juree, limon, nutritif, tarte, garde, paisant, manuvrer, asemblee.*

The close of the Middle Ages marked a change in the ways in which French influenced English. This change is characterised by two things:

(1) whereas Middle English had been very receptive of French loanwords which often became integral parts of the language, after the beginning of the 16th century, French became much more the source of particular classes of words; many of these classes were limited to the better educated or to those special groups who used technical terms. For instance, many of the 16th century loanwords were terms that belonged to war.

(2) these loanwords entered the lexicon in their modern French pronunciation, and this is partly retained and seldom anglicized. Older French loanwords have been so fully assimilated into English that they have followed

[6] Norman French in its British context is often referred to as Anglo-Norman.

its patterns in pronunciation and stress. If we compare older loanwords like *table, chair, court* with *connoisseur, amateur, bagatelle* we can notice that the words in the second group have not been so fully assimilated into English as the words in the first group.

The following are some 16th century French loanwords which have remained in use; besides the military and naval terms we find trading and social words as well. However, this period saw a decrease in the number of loanwords; here are some of them: *mignon, pillotte, machine, gaze, combat, gentile*.

The 17th century was more representative than the 16th century in the process of borrowing French words into the English lexicon. It was a period of close contacts between England and France in matters of literature and social communication. At the same time the borrowing of military terms and terms related to commerce continued. Here is a selected list: *soupe, rapporter, champagne, gentil, ballet, aide-de-camp, beau, penchant, commandant, menage, salon*.

The 18th century was again rich in French loanwords; the terms borrowed are military terms, lexical items from the language of diplomacy, social life, and arts. The pronunciation of these words has not been assimilated into English like Middle English loanwords. They are spoken with different degrees of approximation to French, but with English stress patterns. The list is very selective and resumes to words and phrases in common use (words are not arranged according to their semantic field): *reservoir, etiquette, debris, brunette, bureau, detour, pique-nique, morale, rouge, brochure, boulevard, souvenir, nuance, amateur, plateau*.

The 19th century saw an increase in the number of French loanwords, mainly in terms related to art and letters, e.g. *resume, cliché, motif, fin-de-siecle*, terms related to textiles and furniture, e.g. *parquet, chiffonier*, miltary terms, e.g. *barrage*, social and diplomatic terms like *chauffeur, elite, fiancee, attache*, terms related to food and dress, e.g. *restaurant, menu, souffle*, *beret*. Most of the French loanwords that were borrowed during this period (as well as the 20th century) have not been assimilated to English pronunciation in the way that earlier loanwords have been.

The following list is a small sample of 19th century Frenah loanwords (they are in date order): c*afé, coupon, coupe, chic, cigarette, repertoire, menu, matine, foyer, suede, revue, massage, premiere, cliche, décor, chauffeur*.

The process of borrowing continued in the 20th century: *limousine, haute-couture, fuselage, rotiserie, camouflage, collage*.

We have included in the above list a few examples of loanwords from different areas: military, arts, fashion. It will be noticed that whole phrases, either in their French form or literally translated, are among the recent French items that have come into the English lexicon.

There are relatively few means of identifying French loanwords in English, except in the case of most recent borrowings. Words pertaining to Norman French are hardest to identify: they are simple in form and belong to a great extent to everyday life and thought. For instance, many archaic French usages continue in the legal usage of England. French word order is preserved in *attorney general, court martial*. The names of most legal roles that are used today in English are French in origin, e.g.: *attorney, bailiff, coroner, judge, plaintiff.* The same is the case with the names of many crimes: *arson, felony, perjury,* and of legal actions, processes, and institutions, e.g. *bail, bill, jail/gaol, penalty, sentence.* The later medieval loanwords are likely to be more specialised in meaning and more learned or literary in their use. Since the French had some difficulty with initial 'w' they changed it to 'g', which was later spelled 'gu', this giving such words as: *guarantee, guard, guardian, guide.* Since the French had trouble also in pronouncing words with initial 'sk', 'sp', 'st', etc., they added an initial 'e' and gave us words like *estate, esquire, especially*, although English tends to drop the initial 'e', as in *state, squire, specially.*

Sometimes the pronunciation of more recent loanwords helps to identify its origin, particularly in the case of words with final silent 's, t, ue, x', e.g. *apropos, depot, unique.* When typically French sounds appear, such as the palatalization of 'g' in *vignette*, or the pronunciation of 'g' in words like *regime,* and 'ch' in words like *chef* one may sense the foreign nature of the word. In the same way, the more exotic spellings of certain French words call our attention, as '-re' in *centre*, '-lle' in *gazelle*, medial 'qu' in *liquor*, '-mme' in *programme*.

Some of the suffixes that have been brought into English with French loanwords can reveal their French origin: *-age/homage; -ance/abundance; -ence/diligence (Latin would have –antia/-entia); -ee/devotee; -ese/journalese.* The prefix *de/de la* also reveals the French origin of the loanword, e.g. *Marquis de Lafayette*.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

POLITENESS AS COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGY: (1) GREETINGS

ANCA L. GREERE

ABSTRACT. Nowadays linguists agree that people do not use language just to exchange information efficiently. Besides the informational content, language users employ those communicative strategies that are suitable for the contexts in which the exchange is made. It is difficult to generalize about impolite and polite differences in non-verbal behavior since the details differ greatly across cultures. However, one area of difference concerns hand-shaking, and greeting in general – as well as leave-taking. Greeting and leave-taking are social rituals, which make communication between members of the society possible. Though they are often treated as if they were spontaneous emotional reactions to coming together and separation of people, carrying overtly their own social message, they are highly conventionalized for the most part. In what follows we will try to prove this.

1.0. Any foreign language speaker becomes quickly familiar with certain phrases which seem to be customary (or required) in specific social situations. Generally these are so common that an understanding of their meanings is easy to come by. The obligatory nature of such phrases, however, is sometimes difficult to perceive. The lack of one-to-one correspondence between lexical items in any two languages is well known, but little attention has been paid to lexical items that are virtually identical in meaning, but quite different as to their frequency or their avoidance by native speakers. Such value judgments are not included in dictionaries, but would be most useful in language-teaching materials.

Cultural anthropologists have long been aware of differences across languages of forms of address and reference. The foreigner or newcomer to a community must quickly use the correct forms if he wishes to be inoffensive. One early focus is on the permitted use of first names, and what sorts of titles must be prefixed to last names. Then another item that causes difficulty for native and non-native speakers of English is the imperative. This form is rarely used in both British and American English, where its use is generally deemed to be impolite.[1]

It is difficult to generalize about impolite and polite differences in non-verbal behavior since the details differ greatly across cultures. One area of difference concerns hand-shaking, and greeting in general – as well as saying farewell.

[1] There are a number of exceptions to this which are generally handled well only by native speakers – for instance, the imperative is correct if the action commanded is clearly for the benefit of the hearer, or in special circumstances where the authority hierarchy is clearly defined, or in an emergency (Brend, 1978: 254)

1.1. Politeness has been in the attention of linguists for a long time. The publication of Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) *Speech Act Theory* opened the way for a new, modern approach to politeness, as they made clear the distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary force of the words. Two important moments in the chronological development of the research dedicated to politeness: the publication of P. Grice's (1989)[2] *Studies in the Way of Words* (which becomes one of the most interesting and most commented upon theories of conversation) and the publication in 1978 of *Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena* by Brown and Levinson.[3]

Nowadays linguists agree that people do not use language just to exchange information efficiently. Besides the informational content, language users employ those communicative strategies that are suitable for the contexts in which the exchange is made. The speaker takes into consideration three elements when engaging in a conversation: social distance between him/herself and the addressee, the element of power between him/herself and the addressee and, finally, the imposition which is subject to cultural values.[4] The attention given to politeness is not restricted to the linguistic side of the phenomenon; sociologists, psychiatrists and scientists from all neighboring disciplines have also manifested the same interest in the matter. Their findings complete one another's work, helping researchers from related fields to better comprehend the more general overview of the politeness phenomenon.

1.2. Politeness and cross-cultural awareness are felt more acutely at the level of teaching and learning a foreign language. The everyday routine of one culture differs substantially from that of another culture and language mirrors this accurately. Some of the cross-cultural initiatives narrowed the perspective for language teaching purposes. Specialists have realized that the cultural identity of a human being is so deeply rooted into his/her mind that it is reflected in the way s/he uses any other language, but his native one. However, politeness not only

[2] Although Grice did not elaborate a theory that regards politeness in particular, his influence on every research done after the introduction of his theory of conversation is significant. Grice's contribution to the linguistic theory, the philosophy of language and the other related disciplines is that he tried to draw the boundaries between meaning and use, in other words between semantics and pragmatics. His *Co-operation principle* shows that there are some rules that function beyond syntax and semantics and that there is a significant part played by pragmatics.

[3] Studies of linguistic politeness have generally sought to explain the phenomenon in terms of the Gricean maxims and the speech act theory, but because Grice's theory failed to stand up to all situations encountered in communication the Brown and Levinson's Polite Principle came to have more and more followers as they considered that the apparent deviation from rational efficiency springs from people's desire to communicate politely.

[4] Different cultures perceive the politeness strategies differently, as more or less polite. Many researchers do not agree with this ranking of politeness strategies of more or less polite, because each culture judges these strategies through the prism of their own cultural values.

changes from culture to culture, but also from one epoch to another, and what is polite behavior today may have been considered rude in the past.

2.0. The acts of greeting and leave-taking (parting) appeared from two communicational needs: one of introducing the message to the recipient smoothly and the other of preserving the channel of communication open for future interaction. It is interesting that the acts of greeting/parting do not consist of a single phrasal exchange; the small talk, weather talk, characteristic of greetings and partings could be usefully described as a ceremony functioning as a rite of passage, easing and signaling the transition to and from conversational interactions (Laver, 1975: 234).

Greetings and leave-taking have to be discussed as a pair, because they have a common function: that of opening / closing a conversation.[5] Greeting and leave-taking are social rituals, which make communication between members of the society possible. Though they are often treated as if they were spontaneous emotional reactions to coming together and separation of people, carrying overtly their own social message, they are highly conventionalized for the most part, as sociological observation suggests (Firth, 1972: 29-30). Firth goes on saying that in a broad sense greeting and parting behavior may be termed ritual since they follow patterned routines; they form a system of signs that convey other than overt message.

Greeting and leave-taking form the phatic function of the language; they establish and maintain an open channel of communication (Jakobson, 1956). The pair greeting / leave-taking forms a frame in which a certain message is delivered immediately or at a later time. This frame has significant importance as speakers very rarely leave it out.[6] The greeting / parting ritual is made up of two greeting elements at the beginning of the interaction and two parting elements at the end. For a complete greeting / parting ritual, the interlocutors must utter the two greeting elements and the two parting elements when there is a message to be transferred from one speaker to the other, and only the two greeting elements, when there is no message to be delivered. When greeting and leave-taking function as a pair, there must be a concordance in the level of formality between the two: one cannot use a formal greeting and finish with an informal leave-taking formula or vice-versa.[7]

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[5] The word 'conversation' reduces their territory to verbal communication, a subsystem of the larger system of human communication characterized by several unique features, distinguishing it from other types of communication. Greeting and leave-taking have equivalents in written communication, but they are specific to verbal communication.

[6] The number of occasions in which the elision of the pair is commonly accepted is reduced; in fact they are limited to highly dangerous circumstances in which the transfer of the message is urgent, imperative and for its effectiveness it must be uttered immediately.

[7] Normally the frame reflects the formality between the speakers independently of the message that is delivered. However it is possible for speakers to use a certain greeting formula, but, during the transfer of the message the relationship can change; consequently the

Greeting and leave-taking have their own particularities, their distinct structure and function. The act of greeting has a higher profile in communication by contrast with parting. This is due not only to the fact that the greeting phrase may appear without being followed by the parting formula, but also because the greeting is the initiating element of interaction. The first element is always more important than the rest because what follows is significantly influenced by it. The act of greeting has a higher profile in communication by contrast with parting. If the greeting phrase does not fit the situational context, the message that is to be transferred may be temporarily or permanently affected by the inappropriateness of the greeting. The follow-ups vary from not delivering the message at all, to altering the content of the message or to admonishing the speaker with metalinguistic commentaries about the greeting s/he used or s/he did not use.[8] A special feature of greetings is their re-occurrence in a certain time span, usually twenty-four hours. One may wonder how lasting the effect of a greeting is or when another open channel signal is necessary.

3.0. The function of the greeting is to open the channel for communication, so it lasts as long as the close channel does not appear. In other words, once one utters the greeting, and carries on with his/her activity in the proximity of the greetee, one does not need to greet again unless at some previous moment in time s/he uttered a parting formula. After the leave-taking any other new interaction with the same person needs a new greeting exchange (Nistorescu, 2005:37).

The origin of greeting and leave-taking does not lie just in the need to perform a social ritual to keep the channel for communication open, it goes deeper to the need of human beings to wish well. Greeting and leave-taking as rituals can be divided into two categories according to the contexts in which they are used: common greetings /partings and special occasion greetings / partings.[9] Common greetings and partings are the lexical items that open / close

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formality of leave-taking may be affected by this development. Speakers may decide to have a less formal relationship and to use informal terms of address; this change in formality during conversation creates situations in which interlocutors start their conversation with a formal greeting, but end it with an informal leave-taking phrase. (Nistorescu, 2005:37)

[8] The reverse situation of using the leave-taking formula without the greeting is very rare. Even if occasionally possible, this use is not characteristic for human interaction and it is forced on people only by the situational context. For example, when somebody leaves an office building and s/he takes leave of the receptionist who was not at the desk when s/he entered the premises

[9] The ritual performed daily is an automatic act that speakers do not even think about, it is the phrase uttered when meeting someone or parting from someone without thinking about its semantic meaning. In contrast, special occasions call for more formality or for a special ritual. The words used as greetings / partings are no longer common short phrases, they are ampler, more sophisticated and reach sometimes the dimensions of a speech.

communication in daily exchanges. This category contains a great number of lexical items. They can be classified, according to the level of formality, into formal and informal greetings and partings.[10] Formal formulas do not record as many variants as the informal phrases, and their uses are more restrictive. Informal formulas are characterized by great flexibility and vividness in form and use, by contrast with the formal category. Informal phrases of greeting and parting do not reflect the time of day, and their structure is reduced to one word or one syllable. A great variety calls for a modality of choosing from among them: when selecting one item the speakers take into consideration the time of day, the social status, sex, age, degree of formality, number of greetees, the context.[11]

4.0. The greeting/ parting elements belonging to the class of informal elements, are not always interchangeable; they have their particularities which make them suitable for several specific contexts. *Hello* and *Hi* are the most common phrases suitable in almost all informal situations.[12] The English parting *bye(-bye)* is a shortened informal variant of *good-bye*. The expression *see you* is relatively neutral and it is used in informal situations, but it may, occasionally, appear in formal exchanges.[13]

The English informal greetings are different from the informal partings.[14] The category of informal greetings/partings includes a special subgroup of greetings/partings used as a rule by parents addressing their children or within close family members. Because they are used when waking up in the morning and going to sleep at night, they reflect the time of day not necessarily through direct reference to morning or night, but by the specific moments in which they are uttered. These phrases form a complete greeting/ parting ritual. These

[10] Formal greetings / partings are used between speakers who have only a professional relationship or who are merely acquainted, while informal greetings / partings are used between people who have a personal or even professional relationship, and who know each other well.

[11] It is also important to notice that greeting is not associated only with verbal communication, but also with written communication. The need to greet the interlocutor is so powerful that this verbal ritual has contaminated written communication as well. The written message, just like the oral message, cannot be delivered until the open signal is present. The only difference between oral and written communication is that the latter is more rigid and more conventional than the former (Nistorescu, 2005:38).

[12] *Hi* is more informal than *Hello*. *Hi* is preferred by young people and by close family and friends and sometimes acquaintances. *Howdy* is the contracted form of the phrase *how-do-you-do,* and is typical of American English, being used more rarely than *Hi* and *Hello*. While the phrase *how-do-you-do* is on the formal side, its contraction is used strictly in informal situations.

[13] From the English series of partings, the most interesting ones are *ta-ta* and *cheerio*, which are used as parting expressions only in British English.

[14] The multinational American communities borrowed mainly parting elements from various languages spoken by the immigrants: *adios, hasta manana, adieu, au revoir, arrivederci, Sayonara, aloha*, etc.

expressions are use in the morning and at night, because the nightly separation is perceived as discontinued interaction, hence the need to perform the greeting/ parting ritual. Expressions used for partings are more numerous than greetings. Here are some greetings: *Rise and shine! Time to get up!* The partings are more numerous: *Sweet dreams! Good night, don't let the bugs bite! Sleep tight! Nighty night! See you in the morning! Light out! Go to sleep!* The greetings sound more like imperative invitations to wake up, while the partings are divided between wishes for a good night rest and softened imperatives for falling asleep (Nistorescu, 2005: 55).

4.1. Another important issue is that of greeting/ parting substitute phrases. According to Ecco (2001) as long as the phatic function of a greeting is fulfilled by the greeting element or the greeting substitute, interaction will not be compromised; in addition, the substitutes must be adequately short, in order to be accepted or to function well as greetings. These substitute greetings/ parting are more elaborate linguistic elements, which contain additional information than those enclosed in pure greetings and partings. The substituting elements vary from two words to an entire sentence and the meaning is non-conventional. Substitutes may range from being considered familiar or intimate language to slang. Several greetings substitutes are questions regarding the greetée's well being: *How are you? Hyia? How's life? How's everything? How is it going, Howzit? How are things? How goes it? How's business?* are familiar substitutes used between friends. On the other hand, *What's happening, What's new, What's up? Wassup? What's shakin'?* and many other substitutes with *what* are more slangy variants. Another group of greeting substitutes is made up of interjections meant to inform the greetee about the greeter's presence in the area: *Hey, there! Hey, yo! Yo, ho! Halloo!*

If greeting substitutes inquire about the greetee's well being, parting substitutes are wishes for the greetee's well being in the future, from the regular *Have a nice day! Take it easy! Take care (of yourself)!, Don't work too hard!* to the slangy *Peace! Be cool!* It is also possible for the substitute to announce the end of the interaction *I've gotta go! Gotta go! Gotta Run! Time's up!* or to anticipate the next interaction *Until next time! Until tomorrow! Catch you later! Speak to you later! Talk to you later!* The parting person may also indicate his/her availability through substitutes like: *Shout if you need me! Give me a holler! Call me later! Ring me up!*

4.2. Greeting/ parting exchanges follow different patterns according to the type of relationship existing between the greeter and the greetée and according to the context in which they are uttered. These patterns are identical with those used for address where power and solidarity play an important part, but the rules of greeting are more flexible since the context in which they are used is significant. English is characterized by reciprocity in greeting/ parting exchanges, either at a formal or at an informal level. This implies an exchange of

greetings which is made up of two identical greetings, one uttered by the greeter and the other uttered by the greetee: *Good morning, Mrs. Thomson / Good morning, Mr. Downer*. In this case, the interactants do not necessarily share the same social position or the same age, but formality in greeting is perceived as a safe way to initiate communication (Nistorescu, 2005: 57).[15] Social position may change the rules given by age or sex, especially when the social difference between the interactants is significant. For example, an older male may greet his younger male boss, or a female greets her male superiors, especially when he is older. The context may also change the rules, for example when entering an office or a room the person who enters, regardless of his/her age, sex or social position, is bound to greet the others already present in the room, compartment, etc. The greeting rule of formal exchanges is different when somebody enters a shop or store: in this case, the shop assistant is supposed to greet first and to ask how s/he could help the customer.[16]

5.0. Special greetings and partings are elements used to begin or end conversation on special occasions. These formulas are not used in everyday interaction, consequently their frequency is reduced. The way in which the ritual is performed is also important, it may range from uttering a simple phrase to presenting an entire show, in this case the words are associated with songs, dances, etc. They have a special structure and a slightly different function from common greetings/ partings. The structure of a common greeting / parting act is fixed: interactants exchange a pair of greeting phrases at the beginning of the conversation and a pair of parting formulas at the end. On special occasions, the act of greeting and parting does not follow the same pattern; in fact there is considerable flexibility in the structure of the acts.[17]

There is a great similarity between these formulas and wishes because greeting/ parting phrases were initially wishes and this feature is even more obvious in the case of special greetings/ partings. Common formulas were originally wishes, which through their repetitiveness have become conversational

[15] The greeting rule is age and sex dependent, social position also being relevant. Consequently, when two males or two females of similar social position are involved, the younger party must greet first. When a male and a female interact, the male must greet the adult female, regardless of her age.

[16] It is important to point out that there are situations in which the exchange of greetings is not fully performed and only the greeter's half is actually uttered. This occurs frequently in conversations in which the greeter adds to the greeting phrases a question about the greetee's well being. In this case the greetee may answer directly to the question omitting the matching element of the greeting. Even if these situations are possible only in reciprocal exchanges, both in formal and informal conversations, they are far more frequent in informal contexts. For example: *Hi, how are you? / Fine, thanks.*

[17] The two parts of the frame, forming the greeting and the parting, are different, depending on whether the special event marks a meeting/ reunion or a separation. If the interactants meet/ reunite, the stress falls on the first part of the frame, but if the interactants separate, the parting element is accentuated.

routines that are devoid of semantic meaning; by contrast special greetings/ parings have not lost their meaning completely. As they are not as frequently used as common greeting/ parting phrases, they still preserve some of their semantic meaning.

As people want to say something meaningful on special occasions, the entire functionality of the greeting/ parting ritual is modified. The wish is more meaningful than a greeting, it is not a routine having only a conversational function. Special greetings/ partings have a slightly different function from common greetings/ partings; they keep the channel for communication open, but the circumstances in which interaction occurs are special, either because of the distance in time or because of seasonal or personal events.

5.1. Seasonal greetings and partings are those formulas which are used for greeting and parting around religious holidays.[18] On the other hand, special occasion greetings and partings are those formulas which are used for greeting and parting on special occasions like introducing oneself, on arriving home after a long journey or after being sick in hospital, after being away for a long period of time or on a symbolic separation like graduation, etc.: *Welcome! Welcome home! Welcome to X!*

Formality or informality is significant in the case of special greetings; simply uttering the welcoming words may not be enough and the additional elements signal if the greeter and the greetee have a formal or an informal relationship. In English speaking countries, in formal circumstances, the greetee may receive a warm welcome from a smaller or larger group of greetees, a singing band and a dancing team.[19] The pomp of the welcome decreases along with the level of formality and in informal instances, the greeter only utters the welcome formula.

5.2. Another special occasion is when interactants are introduced to each other. The act of introducing or being introduced to someone is strongly determined culturally. Meeting someone for the first time is special, because there was no previous interaction between the speakers and, consequently, the basic interaction rules have not been established yet. That is why this ritual is not purely greeting routine, it signifies more than that. The phatic function of the first lines is primarily to start a relationship and only secondarily to maintain the

[18] This category is poorly represented in English. In Romanian the only greeting that fits this category is *Hristos a inviat – Adevarat a inviat!* used at Easter. It is normally used instead of the common greeting for three days after the Resurrection. Occasionally the period using Easter greeting phrases may be prolonged a few more days, especially when the interactants have not met in the three day interval. This greeting is used regardless of the degree of formality existing between the interactants. It is uttered at the beginning of the conversation, in which case the parting elements are common parting formulas.

[19] In Romania (cf. Nistorescu, 2005: 63) the welcome party, besides traditional singing and dancing, may include a ritual in which the greetee must taste a pinch of salt and a loaf of bread. The greetee may occasionally receive flowers from the greeter(s) on arrival.

channel open for communication: *How do you do? / How do you do?* or *Nice to meet you. / Same here.* The first pair is suitable in formal contexts, while the second fits situations with a low degree of formality. The formula *How do you do?* which requires the repetition of the same phrase as a reply, is completely devoid of semantic meaning, only the pragmatic meaning being preserved.[20]

5.3. Special occasions parting phrases are more numerous than special occasion greeting formulas. Saying good-bye or bidding farewell has a personal component; it involves the feelings of sorrow, of sadness, implying a high degree of informality: *Good bye! Farewell! Adieu! Adios! So long! Till we meet again!* Their function is to close the communication channel properly, so that the relationship between the interactants does not end in tension. As one can notice, special partings, like special greetings, do not vary according to the degree of formality involved. Frequently special greetings and special partings are doubled by wishes, in a desire to soften the transition to another stage of the relationship in which interaction is impaired by distance, time, separation, etc. Parting, whether definitive or momentary, is extended over a longer time interval. Interactants feel that few words have a powerful phatic effect, namely of terminating interaction, so that they prolong this ritual as much as possible.

6.0. The major differences that appear between greeting and parting formulas in written exchanges and greetings and partings in oral communication spring from the difference between the spoken and the written language. The distinction between oral and written communication is given by the nature of the channel of communication (Jakobson, 1964: 88). Oral communication gives interactants the possibility of taking turns, being successively speakers and listeners, while the written communication does not offer the same dynamics, or not immediately, anyway. On the other hand, spoken language is ephemeral, while written language is theoretically permanent. Coulmas reminds us that the very notion of writing requests a lot of clarification and differentiation, in that processing by human cognition is very relative to the type of writing system. On the other hand, Keseling answers a question that is central to psycholinguistic representation to written discourse, and the relationship to spoken discourse. Are the spoken greetings/ partings dependent on or independent of the written counterparts.

Reading is a cognitive activity. Different types of expressions (greeting / parting phrases) make different contributions towards the construction and modification of a coherent model as it is built up in the written text. There are a number of variant structures that have a facilitating or inhibiting effect on the

[20] In the US *How do you do?* still functions as a common greeting and it is also used when meeting people one knows, a possible reply being *Good. Not bad, and you?*, or *OK, thanks*. When being introduced, the Americans prefer the more informal variant *Nice to meet you.*

reader's task of constructing a mental model. The text comprehension is a process that takes place simultaneously on several levels, so the opening phrases act as a key to the interpretation of the rest of the text. The definitional characteristic of the written medium is that it represents experience or knowledge, and handling such knowledge means knowing that a certain introductory phrase requires a specific interpretation of the text that follows. The focus should be on an inferencing process by the reader, which is necessary to arrive at, or is even itself part of, the meaning or message of the text. This process is pragmatic in its nature under several points of view.

Generally, the result of meaning construction is "safer" if the text offers surface-linguistic instructions to guide the processing of the signs the text contains. The greeting phrase acts like such an instruction so it should be carefully chosen. To a certain extent, the processing of any discourse, written or spoken, requires inferencing. The type of inferencing at issue here is on a higher level, often concerned with what linguistics calls "implicatures". The assumption of the strongly-guided inferencing seems to make for a view, explicitly stated in the introductory phrase, that a defining property of the text is this specific type of inferencing, the direction of which is guided by explicit verbal signals (greetings), and which is very close to the concept of conversational implicature.

Developing strategies for this type of texts (letters) involves correct reading and processing habits different from those applied to literary texts. The constitutive element for a definition of processing letters is the presence of the introductory and ending phrases, which determine the inferencing necessary to a correct decoding of the message. This view could be taken even further to state that the inferencing process is a general tendency of human minds not to stop attempting a resolution until a synthesis is found with knowledge and presuppositions that will resolve the mechanism of interpreting the letter. But the central pragmatic aspect lies in the fact that readers must be willing to accept to read the rest of the text according to the key offered by the introductory phrase.[21] This would amount to a pragmatic definition of the text, a definition based on a willingness of the reader to cooperate with the text by taking pragmatic infringements as an invitation for inferencing.

Written texts have their context built into them (Nystrand, 1986). They are therefore stronger conventionalized than spoken discourse. Part of that built-in context of written discourse are certainly legitimacy expectations about what communicative, cooperational conventions to waive with what text type if a felicitous cooperation with that text is to come about. The structural differences between speech and writing emerge from the fact that writing is disconnected

[21] Some of the reactions by readers clearly show that this willingness to let oneself in with the text cannot be taken for granted. This implies a notion of "adequate" reading, an essential component of which is the readiness to abandon "normal" reading habits with no pragmatic deviations and no hard, painful, inferencing work to be done.

from specific social interactions. Face-to-face interaction leaves room for repairs and clarifications in case misunderstanding is signaled. Consequently, the written message must be well structured and coherent.

The most significant difference between written and oral greetings is the prominence acquired by nominal forms of address in letters, as there is an overlapping between two categories: greeting/ parting and address. In written communication, especially opening salutations corresponding to greetings obligatorily contain and sometimes are made only of a nominal form of address. They have a double function: to indicate the recipient and to greet him/her. In addition, in a letter, besides indicating the addressee, the nominal form of address, being part of the salutation, provides the frame for written communication in the same way a greeting does this for a conversation.

The dynamics of address is considerably reduced in the written communication: the flexibility, the interchangeability and the vocabulary variations specific to oral address are missing in correspondence. The rigidity of the salutations in written communication is given by the particularities of the epistolary style. Since this style lacks the flexibility of the oral style, the degree of formality cannot vary from one paragraph to the other.[22] In English the association of a nominal form of address, such as names, marital status terms of address, occupational terms of address, kinship terms of address or titles, and the adjective *dear*, present in structure of terms o endearment, is frequently used. Regardless of the level of formality, the adjective *dear* is used in various types of correspondence, from the most formal to the most familiar.[23] Unlike salutations, which indicate the degree of formality between the sender and the recipient of the letter, the address on the envelope is always formal. This signals that respect is requested from members of the society, regardless of the intimacy existing between sender and recipient, so formal address is most suitable.

[22] When speaking, interactants may mutually agree on decreasing the level of formality, hence a formal address at the beginning of the conversation may become informal address at the end. This is not possible in letters as the formality of the written message is chosen at the beginning and it stays the same until the end. However, in a series of letters, exchanged by the same people, formality may be replaced by familiarity. This variation is due to the development of the relationship, but a relationship is carried out most of the time by direct exchanges. Thus, modification of the formality level is possible during oral communication, while during correspondence the formality level is preserved (Nistorescu, 2005: 73).

[23] The semantic meaning of the adjective *dear* is in its primary meaning, 'loved and cherished', which is incompatible with business and official letters, since the relationship between the sender and the recipient is professional and not intimate. However, the adjective *dear*appears in dictionaries with a secondary meaning, 'highly esteemed or regarded', which makes its use adequate in all types of letters.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

NEEDS OF NEWLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS OF ENGLISH

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ABSTRACT. This paper informs on the initial results of a survey carried out within the frame of a British Council project whose main aim is to provide professional and personal development to newly qualified teachers of English. The results of this research will help inform and focus the other three strands of the project by identifying who could be responsible for providing the support needed by newly qualified teachers of English and the forms in which these needs may be best met.

The Project

The survey that this paper refers to is one of the four interlocking strands of a larger two-year project (2004-2006) across South East Europe. The aim of the project is to provide professional and personal development to newly qualified teachers of English in the region. The first step of the project consisted of a quantitative survey, carried out in partnership with IATEFL, national teachers' associations and ministries of education across the region, to identify professional and personal development needs of Newly Qualified Teachers of English (NQTs). The results of this survey will inform and focus the remaining three strands of the project which refer to teachers' associations, newly qualified teachers of English and knowledge and learning resources.

The Survey

The overall objective of the survey was to identify the needs, aspirations and concerns of newly qualified teachers of English with focus on identifying what NQTs need and what they currently receive by way of professional support and what role teachers' associations could and currently play in supporting NQTs.

A self-completion questionnaire was distributed in two ways: on the internet and in hard copies. The total number of respondents was 942 out of which 858 fully-completed questionnaires were received. The data were

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quantified and analysed by means of *Confirmit*, a special software. For ease of reference this paper will refer only to the percentages and not to the actual number of respondents. The sampling procedures do not allow for a generalisation of the results of the survey to the entire population frame. However, the sample, as it can be seen in the 'audience profile' section is relatively large and varied enough and, we believe that the results could be considered representative.

The body of the paper is a summary of the findings and what these mean; the numbering corresponds to the sections of the questionnaire, which was completed by the respondents.

1. Audience profile

Section one referred to questions Q2 – Q8. Q1 was optional asking for personal details. In what gender (Q2) is concerned there were 85% women teachers and 15% male teachers who responded. The acknowledged tendency for females to be more numerous in the profession is evident in the gender of the respondents to this questionnaire, too. Most of the respondents (68.8%) are between 20-30 years of age (almost equal numbers for the 20-25 and the 26-30 age groups). This might mean that teachers qualify generally within the first 6 years after graduation and that there is also about one third of the respondents (who are over 30 or 35) who become qualified later. Interestingly, if we assume that filling in the questionnaire relates to interest in the issues posed, the ages between 31-35 are the least represented group, while interest increases again after the age of 35.

Question 4 asked the respondents about their teaching experience. Half of the respondents have taught for more than 2 years (59.8 %). The next numerous group are in their first year of teaching (21.1%), followed by those in their second year of teaching (16.8%). Absolute beginners represent only 2.3%. The answers here might mean that before becoming qualified teachers the respondents gain teaching experience as substitutes or as non-qualified teachers as most of the respondents have more than two years teaching experience.

Of the 16 countries included in the survey (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey) most of the respondents are from Romania and Turkey, there are no answers from Kosovo, very few from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus and Israel. There are also responses from other countries (e.g. China, South Africa, Denmark or Spain) thus showing that the issues posed are beyond regional interest.

The great majority of the respondents teaches in urban areas (73%), where access to the Internet is easier. The responses to Q6 (teaching place) might also mean that there are more schools in urban areas or that urban schools have qualified teachers or that most teachers from urban

areas have access to Internet facilities. The almost 100 questionnaires received as paper copies mean that there are still a fair number of 'young' teachers who do not have or do not use the internet/ computer. They might be an audience that needs to be addressed in other ways than those offered by the Internet.

As far as the age of the learners is concerned (Q7), the leading group is that of teachers teaching teens (74%), followed by those teaching young learners (54%) and young adults (33%). These numbers are indicative of what teaching materials might be needed most by teachers of English. The age groups of the learners are also an indication of the language policy in the countries in the survey. The teachers who responded teach General English (94%), followed by ESP (21%) and EAP (19%). The fact that besides General English almost half of the respondents also teach for Academic or Special purposes is an indication of specialised materials needed. Combined with the answers in Q7 (young adults and adults) these responses might refer to learners in university, language centres or other contexts.

2. NQTs' needs

The summary of the NQT needs suggested by the questionnaire is based on the data obtained in two ways: indirect and direct. The needs presented indirectly refer to Questions 9-16 in Section 2 of the questionnaire. The respondents indirectly point to the areas where they would most need help by referring to their perceptions concerning their own professional competencies in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Questions 17-19, on the other hand show what the respondents state directly that they are in need of in terms of professional help.

2.1 Indirectly expressed needs

The large majority of the respondents (around 80 %) believe they are confident and competent as far as their *language knowledge and skills* and their *knowledge about teaching* are concerned. The respondents do not perceive these two areas as deficient.

