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Discussions

Perennialism, Modernism, Ethno-symbolism: Ideological Conflict or Changes in the Scientific Paradigm?

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The question of the nature, origin and age of nations has generated such heated debates during the past few decades that the answers provided have led to the development of veritable scientific paradigms. The concept of paradigm[1] shows that one is not dealing simply with competing theories, but with frameworks for the understanding of the very general issue, the conciliation of which seems almost impossible. Anthony D. Smith has offered a systematic classification and a penetrating critique of the issues.[2] On the one hand, primordialism and perennialism argue that nations have old origins, at least medieval, if not ancient. On the other hand, modernism considers that the nation is a recent phenomenon, the result of a process of modernisation. Finally, ethno-symbolism tries to surpass this dispute underlining the historical continuity between modern nations and the ethnies which have preceded them. I will not detail here the traits of the above mentioned theories, restricting myself to suggesting to the readers the historiographical works of Smith and, of course the works of the most important representatives of these trends. Instead, in this article I will concentrate on the ideological context of the debate, and on the relationships between the dominant and the contending paradigms.

The Ideological Context

Primordialism and perennialism, the dominant theories until the end of the preceding century, overlap the concept of nation, which has been professed by nationalists themselves. They have often been embraced by medievalists or by the scholars of classical antiquity who were looking for the roots of the modern nations as far into the past as they could go.

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[1] In the sense given by the book of Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1970).

[2] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York, 1998); idem, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Hanover, 2000).

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Modernism, asserting itself during the past 50 years has produced the most influential works concerning nationalism from the contemporary period, signed by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson or Eric Hobsbawm.[3] It has surfaced within the climate of rejection of nationalist ideology, dominant in the western world after the Second World War, and its most recent variant, constructivism aligns itself to the post-modern tendency to demystify the "grand narratives" and ideologies.

Ethno-symbolism starts from the assumption that nationalism is not dying, as the modernist analyses were suggesting. On the contrary, it has registered a recrudescence during the past two decades. Consequently, ethno-symbolists have attempted to explain this tenacious survival through an analysis anchored even deeper into the past. From critical modernist positions, ethno-symbolism can be seen as a simple attempt to resuscitate the older perennialism, in an updated form. In the ideological context of Romania, for instance it could assume the semblance of an intellectual rehabilitation of nationalism. From a different point of view, this time favourable to this theory, ethno-symbolism would be a sort of dialectical synthesis of the two prior stages, capable to take the study of this issue to a higher level. In either case, ethno-symbolism has appeared as a reply to the hegemonic modernist trend. For this reason, it can legitimate with the halo of change, aimed at an antiquated paradigm (in the same manner used by modernism half a century ago), benefiting from the prestige implied by such an innovative stand.

However, more often than not, ethno-symbolism presents itself in a conservative, defensive manner, as a moderate, common sense reaction to novelties and modernist excesses. In Romania, for instance, the adepts of modernism are accused, from a perennialist position that they undermine the certainties of national history from a desire to submit, at any cost to a fashion, adhering mimetically to the shocking, but superficial theories of the present.[4] At international level, due to its prudent behaviour, ethno-symbolism can be associated with ideological conservatism, with which it shares a few "right wing" themes, such as the fears concerning the loss of national identities, the critique of the

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[3] As a significant coincidence, in 1983 three works were published which would prove essential to this trend: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983).

[4] See the critique formulated by the perennialist historian Ioan-Aurel Pop, *Istoria, adevărul şi miturile* (Bucureşti, 2002), to the constructivist work of Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest, 2001).

process of globalization, euro scepticism. In reply, liberal modernism and post modern constructivism (with Marxist antecedents) could be construed as "left wing".

Without any doubt, it could be said that this rudimentary association between the above mentioned scientific paradigms and certain political attitudes is no more than an untoward simplification. The competition between various scientific theories can be seen from another point of view, as a result of the internal dynamic of research in a particular field. However, I believe that the associations which I have made remain, at least potentially valid and that the possibility of ideological instrumentalisation of these theories is always present. Always scientific explanations regarding the nation have been linked to the political views of their authors, due to the fact that they were discussing such an important subject for the whole of society. This fact convincingly explains the heated character of these debates, the fact that specialists are unable to identify a mutual conceptual platform in this field. When one talks about a sensitive subject, such as national identity it is impossible to avoid a close relationship between the academic debates of scholars and the political ideas that trouble the society of which they are a part.

The feelings nurtured towards the national phenomenon by scholars who study it are the most diverse, covering the whole range of possible attitudes: attachment, resentment, indifference or critical examination. The Romanian historian, Lucian Boia writes that recent historians do not love the nation (because they blame it for the violent conflicts of the last century), and this is obvious in their work.[5] However, Boia does not comment on this alleged attitude, in order to preserve his neutrality in this matter. Hobsbawm is far more transparent as regards his own feelings: writing his book on nationalism,[6] he mentions in the introduction that he had not needed to renounce any convictions. In other words, the nationalist feelings are completely foreign to him. But at the same time, he criticised nationalist historians who are not capable of such detachment, which already shows, on his part, a certain involvement, that is an implicit rejection of nationalist ideology. Gellner is far more nuanced in this respect. In the same tone of neutrality professed by Boia, he does not divulge his feelings towards nationalism (although it is obvious that he cannot be suspected of sympathy towards these ideas). But he does consider it a sociological necessity of the modern world: regardless of the fact that one loves it or not, regardless

[5] Lucian Boia, *Două secole de mitologie națională* (Bucureşti, 1999), p. 16.

[6] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 1990).

of how many conflicts it has generated, it is inevitable.[7] The attitude towards nationalism confessed by Elie Kedourie can be placed somewhere between that of Hobsbawm and Gellner. Kedourie is a virulent critic of nationalism, generally showing that the latter has provoked major suffering, for instance in Algeria, in Iraq or in Yugoslavia. However, he believes that scholars do not have the necessary competence to emit judgements of practical value, in reference to a certain nationalism, in particular circumstances. Only the wisdom conferred by the passage of time could help one avoid error in this matter, showing one, retrospectively who was right.[8] In contrast, Benedict Anderson reveals quite explicitly his personal indifference towards the doctrine of nationalism, in relation to his interest towards Marxism. He shows that he has come to study this phenomenon only because he wanted to find out how nationalism could manifest itself as a marker of loyalty, stronger than Marxism, including in the relations between socialist countries.[9]

Although, in the case of all the authors their attitude to the nation is in question, the ideological divergences hidden behind the scholarly debates have a different content in the East and in the West. In the works of western scholars who study the nation, assessments concerning the political or ideological attitudes of fellow academics rarely refer to their position towards nationalism, unlike what happens in the East. In the West, after the Second World War, the nationalism of scholars seems to be a definitely closed subject or, in any case one that is discreetly treated, dissimulated as it is behind other allegiances. By contrast, one often comes across mentions of other major ideological and theoretical references: Marxism.

The constructivists, that is the authors who enunciate the most critical scholarly discourse regarding nationalist assumptions (because their effort exposes the fictional bases of the nations) often pledge allegiance to Marxism. Because of the ample dimensions of the subject, it is not possible, in this article to even sketch the complex intellectual genealogy which connects Marxism to post modern deconstructivism. But it is easy to establish a correspondence between the modernist thesis, which states that the nation is a result of specific conditions of the modern era and the Marxist thesis, according to which the nation represents a specific social formation of the capitalist stage of historical development. Moreover, the

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[7] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, *passim*.

[8] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford, 1993), pp. xviii–xix.

[9] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London, 1991), pp. 2–3.

irrepressible temptation to expose hegemonic "ideologies," the "false consciousness," which justifies the dominance represents a common feature of Marxism and post modernism. This Marxist background, which is thoroughly assumed by modernist authors, such as Hobsbawm, Nairn or Anderson is noticed and carefully commented on by Anthony Smith.[10] But this observation does not become a political accusation (as would without doubt happen in Romania).[11] This is used in a critical, but non-ideological sense, just to stress a genealogy of ideas and eventually to highlight the reliance of the respective authors on a dogmatic theoretical model, which restrains them and limits their interpretative freedom.

This ideological superimposition, visible in the West (constructivism/ Marxism; and, the much more discreet one, perennialism/ conservatism/euro-scepticism) does not yet find adequate Romanian parallels. For the time being, this is reduced to a rather rudimentary conflict between perennialists/nationalists and constructivists/ antinationalists.[12] In Romania, constructivists can not be accused, unless abusively that they are tributary to a Marxist intellectual genealogy. Usually, they are politically situated to the right, they are liberals (in a European sense) and admirers of the West, because their ideas have asserted themselves against the official historiographical discourse, of national-communist makeup. The perennialists, on the other hand, at least the ones from the older generations, have been attached to the official, formally Marxist (practically nationalist) culture. As a consequence of this symbolic and nostalgic connection with the former regime, they are politically placed to the left, although by western ideological standards, they should be placed within a right wing nationalist conservatism. Without doubt, these more often encountered affiliations should not be generalised, especially since they suffer a process of transformation.[13] The younger scholars, for whom

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[10] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, chaps. 3, 6.

[11] Andrei Pippidi, for instance, one of the most important Romanian contemporary historians mercilessly judges Hobsbawm for his Marxist views, in the preface to the Romanian edition of his work, *Nations and nationalism since 1780*.

[12] For the general historiographical climate see Constantin Iordachi, Balázs Trencsényi, "In search of a Usable Past: The Question of National Identity in Romanian Studies, 1990–2000," *East European Politics and Society* 17, no. 3 (2003): 415–454.

[13] See Armin Heinen, "Auf den Schwingen Draculas nach Europa? Die öffentliche Debatte um neue Schulbücher als Indikator der Transformationskrise der rumänischen Geschichtskultur," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 2 (2000): 91–104.

communism does not represent a personal engagement and whose formation has not been influenced dramatically by this reference adhere more freely to a certain paradigm, not allowing their options to superimpose previous political alignments. Obviously, this does not rule out new ideological repositioning, according to western models, among which cultural conservatism and euro-scepticism may play a more important role.

The War of Paradigms

The ideological dispute regarding the origin of nations, which opposes conservatives and liberals, nationalists and antinationalists (complicated in the East, by the complex relationship between post communism and nationalism) is at least parallel (and sometimes inter related) with the "internal" dispute of scholarly nature, between the competitive paradigms. The massive support for this debate is offered primarily, first of all implicitly, by the numerous works of the different authors, who recourse to the theoretical background of a certain paradigm. There are, however polemics or explicit viewpoints, such as the disputes between primordialists and instrumentalists, between Gellner and Kedourie, between Gellner and Smith, between Smith and Breully or the debates regarding Gellner's work.[14] Adrian Hastings has suggestively characterised this huge debate as "the historiographical schism" of our age.[15]

Without doubt, Anthony D. Smith is the one who has placed himself in the most consistent and most well argued position in this debate. The British sociologist states that, among the theories which offer an alternative to modernism, primordialism and perennialism are inadequate. In his opinion, ethno-symbolism is the only paradigm capable of taking modernism further, starting from the well founded

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[14] See the view points of Paul Brass and Francis Robinson, in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp, eds., *Political Identity in South Asia* (Dublin, 1979); Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London, 1997), chap. 15: "Do Nations have Navels?"; John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., *Mapping the Nation* (London and New York, 1996), pp. 146–174; John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1998); Anthony D. Smith, "Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism," in *The Ernest Gellner Resource Page*, www.members.tripod.com/GellnerPage.

[15] Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 9.

critique that ethno-symbolists bring to the opposite trend.[16] But, in my opinion, despite his ambition to represent "a third way" in the debates on nationalism, ethno-symbolism is not equidistant, being closer to perennialism than to modernism.

This, first of all because it has emerged as a reply to modernism, and modernist theories are more severely criticised by ethno-symbolists than perennialist ones. Secondly, ethno-symbolism is structurally closer to perennialism. because, like the latter it stresses the elements of continuity in the process of nation formation, while for the modernists, the nation is a result of a discontinuity in historical development. Thirdly, one should not overlook the strategies able to promote the trend, which have led to the assertion of this paradigm, through its dissociation from the much criticised primordialism and perennialism. I will focus on these strategies in the following argument.

The "godfather" of ethno-symbolism is Anthony D. Smith, who has promoted it, both through his original work[17] and his historiographical analyses of theories on nationalism.[18] Obviously, theorising ethno-symbolism, Smith has not focused on his own work, but highlighted the existence of a vigorous trend in the secondary literature, illustrated by names such as John Armstrong, John Hutchinson, Adrian Hastings or Josep Llobera.[19]

Until Smith, the theories on nationalism were usually classified in two major categories. On the one hand, primordialism/ perennialism, considered by the majority of authors an outdated theory, which uncritically prolonged the nationalist point of view about the nation. On the other hand, modernism, the innovative paradigm, capable of demystifying this error. Smith has succeeded, firstly to de-dramatise this binary position, multiplying the number of participants.[20] First of all, perennialism has not been dissociated from primordialism, against

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[16] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, chap. 7: "Primordialism and Perennialism".

[17] First of all one refers to his main work which attempts to impose a new perspective on the study of nations and ethnicity: Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986).

[18] In the literature from Romania, ethno-symbolism is competently promoted by the massive work of the sociologist Dan Dungaciu, *Naţiunea şi provocările (post)modernităţii* (Bucureşti, 2004).

[19] See the works of John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1982); John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (London, 1994); Josep R. Llobera, *The God of Modernity* (Oxford, 1994).

[20] I refer from here onwards to the hsitoriographical scheme suggested by Smith in *Nationalism and Modernism.*

which the most severe modernist critiques would be directed, principally the accusation that it "essentialises" and "naturalises" the nation (in this way, perennialism will rid itself easily of its bad reputation). Secondly, modernism, considered outdated will be accused of contemporary prolongation, radical and destructive: constructivism (represented by Hobsbawm and Anderson), against which the most consistent critique of Anthony Smith is directed. In this diversified context, ethno-symbolism could appear as a healthy reaction, necessary to the correction of constructivist excesses. Permanently, Smith's analysis attributes an ambiguous nature to the relationship between modernism and post modern constructivism. Although constructivism is presented as an exaggeration of modernism, Smith suggests that, between the two tendencies there is an essential identity, and thus, ultimately the excesses of constructivism could be attributed to the original errors of modernism. In this diversified and de-dramatised landscape (with two radical extremes, severely repudiated: constructivism and primordialism; and between two moderate paradigms, whose viable components could be recuperated: perennialism and modernism), ethno-symbolism comes to offer a "royal" middle way.

Smith's analysis fosters a certain ambiguity, in so far as the relationship between perennialism (especially in its "recurrent" variant) and ethno-symbolism is concerned. I refer to the fact that a series of important authors, different in terms of conception, such as John Armstrong, Adrian Hastings, Susan Reynolds or Hugh Seton-Watson) are analysed in the context of the ethno-symbolist paradigm, although they could be equally well placed (and one does find them evaluated in this manner in Smith's work) in various variants of perennialism.[21] As a consequence, numerous arguments of the ethno-symbolist thesis are taken from the work of these perennialist authors. Evidently, the practical dissociation of the two paradigms, perennialism and ethno-symbolism is not easy to accomplish. On the other hand, it is true that Anthony Smith has taken every precaution in this respect, warning readers that the paradigms he has identified (as well as various definitions of the nation and ethnicity) are, first of all "ideal types". There are no authors or works which belong entirely and exclusively to a

[21] Susan Reynolds can very well be considered an indirect supporter of the modernist paradigm, because in her work on medieval political communities—Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300* (Oxford, 1984)—she supports the idea of historical specificity for these types of medieval solidarities, in respect to modern ones.

certain paradigm, but the most forceful ideas of these theories can be identified, in variable proportions in the concepts and methods of the various authors.

One has to highlight the fact that Smith presents ethno-symbolism as a solution able to offer answers to all the questions raised by the rival theories. His books of historiographical drift are not just critical presentations of the entire range of theories (including ethno-symbolism), but also of the ways of promotion of his own ethno-symbolist theory. Without doubt, the scientific authority of Smith is very well argued. He can be considered, without exaggeration, the most important contemporary specialist in this matter.[22]

Mostly because he is the author who has followed this subject with consistency during three decades. In this sense, Smith has used very efficiently the institutional framework of the *London School of Economics*, as a titular of the course on *Ethnicity and Nationalism,* as the founder of *The Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism,* and the publication *Nations and Nationalism*. It is true that Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm or Benedict Anderson have published more spectacular and more influential works, in their time and at international level. But none of these authors (including Gellner) has focused on the study of the nation with the insistence that Smith has had. For the above mentioned authors, nationalism has been a subject among others, and their works on this topic have not been very extensive. Smith has imposed himself not just by outlining an alternative paradigm, but also through the consistency with which he has dedicated himself to the subject, returning to it with new books.

Secondly, his works fulfil a double quality. Smith is an analyst of all existing theories, which he knows, presents and criticises better than anyone; he is also the principal author of a personal theory, based on original empirical research, which aims to surpass previous gaps. The two sides of his activity support each other, complementing each other well. The quasi exhaustive examination of contemporary paradigms concerning nationalism serves as a starting point for the structuring of this own theory.

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[22] See the brief presentation of his work with bibliography in Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (London and New York, 1999), *sub voce*. The ASEN (The Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism) conference from 2004 has organised a session consecrated to his personality, entitled "Ethno-symbolism in the works of Anthony D. Smith".

Consequently, a critique of the ethno-symbolist theory proposed by Anthony D. Smith needs, without any doubt a much stronger basis than the one which has been sketched in the previous paragraphs.

Conclusions

In my article I have identified two types of major tensions, which impact on the debates concerning nationalism and ethnicity. One is ideological in nature, the other is anchored in the specifics of research. First of all, the debate masks a political and ideological cleavage. The aim of the latter is attachment, lack thereof or critical attitude towards nationalist discourse and the values associated with it. This tension is less visible in international academic research, but constitutes a sensitive topic in eastern European countries, such as Romania.

The second source of tension has its roots in the dynamics of research.

On the one hand, the hegemony and the "block-busting" success of the modernist paradigm, from the last decades have naturally triggered a vigorous reaction, materialised through the reconsideration of perennialism and the emergence of the ethno-symbolist paradigm. This phenomenon has a perfect correspondent in the development of political and social phenomena. Modernism has been the theoretical companion of ideological doubts manifested towards nationalism after the Second World War; as a return to perennialism has tried to explain the recrudescence of nationalism, manifested at global scale during the past two decades.

On the other hand, one deals with differences, which separate social theory from empirical research. The modernist "grand narrative" has been launched initially by scholars interested primarily in theoretical aspects, who have elaborated very general systems of the explanations of facts: specialists in historical sociology and social anthropology or historians specialised in interpretation of fact. While the modernists dedicated to empirical research, who have followed have contented themselves to undertake as such this convincing paradigm as an explanatory background to their research, and to validate its relevance, repetitively through numerous studies applied to particular phenomena. In the other camp were gathered the scholars who have started from the particular to the general: for example, perennialist historians specialising primarily in the establishing of facts. The latter, have either ignored the theories, or have accused their incapacity to respond adequately in various particular cases. Obviously, especially the historians accustomed to identify historical causes (or at least antecedents!) of contemporary

phenomena have not found it difficult to discover past roots of the nations, a fact which, in their opinion served to disprove modernist theories.

Without doubt, both categories of tensions have impacted on the discussions. First of all, one has to take into account the internal dynamics of research, with successive and periodical replies addressed to dominant paradigms, with the tension which is created between empirical research and theoretical interpretation. But the ideological purpose strongly influences debates as well, in a world which questions itself with emotion, whether national feeling will transform itself, will persist or will disappear. Between the two types of tensions there is a complicated interplay. Scholars can be influenced in their theories by a pre-existing ideological commitment to nationalism. But even the scientific theories coolly elaborated, according to internal criteria of the field, are frequently instrumentalised and the work of the scholars is called upon to legitimise various political attitudes. Scholars themselves can legitimise and support a certain political attitude or another personal feeling (for instance the fears regarding the disappearance of national identities), through an appeal to a theory which would satisfy this psychological and ideological need.

As I have tried to argue in this essay, both the ideological engagement of scholars and the political context in which the latter have been active, as well as the internal dynamics of research have influenced, in a major way the debates regarding nationalism. The two factors have interrelated and have stimulated each other. But it would be too risky to find a definite, univocal answer to the question raised by the title of this article. The complexity of the issue makes one lean towards caution, so that one may not chase away Minerva's owl—about which one knows that it spreads its wings also towards this subject—with our acrimonious bickering.

Medieval Antecedents of the Modern Nations

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1. Generalities

The term "nation" with its derivatives is current in every day contemporary life, recurring frequently and drawing attention after the fall of the communist regimes in Europe. The most comprehensive international institution of the states of the world today is called "The United Nations" (UN). On the other hand, one talks more and more frequently about "globalization" or "*mondialization*," about a "united Europe," about a "regional Europe," all often considered opposite realities to a world divided among nations. Many theorists consider that nations are an obsolete reality, which has caused great conflicts and suffering and which needs to be replaced with new forms of human community, more adequate to the exigencies of mankind. There are several arguments in this sense: on the one hand, today there are more trans-national organizations and institutions than there have ever been; on the other hand, there has never been such an emphasis on the autonomy of regions, on local and regional languages, on the decentralizing of national states in previous times during the modern and contemporary period.

At the same time, after the fall of the communist regimes (1989), which had promoted to a significant extent "the proletarian internationalism," "the unity of brotherly states" and even the existence of federal blocks (USSR, The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia), the map of Europe has been retraced according to national criteria. The Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic Countries, Moldavia, Armenia, Georgia etc., forcibly included by Lenin and Stalin in the USSR have proclaimed themselves independent states. The same has happened with a number of nations from the former Yugoslavia, which have formed new states, such as Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia or the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have refused to belong to the same state. The same organization according to national criteria, but in reverse, has been imposed in Germany, which had been divided in 1945 in four zones of occupation and then in two distinct states. After the fall of communism, the eastern part of the German nation, organized through an external political decision in a separate state (the German Democratic

Republic)—satellite to USSR—has united itself to the rest of Germany. In regions where there have been tensions and conflicts, which still persist (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, several regions of the former USSR), this is largely due to the refusal or impossibility of applying the national criteria. That does not mean, of course, that the organization of the world in nations would be an ideal solution today or that nationalisms of various types have not produced and do not produce grave traumas around the world. The historian, however is not necessarily called to judge past realities, to accept them or condemn them, but to research them, to present them according to the criterion of truth, to make them intelligible to others.

2. Defining the Nation

In this spirit, it is necessary to formulate a definition of the nation, which is extremely difficult, because the term has very different meanings. For some, the nation is easily superimposed with the state. That is why, the above-mentioned international institution is called "the United Nations" (with headquarters in New York), after, during the period between the two world wars, it was called the "League" of the "The Society of Nations" (with headquarters in Geneva). For others, the nation is an act of will (see Ernest Renan) and expresses the deliberate decision of people to live together, in a state, with a common organization, unique institutions etc. Other specialists state that the nation is an "invention" of the political and intellectual elites, which have "taught" people to form communities after certain criteria, which they have called national. There are theories—maybe the most numerous in east central Europe—which assert that nations are forms of human community of ethnic faction, born organically, in the course of time and based on the unity of language, traditions, religion, origin, political, territorial institutions etc.

All these types of unity have gradually generated a national consciousness, that is, the conviction of a group of people to live together on the basis of past experience and in order to build a common future. This national consciousness results from the reality called nation and not the reverse, although the nation has been and is everywhere fortified by national consciousness. The nation state remains merely a framework, which favors the development of nations, but is not indispensable for their emergence. Moreover, many European nations were born before the emergence of the national state, within the framework of multi national empires or in the context of feudal fragmentation, inherited from the Middle Ages. The idea of mother-land, of framework territory

for the formation and affirmation of a national community emerges independently from the existing political boundaries, at a certain moment in time.

Although, each nation was born, developed and affirmed itself in unique, un-repeatable circumstances, there are certain common features, which sociologists and political scientists divide in three groups (types): natural (race, ethnicity, origin, kinship), cultural (language, customs, religion) and political (territorial and political organization, the state, the monarchy, the dynasty, the common institutions). For the majority of nations one encounters most of these components or types, but in different proportions and with different roles.

3. The Medieval Nation[1]

Current opinion, even among specialists (political scientists, philosophers, sociologists, historians) is that nations have formed themselves only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the emergence of capitalism and the modernization of society. These analysts are only partly right: in the century of the enlightenment and afterwards in the era of revolutions, American, French etc. the modern nations have developed. But these modern nations have strong roots in the past, when medieval nations existed (*nationes*). The development and affirmation of the latter has taken place in Europe (thirteenth to sixteenth centuries), that is during the final centuries of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Obviously, the ethnic-national type of solidarity has not been at the fore of medieval society. People in those times felt primarily part of the Christian religious community, of various types (the Christian world in general, western or eastern Christianity, the parish, the religious orders, the abbey or the monastery etc.), of privileged estates (*oratores*, *bellatores*, *laboratores*) or social, professional groups, but also of the family, of the village where they lived, of the duchy, principality, kingdom etc. There are many ways in which people—social beings *par excellence*—could live in groups during the Middle Ages, and belonging to these various communities was either conscious or not, a result of birth or of option, temporary or permanent. The forms of territorial, political organization during the Middle Ages (the antecedents of what, in later times was

[1] Ioan-Aurel Pop, *Geneza medievală a naţiunilor moderne (secolele XIII-XVI)* (Bucureşti, 1998), *passim*.

called "state"), as well as the ecclesiastical institutions were not, in general formed on the basis of ethno-national unity.[2]

There were, in medieval Europe two major, general, integrating institutions, that is, the Church, especially the western one (Catholic=universal), which through the notion of *Christianitas* tended to encompass the entire world (western Christian, eastern, pagan, heretical etc.) and the Empire (the Byzantine and the Holy Roman). In the west, the popes as well as the emperors have claimed supreme power, temporal (secular) and spiritual (religious). At the opposite pole, there were the small local communities, extremely active and powerful, such as the state, the manor (the estates of a nobleman), the region or the province. For example, most inhabitants of the Italian Peninsula considered themselves Christians (Catholics), but also Florentine, Sienese, Milanese, Venetians, Romans etc. and considered themselves rivals of and, often in conflict with each other. Despite the tendency towards global organization (promoted by both Church and Empire), medieval society was a deeply fragmented one, comprising little morsels, full of particularities.

After a time, especially after 1200, it became clear that such a world was very hard to govern and to control: on the one hand, globalism was an illusion, even in the West (Eastern Europe, that is the Byzantine world had already become a distinct reality, especially after the Fourth Crusade of 1204), where the Church was in deep crisis and affected by the schism, and the princes (the kings) considered themselves "emperors" in their kingdoms, rejecting imperial authority (an eloquent example is that of the king of France, Philip IV, called the Fair, who reigned between 1285 and 1314);[3] on the other hand, the atomization, in various manors, placed under the authority of various lords, discouraged any tendency towards unitary administration, made communication and the circulation of ideas and goods more difficult, prevented the implementation of legislation, allowed for arbitrariness. Thus the necessity emerges for an intermediate, well-balanced territorial and political reality, situated between the Empire and the county or province, which could become more easily governable. One condition for the fulfillment of this requirement was a new form of unity, perceived as such by the people and accepted by them. The mutual Christian faith or the subjection to a

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 9–21.

[3] Joseph R. Strayer, "Laicization and Nationalism in the Thirteenth Century," in C. Leon Tipton, ed., *Nationalism in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1972), p. 36.

territorial, local lord was no longer sufficient for the efficient organization of society.

Meanwhile, a new ethnic reality was gradually born, based on the experience of contacts and confrontations with foreigners or on what is called alterity (otherness). People have started to value what they had observed a long time ago, that they spoke a language different from that of their neighbors, that they had different customs, traditions, ideals, beliefs, they dressed differently, that they had different ancestors and a different history. Some have come to believe that the union of people on the basis of these characteristics would be useful for the common good of the group. Many medieval sovereigns have tended to cultivate the feelings of unity on an ethnic basis and even to impose through forcible administrative measures these ethnic particularities (language, culture, beliefs, traditions etc.) of the dominant group. In this way, medieval nations were gradually formed, through a diminishing of the above mentioned global or local reality.

4. The Framework for the Medieval Nations

The entities of a national type, based on common language, origin, customs, beliefs, culture, territory etc. have gradually asserted themselves through specific ways, among which the most important were the confrontation (peaceful or violent) with the foreigners, the church, the monarchy (the dynasty), universities and others.

4.1. Medieval Conflicts with a National Subtext

4.1.1. The Hundred' Years War

The French (French speaking) and the English have come to violent confrontation long before the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453). Thus, William of Malmesbury (c. 1090–c. 1143)—Benedictine monk and historian—recounts how the Pope Pascal II (1099–1118) had encouraged the hesitant king Henry I (1100-1135) to invade Normandy, with the justification that this act "will not be a civil war, but… a noble advantage for his country".[4]

When Malmesbury describes the battle of Tinchenbrai, he says that the skirmishes "took place on the same day when, about forty years before, William the Conqueror had debarked at Hastings" and that the fact

[4] Gordon G. Coulton, "Nationalism in the Middle Ages," *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 5, no. 1 (1935): 30.

"took place through the providential judgment of God, with the purpose that Normandy be subjected to England on the same day that Norman forces had come in the olden days to conquer England".[5] Thus, the Norman conquest of 1066 was considered an offense, which required revenge from the English (even if their elite was, for the most part, French speaking, as heirs of the Norman conquerors).

On the other hand, the English feudal holdings in France have started to be considered an offense by the French. Long before 1300, Guillaume le Breton (c. 1165–c. 1225)—a French poet and chronicler—hoped that Aquitaine would return to France, and thus "the foreigner would no longer hold benefices in our kingdom".[6]

The Hundred Years' War was not a national one, but it has acquired in time profound national meaning. The wish of the English sovereign to inherit the French kingdom has triggered strong opposition to the south of the Channel. Consequently, mutual hostile measures became stronger, in the name of ethnicity. After the battle of Crécy (1346), the English court had replaced French, as an official language, with English. Around 1340, in a poem addressed to the Valois king, Philip VI, it was said: "You can know well that the English will now love the French/… and become master, asking for your right/ Of everything that is on this side of the sea/ The sea would become a border/ of England and France".[7] It was repeatedly requested that all Englishmen would be expelled from France.

In the fifteenth century, Jeanne d'Arc (c. 1412–1431) triggered the most impressive moment of French popular unity, within the monarchic and confessional framework of the times. She believed that "those who were at war against the Holy French Kingdom were at war against Jesus."[8] In 1437, the parliament of Paris firmly forbade a French girl to marry an English military man: "the court will not allow the so-called Jeanette to go with the so-called Westeford and become an English woman during the war and the rift between the king and the English."[9] This was an act

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[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Dorothy Kirkland, "The Growth of National Sentiment in France before the Fifteenth Century," *History. The Quarterly Journal of the Historical Association*, New Series 23 (1938–1939): 20–21.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 18; Michel Mollat, *Genèse médiévale de la France moderne (XIVe–XVe siècles)* (Paris, 1970), p. 139.

[8] Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "Patriotic Propaganda," in Tipton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, p. 67.

[9] A. Bossuat, "L'idée de nation et la jurisprudence du Parlement de Paris au XVe siècle," *Revue Historique* 74, vol. 204 (July–September 1950): 54-59.

of treason, that a French woman would become an English woman through marriage. "The quarrel of the two kings" had now become a national conflict. The Humanist Robert Gaguin (c. 1433–1501) notes that "it would be much easier to reconcile a wolf and a lamb than an Englishman with a Frenchman."[10] The negative relation between the two people will remain constant in the modern era.

4.1.2. Reconquista

Spanish identity was formed during the *Reconquista*, that is, during the war of liberation from the Moorish (Arabic) occupation, between 718 and 1492. The fight for freedom has united the Spanish and has conferred upon them, through mutual sacrifices and ideals a sense of community. Because of the Arab occupation, the conflicts with the foreigners in the Iberian Peninsula were more violent, almost irreconcilable and the intolerance was much stronger.[11] The battle was fought here, primarily with Islam, but also with those of Mosaic faith, with the heretics, with the false converts, with witchcraft etc. The massacres, the pogroms, the burning at the stake became aspects of daily life.

4.1.3. The Hussite Revolution

Many years ago, the historian Johan Huizinga (1872–1945) stated that "the only typically national battle during the Middle Ages was that between the Germans and the Czechs during the Hussite war." (1419–1434).[12] Indeed, Bohemian Hussites have identified their religious cause with national interests.[13] Parallel to the process of emancipation of the Czech nobility and church from the German tutelage, one witnesses the start of the struggle of the Czech burghers to win supremacy in the urban environment, until that time, predominantly German.

In 1408, the Czech councilors obtained, for the first time the majority in the magistracy of Prague, an event which was received by the Germans with a degree of discontent. The King, Vaclav IV felt the need to modify (in 1409) the statutes of the University of Prague—the largest university in central Europe—offering prevalence to the Czech nation

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[11] Peter Linehan, "Religion, Nationalism and National Identity in Medieval Spain," in S. Mews, ed., *Religion and National Identity* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 165–193.

[12] Johan Huizinga, *Men and Ideas. Essays on History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance* (New York–Evanston–London, 1970), p. 110.

[13] Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism. Myth and Reality* (New York, 1955), p. 83.

over the other three nations, and especially over the Germans.[14] This was followed immediately by the revolt of the German professors and students, which, after the confirmation by the king of the Czech rector and of a Czech dean, left the town ostentatiously. The new rector, Jan Hus (the adept of John Wyclif), an English writer and "reformer," who lived approximately between 1324–1384), was fully favorable to the emancipation of the Czech people from under the oppression of the Germans and this feeling was shared by all his Czech colleagues. The Hussite speakers commended the exclusion of the Germans from the Czech lands, and the magister Jerome of Prague defined "the Bohemian Nation" as a community of people who lived in the Kingdom of Bohemia and who had as their characteristics "language, blood and faith," that is, they were different from the Germans through their Slav language, through their origin and their new Hussite faith. After centuries of frustration, the Czechs dreamt of their superiority over other nations. Jan of Jesenice (?–c. 1419), a university professor and a jurist said in his *Defensio Mandati*: "According to the divine law and to the natural law, it is necessary that the Bohemian nation, in the Land of Bohemia be higher than the other nations and be at the fore and not at the rear and always above and not below."[15]

The resolution of the Czech diet of 1419 encompassed national requests addressed to Sigismund of Luxembourg, king of Hungary and of Germany, pretender to the Czech throne: the foreigners, both lay and clerical, should not receive any office; in the towns there should be no more German councilors; the Czechs should have the first word in the entire kingdom, while the Czech language should be used in the church and in the courts.[16] The king of Hungary and of Germany was finally rejected as a sovereign in the Czech lands, because he was a foreigner and not a Slav. The national diet of Caslav, of June 1421, called Sigismund "an assasin of honor and of the members of the Czech language."[17] In his turn, king Sigismund—according to a Hussite chronicle—would have been ready to renounce all of Hungary only to be able to exterminate all of the Czechs. Without this medieval experience

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[14] See Frantisek Smahel, *La révolution hussite – une anomalie historique?* (Paris, 1985), *passim*; Stanislaw Bylina, "Le mouvement hussite devant les problemes nationaux," in D. Loades, K. Walsh, eds., *Faith and Identity. Christian Political Experience* (Oxford, 1990), *passim*.

[15] Smahel, *La révolution hussite*, pp. 179–180.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 212–213.

[17] Idem, "The Idea of 'Nation' in Hussite Bohemia," *Historica* 17 (1969): 97–99.

of the Czechs from 1400, it would be difficult to imagine the modern Czech nation from central and south eastern Europe.[18]

Violent disputations between the Germans and the locals have been recorded also in the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland, where, at least until the middle of the 14th century, the Germans predominated in the towns. Thus, it is well known that, around 1350 all of the approximately 150 towns (*civitates*) of Hungary had a German majority population. Gradually, the sovereigns undertook measures, which favored the locals. Against this background, for instance, in 1312, when the German burghers of Cracow rebelled against the Polish king, Vladislav Lokietek, the Polish also responded with reprisals: they stopped passers by in the streets of the town and made them say a few difficult words in Polish; if they could not accomplish this task, they would be killed.[19] Before that time, during the "Matins of Bruges" (1302), when the French knights had arrived in order to repress the revolt of the Flemish burghers, the foreigners were forced to pronounce a few difficult Flemish words ("shild und vriend"—shield and friend), in order to be identified and punished.[20]

4.1.4. The Confrontation between the "Latins" and the "Greeks"

The violent impact with the foreigner was as strong in the European regions, which were under Byzantine influence. The first stage of this conflict took place between 1203 and 1204 when Constantinople was subjected by the western "crusaders". Only now, the rift of 1054 between the "Greeks" (the Christians of Eastern rite) and the "Franks" or "Latins" (the Christians of western rite) had become effective.[21] At the same time, the victorious campaign of the French and Venetian "crusaders" of 1203–1204 (which, instead of liberating the Holy Places had conquered a Christian state, that is the Byzantine Empire), has triggered the national awakening of the Greeks, fed by the hatred towards the foreign invaders and by the consciousness regarding a glorious past.[22] The arrogance of the "Latins," the subjection of the Eastern (Byzantine) Church to Rome, the cruelties and the destruction have confronted the conviction

[18] Jules Szekfü, *État et nation* (Paris, 1945), p. 143.

[19] Pop, *Geneza medievală*, p. 103.

[20] Johan Huizinga, "Nationalism in the Middle Ages," in Tipton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, p. 20.

[21] Jan N. Moles, "Nationalism and Byzantine Greece," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 10, no. 1 (1969): 99.

[22] Dimitri Obolensky, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, series 5, vol. 22 (1971): 1.

concerning the superiority of the Byzantine political community, the heir of the Greek-Roman classical tradition and of Christian "righteousness".

4.1.5. The Confrontation between the Christians and the Ottomans

Also while confronting the foreigner the identity of Serbs and Bulgarians was forged, except this time the enemy was Byzantium itself. From the fourteenth century, this enemy, common for all the Christian peoples of south-eastern Europe, had come to be Islam, embodied by the Ottomans. From 1354, both borders of the continent (the south western one, in the Iberian Peninsula and the south eastern one, in the Balkan Peninsula) were assaulted by the Muslim world, Arab and respectively, Ottoman. The Ottomans, like the Arabs were not just violent, foreigner, enemies and conquerors, but also non-Christian, that is, "pagans". For them, everything Christian was bad for theological reasons. That is why, they considered themselves superior to Europeans and the recipients of a perfect moral and religious path.[23] Everything that was not part of the "House of Islam" was considered *de plano* the enemy and placed within the "House of War," against which the "Holy War" was both a necessity and a virtue. Thus, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Albanians have been for several centuries under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, being deprived of their own states, while the Romanians, the Croats, the Poles, the Hungarians and other people of central Europe have preserved, to a large extent their Christian institutions (with certain exceptions).

Conquered wholly or in part, for a longer or shorter period, the above-mentioned people have forged their medieval national identity during the conflicts with the Ottomans. This identity has initially been tinted by religion, as on the one hand "Christianity" confronted "Paganism," but in time the ethnic component had begun to surface. Thus, the national myth of the Serbs was born after the battle of Kossovopolje of 1389, when the price paid for the conservation of the faith and of Christian identity was the death of the sovereign and their military defeat by "pagans".[24] In the eyes of these Christian people, the Ottomans were not just the enemy of the people, but also of God and the struggle against them was a virtue, which bred martyrs. Some of these martyrs of the faith have later become heroes and national saints. For certain periods of time, the Greeks, the

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[23] Peter F. Sugar, "External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism," in P. F. Sugar and I. J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle–London, 1969), p. 36.

[24] Marko Marković, "La signification de Kossovo dans l'histoire serbe," *Le Messager Orthodoxe* 3, no. 1 (1982): 30–55.

Albanians, the Bulgarians, the Serbs have been overwhelmed by the force of the Ottomans, have hyperbolically interpreted this force, have remained deeply disappointed by their fate, although they have largely defended their ethnic specificity.

The Hungarians, not being directly occupied by the Ottomans before the sixteenth century, although they were thoroughly engaged in the crusade, have sometimes minimized the danger. Against the background of a serious internal crisis, of the multi-ethnic and pluri-confessional component of the kingdom and of the lack of actual support from the west, Hungary was dismembered in 1541, its central part becoming for a century and a half (1541–1688) an Ottoman province. However, the struggle for emancipation continued in the areas, which had remained Christian of the former Hungarian kingdom, considerably strengthening the national pride.[25]

The Romanians, pending on circumstances and the political and geographical situation have sought a way of survival in their relations with the Ottomans and, despite major territorial concessions, have preserved their institutions, within the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. These have remained autonomous countries, with a Romanian and Christian organization, but vassal to the sultan. One of the causes of this development has been the combination (practiced by the princes and the Romanian elites) of the policy of resistance with that of conciliation with the Sublime Porte. That is why, it is not a paradox to state with Filippo Buonaccorsi Callimachus, around 1490, that the Romanians, after they had rejected the attempts of conquest of the Turkish power, "have come to terms through treatises, not as conquered but as conquerors".[26]

The people of central and south eastern Europe have strengthened their medieval and early modern ethnic identity through the "Late Crusade" or the "Defensive Crusade," that is through the complex diplomatic and military actions initiated primarily by the west (the Holy See, the Holy Roman Empire, some of the Italian states, Spain etc.) which

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[25] George Barany, "Hungary. From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism," in Sugar and Lederer, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, *passim*.

[26] Florin Constantiniu, "De la Mihai Viteazul la fanarioți: observații asupra politicii externe românești," *Studii şi materiale de istorie medie* 8 (1975), *passim*; Şerban Papacostea, "Tratatele Țării Româneşti şi Moldovei cu Imperiul Otoman în secolele XIV-XVI: ficțiune politică şi realitate istorică," in N. Edroiu, A. Răduțiu, P. Teodor, eds., *Stat, societate, națiune. Interpretări istorice* (Cluj-Napoca, 1982), p. 98; Ioan-Aurel Pop, *Națiunea română medievală. Solidarități etnice româneşti în secolele XIII–XVI* (Bucureşti, 1998), *passim*.

had as their aim the blocking of the Turkish advance towards the rest of Europe and even the liberation of the territories they had already conquered. The brunt of the battle with the Ottomans during the "Late Crusade" was born by the people of central and south eastern Europe, who have become aware through their elites of this situation and have considered themselves "gateways of Christianity" or "defense walls" of European Christian civilization in the face of Islamic attacks. Both the literary sources and folklore of these people reflect the way that national identity was born in the midst of resistance and of the struggle with an enemy of a different language and faith. This has led to rivalries and egotistical stands concerning the principal role assumed by one or the other of these nations during the crusade. All these conflicts do not necessarily highlight a continuous violent confrontation. At the end of the day, in daily life, the Christian subjects have adapted to the Muslim masters, while the latter have understood, in a certain fashion, to "protect" those they had forcefully taken under their wing. However, the hostility and lack of trust have often fueled disputes and have fed differences.

The examples may continue, taking into account the confrontations between Germans and French, between Germans and Italians, between Hungarians and Germans, between the latter and the northern people, between the English and the Danes, etc. but the model remains the same: from the confrontation there emerged ethnic identity and unity, the pride in being German, French, Danish or English.

