

THE QUESTION OF THE MUSICAL MESSAGE. THE SEMANTIC CAPACITY OF THE EXPRESSIVE STRUCTURE

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SUMMARY. Is it possible to communicate through music? Does the music communicate something in particular? Is music like the message in a bottle – the meaning wrapped in the envelope of a form? Who would be the recipient of the „musical message” in this case – one, many, all of humanity, as in the IV parts of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony? Or maybe just Captain Grant’s children? And how pertinent is the extrapolation of notional-discursive schema and logic to music as Mattheson did in *Der Vollkommene Kapellmeister*? Because this phrase – the message of music – immediately refers to both the „suggestive” neutrality of musical sounds and the „emotional” irrelevance of the relationships between them. Sounds are just sounds. Is a chord the analogy of the word, the melody the analogy of the phrase, and a whole articulation the substitute of a speech? Is music a language? Or, indeed, being both sonorous, but also processual and symbolic, just like spoken language, music does not connote in the same way. And if the language has prescribed references, then music does not. A chord, a melody, let alone a counterpoint, have no predetermined meaning, not even one resembling a notional one, even after the performance is over. Should the composer first be a very good connoisseur of human emotional behavior rather than a very good musician? Or, perhaps, a simple postman, as in the famous song of the *Beatles*?

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From sign to meaning. The questionable relevance of the discursive-notional model

In a poetic sense, artistic position is a shipwreck of the spirit in matter, which arises because of an accident and whose field of materialization is the artistic consciousness. Thus, both the musical endowment and the cases of its upper limit - genius - are just as many accidents, which, in a spiritual sense, offer the statistically average person the chance to witness the revelation of the spirit in the world both through the genius of the composer, the artist-genius, as well as by the value of his work. Conclusion: we are dealing with an outdated anachronism in terms of 19th-century romanticism, which has nothing to do with the unfolding of events in objective reality.

From the lines above emerges a less common representation of the musical work and the message that it, the faces, would contain it is not necessarily necessary that the musical work contains as a fundamental motivation the creator's need to „communicate” something. Only the need to translate the intuitive contents into the form of an objective fact², which is the musical composition, is real. Moreover, the absurdity of the model according to which the message of music would be decipherable in terms and concepts stands out. Or, if there is something to say/relate, then why wouldn't one rather resort to a much more effective procedure in this sense - notional language - and why would one insist on communicating the same meaning only through organized sounds in evolutionary sound structures? From here we deduce that:

– there are communicable meanings only through certain coding conventions through elements as sign-meaning since we admit that the musical work can only be articulated through a specific connotative process.

- since they are opted for, we admit the sufficiency of formulating expressive (communicative) intentions by means of this „language”, which, to be understood, does not require the involvement of other connotative conventions³.

² Rather, the state of specificity boils down to the nature of the means adopted to formalize intuition information. The problem is, thus, only the way the composer organizes space and time, but also the mechanisms for organizing the processes of semanticization in a specific sound sense.

³ The multitude of possibilities for connoting psycho-affective experiences also becomes evident. Applying a certain number of coding conventions to a single human experience would instantly mean as many representations as possible of this experience. In another sense, we could say that we would acquire as many formal-semantic states of this experience as the connotative conventions we applied to it. Or. Each connotative system acts differently and connotes something else. Presumably, for example, an explicable alterity would be between connoting using a process (sound) and connoting using an image (pictorial or photographic). It must also be admitted that only a certain type of experience lends itself to

- it can be admitted that musical language has a very precise descriptive functionality and is specifically intended to produce descriptions⁴ of specific sound contexts⁵.

In this context, we admit the conventionalism that this consecrated expression - the musical language – carries because naming a phenomenon language immediately signifies the fact that there is (a) an objective reality (internal or external) and (b) a language through which we encode experiences to transmit them to other people (in the form of linguistic patterns) or to store them in memory (for later reactivation). The validity of this representation of music as language is hardly credible even from the moment, we try to consider it as a linguistic fact, extrapolating the grid of common (notional) language onto music. Nor does the analogy with the elevated, i.e., artistic, language of literature, drama, and poetry work.