As far as the *practical aspects (skills and areas of teaching)* of their profession are concerned, the areas in need of attention appear to be ranked in this order:

1) dealing with disruptive behaviour
2) lesson planning
3) evaluation
4) choosing (or possibly designing) materials
5) teaching cross-cultural issues
   teaching listening
   teaching writing
   teaching speaking

Forms of professional support that they value most highly are talking to experienced teachers, participating in workshops and conferences (70%) and written materials about teaching. *Lack of support*, support which they expect, is perceived to be from experienced teachers and from written materials.

2.2. Directly expressed needs

This section summarises the findings obtained from the analysis of Q.17-19. These questions were aimed at eliciting direct answers as far as the respondents needs in terms of professional support are concerned: Q17 Professional support needed, Q18 Timing of support needed, Q19 Responsibility for support

What the respondents say they need are 'Courses, workshops and seminars for NQTies' which could be offered by the 'foreign cultural centres'. They need, and implicitly accept, help from mentors who are a relatively new 'institution', but which seem to have gained trust among the teachers, that is why the respondents will accept in relatively high numbers to be observed and then discuss their lessons. Interaction with peers of a similar age and experience is least favoured.

Most teachers need help before starting teaching and at the very beginning during the first three months of being a teacher, which is a comment on the fact that they are not prepared for the job.

In what responsibility for support is concerned the school and the teachers' associations (TA) score highest followed by a mentor. There are over 60 % who expect support from foreign cultural centres. The NQT's seem to need a person to help them. As mentioned before they will trust a mentor. Because the school is the 'closest' to them, the school comes in second place as responsible for providing help especially as the teacher 'belongs' to the school. Surprisingly the teaching association is in third place, so perhaps the respondents are ready to trust the teaching association. The same percentage appears for the ministry who are the 'rule makers' but the lowest percent goes to the inspectorates whom teachers do not trust any longer, perhaps, because they are the 'intermediate' who cannot assume responsibility.

Most teachers need help before starting teaching and at the very beginning during the first three months of being a teacher. They need a person who might be from the school or from the teachers' association and since they trust the 'foreign cultural centres' these may be the place the NQT will come to to look for help.

3. The Teachers' Associations

This part refers to Questions 20-27 in Section 3 of the questionnaire. Surprisingly few of the respondents are members of a teachers' association (25%) even if in the previuos section the respondents mention the associations as 'institutions' responsible for support. Most TA members joined more than two years before (47%). Percentages of duration of membership decrease as follows: two years: 26.5 %; one year: 12,5%, less than a year: 14%. These percentages relate to those presenting the respondents' teaching experience (response to Q4)

The answers to why the respondents became a member of a TA can be grouped in four larger categories: professional development and support (144), networking (18),various advantages: from paying reduced fees in conferences to feeling empowered (18), English language improvement opportunity (8).These answers highly correlate with the answers given to Q.18 (timing of support) and those to Q.23 which asked for the reasons for joining/ not joining a TA. Most of the respondents (84%) would you like to become a member of a TA.

Question 23, which asked for the reasons for becoming or not becoming a potential TA member, was an open question unlike most of the rest of the questionnaire in which the respondent circled an agreement option out of five. Of the responses, 92 % gave reasons why a teacher would join a TA while the remaining 8 % justified why they would not.

The positive answers are grouped under the following themes, which are mentioned starting with the most frequently mentioned one: 1. Professional help (to seek professional help or to offer it - a very limited number), 2. Networking (need to contact peers, exchange ideas or get feedback), 3. Developing language competencies (few mention their desire to improve their English - mainly their oral skills), 4. Empowerment (This was the least frequently mentioned reason. Respondents expressed their wish to be part of the group because this would make them feel stronger and they would have a feeling of belonging). As mentioned previously, the respondents' who expressed their wish to become a TA member want to do it mainly for the same reason as those who are already members: professional support.

Whether they are members of the TA or not, less than a half took part in TA organised events (Q 24). Consequently something should be done to attract them. Those less than a half who participated were present in the following events: courses, workshops, seminars (88 %) conferences (71 %) festivals, celebrations (21 %) competitions, debates (19 %)

The most favoured were workshops and this validates the answers given to the previous questions and it shows how important it is to take running workshops into consideration and direct contact with professionals not just materials. Secondly, it might be useful to consider organising conferences as means of attracting membership i.e. much lower fees for members since conferences are the runner up in this case. Question 26 asked about the forms of support received from TA's. It is notable that less than a half of the respondents mentioned support received from their TA, just over 30 % getting professional support when needed.

In brief, most respondents think that TA's are or should be beneficial to their teaching profession and state that they want to join a TA, as they consider it the second best source of professional development, still 75 % of the respondents are not members of any TA.

Outcomes of the Survey

The results of the survey show that the teachers who responded to the questionnaire appear relatively confident professionally as over 60 % feel that they possess enough language and teaching-related knowledge. There are still a number of areas in need of improvement that were identified.

With reference to teachers associations it should be noted that even if the respondents consider being a member of a TA very useful - 83.6% would like to join a TA - and see a TAs main role that of offering professional support, an overwhelming majority have not yet joined any TA (74%). The responses suggest that lack of information concerning TAs and their roles in a professional's life might be the cause of this lack of membership.

The survey suggests that support offered should be in the following skills and teaching areas: 1. The skills identified as in need of development were *dealing with disruptive behaviour* and *lesson planning.* The results showed that three other skills may also be in need of improvement: evaluation, choosing (and possibly designing materials) and classroom management. 2. The teaching areas identified as in need of improvement were: teaching cross-cultural issues, teaching listening, teaching writing, teaching speaking

The forms of support the respondents identified as best were direct interaction, preferably with an experienced teacher, or mentor, during workshops or conferences; materials or books; websites

The responsibility for support is considered to lie with their own school and the TAs. Although these were the only sources of support which scored over 70 % in the respondents' preferences, other responsible bodies (identified by 60 %) could be taken into consideration. These were: a mentor and the foreign cultural centres

Most respondents feel that they particularly need support very early in their teaching careers.

To conclude, the needs put forward by respondents to this survey could be met by, possibly, the following: 1.A set of written, long-distance materials concerning the areas mentioned previously could be designed by professionals. 2.These materials could be offered by TAs to TA members to encourage NQTs to join. 3.This could be combined with a scheme of workshops/ tutorials which could include observation schedules. 4. This programme should/ could be disseminated in a systematic way taking into account that the sources most frequently identified are person-related (mostly colleagues and fellow teachers) and preferably on occasions such as professional gatherings (conferences and other meetings)

These findings together with data collected from other sources will inform the decisions as to the ways and means in which teachers of English can be best helped in the areas in which they need support.

STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

COSMIC ORDER AND SETTING AS SPIRITUAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENTITY IN EMILY BRONTË'S *WUTHERING HEIGHTS*

ADRIAN RADU

ABSTRACT. Emily Brontë's novel *Wuthering Heights* is a singular presence in the context of the Victorian prose creations. One of the elements that gives it its special place is the setting in which it is placed. It is precisely this unparallelled reality of the setting resulting from the cosmic order under which it is placed and the role it is assigned to play in the novel both as geographical landscape and as spiritual incidence and its subsequent influence on the characters that this essay discusses.

Emily Brontë's only novel was considered by many critics a psychological study of two elemental persons whose souls are torn between love and hate. Alternatively, as Watson Melvin says, 'it cannot be considered a mere revenge tragedy' (87). Neither can it be reduced to the tragic story of love between a man and a woman named Heathcliff and Catherine, as this would mean that the importance of other characters such as Hindley, Hareton, Cathy and Linton 'is displaced and the entire last half is ill-proportioned and the ending off-key' (Watson 87).

The question which arises then in this way is what is *Wuthering Heights* besides being a novel? David Cecil considered it (150) an allegory setting for Emily Brontë's conception of the universe. In this respect, she is does not see the human beings in traditional relation with other human beings who belong to a society with codes of moral, but only in relation to a cosmic scheme of which they are a part. Her question when beholding the world is not 'how does it work?' but 'what does it mean?' Her characters are placed under the great sign of the cosmic order materialised in the surrounding nature and the elemental forces guiding the human beings transformed into allegorical puppets. She is in this respect comparable to William Blake, her predecessor, as both are interested in the primary aspects of human life unaffected by time and space. The same question of man's relation to the universe was taken up again by Thomas Hardy for whom man and nature are set in a different proportion to one another (Cecil 151). In this last case we deal with a cosmic mechanism working on the humans according to the matrix of their fate and any attempt to avoid the previously established destiny is condemned to failure.

Emily Brontë conceives the cosmos in a similar way, as an expression of several spiritual principles governing the whole created world: animate and inanimate, mental and physical.

Such principles are expressed as one set against the other: on the one hand there is the 'principle of storm' of the harsh, the wild and the dynamic and, on the other, the 'principle of calm' of the gentle, the merciful and the passive (Cecil 152). In spite of the opposition between these principles, there is no conflict between them since they are constructed in a dialectal way as constituents of harmony. This is what our world is like, full of discord with one positive pole and a negative one, set in binary opposition. And there is a continuous flow from one to the other: from positive to negative and vice versa. And what is positive may be seen as negative and what is negative as something positive, sometimes breaking the harmony. Thus the calm implies weakness and not harmony while the storm is not always a cause of disturbance. These principles normally follow their undisturbed and unconflicting course, directed by another principle, that of equilibrium.

For Emily Brontë the human race is constructed in transcendental unity having the cosmic surrounding and nature as part of it as unifying element and force. Man and nature form a unity, a single whole, living in the same way. As Cecil points out (153) angry men and an angry sky are 'not just metaphorically alike, they are alike in kind and different manifestations of a single spiritual reality.' This similarity is what makes the discords and conflicts in the microcosm of the humans have a similar reaction in the transcendental counterpart. Different temperaments in men are an expression of that aspect of nature which underlies them. Both act jointly and the final result is a consequence of their interaction.

In Emily's novel when trouble is caused in the humans' order of existence, nature responds accordingly. Take, for instance, Lockwood's ghastly experience in Catherine's bedchamber at Wuthering Heights. During his nocturnal vision a terrible snow-storm is raging outside, as Lockwood confesses:

I heard distinctly the gusty wind and the driving of the snow; I heard also, the fir bough repeat its teasing sound. (*WH* 29-30)

Similarly, Catherine's suffering and torment seem to be expressed in the dreadful wind blowing outside in the dark night. Bad weather also forebodes all the misfortunes caused by her visits to Thrushcross Grange and her subsequent marriage to Linton. The atmosphere that surrounds her is dripping and wet:

The rainy night had ushered in a misty morning – half frost, half drizzle – and temporary brooks crossed our paths gurgling from uplands. (*WH* 226)

All these manifestations are revelations of a troubled order. The direction of the novel is given by the heroes' (often unaware) and painful endeavour to re-establish the cosmic order disturbed by faulty ill-matched human actions – obviously, the improper mixture of Catherine and Edgar Linton and of Heathcliff and Isabella. The result of such marriages are children who bear the mark of hatred. Only after all the elements of trouble and disorder have been consumed in the purgatory of the moors that lie

between Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange, when the souls have been cleaned of their stigmata, can harmony and equilibrium be brought back to all levels. By the annihilation of the extraneous element – Heathcliff, who seems to have been brought in only to embody all the evil in the world – Hareton and Cathy can develop a more 'positive' love. This is the moment when the tempest has exhausted its destructive powers and peace has been brought back to all levels, which is best expressed by the calm and serene sky in the last scene of the novel. This repose penetrates into all the living and the dead, as Lockwood feels when he narrates at the end of the novel:

I lingered around them [the graves] under that *benign* sky, watched the moths fluttering among the heath and hare-bells, listened to the soft wind breathing through the graves and wondered how anyone could ever imagine unquiet slumbers for the sleepers in that *quiet* earth. (*WH* 320, my italics)

Nature and people are placed on the same level – they spring from the same origin, diverge but eventually their end is in unity with the grand cosmos, as many of them desire. Unity for them means expiation and rediscovery of the lost equilibrium and order. There is permanently the strange feeling in them to transcend to the other order of existence to be freed thus of their own faulty and distressing deeds. Unity and identification with what they have yearned for bring about tranquillity, repose and order. But this can happen only on the spiritual level and only after the dissolution of their corporeal argument. Catherine sees it very clearly when she says to Edgar Linton that one day she will go again to the Heights, which she associates with a pagan Eden:

I shall never be there but once more… and then you'll leave me, and I shall remain for ever. Next spring you'll long again to have me under this roof and you'll look back and think you were happy today. (*WH* 133)

Heathcliff has the same feeling and realizes the imposed order to which they have to submit. He has come from the Unknown and he shall return there where his soul can rest for ever, in his last slumber together with Catherine. He says:

I dreamt I was sleeping the last sleep by that sleeper with my heart stopped and my cheek frozen against her [Catherine]. (*WH* 217)

The end implies for him unification and far repose 'of dissolving with her [Catherine] and be more happy, still…' (*WH* 217).

Emily makes it clear that the necessary equilibrium of the two opposed cosmic principles should be brought to a stand *by those who troubled it*, by *their* expiation in a purgatory placed in *this* life, *before* they are allowed to die. Emily's vision in this respect is pagan if not unreligious: her purgatory is the others and the duty to live tortured by never-ending pangs of conscience. Those who have sinned against the established order will never find their rest until they have suffered all the oppressions and ordeal inflicted upon them by the

others. Order, equilibrium and atonement are re-established only when the sinners have been purged of their transgression.

This is what Georges Bataille also expresses when he refers to the somewhat optimistic ending of the novel:

Le monde de *Wuthering Heights* est le monde d'une souveraineté hirsute et hostile. C'est aussi le monde de l'expiation. L'expiation donnée, le sourire, auquel essentiellement la vie demeure égale, y transparait. [The world of *Wuthering Heights* is the world of a rough and hostile sovereignty. At the same time it is a world of expiation. The expiation agreed upon, the smile, for which life basically remains the same and becomes visible.] (Bataille 33, my translation)

Who are in fact those who caused the disorder? Almost all of the characters of the novel may be considered guilty of this trespass. Catherine has betrayed Heathcliff by marrying Edgar Linton and the simple presence of her lover is a torture for her. Her penitence is achieved by her sufferings in living with the husband she chose but never loved. The final step of her agony is her brain-fever when she comes to the full apprehension of the troubled order. Her lover,

Heathcliff, is the last one to die; he is the most wicked character, the evil-doer, a heathen Devil incarnate who has gone too far in his overpowering love. His two great mistakes are his running away, which is, to a certain extent, quite logical in the context of the fact that he has misunderstood Catherine's 'I am Heathcliff' confession. But his second mistake – his marriage to Isabella – is an act of sheer spite in his obsessive attempt to take his revenge against everybody. Accordingly, his expiation is long and painful. The last stroke is for him to see that his vengeance is to no purpose. He lives his life along with the torture caused by Catherine's death, driven by his neurotic aim to attain his goal of settling of scores fulfilled and, when he sees that the result of his behaviour is love and not hatred and total destruction as he planned, he realizes that all his endeavours have been to no purport. He has lost all his strength nourished as it was by his loathing, his soul has been consumed away by his thwarted love. The only thing left for him is to accept his final repose. Paradoxically, he is not destroyed by his hatred but by his strange love which acts like disseminating cancer cells that destroy their host.

The result of the above mentioned marriages is, as already stated, children born of love mixed with hatred – Cathy and Linton. Only one of them can survive: the less guilty and the purer – Cathy. Little Linton is sentenced to immature death for being the child of two ill-matched persons. Heathcliff's marriage to Isabella is not an act of willed union but an act of rape masochistically accepted. This marriage is also the most violently intractable attempt to trouble nature's equilibrium, the balance between the harsh and

the merciful. Little Linton has to take on his too frail shoulders the burden of his mother's mistake and Heathcliff's act of betrayal. But he is not able to carry it and he is crushed under its weight.

Cathy, too, as the offspring of her mother's mistake must suffer but the guilt that she takes upon her is not so strong. She labours under Heathcliff's wickedness and Linton's whims as a spoilt child of a rich family.

Hareton is made up of similar mistakes with his father's cruel treatment of boy Heathcliff falling heavily on him. But as a result of his punishment and imposed obedience, he is finally allowed to see the light and contribute with Cathy to the re-establishment of the troubled order. But not before his father himself has been made to pay for his misbehaviour and be humiliated and degraded and die a miserable death just as his life was.

Edgar Linton is also guilty in the novel's scheme. His fault is his marriage to a woman not destined to him. This trespass results in sorrowful marriage, suffering, illness and death of his wife, of his sister and of his nephew. However, his expiation is not so aching because of the fact that his responsibility is not intentionally assumed. For him it was all natural as a rich man to marry the woman of his own choice, a woman who also willingly consented to this act.

In exchange, Isabella deliberately prefers to elope with Heathcliff, sexually attracted by his manly appearance. For this she has to pay with her life after a long and throbbing agony. But this is not enough and her son must do penance for her.

All the characters mentioned above are caught in the whirl of the tempest that they have set loose and, as such, there can be no moment of respite in the novel. All the forces which have been unleashed as a result of human mistakes cannot be stopped and have to follow their course. Peace can come only when the tempest has exhausted its power and allows order to be brought back. This is when all the evil-doers have expiated for their deeds and received their punishment. Until then the cosmic forces ravage fiercely and without interruption, driving the humans along like disembodied puppets.

The setting against which all this turmoil is set is a grand natural one, divided along two plans: that of the humans and that of the surrounding scenery itself, which is mainly represented by the moors. These two plans are seen in unity, each one counterpointed into the other. It is interesting to remark that death is not seen as an end to human conflicts but as a mere passage from one order into the other. The direction of the soul after the dissolution of its material argument is not vertical, as often seen by religion, but *horizontal*. As such, when Catherine dies, her soul does not go to Heaven or Hell but to Wuthering Heights where 'not just as an ineffective ghost, as much as in life, she exerts an active influence' (Cecil 158). Even when dreaming,

her paradise is not that of the Bible where she does not feel at home and from which is chased out but Wuthering Heights where she would return gladly:

> […] Heaven *did not seem to me my home* and I broke my heart with weeping to come back to earth, and the angels were so angry that they flung me out into the middle of the hearth, on top of Wuthering Heights where I woke sobbing *with joy*. (*WH* 82, my italics)

Death is constructed as a temporary separation from the living since the dwelling of the dead is in the same reality surrounded by the same landscape. Death is for them 'a gateway to a condition in which at last their natures will be able to flow out unhampered and at peace' (Cecil 159), as escape into boundless spaces from the prison of the body shattered as it is by passion and suffering. This is how Catherine expresses her wish for endless spaces:

> […] the thing that irks me most is this shattered prison after all. I'm tired of being enclosed here. I'm wearying to escape into that glorious world and to be always there: not seeing it dimly through tears and yearning for it through the walls of an aching heart, but really with it and in it. (*WH* 157)

It is an infinite which, when found, brings peace and repose abd which Nelly clearly perceives on dead Catherine's face:

> I see a repose that neither earth nor hell can break, and I feel an assurance of the endless and the shadowless hereafter – the Eternity they have entered – where life is boundless in its duration and love in its sympathy, and joy in its fullness. (*WH* 161)

The supernatural is given special emphasis in the atmosphere of the novel. For Emily Brontë the very name of the term becomes inappropriate, since her 'supernatural' becomes 'super-natural', namely the 'natural' of a superior order. Haunting the living is the result of her characteristic vision of the superiority of cosmic laws acting upon humans. The ghosts are mere emissaries that fall over real people in visions set free, as they are, by the storm of human passion troubling the settled order. The way these visions are inserted into the novel is a characteristic of Emily Brontë's style – she is not afraid to deal with them and handles them in a direct way avoiding any roundabout way of presentation, with a door left ajar for her readers so that they may judge things by themselves.

At the beginning of the novel Lockwood really *feels* Catherine's chilly fingers on his hand. And Emily Brontë never clears up the ambiguity – is it ghastly reality or is it a nightmare? Somewhere else in the novel the readers often hear Heathcliff complaining about his being tortured by his love's spirit, and their imagination may wander farther re-creating the above-mentioned scene, but with Heathcliff as the victim, this time. His very death is ambiguous from a purely medical point of view and allows the readers to

construct different hypotheses from the most rational to the most fanciful ones. But what is worth mentioning here, is that there is never an allusion from the writer that might account for any supernatural explanation as the *only* possible one.

Another element that contributes to the special atmosphere of the novel, besides the presence of the supernatural element, is the permanent presence of the material landscape, to which Emily Brontë gives special significance. It does not only serve as the geographical background for the plot but its also acts as a spiritual reality. Geographically speaking, it is a very limited space formed within the triangle lying between Wuthering Heights, Thrushcross Grange and Gimmerton. This space is closed and the characters never leave it, save for Heathcliff. But the readers never know whatever may have happened to him while he was away. This space is isolated and confined to itself as it has no influences and links with the outer world. Here time seems to have stopped, physical laws have no effect and everything is governed by special, peculiar connections between cause and effect. Here life does not belong to the Victorian age, it is lived primitively without any evolution from older times.

Just as Emily Brontë is not very specific about time, spatial details are also sparsely given. The readers are only dropped certain hints here and there about the location of the places, proving that the author did not want to create an exact geography. Everything has to be worked out from such apparently unimportant details.

From Wuthering Heights there is a road that leads to Thrushcross Grange Park across the moors, going downhill. From the gate of the Park to the house there is two miles to walk among trees and a little brook flowing in a little valley. The distance between Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange is four miles, as Lockwood states in Chapter 2. The exact location of the estates and the village Gimmerton is given in Chapter 11. The distance between Thrushcross Grange and Gimmerton is covered in half an our. What is also significant is that the graveyard and the little chapel lie half-way between the Heights and the Grange. Here members of both families lie buried. Gimmerton is the gateway to te outer world – doctors and lawyers in the service of both families come from here. These two locations, it should be underlined, do not lie sideways of the two estates but *between* them. These are places where what is shared by everyone is situated: common life (Gimmerton) and death (the graveyard).

This confined landscape had a multitude of implications which gives it open almost infinite spatial dimensions. The landscape has a life of its own which evolves along with the life of the characters. The defining and spellbinding presence here is unquestionably the *moors* so dear to Emily. Her moors are full of force, here nothing is chained. This is the unfriendly

and inhospitable kingdom of the storm, mist, cold, frost, snow, rain and icy wind. Only now and then does the sun shine and flowers peep their heads, but this only happens during happier moments: while young Catherine and Heathcliff wander carefree and happy and at the end of the book when Cathy and Hareton are allowed the prospect of happiness together.

Thus landscape is also the expression of the cosmic order mentioned previously in this essay. When the equilibrium is troubled, the surrounding nature responds accordingly. As such, the scenery lives like the humans – it is calm and sunny when harmony and order and love reign at Wuthering Heights or at the Grange, stormy and raging when cruelty, violence and trouble darken the human souls.

Emily is like no-one else at least before her. She touches on the elemental, she goes beyond appearances to the intimate structure of things and phenomena, there where order, as conceived by humans, does not exist any longer. Her sceneries are of primitive and pagan beauty, of a force and virility never found before. It gives vitality and life to those who come as friends – Catherine and Heathcliff, as children of the moors – or crushes its enemies. The powers of the storm are set loose when Heathcliff leaves Catherine and vanishes on the moors. Thus terror and a foreboding feeling reign at the Heights:

It was a very dark night for a summer, the clouds appeared inclined to thunder […] About midnight while we still sat up, the storm came rattling over the Heights in full fury. There was a violent wind, as well as thunder, and either one or the other split a tree off at the corner of the building, a huge bough fell across the roof, and knocked down a portion of the east chimney-stack sending a clatter of stones and soot into the kitchen fire […] (*WH* 86)

The same correspondence between man and landscape is to be found around the two houses: while Wuthering Heights is surrounded by barren hills, by a few stunned fir trees and 'by a range of gaunt thorns all stretching their limbs one way, as if craving alms of the sun' (*WH* 10), Thrushcross Grange has a park around full of green trees. The desolate stormy landscape at the Heights best reflects the wild impetuous, passionate temperament of its dwellers while the much more friendly scenery around the Grange shows the milder and more friendly nature of the Lintons.

Emily's landscapes are, unlike Dickens's or even her sister, Charlotte's ones, depictions of human moods, reflecting what is going on in the characters' inner self. They not only depict but also *behave* like living people. The wind and the rain and the poor frozen flowers around the Heights mourn dead Catherine like humans do:

In the evening the weather broke, the wind shifted from south to northeast, and brought rain first, then sleet and snow. On the morrow one could hardly imagine that there had been three weeks of summer. The

primroses and crocuses were hidden under wintry drifts, the larks were silent, the young leaves of the early trees smitten and blackened. And dreary and chill and dismal, that morrow did creep over. (*WH* 165)

Emily Brontë is a master of the descriptions of the moors 'filled with sound, storm and rushing wind – a sound more important than words and thoughts' (Forster 187). Her landscapes are centred on the visual and the audible, they are pictures full of sound movement. The moors luxuriate in sunshine when the wind howls with a human voice, the flowers fade melancholically when autumn draws near. The seasons bring about changes in the appearance of the scenery, as new plants appear or other die away. There is never a static element in this landscape. The moors are covered with racing clouds or falling leaves, the little brook flows, the wind groans, the drops of rain fall through barren boughs of the trees.

What is then the explanation that such a power emanates from the natural element in this novel? The arguments are to be found in Emily's life lived among the moors and dedicated to them. It is a love that exhales – as Swinburne said – a fresh wild odour from a black soil, from every storm-swept page of *Wuthering Heights*. She lived among her native hills and, during her wanderings, learnt their secrets, their language and understood every sound emanated by the soil. If the story of the novel was invented, its setting *is* real; it is a transposition of her life among her beloved hills and wanderings across the heath. It is a life throbbing with feeling and imagination.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

WATCHING CARTOONS WITH THE EYES OF A TRANSLATOR

EVELINA GRAUR

ABSTRACT. When we watch a film, we deal simultaneously with four different types of signs: verbal acoustic signs (dialogue), non-verbal acoustic signs (music, sound effects), verbal visual signs (written signs in the image) and non-verbal visual signs (what is otherwise seen in the image). The purpose of this paper is to suggest that even if the polysemiotic dimension of film imposes significant cognitive demands upon the viewer of animated cartoons, there is always a choice between mental laziness and rewarding alertness. Although at the periphery of film genre, animated cartoons challenge their translators to extract and transmit the meanings "populating" a world of infinite possibilities. Animated shows can walk where live action shows cannot, animated characters can do things that real people cannot. This world of the limitless is created for people to have fun, but the translation of humor-inducing language is serious business.

What is a cartoon?

A cartoon is a form of art with diverse origins and even more diverse modern meanings. In its historical meaning, a cartoon (from the Italian *cartone,* meaning "big paper") is a full-scale drawing or sketch made in preparation for a painting, mural or tapestry.

In modern print media, a cartoon is an illustration with some humorous intent. This usage dates from the summer of 1843 when *Punch* magazine made a joke with serious semantic implications for the English language. The butt of the joke was an exhibition designed to help in the selection of new paintings and murals for the *Houses of Parliament*, then being rebuilt after a disastrous fire. Artists submitted their artistic proposals in form of cartoons. At the time, the most important part of the magazine was the full-page satirical drawing, known to staff as The Big Cut and entitled Mr Punch's pencillings. *Punch* decided to contrast the sumptuous redecoration plans with the miserable poverty of the starving population by publishing a series of drawings, ironically captioned "cartoons". John Leech's full-page wood engraving of ragged paupers puzzling at a gallery of opulently framed portraits was captioned "Cartoon, No 1: Substance and Shadow". The artist's work satirized the elaborate designs made for the grand historical frescoes and invited viewers to disapprove of the self-aggrandizing posturing of Westminster politicians.

As a result of this editorial decision, the word *cartoon* stuck and became associated with pictorial satire and eventually with any humorous drawing, usually presented as a single panel illustration. Soon, because of the stylistic similarities between comic strips (= humorous narrative sequences

of cartoons) and early animated movies, the word *cartoon* was monopolized by animation and "enslaved" by the film industry. To give the impression of movement, illustrated images were shown in rapid succession.

SUBSTANCE AND SHADOW.

Although the term applies to any animated presentation, it is more often used in reference to programs for children, featuring anthropomorphized animals, superheroes, the adventures of child protagonists, or other related genres. Animated material that does not fit the traditional conventions of Western animation, such as Japanese anime, is less often called a cartoon. Similarly, the term is occasionally avoided in reference to material intended for adult viewers, to make it clear that it is not appropriate for children.

Modes of screen translation

Although silent films needed the translation of their intertitles, it was not until the arrival of the talkies in the late 1920s and early 1930s that film translation became a real issue for the distribution of programs all over the world.

Subtitling and dubbing were developed as solutions to the linguistic transfer that was required, and ever since the confrontation between these two major modes of screen translation has created a stir among both professionals and spectators. Nevertheless, I do believe it is sensible to dismiss any arbitrariness of choice and correlate whatever institutional preference for one mode or another to complex and often intertwined factors such as historical circumstances, cultural traditions, intercultural dialogue, film genre, and financial resources (Dries 1995, apud. Szarkowska 2005).

With the table below I have tried two things: first, to summarize the pros and cons of both methods of language transfer, posing as an impartial observer, second to camouflage my inevitable personal voice in favor of subtitling, a less colonizing mode which leaves the original film undamaged and which allows linguistically challenged viewers a "way in".

Subtitling	Dubbing
cheap: the cost represents 1-2% of the total production costs	rather expensive: a dubbed film costs, on average, 10 times more than a subtitled film
the average time for subtitling a feature film is 36 hours (4 working days)	takes longer because it involves choice of actors, rehearsals, use of sophisticated equipment
ensures the originality and foreignness of films and promotes the learning of foreign languages	decreases the sense of 'otherness' and becomes a form of domestication and naturalization
constrained by space and time	constrained by lip-synchronization
requires more compression of original information	conveys more original information
respects the integrity of the original dialogue	the original dialogue is lost
retains the quality of original actors' voices	the voices of dubbing actors may be repetitive
does not allow the overlapping of dialogue	allows the overlapping of dialogue
requires the dispersion of attention between image and written text	viewers can focus more on images
suits the hearing impaired and helps immigrants with learning the language	suits poor readers
pollutes the image	respects the image of the original
viewers will lose the sense if distracted from watching	viewers can follow the sense even if distracted from watching
employs two simultaneous linguistic codes	employs only one linguistic code
can detract from cinematic illusion	allows more cinematic illusion

At this point, my voice cannot help echoing Jean-Marie Straub's words in 1970: "Dubbing is not only a technique, it's also an ideology. In a dubbed film, there is not the least rapport between what you see and what you hear. The dubbed cinema is the cinema of lies, mental laziness and violence, because it gives no space to the viewer and makes him still more deaf and insensitive" (apud. Betz 2001:1).

Humour at the intersection of image with text

We like to contend that animated cartoons are not just light-hearted, wacky fun. They also touch upon hundreds of sensitive issues in human society (duty, friendship, revenge, racism, war, violence, social roles of men and women, etc.) and often constitute the birthplace of many cultural stereotypes we learn and remember. But perhaps the reason why we learn so fast and remember them so well is that the intended humorous veil awaits us to unleash some of its healing powers over our routinized existence. Pragmatically, humorous multimodal texts such as animated cartoons are texts whose *intended* effect is laughter.

However, much of everyday life humour is spontaneous and unintentional; although rendered in the guise of spontaneity, film humour is the result of conscious intellectual endeavour. Nothing is intrinsically humorous, but everything has *potential* for humour. Feeding on double meanings, ambiguities, and wordplay, humour is created through violations of expectations, both verbally and visually. Although a subtitler is supposed to produce a verbal equivalent and use his/her creative flair to encapsulate each segment of dialogue in the fewest possible words, he/she also needs to be visually literate and fully familiar with the language of cinema.

In animated cartoons the cooperation between word and image must be carefully exploited if one wishes to produce appropriate subtitles. In *Ice Age,* two migrating turtles show their concern for the disappearance of their friend, Eddie.

ST: [Turtle 1] Sally, where's Eddie?
[Turtle 2] He said something about being on the verge of a revolutionary breakthrough.
[Eddie] I'm flying!!!
[Turtle 1] Some breakthrough!

TT: [Țestoasa 1] Sally, unde e Eddie?
[Țestoasa 2] Spunea ceva că e la un pas de o mare descoperire.
[Eddie] Zbooor!!!
[Țestoasa 1] Asta da descoperire!

Hardly does Turtle2 finish its line, when poor Eddie's crash becomes visible and audible to the viewer. It is evident that the visual element and the diegetic sound of the crash **anchor** the ironic meaning of *breakthrough* ("an important new discovery") and **secure** the viewer's return to the literal level of decoding the line *some breakthrough.* This time we should read

‘*some ‘break ‘through* and observe that literality is triggered by the phrasal verb to *break through*, meaning “to manage to get passed or through something that is in your way”. Written subtitles, however, are not quite fit to accommodate suprasegmentals such as pitch, stress or juncture patterns.

As suggested by Barthes (1977), *anchorage* remote-controls the viewer towards a meaning chosen in advance. The verbal material frequently performs this function in advertisements and press photographs. In animated cartoons, however, the visual often takes on the verbal, and yet not in the sense that the visual element channels viewers towards some unique verbal signified. It rather remote-controls the viewer towards accepting the pictorial conventions selected for the visualization of some entity or situation.

In the *Emperor’s New Groove*, while Yzma is talking about her diabolic plan to kill the ruler, illustrative material unfolds simultaneously with the verbal text and invites the viewer *see* into the character’s mind. The representational solutions are made available and already prioritized for the viewer: the visual at the top, the verbal at the bottom.

[Yzma] Ah, how shall I do it? Oh, I know. I’ll turn him into a flea. A harmless little flea. And then I’ll put the flea into a box, and I’ll put that box inside another box, and then I’ll mail that box to myself, and when it arrives… ahahahahaha!… I’ll smash it with a hammer! It’s brilliant, brilliant, I tell you! Genius, I say! Or, to save on postage, I’ll poison him with this!

Without the deliberate selection of some visual element to function contextually, the interpretation of verbal deictic words such as *this* –“I’ll poison him with this1”- would be difficult. While talking about Yzma, Emperor Kuzco portrays her as “the living proof that dinosaurs once roamed the earth” and “scary beyond all reason”. At some point Kuzco addresses the audience: “Whoa. Look at these wrinkles. What is holding this woman together?” All by itself, the verbal demonstrative syntgam *these wrinkles* would be incapable of creating any humorous effect.

The controlling function of the visual over the verbal may take extreme forms; for example, the visual may be summoned to enforce structural modifications upon the verbal so that the latter may fit the reality of the visual.

In *Monsters Inc*., the idiom *to lay eyes on somebody* features the singular form of the noun *eye* because the verbal is summoned to fit the nature of Mike Wazowski: “I was just thinking about the first time I laid eye on you how pretty you were.” The line belongs to a little green cyclops complimenting his girlfriend, Celia, a Medusa-like creature, with snakes for hair that copy her emotions.

As Roland Barthes suggested, the words and the images of a multimodal text “are fragments of a more general syntagm and the unity of the message is realized at a higher level, that of the story, the anecdote, the diegesis” (1977:

41). When it is not called in to elucidate, to repress the floating signifieds, the verbal is summoned to compress temporal periods, to advance film action, to fill in all temporal and spatial gaps. In *Ice Age*, while passing by Stonehenge, Manfred the mammoth declares: "Modern architecture. It'll never last." The verbal remark encompasses hundreds of years of evolution and change, and simultaneously evokes too many presences and absences for a mere drawing of the megalithic monument to be able to accommodate.