During the violent or peaceful confrontations of the Middle Ages, the illustrious origin of people and their princes has sometimes been invoked.[27] The Italians appealed to their Roman ancestors, the conquerors of the world, the Germans to the virtues of the ancient Germans, who have successfully confronted Rome and have conquered it, the Greeks to the model of ancient Greece, the Romanians to the glory of their ancestors, who had laid the foundation of Latinity along the Danube and across the Carpathians etc. Sometimes, in the absence of illustrious origins or through the temporary ignorance concerning the latter, imaginary famous ancestors were forged: the French took pride in their Trojan ancestry, the Danes in their Dacian one, the Hungarians in Attila the Hun, the Poles in their Sarmatian ancestors, etc. Many such ancestors were presented as having divine ascendancy, "proven" through the Greek or Roman pantheon or even through the Bible. Often, in official propaganda, which accompanied medieval conflicts, the

[27] Pop, *Geneza medievală*, pp. 33–52.

illustrious origin and the civilizing mission were equally invoked, in order to enliven the combatant forces and bolster their courage. Through repetition, awareness of the common origin (of famous ancestors) had become an important component of national ideology.

4.2. The Church

The Christian Church is, as is well known, through its universal nature, super national. The universalism of the Catholic Church could not exist merely in abstract terms, but had to rely on certain political and territorial entities. Thus, Gaul, Germany, Italy or England have been considered distinct units by the Papal chancellery long before their state unity was fully constituted. Around 1200, a solitary but vigorous champion of the Welsh church has been received by the Pope Innocent III in Rome. The character was Giraldus Cambrensis, scholar, politician, historian, friend and courtier of the king Henry II of England and canon of St. David. When Giraldus insisted on historical requests of independence of the Welsh church from the English, the pope sent for a book. In the book-said Giraldus "all the churches of the world were listed in order, country by country": *Ecclesia Anglicana* (English), *Ecclesia Gallicana* (French), *Ecclesia Daciana* (Danish), *Ecclesia Hispaniarum* (Spanish) and others.[28] The fact indicates the existence of ecclesiastical provinces dependent on political divisions of Europe. Jacob of Viterbo, archbishop of Naples, in his treatise *De Regimine Christiano*, at the beginning of the fourteenth century admits to the existence of "different special churches" (*diversas ecclesias speciales*), which the pope governed through other pastors.[29] These "special churches" will adapt themselves to the later national states. The title of primate has been introduced to designate the leading archbishop, usually within a kingdom; the primate was, thus, more often than not, the church leader of a people, and his national significance, even through his name (the primate of France, the primate of Poland, the primate of England etc.) is obvious. Frequently, local churches have identified with the national cause, have become national symbols, as was the case in France (the Galican church), England (the Anglican church), Poland, Bohemia etc., even before the Reformation. The *bans* (leaders, administrators, governors) of Bosnia, in the thirteenth century, have adopted Bogomilism as an official religion,

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[28] I. P. Shaw, *Nationality and the Western Church before the Reformation* (London, 1959), pp. 4–5.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

to avoid the irritating Hungarian Catholic pressures or the Byzantine Orthodox ones and to ensure the independence of their country.[30] The Hungarian "crusades" against "heresy," of Louis I of Anjou (1342-1382) were in fact wars fought for the conquest of Bosnia.

4.2.1. The Crusades

Starting from the end of the eleventh century, a wave of religious fervor had engulfed the western world, answering the call initiated by the hierarchies of the church for the liberation of the Holy Land. Crowds were convinced that salvation would come as a consequence of their participation in the campaigns against the infidels, which were profaning the tomb of Jesus. Thus, the classical crusades were born, manifestations of Christian unity, of a certain "European patriotism," but also of the ethnic diversity of the continent.

Even during the first crusade (1096–1099), Guibert of Nogent (historian and theologian) remarked upon the irritation of the Sicilians, the Lombards and the Germans in the face of French arrogance, which prompted them to abandon their comrades in arms when they reached Nicomedia.[31] Odo of Deuil (abbot of St. Denis), writing about the second crusade (1147–1149), underlined the bloody episodes, which had taken place between the Germans and the French: "The Germans were unbearable to our people," there were more of them, "they despised the pride of the few French and took up their arms against them".[32] At the same time, from other sources, it is well known that the English and the Normans were set against the Flemish and the Germans. Motives for the dispute were the honor to lead the expeditions, to undertake the first attack, the division of the loot etc. Pierre Dubois (lawyer, pamphleteer, and politician), around 1300, said that France was the natural and inevitable leader of the crusades, because the will of God manifested itself through the mediation of the French (a fact revealed by the very title of a book by the above-mentioned Guibert of Nogent—*Gesta Dei per Francos*). Pierre Dubois also claimed that it would be to the advantage of the whole world that it should be subject to France, because the French nation has more good sense than any other nation.[33] The French appear thus as the people chosen by God to rule the world.

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[30] Pop, *Geneza medievală*, p. 118.
[31] Coulton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, p. 18.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 19–35.

The most eloquent manifestations of the national rivalries have been noticed during the fourth crusade (1203–1204), which, instead of leading to the liberation of the Holy Land has subjected, to the benefit of western Christian forces (Venice, France, the Holy See), regions and Christian lands of South Eastern Europe.[34] At this point the Greeks and the Latins became estranged, but the German and French knights also had acrimonious battles, while the latter had various bones of contention with the Venetians. The Pope Innocent III, although he disapproved of violence and disputes, had decided to put an end to "schism" (i.e. the Eastern Church) by force. The "Schismatics" who persisted in their errors were assimilated to heretics and were therefore an easy prey to plunder (dispossessed of their goods as *iniusti possessores*).[35]

This measure has led to tense general relations between the Western and Eastern Christians, but also between Hungarians and Romanians, between Hungarians and Serbs, Bulgarians or Ruthenians, between Germans (Theutonic knights) and Slavs, between the Polish and the Romanians, Polish and the Orthodox Slavs etc., that is relations between Catholic and Orthodox people. The late crusade (the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries) has attempted to unite all Christian forces, but the rift had become too great between the West and the East, making cooperation difficult. The Romanian prince Ştefan cel Mare (1457–1504), although praised by the pope as a *verus christiane fidei athleta* ("a true athlete of the Christian faith"), had not received the promised help against the Turks and had warned the Catholic powers that if "our country, which is a gateway to Christianity will fall," then "all of Christianity will be in great danger". In an embassy to Venice in 1477, the Romanian sovereign spoke like a patriot: "I don't want to say how useful this country of mine is for the Christian affairs; it is the fortress to defend Hungary and Poland and the sentinel to these two kingdoms."[36] Stephen the Great, like his contemporaries was no longer an authentic crusader, but rather a pragmatic leader, who had the national interest at heart, defending his country, which he called Wallachia and asserting its claims.

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[34] Stephen G. Xidis, "Medieval Origins of the Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies* 9, no. 1 (1968): 1.

[35] Şerban Papacostea, *Românii în secolul al XIII-lea. Între Cruciată şi Imperiul Mongol* (Bucureşti, 1993), p. 54.

[36] Ioan-Aurel Pop, "Ţările Române ca 'Poartă a Creştinătăţii' la Dunărea de Jos (secolele XV-XVI). Ideea şi fapta," in vol. *Spaţiul cultural al Dunării Mijlocii şi Inferioare: tradiţii şi perspective ale convieţuirii* (Reşiţa, 1995), p. 157–163.

4.2.2. The Councils

A place to manifest the national principle was the general council of the Western Church, where beginning with 1274 (Lyon II),[37] the archbishops and bishops, with their retinues were grouped according to nations, in opposition with the cardinals. In the long history of conciliar "nationalism" (1274–1431), the Council of Konstanz (1414–1418) has held the most important place.[38]

During this council, the loyalty to the national framework has been placed above all other loyalties, while the pride in one's own nationality and faith in its superiority have become the order of the day. The council had to solve a number of extremely serious issues, such as the elimination of schism, which had been tearing the western church apart after 1374 (there were already two popes) and, especially after 1409 (when there were three parallel popes) and the eradication of Hussite heresy in Bohemia. During the council, participants voted according to their nation: the English nation (which represented the north), the German nation (which represented the east) and the French (which represented the west), with their clerical and secular members, with a president, deputies, seals, special places within the cathedral, with their own meeting halls. Nothing was finalized during the council, until it received the approval of the nations.

But this division by nation was not considered satisfactory either by all the participants. There were delegates who requested a return to the individual vote, the national vote being considered—as it actually was—of lay, rather than ecclesiastical nature. Most of the opposing voices came from the "smaller nations". Current opinion in the council claimed that, in Europe there were "general nations" and "particular nations". The "general nations" were the four above-mentioned ones, the so-called consecrated ones, which followed a certain geographical criterion (the north, the east, the west and the south). In this way, for instance, Germany also included Hungary, Poland and Bohemia, while the Iberian kingdoms should have been classed with Italy. From the very beginning, the emperor Sigismund of Luxembourg (who was also king of Hungary) had requested that Hungary be admitted as the fifth nation in the council, but his request was rejected. The Iberian kingdoms insistently wished to form "the Spanish nation". On the other hand, the cardinal

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[37] Louise L. Loomis, "Nationality at the Council of Constance. An Anglo-French Dispute," *The American Historical Review* 44, no. 3 (1939): 510.

[38] George C. Powers, *Nationalism at the Council of Constance (1414–1418)* (Washington D.C., 1927), *passim*.

d'Ailly (French), on the 1st of October 1416 has read in the council the discourse entitled *De ecclesiastica potestate*, in which he attacked the system of voting according to nations, which tended to destroy the essential nature of the church, that is unity. For practical reasons, the prelate accepted a certain division of nations, but with France, Germany, Iberia, and Italy, without England (which was supposed to be included in the German nation). As a consequence, rivalries increased, reaching more serious dimensions: the Germans and the English have risen against the French; part of the Spanish had risen against the English; the French and the English have started to have armed conflicts, involving daggers, swords and clubs, both in the cathedral and in the streets of the town. The French claimed that the four nations, which should have been accepted by everyone at the council—the French, the Italian, the Spanish and the German—were "general nations," while the English only represented a "particular nation" (as they had no representatives from Wales, Scotland or Ireland). The English, in reply although they accepted this division of "general" and "particular" nations, claimed that they would be the fourth "general nation". In the document entitled *Anglicae nationis vindicatio* ("The Defense of the English Nation"), the English envoys show that England possessed all the characteristics of a true nation, "whether the nation is understood as a distinct people through its blood relationship <common origin>, through the custom of unity or through linguistic particularities, which demonstrate, in the highest and truest degree, <the existence> of the nation and its essence, both according to the divine and the human law, or that the English nation will be understood, as it should be, as an equal territory with that of the French nation". And even if they have fewer delegates which have arrived at the council—the English added—each nation should count as equal with the other, as it happens in the universities or in the leadership of towns.[39]

All this shows that at the time, the "general nations" were perceived as formal entities of a political, territorial or geographical type, while the "particular nations" appeared as organic, fundamental entities, born of the divine and human will. The characteristics of a "particular nation" are synthesized very clearly by the English delegation to the council (the common origin, the tradition of unity, language and inhabited territory) and they correspond to a significant degree to the definition of the modern nation. The English have added to their plea: "Anyone knows that it doesn't matter whether a nation listens to a prince or to several.

[39] Louise L. Loomis, *Nationality at the Council of Constance*, pp. 523–526.

Are there not several kingdoms within the Spanish nation, which are not subject to the king of Castile, the principal leader of Spain? But from this it does not follow that they are not part of the Spanish nation."[40] Consequently, the nations define themselves, first of all, after the criteria of origin, language, organic unity and not according to artificial political or territorial divisions.

The council of Konstanz has contributed to the strengthening of the national spirit in Europe, but it was also a result of this spirit, which had manifested itself a long time before. There was a clear connection between the national disputes of this council and the big confrontation which would engulf all of Europe after approximately a century, at the time of the Protestant revolt. The nations, which had sided with Sigismund of Luxembourg—the Germans and the English—would become champions of the Reformation, of the imposition of the Protestant confessions, with their powerful national component.

4.2.3. The Monastic World

The monasteries, although they were meant, through their very nature, for peace, prayer and peaceful cohabitation, have also sometimes been a context for the manifestation of national feeling. Intense disputes, sometimes violent have ignited between the English monks and the Norman abbots, after the invasion of William the Conqueror in 1066. The higher clergy of England was almost exclusively Norman, Thomas Becket (c. 1118–1170) being the first archbishop of Canterbury born in England, after almost a century had passed since the Norman invasion. At Westminster Abbey, in 1226, the monks were forced to hold the cup with two hands when they drank, as it had been "the general custom of the entire English nation, until the arrival of the Norman in this country".[41] Even the way they held the cup had become a symbol of the English nation and had become a form of protest against the Norman foreigners!

The Anglo-Norman antipathy within the convents soon impacted on the relations between the English and the French clergy. In 1279, the envoy of the abbot of Cluny, who had come for a canonical visitation to an English monastery, wrote: "The prior is a good man, wise, humble and moderate, although he is English."[42] A tendency can be noticed during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to "nationalize" the

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 526.
[41] Coulton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, p. 25.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

branches of the various religious orders, according to the countries in which they existed. John of Pecham (c. 1240–1292), archbishop of Canterbury, tried to persuade the abbot of Cluny, with the utmost seriousness, that the prior of Lewes, in his quality of chief of the Cluniac order of England should always be "somebody of the English language" (*aliquis de lingua anglica*).[43] In 1330, the English cluniacs complain to the king that there was a tendency among the "monks of one nation <the French>" to lead in their monasteries "as if they benefited from hereditary rights, although they were few in number and evil in their deeds, while the others <the English> were all subordinate, no matter how much good they would do, and that is against the rule of St. Benedict".[44]

Things were similar in other countries as well: the Scottish were irritated by the presence of English monks in their monasteries, while in Poland, the earliest ecclesiastical document which has been preserved concerns the discord between the Polish and the Germans in the monasteries; in pre-Hussite Bohemia, the bishop of Prague, John of Drazice, warned those who wanted to be admitted to the novitiate, in the monastery he had founded at Roudnica that they had to be Czech and to have inherited the Czech language from both parents; in 1083, the Georgian Gregory Pacurianos (Bacuriani) stipulated in the regulations of the monastery of Bashkovo (founded by him in the Rodopi mountains, south of Plovdiv) that the Georgians should be received in that monastic community, before everyone else, because the Greeks were violent, shrewd and greedy.[45]

Some religious orders have involved themselves in ethnic issues of the secular world, under the pretext of the "missionary" role, fulfilled not just among the "pagans" and "heretics," but also among the "schismatics" (Christians of the Eastern rite). Thus, the king of Hungary, Louis of Anjou (1342–1382), a champion of Catholicism, has cooperated with the Franciscan order, in order to subordinate the Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian regions from the Vicariate of Bosnia (a territorial subdivision of the order). The vicar of Bosnia, Bartholomew of Alverna, towards the end of the fourteenth century, talked about the secular advantages of the conversion of the Romanians, the Serbs and the Bulgarians living in Hungary: their greater fidelity towards their Catholic lords and the severance of the links of these "schismatics" with

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] Pop, *Geneza medievală*, pp. 144–145.

their co-nationals from outside Hungary, from their free states (Serbia, Wallachia, Moldavia), neighboring Hungary. In such a Franciscan text it is stated clearly: "That many evils, that is, robberies and hidden murders, which they <the schismatics> carry out now without a conscience, together with those from outside, of a language and a sect with them, would stop" through conversion.[46] The phrase shows that, among the Serbs, the Romanians and the Bulgarians from within and from outside the Hungarian kingdom there was ethnic solidarity, based on their common language and confession. The Franciscan Bartholomew of Alverna thought, as it has been noted, not only in religious terms, but also in political and national ones.

In some monasteries, at the end of the Middle Ages, national consciousness was cultivated through language, origin, traditions, even when confrontation with foreigners did not take place. The monks were scholars who spread the literary language through numerous manuscripts or with the help of printing. Thus, it is known that Neath Abbey has been a monastery of utmost importance from the south of Wales for promoting national sentiment and for its patronage of Welsh literature. In Wallachia, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Italian Francesco della Valle was learning from the Orthodox monks of the monastery Dealu, situated in the vicinity of the capital "the entire history of the settlement of the inhabitants in this country," how the emperor Trajan, defeating and conquering this land, has divided it among his soldiers and has turned it into a Roman colony and thus these inhabitants having their origin, as it is said, from the old <Roman colonists>, keep the name of Romanians.[47] This is an example of the cultivation of this theme of the national origins in the monastic milieu, of identifying the name that Romanians gave themselves (Români) with their Roman origin.

4.2.4. The Battle for Temporal and Spiritual Power in the West

The signs of national unity also encompass the regions, which had traditionally been fragmented, such as Italy or Germany, within the framework of the struggle for power between the Empire and the Holy See. In the battle of Legnano (1176), northern Italy (The Lombard League) had shown solidarity against the foreign armies of the emperor, Frederick I Barbarossa (1152–1190). The Lombards were writing to the

[46] Papacostea, *Românii în secolul al XIII-lea*, pp. 90–95.

[47] Maria Holban, *Călători străini despre Ţările Române*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti, 1969), p. 323.

Pope, Alexander III that they were fighting "pro honore et libertate Italiae et Romanae Ecclesiae dignitate".[48] Several times the very existence of the church of St. Peter in Rome and the possession of the supreme pontifical dignity by the Italians have been reason enough to instill a sense of pride for the inhabitants of Italy and of envy for the foreigners. The Germans have often considered the popes too closely attached to their Italian interests, to their ethnic origin, while the French had become positively jealous. That is why, around 1300, the above mentioned Pierre Dubois, a promoter of French nationalism, was opposing the idea of restricting access to the papal tiara to "the single nation of Italy."[49] Moreover, the violent removal of the pontifical see to Avignon and the imposition of a French pope by the French king, Philip IV the Fair (1285–1314) have meant a wish to subject the church to the French national interests. The same Pierre Dubois saw the French sovereign crowned (by the new French pope, Clement V) as emperor of the Roman-German empire, in order to put an end to the German political supremacy.

In this way, gradually, society was secularized while the church was increasingly placed in the service of national interests. The autonomy of the English Church has become clear, starting from the thirteenth century, when the notion of *Ecclesia Anglicana* surfaced. Thus, Hubert Walter, archbishop of Canterbury (1193–1205), primate of England stated, without hesitation that the church of his country was "part of the western church, which God has established in England".[50] Gradually, the English sovereigns have secured the appointment of the clergy in their country, which could no longer make decisions against royal prerogatives, as well as control over ecclesiastical property. Repeated conflicts with the Holy See, which had started immediately after 1200, have strengthened the autonomy of the Church of England. After the removal of the residence of the popes to Avignon, these conflicts have grown, while the notion of *Ecclesia Anglicana*, which has had, initially a purely geographical connotation, was again laden with new meaning, that of the national identity of the Church of England. Thus, the "Supremacy Act" of Henry VIII, from 1534 was merely a legalization of fact.

By comparison, Gallicanism represented the characteristics which individualized the church of France. A sovereign, such as the above-

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[48] Rosario Romeo, *Italia mille anni. Dall'età feodale all'Italia moderna ed europea* (Firenze, 1981), p. 141.

[49] Coulton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, pp. 36–37.

[50] Shaw, *Nationality and the Western Church*, p. 2.

mentioned Philip IV the Fair, who considered himself "emperor in his own kingdom" could not miss the opportunity to subordinate the church of France to national interests. Guillaume de Plaisian—an influential lawyer of this king—noted with conviction: "all the people of this kingdom are led by the authority of the king; even the prelates and the clerics, in temporal matters, depend on the laws, the edicts and the constitutions of the king."[51] Towards the year 1300, there was already a tradition in France, according to which *corpus mysticum patriae* was placed above and, sometimes against what is called the *corpus mysticum ecclesiae.* The Gallican clergy, which together with the French laity formed the "Gallican Church," *recte* that of France, was represented as an integral part of the "body of the country," frequently in opposition with the "mystical body" of the Universal Church.[52] In 1305, on French soil, at Lyon, in the presence of the king of France, the bishop of Bordeaux, Bertrand le Got, was crowned pope under the name Clement V. In the same year, the new pope consecrated ten new cardinals, out of whom nine were French. The successors of St. Peter were regarded, in the Avignon period of the papacy as "chaplains of the king of France," as "French national pontiffs".[53] The liquidation of the "exile to Avignon" and of the western schism, at the beginning of the fifteenth century have shattered French dreams of eternalizing the "nationalizing" of the church to its own benefit. In these circumstances, not benefiting from control over the property of the church (as had been the case in England), the French secular authorities have elaborated, after 1400 a new doctrine, based on tradition, called Gallicanism. At its center stood the idea of separation, independence and sovereignty of the two powers—ecclesiastical and royal—as well as conciliarism, that is the priority of the decisions of the councils over papal ones (the pope was "in the church, but not above it"). Gallicanism became increasingly prominent during the following centuries, without managing to lead, as it had happened in England, to a complete severance of the Church of France from Rome.[54]

A church with certain national characteristics was created by Jan Hus, in Bohemia, at the beginning of the fifteenth century. At that time, externally, being Bohemian meant being a Hussite, or being a heretic.

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[51] Strayer, *Laicization and Nationalism*, p. 36.

[52] E. H. Kantorowitz, *Patriotic Propaganda*, p. 69.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] See Francis Rapp, *L'église et la vie religieuse en Occident à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1971), *passim.*

Also, in Poland, Hungary and other states, the churches have clearly adapted to national interests. In the eastern world, there was a tradition of "the ecumenical patriarchy" from Constantinople, the leader of a church considered as a "state department" in the Byzantine Empire. The Emperor was, by right and in actual fact, the head of the church. In this way, in the East, at the same time as the development of the states according to a Byzantine model, the churches were gradually subordinated to the authority of the secular sovereigns. That is why, in this part of Europe, the national characteristics of the churches are stronger than in the West.[55]

The church had strengthened national identity everywhere through the forging of national saints, such as Stephen for the Hungarians, Vaclav for the Czechs or Sava for the Serbs etc.

4.3. The State and the Monarchy (Dynasty)

The medieval world, with its realities either too particular or too global—for our taste—may often seem strange. Dante wrote somewhere about the "Slavs, Hungarians, Germans, Saxons, English and other nations" as if all the Slavs would have been part of the same block (perhaps at the time they seemed to be!) or as if the Saxons were not Germans. Dante also presented himself, at a certain moment as being of the "Florentine nation".[56] Although these testimonies may seem confusing for our times, they would be justified for the moment of their emergence. As we were saying, the medieval nations are something else than the modern ones. Nobody could know in the fourteenth century how the Slavs, the Saxons or the Florentines would evolve in time. At the same time, it is very difficult to observe the principal sense of medieval loyalties. The people lived in local units (manors, villages, city-states, provinces), in intermediary units (kingdoms, or other quasi independent formations) and the great unity of Christendom, nominally led by emperors and by popes (or ecumenical patriarchs). Consequently, loyalties, both the secular and the religious were divided. The disputes between these various centers of authority, between these diverse poles of power, have become endemic and have often led to chaos. Gradually, both the church and secular society felt the need for peace, order and better organization. The exaggerated localism, as well as the illusion of

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[55] Pop, *Geneza medievală*, pp. 159–193.

[56] Thomas F. Tout, "Feudal Allegiance and the National Sentiment," in Tipton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, p. 60.

the universal Empire did nothing but emphasize the state of uncertainty. Against this background, certain factors of authority (including those within the church) have started to cultivate, with insistence an idea, current in the medieval age, that is, the link of the subjects with a common master and the loyalty they owed him. It was no longer a question of the fidelity of the peasants towards their feudal lords or about the loyalty of each vassal towards his lord, but rather about the subjection to the prince or king. Obviously, through relations of vassalage, even feudalism has created the premises for unity, of centralizing power. The majority of people were subordinate to a local lord, but absolutely all people owed fealty to the supreme lord, who was the king (as the emperor had become fiction). Consequently, even feudalism could lead to national unity, because, if one excludes the defects, all loyalties led towards a superior one, centered on the sovereign.[57] Even the church, despite its universal vocation has supported the monarchy in achieving centralized authority, which meant order, subjection, peace, prosperity. Moreover, the feudal regime has had a significant contribution to the genesis of nations through parliament (the assembly of the estates).[58] These were born from the institutions of feudal society and have gradually taken steps towards the national uniformity of the kingdoms and principalities. Also from the medieval world were inherited the ideals of liberty and honor, transplanted on national soil.

From the thirteenth century, with the emergence of the theory of the sovereign state, the conditions of the national state were delineated (beforehand only the vaguest of frontiers had existed), while the role and attributions of the king became more well-defined. The kings have thus become factors of loyalty and aggregation. If the subjects benefit from a relatively homogenous structure, a common origin, the same faith and language, the way towards the national state was smooth and easy to follow. If not, then measures towards uniformity, homogeneity, of the diminution of particularities were needed, especially of linguistic ones, which made communication more difficult. A centralized administration was not possible within a tower of Babel of laws and languages! For instance, the kings of Hungary have been obliged to recognize in Transylvania three privileged groups (estates)—the nobility, the Saxons and the Szeklers—called (starting from 1500) "nations," because their

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[57] *Ibid., passim.*

[58] Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics. A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character* (New York, 1944), p. 208.

ethnic component had been emphasized. This political and ethnic fragmentation has been counteracted by the modern Hungarian authorities, through measures towards national uniformity, as in the western states. Some of these measures have succeeded others have not, perpetuating conflicting states, which have, sometimes survived to this day.

All the great modern nations, have been built from small, regional nations. The Florentine Machiavelli (1469–1527), with such a great role in the structuring of Italian nationalism, knew this well, when he attempted to transpose, politically the idea of Italy, under the leadership of a powerful prince.[59] That does not mean that the modern Italian nation owes something to the unifying medieval secular monarchy, because the latter did not exist. Its very absence determined Machiavelli to wish for such a monarchy, capable of coagulating the Italians and of forming the political Italy on the basis of the cultural one. Another classic example of particularism was Germany, but even there, gradually, between the extreme fragmentation and imperial globalism, the German nation emerged. From the fifteenth century, even the empire has a significant official name: the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The political fiction (the rebirth of the Roman Empire) could no longer stifle the German national reality.

The model of the national state, within a medieval framework remains the French. Here, the lawyers of the thirteenth century have created the above-mentioned theory of the sovereign state, that is of the sovereign monarch, as a reaction both to the claims to temporal authority made by the church, to the universalistic doctrine of the Empire and to the centrifugal tendencies of the great lords. The monarchs started to be considered infallible, endowed with power granted by God through the process of anointing (or even through divine origin), and with unusual virtues (such as the ability to heal). Such ideas were soon encountered among the English as well. Thus, Aelred, the abbot of Rielvaulx (1109–1166), a theologian and a historian, in the life of Edward the Confessor claimed that the English were the chosen people and that England was situated before all kingdoms on earth, due to the sanctity of its kings.[60]

The theory of the national territory (the land) claims that all the inhabitants of a kingdom must have the nationality which results from the name of the country. In other words, if one lived in France and was a

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[59] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism*, ed. D. Van Nostrand (Princeton, s.d.), p. 14.

[60] Rosalind Ransford, "A Kind of Noah's Arc: Aelred of Rievaulx and National Identity," in Mews, *Religion and National Identity*, pp. 138–142.

subject of the king of France, then one was necessarily French. Also in this context the issue was raised of the limits of the kingdoms and a theory of natural borders was constructed, which would find full affirmation during the modern period. The French medieval lawyers have proclaimed the fact that France was the rightful successor of the old Gaul and that it should have the borders of the latter, as they were described by Caesar: the Rhine, the Alps and the Pirenees.[61]

The kings have cultivated, through administrative measures the imposition of a single national language in their countries (for instance, of the dialect from Île de France for the French or of the dialect from around London for the English), as well as in the conquered territories. The English sovereigns were worried that their subjects, colonized in Ireland were losing their identity. That is why the Statutes of Kilkenny (1366) forbade mixed marriages (Irish-English), as well as the use of the Gaelic language by the members of the English nation.[62] Henry VIII (1509–1547) has signed a document entitled "an act for English order, custom and language," through which every cleric was supposed to swear that he would teach the people of his parish in English or that he would impose the upkeep of a school, teaching in English.[63] The king of France, Henry IV of Bourbon (1589–1610) explained to the representatives of a province recently integrated into his kingdom: "Because you speak French from birth, it is natural that you would be the subjects of the king of France. I agree wholeheartedly that the Spanish language belongs to the Spanish and the German language to the Germans, but all the regions where French is spoken should be mine."[64] The unifying role of the monarchy is obvious from this text, based on the idea of a national unitary state, a state of a single nation, identified through its common national language.

In the East, Byzantine "imperialism" has stimulated the assertion of Orthodox states, formed according to national criteria. At the beginning of the eleventh century, the Bulgarian Simeon had taken the title of "emperor and *authocratos* of all the Bulgarians," according to the projection of Bulgaria as an equal of the Byzantine Empire. After a few successful campaigns against Byzantium, the same Simeon proclaimed himself (in 925) "emperor of the Greeks and Bulgarians," a title with an

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[61] Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*, p. 171.

[62] Katherine Walsh, "One Church and Two Nations: a Uniquely Irish Phenomenon?," in Loades and Walsh, *Faith and Identity.*, p. 97.

[63] Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*, p. 84.

[64] Pop, *Geneza medievală*, p. 102.

ethnic undertone, invented to glorify himself and the Bulgarians and to insult the Byzantine officials. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the Serb Stefan Dusan assumed the title of "tsar of the Serbs and the Greeks". The Russian sovereigns did not take the title of "tsars of the Greeks," but had fought against Byzantium and have rejected the doctrine of the supreme authority of the *Basileos* from Constantinople. It was increasingly clear that the Byzantine sovereigns were not, in fact "Roman emperors" (just as the western ones were not), but Greek emperors of the Greeks.[65]

Consequently, in the case of several people, the sovereigns have coagulated the energies of their subjects and have given them a sense of unity based on language, origin, faith, that is, by invoking a number of national components. The universal empire had long proved to be a fiction, while the small local formations were generating autarchy and isolation. The kingdoms, created according to national criteria seemed to be a factor of equilibrium and stability. Marsilio of Padua (c. 1270–c. 1342), physician, theologian and political thinker, wrote in this spirit in *Defensor Pacis*: "We could ask ourselves if it would be appropriate for all people living in a civil state and spread out across the surface of the globe to choose a unique supreme leader, or if on the contrary it would be preferable, in the various regions, separated by geographical, linguistic or moral frontiers for each of the particular communities to attribute the government they would see fit. It seems that the second solution would impose itself."[66] This theoretical text is a plea against the universal empire and in favor of the structure that would become the national state, on the basis of a common language, of customs and of a well-defined territory.

4.4. The Universities

In the Middle Ages, education was not a self-sufficient institution and it was not a "state institution," as would happen during the modern period. It was under the supervision of the church, which offered patronage in all cultural matters. Even the inferior schools functioned alongside churches and monasteries. In the universities, it was not only obligatory that each teacher would be a cleric, but such a quality, even for the future was also required of the students. Thus the patronage of the church, the provenance of its members from various countries and

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[65] Obolensky, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, pp. 11–13.

[66] Jacques Le Goff, *Intelectualii în Evul Mediu* (Bucureşti, 1994), p. 158.

provinces, as well as the Latin language in which teaching took place should have turned these centers of culture into true international tribunes. Which was happening to a certain extent.

By definition, western universities were communities of teachers and disciples (*universitates magistrorum et scholarium*), but their members were divided according to nations. For example, at Paris and at Vicenza there were four nations, while at Bologna there were 35, further reunited in two larger groups, that is *Citramontanes* (literally translating as "the ones from this side of the mountains," that is from Italy) and the *Ultramontanes* (translating as "those from beyond the mountains," that is from north of the Alps). Eventually, custom has preserved almost everywhere the number of nations, fixing it at four. Within these, both teachers and students were included. In 1209, the four *nationes* of the University of Paris were: the French, the English, the Norman and the Picard.[67] Three of these nations represented regions or provinces, with a strong individuality, from northern France, while the fourth "natio Anglica") included the Germans, the Scandinavians and the Polish. Only towards the middle of the fourteenth century, *natio Alemaniae* had separated itself from the *natio Angliae*. At Oxford, the university statutes stipulated an official division according to two nations, based on the differences between the north and the south of the British Isles. Thus, the Scottish were ranked among the *Boreales*, while the Welsh and the Irish among the *Australes*. From 1374, the two "nations" from Oxford were united, as a symbol of a desired progress towards national unity, while in 1379, at the height of the Hundred Years' War, Edward III had ordered that the French would be expelled from this university.[68]

Before 1500, there were in Catholic Europe some 73 universities, all organized according to the national principle. Group solidarity was often very strong, giving birth to rivalries, disputes, adversary camps, according to ethnic and territorial criteria. Around 1220, Jacqes de Vitry (c. 1160–1240), theologian, historian and preacher, in the text called *Historia Occidentalis* stated the negative characteristics, which the students of the university of Paris attributed to each other: the English were heavy drinkers and sycophantic; the French proud, effeminate and adorned like women; the Germans furious and obscene at table; the Norman superficial and boastful; the Burgundians vulgar and stupid; the Britons frivolous and unstable (fickle); the Lombards prone to avarice, full of vices and cowards; the Romans (those of Rome) rebellious

[67] Shaw, *Nationality and the Western Church*, p. 58.
[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.

and turbulent; the Sicilians inclined to tyranny and cruel; those of Brabant blood-thirsty, arsonists, robbers; the Flemish excessive and given to squandering their fortunes etc.[69] The testimonies referring to university life at Oxford were not optimistic either.[70] The faculties and the colleges were frequented by impetuous youngsters, coming from different countries and speaking different languages, who saw each other with distrust and antipathy. The conflicts between the rival nations were often reproduced, on a smaller scale on the narrow streets of medieval Oxford. Conflicts erupted more strongly when the natives of a country got together to celebrate the feast of their national patron saint and when they were going to church as a group, dancing and shouting, wearing masks and crowned with garlands. In December 1258, at Oxford there was a general skirmish between the Scots, the Welsh, between the Northerners and the Southerners, when a number of the combatants were killed. The armed conflicts erupted again in 1273, 1334, 1388, 1389, 1401, 1402 etc., the Irish and the Welsh being among the protagonists. At the beginning of the rebellion of 1401, the Welsh students from Oxford and Cambridge were expelled and sent to their country of origin. For the Irish, the solution was also a sort of "ethnic cleansing," because a Parliament of 1413 had forced them to leave England (the decision was only partly implemented). For several decades, the Irish students have needed warranties concerning their good behavior from English administrators, in order to be able to attend the two English universities.

Such disputes, with a national undertone are to be encountered in the universities of Vienna, Prague and Cracow, especially among the German, Czech, and respectively Polish students.[71] At Prague, in 1409—as it has already been noted—the king, Vaclav IV had ordered changes in the statutes of the university, according prevalence to the Czechs, in relation to the other three nations, especially in relation to the Germans. This was followed by the revolt of the German students and Professors, their withdrawal and the transformation of the Prague university in a Czech national institution. During he Renaissance, the ambiguity of belonging to a nation or another was often eliminated through the linguistic criterion. Thus, in 1497 "The statute of the German nation" from the University of Bologna established exactly which people belonged to this nation ("ex quibus personis natio nostra consistat"), that is, the German nation is composed of all those who have German as a

[69] Romeo, *Italia mille anni*, p. 135.
[70] Coulton, *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, pp. 20–22.
[71] Le Goff, *Intelectualii în Evul Mediu*, p. 159.

birth language ("quod est Teutonicorum natione, id est omnes qui nativam Alamanicam habent linguam").[72] Consequently, the linguistic criterion is again the decisive one in order to establish belonging to a nation. Obviously, in the medieval and Renaissance universities, there were long periods of concord and peace, in order to favor studies. There were also disorders, caused by political, religious, moral and sentimental reasons etc., but the structure according to nation had encouraged awareness of ethnic differences and had eventually led to the transformation of the universities into national institutions, hotbeds for the development of a national cultural elite in the modern period. No wonder, Jacques Le Goff called the Caroline University of Prague "the first national university."[73]

5. Conclusion

All these examples show that, in the context of several medieval loyalties and the prevailing solidarity there emerged gradually a national community, based on common origin (illustrious), on language, confession, traditions, on the same government (the monarchy), on the same territory etc. This community of a national type was not very strong during the Middle Ages, but tended to become stronger later, when its assertion was encouraged by the confrontations with foreigners (alterity), by the church (through the classical and late crusade, through the councils, monasticism, through the struggle with the empire etc.), by the measures taken by secular authorities (sovereigns, the assemblies of estates), by education (the universities) and by other factors. The word *natio,* which initially had several very diverse and, sometimes vague meanings (including the political one, of privileged group or estate), will now be laden with ethnic connotations. Gradually, a part of the elite started to think in national terms, to acquire national awareness. This medieval national consciousness is, generally limited to a part of the community and is often latent and passive and does not, with some exceptions lead to massive movements in favor of the nation. However, towards the end of the Middle Ages, the great western nations French, English, Spanish)—and not just them (see the example of the Czech nation)—acquire the signs of modernity, become modern nations, based on mass coherence. After their example, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries most modern European nations developed, as well

[72] Romeo, *Italia mille anni*, pp. 136–138.
[73] Le Goff, *Intelectualii în Evul Mediu*, p. 159.

as the American nation or some Asian ones. The new concept of nation permeates society increasingly deeply and becomes a mass ideology. At the same time, the triumph of democracy (the power of the people) has increasingly led to decisions taken in the name of the majority. Moreover, the new industrial society and the demographic explosion have led to migration and urbanization phenomena without precedent. All that (the industrial revolution, democracy, nationalism as a mass ideology etc.) have profoundly changed the nation, inherited from the early modern period. The modern nations are strong and active communities, within which some older components will be highlighted (such as unity of language, of culture, the framework provided by the unitary state), while others lose their importance (confessions, the church, the monarchy etc.). Some "provincial nations," which promised to be quite vigorous during the Middle Ages have been substantially reduced in importance or have been integrated into bigger nations. National disputes have become the order of the day, because each nation wishes to have a state framework as big as possible and to integrate all those who are considered members of that community. The term nationalism acquires a pejorative meaning, being often confused with xenophobia or with chauvinism, although, for the Middle Ages it is very close to patriotism, to appreciation for one's own nation. In the context of these bloody conflicts, with national undertones and against the background of globalization of the last decades, among the specialists and within public opinion there is a current tending to blame the nation as a contemporary reality or as a historical one. Obviously, these excesses need to be condemned, but the struggle for national emancipation has not been synonymous with terrorism, so well-covered by the media today. One must nor confuse the cause and the effect. In the name of the Church, abominable crimes were committed and bloody wars have been fought. But that does not mean that the Church can be entirely condemned as an institution. Even if the Europe of the future will be one of regions or will be globalised, for the time being, the actors of international legislation within this Europe are the nations (the national states). That is why, their history must be known and interpreted correctly. The European nations of today are neither good nor bad; they simply exist and have strong roots in the past. The present lines have attempted to trace exactly these roots, a reality which has traversed several centuries of the history of mankind.

Romanian Nation-formation in Transylvania: The Stages, Seventeenth Century to 1914

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The origins of nations and the emergence of nationalism and national movements have been the subject of scholarly, and sometimes unscholarly, attention since the nineteenth century. At the theoretical level the debate about the nature and role of nation became especially sharp in the second half of the twentieth century, as modernists boldly challenged traditional conceptions. New explanations for the appearance of nations and their character and new estimates of their longevity held that they were constructs founded upon economic and social realities specific to the modern age. Such arguments clashed with the certainties of the so-called primordialists and perennialists about the age-old existence, even the permanence of nations in human society. Still another body of scholars—the ethno-symbolists—proposed what might be called a third way of approaching the matter. They emphasized historical and cultural links to the past, but at the same time they accepted the essential modernity of nations.

This paper proposes to measure the evolution of the Romanian nation in Transylvania against the background of wide-ranging theory. It aims especially to examine which paradigms of nation-formation—traditional or modernist—accommodate best the Romanian case, that is, how accurately one or another theory accounts for the emergence and development of the Romanian nation. It is divided into three main parts: first, an examination of the theories of representative modernists, primordialists, perennialists, and ethno-symbolists and of others who have influenced the debate about nationhood; second, the identification of the principal stages in Romanian nation-formation; and third, some suggestions as to the commonness and the uniqueness of the Romanian case.

I.

Since the middle of the twentieth century modernism has been the most influential paradigm explaining the emergence of nations. Its representatives generally agree on the approaches to the central issues of

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the debate: the existence of an essence of nation or its constructed nature; the antiquity of nations or their relatively recent appearance; and the historical and cultural, as opposed to the economic and political, foundations of nation. Modernists reject the idea that nations are intrinsic to human society, that they are "natural phenomena." They claim, instead, that nations and nationalism are products of the modern world and that they were formed in order to satisfy the peculiar needs of that world, and then, they predict, as times change nations will disappear, to be replaced by other forms of community organization appropriate to new ages. In all this they emphasize the key role of elites as the constructors of nations.

Ernest Gellner set forth the premises of modernism in radical form, first, in *Thought and Change* (1964) and, then, at greater length, in his well-known and controversial *Nations and Nationalism* (1983). He insisted that the rise of the nation cannot be explained satisfactorily either as an exercise of the will or by adherence to culture; such factors simply did not differentiate the origins of nations from those of other kinds of communities and movements. The crucial elements, in his view, were the economic and social circumstances of the modern age. Thus, nations and nationalism, for him, could only be products of modern capitalist, industrial society. Nations, he reasoned, were, in fact, indispensable, if modern society—a complex, mobile, and mass entity—was to function properly.[1] Thus, he denied that nations had existed for all time or that they were the natural way of organizing and separating human beings. His concept of nationalism flowed from such considerations. He defined it as a principle of political legitimacy that required ethnic and political boundaries to coincide, and he defined the national sentiment behind it as the feeling generated either by the hope of achieving this goal or by the very impediments to its achievement, and he classified national movements as organized attempts to attain this goal.[2]

Two other, radical modernists, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, approaching matters from a Marxist perspective, have also contributed immensely to the sharpening of the debate over nations and

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[1] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (New York, 1983), pp. 39–43. For an exposition and criticism of Gellner's theories, see Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York, 1998), pp. 27–46. More critical is Brendan O'Leary, "Ernest Gellner's Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Nationalism?," in John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 40–88.

[2] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* p. 1.

nationalism. Hobsbawm, first in his introduction to his co-edited volume, *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), and later in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (1990), and Anderson, in *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), raised serious questions about the very existence of nations.

Hobsbawm argued that nations were the creations of nationalism, and he shows how nationalism itself was a product of the modern age of urbanization, industrialization, and democratization. Nations, he insisted, were by no means eternal or long-lasting; rather, they were engineered or constructed in the modern age by elites—he calls them nationalists—who were anxious to preserve order in the unstable conditions of late capitalism.[3] As the bearers of nationalism they had as their inevitable goal the creation of a nation-state, a role, he thinks, nationalists began to play in a significant way about 1830. He therefore dismisses the French Revolution as the first example of full-fledged nationalism at work, suggesting, instead, that its primary influence lay in the reaction it aroused to its own and Napoleon's excesses. Nor is he anymore indulgent toward myths, memories, and various traditions of the past, that is, those cultural and ethnic bonds that might shift emphasis away from his preferred modern origins of nations. His focus on the nation-creating role of elites also leads him to reject any part for the masses in the process. For him, the cultural and ethnic heritage of the peasants, for example, could provide no basis for the establishment of the nation.[4]

Benedict Anderson shares some of Hobsbawm's basic premises about the nature of the nation: he regards it as an abstraction and a construct, a product of modern times. He thus denies the intrinsic reality of nations, insisting that they are "imagined communities," and he accords elites the crucial role in the process of their construction.[5] But against the general background of capitalist development he reserves a more important place for culture than does Hobsbawm. He points out that while elites may conceive of the nation as embodying qualities such as language, memories of the past, and even religion, which are, in their minds, common to a people as a whole, neither they nor the people can hope to meet every member of the community personally. But, he argues, in

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[3] E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 9–11. For an overview of Hobsbawm's thought on nation, see Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, pp. 117–131.

