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Communism “under construction”, Case Study – Maramureş 1945-1965¹

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The present paper aims to be an interdisciplinary approach to a spatially and temporarily strictly delimited space, the Maramureş region. The paper is based on a twofold analysis: The political and institutional dimension:

- a. *Where the historic and ethnic records of this region are viewed as a significant element of the periphery and of the manner the hierarchical and the territorial structures were developed after 1945,*
- b. *Where the new organization of the local political structures represented the basis of the human resources policy,*

The social and human dimension: how the Party proceeded to recruiting, selecting and promoting the human resources, in order to “fill in” the newly developed institutions with people entirely committed to Party and its mission.

The choice for a space territorially restricted to Maramureş diminishes neither the complexity of the methodological approach nor of the scientific one. In addition, it gives a global and unitary perspective upon the whole phenomenon, the possibility of a theoretical and practical applicability of the already analyzed concepts. But the aim is not to prove the utility, the relevance or the correctness of a paradigm. What we aim at is the understanding of a functioning mechanism, of the defining elements of a political construct inwardly coerced, without any local relevance, and against which there were serious reserves. The questions asked throughout this study “How was the Communist regime locally built, implemented and structured?”, “Who did it?” “For who?” led us to a strange situation, that of having simple answers, as they had already been substantiated by the historiography of the Cold War (through deeds of the Party structures, by the Party leaders, and by the change of the social structure, opponents destruction and country modernization). But if we look at the local community, the answer to these questions is not as simple as we expected. It does not imply only the thorough knowledge it was applied, but also the motivations behind. In fact, it is based on these questions that the Communist regime decided to shape, transform and change the local communities in accordance with the central authorities' projects.

Key words: Communism, Romania, Maramureş, cadres, evolution of the social structure of the RCP.

¹ The documentation of this paper was due, partially, within the research project “Remembering Communism”, sponsored by the Volkswagen Stiftung and hosted by the University of Leipzig.

Although the contemporary historiography shows an obvious interest in the study of the Communist topic, we believe that our approach brings in a new and integrated technique, by the attention paid to the analysis of the Communist power structures at the local level, to the interdisciplinary perspective on the phenomenon and the original value of the records that provided the information support. The documentation base was made by archival records, both local and national, by interviews, local media and edit historiography. We refer to the records created by the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) structures: PCR Funds – the Organizational and Administrative Department of the State Archives, Baia Mare PRM (Romanian Working Party-RWP) Funds, Raion Vișeu Funds, the mass organizations files, the cultural and religious organizations files, the archives of schools and town-halls, the main local publications, personal archives.

The paper is structured in three parts. The first one is a short introduction in the local universe of the human and institutional characteristics, aiming to emphasize the cultural and economic legacy, that gets in touch with the Communist ideology and the reformist projects supported by Bucharest. This part deals with an important period in the region's history – the inter-war years – when the region, already part of the Great Romania, come into contact for the first time with the modernization policy of the Romanian State. It is very important to analyze and stress the importance of this episode for a better understanding of the State, the people's defining characteristics and features, the relations among them, and the way they structured their relations with the authority, be it central or local.

The second and third parts are structured according to the analysis proposed and defined in the beginning. The contact with the institutions of the new system becomes direct now. From its position of power leader, the PCR changed the nature of the political regime and consequently the functions and duties of the local institutions. Without ignoring the importance the repressive institutions enjoyed within the Communist regime, we stopped upon the Party structures since they were the visible face of the system. The transformation of realities under the influence of the Communist human resources representatives (in Romanian, *cadre*) is fundamental for the understanding of the Communist regime, of the institutions it was based on. The political system transplant, violent and destructive, was meant to transform the political and administrative institutions at first, later on being the tools for the Communization process of the society as a whole.

This mainly institutional approach comes to unify the image of a changing world, subdued to several structural changes that modified not only the

relation between the human community and the Party-State, but also the inter-human relations - based on certain political and administrative institutions and practices shaped on those already experimented in the USSR. At the same time, we analyze the human resources the Party leaned its effort of power monopolization and management on. Installed with the help of the Soviet Army and serving the PCUS interests, the RCP hurried on its first ruling day to create a recruitment basis and to gather as many partisans as possible. The institutional import by the new political state required the necessity of adopting the Soviet political, economic and social construct is added the implementation of a recruitment policy, selection and promotion of the staff exclusively on the basis of the ideological principles regarding the origin, training and commitment to the Party. That is why we decided to analyze the main characteristics of the Party members and the institutionalization of the leading bodies. The new Party brought in new methods, techniques, functioning mechanisms and human resources, adapted to and shaped on the present ideological thinking. This underpinned both the creation of manifesting forms and Party evolution, and the recruitment of followers.

The heritage of Maramureş

The Romanian Maramureş represented only a third of the old Maramureş County, part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, including the Tisa valley and its affluent streams, Vişeu, Iza, Talaboru, and Agul Mare². Its geographical position, surrounded by mountains, produced many difficulties in communicating with the neighboring areas, be they from Romania or other countries, the single ways to enter or exit being the passages, unusable the most of the year³. The existent railway linking the Sighet station with the rest of the country would cross Czechoslovakia or Poland before entering the Romanian territory. The border settled in 1918 also changed the distribution of incomes between the north and the south of the region. This is one of the reasons the local community “developed” without keeping contact with other communities, while the local elite assumed the right to

² Central National Historical Archives (CNHA), Bucharest, Personal Fund Vasile Stoica, *Situația Maramureşului*, 1945; As part of Hungary from 1733 till 1918, Maramureş district had 50,7% Romanians, 17,8% Jews, 16,3% Hungarians, 13,2% Ukrainians, 1,6% Germans, living in 156 villages and one town, organised in 10 small administrative districts.

³ Through Prislop passage with Moldova, passage Şetref with Transilvania, passages Gutâi and Huta with Satu Mare, passage Frasin with Polonia and on the Tisa valley with Ceho-Slovakia.

filter the government policy and to monopolize the communication with the State bodies.

On the other hand, from the ethnic and social point of view, Maramureş was far from the image created by the Mihaly Diplomas⁴. According to several economic patents, social privileges and political facilities conferred to different ethnic groups by the authorities, there were five important communities which lived there: Romanian, Hungarian, Ukrainian, German, and Jewish. Known as urban residents, the Jews from Maramureş represented themselves a distinct group within the Romanian Jewish community. They had come here from Galicia and other parts of Poland and Russia. The first record attesting their presence is a Conscription of 1728, mentioning seven names. Gradually, their number increased and by the beginning of the 19th century, there were around 158 families. In 1828 they already had been organized in a guild of merchants, with the largest trade network in region and in 1867 they received the right to own real estate and to have access to the *noble co-property (composesorat)*⁵.

After 1918, the process of local elite selection underwent a distinct evolution, in the way of multiplication and variation of human resources. The elite started to be shaped and formed then from members of the old Romanian families, the Jewish, Hungarian and German communities, but also a large number of people come from the old Romanian Kingdom⁶. In time, mainly Romanians represented the political and cultural elite, the Jews monopolized the economic elite, in the administration there were equally Hungarians, Romanians, or Germans and the religious elite followed closely the ethnic characteristics of the region. The new comers made up the technical and bureaucratic elite, a new urban category that represented the State agents and high officials and also teachers, head masters or soldiers⁷.

Without knowing the effervescence, implications, passions and ambitions at the central level, the political participation of elites in Maramureş represented maybe the best-integrated local aspects of life in the national development after 1918. We base our statement on the way political parties emerged and acted, the way in which the population was involved in

⁴ Mihaly de Apşa, *Diplome Maramureşene*, 1900.

⁵ Gheorghe Coman, *Moisei, an Old Romanian Home*, (Cluj-Napoca, 2000), p. 14, 15.

⁶ "News", *Vocea Maramureşului (Maramureş Voice)*, no. 6, 1935, p. 4; Prefectura, 2/1926.

⁷ See Dorina Orzac, *Regimul comunist în România. Studiu de caz Maramureş (The Communist Regime in Romania. Case Study Maramures)*, PhD paper, presented in June 2007, Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj..

political life by participating to the vote, the way in which the state influenced and imposed the right of minority groups to be represented, the state's interference, by its local representatives (civil servants, officialities) in the free exercise of the right to vote. The state, benefiting from punitive instruments, but also from the availability of an elite that wanted access to the political stage and implicitly to resources, succeeded in penetrating the most isolated and traditional communities, in order to give the population the feeling and certainty that it belonged to a new system⁸.

The liberal leaders (the urban Romanian elite of the county) benefiting economically from the state's support and from Romanian population migration to the urban zones during the first years after the war, strengthened their positions to the detriment of the Romanian National Party. The electorate's tendency to give its vote to the two parties (after 1926, the Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party) continued until 1930⁹.

After this date, new parties emerged in Maramureş also. The votes were dispersed among all political groups involved in the political struggle¹⁰ and a certain strengthening of the right wing parties' position, simultaneously developed with the gradual disappearance of the elite formed and educated

⁸ M. Ivan, *Evoluția partidelor noastre politice (Evolution of our political parties) 1919-1932*. At the moment of the parties in the Old Kingdom penetration, part of the former Romanian National Party (RNP) militants reoriented to the National Liberal Party (NLP), to the People's Party, and to the Peasant Party. The political mutations became relevant and were illustrated by the way the electoral support for the different political groups developed. If in 1919, the 5.847 votes in the two constituencies organized here were given entirely to the Romanian National Party (people voted in uninominal constituencies in compliance with the Hungarian electoral system), three years later the votes were distributed between the National Liberal Party that won most representatives and the Romanian National Party. The 1922 election results reflect completely the new distribution of the political power at territorial level.

⁹ As one can notice, until 1931, the votes were given to 6 political groups only, NLP, NPP, People's Party, Social-Democratic Party, LANC, Hungarian Party and Peasant Party. Among these groups, only 3 succeed in sending representatives to the Parliament, and the prefect position is only in the hands of the representatives of the three parties, NLP, NPP, and People's Party.

¹⁰ LANC obtained 39% of the votes in 1932. In 1933 it was on the third position with 1.136 votes. The other votes were as follows: out of a total of 23.916, 344 are annulled, 102 null, NLP got 17.932, NPP - 1.703, Peasant Party - 909, Goga's party 325, Argentoianu's party 98, Jewish Party 533, People's Party 32, Hungarian Party 773 - "Elections results for the Chamber of Deputies, December 20th, 1933", *Maramureş Voice*, no. 21, 1933, p.4

before 1918¹¹. In 1935 most of the National Peasant Party (NPP) leaders joined the Romanian Front¹² set up by Al Vaida-Voevod. Consequently, Ilie Lazăr remain the NPP leader. Without being an answer to the evolutions at national level, especially as the ethnic, local and regional touch were preserved, the dynamics of the political relations established the gradual integration in the rhythm of Romanian political life, especially in the fourth decade. In the case of local elections the same electoral behavior¹³ applied, by giving votes to the party in power. As compared to the political elites, almost a Romanian monopole, in the case of administration, certain personal and professional qualities prevailed before the political ones, all ethnical groups were present¹⁴. Within the local elite, the civil servants were the most trained, alphabetization percentage reaching 78,3%. In the urban area it grew to 80,6% and went down in the rural zone, 75,7%¹⁵.

The broad mass of the population, that lacked financial possibilities and a social-economic frame for the community development, struggled permanently to survive. Paraphrasing Mihai Marina, we can say that the peasants were left with "the pride of a past considered glorious and a lot of poverty"¹⁶. The image of villages scattered on the mountains' valleys and water flows, with small houses made of logs, crammed on narrow and broken roads, can illustrate, besides the slight romantic appearance, the

¹¹ Direcția Arhivelor Statului Maramureș - further DASMM - (The County Direction of the State Archives, Maramureș), Fund Prefectura (Prefecture), 1/1930. Alexandru Lazar, Alexandru Filipciuc, Fuchs Eduard, Tiberiu Kiss stood for deputies and were elected for the first time in 1930.