Conclusions

Unlike other forms of interlingual transfer, effective subtitling requires recognition of the constraints of the media and an approach focussed upon the viewer. Although it is the verbal message that needs to be translated, pure verbal strategies such as compensations of meaning loss, lexical and syntactical omissions, literal renderings should not be judged outside the multimodal nature of cartoons. Subtitling is ultimately a tool designed to make the image-story comprehensible.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

THE RELEVANCE CONTINUUM IN COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING

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ABSTRACT. Relevance flouting represents a major development in commercial advertising where the slight difference that exists between commodities entitle advertisers to superimpose non-relevant concepts with which the consumer will strive to work out a however far-fetched connection. Non-relevant verbal or visual elements overcome audience distrust, increase claim strength, enhance tangibility through sexual innuendo, and compensate for the lack of "new feature" information in a continuum, ranging from strong and overtly communicated, through weak and covert implicatures inherent in metaphoric expression, figurative and loose language and puns, to extreme frustrated relevance and indirectness. This hypothesis will be tested on ads for commercial products within the framework of Relevance Theory.

Advertising communication relies considerably on inferences and assumptions which help proceed towards eventual interpretation(s). It has been advocated (Tanaka:1994) that **cooperation is a misnomer for the marketing communication** and hence the nature of the relationship between participants challenges the possibility of applying Grice's approach to the study of inferences in advertising.

Starting from Grice's (1975) view of communication as intention recognition, the Relevance Theory (RT) developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986) proposes a simplification of the maxims as assessment means, and distinguishes two types of intention:

- the informative intention,
- the communicative intention, i.e. of having the informative intention recognized.

The central claim of RT is that the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise and predictable enough to guide the reader towards the speaker's meaning. Utterances raise expectations of relevance **not because speakers are expected to obey a CP and maxims, but because the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition that advertisers may exploit.**

Relevance is a function of effort and effect: the greater the positive cognitive effects, the greater the relevance; the greater the expenditure of processing effort, the more restricted the relevance.

The universal tendency to maximise relevance makes it possible to predict and manipulate the mental states of interlocutors. In advertising terms, given the readers' tendency to pick out the most relevant stimuli in the environment and process them so as to maximise relevance, advertisers

may produce stimuli likely to attract attention, to prompt the retrieval of specific contextual assumptions, and to point towards an intended conclusion.

Inferential communication is ostensive (overt) if it involves the extra-layer of communicative intention of informing about one's informative intention besides the informative intention, e.g.: When I casually leave an empty glass in the line of my partner's vision, I'm not engaging in inferential communication, I merely have exploited his natural cognitive tendency to maximise relevance. Noticing my empty glass (the informative intention made manifest through the ostensive stimulus) my partner may be entitled to conclude that I *might* like another drink, but if I deliberately wave it about in front of him (communicative intention) he would be justified in drawing a stronger conclusion that I would like another drink. Consequently, the intention to inform is more likely to be fulfilled if it is recognized.

The processing effort is supposed to interrupt our continuous search for relevance at an optimal level, the optimal relevance (OR). To arrive at OR an advertiser may make an efficient, overt attempt to secure his audience's attention and make it mutually manifest that he intended that information (overtly communicated).

On the other hand, advertisers may undertake to convey information in a **covert way when their communicative intention is not manifest**, leaving it up to the audience to draw the inferences that they want to be drawn and thus avoid taking responsibility for them. In the case of covert communication, inferences are less controllable, the reader being exposed and vulnerable to manipulation.

Overtly Communicated Implicatures

According to RT advertisers may choose to communicate in ostensive ways when both the informative and the communicative intentions are revealed. Presuppositions and conventional implicatures are intended to be recognized as intended since they are present in the logical form and non-cancellable: e.g. "How good is easy-on Durex?" contains a structural presupposition (questions share the presupposition of their assertive counterparts) and thus the otherwise critical claim of product superiority is taken without resistance.

Visual arguments situated at the most representational end are supposed to work in a similar overt way although in commercial advertising visuals are usually layered through superimposition of different degrees of glamorization implicatures pertaining to beauty, youth, happiness, modernity, etc.

At the level of verbal overt communication, Sperber and Wilson (1986) also introduce the idea of assumptions obtained by the LF development, called **explicatures** (a different distinction between Grice's "saying"- LF and "implicating" – contextual implicatures). "An assumption is an explicature if and

only if it is a development of the LF encoded by the utterance"(Sperber and Wilson, 1986:182). Belonging to what is said, explicatures are overtly communicated and must be relevant to meaning interpretation. The following pragmatic processes are involved in deriving explicatures: disambiguation, reference assignment, and enrichment, which can involve narrowing or loosening.

Below is an example of derivation of overtly communicated implicatures at the verbal level in the headline „E TIMPUL SĂ AI FARMEC" (It's time you had Farmec/charm).

Disambiguation. Unless the denotation of „Farmec" is narrowed to mean the advertised product, the intepretation does not satisfy the reader's expectation of relevance. Were „Farmec" taken to mean "charm", underlying the presuppositional content or rather the felicity condition on invitations, would be the reluctant idea that "You don't have charm", which is hardly probable for the advetiser to have intended. The meaning which narrows „Farmec" to the commodity is therefore activated, retained as intended, and represents part of the LF.

Reference assignment implies giving indexes to deictic expressions. In our case YOU has exophoric reference with realisation in the external situational context of the ad and is understood to define the addressee/s.

Enrichment is represented here by what is explicitly communicated through a higher order speech act description (even though enrichment may include different other processes). "The advertiser invites you, the addressee, to have Farmec" is a higher level explicature and is defined as indirect invitation.

Conversational Implicatures

The advertiser's intention to communicate the above is overt and, therefore, the derived implicatures are strong. He is readily willing to take responsibility for them and by choosing an indirect invitation, interpretation of sincerity as a contextual effect must have been presumed. Likewise, having made his sincerity intentions manifest, one takes this invitation to conversationally implicate that „Farmec" is something desirable. This is a strong implicature but other weaker implicatures which function as further implicated premises could be that, being desirable ("charming"), the product is good. The scheme can function as below:

Implicated premise: If you have made a sincere invitation → the product is desirable

Implicated conclusion: If something is desirable → it is good.

The implicated conclusion will further serve as a basis for additional premises and weak implicatures. What is extremely important is that implicitly communicated **strong and weak implicatures alike were based on the explicatures**.

The concept „farmec" suffered a process of meaning narrowing while other instances may require some degree of widening or loosening. Loose

uses including figurative elements presented a problem for Grice's framework of interpretation. Strictly speaking, secrets do not have power („Descoperă puterea unui secret" - Secret Deodorant), products do not enchant our senses („Şampoane care îți încântă simțurile" – Herbal Essences), countries do not have spirits ("Descoperă spiritul Americii – LM), nor do medicines have targets („Nurofen. Ținta lui este durerea"). To describe them as such would be violating Grice's maxim of truthfulness ("Do not say what you believe to be false"). They are neither covert violations, like lies which are constructed to deceive the reader, nor jokes or fictions which cancel the maxims entirely.

Therefore, it is difficult to accomodate loose talk, metaphor and hyperbole under the cover of truthfulness violation and still distinguish among them.The Relevance theory perceives these aspects as merely alternative routes to achieving optimal relevance. If either the literal or the figurative interpretation fails to satisfy the expectations of relevance, then the other will be accepted.

Covert Implicatures. *"You decide how hot it/she is"*

Starting from the premise expressed by Tanaka (1994:40) that "advertising is typical of a situation in which the speaker is not trustworthy and the hearer is not trusting" it is highly probable that advertisers will **employ covert strategies to overcome audience distrust and compensate for the lack of „new feature information"**. Exceptions from attempts to overcome audience resistance through self effacement as in the "Think small" slogan (VW), humour, or other honest approaches such as understatement in „Adria îşi face singură reclamă", are also rife in both Romanian and English advertising.

Covert communication has been defined as a "case of communication where the intention of the speaker is to alter the cognitive environment of the hearer, i.e. to make a set of assumptions more manifest to her, without making this intention mutually manifest" (Tanaka, 1994:41). Therefore, it is contended that **exploitation of social taboos, sexual innuendo, etc., are likely to be bypassed by the use of a covert communicative approach**.

An increasing number of Romanian advertisements, especially TV commercials and posters are designed in such a way that the transmission is dependent on the addressee's ability/failure to recognize the advertiser's intentions. Different stimuli such as sex images, are persistently used in place of ostention and function as a means of making the informative intention manifest, but not mutually so. Sexual stimuli gain relevance in virtue of their being "basic needs" and it is not deniable that they function well as attention grabbers.

The Elsaco poster for gas distribution devices is based on covert communication, whereas the slogan exploits punning at the reference level (grammaticalized reference – encoded in the morphology of agreement):

„Tu hotărăşti cât e de fierbinte" ("*You* decide how hot *it/she* is", Fig.1)

Two interpretations are activated:

1. You$_1$ decide how hot it is – where *you*$_1$ has text internal reference, i.e., to the woman in the picture, and *it* refers to the product;
2. You$_2$ decide how hot she is – where *you*$_2$ is true exophora, i.e. the reader, and *she* is the female in the picture.

Interpretation 2) is also supported by the employment of the term "fierbinte" which brings collocational (associative) shades of meaning from the "hot line". In Romanian, „fierbinte" is neuter gender, whilst another adjectival complement such as „cald" has marked gender and person. This would have been the proper choice had the advertiser not intended the punning.

Fig. 1. „Tu hotărăşti cât e de fierbinte"

„Cald" is gender inflected, punning-disambiguating and would have channeled the interpretation unerringly towards (1).

The second meaning alone could antagonize many women due to its gender bias. On the other hand, if the advertiser had chosen a straightforward utterance based only on interpretation (1), such as: "This device can give you as much heat as you need" we would have missed on the other **weak implicatures covertly transmitted by the deliberate equivocation in the deixis:** "This product will also give you sexual satisfaction and your love life will improve".

Such further interpretations (and others) are derived through image contiguity, but the advertiser can always deny them and argue in favor of just proper heat environment. The readers are supposed to conclude that since a sexual interpretation is irrelevant to the product advertised in the poster, and since a strong implicature of any ad is that it makes a positive claim about the brand, the consumers believe that the advertiser cannot have intended it.

More and more Romanian TV commercials covertly communicate a welter of weak implicatures about happiness, sexual satisfaction, self-esteem, etc., with such diverse and unsexually linked products as the following:

1. NesTea Ice Tea: „Plăceri *răcoritoare*"
2. Schlossgold beer: „S*atisfacție* fără alcool"
3. Coca Cola: „Un gust care *mă priveşte*"

Specific for the Romanian advertising is also the co-occurrence of punning at the linguistic level in the headline and/or slogan and weak sexual implicatures derived through image contiguity. In examples 1. and 3. above

the italicized terms being ambivalent, raise the problem of equivocation and authorize double interpretations.

Relevance in Puns

Puns are deliberately exploited equivocations so that the reader is encouraged to retrieve more than one interpretation with either converging or diverging effects, in order to increase claim strength and compensate for the lack of new feature information. For Romanian commercial advertising punning is a predilect device which triggers longer attention span and increased memorability as it sells "two meanings at the price of one" (Redfern, 1984), occurring in headlines especially at the level of the brand name:

1. „Descoperă puterea unui Secret";
2. „E timpul să ai Farmec";
3. „Câte un Diamant pentru fiecare dintre femeile care eşti" (Diamonds panty hoses);
4. „Acum Rama, mai mare decât Rama, la acelaşi preț";
5. „O EXCLAMAȚIE.... provocatoare" (Exclamation perfume);
6. "How Fa can you go" (Fa deodorant).

Tanaka (1994:66) proposes a threefold typology for pun interpretation:

a) a pun activates two sets of interpretations but ultimately communicates one;
b) the rejected interpretation contributes cognitive effects to the intended interpretation;
c) both meanings are communicated.

The question that arises with this theory is what motivates retrieval and inhibition of meanings. Jones (1989) has conclusively proved that given a lexical item, all its meanings are simultaneously activated and immediately afterwards, the human parser selects the most appropriate to the context through what he terms "***semantic priming***" or the influence of the preceding elements. No less important is Hogaboam and Perfetti's (1975) contention that it is always possible to discern a dominant meaning from secondary ones, a prevalence that appears to obey the frequency of use or as they term it "***The Priority Principle***".

In the Connex headline: „El îți promite luna de pe cer", the item „luna" is disambiguated by the place adjunct that imposes upon it the clear interpretation of „moon". It is relevant to make this reading clear, since we usually associate "the moon" with the intangible. But as the reader proceeds, he finds the punning in „Noi îți promitem şapte luni" where the first reading is rejected due to the semantic priming of „....cu doar 25$" and a new interpretation conjured to mean "the lunar month". The derived implicatures of the latter reading dwell on opposite concepts such as "accessibility". Semantic priming can thus be responsible for destroying the initial interpretation of "intangibility" through what has been described as a "destructive garden path effect" (Diez Arroyo, 1997-98:101)

A special type of ”semantic priming” occurs in cases of punning between the brand name and its literal meaning as in the slogan for *More* cigarettes (fig.2.):

”I’m MORE satisfied”

The first person endophoric deixis (ad internally is presented the image of a young lady and the headline presumably represents her endorsement) primes the item ”more” to activate the meaning of a comparative and there is no other linguistic context to impose otherwise.

Fig. 2. I’m More satisfied

The image nevertheless, introduces an incongruity: the woman is lying on a packet of MORE and the brand name destroys the acquired relevance. The reader will derive a new interpretation: ”I’m satisfied with MORE”. Unlike the previous example, this one illustrates a cumulative garden-path and therefore an enhanced claim strength:

”I’m more satisfied with MORE”

Implicatures in Metaphors. „Dorința care te apropie”

Implicatures can be primed by pictures in headlines with metaphorical meaning. The Romanian headline „Dorința care te apropie” (Alexandrion) pictures the product, a bottle of Alexandrion, and a seductive and enticingly smiling woman with a glass of Alexandrion in her hand (see fig.3). The ambiguity is achieved here at the level of definite reference in the NG. Salience of the product in the ad and of the product name (repeated twice) primes the coreference between the product and the definite NG head. That the product is a strong drink (claim enhancement) is therefore overtly communicated under the form of strong implicature – the advertiser taking responsibility for it. This is a strong implicature since its recovery is essential in order to arrive at an interpretation that satisfies the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance.

Implicatures derived through puns and metaphors are extremely efficient in conveying a wealth of cognitive effects under the form of weak implicatures, both overtly and covertly communicated. The advertiser takes responsibility only for the implicatures overtly communicated, which are usually linked with the product qualities. Weak implicatures are covertly communicated via the picture, or very often in the case of Romanian headlines, by the priority of the literal meaning of the pun.



Fig.3. „Dorința care te apropie”

Nonetheless, the woman's image which has a dominating effect in the total architecture of the ad activates other weak implicatures which are only covertly communicated, such as inciting temptations, happiness, love, pleasure, etc. Being addressed to male readers, the ad re-enacts the initial temptation, and negative implicatures about sin might not be excluded.

Weak implicatures derived through picture relevance are usually more indeterminate (depend on the reader not only on the context), easy to deny, and seem to be used to reinforce the salient overtly communicated implicatures.

Being more indeterminate, they can also be deemed risky and the advertiser takes a serious responsibility in employing them since negative implicatures are possible to derive and are inherent in every metaphoric or loose expression.

Subsequently, we can argue that ***through loosening, negative aspects of meaning may infest the otherwise advertisingly- propitious environment***.

The copy-writer enjoys such weakly communicaed implicatures as they are usually meant to enhance tangibility, convey beauty, happiness, exclusiveness, confidence, self-respect, etc. as collateral aspects of the product acquisition. However, he deserts taking responsibility when such implicatures touch sensitive subjects such as gender, sex (see headline „Tu hotărăşti...” - Elsaco). Nor will the advertiser agree to have communicated negative implicatures which the reader constructs on his own from metaphorical expressions.

Frustrated Relevance – Schweppes

The Schweppes ad (Fig.4.) is a notable case of frustrated relevance based on the reader's onus to recover meaning. No reason for buying is conspicuously placed as the headline is voluntarily obscured in the corner of the page:

Headline: “Sch…. you know it's not really them”
Logo: Schweppes. Since 1783
Slogan: “Sch…. you know who?”

Headline: "you know it's not really them"



Slogan:"Sch… you know who?"

The linguistic message was arbitrarily arranged under the above headings, although a coherent reading would revert the order so that the slogan be read first and the headline second due to the Question/ Answer frame (Q/A) and the anaphoricity of "them". Moreover, the linguistic message is less salient, even absconded within the overall image - priming construction. The following stages of pragmatic processes in identifying the propositional form were pursued: disambiguation, reference assignment and enrichment.

Fig. 4. Schweppes

Disambiguation targets an exceptional type of phonetic pun with all threefold readings validated by different sections of the ad:

"Sch" is ambiguous between:

a) the initial part of the product name;
b) the sound made by fizzy drinks;
c) the silencing sound made by placing one's index on the lips and is validated by
    i. a) the product logo,
    ii. b) the product logo and entailed by a,
    iii. c) the image.

It is an exceptional type of pun because it activates three rather than two readings and also because it is difficult at this stage to make a relevant disambiguating choice.

Reference assignment. The candidates for the paradigm case of saturation are not present in the linguistic context, rather the pronouns "you", "them", "who" have to be found either ad-internal (image) or exophoric (epistemologic context) values. We assume that the ad must be coherent and cohesive and therefore "you" in "you know who?" and "you know it's not really them" must be allotted a similar index.

As previously hypothesized, the slogan and headline belong to a Q/A sequel in an abbreviated colloquial form (-operator), where the interrogative "who" refers cataphorically to "them". As a result, the two variables arrived at within the Q/A framework can be assigned the following fundamental values:

You_1 = the addressee
Them = -S, -A, neutral, plural
} Since contextual values must be salient in the perceptual environment of the picture-salient ad, we infer that:

You_1 = either of the 2 persons primed by the picture (still not definitely identified)

Them = the blurred crowd outside, which is a clearer value than you_1.

Specifying the right contextual values for the indexicals requires further anchorage into the "place" (P), "time" (T) and "speaker"(S) axes. The "narrative" must provide cues of refining the relevant interpretation which, so far, has not proved easy to arrive at. P is easily retrieved if the number 10 on the open door, the guards, and the crowd of journalists outside are brought together: Downing Street 10, the British prime-minister's residence. Consequently the characters are easy to identify: Tony Blair (seen from the profile) and his wife. The funny, intimate and inadvertently advertising gesture of the prime minister's wife in the narrative (Sch_3) captured by the candid camera, identifies her as the S_1 (questioner) and then addressee. From this perspective their exchange can be translated as:

Lady: Sch.. [Do] you know who? ['s outside?]

PM: Sch… You know it's not really them.

Interpretation$_1$ (I_1): you_1 = in turn prime-minister and his wife
Them = crowd of journalists

This interpretation is valid for the Q/A framework and ad narrative, but they do not represent valid interpretations for the advertised commodity. Another interpretation consistent with the product relevance will take our process further to the enrichment stage:

"Sch_1…[do] you_2 know who [made *it*]?

I_2: Do you know who made it?

According to this interpretation You_2 is mapped onto the reader and the product is focused in the verb argument. The commodity scheme does not cancel the Q/A frame and is consistent with previous product slogans : "Sch… [by] you know who". I_2 satisfies relevance by highlighting producers, but violates I_1 . Though relevant, I_2 is unlikely as Q/A for such a well-known and well-established brand, but still the question-mark presence does not qualify for an assertive interpretation.

I_3 is also possible as concentrating on the consumers is supported by the characters in the image narrative and the date: since 1783, but is refuted by the headline.

I_3: …You know who drinks it?

Enriched syntactic positions through expansion did not yield optimally relevant and consonant interpretations for the headline and the slogan. The reader's expectation of relevance is invariably thwarted by the semantics of what is linguistically expressed. The LF is informationally opaque due to the ellided

arguments, operator and unassigned indexicals, leaving the reader guessing as to the set of assumptions that the advertiser was intending to make manifest.

This conclusion stresses the fact that in advertising relevance can be exploited to its maximum negative end, it can be unclear and indirect, a parallel to uncooperative conversations where some participant is unwilling to bring forth a positive contribution to the other participant's goals. The chain means-ends is consequently extremely intricate with the linguistic constitutent not bringing a contribution to the "conversational" goal of finding relevance.

The presence of the linguistic constituent and the narrative are assumptions of the intention to communicate and we, as readers, are summoned to create coherence by bolting together these assumptions. They must be weak and mostly covertly communicated (the image is primed):

Immplicated premise: People like Tony Blair have class […….]

Implicated conclusion: People who have class drink Schweppes

Weak Implicature: If you drink Schweppes, you will have class

The square brackets in the implicated premise section can be further elaborated with other relevant elements such as:

Implicated premises: People like Tony Blair are TONIC, FUNNY, UNIQUE[1]
RESPECTED
Have TRADITION

Implicated conclusions: People who are [tonic, unique, funny, respected….] drink Schweppes

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Weak implicatures: Drinking Schweppes will rub on you some tonicity, uniqueness, fun, tradition, etc. (an array of weakly communicated implicatures).

Each weak implicature can function as implicated premise for the subsequent derivation of weaker CIs of the type a, b, below, as well as an indirectly communicated implicature from the advertiser's technique in c):

a)"Schweppes is a unique drink";

b)"Schweppes is a good drink";

c) "Famous brands do not need a hard, reason approach."

Flouting relevance is employed as an implicature generating device, all these weak implicatures being overtly communicated since they are linked to the product in ways in which the ad textual representations are not. The textual interpretations I_2 and I_3 helped the reader make bridging assumptions about consumers and producers alike but it was the image narrative on which the implicature derivation process was based and which associates the ad with "poetic" communication and "tickle" soft sell.

[1] "unique" and "tonic" are rhetorically relevant (assonance rhyming with Tony B.). The Romanian TV commercial capitalized on the product unicity: "Gustul unic al lui Schweppes" nu poate fi deghizat"

This case was a demonstration of the fact that negative contributions can be brought to the communicative intention (textual components) alongside with positive relevant contributions through the image narrative.

Conclusions

Commercial advertising prefers indirect soft-sell pitches based on non-imposition and dissociation inherent in the different degrees of Relevance flouting.

Since the product „new feature" is hard to delineate and there is practically no clear-cut distinction between different brands of similar commercial products, non-relevant cues and images are associated in a continuum with strong implicatures strongly backed by the advertiser, and weaker, less determinate implicatures derived by the consumer/reader on his own responsibility. Strong overtly communicated implicatures are linked with presuppositions and explicatures which are present in the LF, are definite and non-cancelable and therefore carefully selected since the advertiser takes responsibility for them.

Weak implicatures inherent in metaphoric or loose expression help with the construction of the interpretation but are not essential for the product being advertised. Being more indeterminate, weak implicatures can also be deemed risky and the advertiser takes a serious responsibility in employing.

Interpretations seemingly irrelevant or peripheral to the product, contributing the reward for paying attention, such as sexual pleasure, beauty, happiness, are likely to be covertly communicated through visuals.

Quite often in the case of Romanian headlines, weak implicatures are communicated by the priority of the literal meaning in the pun, as the literal meaning is arguably better known than the corresponding product name.

Despite covertly communicated negative weak implicatures and relevance at its maximum negativeness, flouting Relevance is an implicature generating device with metaphors, figurative, loose language, and puns representing an economic way of arriving at optimal relevance and at the same time a profitable pathway to bypass audience distrust, to enhance tangibility and claim strength.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

HYPOTHESIZING ON SECOND LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION THROUGH THE MEDIA

DIANA ROXANA COTRĂU

ABSTRACT. The paper below, without being the result of research *per se*, intends to show that the local Romanian media are a source of second language socialization for the young Romanian teenagers. Only two types of media are examined for instances that could create the possibility for such type of socialization to occur: the niche television and printed press. Without carrying out an actual survey and without actually verifying the occurrence of socialization, our hope is that the hypotheses we lay down in the paper below will perhaps be validated by future research.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is trying to launch some hypotheses on the possibilities available for young people as media consumers to be socialized in a second language. To that end, without engaging in thorough research, we trekked the niche media landscapes to identify and highlight the potential of two types of media products as instruments and sources for the socialization of young Romanian consumers into a second language: English. The television and the printed press will be scanned for loci where the young people are enabled either to consume or to interact with cultural products cloaked to varying extents in the second language.

There are three considerations underlying our perspective. Firstly, we have to take into account that we are dealing with an age where locality and globality are two intersecting forces that shape the new socio-cultural discourses, language included. With that in mind, we have to remark upon the fact that while the two media of our choice are either carriers of imported formats, domesticated or otherwise, or facilitators of cultural affiliations that transgress geographical borders, far from being inhibited by the unfathomable horizons thus opened the young Romanian viewers and readers alike adeptly negotiate these new dimensions of communication to consume or produce cultural products. The formats and products are designed to be more interactive than ever since the editorial policy makers have increasingly come to acknowledge the audiences to be active rather than passive[1]. The young teenagers being by definition creative and innovative will, as a segment in the audience, use selectively the media niches which give them leeway to interact and innovate. In the process, we hypothesize, the young consumers will come across the possibilities to

[1] Stuart Hall is the author of the seminal study Encoding/Decoding television messages, where he argues that audiences are not passive but active and classifies the three types of decoding television messages: preferred, negotiated and oppositional.

socialize in a second language, which in turn lays the ground for them to re-create literally and symbolically identities surpassing the local.

To this we add the third element configuring our hypothetical build-up: the sociolinguistic tenet that knowledge of grammar, lexicology and phonology, does not suffice to explain the development of language in children. Language development exceeds the strictly linguistic boundaries and moves into the socio-cultural dimension. Children learn the *appropriate* use of language, the cultural norms of spoken interaction, rather than just the linguistic rules of correct grammatical usage (Ochs and Schieffelin: 1983, Dell Hymes). Given the new types of media products, the Romanian teenagers are exposed to socio-cultural dimensions that exceed the familial and the neigbourhood articulations and move onto the global coordinates. What we intend to explore is how the young local media consumers and producers[2] can acquire new identities and socialize through the intermediary of the second language outside the formal education institutions.

a. Television

In the aftermath of the emblematic 1989 (the change of regime in Romania) we have witnessed the proliferation of the television channels, domestic or imported, and the differentiations of the members of the audience into segments and communities of taste and thus of niches within the audience. One such segmental audience coalesced around the determinants of age and subcultural orientation forming the group of young television viewers. They began to be targeted more and more narrowly until eventually niche channels were especially created bombarding them with messages designed to conserve their loyalty as viewers. In turn, the young people in Romania circumscribed culturally by this niche medium can and do appropriate its messages in ways that show them to be literate television consumers and selective decoders of its multicultural messages. Moreover, they do not emerge unimpressed in the process. Their consumption of the television products, mainly of the prevailingly imported messages, is underlain by a complex process: the global, or imported, discourse is locally contextualized. The local identity vectors are put to work and the television messages are decoded either in line with the dominant meaning or in opposition, or else they are negotiated (Hall).

Perhaps the best illustrator of the efforts by this niche medium to gratify the special focal needs of the young Romanian viewers is the evolvement of the MTV Romania and VH-1 channels. Since our concern in the present paper

[2] Audiences, readers, etc. can and do interact with the media products and provide their own inputs in the form of feed backs that can influence the programming of shows, the writing in/out of characters in soap operas et al., sending SMSs in interacting shows which are flashed on the screen, call in on radio or TV programmes, writing letters to editors which are answered in editorials or the *problem pages* in magazines, and in other subtler or less conspicuous forms.

is to track the possibilities of second language socialization embedded in the media we considered two levels where the process is likely to occur: the linguistic wrapping (language of the titles) and the linguistic content (language of the programmes/editorial content). In the case of the former, a salient point was made by the titling of programmes for the Romanian MTV and VH-1 channels[3]:

MTV
06.00 Hituri non-stop
07.00 MTV AM
10.00 Top Ten
11.00 Hituri non-stop
11.55 MTV News
12.00 Hituri non-stop
13.00 MTV Exclusiv
13.55 MTV News
16.00 Total Request
17.00 MTV Select
18.00 Daria
18.30 Videoclip Loredana. *Making of*
19.00 Lista hiturilor UK
19.55 MTVNews
20.00 Hituri non-stop
22.00 Jackass
22.30 Punk'd
23.00 Yo!
01.00 Videoclipurile de noapte

VH-1
07.00 Hituri VH1
11.00 Then and Now
12. 00 Top 10. Bob Marley
13.00 Ora anilor '80
14.00 Top 10. Viewers
15.00 Hituri VH1
18.00 Ora anilor '80
19.00 Top 10. Bob Marley
20.00 Smells like the '90's
21.00 Then and Now
22.00 Concert. Peace One Day

[3] Cotrau, Diana, Linguistic Mediation of Subcultural Identity on MTV Romania, *LINGUA A. LINGVISTICA,* ANUL II/2003

00.00 Greatest Hits. Charity
00.30 Phil Collins
01.00 Flipside
02.00 Chill Out
03.00 Hituri VH1

The imported formats are instantiated at the linguistic level at varying extents:

- exclusive use of mainstream English: e.g. *Total Request, MTV News, Greatest Hits, Then and Now, Top Ten, Viewers*, suggesting that the young Romanian viewers are English literate as members of a larger geolinguistic space.

- exclusive use of vernacular English as indicative of the subcultural style: e.g. *Jackass, Flipside, Chill Out, Punk'd, Yo!* , assuming that the young Romanian audience is knowledgeable in the fine variety distinctions of English.

- Romanian titles playing on homophony between Romanian and English: *Hituri non-stop* [English translation: Non stop hits], *MTV Exclusiv* [Engish translation: MTV Exclusive]. Verbal play is an intrinsic and defining feature of teenage talk (Labov).

- titles combining Romanian and English in the same syntagm: *Videoclip Loredana. Making of*, an instance of symbolical code-switching (Gumperz) suggesting that the imported (second) language is the better reflector of the programme content.

In what concerns the programmes, besides the Romanian productions most of which are shaped on imported formats, there are several authentic productions (American or British) where the only interference with the local variety comes in the form of the Romanian subtitles (with the reservation that poor translations might distort the cultural and linguistic message). Such shows as *MTV News, The Osbournes, Punk'd*, etc., are examples of carriers of cultural values that transgress geographical borders. By consuming such television produce and appropriating the embedded (sub)cultural values the Romanian teenagers can identify with groups that are distributed worldwide and can form affiliations with other teenagers even though the geography forbids it. Perhaps this could be taken as an extra example substantiating the remark that "in the contemporary period of globalization, the construction of identity and social relations is increasingly taking place amidst the trans-border circulation of cultural and discursive materials that embed forms of belonging"[4]. Such global affiliations are formed through the agency of language – in the case of the Romanian teenagers, the second language: English. Such second language learning as is carried out in formal settings (school, etc.) is amply

[4] Arjun Appadurai quoted in Wan Shun Eva Lam, Second Language Socialization in a Bilingual Chat Room: Global and Local Considerations, *Language Learning & Technology*, Vol. 8, No.3, September 2004, pp.44-65.

supplemented by the exposure to genuine (native) audio-visuals of the language as made available by television. Not only that, but the television medium transcends the formal process of learning and enables the teenager to virtually move on a global scale and form allegiances with peers worldwide. He/she can, thus, acquire new and unprecedented identities for the environment where the second language 'learning' takes place is extended *ad infinitum*.

b. Teen Magazines

The printed press has proliferated along the same lines as the television in Romania. The readership has been segmented for marketing reasons and ever narrower reader niches were circumscribed and cultivated for the consumption of the self-multiplying printed material produced. From among them, the most prolific and loyal consumer proved to be the teenage readership. Consequently, the number of teenage magazines has risen almost exponentially within the past 15 years.

The appeal of this type of niche press rests, perhaps, in its capacity of carrier and disseminator of focal news (about music and film stars, factual or gossipy) as well as that of anticipator and identifier of focal needs (advice on health, beauty, fashion and sexual matters). But its greatest appeal yet is the use of a language of solidarity (Trudgill, Hudson) and of a dialogic mode[5] meant to 'humour' the teenager, who is by definition oppositional (Hebdige).

The solidarity of the language in the teen magazines designed to establish a sense of closeness[6] and intimacy between the editors and the readers is realized at several levels. Firstly, the choice of content topics concords with the focal interests of the teenagers. Interest in movie and music stars is gratified by ample material on the lives and exploits, public or private, of top-of-the-wave figurants in show business. The young readers are thus socialized into a world that is virtually out of their reach both socially and geographically. The next step would be discussing the topics of magazines and socially mediating them (introducing glamorized elements and ritualizing them in the teenagers' life routines)[7]. By consuming these cultural products offered by the niche press the Romanian young males and females are united with teens worldwide into a community of taste and thus can surpass their local identity to acquire a different status: that of the 'global' teen.

[5] Bignell, Jonathan. 2002. *Media Semiotics. An Introduction*.

[6] Sue Thornton, in a seminal volume on subcultures, notes that the editing staff might be former or current subcultural members. She calls them *aficionados*: "the writers or editors of subcultural press who at one point or another have been participants in subcultures and still espouse versions and variations of the underground".

[7] Barker, Chris and Andre, Julie. 1996. Did you see? Soaps, teenage talks and gendered identity.

Secondly, the graphics and layout designs, the cover logos and fonts are *teen-appealing* and *teen-friendly*[8]. Thirdly, much of the written material replicates the idiosyncrasies of the teen vernacular. Not only that, but as the teen slang is known to be the most changeable and innovative area in language (Crystal), magazine policies make it their priority to stay updated on the linguistic developments of teen talk.

We mean to make a point of the last of the three aspects above for *it* is relevant to our topic since it concerns language *per se*. We should note that several[9], if all, of the Romanian teen magazines reiterate the new features of Romanian teenage slang resulting mainly from contamination with 'foreign' models. The contaminating models circulate across borders and are universal teen values, piecemeal of the teen subcultural capital[10]. Just as foreign borrowings, most of which are American, populate the 'cool' language of the Romanian young speakers, so the logos or titles or embedded sentences of the written material in the teen magazines either contain random lexical elements or are fully rendered in the foreign (English) code. To give just a few examples: *COOL Girl* – magazine name, *Orlando rulz* - superlative reference to an American movie star, *girl 2 girl* - column title circumscribing a gendered reader, etc. All of these examples prove at least two things: on the one hand, the editors are making it their priority to monitor teen slang and its developments, and this they turn into a strategy to maintain a critical mass of audience. On the other hand, their use means that the editorial expectations are for the readers to have no problem decoding them, which in turn means that they have been internalized by the young readers at deep-seated levels.