[4] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 46–79, 101–130.

[5] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London and New York), 1991, pp. 5–7.

modern times through "the technology of print capitalism" they can know the members of the community, which he thinks of as a cultural nation, through newspapers, magazines, fiction, and poetry, printed in large quantities and widely disseminated. It is at this point, he argues that the nation in the form of an imagined political community becomes predominant in social thought and organization.[6]

Opposed to modernism were earlier paradigms of nations and nationalism—primordialism and perennialism. They had been predominant among scholars until the middle of the twentieth century and continued to exert great influence afterwards. The primordialists were the champions of organic nationalism. They claimed that the world had been and still was composed of natural nations, and they portrayed these nations as the foundations and chief actors of human history. Conceiving of nations as organisms, they thought that the differences between them were obvious, because of the distinctiveness of the cultures they represented. A characteristic expression of primordialist thought was the sociobiological argument raised by Pierre van den Berghe that ethnic communities and nations were essentially kin groups.[7] As evidence he cited the myths of origins and common descent, which he thought corresponded in the main to actual biological ancestry.

Perennialists share with the primordialists certain fundamental beliefs about the nation. They insist on the antiquity of nations, claiming that they have always been a part of human society, that is, of recorded human history, and that in their contemporary guise they simply represent age-old biological nations. Furthermore, they discern a core, or essence, of the nation, which assumes different forms as time passes, and they recognize the underlying ethnic link that unites the members of a nation. But perennialists part company with primordialists when they deny that nations are natural phenomena. Instead, they view them as historical and social creations. Walker Connor, for example, emphasizes the emotional power of ethnic and national consciousness when he argues that a nation is a group of people who sense that they are related through common ancestry. But he is quick to note that this understanding of kinship is not factual history; it is feeling, intuition.[8] At the same time he shares with modernists the conviction that the nation

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–46.

[7] Pierre van den Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (1978): 402–411.

[8] Walker Connor, *Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N. J., 1994), p. 202.

appeared in recent times, the late nineteenth or twentieth century, explaining that national consciousness is a mass, not an elite phenomenon and that nation-formation is a process, not a single event.[9]

Historical ethno-symbolism represents an attempt by a number of scholars to bridge the gap between colleagues who regard nations as solely modern artefacts and those who defend the "naturalness" and antiquity of nations. Ethno-symbolists emphasize continuity between the past and the present. They investigate the ways in which modern nations and nationalisms revive and reinterpret the myths, traditions, and symbols of earlier eras, and they show how vital this cultural heritage is in arousing ethnic and national consciousness. In so doing, they call attention to the historical and subjective content of nations and nationalisms.

Anthony D. Smith, the leading exponent of ethno-symbolism, makes an important distinction between the ethnic community (*ethnie*) and the nation. He is convinced that the study of the former is essential for an understanding of why and where nations were formed and how they differed from one another.[10] He points to "the myth of a common and unique origin in time and place" as crucial for creating a sense of ethnic community, since it was the origin of the *ethnie*'s history and marked its individuality.[11] He defines ethnic communities, then, as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity."[12] But the *ethnie,* he points out, is not yet a nation; it lacks a clearly defined territory, economic unity, a public culture, and rights and responsibilities shared by all.[13]

Smith recognizes the importance of the economic, political, and cultural changes in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe in making culture and ethnic identity the main elements in new political formations or nations. He thus argues that nationalism as an ideology and a movement originated in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but he also recognizes the existence of religious nationalism much earlier in England and Holland and discovers national structures, feelings, and symbols as far back as the late Middle Ages in certain European

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[9] Walker Connor, "When Is a Nation?," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no. 1 (1990): 98–100.

[10] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 6–18, 153–173.

[11] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism,* p. 191.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 191.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 196.

countries. It is a view expanded upon by others, notably by Adrian Hastings.[14] Smith clearly differentiates nationalism, which he defines as "an ideological movement… for self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential «nation»," from ethnic consciousness.[15] But he can discern no discontinuity between *ethnie* and nation. Rather, on the basis of culture and history and language he sees the one merging into the other. Yet, the process is by no means automatic. It is the elite—intellectuals or nationalists—he insists, who guide the transition, and it is they who create and lead the national movement.

An insightful contribution to the debate about nation came from the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. He is concerned primarily with identifying those social groups that organized and led the national movements of the "non-dominant" peoples of Europe in the nineteenth century, notably the Norwegians, Czechs, Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Flemish, and Danes of Schleswig. He also suggests a useful paradigm for measuring the maturation of a national movement: phase A ("scholarly interest"), phase B ("patriotic agitation"), and phase C (the "rise of a mass national movement").[16] As for a theory of nation and nation-formation, he stands somewhere between Gellner and the ethno-symbolists, perhaps closer to the latter.[17]

With the modernists Hroch rejects the idea that nations are eternal, and he argues that if the process of nation-formation is to be properly understood, then the changes in society, the economy, and politics that ushered in the modern age must be taken fully into account. It is not just coincidence, he argues, that the emergence of capitalist society and the emergence of nations occurred at the same time.[18] Nonetheless, he insists that nations are not myths or constructs, but, rather, had roots that went back well before the modern era. He accepts the role of elites—"nationalists"—as the creators of nations, to a certain degree, but he relates their effectiveness as "agitators" for their cause to the "harmony" between their sentiments and the sentiments of the mass of

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[14] Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 35–95.

[15] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism,* p. 188.

[16] Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 22–24.

[17] Miroslav Hroch, "Real and Constructed: The Nature of the Nation," in Hall, *The State of the Nation,* pp. 91–106.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 94.

the population whose deep inner ties, fashioned over centuries, had prepared them to accept the message delivered by intellectuals.[19]

With these theoretical considerations in mind we may now turn to the Romanian case.

II.

Adapting Miroslav Hroch's paradigm of nation-formation to the Romanians of Transylvania, I can discern three main stages in the evolution of the modern Romanian nation: first a period characterized both by scholarly inquiry into the history, language, and customs of the community and by the dissemination of a new sense of community, a period lasting from about the 1770s to the 1820s; second, a period distinguished by efforts to organize a national movement and gain a mass following for the idea of nation and covering about half a century between the 1830s and the 1880s; and third, a decisive time, between the 1890s and 1914, when the national movement was reaching maturity and becoming a mass movement. Yet, before examining these three stages, and in keeping with the ideas on nation-formation of Hroch and the ethno-symbolists, we must examine the sense of community that existed among the Romanians between roughly the second half of the seventeenth century and the 1760s. In all these periods elites are the key players.

Feelings of solidarity fashioned in an earlier time were the foundations upon which the first stage and even, in certain respects, the two succeeding stages in the formation of the modern Romanian nation rested. Political and social conditions in Transylvania and allegiance to one or another religious confession between the mid-seventeenth century and the mid-eighteenth century provided the framework within which the Romanian ethnic community evolved.

In a political and social system in the second half of the seventeenth century that prized quality over quantity and limited rights and accorded power to the well-born and the wealthy the Romanians found themselves barely tolerated. They were mainly a peasant people lacking a nobility of any consequence, and they were Orthodox, whereas the dominant "nations," the nobles (largely Magyar), the Szeklers, and the Saxons, were by definition privileged and belonged to the four "received," or constitutional, churches—Calvinist, Lutheran, Unitarian, and Roman Catholic. A "nation" at this time, it must be remembered,

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100.

was not primarily an ethnic term; rather it referred to a small segment of society that enjoyed rights and privileges denied to the mass of the population. Thus, Magyar peasants, for example, did not belong to the Magyar nation. A Romanian nation did not exist at all; the laws of the land were silent on the subject. Yet, this very exclusion had the effect of intensifying the differences Romanians felt between themselves and others, and thus, in some measure, it strengthened their own sense of community. In this era, too, feelings of solidarity linked the parish clergy to the mass of the rural population, a solidarity based partly on shared economic hardships and social discrimination and partly on the spiritual bond between a pastor and his flock.

The religious consciousness of the Romanians was constantly nurtured by contacts with the wider Orthodox community. Isolated from the dominant nations and churches of Transylvania, they turned to the Orthodox churches in neighboring Wallachia and Moldavia, where their priests studied and were ordained and where princes and boiers offered them generous gifts.[20] They also sought aid from Russia, which enjoyed great religious and moral authority among them, and pilgrimages to Moscow and to Russian holy places reinvigorated their attachment to the Orthodox commonwealth.[21]

These times were by no means stagnant. Events rooted in broader European concerns changed the course of the Romanians' history in dramatic ways. The conquest of Transylvania by Austria at the end of the seventeenth century, sealed by the Treaty of Karlowitz with the Ottoman Empire in 1699, created a new political and social framework within which the dominant nations and the Romanians would henceforth interact. For the next two centuries, then, the Romanians became more, not less, dependent on the will of outsiders.

One of the immediate consequences of Habsburg predominance in Transylvania was the Church Union with Rome, which the Jesuits engineered in the so-called Act of Union of 1700. Under its terms Romanian Orthodox priests accepted the Four Points of Union, including recognition of the Pope of Rome as the head of the Christian Church, that had been negotiated between the Roman Catholic and Byzantine Churches at Florence in 1439. In return, Emperor Leopold I promised

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[20] Mircea Păcurariu, *Legăturile Bisericii Ortodoxe din Transilvania cu Ţara Românească şi Moldova în secolele XVI-XVIII* (Sibiu, 1968), pp.123–124, 129–130, 135–137, 141–143.

[21] Silviu Dragomir, "Contribuţii privitoare la relaţiile Bisericii româneşti cu Rusia în veacul XVII," *Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile secţiunii istorice, s. II* 34 (1912), pp. 1075–1078, 1098–1105.

them the rights and privileges of Roman Catholic priests. This arrangement, which the Orthodox bishop and a part of his clergy accepted, did not, it must be emphasized, require any significant change in religious principles or practices, and in the villages particularly, even a knowledge of the Union was rare.

One of the most far-reaching consequences of the Union was the creation of an elite that took Romanian intellectual life in new directions by opening up a traditional society to European currents of ideas. The elite fashioned a new idea of nation, which by the 1730s had taken on a mainly ethnic meaning. Henceforth, when intellectuals spoke of *natio valachica* they usually meant the Romanians as a whole, not a small privileged elite.

A shift from an estates to an ethnic definition of community is evident in the thought of Ion Inochentie Klein (or Micu-Klein), Bishop of the Greek Catholic Church between 1729 and 1751 and the leader of the struggle to gain fulfillment of the promises made to the Greek Catholic clergy at the time of the Union. In numerous petitions to the Imperial Court in Vienna he referred often to *natio valachica,* a formula with clear ethnic connotations that went beyond the narrow legal framework of a social group set apart from the general population by privilege.[22] Underlying his idea of nation was a strong historical consciousness. In a petition he submitted to the emperor in 1735 defending Romanian rights on the *Fundus regius,* the area in southern Transylvania where the Saxons enjoyed extensive autonomy, he argued that Romanians were entitled to privileges there because they were the oldest inhabitants of the territory, having lived there uninterruptedly since its conquest by the Romans under Trajan in the second century.[23] He thus expressed an idea current among Romanian intellectuals of the time that the Romanians were the descendants of the Roman colonists in Dacia and had remained in place down to his own time, an idea that would form the core of Romanian identity down to the present. But, limited in his thought by the legal structures and mentality of the time, Klein drew no theoretical conclusions from this notion of Roman ancestry; he treated it simply as a tactical weapon.

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[22] Augustin Bunea, *Din istoria Românilor. Episcopul Ioan Inocențiu Klein (1728–1751)* (Blaj, 1900), pp. 37-39.

[23] Országos Levéltár, Budapest, Erdélyi Kancellária, 1735/93, f. 2; Nicolao Nilles, *Symbolae ad illustrandam historiam Ecclesiae Orientalis in Terris Coronae S. Stephani,* vol. 2 (Innsbruck, 1885), p. 528.

A younger generation of Greek Catholic intellectuals, Klein's disciples, brought the notion of ethnic community nearer to the modern conception. They were at pains to place the Church Union and the Greek Catholic Church in a historical context that would make clear the unique identity of the Romanians. Such ideas took form in the works of Gerontie Cotorea, a leading intellectual and later vicar-general of the Greek Catholic Church. In 1746 he translated *Despre schismăticia grecilor* (On the Schism of the Greeks), based on a text by Louis Maimbourg, a proponent of Catholic absolutism, as a kind of introduction to his defense of the Four Points of Union, *Despre articuluşurile ceale de price* (Controversial Questions), which he also wrote in 1746. He reiterated the commonly accepted idea among his colleagues that the Romanians were the descendants of the Roman colonists of Dacia, but the originality of his work lay in his identification of the Romans with the Church of Rome. He thus conceived of the Union as a reaffirmation of the inherent Latinity of the Romanians. But he did not at the same time deny the spiritual culture of Orthodoxy, which he and his colleagues prized as much as Romanness. He was, consequently, intent upon awakening his fellow Romanians to a consciousness of their Western origins without obliging them to sacrifice their Eastern heritage.[24]

Cotorea and his colleagues were, in effect, wrestling with the idea of the ethnic nation, as is also evident in the use of the term, "Romano-Valachus," to describe Romanians who had united. They acknowledged their identification with Eastern Orthodoxy, as is marked by the word "Valachus," which distinguished Romanians from the other peoples of Transylvania—the Lutheran Saxons and the Calvinist and Roman Catholic Magyars, while by emphasizing the connection to Rome, signaled by "Roman," they differentiated the Romanians from the neighboring Slav Orthodox.

Such ideas clearly suggest the encroachment of an ethnic identity on that of religion. Thus, in elaborating a sense of community that fused Roman ethnic origins with the Orthodox spiritual tradition, they established as the foundation of community a common heritage for all Romanians that encompassed religion and at the same time transcended it. It is evident, then, that a Romanian *ethnie*, at least in the minds of the elite, existed.

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[24] Zoltán I. Tóth , "Cotorea Gerontius és az erdélyi román nemzeti ontudat ébredése," *Hitel* 9, no. 2 (1944): 89–91; Gherontie Cotore, *Despre articuluşurile ceale de price*, Laura Stanciu, ed. (Alba Iulia, 2000), pp. 15–19.

III.

The first stage, properly speaking, in the process of forming the modern Romanian nation is bounded, on the one side, by Samuil Micu's *Brevis historica notitia* in 1778 and, on the other, by the joint work, *Lexicon Valachico-Latino-Hungarico-Germanicum* in 1825. The former was Micu's first synthesis in which he asserted the Romanians' direct descent from the Romans, and the latter was the first etymological dictionary of the Romanian language, whose general purpose was to demonstrate the Latin origins of Romanian. The period between the 1770s and the 1820s was, then, mainly one devoted to scholarly investigations of the Romanian past by an elite intent on establishing a national identity. Yet, this same elite did not hesitate to raise political demands when the occasion rose or to seek ways of propagating their vision among broader elements of the population.

The elite that assumed these responsibilities was composed of but a small number of intellectuals. They were encyclopedists who were remarkably receptive to the new ideas of the age and who thought of themselves as the enlighteners of a nation whose existence they had no reason to doubt. To ensure its progress, they produced an astonishing variety of works—histories and grammars, theological and philosophical tracts, church sermons and school texts, and translations and adaptations. Although they were almost all clergy, the range of their interests and their approach to the crucial issues of the day suggest a deep secularizing trend among educated Romanians. Many had studied in centers outside Transylvania—Vienna, Rome, Nagyszombat (Trnava, in present day Slovakia)—and were thus the bearers of the new ideas and the new spirit of the Enlightenment, especially in its Central European form.[25]

The works of the elite on Romanian history and the Romanian language reveal a definition of nation that was gaining wide acceptance among their peers. They understood by the term "nation" a people joined together in a community by the memory of common origins, a shared history and spiritual tradition, and a common language. They insisted on the descent of the Romanians from the Roman settlers in

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[25] Among general works on Romanian intellectuals of the period, one may consult: D. Popovici, *La littérature roumaine à l'époque des lumières* (Sibiu, 1945), and Dumitru Ghişe and Pompiliu Teodor, *Fragmentarium illuminist* (Cluj, 1972). On clerical intellectuals, see also: Remus Câmpeanu, *Elitele româneşti din Transilvania veacului al XVIII-lea* (Cluj-Napoca, 2000), pp. 125–284.

Dacia, on the presence of a Romanized population there down to their own day, and on the Latinity of the Romanian language.[26] Their conception of nation, then, was clearly ethnic, a sense of solidarity to which Samuil Micu gave eloquent expression when he described the territory inhabited by the Romanians as encompassing Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, Maramureş, the Banat, and parts of Hungary. Despite their separation by political boundaries, he had not the slightest doubt that they were one people.[27]

The primacy of the ethnic nation in this generation's thought about community is manifest in their political activity between 1790 and 1792. They took advantage of the crisis in the Habsburg Monarchy following the death of Joseph II in 1790 to seek recognition of a Romanian nation from the Court of Vienna. In the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* of 1791 Samuil Micu and his younger colleagues Gheorghe Şincai and Petru Maior and others demanded that Romanian nobles, clergy (both Greek Catholic and Orthodox), and peasants have the same rights as those of the other nations of Transylvania; that Romanians be granted proportional representation in county and communal government and in the diet; and that they be allowed to hold a national congress of nobles and clergy, whose purpose would be to find ways of satisfying the demands of the Romanian nation.[28] Their expectations were quickly undone, for in the prevailing atmosphere of a restoration of the old regime the innovations they sought were little short of revolutionary.

The idea of nation expressed in the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* differed significantly from that found in the writings of Bishop Klein and Gerontie Cotorea. Despite their consciousness of Roman origins and their willingness to put the welfare of the nation as a whole ahead of sectarian interests, they could conceive of success for their cause only in terms of the union of all Romanians in a single church. The authors of the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, on the other hand, demanded rights for Romanians without regard to religion and spoke in the name of the

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[26] Samuil Micu, *Istoria şi lucrurile şi întâmplările Românilor,* manuscript, Biblioteca Academiei Române, Cluj, Oradea Collection, vol. 1, pp. 49, 64–65; Gheorghe Şincai, *Hronica Românilor*, Florea Fugariu, ed., vol.1 (Bucureşti, 1967), pp. 13–14, 48–50,65–67, 136–137, 263–266, 337–338, 341–345, 598–602; vol. 2 (Bucureşti, 1969), pp. 123–125, 213–216; vol. 3 (Bucureşti, 1969), pp. 177–181; Petru Maior, *Istoria pentru începutul Românilor în Dachia,* 2nd ed. (Buda, 1834), pp. 6–17, 29–31, 189–195.

[27] Pompiliu Teodor, "Despre «Istoria Românilor cu întrebări şi răspunsuri» a lui Samuil Clain," *Studii. Revista de Istorie* 13, no. 2 (1960): 203.

[28] David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum,* rev. ed. (Bucureşti, 1984), pp. 465–467.

entire ethnic nation. They recognized as members of the nation every individual of every social class who affirmed the same ethnic origin and spoke the same language.

IV.

The second stage of Romanian nation-formation coincides with the half-century between the 1830s and 1880s. It is a time when Romanian leaders engaged in economic and cultural as well as political organization and made direct appeals to the mass of the population, all intended to broaden the base of the national struggle and assure its continuity. National autonomy was the ultimate goal of these efforts, but it was an autonomy still largely beholden to history and tradition, notably an autonomous Transylvania.

This stage is also distinguished from the preceding stage by the presence of an elite composed mainly of laymen who imposed their own objectives and methods on the national cause and thus signaled a crucial shift from clerical to secular leadership. Membership in the new elite was by no means unchanging; it continued to evolve throughout the period in response to continuous modernization. Thus, the elite of the 1830s and 1840s, who formed the generation of 1848, although still composed of intellectuals and still largely Greek Catholic, differed in significant ways from the generation of the 1880s.

The generation of 1848 was also different in many ways from preceding generations.[29] Its members generally were secular in outlook. They were not attracted to the priesthood. Instead of holy orders, like their intellectual forebears in the eighteenth century, they chose teaching, journalism, and the law, careers that suggest how greatly opportunities for Romanians had expanded as the economy and society of Transylvania assumed modern forms. They showed little patience for disputes between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic clergies, which they treated as obstacles to the achievements of their goals. But they gave no thought to the dissolution of the two churches. Rather, they sought to mobilize their priests and faithful and material resources to serve the national cause.[30]

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[29] George Em. Marica, et al., *Ideologia generaţiei române de la 1848 din Transilvania* (Bucureşti, 1968), is a comprehensive portrait. See also Ladislau Gyemant, *Mişcarea naţională a românilor din Transilvania, 1790–1848* (Bucureşti, 1986), pp. 336–362.

[30] *Foaie pentru minte, inimă şi literatură,* Braşov, (henceforth *FM*), October 1, 8, 15, 1839, July 30 and August 6, 1845. See also the wide-ranging discussion of these matters in Sorin Mitu, *Geneza identităţii naţionale la românii ardeleni* (Bucureşti, 1997),

Two new generations came to the fore in the second half of the nineteenth century whose leadership of the national cause was to last until the end of the First World War. Its members belonged mainly to the middle class, a class of shifting contours. It included professional people, especially lawyers, but there were also businessmen and large landowners and priests with urban-type interests. Although diverse in their occupations, they shared a common vision of social and economic development. In particular, they liked to compare themselves to the middle classes of Western Europe, whose vitality and success they admired, and thus they thought of themselves as peculiarly attuned to the rhythms and aspirations of the modern world.

The métier of this middle class was organization and institution-building. They were determined, above all, to create a permanent political structure that would ensure their movement's continuity and would faithfully defend the welfare of the nation as they understood it. They dismissed the traditional leadership of the national cause, exercised by the Greek Catholic and Orthodox bishops well into the 1860s, as a remnant of the past and a hindrance to the fulfillment of their own ambitions. The national conferences of 1861 and 1863 held in Sibiu to discuss the Romanians' place in the new constitutional Habsburg Monarchy after a decade of absolutism were striking examples of what they sought to avoid. Both were dominated by the Orthodox Bishop of Transylvania, Andrei Şaguna, and both followed agendas imposed from Vienna. But national conferences held after the Ausgleich of 1867 and after the authority of the bishops had been diminished, in 1875 and 1878, were far from encouraging; attendance was poor, and the elite itself was badly divided.

By the spring of 1881 all factions were finally agreed on the need for permanent institutions and the systematic coordination of their activities, if they had any expectations at all of achieving their goals. At a national congress in May of that year the delegates laid the foundations for a modern political movement by establishing the Romanian National Party. Henceforth, it became the chief political instrument of the elite and the most authoritative representative of the Romanian nation in its relations with the Hungarian government and the Court of Vienna.

Characteristic also of the second stage of Romanian nation-formation was the effort of the elite to create a true national movement by involving the mass of the population—the peasants and the humbler

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pp. 362–394; Simion Bărnuțiu, "Săborul cel mare al episcopiei Făgăraşului," in *FM* (January 25 and February 1, 1843).

ranks of urban society—in their struggles. Both the generation of 1848 and the middle-class leaders of the latter half of the century recognized the value of numbers in a Transylvania where the Romanians constituted a majority of the population. Yet, at the same time they were conscious of themselves as an elite; they had no doubt about their right to lead and about the duty of the common people to follow.

Among the high points of the elite's growing attention to the masses was the national assembly at Blaj in May 1848, to which the intellectuals invited thousands of peasants and others to hear the proclamation of Romanian nationhood.[31] Then, there were the elite's demands for universal suffrage at the national conference in 1861 and during campaigns to elect deputies to the Hungarian parliament later in the century. Notable also was the elite's anxiety over the alienation of peasant land and the resulting loss of the "national patrimony." A number of lawyers worked hard to protect peasants from "administrative abuses" of officials and "economic exploitation" by landlords, but often with little to show for their efforts.[32]

Similar aims lay behind the National Party's political activity at the local level. Hunedoara County, where Romanians made up a large majority of the population, is a good example. Lawyers and clergy between 1883 and 1887 formed political clubs in a number of towns and carried on spirited campaigns to elect candidates for the county council.[33] Yet, they failed to establish a close relationship with the mass of the people.

The "democratization" of Romanian political life appealed particularly to a young generation who were rising to positions of leadership in the

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[31] Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian, *Istoria românilor din Dacia Superioară,* vol. 2 (Vienna, 1852), pp. 114–115, 132–133, 135–136; Simion Balint, "Descrierea unor evenimente din Munții Apuseni ai Transilvaniei din anii 1848 şi 1849," in Nicolae Bocşan and Valeriu Leu, eds., *Revoluția de la 1848 din Transilvania în memorialistică* (Cluj-Napoca, 2000), pp. 125–128.

[32] Keith Hitchins and Liviu Maior, *Corespondența lui Ioan Rațiu cu George Barițiu, 1861-1892* (Cluj, 1970), pp. 102–103, 154–156, 172–173; Rațiu to Barițiu, April 25, 1866, November 6, 1867, February 1, 1868.

[33] Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Cluj, F. Hossu-Longin Collection, 252/1: Protocol of the meeting of the central electoral club, Deva, April 19, 1883; Romul Crainic to Ioan Papiu, Dobra, April 4/16, 1884; Petru Truția to the provisional committee of the central electoral conference in Deva and Baia de Criş, April 15, 1884; Protocol of the meeting in Orăştie, April 12, 1884; F. Hossu-Longin to the executive committee of the Romanian National Party, July 20, 1887; 252/3: Ioan Papiu and F. Hossu-Longin to Romanian electors, November 24, 1883, and November 28/December 10, 1883.

1880s—the Tribunists, who edited the influential newspaper *Tribuna* in the 1880s and early 1890s. They were eager to organize a genuine national movement and insisted that only those who consulted the great mass of the population were entitled to lead.[34] They were thus intent on drawing the peasants and the lower classes of towns and cities to the national cause as partners of the middle class.

The elite was concerned not only with political organization but turned its attention in the 1870s and 1880s to culture and the economy. They were especially eager to mobilize the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches and schools to serve the national cause, and they did their utmost to protect them from the relentless efforts of the Hungarian government to break down their autonomy and their ethnic character and to integrate them into the broader Hungarian society. But Orthodox and Greek Catholic hierarchs were not always cooperative; they refused to place the welfare of their respective churches in the hands of laymen, whose aims they knew were profane, not spiritual.[35]

Nonetheless, laymen and clergy worked together on numerous occasions to mobilize Romanians to defend and promote their culture. Among their successes was their founding in 1861 of Asociațiunea transilvană pentru literatura română şi cultura poporului român (The Transylvanian Association for Romanian Literature and the Culture of the Romanian People).

ASTRA, as it was commonly known, established branches throughout Transylvania and encouraged language and ethnographic studies and literary creativity, provided financial support to schools and individual students, and published didactic materials on a great range of subjects, including agriculture.[36] As for economic mobilization, the leaders of the National Party had their greatest success in establishing banks and credit cooperatives, which they were counting on to lay the foundations of a national economy.[37] But their attempts to bring large numbers of

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[34] Ioan Slavici, *"Tribuna" şi Tribuniştii* (Orăştie, 1896), pp. 13–22.

[35] Keith Hitchins, *A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1860 to 1914* (Bucharest, 1999), pp. 169–220.

[36] Tanya Dunlap, "Astra and the Appeal of the Nation: Power and Autonomy in Late-Nineteenth-Century Transylvania," *Austrian History Yearbook* 34 (2003): 215–246.

[37] Vasile Dobrescu, *Sistemul de credit românesc din Transilvania, 1872–1918* (Târgu Mureş, 1999), pp. 24–51, 173–273; Mihai D. Drecin and Vasile Dobrescu, "Consideraţii asupra sistemului financiar-bancar românesc din Transilvania (1867–1918)," in Mihai D. Drecin, ed., *Studii asupra băncilor din Austro-Ungaria (1867-1918)*, vol. 2 (Cluj-Napoca, 2001), pp. 40–84.

peasants and artisans together into cohesive associations for the same purpose were largely unsuccessful.[38]

The ultimate goal of all these endeavors was national autonomy. Yet, at first, the elite was convinced that Romanian autonomy could be achieved and defended only within the framework of an autonomous Transylvania, that is a Transylvania independent of Hungary. To justify both national and Transylvanian autonomy they drew their arguments from constitutional and historical precedents. Only on rare occasions did the claims of ethnicity override legal structures, as they did briefly in February 1849, when Romanian leaders from all parts of the Habsburg Monarchy ignored provincial boundaries to demand a single "duchy" for all Romanians.[39]

Major statements of the Romanian position on autonomy down to the 1880s exhibit a remarkable consistency. At the national assembly at Blaj in May 1848 the elite declared the "independence" (i.e. autonomy) of the Romanian nation and asserted its right to be represented in the diet, the administration, and the judiciary in proportion to its population and to use the Romanian language in all matters affecting Romanians.[40] At the Romanian national conference in April 1863 the delegates again demanded national autonomy linked to Transylvania's autonomy within a federalized Habsburg Monarchy. At the Diet of Sibiu a few months later Romanian deputies with help from their Saxon colleagues laid the constitutional foundations of national autonomy by passing two bills, one recognizing the equality of the Romanian nation and churches with the other nations and churches of Transylvania, and the other making Romanian one of the principality's official languages (neither, in the end, became law).

A few years later in 1868, Romanian opponents of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which provided for the incorporation of Transylvania into Hungary, issued a *Pronunciament* in which they demanded both the restoration of Transylvania's autonomy and the

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[38] Gheorghe Dragoş, *Cooperaţia în Ardeal* (Bucureşti, 1933), pp. 16–84; Vasile Dobrescu, *Elita românească în lumea satului transilvan, 1867-1918* (Târgu Mureş, 1996), pp. 120–186.

[39] Nicolae Popea, *Memorialul Archiepiscopului şi Mitropolitului Andreiu baron de Şaguna sau luptele naţionale-politice ale românilor, 1846-1873,* vol.1 (Sibiu, 1889), pp. 243–250.

[40] Ştefan Pascu, ed., *Documente privind revoluţia de la 1848 in Ţările Române. C. Transilvania,* vol. 4 (Bucureşti, 1988), pp. 41–43.

reinstatement of the bills passed by the Diet of Sibiu, all to no effect.[41] Delegates to national conferences in 1872, 1875, and 1878 made similar appeals. The most detailed exposition of the matter came in 1882, when the new National Party had the *Memorial* drawn up setting forth the historical bases of Romanian and Transylvanian autonomy[42], but it, too, failed to change the course of events.

A corollary of the Romanians' commitment to Transylvanian autonomy was the idea to establish a Romanian-Magyar partnership to govern a restored principality. It was rooted in history, in the conviction that the two peoples were "natural allies" in a struggle for survival against the surrounding Slavs. To many Romanians they were like "two islands in a Slavic sea," with no strong empire like Russia to which they could turn for protection.[43] Such a gloomy perspective helps to explain why Romanian leaders, in general, showed little interest in cooperating with the Slavs of Hungary in the 1870s and 1880s. They were so intent on pursuing their own and Transylvania's autonomy, a campaign based on their unique history and constitutional position, that they had no wish to jeopardize their cause by becoming entangled in the problems of the Slavs.

V.

The period from the 1890s to 1914 forms yet another, distinct stage in the process of Romanian nation-formation. In certain respects, there was no sharp break with the 1880s. The National Party persisted in its efforts to mobilize the Romanians for political struggle in the face of increasing adversity, and it continued to treat the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches and schools as bastions of national identity and protectors of ethnicity. Nonetheless, in the two decades before the outbreak of the First World War a change of mood and a broadening of perspectives are discernible that impelled the elite in new directions and lent the national movement itself an aura of modernity.

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[41] Simion Retegan, "Pronunciamentul de la Blaj (1868)," *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Cluj* 9 (1966): 127–142.

[42] *Memorial compus şi publicat din insărcinarea conferinţei generale a representanţilor alegătorilor români…*, 2nd ed. (Sibiu, 1882), pp. 40–68, 101–103.

[43] *Telegraful Roman,* June 17/29, 1871, May 13/25, 1876; T. V. Păcăţian , *Cartea de aur, sau luptele politice-naţionale ale Românilor de sub coroana ungară,* vol. 7 (Sibiu, 1913), pp. 170–171.

The structure of Romanian society was becoming more differentiated and complex.[44] The professional and middle-class elite of earlier decades became stronger and more conscious of its leading role not only in the national movement but also in public life in general. Indicative of their leading role was the composition of the Romanian delegation in the Hungarian parliament. Of the thirteen deputies chosen in the election of 1906, there were eight lawyers, a doctor, a professor, a bank director, and two priests, and all displayed great spirit in promoting the Romanian cause in the face of relentless hostility.[45]

Yet, unity eluded the elite. After the turn of the century strong differences arose particularly over the role to be given the mass of the population in the national struggle. A rising generation of younger activists sharply criticized the established leaders of the National Party for their failure to devote enough attention to the mobilization of the peasantry. These *Oţeliţi* ("Steely Ones") demanded the "democratization" of the National Party in order to bring the entire population fully into the struggle for autonomy. The party's traditional leadership was indeed committed to democratic principles, as its support of universal suffrage suggests, but they continued to subscribe to the view that the lower classes were incapable of emancipating themselves and still needed the tutelage of "intellectuals."[46]

The formation of an urban working class and the emergence of an organized socialist movement after the formation of the Romanian section of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party in 1905 are evidence of a diversifying class structure and signs of modernity. Romanian socialism offered an alternative to ethnic and national divisions: a class and an international identity. But the fledgling Romanian socialist movement did not prosper, partly because of the small size of the Romanian working class and the indifference of the parent party. But the main cause seems to have been nationalism, the commitment to ethnic identity, whose prevalence in contemporary society Romanian socialist leaders themselves were forced to acknowledge. Even though they

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[44] Sorina Paula Bolovan and Ioan Bolovan, *Transylvania in the Modern Era; Demographic Aspects* (Cluj-Napoca, 2003), pp. 205–219.

[45] Stelian Mândruţ, *Mişcarea naţională şi activitatea parlamentară a deputaţilor Partidului Naţional Român din Transilvania între anii 1905-1910* (Oradea, 1995), pp. 78, 81–82.

[46] Liviu Maior, *Mişcarea naţională românească din Transilvania, 1900–1914* (Cluj-Napoca, 1986), pp. 85–86; articles by Octavian Goga in *Ţara noastră*, January 1, March 4 and October 14, 1907; Octavian Tăslăuanu, "Două culturi," *Luceafărul* 7, no. 4 (February 15, 1908): 63–64.

denounced nationalism as an "insidious disease" that divided workers into hostile camps and undermined the socialist movement, in time, they came to recognize the idea of nation and the national struggle in Hungary as precisely the elements that gave their section its distinctiveness and strengthened its appeal to the Romanian worker. If socialism was to prosper among Romanian workers, they concluded, then it must be grounded in ethnicity.[47]

The elite of our period was preoccupied with economic questions to a much greater degree than its predecessors. Romanian leaders in the 1870s and 1880s had indeed organized banks and agricultural societies, had worried about the plight of the peasant, and had weighed the merits of industry. But by the 1890s the elite, while pursuing these goals, had become convinced that the national struggle was in essence as much economic as it was political. The vice-president of ASTRA in 1907 put the matter bluntly when he called the "material" competition among nations a "struggle for existence."[48] Such ideas reflect the changed composition of the elite itself as well as economic progress in Transylvania and the slow but steady absorption of Transylvania into the economic life of Hungary and Central Europe.

The model the elite favored for the economy that it was eager to build for Romanians was the West. The majority could express only admiration for Western Europe's material wealth and high level of civilization. Such success, they were certain, had been achieved through industrialization, urbanization, and large-scale commerce, and they held up Great Britain, Germany and the Low Countries as examples worthy of emulation. At the same time, they rejected a reliance on agriculture as a path to progress, since they had no doubt that it would relegate the Romanians to permanent underdevelopment. Their own duty, then, was clear: they must promote industrialization in every way possible, even if at the beginning their efforts had to be limited simply to encouraging more Romanians to take up artisan trades.[49]

They were also conscious of a second imperative: the creation of a strong middle class. They again looked to Western Europe for inspiration, and they found it in the British, German, and French middle classes whom they admired as the most dynamic force in their respective

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[47] Hitchins, *A Nation Affirmed,* pp. 277–282.

[48] *Transilvania* 38, no. 4 (1907): 195–198.

[49] *Ibid.*: 198; 12, no. 5–6 (1881): 49; 14, no. 21–22 (1883): 154; D. Comşa, "Studii asupra stărei noastre economice," *Foişoara Telegrafului Român* 1, no. 2 (January 15, 1876): 13.

societies, the class mainly responsible for spectacular economic development and the flourishing of science, literature, and art. While the Romanian bourgeoisie—they had themselves in mind—would thus concentrate on industries and cities, they had no intention of ignoring agriculture. On the contrary, they promised to promote the economic interests of all classes by serving as the indispensable link between the "agricultural class" (the peasantry) and the "intellectual class" (the political elite).[50]

The elite's ultimate goal was nothing less than the creation of a Romanian national economy. They were thus determined to organize the Romanians economically in the same way they had organized them politically through the National Party and culturally through ASTRA and churches and schools. It was a project with far-reaching implications; it signified their intention to promote national autonomy in yet another guise by eventually separating themselves economically from the broader Hungarian society.

What is also striking about the prewar decades is the internationalization of the Romanian cause in Hungary. It was no longer a purely Hungarian problem, but became the subject of increasing concern to the joint Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the German and Romanian governments. Austro-Hungarian and German officials worried especially about how the Hungarian government's aggressive treatment of its Romanian minority of three million would affect ties between Romania and the Triple Alliance, which Romania had joined in 1883. In Romania itself politicians and the king sought ways of turning the aspirations of the Romanians of Hungary to their own advantage.

The Romanian elite in Transylvania encouraged international involvement in the "Romanian question" in Hungary. They had begun to try in earnest to attract European attention to their cause after the founding of the National Party, when they had had the *Memorial* of 1882 drawn up and had launched the monthly *Romänische Revue* in 1885. But these initiatives had not been coordinated with sustained political activity and had thus been largely ineffective. After 1890 the situation changed, as National Party leaders became more combative in their opposition to the nationality policy of the Hungarian government. Their activities, notably the presentation of a statement of grievances, the *Memorandum,* to Emperor Franz Joseph in 1892 and the subsequent trial of National Party leaders attracted the attention of foreign governments

[50] Eugenia Glodariu and Nicolae Cordoş, "Reuniunea sodalilor români din Cluj," *Acta Musei Napocensis* 10 (1973): 390–391.

to the Romanian question. These events aroused their anxiety about the wisdom of the Hungarian government's approach to its minorities and its effects on the stability of the Dual Monarchy.[51]

The Kingdom of Romania became a serious player in the affairs of the Transylvanian Romanians beginning in the 1890s. Leaders of the two main political parties in Bucharest, Liberals and Conservatives, and King Carol perceived an opportunity to enhance their country's standing in the Triple Alliance and to further their foreign policy goals in Southeastern Europe. For their part, National Party leaders in Transylvania welcomed diplomatic and moral support from Bucharest and sought to use Romania's alliance with Austria-Hungary to soften the Hungarian government's efforts to stifle their movement. Yet, Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians were cautious. Politicians in the Kingdom, who might have wished to use the Romanian question in Hungary for electoral success at home, were wary of alienating Austria-Hungary and especially her ally Germany. For their part, the Transylvanian Romanians opposed the subordination of their "sacred cause" to partisan politics in Bucharest.

Perhaps the feature that most strikingly differentiated the 1890s and early 1900s from earlier stages of nation-formation is the new conception of autonomy that emerged. The restoration of Transylvania's autonomy as the necessary framework within which a Romanian nation could survive and prosper was abandoned; historical tradition and legal precedents gave way to the sovereign claims of ethnicity.

Behind this modern style of ethnic autonomy lay a new idea of nation, which had been slowly forming before 1890 and now found eloquent expression in the theoretical writings on "nationality" by Aurel C. Popovici, a National Party activist and advocate of the federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy. He regarded the triumph of the "principle of nationality" as the inevitable consequence of the workings of "natural law." The idea of nationality was, for him, the dominant creative force in modern Europe, which he defined as the striving of every people to develop in accordance with its own unique character. He was convinced that the bond that linked all members of a large social group together was national consciousness, that is, an awareness of shared, distinctive qualities. He argued that once a people had become conscious of itself, as

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[51] Keith Hitchins, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and the Memorandum, 1894," *Rumanian Studies* 3 (1973–1975): 108–148; Idem, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and the Nationality Problem in Transylvania, 1894–1897," *Rumanian Studies* 4 (1976–1979): 75–126.

the Romanians had, it took on all the attributes of a living organism, and thus the nation they formed was endowed by nature with the inherent freedom to develop. But if it were to grow and prosper, he suggested, it must, like any organism, have a suitable environment, and thus, ultimately, it must establish an autonomous or independent state of its own and, if it wished, unite with other states on the basis of nationality.[52]

Others in the political and intellectual elite, who shared Popovici's conception of nation, enthusiastically embraced the new vision of autonomy. The younger generation offered its assessment in the *Replica*, a response to Magyar university students' views on the nationality question drawn up by Popovici and a number of colleagues in 1891. They linked autonomy to a federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy and concluded that the Romanians could be free only if they separated themselves politically from the Magyars and secured a territory of their own within the Monarchy.[53] The established leadership of the National Party was more circumspect in their *Memorandum* of 1892, but they, too, urged a federalist solution to the Monarchy's nationality problem that would assure the existence of each of its peoples by recognizing their individuality and right to autonomy.[54] It is significant that neither document mentioned the restoration of Transylvania's autonomy. Nor was this objective of any moment to Vasile Goldiş, a respected theorist on the nationality question, who in 1900 demanded political autonomy for all the Romanians of the Habsburg Monarchy.[55]

Romanian leaders expressed their commitment to the principle of national autonomy in other ways besides proclamations, sometimes with far-reaching consequences. They abandoned the notion of Romanian-Magyar cooperation within the historical framework of Transylvania, which had been widely discussed in the 1870s and 1880s, as no longer possible or even desirable. The discriminatory legislation and actions of the Hungarian government beginning in the 1870s and intensifying afterwards as well as the evolving idea of nation were largely responsible. At the same time, now that they were no longer constrained

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[52] Aurel C. Popovici, *Principiul de naţionalitate* (Bucureşti, 1894), pp.6, 12, 21.

[53] *Cestiunea română în Transilvania si Ungaria: Replica junimii academice române din Transilvania şi Ungaria la "Răspunsul" dat de junimea academică maghiară "Memoriului" studenţilor universitari din România* (Sibiu, 1892), pp. 144–151.

[54] *Memorandul Românilor din Transilvania şi Ungaria către Maiestatea Sa Imperială şi Regală Apostolică Francisc Iosif I* (Sibiu, 1892), pp. 22–23.

[55] Vasile Goldiş, *Scrieri social-politice şi literare,* Mircea Popa and Gheorghe Şora, eds. (Timişoara, 1976), pp. 79–83: article published in *Tribuna Poporului,* April 22/May 5, 1900.

by the need to defend Transylvanian autonomy, many Romanians discovered a community of interests with the Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy. The most dramatic expression of the new "alliance" was the Congress of Nationalities organized by Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks in Budapest in 1895. Even though Romanian-Slav cooperation proved to be of little practical value, it was a significant marker of the new stage reached by the Romanian national movement.