¹² The County Committee of the Front consisted of Alexandru Anderco-Cuza, president, Gavrița Iuga, Sigismund Pop, Alexandru Balint, Gheorghe Tite, Ion Chis, Tiberiu Kiss, Gheorghe Bota, archpriest Vlad Darie, Abel Anderco, Ion Biltiu-Dancus - "The County Committee Assembly", *Maramureș*, no. 8, 1935, p.2

¹³ The results obtained in 1926 in Sighet could be significant examples: thus 4122 votes were given to NLP and 1597 to the opposition, while in Petrova, known as one of the Peasant Party fief, 264 of the votes went to NLP and 221 to the opposition ("Elections", *Viitorul Maramureșului - Maramureș' future*, no. 9, 1926, p.1). The situation repeated itself in 1935. In Berbesti commune out of the 424 votes, 39 went to NPP, 29 for the Romanian Front and 343 for NLP. (*Maramureș Echo*, no.5, 1935, p4). At the county elections in 1937, NLP got 38,6%, and NPP 38,3%. The other votes went to Goga-Cuza group, 2,8%, 16,2% to the Romanian Front, others 2,6%.

¹⁴ Universal Census of Romania (RGR), 1930.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ M. Marina, *Maramureșul-nevoi și remedii (Maramureș. Needs and Remedies)*, Cluj, 1939, p. 8.

miserable life conditions of these people. The contrast is ever bigger as we think at Romania's modernity status, claimed by the elites during the inter-war period. Similar to the ethnic polarization that occurred within the elite's organization, the same structure is obvious at the masses level.

If agriculture "lived" exclusively by the Romanians and Ukrainians' work, forestry operation, trade and credits were the prerogative of Jews, Hungarians and Germans, while the administration was a common space for all¹⁷. If we quickly revise the alphabetization index according to the data provided by the 1930 Census, we may see that illiteracy was a severe problem of the region, with its 73% of illiterates. Without having statistics of the phenomenon from the beginning of the century, the fact that 12 years after the unification three quarters of the county's population had no access to the cultural means of its own nation looked rather alarming.

Imposing the new political structure

The main characteristic of the 1945 spring is the total chaos¹⁸. The lack of a recognized authority after repeated administrative and political changes (in October 1944 the Hungarian administration was abolished and the Romanian National Council (RNC) authority was imposed under the Soviet army guardianship, in January 1945, Odoviciuc regime was set up, and a new Romanian prefect was appointed in April), the state of war, the transit role provided to Sighet, for the repatriation of Soviets who fought in Central Europe, infrastructure destruction, "disappearance" of the Jewish community and the repressive measures adopted by the central authorities against the German community blocked any attempt of coagulating the political, economic and social life¹⁹. For a better management of public

¹⁷ According to the 1930 census, the Romanian population was involved in land operation in 73,7%; 26,2% in underground operation; 24,5% in metallurgy; 17,7% in wood working; 11% in manufacturing industry; 17,5% in trade and credit agencies; 4,4% in trade; 53,6% in public institutions. The most bizarre distribution is in wood working, the Romanian and Ruthenian peasants being allowed only for work in subordinate organization, that of wood cutters, manipulators and heap up workers, leaving to the Jews (44%), Germans (12,6%) and Hungarians (19,8%) the task of organizing the forestry operation and production capitalization, RGR 1930.

¹⁸ DASMM, Romanian Communist Party Fund- Sighet (further on PCMM), file 1/1945, p.1-2

¹⁹ Prefecture, 184/1945, p.91; Prefecture, 184/1945, p. 68; Prefecture, 377/1945, p. 9; PCMM, 1/1945, p. 24.

affairs before 1940 old administrative-territorial organization²⁰ was preserved in four administrative subdivisions – Sighet with 13 localities, Vișeu with 20 localities, Șugatag with 20 localities and Iza with 13 localities, per total 59 communes and a town as county residence²¹. Statistics noted immediately after the war a population of 135.013 persons, out of which 99.796 Romanians, 29.790 Ukrainians, 9.174 Hungarians, 1.416 Germans and 464 Jews.

Building up the new system imagined by the communists was not an easy task. Focusing our interest at the level of Maramureș region shows precisely the steps they made to access power. Less spectacular, triumphant and fascinating than the nearness to the universe of intrigues, speculations and deified personalities at the top of the RCP, in “the story” of the beginnings and of the trivialized party life is the key of the unraveled operating mechanism of the communist system.

The setting up of the first communist structures in this area, took place against the background of the winter events in 1945, when, with the help of Soviet authorities, the National Democratic Front (NDF) (The National Democratic Fond – Ukrainian variant) took over the county’s leadership. Even though after the county’s liberation from the Hungarian administration the Romanian National Council was formed after the 1918 pattern that consisted of inter-war political elite representatives²², once the relation with Romania was reestablished, the direct intervention of the central authorities, by the Communist Party representative, Vasile Luca, was not on the support trend of assuming power by the former RNC members, but on the Communist Party reorganization, eliminating elements that came from Ukraine, and entrusting management to Iuliu Chitta, member of the Ploughmen's Front, brought from Cluj²³. In this context, conditions were in favor of the Romanian Communist Party. Part of the RNC members²⁴, of the preparatory Commission for annexation to Soviet Ukraine²⁵ and of those in the People’s Committee in Sighet, were to become the first organizational structure of RCP, Maramureș branch, under the leadership of the Ukrainian

²⁰ Law no.552, published in The Official Monitor 253 of November 1st, 1944, and Prefecture, 2/1945, p.1.

²¹ Prefecture, 95/1945, p.3.

²² Petru Mihally, Ilie Chindris, Alexandru Cuza Anderco, Ion Biltiu-Dancus, Gheorghe Iusco, Iuliu Epure, Zizi Man.

²³ Prefecture, 377/1945, p.6.

²⁴ Ion Mois, Nicolae Vancea, Iuliu Ardelean.

²⁵ Teodor Bocotei, Vasile Ierima, Nicolae Pipas.

Dumitru Cernicica²⁶. Their control over the public affairs was insignificant. With the direct support from Cluj local branch, RCP started the recruitment program in April 1945. Its purpose was to fill the void of power created at the end of the war by organizing local centers as quickly as possible. Despite the huge financial and logistic support received from the central party structures, at the level of the county the conditions were rather hostile. This happened because of the strong anti-Soviet feelings of the Romanian population, induced by the presence of the Red Army, and the support it ensured to the Ukraine separatist movement as well as by the new political leaders' involvement in the actions of January-March 1945. The ethnic configuration in Vișeu, Șugatag and Sighet²⁷ was also added where communities of Romanian, Hungarians, Ukrainians and Jews lived, each of them relating and considering differently the political situation; against the background of negotiations between the Allies concerning Central Europe's boundaries, the Hungarians wanted Maramureș annexed back to Hungary²⁸, the Ukrainians were dissatisfied with abandoning of the unification with Ukraine, while the Jews coming back from the German concentration camps were trying to start a new life, to regain their positions and to rebuild the previous status, being rapidly co-opted in the communist movement²⁹. The lack of information means, the high percentage of illiterates, the low level of industrialization and modernizing because of isolation and monoculture agriculture, war destructions, administrative system disorganization and typhus epidemic made it difficult both for the communists and the opposition activity.

Depending on the multiple local conditionings, the new group that aimed at assuming power had to build a flexible strategy that focused on party structures extending at the level of the entire county, by massive enrolling of members, by subordinating key services, followed by control over the entire economic, administrative and cultural activity, by bringing in their ranks those that intended to maintain or maximize their power positions, by identifying individuals inclined to any compromise, who were obedient, by

²⁶ Petru Mihoc, Tiberiu Szollosy, Ernest Fisch, Gheorghe Oros, Nicolae Lazarciuc. We can also find in this Committee other members of the RNC and the Commission.

²⁷ Prefecture, 1/1945, p. 4.

²⁸ NARA, RG 59, Department of State, IRIS, R@A Reports, no. 3467, December 31, 1945, Problems involved in the Rumanian Settlement.

²⁹ NARA, RG 59, Department of State, IRIS, R@A Reports, No.2941, June 1, 1945, Radescu Cabinet: Political and Economic Developments in Rumania, Nov. 1944 - Febr. 1945.

eliminating former “colleagues” in RNC or all those that were holding leading offices. These measures were supported and determined by the legislative measures adopted centrally and by the course of transformations that the entire Romania experienced.

The achievement of these strategic objectives called for gradual action. The first stage was represented by the set up in April 1945 of the first Party County Committee (15 members) under the direct guidance of Nicolae Goldberger and Vasile Luca. This was structured on four sectors: organizational, propaganda and agitation, personnel and peasantry. Till the end of the year the administrative sector was added, and during 1946, the sectors concerning the mass organizations, trade-unions and army³⁰. Each sector had two to four instructors, to which another two county trainers were added and they were at the Committee’s disposal.

The next step was to monopolize the trade-union structures in the only commercial functional enterprises, the Salt Mill Ocna-Şugatag, CFR Sighet, Sighet Power Station and the Timber Factory Câmpulung la Tisa³¹. The four committees set up in November 1945 that theoretically brought 1500 members for the Party, had personnel, organizational, administrative and propaganda sectors, but their actions were equally directed towards making the Party popular among the inhabitants of the neighboring localities. The necessity to build the party’s structure starting from the superior levels (County committee, enterprises’ committees) towards the basis, to train the personnel for each specific action, to control the activity of each sector, made the party’s work difficult and reduced its efficiency.

The party’s penetration in the urban and rural environment happened first by strengthening the party’s structures in the Sighet county residence town, then by invading the workers’ centers in Ocna-Şugatag, Câmpulung la Tisa, by creating cells in the multi-ethnic localities and by encouraging participation to the political and economic life of a community to the detriment of others (Crăciuneşti, Virișmort, Sighet, Rona), by extending propaganda and recruitment in localities considered fiefs of the opposition (Giuleşti, Calineşti, Ieud, Vişeu, Borşa), by starting the “attack” on the Romanian compact communities, by taking over the administrative and group recruitment levers³². At the same time with the party’s extending on the horizontal, an internal reorganizing process took place at the level of the party superior hierarchy, but only in December 1946, after the November

³⁰ PCMM, 1/1945, p.1.

³¹ PCMM, 1/1945, p.3-130

³² PCMM, organizational section, 1945-1947.

elections, they succeeded in organizing the four sector committees each of them structured on seven administrative subdivisions that had 80 cells in subordination³³. Starting with March 1948 the Romanian Workers' Party reorganization entailed a restructuring of the party local hierarchy. The County Committee Apparatus, consisting of 20 persons³⁴, is made of the Secretarial and Political Bureau and the Party College as of November 1949. The old sector organization, is replaced by a more flexible structure with four sections, organizational, personnel and agitation, and administrative, and sectors, the party activists belonged to. The administrative subdivisions' committees were maintained plus two enterprise committees, each respecting the same organization³⁵. The novelty was that the cells disappeared as micro-structural organization forms (having an essential role during the party's horizontal extending stage) and the basic structures (that correspond to the new party line, for power consolidation, for control and vigilance strengthening)³⁶. Maramureş felt rather brutally the new political administrative organization as of 1950.

Using the economic argument of transport facilities between Maramureş and Salva-Năsăud zone, once the Salva-Vişeu railroad started to function³⁷, but also the necessity to destroy any identification or relation of its inhabitants with tradition and cultural inheritance, the county's territory was grouped in two districts; the Western half, consisting of the localities in the former administrative subdivisions Şugatag and Sighet represented Sighet district, round Baia Mare region and the Eastern half, that grouped the former administrative subdivisions Vişeu and Iza, formed Vişeu district, round Rodna region. As the party documents mention³⁸, citizens' protests were numerous. They were followed by adoption of attitudes on party and

³³ PCMM, 5/1946, p.45; 6 enterprise cells, 14 institutions cells, 12 district cells, 38 village cells, 5 in Vişeu administrative subdivision, 7 in Iza subdivision, 17 in Şugatag administrative subdivision and 19 in Sighet administrative subdivision.

³⁴ PCMM, 34/1948, p.105.

³⁵ PCMM, 70/1949.

³⁶In 1949 the party apparatus consisted of the County Committee made of 19 people, two county instructors (March 1949 - three instructors), four members of the organizational section (March 1949 - eight members), two members of the personnel section (March 1949 - seven members), four members of the administrative section; Iza and Şugatag administrative subdivisions committees had 9 members each; Sighet and Vişeu administrative subdivisions had 13 members each; The Party Committee in Ocna Şugatag had 10 members and the one in Câmpulung la Tisa 8 members.

³⁷ CNHA, Fond *Cancelarie (Chancellery)*, 53/1950, p.19.

³⁸ DASMM, Vişeu District Committee (further on Vişeu district), 3/1950.

administrative line³⁹. Although this situation lasted only until July 1952, the loss of the direct “contact” with the central party hierarchy and the separate reporting of the two power centers affected “the quality” of communists’ presence especially in Vișeu area. “An image blow” came to be added by the elimination of Maramureș name from any administrative acts. After amending law in 1950, from September 1952 the two districts are included in Baia Mare region⁴⁰.