Conclusions

There are several possibilities offered by the Romanian niche media to the Romanian teens to be socialized in a second language: the English language. The content of the television programmes and teen magazines as well as their linguistic cloaking, either fully or sparingly, in an imported and prestige language are so many proofs that the context exists for the socialization to occur, even if we haven't actually recorded it. This potential lies in the audio-visual rendering of genuine language samples in the case of television and written occurrences in the printed press.

The Romanian teens when consuming the television and printed press products are exposed to cultural values, linguistic included, which transgress geographical borders. This transgression dissolves spatial and national divides and dispels locality contours. Romanian teens are thus enabled to acquire new

[8] My italics.

[9] Romanian Teen Magazines and Their Active Readership, STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, Philologia, XLIX, 4, 2004.

[10] Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concept of cultural capital, from which Sue Thornton coins 'subcultural capital'.

identities and socialize globally through the intermediary of the local media which deliver their messages, fully of partially, in a transnational language of prestige, a teen *lingua franca*.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

SITCOMS REVISITED

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ABSTRACT. Comedy is that which makes one laugh. But, just what is it that makes one laugh? Some elements are required for something to be humorous: it must appeal to the intellect rather than emotions, it must be mechanical and inflexible, it must be inherently human, with the capability of reminding us of humanity, there must exist a set of established social norms which are familiar to the observer, the situation and the actions performed as well as the dialogue spoken must be inconsistent or unsuitable to the surroundings, but it must be perceived by the observer as harmless and painless to the participants. The article tries to give some answers to some of these questions.

1.0. Television is the most popular art form for many people. They have the set on several hours a day, seven days a week, watching everything from soaps to sitcoms. Such a voracious appetite for entertainment and information requires a huge quantity of material in the form of programs. Television needs shortcuts to provide those programs.

The most prevalent form of show on television is the episodic series. It has a continuing set of characters and settings with a different plot in each episode. This approach to doing programs came from radio, and is usually used in mystery/crime or comedy formulas.

The quality of shows originates from a wide variety of influences, but mediocrity (i.e. ordinary, neither extremely high nor extremely low quality) appears to be the order of the day. However, contrary to popular opinion, the TV industry is not necessarily to blame for mediocrity. The ratings show that mediocrity, and not the difficult-to-define "quality", draws enough audience to make commercial TV pay.[1] This does not mean to say that there is no quality programming on television. It simply indicates that the kind of quality demanded by critics is not economically nor is it commercially feasible.

One thing that is immediately clear when watching television is that programming is dominated by entertainment format. Comedy on television came almost intact from radio, doing a visual version of popular shows.

2.0. Television is one of the major forms of entertainment in the world today. It has become a major component of our lives. Television as an entertainment medium is very much different from other performing art. First, of course, there are the commercials. Second, you have a whole different

[1] The rating systems, the research bureaux, etc., all show the same results: audiences are offered quality programming – thoughtful, provocative drama, discussion programs, cultural offerings such as opera, ballet, concerts – they just don't watch it.

attitude when approaching commercial television than when approaching the theater. In the latter case you go and sit in a darkened room with the idea of concentrating on that one thing: the play or the movie. In addition, you are surrounded by other people that have the same intention. This is not, however, how television is usually watched. Television is in your home, but there are constant interruptions: the phone rings, a visitor at the door, it's time to cook dinner, housework, any number of things fighting for your attention. Theater is considered an art; television is considered, particularly by those who run it, an industry.

Television is an important part of our life, and, although a great amount has been said and written about its significance and impact on politics, sociology, communications, technology and the modern life style, almost no attention has been paid to the programs themselves as an art form.

The sitcom is the most numerous form of program on television.[2] Comedy is that which makes one laugh. But, just what is it that makes one laugh? Some elements are required for something to be humorous: it must appeal to the intellect rather than emotions, it must be mechanical and inflexible, it must be inherently human, with the capability of reminding us of humanity, there must exist a set of established social norms which are familiar to the observer, the situation and the actions performed as well as the dialogue spoken must be inconsistent or unsuitable to the surroundings, but it must be perceived by the observer as harmless and painless to the participants. One major point that becomes apparent when one examines comedy is that it is based on incongruity: the unexpected with the expected, the unusual with the usual, the misfit in what has been established as a societal norm. For there to be incongruity there must be something to be incongruous to. Therefore, for a comedy to work there must be an established set of cultural, human and societal norms, mores and idioms, idiosyncrasies, and terminologies against which incongruities may be found. Such norms may be internal (which the author has provided in the script) or external (which exist in the society for which the script was written). The major problem is to

[2] This term applies to all types of situation comedy, and there are three distinct types of sitcom: *artcom* (for the action comedy), *domcom* (for the domestic comedy), and *dramedy* (for the dramatic comedy). The *artcom* is the most numerous type of sitcom on television and can be based on a variety of themes: the family, places, occupations, etc. The *domcom* is more expansive than the *artcom*, having a wider variety of events and a greater sense of seriousness. It involves more people, both in the regular cast and in transient actors brought into individual episodes. The greatest emphasis in a *domcom* is on the characters and their growth and development as human beings. A *dramedy* is the rarest and most serious type of sitcom; its entire being is not devoted to evoking laughter from the audience. Its emphasis is on thought, often presenting themes that are not humorous: war, death, crime, aging, unemployment, racism, sexism, etc. The humor is more comic intensification than an end in itself.

know what norms exist, and which have become out-of-date. Nonetheless, a funny play can remain funny, even when the norms change.[3]

Three aspects of incongruity are *literalization*, *reversal*, and *exaggeration*. In *literalization* the joke comes from taking a figure of speech and then performing it literally.[4] *Reversal* is simply reversing the normal, taking what is normal and expected and doing or saying the opposite. An *exaggeration* is taking what is normal and blowing it out of proportion. Events occur to which the characters will react beyond all proportion.[5] The greatest incongruity is the violating of societal taboos. This violation can provoke the greatest laughter. In American society the greatest taboos are discussions of sex, death, and biological functions such as the elimination of body waste. These are all subjects which society has 'decreed' should be discussed seriously, discreetly, and euphemistically, if discussed at all. It is from these taboos that much humor is derived.

The final criterion for humor is, as Aristotle states, that *'…which causes no pain or destruction…is distorted but painless'*. The comic action is perceived by the audience as causing the participants no actual harm: their physical, mental, and/or emotional well-being may be stretched, distorted, or crushed, but they recover quickly and by the end of the performance they are once again in their original state.[6] For an attempt at humor to succeed, these must be present: as long as the audience knows the norms and can thus see the incongruity, the participants act in an inflexible manner but are inherently human, no one appears to be hurt, and the audience doesn't take it personally, then an attempt at being funny will succeed.

2.1. Television has a tight external structure forced on it by the limitations and practices of commercial television. A thirty minute television series episode has the following characteristics: (a) it generally has a

[3] There are many things in Shakespeare's plays that are incongruous to today's norms, and thus his comedies continue to be funny four hundred years later. We still laugh and the plays are still funny because he gained most of his humor from human rather than social norms.

[4] When Max Smart (*Get Smart*) asks the robot agent Hymie to "give me a hand", Hymie detaches a hand and gives it over, interpreting the instruction literally. On the situation comedy *Cheers,* Coach, and later Woody, the bartenders, take everything that is said to them at face value, apparently incapable of recognizing allusion and double meaning, hyperbole, or figures of speech.

[5] The jealous wife's discovery of a blond hair on her husband's jacket leads her to build an etire scenario of mad trysts, trips to the Riviera, and a murder plot against her, until he points at the collie sitting at her feet. Such exaggeration is a standard in comedy.

[6] A prime example are the Warner Brothers' Road Runner cartoons, in which Wile Coyote is dropped, crushed, pummeled, rolled, wrung, and otherwise punished for his attempts to catch the road runner, yet seconds later is putting together his next 'perfect widget' to carry out his next plan. Wile Coyote is never damaged permanently, no matter how high the cliff he falls off or how big the rock that lands on him. The criterion applies to real life, as well. It is funny when someone slips on the ice and falls: people laugh – until they realize that the person broke his/her leg. At that moment the event is no longer humorous.

playing time of 24 minutes (filled with six minutes of the show's sponsor's commercials), (b) it uses a cast of actors playing the main and supporting characters that continue in their roles in every show, with transient characters brought in to provide variety and/or plot complications, (c)the relationship of the regular cast of characters stays the same throughout the series, as long as the format remains the same, (d) the major situations in which the characters are found remain the same, plots arising out of the problems introduced to the situation and the characters responding to the problems, (e) every show has an opening used before each episode which acts as background to the credits, and which with pictures and perhaps lyrics to a title song, establish characters, time, environment, and the basic situation (i.e. the exposition), (f) episodes often begin with a teaser, one to two minutes in length, which introduces that episode's problem, the disruption of the status quo, in such a way that it leaves the audience eager to see what will happen after the first set of commercials, and (g) at the end it shows that the status quo has been reestablished and that leaves the audience with a good feeling about the show, so they will watch it again next week.

The structure of a typical television show episode is very simple, and applies to the situation comedy. So the situation comedy appears to be just like every other half-hour series program on television. What makes it different is one prime consideration: it is supposed to be funny. Its main reason for existing is to evoke laughter from its audience.

3.0. Sitcom is defined most simply as a comic narrative in series format Lovell, 1986:152). There is relatively little work of a substantial kind written about individual television programmes, or about the work of television authors. It is only 'art television' which invites and receives attention in such terms, but then usually as art rather than something specific to television, produced as it were against the odds. One reason for this difference in the way television is studied is its heterogeneity. It is a medium which appears to be a neutral relay for other forms and materials – journalism, drama, sport, film, variety shows, etc. – with nothing distinctively its own, so that it becomes interesting chiefly for its social function and effects in an advanced industrial society (Lovell, 1986:149).

Murdock and Golding (1989:183) argue that television must be understood primarily as a commercial organization which produces and distributes commodities. It is this function that determines the nature and shape of the programs. This gives television a certain homogeneity behind the surface diversity, which is essentially ideological. The need to reach a mass audience leads to television which caters to the lowest common denominator of public taste and prejudice. They believe television has an

inbuilt conservatism which can only be evaded at the margins, in programs with minority appeal, inevitably slotted into off-peak viewing hours.[7]

Williams (1974:24) argues that radio and television transmission processes preceded the development and definition of content, and as a result, television was parasitical upon existing events – a coronation, a major sporting event, theatres, etc. Its novelty consists in its ability to bring the public world into the increasingly privatized home; again an emphasis on social function rather than form.[8] However, he accepts that television is typically not switched on for a single program, but for a period of time, frequently a whole evening. He argues that advertising breaks and other interruptions, such as trailers, become part of a continuous flow of discontinuous and unconnected items. The effects of television are mediated by this experience of flow, which overrides the effects an individual program might have if it were watched as a discrete item.

Williams's concept of flow draws attention to television's mode of consumption – the viewing situation at home. Buscombe and Alvarado (1978) develop a similar argument from the point of view of production rather than consumption. They share Murdock and Golding's definition of television as commodity production, and like any other such, its product must, they argue, be standardized and reproducible. Hence the tendency noted by Williams, to produce series and serials.[9]

In what follows we will be looking at situation comedy, a form which is more or less specific to television – one of its innovations. It is a form which is widely denigrated, but which enjoys great popularity. It has received almost no critical or theoretical attention. It comes under the category of 'light entertainment'. Light entertainment also comprises variety shows, quizzes and games, and general entertainment. Sitcom is defined most simply as a comic narrative in series format. It shares with other types of comedy the intention to produce laughter, while its telling of a story places it with other non-comic series. Most sitcoms are series rather than serials, but

[7] The consequence of this view is that popular television such as crime series, soap operas, quizzes, variety acts, are largely ignored, and it is only recently that this type of television has gained serious attention in terms which do not take it for granted that it is aesthetically worthless, ideologically pernicious, or both.

[8] Williams does recognize however that television, over time, developed forms peculiarly its own, in the dramatic series and serial, and in the drama-documentary. But what he considers unique on television, the characteristic which defines it, is the viewing experience it affords. This he identifies in terms of 'sequence or flow'.

[9] The process of scheduling generates uniformity which also favors the serial/series format. The schedule creates a grid of program slots, or units of time, classified according to the size and composition of the audience who will be watching at that time. These pre-given slots must be filled with material deemed suitable to that audience and that time of day. The length and format of a program is therefore determined not by anything intrinsic to its form or content, but by the demands of the schedule.

a hard-and-fast distinction is difficult to sustain.[10] The serial has narrative continuity from one episode to the next, while the series has only continuity of character and situation. The events of one episode have no narrative consequences for the next. Each episode is complete in itself.[11]

4.0. There are a number of major theories of narrative structure and process, and fewer of jokes and the comedic. But we run into problems when the two resources are explored jointly in the hope of making them yield up a viable approach to comic narratives.[12] In the face of this difficulty it is tempting to separate narrative structure from comedy, and to identify the source of the comic in elements independent of the narrative with which they are articulated. Eaton (1981:22) takes this line of argument when he finds the source of comedy not in the narrative itself, but in "those excesses – gags, verbal wit, performance skills – which momentarily suspend the narrative". However, Lovell (1986:153) does not accept that comedy in comic narratives can be reduced to a series of jokes, gags, etc. strung out along a facilitating narrative which is not in itself funny. There are stories that are comic, or whose 'funny side' we may be invited to see through the telling, whether or not these stories are interlarded with jokes and witticisms by the teller.

Why are some aspects of 'human social relations' funny? Are they in themselves comic, or are they only so if looked at in a certain way, or from a certain distance? Are there some situations which are always perceived as funny, and any which cannot be? Sitcoms share in common the intention to produce laughter through the telling of a series of funny stories about characters tied together in some ongoing 'situation'. Here, we are not considering anything 'found' in real life which is unintentionally funny, but an artifact constructed for the very purpose of making us laugh. The comic intention of sitcom is clearly signaled, just as clearly as the comedian telling a joke.

If it is granted that there is such a thing as a comic narrative, then do comic narratives have a distinctive type of narrative structure? The dominant view, which informs the conventions of most social realist comedies, is one which traces events and actions back to earlier events and actions, to the motives and intentions of individuals, and also the unintended consequences of those actions. A typical narrative chain will consist of actions, interactions and their consequences. Those genres where causality is governed by

[10] Serials are dramatized narratives, like series, but they are split into episodes so that the story is told piecemeal. In the special case of the long-running narrative, such as *Coronation Street,* there are parallel and interlocking stories rather than a single narrative, and in principle the story has no ending.

[11] Some classic examples are *Dad's Army, Porridge, Fawlty Towers, Steptoe and Son.* However, there are some sitcoms series which do have minimal narrative continuity over a block of episodes, for instance *Sole, Butterflies,* and *Agony.*

[12] If we ask what it is that makes sitcom funny, the narrative element has a habit of receding; if we begin to analyze the narrative structures of sitcoms we find ourselves describing them in ways which lose from sight the fact that they are funny (Lovell, 1986:153)

chance are often labeled escapist. Like social realism, says Lovell (1986:156), they recognize the boundaries of possibility of the real social world. Nothing is allowed to happen which might not happen in reality. They produce tales of what might just conceivably occur in a given social world, a given situation. But since their primary goal is not to 'show' that reality, but to entertain, they emphasize the surprising, the unexpected, the unusual and the exceptional.

Neale (1980:20) argues that in comedy it is orderly narrative *per se* which is disrupted, and that the disruption takes the form of jokes, gags and other excesses which temporarily suspend the narrative flow.[13] The importance of intentionality to the comic is very high. Unless we recognize the intention to produce laughter we would not classify a fiction as comedy. Much realist fiction uses comedy extensively, and there are 'comedies of social realism' (Lovell, 1986:157). But just as the marvelous in comic mode licenses certain types of comic strategy, so comedies of social realism license different form of comedy. Since realism, in comic and non-comic mode, must restrict its action to the plausible, its comedy tends to be naturalized. It appears as a property of the world depicted, not as something constructed in the telling. It 'brings out' what is inherent in 'the human condition'.[14] Comedies of social realism, then, reference the social world through notions of what is typical.

At the other end of the spectrum we find those comedies which, like the non-comic forms they resemble, remain governed by naturalistic cause and effect, but their characters and action may be deeply implausible. There is far greater scope here for stereotyping and caricature. Like detective fiction, romance, etc. this type may be escapist, because it openly acknowledges its primary goal of entertainment.[15] The sitcoms seem to be closest to comedies of social realism because they are rather subdued in tone, producing a rueful smile rather than a good belly laugh.

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[13] This description fits to some extent those comedies which consist of narratives interspersed with jokes. But it fails to account for funny narratives as such. Moreover, Todorov's categories are here stretched to their limit. In his schema, adapted by Neale, the typical narrative structure opens on an order which is in equilibrium, and a condition of narrative process is that this order must be disrupted. Disruption is necessary to narrative process, not something to which it is opposed (Lovell, 1986:156)

[14] One common strategy for doing this is to create a character with a sense of humour who registers and comments on or reacts to the unintentional comedy s/he sees around her. This finding of comedy in the social world depicted draws attention away from the manner in which it is produced in the text, in a way quite commensurable with the goals of realism.

[15] Farce is one type of comedy which has this characteristic. Unlike comedies of formal disruption, nothing happens which might not happen. Unlike comedies of social realism, what happens is extraordinary rather than typical, as the characters that we meet. Like its non-comic equivalents, farce links its actions through chance encounters, coincidences, mistaken identities, etc. It all remains within the bounds of the possible, but if it can happen, then sooner or later it will Lovell, 1986:158).

The recognized social order which sitcom references comprises two levels: a normative or ideal order –what things ought to be like – and a 'real' order which comprises what usually and typically happens.[16] There is a possibility of some convergence between the requirements of social realism and the necessity, dictated by the constraints of the fictional series, to produce recognizable situations and characters quickly, through stereotyping, even caricature. Yet there is still a clear distinction between those characters in sitcom who are meant to pass as socially typical and those who are not. Only in the former case will the objection be raised that the character is not true to life (Lovell, 1986:159).

Sitcoms which come closest to social realism often generate their comedy through the exposure of contradictions and contrasts between these two orders – the ideal-normative and the real-typical. We laugh at the ideal, because the 'reality' we are shown falls so far short. We also laugh because we recognize its impossibility, and we laugh at ourselves and at the characters for nevertheless wanting and insisting on it. The conventions which govern character and action in comedies of social realism, then, are bounded, and in part determined, by those comedies' reference to a real social world. Eaton (1981:22) argues that the limited range of 'situations' used in sitcoms is determined not so much by their relevance to social reality, but by the constraints of format: the 'situation' needs to be one whose parameters are easily recognizable and which are returned to week after week.[17] Comedies of social realism have to be assessed not only in terms of their 'truth to reality but also 'truth to character'.

Governed only by the possible, they are from the start a law unto themselves. We expect the unexpected. Disorder rules. However, the real-typical may still play an important part in relation to sitcoms which place themselves outside the conventions of social realism. Characters belong to a possible rather than a plausible world, which takes its point of departure from the audience's knowledge of the social conventions of the real world. Role-reversal is only funny in relation to 'the normal'. Class is represented through lifestyle, and all the characters marked by self-conscious class identity are stereotyped.

Lovell (1986:163-4) asks himself whether there is any more fundamental connection between say, sexism, or generally reactionary ideologies, and either comedy in general or sitcom in particular. It would be most surprising to find unequivocally 'subversive' entertainment going out at peak viewing

[16] Crime has no place in the normative order which it violates but has a recognized place in the 'real-typical' People will have ides and beliefs about crime, probably stereotyped and certainly not always drawn from knowledge or experience.

[17] But sitcom's generic subordination to the requirements of the repeated series does not obliterate the differences between them in terms of the relationship of their conventions to prevailing views of the real typical (Lovell, 1986:160).

time. It is a matter of establishing that entertainment is of interest in its own right, before we bring it to be arraigned at the bar of ideology (Dyer, 1973: 45). In fact the question might be reversed, so that instead of asking comic forms for their ideological credentials, we might ask which ideological systems have generated good comedy. There is a range of types of comic narrative which have differential relationships to the 'real-typical' of social life, from 'comedies of social realism' to farce, with most sitcoms falling somewhere in between. Comedies of social realism share the realist goal of 'showing things as they really are', adapted for purposes of comedy to 'showing the funny side of life' (Lovell, 1986:164).

Comedies of social realism can have a critical cutting edge. Television sitcoms of this type work on the whole to produce tolerant acceptance of an imperfect but after all 'human' world. They produce a wry smile and at best the wish that things might be different, rather than any urgent sense that they can and should be. Lovell's view (1986:165) is that comedies which expose the inconsistencies and contradictions of the social world to laughter may extend 'recognition' beyond its usual boundaries; or, they may strengthen the sense that that order, flawed as it is, is normal and inevitable. We have to accept that the closer the referencing of social reality, the less 'subversive' the sitcom tends to be. This is not because this form of comedy is inherently conservative, but because the conventions of realism invite the audience to take the fiction seriously, even when it is a comedy, because it is to be seen as social comment.

4.1. Language creates comic effects and this thing is very relevant in the case of characters that have a special 'gift' to entertain and to talk nonsense. In this case the language is made of contradictions, antonyms, similes, etc. Messages have three levels of meaning: the denotative level, the interpretative level, and the relational level. The denotative level is that to which the message literally refers, the interpretative level is generated by a set of clues with the message, and, finally, the relational level expresses the relationship between the two communicants (Smith, Williamson, 1994:76). Speaking seems to be the most important 'activity' of the characters.

One of the most important functions of discourse analysis is to help to distinguish "what is said" from "what is done", from the actions performed with words. Labov (172:134) attempts to formulate rules that explain our ability to connect utterances in sequences by that functions they have.[18] This is done in terms of *shared knowledge*: "Given any two-party conversation, there exists an understanding that there are events that A knows about, but B does not; and events that B knows about and A does not: and AB events that are known to both. We can then state simply the rules of interpretation: if A

[18] "A statement follows a question; the question is a request for information; but in what way does the statement form an answer to the request? […] In answering A's request for information Q-S1 with a superficially unrelated statement S2, B is in fact asserting that there is a proposition known to both A and B that connects this with S1" (Labov, 1972, 134).

makes a statement about AB event, it is heard as a request for confirmation. That is, if A talks about an A event it is not heard as a request; if A talks about a B event it is a request for confirmation; if A talks about an AB event, a shared information is being drawn on" (Labov, 1972:138).

In sitcoms the most important feature is language and it shows interpersonal communication. The most important comedy tool is language beside gestures, settings and appearances. In the case of sitcoms Labov's shared knowledge comes in terms of double meaning. Double meaning words, shifts from one main idea to the other, onomatopoeia, pleonastic expressions, diminutives, the transgression of the decorum by the use of comic words, are some of the ways by which language creates meaning and provides humor.

Language creates comic effects and this thing is very relevant in the case of characters who have the special gift to entertain and talk 'nonsense'; the language they use is made of contradictions, antonyms, similes, but first of all their speech reveals meaning through the use of nonsense words. Sitcoms as forms of interpersonal communication assign language the most important role.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOVEL

ALINA PREDA

ABSTRACT. The **autobiographical novel** seems to have taken over some of the territory abdicated by the ambiguous genre called **autobiography**; and this is by no means surprising. While autobiography is a subgenre adopted by authors already known, who have published at least one book and distinguished themselves at some other, less controversial form, the autobiographical novel seems to be the subgenre of choice especially in the case of writers new to the literary scene. The similarities that bind the two closely related genres have made the boundaries between autobiography and the autobiographical novel seem vague, flexible, and fluid. In my attempt to assign Jeanette Winterson's *Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit* to a literary genre, I found Philippe Lejeune's work, *The Autobiographical Pact*, most useful. Lejeune's definition clearly shows the difference between the various autobiographical genres, pointing to the fact that it is possible to draw a definitive boundary between them. His classification can easily be put to work in separating autobiography and the autobiographical novel, as well as in settling the debate over how to distinguish one form of autobiographical writing from the others.

"As soon as I write, as a matter of fact, I share the desires and illusions of autobiographers, and I am surely not ready to renounce them. I say out loud: "I is someone else," and in a whisper perhaps I add: "but what a shame!" I am therefore inside and outside at the same time, in a situation of overlap."

Philippe Lejeune, *On Autobiography*
(1989: 133)

The autobiographical novel seems to have taken over some of the territory abdicated by the ambiguous genre called autobiography; and this is by no means surprising. Given the risks and responsibilities one has to take when publishing a work of non-fiction, it is no wonder that most writers would rather embark on a fictional adventure, instead of taking up the delicate task of giving birth to a naked version of their lives past. While autobiography is a subgenre adopted by authors already known, who have published at least one book and distinguished themselves at some other, less controversial form, the autobiographical novel seems to be the subgenre of choice especially in the case of writers new to the literary scene. The novelist is free to chafe against the norms of a sharply defined genre, to violate the rules of autobiography, never having signed the autobiographical pact. Unlike novelists, who hide behind the scenes while skilfully pulling the strings to enthral us with puppet shows of imaginary characters, autobiographers are ever-present, unable to hide or even temporarily retreat out of the limelight. Their responsibility is

enormous, and difficult to face, since they are bound to be subjective, no matter how hard they may try to reach the unattainable peak of neutrality. They can only rely on memory, mental adventure, verbal play, wit, and style to give life to their world, and to thus lure us into the world of their life.

The autobiographer may well have to highlight some events and downplay others, to pick and choose among thousands of significant details, to use what might be termed the fictional arsenal, settings, scenes, events, characterisation, focalisation, speech representation, etc. Still, s/he need not be accused of depicting the invented, rather than the actual, the fictional, instead of the factual, because it is neither the absence or presence of literary devices, nor the subject, or theme or tone of voice, that works to distinguish autobiography from the autobiographical novel, but the stance the author takes towards the things to be written. The author of the first intends to recall names, to recast presence, to record events and thus preserve a reality that existed and affected her/him. The latter may wish to recreate her/his life in fictional terms, by bringing into existence a fictional character. But there is something, in this literary attempt, that characterises both autobiographers, and novelists alike: it is as if, dazzled by the permanent shifting of disparate images in their everyday life, they turn to narrative in an attempt to stop the incessant flow of happenings that constitute their actual experience, and transform it into a well ordered whole, stable and secure. This is a process of filtering the spring of thought, of rejecting abstractions for the sake of the concrete, of turning chaos into order, fuzziness into a clearly shaped form. By cutting down bushes and trees from the woods of memory, to build a dam that might slow down the river of time and the spring of events, the authors of factual and fictional works finally manage to impose form on life.

The similarities that bind the two closely related genres have made the boundaries between autobiography and the autobiographical novel seem vague, flexible, and fluid. Autobiography employs fictional techniques and literary language; while the novel, being a text in a borderland genre, presents characteristics of both autobiography and fiction. Autobiography is an extremely brave performance, one might say, if compared to those curious monologues which constitute the less-daring related genres, resembling autobiography more or less closely: the autobiographical novel and the autobiographical poem. Unfortunately, the truth of autobiographical works is difficult to prove, since, as a rule, people create their own realities within their own semi-autonomous worlds. And even if the autobiography does not **hide** anything, it is actually impossible to argue that it **discloses** everything. The autobiographical novel allows the author to enjoy both the advantages of self-revelation, and the freedom to use the essential tool of imagination. But choosing the autobiographical novel over the more restrictive genre, is not to be seen as merely taking the easy way out. Lejeune explains that “when we see an autobiographer complain about the limitations and shortcomings of the genre,

which prevent him from expressing the complexity of his story or the profundity of his feelings, such passages should be read as a proof of his conformity. For who forces him to use this model of linear storytelling? Why doesn't he invent a form that better fits his particular experience?" (2000: 224)

Philippe Lejeune's definition clearly shows the difference between the various autobiographical genres, pointing to the fact that it is possible to draw a definitive boundary between them. His classification can easily be put to work in separating autobiography and the autobiographical novel, as well as in settling the debate over how to distinguish one form of autobiographical writing from the others. In my attempt to assign Jeanette Winterson's *Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit* to a literary genre, I found Philippe Lejeune's work, *The Autobiographical Pact*, most useful. (2000 [1996]) This was highly due to his reader-centred approach to the study of autobiography and of the other genres related to this frequently debated type of text.

In order to avoid falling into the trap other theoreticians could not evade, thus emitting either too narrow or too wide definitions, Lejeune starts neither from a particular work of one specific author, not from the determination to set the canonical basis of a literary genre, but from the way a certain work is perceived by the readers. Thus, he defines autobiography as "a retrospective account in prose made by a real person about his/her own existence, focusing on his/her personal life, and mostly on the history of his/her personality." (2000: 12) This definition rests on four different requirements:

- linguistic form
- subject matter
- the author's position
- the narrator's position

The main problems that Lejeune (2000[1996]: 6–7) identifies in the study of autobiography are:

- the place and the function of the autobiographic text for the author's work
- the chronology in an autobiographical story
- the relationship of the narrator to the narratee and to its 'hero'

Lejeune's aim is to analyse the behaviour of the narrator as mirrored by his/her own discourse, as well as the narrator's tactics in relation to the truth. (Lejeune 2000: 8) He first recalls the distinction between Genette's notions of **autodiegetic** narration and **homodiegetic** narration: while the former presupposes the identity narrator – protagonist, the latter employs first-person narrative although there is no identity between the two. From this follows the necessity to distinguish between the notions of grammatical person and the

narrator – protagonist identity[1]. It is autodiegetic narration, of course, that we will encounter in autobiographical writings. Autobiography proper also presupposes the identity of *the author* with *the narrator* and *the experiencing character*, identity which may be extremely difficult to prove, unless clearly stated. Although Lejeune mentions that these two conditions are either fully satisfied or not at all, he then goes on to show how problematic this identity issue really is[2]. And, indeed, Winterson's novel is a case in point. In *Oranges* the narrator is the same with the experiencing character, and first-person narrative is employed. So far, *Oranges* satisfies the autobiographical conditions. But Jeanette Winterson's book does not begin with a statement of the kind: "I, the undersigned" even though the name of the narrator – main character is Jeanette. Still, the surname is never mentioned, and though there are elements in the text that match events and realities identical to the ones in the author's life, the identity cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt. Lejeune claims that "autobiography is all or nothing", it is not "a guessing game"[3], on the contrary, it must be based on **the autobiographical pact**.

According to Lejeune, identity may be explicit or implicit. It is explicit if the name of the author on the cover of the published book matches the name of the narrator-protagonist in the story contained in that book. It is implicit, if there are other elements, at the edge of the text (2000: 27)[4], which may satisfy critics as

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[1] "Identitatea *naratorului* şi *a personajului principal*, pe care o presupune autobiografia, este marcată cel mai adesea prin utilizarea persoanei întâi. Este ceea ce Gérard Genette numeşte narațiunea „autodiegetică", în clasificarea pe care o face „vocilor" povestirii, pornind de la operele de ficțiune. Dar el observă foarte bine că poate exista povestire „la persoana întâi", fără ca naratorul să fie aceeaşi persoană cu personajul principal. Este ceea ce el numeşte, mai extins, narațiunea „homodiegetică". Trebuie, prin urmare, să distingem două criterii diferite: acela al persoanei gramaticale şi cel al indentității indivizilor la care trimit aspectele persoanei gramaticale. Această distincție elementară este uitată din cauza polisemiei cuvântului „persoană"; ea este mascată în practică prin legăturile care se stabilesc *aproape întotdeauna* între o anumită persoană gramaticală şi un anumit tip de relație de identitate sau un anumit tip de povestire. Dar aceasta se întâmplă „aproape întotdeauna"; excepțiile incontestabile ne obligă să regândim definițiile." (Lejeune, 2000: 14)

[2] "Două condiții sunt îndeplinite în întregime sau deloc şi acestea sunt, desigur, condițiile care opun autobiografia (dar, în acelaşi timp, şi celelalte forme de literatură intimă) biografiei şi romanului personal: condițiile – roman personal şi biografie. Aici nu există nici tranziție, nici amploare. O identitate există sau nu există. Nu există grade posibile, orice îndoială antrenând o concluzie negativă. Pentru ca să existe autobiografie (şi, în general, literatură intimă), trebuie să existe o identitate a *autorului*, *a naratorului* şi *a personajului.* Dar această „identitate" ridică numeroase probleme." (Lejeune, 2000: 13)

[3] "Autobiografia nu comportă grade: este totul sau nimic. […] Autobiografia nu este un joc de ghicire, este tocmai contrariul." (Lejeune, 2000: 25)

[4] "*Identitatea de nume* între autor, narator şi personaj poate fi stabilită în două moduri: *Implicit*, la nivelul legăturii autor – narator, cu prilejul *pactului autobiografic*; acesta poate lua două forme:utilizarea titlurilor, nelăsând nici o îndoială asupra faptului că persoana întâi trimite la numele autorului (*Istoria vieții mele, Autobiografie* etc.); *secțiunea inițială* a textului, în care naratorul îşi ia angajamentul față de cititor, comportându-se ca şi când el este autorul, astfel încât

a signature of the autobiographical pact: a book bearing the title *The Story of My Life* or a foreword stating: "This is an autobiography." In the case of *Oranges* there is no agreement whatsoever between the author and the readers, so the book does not qualify as an autobiography. But, in the absence of an autobiographical pact, what has determined the readership to view *Oranges* as Winterson's autobiography? Especially since *Oranges* was Winterson's first published work, and, according to Lejeune, it is probably only with the second published book that one can be called an author, since it is then that one ceases to be unknown and provides the audience with a sign of reality and with the possibility to match the name on the cover with two different discourses, at least one non-autobiographical[5]. The answer to this question comes from Lejeune's very words: In *The Autobiographical Pact*, Lejeune responded to critics who claimed that the definitions he gives in *L'Autobiographie en France* are too rigid, by admitting that, in his attempt to distinguish autobiography from the autobiographical novel, he had apparently over valuated the contract, and that, "if we remain on the level of analysis within the text, there is no difference". (Lejeune, 2000: 26) The text's reception is the only element that might be thought to validate the autobiographical pact, together with the intention of the author to engage in a contractual relationship with the readers, namely to sign **the autobiographical pact**.