Even when we try to consider music as a specific artistic language, we get nowhere, because music does not behave like a language, or, in other words, musical structures (pretending to be linguistic in nature) in their operation, do not lead to results which would allow us to treat them as linguistic structures, except perhaps only in appearance and in any case forcing the natural.

In this sense, a first set of considerations is brought to us by the same Eduard Hanslick in his work *On Musical Beauty*:

And between the notional discourse and music, parallels have often been tried with the aim of superimposing on music the legalities that act in the conceptual language. ... The fundamental and essential difference lies in the fact that in language the sound is nothing but a sign, so it serves to express a content foreign to it, while in music the sound is an object, so it becomes its own end.

Here – a stand-alone beauty of sound forms; there - an unconditional supremacy of thought over sound, which serves only as a means of expression. So, the center of gravity in music is in a completely different place than in language, and next to this center

a certain connotative procedure. Painting connotes differently and something else than music or literature, poetry, dramaturgy.

⁴ In the context of thinking and musical interpretative activity, the imprecision of the term „description“ stands out even more. This gross extrapolation of the functions of the notional language on the specifics of the musical work of art is obviously reprehensible and rather betrays a certain insufficiency of the one who applies such extrapolations.

⁵ The situation with the identification of the message is even more acute in a poetic context, because in this case the sought message will not necessarily be contained in the meaning of the lexical units used by the poet.

all other differences are grouped. All specific musical legalities will be concentrated near the autonomous meaning and beauty of sounds, all legalities of language - near the correct use of sounds for the expression of thought. [...] Music never „rises to language”. At the same time, it would be more correct to say that it will not debase itself, because music should have been considered a language of a higher order⁶.

Hanslick's thinking is completed, already in the context of the sec. XX, by American researcher Susanne Langer:

[...] Logically, music does not have the characteristic properties of language – separate terms with fixed connotations and syntactic rules for obtaining complex connotations without any loss of constituent elements. [...] For music has all the hallmarks of true symbolism, except one - the presence of an assigned connotation. Music is such a form capable of connotation, and the meanings to which it is malleable are articulations of emotional, life, sensual experiences. But its meaning is never fixed.⁸

And in a beautiful consonant sequence with the assertions of the American philosopher, come the observations of the Romanian esthetician Alexandru Husar:

Unlike – therefore – language, which is the symbolic form of rational thought, - representative symbolism includes everything that belongs to the domain „beyond logic”, the domain of the „unspeakable”. [...] This field includes myth, music, visual arts, etc. If the discursive symbolism of language cannot directly reflect the nature of the psychic process, the non-discursive symbolism of music, for example, can. Music can be called a symbolic form, a presentational symbol of the psychic process (our highlighting), symbolizing the morphological features of this process, showing its features themselves.⁹

⁶ Eduard Hanslick, *О музыкально прекрасном* [On musical beauty], Музыкальная торговля Юргенсона, pp. 98-99.

⁷ Susanne Langer, *Философия в новом ключе. Исследование символики разума, ритуала и искусства* [Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art], Moskva: Respublika, 2000, p. 207.

⁸ Susanne Langer, p. 213.

⁹ Husar, Al., *Ars longa. Probleme fundamentale ale artei* [Fundamental problems of art], Ed. Univers, București, 1980, p. 44.

In a certain sense, the determination of description that the musical language would offer would be inappropriate. But musical „language” does not describe anything since it represents the transfer into objective sonority of the composer's intuitive sound representations.

Another possible carrier of communicative meanings could be expression, in the sense in which it is equated with a quality of musical elements or structures: expression, therefore, is a meaning of the sound arabesque, it colors it, gives it life, and, in fact not lacking in importance - makes it comprehensible. In the absence of this comprehensibility, the Symphony op. 21 by A. Webern or *Movements for piano and orchestra* by I. Stravinsky should represent a cacophony.