The change is obvious even at the political structure level, not only administrative, especially as regards hierarchic relations. Until 1950, Maramureș branch of the Communist Party was coordinated on turns by Cluj and Oradea organizations, while maintaining direct relations with the central bodies, on organizational, administrative, personnel and propaganda line, as well as at the level of the Committee, Bureau and Secretariat. By double subordination before the two structures, numerous dysfunctions occurred while exercising control at the county’s level⁴¹.

Following the division into districts of 1950, exclusively the two committees in the region and the related political apparatuses exercised the party authority in former Maramureș County. At the level of Baia Mare organization, the structure Sighet district belonged to and in 1952 Vișeu⁴² district too, consisted of the Regional Committee made of ten persons, 5 of them also members of the Bureau, the party college of 5 members, a prime-secretary, three secretaries, six chiefs of sections⁴³, four regional instructors and 28 sectors’ chiefs. The 49 activists were grouped depending on the

³⁹ The Party’s arguments for keeping Rodna Region aimed the development perspectives by building a future mining enterprise in Rodnei Mountains, Salva-Vișeu railroad that linked together the two slopes, the fact that Bistrita and Năsăud districts could not be united with other regions, Vișeu district was too far away from Baia Mare, the commissions responsible for districting in Maramureș and Năsăud had already given their approval, *Ibidem*, p.26.

⁴⁰ Decree regarding modification of law 5 of 1950, for dividing into districts the administrative-economic territory of the Popular Republic of Romania, *The Official Bulletin*, no. 50, September 27, 1952, p. 471.

⁴¹ See the activity reports of the party leading bodies, trade-unions and youth working unions (YWU).

⁴² The 1952 territorial reorganization did not modify the party structure, only the number of subordinated district or town committees, DSAMM, Fund Romanian Working Party-Baia Mare (further RWP), 12/1950, p.9-18.

⁴³ The sections of the party’s leading bodies, trade-unions and YWU; propaganda and agitation; industry; planning, finance, trade, cooperative societies, agrarian section, administrative-political section; party personnel verification sector; Regional Committee management, RWP, 12/1950, p.9-18.

party's momentary objectives in sections⁴⁴. Although this organization is maintained all along the period under analysis, the party periodically intervened, at the sections' level, on the composition of the regional Committee and Bureau. In 1954 party work section is set up for women and the industry and trade section, the latter by means of unifying industry, planning, finance, trade and cooperative sections⁴⁵. Three years later, the special personnel verification sector was subordinated to the organizational section, remaining, besides the regional committee Bureau, a verification sector of the regional nomenclature⁴⁶. Although the envisaged transformations should have reduced the personnel expenses, Baia Mare regional was insignificantly affected by this reorganization, as there a minimal party structure operated permanently.

The district committees and Bureaus (September 1950 – 6 districts, July 1952 – 8 districts, December 1960 – 7 districts) as well as two town Committees and Bureaus (Baia Mare and Satu Mare, both towns regional subordination, under RWP statute having the right to be represented at the Committee level) were under the authority of the Regional Committee. Their organization chart consisted of three sections, two sectors⁴⁷, a technical secretariat and 16 sectors subordinated to the sections⁴⁸. As of 1954 four sections were operating (party organs, trade-unions and Young Working Union (YWU)); with responsible role in welcoming candidates and members; propaganda and agitation and industry) and three sectors (party card and statistics, party management and verification). A distinct position was occupied by the newly set up structure of GAC⁴⁹ organizers, with 10 positions that took over the former agrarian sector activity⁵⁰. On the way to the socialist transformation of agriculture and because of the peasants

⁴⁴ 12 with the leading bodies section, 9 for propaganda and agitation, 5 for heavy industry, 3 for planning and finance, 2 for agrarian section, 2 for administrative section, 4 for personnel verification, 4 for party management and 6 for the technical secretariat. The most important party section was that of the party leading bodies, trade-unions and YWU, the chief of this section becoming member in the executive structures of the party (at the adequate level of representation, regional or district). Data concerning the regional and district structures composition come from RWP, 34/1951, p.2, 13, 14, 162; 25/1952, p.3, 6, 15-28; 32/1951, p.97.

⁴⁵ RWP, 26/1954.

⁴⁶ Chancellery, 112/1957.

⁴⁷ Party bodies' sections, trade-unions and YWU, propaganda and agitation, economic, personnel verification sector and an agrarian sector for district Committees.

⁴⁸ Chancellery, 55/1950, p.4-23.

⁴⁹ RWP, 26/1954.

⁵⁰ RWP, 26/1954, p.20-21.

reticence confronted with the party propaganda, the Party increased the wage-earning personnel of the district apparatus by setting up several secretaries' positions. Besides the territorial instructors, new trainers were appointed who were specialized in propaganda, agrarian aspects, party information, letters and audience and personnel verification. The permanent dissatisfaction with the good functioning of the party apparatus and its relation with the masses of working people led to an increase in the organigram of district responsible positions, maintaining or reducing at the same time the regional one.

After districting, the enterprise committees' statutes were modified, which formerly had entered directly the county organization chart. The new regulations maintained the minimum number of members (100) for setting up a local party organization Committee consisting of nine or 11 members, but reduced significantly its representation at the district or town level. In the case of enterprises that belonged to economic priority sectors (heavy industry, metallurgy, extractive industry) visibility was possible by promoting party members with responsible positions in the regional or district executive bodies, while the local party organization with all its structures (committee, bureau, general assembly) were obliged to support the Party's demarches. In case the members' number was insufficient, maximum three local party organizations could be joined to elect a Committee, led by a Secretary or even a Bureau of three or seven members. In their turn, the local party organizations needed a minimum number of three groups to set up and elect a secretary.

Districting was followed by a transformation of the party's basic structures. At Sighet district level, by merging party groups and eliminating the small organizations only 38 local party organizations still remained⁵¹. Because of the split that intervened with members living in villages and parishes who refused to attend activities organized by the commune bureaus, the party decided in 1951 to set up again the village organizations. In January 1951 there were a number of 41 organizations, plus a mixed party group and YWU; in March 1951 their number reached 80 organizations⁵² and 88 in 1952⁵³ having also bureaus.

⁵¹ RWP, 16/1951, p.13.

⁵² 26 enterprise organizations, 14 institutions organizations, a district organization, a GAS organization and 3 GAC organizations, 35 village-territorial organizations.

⁵³ In January 1952 there were one local party organization in heavy industry, nine in CFR (Romanian Railroads) and transportation, three in forestry industry, six in light industry, six in cooperative, 18 in institutions and bureaus, three in

In Vișeu district, the situation was the same in March 1951 when 34 local party organizations⁵⁴ were set up, their number reaching 34 local party organizations in November 1952, 22 of them having bureaus⁵⁵. Against the background of reopening access to the Party, the number of basic structures grew progressively, reaching 95 in Sighet district and 53 in Vișeu in October 1953⁵⁶. These figures do not represent exclusively a party extension to the level of each parish or workshop in the districts. They show the local party structures attempts to prove their efficiency, but also the permanent reorganizing, depending on the momentary objectives. Most of them did not have the minimum number to elect a bureau. If we compare the two districts situation and that of Baia Mare regional we notice that the growth rhythm of the two is clearly inferior to the regional one, showing the difficulty to find ways to bring local inhabitants in the party's ranks. Between August and October 1952, in Baia Mare region, the number of organizations increased from 749 to 907 (after decreasing between January and August from 777 to 749), then to 934 in October 1953⁵⁷ while the number of party members grew⁵⁸ and new organizations were set up for each agricultural structure of the socialist and cooperative type⁵⁹. The trend was going upward, 1284 organizations in 1961⁶⁰, 1681 in 1962⁶¹, 2264 in 1964⁶², while in the districts mentioned above they remained constant. Fluctuations are based on the party statutory changes, on the development of new industrial objectives, on the territorial reorganizing of 1952 and 1960 and on collectivism in agriculture.

districts, one at GAS, three at GAC and 36 in villages, RWP, 23/1952; RWP, 18/1952, p.15-19.

⁵⁴ 13 are organized in productive places and 21 are territorial (village), Vișeu District, 4/1951, p.43.

⁵⁵ RWP, 23/1952; RWP, 18/1952, p.15-19.

⁵⁶ RWP, 17/1954.

⁵⁷ RWP, 17/1954.

⁵⁸ RWP, 23/1952.

⁵⁹ In October 1952 at the regional level 64 local party organizations are set up by transferring part of the village organization members, RWP, 23/1952; RWP, 18/1952, p. 15-19.

⁶⁰ RWP, 32/1960, p.9-13.

⁶¹ RWP, 6/1962, p.47-60.

⁶² RWP, 35/1964, p.5; 2090 of them were territorial, industrial and institutional local party organizations, 42 were section and workshops organizations and 132 local party organizations in GAC.

Human resources policy of the RCP

The RCP started its recruiting program in April 1945. It aimed at organizing as soon as possible the local power centers. Despite the aid from the central power structures, the expectations of the RCP County Committee were weakened. The massive registration campaign limited itself to the needs formulated by the decisional center. Actually, speaking about the first categories of party members and their recruiting mechanisms, we must regard their numbers with circumspection and see behind the figures more a projection of the party's expectations than a realistic and objective evaluation of the real facts. The temporal perspective of the RCP and of the public documents regarding the members' number allows the wording of a staging of the local evolutions. For instance, an extremely interesting fact is the way in which the local characteristics influenced the manner the national and international factors (political, economic and social, concrete and specific for Romania, RCP's position as against the European communist movement and the regime from Moscow, international political evolutions, the reformulation of the objectives and the reinterpretation of the ideological fundamentals that led the RCP) manifested locally.


A first stage can be noticed between 1945-1948 when the motivations for mobilizing the society and promoting the party depend on satisfying the urgent need of staff and on formal justification in front of the countrymen, but as well of the exterior non-communist society who wants to intimidate the opponents and to construct the institutional, economic and social system.

From May 1945 when 100 members were registered ⁶³ to December 1948, with 3581 members⁶⁴ the numerical increase of RCP in Maramureș is 350%. Between these dates the evolutions were neither uniform nor unitary. They reflect the mutations felt by the society as a result of the authority imposed by the communist power; the newly local social and economic polarizing; the direction of the speech and of the ideological propaganda of the party; the strategies of understanding and mobilizing the society; the answer it gave to this politic; the superficial character of the population's perception of the real dimension of communism despite the visible results in the USSR; the state of uncertainty on one hand and of hope on the other hand; people's increased expectations; some party's members demagogy and the honest belief; the steps taken by RCP in generalizing the power, the indications come from the party and the state; the formalism and the lack of control in

⁶³ PCMM, 1/1945, f.1

⁶⁴ PCMM, 44/1948, f.16.

supervising the structure and the local party organisms; the resignation and feeling of betray with which part of the old elite met the transformations of the epoch; the emptying of the opposition's content of speech by its identification with the "collaborationists" and the enemies of the state; attracting on the side of the new power of the disfavored classes, who did not have access to education and culture and their instruction to destroy and eliminate everything related to the past - institutions, people, behaviors or traditions.



In that period the enrollments in the party had an ascendant line: between May 1945 and December 1945⁶⁵, the increase is from 100 to 1514 persons. The massive afflux comes from two directions, on one hand there were enrolled in the party the workers from the functional factories in the county, and on the other hand the first part cells are created in the main administrative institutions. The delay recruiting policy started in the county is noticeable in the reports the County Committee has with the other hierarchical party structures and with the soviet military authorities. In this period the accents lie on the attempt to supply the popular enthusiasm with the selective membership recruitment. Once they became party members, the workers from the salt mines, the wood factories, the power station from Sighet and CFR⁶⁶ become real centers for the propagation of the communist ideas. Around them the first territorial cells are formed, in the neighboring villages and the first district committees are formed. As for Vişeu and Iza the strategies and the results are different. Taking advantage of the great number of the enrolled persons in the Soviet army, and of the ethnic affinities the Ukrainians have with the Soviets, the propaganda aimed at enrolling these communities, promoting and highlighting the attachment to the common Slave family and the contempt towards the rest of communities.

⁶⁵ PCMM, 1/1945, f.1-130.

⁶⁶ PCMM, 1/1945, f. 3-130.