Here are some examples of autobiographical works, of titles that mirror ways in which the autobiographical pact can be "signed":

The Confessions of St. Augustine, written at the turn of the fourth to the fifth century

A True History of the Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson (1682), which was the first autobiographical account in the Indian captivity narrative

The Journal of Madam Knight, by Sarah Kemble Knight, written in 1704-5, but only published in 1825

Jonathan Edward's *Personal Narrative* (ca. 1739)*The Autobiography of Thomas Sheperd*, *the Celebrated Minister of Cambridge, New England* (1830),

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cititorul nu are nici o îndoială asupra faptului că „eu" trimite la numele de pe copertă, chiar dacă numele nu este repetat în text. *Evident*, la nivelul numelui pe care naratorul – personaj şi-l atribuie în povestire şi care este identic cu acela al autorului de pe copertă.Este necesar ca identitatea să fie stabilită cel puțin prin unul din aceste două mijloace; se întâmpla adesea ca ea să fie stabilită prin ambele în acelaşi timp." (Lejeune, 2000: 27)

[5] "Pentru cititorul care nu cunoaşte persoana reală, crezând total în existența sa, autorul se defineşte ca persoana capabilă să producă acest discurs, şi îl imaginează, aşadar, pornind de la ceea ce această persoană produce. Poate nu este cu adevărat autor decât începând de la a doua carte, când numele propriu înscris pe copertă devine „factor-comun" a cel puțin două texte diferite şi oferă, prin urmare, o idee asupra unei persoane care nu este reductibilă doar la unul din textele sale şi care, susceptibilă să producă alte texte, le depăşeşte pe toate." (Lejeune, 2000: 22-23)

the first book in America, to use the term in its title *The life and Times of Frederick Douglass* (1881)
Besant, W. (1902). *Autobiography of Sir Walter Besant*. New York: Dodd, Mead.
Galton, F. (1908). *Memories Of My Life*. London: Methuen.
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Since *Oranges* does not meet the third requirement established by Lejeune, and part of the fourth[6], namely the identity author—narrator—main character, it must belong to a genre closely related to autobiography, namely **the autobiographical novel**. Although not an autobiography proper, *Oranges* plays an essential role in creating Winterson's autobiographical space. My claim seems to contradict Lejeune's statement regarding autobiography as the first published work: if the autobiography is the first book, its author is unknown; so even if s/he tells her/his own story in the book, s/he does not enjoy, in the eyes of the reader, the authority given by the previous production of other, non-autobiographical works. According to Lejeune, this type of authority is "essential for what we will call "the autobiographical space" "[7]. But this contradiction can be solved upon reading Lejeune's discussion (2000: 182) on

[6] "Definiția pune în joc elemente aparținând unor patru categorii diferite: *Formă a limbajului:* povestire în proză. *Subiect tratat:* viața individuală, istorie a unei personalități. *Situația autorului:* identitate a autorului (al cărui nume trimite la o persoană reală) şi a naratorului. *Poziția naratorului:* identitate a naratorului şi a personajului principal; perspectivă retrospectivă a povestirii. Este o autobiografie orice operă care îndeplineşte simultan condițiile indicate în fiecare dintre categorii. Genurile înrudite cu autobiografia nu îndeplinesc toate aceste condiții." (Lejeune, 2000: 12)

[7] „dacă autobiografia este prima carte, autorul său este, în consecință, un necunoscut, chiar dacă se povesteşte pe sine însuşi în carte; îi lipseşte, în ochii cititorului, acest semn se realitate care este producția anterioară a *altor texte* (nonautobiografice), indispensabilă pentru ceea ce vom numi „spațiul autobiografic"." (Lejeune, 2000: 26)

the work of André Gide. There, he defines *"**the autobiographical space"***, as delineated by two elements. On the one hand, the display, in a writer's work, of various writing games that build, shape and render the author's personality; on the other hand, the presence, in the cluster of these textual games, of a retrospective account of events central to the formation of the author's personality[8]. *Oranges* made way for the works to come, and, in light of these new works, the autobiographical novel appears to gradually open, offering a panoramic view of the writer's image. As Lejeune (2000: 206) pertinently argues, while for the writer the autobiographical space is a matter of demeanour, for the critic it is a matter of interpretation[9].

It is true that, unlike Gide, Winterson did not manifest a clear intention of building the image of her self as a correlation of various works which made no claim as to their autobiographical veracity, but which yielded that image through reciprocal interplay and through the space their architecture wedged together[10]. And still, I would argue that her novels together with her book of essays, do create what Lejeune called "***the autobiographical space"*** and this can be witnessed by considering the ambiguity lurking behind Winterson's literary discourse. This ambiguity is the result of certain contradictions regarding the position of the narrators in her stories towards the events they narrate. This uncertainty eventually places the readers in the uncomfortable position of being unable to identify the author's stance, in spite of their persistent efforts[11]. Lejeune (2000: 185) mentions, in detail, the way in which such a strategy

[8] "Nu este vorba de ceea ce numim banal o „inspirație autobiografică", adică scriitorul care folosește date împrumutate din viața sa personală, ci de o strategie care urmărește să formeze personalitatea prin cele mai diverse jocuri ale scriiturii. Fără îndoială că ar trebui inventat un cuvânt nou pentru a distinge această atitudine generală în raport cu scrisul, de ceea ce numim *stricto sensu* „autobiografie", adică povestirea retrospectivă a formării personalității asumate de autorul însuși. Când acest joc al textelor conține *și* o poveste autobiografică *stricto sensu*, am ales să o definesc prin expresia „spațiu autobiografic" "(Lejeune, 2000: 182)

[9] "Pentru autori însă, era vorba despre un comportament propriu-zis – neteoretizat; pentru critici, era vorba despre o interpretare ulterioară." (Lejeune, 2000: 206)

[10] "Imaginea acestui „om al dialogului", așa cum era el și care a dorit să fie rezultanta tuturor textelor pe care le-a scris, texte care, analizate pe rând, nu pretindeau în nici un fel fidelitatea autobiografică, dar care, […] prin jocurile lor reciproce în *spațiul* pe care îl continuau toate la un loc, defineau imaginea. […] Spațiul autobiografic astfel obținut creează categoric o complexitate, la nivelul diversității enunțurilor, dar mai ales produce, la nivelul enunțării, un efect de *ambiguitate*." (Lejeune, 2000: 183)

[11] "*Ambiguitatea* este cu totul altceva: este la nivelul enunțării, incertitudinea *sensului*, adică, în cele din urmă, incertitudinea în care se află cititorul în raport cu poziția naratorului față de ceea ce el povestește. […] Ambiguitatea se situează la nivelul fundamental al valorilor sau al viziunii lumii naratorului, unde alegerea mi se pare, de obicei, necesară și unde sistemul de indecizie nu poate decât să genereze o stare neplăcută. […] Atunci se creează jocul complice în care ambiguitatea enunțării se grefează pe complexitatea enunțului, joc care este, de fapt, cel al „*complicației*". […] Ambiguitatea lui Gide presupune că, în cele din urmă, cititorul nu poate să reducă sau să fixeze poziția autorului în ciuda dorinței pe care inevitabil o are." (Lejeune, 2000: 184)

works for the writer: fiction becomes depersonalisation as well as personal confession, (as, I would add, intimate confession turns fictional); memory and experience are, at the same time, "narcissistic and self-critical". This, Lejeune (2000: 185-186) states, is "a way of flirting with autobiography". Though, just because each work written by Winterson displays its own ratio of autobiographical features, it would be not only a mistake, but also a consequential mistake, to see any of them as ***the*** autobiography. By doing that, the readers would become unable to appreciate the interblending between the complicated art of self-fashioning and the related art of self-deception, the skilful shift from self-dramatisation to self-effacement.

The words of La Capra on the representation of history could well be applied to the representation of events in an autobiography: autobiographical works are far from being a corpus of data that one can represent truthfully and objectively, in a neuter way, but rather data that is processed repeatedly according to one's narrow present interests[12]. Linda Hutcheon points out the similarities between the writing of history (in our case life history, or the autobiography) and the writing of fiction, given by the way in which all storytellers express facts in words of their own, facts that they choose themselves, and to which they offer their own interpretation and significance. (Linda Hutcheon, 1997: 63) The facts cannot speak for themselves, they only become coherent when arranged in discourse by storytellers[13]. The role of the autobiographer, just like the one of the historian, is to tell plausible stories by using fragmentary and incomplete facts to which s/he gives order and meaning in a carefully constructed narrative structure. (see Hutcheon, 1997: 72) Some events remain closeted, others are given prominence or subordinated to make a point, the ordering and the hierarchy given to them by the author is meant to convey a certain meaning[14].

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[12] "însuşi procesul de transformare a evenimentelor în fapte, prin interpretarea mărturiilor de arhivă, se dovedeşte a fi un proces de transformare a urmelor trecutului (singura noastră cale de acces astăzi la acele evenimente) într-o reprezentare istorică. Prin aceasta, ficțiunea postmodernă subliniază faptul că „trecutul nu este un «acesta», în sensul unei entități obiectivate care poate fi reprezentată neutru în şi pentru sine sau reprocesată proiectiv în termenii intereselor noastre «prezente» înguste" (LaCapra, 1987: 10). Deşi aceste cuvinte aparțin unui istoric care scrie despre reprezentarea istorică, ele descriu la fel de bine lecția postmodernă asupra reprezentării istorice ficționalizate." (Hutcheon, 1997: 62)

[13] "Reprezentarea istoriei devine istoria reprezentării. […] Există o serie de analogii importante între procesul scrierii istoriei şi cel al scrierii ficțiunii şi printre cele mai problematice dintre acestea sunt presupozițiile lor comune referitoare la narațiune şi la natura reprezentării mimetice. Situația postmodernă constă în faptul că „un adevăr spus, cu «fapte» care-l susțin, dar un povestitor construieşte acel adevăr şi alege aceste fapte" (Foley, 1986: 67). În fapt, acel povestitor – al povestirii sau al istoriei – construieşte chiar şi aceste fapte, conferindu-le evenimentelor o semnificație particulară. În nici un fel de narațiune faptele nu vorbesc de la sine: povestitorii vorbesc pentru ele, alcătuind din aceste fragmente ale trecutului un întreg discursiv." (Hutcheon, 1997: 62)

[14] „[...] ideea lui Collingwood conform căreia rolul istoricului este să povestească istorii plauzibile, extrase din haosul de fapte fragmentare şi incomplete, fapte pe care el/ea le prelucrează şi

According to Hutcheon, (1997: 75) "the relationship between past and present is one of the still unsolved contradictions in the representations of postmodernist fiction". She pertinently argues that both historiographic theory and postmodern fiction manifest an inherent realisation of the influence the present imposes on the past in the very act of narrating, thus, neither the historian, nor the novelist try to reduce the strange events of the past to a veridical present[15]. As Linda Hutcheon points out, "the past is not something that can be avoided, controlled, or run away from. […] The past is something we have to come to terms with, and such a confrontation implies an acknowledgement of limitations, but also of power. Today we have access to the past only by means of following its traces […]. In other words, we only have at hand representations of the past, with which to build our narratives or explanations. In a very concrete sense, postmodernism manifests a tendency to understand the present culture as the product of previous representations. What this means is that postmodern art accepts and acknowledges the challenge of tradition: the representation of history cannot be avoided, but can be exploited and critically analysed in ironic and parodic ways[…]"(Hutcheon, 1997: 62–63).

It is, nowadays, widely acknowledged that, since the written text "cannot offer *direct* access to the past, it must be seen as a representation or a substitute obtained through the textual re-figuration of the raw past event." (Hutcheon, 1997: 86) Distortion of events in the process leading to their transformation into facts is inevitable. Raw material is given shape, form and meaning in narrative. To paraphrase Linda Hutcheon's statement about history[16], I could argue that autobiographical writings do not necessarily show readers what and how the author's past was like, but rather what parts of it can still be known in the form of representation. (1997: 92-93) But even though, at times, the attempt to use narrative in order to give meaning to experience may fail, narrativization is still the preferred method of representing knowledge, as Lyotard argues, in *The Postmodern Condition*. (see Linda Hutcheon, 1997: 72)

By writing *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, Winterson transposes her life into fiction, and also, as she herself has stated, re-creates herself as a fictional character. Her life becomes a story, while the story comes to life. Moreover,

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cărora el/ea, în consecință, le conferă o semnificație prin introducerea într-o structură narativă. Hayden White, desigur, merge şi mai departe şi arată cum istoricii trec sub tăcere, repetă, subordonează, subliniază şi subordo-neză aceste fapte, dar, din nou, scopul este acela de a conferi evenimentelor trecutului o semnificație anume." (Hutcheon, 1997: 72)

[15] „Atât în teoria istoriografică, cât şi în ficțiunea postmodernă există o acută conştiință de sine (atât teoretică, cât şi textuală) cu privire la actul narării, în prezent, a evenimentelor trecutului, la conjuncția dintre acțiunea prezentă şi obiectul trecut, absent, al acestei acțiuni. În reprezentarea postmodernă – istorică şi ficțională –, această dedublare este ireductibilă: nu există, de partea istoricului sau a roman-cierului, nici o intenție de a reduce trecutul straniu la un prezent verosimil." (Hutcheon, 1997: 76)

[16] „Istoria nu spune ce şi cum a fost trecutul; mai degrabă, ea spune ce mai este încă posibil să cunoaştem din el – şi, în concluzie, să reprezentăm." (Hutcheon, 1997: 92-93)

Winterson's readers might, and indeed, most of them do, see *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* as an autobiography. Thus, Winterson's story becomes her life in the mind of her readership. So, to paraphrase Linda Hutcheon (1997: 6)[17], the tension brought forth by this imposition-opposition ultimately defines the paradoxical worlds of Winterson's fiction. This kind of interaction is typically postmodern: Winterson's refusal to write a genuine autobiography gives rise to a postmodern representation, where subjective projection and mimetic mirroring are replaced by narrative and imagery that shape her ways of seeing herself, and her very ways of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing her present and past subjectivity. Roland Barthes[18], in his autobiographical work, clearly points out that representation of the self is impossible, since in order to represent the self one has to recreate the self. Jeanette Winterson's message echoes Barthes' – she might as well have stated: 'I will not say "I am going to reflect myself in this book", but just that "I am going to construct a text about Jeanette."

The novel, claims Lennard Davis[19], was the literary form that actually brought about an unprecedented overlap of signifier and referent, of fiction and fact, of illusion and reality. Thus, argues Hutcheon, some critics consider that "all novels manifest an ambivalent attitude towards the separation between fact and fiction." (1997: 81) By undertaking the act of writing, Winterson engages in a process of transforming events in facts, constructing the object of narration as subject, in a paradoxically totalizing, though inevitably partial approach. Winterson's *Oranges* is a self-reflexive work, and this feature points not only to the events narrated as facts, but also to the very act of narration, since "one can never separate 'facts' from the acts of interpretation and narration, as the facts (though not the events as well) are created by and through these very acts. And what becomes fact depends […] on the cultural and social context of the historian" or, in our case, of the writer. (Hutcheon, 1997: 81) Consequently, writing becomes an act resulting from a double codification, no dialectical recovery ever being

[17] "Acest gen de definiție […] îşi are însă rădăcinile în acea sferă culturală în care termenul de „postmodernism" şi-a găsit pentru prima dată un uz generalizat: arhitectura. Iar aici o nouă contradicție. În ea, autoreflexivitatea şi fundamentarea istorică – adică ceea ce este orientat către interior şi aparține lumii artei (precum parodia) şi ceea ce este orientat către exterior şi aparține „vieții reale" (precum istoria) – sunt juxtapuse şi egal valorizate. Tensiunea creată de această opoziție manifestă defineşte, în ultimă instanță, paradoxalele lumi textuale ale postmodernismului." (Hutcheon, 1997: 6)

[18] "E greu să ne imaginăm un text care să abordeze problema reprezentării-construcție mai direct decât această autobiografie postmodernă: „Eu nu spun: «O să mă descriu pe mine», ci: «Scriu un text şi îl numesc R.B.»" (Barthes, 1977 b: 56). El adaugă apoi: „Nu ştiu eu că, în *spațiul subiectului, nu există referent?*" A reprezenta sinele înseamnă să „constitui" sinele (82), fie în imagini sau în povestiri." (Hutcheon, 1997: 45)

[19] "Ca primă formă literară puternică, cuprinzătoare şi hegemonică, romanul a servit la ştergerea, într-un fel nemaiîncercat până atunci, a distincției dintre iluzie şi realitate, dintre fapt şi ficțiune, dintre simbol şi ceea ce este reprezentat." (L.Davis, 1987: 3, quoted in (Hutcheon, 1997: 46))

possible[20]. From this point of view, Winterson's statement that places *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* in the realm of fiction, rather than in that of factual writing, makes perfect sense. Winterson merely follows what Hutcheon (1997: 76-77) sees as the technique of postmodern writers: she does not write out of the urge to satisfy a need for totalisation, she simply offers an alternative representation of what her memory recorded as past events. This alternative view is contaminated by the present personality of the writer, who chooses exactly what facts to narrate, and how to interpret them. Moreover, the interpretation is bound to be shaped by the knowledge of the adult, who writes, not by the lack of knowledge of the experiencing character. Whether an attempt to clarify her past in order to better understand her present, or a mere literary endeavour, whether a semi-autobiography or just an autobiographical novel, *Oranges* is a work that clearly establishes a relationship between the past events in the writer's life, unstructured as they may have been, and the present in which she writes, transforming chaos into order, mystery into understanding, a fragmentary existence into the wholeness of a book[21].

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[20] "Aceasta este în mod deliberat o narațiune dublu codificată, aşa cum arhitectura postmodernă este o formă dublu codificată: ele sunt şi istorice, şi contemporane. Nu există o rezolvare sau o recuperare dialectică în nici unul dintre aceste două cazuri." (Hutcheon, 1997: 76)

[21] „Istoricii sunt conştienți că ei stabilesc o relație între trecutul despre care scriu şi prezentul în care scriu. Trecutul va fi apărut, poate, la fel de confuz, plural şi nestructurat ca şi prezentul *atunci când era trăit*, dar sarcina istoricului este de a transforma această experiență fragmentară în cunoaştere." (Hutcheon, 1997: 75-76).

STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

IS THIS LEXICAL SEMANTICS? THE CASE OF *HAVE TO* IDIOMS

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ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to explore some aspects of linguistic categorization, starting from the assumptions of cognitive linguistics, with application to idiomatic *have a V* constructions. Because cognitive linguistics sees language as embedded in the overall cognitive capacities of mankind, topics of special interest for cognitive linguistics will be identified and described including the structural characteristics of natural language categorization, the functional principles of linguistic organization, the conceptual interface between syntax and semantics, the experimental and pragmatic background of language in use, and the relationship between language and thought.

1.0. The aim of this article is to explore some aspects of linguistic categorization, starting from the assumptions of cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics posits an intimate and dialectic relationship between the structure and function of language on the one hand and non-linguistic skills and knowledge on the other.[1] Linguistic knowledge is no longer considered to be an autonomous form of knowledge that can be studied in isolation, but an adequate picture of language comprehension and production which is expected to involve the cooperation of distinct forms of knowledge. Because cognitive linguistics sees language as embedded in the overall cognitive capacities of mankind, topics of special interest for cognitive linguistics include the structural characteristics of natural language categorization, the functional principles of linguistic organization, the conceptual interface between syntax and semantics, the experimental and pragmatic background of language in use, and the relationship between language and thought, including questions about relativism and conceptual universals (Ionita, 2004:16).[2]

[1] Cognitive linguistics is an approach to the analysis of natural language that focuses on language as an instrument for organizing, processing and conveying information. Methodologically speaking, the analysis of the conceptual and experimental basis of linguistic categories is of primary importance within cognitive linguistics: it primarily considers language as a system of categories. The formal structures are studied as reflections of general conceptual organization, categorization principles, processing mechanisms, and experimental and environmental influences.

[2] Cognitive linguistics is the study of language in its cognitive function, where cognitive refers to the crucial role of intermediate informational structures in our encounters with the world. It assumes that our interaction with the world is mediated through informational structures in the mind. Language, then, is seen as a repository of world knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categories that help us deal with new experiences and store information about the old ones.

From this overall characterization, three fundamental characteristics of cognitive linguistics can be derived: the primacy of semantics in linguistic analysis (if the primary function of language is categorization[3], then meaning must be the primary linguistic phenomenon), the encyclopedic nature of linguistic meaning (this follows from the categorizing function of language), and the perspectival nature of linguistic meaning (which implies that the world is not objectively reflected in the language).

For the linguist, categorization is an important issue because it underlies the use of words and the use of language in general. Since producing and understanding language involve cognitive processes, categorization is necessarily something that takes place in our minds, and the categories resulting from it can be understood as mental concepts stored in our minds. Taken together they make up the so-called mental lexicon.[4]

2.0. By means of experiments, Eleanor Rosch (1975, 1976) developed in psychology what has since come to be called *the theory of prototypes and basic-level categories*, or *prototype theory*. Rosch's experimental contributions are recognized by cognitive psychologists as having revolutionized the study of categorization within experimental psychology. Rosch's findings and proposals were taken up by formal psycho-lexicology trying to devise formal models for human conceptual memory and its operation. Prototype theory has had a steadily growing success in linguistics since early 1980s by establishing the following typical characteristics: (1) prototypical categories exhibit degrees of typicality; not every member is equally representative for a category, (2) prototypical categories exhibit a family resemblance structure, (3) prototypical categories are blurred at the edges, and (4) prototypical categories cannot be defined by means of a single set of criterial (necessary and sufficient) attributes. Therefore, there are two ways in which to understand the term prototype: as the central member of a category or as the schematic representation of the conceptual core of a category.

Rosch established paradigms in cognitive psychology in order to demonstrate centrality, family resemblance, basic-level categorization and primacy against the classical view. Her theory does not consider abstract,

[3] Categorization, the process by which distinguishable objects or events are treated equivalently, is an inherently pragmatic function, an act of the body, speech and mind. Humans live in a categorized world: from household items to emotions, from objects and events to categories of the language, which, although unique, are acted towards as members of classes.

[4] Categorization is the area in psychology which deals with the ancient philosophical problem of universals, that is, with the fact that unique particular objects or events can be treated equivalently as members of a class. Since we do not have direct access to cognitive phenomena, our hypothesis can be supported by philosophical argument, by psychological research into the human sensory apparatus and by experimental evidence based on linguistic and other human behavior.

functional features, it excludes the existence of disjunctive concepts which are often superordinate concepts, but at he same time it cannot handle unclear cases[5]. As a result of her experimental tests, Rosch comes to the conclusion that (1) categories are based on the cognitive capacities of the human mind, (2) cognitive categories are anchored in conceptually salient prototypes, (3) the boundaries of these categories are 'fuzzy', and (4) prototypes are no longer 'the best example' of the category[6].

Lakoff (1975: passim) underlies the internal graded structure of the categories. He argues that natural languages themselves contain various devices which acknowledge and point to this graded structure.[7] Lakoff's experimental view on meaning reveals the limitations of what he calls 'the myth of objectivism'. For Lakoff (1975:221), cognitive linguistics began with the discovery that our conceptual systems are grounded in our bodies. The discovery came simultaneous in the area of color, of basic-level concepts – for example, colors arise from our interaction with the world, they do not exist outside us.[8] The cognitive approach claims that meanings do not exist independent of human perception and cognition but are created by the way in which humans experience and think of the phenomena that surround them. The cognitive view could account for the flexibility of word meaning and explain why definitions of words are often so difficult to make precise. It concentrates on how language is shaped by human experience and cognitive processes. Cognitive linguists argue that categories are conceptual in nature and that many, if not all of our conceptual categories are laid down in language as linguistic categories.

2.1. "Since the lexicon purports to record all the pre-set meaning-bearing units of a language, ideally it would have to include every collocation as well as every word. In practice this is impossible – and probably in theory too. Practically, there would be no room. Theoretically one would not know where to stop, because collocations shade off into more or less freely

[5] For instance, 'tomato' can be an unclear case of 'fruit' because 'tomato' matches a comparable number of features of fruit and vegetables.

[6] Instead, the prototype is the mental representation, a cognitive reference point, an idea according to which it is applied (Rosch, 1975, 1999). This opinion is also shared by Lakoff (1986) and Murphy (2002)

[7] Recent studies (Rosch, 1999, Tye, 2000, Waxman, 2000, Allan, 2001, Murphy, 2002) emphasize the fact that categorization by prototype is the best approach in categorizing colors, natural species, and artifacts. As Murphy (2002) says: "The prototype view solves many of the problems of the classical view: there are no defining features and typicality effects are predicted."

[8] It is known that color categorization is partly a matter of cultural convention, i.e. different cultures have different boundaries for basic color categories and partly a question of gendered language in the sense that women make for more precise discrimination in naming colors than men do.

formed constructions and fluctuate too much from place to place and from individual to individual"(Bolinger, 1975:105). Bolinger is right that the borders between collocations and constructions are vague. What kind of criteria can one rely on to decide whether a group of words forms a lexical unit or not. The decision to treat a word group as a lexical item will always be based on a judgment of how strong a semantic unity the group forms.[9]

An investigation of complex areas of the lexicon arise problems that are not hypothetical or possible, but problems that come up in the process of practical lexical research.[10] The necessity to take complex lexicalizations (i.e. word groups) into account is quite clear if we do not just think about a lexical semantic investigation in terms of the study of part of the lexicon as such, but as a reflection of underlying conceptualizations. Every lexicalization of reality or experience, whether simple or complex, is a unique reflection of some conceptualization habit (Verschueren, 1981:319).

When attempts were made to apply componential analysis or lexical decomposition to verbs, it was soon realized that the meaning components should be viewed as constituting a hierarchic semantic structure instead of a simple sum.[11] The semantic complexity of notions such as promising, ordering, etc. is such that it cannot be captured in a lexical decomposition formula for the corresponding verbs (which is not to say that analyzing into components is impossible, but simply that the formalism does not work (Verschueren, 1981: 324). Elsewhere, Verschueren used the decomposition paradigm to illustrate that complexity. He tried to construct comparable formulae for different speech act verbs. A serious problem emerged immediately. The formulae do not provide for any differentiation in meaning between *to order* and *to request* nor do them for *to state* and *to argue*; yet to order is not a synonym of to request, and *to state* and *to argue* are not synonyms either. There is no obvious way in which the authority implied by *to order* and the expectation of the hearer's resistance against believing P

[9] Consider *to take a bath, to take a walk, to have breakfast, to have a haircut*. These are all transparent for the addressee of a message who knows the meaning of the individual words. But why does one ***take*** *a bath* and ***have*** *a haircut*? The formation of these expressions is not completely predictable for a speaker who knows the meaning of the individual words.

[10] A first question which the reader may be inclined to ask is the following: How can you justify including groups of words (such as *to beat around the bush* and *to pronounce X and Y husband and wife*) into the investigation if you pretend to be doing **lexical semantics**? However, it would be suspicious to find only categories with clear boundaries in the description of a phenomenon which is itself in constant fluctuation. (Verschueren, 1981:319)

[11] A verb such as *to kill*, for instance, was thought to be analyzable as kill (x,y): CAUSE(x,BECOME(y, NOT ALIVE)), where x is the **agent** of *to kill* and y is the **patient;** Read: *x kills y means that x causes y to become not alive.* One common criticism is that, for instance, *to kill* and *to cause to die* cannot be substituted for each other: one can say *Yesterday John caused Jim to die* even if Jim did not die until today; this is impossible with *Yesterday John killed Jim.*

in the case of *to argue* can be formalized in such a way as to obtain sufficiently differentiated decomposition formulae (Verschueren, 1981:325). Thus, lexical decomposition of speech act verbs does not lead us any further than the construction of a more or less general formula, in which some basic semantic components of all speech act verbs are brought together.[12] It is clear that such formulae cannot make explicit the full meaning of individual speech act verbs.

It is obvious that we have to look for an improved way of describing the internal semantic structure of linguistic action verbs/expressions, but this does not mean that the idea of componential analysis or lexical decomposition has to be abandoned altogether. Evidently, any type of lexical semantic analysis will require a decomposition of some kind.[13] But we should always remember that not everything can be explained in terms of features.

In order to identify the semantic relationships between lexical items we should look for an answer in the structuralist theory. Saussurean structuralism regards a language as a unique system or network of functionally related elements within which each separate element derives its essence from its functional relation with the other elements. With respect to the vocabulary of a language this means that the meaning of each word depends on the existence of the other words. The meaning of each word covers a relatively small conceptual area which is part of a wider conceptual field.[14] Since conceptual fields can be lexicalized, i.e. split up into conceptual areas, in different ways, the structure of the lexical fields to which certain words belong has to be taken into account when semantically comparing

[12] The formula suggested by Verschueren (1981:325) is: SAV (x,y,(P): SAY(x,y,Se)^INTEND(x, CAUSE ([SAY(x,y,Se)], COME ABOUT – (ACCEPT(y,SA')))). Note that **SAV** stands for speech act verbs an **SA'** for all aspects of the speech act in question, except (i) the effects **x** typically intends to bring about, for which ACCEPT(y,SA') stands and (ii) the fact that **x** utters a sentence **Se** by means of which he intends to bring about those effects, for which the rest of the formula stands.

[13] However, claims about the universality of sets of semantic features should be handled with care; we should not shy away from identifying semantic features with words in natural language, as long as we are aware of the consequences; and we should forget about our desire to obtain nice formulae (Verschueren, 1981:326).

[14] The collection of words which together cover a complete conceptual field is called a **semantic field**, a **lexical field** or **lexical domain**. Within such a lexical field the size of the conceptual area associated with a particular word is determined by the size of the conceptual areas of the surrounding words. There are three different types of lexical fields. First, fields consisting of words belonging to the same part of speech, such as *tower, steeple, turret, pinnacle, etc.,* are called **paradigmatic fields.** Second, we are confronted with a **syntagmatic field** if it consists of syntagmatically related words from different parts of speech; the syntagmatic relationships are based on essential semantic connections such as between *bark* and *dog, hear* and *ear, blond* and *hair.* A **complex field**, finally, includes words from different parts of speech (i.e. the syntagmatic dimension) along with their paradigmatic correlates

those words with their equivalents in different languages. Semantic field theorists have also drawn attention to the existence of *lexical gaps.*[15]

2.2. Insofar as componential analysis is itself a product of structuralism it shares the latter's problems. The two have in common the belief that an adequate description of the meaning of a word must be such that it covers the meaning that word has in all of its literal occurrences. The lexical decomposition is inadequate to account for the internal structure of lexical items and the structuralist approach to lexical fields cannot be expected to yield sufficient insight into the semantic relationships among them. The lexicalization of the potentially infinite diversity of reality looks like a mission impossible for language. The internal structure of reality and the laws governing the perceptual apparatus lead us to the notion of prototype.[16] A prototype approach to meaning, which takes into account the eternal structure of reality, the laws of perception and human cognitive strategies, immediately solves three of the problems raised in connection with the structuralistic semantic field theory.[17]

The best argument for the prototype approach is that, in practice, most analyses of word meanings are based on it, though often unconsciously. Prototypes are products of cognitive processes which serve to make perceived reality manageable. Judgments about prototypical meanings must be regarded as hypotheses as long as they have not been verified by means of extensive psychological testing. Since prototypes are basic tools in human categorization, this approach is especially relevant if one is interested in word meaning for the sake of the conceptualization habits reflected.

2.3. The importance of extension from a prototype as a principle of category structure has been recognized by a number of linguists (Jackendoff, 1983; Langacker, 1987, 1991). For Langacker, extension from prototype co-exists with a second structuring principle, namely elaboration of a schema, where schemas may be hierarchically organized within a category,

[15] We can talk about a *lexical gap* whenever a particular language lacks a word to cover a certain conceptual area within a conceptual field which belongs to the experiential world of the language community involved.

[16] The formation of prototypes, 'ideal' instances of a particular category, is one of the cognitive processes enabling man to grasp the diversity of the world with his mind. This process is partly determined by the laws of perception and the structure of reality. For each lexicalized category human cognition contains a prototypical example (which does not have to be an actual member of the category itself, but which is a kind of 'mental image'), which is used as a yardstick to decide whether a particular object can or cannot be referred to by means of the lexical item in question. If the deviation from the standard is too great, the word cannot be used. (Verschueren, 1981:332)

[17] Verschueren (1981:334) points out that "the prototype idea also reveals the absurdity of the checklist view which is still being held by many linguists (most of those practicing lexical field theory and/or componential analysis".

in conjunction with extension from prototypes. To this type of research, Putnam added his theory of stereotypes, leading to a view of word meaning which is broadly encyclopedic in scope.[18] Putnam's *internal realism* provided a viable alternative advocating for (1) a commitment to the existence of a real word external to human beings, (2) a link between conceptual schemes and the world via real human experience, (3) a concept of truth that is based not only on internal coherence, but, most important, on coherence with out constant real experience, and (4) a commitment to the possibility of real human knowledge of the world.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) considered that **Internal Realism** needed to be further developed and, thus, drew up the principles of **Experimental realism** or **Experientialism**, characterizing meaning in terms of *embodiment,* which claims that conceptual structure is meaningful because it is *embodied.* Conceptual structures can be understood because pre-conceptual structures exist and are understood (Lakoff, 1987:267).[19] Lakoff (1987:284) argues that complex symbolic structures have a *building-block structure* if their structural elements all exist independent and if the meaning of the whole is a function of the meaning of the parts. On the other hand, they have a *gestalt structure*, that is a structure whose elements do not exist independent of the whole or whose general meaning is not predictable from the meanings of its parts and the way those parts are joined together.

Cognitive categories are stored in our minds as mental concepts and signaled by the words of a language. They do not represent arbitrary divisions of the phenomena of the world, but should be seen as based on the cognitive capacities of the human mind. (Labov, 1973:1978) Categorization may involve two stages: the perception of an object as a whole (the so-called *holistic perception*) and a kind of decomposition of the whole (*gestalt*) into individual properties or attributes as a second step. When the attribute lists for individual category members are compared, this is assumed to reflect the similarity relations between category numbers (Taylor, 1989:51). Such similarity relations may encompass all category members (*category-wide attributes*), or they may establish links only between

[18] We can regard the relevant background information for the characterization of word meanings as a network o shared, conventionalized, to some extent, perhaps, idealized knowledge, embedded in a pattern of cultural beliefs and practices.

[19] Cognitive models are directly embodied with respect to their content or else they are systematically linked to directly embodied models. Cognitive models structure thought and used in forming categories and reasoning. Concepts characterized by cognitive models are understood via the embodiment of models. Each cognitive model is a structure consisting in symbols. There are two sorts of such structures: *building-block structures* and *gestalt structures*.

some of the members. In the latter case, category coherence is produced by family resemblances.[20]

Prototypical categories are eminently suited to fulfill the joint requirements of structural stability and flexible adaptability. On the one hand, the development of nuances within concepts indicates their dynamic ability to cope with changing conditions and changing expressive needs. On the other hand, the fact that marginally deviant concepts can be incorporated into existing categories as peripheral instantiations of the latter proves that these categories have a tendency to maintain themselves as holistic entities, thus maintaining the overall structure of the categorical system (Geeraerts, 1990:198).[21]

Prototype Theory permits us to state the general principles that provide the semantic basis of the categories; it provides a valid theory for those aspects of categorization that do not fit the classical theory, yet present in language. *Prototype Theory* permits us to characterize the experimental and imaginative aspects of reason as well.[22] Prototype theory, in its extended version, extends the prototype model, so as to render it applicable to a wider range of linguistic data, including polysemy, synonymy, etc.

3.0. Cognitive linguistics seeks to ascertain the global integrated system of conceptual structuring of language (Talmy, 2000:4). Thus, cognitive linguistics addresses the concerns of the formal properties of language from its conceptual perspective while seeking to account for grammatical structure in terms of the functions this serves in the representation of conceptual structure. The tradition of cognitive linguistics is working to determine the more general cognitive structures pertaining to conceptual content that will encompass both the cognitive structures known from psychology and those known from linguistics.

[20] Cognitive categories interact with and influence each other and this can cause a shift of category prototype, of boundaries and of the whole category structure. Over and above the actual context in which the use of categories is embedded, the internal structure of categories depends on cognitive and cultural models which are always present when language is processed.