But the fact that in its explicit forms and as a meaning of structures the expression is more conceptual, is demonstrated by the abundance of adjectives in indicating the qualities/expression of musical sounds, as well as the structures resulting from their relationship (vertically or horizontally).

The rational image of the expression is a discrete-punctiform one in which the mode, the state of the expression in its accumulative articulation process is not and cannot be captured. A melody, a chord, or a counterpoint is lyrical, dissonant, or efficient, and that's about it. The word only comes to punctuate the finality of the accumulation. The concept, no matter how wide the semantic area it would cover, is only a universal grid to indicate groups or families of phenomena related by a sum of common attributes, a fact that is not very effective when we aim to be aware of the specifics of articulation of the expression in the context of a musical composition. The insufficiency of the concept stands out even more when we make a simple comparison of the semantic capacity it has with the specifics of the cumulative articulation of meaning in the context of the unfolding of the musical composition.

The qualities of organized sonority as a negative (or „mirror”) deduction from the incapacity of the concept

a. the concept does not capture and cannot indicate the procedural state of the musical composition, nor its specificity, or the differentiation of this state from static states.

a.1. There is the word and meaning structure, but the concept does not indicate the specificity nor the multitude of functions that a structure has in the case of a dynamic musical context. In this case we cannot talk about a mode of the structure like the mode that the structure has in the case of architecture. We cannot talk about a resistance structure already given in its finitude and perfection in the proper sense of the word. The architectural condition of the structure in the case of the musical composition represents only a convention of meaning, which can only be observed in the notation in

the score, and which would rather refer to a specific way of organizing the relationships and interaction between sound points organized in sets and strings. In the best case, the structure could be visualized through a metro-tectonic analysis, as a set of sound surfaces, i.e., through the number of measures that the articulations of the musical composition have. The joining of these blocks, various in several measures, provides, by comparing their dimensions, an image of the proportional relationship established between the sections of the form.

a.2. The concept does not capture the specificity of the collaboration between the constitutive parameters of the musical composition, parameters structured on several functional levels. In the case of musical composition, the structure represents data in continuous self-multiplying expansion very strictly oriented, the whole expansion being controlled and supervised, therefore also corrected along the way by the objective of the final integration.

In the case of musical composition, two antithetical procedural models are combined:

(a) accumulative progress achieved as a real-time progression – processuality I, but also

(b) the intuitive image of the completed form of the musical composition as a process – processuality II, and from the perspective of which the organization, control, and orientation of the processual evolution towards the accumulation of expected meanings are realized. However little obvious the image of the pendulum between intuitive virtuality and objective reality may be, the bi-univocity of these displacements is a determining condition of the compositional process.

Without exaggerating, we can state that the conceptual forms of representation of the dynamic musical structure omit a considerable part of the consistency and multiplicity of structural and functional objects in the case of a musical interpretation.

a.3. The concept does not even have the possibility to represent the simultaneity of the interactions between the elements of the structure, and even less can it keep pace with the series of provisional syntheses, not punctiform, but continuous, in which the effects – the expression – of the evolutionary interaction that takes place at the level of the structure are engaged. Everything being fluency, inseparability, and fusion (both terms belong to Alexei F. Losev), the ineffectiveness of the concept becomes even more obvious. The essence of the process is energy, pulsation, expansion, and accumulation, all these parameters do not find an even approximate analogy in the possibilities offered by the concept.

a.3.1. The concept cannot adequately reproduce the specifics of the organization and setting in motion of the sound process.

a.3.2. The concept does not capture the cumulative meaning of the mechanisms of articulation, the accumulation of structure and, simultaneously, of meaning, representing the meaning, but also the purpose of articulation.

a.3.3. Hence the inability of the concept to provide a fair representation of the multiple and concentrated and/or essentialized¹⁰ functioning processes (understanding by concentration first the sum of the cumulative processes within the musical composition) of all the means that participate in the gradual growth of the musical composition.