The path to federalism that seemed most promising to many influential members of the Romanian political elite lay through the chancellery of the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. One of these was Aurel C. Popovici, who urged the transformation of the Dual Monarchy, dominated by two master peoples—the Germans and Magyars, into a federalized "Great Austria," where all the nationalities would have autonomy and would share benefits and responsibilities equitably.[56] His colleague, Alexandru Vaida, an uncompromising opponent of the Hungarian government's nationality policy, served as the National Party link with the Archduke's circle from 1907 to 1914. He and his colleagues put great hopes in Austria and the Habsburg dynasty as the protectors of the smaller peoples of Central Europe and expected Franz Ferdinand to move decisively to ensure their autonomy when he came to the throne.[57] His assassination in 1914 was a stunning blow to Vaida and other federalists, but by then others within the National Party were already redefining autonomy.

Iuliu Maniu, a lawyer who had represented the Romanians in the Hungarian parliament between 1906 and 1910, had become the chief spokesman for an autonomy based on an organic view of nation that recognized no limits on self-determination. At its core was the Romanian nation's right to establish its own institutions, parallel with and separate from those of the Hungarian state and Hungarian society. In a speech in parliament in 1906 Maniu insisted that every nationality had a right to develop in accordance with its own unique character and must therefore live in an environment that would guarantee it liberty and justice.

The achievement of such a goal lay behind his and several of his colleagues' willingness in 1910 to seek a solution to the Romanian

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[56] Marius Turda, "Aurel C. Popovici and the Symbolic Geography of the Romanians in the Late Habsburg Empire (1890-1910)," *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* 36, no. 1-2 (1997): 115–120.

[57] Liviu Maior, *Alexandru Vaida-Voevod între Belvedere şi Versailles* (Cluj-Napoca, 1993), pp. 48–63. Vaida's own accounts of his activities between 1906 and 1910 may be found in Keith Hitchins, *The Nationality Problem in Austria-Hungary. The Reports of Alexandru Vaida to Archduke Franz Ferdinand's Chancellery* (Leiden, 1974).

question by negotiating with Istvan Tisza, the most influential Hungarian politician of the time in a memorandum on September 12th they set forth in detail what they meant by national autonomy. They demanded political autonomy (a recognized national political party, universal suffrage, and fifty Romanian electoral districts); administrative autonomy (Romanian functionaries in Romanian-inhabited areas); church autonomy (the management of internal church affairs without outside interference and with state financial support); educational autonomy (the right of churches to establish and maintain Romanian elementary schools, the construction of Romanian middle schools, and the use of Romanian as the language of instruction); and economic autonomy (regular state subsidies to develop Romanian-inhabited areas).[58] Tisza, who was committed to the transformation of multinational Hungary into a Magyar nation-state, found such proposals unacceptable, and, consequently, his negotiations with the Romanians, though revived briefly in 1913, ultimately came to naught.

Maniu was no more inclined to compromise than Tisza. Several years earlier he had given expression to a bold conception of nation that embraced all Romanians. He urged the Romanians of Hungary to coordinate their political struggles with those of Romanians everywhere because they all served a single idea: "Romanianness." That idea, he insisted, was sustained by a national consciousness that transcended all geographical and political boundaries.[59] The allusion to a state encompassing all Romanians was clear.

VI.

We may now return to the several paradigms discussed at the beginning of this paper in order to put the Romanian case in context. The modernists, it will be remembered, argued that nations were modern phenomena dating from after the French Revolution; that they were wholly products of the modern age in the sense that they could appear, indeed had to appear, in response to modern economic and social conditions, in particular the development of capitalism and industry; that nations were the result of fundamental economic, social, and cultural changes taking place in Europe in recent times and thus were not deeply rooted in history; and, finally, that nations were created, that

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[58] Ioan Mihu, *Spicuiri din gândurile mele* (Sibiu, 1938), pp. 159–164.

[59] Iuliu Maniu , *Discursuri parlamentare 29 maiu–31 iulie 1906* (Blaj, 1906), pp. 76–77; *Revista politică şi literară* (Blaj) 1, no. 1 (September 1906): 3–4.

is, they were imagined and constructed by elites and thus were not natural entities existing from the very earliest times.

The Romanian case suggests that certain modifications in the modernist explanation of the emergence and development of nations are in order. It is evident that Romanian elites, in some sense, constructed the Romanian nation. It was they who conceived of the ethnic nation, who formulated a national ideology, and who led the movement for autonomy. But their nation was not a construct; it was not simply an entity they imagined as a response to the economic and social imperatives of the modern age. Rather, the elites of the eighteenth century built on the sense of community that was already strong in 1700: the memory of shared experiences in the past, the folk customs and myths, the language, the Eastern Orthodox religious tradition and the social and political exclusion that tended to draw the community together. This sense of community was even the foundation of the idea of nation for the secular elites in the second half of the nineteenth century, although they no longer thought it necessary to emphasize Roman ethnic origins and the Latinity of their language as justification for their demands for national autonomy.

The Romanian elites' idea of nation thus had strong roots in the past, but there is other evidence, too, that it was not wholly a product of modernity. Romanian society and Transylvanian society in general in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were agrarian. They could not reasonably be defined as capitalist and industrial, even though the economy of Transylvania was becoming increasingly modern. Yet, if the modernists' denial of the rootedness of nation in the past is unfounded, then equally unacceptable is the insistence of some historians, the so-called primordialists, that nations are part of the natural order of things and have existence from time immemorial. The Romanian case, as the changing conceptions of nation set forth by the elites reveal, was continuously evolving in response to changing social and cultural conditions. The idea of nation put forward by the generation of 1848 and by Aurel C. Popovici and Iuliu Maniu after 1890 was, after all, significantly different from that which inspired Bishop Klein in 1730s and the authors of the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* in the 1790s. These changes reflected new economic and social realities. The Romanians were part of the broader Transylvanian, Hungarian, and Central European world; new ideas, new opportunities, and new classes were constantly forming. Nor was the transformation of the ethnic community of 1750 into the nation of 1910 by any means inevitable. If it had been there would have been no need for intellectuals, those who were

continuously measuring themselves and always in search of themselves, or for the later middle-class elites, who were continually mobilizing resources and building institutions. Had the process been automatic, there would have been no passion in the creation and defense of nation.

National Sensitivity in Romanian Society (Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries)

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The nation comes from a far away time, and its modern form has meant the continuation of an aspiration toward unity and collective solidarity, perennial co-ordinates of social life, fed by popular millenarianism and the new wave of political ideologies. In the eighteenth century, the new "entrepreneurs" of politics have sought a new supremely unifying principle, a new essential value, a more encompassing ideal, and the national framework has become the repository of the social pact, the natural link of legitimacy and collective solidarity.

The national passion, the belief in a grand political unity has become a vocation of national ideologies, which have dressed it in the attire of mythology and of light-filled eschatology, to make it fascinating. It has accommodated the modern democratic passion, which has tended—at the end of the eighteenth century, in the Parisian revolutionary turmoil—towards the blurring of the differences within society, towards the melt down of opposite social and political conceptions, criticised as historical reflexes. After the Great Revolution, which occurred in 1789, the problem of the tension between the universalism of civil society and ethnic and national particularism have opened, a paradox which has profoundly marked the destiny of the past two centuries.[1]

The "theoretical aspect" of the modern nation—a nation which has taken shape starting from the sixteenth century in England—has been tied in the eighteenth century to the ideas of rationality, freedom, progress, collective happiness. In the nineteenth century, the concept of nation, but also those tied to progress, sovereignty, emancipation have stood at the heart of political debate. The nations of Europe, seen as realities and individualities, have meant a reproduction of national models in different manners, from one people to the other. The European communities have represented a conglomerate of ethnicities,

[1] Dominique Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation* (Paris, 1994), pp. 59, 75. Cf. Guy Hermet, *Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe* (Paris, 1996), p. 15; Gérard Noriel, *État, nation et imigration. Vers une histoire du pouvoir* (Paris, 2001), p. 88; Simona Nicoară, *Naţiunea modernă, Mituri, simboluri, ideologii* (Cluj, 2002), p. 197.

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differentiated through history, language, traditions, mythologies and culture. The dimensions of ethnicity have been associated with a common myth of descent, with a distinctive and shared history and culture, an association with the ancestral territory and a specific sense of solidarity.

The modern nations have needed, as the *longue durée* shows us, particular circumstances in order to form and consolidate. They hide an inner diversity, exactly because they have emerged in history by different paths, with social morphologies and with differentiated historical memories, with unequal levels of development.[2]

Numerous national geneses have been the daughters of a direct or indirect reaction to the French revolutionary phenomenon, and the cultivation of the universalist vocation of the nation has made the latter embody a mosaic of modern political units, which make a number of people or groups, who live at the same time in the same space, who accept the same values and institutions feel solidarity. The Great French Revolution has also been a historical mutation which has accelerated a much older phenomenon, that of the secularisation of modern consciousness, which has encouraged the transfer of sacredness towards values or terrestrial instances, such as the nation, the state, the country, progress, rationality, science.

The transfer of patriotic and national sensitivity to the Romanian space has taken place slowly and within the traditional cauldron, but, beginning with the nineteenth century, the development towards the laboratory of modern sensitivity would become decisive and irreversible. Starting with the end of the seventeenth century, in the Romanian space, a crisis of the traditional consciousness was manifest, which has allowed, in the eighteenth century a shift of emphasis from the confessional to the secular, from the problems of the churches to the issues of nationality.[3]

Even if the *great century*, as the eighteenth century has been considered, has not been particularly *happy* for the Romanian world, it has favoured a gradual crystallisation of modern solidarities. The agitation linked to the envisioned danger, that the Romanian nation could "disappear completely," can be found a century earlier, in the work of the chronicler Miron Costin. The humanist elite has encouraged

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[2] Cf. Christophe Jaffrelot, "Câteva teorii despre naţiune," in Serge Cordellier and Élisabeth Poisson, eds., *Naţiuni şi naţionalisme* (Bucureşti, 2002), p. 59.

[3] Pompiliu Teodor and Dumitru Ghişe, *Fragmentarium iluminist* (Cluj, 1972), pp. 9–10; Andrei Pippidi, "Preface," in E. J. Hobsbawm, *Naţiuni şi nationalism din 1780 până în prezent. Program, mit, realitate* (Chişinău, 1997), p. xiii.

this national consciousness, which ignored, already, the rigidity of political separatism: from the old term of "country," which had named the assembly of privileged estates, at the beginning of the eighteenth century this concept has been given an ethnic and historical vestment. The awareness that the progress of Romanian society depended more on the entire group, than on the particular interests of social strata, was gaining ground among the cultural and ecclesiastical elites. In 1732, in the will of a boyar exiled to Poland, regrets were expressed that his "beloved Moldavia," that is "the tombs of the ancestors" were trampled on by heathens.[4]

Enlightenment and Nation

The confrontations between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires, in the eighteenth century have engulfed the Romanian space, divided between these huge forces, encouraging a stronger mobility, especially in the sense of catalysing some of the options and political attitudes of the Romanian elite. In the context of confessional mutations and of the pressures of the Counter Reformation, within Romanian society, vertical solidarities were crystallised, which translated a new political comprehension, in reference to the traditional mentality. Moreover, there has been an unleashing of political initiatives, against the background of a gradual marginalization of the traditional ecclesiastical authority in relation with the political and cultural elite. Mainly, during the second half of the century of the enlightenment, there has been a polarisation of forms of solidarity: on the one hand, solidarities, specific to the estates regime have been prolonged and strengthened, a solidarity of the privileged in the face of the pressures of central authority, on the other hand, a solidarity of the non-privileged groups has been strengthened, while new relations between social and ethnic groups have been established.

The world of the small Romanian nobility from Transylvania has proven to have, in the eighteenth century a propensity towards social ascension, and became known for seeking national individuality, coming to an agreement between its aspirations and those of the times.[5] In the

[4] Ştefan Lemny, *Sensibilitate şi istorie în secolul XVIII românesc* (Bucureşti, 1990), p. 186. See Toader Nicoară, *Sentimentul de insecuritate în societatea românească la începuturile timpurilor moderne (1600–1830)* (Cluj, 2002), pp. 159–162.

[5] Pompiliu Teodor, *Interferenţe iluministe europene* (Cluj, 1984), pp. 236–239; Teodor and Ghişe, *Fragmentarium*, p. 181; Mihaela Grancea, *Călători străini prin Principatele Dunărene, Transilvania şi Banat (1683–1789)* (Sibiu, 2002), pp. 191–192.

historical development of Transylvanian Romanians, the moment 1744, in which Inochentie Micu had summoned the great *sobor* (assembly) with a broad participation, Uniates and laity (small nobility, Uniate and Orthodox peasantry), witnessed already a national solidarity, surpassing the social and confessional divisions.

Josephinism, anchored in the secular needs of the Habsburg state, has considered the Transylvanian Romanians an object of governing actions—situated under the influence of "state pedagogy"—and has targeted, especially, their social transformation in the direction of the new reformist ideas. Even if the Josephine state doctrine has not intended a firm improvement of the condition of the Romanian themselves, it has awakened the Romanian consciousness regarding identity, has amplified the national demands, which has precipitated the configuration of a more coherent national program. The content of the reforms, tolerance, the emancipation from serfdom, the creation of a Josephine intellectuality, have co-operated in crystallising a new type of national solidarity.[6] The reformist practice, the direct and systematic contacts with the Viennese or Roman intellectual environment have contributed, after the eighth decade of the eighteenth century, to the forging of an elite, more and more committed intellectually and politically. Moreover, this intellectuality has become more and more receptive towards a modern mental equipment and consequently, more capable of collective self-examination, triggered by the fall of Josephinism. In the context of reformist practice, the generation of intellectuals, at the end of the eighteenth century, regardless of their confessional allegiance and despite their different mental status have met increasingly, against the background of mutual consciousness, of national aspirations and ideals.[7]

The philosophical air of the west, in the eighteenth century has encouraged interest towards the principles stemming from the rational nature of man. Science and philosophy had to become a common good, disseminated through books and schools. The enlightenment of the people has acquired, increasingly an ideological and cultural hue, meaning a surfacing from misery and ignorance through education, in the spirit of civility, of dignity and of law. The reformist initiative of enlightened despotism has also engaged the church in this effort towards

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[6] Mathias Bernath, *Habsburgii şi începuturile formării Naţiunii Române* (Cluj, 1994), pp. 12–13, 19–20, 258; Angelika Schaser, *Reformele iozefine în Transilvania şi urmările lor în viaţa socială* (Sibiu, 2000), pp. 26, 30–33.

[7] Teodor, *Interferenţe*, pp. 240–245.

"the spreading of the light". Except that this policy of reforms, of the Theresian and Josephine sort, targeted primarily a *faithful citizen,* devoted to the Crown and to state interests.

The ecclesiastical monopoly in supporting the ethnic and, especially the confessional specificity of the Romanians from Transylvania has been upset by the initiatives of some scholars, with an enlightening mission, who have encouraged a process of secularisation of the national movement. For Samuil Micu (1745–1806), author of *Istoria lucrurilor şi întâmplărilor românilor* (*A history of the things and happenings of the Romanians*), the demonstration that Romanians had a historical specificity, a noble Daco-Roman descent, added to the fact that they represented an old Christian people, whose destiny was not lesser than that of ethnic "others," who defined themselves within the Habsburg empire had become more important. Although the ethnic register of national identity was very important, the mentality of the Romanian elite could not imagine the rural masses as a component of the political nation.

In all the Romanian provinces, between 1792 and 1821, this was felt and expressed in the writings of the time, that is, through a certain political vocabulary, which attested more and more the idea of ethnic and political solidarity; however, only the cultural expansion, which has followed after 1821 has consolidated gradually the vertical solidarities. The rapprochement between the intellectuals and the people, in all of the Romanian provinces has opened up mutual communication, and the national demands have incorporated important social requirements of the peasantry or of the merchants. Also, the more intense links, which have been established between the intellectuals coming from all the Romanian provinces have cemented a solidarity of national faction.[8]

While in the eighteenth century, in Transylvania the crystallisation of a Romanian solidarity was noticeable, in Moldavia and Wallachia, the more and more obvious solidarity, which expressed the interests of the Romanian boyars in relation to those who had come from the Phanar have become apparent. Moreover, immediately after the oriental crisis of 1768, the vocabulary of the political memos written by the boyars, addressed to the great powers valued terms such as "autonomous," "free standing," "homeland," "folk," even "nation" (in the French texts), but also enlightenment concepts, such as "happiness," "Romanian," "freedom," "Christianity," "Orthodoxy". The letters of the boyars

[8] Liviu Maior, *Memorandul. Filosofia politico-istorică a petiționalismului românesc* (Cluj, 1992), pp. 5–6.

mentioned the common homeland, the life of the "suffering compatriots," a language which highlighted a new sensitivity towards the general interests of the country. In 1811, Şerban Grădişteanu expressed explicitly the need for a communion between the boyars and the people, "as we are the same people of the land". The homeland, suggested Dinicu Golescu, "is above all the things of the world" and the "union for the common good glorifies".[9] The broadening of the social and political meaning of the homeland, in the anonymous appeals, between 1821–1822 has imposed, without effort, the idea of the union of the nation—in the sense of solidarity of the social classes belonging to the same province—a fact which has prepared, to a certain extent, the evolution towards the idea of unity in a national sense.

In Moldavia and Wallachia, the indigenous boyars, increasingly hostile to the people from the Phanar, have engaged the teachers, the writers and the scribes in order to serve together a number of cultural. patriotic and national ideals. The impulse to enlighten the people through education, through access to the conquests of philosophy and modern science served rather well the promotion of new political and national ideologies. Moreover, towards the end of the eighteenth century, within the Romanian space, a certain separation occurred, between the scholars tied to ecclesiastical aspirations (those who continued to feel attached to the cleric's mirror) and an intellectual class, fascinated by the progress of historical, philosophical, scientific knowledge: teachers, translators, and writers who proved to be increasingly attracted to political and national ideology. However, some clerics, such as Veniamin and Grigore Dascălul have encouraged the establishment of schools for the national renaissance, being tolerant towards the secular content of the knowledge disseminated among the young, knowledge profoundly linked to the mirror of the citizen. "If one were to listen to those who gossip—confessed in 1813 a cleric, conscious of the fact that his printing no longer belonged integrally and firmly to the realm of religious literature—the young of our folk will remain in the darkness and will never reach the light, as other nations have done."[10]

Many scholars, although they were the producers of monumental religious literature have started to acquire free standing scholarly

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[9] See Dinicu Golescu, *Însemnare a călătoriei mele* (Bucureşti, 1977), pp. 75–89; Gheorghe Lazăr, "Povăţuitorul tinerimii," in *Bibliografia românească veche*, vol. 3 (Bucureşti, 1912–1936), pp. 500–502; Lemny, *Sensibilitate*, pp. 186–187; Teodor, *Interferenţe*, pp. 238–239; Daniel Barbu, *Bizanţ contra Bizanţ. Explorări în cultura politică românească* (Bucureşti, 2001), p. 270.

[10] Alexandru Duţu, *Cărţile de înţelepciune în cultura română* (Bucureşti, 1972), p. 38.

authority. Gradually, there emerged a secular ideology and culture which has detached itself, without hostility from religious ideology, partial to church interests. The scholar had become an intellectual, he has actively and primarily focused on the role of man and of society, in opposition to the cleric, who continued to be devoted to theological discipline. For both of them, the citizens or the sons of the nation have become a pedagogical purpose. As it was noted in 1809 by the historian Petru Maior, "when the Romanians should see from what noble vintage they had come, they should all be led towards kindness and common sense".[11]

Starting from the eighteenth century, reformism had introduced new standards of social ascension, such as education and competence, which have encouraged the individual and then the national wish to succeed. Even if they did not come any nearer to the status of the western intellectuals, the Romanian ones had become the new *clerical* stratum, in the service of faith in culture, in science, rationality and progress, while the state started to need their services, more and more, in creating order and civilisation. Starting from the beginning of the nineteenth century, writings recommended to the people that they "should not complain or to wait against their wish, but should always show themselves ready to pay the necessary obligations," or even more explicitly, they suggested that the duty of a good citizen or subject was "that he should be faithful to the master of the country, that is they should belong to him completely." The enlightenment's cultural and political message clearly transferred the concern towards "the true price of man" towards the "duty to oneself, towards his property and towards human society," wrote Damaschin Bojincă.[12]

From Enlightenment to Romanticism

If the idea of nation, for the scholars of the eighteenth century has been marked by the social, mental and cultural stratification of the people, after 1800 it has started to attain modern outlines. From an elitist understanding, the content of the nation has gradually been extended towards the great mass of the people. The book of knowledge has started

[11] Petru Maior, "Istoria pentru începutul românilor în Dachia," in Florea Fugariu, ed., *Şcoala ardeleană* (Bucureşti, 1983), pp. 863–864.

[12] Nicolae Bocşan, *Contribuţii la istoria iluminismului românesc* (Timişoara, 1986), pp. 227–229, 231.

to acquire the face of national ideology, which required devotion to the homeland, the nation, its culture and history.

In the history of Petru Maior the past of the Romanians has been transformed into a force engaged in the future of the "new Dacia". Gheorghe Şincai wrote, in 1800 *Cronica românilor şi a mai multor neamuri* (*The Chronicle of the Romanians and of Several Nations*), a manner of approaching the past which would gallop towards the national formula of history. The Romanians were called brothers of history, to include them in the creation of a single people, a retrospective fascinating illusion of a past in which the generations would consciously prepare the great acts of national unity. In the preface to the translation of Millot, *The Universal History* (1800), Ioan Piuariu Molnar suggested that history could offer examples, whence the temptation of replacing Christian mythology with a profane one.[13]

Enlightenment thought has advocated mankind's right to happiness on earth, in a world appreciated as heavenly, as "a beautiful world, full of milk and honey" (Dimitrie Ţichindeal). If Christian morals considered that, only through faith could one attain happiness, the enlightenment has suggested an inversion of the criteria: the social and political morality will subordinate religion! The tension of messianic expectations within a national ethos has encouraged the discovery of secular eschatology, while between 1780–1820, this would assume the character of national progress.

A Transylvanian, Nicolae Horga Popovici, wrote in 1801, in *Oglindă arătată omului înţelept* (*A Mirror shown to the wise man*) that "the great love is shown by the one who helps his folk rise, through able men, good ploughmen, wise scholars". Christian salvation is increasingly in competition with the hope of collective happiness, a strictly terrestrial one, a renaissance of the country and the nation. But collective happiness assumes, first of all the sense of individual accomplishment, acquired through rational knowledge and personal activity. For Horga Popovici, "the walk towards happiness" meant the development of crafts, of trade, while for Ţichindeal (*Adunare de lucruri moraliceşti*, 1808) [*A Gathering of Moral Things*] "a good man" that is civilised, meant the one who worked "for the good of mankind, of the country and of the nation".[14]

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[13] Maria Protase, *Petru Maior. Un ctitor de conştiinţe* (Bucureşti, 1973), pp. 196–197; Duţu, *Cărţile*, pp. 110, 115–117; Lucian Boia, *Două secole de mitologie naţională* (Bucureşti, 1999), p. 36.

[14] Alexandru Duţu, *Sinteză şi originalitate în cultura română* (Bucureşti, 1972), p. 127; idem, *Coordonate ale culturii româneşti în secolul XVIII* (Bucureşti, 1968), pp. 147–151,

The collapse of the "Phanariot" regime and the decline of the Greek language in administration and culture have been compensated by an interest in the Romanian language, not only for its Latin origin (so exalted by some of the intellectuals), but also for its structure, which expressed a national and patriotic specificity. In their memoirs, written after 1821, the representatives of the small nobility have underlined the idea that their political rights were justified by their belonging to the great ethnic and linguistic community. For Naum Râmniceanu, the common data of the nation were consanguinity, origin, religion (orthodox) but also language, including within the national corpus the Romanian everywhere. Ion Budai-Deleanu considered it a noble duty to "take up the thread of history" of the Romanian nation, in order to make known "those enlightened persons from the grey-haired centuries, that are presently covered by the fog of forgetfulness".[15]

The knowledge of the nation became the "foundation of the edifice of knowledge" (Eftimie Murgu), that is why, the obstacles in the path of the emancipation of the people had to be obliterated. The good citizen of the country and of the nation had to be a believer, his creed being the nation, the *chosen people* of God, as Ion Heliade Rădulescu stated. Among the virtues of the good citizen, that of good Christianity had to be included, as he was the son of a Christian nation. The intellectuals, interested in enlightening the nation have not built an anticlerical culture, but have only wished to capture the interest of the urban inhabitants, but also of the peasantry, for a new mentality, that of the active man, adapted to the rules of harmonious cohabitation, interested in the problems of the city. The interest to offer the young *good behaviour* referred, not only to society but also to the church. But, instead of the biblical sentences or of the stories taken from ancient history, historical portraits and social and political comments, as well as manuals of patriotism have increasingly appeared. *Datoriile bunului creştin* (*The Duties of the Good Christian*, 1829) urged the public towards *Christian patriotism,* that is, towards "the sacrifice for the happiness of the citizens," for the public good, which Aaron Florian saw as attained in the republic.[16]

338; Daniel Barbu, "Etica ortodoxă şi spiritul românesc," in vol. *Firea românilor* (Bucureşti, 2000), pp. 89–90.

[15] Ion Budai-Deleanu, *Ţiganiada* (Bucureşti, 1974), pp. 3–4. See Golescu, *Însemnare*, pp. 75–89.

[16] Alexandru Duţu, *Histoire de la pensée et des mentalités politiques européennes* (Bucureşti, 1997), pp. 220–221, 235 ; Bocşan, *Contribuţii*, pp. 214, 217, 219, 312. Cf. Olivier Gillet, *Religion et nationalisme. L`idéologie de l`Eglise orthodoxe roumaine sous le regime communiste* (Bruxelles, 1997), p. 156.

The Historical Mythology of Romanticism

Romanian modernity has been understood, at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a culture of discourse, in which the present was founded on the values of History and subjected to the irradiation of the European democratic model. History in the service of the reformist spirit has offered arguments to the political shaper, but the other mental tiers have remained isolated from history until the middle of the nineteenth century, being rather rooted in folklore, that is in permanence (myths and legends) and repetition. Romanian Romanticism has proven sensitive to history, its affinities developing towards a lyricism, which covered a triple aspect, that of confession, of mythologizing the past and of humanitarian and national messianism. The young generation of Romantic intellectuals, after 1840 has assumed, with sympathy the vision of a folk-nation, with a peasant majority, from whence the excessive appreciation of folklore, of a rural way of life, which the advocates of the enlightenment had considered haunted by ignorance and superstition and which they had engaged to *enlighten*.

For the Romantics, the peasant was a symbol of fidelity to the past, but also an innocent victim of the social and of *eighteen centuries of history* (Nicolae Bălcescu). The problems of the Romanian society required urgent changes at the level of the collective mentality, and that is why this generation of intellectuals has encouraged the means on which depended the dissemination of the ideas of the century, the realisation of the cultural dialogue through the media, schools, cultural associations. The *enlightenment* of the people did not mean only a cultural messianism, but also reflected concern for the collective consciousness regarding political and national interests.

If in 1839, as George Barițiu has stated, "the multitude of the people made the nation, and not a few arrogant persons, proud of the age of their families," in 1869 Dimitrie Bolintineanu appreciated that the "nation is the people and all the classes which are comprised in it, together, who live under the same laws, with the same language, with the same customs. Each nation has a character of its own, which distinguishes it from the rest. In order that people would unite themselves into a national body it has been necessary to have a

community of views and identity of interests".[17] George Barițiu warned that "a beautiful spirit," national union, ran through the people of Europe, that "the strength and force of a people, its foundation, its politics of balance, its hopes, its present and future, all exist in national union." This meant a single people, which comprised the leader, the aristocrat, the priest, the soldier, the ploughman, the craftsman, the man, the woman, the elderly, the young, the infants, "all the nationals, all the speakers of a language preserved from the ancestors of centuries ago, all the sons of a people careful of moral laws, fired by the liberty of the country, loving towards its kindred, tolerant to foreigners, as far as national independence would allow it." That is why the nation had to comprise those who are "blood brothers, of language and laws". The ideals of the Romanians from all the regions of the old Dacia (a mythical Dacia) had to be the maintenance of the real unity, of all the ancestral language and of the national church.[18]

The ideology of 1848, in its desire to impose itself, has effectively exploited one of the major figures of the social and political hopes: the people-nation, as an image of a mythical origin and destiny, endowed with exemplary virtues, a model of permanence, continuity and collective solidarity. The nation appeared as a *natural* product of history, while historical writings, next to poetry, novels, plays had, in their turn to become a source for the moulding of national consciousness.

The stories, the legends about leaders and heroes of the Romanian past have been fulfilled by an authentic history of the people, such as *Histoire de la Valachie, de la Moldavie et des Valaques Transdanubiens* (Berlin, 1837), published by Mihail Kogălniceanu. Nation meant unity, that is why, in 1840 Kogălniceanu has initiated at Iaşi a nucleus for promoting a coherent cultural doctrine, developed around the review *Dacia literară*. His enthusiasm in encouraging an original and substantial Romanian culture has had to face the wave of "French mania," which, in his opinion, was drowning the Romanian spirit. Nicolae Bălcescu himself believed that, through the mediation of knowledge about the prestigious past, the nation could be modelled and the social and national militancy could be nurtured. Next to August Treboniu Laurian, Bălcescu has

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[17] Dimitrie Bolintineanu, "Națiune, naționalitate," in vol. *Cartea poporului român. Cugetări filosofice şi politice în raport cu starea actuală a României* (Bucureşti, 1869), pp. 11–12; Barbu, *Bizanț*, pp. 77–78, 264.

[18] George Barițiu, "Naționalitate," *Foaie pentru minte, inimă şi literatură* 2, no. 12 (1839): 94; 7, no. 15 (1844): 399–400; Mihai Eminescu, *Publicistică. Referiri istorice şi istoriografice* (Chişinău, 1990), p. 52; Lucian Boia, *Jocul cu trecutul. Istoria între adevăr şi ficțiune* (Bucureşti, 1998), pp. 44–47.

founded *Magazin istoric pentru Dacia* (1845-1848), [*The Historical Magazine for Dacia*], a forum for the emergence of Romanian national messianism.

In a Romantic spirit, the past of the nation had to be a *live* history—although the generations and the periods invoked no longer existed—because it lived through the historical memory that each generation had a duty to keep. "History, said Mihail Kogălniceanu in *Cuvânt introductiv la cursul de istorie națională* (*Foreword to the introductory course in national history*, 1843), brings forth from the graves our ancestors and displays them before our eyes, as if they were alive, with all their virtues, with all their passions, with all their habits. It, therefore, connects us with eternity, initiating communication between ourselves and the past folks, and again between us and the seeds of the future". The greatest monarchs of the past have been considered national heroes, righteous and tolerant leaders: "my heart beats when I hear the name of Alexandru cel Bun, of Ştefan cel Mare, of Mihai Viteazul. These men, for me are more than Alexander the Great, than Hannibal, than Caesar; those are the heroes of the world, while the former are the heroes of my homeland. The battle of Războieni, the victories of Racova and of Călugăreni seem to me more brilliant than those of Marathon and Salamina, because they have been won by the Romanians."[19] This icon of an heroic history has been attached to an authentic, symbolic and emotional charge, being popularised through culture and political discourse, which explains the exceptional fealty and devotion to the point of sacrifice, tested in numerous historical moments, such as 1848 and 1877.

The representation of the Romanian nation has been linked to the effort of history, to the struggle between the unifying forces of convergence and cohesion and those of division, which disperse and dissociate, while the *spirit of union* had to prevail: "our ancestors have wanted us to be Transylvanian, Wallachians, Moldavians and not Romanians; rarely have they come to look at each other as members of the same nation; in their lack of union one has to see the root of all past misfortune." National history seems like a vast deposit of experiences, the certainty of family solidarity, of folk, of faith, while "the happenings and the acts of our ancestors, through inheritance become our own". History is the memory of past deeds, but it is also the seminal book, a book of wisdom and learning, as "the highest achievement, the most glorious actions" have moralising effects: "to instil in the heart a striving towards goodness and towards virtue, to awaken the noble ambition to

[19] Mihail Kogălniceanu, *Profesie de credință* (Bucureşti, 1962), pp. 122–143.

do great and righteous things" (Mihail Kogălniceanu).[20] This Romantic message has rendered history sacred, has transmitted hope, triggering a transfer of a saving immanence towards the nation.

Historical mythology, linked to noble origins, heroic virtues, the endeavours towards continuity on the earth of the homeland was subordinate to a national ideology, characterised by a messianic and prophetic happy future of the nation. In the schools, there were already prints with a historical subject, such as the one produced by Constantin Lecca, representing the assassination of Mihai Viteazul (1829). Iosif Genilie, in his *Historical Geography* of 1835, had called Trajan the father of Romanians, but had not yet mentioned the Dacian king, Decebal.[21] A new gallery of ancestral models, voivods from the Middle Ages were celebrated alongside famous personalities of the century, such as leaders, diplomats, prestigious teachers, bishops. Like the political discourses or literary creations, history textbooks insisted on commemoration of the foundations, to the glory of Latinity and the exaltation of ancestral virtues. In 1857–1858 a "true national learning" but still based on the "love and fear of God" was maintained.[22]

Romanticism has seen in literature (in all its genre and species) the expression of the entire spiritual being of the nation. The publication of national literature has become an educational project, which would unite all the social components into an awareness of a unique national destiny. The poetry of Vasile Alecsandri has spoken to the "Latin people" of everywhere, while the poet Mihai Eminescu has invoked the traditional values, as a warranty of national *genius.*

Literature has been remarkably disseminated through the media, which, beginning with the middle of the nineteenth century, has defined itself as national, espousing a certain intellectual discipline to all Romanians. The theatre in the national language gathered people from different social strata, familiarising them with the virtues of the nation, instilling in them the interest for its past and its destiny. The theatre has

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[21] Mirela-Luminița Murgescu, *Între "bunul creştin" şi "bravul român". Rolul şcolii primare în construirea identității naționale româneşti (1831–1878)* (Iaşi, 1999), pp. 118, 138. See Ovidia Babu-Buznea, *Dacii în conştiința romanticilor noştri. Schiță de istorie a dacismului* (Bucureşti, 1979).

[22] Mirela-Luminița Murgescu, "Figura lui Mihai Viteazul în viziunea elitelor şi în literatura didactică (1830–1860)," *Revista istorică* 4, no. 5–6 (1993): 539–550; eadem, "Galeria națională de personaje istorice în manualele de istorie din şcoala primară (1859–1900)," in Lucian Boia, ed., *Mituri istorice româneşti* (Bucureşti, 1995), pp. 31–41; eadem, *Între "bunul creştin,"* pp. 54–55, 138.

become a privileged place for the popularisation of national history, as historical drama was preferred by the public. The dramatic repertoire, inspired by the heroic past has had this role in the Romanian Principalities, where a number of plays have been written and staged, such as *Dragoş, întâiul suveran al Moldovii* (1834) [*Dragoş the first sovereign of Moldavia*], *Lupta moldovenilor cu cruciaţii teutoni la Marienburg* (1847) [*The Battle of the Moldavians with the Theutonic Crusaders at Marienburg*].[23]

Liberalisation, although timidly introduced after 1830 and then hampered by the legislation of censorship, has created the premises for the generalisation of new ideas and of transforming personal dissatisfactions into a general climate, able to shape public opinion. The struggle for cultural development has become a struggle in favour of modern values, revolution, nation, democracy, liberalism, and the pathos of "civilisation" has been felt as an immanence of spiritual progress. Because of censorship, which tempered the zeal of nationalism, the media, the cultural associations and the schools have become the most effective means for the popularisation of the idea of nation and for the modelling of a patriotic and national mentality.

In the period prior to the revolution of 1848, when indigenous reality was amalgamated with western influences, a few tendencies have been outlined: the nostalgia of enlightenment, the Romantic vocation and the liberal one. Among the latter, the Romantic one has become the most attached to the national spirit, to the wish to revive the past, to strengthen ethnic individuality in order to build the arguments in favour of national rights. "The Nation, has been wanted by History!"—the revolutionaries of 1848, who have primarily appreciated the past as an identity landmark exclaimed. The people existed as a type of solidarity, solidified by perennial impulses, received as a characteristic sign of its individuality, nationality. The nation, as a messianic entity, militant and combative has been associated, in 1848 to a state mechanism, which had to be free, independent. The national discourse from 1848, from the Union of the Principalities in 1859, or from the one in 1918 have in common this description of the mutual framework of history, of the desire to be together manifested by all the Romanians, from all the Romanian historical provinces. The old Dacia, the quasi concomitant formation of the Romanian medieval states and the legendary experience of the "descent," the unity accomplished in 1600 by Mihai Viteazul, the

[23] Ioan Massof, *Teatrul românesc. Privire istorică*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti, 1961); Ştefan Lemny, *Originea şi cristalizarea ideii de patrie în cultura română* (Bucureşti, 1986), pp. 160–167.

Romanian chronicles, written in Old Church Slavonic, which remind one of these countries and their inhabitants have been used as arguments of continuity, of the wish of the Romanians to draw together, to build a state unity, which has been given national characteristics.[24]

The political consciousness has become the soul of the century, the "powerful circulation, which stirs the thought and the action". A source of concrete purposes, politics passed to the fore in terms of values. Intellectual activity, literature, art, morals, history—have all been called to concentrate on the destiny of the country and of the nation. The revolutionaries of 1848 have embraced unanimously the mission of national regeneration, but not all of them saw in "the hurried and vocal changes" (M. Kogălniceanu) or in the "incendiary spirit" (I. Heliade-Rădulescu) the most opportune way for Romanian society.

The School and the Modern Nation

The expression of the revolutionary C.A. Rosetti, "Enlighten yourself and you will exist," suggested the immense appreciation that the revolutionaries of 1848 attached to culture, education, work, and science, necessary to the material and spiritual progress of the nation.[25] Whilst, for a long time the questions concerning education have been controlled by the religious institutions and the local authorities, they have become, after the third decade of the nineteenth century, a unitary project of the State, with a systematic organisation, regarding the extension of education to broader categories.

The purpose for the schools was not only literacy, but also the cultivation of civic and moral values, the stimulation of patriotism, the modelling of identity consciousness, that is the formation of a civic and national model. Education had emerged also for the Church, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as a positive thing, with salvation and material and moral benefits in view. The clerics believed that education diminished vices, misdemeanours and crimes and that it favoured a more stable and harmonious family life. The spiritual culture

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[24] Lucian Boia *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească* (Bucureşti, 1997), pp. 91–99; idem, *Două secole*, p. 36; Duţu, *Coordonate*, pp. 147–151, 338.

[25] Alexandru Duţu, „Pour une histoire de la dévotion sud-est européenne. Contributions récentes," *Revue des études sud-est européennes. Civilisations—méntalités* 29, no. 3–4 (1991): 241–245 ; idem, "Sacré et profane dans le Sud-Est européen. Réflexions préliminaires," in Paul Stahl, ed., *Études roumaines et aroumaines* (Paris, 1990), pp. 51–53 ; idem, "La vision du monde dans le roman populaire du sud-est de l`Europe à l`aube de Romantisme," *Synthesis* 16 (1989): 43–50.

of the people, until the middle of the nineteenth century, in the absence of schools, has been fed by the instruction offered by the writings with religious content. The entire Orthodox church pedagogy encouraged the "salvation of the soul" of the Christians, being less preoccupied by the practical side of people's lives.

As a consequence of the distinctive prestige that the national Church had enjoyed in the collective mentality, it had represented the unique place of collective sociability, in the absence of a political framework, the same way as, in the absence of educated notabilities, who could be the voices of the nation, the clerics had been the only cultivated elite. This was the case of Transylvania, until the revolution of 1848. The religious factor has not been less determining in the dislocation of the Ottoman Empire, precipitated by the movement for independence and for Orthodoxy of the Christian people from the Balkans, at the beginning of the nineteenth century: the Romanians, the Serbs, the Bulgarians. The birth of the modern state has transformed the school in an institution which, gradually benefited from a professional staff, an institution with norms and rules, and has tended to free it from the patronage of the church. The pedagogic vocation of the state, starting from the model of the school, as an elementary educational milieu, the generalisation of the concerns for civic, patriotic and national education has merged with the perception of the school as a privileged place of professional formation and a panacea in the face of social deviancy.[26]

The need for *public learning* had been sanctioned by the *Regulamentele Organice* (*Organic Regulations*) (1832) a "constitution" which made the school a permanent institution of the state, after it had been a "blessing" and "a princely work of mercy". A memo from 1834 invoked explicitly the necessity to bring everyone together around the new institutions created by the Organic Regulations and waiting faithfully for the fulfilment of a time of development, of prosperity, which they promised. If, in 1832 the Regulations for the Schools of Wallachia requested the modelling of children for "the piety shown the sacred, the respect towards the law and towards leadership, the love of order and the love of country," after three decades, the educational aspirations were oriented towards "the necessary knowledge for good ploughmen and good citizens".[27]

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[26] Keith Hitchins, *Ortodoxie şi naţionalitate. Andrei Şaguna şi românii din Transilvania, 1846–1873* (Bucureşti, 1996), pp. 254–255; Bocşan, *Contribuţii*, p. 214.

[27] Murgescu, *Între "bunul creştin,"* pp. 32–33, 40; Vlad Georgescu, *Mémoires et projets de réforme dans les Principautés Roumaines, 1831–1848. Répertoire et textes. Avec*

Although, in the official educational discourse, moral, religious and patriotic education had remained a priority, the national and patriotic education represented a priority in the view of Mihail Kogălniceanu and, generally of the nationalist elite of 1848. Patriotism has been associated to the national spirit, by the teachers of the Saint Sava College, such as the professor of logic, Ioan Pop, who used numerous examples of logical sentences with a patriotic and national connotation, such as "The Romanians are brave knights."[28]

The consolidation of the new state, formed through the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, from 1859, had gradually encouraged national consciousness. The schools, noted the politician Vasile Boerescu, in 1858 were destined "to bring the light in the midst of the nation, in the hovel of the ploughman, who, through the strength of his arms, nourishes and defends the country. The enlightened, knowledgeable and virtuous men are also zealous citizens. The natural intelligence of the Romanians, the civilising mission of Romania will be the first that, in the Orient will spread the light of the West".

The political and intellectual elite from Romania saw in the creation of a model of the national patriot a condition for the new aspirations for the modernisation of society. Public learning became "free and accessible" in Wallachia and Moldavia, because the school was equated to the national cauldron, meant to develop civic sentiment, the means "towards spreading new life throughout the country". In the message of December 6 1859, the prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza stressed, in a national spirit that, "in the education of the people, well run, there are the best warranties of order, of progress and of enlightened patriotism". The prince was convinced that national vitality "resides always in the mass of the people and that the only means for national regeneration are the regeneration of the people".[29] If, in the regulatory school and even during the first years after the union of the principalities, from 1859 a priority concerning moral and religious education was perpetuated, from the seventh decade, especially after the independence of the Romanian state, education in a national patriotic spirit was emphasised. Moreover, towards the end of the sixth decade of the nineteenth century, the intellectuals, many of them adepts of a secular society, have taken from

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un supplément pour les années 1769–1830 (Bucureşti, 1972), p. 44; Barbu, *Bizanț*, p. 267–268.

[28] Murgescu, *Între "bunul creştin,"* p. 79.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37, 56–57.

the bishops (traditional in their approach to social and political issues), the leadership of the national movement.[30]

Religion and the Modern Nation

The new secularised morality, which had fascinated more and more intellectuals, even after the 1830s has been the one emancipated gradually from the exclusiveness of religious doctrine, relying on virtues and the possibility of human improvement, that is on a modern anthropocentrism. In the nineteenth century, the idea that moral obligations did not necessarily need to rely on the affirmation of transcendence and that the support for moral law was achieved through itself, without any need of reference to God, gained ground. It was admitted, without any difficulty, that there was an identity between Christian and natural morality. The impulse that France has given to militant secularisation has been sustained among the Romanians by those who estimated that "scientific morality" and "scientism" needed to be popularised, not only through schools, but also through a new cultural climate.[31] Secularisation, as an intensification of concerns for mundane aspects, for values emancipated from the register of traditional sacredness, has been increasingly felt in the Romanian elitist culture and mentality throughout the nineteenth century.