[21] The epistemological consequences of this characteristic of prototype categories are explored by Geeraerts (1988) who argues that the central members of a prototype category do share a large number of attributes, in this sense, the center of a prototype category approaching the ideal of a classical category, whereas prototype categories simultaneously permit membership to entities which share only a few attributes with the more central members. In this way, prototype categories achieve the flexibility required by an ever-changing environment.

[22] It is a reliable approach meant to discover what reason is like and, correspondingly, what categories are like, offering explanations both for the categorization of entities of the world, and of the language, using the concept of cognitive model, and thus, accommodating anomalies and imperfect cases within a convincing and articulate paradigm.

In cognitive semantics, the meaning of lexical items corresponds not only with classical conceptual structures that are the result of our mind registering common properties in extra-linguistic entities, but also with conceptual structures that are a consequence of how we function in our environment, or, in other words, that are the consequence of our mind processing, ordering, and interacting with reality. The cognitive semantic approach takes into account factors that result from our functioning with entities in the world.

Whereas concrete terms are prototypical categories, abstract terms are non-prototypical categories, requiring a different type of coherent conceptual organization with a higher degree of abstractness. The most representative scholars for the development of this theory (Lakoff, 1975, 1987; Fillmore, 1977; Rosch, 1979) have argued against traditional generative and structural checklists of semantic features that contribute necessary and sufficient conditions for set-membership in the category denoted by a word. Experimental studies (Labov, 1973; Rosch, 1975) emphasized the obsolescence and invalidity of classical theory, pleading for prototype theory, i.e. a theory capable to accommodate and explain degree of category membership, as well as fuzzy boundaries.

Lakoff (1987) argued that prototype theory could be extended from those categories having both a referent and a perceptual support, to all linguistic categories. "The approach to prototype theory, says Lakoff (1987:8), suggests that human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination – of perception, motor activity and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other. We have categories for biological species, physical substances, artifacts, colors, kinsmen, and emotions and even categories of sentences, words and meanings. We have categories for everything we can think about. To change the concept of category is to change our understanding of this world." According to this theory, there are several differences between abstract and concrete structures: abstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they are understood by their systematic relationship to directly meaningful structures, whereas abstract categories are projected from basic-level categories. The anomalous grammatical features of abstract entities in English differentiate them from concrete entities.[23]

[23] An excellent example is the work of Croft (1993:79) in which he draws up a hierarchy of prototypicality within the range of inflectional categories: **nouns** – number (countability), case, gender, size (augmentative / diminutive), definitions, shape (classifiers), alienability; **adjectives** – comparative, superlative, equative, intensive, (very ADJ.), approximate ("more" or "less" ADJ. or ADJ.-ish), agreement with head; **verb** – tense, aspect, modality, agreement with subject and objects, transitivity. If prototypical nouns, adjectives, and verbs follow the above-mentioned system, animate nouns are more prototypical than event nouns, which are more prototypical than abstract nouns, which are more prototypical than idioms. As the degree of prototypicality declines, so does the freedom of syntactic distribution.

Linguists (Lakoff, 1987; Geeraerts, 1988; Langacker, 1991; Talmy, 1991) felt the necessity of extending the theory from a prototype as a principle of category structure to a second structuring principle, namely the elaboration of *schema.* Thus, a prototype is a typical instance of a category and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype, whereas a schema is an abstract characterization fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines. Consequently, membership is not a member of degree, it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members.[24]

These observations support the view that abstract concepts are characterized by innate imaginative capacities by linking them to image-schematic and basic-level physical concepts. Cognitive models are built by such imaginative processes, mental spaces providing medium for reasoning using cognitive models. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have further proposed that linguistic usage frequently reflects our inherently metaphorical understanding of many basic areas of our lives; that is not merely language but cognition operates metaphorically most of the time. The metaphors manifested in most linguistic systems fall out from a more holistic viewpoint, which takes language as part of our cognitive system. Linguistic structure is, then, as logical and objective as human cognition, no more, no less (Sweetser, 1990:17). It becomes obvious that the domains of cognition are metaphorically structured with pervasive metaphorical/ metonymical connections that link our vocabulary of physical perception and our vocabulary of intellect and knowledge.

4.0. The cognitive semantics approach suggests that one major stumbling block in understanding the nature of idioms and making use of this understanding in the teaching of foreign languages is that they are regarded as linguistic expressions that are independent of any conceptual system and they are isolated from each other at the conceptual level. The conceptual approach can offer a clear-cut arrangement of idiomatic expressions, whereby transparency of their workings can be observed. By saying that most idioms are the product of our conceptual knowledge and not simply a problem of the lexicon we contradict the traditional approach.

Consider these idiomatic expressions: *He was spitting fire (fire = anger), The fire between them finally went out (fire = love), Go ahead. Fire away (fire = conflict), The killing sparked off riots in the major cities (fire = conflict), The speaker fanned the flames of the crowd's enthusiasm (fire =*

[24] This means that categorization by schema and categorization by prototype are aspects of the same experience – in the former case an entity is fully compatible with an abstract representation, in the latter case it is only partially compatible.

enthusiasm), He was burning the candle at both ends (fire = energy).[25] As the examples suggest, in addition to the word *fire,* several other words are used from the semantic field of ***fire***, such as *burn, candle, snuff, flame*, etc. These examples suggest that it is the conceptual domain (the concept) of **fire** – and not the individual words themselves – that participates in the process of creating idiomatic expressions. The individual words merely reveal this deeper process of conceptualization.[26]

If this is the case, we can rely on our knowledge to make sense of the meaning of idioms; their meaning can be seen as much motivated (predictable from the constituent parts) and not arbitrary (our knowledge provides the motivation for overall idiomatic meaning). This goes against the traditional view which argues that idioms are arbitrary pairing of forms (each with a meaning and a special overall meaning). The linguists that share this opinion also argue that the meaning of an idiom is entirely predictable (motivated). However, in some cases there is no conceptual predictability for the meanings of idioms at all (as in the case of "kick the bucket").

4.1. The cognitive mechanisms that link the domain of knowledge to idiomatic meanings are the metaphor, the metonymy, and the conventional knowledge. They may be represented as **idiomatic meaning** (the overall special meaning of an idiom), **cognitive mechanisms** (metaphor, metonymy, conventional knowledge), **conceptual domains** (one or more domains of knowledge), **linguistic forms and their meanings** (the words that comprise an idiom, their syntactic properties, together with their meanings).[27] Idioms can be classified as *idioms based on metaphor* and *idioms based on metonymy* and *conventional knowledge*. Conceptual metaphors bring into correspondence two domains of knowledge; one is the well delimitated, familiar, physical domain (*source domain*) and the other one the less delimitated (less familiar), abstract domain (*target domain*). The *source*

[25] In this set of examples, the idioms are related to various aspects of the phenomenon of fire including its beginning (*spark off*), its end (*snuff out*), how it makes use of an energy source (*burn the candle at both ends*), how it can be made more intense (*fan the flames, spit fire*).

[26] An idiom is not just an expression that has a meaning that is somehow special in relation to the meaning of its constituting parts (semantic markers), but it arises from our more general knowledge of the world (embodied in our conceptual system). In other words, idioms (if not all, at least the great majority) are conceptual, and not linguistic in nature.

[27] By providing the learners with cognitive motivation for acquiring idioms, they should be able to learn idioms faster and retain them longer in memory. Teaching students strategies for dealing with figurative language will have to take advantage of the semantic transparency of some idioms. If students can figure out the meaning of an idiom by themselves, they will have a link from the idiomatic meaning to the literal words, which will help them to learn the idiom. Thus, the semantic transparency or motivation of idioms arises from knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms (metaphor, metonymy, conventional knowledge).

domain is applied to provide understanding about the target domain.[28] As a result of their meaning, many (though not all) idioms depend on the metaphorical conceptual system. In *spit fire, the fire went out*, and *to set fire*, for example, *fire* belongs to the concrete source domain, whereas in the figurative (abstract) target domain the meaning is *anger*, *love,* and *enthusiasm,* respectively.

To conclude, in many cases, what determines the general meaning of an idiom (i.e. what concept it has to do with) is the target domain of the conceptual metaphor, and the more precise meaning of the idiom depends on the particular conceptual mapping between the source domain (*fire*) and the target domain (*anger*, etc.).

Considered as one of the cognitive mechanisms, metonymy is different from metaphor as it is characterized as typically involving one conceptual domain rather than two distinguished ones (as in the case of conceptual metaphors). Metonymy involves a "stand for" conceptual relationship between the two entities within a single domain, while metaphor involves an "is" or "is understood as" relationship between the two. E.g. *hold one's hand* (*hand* stands for *person*), *we need more hands* (*hands* stands for *persons*), or *from hand to hand* (again, *hand* stands for *person*). On the other hand, conventional knowledge has a cognitive mechanism which means that the idiomatic meaning is the shared information that people in a given culture have concerning the conceptual domain.[29]

The motivation for idioms (i.e. predictability for meaning or semantic transparency) rarely comes from a single source (from a single cognitive mechanism). In most cases, motivation comes from a combination of two or even more sources. To say which is more powerful is often difficult as it is a

[28] In the expression *spit fire* the domain **fire** (source domain) is used to understand the domain of **anger** (target domain). Following the conventions of cognitive semantics this can be called *anger* is *fire*, i.e. **conceptual metaphor**. As a subsequent result, conceptual metaphors function like connecting elements between an abstract domain (such as *love* is *fire*) and the more physical domain (source). Because of the connection they make in our conceptual system, the conceptual metaphors such as: *anger*, *fire*, *love* allow us to use terms from one domain (e.g. fire) to talk about another (*anger* and *love*) abstract domain (target). The particular conceptual mapping is applied to individual words, too: the intensity of fire is the intensity of state (*spit fire*), the end of love is the end of state (*the fire went out*), and the beginning of fire is the beginning of state (*to set fire*).

[29] The expression *with on open hand* meaning "generously": *She gives her love to people with on open hand*. The image of a person giving objects to another with on open hand implies the knowledge that nothing is held back and everything can be taken. This stands in marked contrast with the knowledge about the image of a person who gives with his fist held tight. As a matter of fact, it is hard to imagine how this person can hand over anything at all, except a punch; the expression *tight fist* indicates just the opposite of giving with on open hand. The latter suggest willingness and the former reluctance in giving.

matter of individual taste (and this often influences the practical applicability in the process of idiom learning and teaching).

5.0. These verbal expressions, far from being idiosyncratic, exhibit highly systematic behavior, are governed by strict rules, and constitute a vital part of English grammar. The rules in question are semantic in nature, and reflect different possible conceptualizations of the same situation.[30] The task of predicting which verbs have a *have a V* counterpart, which have a *give NP a V* counterpart, which have both, an which have neither is inseparable from that of stating these semantic differences.[31] However, the semantic rules involved are subtle and harder to bring to consciousness than purely formal rules like those governing agreement and inflectional morphology. This does not mean that such rules are not firm and reliable. They are remarkably so in guiding speakers in their usage, at the unconscious level; but people's judgment about these rules are less reliable.[32] Several idiomatic expressions in which *have* is combined with a verb stem of the same form as the stem of the infinitive will be interpreted with a view to demonstrating the way they function in the language.

5.1. One could prove the nominal character of the words *smile*, *cough* and *quarrel* by showing that sentences like *She has a nice smile, He has a nasty cough, They had a quarrel* illustrate productive structural patterns (ones which require nouns).[33] Expressions like a pleasant laugh or an engaging smile illustrate another construction where the predicational word must be regarded as a noun, not a verb. This construction is also productive, in that any bodily manifestation of the personality can be described in a frame '*have a* ADJevaluation N': *John has a pleasant voice, Mary has graceful movements.*

One clear semantic difference between simple-verb and *have a V* constructions is aspectual: the periphrastic *construction* presents the action (or the process) as limited in time. The *have a V* construction implies that the

[30] If the grammar of a language is seen as a set of rules to generate sentences, regardless of their meaning, then either expressions like *give someone a kiss* will never be generated, or expressions like **give someone a kill* will never be blocked. There is a difference in meaning between *kissing someone* and *giving someone a kiss,* between *walking* and *having a walk* (Wierzbicka, 1982:754)

[31] In fact, Wierzbicka (1982:754) shows that expressions under consideration provide a striking illustration of the futility of all dreams of a non-semantic generative grammar: only a semantically-based grammar can be truly generative.

[32] A major difficulty lies in the fact that almost any violation of semantic rules can occur in real speech. Creativity, vividness, and humor in speech are achieved largely through violating semantic rules.

[33] Thus one can *have a nasty cough*, but one can also *have a headache, pneumonia, a tummy upset*, or *a severe cold*. In short, one can *have an illness*. The morphological structure of the noun *cough* (N=V-inf) is quite accidental, and is irrelevant from the point of view of its combinability with **have**. The construction is productive; but it must be represented by the formula 'NPhuman *has* (*a* ADJ) Nillness' not by 'NP human *has a* V-inf' (Wierzbicka, 1982:755)

action goes on for a limited, and in fact rather short, period of time.[34] But it cannot be momentary; it must go on for some time, though not for a very long time.[35]

Furthermore, the action reported in a *have a V* frame cannot have an external goal: it must be either aimless, or aimed at some experience of the agent. We can accept *John had a walk round the house* but we find it difficult to accept **John had a walk to the post office to post a letter.* All these facts can be explained if we assume that the *have a V* frame specifically excludes a goal different from the agent itself: if the agent does something in order to affect some other object, then the *have a V* frame cannot be used. The action described in the *have a V* frame is viewed not only lacking an external goal, but also as having a potential internal goal. An action which would have no external goal, but which is described from outside would not be reported in the *have a V* either.

Finally, the action must be seen as repeatable. *Having a swim* is something that can be done again and again. There is something arbitrary about the length of *a walk,* or *a lie-down.* Since these activities (when reported in a *have a V* frame) are aimless, devoid of any external goal, they cannot only be extended or terminated at will, but can also be resumed at will. Thus actions which cannot be repeated cannot be described in a *have a V* frame (Wierzbicka, 1982: 758).[36] The verb *have* in the *have a V* construction contributes to the elimination of any external goals, and to the concentration of the speaker's attention on the experiences of the person involved in the situation, to the exclusion of everything else.[37]

Expressions like *have a walk, a lie-down,* or *a swim* imply that the activity is enjoyable, or potentially good for the agent. However, we cannot postulate this component for all instances of the *have a V* construction: *Have a look at this file, would you?* or *She is a horrible cook – just have a taste of this!* It is clear that *having a look,* or *a taste* do not imply the possibility of an

[34] If one swam for ten hours, one would hardly be described to have *had a swim* and if one spent ten hours in bed, one would hardly be described as having *had a lie-down.* Moreover, one cannot say *I had a long lie-down* or *a long shave* or *a long look at a letter* or *a long smoke*. (Wierzbicka, 1982: 757)

[35] Verbs which cannot take adverbial expressions indicating duration, e.g. *for ten minutes*, cannot occur in this frame: thus **She was getting-up for ten minutes*; **She had a get-up*.

[36] For example, the contrast of *have a bite* or *a lick* or a *taste* vs. **have an eat* may result at least partly from the contrast in repeatability of the actions in question. One could *bite John's sandwich*, or *lick his ice-cream*, or *taste his soup* – not once but twice, or more – but one could *eat his sandwich* only once.

[37] This explains why one cannot say **The book had a lie-down on the table* (the book is not a person and is not doing anything). It also explains why one cannot say **Lazarus had a lie-down in his grave* (Lazarus was a person, but when lying in his grave, he was not **doing** anything. It explains why one cannot say **John had an arrive* or *a depart* (*arrive* and *depart* are not durative verbs). It explains why one cannot **have a break of the mirror* (one cannot break the same mirror twice) (Wierzbicka, 1982: 760)

enjoyable, relaxing, or invigorating effect. This can be explained by the fact that verbs of perception behave differently in one respect from verbs of bodily action: the latter, in the *have a V* frame, imply an action which could cause one to feel good, whereas the former imply an action which could cause one to find out (to come to know) something about something.[38]

5.2. Verbs of bodily action are intransitive; they do not require a second argument, except to designate place. They either require or at least allow an agentive interpretation and must be durative, i.e. they must allow an adverbial modifier of the '*for time t*' type. The other class of verbs (verbs of perception) must be transitive or semi-transitive agentive perception verbs: *John had a look at the file; Strange mushrooms – have a smell.* All the verbs meeting the 'intentional + perception' requirement are durative. While all perception leads to cognition, the *have a V* frame emphasizes the cognitive component of perception verbs. When one *has a look at* something, the construction itself emphasizes the cognitive, knowledge seeking aspect of the sensory action: usually one *has a look at* something in order to find out something about it. In fact, the expression *have a look at* is often used in the sense of 'examine briefly and superficially'. The *have a look* subtype does not imply that the activity could cause the agent to feel good. Nonetheless, it is agent-oriented, because it emphasizes the agent's experience or potential mental gain.[39]

This subtype (verbs of perception) is related to another subtype, though it is not clear whether the two should be distinguished. It is the case of *have a try, a look for, a think about,* etc. In fact, both could perhaps be subsumed under the heading 'action which could cause someone to know something'. The verbs included in the present subtype are durative but not necessarily atelic. One could indeed be trying to do something indefinitely, if one were unlucky. However, the differences between *looking for* and *having a look for* go even further, paralleling those between *looking at* and *having a look at.* When one tries to do something, one could be desperately keen to succeed; but one who *has a try* seems not to care greatly – he is more interested in finding out whether or not he can do it than in actually doing it. Thus we can postulate for *having a try* the same 'cognitive'

[38] Without knowing English, we could not from general principles of universal grammar, human nature, or anything else. The difference between the two subtypes of the *have a V* construction discussed here is natural predict that *having a look* does not imply a potentially enjoyable effect in the same way as *having a swim;* we could not deduce it and understandable; but it remains an empirical fact about English, and must be recorded in the grammar of English.

[39] Moreover, the *have a V* frame adds to the meaning of he verb the idea of a half-hearted and not totally serious effort. It is no accident that one can *have a look at something*, but not **have a watch of something. The expression have a look at seems to suggest a lack of commitment.*

component which was postulated for *having a look at*: 'X was doing something which could cause him to come to know something' (Wierzbicka, 1982: 767).[40]

5.3. Sentences like *Have a cough* (*sneeze*)! imply that the agent is experiencing some unpleasant sensation which calls for a physical outlet. Once performed, the action could cause one to feel better. In contrast to walking, swimming or running, the speaker is not presenting coughing or sneezing as activities which are potentially enjoyable or conducive to feeling good. The temporal characteristic of the bodily-process subtype are the same as those for the other subtypes: *He's been coughing for several days.* But if one is *having a cough* it must be done in one relatively short spell. The physiological processes under discussion have a natural boundary. However, the natural boundary of the activity is determined not by an external goal, but by the state of the agent's body. For this reason, it does not interfere with the agent- / experiencer-oriented meaning of the *have a V* frame.

There are other verbs that can occur in this frame: *have a bite, have a lick, have a chew,* or *have a nibble*. The meaning of the verb ensures that the undergoer of the action is only negligibly affected by it. A lick, a bite, or a nibble is not enough to make much difference to the object involved. This means that, while the verb is transitive, and the action requires an undergoer as well as an agent, the undergoer can be ignored; the action can be viewed as really involving only one participant (the agent).[41] The verbs occurring in this subtype typically allow a prepositional object: one can *nibble something* or *at something* (Anderson, 1971). Returning to the *have a V* construction of bodily consumption, note that it is possible to *have a lick of John's ice cream* or *a bite of John's sandwich* but not to **have a lick of John* or *a bite of John,* even though one could lick or bite John. This fact shows clearly that the different subtypes of the *have a V* construction cannot be defined in lexical terms: they must be defined in terms of semantic domains such as consumption, perception, and physiological processes.

[40] Wierzbicka (1982: 767) shows that it might be objected that, since one can *have a try* but not **an attempt* and since *try* and *attempt* are synonymous, the contrast between the two must be idiosyncratic, and not predictable from the meaning. However, she argues that this objection is unfounded because the assumption of full synonymy between the two verbs is unwarranted.

[41] However, if someone eats an apple or a sandwich, the object in question is totally affected, and thus impossible to ignore. This is why one can *have a bite* or *a lick*, but one cannot **have an eat.* Generally speaking, the *have a V* frame allows no change in the state of the object, even a negligible one. One cannot **have a dust of the furniture* or *a trim of the bushes* – even though one could argue that in these cases the object is only minimally affected. In English, the *have a V* frame, which focuses interest on the agent and his experiences, cannot be used with those verbs which imply a change in another object and thus necessarily draw attention to that object (Wierzbicka, 1982: 771-2).

Why is it possible not only to *have a sip of orange juice* but also *a drink of orange juice*? Wierzbicka (1982: 775) observes that English has two distinctly different subtypes of the *have a V* construction dealing with bodily consumption; both defocus the patient, but in different ways. One does it by allowing only verbs of minimal impact, the other by allowing only verbs which assume a non-discrete (mass-noun) object.[42] This means that the 'unlimited substance' type, like the 'objectless action' type, demands strict atelicity. Drinking or smoking is something that can be prolonged for as long as the agent wishes; but drinking a glass of water or smoking a cigarette cannot be indefinitely extended.

Another group includes intransitive verbs, or transitive verbs that can be used intransitively, which refer to bodily care: *John had a wash.* These verbs allow no prepositional phrases referring to the object of the action: **John had a wash of himself.*[43] To this group we can add two more groups, one that indicates joint bodily activity which could cause the people involved to feel pleasure: *have a kiss, a cuddle, a dance* and one that indicates joint speech activity which cause the people involved to feel pleasure: *have a chat, a gossip, a laugh.* The condition on the last two subtypes includes not only reciprocity, and not only a common action, but also an identity of roles and a unity of action. There is intuitive similarity between chatting and gossiping, on the one hand, and hugging and kissing, on the other. When two people are having a kiss, a cuddle, a chat or a gossip, there is only a single kiss, cuddle, chat or gossip. This means that the group of people involved in the action must be seen as a single entity, performing a single action; moreover, no other entity can be included in the picture.[44]

6.0 Sentences in the *have a V* frame are not a jungle of idiosyncrasies, but exhibit orderly and systematic behavior. The joint contribution of *have* and *a V* always results in a notion of action seen as repeatable experience, involving one core participant: the agent / experiencer. This does not mean

[42] The contrast between the two can be illustrated: *John had a bite of Mary's sandwich* and **John had a smoke of Mary's cigarette.* The following are possible, of course: *John had a drag from Mary's cigarette,* and *John had a puff on Mary's cigarette. Drag* and *puff* are verbs compatible with the 'small amount, minimal impact' interpretation, whereas *smoke* fits only the 'unlimited substance' type. The *have a V* frame highlights this, and makes the 'unlimited substance' condition explicit: *John had a smoke of tobacco,* but **John had a smoke of a cigarette.*

[43] However, *having a shampoo* or *a trim*, like *having a haircut*, do not imply that the agent does it herself; in fact, they rather suggest that someone else does it for him/her. *Having a wash,* by contrast, suggests that the agent is doing it to himself/herself; *have a shave* is ambiguous in this respect.

[44] *Having a chat* or *a gossip* implies an aimless, self-absorbed, pleasurable, non-serious activity. Like all the other *have a V* types, it also implies an activity which is limited in time; and like many other types, it implies a limited chunk of an activity which is potentially unlimited in time.

that the frame takes only intransitive verbs. It allows transitive verbs, too, but only if the sentence with a transitive verb permits an interpretation compatible with the requirement of one core participant. In a sentence with two arguments, *have* converts a predication about the object into an (implicit) predication about the subject; in a sentence with one argument, it expands one simple (explicit) predication into a composite one; in both cases, it implies something about the subject, over and above what is said explicitly. The *have a V* device combines a heightened subject perspective with a restriction on time, rather than a generalization.[45]

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[45] In contrast to *have a V,* the *take a V* frame suggests a definite moment of time as the starting point of the action. The action itself need not be momentary (*taking a walk, taking a swim*); on the contrary, it is extended in time, though it lasts only a short time.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION

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ABSTRACT. This study presents conversational interaction as an orderly activity and a reciprocal undertaking in which participants jointly contribute to its emergence. It discusses the elements of conversational discourse, the local and intersubjective construction of conversation through the turn system, and the actions within the turn-taking process. The article also attempts to explain the mechanism that underlies local management in conversation by reference not only to Sacks et al.'s classic theory but also to alternative accounts of the turn-taking phenomenon.

Introduction

Conversation analysts have been fascinated with the orderliness that people generally exhibit in their everyday conversational interactions. Conversation Analysis (standardly abbreviated as CA) focuses on the recurrent conversational patterns and devices and the 'participants' own constructivist processes' (Forrester 1996: 79) in producing and understanding conversation.
In this paper, we will overview the basic elements of conversational discourse, discuss the local and intersubjective construction of conversation through the turn system, and present some theories that explain the mechanism underlying its sequential organisation.

1. Elements of conversational interaction

There are two senses in which conversation is considered. One is the pragmatic approach, which conceives of it as a micro-sociological context where such external parameters as status or age of participants can influence both the content and the organisation of the conversation. The other is the CA approach, which concentrates on the turn-by-turn emergence of conversation from within, through the participants' orientation to the sequential structures and their contribution to making such structures recognisable as relevant by the others.

Clark (1994) speaks about four elements of all joint activities by means of talk: (i) personnel, (ii) accumulation of common ground, (iii) action sequences, and (iv) grounding. Using the two conversations below for exemplification, (C1) and (C2),[1] we will demonstrate how each of these components has to do with one or the other of the two approaches described above. (C1) takes place between peers, Mike (M) and John (J), and (C2) is a (telephone) conversation between Alice (A), Professor Dwight's (PD)

[1] (C1) is taken from Graddol et al. (1994: 193) and (C2) from Svartvik and Quirk's (1980) corpus of English conversation.

secretary, and Benjamin (B), a student. The characteristics of the two samples are derived from their social origin and function, which make them recognisable with a particular way of coding social relationships, be they of informality (C1), or formality and distance (C2).

(C1)
1 M: *Oh, g'day John! How's things?*
2 J: *Hi, Mike, not too bad. How's things with you?*
3 M: *Can't complain, can't complain, be going on holiday soon. How's work?*
4 J: *Good, real good, actually.*
5 M: *Well, look, got to dash, good seeing you – catch up with you later.*
6 J: *Yeah, look, let's have coffee soon.*
7 M: *OK, great: see you then.*
8 J: *Yeah, see you.*

(C2)
1 A: (rings)
2 B: *Benjamin Holloway.*
3 A: *this is Professor Dwight's secretary, from Polymania College,*
4 B: *ooh, yes, –*
5 A: *uh:m . about the: lexicology *seminar,**
6 B: **yes**
7 A: *actually Professor Dwight says in fact they've only got two more m . uh:m sessions to go, because I didn't realize it it . finishes at Easter,*
8 B: *I see, yes, *uh:um**
9 A: **so** it . wouldn't really be .*
10 B: *much point, . *no,**
11 A: **no,* .* (laughs)
12 B: *OK right, thanks very much,*
13 A: *OK . * bye,**
14 B: **bye,**[2]

1.1. Personnel

Any spoken discourse needs at least two actors, who perform in turn the interactional roles of speaker and addressee. When there are more than two actors in a conversation, we can distinguish between participants and non-participants, or overhearers. The other participants are side participants, while the overhearers fall into two groups: bystanders, whose presence is fully recognised and who have access to what the participants

[2] Transcription symbols: a comma (,) = end of a tone unit; a spaced dash (–) = long pause; a spaced period (.) = short pause; a colon (:) = stretched vowels; adjacent pairs of phrases in asterisks (* *) = overlapping talk.

are saying, and eavesdroppers, whose presence is not recognised, but who have access to what is being said.

Clark also distinguishes between personal roles and professional roles, which will be enacted depending on the micro-sociological context in which the conversationalists happen to perform: M and J in (C1) are acting their personal roles, while A in (C2) is enacting her professional role, identifying herself as the representative of an institution.

1.2. Accumulating personal ground

Two persons participating in a joint activity cannot perform together successfully unless they coordinate on their own actions. Clark (1994) and Searle (1997 [1986]) argue that they can only do this by making assumptions about each other. When people involve themselves in a joint project, they 'take for granted that they share certain knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions – and they each presuppose that they both presuppose this' (Clark 1994: 989).

Clark calls the totality of these presuppositions the participants' 'common ground'. Within it, he distinguishes between 'communal common ground', representing all the facts, beliefs, and assumptions that are universally held in the communities they mutually believe to belong to, and 'personal common ground', comprising all the mutual knowledge they have accumulated from their personal experience with each other. Common ground is crucial to conversational activity, as it is the background for the emerging discourse that the participants are jointly constructing.

For example, B's first move in (C2) relies on a convention in British culture for answering the telephone by giving one's name; similarly, A relies on the same communal common ground in interpreting that as his name. Next, A assumes, as part of their personal common ground, that B is acquainted with PD of Polymania College only after they establish the mutual belief that he is B. This shows that every public move in a discourse is taken and interpreted against the current common ground of the participants.

Searle (1997), in his pursuit of insightful findings about the structure of conversation, speaks about 'shared intentionality' and the 'background', two features that he finds of crucial importance for understanding discourse in general and conversation in particular. He contends that 'conversations are a paradigm of collective behaviour', which is 'a genuine social phenomenon and underlies much social behaviour' (1997: 248-9). He amends the traditional analytic conception that treats intentionality as a matter of the individual person: 'When we are pushing a car together, it isn't just the case that I am pushing the car and you are pushing the car. No, I am pushing the car as part of *our* pushing the car' (ibid.: 248, original emphasis). What this analogy is meant to suggest is that the individual intentional states are not of much help in accounting for the structure of

conversation if they are not understood as being derived from the 'collective intentionality'. Thus, on this pattern, when two people greet each other, they are beginning a joint activity rather than two individual activities.

Searle's thesis of the background runs like this: 'all semantic interpretation, and indeed all intentionality, functions not only against a network of beliefs and other intentional states but also against a background that does not consist in a set of propositional contents, but rather, consists in presuppositions that are, so to speak, preintentional or prepropositional' (ibid.: 250).

1.3. Action sequences

Although spontaneous conversations seem to flow freely without great structure or direction, one can notice that they share some similarity in their overall organisation. In our case, Mike and John's and Alice and Benjamin's conversations consist of three broad actions in sequence: (i) they open the conversation (ii) they exchange information, and (iii) they close the conversation. Each of these actions further divides into other sequences of actions. Here is the sequential organisation of the first two actions in (C1):

Action (i)
(ia) (line 1) M greets J.
(ib) (line 2) J greets M.

Action (ii)
(iia) (line 1) M asks J a question.
(iib) (line 2) J answers M's question and asks M a question.
(iic) (line 3) M answers J's question and asks J a question.
(iid) (line 4) J answers M's question.
(iie) (line 5) M attempts to close the conversation and gives reason for it.
(iif) (line 6) J agrees to close but not before he has made an invitation.
(iig) (line 7) M accepts the invitation.

What accounts for most of the sequencing in our examples is the fact that each action is dependent on the completion of the previous one. Thus, the interlocutors cannot exchange information until they have opened the conversation, and they cannot close before the exchange of information has taken place. The same explanation holds for the sequencing of sub-actions: a question cannot be answered prior to asking it, just as an invitation cannot be accepted prior to launching it. It follows that these sequences are not determined by what the interactants are trying to say, but by what they are jointly trying to accomplish.

The fundamental sequencing device in conversation is the *adjacency pair*, the prototype of which is the question-answer sequence.

Adjacency pairs have two parts: a first pair part (FPP) and a second pair part (SPP), and their most important property is *conditional relevance*. This means that once the speaker has produced a FPP of a certain type of adjacency pair (e.g. invitation), it is conditionally relevant for the hearer to produce a SPP of the right type (e.g. acceptance/rejection of invitation). Clark explains that adjacency pairs are 'minimum joint projects' and 'ideal building blocks for dialogue' (1994: 992).

We have shown that the conversational interaction in (C1) is organised in sequences of action. Next, we analyse the sequencing of adjacency pairs in (C2):

FPP = 1A [Summons] – SPP = 2B [Response]
FPP = 3A [Assertion] – SPP = 4B [Assent]
FPP = 5A, 7A [Assertion] – SPP = 6B, 8B [Assent]
FPP = 9A, 10B [Assertion] – SPP = 11A [Assent]
FPP = 12B [Thanks] – SPP = 13 A [Response]
FPP = 13 A [Good-bye] – SPP = 14 B [Good-bye]

1.4. Contributions

For a conversation to proceed successfully, the participants must ground each utterance, that is, understand an utterance precisely as the speaker is issuing it. The result of the grounding of an utterance is a contribution.

Going along with the idea of sequencing in mind, contributions, according to Clark (1994), are generally made up of two phases: (i) a 'presentation phase', in which the speaker issues an utterance for their addressee to understand, and (ii) an 'acceptance phase', in which the addressee provides the speaker with evidence that the utterance is understood sufficiently enough for the current purpose. The addressee is expected to give the speaker not only positive evidence but also negative evidence when the utterance is not interpreted as it was intended. Clark puts positive evidence into two categories: (i) relevant next contributions and (ii) back-channel responses.

Relevant next contributions prove the current speaker's understanding of the previous speaker's utterance, as in the following exchange (C3) between Adriana (A) and Gabi (G), which we once overheard in the teachers' room:

(C3)
1 A: *Gabi, everybody says you're a nice girl.*
2 G: *Oh, yeah? And what would you like me to do?*
3 A: *Well, do you think you could take this list of books to the States and order them there?*

Gabi's contribution is the appropriate next contribution given the understanding of Adriana's utterance as a pre-request, which is confirmed by the latter's relevant next contribution – a straightforward request.

As for back-channel responses, we have an example in (C2), line 6, where B is acknowledging that he has understood A's message in the presentation phase and is actually telling her to go on. Schegloff (1992) calls this type of response 'continuers'. B's encouraging A to continue is doubled by the fact that his response overlaps with the end of A's presentation, which means that he is leaving the floor to A so she can proceed with it. In face-to-face interaction, positive evidence can also be rendered by smiles, head nods, while negative evidence by raised eyebrows or frowns.

In (C2), we have another kind of contribution called 'collaborative completion' (Schegloff 1992): B's completion 'much point', in line 10, comes to help A, who is trying to find the right words (see the pause in line 9), by giving her clear evidence that he has understood her assertion.

1.5. Conclusion

Conversation is an orderly activity and a reciprocal undertaking in that it involves its participants to jointly contribute to its emergence. The actors in a conversation take up various roles either as individuals or as societal agents. They initiate a discourse on the assumption of a common ground inferred on the basis of shared communal ground or personal common ground that they add with each move to their current common ground.

2. The creation of conversation

As we have seen above, participants in a conversation accomplish together broad projects through smaller joint projects that are completed in sequence, the minimal joint project being the adjacency pair. These minimal joint pairs are in their turn accomplished through contributions. All these conversational elements and procedures indicate that conversational interaction is a finely tuned collective enterprise.

In the following section, we will look at the processes and procedures through which conversation is created.

2.1. Intersubjectivity and accountability in conversation

The ethnomethodological[3] contribution to CA is founded on two very closely interrelated processes, namely the architecture of intersubjectivity and accountability.