a.3.4. The concept cannot provide an explanation of the fact that the meaning of the musical composition functions equally as a dynamic meaning and as a meaning of accumulative dynamics and in no way lends itself to an „extraction” (conceptualized) from the process¹¹. Or, as an expression of an accumulative structure, so one is incomplete for the entire duration of the interpretation, but in the process of continuous completion, the meaning will also adopt the same form of accumulation. The transferable meaning in words is the meaning fully accessible only after the completion of sonority. In other words, the dynamic-sound form of a musical composition—the determining meaning — remains beyond any possibility of conceptualization.

Omitting the dynamic form of the context that generated this meaning leads to the suspension of the original content of the musical composition, and consequently to the generation of a different meaning, even if the same phenomenon is considered or spoken about.

a.3.5. The concept does not offer any adequate explanation of the process of accumulation (in time) of the expression, nor even the idea that the acceptance of meaning in the case of musical composition is in turn constituted as the consubstantiality of structure and expression. The first is visible only in the score, and the second exists exclusively as audible data only in the acoustic, performed form of the music.

¹⁰ In the composition process, the composer's consciousness represents a field in which multiple selections of compositional/constructive entities are made according to their maximum utility in the composer's intuitive project, which finds its final form in the finished musical composition. Thus, in the generative consciousness of the composer, a competition takes place from which only the compositional/constructive entities appropriate to the composer's configurational intention will emerge victorious. The most powerful elements - cutting edge (in a constructive but also expressive sense) - will represent, at the same time, a dictionary of essentialized forms, later becoming styles of the musical language of the era (baroque), school (Viennese classics) or to a single composer (Beethovenian trichord).

¹¹ "If there was no imperialism of the concept, music would have taken the place of philosophy: it would have been the paradise of inexpressible existences, an epidemic of ecstasies." (In: *Cioran și muzica* [Cioran and music], Bucharest: Humanitas, 1996, p. 17).

Secondly, what we call heroic or pathetic expression (Symphony III, *Sinfonia Eroica*, or Sonata No. 8, op. 13, *Pathétique* by L. van Beethoven), without saying dramatic or however otherwise it functions as a multitude of fluctuating zones (horizontally and vertically) of expression. The accumulation of these areas takes place, in a late phase, (only) in consciousness, which by eliminating the less significant data, selects the idiosyncratic typology to produce a very general formulation of the expression and which it fixes as representative.

And this in a situation where every structural and procedural detail is important because every detail is a vehicle of expression and thus of a constitutive meaning. And it is obvious that the conceptual language has no possibility to represent this hyper-textuality in terms specific to the musical phenomenon.

a.3.6. By the very specificity of the semanticization it achieves, the concept imposes a precise semantic outline on the expression, while in the case of the musical composition, both the structure and the expression behave rather like condensations, spots, and clouds, with a provisional content, i.e., an incomplete one. In the case of musical work as a structural-expressive event, the latter cannot be firmly presented in its quality as an object, in analogy with a chair, a bed, a table, or a closet. The music of R. Wagner (the phenomenon of infinite melody, by avoiding an explicit conclusion of the development) or A. Webern (the lack of compositional functions of beginning, development, and conclusion) is a relevant example in this sense.

In the case of the interpreted form of the musical composition, the expression appears rather as an area with less determinable limits, since the expression in the case of sonority is a constantly accumulative one, while in the case of the notional description, it is a "posthumous" one, i.e., of maximum generality.

Thus, within the process, we would not be able to clearly delimit where one typological area of the expression ends, and where another begins. This cannot be achieved with the same firmness with which meanings are achieved through words.

The arguments of musical perception: otherness, mimicry, or empathy?

a.3.7. And finally, how does music perception work? What happens beyond the appearances of self-sabotage or otherwise voluntary enslavement in favor of a familiar and thus pleasant sonority, one in equal measure elegantly invasive and thus seductively coercive, but possessively and domineeringly tickling emotional fantasy rather than both the ears of the music-loving public?