If in the national states, starting with the beginning of the nineteenth century, the civic area was defining itself by contrast to religion, among the Romanians, in Habsburg Transylvania, even confessional disputes have taken on the wrappings of an ideology, which had served political and national purposes. Without knowing any agnostic and atheist impulses, the intellectual world did not look kindly upon the disputes of Transylvania between the Orthodox and the Uniates, and considered them irrational and unpatriotic, dangerous for the unity of the nation. Starting with the 1840s, a great part of the intellectuals have shown fascination with *liberal* thought, which served the "religion" of the citizen and with *national* thought, interested in *national faith*. Both tendencies, the national and the liberal, have encouraged the use of rationality and of knowledge, have invoked material and spiritual secular progress for the emancipation of the people from what is called "political slavery".

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[30] Hitchins, *Ortodoxie*, pp. 232–237, 240, 254–255.

[31] René Rémond, *Religion et Société en Europe. La sécularisation aux XIX et XX siècles, 1780–2000* (Paris, 2001), p. 97; Jean Baubérot and Séverine Mathieu, *Religion, modernité et culture au Royaume-Unie et en France. 1800–1914* (Paris, 2002), pp. 272–273.

Romantic religiosity has been, as in the west, a *reinvention of Christianity,* invested not in its divine sense, but towards the use of mundane purposes, political and national. The Romantic ideal was a mixture of evangelical Christianity and of social messianism à la Lamennais (*Paroles d'un croyant*, 1834), which had made a profound impression on several representatives, even clerics of the 1848 generation. On the other hand, the traditional osmosis between religious belief and ethnicity, which has perpetuated itself within the nation, has turned the church into an institution intrinsically linked to the evolution of the State. From this point of view, the relation Church—State—Society has been modelled in a different way from its western, especially French counterpart, which has known in the nineteenth century a frontal dispute with the Catholic Church.

The antiliberal movement of the Catholic Church, affirmed in the encyclical *Mirari Vos*, of 1832 of the Pope Gregory XVI condemned the liberal current within French Catholicism, directed by Lamennais, which advocated the separation of Church and State, the freedom of conscience and the freedom of the press. After the events of 1848, Pius IX has condemned all forms of innovation, considering necessary the restoration of authority, not of a critical spirit, of unconditional obedience, not of liberty, of subjection to group law, not of individual will, of dogma, not of rationality, of tradition against progress, of conservative spirit against democracy.[32] If, in 1832 the Pope Gregory XVI had qualified as "delirious" the advocacy of the freedom of conscience, three decades later, Pius IX noted in *Syllabus errorum*, of 1864 that he could not accept modern civilisation, liberalism and the idea of progress, considered to be the sources of secular religiosity, incompatible with Christian exigencies. Moreover, Rome imagined itself, throughout the century as a citadel assaulted by the new barbarians, who threatened to overturn the moral order of the world.[33] In the nineteenth century, the liberal principle of guaranteeing citizens a true liberty of choice has been confronted with an authoritarian tradition of the church and has contributed to the dissociation of civic action from the sacrament. The Holy See has contended with the requests of the state, which controlled communication between the Roman curia and the national clergy and which opposed the dissemination of the Papal bulls. In its turn, the

[32] Rémond, *Religion*, pp. 189, 121.

[33] Gérard Cholvy, *Être chretien en France au XIX^e siècle, 1790–1914* (Paris, 1997), p.150; Jacques Rollet, *Religion et politique. Le christianisme, l`islam, la démocratie* (Paris, 2001), pp. 138–139.

tendency of the Holy See was to abolish the customs or to abrogate the texts which limited its freedom of action.[34]

In the Orthodox space, the metamorphoses of the relationship between Church-State-Society have had a different specificity. The ecclesiological identification of the Orthodox Church with the nation has had a huge ideological stake, the Orthodox consciousness being necessary to the nation, against ethnic and national alterity, that is against those of other *laws* (faith). The nation was, in 1848 the "charismatic centre" around which the affective effervescence has been sustained through the terminology of "love," of "goodness," of "fraternity," while its charisma has been transferred to the disciples. But the charismatic virtues, such as equity, truth, love, liberty, hope were the domain of faith, and that is why the nation has become, in the ideology of 1848, a polarising mysticism.

The intrinsic link between religious and national identity illustrates the idea that this identity could not be conceived of, other than in a spiritual, sacred manner, from whence the frequency of the expression *sacred nation,* which has meant the nucleus of a revolutionary secular theology, which has promoted the firm struggle with the secular Evil, embodied in the national adversary. Influenced by Jules Michelet, Nicolae Bălcescu considered, in *Mersul revoluției în istoria românilor* (*The Road of the Revolution in the History of the Romanians*), that the spirit of his times was a providential messianism, a sacred duty to create a nation, of brothers and free citizens: "salvation resides within us, in the nation, in its genius, which will propel it towards progress and civilisation."[35] In Transylvania in "the springtime of the people," the *death of the nation* was the most disquieting spectre. The link between the death and the resurrection of the nation has been associated, in the 1848 revolutionary discourse, with a secularised Christic episode. The people-Christ comes out of the grave of servitude, in that hour of salvation. The same way that Christ had ended slavery "the Romanian nation could no longer be enslaved, while the abolition of servitude, the institution of a Romanian nation and a national congress, were absolutely necessary because, without them heaven would still be hell!"—said a revolutionary text from 1848, from Transylvania.[36] Like Christ, love holds the heart alight, in

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[34] Rémond, *Religion*, pp. 92, 182.

[35] Simona Nicoară, "Sacralizarea ideii de națiune în Revoluția de la 1848 din Transilvania," in vol. *Revoluția de la 1848–1849 în Europa Centrală. Perspectivă istorică şi istoriografică* (Cluj, 2000), p. 405.

[36] Simion Bărnuțiu, *Discursul de la Blaj şi scrieri de la 1848* (Cluj, 1990), pp. 33–35.

order to witness the affection of the people towards the Nation, Country and Emperor, but also for freedom.

The strong involvement of the Orthodox Church (and of the Uniate one in Transylvania) in the political domain, despite the control and the subordination by the Habsburg and Ottoman state, has been added to its tradition of spiritual and moral education. The identity between Romanianism and faith, the *symphony* between the Church, Nation and State, the absence of a clear differentiation between civil and religious society has allowed the integration of religion, civic and national discourse. The Christian ideal has been secularised in relation with national aspirations. In the schools of Blaj, in mid-nineteenth century, the teachers have frequented less and less the religious services, together with the pupils and the students, dedicating themselves to the strategies of social reforms, public and political behaviour. The role of the priest, as a cultural mediator, and as a representative of the parish, in perpetuating solidarity within the village "family," which was part of the national family was appreciated by those who conferred upon the ecclesiastic institution a social and national purpose. The intellectuals of both churches, Orthodox and Greek-Catholic have pleaded that, within the leadership of the church the laity would also be represented, while the leadership of national affairs should be more broadly represented socially, as it could not remain "aristocratic," that is, elitist. Also, the priority of education, in a patriotic and national spirit, to which the representatives of the church consented, was justified by the danger of denationalisation.[37] The pleas of Transylvanian intellectuals for religious reunification has been invested, in 1848 with a national meaning—and therefore a less ecclesiastical one—which has triggered opposition among the bishops, the orthodox Andrei Şaguna and the Greek-Catholic Ioan Lemeni.

Bishop Şaguna has been close to the militant spirit of the national movement, but has insisted that elementary and secondary schools would remain under the control of the church, because the educational process did not mean only an acquisition of knowledge, preparation for a craft or a profession, but also a *moral* and *spiritual reawakening*. Moreover, his program to reform the church has encouraged changes in the spiritual and social concerns of the priest (for instance, the theological education was extended to three years, and it involved, among other things, Biblical studies, morality, ecclesiastical history and...

[37] Gillet, *Religion*, pp. 115, 126, 148–149. Cf. Simion Retegan, "Églises, sentiment national et nationalisme," *Transylvanian Review* 2, no. 2 (1993): 6–7.

agriculture, practical medicine etc.), to the benefit of the people. Şaguna was not pleased that the church, based on dogmatic and eternal principles could be drawn to secular matters, more that its authentic mission would allow. That is why, he requested that ecclesiastical matters would be reserved to the pulpit, far away from the political and national disputes. But the religious fervour of nationalism, which "preached" an ethnic fraternity has competed with organised religion, and that is why, the bishop has complained against the "excessive national spirit," holding it responsible for the feeling of indifference towards the church and traditional religion.[38]

In Western Europe, the competition between religion and nation had divided the national consciousness, beginning with the eighteenth century. Among the Romanians, the ecclesiological assimilation of nationalism has stimulated solidarity between the church, religion and national consciousness. The Orthodox Church has become the national church, because of its apostolic origin, because it was anchored in the customs of the people, it cultivated the national language, it propagated religious and national feelings. Article 21 of the first modern Romanian Constitution designated orthodox religion as the dominant religion of the Romanian state. "As the nation is, so the church is. Those who accuse the church of the past, accuse the nation, those who praise the church, praise the nation. That is how closely linked church and nation are within Orthodoxy."[39] The osmosis between orthodox faith, ethnicity and nation has turned the church into an institution intrinsically linked to the development of the state. Christianity has been considered a Romanian property, while the modern state has used the church (which has gradually turned over some of its competence to the state), conferring upon it a significant role in the unification of national souls within a Christian and Romanian community. For the European nations, placed under foreign and non-Christian domination, such as the Turkish one in Moldavia and Wallachia, national religion has maintained and favoured the consciousness of national individuality. The Church has become "an ark or a sainted anchor" of the country, safeguarding the national soul.[40]

The link between Christian tradition and the national being implied the support of the church in national and patriotic education, that is why the Address of the Minister of Cults and Public Instruction of March

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[38] Hitchins, *Ortodoxie*, pp. 246–247, 272; Gillet, *Religion*, p. 156.

[39] The Romanian Constitutions of 1866, 1923, 1938, 1991 have all designated the dominant role fo the Orthodox Church. See Barbu, "Etica ortodoxa," pp. 109, 111.

[40] Murgescu, *Între "bunul creştin,"* p. 169.

1866 targeted "the shepherds of the soul" of the nation, in order to work towards their enlightenment, while "the great principle of the obligatory nature of primary education" was considered a "saving principle in the shadow of the ancestral church" because although ancient religion has been in the past the shield of Romanian-ness and it was a shield of nationality, because from the shield of this religion poured forth upon it the light and the truth.[41] The voice from the pulpit was used for the prosperity of public instruction. The priests had the mission to goad the villagers to send their children to school, because "the glory of religion will be in the victory of light and the salvation of the Romanian country," which meant a nationalisation of the Christian religion for the "temple of Romanian-ness: the schools, in the past were held in the porches of our church, but in the future the school would be the porch of the Romanian church". The educational message became to "leave aside all worldly worries, for the cultivation of the soul by the true Romanians!" A circular letter to the foremen, of 1866 encouraged the support given the schools, the new "temple of light, for the salvation of the nation. Only the school will give Romanians the consciousness of its grand future and of its grand rights to existence and independence, in front of the world and under the benediction of God."[42] If, until the seventh decade, the study of the duties of man towards God, towards himself, towards his fellowmen and towards the country had been a priority, from this date onwards, the concern for modelling awareness of identity has become equally important.

National Celebrations and Cultural Communion

The natural inclination from the seventh and eighth decades of the nineteenth century meant faith in the people and the country, devotion to the homeland, "the theatre of our existence". In the school programs produced after 1870, the use of studying national history was more intensely discussed, as a fundamental identity marker, starting from the primary grades, if not from the first grade. The study of national or world history had been reserved to secondary education, the programs requesting for the primary cycle primarily biographies of famous people, such as the most renown voivodes and an abridged history of the people. From 1862, with the emergence of common programs for the elementary schools from the United Principalities, the subjects predisposed towards

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 169.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 61.

national and patriotic education, such as history and geography, had acquired a more important role in both urban and rural education. History and geography had to make known "the links and uses which hold people together in society," being new markers of national solidarity, "a second milieu and a more efficacious means" after religion, for the cultivation of national and patriotic feelings. In 1878, a textbook mentioned, that "as Christ is the founder of Christian religion, also Trajan is the founder of the Romanian nation". The legendary, exemplary halo of the Dacians and Romanians has become the proof of the virtues of the Romanians. The places of memory have become those of famous battles, but also those of brilliant ecclesiastical foundations, such as the Monastery Argeş, built by Matei Basarab, unanimously appreciated as the most beautiful monument of Romania.

History appears as the new *sacred book* of the people, "the prophet who says and calls forth incessantly: that without fear of God and without love of country a people cannot live in the world, free and un-subjected. History tells us that a people, when it follows the laws of God will reach a happy future!"[43] The moral, religious, scientific, economic and national knowledge had to be the basis of a new mentality, dominated by national feeling. The teacher, together with the priest and with the mayor were designated the cultural mediators of the new forms of socialising, wherein schools occupied the primary place, formerly reserved for the church. The school inspectors recommended such a mission to the rural clergy: "to slip into their discourse, here and there, a more glorious passage from the history of the ancestors, through which they may awaken, even if a little at a time, the national consciousness, so numb now."[44]

The national celebration is a *pious pilgrimage,* for the past, a carrier of moral unity of the nation, for the future. The celebration of Putna, from 1879, dedicated to the voivode Ştefan cel Mare has had a religious and national character: "because the Godly abode, the monastery Putna is founded by the hero (become national saint!) and therein lie his sainted bones."[45] In Transylvania, at the end of the nineteenth century, the newspaper *Telegraful Român* (*The Romanian Telegraph*) wrote that "the memory and the celebration of great days are not just manifestations of gratitude towards those who, through their heroism have written in the history of the people days of national greatness," but also a powerful

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 138, 170.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 122, 160.
[45] Eminescu, *Publicistică*, pp. 562–563.

encouragement for the continuation of national militancy.[46] In 1900, the media criticised the fact that the people "no longer ran to join meetings," and reminded people of the National Assembly of Blaj, from 3/5 May 1848 as a golden age of the national movement.[47]

The cultivation of the national language, of historical, scientific and philosophical knowledge, which spoke of natural law, of human inalienable rights have had as their purpose the creation of a community, of national solidarity, against class solidarity.[48] The national educational system had to provide the normative criteria, of common knowledge, to become that common milieu which implanted "the roots" of nationalism. Analysing, with interest the identity consciousness, the poet Mihai Eminescu wrote that Romanians have "a unitary self awareness: perhaps no other people, which numbers twelve million has so little difference between its parts as the Romanian. The language does not know dialects, the religion has remained, despite the formal division of the church, the same in its innermost core."[49] It was believed that nationality was not composed only by ethnic, linguistic or historical factors, but also by identity feelings, the one that makes it capable to model itself, in its consciousness and to manifest itself, outside it. The awareness regarding the existence of a common patrimony of knowledge and of values has encouraged, in fact an awareness regarding cultural unity, which has intensified at the beginning of the twentieth century.

All in all, Romanian Society of the nineteenth century, rural in its majority has been subjected to a slow and cumbersome process of cultural homogenisation, in which the obligatory school, the newspapers and the books, the railways, the military service have united the inhabitants of the villages and of the towns within a national culture. Although, the day to day realities, the precarious material conditions, the low level of culture and civilisation have made their mark on Romanian identity, this national culture has fortified that emotional legitimacy, which has been the basis of each modern nation. At the end of the nineteenth century, the consolidation of the Romanian state, the temptation of the appropriation of Transylvanian nationalism and the hope of a whole Romania has encouraged the perception of the nation in direct connection with the great country, carrier of modernity and of liberty.

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[46] *Telegraful Român* 41, no. 48 (1893).
[47] *Unirea* 10, no. 20 (1900).
[48] Hitchins, *Ortodoxie*, p. 241.
[49] Eminescu, *Publicistică*, p. 531.

Visual Mythology: The Case of Nicolae Grigorescu as the National Painter

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Every modern nation has its cultural Pantheon of poets, writers, painters, sculptors, playwrights, composers, singers, scientists, doctors and many more. But out of the ranks of these most prestigious figures there will always be a number one in each category. There will be for each and every nation, the Poet, the Composer, the Sculptor and the Painter. In Romanian cultural tradition these figures cannot be mistaken, the Poet with a capital letter is Mihai Eminescu, the Composer is George Enescu, the Sculptor is, to be sure, Constantin Brâncuşi and the list may be continued. It goes without saying that the Romanian national painter is Nicolae Grigorescu. They have achieved this position in the collective consciousness not because they were the very first in their respective fields, but mainly because they where the first to create works comparable with those of their Western counterparts and therefore have had a major contribution to the modernisation of the Romanian society. This is important. Modernisation and synchronisation with the civilised Western cultures has been a central issue in the political and cultural life of Romania throughout the 19th century and the beginning of the next. These figures also became role models for the generations that followed and have been presented as heroic figures in textbooks and have been an important component of popular culture.

This is true for Nicolae Grigorescu considered, for many decades now, the greatest Romanian painter. Why would he be chosen from among other artists of his time, when Romanian modern painting was awakening? Why would Grigorescu be a figure of the high ranking ones, why is he placed together with the figures that have contributed to the modernisation of the Romanian society and its synchronisation with the West, when he is best know for his bucolic landscapes, carts with oxen, cheerful peasant girls and dreamful young shepherds? There are, of course, multiple reasons for this. He has been doubtlessly appreciated for his novel, at the time, technique and manner of painting. Chronologically Grigorescu is the first Romanian painter to let behind neoclassical academism and pathetic romanticism. He gradually abandoned traditional bourgeois genre painting typical of the 19th

century, adopting a way of treating his subject matters and a technique very similar to that of the painters of the Barbizon school, he himself having spent many years in the village and in the forest of Fontainebleau. He has introduced landscape painting for its own sake and outdoor painting, daily life scenes of rural lowlife, portraits that were no longer effigies of the aristocracy or the bourgeoisie. His technique was also very different from that flat and cold painting that used many layers of transparent or semitransparent subdued tones to construct objects by means of a continuous, gradual transition from light to shadow. He borrowed from the Barbizon painters, and also from the great old masters of colour a fashion of painting in which objects were made of light and the light was made of colour placed on the canvas with impulsive, free brushstrokes and sometimes even with a spatula.

But what is far more important for the way in which Grigorescu is remembered is the fact that he has elaborated images that, ever since their creation, have been present in the visual environment of Romania. His paintings could and can still be found in textbooks, on framed printed materials hung in classrooms, public buildings, housing estates stairways, railway stations and trains, on beverage and food packaging, matches, china and innumerable other media, or copied, in works ranging from hilarious to grotesque, by amateur painters, milliners and various artisans. In a word, these images have been present in a way or another in the life of anybody that lived, even for a short period of time, in Romania. Eventually, this immense popularity of his paintings and the great notoriety achieved through it has qualified Grigorescu for receiving the title of national painter.

Although he painted extensively both in France and in Romania the critique has always emphasized the importance of the works made in his home country. These very paintings have contributed to the creation of his legend as the national painter. Biographers, critics and historians have dealt ever since his death with these aspects of his creation. Some, such as his early biographers Alexandru Vlahuţă, Nicolae Petraşcu or Virgil Cioflec[1], have left us idyllic accounts of his life and work, full of very emotional descriptions of his painting and himself. More serious research has been carried out in the years precedent to World War II and in the decades following it by George Oprescu, Remus Niculescu, and others, the first two authoring a number of albums and a large two-

[1] Alexandru Vlahuţă, *Pictorul N. I. Grigorescu, vieaţa şi opera lui* (Bucureşti, 1910); Nicolae Petraşcu, *Pictorul Grigorescu* (Bucureşti, 1895); Nicolae Iorga, *Oameni care au fost*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti, 1934); Virgil Cioflec, *Grigorescu* (Bucureşti, 1925).

volume monograph.[2] The primary aim of these works has been that of collecting new pieces of information about the life of the artist, identifying unknown works, dating the known ones. As far as the interpretation of various works is concerned, this is mostly descriptive, sometimes anecdotic, sentimental or subjective. There has been yet another way of relating to Grigorescu's work, adopted mainly by artists, concerned with his technique and maters of composition, colour, light, etc.[3]

Almost all critics have been aware of the idyllic and sentimental nature of many of the artist's works. Consequently, these works have been categorised altogether as second hand productions that have been made—it was said—under the great pressure from the bourgeois public and although these paintings are mentioned, they are never discussed and are not considered to be representative for the artist, for the true nature of his genius and of his artistic thought. Therefore it is only a part of his vast work that is taken into consideration.

On the other hand, the majority of the authors, in an effort to show Grigorescu as a complete artist, have discussed indiscriminately in their writings a number of categories of his paintings such as nudes, caricatures, cityscapes, intimate scenes, all of which are not the most representative for his work as a whole, and therefore have established, to a certain extent, a false image of the painter.

Grigorescu and his work are well know, but not well understood. We know what he painted and when, who ordered a specific painting, how much it has been paid for, its whereabouts, the painters whereabouts, lots of details about his life. We can read his letters, visit his house, follow his footsteps in Romania and even abroad, listen to his confessions. But very little we know about what lies behind his best-known images and their narrative. Authors have agreed more or less on the national and patriotic nature of Grigorescu's work and its narrative. It is true that some did it in a very affectionate and pathetic way, their writing being nationalistic, patriotic, grandiloquent and, by and large, offering an idyllic portraiture of the man and his work. The scholarship, notably that of the second half of the 20th century, presented a less idealistic image of the painter but maintained much the same view in what the nature of Grigorescu's art is concerned. This position was maintained during the Stalinist period as a form of Romanian cultural

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[2] George Oprescu, *Grigorescu* (Bucureşti, 1961–1962).

[3] Vasile Varga, *Nicolae Grigorescu* (Bucureşti, 1973); Francisc Şirato, "Grigorescu," *Gândirea* (June 1937).

resistance, as many important figures of the national Pantheon have been doomed to obliteration. In the time of the nationalistic communism of the Ceauşescu era, the figure of the painter was considered perfect to take part in the great show of official propaganda. On the other hand there has been a relative disappearance of discussions around Grigorescu in the last decade or so. This is due, I believe, to a common habit of art historians in Romania that prefer avoiding a subject on which "much has been written," everyone preferring his or her own path, doing this, on the one hand, in an attempt of being original and, on the other, it is a way of staying out of trouble, not bothering other colleagues—in most cases in higher academic positions—and avoiding any kind of polemics that might eventually affect ones career. It is a sad fact to acknowledge, and it had contributed massively to the perception we get today about Grigorescu which is, to be sure, very limited and confined to a single perspective. But it is much more to Grigorescu than just this narrow way of understanding him.

It is said, and generally accepted, that Grigorescu has elaborated the painterly image of the Romanian people and of its land, although most authors admit it, the painter exaggerated in some works by creating an idealised picture, most of them towards the end of his career. Except for the later, Grigorescu's paintings are often thought to be realistic, meaning both that they are true to life and also that there is a connection with the school of French realism.

But what is this image of the Romanian people and landscape made of?

Looking at any of the albums that have been printed since 1908, when the first one appeared, or browsing Internet sites dedicated to Grigorescu's work, one will most certainly notice the large number of portraits of merry peasant women, often spinning, shepherds and shepherdesses, dozens of carts with oxen, and soldiers in late 19th century uniforms, numerous landscapes, portraits of Gypsies and Jews and some paintings with people and landscapes of Brittany. This brief overview shows a very selective Grigorescu when it comes to choosing his subject matters. It is true that in his work as a whole, as I have mentioned before, almost all kinds of paintings can be found: from genre scenes to historic compositions, still lifes and nudes. But these are rare features and are not representative for the artist's work as a whole. Representative for Grigorescu's painting in terms of both number and quality are the images of Romanian peasants and peasant life, the oxen-drawn carts, landscapes from Romania and Brittany, scenes of the 1877 war in Bulgaria and, maybe, portraits of Jews and Gypsy girls.

It is important to understand the mechanism that led to this selection operated by Grigorescu and his motivation in choosing the images he repeats over and over again. The painter created his most important works in a time when Romania was trying to define itself as a modern nation, a process that, as Alexander Kiossev puts it, gave way to a long lasting birth trauma. The Bulgarian author calls these nations of 19th century East Europe self-colonising, "cultures that are not central enough, not timely enough and big enough to the «Great Nations»" and "at the same time, they are insufficiently alien, insufficiently distant and insufficiently backward".[4] It is a trauma of being and, at the same time, not being the Other, where the Other (i.e. Europe, the West) is and has everything that these nations lack. So they aspire to near as soon as possible the status of the nations of Western Europe and try to achieve this goal by the willing and self imposed import of institutions, laws, and way of life. "That is to say, by adopting these alien universal models, the self-colonising cultures traumatise themselves—for they also adopt their own inferiority, their own painful lack of essential Substance and Universality".[5] By doing so, these cultures inevitably created sublime rationalisations meant to conceal and suppress their own birth trauma. Kiossev argues that these rationalisations are not at all accidental but "substantial—because they belong to the structural and generative necessity of this cultural type".[6] The first of these rationalisations is that of inventing a far going historical past, identifying the modern nation with structures that are very different: medieval kingdoms, rulers, dynasties, saints, ancient philosophers, rural magic and society etc. This Narrative is meant to present the actual birth of the nation as a Re-Birth. The second rationalisation consists in developing two opposing, equally mistaken, doctrines: Europeanisation vs. Nativism. The first doctrine advocates for a rapid absorption and assimilation that has been referred to in Romanian culture as a "skipping of stages". The second doctrine is a search—and if it fails, an invention—of the "authentic substance," "the national specificity," before aliens, modern civilisation, and industrialisation corrupt it and then idealises it in a bucolic fashion.[7] This doctrine eventually gave birth to a new national mythology and to some nationalistic movements. The third rationalisation, as Kiossev sees it, is

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[4] Alexander Kiossev, "Notes on Self-Colonising Cultures," in Bojana Pejic and David Elliot, eds., *After the Wall: Art and Culture in Post-Communist Europe* (Stockholm, 1999), p. 114.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

the most profound and produces a reverse representation of the relation between the self and the Other.

As far as Grigorescu is concerned, he is a typical representative of the Nativist doctrine. He actually looks for and invents a world that is bearing the "national specificity" and, by means of visual representation, creates an idealised, bucolic image of the Romanian national spirit. It has been generally ignored—in an effort of presenting a totally original Grigorescu, which was gifted with all great qualities of the Romanian people, originality included—the ideological influence that he received from the "Junimea" group, founded in 1863, and of its spokesman, Titu Maiorescu. The group has pointed out that the reforms that have been made in the economic, social and cultural life of Romania are implemented at a pace exceeding the society's capacity to assimilate. The members of this group, many of them young aristocrats that have been studying abroad, were not traditionalists. They looked forward to the modernisation and westernisation of Romania, but sought to preserve the national spirit and avoid a reformation made at any cost. Maiorescu expressed these ideas in his celebrated words "forms with no background," meaning that most imports, economic or cultural, are being implemented to a traditional, patriarchal society. He believed that in Romania there are only two social classes, the landowners and the peasantry, not admitting the existence of the bourgeoisie in Romania.[8] This is the reason, he said, that made impossible the introduction of western models that have been developed by this very social class. Grigorescu has been more often associated with the "Semănătorul" group, founded in 1901. This is due to the fact that his first biographer, Alexadru Vlahuţă was a member of this group, and the early perception of the painter was developed under the influence of authors related to this agrarian movement and also because the very influential leader of the group Nicolae Iorga wrote a number of important texts regarding Grigorescu. Therefore the painter was associated with a movement that virtually appeared after his major works were completed and which has been creating its own literary and visual clichés, partly under the spell of Grigorescu's painted metaphors.

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[8] Mihai Bărbulescu et al., *Istoria României* (Bucureşti, 1998), p. 391.

Grigorescu's most significant and characteristic works, painted in Romania, should be divided, first of all, into two important categories: his so-called portraits and the landscapes.

In the first category, which includes works that have often been referred to as portraits, are a vast number of paintings depicting peasants, shepherds, soldiers, Gypsy women and Jews. These are not portraits *stricto sensu*, since many of them are made from memory and are not always meant to be a "likeness" of a real person, but are effigies, typical models for a social or ethnic group. It was said on numerous occasions that Grigorescu revealed the true nature of the Romanian people. But only some, very few types represent this people. By far, the most numerous representations are those of women, and, with the exception of very few bourgeois types—mostly family friends or family members—all the others are peasant women. No aristocrats, no working class women, any urban lowlifes, prostitutes, etc. Just peasant women and shepherdesses. Almost all women are young, pretty, cheerful, and dressed in what should be a traditional peasant outfit. The way these peasants are dressed with their colourful head kerchiefs, cross-stitch embroidered blouses, and coloured necklaces is also an exaggeration of the painter. Women dressed this way were most probably of a higher-ranking category within the peasantry and most likely are wearing their better clothes, that are worn on Sundays and high holidays. This is very strange since these women are most often seen spinning, sometimes sewing, with a pitcher of water or while doing this, watching over a flock of sheep, seldom doing anything at all. But which peasant women will be spinning, sewing or pasturing sheep on a Sunday or an important holiday? And which peasant women will ever wear her only "Sunday" outfit—that is sometimes inherited from a generation to the next—while carrying water, or while watching over the cattle or even spinning? It must have been a situation as likely as seeing today a woman in a fine business or evening attire out for jogging. These women are simply too well dressed. Grigorescu has some portraits of women from the wealthy peasantry, but they are never working. It is therefore certain that the painter voluntarily produces an exaggeration in order to create an image that would be more authentic, although the result is an idealisation of a real situation.

Very often these women are spinning: indoors, on porches or even while in the fields watching over a flock of sheep. This motive of the spinning woman is present in some paintings by Jean François Millet, the French realist painter and himself a resident of Barbizon, whom Grigorescu knew (it seems he fancied at some point marrying Millet's

daughter[9]). But, in the works of the French artist, images become symbols of a different kind, their narrative being one of social critique and even satire, whereas the Romanian painter is always creating a romanced, bucolic scene. Grigorescu's women often appear sitting on or in the proximity of a chest, the one that they will take to the house of the one they are betrothed to. Therefore we must presume that most of these female figures are actually young girls, longing for their loved ones, metaphors of desire and also objects of desire. I will not go into this here since this is a different topic, that of the eroticism of Grigorescu's art.

Related to this topic let us just mention the opposing figure of the Romanian female figure, the Other: the Gypsy girl. Let us take a look at the famous *Girl with a Pitcher* and the *Gypsy girl of Ghergani*, from the National Art Museum, both of which are depicting young girls with a pitcher. In both cases it is difficult to say whether the girls are indoors or someplace outside, maybe near a fountain, but certainly both can be included in that ambiguous type of painting of the late 19th century which is no longer a genre painting, nor is it a portrait.[10] The act of getting water is customarily, in genre painting, the moment when the girls are out of the house, which is in traditional societies the place where modest girls should stay until marriage and is also the moment when they can see and be seen, the moment of a direct contact with the outside world. But what a difference between the two! The Romanian girl wears a well-tied head kerchief that hides her hair, a cross-stitched blouse and skirt, leather vest, coloured necklace and slippers. She has her left hand laid on the pitcher and her right one bent, with the rear of her fist pressed against her waist and looks with her head slightly balancing towards her left. The Gypsy girl is holding her elbow on the pitchers handle and is dressed with a large and long shirt tied to the waist with a red shawl, so that it becomes both a skirt and a blouse. Over this she wears an old large cloak and wears a necklace made of pierced gold coins. The head kerchief that covers her dark hair is loose, leaving black locks fall over her forehead and even over her eyes. The shirt generously reveals her bosom and her mouth is half open in what can be both a smile and a sign of lust. It is a great difference between the two, and by

[9] Remus Niculescu, "Grigorescu la Fontainebleau," *Studii şi cercetări de istoria artei* 4, no. 1–2 (1957): 218.

[10] Amelia Pavel, "Trăsături ale picturii de gen româneşti (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, începutul secolului al XX-lea)," *Studii şi cercetări de istoria artei* 6, no. 1 (1959).

comparison the Romanian girl is obviously chaste and modest, although she is not less beautiful and she is, to be sure, a role model.

The men in Grigorescu' paintings are shepherds, soldiers, or peasants driving or leading of ox-drawn carts and are seldom shown doing hard physical work. Men ploughing, sowing or harvesting are rare features in his paintings. The shepherds do not appear as frequent as any of the women figures we have discussed above.

Grigorescu's shepherds are mostly young boys, often accompanied by a dog, leaning on a club, seen as a baton symbolising a dignity, or sometimes playing the flute and having as décor soft hill slopes and grazing sheep in the background. The boys are dressed with a shirt made of rough canvas tied with a waist band holding a knife and a flute, rough wool trousers, on his shoulders a cloak or simply a sheep's skin and on his head a large simple hat or one made of sheep's fleece. It is almost a uniform in which this symbolic figure appears.

The paintings of soldiers are the result of Grigorescu's official duty as a war reporter in the service of the Romanian government during the Bulgarian campaign in 1877-1878, which became known as the Romanian War of Independence. He produced thousands of sketches: front scenes, battle scenes, prisoners, hospitals, the dead, refugees, marching troops, etc. Of these, a relatively small number of finished scenes have been produced. There are some large battle scenes, as the *Attack of Smârdan*, and a number of paintings representing different arms and ranks of the Romanian army. Just like the shepherds, these are solitary figures of young handsome men in uniform, idealised figures, symbols of the Romanian army's Soldier. They are not representations of fierce warriors, heroic figures in action, but idealised figures of simple people in military outfit and a rifle in their hands, some figures are standing and some—according to their rank and weapon—are on horseback. Most of these paintings are images of peasants in uniforms.

The ox-drawn carts are perhaps the best-known motive of Grigorescu's paintings, as he did hundreds of them for an ever-demanding market. Another Barbizon painter, Constant Troyon, has introduced cows and oxen in Western painting and had a great success with such canvases receiving many medals in the Paris salon and therefore enjoyed an immense success. He adopted this theme and, to a lesser extend, that of the sheep, after he discovered in Belgium the works of two seventeenth-century painters, Albert Cuyp and Paul Potter, whose landscapes were backgrounds for various domestic animals,

especially cows.[11] Troyon was the best of a larger group that dedicated their works to the study of this animal. Therefore this is not a theme that was new in European painting, but as far as Grigorescu is concerned he has made the oxen-driven carts a national symbol, a feature much emphasised by early critics, especially those of the "Semănătorul" group such as Nicolae Iorga or Alexandru Vlahuță.

Although the oxen can be seen in different situations they will also seem to be the same, rendering a deja vu sensation. Sometimes its just a couple of them, while in another canvases there are two pairs drawing the same car, or a convoy and the background can be a plain that stretches far away or hills with gentle slopes, in most cases the landscape is bare, but sometimes a forest, a village or an inn appears. Why then, do they all look alike? This is because Grigorescu always paints the oxen seen from the same angle (be it from the right or the left) less than halfway from a side and a little bit from above so that the car seems to lightly descend. The oxen are almost always white; the blue sky above them is wide, almost like in the paintings of the seventeenth century Dutch masters, with white fluffy clouds filling most of it. Analysing these compositions it becomes clear that in most cases Grigorescu, like many other painters that enjoyed success during their lifetime, has indulged in repeating over and over again an image or a scene. Therefore, given their numbers, these painting were impossible to ignore and have been present in many galleries across Romania and always, at least one, has been reproduced in the albums printed in the last hundred years.

A last group of Grigorescu's paintings must be mentioned here: his Romanian landscapes that play an important part in his picture of the country. It has been justly noted that the landscapes he painted in Romania are very different from those he painted elsewhere, apart of course from the subject itself. It is the way he uses light and colour that makes the difference. In these paintings like in the rest of his works, Grigorescu looks for the most picturesque settings and creates a convention in representing, in the same way he does with the oxen, the soldiers or the girls. Of these landscapes, Grigorescu is choosing some that he repeats again and again, and even if some views are taken in very different places they look alike, because the painter is always looking for the same kind of place, be it a hillside, a haystack, a meadow or a roadside inn. It is the same idealised snapshot of nature. There is never a storm or blizzard, winter or late autumn is hardly the painter's favourite

[11] John Canaday, *Mainstreams of Modern Art* (New York, 1961), p. 150.

season, thus excluding them from his works. He is looking for the "typical Romanian" landscape in order to find the expression of the "national specificity" in art.

In his quest for this specificity he creates, like in the case of the other topics discussed, symbolic images. Images that have been liberated of many details that exist in real life, leaving aside any unpleasant aspect such as hard labour, old age and poverty. He leaves aside desolating areas of the country such as the vast Danubian plain or, although he has spent a summer in Constanța, he ignores the Black Sea and its environs. Although in Brittany he painted seascapes, Romanian seashore is still a feature so new to the national geography that Grigorescu prefers to overlook it. He also ignores there the Turks, the Tartars and other ethnic groups. His Jews are mostly of Galicia, with the notable exception of the *Jew with a Goose*, a social satire that has to be connected with the discussions concerning the naturalisation of this minority and has been admirably analysed by George Oprescu.[12] During the war in Bulgaria he leaves but few accounts of allied Russian soldiers. He does paint Turks since these are prisoners, and their status is the direct effect of the Romanian soldiers' heroism. He paints mostly boys and girls and young men and women but not old peasants. He paints with luminous, bright colour, most of his painting being filled with sunshine. He never paints images of despair, tragedy or decay. Grigorescu's painting is optimistic and his images are pristine symbols of a nation in a golden age before industrial society and aliens have altered it.

All these images became, by means of exhibitions, mechanical reproduction and through his numerous imitators, very well known and are now part of the popular culture. And every person that was brought up in Romania inevitably made contact with these images that became synonyms of tradition and national specificity.

[12] George Oprescu, *Grigorescu*,vol. 2 (Bucureşti, 1962), pp. 108–111.

Propaganda and Reception in the Construction of the Romanian National Identity: A Case Study on the International Exhibitions in Paris, 1867–1937

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Originally, a world fair was conceived as a competition where each participant hoped to obtain a direct profit from the sale of its products. Later, it had become a stage which disseminated various ways of life, ideologies or political constructs, that is, coherent systems of representation, underscored by a globalising principle.[1]

A dominant role in the development of the idea of exhibition has been held by the classifying rationale which, on the one hand ordered, according to certain affinities, a heterogeneous amalgamation of products, while on the other made the comparison of the objects exposed possible (reunited in groups or classes), objects which were subjected to the examination of competent juries.[2] Initially, the classification has targeted the economic domain exclusively, the only interesting one for the industrial and liberal societies, as has happened at the international exhibitions of London (1851, 1862) and Paris (1855). From the world fair in Vienna in 1873, when the visitors no longer found in the Rotonde der Industrialpalast compartments with categories of products, but rather true economic, national sections (to a certain extent, things presented themselves in a similar way at the Paris exhibition of 1867), the classification revealed its encyclopaedic, universal ambition,[3] as well as the national component (see the so-called "Rues des Nations" from the world fairs of 1878 and 1900, which brought together, in a specially arranged neighbourhood, the representative edifices of the participating countries).

The world fairs or international exhibitions, defined by the convention of 1928 used fewer systematic classifications, but rather a thematic division, especially connected to the national pavilions. Thus, in the

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[1] Anna Rasmussen, Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès. Le guide des expositions universelles, 1851-1992* (Paris, 1992), p. 7; Florence Pinot de Villechenon, *Les expositions universelles* (Paris, 1992), p. 6.

[2] Rasmussen and Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès*, p. 21.

[3] Linda Aimone, Carlo Olmo, *Les expositions universelles, 1851–1900* (Paris, 1993), pp. 53–62.

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twentieth century, the visitor of a world fair, guided by a certain theme (for example, at Bruxelles in 1935 the theme was "Paix entre les races," at Paris in 1937, "Les artes et les techniques dans la vie moderne," while at New York, two years later, "Building the World of Tomorrow"), has not turned out to be a banal entrepreneur, but a consumer of concepts, lifestyles, projects concerning society or political systems.[4]

Between 1851–1939, Romania has taken part in fourteen world fairs and international exhibitions of smaller or larger importance: Paris (1867, 1889, 1900, 1937), Vienna (1873), Anvers (1894), Bruxelles (1897, 1935), St Louis (1904), Liège (1905), Milano (1906), Gand (1913), Barcelona (1929), New York (1939). I have not taken into account the presence of Moldavia in the pavilion of the Ottoman Empire from the world fair in London in 1851.

From all the Romanian participation in world fairs or international exhibitions, the most substantial and significant presence have been to French events. They were valued in a special manner by the governments of Bucharest, proving in time to be the most eloquent expressions of the cultural, economic or political development of Romania in the last four decades of the nineteenth century and the first four of the next century.

Thus, starting from the premise that the specificity of a world fair highlighted a certain strategy concerning identity and that the stage where the various propaganda images confronted each other was the same (in our case, the Parisian world fairs), one certainly has the possibility to construct a relatively coherent historical series, where one may follow the dialogue between the images of Romanian identity (conceived at various times, with specific intentions) and the prejudices or the circumstantial perceptions of the French public opinion. This investigation has relied on the analysis of the architecture of the pavilions (the symbolic projection with which the representative edifices were invested),[5] of historical and folk vestiges from the exhibition's displays, as well as the interpretation of statistics of the profile of the economic products in competition, which together delineated the image of the national identity in the context of Romania's need to assert itself and to obtain European recognition.

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[4] Rasmussen and Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès*, pp. 37–38.

[5] See Harold Lasswell, *The Signature of Power. Buildings, Communication and Policy* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1979), pp. 90-91; Paul Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas. The 'Expositions universelles', Great Exhibitions and World's Fairs, 1851–1939* (Manchester, 1988), pp. 112–141.

In 1867, the official image of the United Principalities was that of a country which had recently acquired a new European political identity, conferred by its new sovereign, Charles of Hohenzollern (1866, 1881–1914). Perhaps this has determined the general commissioner of the Principalities at the world's fair, Alexandru Obobescu to insist on mentioning, in all of the official transcripts, the name "Romania" instead of the name consecrated by international treatises.[6]

Moreover, the officials in Bucharest have tried to impose the image of a country with significant human and economic potential, especially in the field of light industry, mining and food processing. From a total of 1061 Romanian participants—according to some sources, 1062—29,63% had displays among the textiles' stalls (and one should stress here the presence of traditional peasant costumes), 26,48% in mining products, both raw and processed, and finally, 18,54% had brought to Paris fresh or preserved food stuffs.[7] From a cultural point of view, the principalities pledged allegiance to two of the most resplendent ancient and medieval civilisations (Rome and Byzantium), as the retrospective exhibition at the Gallery "Histoire du Travail" testifies.[8]

Last but not least, the authorities of Bucharest, charged with representing the country at the exhibition of 1867 drew attention to the heroic component of Romanian history. The protagonists of this history, to whom the Romans had bestowed the "courage and vigour," were considered "brave defenders of the Orthodox faith," which had meanwhile become, as Alexandru Odobescu stated, quoting the architect Dimitrie Berindei, "the fundament of [Romanian] national existence".[9] A fulfilment of this option was the Princely Romanian pavilion, built on Champ de Mars, according to the designs of the French architect, Ambroise Baudry, who had used as a model for the construction the monastery of Curtea de Argeş (sixteenth century), and as decoration details from the church Trei Ierarhi of Iaşi (the seventeenth century) and Stavropoleos of Bucharest (the eighteenth century).