The former issue refers to the fact that, in everyday talk, people generally interact under the assumption that there are no relevant differences in their experience of the real world. Consequently, the interpretations that one person creates are similar to the interpretations created by other persons.

[3] Ethnomethodological theory sheds light on the relation between the speakers' social identities and the responsibilities associated with their roles in various interactional settings.

However hard it may be to get access to our co-participants' intentions, feelings, and thoughts, we can obtain an 'intersubjective' shared world, or 'common ground'.

Social interaction is thus realisable, among other things, on account of this intersubjective understanding among people in interaction, and an analysis of the conduct of conversation should start from an examination of how interactants get 'a continually updated (and, if need be, corrected) understanding of the conversation' (Nofsinger 1991: 66) by making use of their sense of prior, current, and anticipated talk in performing a particular action.

The related notion of *accountability* in interactional behaviour is derived from the assumption that people will orient to certain structural or interpersonal norms of behaviour that guide and control the interaction. Taylor and Cameron (1987: 134) explain the importance of accountability as follows: 'participants assume that their co-interactants also know the rule and will be judging their behaviour accountable for its conformity or non-conformity to the relevant rule. Ordinarily, the relevant rules will be followed; but when they are not followed, the co-interactants can be expected to look for the reasons why (Is the actor angry? Inattentive? Rude? and so on)'.

The ensuing section discusses the issue of how conversational interaction emerges.

2.2. Turn-taking management

Spontaneous conversations are not pre-planned on the whole. They are constructed piece by piece in the joint acting that two or more actors try to accomplish by using language. This implies that conversations are locally managed and that interactants need certain basic management skills that will allow them to integrate their performance with those of other speakers and listeners.

The most influential answer to the question about how conversations proceed and flow in such an orderly fashion was offered by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974), who focused on the micro-analysis of turn-taking. Basing their research on a large corpus of conversations, they established a model of interaction according to which participants speak in units, which they call 'turn-constructional units', and the business of handling turns at talk is conducted 'locally' on a 'turn-by-turn' basis in the immediate process of conversing. These units range in size from a single word, a gesture, or a sound to one or more clauses. The end of each turn-constructional unit is a 'transition-relevance place' (TRP).

Sacks et al. (1974) noted recurrent features of speech at points where the floor is yielded to another participant. They inferred a set of very simple rules that make up the second component of the local management system and apply recursively at all TRPs in the following order:

Rule 1 – applies initially at the first TRP of any turn:
(a) If the current speaker (S) selects the next speaker (N) in the current turn, S is expected to stop speaking, and N is expected to speak next.
(b) If S's utterance or behaviour does not select the next speaker, then any other participant may self-select.
(c) If no speaker self-selects, S may continue.

Rule 2 – when Rule 1(c) has been applied by the current speaker, then at the next TRP rules 1(a) to 1(c) apply again, and keep reapplying until speaker change is accomplished (Sacks et al. 1974: 704).

The authors of the conversational turn-taking model argue that their turn-allocation system accounts for many features of spontaneous conversations, such as variations in the number of participants, turn size, turn order, and conversation length. They contend that the application of these rules is meant to minimise gap and overlap and lead to an orderly sequence of turns.

2.2.1. Searle's critique of the local management model

Searle (1997) provides us with a solid alternative explanation of the turn-taking phenomenon. With his power of insightful philosophical argumentation, he raises a few fundamental objections to Sacks and al.'s turn-allocation scheme. He mainly argues that these rules have no explanatory power, that is, they do not play a 'causal role' in the production of one's behaviour.

Searle begins by spelling out the meaning of rules: 'The rule has the world-to-rule direction of fit – that is, the point of the rule is to get the world (that is, my behaviour) to match the content of the rule', and exemplifies: 'I don't just *happen* to drive on the left-hand side of the road in England: I do it *because* that is the rule of the road' (1997: 245, original emphasis). The fact that while driving in England, people keep the steering wheel near the centreline and the passenger side nearer to the curb is a consequence of following the road rule, given the structure of English cars, but it does not constitute a rule.

In light of Searle's logic, Sacks et al. wrongly describe the surface phenomenon of turn-taking as if it were a rule, when in reality it is 'partly explicable in terms of deeper speech act sequencing rules having to do with internally related speech acts' (ibid.: 245). For example, a speaker asks a question or makes an offer. The 'rules' that prescribe who is to speak next reflect the rules for performing the internally related speech act pairs. So rule 1(a) is 'an extensionally equivalent description of a pattern of behaviour which is also described, and more importantly explained, by a set of speech act rules' (ibid.: 246).

Searle explains the other rules in the same pragmatic vein, i.e. in terms of sensible behaviour in real life. Rule 1(b): When you want to say

something, you simply wait for a chance to speak because it is not polite to interrupt the speaker and, besides, it is not efficient for two speakers to talk simultaneously. Once you have managed to edge your way in, you start talking fast lest others should take the floor. Rule 1(c): When you are talking, you are free to keep talking if nobody else claims the floor or if you still have some more to say. He concludes by reinforcing his argument against Sacks' et al.'s turn-allocation model: 'a statement of observed regularity, even when predictive, is not necessarily a statement of a rule' (ibid.).

We subscribe to Searle's alternative perspective on the local management of turn taking. Indeed, in conversation, people's objective is not to follow certain turn-allocating and turn-creating rules, but to succeed in the projects they undertake together. In other words, people will take turns when they have to by virtue of the contributions they feel they are due to make and the joint actions they are trying to initiate or complete. Thus, local management in conversation is not concerned primarily with the creation of turns, but with making contributions to the conversational actions and projects that conversationalists pursue together.

However, Forrester (1996) notes Sacks et al.'s merit in providing insights into the sophisticated aspect of speaker transition and into the process of predicting and projecting the TRPs. More significantly, they have shown that 'it is participants themselves who are oriented towards locally managed techniques and devices for the 'doing' of conversation' (Forrester 1996: 97-8).

The issue we pursue next is the emergence of turns.

2.3.The emergence of turns

Sacks at al. (1974) prescribe the following properties for turns: (i) they consist of turn-constructional units, (ii) they are ordered, and (iii) they are non-overlapping. Nevertheless, the turn allocation rules fail to account for a set of strategies that are common in conversation. That is why we present an overview of the criticisms levelled against Sacks and al.'s turn-exchange scheme and alternative accounts of the turn-taking phenomenon.

2.3.1.Further amendments to the local management model

Edelsky (1981) and Clark (1994) observe that patterns of turn exchange seem to be more variable in practice. Clark (1994: 997) lists the following set of such non-conformable strategies that are frequently encountered in conversation:

'acknowledgements', which are timed to overlap with the ends of the units they acknowledge;

‘collaborative completions’, as when next speaker interrupts current speaker’s utterance to complete the turn constructional unit, contrary to Rule 1(a) and (b);

‘recycled turn beginnings’, where next speakers deliberately start their turns before the current turn is complete in order to signal they want the next turn and the beginning of the next turn is recycled to make sure that the previous speaker hears it;

‘invited interruptions’, by which current speakers encourage addressees to interrupt and collaboratively complete a turn;

‘strategic interruptions’, where next speakers interrupt current speaker in mid-turn because they believe that what they have to say is more urging than what is currently being said;

‘non-linguistic actions’, such as nodding and shaking one’s head in response to questions or other gestures that cannot be considered turns, as they are completely overlapping with other turns.

All these instances turn Sacks and al.’s notion of ‘turn’ into a questionable one. How can we account, then, for the fact that people generally succeed to communicate in spite of overlapping speech and incomplete turn-constructional units?

Edelsky (1981) suggests that the traditional one-person-at-a-time model of conversation is characteristic of formal contexts. She distinguishes between more formal ‘floors’, generally developed by one speaker at a time, and informal collaboratively developed ‘floors’, with a lot of overlapping in speech, which does not necessarily mean that the speech is interrupted. She also differentiates ‘turns’ (talk on record) from ‘side-comments’ (talk off record). Turns are thus defined not from a formal point of view, but in terms of their function: ‘on record speaking behind which lies an intention to convey a message that is both influential and functional’ (1981: 403).

Another alternative model of turn taking is the ‘duet’ as identified by Falk (1979), in which two or more speakers jointly construct a speaking turn. She considers the sequential pattern of turn exchanges the baseline of unmarked forms for English speakers. Other forms of organisation are possible, but these acquire particular social meanings. In her data, joint construction of speaking turns mark the talk as intimate or friendly.

In their concern with understanding how speakers manage to take over from each other so smoothly and rapidly in ongoing immediate interaction, Sacks et al. (1974) invoke the notion of ‘projectability’, although they largely leave open the question of how such projection is accomplished. Graddol et al. (1994: 163) mention the following cognitive skills that hearers draw upon in predicting what kind of utterance will be made next. This knowledge includes:

-general frame and script – a stereotype of a particular event associated with a predictable sequence of actions that are typical of a certain situation;

-discourse structures – hearers' familiarity with such structures as adjacency pairs, opening and closing a conversation, etc.;

-grammatical structure – hearers' grammatical knowledge, which helps to anticipate the end of a turn, although this does not always coincide with the end of a sentence.

Drawing on this data, listeners 'must first recognise that a transition-relevance place is coming up (the projection problem) and must then synchronize their entry precisely when the transition-relevance place arrives' (Graddol et al.: 164).

It follows that the model put forward by Sacks et al. (1974) does not go into detail about the precise cues used by listeners when they project a TRP and fails to explain how it is that they can take over a turn instantly. Psychologists have suggested that speakers give out complex verbal turn-yielding cues that help participants to synchronise their turn exchanges with such precision. Other helpful signals in this respect are gaze direction, intonation, loudness, stereotyped tags, gesture, etc.

2.3.2. Forrester's affordance model

The CA model, which highlights the projectability of talk in terms of principles of construction, just like the theory of common ground accumulation (Clark 1994) and the theory of cognitive skills (Graddol et al. 1994), does not accommodate findings that document the sophisticated nature of children's communicative skills at an early age. Forrester (1996) proposes a model of conversational participation that constitutes an intermediate solution to the study of talk, informed by both the CA approach to talk as a micro-sociological context governed by the principles of intersubjectivity and accountability and the cognitive view based on principles of detection and recognition.

Let us see how Forrester (1996) brings together the notion of conversational constructivism and certain ideas from perceptual psychology. He puts forward an 'internal' model of conversational participation in order to help us comprehend how people can manage with complex structural procedures as those involved in creating conversation. Forrester starts from the principle of the 'coupling' of organism and the environment: 'One resonates with the environment and the environment "affords" sets of actions and events. Learning, then, involves detecting the "invariant" and "transformational" aspects of events' (1996: 110). It follows that the 'perceiving organism' associates various situations, events, and objects with particular affordable actions.

What are the insights that we gain from the perceptual perspective for an understanding of the emergence of talk in interaction? Forrester infers that 'the predominant orientation of our sensory-cognitive processes (i.e. arising

from, but not exclusively, visual perception) leads to our engaging in constructivist conversational practices which build upon our skills, or predispositions, to detect and extract affordances' (ibid.). In line with this perspective, the structural patterns identified by CA – TRPs, adjacency pairs, contributions, openings and closings are perceived as 'recognisable structural patterns of talk, realisable as conversational affordances' (ibid.: 111). Forrester explains that these 'affordances' do not cause or require certain actions but rather offer or have a potential for them: 'This model is not a stimulus-response kind of approach. (…) Rather it is a framework which allows for, and more importantly emphasises, the dynamic potential of social interaction' (ibid.: 110)

Forrester's affordance model of conversation comes to explain details of the dynamics of conversational interaction that are not accommodated by Sacks and al.'s CA constructivist model or by the cognitive models because the latter lay stress only on the extra-discursive elements that contribute to the ongoing creation of structural entities within the interactional process. The phenomenon of collaborative participation in conversation is accounted for by participant 'structuration', that is, 'the production of affordance-like conversational structures by participants for co-participants, the making available of structural patterns of talk which allow our predisposed "perceptually biased" cognitions to take expression and function' (ibid.: 113).

The identification of participatory affordances requires an 'internal' account, and that is, in Forrester's theory, the participants' inclination towards the accomplishment of talk that in its turn explains the provision of 'structuration strategies'. In conclusion, production and detection of constructi vist patterns in conversations can be analysed 'not only for their "structural regularities" but also as dynamic potentiating "on-line" affordances oriented to by participants'. (ibid.: 112).

2.4. Conclusion

The attempts to amend and complete Sacks at al.'s model of turn construction and turn-taking organisation are justified by its failure to provide a reasonable explanation of the nature of the 'engine' that sets the conversational mechanisms in motion.

From the perspective of Sacks at al.'s model, the turn system functions as described simply because the speakers and hearers treat it as normative. Participants demonstrate daily that they are able to make utterances and behave in a way that is immediately accountable in relation to the ongoing discourse. They are also able to project a TRP and, at the same time, indicate to the hearer(s) that a turn is about to finish. Once again, as with the turn-allocation rules, Sacks and al. appeal to examples of the phenomena as explanations for their expressions, failing to associate the surface phenomenon of speaker selection with deeper patterns of behaviour related to speech act rules (cf. Searle 1997: 243-6). The phenomena of intersubjectivity

and accountability and their causal dependency provide an explanation of the structure and emergence of turns.

Just as Searle has demonstrated that it is not reasonable to consider the rules for the local turn management as the cause of our interactional behaviour, so has Forrester shown that these phenomena should not be taken as given, but as the external expression of some internal, sensory-cognitive processes. The affordance account states that our conversational participation in relation to the emergence of turn-constructional elements is informed by our orientation to making available, recognising and using affordance structural patterns of talk.

The difference that the affordance perspective makes on accounting for the spontaneous production of turns consists in viewing 'the overall coherence and manageability of talk as a highly conventionalised and socially instituted form of interaction' (Forrester 1996: 111), rather than a manipulation of patterns as part of a local management system. In addition, the promptitude with which participants exchange turns and, more significantly, 'the synchronistic interaction abilities of young infants in pre-linguistic proto-conversations' (ibid.) and the precision timing of young children in turn switching justify the 'directly' perceptible affordance nature of conversational contexts.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

PAUL - A LINGUISTIC FILTER IN THE INTERTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT

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ABSTRACT. Using Paul as a model for scriptural interpretation encourages a focus on the texts and practices of the church, rather than on apologetic strategies or spiritual self-examination. Postmodernism has many meanings and many names. Whatever it actually means depends on different cultures and different individuals. How much continuity remains from the past? How much discontinuity will characterize the future? How does this affect the interpretation of biblical texts from different cultures and different time periods? Can biblical scholars and religious leaders ever be clever enough to be aware of, and respond to, the lived existence of ordinary believers? There are hardly any definite answers to these

2 Peter 1:20, "Knowing this first, that no prophecy of the scripture is of any private interpretation."

Instead of superimposing a meaning on the biblical text, the objective interpreter seeks to discover the author's intended meaning (the only true meaning). One must recognize that what a passage means is fixed by the author and is not subject to alteration by readers. "Meaning" is determined by the author; it is discovered by readers. Our goal must be exegesis (drawing the meaning out of the text) and not 'eisogesis' (superimposing a meaning onto the text). Only by objective methodology can we bridge the gap between our minds and the minds of the biblical writers. Indeed, our method of interpreting Scripture is valid or invalid to the extent that it really unfolds the meaning a statement had for the author and the first hearers or readers. Interpretation is merely logical reasoning. When interpreting Scripture, the use of reason is everywhere to be assumed. Does the interpretation make sense? The Bible was given to us in the form of human language and therefore appeals to human reason - it invites investigation. It is to be interpreted as we would any other volume: applying the laws of language and grammatical analysis.

The history of Christianity is not the story of the transmission of an unchanging language to successive communities. It is instead the story of successive fusions of the linguistic world of Christian texts and traditions with other linguistic worlds. Using Paul as a model for scriptural interpretation encourages a focus on the texts and practices of the church, rather than on apologetic strategies or spiritual self-examination. But this linguistic focus should not be construed in a narrowly intertextual fashion, one that attempts to bracket all questions of referent and religious experience. In acknowledging

the active presence of God in their midst as the basis for their reforming efforts, Christian researchers have been faithful to Paul's example. His immersion in the world of the Bible was a conduit, not a substitute, for his encounter with the living God. He recognized the God who is rendered in the scriptural narratives as the same God actively present in his own day.

Likewise, readers and interpreters of the biblical texts should note how Paul's experiences of the work of God in the community's midst infiltrated the world of the text, changing its content as well as its audience. The traffic between the ecclesial context and the world of the text was for him always two-way.

No one can deny the fact that some of the main topics of Scripture display rich meaning: the nature of God, the image of God, sin, Christology, and eschatology, the various literary phenomena such as metaphor, narrative, and poetry. The biblical text, whatever the way it is approached, abounds in mystery, complexity, and ultimately uncontrollable richness.

If we are to investigate it from a linguistic point pf view, we should perhaps start by focusing on the whole area of the nature of language. What view do we hold about the nature of language? What is the nature of meaning in language? Do we allow richness here or not? Our assumptions about language will clearly influence our approach to word meanings, sentence meanings, exegesis, and Bible translation. If we have an impoverished view of language, we are likely to have an impoverished view of the Bible as well. For example, if we think that language is designed only to communicate literal propositions, we will probably end up minimizing the functions of metaphor and allusions. If we think that language is designed only to talk about this world, we will be suspicious of God-talk as an allegedly improper use.

Modern language, like modern human anatomy, finds its original essence in providing for survival. This mode of thinking naturally throws suspicion on all use of human language for nonmaterial goals. The most material and simplest meaning is the most basic. Talk about God obviously stretches, perhaps to the breaking point, the original functions of language.

By contrast, the Bible shows that human language from the beginning included the function of serving for communication between God and man (Gen 1:28-30; 2:16-18). Speech about God and speech from God does not represent a stretch, but a normal function of human language. Moreover, it is plain from Scripture that God designed language in such a way that there can be multi-dimensional, complex, nuanced communication between God and man. God can tell stories, both fictional (parables) and nonfictional. He can expound and reason theologically, as in Romans, and he can express the full range of human emotions, as in the Psalms. The Bible contains propositional truth, but can express it either in prose or poetry. It contains both short sayings, as in Proverbs, and multi-generational histories, as in Genesis. The meaning of one sentence in Genesis coheres with the meanings in the

whole narrative. Meaning is not reducible to pellet-sized isolated sentences that are thrown together at random.

For the past twenty years the study of literature has been greatly influenced by the very questioning of any effort to communicate in a coherent manner. Postmodernism differs considerably in English speaking cultures. All agree, however, that a major shift has taken place in what and how people know.

Recently this phenomenon has begun to influence the interpretation of biblical texts. Most contemporary biblical scholars are aware of the relativity of many of the texts and some question the very possibility of language communication itself. The multiplicity of biblical languages - Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek - in books written over at least several hundred years, certainly causes further problems in communicating. Many fear that in postmodernist thought little remains for both Judaism and Christianity as religions. Yet, no one can deny the influence of postmodernist thought on religious traditions. No good can result from failing to confront this phenomenon which has permeated all contemporary cultures.

Hermeneutics has already contributed to the entrance of postmodernism into biblical studies. The art of bridging the gap between the classic and contemporary reality allows for differences in understanding the classic. Tracy's description of the "classic" helps us understand how hermeneutics continues to challenge interpretation: "Certain expressions of the human spirit so disclose a compelling truth about our lives that we cannot deny them some kind of normative status" (Tracy 1981:108). Persons, places, texts, objects, or events function as "classics" and "bear an excess and permanence of meaning, yet always resist definitive interpretation" (Tracy 1987:112). Knowing how to communicate the meaning of the classic understood by the interpreter and knowing the audience to which the meaning of the classic is directed adds further limitations in interpretation. Tracy continues: “Any contemporary interpreter enters the process of interpretation with some preunderstanding of the question addressed by a classic and the good interpreter is willing to put that preunderstanding at risk by allowing the classic to question the interpreter's present expectations and standards.” [Tracy 1987: 116].

In the history of both Judaism and Christianity individuals and even institutions have taken certain verses from the Bible and used them to demand a specific behavior. Little attention was given to the original language, context, or original purpose of the biblical texts. This has caused not only confusion but often great personal damage. Postmodernism suggests that religious leaders re-examine this tendency. Biblical scholars have an obligation to respond to the questions of postmodernism, and in the meantime ordinary believers draw their own conclusions and live accordingly.

From a linguistic point of view, one could easily note the fact that the vast majority of Jews and Christians do not know Hebrew or Greek. Added to this problem is the corrupted text. In most cases Christians have a reasonably good chance to reach the original Greek, but the Hebrew text is another matter. Even if the original text has been established, how can one translate accurately from three-thousand-year-old Hebrew texts or two-thousand-year-old Greek texts?

Language has always caused problems for translators. The English word ‘fair’ cannot be translated accurately into Spanish, Italian, French, or German. The English word means more than "just." The Romanian word ‘disponibil’ cannot be accurately translated into English, or French, or German. ‘Available’ is not accurate; the word's meaning: "to be actively passive," violates the English language structure. The Greek word ‘porneia’ in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 has been translated in many different ways in the various English Bibles. The RSV translates it as "unchastity." The NAB chooses "unlawful marriage"; the Jerusalem Bible as well as the Gideon uses "fornication," and the King James uses "adultery." What is the exception to divorce of which Matthew speaks? If only all contemporary Jews and Christians could be transported back a few thousand years and learn Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek, maybe then people could have some idea of what the Word of God actually means.

Postmodernism questions the possibility of accurately translating from one language to another. There may be some continuity, but often nuances are lost. The language comes from a particular moment in history and can be understood only in that context. Further applications can be made only with some hesitation and uncertainty (Guarino: 673-80). In First Corinthians ‘malakoi’ probably means men who allow themselves to be treated as women: the degradation of the male by the domination of another male. ‘Arsenokoitai’ might mean pederasts or perhaps male prostitutes. The meaning of the words is not evident and cannot be easily translated into English. And as in Romans, these acts fall within a general list of sins without any hierarchy.

As readers should pay attention to those stories in the First Testament that carry some dimension of homosexuality, so they should pay attention to relevant passages in the Second Testament. Individual sins should not be separated from the general loss of value and virtue when a person lives without a relationship to the true God. All sins are abominations. Individual verses should not be taken to dictate human behavior, but the Bible should as a whole generate a sense of values and virtues from which the behavior will flow. Once again, intertextuality brings caution to interpretations.

The Greek word for ‘subject’ is ‘upotasso’, found in Hellenistic Greek as well as translating some ten Hebrew equivalents in the LXX. The word appears in both the active and the middle voice in Luke, the Pauline corpus,

Hebrews, James and 1 Peter. It has a considerable range of meaning, especially in the middle voice. The subordination expressed may be compulsory or voluntary. In the Second Testament it does not immediately convey the thought of obedience (Delling: 39-46).

Paul uses the term in his formulation of important Christological statements. The most significant ones concern Christ and his submission to God in 1 Corinthians 15:28.

The usage in Colossians and Ephesians (whether these letters were written by Paul or not) suggests a readiness to renounce one's own will for the sake of others, i.e. for agape and to give precedence to others. In society the submission of those who are properly subordinated, in this case wives to husbands, does not stay the same when done under the control of dependence on the Lord. The demand now has a specifically Christian basis: individuals are to each other as the community is to Christ. The detailed meaning can come only from the context.

Some interpreters of these texts consider that the true sense is that the wife must obey her husband. Scholars said such an interpretation or hypothesis or conclusion is unwarranted precisely because of the theological background and the intertextuality of the usage. Religious leaders gave their interpretation; ordinary believers made their own decision. What does submission to a husband mean in the context of contemporary Christianity? Surely it cannot mean obedience, since the giving of the Spirit has made Christians free, subject only to Christ and through Christ to God. Even the English word subject does not mean slavish obedience. All are subject to law, but no one is obliged to obey the law in all times and places and under all circumstances. People voluntarily subject themselves to authority, e.g., when accepting a work position; but this does not destroy human freedom.

The injunctions about wives in both Ephesians and Colossians are at best ambiguous: they convey, not demands for specific behavior, but an attitude. Ephesians uses the verb only once and counsels both husbands and wives to be subject to each other. Most translations repeat the verb in reference to wives but not to husbands. Colossians uses the word only in relationship to wives but then uses agapao in reference to husbands. Surely this does not call for obedience on the part of the wives in relationship to the husbands.

Language plays an important role in the interpretation of these texts. Recall that the word has some First Testament background and comes from a language that, unlike English, has active, passive and middle voice. How can these differences be expressed accurately in English? How can the injunction apply to Christians today?

It is also worth noting that the verses come from a first-century context in which a woman was considered the property of the man. Jesus does not seem to accept this attitude, and Paul wants to change it--as he remarks in Galatians, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor

female, but we are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal 3:28). But what can the injunctions mean? What is conveyed beyond the ordinary sense of the words?

The postmodernist insists that, first, language has changed and that secondly, as human beings change so does the understanding of what is virtue and what is sin.

What one generation took as "true" is now lying around in pieces. What is true for me is not necessarily true for you. The old "givens" have been torn down (Jones: 49-51). The loss of objectivity leads us to question the existence of eternal or perennial truths. How can one person unequivocally tell another what is true? How can one person hand on to another understandings that alone will give meaning to life? For the postmodernist, human finitude, sociocultural embeddedness, and contextualized reason lay the axe to metaphysics and ontologies of all types, and they fall. Philosophies can offer neither final answers nor ultimate structures. Radical historicity constitutes every person and every thing. Human nature emerges from a combination of history, cultural clutter, unfinished societies, and ambiguous language, which always belies the existence of a common human nature for all times and places.

Stories are interpretations of history. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has greatly influenced the physical sciences: "the physical world is bizarrely complicated and unyielding to rational explanation". Something similar can be applied to the human world; human relationships and behavior are bizarrely complicated and unyielding to rational explanation. Thus people tell stories which never should be critically analyzed seeking some objective expression of reality. Rather, the stories are poetic, often conveying more than the actual meaning of the words involved. Stories flow spontaneously in a creative and often occasional manner rather than a detailed thought-out structure to which the storyteller adds the flesh. Good storytellers use poetic words as well as a poetic non-structure. In this way they convey more than just the ideas expressed in the words. In fact such a poetic non-structure often conveys what exists behind the words rather than the actual traditional understanding of a union between word and reality. The good storyteller brings about a union between the listener and the interpretations of reality as presented and lived by the storyteller.

The stories in the Bible are dialogic inviting the listener or reader to participate and thus allowing a multitude of interpretations. In the language of Bakhtin great time: "the infinite and unfinalized dialogue in which no meaning dies"(Bakhtin: 169) allows for new meaning.

Traditions lay the foundation for religions. Here lies the crucial responsibility. Note the word crucial for Christians. It all goes back to the cross of Jesus, from which came the giving of the Spirit and the resurrection. For Jews the cross is more the crossing from the Reed Sea to Sinai. Both groups believe that God has spoken historically, creating distinctive

peoples: Jews and Christians. This tradition passed from one generation to another continues the line and binds people together into a common faith. But what is passed on? How is it passed on? How can the traditions affect how people live? Three distinct groups hand on the tradition: scholars, church leaders and ordinary believer. Often the scholars and church leaders see themselves in opposing camps. The scholars claim to know the interpretation of the texts and how they can and cannot be used for behavior. The church leaders often hold the scholars suspect for their interpretation, and the ordinary believers often feel confused and ill-served by both groups.

When it comes to the Bible and interpretations, postmodernism calls into question much of what has been presented as eternal biblical truths, valid for all peoples at all times. The distinction made among the three groups - ordinary believers, scholars and religious leaders - comes into play when members of the second and third group take biblical texts and impose specific interpretations upon the first group. Postmodernism prohibits anyone from giving an eschatological, irrevocable, never-to-be-changed interpretation to any biblical text. The Bible teaches the truth, but not necessarily truths that include eternally valid norms of behavior. Rather the Bible tells stories that help individuals to come to conclusions and hypotheses for living ordinary life. The Bible offers values and virtues, which are practical helps for living to be interpreted and lived out by individuals. Pay attention to the story and not to the individual verses that tell the story. Examine the values and virtues to be handed on, and then encourage believers to make their own application.

When individuals fail to read the whole story, false hypotheses arise which cause disastrous consequences for the one who hears the story. People do not have to accept a jealous, revengeful God who destroys enemies, kills women and children, and imposes punishment on generations. Although verses can be found in the Bible which support this hypothesis, it makes no sense in the overall understanding of the stories told by people in different periods of human history. The stories associated with anger and revenge must also be read in the light of forgiveness and mercy and redemption. Intertexuality prohibits an exclusive reading of a particular verse. Humans usually want revenge and want the destruction of enemies. Naturally they would think God would act according to how humans act but the full stories of God contradict the way ordinary people act. Mercy and forgiveness overcome all thought of anger and revenge. The stories about God in the Old Testament deal rather with what people do to themselves by their choices rather than what God does to them because of their actions. The good stories outweigh the bad stories and change the context of the bad stories. Intertexuality adds a new meaning to interpreting texts (Claassen).

Of course the great area of dispute concerning behavior is the Sermon on the Mount. This great charter of Christianity presented by Matthew demands a whole study, seeking to understand the values and virtues behind

the various laws and injunctions. The Beatitudes should be seen, as an exordium (i.e. the opening chapter of the holy text) for the entire Sermon. Pay attention first to the virtues involved. The central section, involves four principles: Jesus teaches the Torah, the Hebrew Scriptures have authority, the interpretation of Jesus also has authority, and righteousness is an important virtue. The concluding section (7:13-23) has three exhortations: first, your choice of values affects your destiny: eternal life or everlasting destruction; secondly, make sure false prophets do not invade your values; and thirdly, beware of self-delusion. The individual verses make sense only when understood in context.

Conclusion

Can individuals interpret a particular passage in Scripture and apply that interpretation to human behavior? Of course. Both Jews and Christians have done this for centuries. They: religious leaders, scholars, and practitioners, will continue to do so. But postmodernism has affected all people whether they acknowledge it or not. The Bible can offer justification for any particular behavior from murder to incest to seduction to cheating and stealing provided the reader looks long enough and has sufficient command of the languages. Such efforts, however, destroy the value of the word of God. Intertextuality and the dialogic nature of all discourse with new listeners and new readers cautions especially religious leaders and scholars to proceed slowly when giving instruction to ordinary believers. If the guidance makes no sense to people today, both leaders and scholars contribute to their own demise. People may not say anything; they just will ignore both religious leaders and scholars alike. Better for all to listen to the Word of God and to develop values and virtues. Let the Word of God become the subject and the listener become the object. Then the dialogue will continue, and the right behavior will follow.

Paul uses various arguments to convince his readers: first cosmological and anthropological arguments, and finally theological arguments. Out of these all, every specialist will take the direction more apposite to their purpose.

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

THE PASSIVE IN TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC WRITING

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ABSTRACT. Almost every discussion of technical or scientific style mentions the passive voice, usually as a stylistic evil to avoid. I have selected five kinds of passive structures for discussion here. Since I believe that the bias of the technical writing teacher is toward avoiding the passive voice, I have concentrated on the arguments that support the use of each of these five structures.

1.0. While I doubt that many of us would endorse such extreme prescriptions as "Always use the active voice," [1] or "A writer will almost automatically improve his style when he shifts from passive to active constructions,"[2] we may be more ready to accept Freedman's position in "The Seven Sins of Technical Writing." His Sin 6 is "the *Deadly Passive*, or, better, deadening passive; it takes the life out of writing, making everything impersonal, eternal, remote and dead,[3] but he adds that "frequently, of course, the passive is not a sin and not deadly, for there simply is no active agent and the material must be put impersonally."[4]

From these two statements one would have to conclude that the legitimate use of the passive voice is restricted to situations where there is no "active agent." But is this conclusion correct? I think we can agree that the passive voice does have legitimate uses in technical and scientific writing and also that it is frequently misused. The problem is to define the appropriate or effective uses and the inappropriate or ineffective ones. In trying to solve this problem, I examined the use of the passive voice in six articles, three in *Scientific American* and three in more specialized journals. [5]

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[1] P.B. Ross, (1974) *Basic Technical Writing,* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, p.210

[2] D.H. Menzel, H. Jones and Lyle G. Boyd, (1961) *Writing a Technical Paper*, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, p. 81

[3] M.Freedman, (1958) "The Seven Sins of Technical Writing", in *CCC*, 9, p.14

[4] ibid, p. 14

[5] T.P.Yin, (1969) "The Control of Vibration and Noise", in *SA*, 220:1, pp. 98-106 R.I.Schimke, (1980) "Gene Amplification and Drug Resistance", in *SA*, 243, pp. 60-69 P.A. Charles and J.L Culhane, (1975) "X Rays from Supernova Remnants", in *SA,* 233:6, pp.38-46 N. Estes, (1963) "Solions, Their Characteristics and Commercial Applications", in *IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics,* 10:1, pp. 91-100. J.L. Bronte and D.S. Martin, (1977) "Szilard-Chalmers and Thermal Annealing Processes in D- Tris (Ethylenediamine) Cobalt (III) Nitrate", in *Journal of Inorganic Nuclear Chemistry,* 39, pp.1481-1486 F.A.Neville, and S.C Chatwin, (1979) "Late Pleistocene History and Geomorphology, Southern Vancouver Island, British Columbia", in *Canadian Journal of Earth Sciences,* 16:9, pp.1645-1657

2.0. The minimal distinction that must be drawn in discussing passive structures is between what is called the full passive and what is called the truncated passive. [6] The full passive, sentence 1, includes an agentive adjunct,[7] whereas the truncated passive, sentence 2, does not:

The ball was kicked by Bill.
The ball was kicked.

As a result, different arguments must be used to support or discourage the use of these two major kinds of passives. First, since the agent is specified in the full passive, the subject for an active voice equivalent is always available, so that sentence 1can be replaced by sentence 3:

Bill kicked the ball.

On the other hand, if a truncated passive is to be replaced by an active clause, a subject must be supplied for the active clause, and there is considerable variation in how straightforward or desirable this is. Second, only the full passive is longer than the equivalent active, and this means that the argument that the passive "squanders words"[8] applies only to the full passive. The important similarity among all passives is that the recipient of the action, not the agent, is the subject. Whether or not this is a desirable feature depends on the discourse context of the passive structure under consideration, and on the nature of the statement the passive structure makes.