Musical practices are traditionally oriented towards the public space and focused on a music-loving public. Artistic existence is explicitly public. This determinant also functions as a technique regarding the organization of the means to exercise multiple and concentrated flows¹² directed toward the public. Thus, music justifies its status as a cultural, artistic, and expressive object. All three terms are value indicators.

Do these findings mean that, for example, music necessarily carries a message? Furthermore, do these findings mean that the expression of music should be understood as a macro-message broadcast by the musical composition? And then, in what way is the message formulated, a translatable concept or an untranslatable¹³ one? Then how is the intelligibility of the information transmitted in this way ensured? It should be assumed that the language of music, as noted by the Russian musicologist Mark Aranovski

[...] provides the composer with the principles of corroborating the elements and structuring the text, and at the same time forms the auditor's reception system, providing him with the necessary means to interpret this text¹⁴

Thus, music is and at the same time determines the existence of an environment in which the transmission of human experience is possible. Given this fact, it should be noted that music is the material and the consequence of a thought process, one of (above) music and even more, a specifically musical one. It becomes clear that thinking is synonymous with the process of composition because this thinking cannot be conceived otherwise than in the specific terms of compositional means (the fund of structures) and techniques (methods of integration, control, and articulation).

¹² Mazel L.A. Принцип пользовательного и концентрированной продукция [Principle of multiple and concentrated influence], in: Вопросы анализа музыки. Опыт образования теоретического музыкознания и эстетики [Problems of musical analysis. The experience of rapprochement between theoretical and aesthetic musicology] M. 1978, pp. 167-195

¹³ „... among all languages, only this one (the musical one - n.n.) is endowed with the contradictory features of being at the same time intelligible and untranslatable... Indeed, we would be wrong if we invoked poetry, claiming that it also raises a problem of the same order. Not everyone is a poet, but poetry uses a common good as a vehicle, which is articulate language. She is content to use it according to some special rules, which she decides herself. On the contrary, music serves as a vehicle that is its property, and which, apart from that, can no longer be used for any general use.” (in Lévy-Strauss, Cl., *Mitologie I. Raw and cooked*, Ed. Babel, Bucharest, 1995, p. 40)., but intelligible?

¹⁴ Mark Aranovski, Мышление, язык, семантика [Thinking, language, semantics], in Проблемы музыкального мышления [Problems of musical thought], Moskva: Muzika, 1974, p. 92.

The question of the message, however, remains a suspended one: is there or is there not a message of the music? Should it be admitted that the message is one carefully distributed between melody, harmony, and rhythm, and what remains is given to orchestration, agogic and tempo, tonal plane, or system of sound organization?

Does the public context of the performance mean that the music is oriented toward the listener and thus, implicitly, presents itself as a message of the size of the entire musical work? But even apparently, there is no observable causal connection between the fact that Mahler wrote a symphony and the public context of the performance.

Historical argument

But by virtue of the acoustic matter and the procedural specificity, music advertises and, implicitly, generates an environment in which there are both performers and a receptive audience. A direct causal link between music and the (necessary) existence of an audience still cannot be discerned since there is no difference between an individual and a collective audition. The music is the same.

Or, in this sense, both the origin and several centuries of music practice present the public community as a legacy handed down from previous cultural periods. Starting with the romantic period of the second modernity, the audience becomes an explicit component of a concert. And this contrasts with the historical periods when there was no public acceptance but involved assistance.

Indeed, the practical form of philharmonic concerts is historically late and can be understood, in turn, as emulation, extrapolation, or „ritualized” imitation of the obligation of a space with a special purpose for hearing high music. The keyword is not the music, but the treble attribute. What would be the connotations that currently function as white metaphors, since European music of the compositional tradition (also called classical) is preferred to be heard in a special space? And what could be so high, unlike jazz, jazz-rock, rock, or electronic music?