The belonging to the great communist family had to be seen as a valorization of the past, as a detachment from the backward and slavery state the people had been stifled in by the former bourgeois regimes. By the end of 1945 three district committees were formed, but the exact number of members is not known. The sectors' reports of the County Committee and of the district committees are not only briefly drawn up and written in a mediocre way, but they are also confusing, elaborating different statistics for similar situations.

Between December 1945 and December 1947⁶⁷ the number of members becomes triple. In December the Iza district committee is formed and the first attempts to systematize and quantify the organization's dimensions take place. Compared with the events taking place at the headquarters, with RCP already gained statute on the political stage, with the destruction of the opposite centers and Romania's de facto satelization and its inclusion in the Totalitarian Block, the almost desperate attempts of the local organisms to form a functional structure in the district shows the directions the RCP followed, from up to down, from the headquarters to the outskirts aiming at gaining the power. This hardened its mission of penetrating the society and of putting into practice the reformist project. Iza district was a test case. The two years the RCP needed to form a committee is due not only to the small number of members joining the party, almost 100 until 1948, but also to the support of another communist project, namely the focusing of the interest in supporting the PF as against the RCP. The 1946 elections also played an important role in the party enrollment's economy and administration. The application of the agricultural law, the taking of administration, the prevent of the opposition campaign, the maintenance of the form's sake organizations hoping that they would diminish the negative impression about communists, the blackmail, the threatening, the destitutions, affected those who formed, either the group of those called to support the party, or of those identified as enemies of the former.

The obvious decrease number of members in august 1947, as long as the checking action hadn't been initiated, plays the role of clarifying the real dimension the party had reached. The change of the means in which the members were counted and the first member cards were given reduces the fabulous figures so far spread and partially rearrange the statistics of the county organization. Even though in August 1947 there were 2989 party members, until December 1948 there was a slower increase, up to 3581

⁶⁷ PCMM, 25/1947, f.1-44.

people.⁶⁸ However the member cards are still difficult to issue. The amounts of money that had to be paid, some members' frequent renunciation, the inexistence of some regulations that could point out the persons who left the towns or those who were eliminated, the lack of interest of the cell officials or of the local committees, reduced the number of the possessors. In December 1947, 1342 member cards were issued, even though there were 3500 persons enrolled⁶⁹.



Starting with the fall of 1947 the district committees are equally paid attention to, especially to institutions and schools. The difference between Sighet town and Sighet district will constantly reduce, till the latter has the greatest number of party members. The increase of the peasant members determined the repositioning in all the district committees. It is found the different dynamic of the enrollments for Vișeu and Șugatag districts and the very small number of members for Iza district, where there were industrial factories.

The numeric evolution of the party is also strictly linked to the number of places where there were party cells. In February 1946⁷⁰ there were 22, out of which 11 in Sighet district, 6 in Vișeu district, 5 in Șugatag district, and 2 in Iza district. In June 1948⁷¹ this kind of organizations were in all the communes⁷².


⁶⁸ PCMM, 44/1948, f.1-16.

⁶⁹ PCMM, 34/1947, f.53.


⁷⁰ PCMM, 8/1946, f.46.

⁷¹ PCMM, 44/1948, f. 9,13.

⁷² For the analyzed graphics the data were worked out: 1945, from PCMM, 1/1945, f.1, 39-42, 51, 63, 89, 108, 1946 from PCMM, 5/1946, f. 15, 23, 1947, from



The ethnic configuration of the members of the Communist Party met significant mutations especially until March 1946, when, but for the strategic railway between the Hungarian and Ukrainian officials, we can speak about a constant estimate of the Romanians' number and about a noticeable decrease of the Jews⁷³.



The professional training of the candidates and members represented one of the most important criteria of admission in the party. The local situation was such that it didn't manage to satisfy the preferences for the massive enrollment of the workers. As we have already seen, at the basis of the party lay only the groups of workers from the mines and wood factories. The peasants were the second most representative group in the party. The

PCMM, 25/1947, f.17, 35; 1948 from PCMM, 44/1948, f.1, 16, and for September 1948 from PCMM, 49/1948, f.42.

⁷³ The number of Romanians varied from 25% in May 1945 to 41% in November 1945 and to 32,5% in December 1945. Until May 1947 the percentage of the Romanians is under 40% and from September, the same year, when they represented 43%, they become 43% in January 1948, and then 49% in September 1948. The Jewish evolution is contrary: from 40% in May 1945, they descend to 18,2% in December 1945, 11% in August 1946, 9,3% in May 1947, 7% in January 1948, and 4,2% in September 1948. Between September-November 1948 they didn't go beyond 10% of the total enrollments, the percentage of Ukrainians will oscillate between 19% in April 1946 and 20% 1948. As for the Hungarians, they reach the climax in September 1945, after which we can notice a decrease up to 24% in April 1946, and they hold on between 25-28%.

evolutions of the two professional groups oscillated between 1945-1948. It was due less to the immediate needs of the party and more to the enrollments in the party, showing at the same time that the amount of workers had gone over 40%, reaching 51% of the whole in 1957, after which a decreasing tendency was perceived. In December 1948 they represented 31,25%. This increase favored the workers and the peasants. The former, after a certain decrease from 6,3% in February 1946 to 2,4% in May 1947 became until December 1948, 18,20%. It was the same for the peasants. It was now that a new social category appeared, represented by housewives, with a 5,6% percentage. The percentage of intellectuals and the small holders lessened.

After 1948 we can speak about a “superior stage” in the evolution of the party, the institutionalization and capitalization of the human resources, when the ideological and propagandist arguments become important, when the already politically subordinated masses had to be indoctrinated, and when the number of those chosen to propagate but also to take benefits of the previous efforts had to be limited and the members disciplined. The decreasing number of members until 1955, according to the data given by the RMP at a national level, didn't mean the abandon of the fight, but to cultivate the fight against exploitation, against the declared enemies and the emigrants. The checking started at the beginning of 1948 and the stopping of new members joining the party was only one aspect of the party's life. Until the second Congress of the RMP, the party reformed its organizing structure and changed most of the territorial leadership; there were purging processes and the rivals were banished from the leading positions of the party; the institutions of the totalitarian regime were created and the first 5-year-plans were inaugurated.

The stopping of new members joining the RMP didn't mean the reduction of the “revolutionary” vigilance. The basis organizations were charged to damask the “well-being of labor” and to persuade as many people as possible to join the mass organizations. Thus, the party's vitality is felt both at a district level and especially in communes and institutions. Each party member has well-established duties regarding the number of those who were to be persuaded, organization towards which the developed activity has to go as well⁷⁴.

⁷⁴ PCMM, 63/1949, f. 2. See as well districts Vișeu and Șugatag. Taking the example of Bogdan Vodă organization, things function the same in the others, Moiş Ioan planned for the first semester of 1949 to persuade 5 young men to join the Village Youth Organization (VYO). Deac Ioan and Deac Petru had to bring 20 members in PF, and Gogea Vasile was in charge with the enrollments in the Agricultural Union,

In February 1950 the statistics mentioned 3357 party members, distributed in 113 organizations.

The most were in Sighet town, 984 members grouped in 33 organizations followed by Sighet district with 831 members in 23 organizations, Șugatag district with 641 members in 25 organizations, Vișeu district with 625 members in 17 organizations and Iza district with 216 members in 15 organizations⁷⁵. Three months later the data were completely different; according to the same sources there were 3070 members grouped in 116 organizations, out of which 25 inside the institutions, 20 in the factories, 8 district organizations, 61 village organizations, and one GAC and GAS organization.

Actually, despite the so-called enrollment blockage, the number of the members increased and decreased according to the economic and social politics projects. The first economic plan aimed at keeping the workers in the party, more than any other social categories. We notice a smaller number of those eliminated from these categories in Sighet and Șugatag districts. The beginning of the social transformation politic of agriculture and the hunting for kulaks facilitated the paying of attention to the village organizations, the less performing and organized ones, where the meetings, the labor plans and the members' interest did not exist. On the other hand another technique was initiated. It was extensively used after 1952. Its objective was to transfer the communal organizations at GAC's or GAS's, schools, institutions or factories that were in the neighborhood of the place in order to confirm the accomplishment of the aims established by the CC of the RMP or its sections⁷⁶.

Bizau Ion had to persuade 20 people to join the co-operative society. Following the previous years' pattern when the enrollments in the party were based on family relations, bonifications or the interest of the poorest layers against the moral monopoly of the traditional elite, this time the role of the same loyal members was to counter-balance the party's incapacity of monitoring its own structures with the enrollment and political joining in the mass organizations. Not all the members of an organization were favored to serve the party. Of the above mentioned 284 members only five had member card (the Office members and the Secretary); they could also be in charge with the persuading activity. All the others said to be poorly ideologically trained, to lack the fighting spirit and to be easily contradicted by the enemies. The same delimitation took place at the superior levels of the party hierarchy, and the checking followed the same structures. They began with the leading positions and as the new staff took these positions, their files were checked.

⁷⁵ PCMM, 68/1950, f. 11; 83/1950, f. 123.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*.

Still in full process member checking, the party looked for monitoring and finding its ideal formula for its social composition. Lacking experience, it resorted to its own legitimating sources, SUCP, that had a troubled situation between 1918-1924, situation that RMP is identifying with even nowadays. Thus, the information given by the Organizing Leadership of the RWP's CC, on 24 January 1949, proved that the number of members increased only if healthy proletarian groups from the countryside and towns joined the party. The party has to watch closely the changes that take place in its social composition. All party organizations must keep an exact evidence of their composition and tell it periodically to the CC. A very careful attitude is required when non-worker and non-peasant individuals are allowed in the party⁷⁷.

The region is the one that establishes the necessary of staff and members, their typology. The subordinate structures are in charge with the enrollment according to the established instructions. Even though their numbers did not correspond at district level, things were “arranged” at regional level by gathering the information from all the districts⁷⁸. The huge differences among the districts regarding the professional structure, the ethnic and social origin, disappeared due to the interventions at regional level, so that they could represent cues at a reduced scale to the national structure.

Destroying or changing the data, the spread figures, and the amounts measured in percentage or numbers depending on the aimed audience or auditory, was part of the practice and normality of the party's life. Especially after 1950, the tonality and the given rapport statistics of the district and regional activists, as well as the informative notes to the RWP's CC are very different. As the information is stocked and analyzed in decisional structures, no matter if it is about district or region, it gets a more general character also according to the indications from the different plenary sessions.


According to the territorial division, Sighet regional district had 1700 party members, in 87 basic organizations, with a 730 person deficit from April, the same year. It grouped the basic organizations from the former Sighet and Șugatag districts, and Sighet town. Since the checking made at the beginning of 1950 doesn't confirm this huge member loss, it can be put on

⁷⁷ *Politica de cadre a Partidului Muncitoresc Român (Cadres Policy of RWP), 1948-1955*, coordinated by Alina Tudor Pavelescu, Romanian National Archives,(Bucharest, 2006), p 85.

⁷⁸ See the worked data from RWP, 18/1952, 23/1952, 59/1953, 21/1956, 15/1957, 1/1958, 30/1958-1959, 32/1958, 32/1960, 31/1961, 6/1963, 40/1963-1964, 35/1964.

the recounting of party members by the commissions in charge with the territorial division.⁷⁹ 938 of them were from the countryside. The same situation is in Vişeu district. The loss is smaller, almost 200 members⁸⁰. However, what is important for the way the two districts evolved is their belonging to different regions, Baia Mare for Sighet district and Rodna for Vişeu district.

The structure remains constant all along 1952, when only 100 members are lost because of demise, sanction or moving to other places. It is interesting the structure of the members according to the professional branches they come from⁸¹.



The comparative view that we are suggesting between the regional Sighet department and Baia-Mare administration illustrates one of the ideas mentioned before, which is that there is a discrepancy between the structure of members at regional and district levels. Whilst the percentage of members originating from CFR organizations, transport and wood industry in Sighet district is superior to the one in the region, the heavy industry is very weakly represented. Things are levelled out by supporting the organizations in the areas where industry was better organised. Thinking of the economic and ideological motivations behind the changes in September


⁷⁹RWP, 5/1951, f. 6

⁸⁰ Vişeu district, 4/1951, f. 112.

⁸¹RWP, 23/1952, f. 7, 16, 25, 34, 43, 54, 64, 65, 76, 77, 84, 85, 94, 95; 18/1952, f. 2, 15, 16, 19. See the annex with the figures..