The efforts of the princely committee have not had the expected echo in the assessment of the exhibition or in French public opinion. Weakly

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[6] Alexandru Odobescu, *Opere (Corespondenţă, 1847-1879)* (Bucureşti, 1979), pp. 157–159.

[7] Petre S. Aurelian, Alexandru Odobescu, *Notice sur la Roumanie principalement au point de vue de son économie rurale, industrielle et commerciale suivie du catalogue spécial des produits exposés dans la section roumaine à l'exposition universelle de Paris, en 1867 et d'une notice sur l'histoire du travail dans ce pays* (Paris, 1868), pp. 205–344.

[8] See for example *Notice sur les antiquités de la Roumanie* (Paris, 1868), pp. 77–86.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 55–56.

developed from a technological point of view, the Principalities did not achieve spectacular results in the competition: the eighteenth place among the European countries from 22 participants, and twenty first in the world from forty-nine (only 89 awards—according to some sources 86—from a total of 19776 given at that time).[10] Many visitors of the Romanian stalls, specialists as well as dilettantes have remarked upon the economic perspectives which were opening for the principalities, on condition that they would detach themselves from all the "historical constraints"; thus, they could become "important centres of production," a sort of "Switzerland" or a "Belgium of the Orient," as a journalist from the "Hexagon" aptly expressed it (one needs to mention that the latter stereotype can be found in the propagandistic discourses of the government of Bucharest, produced for the occasion of world fairs or international exhibitions of Liège and Bruxelles in the nineteenth century).[11] The first step towards the definitions suggested by the French observers in 1867 has been accomplished by the coronation of Prince Charles, a sovereign from a ruling family of Europe, who was meant to free the local spirit from its retrospective obsessions, which did not suggest to the western spectators anything other than a hybrid cultural identity. Frequently, they identified the Romanian space, either with a "bridge between the Orient of poetry," "of beautiful women," "of voluptuous feeling" and the technical west, sober, performing or with the Asian environment which "clothed its ignorance in garish and wild colours". And all this, in the circumstances of acceptance of the official propaganda concerning the affiliation of the Romanians to the Latin cultural area. Thus, there remained a question with no answer: "how was it possible that a Latin people would adhere to a church of Greek rite"?

On the occasion of the exhibition dedicated to the Centennial of the French Revolution, the Romanian National Committee, presided over by George Bibescu, circulated the image of a country which hoped to be the "most western of the Balkans,"[12] backing this assertion with the economic progress achieved during the 1880s and 1890s. One needs to mention that this time the initiative of taking part in such an event had

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[10] Rasmussen and Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès*, pp. 78, 81.

[11] See my study *Propagandă şi identitate. România la expoziţiile universale belgiene (1897–1935)* (Bucureşti, 2001), pp. 50–51, 98–101, 119, 123 and *Pe urmele 'Belgiei Orientului'. România la expoziţiile universale sau internaţionale de la Anvers, Bruxelles, Liège şi Gand (1894–1935)* (Bucureşti, 2004), pp. 48, 74–80, 138–140, 147, 160.

[12] George Bibescu, *Notice sur la Roumanie. Productions – Industries* (Paris, 1889), p. 30.

been private, the government of Bucharest avoiding any involvement in proceedings with strong republican ideological connotations.[13] At the same time, following his predecessor from 1867, the Prince George Bibescu relied on the same stereotypes: Romania had a powerful cultural Roman-Byzantine tradition, a glorious history and an exceptional human and natural potential. At the top, light industry and food processing accounted for 46,37%, and respectively 20,51% from the total number of Romanian participants (547 or 736; the sources provide numbers which don't match), illustrating these fields.[14] Furthermore, there were praises sung to the Romanian peasant and his patriarchal life (see the traditional costumes, presented again in the same way as in 1867); the expression of such thoughts was represented by the two pavilions with rural specificity, which brought local colour among the sober and festive images conceived by George Bibescu in the stalls of the exposition palace.

In the 1889 exhibition, Romania managed to rank better, by comparison to 1867; the 265 awards (some sources suggest 278) from a total of 33889 prizes attributed on this occasion, placed Romania in the eleventh place among the European countries from the twentytwo present in Paris officially and unofficially, and respectively the eighteenth in the world, out of fifty-four.[15] At the same time, the French media, which was fairly reserved concerning the Romanian exhibits and stalls, with the exception of the restaurant, which was extremely appreciated by the trend-setting world of Paris, took on board, to a significant extent, the favoured stereotypes, which had been used by George Bibescu (this partial success was owed, to a certain measure, to the status of the Prince in France and his personal relations, as he was one of the favourites of the Parisian press). Moreover, he wished to place Romania symbolically within the European cultural space: it was no longer the "barbarous orient" or the "bridge" between Asia and Europe, but one of the "most western Balkan countries" or simply, "the Orient of Europe".[16]

The year 1900 has marked a few novelties in the definition of national identity through propaganda. They were mainly due to the experience as

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[13] Idem, *1889. Exposition universelle. La Roumanie. Avant. Pendant. Après* (Paris, 1890), p. 10.

[14] Idem, *Notice sur la Roumanie*, pp. 29–63, 75–128.

[15] Rasmussen and Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès*, pp. 114, 118.

[16] See the articles in *Le Figaro*, *L'Indépendance Belge*, *Petit Moniteur Illustré*, *La République Illustrée*, *Le Temps* etc. Apud Bibesco, *1889. Exposition universelle*, pp. 112–125, 427–430.

a career diplomat of the general commissioner of Romania, Dimitrie C. Ollănescu. Besides the usual clichés, brilliantly illustrated by the retrospective exhibition, or by the royal pavilion at Quai d'Orsay, projected by the French architect, Jean Camille Formige, who had as construction models, respectively the churches at Curtea de Argeş and Horezu (the seventeenth century) and had used as decoration details from Trei Ierarhi and Stavropoleos, Dimitrie C. Ollănescu has restructured the image of the dynasty, which had been absent in 1889, because of the lack of involvement from the state in the proceedings. At the same time, he has tried to add a series of notes regarding the development of the mining industry (an effective propaganda was carried out, regarding Romanian petrol, which had a separate pavilion from the royal one), as well as the emergence of new industrial domains, unknown in 1867 and 1889 (electricity, telephones, telegraphs, etc.). One must note that the representative sections until that time have strengthened the positions of 1990: from a total of 2057 exhibits (according to some sources, 2255 exhibits were present in Paris), 55,12% from the Romanian exhibits were enrolled in the agricultural and food processing groups, while 15,41% would enrol in the stalls destined for textiles.[17] In the opinion of Dimitrie C. Ollănescu, obviously, an official one, Romania in 1900 was "testimony to European civilisation" (western), from its prestigious beginnings ("Trajan's Dacia"), until contemporary times, at the beginning of the twentieth century.[18]

The 1029 prizes awarded Romania by the International Jury of the world fair (some sources speak of 1090 awards) have placed it eighth among the twenty-five European countries present in Paris, respectively eleventh in the world, from forty-one participants (one must mention that the total number of awards has reached 49905).[19] The press reflected, to a considerable extent the propagandistic programme of Romanian officials. The perception of a Romania recently returned to western civilisation, to which in essence it belonged, was associated with its concrete placement, from a geographic, political and cultural point of view in Eastern Europe.[20] The novelty of such reception was obvious,

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[17] See the propaganda volume *Catalogue. La Roumanie à l'exposition universelle de 1900* (Paris, 1900), pp. xi–lxii.

[18] Dimitrie C. Ollănescu, *România la expoziţiunea universală de la Paris, 1900* (Bucureşti, 1901), pp. 25, 45–46.

[19] Rasmussen and Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès*, pp. 134, 139.

[20] See *Bulletin des Halles* and *Revue des Revues* (apud Dimitrie C. Ollănescu, *Raport general asupra participării României la expoziţia universală din Paris, 1900* (Bucureşti,

because in previous formulations of French public opinion—and one, of course has in mind the occasions of 1867 and 1889—the cliché "oriental" or "Balkan" were occurring frequently. But not all points of view, which have been expressed in Paris at that time have been positive; some observers have noticed some vices in the character of the Romanians, not just bravery on the battle field or wisdom in times of peace, vices which Dimitrie C. Ollănescu himself was aware of: his compatriots often proved "lazy," "boastful," "pretentious," "spendthrifts" or "snobs".[21]

Almost four decades later, Dimitrie Gusti, the general commissioner for Romania at the international exhibition of 1937 constructed the image of national identity without renouncing the elements which had consecrated it in 1867, 1889, or 1900 (the Latin tradition, in both culture and demeanour, the patriarchal quality of rural life, the orthodox confession, marked especially through its expressions of an artistic nature, its economic perspective—the traditional domains, food, mining, textiles, but also the newer branches, such as metal construction or train cars etc.). But his conception benefited from superior coherence, its points of reference being the natural environment and history, which materially and psychologically defined the rural world, and urban civilisation (industrial, specifically—the statistics in the royal pavilion designed by the architect Duiliu Marcu, were extremely generous and conclusive in this sense). The four references have constituted the fundaments of the Romanian exhibition concept from New York two years later,[22] as well as the basis for the editing of the Romanian Encyclopaedia, being necessary stages of research in the process of developing "the science, the ethics and the politics of the nation" (that is, perhaps why the majority of the Romanian exhibits were to be found in the generous stalls of the Second Group, which had as its object the social).[23] Thus, one understands the presence in the middle of the project of Romanian identity of the political supporter of Dimitrie Gusti, the king, Charles II. One could therefore say that all these notes legitimised Romania to an "energetic sovereign," they explained "the solidarity of

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1901), p. 43. M. Normand, *L'Illustration* 58, no. 2.988 (June 2, 1900): 346; L. Grandeau, *Le Temps* (September 24 and October 8, 1900).

[21] Ollănescu, *România*, pp. 33–36, 38–43.

[22] Laurenţiu Vlad, "Images de l'identité. La Roumanie de Carol II aux expositions universelles" in vol. *Pouvoirs et mentalités* (Bucarest, 1999), pp. 137–155.

[23] Dimitrie Gusti, "Ştiinţa naţiunii," *Sociologia românească* 2, no. 2–3 (1937).

the people" gathered around him, marking, at the same time "the force and grace of the nation" which was "building its future".[24]

The propagandistic image of Romania in the year 1937 was totally reflected in the pages of the Parisian press,[25] going as far as reproducing the panegyrics from the pages of Bucharest publications. One explanation could be offered by the spirit of its participation in the exhibition, completely freed from the complex of its European-ness. An important role was also played by the quality and the performance of the Romanian presence in the pavilions and exhibition stalls; as a consequence of the awards received (236 out of a total of 16705 awarded), Romania ranked tenth in Europe, from among twenty-nine participating countries, respectively eleventh in the world, from among forty-eight.[26] One must not neglect, in this context the substantial contribution of the specialised propaganda service, which Romania had started to use since 1927.

Thus, from the reiteration of a number of elements, which have contributed to the building of national identity (propaganda) in Romania in the studied context, one must note the existence of a body of stereotypes, which recur in official discourse from 1867, 1889, 1900 or 1937 and which are appropriated broadly, with minor differences, by the French publications (the Latin inheritance and the Byzantine artistic tradition of the culture of the Romanian people, the heroism and the historical continuity, strongly linked to its adherence to the Orthodox confession, the archetypal values and the freshness of the rural world, the human and natural potential of the country etc.).

Besides the latter, the Romanian general commissioners have tried to impose a series of framework images, which would have characterised the historical moment in which their country was placed. If in 1867, the United Principalities had to offer the image of a young state, which was striving for European recognition, in 1889 and 1900 the stakes were higher, underlining the extent to which Romania was part of the Europe of its time, the step (the stage of development / political status), which it occupied in the given system and the modality of accessing it, of being engulfed within it. An example in this sense could be, as we have mentioned before, the career of the "Belgium of the Orient" stereotype,

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[24] Idem, *Opere. III* (Bucureşti, 1970), pp. 444–446, 449; *Le livre d'or de l'exposition internationale des arts et des techniques dans la vie moderne. Paris - 1937* (Paris, s.d.).

[25] *Le Figaro* 112 (June 7, 1937): 4; (June 26, 1937): 2; *L'Illustration* 95, no. 4917 (May 29, 1937): lxx; *Le Temps*, no. 27697 (July 8, 1937): 11; *Beaux-Arts* (September 1937).

[26] Rasmussen and Schroeder-Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès*, pp. 194, 198.

invented in the 1850s, present both in propagandistic discourse, constructed by the officials in Bucharest on the occasion of the exhibitions of Liège or Bruxelles in the next century and in the European imagination of the epoch.

The perception of the French has not always coincided with the intentions of the Romanian propaganda, and thus the publication of the Hexagon, paying tribute to prejudice fostered in the first half of the nineteenth century and sustained later through the same channels (school books, media and travel accounts) have propagated all sorts of images concerning the affiliation of the United Principalities / Romania either to a "wild" or "poetic Orient" or to a cultural space which linked Asia and Europe (1867), or an "Orient of Europe" (1889) or "Eastern Europe attracted to the values of the western civilisation" (1900). None of this will be found in 1937. The extremely well directed propaganda of Romania has made French observers become fascinated by the "efficiency" of a political and social system, which had created "profound solidarities around Charles II". Romania was conscious that it found itself in Europe and that is why it did not need to strongly reiterate that. It was "building its future" on the "foundation" of an authentic "patriarchal" past (the rural world), and on a present legitimised by Charles II, who would become, both in the documents of official propaganda from Bucharest, and the French (in general, foreign) press, which undertook the panegyrics from the Romanian capital, "the king of the young and of the peasants," that is of the most dynamic and most important groups from a numerical point of view in the 1930s.

Inside the Heritage Idea: Facts, Heroes, and Commemorations in the Twentieth Century

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Nostalgia as a good market

In all eras, people have received events with fear, seeing in them dangerous discontinuities, susceptible of threatening the stability of existing structures. But, while traditional societies rarefied surprises through traditions and the cyclical time according to which they lived, modern societies tributary to linear, accelerated time are perpetuated through an excess of typified news, always the same, which render the event banal,[1] transforming the unusual (accidents, death, cataclysms) into current events. The present becomes, much too quickly, immediate history, one that explains and renders everything historical, even before the event itself is thoroughly consummated.[2] That is why, as modern individuals, we discover in memory a good pretext to slow time and to look behind us. The distance between history and memory is that between succession and resemblance,[3] pretentiously otherwise called, contiguity. The time of memory recurs, in one form or another, and appeals to the origins, essential to them being the beginning. The time of history (historical time) is one of progress, which does no value the primordial moment, but rather the purpose.[4] This utilitarianism leads one to rediscover the silent life of statues, compensating the lack of present through a surplus of past.

The modern social and mental context, which favors the transformation of heroes into fetishes, of the old vestiges and of monuments could be reduced to the following coordinates: a) the feeling of a far too accelerated historical development; b) the loss of familiarity with the past; c) the perception of modern time as being only daily and,

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[1] Pierre Nora, "Le retour de l'événement," in Jacques Le Goff, Pierre Nora, eds., *Faire de l'histoire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1974), p. 220; Jean-Michel Adam, Françoise Revaz, *Analiza povestirii* (Iaşi, 1999), pp. 28–29.

[2] Jacques Le Rider, *Europa Centrală sau paradoxul fragilităţii* (Iaşi, 2001), pp. 154–155.

[3] Viorica Nişcov, "Ernst Jünger — o călătorie prin casele timpului," in Ernst Jünger, *Cartea ceasului de nisip* (Iaşi, 2001), p. 13.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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implicitly the frustration that we consume a history, which is written by others, never by us, the epigones; d) the modern crisis of under utilizing the individual, convinced that he is leaving history much too anonymously, that society does not notice him, does not value him, and that, he is forced to take upon himself the preservation of self; e) the risk of diminishing the power to resemble, to compare or to identify with past epochs; f) the anachronical report to legendary times with which we distort contemporary times, through various regressions in time; g) the feeling of guilt to those glorious or picturesque histories of which we were not a part, but the memories of which is, on the other hand, threatened with extinction; h) the transformation of the past, from a simple precedent or prestigious model into an inheritance that is worth saving; i) the use of the obsession with the past, inherent to the conservation of the patrimony as an anti-modern, anti-industrial discourse; the removal from the public debate of sensitive subjects through the discovery of the patrimonial value and their transformation in an amulet (for example, the salvage of the French monarchical art, during the Revolution, under the title of national value); the reality that elements of patrimony demand a certain piety, a *sui generis* silence around their real history, whence the danger of replacing the investigation of the past with the treasuring, the accumulation of the past in a respectful confusion, an ante chamber of ignorance and oblivion (the archives of the former secret services from the communist era); j) the perception of history through analogy with the finitism of objects; they give us the image of a closed past, easy to recapitulate and to dominate with the aid of artifacts, which merely symbolize it, without actually recounting it, without entirely recasting it; k) the antithesis between the quantitative accomplishments of modern science and the uniqueness of artistic creation; l) the ambivalence of the idea of duty: on the one hand, flattering, because, once assumed, it accredits us as the continuators, offering us a biography and outstanding ancestors; on the other hand, difficult to honor, as time takes refuge, most often in statues, more of them every day.

Quoting from history, playing with memory

Social memory is selective with memories, not in a rational way, but rather to the extent to which historical consciousness accommodates the

various attempts and allows itself to be impregnated by them.[5] The memorable facts are thus not simple information. They are existential experiences,[6] individually and collectively felt, with or without our consent. Things are different when one considers historical facts, perceived as foreign, 'cold', without any value of living history. That explains why history is not self evidently understood,[7] 'natural', requiring a cognitive effort of great magnitude.

The memorable fact synthesizes communal experiences, shared events, which impact on everyone, with more force when they seem devoid of precise motivations or of a firm anchorage in reality.[8] The identification of the communal evolution constitutes the basis of social memory, its imperative.[9] Anonymity often inculcates the impression of lack of identity, determining one to put together memories. Taken together, sublimated, renamed, generalized according to context, singular cases receive collective significance, gaining meaning, whether they can be integrated or not into the order of narrative. Without depending necessarily on a causal series, the memorable fact is self-sufficient, even self-explanatory.

If the historical fact is part of a definitely sealed past, perceived only as far, and known only from documents, from written history, the memorable fact, not necessarily oral, belongs to a past that does not pass.[10] It is in a relation of continuity, of approach and familiarity with a present of historical consciousness.[11] This will facilitate the re-opening, the experimentation of the past, educating in us, by these means, an awareness of time.[12]

The historical past is part of a discontinuous, fragmentary description, determined by the periodization, inherent to academic knowledge.[13] The memorable fact comes from the survival of the live memory and benefits from great authority in the periods of great change, when traditions are called upon to salvage the stability of collective identities.

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[5] Nikolaus Himmelmann, *Trecutul utopic. Arheologia şi cultura modernă* (Bucureşti, 1984), pp. 228–229.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[8] Adriano Duarte Rodrigues, "Mémoire et technique," in Henri-Pierre Jeudy, ed., *Patrimoines en folie* (Paris, 1990), p. 251.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Paul Ricœur, *Memoria, istoria, uitarea* (Timişoara, 2001), p. 73.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Jörn Rüsen, *Studies in Metahistory* (Pretoria, 1993), p. 195.

[13] Ricœur, *Memoria*, p. 482.

The historical fact has an episodic character and occupies a well-delineated position in the economy of the narrative. Brought to attention through explanatory strategies of a determinist type, is becomes part of a diachronic reconstruction of the past. The memorable fact acquires exemplary value and a significant irradiation power, mobilization capabilities, signifying, synchronically, several things at once. The memorable fact is participatory, lived and relived, here and now, the historical is designated retrospectively and conventionally,[14] from amongst many, only if it serves towards an historiographical construction. If, at a given time something happens, the respective fact does not become historical, unless it becomes known and consecrated by specialists. On the contrary, the memorable fact imposes itself effortlessly as notorious, perpetuating itself as a communication phenomenon, authentication, reminder.

If the historical fact is discovered and verified, the memorable fact is transmitted and believed. The first is considered true, standing under the sign of epistemic fidelity towards what has actually happened, the second is far more imaginable, depending on practices of remembrance.[15] Generally, they exist only through the fact that they have been mentioned, without appeal to any other possibility of authentication. It lives through the narrative, that is, through a process theoretically inexhaustible. Essential is not the ritualizing, but the motivation for taking the account further, because the story teller, who fails to leave the impression that he could continue the story infinitely is not a convincing narrator.[16] When continuity becomes tradition that does not mean unadulterated conservation, but rather transposition.[17] However paradoxical, memory relies more on recognition and less on mnemonic techniques. Through recognition, one understands the perception of what is durable from what is transitory, a perception of the general in its remanent form, purified by hazard, the construction of a growing familiarity with the world we live in.[18] Acting as a unifying tradition, where everyone understands each other and encounters oneself, recognition is another name for the memorable fact. It retains the common content of representations of the past.[19] Recognizing it, we accept our own biography, even through nostalgia, regret or fear.

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[14] Paul Valéry, *Criza spiritului şi alte eseuri* (Iaşi, 1996), p. 219.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[16] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Actualitatea frumosului* (Iaşi, 2000), p. 10.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 120.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

In the fluidity of becoming, memory provides us with landmarks, the memorable facts. The latter reconcile the multitude of individual experiences—despite their heterogeneity and, especially frame them in terms of values (truth, good, liberty, consensus). They thus play the role of markers of identity, which ensure our sense of self, our adequacy to the present.[20] It has been said that the historical fact is cognitive, while the memorable fact is affective. Indeed, if the memory of a feeling is always a feeling, the memory of knowledge is not necessarily knowledge.[21] We can always remember that we have known, at some point the period when the monastery Putna has been built,[22] but meanwhile we have forgotten. However, we experience a pleasant nostalgia whenever we remember how impressed we have been by the fact that we walk on the same stone slabs that centuries before the famous character has walked upon. This is a continuity of feeling, the permanent link that, through the memorable fact we maintain with the past. The feelings are preserved in our memory, which, in its turn is perpetuated by feelings. They also presuppose the obligatory repetition of that which, not being held in memory is returned there from somewhere else. That is why, the memorable fact does not necessarily belong to recent history. Confronting actual feelings with the updating of past feelings it can maintain contact with times long past.

An event is often catalogued as a historical fact, depending on our ability or incapacity to surpass its consequences. Theoretically, a historical fact, for instance communism is preserved in collective memory through the retardation experienced fully by our society. However, the delimitations operated by us do not have to induce the idea that, between the historical and the memorable fact there would be an irreparable antithesis. The distinctions of nuance signaled, however literarily, for a better understanding of the phenomena under discussion are perceivable with difficulty in daily life, where memory and history are interwoven, sometimes to confusion. A certain event can be, in turn a historical fact and a memory fact. Forgotten, for various reasons, a memorable fact survives as a historical fact in specialized literature, without this change of stress becoming definite.

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[20] Rodrigues, *Mémoire et technique*, p. 251.

[21] Thierry de Duve, *În numele artei: pentru o arheologie a modernității* (Cluj, 2001), p. 39.

[22] A princely monastery and necropolis in the Bucovina, built between 1466–1469, it has become in modern times extremely popular, a true place of memory.

Both history and memory extract from the present the model of our curiosity concerning the past.[23] Except that one only wishes to explain, while the other attempts to justify. For example, it is possible that our medieval wars were memorable to their contemporaries or for their heirs. But, after hundreds of years, they have certainly become historical facts, which only the chroniclers have kept track of. Their odyssey has not ended yet, because in the nineteenth century, at the same time as the assertion of romantic sensitivity, of the national idea and of a desire for independence, the battles of Mihai Viteazul[24] became memorable, mobilizing antecedents. On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, we can only conclude that memory reconciles the necessary preservation of chronological landmarks with a desire to last, that is, to be in perpetual motion, re-adaptation, re-use.[25] This is the reason why we see in the memorable fact a truce, frequently renewed, between the inventory and invention.[26]

All sorts of memories

Pending on the source of the mnemonic discourse, one can trace the following hypostases of the memorable fact:

1) the fact without precedent, unusual, out of the ordinary, eventually mediating, but not programmed, contemporary with—and thus, autobiographical, retained in memory, likely to be confessed, commemorated at random, without a specific ritual (for example, the meeting with a personality, reminisced about, later in memoirs);

2) the institutionalized memorable fact: identity, heroic, macro social, publicly commemorated, either periodically, in narrative form, or permanently, in symbolic form, usually statuesque; (for instance, the first of December 1918, the national day of the Romanians); remembered, 'received', exercised, examined, didactic, authoritarian and thus, persuasive if not restrictive (for example, the struggles of the railway workers from Griviţa, in 1933 were changed by Stalinist historiography, after 1948 into a referential moment in the history of the Romanian Communist Party);

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[23] Valéry, *Criza spiritului*, p. 223.

[24] Voievod of Wallachia between 1593 and 1601. Because he had unified under his leadership, Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia he is considered a pioneer of Romanian national unity, only achieved in 1918.

[25] Mioara Caragea, "Biografia memoriei," in José Saramago, *Toate numele* (Iaşi, 2002), p. 270.

[26] *Ibid.*

3) the generation memorable fact, orally transmitted, fiduciary, as a collective memory (for instance, the second world war and its traumas); a testament, written, wise, underlining a future absence, that of the donor, of the character who has something to transmit (the political wills and not just those); patrimonial, reiterated, belonging to the mnemonic function of the old object and its functions; the transformation of certain buildings from a functional role to the one of vestige (memorial homes) or the other way around, maintaining them in memory through a deviation from their symbolic function towards practical purposes, consumerist, touristy; (the Roman ruins during the Middle Ages, the personal collections included in museums, the palaces of the Hohenzollern dynasty, the holiday homes of communist leaders);

4) the daily memorable fact, resulting from the customary life experience, the recurring memorable fact, routine but perennial in people's attention, having become permanent, incorporated; (from example, the memory of the shortages during the last years of the Nicolae Ceauşescu regime[27]);

5) the obsessive fact, traumatic, sometimes unspeakable; secrecy ensures continuity, the balance between past and present; (for instance, the decimation of the Romanian army, allied with the Germans, in the battle on the Don; the periods of reclusion in communist prisons);

6) the autonomous memory: the fact, alternative: parallel, marginal, nostalgic or competing for the dominant culture, for official memory; a substitute, resigned, therapeutic, compensating, aiming to trigger the forgetting of another memorable fact; it requires the extraction from the traumatic memories of exemplary values, which only the transformation of memory into a project is able to turn into something pertinent: if the trauma refers to the past, the exemplary nature refers to the future; (events which produce huge rifts, such as the events in December 1989, when the communist regime found its end, the post December idea that it was better during communism, when the quality of life was worse, but certain);

7) the experimental memorable fact is also of two kinds: founding, notorious and thus committed to memory, prospective (public executions or filmed ones, such as that of general Ion Antonescu,[28] or the

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[27] General secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, president of Romania (1965–1989). He lost power at the end of 1989, following a popular revolt, being executed together with his wife Elena on 25 December 1989.

[28] Leader of Romania between 1940 and 1944. Condemned to death and executed in 1946 because of the alliance with the Third Reich, of participation in the anti-Soviet war and the antisemitic policies.

more recent one of the Ceausescu family, the legislative initiatives, especially the most prohibitive ones): the myth of new beginnings: analogical, predictive, stemming from the imitation of, or the applicability of a prestigious political/cultural model, with the aim of obtaining the same results; (the neoclassical style, the society model imposed throughout Eastern Europe);

8) the memorable as an un-localized source, unknown, ritualized or not, with suggestions of a-temporality, immortality: a) common sense, the generally valid, received ideas; b) folklore, tradition, customs; c) the memorable as a miraculous fact, supra-historical, unexplainable, epiphanic, recuperated through the mediation of the liturgy, icons, myth; d) the impersonal memorable, the so-called perfect memories, without oblivion: photographs, audio and video recordings.

Calendar's comforts

People have always striven to represent the times they have lived, to associate them with a more concrete, more visible image, in order to understand them better and to appease the anxieties, which the passage of time triggers. Instinctually, the first temptation is to integrate them within a measurable regularity, establishing periodizations, cycles, chronologies, precise, and especially repeatable, duration. Similar to the rotation of the stars and to the succession of seasons, the passage of the years has been defined, consequently, as a reversible movement and, thus controllable. Moreover, this circularity has always impacted the idea of plenitude: seeing it in its numerical, rational entirety, reachable, man has believed that he could save time and, with it, his own immortality.[29] Thus, our passion for 'round' numbers was born, as a first, quantitative solution of domesticated evolution. The second, qualitative offers its particular, or even personalized image, often renouncing the aspiration towards universal validity in favor of a local truth, of a confession or a reconstruction of the past.[30] At this level, the function of the calendars was that of founding a community, of encouraging a certain group to react in the same way, at the same time, through the same values, to the same events, symbolically invested. Not wanting to perceive our temporality, unless through the lens of continuity, collective

[29] Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, *Problema timpului. Şapte studii filosofice* (Bucureşti, 2000), pp. 178–179.

[30] Ciprian Mihali, *Anarhia sensului. O fenomenologie a timpului cotidian* (Cluj, 2001), p. 31.

anniversaries circumscribe us to a perfectly closed, protective circle, from the middle of which we defy hazards and the breaks of daily existence.[31] A history, periodically reinstalled in practical terms is a history shared, a history where the individual tends to involve himself as if he was a contemporary of the moments which his fellowmen are accustomed to commemorate. On such occasions, all those aspects which, with the passage of time would disappear, would disperse, thus losing their cohesion and their meaning, are re-gathered and brought together.[32]

Time, threatening to pass, always irreparable, without consequences, taking everything with it, the facts, the epochs and the historical characters acquires a heavy uniqueness, susceptible of generating aesthetic tendencies, heroic ones and legends. That is why, resurrecting an older period, commemoration confirms and then consolidates its existence in our memory. Their essence is recuperation through *repetition*. Opposing the *irreversible*, that is, the series of random events, without posterity, *stereotypes* accustom one to a certain sense, contributing to the support of the world, to its reproduction and stability.[33] Moreover, a commemorative act is always an incomplete symbol, through which the public does not only live the physical experience of rituals, but also of the *language,* which refers to them. Even if people are the witnesses of a significant event, the words used in order to define it are the ones which give it sense.[34] Moreover, the marking of a jubilee quickly transforms itself into a spontaneous fairy tale, which retells the subject of the celebration and especially the rituals, which it comprises. The narration[35] of the latter, of the gestures designated to provoke the memory makes commemoration, of both events and characters, possible and renders it referential.

Telling a story, shaping the self

The commemorations of Ştefan cel Mare[36] from 1904 and 2004 highlight one of the paradoxes of our historical culture: although millennia are at

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[34] Murray Edelman, *Politica şi utilizarea simbolurilor* (Iaşi, 1999), p. 184.

[35] Ruxandra Ivăncescu, *Paradisul povestirii — memorie şi realitate trăită în povestirea tradiţională* (Piteşti, 2004), p. 35.

[36] Voievod of Moldavia between 1457 and 1504, much appreciated because of the success in battle against the Ottoman, of the numerous foundations and of the fact that he managed to reign for 47 years. In modern times he has become the best

our disposal, the Middle Ages seems to illustrate best the notion of the *past.* Or, if history can no longer be recuperated in other than festive ways, we allow ourselves to highlight an axiomatic truth, both simple and difficult to grasp: the extremely long posterity of a personality affects even the endeavors of specialists who are still researching his life. Because, insistently exposed as it is to commemoration, the glory of a long-gone past, of the medieval one primarily, becomes recent history. Situating ourselves within the prolongation of the latter, we can imagine that the excellence of those times continues still, exonerating the heirs from the obligation of demonstrating something. We believe, consequently, that time is at our disposal, that it can return, for us to relive only what we like and thus, the Turks would be defeated at Vaslui[37] whenever our memory recalls a success.

The profound structure of historical legends, of the type dedicated to Ştefan relies on paradox: the amount of preservation corresponds to a considerable amount of oblivion. One must admit the implacable passage of time, but parallel to that, making different copies or effigies, which help one to believe in its reversibility. It is only thus that one can understand the expenses generated by bringing to Romania in 2004, by the president of Turkey, a sword, which allegedly belonged to Ştefan cel Mare. Returning nostalgically to these story land worlds, which prolong their biography, people dissimulate, for the moment, ideological and party divergence, encountering each other within a neutral and far away realm, where they can accept each other as descendants of the same history. While the patriotic legends allow this 'armistice', because they communicate, usually, among themselves, they exchange times, scenarios, characters. They oblige the latter to play in one all-encompassing play, where each element is maintained in memory as an analogy of other things. Their probity is always saved by the armistices, by the symbioses between the heroes of the grandparents and the super-heroes of the grandchildren. In other words, the legends which have not been contradicted by other legends resist as truths.

The longevity of a community is, consequently, that of the capacity to narrate continuously about itself. While anniversaries come to meet this need, revitalizing the narrative potential, requesting us to stage our

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knwon figure of the national pantheon, initially symbolising the struggle for independence and later that for national unity.

[37] A battle where Ştefan cel Mare has succeded in January 1475 to defeat a powerful Ottoman army. It is the greatest success from the history of Romanian Ottoman confrontations, glorified as such by modern historiography.

history, to relive it ritually, in order to leave an inheritance to those who follow its principal significance. Because the first form of *consent* concerning an image of the past is that of further *transmission.* The rite transfers, in such occasions, an incorporated cultural knowledge, which individuals consider to own in common, at least for the duration of the ceremonial, with past generations or with their fellowmen who are still living, but elsewhere.[38] It is not said in vain that, through its mediation societies seek, outside themselves, that which is absent from within, that it sublimates, into a festive code, the nostalgia of the 'missing part'.[39] The reiteration of the past through commemoration is not limited to the role of conserving memory. It is also based on the analogy past-present, on the capacity of comparison, of innovation, of prognosis ('then, thus now as well', 'now, thus also in the future'). We know it already, there are no repetitive facts in history, but the eternal return seems to be the historical condition, which allows something new to happen effectively.[40] If the French, at the beginning of the nineteenth century defined themselves as 'resurrected Romans', somewhat later, the Romanians, not benefiting from a classical antiquity, which would inspire the model of the *agora,* would return systematically to the Middle Ages, from where they extracted idyllic models of solidarity and harmony, between the leaders and the led.

The celebration of memorable events secretes narrative[41] with supra-historical, universally valid significance, capable of helping to forget the difficult, transitory moments of social life. No matter how traumatic the past may have been, these stories seem to help one find oneself, as if by miracle, in a present, that is always better.

For instance, Ştefan cel Mare was celebrated in 1904, not so much in the hypostasis of the fighter for independence, but rather as the warrantor of the cultural unity of the Romanians everywhere and of a precursor of the future territorial unification. The ritual repetition took up again possibilities previously opened, allowing the understanding of unique times, revolute, but which, in the opinion o their supporters, did

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[38] Pascal Lardellier, *Teoria legăturii ritualice. Antropologie şi comunicare* (Bucureşti, 2003), p. 71.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 129. Before 1918 this was the case of the Romanians from the territories which belonged to Austria-Hungary and Russia, and after 1989 by those of northern Bukovina and the territories betwen the Prut and the Nistru, incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940.

[40] Gilles Deleuze, *Diferenţă şi repetiţie* (Bucureşti, 1995), p. 143.

[41] Mihali, *Anarhia sensului*, p. 52.

not cease to contain grains of the present.[42] As the Turks were no longer an immediate problem, the repetition, the ritual reliving of the epoch of Ştefan cel Mare signifies the quest for 'a new rooting of actuality', as Ciprian Mihali would say. The new neighbors, the Hungarians and the Russians seemed to inherit—as they owned Transylvania, the north of Bukovina and Basarabia—the position of posthumous adversaries of pan-Romanian politics of the Moldavian voievode. To commemorate meant to auction some borders.

The hero in us

Today, in the media, one says more often that, through the anniversary of medieval heroes one imports from the past only the models of authority. As historians, it would be good to avoid these clichés and to explain as credibly as possible the need of certain societies to commemorate and to periodically redefine themselves through this type of manifestation.

Practically, the word 'model' does not possess a definite reality, the term surviving through its numerous contexts, duplicates, derivatives, which maintain it at the fore of the debate, through the centuries. Transmitted through tradition, it could not survive, except by adapting itself, changing continuously. The memory activating more like a culture of precedent, the re-adaptation of the model is not possible, unless following numerous comparisons between what has been and what will follow. However, the hero does not possess these great traits exceptionally. Providence is expressed through them, said the Romanians in 1904, and anyone could, at some moment be its chosen advocate. If the hero would be a rarity, he would not be given as example and, moreover, we would detest him, as we know how to detest the people, who, through their success, challenge our conservation instinct, awakening inferiority complexes. Such a person would be impossible to understand, to esteem and, implicitly we would denigrate ourselves. Not recognizing ourselves in him we would agree with the fact that his qualities could not belong to us either. The heroic model does not legitimize itself, unless through an entire dynasty of replies, which maintain it within social memory. It does not persist through its uniqueness, but because it can be imitated, applied within limits. We know, moreover, that when we commemorate a personality, we do not wish, primarily to find out new things about it. On the contrary, the

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

trigger of commemoration is that of resurrecting the missing person *as he was already known,* the eventual novelties not being accepted, unless they are able to strengthen the existing profile.

Our statements will be subsumed by the conclusion of Hans Robert Jauss, who completed, from an aesthetic point of view, a well-known theory concerning models and guides, outlined by Max Scheler: blood ties, tradition or faith in the individual are not the only carriers of exemplary, as it is known that we have the tendency to love the *un-fragmented whole* of certain individuals, starting from the global, value impression they make on us.[43] The un-fragmented whole does not have a physical sense, but is the fulfillment of a perspective from which we admire a person as being heroic, beautiful, sacred. The social function of identification, through the mediation of the aesthetic is manifest in history when new directions are imposed by taste, by literature, as it has happened, in fact, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the Romanian culture dominated by 'sămănătorism'.[44] The reorientation of this type provoked changes in behavior, through the mediation of individual models, which symbolize and support the apparition and coagulation of group identities.[45] With the mention that, it is far more probable to observe an object, a person or an activity, when it is blatantly different from the environment in which it appears.[46] That is why commemoration often takes the shape of staging, with period dress, or picturesque processions, which endeavor to reconstruct, as accurately as possible a revolute epoch and to encourage the spectator to relive it.

The passage to a new century, be it the twentieth or the twenty-first, encourages retrospective, which coexists with the feeling that the present allows itself too much to be invaded by the anxieties of the future, distancing itself from the certainties of the past. That is why, the fever of commemorations designates a distinctive concern for patrimonial policies: to take finally into account and to conserve, at least in declarative mode, the memory of the great moments of collective history. The sanction of the saccharine in the accompanying discourse to these associations does not constitute, for us a real stake, we perceive the

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[43] Hans Robert Jauss, *Experienţă estetică şi hermeneutică literară* (Bucureşti, 1983), p. 270.

[44] We refer here to a current which was more ideological than it was aesthetic, which emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, defined as anticapitalist, a tendency to fetishise the rural world, traditionalism, the rejection of cultural imports or western origin, the Romantic resurrection of the past.

[45] Jauss, *Experienţă estetică*, pp. 269–271.

[46] David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, politică şi putere* (Bucureşti, 2002), p. 95.

commemorative scenarios rather as possibilities *to identify, not so much the legends, but rather the criteria and the categories through which the distant past is maintained in the memory of modernity.* Within social memory of modern society, the day of the death of a hero, no matter how legendary, is not usually very well-known, is not a memorable fact in the proper sense of the word. Here, the deliberate efforts to bring forth and to maintain the events in the public attention come into play. Moreover, the patrimonial consciousness is not verified in the assiduity with which one commemorates a certain character, but rather in the guilt one feels when one realizes that one has stopped remembering it. Culpability comforts loyalties more than the feeling of gratitude is able to.

Present as celebrated pasts

In modern societies, especially in those of Victorian type, to publicly exercise gratitude towards a hero was a way of gaining social existence, to find and recognize yourself in the similar attitude of others. In such ceremonies, with the public taking part in the performance, it should not surprise us that the arrival of the public administrators was obligatory. The community did not identify itself unless in action, requesting the participants to physically demonstrate the creation of a presence, of an 'incarnation'.[47] The inheritance is transmitted, usually in a ritual way, but not few are the situations when the ritual itself creates or recreates the object of the inheritance.

The care for appearances insinuated, in 1900 a form of virtue, because the pose had fused, from a social point of view with dignity, entertaining according to a western model, a rather close relationship with identity, a sense of belonging and respectability.[48] The external sumptuousness corresponded, starting from the classical period to internal moral excellence, the magnificence of political feasts, assimilating the beautiful and the good and both of them with the credibility of government.[49] The visible was identical with the perceived, with the understood, every festivity needing to be, at any cost, pleasant to the sight, to confer a feeling of perfection, order and, especially purity.[50] The ritual was similar to a code of expressing emotions[51] and passed for a model of

[47] Lardellier, *Teoria*, pp. 88, 93.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 162.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 165.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

ideal functioning of society. In the duties of schools and of public administrators—from the time of Spiru Haret,[52] for instance—to participate in public commemorations, the exegetes with left wing views, if the ritual phenomenon would find the best proof that collective celebrations have always been formal and that the past was used only propagandistically, in order to help the reproduction of the existing regime. The purpose of rituals, in these circumstances, was in fact *to discover public stakes and things to salvage.* That is why, the obligatory presence of administrators in these feasts should be understood in a different way. They fulfilled a pedagogical role, having to inspire societies, a model attitude and especially, a state of mind, which would contribute to the consolidation of public space: the place where, also through commemoration, people would rediscover, cyclically, what they had in common. In other words, rituals not only excited, they instructed, placing the individual in a receptive mood.[53]

Emotivity is one of the masks under which society shows itself disposed to accept, to re-discuss, to re-live its past. Requiring visible gestures, in order to demonstrate its presence, affectivity is often taken as an effigy of *authenticity.* And the exaggerations, inherent to the patriotic celebrations are not necessarily proof of ill will, or of a premeditated fictionalization of history. They demand a higher degree of indulgence, being after effects of empathy, of the interest, which a civilization irretrievably lost could still arouse in people of the twentieth century. Illicit at *academic* level, the lyricism and encomia did not favor, in festive context, anything beyond added comprehension, an *identification* with the 'other', in the Romantic sense of the word. One can not speak of pathology, unless the separation between the two fields is annulled and festiveness enters the history books. It is not by chance that, in the present endeavor we do not attempt to deal with professional historiography, but rather with a broader phenomenon, historical culture,[54] by which one understands, shortly, the way in which the story of a historical personality is 'read' in the street. These are just a few of the articulations of this concept: a) the producer of historical discourse, generally official or academic; the formation of the historian (schools, teachers, political orientation, religious orientation); b) the receptor of

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[52] Liberal minister, at the beginning of the twentieth century, considered the father of the modern Romanian school system.

[53] Kertzer, *Ritual*, p. 114.

[54] An ensemble of ideas, theories, values, representations, symbols and practices shared totally or partly by the historian and his public.

this discourse, the aware public and the 'profane', that is, educational, political, military; degree of instruction, social situation, sociability of reading, forms of dissemination and of consummation of information with historical character, such as theater, the historical novel, the *feuilleton* in the media, cinematography; c) on the one hand, the values with which the historian helps to reconstruct the past (truth, probity, arguments), on the other hand, the values, usually different, through which society will integrate the information provided by the historian (good, beautiful, picturesque, glorious, gratitude, national interest); d) the 'silent' means through which historians preserve knowledge of the past (articles, books, treatises, volumes of documents, archives) and the commemorative practices through which society, insisting on orality and image (the so-called performance) understands to apply, *to exercise* and, thus to conserve the known history; e) the way in which the professional historian shows himself willing to take into account the reactions of the public, sometimes exaggerated, re-dimensioning or not his own writing.