Although textbooks often discuss only the full passive, the full passive is rather rare in scientific writing, and in English prose generally. In four of the articles I examined, fewer than ten percent of the passives were full passives, and in the other two articles, only twenty percent and twenty-seven percent of the passives were full. In other words, more than seventy percent of the passive structures in any of these articles were truncated, and this statistic is perhaps supported by Jespersen's claim that "over 70 percent of passive sentences found in English literature contain no mention of the active subject."[9] It may be interesting to note also that English is in fact unusual in having a full passive; most languages that have a passive voice have only the truncated passive. [10]

What, then, are the arguments for using the full passive instead of the active? First, as Jane Walpole and others have pointed out, the full passive may allow theme to be maintained in the discourse. [11] What this

[6] R. Freidin, (1975) "The Analysis of Passives", in *Language*, 51:2, pp.384-405.
[7] J. Lyons, (1968) *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics,* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, p. 378.
[8] K.W. Houp, and T.E Pearsall, (1977) *Reporting Technical Information,* 3rd ed., Encino, Ca: Glencoe, p. 138
[9] O. Jespersen, (1933) *Essentials of English,* London: Allen and Unwin, p. 121.
[10] J. Lyons, *op.cit*., p. 378.
[11] Jane R.Walpole, (1979)"Why Must the Passive Be Damned?", in *CCC,*30, pp.251-254.

means, briefly, is that the subject of the sentence is usually interpreted as the theme, or what is being talked about. [12] If the agent is not the theme, then the full passive allows the writer to remove it from the subject position. In part then, the choice between the full passive and the active is constrained by the discourse context of the particular clause. One fairly common use of the full passive is in the acknowledgement of the scientist responsible for a discovery, as in sentence 4:

4. *Solions for " solution of ions" utilizing a reversible redox electrochemical system, were first proposed and studied by Elihu Root, 111, at the U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, now at Silver Spring, Md. 1 3*

Sentence 4 is the opening sentence in an article about solions; the active equivalent would have suggested that the article would be about Root. The use of the full passive to maintain theme is also shown in sentence 5:

5. *The X-ray map of Cassiopeia A we have made, together with a spectrum of the remnant plotted from the same data, suggest that the X-rays are radiated not by some central source but by hot gas produced by shock waves from the original explosion traveling through the interstellar medium.*[13]

Clearly, X-rays is the theme. Furthermore, in this case the subject of the equivalent active clauses so complex linguistically that the active would be clumsy at least: [14]

5a. ... *suggest that not some central source but hot gas produced by shock waves from the original explosion traveling through the interstellar medium radiates the X-rays.*

Generally, then, we can argue that the full passive is a useful alternative to the active if the subject of the passive, and not the agent, is the theme of the discourse segment, or if the agent is so complex linguistically that its placement in subject position could lead to a perceptually more difficult sentence.

It is much more difficult to generalize about the truncated passive. Here I have limited my discussion to truncated passives used in the following four kinds of scientific discourse segments:

A. descriptions of experimental procedures
B. descriptions of standard procedures
C. descriptions of the state of knowledge
D. descriptions of natural processes.

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[12] See : J. Lyons, (1977) *Semantics II*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press, p.500-511; M.A.K. Halliday and R.Hasan, (1976) *Cohesion in English,* London: Longman, R.D. Huddleston, (1971) *The Sentence in Written English,* Cambridge:C.U.P.

[13] N.Estes, *op.cit*., p.91

[14] P.A.Charles and J.L Culhane, *op.cit*., p.38

These passives differ in the kind of subject their corresponding active clauses could have, if any. The truncated passive used in descriptions of experimental procedures is almost synonymous in many people's minds with "the scientific style," and has probably received most attention in discussions of scientific style. What differentiates it most clearly from the other truncated passives I will discuss is the fact that the choice between it and an active clause is structurally unrestricted; it can easily be replaced by an active clause whose subject usually is I or we. For example, passage 6 can be replaced by passage 6a:

6: *One sample was dissolved prior to thermal treatment. At 30 min. intervals, samples were withdrawn and dissolved in carrier solutions, and the temperature of the bath was increased by approx. 5,C.*[15]

6a: *We dissolved one sample prior to thermal treatment. At 30 min. intervals, we withdrew samples and dissolved them in carrier solutions, and we increased the temperature of the bath by approx. 5,C.*

In practice, of course, I doubt that many writers exercise a conscious choice, for the truncated passive has become traditional. Tradition aside, however, the main argument that supports this use of the truncated passive is that it allows theme maintenance, for surely the discourse is not about the agent, but rather about the procedure. The counter-argument that the truncated passive obscures the identity of the agent is not valid in this case, it seems to me, for the agent is fully recoverable from the context. We assume that the agent is the author(s) or the author's assistants, who allow him to perform the experiment by proxy. Another counter-argument is that this use of the passive leads to monotonous prose. However, the active equivalent would probably be just as monotonous, since every sentence would have to repeat the agent in subject position. Also, at least in scientific articles, monotony is probably not a serious fault for procedural descriptions are never read for entertainment, if they are read at all, the descriptions simply qualify the results.

A related but somewhat different use of the truncated passive is shown in passage 7:

7. *To measure the number of gene copies the cellular DNA is broken into small pieces, the double strands are denatured (separated into single strands) by boiling, and a small amount of the radioactively labeled complementary DNA is added to the mixture under experimental conditions in which the complementary DNA can now hybridize with any DNA with which it has complementary nucleotide sequences.* [16]

[15] F. R. Palmer notes this use of the full passive on p.87 in: (1974) *The English Verb*, London: Longman

[16] J.L.Bonte and D.S. Martin, *op.cit.*, pp. 1481-82

Whereas passage 6 describes a particular procedure, passage 7 describes a standard procedure; descriptions of particular procedures use the past tense, while descriptions of standard procedures use the present tense. Supplying a subject for an active equivalent is still not difficult; some choices are one, a person, or we. Thus, passage 7 could be replaced by passage 7a:

7a. *To measure the number of gene copies, one breaks the cellular DNA into small pieces ...*

However, since the active subject has to be general or indefinite, the active clauses are no more informative than the truncated passives and the criticism that the passive obscures the identity of the agent clearly does not apply. In fact this use of the truncated passive allows a writer to sidestep the issue of non-sexist language. As Mills and Walter have pointed out, "the active voice has in recent years become somewhat impractical because of distaste for the use of masculine pronouns ... in situations in which the referent may be either male or female."[17]

A truncated passive may also be used to describe the state of scientific knowledge. Consider for example passage 8:

8. *The mechanics of isolating vibration are well understood, and the necessary properties of the isolators have also been determined.*[18]

The two clauses present slightly different problems. It is difficult to supply an appropriate subject for an active equivalent of the first clause, for someone is probably too vague and narrow, the general we may be confused with the particular we if the paper has more than one author, and scientists or people is probably too broad. It seems to me that statements like those in passage 8 presuppose an abstract agent that represents our sense of a communal repository of knowledge, and the truncated passive allows us to avoid having to define this abstraction more concretely. In the second clause, however, in addition to the abstract agent, there are also, ultimately, specific agents who determined the physical properties of the isolators. Whether or not these specific agents should be named depends in part on the purpose and audience of the discourse. Sentence 8 appears in *Scientific American* and the purpose is to provide fairly general information. If the same statement were presented for a more expert audience, documentation conventions would probably be used to identify the agents. This general category of truncated passives also differs from the previous ones in that the verbs are restricted to a rather small class.

Finally, the truncated passive is used to describe processes in which there is no direct human agency, as in sentence 9:

[17] R.I. Schimke, *op.cit.*,p.63
[18] G.H. Mills and J.A.Walter, (1978) *Technical Writing,* New York: Holt, p.133.

9. *If the pulsar is embedded in a nebula, the electrons are presumably hurled into the nebula and spiral along its own magnetic lines of force, emitting radiation over an enormous range of wavelengths.* [19]

Often it is very difficult to supply an accurate subject for an active clause equivalent in these cases, for the only legitimate choice may be something like "natural forces." In fact, in trying to supply such a subject, one could very easily distort scientific facts.

3.0. In conclusion, then, the main fault of many prescriptions about the use of the passive voice is that they are over-generalizations. For example:

"The passive voice is weak and colorless. It is also wordier than the active voice, and tends to hedge. Nevertheless, it is often used in technical writing because it promotes impersonality and restraint."[20]

While there is, of course, *the* passive voice, there isn't *the* passive clause, but rather a number of different kinds of passive clauses, so that a statement that applies to one kind does not necessarily apply to the other kinds. It is necessary, first of all, to distinguish between the full passive and the truncated passive. The argument that the passive is wordy can only apply to the full passive, and the argument that the agent is obscured can only apply to some truncated passives. Within the category of truncated passive, further distinctions can be made on the basis of the kinds of subjects, if any, that could be supplied for active clause equivalents. As we have seen in this fragmentary examination, there are truncated passives for which it is impossible to supply active clause subjects, ones whose active clause subjects are abstract, ones whose active clause subjects are general and indefinite, and ones whose active clause subjects are directly recoverable from the discourse context. These different kinds of truncated passives are also used in different kinds of statements commonly found in scientific prose.

[19] 9 T.P. Yin, *op.cit.*, p. 101
[20] P.A.Charles and J.L Culhane, *op.cit.*, p. 40

STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

ITALIAN LOANWORDS IN THE ENGLISH LEXICON

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ABSTRACT. The Italian influence on the English lexicon is, undoubtedly, the greatest after French and Latin. The vocabularies of music, literature, or painting have benefited most from Italian during the last four centuries; the earliest borrowings belonged to commercial or military fields.

Italian products, plants, animals: **belladonna** [< It. *bella donna*, lit., beautiful lady, a folk etymology (influenced by cosmetic use for dilating the eye) for ML. *bladona*, nightshade]; **macaroni** [It. *macaroni, maccheroni*, plural of *maccherone* < LGr. *makaria*, food of broth and barley groats, sacrificial cake made from such mixture, lit., blessed (cake) < *makar*, blessed]; **rocket** [Fr. *roquette* < It. *rochetta*, variant of *ruchetta* < *ruca*, rocket < L. *eruca*, kind of colewort]; **tarantula** [< It. tarantola < Taranto, near which the wolf spider was found]

Terms relating to military matters: **bandit** [It. *bandito* < *bandire*, to outlaw]; **bandolier** [< It. *bandoliera* < *banda*, a band]; **battalion** [Fr. *bataillon* < It. *battaglione* < *battaglia* < VL. *battalia*, battle]; **cartel** [Fr. < It. *cartello*, diminutive of *carta*, card]; **cavalier** [Fr. < It. *cavaliere* < LL. *caballarius* < L. *caballus*, a horse]; **cavalcade** [Fr. < It. cavalcata < cavalcare, to ride]; **casemate** [Fr. < It. *casamatta* < Gr. *chasmata*, opening; altered after It. *casa*, a house and *matto*, dark]; **citadel** [Fr. *citadelle* < It. *cittadella*, diminutive of *cittade*, city]; **curvet** [It. *corvetta*]; **duel** [It. *duello* < L. *duellum*, the original form of bellum < *duo*, two]; **escort** {Fr. *escorte* < It. *scrota* < *scorgere*, to perceive, lead]; **manage** [It. maneggiare < mano, hand]; **musket** [MFr. *mosquet* < It. *moschetto*, musket, originally, fledged arrow < *mosca*, a fly]; **paladin** [It. *paladino*]; **parapet** [Fr. < It. *parapetto* < *parare*, to guard]; **partisan** [< It. *partigiano* < *parte* < L. *pars*, part]; **plastron** [Fr. < It. *piastrone* < *piastra*]; **post** [Fr*. poste* < It. *posto*]; **squadron** [It . *squadrone* < *squadra*, a square]; **stiletto** [It., diminutive of *stilo*, dagger]; **vedette** [Fr. < It. *vedetta*, altered (after *vedere*) < *veletta*, sentry box]

Next we come to trade: **baldachin** [< It. *baldacchino* < *Baldacco*, Baghdad, where the cloth was manufactured]; **bankrupt** [Fr. *banqueroute* < It. *banca rotta* < *banca*, bench + *rotta*, broken < L. *rupta*]; **agio** [It. *aggio*]; **carat** [Fr. < It. *carato*]; **contraband** [Sp. *contrabanda* < It. *contrabando*]; **citron** [Fr. *lemon* < It. *citrone*]; **ferret** [< It. *fioretti*, floss silk, originally plural of *fioretto*, diminutive of *fiore*, a flower]; **frigate** [It. *fregata*]; **lira** [It. < L. *libra*, a balance, pound]; **muslin** [Fr. *mousseline* < It. *mussolino* < *mussolo*, muslin < *Mussolo*,

Mosul, city in Iraq, where it was made]; **mercantile** [It. < *mercante*, a merchant]; **artichoke** [It. *articiocco*]; **padrone** [It. < L. *patronus*, patron]; **parmesan** [Fr. *parmesan* < It. *parmegiano* < *Parma*, city in Italy]; **porcelain** [Fr. *porcelaine* < It. *porcellana*, originally, a kind of shell < *porcella*, little pig, vulva: shell so named from its shape]; **piastre** [Fr. *piastre* < It. *piastra*, thin plate of metal, dollar]; **scudo** [It., originally, a shield < L. *scutum*, a shield]; **skiff** [< It. *schifo*]; **smalt** [Fr. < It. *smalto*]; **traffic** [Fr. *traffic* < It. *traffico* < *trafficare*, to trade < L. *trans*, across + It. *ficcare*, to thrust in, bring]

Architectural terms: **balcony** [It. *balcone*]; **belvedere** [It., beautiful view < *bel*, beautiful + *vedere*, to see]; **cupola** [It. < L. *cupula*, diminutive of *cupa*, a cup]; **corridor** [Fr. < It. *corridore*, a gallery, runner < *correre*, to run]; **duomo** [It. < L. *domus*]**; grotto** [It. *grotta*]; **impost** [Fr. *imposte* < It. *imposta*]; **pedestal** [< It. *piedestallo*]; **pilaster** [Fr. *pilaster* < It. *pilastro* < L. *pila*, a pile, column]; **piazza** [It. < L. *platea*, a place]; **portico** [It. < L. *porticus* < *porta*, a gate, entrance, passage]; **rotunda** [It. *rotonda* < L. *rotunda*, feminine of *rotundus,* akin to *rota*, a wheel]; **stucco** [It. *stucco*]

Words connected with the arts: **buffoon [**Fr. *bouffon* < It. *buffone*, jester < *buffare*, to jest]; **bust** [Fr. *buste* < It. *busto*]; **cameo** [It. *cameo* < ML. camaeus]; **canto** [It. < L. *cantus*]; **canzone** [It. < L. *cantio*, song < *canere*, to sing]; **cartoon** [Fr. *carton* < It. *cartone*]; **catafalque** [Fr. < It. *catafalco*, funeral canopy, stage]; **costume** [Fr. < It. < L. *consuetudo*, custom]; **dilettante** [It. < L. delectare, to charm, to delight]; **filigree** [altered from earlier *filigrain* < Fr. *filigrane* < It. *filigrana* < L. *filum*, a thread]; **figurine** [Fr. < It. *figurina*]; **fresco** [It., fresh < OHG. *frisc*]; **fugue** [Fr. < It. *fuga*]; **girandole** [Fr. < It. girandole < *girare*, to turn]; **gouache** [Fr. < It. *guazzo*, water colour, spray, pool < L. *aquatio*, watering < *aqua*, water]; **madrigal** [It. *madrigale*]; **miniature** [It. miniature, rubrication, illumination of manuscripts]; **model** [< It. *modello*]; **motto** [It., a word < L. muttum]; **pantaloon** [Fr. Pantalon < It. Pantalone, name of a character in Italian comedy, from the Venetian patron saint Pantalone or Pantaleone; also, the garnment worn by this character]; **pandora** [It. < LL. *pandura* < Gr. *pandoura*, musical instrument]; **pastel** [Fr. < It. *pastello*]; **picturesque** [< It. *pittoresco* < *pittore*, painter]; **profile** [It. profile < profilare, to outline]; **replica** [It., a repetition, originally, reply < ML., an answer < L. *replicare*]; **sienna** [It. *terra di Siena*, lit., earth of *Siena*, where first obtained]; **sonnet** [Fr. < It. *sonnetto* < Pr. *sonet*, diminutive of *son,* a sound, song < L. *sonus*, a sound]; **stanza** [It., lit., stopping place, room]; **studio** [It. < L. *stadium*, a study]; **tempera** [It. < *temperare*, to observe proper measure, mix, regulate]; **torso** [It., a stump, trunk of a statue < L. *thyrsus*, a stalk, stem]; **vista** [It., sight < *vedere*, to see< L. *videre*]; **virtuoso** [It., skilled, learned < LL. *virtuosus* < L. *virtus*, worth, virtue]

Life and society: **balloon** [Fr*. ballon*, altered (after *balle*) < It. *pallone,* large ball]; **ballot** [It. *ballotta, pallotta*]; **bambino** [It., diminutive of *bambo*,

childish]; **brigand** [< It. *brigante* < *brigare*, to contend < *briga*, strife, quarrel]; **bulletin** [Fr. < It. *bulletino*]; **capriccio** [Fr. < It. *capriccio*, a shivering, whim< *capo*, head + *riccio*, curl, frizzled, lit., hedgehog]; **carnival** [< It. *carnevale* < Ml. *carnelevarium*, to remove meat; associated by folk etymology with ML. *carne vale*, "Flesh, farewell!' < L. *caro*, flesh + *vale*, farewell]; **casino** [It., diminutive of *casa*, house]; **camorra** [It. < Sp., quarrel, dispute]; **cicerone** [It. < L. *Cicero*, the orator: from the usual loquacity of guides]; **concert** [Fr. *concerter* < It. *concertare* < L. *concertare*, to contend, contest]; **florin** [< It. *fiorino* < *fiore*, a flower: from the figure of a lily stamped on the original coins]; **gala** [It. *gala*]; **garb** [< It. *garbo*, elegance]; **gondola** [Venetian dialect: origin obscure]; **intrigue** [< It. *intrigare*]; **gazette** [Fr. < It. *gazzetta* < dialectal (Venatian) *gazeta*, a small coin, price of the newspaper]; **irredentist** [It. *irredentista* < (*Italia*) *irredenta*, unredeemed (Italy)]; **incognito** [It. < L. *incognitus*, unknown]; **lagoon** [It. *laguna* < L. *lacuna*]; **lazaretto** [It. < Venetian *lazareto, nazareto* < Venetian church of Santa Madonna di Nazaret, used as a plague hospital during the 15th century; initial *l-* after *lazzaro*, leper]; **mafia** [It. *maffia*]; **pall-mall** [< It. *pallamaglio* < *palla* (< Lombard *palla*, ball) + *maglio* < L. *malleus*, a hammer]; **parasol** [< It. *parasole* < *parare*, to ward off + *sole*, the sun]; **regatta** [It. (Venetian) *regatta*, gondola race, lit., a striving for mastery < *regatar*, to compete]; **seraglio** [It. seraglio, enclosure, padlock]; **sbirro** [It. *sbirro*]; **strappado** [It. *strappata* < *strappare*, to pull]; **umbrella** [It. *ombrella* < L. *umbrella* (altered after umbra, shade) < *umbella*, parasol, diminutive of *umbra*, shade]; **valise** [Fr. < It. *valigia*]; **vendetta** [It. < L. *vindicta*, vengeance]

Food: **broccoli** [It., plural of *broccoli*, a sprout, cabbage sprout, diminutive of *brocco*]; **cantaloupe** [Fr. < It. *cantalupo* < *Cantalupo*, former papal summer estate, near Rome, where the melon was first grown in Europe]; **gorgonzola** [< *Gorgonzola*, a small Italian town near Milan]; **macaroon** [< It. *macaroni*]; **pepperoni** [< It. *pepperoni*, cayenne peppers]; **risotto** [It. < *riso*, rice]; **rosolio** [It. *rosolio* < L. *ros solis*, *dew of the sun*]; **salami** [It., plural of *salame*, preserved meat, salt pork]; **spaghetti** [It., plural of *spaghetto*, diminutive of *spago*, small cord]; **vermicelli** [It., plural of *vermicello*, lit., little worm]

Geology: **bronze** [Fr. < It. *bronzo* & ML. *bronzium*]; **cipolin** [Fr. < It. *cipollino*, lit., little onion: from its structure]; **breccia** [It., fragments of stone < Fr. *breche*]; **cascade** [Fr. < It. *cascata* < *cascare*, to fall]; **granite** [It. *granite*, granite, lit., grained < *grano* < L. *granum*, a seed]; **lava** [It. < dialectal (Neapolitan) *lave* < L. *labes*, a fall, subsidence]; **mofette** [Fr. < It. *muffare*, to be mouldy]; **travertine** [It. *travertine*, altered < *tiburtino* < L. (*lapis*) *Tiburtinus*, (stone) of *Tibur* (now Tivoli); **solfatara** [It. < *solfo*, sulfur < L. *sulfur*]; **tufa** [It. *tufo, tufa*, kind of porous stone < L. *tofus*, tuff]; **volcano** [It. < L. *Volcanus*, Vulcanus]

Music: **allegro** [It. < L. *alacer*, brisk, cheerful]; **adagio** [It. *ad agio*, lit., at ease]; **andante** [It. < *andare*, to walk]; **aria** [It. < L. aer, air]; **bravo** [Fr. < It.

bravo, brave, bold, originally, wild, savage < L. *barbarus*, barbarous]; **cadenza** [It. *cadenza* < L. cadere, to fall]; **diva** [It. < L., goddess, feminine of *divus*, god]; **duet** [It. *duetto*, diminutive of *duo*, duet < L. *duo*, two]; **falsetto** [It., diminutive of *falso*, false < L. *falsus*, false]; **fiasco** [Fr. < It. *(far) fiasco*, to fail < *fiasco*, bottle: probably translation of Fr. *bouteille*, bottle, student slang for "error, blunder"]; **forte**[It. < L. *fortis*, strong]; **fantasia** [It. < L. *phantasia*, idea, notion]; **impresario** [It. < *impresa*, enterprise < *imprendere*, to undertake]; **improvise** [Fr. *improviser* < It. *improvvisare* < *improvviso*, unprepared < L. *improvisus*, unforeseen]; **intermezzo** [It. < L. *intermedius* < *inter-*, between + *medius,* middle]; **libretto**[It., diminutive of *libro*, a book]; **maestro** [It. < L. *magister*, a master]; **mandolin** [Fr. *mandoline* < It. *mandolino*, diminutive of *mandola*, *mandora* < LL. *pandura*, a kind of lute < Gr. *pandoura*, a musical instrument with four or five pairs of strings]; **opera** [It. < L., a work, labour, akin to *opus*]; **piano** [It., soft, smooth < L. *planus*, smooth, a plane]; **presto** [It., quick < L. *praestus*, at hand, ready]; **pastorale** [It., lit., pastoral]; **prima donna** [It., lit., first lady]; **quartet** [Fr. *quartette* < It. *quartetto*, diminutive of *quarto* < L. *quartus*, a fourth]; **recitative** [It. *recitative* < L. *recitare,* to recite]; **rondo** [It. < Fr. *rondeau*]; **scherzando** [It. < scherzare, to play < *scherzo*, a jest, sport]; **serenade** [< It. *serenata* < *sereno*, serene, open air < L. *serenus*, clear; meaning influenced by association with L. *sera*, evening < *serus*, late]; **solo** [It. < L. *solus*, alone]; **solfeggio** [It. < *solfa* < *sol* + *fa*]; **sonata** [It., lit., a sounding < L. *sonare*, to sound]; **soprano** [It. < *sopra*, above < L. *supra*]; **tarantella** [It., diminutive of *Taranto*]; **tempo** [It. < L. *tempus*, time]; **toccata** [It. < *toccare*, to touch]; **trombone** [It. < *tromba*, a trumpet]; **violoncello** [It., diminutive of *violone*, bass viol < *viol*, viol]; **viola** [It. < OPr. Viula, viol]; **violin** [It. *violino*, diminutive of *viola*]

Literature: **burlesque** [Fr. < It. *burlesco* < *burla*, a jest, mockery]; **concetto** [It. < L. *conceptum*, conceit]; **extravaganza** [< It. *estravaganza*, extravagance < *estravagante* < ML. *extravagans*]; **fantoccini** [It., plural of *fantoccino*, diminutive of f*antoccio*, a puppet]; **pasquinade** [Fr. < It. *pasquinata* < *Pasquino*, classical statue in Rome to which it was the custom in the 16th century to attach satirical verses]; **Punch** [It., contraction < *Punchinello*, earlier *Polichinello*, a character in a Neapolitan puppet play]; **Scaramouch** [Fr. *Scaramouche* < It. *Scaramuccia,* lit., a skirmish]; **scenario** [It. < L. *scaenarium* < *scaena*, stage]; **sestina** [It. < *sesto*, sixth]

Medical: **malaria** [It., contraction < *mala aria*, bad air]; **pellagra** [It. < *pelle*, skin + *agra* < Gr. *agra*, seizure]; **tarantism** [It. *tarantismo*: because formerly epidemic in the vicinity of *Taranto*; popularly associated with the *tarantula*, by whose bite it was erroneously said to be caused]

Miscellaneous: **canteen** [Fr. *cantine* < It. *cantina*, wine cellar, a vault < *canto*, an angle, corner]; **firm** [It. *firma*, signature, hence title of a business < L. *firmare*, to strengthen]; **fracas** [Fr. < It. *fracasso* < *fracassare*, to smash];

graffito [It., a scribbling < *graffito*, a scratch]; **hippogriff** [Fr. *hippogriffe* < It. *ippogrifo*]; **imbroglio** [It. < *imbrogliare*, to embroil]; **inferno** [It. < L. *infernos*, underground, lower, infernal < *inferus*, low, below]; **manifesto** [It. *manifestare*]; **maraschino** [It. < *marasca, amarasca*, kind of cherry < *amaro*, bitter < L. *amarus*, bitter]; **parry** [< It. *parare*, to ward off]; **portofolio** [earlier *porto folio* < It. *portafoglio* < *portare*, to carry + *foglio*, a leaf]; **stiletto** [It., diminutive of *stilo*, dagger]; **terra cota** [It., lit., baked earth]; **tirade** [Fr. < It. *tirata*, a volley]; **tombola** [It., probably < *tombolare*, to tumble];

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STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI, PHILOLOGIA, L, 4, 2005

ON POLITICAL LANGUAGE

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ABSTRACT. Although it is not one of the favorite subjects for analysis, propaganda language can be placed with justification in the area of confuse communication, next to manifestations of mass-media, advertising, marketing, etc. This area deserves a more profound investigation in order to understand how propaganda language (as a subsystem of natural language) functions and what its structure is. Here we will try to take a first step in that direction.

1.0. Background considerations

Considering political language a variety of ESP in that it uses certain registers and specific jargons in a given situational context, a brief description of its place within ESP might be relevant. Notably, there are three reasons common to the emergence of all ESP: the demands of a Brave New World, a revolution in linguistics, and focus on the learner (Hutchinson & Waters, 1987). This Brave New World brought with it the "[...] age of enormous and unprecedented expansion in scientific, technical and economic activity on an international scale - for various reasons, most notably the economic power of the United States in the post-war world, the role [of international language] fell to English" (ibid:6).

Subsequent to this development it appeared the urge of shaping new forms of language that could provide the delivery of the new required goods. Hutchinson and Waters (1987:7) underlined the fact that English has become the subject of the wishes, needs and demands of people other than language teachers. The second reason (perhaps the most relevant here) that contributed to the process of emergence of all ESP was the shift from the traditional view (linguists who were preoccupied with the description of the features of the language) to the revolutionary view, that of focusing on the ways in which language is used in real communication. The final reason mentioned above was concerned with the way in which learners acquire language and the differences in the ways language is acquired. Therefore, focus on the learners' needs became equally paramount as the methods employed to disseminate linguistic knowledge. Designing specific courses to better meet these individual needs was a natural extension of this thinking. To this day, the catchword in ESL circles is learner-centered or learning-centered (Kristen Gatehouse, 2001).

David Carver (1983: 135) identifies three types of ESP: English as a restricted language (ERL), English for Academic and Occupational Purposes

(EAOP) and English with specific topics (EST). All these types of ESP can be broken down into different branches according to the registers and specific jargons they use.

1.1. What makes political language distinctive?

Political language, as Michael Geis (1987:7) points out in *The Language of Politics*, conveys both the linguistic meaning of what is said and the corpus, or a part of it, of the political beliefs, underpinning any given statement. In realizing this, political language developed a series of grammatical, rhetorical and narrative structures that permit the propagation of ideas (ideologies, beliefs, etc.). A great example would be the political language of the totalitarian states where words themselves seem to lose their meaning and work only for a well determined interest that of serving the 'supreme ideology'. The main characteristics of the totalitarian political language are: a) *the impersonal character of the phrases* ('the mutual contact was established', 'honorable atmosphere of mutual respect', 'send-offs were declared'), b) *the abundance of linguistic means that emphasize the compulsoriness* ('to be obliged to', 'to be indebted to', 'by all means', 'firmly position'), c) *Manichaeism* (the semantic dichotomy: good people/bad people, friends/enemies, devoted/betrayer, abstract/concrete, objective/ subjective, general/particular), d) *the excessive use of metaphor and personification* ('the father of the nations'), e) *codification* (certain words as 'the enemy of the nation' 'trigger the attack signal', others as 'lack of revolutionary vigilance' used as warning or threat) (Corneliu Cosmin, 2002: 37).

The nowadays political language use the means of repetition, association and composition to backstage the "frequency of some syntactic structures and the rigidity of these structures" (Van Dijk, 1980: 17) as well as of omission, diversion and confusion in order to achieve control in communication. *Repetition* in political language makes use of *key words, themes, ideas,* (within internal phrase repetition techniques: rhyme, alliteration and anaphora), *images, pictures, symbols, backgrounds* that have a certain frequency and duration and most of all the expected *effects. Association* covers the area of *explicit or direct assertions* ('I represent', 'I am', etc.) and of *implicit, indirect suggestions* in order to trigger intense emotions. *Composition* comprises the grammatical level and the stylistic level: *key content words-nouns* (naming persons, places, things, concepts), *verbs* (for actions), *absolutes* ('it is'), *qualifiers* ('perhaps', 'maybe'), *conditionals* ('if …then'), *parallel sentence pattern structures, metaphors, rhetorical questions, hyperbole (overstatement), litotes (understatement), puns, irony* (Hugh Rank, 2005).

1.2. What makes political language "political"?

"Language is the life blood of politics. Political power struggles, and the legitimization of political policies and authorities occurs primarily through discourse and verbal representations… Put simply, the manufacture of consent is a language based process of ideological indoctrination" (Geis, 1987: 30). As it is noticed, the greatest political aspect of the political language lies in its power of manipulation-achieved not through verbal interaction but through propaganda, as J. Ellul (1973: 52) states "what separates propaganda from 'normal' communication is in the subtle, often insidious, ways that the message attempts to shape opinion […] propaganda is often presented in a way that attempts to deliberately evoke a strong emotion, especially by suggesting non-logical (or non-intuitive) relationships between concepts.". Propaganda in totalitarian regimes is easy to be recognized due to its blatant and cruel methods.

There exists in the political language a communicative component, but the fundamental meaning of communication is altered as it uses a semiotic system which, through processes of sudden changes of the code. The political language exists within a rigorous semiotic system, but the defining factor is the ideological surplus. What makes this domain to be ideologically contaminated? The main feature is represented by its relationship with the political power. Kaufmann (1989: 17) states that "the political language is the language of those in power". Among the basic means of imposing the asymmetrical relationship of power, language plays an important role as it reflects the position of the utterer/leader and the audience/masses. Once established, the relationship will perpetuate the asymmetrical relationship identified in language, and subsequently, in thought. The corruption of the relationship emitter/receptor though the political language is reflected automatically on the social level. The relations with the natural language are interrupted at the social levels controlled by the people in power, they having the permanent tendency or re-organizing the essential modality of communication – language.

In democratic societies, propaganda exists, but is harder to de detected because of its linguistically polished formulae:

> "…I think we all know what they are trying to do. They are trying to use the slaughter of innocent people to cow us, to frighten us out of doing the things we want to do, to try to stop us going about our business as normal as we are entitled to do, and they should not and must not succeed.
> When they try to intimidate us, we will not be intimidated, when they seek to change our country, our way of life by these methods, we will not be changed. When they try to divide our people or weaken our resolve, we will not be divided and our resolve will hold firm.

> We will show by our spirit and dignity and by a quiet and true strength that there is in the British people, that our values will long outlast theirs.
> The purpose of terrorism is just that, it is to terrorise people and we will not be terrorised.
> I would like once again to express my sympathy and sorrow for those families that will be grieving so unexpectedly and tragically tonight.
> This is a very sad day for the British people, but we will hold true to the British way of life. "
>
> (Times Online, Tony Blair's Speech, July 07, 2005)

2.0. Characteristics of PL

The global process of mass communication, which presupposes, implicitly, a process of persuasion, ideologically generated, must be analyzed as a result of the combination of the three factors that concur to its realization: *the communicator*, *the channel* and *the audience*. The stress laid on one or the other of these elements can be interpreted in terms of intentionality. The selection and editing of a piece of news, the selection of the channel and the presupposition of the existence of a certain type of receptor/addressee represent elements that concur to the realization of a certain model. From the perspective of mass media there exists a process of message selection and communicator selection function of the communicative needs of a certain audience.

From the point of view of the communicator, the problem raised is that of the access to means of communication that can direct the message towards an audience. The main task of the audience is that of selecting the right messages from a wide range of messages offered to them. In terms of a model Elliot (1972: 19) suggests the existence of three independent systems: society as source, mass communicators and society as audience. Such a paradigm will function properly within a society whose goal is correct information, including here the specific circumstances. It is equally obvious that the situation is completely different in a society in which the ideological surplus carries out the selection function, generating modifications both in the form and in the substance of the communicative chain.

2.1. How can we analyze the phenomenon?

The ideological text can be interpreted as a complex sign, function of a double process: of signification and of communication. This structural duality of the object imposes the semiotic approach as a fundamental way of analyzing the persuasion processes achieved through language. We have to accept that each communicative process implies the triggering of complex mechanisms, whose semiotic nature can be identified and interpreted. Semiotics offers an integrating perspective in the analysis of a political text, irrespective of its nature and extension, as a discursive text.

For Dijk and Kitsch (1978: 67) the interpretation of text is a function of the structures assigned to this text. The political language can be interpreted from three alternative points of view: the function of the phenomenon within a general theory of communication, the analysis of the phenomenon through methods specific to the semiotic act, and the description of the phenomenon in terms of a text theory. The newspaper information implies freshness whereas the political language (and especially *officialese*) implies stereotypes. On the other hand, being used as the main means of propaganda by the unique political party in power, mass-media is transformed from a means of information in a means of control and coercion.

Due to its nature, mass communication differs fundamentally from the other types of human communication, because of the way its techniques are used and the way they are institutionalized. The basic difference is represented by the participants in the act of communication; they are no longer individual human beings but large masses of people. Their behavior (with all its implication) will not be individually-conditioned but it will have a collective character. The source-group is fundamentally different from the receptor-group, being organized on a number of common values, within a common spatial unit which permits direct interaction. The implications refer to the degree of control and cohesion which obviously favor the source-group. Because of this asymmetrical relationship, the audience will lack a unitary representation and the ability to react.

It follows that an approach of the system of communication and signification, ideologically saturated, represented by the political language, imposes a linguistic interpretation as well as a socio-cultural approach able to bring to light the infra-textual signification (verbal) and the textual signification (cultural). Only an analysis of the two aspects will offer a clear image of the analyzed object. Proposing the semiotic approach as a basis for analyzing the communication realized by the political language we have in mind, first of all, the connotations of such a discourse. Semiotics underlies the mechanisms on which we build our experience. It helps us understand our communicative abilities as they are realized through signs and symbols (Real, 1989: 255).

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