1950 this party structure also marks the stage at which we find the national economy, the territorial disposition of industrial branches and the direction of Romanian modernisation. The change found within territorial organizations, once deriving from GAC and association must also be mentioned. Along with the effort of the socialist transformation of agriculture, party members from the new GAC or GAS are also transferring the state organization, reducing its activity to propaganda in the agricultural field.

We must not make the mistake of believing that the large number of rural territorial organizations did automatically lead to the increase of peasant representability. On the contrary, these were weak and numerically challenged, while the number of members in industrial organisations was infinitely higher. Whilst the three organizations in the wood industry had 162 party members, the average for regional organizations was of only 25 members. Many of those were not peasants, but administrative clerks or intellectuals²⁰. This disposition of members also influenced the activation and making of party work more efficient. Human and material effort in the regional committee was low, but the effects were major, while communication with members of the tens of rural organisations was slow.



In Sighet district, at the end on year 1951, workers represented 38.35% of the total number of members, of which 61.64% were unskilled. Peasants represented a percentage of 25.33% and clerks 14.47%⁸². The situation of Viseu district was completely different. Eight months after territorial division, following an investigation of the party's organization sections, syndicates and UTM of the Rodna Regional Committee it was shown that „we have not yet managed to determine the number of members, that some

⁸² *Ibidem.*

members have left without retrieving their coupons, other members have come without relocation coupons". There were serious problems in all of the thirty four organizations as the villages were „culturally behind, did not lead a party life, there was no meeting frequency, did not pay fees"⁸³. Of the approximately 650 members, four fifths come from territorial organisations, 104 being illiterate, and 147 left for seasonal jobs. More so, in six village organizations made up of 204 members, the current language was Ukrainian and territorial instructors are unable to carry on their activities⁸⁴.

Only beginning with September 1952 can we speak of a clear policy concerning RWP options on receiving new members and the directions the party intended to follow, although the Central Committee (CC) tried to define such an action as of 1949⁸⁵. We shall not insist on arguments that postponed by two years the taking of this decision, from the final report presentation on members' verification and up to this date. The four years in which the party's human resources had not been supplied with new members, had consequences both on the party's efficiency and balance, but most of all they encountered difficulties in implementing the economic plans and agriculture collectivization.

To counter possible "attacks" from class enemies, joining the party followed a regulation, namely, to strictly observe criteria on class, ethnic, education

⁸³ RWP, 16/1951, f. 114.

⁸⁴ Vișeu district, 4/1951, f 112.

⁸⁵ Chancellery, *Personnel policy of RWP, 1948-1955*, p.87-88, Note elaborated by the Organizational Direction of CC of RWP, concerning the way in which party candidates must be received; there were three categories of possible candidates: 1. Workers in industry, working women, agricultural employees, poor peasants, soldiers (descending from workers and peasants); 2. Middle peasants and small artisans that did not exploit somebody else's work; 3. Civil servants, intellectuals etc. Those in category I shall prevail, for those in category II and III certain norms were to be received: for middle peasants that did not exploit someone else's work, the recommendations had to be signed by agricultural employees or by the poor peasants; for the small artisans that did not exploit somebody else's work the recommendations had to be signed by workers in industry and not by elements of the small bourgeoisie or by intellectuals; for civil servants and intellectuals, the recommendations had to be signed by workers in industry or by civil servants and intellectuals whose party activity was thoroughly verified. All those giving the recommendations had to observe article 10 of the party Statute, to have a length in party of at least two years and to know the recommended person from a mutual activity of at least six months. To that effect mass organizations were recommended. Those wanting to join the party had to be on probation for at least six months.

and social origin. Action processing was meant to develop in three stages. The first focused on measures to be taken by the Regional Committee, the second referred to District Committees attributions and the last one focused on the local party organizations' tasks. On June 4, 1952 the Regional Committee Bureau, where party members' situation was under scrutiny and instructions from CC of RWP were processed, analyzed the measures. From this moment on, discussions took place at intervals, on hierarchic line⁸⁶.

Although the official starting point was in September, on November 17, there were only 33 candidates in the entire region. The number of those submitting applications was much greater, 27 in Sighet district and 19 in Vişeu⁸⁷. A certain caution prevailed the next year too. In Sighet district, in 1953, only 80 candidates were accepted though over 200 applications had been submitted. The working elements, foremost people in industry, Stakhanovists and YWU prevailed. This mass organization, similarly to the others, numbered over 34.000 members⁸⁸, and its members were favored. Out of the 26 candidates received in March 1952, 17 were coming from YWU. In April, in Vişeu district, 7 members of the YWU were expected and also four foremost people in industry. The situation repeats itself for each calendar month.

Acceptance of new members was the object of repeated changes of strategy. The CC of RWP analysis of 1956 regarding the stage of party joining noticed that, after four years since the Plenary in 1950, "the problem of putting into practice the Resolution regarding verification and restarting to accept new members" was still current. The task was this time to improve social composition and reaching 60% of workers until 1959⁸⁹. The effort is not insignificant, Baia Mare region having to recuperate an 18 percent gap. Of the 3564 candidates proposed for being accepted, 1150 had to be foremost people in industry, innovators and rationalizers. Including candidates in the party's statistics preserved appearances, but finally the number of those joining the party was only of 32%, and exceeding the probation stage that any candidate was forced to pass raised a new problem, for which there were no norms established⁹⁰. Massive enrollment of candidates after 1956,

⁸⁶ RWP, 15/1952, p.53.


⁸⁷ RWP, 15/1952, p.17, 91, 126.

⁸⁸ RWP, 1/1957, p.41-43.

⁸⁹ RWP, 1/1956, p.159-161.

⁹⁰ ANIC, Central Committee (further CC), 36/1956, p.32-41. According to the criteria established by CC of RWP in the session of April 9, 1956, there were three categories of candidates. The first and those benefiting from an easy treatment were the workers in heavy industry. They needed, for their candidates' file, only two recommendations

on the basis of criteria established by CC, became visible in all the local party structures. Workers represented 45,50% in 1956 and 69,23% in 1958, 51,47% and 76,20% in Vișeu district to balance the previous bigger preponderance of peasants and civil servants. The workers-candidates reach 65,15%, 70,18%⁹¹ respectively, at the regional level.



A certain increase in difference among party members and candidates (workers and peasants) can be noticed and it progressively accentuated up to 1960. Granting a superior statute for workers in heavy industry as compared to the rest of social categories, was intended for the created structures to strengthen and assert themselves once Romania's industrialization process started. Taking one example, of 1956, 46,95% of the

from party members with a minimum 3 years length of work in the party, a recommendation certified by the local party organization secretary of those who signed the recommendations and one year probation period. In the second category that could aspire to the member statute, entered the rest of the workers in SMT, GAS, GAC, soldiers, officers, YWU activists, trade union representatives. They needed three recommendations from members with 4 years length of work in the party, a certification recommendation and a year and half probation period. The third category is represented by the other categories of peasants, civil servants, workers, teachers, intellectuals. For them 4 recommendations were necessary from persons with 6 years length of work in the party, the same certification recommendation and a two year probation period. Although they were not mentioned as a separate group, candidates from other parties could be accepted, but only exceptionally. In their case 5 recommendations were necessary, 3 from members with at least 8 years of length of work in the party, and 2 from members that had acted underground or had joined the party at least in 1944. A confirmation from CC of RWP was also necessary. The simple observance of the mentioned criteria was not enough. The local party organization Bureau that analyzed the applications had to be careful with respect to the social origin, education and recommendations' content.

⁹¹ RWP, 23/1954-1955, p.1;15/11957, p.1-5; 30/1958-1959, p.1; 31/1961, p.1-4; 6/1963, p.47-60.

workers were of worker origin and 43,86% were of peasant origin⁹². Not all those stating their professional education as workers were actually in the production activity. This statute ensured for many of them the access to leading positions or other administrative works in the state apparatus, mass organizations or party structure. In January 1957, 682 workers had such “beaurocratic” activities, and for production barely 63,52% of the total of workers were included. Among them 73,82% worked in heavy industry⁹³. What CFR (Romanian railroads) used to represent in the previous years, the tough party nucleus, was now the mining and chemical industry, metallurgy and machine building industry. 3041 party members and candidates came from the 7154 who worked in industry⁹⁴. Until 1961, their number increased progressively and included almost all those working in the mining and non-ferrous industry, mentioning that the percentage reached 92,9% for those working underground; 85,4% among the workers in constructions, 88% of the workers in machine building industry; 85,2% of those in light and food industry, 87% of the forestry industry workers and 88,9% of GAS workers⁹⁵. These figures speak of the critical condition the “working class” was in, reduced in number and obliged to massively join the party.

Party joining no longer followed the CC established norms, but rather the effort to meet the required percentages⁹⁶. In 1963, they came to have 25,23 % of the workers in the entire region as party members or candidates, while at national level, the percentage reached 18,02%⁹⁷. Accepting members without probation period became the current practice; for six months, in 1962, 515 such new members were accepted, 105 workers, 343 peasants, 67 engineers specialists in agriculture and intellectuals⁹⁸. This practice continued the next year, out of the 338 accepted members, 81 were workers, 216 collectivists, 15 engineers, technicians and specialists in agriculture and 26 teachers and schoolmasters in villages⁹⁹.

The situation was a little bit more nuanced in the territory, as the following graph shows¹⁰⁰. The two analyzed districts presented other industrial

⁹² RWP, 15/1957, p.287.

⁹³ RWP,1/1958, p.287.

⁹⁴ RWP, 15/1957, p 1-5.

⁹⁵ RWP, 31/1961, p.1-4.

⁹⁶ RWP, 6/1963, p. 47-60.


⁹⁷ RWP, 6/1963, p.48.

⁹⁸ RWP, 6/1963, p.49.

⁹⁹ RWP, 40/1963-1964, p. 45-50.

¹⁰⁰ RWP, 23/1954, p.9, 19; 21/1956, p. 22,28; 15/1957, p. 23-34; 30/1958-1959, p. 22,28; 31/1961, p.9, 13; 40/1963-1964: Vișeu district, 4/1951, p.112.

specifications than those promoted by the party. In Vişeu district, the party started from a reverse ratio between peasants and workers, the latter hardly succeeding in representing half of the peasants' percentage. A noticeable change can be remarked once Borşa mining exploitation opened, moment that marked an increase of workers preponderance. Although party activists efforts were obvious, only a small part of the new employed are received in the party, at least until 1960. The biggest share belonged to the forestry industry workers, 327 of a total of 837 members and party candidates as mentioned in the 1957 census¹⁰¹. They were in fact peasants that worked in the forests and had no professional training. Only after 1961 a certain re-establishment of the party social composition can be noticed, as massive investments took place in industry here also. The number of workers was very little even compared to Sighet district. The growth was constantly on an ascending trend, but workers came from forestry industry also, from CFR and light industry¹⁰².



The interest exclusively shown to workers ended in 1960, when, although they claimed that "accepting new members is a permanent task, that is not performed in campaigns and that must meet the right social composition"¹⁰³, the peasants, specialists and intellectuals drew the communists leaders attention. Turning their attention to the peasantry occurred against the background of forced collectivism on the entire Romanian territory. Plus the organizational and human impossibility to mobilize the entire party personnel in performing simultaneously several activities. Focusing their interest on agriculture turned all party components and resources to finalizing the socialist transformation of agriculture and organization of

¹⁰¹ RWP, 15/1957, p. 29-34.

¹⁰² RWP, 15/1957, p.23-28.

¹⁰³ Chancellery, 36/1956, p.4.

party life and of territorial organizations. The campaign was based on bringing to the party's ranks of the best collectivists, with authority and prestige in their villages, of associated peasants, but exclusively from localities where GAC was non-existent even though they had applied for GAC, of specialists in agriculture, of agricultural workers, whose number had to represent 35% of the newly received, of newly promoted brigade leaders and foremen¹⁰⁴. Withdrawal of the member quality could not be done only upon approval from the local party organization, but the Regional Committee notification was needed¹⁰⁵.

Indications of number or percentages received from CC of RWP for Maramureş regional, concerning the social structure and repartization of percentages on district, was permanently a standard against which activists performances were valued as well as sections' activity¹⁰⁶.