'The nostalgic discourse engulfs itself with pleasure in gratuitous details', noted V. Jankelevitch; 'and especially because of that it is evocative. The didactic and rational discourse, which communicates a conscience, projecting light on the essentials and leaving in the shadows the superfluous details, and which is consequently organized according to the laws of perspective, the discourse of action, that of eloquence, which, possessing the art of persuasion, would like to obtain a certain result, is counterbalanced with the suggestive discourse, the musical discourse, which, merely by evoking the past, induces magic within the audience of the reading public, a certain state of poetic grace. To talk does not mean here, either to explain, or to transmit orders, but to make the audience to re-live, to feel, to recreate the past. Moreover—as slowness sends one again to incapacity: to talk does not mean 'to do something' , as in the case of tribunes and advocates, for whom speaking is an act; to speak means here to tell a story [...]—in other words, to do the only thing possible, when there is nothing else to do'.[55] In the society of the beginning of the twentieth century, which suspects itself systematically of ingratitude towards its heroes, the proofs of attachment, extracted from this suspicion do not represent a burdensome obligation, but enter within the 'recipe' of social success, within the coordinates of the good citizen. Methodologically speaking, both for historical culture, to which we have been referring and the lyrical reading of the past, the poetry of a consecrated author is not essential,

[55] Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Ireversibilul şi nostalgia* (Bucureşti, 1998), p. 156.

but rather the wish, un-stimulated institutionally, of anonymous people, to write verse about various memorable facts, to make them public and to feel flattered if they were, at least included in the scenario of a school celebration. Exactly because they are not included, over presented in a history of literature, these rather numerous persons can be taken into account as indicators of historical sensitivity, at a time chosen at random. If, in this day and age, the patriotic verses are placed under the sign of kitsch, a hundred years ago, this type of effort was an attempt to confirm oneself in the eyes of the community. The anchoring of a commemoration within social reality is not suggested only by the initiatives 'from below' of professors, priests and all those passionate about history, with enough notoriety in the places where they were living. Obviously, we do not have information or statistics, which would give us the exact measure of the reception of memorial discourse, but these voluntaries say something about the existing *expectations,* which surround a ceremony.

Ways of inheriting a memorable fact

If the actual celebration of the 500 years from the death of Ştefan cel Mare is linked to the electoral interests of the governing party, in 1904 the jubilee of the four centuries from the disappearance of the same character has enjoyed the consensus of the whole Romanian society. It was known about him that he has had many battles, that he has built many churches and 'especially that he *has reigned for a long time,* which allowed, to a certain extent, the feeling of fulfillment: a rare event in the history of the Romanians. This very longevity has been understood, starting from the nineteenth century, as belonging to the entire nation. A small Balkan state in the course of modernization, of international assertion and, sometimes, of territorial expansion needed to know that what it was attempting was not impossible, that it was not daring too much, that some predecessors had succeeded something, even partly, a long time ago. For example, the especially risky context, in which Romania has decided who to side with, in the first world war attests the usefulness of this psychology. The modern commemoration of the death of a hero had, before the communist regime, a demonstrative function, stimulating several *patterns of thought,* and less *behavior.* And as no one wanted to live a negative event, the death would be exercised, re-memorizing the preceding period, of life, truly positive, in the case of national heroes. From here results the best means of abolishing temporal distances and of patrimonial preservation: the ideology of the political

'testament', of the tasks, which still needed to be fulfilled, which link closely 'the parent' to 'the child', the past of the first to the future of the latter. Encouraging the dialogue between periods which, apparently, had nothing to tell each other, the national patrimony facilitates direct filiations with those times, which one feels indebted to. In another form, considering ourselves grateful towards a distant past, towards the monuments it has left us or towards the deeds with some consequences in contemporary times, means to resuscitate a continuity of historical consciousness between periods in which, normally, there is no easy communication.

The meaning of the idea of *succession* determines us to define the national pantheon as an *incomplete inheritance adjudicated*, perfectible, an inheritance which the beneficiary disputes endlessly. The patrimonial consciousness *obliges* us, by making us, paradoxically, the heirs of certain monuments, of a certain memory, but also 'testamentary executors', forced to transmit what we have received to those that come after us. In conformity with this 'contract', the present can revendicate itself from the past, ennobling itself, for as long as it renews it, prolonging it towards future posterity. Although patrimonial discourses address each citizen, they rely on a *symbolic dis-individualization* and on the creation of faith, devoting oneself to certain things, which, in fact do not belong to us in the actual sense of the word, the citizen assures himself of a better self-representation, entering really in possession of his own identity. The idea of patrimony seems to re-sanctify the relations between generations: to preserve something with which others in mind means to give something of yourself, to sacrifice yourself, in a certain sense; according to this asceticism, of secular nature to leave an inheritance is a renunciation, which enriches one. At a first glance, it would seem that the exercise is worth the effort: the process of transmitting, from one generation to the next of the memory of an important man, includes and conserves, at the same time as his glory, the name of the descendants who keep it alive. The posterity of the one commemorated and the ones who commemorate associating at a certain time, the tradition of commemoration of certain facts and personalities is received today together with the memory of those who have fulfilled this ritual before us (Nicolae Iorga, A. D. Xenopol, Dimitrie Onciul etc.).

The patrimonial conscience better agrees with the act of giving than the gift itself. For this reason, we are concerned, not so much with the *founding event itself,* but rather with the *interval in time,* which appears between its occurrence and our times. Looking at things in this particular way, one realizes that national celebrations do not have as their first

intention an *ad litteram* reconstruction of a given historical moment, but rather to take into account and to pay homage to time which, since then continues to pass, and not in vain, increasing our age, enriching our genealogy. Anniversaries of heroes from the national pantheon are also the pretext of self-questioning, following which a collective would reconsider its coordinates, the altitude and longitude of its actuality. Counting the years which separate us from a certain time in our history, we position ourselves, becoming aware of what we have meanwhile become. Because the continuity of a history tells us something about those who, from one century to the next, keep track of this perennial view, the identity of an ethnic group can alight also in the consciousness of temporal distance. It is a cyclical occupation, taken up again, every now and then, because the past does not behave itself, does not resign itself, within our chronologies, becoming, as we grow older, seemingly, increasingly unstable. It is as if we would like to run away, as far as we possibly can, on the horizon, but we would become aware, when we look back, that it is not there, where we had left it, but it is coming, impassable towards us. It is, consequently asking us to stop and to conclude new accounts, at least for a time. If we hesitate or we try to elude the issue, it is as if we are trying to leave for the desert without a compass. It is in this way that we must understand, anthropologically speaking, the pressure of 'round numbers', the commemorative vigilance, the patrimonial anxieties, the fear that the artifacts are not being conserved, are not too well 'fixed' in their time and they 'follow' us too closely, evolving or declining at the same time as we do.

In the twenty-first century, relics are not kept, with terrible expense, for the sake of fragile reveries. Some strive to forget them, because they can no longer constitute another barometer of the changes we undergo, playing, in a sense, the role of Ariadne's thread. To conserve memory of heroes does not mean, they say, to instigate pathos, but to administer the sense which still irradiates, who knows from the vestiges of other times. The medieval heroes, such as Mircea cel Bătrân,[56] Vlad Ţepeş,[57] Ştefan cel Mare and Mihai Viteazul still have their fans and can still present themselves to posterity as symbols of the Romanian success of olden days. The idea transpires permanently, throughout the previous century,

[56] Voievod of Wallachia between 1386 and 1418, conqueror of the Turks led by the sultan Bayazid I in the battle of Rovine (1395).

[57] Voievod of Wallachia in three brief reigns, the most important of which is considered the one between 1456 and 1462, when he confronts the sultan Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople. In the west he is also known as Dracula.

both in the discourse of specialists and in those of various dilettantes, in order to see that, in *commemorative context, the differences are hard to grasp.* Although the differences between the two types of discourse survive and must not be overlooked, as the intrusion of anniversary rhetoric in the endeavors of professionals seems important. With the mention that our purpose is not to ridicule this encomiastic exercise—a much too facile tendency in our opinion—restricting ourselves to capture, within it, the uses of concepts (continuity, precedence, age, inheritance, descent, merit, authenticity) and of attitudes (indebtedness, comparison, heroism, praise, self praise, guilt, sacrifice, engagement) with the help of which it would be easy to ensure the permanence of transfers of patrimonial type. Stopping to examine the significance of this exercise, Vladimir Jankelevitch noted: 'A past, which the future no longer airs, a past completely petrified and mineralized, a past literally indelible and un-erasable is no longer a 'past'. In the same way, when a past no longer participates in the continuous recreation of the present and when there is no one to relive it, how is it a past and for whom is it a past, whose past is it?'[58]

Waiting for the right conclusions...

We can not answer the above question in more firm terms, because of the ambivalent roles, sometimes positive, sometimes negative, which memory and forgetting play in our lives. For instance, to forget is sometimes the same as placing between us and a certain moment, perhaps unpleasant, too many other events, which would make the trauma less present. Involuntarily, the undesirable memories force us to inaugurate other histories, from which nightmares would not be a part. Thus, we would not have anything other than past, we could not distance ourselves and we would not even think to turn our backs on an event born of misfortune, but matured as an idyll with the eternal compassion towards the self. These are words more credible, we think, now in a civilization, which links so much memory and image. From this point of view, to remember means to acquire a coherent image of something. To forget, on the contrary means the incapacity to represent, to place in translatable, familiar images, a certain past; or when the images fail to do their duty any longer, when they do not re-present anything, when they 'skive' and recommend themselves as being equal

[58] Jankélévitch, *Ireversibilul*, p. 144.

to that reality, which we wanted deciphered through their mediation.[59] Memory can thus be deduced as a dictionary of established equivalencies, of approximate synonyms between the historical fact and its 'translation' into images. But when the latter emancipate themselves and proliferate at random, excessively they, in fact come to self suspend themselves, as, inevitably amnesia occurs.

From this amalgamation of hypotheses, deductions and nuances, one can finally separate only a few suggestions, which can find confirmation in future interventions:

a) As long as the past is wished for, sought, researched, it stays alive and active in the present, but changing itself without interruption, changing the lives and the identity of those who recognize it.[60]

b) The past has new consequences for each generation. We always reinterpret it, but all these new visions benefit only from a posthumous understanding, forbidden to the perspective of the present.[61]

c) A representation of the past is best highlighted when it is borrowed or taken up by other actors than those who have created it.[62]

d) History and memory are distinctive, less as types of knowledge and more as attitudes towards this knowledge.[63]

e) The fundamental horizon of historical knowledge transcends conventional history, encompassing a broader history, a wider range of sources and a larger notion of 'truth'. The sense of the past comes less from history books and more from what one does and sees each day, without the declared intention of engaging a certain relation with time.[64]

f) After times of great changes, of traumas people seek new things to posses in common. As the past slips further away from us, we tend to multiply these things, facts and people who are, or we wish to believe they are, linked to it.

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[59] On the margins of this crisis one can see the gloses of Vilém Flusser, *Pentru o filosofie a fotografiei* (Cluj, 2003), pp. 9–11.

[60] Caragea, *Biografia*, pp. 250–251.

[61] David Lowenthal, *Trecutul este o țară străină* (Bucureşti, 2002), p. 90.

[62] Ricœur, *Memoria*, p. 480.

[63] Lowenthal, *Trecutul*, p. 247.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

Book Reviews on Romanian Nationalism

Naţiunea şi provocările (post)modernităţii. Istorie, concepte, perspective.
[Nation and the Challenges of (Post)modernity. History, Concepts, Perspectives]. By *Dan Dungaciu*.
Bucureşti: Editura Tritonic, 2004, 512 pp.

Dan Dungaciu has already become a name of reference in the field of the debates on nation and national ideology. He is a sociologist formed by professor Ilie Bădescu, with whom he wrote *Sociologia şi geopolitica frontierei [Sociology and Geopolitics of the Border]* (1995); Dan Dungaciu teaches at the Faculty of Sociology of the University of Bucharest and he is chief researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy. He also collaborated with European and American research institutions and was awarded several distinctions for his scientific activity: the award for sociology of the Romanian Academy (1995) and the international award for sociology of the University of Istanbul (2001).

Dan Dungaciu's book offers a sociological approach of nation and nationalism, in which the author's competence and professionalism show a series of qualities: from subtle definitions and conceptual delimitations to the erudition proved by clear bibliographical sources and the discussion on certain reference theories and works of the Romanian, Italian, British, or American historiography.

This book is structured on five chapters: Modernity and Nation; Nation, Nationalism and the Theory of Nation and Nationalism during the Interwar Period; Geopolitics of the Nation and Geopolitics of Orthodoxy; The End of Modernity?; Nation and the Challenges of Modernity. This extremely complex book firstly impresses by erudition: a genuine "catalog" of comments on the doctrines and the interpretations concerning the nation and nationalism, from the beginning of the modern era until the time of "the European integration". The introduction briefly presents the theoretical framework of the debates, underlining the main concepts and the contemporary directions of interpretation: modernism, post-modernism ("inventiveness"), priority, perennialism, or ethno-symbolism. The first part, Modernity and Nation, presents "the national doctrine of the Romanian space until the first world war," with samples grouped on the historical provinces: Transylvania, Bucovina, and the Ancient Kingdom. It is worth mentioning the end of this first part, represented by a subchapter in which Dungaciu analyzes Aurel C. Popovici in comparison with Otto Bauer; here we have two "parallel readings" built on the relation between nationalism and federalism in Austro-Hungary before the First World War. The second part Nation, Nationalism and the Theory of Nation and Nationalism during the Interwar Period, presents and comments upon the theories on nation and nationalism between the two world wars in the Western

and the Romanian cultures. The third part, called Geopolitics of the Nation and Geopolitics of Orthodoxy also presents the Romanian interwar space, underlining various trends and theories related to the elements of the national "paradigm". The fourth part, The End of Modernity?, is less descriptive and more interrogative, which could be seen in the titles of certain subchapters, such as: Olympianism and the New Universalism or About Faith and Reason in International Relations; Reflections on nation and Nationalism; Nation and Nationalism in the European Debate—the metamorphoses of "inventiveness" (post-modern theory); the Analysis of the Balkans—a climax of essential things; the last subchapter of this part insists on the relation between the ethno-national symbolic values and those imposed by Romania's objective to accede to the European structures. The last part reformulates the title of the book: Nation and the Challenges of Post-modernity; it summarizes the whole content of the book, resuming certain theories of the international debate on nation and national ideology, and it presents the debate through the "post-modern" political and intellectual realities. This last part underlines more clearly than the previous ones the polemic dimension of the author's reasoning.

By its complex and rich information and comments, the work of this young sociologist from Bucharest defies any attempt of exhaustive presentation of the content in a review, no matter how concise. I will focus only on a few remarks related to his opinion about nation in the contemporary debates. First of all, despite the complex discourse and the impressive sources, which would confer it an expositive character, this work is characterized by a strong polemic spirit. Dungaciu argues about the ancient or new modernist and "inventive" approaches of nation; he critically evaluates and appreciates the authors and the works that make the national paradigm relative and fights the theories according to which the modern nations are "inventions" of the elites, the results of state's centralizing actions, or mere "imagined communities". These points of view were sustained by Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, or Benedict Anderson; Dungaciu opposes them by counter-relativist perspectives on nation and nationalism, of "primordial," "perennial," or "ethno-symbolist" origin. These theories, illustrated by Anthony D. Smith, Josep Llobera, or Walker Connor, sustain that nations are realities difficult to "invent" or "imagine" in a certain historical era and that there are structural links between the medieval-like ethnic solidarities and the modern nation. Dungaciu does not limit himself to a neutral presentation of the two sides that try to explain correctly the fundamentals of the nation; he argues on these issues, obviously supporting the second. For example, at page 372 he wrote: "«Inventions» cannot tell the whole story of a nation. There cannot be *ex nihilo* creations in this field, because thy have no link with the spirit and memory of that community. Nations are undoubtedly modern, but not artificial. «Inventing» traditions remains a contradiction of terms".

Another major subject that Dungaciu deals with while presenting the fight between the two categories of opinion is the European construction. The author's point of view is very well synthesized in the interrogation on the fourth

cover of the book: "Is the Euroskeptic a well informed optimist?" The European political projects on integrating and surpassing the national state are non realistic. "We don't have a trans-national system yet on the legitimacy of which we should create a new global order". According to him, one could not trust the creation of a "European identity" which surpasses national identity, as nobody has been able to prove up to now that an economic unification leads to a cultural or political one. "Should it be possible, is it also desirable?" (p. 374). The new Europe is being built on the symbolic structure used by the European states in the XIXth century, the nationalist ideology is replaced by the new ideology of the European trend, while the European Union's identity strategies "only resume on a larger scale what had been rejected from the very beginning in the case of nations. For the "Euroskeptic" Dungaciu the fundamental and long-lasting ("perennial") realities are the national ones, while trans-national political projects are at least illusive; the European Union is "a huge experiment with an unpredictable end". As he rejects this political "invention" of continental proportions, the author prefers to remain the supporter of a "nationalist criticism" or of the "critical European trend."

Thus, Dan Dungaciu classifies in a field of the Romanian historiographical debate which is different from those we have known so far. He makes references to other points of view similar to his (Ioan-Aurel Pop, who can be classified, by his works, in the recurrent "perennialism") or totally different from his (Lucian Boia, who illustrates the post-modern or "inventive" approach of the nation). At the same time, he clearly argues with the journalism that supports "a boundless Euro-optimism". This is the category the author argues with at the beginning of the chapter called *Nation and Nationalism in the Contemporary Debate—the metamorphoses of "inventiveness" (post-modern theory)*. Dungaciu's main accusation is the lack of professional competence when dealing with the subject: "One can see that those who ramble nonchalantly and at any time on this subject, ignoring its elementary bibliography, are our so-called fieriest Westerners" (p. 377-378).

Beside its polemic approach, this book is something more: an attempt of intellectual rehabilitation of nationalism, achieved in a competent manner, and based on very good sources. It is first of all an approach oriented towards the cultural debate on this subject in Romania. Nation and the nationalist ideologies are revaluated in a fishy manner in the Romanian cultural high-life environment of the last 15 years and even overtly "incriminated". Widening the framework of this debate by including remarkable Occidental bibliography, Dungaciu undoubtedly succeeds in restarting the discussion in other terms.

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Geneza medievală a naţiunii moderne (secolele XIII-XVI).
[The Medieval Genesis of the Modern Nation (the XIIIth-XVIth Centuries)].
By *Ioan-Aurel Pop*.
Bucureşti: Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1998.

Starting from his personal research on the Romanian solidarity in the XIVth-XVIth centuries and benefiting from the comparative views offered by a rich foreign literature, professor Ioan-Aurel Pop's aim is to underline "the ways medieval national feelings appear," exactly as they are shown by the sources, as historical facts. His aim is limited; he wants to show historical facts, while leaving the others the task of sublimating facts "in concepts, ideas, and theories". However, this last statement is debatable, as the book itself is a theory and the introductory chapter tries to clarify the concept of "nation". On the other hand, just like other specialists can use the results of historians' work, historians could build theories by interpreting facts.

Dominated by the corporatist spirit, the Middle Ages dissolves individuality in a multitude of groups, or communities. Thus, the medieval man is part of a network of solidarities, among which the ethnic one. And the object of this work is to render this very solidarity. Ethnic solidarity is defined as a "concrete and collective (group) manifestation of a cohesion resulted from the links that unite the members of a people in several moments of their life, under certain circumstances and in different geographical regions". And the term of nation is applied to that specific form of solidarity. Nation—as I.-A. Pop sustains—implies two axis separations: horizontal (birth, race, species, kind, nation, and people) and vertical (*natio*, as a privileged social group). During the modern era we reached the identity between nation and state (centralized, efficient, and "leveled"). Still, "generally speaking, we can see that the term of nation, irrespective of time and place has—although vaguely and veiled—a component that includes ethnicity (common origin, language, unity, etc.)". This finding makes the author present "partial and local" ethnic solidarities; their extension and generalization will give birth to national consciousness in the modern era. There is a double reason for this research: on the one hand, the medieval nation—understood by taking into account the necessary reserves—is worth studying as a historical fact in itself; on the other hand, there is the will to present the past of a form of global solidarity, which played a decisive role in the history of the last two centuries and which caused controversies during the last decades.

The next chapters are dedicated to the ways in which the "national feeling" appeared in the Middle Ages. The arguments and examples refer to the following: the genesis of national feeling, the moments and ways of manifestation, and the factors that intensify it.

The first step towards ethnic consciousness is made by acknowledging the difference; this is most often associated with the feeling of superiority and exclusivity. The idea of a special relation with divinity appears in the same

context and examples in this respect are numerous both in Catholic Europe and in the regions spiritually dominated by the Eastern Church.

Generally speaking, conflicts (from political and military or of other kind to situational) generate and intensify solidarities; in some cases—such as the Hundred Years' War or the Hussite Wars—a strong feeling of ethnic belonging is revealed, combined with hatred and contempt for "the other". Other violent conflicts—inside European universities or in regions from central and Eastern Europe inhabited by German colonists—reveal a precocious and very virulent nationalism. However, ethnic solidarities can also be found in the environments theoretically dominated by the idea of the universal: crusades, synods, monastic orders, etc.

An important role in the self defining of different human groups is played by the vernacular, which shows up in the Middle Ages in competition with cultural languages (Latin, Greek, and Slavonic) or with other languages spoken by the mass. "Beginning with the XIIIth-XIVth century, the national feeling and the vernacular combine". [p. 104]

Personal identity is also showed in comparison with "the other," as it is stated in medieval texts. These texts confess, at least for one class of the society, a kind of aversion to the foreigner from "the outside" or "the inside".

Nation is a product of history. Several factors fully contributed to its development: the organization—for financial reasons—of the western Church on large units, which mainly coincide with the future national states; the "national" voting procedure inside the synods (beginning with the XIIIth century); the foundation and strengthening of national monarchies. In other cases, state's disappearance transferred the role of national identity catalyst to the Church. It was the case of Balkan peoples which maintained their individuality in their relation with the Ottoman power by their strong link with Orthodoxy. In the Occident, within the Council of Konstanz (1414-1418) one could distinguish between "general nations" (geo-political units) and "particular nations" (made up of stable elements) and define nation as "a people distinct from others by its common origin, unity, common language and territory".

Even if he does not say it, professor Ioan-Aurel Pop argues with those who sustain that nation was "invented" or "created" in the modern era and that it is a cultural result. Mr. Pop considers that between the medieval nation and the modern nation there is only a quantitative and not a qualitative difference ("a difference of degree and not of type"). As I.-A. Pop sustains, the medieval nation is a form of solidarity among many others, which, through a series of historical experiences, enriches, becoming dominant inside the European society. Personally, I agree with this theory, being convinced that history is rather similar to an uninterrupted movie and not to a succession of contexts.

It has already been said that this work does not communicate with the other social sciences, especially sociology and anthropology; however, it is difficult for the historians specialized in the Middle Ages to be well trained, as they are confronted with two big problems: acquiring of specific research techniques (ancient languages, paleography) and lack of sources (which also requires

adapting the methods borrowed from other fields). This is still valid in the French historiography after more than eight decades of "Annales-like" history. I am not for this situation becoming permanent, but professor Pop's initiative has to be appreciated for its comparative vision (as it supposes rich information, which is not always accessible in the Romanian libraries) and for its attempt to clarify a problem of the European history, which could be confirmed or refuted by further research.

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Naţiunea română medievală. Solidarităţi etnice româneşti în secolul XIII-XIV. [The Romanian Medieval Nation. Romanian Ethnic Solidarities in the XIIIth-XIVth Centuries]. By *Ioan-Aurel Pop*.
Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 1998.

"The Romanian medieval nation" is in fact a continuation of the work Ioan-Aurel Pop dedicated to the medieval nation in Europe. The conceptual framework of the first book is applied to the Romanian realities. The term of *nation* corresponds today with the national state (a basic unity of the international system), but the ancient meanings of *natio* are different: an ethnographic group and, later, a privileged social group which detains power. As towards the end of the Middle Ages nation acquires more and more ethnic characteristics and groups often appear as ethnic cohesions, it is naturally legitimate to speak about the *medieval nation*, which does not have the proportions of the modern nation. At the same time, there are two reasons which motivate this work: a scientific reason (the past of contemporary nations has to be known as a historical event and it is a subject for research in itself) and a moral reason (avoiding the errors from the past).

Open by a "preliminary explanation" of the author, the book is made up of three big parts: the ethnic manifestations caused by prince Michael the Brave's conquest of Transylvania ate the end of the XVIth century; examples of Romanian solidarities previous to Michael the Brave (the XIIIth-XVIth centuries); the significance of Michael the Brave's rule over Transylvania.

We have to notice that, when building his argumentation, the author gives Transylvania a prevailing role. The main topic of this work is the clash between two models of civilization: a Byzantine-Slavic model represented by the Romanians and a western-Latin model represented by the Hungarians and the Szecklers; the latter will give birth to a split and then to a real abyss between the Romanians and the "others". The opposition between "jus Valachicum" and "the law of the realm" (including the land possession, goods checking, punitive procedures), between the Orthodox and the Latin Church, between the forms of Romanian political organization and the expansionist tendencies of the Hungarian kingdom, will generate reciprocal tensions and aversions. All these

will lead to ethnic differences and solidarities. According to the author, these ethnic micro-solidarities form the "Romanian medieval nation". It is not a global solidarity, at the level of the whole Romanian population, as this would be impossible under the given historical circumstances; it is a sum of solidarities the vertical and horizontal expansion of which will lead to the modern nation.

As he knows sources extremely well, professor Pop offers in more than 100 pages examples of restricted (geographically and socially) and occasional Romanian solidarities. What is really important is the fact that those examples come mainly from Transylvania or from the regions of contact between foreign powers (especially Hungary) and the Romanian population. As the author states, it is here that the otherness and the awareness of the otherness favoured the coagulation of identities. These identities are awakened by different conflicts, often very small: trials for land (complaints of the Romanian feudal lords disadvantaged after the introduction of the gift acts issued by the king), church divergences (linked to the proselytizing measures of the Hungarian kings taken in collaboration with the Roman Church), uprisings or small rebellions of the Romanians, solidarity between the Romanian inside and outside the Carpathian arc, discriminatory judicial decisions and procedures, etc. Most of the quoted sources are relevant: in 1371, "universii kenezii et Olachi de quatuor sedibus districtibus castri Dewa" protest together against the punishment decided for another Romanian, asking for the application of the Romanian right instead of the law of the realm; or, the Diet of 1554 equals, given their quality of witnesses, three Hungarian dependant peasants with three Romanians belonging to the same category. The other cases do not seem relevant for this demonstration. For example, the authors speaks about ethnic differences in the case of the Bobîlna Uprising of 1437, showing that the agreement of Cluj-Mănăştur was signed by "universitas regnicolarum Hungarorum et Valachorum". But, beside ethnic diversity, this quotation proves that some Hungarians and Romanians from the XVth century, irrespective of linguistic differences, fought together in order to be recognized as a universitas, which is exactly a type of medieval solidarity, different form the ethnic one. The author shows that during the XVIth century ethnic stereotypes appear frequently in documents, which is the result of "sensitivity" towards foreigners. The Poles are "thick-headed and long-legged and they wear short clothes"; The Turks and the Tartars are "pagan and mean"; the Hungarians are "mean" or "stupid," while the Romanians are "dependant peasants," "split-lovers" and "lazy". A series of characteristics, such as language, religion, or the origin given by the foreigners and by themselves, make the Romanians different from the "other".

Thus, in the author's opinion, Michael the Brave's entrance in Transylvania in 1599 was a shock both for the privileged and the inferior classes, especially the Romanians. The description of this moment by the chronicles of that time show obvious "ethnic" attitudes and manifestations. The authors prudently appreciate those sources, as "we are not looking for mere events, but for facts related to consciousness. It is important that the name of Michael the Brave, as Romanian, could be related to the Romanians' uprising, as, around 1600, many intended to

present the Romanians fighting the Hungarians, and not the peasants fighting the noblemen." Many of the measures taken by Michael the Brave during the few months in which he ruled in Alba-Iulia were obviously pro-Romanian; they even aimed at modifying the system of the official religions (and, consequently, of the privileged nations) in favour of the Orthodox (the Romanians) and against Calvinists and Unitarians (the Hungarians). In the author's opinion, the short Romanian rule over Transylvania represents a crucial moment: it is the beginning of a slow transition from "the medieval nation (mainly passive and relatively split) to the modern one (active, unitary, conscious about its role and 'mission')". However, Michael the Brave's action did not have a spectacular impact on consciousness at that moment; his act was appreciated only in the XVIIIth century, when a national discourse and program was designed (in a modern way). It is true that the "aspirations and achievements under Michael the Brave's rule were validated by history," but personally, I think that history could be as well different. Although I am among those who consider that the birth of a nation is a long historical and accumulating process, in which identity "building" is only a step (maybe the most important for its consequences), the "medieval nation" has to be studied in its "present," leaving aside its "future". The author clearly states the plurality of medieval solidarities. But, by isolating the ethnic solidarity and opting for a regressive approach, he is "not protected" anymore and leaves room for some examples (of other solidarities) that contradict him.

Professor Ioan-Aurel Pop's thesis is an alternative to the theories that sustain the absolute modernity of the nation. It is scientifically viable and it couldn't be omitted by a further debate on the nation (which would be really necessary), given the fact that it is not about an isolated opinion.

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Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească. [History and Myth in the Romanian Conscience]. By *Lucian Boia.*
Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 2002.

Istoria, adevărul şi miturile (Note de lectură). [History, Truth and Myths (Reading Notes)]. By *Ioan-Aurel Pop.*
Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2002.

Lucian Boia is a professor at the Faculty of History of the University of Bucharest and the founding director of the Center of Imaginary History (founded in 1993). The exploration of the uncertain space of social imagination and the universe of the representations and myths that liven up human societies are some of his interests. From the myth of longevity and that of the end of the world to national mythology, Lucian Boia analyzes a large range of these imaginary achievements,

trying to establish the content, the meanings and the functions of these mythical constructions.

In his work *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească [History and Myth in the Romanian Conscience]*, which was initially published in 1997 at the Humanitas publishing house in Bucharest and whose third edition was issued in 2002, Lucian Boia uses, beside his vast experience in the field of the imagination, his studies in the field of history of the historiography. He proposes an analysis of the Romanian historical writings from the last two centuries, by underlining the main mythical constructions of the Romanian modern and contemporary historiography. The authors he analyzed are not just historians, but also other cultural personalities interested in history, who were very appreciated by the public and who contributed to the shaping of the Romanian consciousness: men of letters, artists, linguists, and political analysts. Boia also takes them into account by placing beside a well-known historian like A.D. Xenopol the poet Mihai Eminescu or the literary critic Titu Maiorescu.

In the Introduction, after defining the two main concepts of the title, "history" and "myth," the author presents his aim, which is not "demolishing national mythology," as "we cannot live outside imagination," but "purifying" the Romanian historical writings by eliminating the "ideological remnants" that stop their real "democratization". The analysis starts from the definition presented in the introduction, according to which myths are not mere lies, but imaginary constructions which function according to their own logic and which aim at underlining the essence of some social and cosmic phenomena in accordance with the basic values of the society in order to ensure its cohesion. The first chapter of the book, *Istorie, ideologie, mitologie [History, Ideology, Mythology]*, presents the steps the Romanian historical writings underwent from the Transylvanian School (the XVIIIth century) to contemporary historiography. Many myths were introduced by the Transylvanian School and the romantic historians (especially Nicolae Bălcescu) and they were continued and "enriched" by the nationalist historians from the second half of the XIXth century and the interwar period (A. D. Xenopol, B. Petriceicu-Hasdeu, Nicolae Iorga). At the end of the XIXth century, as history became professional, a critical school appeared; Dimitrie Onciul and Ioan Bogdan were among the first who contested myths, following the critical line inaugurated by the Junimea literary and cultural society, founded by Titu Maiorescu in 1867.

The main ideology that determined the use of history for political aims, ever since the end of the XVIIIth century, was nationalism; consequently, most of the long-lasting historical myths were built. The "nationalist boost" is stopped for a short period by the initial internationalist stage of communism (1948-1964); at that time, "fake" historians like Mihai Roller rewrite the history of the Romanians, minimizing the importance of the "strong" moments of national mythology and interpreting all through class fight. In the nationalist stage of communism national myths revive and they are even exaggerated in order to establish a state and "dynastic" continuity from Burebista to Ceauşescu. The obsessive repetition of the historical discourse dressed in myths and

falsifications strongly influence consciousness. Lucian Boia considers that the Romanian post-1989 historiography has not yet got rid of all "historical" directives imposed by the communist period.

The next five chapters speak about the main Romanian historical myths: the origins, continuity, unity, the stranger (otherness), the heroes and saviors. The author tries to determine the beginnings of the myths and their evolution along the different stages of the Romanian historiography; in some cases, directly or indirectly, he tries to give his personal opinion about the issues discussed.

The myth of the origins is present in all national mythologies. The creators of the Romanian national mythology had different opinions in this respect; their interpretation oscillated between the purely Roman origin, the Dacian-Roman synthesis (with the stress on one of the two elements) and the denial of the Roman element. In the internationalist stage of communism, the Romans are seen as conquerors, while in the nationalist stage, although the economic progress brought by the Roman conquest is accepted, the Dacian element is overstressed because of the will to present Ceauşescu as the descendant of Burebista, the founder of the first Dacian unitary state. The Slavic influence was denied in the Latin stage of the Romanian historical writings. The first who strongly underlined the Slavic element in the formation of the Romanian people was Ioan Bogdan, followed by Nicolae Iorga, C. C. Giurescu and P. P. Panaitescu. The Slavic influence was mostly stressed during the period of internationalist communism, while during the national stage the Slavs were accepted only as a secondary founding element.

The search for remarkable origins is common to historiographical Romanticism and it is found in all the areas where it appeared. There is a strong connection between origins and continuity; the latter is an element with strong ideological implication in a period in which the historical right was used as an argument for territorial claims and in a context in which some foreign historians deny the Romanians' continuity in the northern-Danube space. The author shows that in the second half of the XIXth century and during the interwar period there were three main interpretations: the first one places the continuity of the Romanian people north of the Danube (Hasdeu, Xenopol); the second one has very little influence and sustains that the Romanian people formed south of the Danube, after which it migrated to the north (Alexandru Philippide); the last one sustains a double origin, north and south of the Danube (D. Onciul, Sextil Puşcariu, G. I. Brătianu, P. P. Panaitescu, Vasile Pârvan, N. Iorga). In the communist historiography, the Balkan Romanian origin is gradually eliminated and archeology is called to prove the formation of the Romanian people in the northern-Danube space.

Unity is, as Lucian Boia shows, an essential archetype which can also be found in the Romanian historiography since its beginnings when the first chroniclers underline the kinship and the common origin of the Romanians. The idea of unity was used as a political instrument especially during the communist period. Being a passionate supporter of the theory according to which nations were created in the modern era, the author disagrees with all those who

considered the unification made by prince Michael the Brave in 1600 a result of the will for national unity. Nicolae Bălcescu linked the idea of national unity to Michael the Brave's achievement only during the XIXth century. The next generations of historians (A. D. Xenopol, D. Onciul, P. P. Panaitescu, N. Iorga) denied the national implications of Michael the Brave's unification; during national communism, Michael became the first founder of a national state in Europe. As to the Romanian peculiar spirit, promoted by philosophers such as Lucian Blaga, but also by the theoreticians of the right nationalist movement, the author denies the existence of a national peculiarity, sustaining that ethnopsychology merely underlines generally human characteristics.

As to the Romanians' relations with the foreigners, the Romanian mythology underlines their traditional hospitality. Lucian Boia considers that we can possibly speak about the Romanian peasant's hospitality which coincides with peasant's hospitality in general. However, the images of the stranger are mainly negative. The will of the XIXth century intellectuals to launch Romania towards westernization created negative images of those who were associated with the eastern world: the Greek, the Turk, and the Russian. The Turks and the Hungarians are considered Romanians' traditional enemies, while the Jews and the Roma are also negatively seen. The western model which the Romanian intellectuals appreciated most was the French model, the author considering that the Francophile and francophone spirit has survived up to now. During the communist period, Romanians fell again under the influence of the East, while the myth of the West alienates, as it is associated with the symbols of wellbeing, such as coffee or Coca-Cola.

Romanian mythology, like any other mythology, has its own heroes and saviors. During the XIXth century, the national pantheon included leaders who symbolized our remarkable origins (the emperor Trajan), the glory of the anti-Ottoman resistance (Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave), cultural development (Constantine Brâncoveanu, Matei Basarab) or national unity (Al. I. Cuza, king Carol I). These heroes penetrated the consciousness of generations of Romanians not necessarily due to the historians' works, but especially by the historical literature and school books. Dynasty plays an important role in our national pantheon. In 1906, the main heroes of the Romanian mythology are Trajan and king Carol I, the founder of our people and kingdom. In the interwar period, because of the deep changes in the Romanian society and because of the totalitarian model in Europe, some Romanians looked for their saviors in characters such as Carol II, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu or Ion Antonescu. Because they were considered the representatives of the bourgeois regime, the kings and the great politicians who created modern Romania were excluded by communism from the national pantheon. Princes lose their ancient glory, and the real heroes are the leaders of peasant revolts. During the national stage of communism, the main heroes of our national pantheon become Burebista and Ceauşescu, who are the founder of the first unitary Dacian state and, respectively, the ambitious creator of a new Romania.

In the first chapter of the book, called *După 1989 [After 1989]*, Lucian Boia states that the Romanian society has remained up to now dependent on these historical and political myths, being still led by the local spirit and the idea of unity. The authors admits that every society needs founding myths, heroes, or unity symbols, but the Romanian society is firmly rooted in an isolated mentality, which keeps it away from the west-European culture and mentality. At the same time, the deeply rooted nationalist clichés prevent the "democratization" of historical writings. All these represent a very important obstacle to Romania's European integration.

The author does neither believe in the historian's possibility to reach absolute truth nor in the objectivity of the one who explores the past, as the historian inevitably builds his own system of values on the past.

Lucian Boia's book caused enthusiastic reactions, but also harsh criticism in the Romanian cultural environment. The strongest criticism came from Ioan-Aurel Pop, a historian and professor at the Faculty of History from Cluj, the director of the Center for Transylvanian Studies from Cluj.

His review got the dimensions of a new book, *Istoria, adevărul şi miturile [History, Truth and Myths]*, published in Bucharest in 2002. Ioan-Aurel Pop thinks that Lucian Boia's book is an offence brought to history and historians, for two reasons: because it denies the capacity of history to offer the truth about the past; and because it accuses the great Romanian historians of having mythologized history for political reasons. Although the historian from Cluj agrees that absolute truth cannot be reached, he believes in the historian's moral duty to look for the truth and interpret sources as honestly as possible.

As for the methodology, Ioan-Aurel Pop accuses Lucian Boia of having put professional historians, such as A. D. Xenopol, N. Iorga, P. P. Panaitescu, G. I. Brătianu, Vasile Pârvan, etc., together with different men of letters and philosophers, who may possibly be permitted to give up scientific rigour when evoking the past. But the historian has not the right to do this, as in this way he would falsify history consciously. Moreover, Ioan-Aurel Pop finds it unsuitable to analyze great historians from the interwar period in the same context with some authors with no value, such as Mihail Roller, the official historian of the communist regime of the '50s. At the same time, Lucian Boia is criticized for having condemned the entire Romanian historiography of the communist period without emphasizing those historians who, beside the small concessions made to the regime, elaborated important works. Lucian Boia is accused of having interpreted the historiography of the XIXth century and of the interwar period according to his own values, looking for democratic attitudes where he shouldn't have to.

Some of the divergent opinions between the two historians come from their different views on the historical theory and method. Thus, Lucian Boia sustains the modernist theory concerning the building up of nations, while Ioan-Aurel Pop thinks that we can speak about nations in Europe ever since the XIIIth-XIVth centuries. Mr. Pop insists on the concept of "medieval nation" and he does not accept the idea according to which the nation would be "an imaginary

community" or "an invention". According to I.-A. Pop, the nation appeared as a consequence of an organic evolution, started from other ancient types of solidarity, similar to the national ones.

Furthermore, Ioan-Aurel Pop reproaches Lucian Boia for having destroyed the entire Romanian historiography without offering anything in exchange or without replacing myths with "possible truths". As Mr. Pop states, Mr. Boia also dealt with historical segments which are not familiar enough to him, thus breaking the rules of specialization. At the same time, Mr. Boia denies some theories and conclusions of traditional historiography without giving his personal theory, which he could deem correct.

We can say that both Lucian Boia's work and the polemic reply which was addressed to him by Ioan-Aurel Pop are extremely important for the present orientations and trends of the Romanian historiography. Moreover, they can be classified among the contemporary debates of the international scientific life regarding the limits of the historical knowledge.

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A Nation Discovered. By *Keith Hitchins*.
Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 1999.

The Identity of Romania. By *Keith Hitchins*.
Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2003.

When finishing one of professor Hitchins' books, any specialist, but also the mere reader of history, can't stop admiring his attractive style and the manner in which this famous historian approached the Romanians' past. Professor Hitchins is a name well known by the Romanian readers whose past was studied by him, thus trying to understand their peculiarity which has always attracted him.

As compared to what professor Hitchins has published up to now, the two books reviewed here contain a new kind of discourse, which seems more attractive and exciting. The author does not seem to make a synthesis, but he needs to reflect more deeply on what he has written up to now. This time there is not much new archive information, but we rather find a series of questions and reflections on some essential issues. He asks himself: what are the characteristics of this community which calls itself the "Romanian nation"? Do the Romanians belong to the East or to the West? What are the attributes that define the Romanians? When did the Romanians become conscious about their common origin? What does it mean, in fact, to be Romanian? How can one write the history of a people in the best possible way? The conclusion reached by the author, as a consequence of his rich research experience, is that it is not enough to collect much documentary material. Being a foreigner in a country in the past of which we are interested can offer us the advantage of objectivity; we are not

tempted to be partial and we see delicate issues from distance. This is a quality indeed, but it is not enough to be pleased with it. First of all, we have to take into account those realities that show the peculiarity and originality of a people and those aspects which make it special and which can be best rendered by those who write the history of the territory on which they were born. As a foreigner, one has to be inside, to know that people very well, to feel its rhythm, and to go deeply in its past; then, one has to stop and think about he has written, through the eyes of those from whom you learned how to discover its mysteries.

The volume "The Identity of Romania" contains 210 pages and has nine chapters of which only the first four refer to the shaping and building of the Romanian identity. The other work, "A Nation Discovered" dedicates its seven chapters to this aspect. The authors strongly believes that the Romanian identity cannot be limited just to one myth, such as the Dacian-Roman continuity, for example, or to a single image, that of the devout Orthodox peasant, or not even to one century. As philosopher Lucian Blaga also remarked, we can speak about several types of Romania, that is about "consecutive types of Romania": the Romania of the XVIIIth century, that of 1840, that of the interwar period, and, finally, the one of the postwar communist period. In other words, each of these types, which alternated in time, is a distinct step in the process of maturation of the Romanians' identity and their national consciousness. Hitchins considers that, in the case of the Romanians, we can speak about several steps in the evolution of the idea of nation: the period 1700-1760, the one between 1770-1820, and period between 1830-1840.