A defining difference would be that the last four are the emulation of a culture of teenagers, while classical music is a culture of adults.

The heights of music are due to the religious origin, and this starts even with nature societies (shamanism, animism, totemism), with a late consequence in the culture of the temple (ancient/polytheistic and medieval/renaissance Christian monotheistic). Having as a reference the (imaginary) transcendental space, i.e., one located beyond the physical and thus sensory, music proved to be the only one able to represent the unrepresentable and equally the non-objective. Only in this way could the censorship (i.e., the impossibility) of the authentic representation of the divine (i.e., heavenly,

located above the terrestrial space of mortals) worlds and entities be circumvented. Through music, the high was presented in space and in terms of the low, that is, both improper. And only the invisibility of music allowed him to make this transfer in acceptable terms. That is, without any damage to credibility. It was like this starting with the sacred hymns of Antiquity and until the celebration of the liturgical service in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Baroque, and it remains so even today.

In theater culture, music made the psycho-affective movements of the actors-characters noticeable, thus contributing (again in the imaginary plane) to a stronger identification of the viewers with the interaction on the stage, thus amplifying the catharsis effect experienced by the audience. In both cases, the music presents the invisible, itself being imperceptible other than aurally. It was like this starting with the ancient theater and up to the contemporary genre of opera.

And the temple (especially the Christian one), but also the (musical) theater, were two institutions that claimed the organization of people in collectives of receivers. And it wasn't about music, but about ideological impregnation, either one of confessional substance or one of artistic substance. The music only contributed to the efficiency of this type of rivering.

Also, the culture of the noble court (and, implicitly, the noble salon) recognizes the high acceptance of music, because it was about the elite located at the top of the social hierarchy, i.e., high. And implicitly, culture in general and art, both practiced at this level and in this environment displayed refinement, subtlety, elegance, and complexity, as emulations of the qualities proper to the aristocracy, and which to be realized artistically and thus aesthetically, required craftsmanship, skill and key word, professionalism.

Sociological argument

However, the culture of the public institution (the opera house or the philharmonic) only takes both meanings from the temple and the court, preserving the ritualistic framework of the audition, the high attribute of the music, together with the refinement, the complexity and, importantly, the organization of human individuals in the collective of auditors, as well as the action of impregnating (of ideological substance) the public.

Following this genealogical hypothesis, the existence of a message becomes indisputable, as well as the otherwise complex composer-performer-audience relationship as a closed circuit. The composer and the performer are born and evolve in a specific bath of intonations, themes, and professional standards, and the composed works are the result of a social command, although one formulated in multiple ways thus determining the contents of musical thought and practice. By means of the musical composition, the

claimed contents, images, and states are returned to the principal. The success or failure of a musical work is largely a reflection of the composer's correct intuition of the contents of the collective consciousness at a given historical moment. Examples here include Palestrina in the context of the Counter-Reformation, Bach as a late consequence of the (religious) Peace of Westphalia, and Beethoven in the context of the Napoleonic Wars, and Wagner in the context of Bismark's unification of Germany.

But how is this supposed message of a musical composition received? Is it distributed among all the constituent means, is it entrusted only to the most audible, foreground ones, or is it a whole symphony and is, in fact, the message? In this case, the keyword is assistance. The audience attends the performance.

And then how is addressability to be understood? For example, Liszt composed the symphonic poem *Preludes* for a specific audience in a specific historical context. And with whom he shared the romantic ideology. Orlando de Lasso composed for the people of the Renaissance, and Gesualdo di Venosa, an aristocrat, composed his works with a view to interpretation. It is certain that both Palestrina (theocratic culture) and Lully (aristocratic culture), along with Salieri and Mozart, composed works intentionally oriented towards a certain type of audience. One that is decidedly not the same as the contemporary audience. And then how intelligible is the „message” of historical works, that is, intended for someone other than the contemporary public, and which in any case shared with the musician-composer at least the current moment?