Structure	Year	Workers		Peasants		Civil servants		Women	
		Indicated	Achieved	Indicated	Achieved	Indicated	Achieved	Indicated	Achieved
MM region	1960-1961	66,5%	59,2%	27,8%	27,3%	5,7%	13,5%	21,5%	11,9%
Sighet District		70%	65,8%	25%	13,9%	5%	20,3%	25%	24,7%
Vişeu District		70%	77,7%	25%	6,1%	5%	16,2%	20%	6,7%
MM region	1962	41,98%	37,95%	39,46%	24,94%	15,75%	15,51%		
Sighet district	1963	25%	39,6%	61,36%	41,68%	29,19%	16,46%	36,36%	30,10%
Vişeu district		22%	48,5%	66,54%	27,83%	27,45%	21,58%	36,36%	20,10%

The change that occurred in the party's vision on categories that should join the party was received at the local level as a commitment, its exceeding coming against other provisions set by communist leaders. Although they were received with a plus of 298 candidates than already established by plan, the District Bureau was criticized for not meeting the set indices. The differences between the supplied data by districts and those quantified by the region are once again visible. Their homogenization, by corroborating statistics in the seven districts the region consisted of, was the object of activity for the organizational section, so that in the end things engaged on the required direction.

¹⁰⁴ RWP, 32/1960, p2-9, presidents from 22 GAC and 216 associations are not party members and candidates, 64,55% of the brigadiers and 89,07% of the teams' chiefs are not party members or candidates.

¹⁰⁵ RWP, 32/1960, p.12-13.

¹⁰⁶ RWP, 32/1960, p.1; 6/1963, p.48, 94.

The attention given to the collectivist peasants increased even after the official closing of collectivization, The Regional Committee drawing the attention to local party organizations secretaries' that collectivist peasants' percentage must reach over 40%. In 1963, 4789 party candidate and member peasants are accepted with no probation period in order to meet the percentages imposed by the party¹⁰⁷. The massive increases registered in the case of cooperative and associated peasants¹⁰⁸ had to compensate the dissatisfaction in the rural space and annihilate those, who although members with age-old stages in the party, had refused to submit applications to join GAC. The transfer of members from territorial organizations to GAC offered the necessary support for the envisaged increases, no less than 35 committees being thus set up in the first three months of 1963, to which 65 local party organizations were added¹⁰⁹.

For the party leadership the proletariat, represented by workers and peasants, was not the only preoccupation. Equally there were requirements for an increase in number of the intellectuals, of didactic personnel in the rural environment, the specialists in agriculture, the engineers and technicians. Their role became important only now, after the periods of consolidation of the working class, adoption of communist institutions and practices and ideological strengthening of the party. Vigilance was still awake, but it could be achieved by a tighter control of the personnel and activities performed. Especially after the Plenary of April 1962, stressing the role that these social categories may have in modernizing and edify the state brought them to the party's attention.

Including everybody in the civil servants category and explicitly defining them only when intending to underline sub-categories, their number increased constantly, as young trained people were employed. Even in these structures situation there was a distinct group, that of the civil servants coming from workers¹¹⁰. While the importance of school education was valued and supported by the party, many of the party members were supported to continue their studies. Transfer from one category to another, though not changing the human composition, modified the ratio among the different


¹⁰⁷ RWP, 6/1963, p. 47-60.

¹⁰⁸ In 1960 out of the 703 peasants received in the party, 54,62% were collectivists, 45,38% associated and only 3,74% were peasants with individual households, while a year before the percentage was of 30%. RWP, 32/1960, p.1-5.

¹⁰⁹ RWP, 40/1963-1964, p.45-50.

¹¹⁰ RWP *personnel policy, 1948-1955, p.257-261, Guide regarding determination of social status and of the social origin of party members and of those that require to join the party, October 9, 1951.*

social groups and elements. In 1962, 109 agricultural engineers were accepted without probation period (the task in the region was of 152) and 250 teachers and schoolmasters. As concerns the party members’ studies, mention should be made that illiteracy disappeared and the share of those with secondary education increased. Although there is no special mention regarding persons that wanted to study or were forced to join the party, school education became ever more important for promoting in administrative, state and mass organizations positions¹¹¹.



Once again Vişeu district had the highest rate of illiteracy, but at the same time one could notice the highest rhythm of growth as regards members with elementary and secondary education, while at the region and Sighet district’s level the tendency was the decrease in elementary education in favor of secondary and higher education.


The party’s ethnic composition was the object of repeated attitude changes of the communists leaders¹¹². Without going into debate as concerns the theoretic position adopted by the Marxism-Leninism regarding the relationship with the “cohabiting nationalities”, the motivations and used terminology, of interest to us is the way in which this problem was solved locally. The ethnic amalgam that characterized the inter-war Maramureş had visible consequences on the ethnic structure of the party and welcoming the communist doctrine.

After districting, Baia Mare region preserved the same eclectic character, but the position of some of the well represented groups in the former Maramureş county was eroded. The Ukrainians and the Germans lost

¹¹¹ RWP, 15/1957, p 1-5, 22-28, 29-34;; 31/11961, p 1-4; 40/1963-1964, p. 45-50; 35/1964, p. 1-5.

¹¹² RWP, 23/1954, p. 9, 19; 21/1956, p.22,28; 15/1957, p.23-34; 30/1958-1959, p. 22, 28; 31/ 1961, p. 9, 13; 40/ 1963-1964; Vişeu district, 4/1951, p.112

themselves in the mass of other ethnic groups, their share reaching hardly 3,6%, 0,9% respectively¹¹³. The Hungarian community had a different statute. Its growth was important, reaching a representativity of 27,8%, while in Sighet district the Hungarians represented 15,87%, and in Vișeu district only 2,9%. The Romanian population reached 66% for the region, 70,42% in Sighet district and 75,50% in Vișeu district¹¹⁴.



Transformations in the ethnic composition, because of the decimation of the Jewish community, of the marginalization of the German population, of diminishing child mortality and increase in the living standard had implications on the preponderance that each of these ethnic groups had in the party.

We already saw that the ethnic minorities' interest towards the communist system had many connotations and motivations, which determined their number to be superior as compared to their share in the population. The interest to enroll massively Romanians, but also for "a fair representation of all coinhabiting nationalities in the party in compliance with the Plenary of April 1962"¹¹⁵, had less ideological and economic valence than political or strategic. After the promotion of Hungarians in the regional and district party apparatus that was the object of certain special norms and directives in the autumn of 1956, after the territorial reorganization of 1952 where the economic interests were doubled by the necessity to respect the Soviet experience in relation to the minorities, RWP tried to recuperate the percentage gap between the two communities, Hungarian and Romanian, by establishing a fixed number of Hungarians that could join the party.

¹¹³ Romania's General Census of 1956.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁵ RWP, 6/1963, p.58.

The autonomy policy initiated by the Romanian leaders needed a change of the propaganda content, scored by an increase in interest for the Romanian nation. The party conferences, speeches, work plans of the party sections, all promoted the idea of correlating the preponderance of the party members representing a certain ethnic group with the share present in the population structure. A lot of calculations were made, to this end, and they stated that 75% of the accepted members in 1962 and 1963 should be of Romanian ethnic¹¹⁶. Improvement in Romanians' representation was not made by eliminating the others, but only by facilitating their access, eliminating the probation period or restricting acceptance of the others. Once the Hungarians' positions eroded, the first aimed at by the new orientation, the interest in promoting the Ukrainians decreased. Their share in the party still remained significant in the districts they lived, but in the personnel selection policy they were disadvantaged. The German population enjoyed a similar evolution as the Romanians. Neglected by the party propaganda, considered traitors and fascists, the Germans were constantly prevented from joining the party. After 1960, their cultural inheritance was revalued, against the background of the relationship established between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany, so this population was supported to join the party, and promoted both in the party and in economy.

Conclusions

All along our study we focused upon two coordinates on which the imposing of the communist regime occurred locally, considering them not only illustrative but also emblematic for the taken steps: the "modernization" by the import of the soviet pattern and the human resources identified, selected and promoted by the party in local leading functions through the party and administrative structures of the mass organizations. The transplant of political system changed firstly the political and administrative institutions, the means of the communist process but also the relations between the human community and the state-party and the inter-human relations. To deal with the power ambitions and Moscow's requests, the RCP needed a good organizing structure, disposed in the territory, with well shaped control keys, in a continuous search of the ideal manifestation formula. The good State's functioning depended on the party's good functioning. Hardly had the revolutionary import come to an end when the USSR and the Romanian communists' interest focused on the consolidation of the political regime. The organizing construct of the party

¹¹⁶ RWP, 6/1963, p.52.

was parallel with the increasing of the social basis of party members' recruitment and the taking over of the local decisional administrative structures. The problems that appeared in Maramureş at the functioning of the Party's structure and at the level of joining the party were not related only to the organizing form, common and compulsory in the whole country, but to its functioning and efficiency. However the particularities of the political life do not lie in the number of party functions and positions but in their ability of accomplishing the established duties and attributions and in the relations they are with the party hierarchy.

As we can notice from this analysis, this demarche supposed to pass through certain stages, by means of which the first support structure was made round a tough nucleus, ideological nucleus belonging to underground communists, identification of the working class members willing to follow and submit to the strictness of a new type of organization, with new organizational methods and practices, with purposes and expectations different from those promoted up to that moment.

Beyond their preoccupation to have the organizational structure in perfect correlation to the system of ideological believes and the way to interpret them¹¹⁷, recruitment of human resources to comply with this structure of command and to play the role of the activist and of the propaganda man needed efforts and flexible strategies, though doctrinarian rigidity proved inflexible. The immediate reality of putting into practice the Stalinist-Leninist precepts stroke against the society refusal to accept reorganization, first social, of already known organizational formulae, but also the struggle for power, that was contagious and in the absence of a political dispute between well individualized adversaries, transformed itself into a war of attrition between pseudo-allies in principles, but enemies in practice and convictions. On this action line found itself the recruitment policy of members and of party structure strengthening.

The party's actions seen more and more frequently as being non-unitary and directly depended on its employees' goodwill, servility, correctness and interests, is due to the free and decisional behavior assumed by each level of the party structure decided by the almighty leading character, the impossibility of job safety assurance in the case of some open or latent conflicts with an influent member of the Party, no matter his position, of

¹¹⁷ Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthrough and National Development: the Case of Romania 1944-1965*, Berkely and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971, p.144.

some staff's desire of affirmation or the creation of some groups well-individualized in the Party, through the help of which each local leader supported his reliable men, promotions and demission were made. The consolidation of these practices was obvious after 1952 in the Regional Committee Office and in the District Committee Offices.

Another important aspect of the process of "districtazition" is the way some statistics sent to Bucharest were changed. The shortcomings were changed and transformed so as the number game, that lied at the basis of the assessment of the party staff's records, to correspond to the norms required by the headquarter. The institutional dimension where the relation between the headquarter (either regional or of district) did not succeed in satisfying either the leading power's necessities or the society's. That's why the system's creation had both a social and a cultural dimension. The misunderstandings generated by the staff's lack of professionalism, by the organizing and social mobilizing problems at the superficial level the RWP had managed to interfere in the society were obvious especially the party members were recruited. The Party addressed to some professional, ethnic categories and some different institutional structures, distinctively. An analysis of their evolution along 20 years highlights the complexity of the mentioned phenomenon and the fact that the relations between the Party and masses were marked by syncope, periods of mobilization, relaxation or terror.

The Young Revolutionary's Myth: The Nicolae Ceaușescu's Case

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"The question at issue is not whether or not should be a cult of the individual, but rather whether or not the individual concerned represents the truth. If it does, then he should be revered". Mao Tse-tung¹

The article deals with the way in which the Nicolae Ceaușescu's biography as a professional revolutionary was constructed by the Romanian propagandistic apparatus. The identification of the main events of his revolutionary activity is presented in relation with the methods used for the rectification of their official version, underlying the possible motivations behind the effort of assigning to Nicolae Ceaușescu a false major role in their manifestation. As I would demonstrate below, Ceaușescu was not a unique case of a dictator preoccupied of the falsifying his revolutionary past. In fact, his official biography is similar to other political leaders' biographical accounts in its thematic content and in the symbolic meanings attached to the main events of his earlier political activity.

Key words: Communism, Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Young Revolutionary's Myth Celebrations; The Cult of Personality

In most cases, the cult of personality created around the famous dictators of the 20th century (such as Stalin, Fidel Castro, Mao Tse-tung, Saddam Hussein, Nicolae Ceaușescu etc.) has included among its thematic manifestations the modified presentation of some episodes of their revolutionary past. These events are usually related to their initial activity within the political organizations that gradually have propelled them to the highest echelons of the party or / and state power. The press and other forms of homage accounts about the revolutionary activity of the dictators of the 20th century were mainly based on their official biographies. In some cases, their official character was established by a political decision or it was a direct consequence of the publicly acknowledged of the authority of the biographer or /and the publishing house where the volume had been printed. Therefore, these official volumes identified the thematic, the

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Talks at the Chengtu Conference*, March 1958, (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_06.htm, accessed on 27th September 2006).

explanatory and prescriptive lines to be followed in making of the subsequent biographical accounts².