The first period is characterized by the Hapsburg domination and the unification with the Church of Rome; this unification contributed to the formation of a new Romanian Greek-Catholic elite, which started to ask questions about the origin of the Romanian people. Thus, it played a key-role in formulating the idea of nation, becoming the author of the new meaning of identity. This elite used the term "natio" in order to define itself a distinct clerical class, composed of those who benefited from special rights and immunities and not of those with the same ethnic origin.

Because it did not have a strong ruler, the new church had difficulties and did not succeed in gaining its recognition as an independent entity; this happened also because the Leopoldine Diplomas addressed a religious group and not an ethnic one; they addressed mainly the clergy and the united laymen and not the Romanians as such. This movement finally became mature during the time of Inochentie Micu Klein, whose great merit was that of having succeeded in giving a different interpretation to the word "nation". He used the term "natio" to define a group that enjoyed economic and political privileges, but he also used the same term with a popular meaning, that of a community united by its common origins, customs and religion. Through the petition of 1735 he referred to the Dacian-Roman continuity, which will further lay the foundations of national ideology. However, the religious unification has never been complete. The violence with which the rural society met this unification has to be seen like a spontaneous act of self-defense, as those who adopted it did nothing but

violate the community spirit, which united individual lives in an all-inclusive social model. The resistance to the idea of unification proved that the Orthodox religion provided a sense of identity. Most of the people were instinctively conscious about the difference between them and the Serbs, especially when they referred to their Wallachian religion; so, there was a strong confessional solidarity, but the idea of nation, as a natural framework in which they should live, was still totally strange to them.

The intellectuals from the period 1770-1820, and especially the outstanding representatives of the Transylvanian School, asserted themselves by the variety of publications: history or grammar books, theology or philosophy works. This generation laid the linguistic and historical foundations of the concept of modern Romanian nation. These intellectuals defined it better, underlining the Romanians' noble origin, thus justifying the claims for a place inside the system of the privileged nations. Their preoccupations were illustrative of the new tendency in the Romanian society of that time: the secularization of the elites. These intellectuals criticized the church, as the rationalism they assimilated in Vienna made routine, ignorance and superstitions unbearable for them; that is why they always tried to enlighten the masses through culture and education. This is explicable, especially if we take into account the fact that the Enlightenment in Transylvania, just like the one in Eastern Europe, was a strange mixture of natural right, rationalism, western optimism and local nationalism. The enlightened thinking offered the intellectuals a new justification for their aspirations for equality of their neighbours. They applied the notion of natural and civil equality among individuals to the relations between peoples; thus, they accepted the myth of the social contract as the basis of the society and as a guarantee of rights for all its members.

Between 1830 and 1840, the Romanians in Transylvania undergo a modernization process, previously characteristic to Western Europe. The philosophy of the Enlightenment, romanticism, the doctrines of the economic and political liberalism widened the secular intellectuals' horizon, forcing them to contest the traditional bases of the Romanian society. Religion did not offer them any more clear explanation on human existence and any more adequate model of social division. Only the idea of nationality could satisfy their wish for a change in society, respectively in Transylvania's political life. The national movement was complete and suitable for replacing the exclusively theocratic organization of the society with a system of secular methods and objectives. That is why, during the Revolution of 1848, they formulated programs and proclamations, talked about fundamental human liberties, and proclaimed the independence of the Romanian nation, the unification of the church and equality with the other nationalities. 1848 meant for the Romanian intellectuals the maturity and, at the same time, the triumph of the idea of nation. They explained their independence and autonomy claims, invoking the inherent rights of the ethnic community to self-determination. The nation discovered and affirmed by the Romanian elites was neither artificial nor rigid. It was not an entity they imagined as an answer to social and economic requirements of the modern

period. As it has already been said, the XVIIIth century elites already had a strong sense of the community, mainly based on myths, popular customs, language, the eastern Orthodox tradition, and on social and political exclusion. The generation of 1848 only used them as bases for the moral and legal justification of political autonomy.

The author's final conclusion is that Europe itself played a major role in the history of the Romanians. As the polemics of the interwar period showed, Romania's gradual integration in the Occident was a crucial and controversial aspect of its connection with Europe. However, despite the similarities with the contemporary European identity, there is a distinct Romanian identity. It is the vital product of the gradual past events. More precisely, it is the result of social and cultural structures, as well as of their evolution in time. It is also the result of the Romanians' personal reflections, which they made on their identity. As to the idealism of the 1848 generation, it continued in the sense of the solidarity felt by the Romanians towards smaller nations of Europe, which also fought for their freedom. This specific sense of community mainly followed the western example and thinking, while 1848 was a reference for the Romanians' integration in Europe. Here, in a subtle way, the author transmits a specific message to his readers; this is in fact a discourse in favour of Romania's integration in the big family of European states, which is now building its unity; the Romanians are warmly invited to contribute fully to this unity.

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Naţiunea modernă. Mituri, simboluri, ideologii. [The Modern Nation. Myths, Symbols, Ideologies]. By *Simona Nicoară*.
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Accent, 2002.

Approaching a historiographical field experienced by many, Simona Nicoară proposes her own model for experiencing this universe. It is about a "historical and anthropological perspective on nation and nationalism" which presents the historical evolution of nations and underlines a world of "imaginary emotions," myths, symbols and images which make the national phenomenon a specific process for the history of mentalities. The author specifies in the beginning of her approach that she focused on the *national imagination*.

Simona Nicoară begins her work by defining the historical and anthropological perspective of nation as a research field for "the system of national beliefs, the network of tensions, antagonisms or collective solidarities." For a reader less familiarized with this topic, the first part of the book is important because it mentions the most important names and works that approached nation and nationalisms.

Once she has defined the research field, the author starts talking about the nation itself, from the myth of unity and the search for unity along the years to

the investigation of memory about nation. Taking into account the most frequently used definitions of nation, Simona Nicoară interprets its components through the new interpretation scheme. Thus, the common origin, unity, the territory, religion, culture, and the state are subject to the new investigation procedure. Along some big chapters, the author analyzes "the nostalgia of the origins," "the body and soul of the nation," "the mother country—the love of common freedom," "the holy nation" and its heroes, "national pedagogy," and "the nation and the modern state". The author underlines the fact that the nation has been specific to mankind for many centuries and, consequently, the issue is not whether to accept it or not, but to "use it, define it correctly, and live inside it."

In the second part of this work, the author gives a definition of the nation according to its future: the myth of progress, national eschatology, prophecy, messianic thinking, modern millenarianism, otherness, nationalism variants—Nazism, fascism, Zionism, anti-Semitism, the ideological nationalism of the "new countries," nation and democracy, and the chances of national ideologies.

I hereby present the content of this work in details. The first chapter clarifies the epistemological and methodological intentions, defines the research field, and includes the national phenomenon in the register of collective imagination. The part dedicated to secularization and the modern vision of the sacred show how "the disintegration of the mythical paradise," that "death of God," announced by Nietzsche, is replaced during the modern era by a secularized paradise, in which the reason is substituted for an absolute God, while religions transform into secularized ideologies. As to mythologies and their presence in the modern era, we can see their perpetuation in a new form, "hidden by culture and scientific ideologies". Modernization did not mean the elimination of myths from history, but it influenced them, by another transfer of sensitivity.

Memory, a source of the nation, plays an important role in building up the national feeling. The collective memory of a nation forms, as Simona Nicoară says by quoting Paul Ricoeur, the time component of national identity, "being always linked to the evaluation of the present and the projection of the future". However, the author, just like Tzvetan Todorov, states that there is a very short distance from "the duty of memory" to "the abuse of memory"; moreover, the ritual awakening of memory can lead to the passionate and wounded memory. The wounded memory is the one which causes xenophobia, hatred among peoples and nations, and racism. At the end of this chapter, the author pleads for the collective memory, which should contribute "to solidarity and not to provoke conflicts among people or national communities."

Quoting well-known Romanian and foreign authors, Simona Nicoară discusses the "battle of origins" in a well-sourced chapter, destined to the discovery of national past. Thus, we can see the way in which these ideas appear in the field and how the phobia of distant and noble origins transforms the work of those who write national histories trying to find remarkable origins and the affirmation and defense of their continuity on the national territory.

The next chapters introduce concepts such as the *body and soul of the nation, the mother country, the religion of the nation, and its heroes*. The nation appears as a superior reality, or an ideal associated with a physical reality. From the medieval country and the monarch's power we experience the modern country, after several sensitive changes, such as the great geographical discoveries and the faith of the universal reason. The country has many values, symbols, and beliefs; all are based on the supreme sacrifice for which every patriot has to be prepared at any time.

A nation is also a world of personal values, rooted in the national culture. Although unique, it is exposed to acculturation. Ethnography and folklore are included in this culture like a primary and indestructible source of identity. National pedagogy is the one that spreads national culture through schools. The nation is not important for its oral character but for its force to maintain schooling. The school is the one to spread the national culture and cultivate the national language. Erudition, lyricism, literature, and theater are called to support the national ideal. This kind of mass culture is an exclusively modern element.

As to the modern state, Simona Nicoară chooses the most recent formulas and analyzes the couple nation-state, articulating the links between them. The modern state is the one appointed by the nation to make its general politics, represent its interests and defend its citizens. The identification of the Nation with the State was first done by the French Revolution. The nation gives legitimacy and legality to the nation-state. For many historians, the system of national states has its origins in the Westphalian treaties of 1648. But what is certain is that the XIXth century best illustrated the system of national states. The author retraces the evolution of all these theories of the nation-state, without being partial and trying to maintain a balance difficult to identify in the present works on the same chapter.

The second part of this work deals with nation through the image of its future, its representation profile and ideological stake, but also through the perspective of the nationalist waves of the XIXth and the XXth centuries. There is a balance between the myth of progress, the decline, the new man and his city, on the one hand, and the crisis of conscience generated by the two world wars. Waiting for the providential state and a new political order is specific to modernity. The prophecy of the Renaissance, national salvation and a messianic destiny are the coordinates of this chapter.

The representation profile retraces the evolution of nation through its meeting with the other; this meeting could be the origin of national peculiarity and, most of the times, of mistrust towards the foreigner. Another result of the relationship with *the other* is a strong nation, ready to face its rival; in this respect, the appeal of a glorious past is an objective of the nationalisms that claim to be legitimate. The next chapter presents the *marks of national identity*, in a series of sequences specific to the widely-accepted theories on nation. Thus, following Ernest Renan's discourse, national membership, the territory, imaginary or real

borders, as well as the relation between ethnic groups, race, nation, language, religion, and the individuals' will to be together are reevaluated.

The last chapters test the resistance of the nation against nationalist ideologies and waves that affected the world especially during the last century, underlining Nazism, anti-Semitism, and Bolshevism. Modern democracies bring tensions, which are identified in the link between universal values and national interests. The resistance of the nation in the context of globalization and universalism is a touchstone for what we call democratic nations. The last chapter of this book evaluates *the chances of national ideologies*; the conclusion is that among all political ideologies, nationalism "has the biggest chances to revive in time". This is because "the feeling of belonging to the community of origin is natural and it is built on other two natural feelings: the respect for one's nation and the more or less visible non-respect for the others." Liberalism, anti-nationalism, cosmopolitism, and other ideologies opposed to nationalism are fighting at present those alternative ideologies that propose "the praise of the heterogeneous national state," such as multiculturalism.

The book ends with the author's last reflections on nationalism, which she sees as "a Janus of modernity". His prophesied end has not come yet and his power over the world has not diminished. The last lines of the book witness once again the author's preference for the imaginary world, her affection for the mythical, symbolic and "hopeful" universe, thus demonstrating that it is possible to design the profile of nation and modern nationalism from this perspective too.

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Náció és nemzet. Székely rendi nacionalizmus és magyar nemzettudat 1848-ig.
[Natio and Nation. The Szeckler Medieval Nationalism and the Hungarian National Conscience from the Beginnings to 1848].
By *Gusztáv Mihály Hermann*.
Csíkszereda: Pro-Print Kiadó, 2003.

This book proposes an analysis of the two types of Szecklers' identity: (1) the Szeckler nationalism and (2) the conscience of their Hungarian national identity.

In the foreword, the author analyzes the political discourse of the '90s, insisting on that of Levente Borbély's. The latter defines the Szeckler nation according to the Stalinist criteria (which was very strange for the communist era) and talks about interests which were independent from the Hungarians in Romania, about an independent Szeckler nation, and even about an independent ethnic group.

Hermann chose to discuss this element, as it seems that at that time (the '90s) not even the intellectuals knew something precisely on the Szecklers' national identity. Thus, according to the author, in the XIVth-XVIth century, we can speak

in the case of the Szecklers about an identity based on medieval privileges; however, the process that led to the identification with the Hungarian nation (the transformation of *Natio Siculico* in *Gente Hungarus*) is not very clear. The author thinks that this event happened sometimes in the modern era. The identification and analysis of this moment makes the subject of his book. The author tries to present the different evolutionary steps of this identity.

In order to explain the structure of the book, he uses Jenő Szűcs's definition of the perception of identity along the centuries. If in the XIXth century the individual was defined through nationality, confession, political views, and regional identity, in the XIVth-XVIth century the order was different. The individual at that time was defined first of all as a member of the church, then through feudal relations, regional identity, social status, and possibly, finally, through nationality.

The author starts his book by presenting the socio-political environment in which the Szeckler identity was born in the Middle Ages and some analogies on the Hungarian territory of that time. Hermann presents things in such a way that he could not be accused of local patriotism; he does not have a patriotic discourse on the social balance and equality inside *Natio Siculico*, but he also presents, in a very objective manner, other such privileged regions.

The situation of the Szeckler Seats will change radically under the Hapsburg domination, which will cause breaks inside the Szeckler society. The Szeckler identity breaks and the author asks himself if under such circumstances we could still talk about a unitary Szeckler identity. The Hapsburg policy looked for help inside the Empire or among different ethnic or isolated groups in order to find allies against the Hungarian aristocracy. Joseph II saw such an ally in the Szecklers, but his attempt to bring them closer to Vienna failed, while the Szecklers became more and more linked to the Hungarians. Another important aspect at that time was the myths of origins. The Hungarian Hunnish myth and Szecklers' origin from Hunor and Magor will prove their kinship.

They became conscious about this kinship due to Joseph II's decree on languages. The substitution of Latin for German in legislation and administration will create repulsion among Hungarian speakers. This is the moment when the country did not mean *Siculio* anymore and *Natio* did not contain only the Szeckler Seats, but also all those who spoke Hungarian. According to Hermann, this is how the national liberal identity was born (liberal because social identities had been removed and the people's typically nationalist spirit of freedom became the supreme ideal). In their identity discourse, the Szecklers will stop arguing on medieval principles and will adopt a liberal and modern discourse, in the spirit of that time. According to Judit Pál, this was possible due to the Szecklers' high literacy rate, which was much higher than in the other parts of Transylvania.

Consequently, this discourse of solidarity among those who speak the same language made the Szecklers sympathize with the Hungarians. The Szecklers will become supporters of the national spirit and will consider themselves

members of the Hungarian nation. This is the moment when *Siculio* transformed in *Gente Hungaricus*.

What is really curious is the way in which the author placed this process in time. At a certain moment of his analysis, he placed it in the modern era (which could make us think that he is a supporter of the modernist theory on the origin of nations). However, his arguments go back in the Middle Ages (which would make Hermann a perennial supporter and an ethno-symbolist).

But if this Szeckler identity really began in the Middle Ages, crystallized in the modern era, and then merged with the Hungarian identity, how can we explain the fact that in our century the Szecklers are again in the situation in which they represent themselves as an ethnic group separate from the Hungarian one? When did this break occur and why? Was it only for political reasons, such as Hermann said in the foreword on politician Borbély's discourse?

The book is well structured and argued and the author uses different and rich sources. Obviously, it is an extremely successful work. However, the author's position towards the subject is not very clear. We think that sources are only presented and not interpreted. The author does not elaborate his own definition of nationalism, but he quotes other authors, such as Szűcs or Sykora.

The author's conclusion is that the Szecklers' belonging to the Hungarian national identity started neither in the modern era, once with Joseph II's decree on the official language (this was only a strong catalyst and a moment of awareness), nor in 1848, as some historians sustain. According to the author, the Szecklers would have been together with the Hungarians from the very beginning in the process of crystallization of the Hungarian national identity. In this case we wonder what does this beginning mean for Hermann and when exactly was the Hungarians' national identity born?

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Idola tribus. Esența morală a sentimentului național.
[Idola Tribus. The Moral Essence of the National Feeling].
By *Gáspár Miklós Tamás*.
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia, 2001.

By this work, the author aims at awakening our interest in the ideas that restrict us every day; thus, he shows us our limits and bring us in front of our prejudices we have towards ourselves or the others. The book is a collection of moralizing and sometimes irritating essays (as Andrei Pleşu's foreword warns us), but necessary to understand how the national feeling and its extremisms, which drove us to despair in the XXth century, were born.

As to the author's personality, it is necessary to make a short history of his existence. Born in Cluj in 1948, he studied philosophy and philology and then

got hired with a newspaper; he would soon be fired by the political police of the communist regime. He migrated to Hungary, where he taught in Budapest for a while, but he was fired again for political reasons. Thus, he became one of the best known dissidents. After 1989, he became a deputy in the Liberal-Democrat Party, and between 1991-1995 he was the Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy. These bibliographical data are very important in order to understand how Tamás sees nationalism.

In the first essay, Tamás looks for an answer to the following question: What the use of nationalism? His answer is that it is not something good, as we kill in the name of nationalism; we are not able to stay out and live without the limits it imposes. This means that we place ourselves in a circle and watch the others suspiciously, as We, the members of a nation, are different from the others by our language, blood, and territory. Our belonging to such a circle is a must, as it is the one which gives our identity. Nationalism restricts us a natural gift and always obliges us to be for or against nation.

If we make a parallel between Christianity and nationalism, it is obvious that God Almighty's place is taken by the Country. "Love your enemy as you love yourself" is transformed in "love your comrades," that is those inside the circle. Paradoxically, as nature looks for balance, nationalism imposes certain rules concerning not only those inside the circle, but also those outside it. That is how *the myth of the stranger* was born. All bad things come from the strangers, as they sin. While We live in total harmony, They live in a total chaos. In order not to get contaminated by the strangers' ideas, we have to stay away from Them. That is how borders were born. The problem occurs when the stranger crosses the border. In this case, we must purify and isolate him. In vain would the stranger complain about the rules we want to impose on him; it is not true. We just adapt them and we could even cancel them symbolically, and they won't have anything to reproach us with. However, the stranger has a quality. He also has national feelings.

There is one more issue to be solved. It is clear who We are (those inside the circle) or who the Others are (those beyond the border). But there is one more category: The One Who Crosses. He is always badly looked at. He thinks that he can see both sides, but he forgets that one of them always remains invisible. The great secret of nationalism is that it never rejects the Stranger, as he doesn't even exist for him; however, nationalism rejects The One Who Crosses, because he once had some qualities.

According to Tamás, the moral essence of the national feeling is rooted in the Christian principle "do not kill". But this principle is transformed in "do not kill my comrades". Ethics is combined with the national feeling when loyalty to the Country becomes a moral obligation and a superior psychological force. The national feeling claims loyalty to the ideology of the national state; it asks for and generates a spiritual and almost religious identification. Education is the church of nationalism. It is clear for the author that modern education gives birth to nationalism and that it does not agree with liberalism because of the way in which it implements certain ideas.

However, liberalism becomes a national problem in the XXth century. That is why, in a totalitarian regime, minorities are democratic, while in the democratic regimes they have a left-wing or right-wing romantic character. The slogan "freedom of mankind" has no value, while the freedom of my country can mean everything. Consequently, we can draw a clear conclusion of nationalism: it is racist. But, according to Tamás, only the mad draw final conclusions. Although the national feeling is not a religion, so it should not impose feelings, although it is not rational ethics, so it cannot formulate rules, it does all these.

Thus, the national feeling becomes a rival of Christianity. The first contact of this kind took place during the religious Reform, when the Christian altruism was replaced by the holy collective selfishness. As to the east-European nationalism, the author considers that we, the people from the east, forget that we belong to the *Barbaricum*. We were not able to have remarkable cultural performances and in vain are we proud of our folklore. The Occident has its folklore, too. We have only one Occidental moment: the XIXth century and its liberalism. But, after 1914, we became Balkan again and we are still characterized by wild provincialism.

In conclusion, the national feeling cannot be judged. Even though it is selfish outside and imposes constraints inside, it is beyond any criticism, as everything is correct the way it is.

Tamás tries to enlarge our views and to explain us why today's liberal nationalism (idealized by the author) degenerated into phobias and madness, while being adopted by the lumpenproletariat. The present nationalism degenerated into ethno-anarchism and it represents the name we give to the Devil. In the end I wonder how the author integrates in the context of The One Who Crosses and what identity he chose. Or, to use the terms he proposed, what kind of Hungarian did he consider himself: "a profound or a superficial one"?

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Imagini ale identităţii naţionale. România şi expoziţiile universale de la Paris, 1867-1937. [Images of the National Identity. Romania and the Universal Exhibitions in Paris, 1867-1937]. By *Laurenţiu Vlad.*
Bucureşti: Editura Meridiane, 2001.

What Laurenţiu Vlad tries to do in this work is to underline the identity dimension of the propaganda discourse used by Romania at the Paris universal exhibitions. Its participation in these exhibitions—in 1867, 1889, 1900, 1937—is a good opportunity to promote an identity discourse for external use. However, this discourse proves also useful for Romania's personal and internal use, as all big subjects of the Romanian identity discourse are to be found both in the external propaganda discourse and in the one addressed to our own citizens. Thus, the identity discourse proves unitary.

The structure of this work is clear and precise; Romania's participation in each of these exhibitions is treated by following a set of issues, which remain invariably the same: the presentation of the historical, social and political context in which the exhibition is organized; a short history of Romania's participation, followed by the analysis of the identity discourse through the publications specially edited on this occasion and the architectonic discourse; the end focuses on the way in which the identity discourse is seen by the French press. Consequently, beside the modern analysis made from the identity perspective of the propaganda discourse, this work also wants to present a more classical history of Romania's participation in the Paris universal exhibitions; thus, the author builds his research on a serious archive documentation.

I think it would be interesting to mention here some of the big subjects of the identity discourse used during exhibitions: a) the inheritance of Rome, but also of the Byzantium as a national cultural peculiarity very well underlined in an architectonic register (1867, 1889, 1900); b) the Romanians' rural spirit, which is mainly reflected at the national economy level, but which also gives the national peculiarity. In 1867, Alexandru Odobescu intended to build Romania's stand like a peasant farm; c) Romania, a European country—the most westernized Balkan country (1889).

The symbolic geography in which the Romanian identity discourse is presented is the transition space, the bridge between the East and the West. The Romanian identity discourse of that time tried to answer the western discourse, especially by underlining the exclusivist character of the latter and by trying to integrate Romanian in the context of western values.

In conclusion, Laurenţiu Vlad—a specialist in the research of Romania's participation in international exhibitions—hereby proposes us the French section of his research. We think that the value of this work is given by underlining the identity discourse, which offers the access code for the analysis.

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Artă şi identitate naţională în opera lui Virgil Vătăşianu. [Art and National Identity in the Work of Virgil Vătăşianu]. By *Corina Simon*.
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Nereamia Napocae, 2002, 233 pp.

Corina Simon's book *Artă şi identitate naţională în opera lui Virgil Vătăşianu* was published in March 2002 and dedicated to the birth centenary of the Transylvanian art historian. The work, one of the very few in Romanian art literature to deal with art historiography also represents the author's doctoral thesis. The volume has been published several months before the thesis was presented before the committee and has been prepared in great haste in order to be issued for the anniversary. This, unfortunately, is reflected to a certain extend on book itself.

Although art historiography was never a very popular topic among Romanian scholars, the figure of Virgil Vătăşianu has been, by Transylvanians at least, very much discussed. He is considered to be the founder of the art history school within the Cluj University. It is certain that he and his works were of seminal importance to the forming of generations of art historians. His figure has been and still is regarded by his followers with a sort of religious piety and being his disciple has offered a kind of legitimacy for many art historians. There has always been a great deal of discussion on Virgil Vătăşianu's work methodology, which most refer to as his "method". It is a matter of pride and legitimacy for many art historians today, disciples of the late scholar to be continuing this century old method and keep the tradition alive. This sacrosanct figure has seldom been analysed and never in a critical manner. Scholars that dealt with his work such as Mircea Ţoca, Viorica Guy Marica or Marius Porumb have emphasized his role as a scholar placing him in a genealogy, almost dynastic in kind, of important art historians in the West, mainly of the Viennese school and have praised his very strict scientific method. This type o discourse was in fact meant in many cases to legitimate the author as Vătăşianu's legitimate heir and successor.

I am writing this review in the aftermath of the annual symposium dedicated to the memory of Virgil Vătăşianu, organised in Cluj under the patronage of the Romanian Academy's Institute of Art History and Archaeology. Like every year, the first part of the conference was dedicated to the figure of the great scholar and the way in which the speakers referred to Vătăşianu was in no way different from what I have shown above. It then became clear to me that although all speakers knew Mrs. Simon's book, every single one of them ignored it and I think this is unfair.

It is unfair but not surprising I would say, because Romanian art historians tend to keep quiet when it comes to discussing a new book or a new idea. It is easier and safer to do so and it will keep everyone out of trouble. But it will also make art history in Romania an academic discipline were hardly any dialog or polemic is heard. This, of course, does not mean that scholars don't have any opinions. It is just that gossiping is ever so often preferred to frank and direct academic discussions. But Mrs. Simon's book deserves to be discussed, even just for the sake of breaking the silence and for the fact that the book is dealing with a novel subject. To be sure, the text is not a praise of Vătăşianu's personality or "method" as so many have yet done, nor is it an routine review of his most important works but, as the title goes, it tries to uncover the relation that the scholar sees between art and the national spirit. It is not a sophisticated analysis of Vătăşianu's "method," a subject the older generation of scholars seems so obsessed with. Mrs. Simon is in fact unveiling much more that the title would suggest, she is reading far beyond the text proper and shows a facet that has been ignored through the decades due to a very narrow perception the professor's work. This book is deconstructing Vătăşianu's thought and belief as they appear in his work, a subject seldom discussed since the deeper meanings of the texts lay hidden behind words and under a rather rigid method of

analysis and it seems that for many it has been to great an effort to peek below the surface of things.

The book is divided in two major parts, of which the first is dealing with the scholar's work in the interwar period and the second with the major writings published after World War II. The first part includes a biographic outline, although numerous other details related to the scholar's life that are relevant to the analysis of different works of Vătăşianu are present throughout the book.

Vătăşianu's major works are discussed in chronological order and the author analyses the changes that occurred in the scholar's views over the decades. On the other hand, a selection of the professor's works has been operated, thus only the works concerning Romanian art have been included and of these only the most important ones, also leaving aside different monographs of artists and other text of lesser importance. This selective, though broad review reveals the sometimes paradoxical nature of Vătăşianu's work: "the temptation of encyclopaedism that will be opposed by strict specialization, a broad interpretative vision vs. exact method, positivism vs. phenomenology and image hermeneutics, European opening vs. the mission of shaping a national identity in art, the nostalgia of origins vs. acceptance of modernity." Mrs. Simon sees Vătăşianu as a typical representative of the Central European intelligentsia at the beginning of the 20th century, born of a combination of late romantic and illuminist values, a strong belief in both individual and group progress and the need of being up to date with developments both in science and in the cultural field.

Although aware of his being part of a minor culture, Vătăşianu never seems to be bothered by it, he always believed that the East, and especially the Romanian space is and has been not only a melting pot of influences received from all directions, but a place from which cultural influences spread. He strongly believed in the role of local traditions and especially of the wooden architecture that presented the model for future developments. The Transylvanian scholar has always opposed the idea that Romanian art was born of "free influences as a result of the will of some to place it under some legitimising authority. In the interwar period when many intellectuals gave way to extremist concepts of nationalism Vătăşianu kept a low profile, constantly stressing the idea of the "necessity of recycling tradition and the acceptance of modernity in order to create a valuable and intelligible" new art. Later he revised his ideas considering that "any kind of art based on a strict ideological program loses its intrinsic value," considering this to be a late romantic idea he will "point out that national identity in art is reflected naturally, irrespective of the imposed programs". Vătăşianu generally views art as following an ascendant course, though with few moments of truly constant and linear evolution, "consequently national particularities will be expressed in a more discreet fashion in transition periods and recess, but will be strongly articulated and coherent in blissful moments, of equilibrium". Of these Vătăşianu considers the Moldavian style of the 15th and 16th centuries and the one of the Brâncoveanu period of the 17th and 18th centuries to be the most representative and will, time

and again, state that these accomplishments of Romanian art "were not the product of an official program which was meant to impose the construction of projects with specific characteristics, but emerged naturally, representing landmarks of equilibrium to an organic development." But Mrs. Simon investigates aspects of Vătăşianu's philosophical approach in the interpretation of Romanian art, which was mostly overlooked. The Transylvanian scholar saw Romanian mediaeval art as "a reflexive art that does not become an antithesis to nature—following the western model—but tries to be part of it becoming a naturalist art in the sense that it penetrates the intimate essence of nature". This approach is gradually abandoned as Vătăşianu is more and more interested in contemporary urbanism. But as Mrs. Simon points out, this more pragmatic vision and the very rigid method he developed in the 1950's and 1960's have been a way by which Vătăşianu tried to resist communism and its obtrusive ideology.

Unfortunately, probably due to the haste with which the book has been published, this excellent book fails to have a proper ending, the author abruptly finishing the last chapter leaving no place for a conclusion. General remarks can be found though in the introductory chapter but the structure of the book would have required a different ending. Nevertheless Mrs. Simon's text is a very important one for the Romanian art historiography and is a work that unlike many authors that have dealt with this subject is not limited to mere description or simply admitting facts, but it opens way to an analysis that uncovers phenomena that lay hidden just beneath the surface.

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Discussions

Why History? Ethics and postmodernity.
By *Keith Jenkins.*
London and New York: Routledge, 1999, xi + 232 pp.

Why history? A question that preoccupies many historians and not only, and which has become ever more stringent because of the challenges launched by the adepts of postmodernism. In the book subject of our book review, Keith Jenkins, professor at the Chichester University, tries to provide arguments supporting a radical answer to the title question: history and the ethics it inspires no longer have a reason to exist in actual circumstances because—according to Jenkins—postmodernism provides us with tools allowing us to build imaginaries that are by far less coercive than those made up by history and the ethics relying on it.

Jenkins is a well-known contender in the dispute on the state and the role of history in today's world, as his books (*Rethinking History*, 1991, *On "What's history?" From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White*, 1995) have stirred strong reactions every time—either rejection, or approval—among historians due to the fact that they were founded on philosophies gathered under the generic name of postmodernism.

When referring to history, Jenkins understands this term in two ways: upper-case history, that is, a general progression in a linear and homogenous time—history in a Hegelian sense—and history, understood as the practice of conferring meanings ("reconstituting") to the past based on a set of rules (*lower-case history*), with the latter sense of the term designating the object of the profession of historians. Both meanings are attacked by Jenkins. He supports the thesis of this book resorting to the ideas of authors such as Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit, Elisabeth Deeds Ermarth and David Harlan, this being the expository part of his book. The argumentative dimension of the book is built on a polemic with Richard Evans, the author of a book supporting the validity of history as a professional practice and as a mode of objective cognition. Beyond the polemic dimension, Jenkins's book is at the same time a remarkably useful guide for the readers—students or researchers—to certain authors that are often criticised for their lack of accessibility, such as most of those mentioned above.

In the first part, the discussion is centred on delegitimizing the first meaning of the notion of history. This is done mostly employing ontological arguments derived from the anti-essentialist philosophies of authors such as Derrida, Baudrillard and Lyotard. Jenkins resorts to Derrida's notion of deconstruction and implicitly to his theory concerning the primary instability of the meaning, that is, the unbridgeable gap between the sign (text) and the referent (reality). From this a sceptical opinion concerning existence of objective cognition—which

requires knowledge of the essences or of universals such as the Truth, Law, Justice—is derived. Consequently, Jenkins challenges, along with Derrida, the fixed, univocal world progressing along a linear and homogenous time. Jenkins takes from Derrida the "textual" vision of reality (*il n'y a pas rien hors de texte*), which is probably one of the assertions that are most difficult to accept by the historians, which are usually convinced that a firm distinction between a fact / reality and its interpretation exists. Aware of this, Jenkins proceeds with an extremely necessary clarification of the assertion using Derrida's very words. He stresses upon the fact that Derrida does not hold that all signifiers are trapped in a text or suspended, but that the whole reality embraces the structure of a *differential* relationship (between signs)—that is, a relationship on which the text is based—and not of a *referential* relationship (between signs and external referents) and that no one can refer directly to reality but to the interpretation thereof.

Ethics (which according to Jenkins must be differentiated from morality) is symbiotically linked to the acception of history as an embodiment of Truth and of the historian's work as a recovery thereof. A follower of Derrida, Jenkins argues that once all claims to transcendence and total cognition overthrown, there is no categorical foundation on which to base a moral decision; the condition any decision must fulfil in order to be a moral one is to experience a moment of *aporia*, that is a radical impossibility to make a decision between positions that are logically possible. In order to be moral, any decision has to rely on itself alone—involving at the same time an individual responsibility for the decision. This position helps Jenkins reject an ethics deducted from a system of rules or empirical sentences which only create the impression of solid founding onto something transcendent—such as History—which is in fact contingent. Although it seems to have no connection to what concerns "proper" historians, this vision of ethics makes up the motivational—and even the political—core of the book. From this position Jenkins can reject the Ciceronian postulate of history as a teacher, and assume an anti-teleological, anti-transcendental and optimistic attitude and, probably more important, argue that History is an imaginary which cannot function in an emancipatory way and therefore cannot be a democratic instrument but a constraining instrument. Far from being just an intellectual whim, the relinquishing of History and of Ethics as defined by Jenkins might bring about positive consequences *in the world*. Jenkins suggests a life outside ethics, but in morality, in time, but outside history (p. 2). This moral dimension of the book—*History cannot serve emancipation*—helps us explain the reason why Jenkins radically rejects History and does not accept it—in the spirit of postmodernity—as one of the postmodern imaginaries the emergence of which he supports.

A second line of arguments in the book focuses on the challenging of history as a scientific practice (its *lower case* meaning, in Jenkins' terms), an area less visited than the challenging of universal metanarratives (*upper case*). Here Jenkins adds to the ontological arguments in the first part of his book arguments of an epistemological nature that are exposed through a polemic with Richard

Evans. In his book entitled *In Defence of History,* the latter defends the classical principles of the "historical science," as they were established during the 19th and the 20th centuries—mainly the belief that the past can be reconstituted as it was, the judging of the past in its own terms and the existence of a method allowing the interrogation of the past based on the study of its traces. Jenkins rejects Evans's arguments—one cannot know the past, any selection of sources involves interpretation, the reconstitution of the past is not limited to a logical operation (a succession of syllogisms, as "proper" historians claim), but it takes shapes which are related, as Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit pointed out, to rhetoric, poetry and literary theory. Jenkins insists on the shift generated by the above mentioned authors in the field of the debate on history—from the debate on the research methodology to the debate on the theory of meaning production in historical writing, a shift that is probably similar to the one initiated by Thomas Kuhn in the philosophy of science. For White, Ankersmit and Jenkins, historians become practitioners of sense allocation according to a logic of the narrative, but claiming that they establish, in fact, causal links and hence logical veridicity / validity. History is no longer "as it actually was," a re-establishing of things on a solid foundation, but the result of an "emplotment" of the things selected by the historian and presented following an aesthetic criterion.

The claim that a linear time exists, a consequence of the linear representation of history, is dismantled with the help of Elisabeth Deeds Ermarth, who proposes the notion of rhythmical time—in fact a new way of relating to time—, while the claim concerning the necessity of reinterpreting the past in its own terms is rejected with the help of historian David Harlan, who proposes the deliberate embracing of a strategy consisting in the appropriation and use of the past according to the terms and for the purposes of the present.

The merit of the polemic with Evans and of the further discussion is that Jenkins manages to articulate coherently and intelligently in a relatively limited space the main positions of a dispute that claimed thousands of pages and which opposes the defenders of the classic historical practice to its challengers inspired by postmodernism and / or by the linguistic turn. Moreover, Jenkins convincingly criticises with an often pervasive irony the "guild" practices of "proper" historians as parochial and sometimes obtuse forms of defence against the advancing postmodernism.

What Jenkins fails to do is to clarify and to elaborate in more detail the replacement of History with postmodern imaginaries allowing more democratic and emancipatory ways of conceiving the future.

An even more problematic issue is the requirement to abandon the research practice called history altogether. The criticism of "proper" history also contains a criticism of history as a research practice of whatever type, in relation to which Jenkins resorts to an argumentative strategy called "the straw-man fallacy". This consists in the distorted presentation of a point of view in order to be able to refute it easier. Thus, Evans's version—a version that deserves to be abandoned indeed—is considered representative for the practices that go under the label "history". But Jenkins seems to ignore *histories* that separate themselves from the

central core of assumptions on which *orthodox history* is based—all those who deal in some way with the past seem—in Jenkins' view—to fully share Evans's opinions and—by extension—Ranke's. Or, this is not the case as long as the past is not equated to its historicisation and can be appropriated in ways that do not claim to be ethically superior to one another.

Read in the Romanian context, the original sharpness of this book not only remains intact, but is enhanced by the fact that its arguments are particularly relevant for a historiography dominated by a combination of nationalist ideology and positivist methodology as the Romanian one still is.

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The Landscape of History. How Historians Map the Past.
By *John Lewis Gaddis.*
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, xii + 192 pp.

John Lewis Gaddis, professor at the Yale University, is a very well known expert in diplomatic history. His books—*Strategies of Containment* (1982), *The Long Peace* (1987), *We know now: Rethinking Cold War History* (1998), to name but a few—have decisively shaped our perception of the Cold War. Professor Gaddis has been lately interested in issues like historical knowledge and theory, and the present book is one of the outcomes.

Gaddis tackles in this short, but extremely interesting book a wide array of problems, which can be roughly grouped in three interrelated areas: how historians know the past, the place of history in relation to other sciences (natural and social) and the future role of history.

The main line of discussion of this book is concerned with the way historians know the past and how is this different or similar to other sciences. Gaddis's view, transmitted through a visual metaphor which recurs throughout the book, is that since historians cannot replay events in their hypothetic laboratories as physicists can, they do something very similar to a cartographers' work—they *map* the past. Hence, the historians have a bird's eye view on past, similar to the all-encompassing view the cartographers have upon the landscape. Using an alternate metaphor, historians have the task of making the past *legible*. This view has implications especially on the way Gaddis conceives the epistemology of history. Thus, historians can manipulate temporality, and space, they can visualize the detail without losing the general picture; they can have in sight many points at the same time and they can abstract and reach to the essence of phenomena.

As far as causality is concerned, Gaddis praises history because it considers causes and variables in interdependence and takes into account the coexistence of regularity and contingency in attempting to explain unfolding phenomena. As a consequence, history cannot be predictive, but retrodictive.

All these make history essentially different from the other social sciences, such as sociology, economy, and political science. Social scientists attempt to do what "hard scientists" are doing—they try to isolate variables in order to identify the most important of them, the independent variable, and to replicate and model phenomena in an attempt to be predictive. For Gaddis, what the social scientists are doing is plain reductionism, inspired by the positivism of the nineteenth century.

In fact, Gaddis is concerned with the scientificity of history as compared to the scientificity of other social sciences—and this is the second line of discussion. He takes as a standard the hard sciences, which the social scientists are trying to emulate—they suffer of a Freudian "physics envy". He even maintains that history is more scientific than the social sciences, as it has at least two main elements in common with the natural sciences, especially with the so-called non-laboratory natural sciences such as geology or astronomy. One is the specific way of doing research in history—a movement back and forth between data and theory—which is employed in the above mentioned hard sciences and rejected generally by the social sciences, who apply a deductive mechanism. The second is that it uses chaos theory and its developments. This theory, used to explain large systems and processes such as weather or evolution of species, holds that there is no clear relationship between the variables of complex phenomena to allow one to accurately predict a particular outcome. Each variable depends on all the other and small changes in the initial conditions could result in radically different outcomes (the so-called "butterfly effect"). Thus, social sciences—which, like history, attempt to study large phenomena—employ a flawed conception of causation, monocausality, which is appropriate to simple systems, but not to complex ones. Historians also use a principle of fractal theory—similarity across scale—when they generalize. Their generalizations are (paradoxically) always particular—and, as such, limited in place and time, because past itself is infinitely divisible, as the space is in fractal theory.

Moreover, Gaddis remarks that hard sciences have began—under the influence of theories such as this and others, like Heisenberg's principle of indetermination—a process of "historicisation" and of taking into account (besides regularity) the contingency and non-linear structures or phenomena. So, in the end, history turns out to be more scientific than was thought. In Gaddis's words, "'(p)hysics envy' need not be a problem for historians because—metaphorically at least—we've been doing a kind of physics all along" (p. 89).

The third line of discussion concerns the role of the history in society. Gaddis touches upon this issue in the beginning and end of his essay. History, according to Gaddis, is a teacher—historians distill the past in order to make it usable in the future. Without history, in the author's view, humans would not be capable to transmit knowledge from one generation to another. In addition, Gaddis seems to believe that history has a necessary celebratory function: "(h)istorians perform that commemorative function for the great but dead (...) we do, at least, free them from oblivion (p. 139)". Somewhat contrastively, towards the end of the book, Gaddis assigns to historians an emancipatory role. He states that

historians have the task to provide the oppressed with the tools to fight oppression, as "the sources of oppression are lodged in time and are not independent of time" (p. 146) and historians are best positioned to expose this. Thus, although Gaddis ignores or refutes postmodern claims throughout most of his book, he puts forward an argument which resembles deconstruction, an essentially postmodernist concept.

Surely, the critique of social sciences' reductionism, connected with the very interesting presentation of the chaos theory in connection to history—path taken by several historians lately—is the best part of the book. Nevertheless, Gaddis seems to ignore that even social sciences are experiencing an ongoing debate between the quantitative and qualitative epistemologies. So, the distinction between the "reductionist" social sciences and the "non-reductionist" history is not as clear-cut as Gaddis presents it.

There are several other problems and inconsistencies in this book, which by no means diminish its value. Firstly, the author sees no limitation in the historian's capacity to know the past. He suggests that the past is something objective, which exists outside human interpretation and is univocal. This is in line with a positivist theory of knowledge, which Gaddis implicitly assumes. He does not engage (except for a few paragraphs), though, against probably the most powerful adversary of this view, the postmodern views of history.

Another problem is that Gaddis sees history (as a knowledge-gathering practice) as something which the same everywhere. But especially in the decades, history is a contested concept and practice and the research practices within it are multiple. On the other hand, reifying the past and the history is not consistent with the emancipatory role Gaddis envisages for history. A univocal History—as Gaddis seems to consider it—has no possibility to be emancipatory, because it necessarily privileges a (conservative) way of writing. History (especially in the only form existing until several decades ago, the political history) has been an instrument of preservation and justification. On the contrary, recent trends which aim openly towards the emancipation of the "forgotten" categories—along the lines of gender, race, class—emphasize the multi-vocality of meanings and the deconstruction—something which is essential to all emancipation strategies. So, we can say that Gaddis mixes a left-wing view politically (he talks about emancipation) with a somewhat right-wing view epistemologically. Finally, although Gaddis is talking at length about history as a teacher, he does not touch upon the way historians write—which strategies do they use to convey meaning and how they do it. Symptomatically, he approaches the narrative only in connection to research and not in the connection to the final outcome of doing history.

Besides these drawbacks, the book has the merit that it creatively incorporates theories originating in other disciplines and does this not for its own sake, but in a clear and consistent manner.

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