Another assessment would refer to the comparison between the music of the Baroque, for which there is the English phrase *public-oriented music*, and, for example, the music of the Euro-American avant-gardes of the 50s-60s of the 20th century. One that is explicitly experimental and not intended to be received in the same way as the music of Corelli, Scarlatti, or Bach is conceived. Although it is obvious that the music of Xenakis (stochastic music) and Ligeti (in particular, the micropolyphonic period), Schnittke or Glass, faithfully reflects the moods and mutations in the collective consciousness of that period. What kind of message does John Cage's music (random music) „send”? Or *Symphonie pour un homme seule* (concrete music) by Pierre Schaeffer and Pierre Henry? No plausible answer. Then the fact of a phenomenon of intentionally articulated sonority. Even as a cultural fact.

The very term message is a flawed one, as it claims to be the most likely form of (notional) assertion. Which has nothing to do with the supposed addressability of music. How can one imagine a „message” of over an hour and twenty minutes of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and Mahler's Tenth Symphony, or over an hour and forty minutes of Bruckner's Eighth Symphony?

The psychological argument

The answer could be formulated in terms and images borrowed from the psychology of reception. Listening to music is not a linear process, but rather an undulatory one, that is, one composed of two phases in relation to effort and energy. Both represent finite values and thus the first phase – of active reception, therefore also of sustained effort – involves energy consumption. The latter being exhausted and falling below the available threshold, the second phase – of accumulation – is initiated. In fact, it is about the management of attention, which in the active phase, of consumption, is oriented downward, and in the passive phase, of accumulation – upward.

But this dichotomy – consumption/accumulation (of attention as a quantum of psychic capacity) – requires an inner differentiation, especially of the active phase, which is not linear, but univocally oriented, in the form of two processes with divergent orientation – a progressive one and, respectively, a second regressive. The reception of new musical material in the active phase stimulates assimilation from the very first sounds of composition, applying the absorption of information. But, at the same time, the action of retroversion synthesis is also stimulated – the integration of the received data into a provisional totality (of the musical text) and thus accelerating the sequence of readjustment sequences of the already accumulated sound image. Both progressive acceleration and retroversion deceleration are synchronous processes that require the consumption of increasing amounts of attention. In terms of energy (i.e., attention) expended, over the entire duration of the accumulation of musical material (i.e., form), a reception will have to withstand an increasing consumption of attention. And this fact will cause progressive exhaustion of the reception capacity. However, in such a working regime, it is difficult to imagine the resistance of the public from under an hour of each of the four symphonies by Brahms to almost two and a half hours – *Messiah* by Handel, around three hours as it lasts, for example, Bach's *Matthäus Passion*, or in five hours – Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*.

It must also be admitted that in the phase of attention accumulation, the amount of information received and integrated (internalized) is minimal if not even negligible. The conclusion is obvious: reception is fragmentary, i.e., discontinuous. In this case, the „message” of the musical composition will also be structured in consciousness as fragmented, that is, disarticulated, and consequently should be irrelevant. But the public insists on staying in a philharmonic hall or an opera house. So, assimilation works, however discontinuous it may appear to be in terms of the receiving conscience.

In this case, it must be admitted that in the absence of other attention-stimulating factors than just the musical material of a composition, it will be conceived in a very strict correlation with the specifics of the reception.

Moreover, intuitively, or consciously, the composers are forced to consider the phase of accumulation and during its estimated duration (as well, intuitively, or consciously) to conceive segments of musical text with a minimum degree of demand for attention.

Milos Forman's film *Amadeus* contains an episode in which Emperor Joseph II of Austria reproaches Mozart for the number of extra notes, thus implying that the music of the opera *The Marriage of Figaro* does not respect either the sequence or the duration of the two phases of reception. And consequently, His Majesty runs the risk of being bored.

Another example could be Symphony No. 94, *Mit dem Paukenschlag* (1791), in G major, by Haydn, the drumming being an unusual method of stimulating attention.