The importance given to these official biographies is underlined by the various forms used for the popularization of their content. The most frequent forms refer to the published materials such as books, brochure, manifests, press articles, novels or any other kind of literary production (poems in Fidel Castro case³). In some cases, the biographical information related to the past of the political leader was included as one of the subject of the courses within the party or normal schools (see for example, the cases of Mátyás Rákosi⁴ or Saddam Hussein⁵) or as a topic of some artistic movies. The motivations that have propelled such propagandistic falsifications related to the revolutionary past of the different political leaders are various and usually related to the specific historical conditions of the country. For example, given the situation of the newly created Yugoslav state, the underling of Tito's exceptional activity during the liberation war was an argument used by the official propaganda in order to present him as the only capable person of overseeing the country's road to reconstruction and stability⁶.

In spite of the normal differences generated by the local conditions, the dictators' official biographies present a common, general characteristic that explains the intended proliferation of the biographical accounts: the personal need of legitimating their exceptional power positions by highlighting their extraordinary revolutionary activity directed against the old regime. A closer examination of the official biographies of the dictators of the 20th century reveals not a distinctive character, but a general, impersonal and idealized model of a militant, a model that should be emulated by the members of the party or by the entire society. Therefore, the biographical accounts were to become a code of the moral and officially accepted or

² Balázs Apor, "Leader in the Making: The Role of Biographies in Constructing the Cult of Mátyás Rákosi", in Balázs Apor (editor), *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*, (New-York, 2004), pp. 63, 65.

³ Scott Park, „Elian faces Communist reeducation in Cuba”, *Human Events*, (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200004/ai_n8895842, accessed 1st August 2007).

⁴ Balázs Apor, "Leader in the Making: The Role of Biographies in Constructing the Cult of Mátyás Rákosi", Balázs Apor (editor), pp.63, 71-72.

⁵ Mark Bowden, „Tales of the Tyrant”, *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 2002, (www.theatlantic.com, accessed 4 februarie 2004)

⁶ Stanislav Sretenovic, Arton Puto, "Leader Cults in Western Balkans (1945-1990): Josip Broz Tito and Enver Hoxha", in Balázs Apor (editor), pp. 209-210.

desired qualities that were to characterize “new man” of the newly created state or society⁷.

The falsification of the different moments of the political leaders’ biography is usually related to their contribution to the history of the political organization that promoted them. This determines, in fact, a re-interpretation of the history of that organization in order to include the so-called exceptional activity of the respective dictator. The reinterpretation refers to the several patterns or types of thematic moments. They are usually related to the symbolic foundation of the new political regime (for example, the Stalin’s role during the 1917 October Revolution⁸) or to the different confrontations of the future leaders with the official representatives of the old regime (see for example, Saddam Hussein’s contribution to the failed attempt of murder against the Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qassem⁹). These conflicts with the former political regime had a symbolic role, namely that of testing, exercising and confirming the exceptional leadership qualities of the militant. Invariably, the detention period receives the meaning of a formative period. The future leaders used this time in order to impose on him a severe discipline, to complete his own and others’ political education and finally to exercise on a smaller scale, his special qualities of direction.

The reinterpretation of the official history of the party from the point of view of the prospective leader takes into the consideration his relationship with other political personalities. For example, Stalin associated himself with Lenin in the position of his deputy and private confessor in order to gain legitimacy for his leadership¹⁰. Similar to Stalin, Fidel Castro promoted the cult of Jose Marti and Che Guevara in order to present himself as a faithful successor of their revolutionary efforts and ideals¹¹. In some cases, the

⁷ For more details regarding this aspect, see Balázs Apor, “Leader in the Making....”, pp. 76-77.

⁸ See for example, Karen Petrone, *Life has Become More Joyous, Comrades. Celebrations in Time of Stalin*, (Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 162-163, 165; Roy Medvedev, *Stalin și stalinism* (Bucharest, 1991), 18-19; Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank you, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, (Princeton, 2000), p. 61.

⁹ For more details, see Efraim Karsh, Inari Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein. A Political Biography* (New-York, 1991), pp. 17-18.

¹⁰ For more details about this subject see for example, Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!: The Cult of Lenin in Soviet Russia*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

¹¹ See for example, Jean-François Fogel, Bertrand Rosenthal, *Sfârșit de secol la Havana*, (București, 1999), 198, 211; Tad Szulc, *Fidel. A Critical Portrait*, (Perennial. An Imprint of Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), pp. 21, 75, 87, 643;

exaggerated version on the dictators' biography does consider not only their person and their activity, but also the impact of their actions on the others. For example, the attitude of peasants from Sierra to Castro was not as spontaneously enthusiastic as the latter propaganda led people to believe¹².

I have distinguished two main methods of falsification the early revolutionary activity of different political leaders. First manner is related to the exaggeration of the prospective leaders' roles during the different political activities or even the invention of such situation in order to highlight their exceptional, "correct" qualities of the (for example, the Stalin's role during the 1917 October Revolution¹³ or Saddam Hussein's contribution to the failed attempt of murder against the Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qassem¹⁴). The second method refers to the diminution or the omission of other historical characters that could have cast a shadow on the leaders' revolutionary performances (see for example, the Mátyás Rákosi's case¹⁵).

Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography includes a mixture of omissions and inventions regarding its main episodes. In my opinion, their fabricated character is meant, on one hand, to hide the insignificance of the Romanian leader's revolutionary activity and, on the other hand, to justify its predestination for the epochal achievements of the future Conducator, Nicolae Ceaușescu. The Ceaușescu's biographical narrative was also used to legitimize his special position within the party and the state apparatus. This position was invariably presented as the well-deserved reward of his previous revolutionary activity against the old regime and of his full dedication to the cause of building communism in Romania.

My bibliographical sources include the articles identified in different Romanian newspapers (*Scanteia, Romania Literara, Flacara, Luceafarul*) between 1965-1989. Some of them present the official version on a singular event included in Ceaușescu's biography while the others contain a general perspective of his earlier revolutionary activity. My research highlights the

<http://www.stanford.edu/depts/hasrg/german/exhibit/GDRposters/che.htm>
l, accessed 1 august 2007.

¹² Leycester Coltman, *The Real Fidel Castro* (New Haven and London, 2003), 118 and Richard Weitz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America 1960-80", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, (No. 3 1986): 402.

¹³ See for example, Karen Petrone, pp.162-163, 165; Roy Medvedev, pp.18-19; Jeffrey Brooks, p.61.

¹⁴ For more details, see Efraim Karsh, Inari Rautsi, *op.cit.*, pp.17-18.

¹⁵ Also see, Balázs Apor, "Leader in the Making: The Role of Biographies in Constructing the Cult of Mátyás Rákosi", in Balázs Apor (editor), pp.72-76.

fact the appearance of the specific press accounts on this subject is strictly related to the officially marking of the anniversary of the respective event (for example, the passing of 45 or 50 years since the taking place of the episode). This situation does not exclude the mentioning of the same events as the parts of the official history of the party in the newspapers, sometimes even omitting or only superficially mentioning Nicolae Ceaușescu's contribution to their manifestation. The second category of bibliographical sources consists of the biographical homage volumes dedicated to Nicolae Ceaușescu. They invariably include a part dedicated to revolutionary activity of the Romanian communist leader. Among them, the volume signed by the French journalist Michel-P. Hamlet became Ceaușescu's first official biography and consequently, the reference for all the similar subsequent works printed in Romania and abroad. The same referential value was given to the contributions of the Romanian party historian, Olimpiu Matichescu. His research concentrated on the underling of the so-called Ceaușescu's exceptional contribution to the political activities of the RCP during the inter-war period and also became the reference for other related contributions. The archival documents and memories of different ex-RCP leaders were also used in order to identify the real political course of the young Nicolae Ceaușescu.

Using the qualitative analysis of the bibliographical sources will provide the data for the analysis of the way in which Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography is reconstructed, following the typology drawn on by Sorin Șerban¹⁶, also retaining the following elements: 1) the existence of a pattern and variations in falsifying the main moments of Ceaușescu's activity as a professional revolutionary by comparing the official version with information from different sources; 2) the illustration of the changes in the depiction of these moments of Ceaușescu's revolutionary activity in time and sometimes at the same author; 3) the comparison of the way in which personal history of Nicolae Ceaușescu's intersected that of the Romanian Communist Party (hereafter abbreviated as RCP); 4) an insight into the motives of selection, re-interpretation or even the alteration of the significance of some events of RCP history in order to introduce Nicolae Ceaușescu as a main character.

In his PhD thesis, Adrian Cioroianu analyzes the relation between the Romanian society and the Conducatorul Nicolae Ceaușescu, including the phenomenon of the Romanian communist leader's personality cult as part

¹⁶ See Sorin Șerban, "Ilegaliștii" ("The Underground Militants") in Lucian Boia (ed.), *Miturile comunismului românesc* (Bucharest, 1996), pp.133-136.

of this relation. He distinguishes seven main mythical features of Nicolae Ceaușescu. They are the following: the young revolutionary, the theorist, the architect of modern Romania, the hero of the national independence, the champion of peace, the patron of national unity, the father of the nation¹⁷.

According to the same author, these mythical features constitute the basis for the so-called *representations*. These representations are the basis for building the Nicolae Ceaușescu's cult of personality. They represent that imaginary and discursive constructions created by the propaganda apparatus having essentially a legitimizing role and they are characterized by a perpetual process of invention or reinvention in order to create a protean image or representation of one leader (in my case, Nicolae Ceaușescu) whom any citizen can identify with¹⁸.

Thus, I find revelatory Marry Ellen Fischer's observation that the Romanian propaganda has created for Ceaușescu a protean idol: "a peasant hero to appeal to the majority of Romanians who were born peasants; a revolutionary hero to appeal to the communist political elite; and a Romanian national hero to bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled in contemporary Romania by identifying the RCP at long last national unity and sovereignty in the person of Ceaușescu"¹⁹.

1. The 26th January

The celebration of Ceaușescu's birthday on 26th January 1978 marked irremediably the public overwhelming intrusion of a private celebration into the official calendar of the anniversaries established by the Romanian communist regime.

Anneli Ute Gabanyi²⁰ and Silviu Curticeanu²¹ mentioned that on 26th January 1978 was the first time when Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary activity was introduced in the publicist discourse. But our findings regarding the materials published on the occasion of Nicolae Ceaușescu's

¹⁷ Adrian Cioroianu, *Ce Ceaușescu qui hante les Roumains. Le mythe, les représentations et le culte du Dirigeant dans la Roumanie communiste* (deuxième édition révisée) (Bucharest, 2005), pp.182-209.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 36-38, 182.

¹⁹ Marry Ellen Fischer, *Nicolae Ceaușescu. A Study in Political Leadership* (Boulder, 1989), p.34.

²⁰ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *The Ceaușescu Cult. Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, (Bucharest, 2000), p. 22.

²¹ Silviu Curticeanu, *Mărturia unei istorii trăite. Imagini suprapuse* (Bucharest, 2000), pp.145-146.

birthday reveals that the 26th January 1973 represents the beginning of referring to him as a professional revolutionary. Consequently, Ceaușescu celebrated his 55th anniversary and “four decades of revolutionary activity within the party”²².

Beginning with the 1978, the revolutionary character of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s biography was to become an indispensable thematic element of his birthday celebration. Therefore, from 1978 until the demise of this regime, on 26th January Nicolae Ceaușescu celebrated his birthdays and significant numbers years of an “uninterrupted revolutionary activity”²³.

Silviu Curticeanu mentioned that Ceaușescu’s consciousness assuming of the quality as a professional revolutionary was due to his lacking of any genuine proletarian activity. Looking for an argument to justify his exceptional merits, he adopted the convenient formula of the “professional revolutionary”²⁴.

In my opinion, the revolutionary aspect of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s biography encompasses two main features determined by the existence of a continuous celebration of his revolutionary activity: one is related to the image of Ceaușescu as a professional revolutionary. Influenced by the generous communist ideals, the Romanian communist leader dedicates his youth to the cause of the workers’ movement, fighting against the old regime in order to replace it with a socialist one. The other aspect regards Ceaușescu’s biography from a different point of view. He remains the same man devoting his life to the cause of victory of socialism, but he is doing it not by fighting against the political establishment. Instead, he is involved in theoretically and practically planning the material and the spiritual basis of the new socialist order, especially after 1965.