However, the specifics of the reception find a faithful replica in the elementary scheme of a popular song (of rural tradition): $a-b-a-b-a-b-a-b\dots a^{n+1}+ b^{n+1}$, where a is the couplet (new material) and b – the chorus (new alternative). The alternation of two types of heterogeneous musical material keeps the attention alive, and constantly active, thus contributing to the spontaneous involvement in interpretation of an indefinite number of participants. The same principle works in the case of revolutionary songs (the *Internationale* sung en masse), and in the case of jazz, rock'n'roll, or pop standards (the last three having a viral spread).

The couplet-chorus principle also works in the case of the rondo compositional scheme – $A-B-A-C-A$ –, the homogeneity of the A 's being successively „refreshed” by the heterogeneous novelty of the inserted sections, which, in addition to the functions of maintaining processual motility, also act as stimulants of attention.

A different model is presented by the compositional scheme (rather the principle) of the variations, consisting of the initial exposition of a theme with the role of the processual trigger, after which follows a sequence of replicas as more and more advanced graduated transformations of the initial melody.

A synthesis of the rondo with the variations underlies the Baroque fugue scheme, in which the middle articulation is structured as a succession of middle reprises (with the varied exposition of the theme), these exhibited in alternation with a series of episodes (general forms of movement). This is how the fugues from both volumes of Bach's *Das Wohltemperierte Klavier* are organized. But here also an element of novelty appears regarding the general form of a fugue, this one organized in three large joints – the Exposition, the Treatise (the middle section), and the Reprise followed by a possible Coda (with a cadential character). All three articulations can be thought of as conceptually mediated (ie, sonically and structurally) replicas of how perception works.

Thus, the first phase of attention consumption corresponds to the first two articulations, which are:

- The Exposition (A, initio), where a musical material of absolute novelty and in a relatively simple form is presented.

- and the middle section (B, motus), which is procedurally fragmented, harmonically-tonally unstable, heterogeneous in writing, and very structurally differentiated (until the inclusion of episodes with new musical material).

And if the Exposition has the role of inciting attention, then the Treatment consumes it almost entirely. And against the background of exhausted attention, the Reprise section intervenes, where the musical material from the Exposition is resumed, obviously, in a shortened form (that is, dynamized), and this without the recognition of the music already once received being a problem in terms of energy.

In the same scheme the events (structural and psychic) are organized in the case of an exponentially more complex scheme of a *sonata Allegro*. As an example, here, I can serve, first, the famous piano sonatas of Beethoven: no. 8, *Pathetic*, no. 23, *Appassionata* and possibly no. 29, *Hammerklavier*, but also the first parts of quartets, instrumental concertos and symphonies composed in the periods of Viennese Classicism and Romanticism.

Thus, not only the semantic codes of the compositional structures must be accessible to the auditor, but the very composition of the musical work must be emulated from the schema of the functioning of the psyche as its sound replica.

Critical conclusions

In this case, what kind of message can we talk about if the very organization of articulations in their quality of compositional functions correspond faithfully to the way in which psychic processes proceed? Why would more be needed, than only if it were an obvious demanding ignorance of a music-loving auditor, who would keep insisting on the need for notional meanings as „translations” (however general and obviously redundant) of the contents of the music, one that "narrates" the contents of their own psyche anyway.

From the domain of the translatable as a message, perhaps, only the expression remains as a rough analogy of the emotional and imaginary strings that necessarily accompany the articulation of the organized sonority. But both have nothing to do with, for example, Charles Ives's *Three Places in New England*, Symphony No. 3 by Lutoslawski or with *Five Pieces* op. 10 by Webern, only in a very approximate way, which in the end ends up being

synonymous with irrelevance. In a completely different sense, if the existence of a message were to be admitted – which in reality is only the consequence of the impressive impregnation in contact with the organized sonority – it could only be accepted as a form of the limit of abstraction and in the same in the sense that abstract and equally undefinable with precision is the multitude of psychic processes through which both the perception and the reception of a musical composition become possible.

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