Besides this imposition of the double significance attributed to Ceaușescu’s birthday, the cultic manifestations around him diversified to include new forms of official recognition of his “revolutionary activity”. For example, in 1983 Ceaușescu received “the first jubilee medal specially instituted and granted to the comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu on the occasion of his reaching 50 years of revolutionary activity and of its anniversary”²⁵. In 1988, a common decision of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the RCP and of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of

²² *Omagiu tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al PCR, președintele Consiliului de Stat al RSR* (Bucharest: Politică, 1973), 26 or *Scântea* 55, 9402 (26 January 1973), p.1

²³ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, p. 22.

²⁴ Silviu Curticeanu, p. 146.

²⁵ *Flacăra* 32, 4 (28 January 1983), p.3.

Romania awarded Ceaușescu the new jubilee medal and for the second time (first time in 1978) the supreme decoration of "Hero of Socialist Republic of Romania" and the "Victory of Socialism" Order²⁶.

From 1983, on the press have included another way of expressing appreciation towards Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary virtues on his birthday, namely the homage messages and letters belonging to RCP, state, mass, cultural organizations²⁷.

The homage exhibitions were organized on the same occasion. For example, in 1987, the "Dalles" Hall in Bucharest housed an exhibition named "Homage" and in 1988 another display "Under the Banners of the Party, Republic's Columns of Light" was organized at The Art Museum of the Socialist Republic of Romania. The sections of these exhibitions pointed out the role of the general-secretary in the preparation and in the implementation of the program for the general development of Socialist Romania, the great achievements of Ceaușescu's epoch, photos and documents related to the most important moments of the Romanian leader's revolutionary activity²⁸.

The Romanian National Television included a special program narrating the Ceaușescu's revolutionary youth. For example, in 1978, the 26th TV channel program enclosed an homage movie "A Life Dedicated to the People's Happiness"²⁹ and in 1983 another one simply named "The Homage"³⁰.

Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary youth was also the subject of other activities (such as symposiums, public debates and discussion, books and art exhibitions, films, contests of the type "Who knows, answers") organized by the RCP local organizations, museums, cultural and educational organizations etc.³¹.

²⁶ *Flacăra* 37, 4 (29 January 1988), p.7.

²⁷ See for example, *Flacăra* 32, 4, (28 January 1983) p. 2; *Flacăra* 36, 5 (30 ianuarie 1987), p. 2-3; *Flacăra* 37, 4 (29 ianuarie 1988) p.6-7; *România Literară* 16, 4 (26 ianuarie 1983), p.1.

²⁸ *România Literară* 20, 5 (29 January 1987) p. 18; *România Literară* 21, 4 (21 January), p.18

²⁹ *Flacăra*, 27, 6 (9 February 1978), p.3

³⁰ *Flacăra*, 32, 5 (4 February 1983), p.2.

³¹ For details and examples, see *Scântea* 51, 12258 (21 January 1982), p. 5; 12259 (22 January 1982), p.4; 12261 (24 January 1982), p.7; 12262 (26 January 1982), p.4; *Scântea* 55, 13507 (26 January 1986), p.6; *Scântea* 58, 14442 (25 January 1989), p.2; 14443 (26 January 1989), p. 4 etc.

2. The Beginning of Ceaușescu's Revolutionary Activity

Beginning with the year of 1978, the official discourse underlines Nicolae Ceaușescu's predestination for his future career by mentioning the significance attached to his birthday and to his native place.

Nicolae Ceaușescu was born on January 26th 1918, in the village of Scornicești, the Olt County. Two symbolical meanings were given to the Romanian leader's birthday. The first one is related to the fact that the year of 1918 was also the year of making the Great Romania³². The second relates the day of 26th of January to the unification of Moldavia and Walachia, which took place on 24 January 1856³³.

The historical value of Scornicești was also emphasized. As the press mentioned the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the founding of Ceaușescu's native village in September 1979, it was considered one of the oldest Romanian settlements³⁴. The Scornicești Museum displayed all sorts of exhibits, ranging from archeological vestiges found in the village to documents attesting its inhabitants' participation in the revolution of 1821 and 1848, in the 1877 war of independence and in the peasant uprising from 1907³⁵.

The village of Scornicești was indirectly included in the history of the Romanian protochronism. In 1981, a Romanian anthropologist discovered the remains of the most ancient hominid on the European continent and named it "Australanthropus Olteniensis". The name indicated that the Olt region was the founding place of these remains and therefore it introduced the hypothesis that the Ceaușescu's native region was also the place where the anthropogenesis in Europe started³⁶.

Analyzing the underground militants' biographies, Sorin Șerban has distinguished several common elements of them.

The first element is the *hard life*³⁷. Nicolae Ceaușescu was born in a family of poor peasants as one of the ten children. He lived in a small and a modest home. As a child, he had to work side by side with his parents in the fieldwork, proving himself the tenacious member of his family. This was the

³² Michel-P. Hamelet, *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Biografie și texte selectate*, (Bucharest: Politica, 1971), p.9.

³³ *România Literară* 15, 4 (21 January 1982), p.1.

³⁴ *Flacăra* 28, 39 (27 September 1979), p.2-3; *România Literară* 12, 39 (27 September 1979), p.12.

³⁵ *Flacăra* 27, 3 (19 January 1978), p.5.

³⁶ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, pp.163-168.

³⁷ Sorin Șerban, pp.136-137.

moment when the future leader experienced “the landowner exploitation” and started to interiorize a strong feeling of revolt against the established social order³⁸.

The young Ceaușescu also proved remarkable qualities and a strong character. Visiting Scornicești, one inhabitant told Ilie Purcaru, the reporter for *Flacăra* that the little Ceaușescu could not bear injustice, he had no fear and he was never afraid of the wolf when going into the forest.³⁹

In his volume dedicated to Nicolae Ceaușescu, Edward Behr mentions that the Ceaușescus were not the poorest family in the village and the lack of financial means was due to drinking habit of the future Romanian communist leader's father, Andruța⁴⁰.

*The thirst for knowledge*⁴¹ is another element of the underground militant's type. All Ceaușescu's teachers (Constantin Grosu, Ion Bărașcu) mentioned his cleverness and intellectual curiosity⁴². His favored matter was history and he was reportedly particularly fond of playing historical games involving national heroes, captains and outlaws, games in which the other children elected him as their chief⁴³. Nicolae Ceaușescu was always “the first in his class” in spite the fact that his family could not afford buying him books and so he was forced to borrow them from his colleagues⁴⁴. In fact, his studies were limited to the elementary level (four classes), but his intellectual deficiency will be balanced by his native intelligence⁴⁵.

At the age of 11, “the age of childhood and innocent games”, the young Nicolae Ceaușescu left his native village to learn a trade⁴⁶. Later, the official

³⁸ *București – Omagiu marelui erou*, (Bucharest, 1988), p. 37.

³⁹ *Flacăra*, 27, 3 (19 January 1978), p.5.

⁴⁰ Edward Behr, <Sărută mâna pe care n-o poți mușca>. *Românii și Ceaușeștii: Investigația unui blestem al istoriei* (București, 1999), p.72-73.

⁴¹ Sorin Șerban, pp. 137-138.

⁴² Michel-P. Hamelet, 10-11; *Omagiu tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al PCR, președintele Consiliului de stat al RSR*, p. 10.

⁴³ *Flacăra* 27, 3 (19 January 1978), p.5.

⁴⁴ John Sweeney, *The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceaușescu* (London:Hutchinson, 1991), p. 13.

⁴⁵ Pavel Câmpeanu characterizes Nicolae Ceaușescu as following: “Because of this handicap [his incapacity of learning a trade, as well as the Romanian language], his natural and remarkable intelligence would operate in different domains not with proper knowledge, but with rudiments” Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu, anii numărătorii inverse* (Iași, 2002), p.24.

⁴⁶ *Flacăra* 27, 3 (19 January 1978), p.5; *Omagiu tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al PCR, președintele Consiliului de stat al RSR*, p.10.

discourse mentioned another motive for his leaving: “the child left in the world to search of liberty and justice (...)” carrying one bag and walking barefooted⁴⁷. His taking a job in a shoemaker shop is usually left out (with the exception of Hamelet’s book⁴⁸). This is probably due to the fact that this rural, traditional job was not suitable for the future RCP leader, a party of the working class.

Another un-verified version relates the Ceaușescu’s leaving Scornicești to his being caught stealing clay from other villagers⁴⁹. Nicolae Ceaușescu found himself in Bucharest, in a city torn apart by the intense social conflicts as the result of the economic crisis. Leaving the shoemaker shop, Ceaușescu was hired as worker in different factories. In 1930, at the age of 12, Nicolae Ceaușescu is reported to have been participating in the activity and in the conflicts of the union revolutionary youth, in numerous strikes and meetings and manifestations organized by the workers’ class. He also used this period in order to enrich his knowledge related to Socialism and Marxism⁵⁰.

This initial contact with the workers’ revolutionary movement represented a determining and a formative experience for the young militant Nicolae Ceaușescu, “having a decisive influence on his moulding as a tireless combatant for the cause of the social and national liberation”⁵¹ allowing him “to successfully sustain his first exams at the most exigent school—the school of the revolutionary combatants”⁵².

The official version regarding Nicolae Ceaușescu’s revolutionary youth was included in Michel P. Hamelet’s biography for the first time as a part of a foreign homage volume and in 1973 in the special number of *Scanteia* dedicated to the birthday anniversary of the Romanian communist leader. It invariably included several events that transformed Ceaușescu into a *professional* revolutionary⁵³, namely: a) Ceaușescu’s participation in The National Antifascist Committee (later abbreviated as NAC); b) the 1934 Craiova trial; c) the 1936 Brasov trial; d) the detention period in Doftana prison; e) the workers’ demonstration of May 1st, 1939; f) Nicolae Ceaușescu’s contribution to the reorganization of the Union of Communist Youth; g) the detention years (1940-1944). Although these events remained the landmarks

⁴⁷ *România Literară* 16, 3 (20 January 1983), p.12.

⁴⁸ Michel-P.Hamelet, p.13.

⁴⁹ Constantin Dumitrescu, *Ceaușescu, șef de Dumnăzâi!* (München, 1990), p.164.

⁵⁰ Michel-P.Hamelet, p. 13.

⁵¹ *București-Omagiu marelui erou*, p. 38.

⁵² *Omagiu tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al PCR, președintele Consiliului de stat al RSR*, p. 10.

⁵³ Sorin Șerban, p. 139-140

of Ceaușescu's revolutionary activity before 1944, their significance and descriptive content were continuously modified and re-valued in order to meet the biographical exigencies of a great leader. Their introduction in the homage and public discourse was usually related to the celebration of a significant numbers of years from the moment when respective event had taken place. This situation did not exclude their summary mentioning in the general articles on Ceaușescu's political activity before August 1944.

a) *The National Antifascist Committee*

The National Antifascist Committee was created in June 1933 by the RCP. Its declared purpose was to create "*a large united front of the antifascist combat*" that was to reunite all "*the social, democratic, progressive and patriotic*" forces of the Romanian society in order to expose and fight against the Hitlerism and the Fascism. The rise of the European extreme right was perceived by the Romanian communism as a direct danger to the independence and to the territorial integrity of Romania⁵⁴.

The NAC was composed of the representatives of different social groups such as workers, teachers and professors, lawyers, writers, peasants, students, artists, journalists⁵⁵. Its leadership was formed by well-known public personalities such as Professor Iorgu Iordan, the president of the Committee, Professor Petre Constantinescu-Iași, the vice-president, Victor Gherasim, the secretary, George Enescu, Mihail Sadoveanu, Scarlat Callimachi etc., and the young teaching assistant of Cluj, Tudor Bugnariu⁵⁶.

From 1983, the Romanian press began to present specific articles regarding the Nicolae Ceaușescu's involvement in the activity of this organization. These specific press articles appeared around moment of celebrating 50 years from the creation of NAC.

The hagiographic literature mentioned that at the age of 15, Nicolae Ceaușescu participated in a conference of the Romanian antifascist combatants as the representative of the democratic youth of Bucharest. In the same circumstances, Nicolae Ceaușescu is reported to have been elected as one of the member of the NAC leadership⁵⁷. The press articles cited several testimonies belonging to the eyewitnesses in order to confirm his presence in this organization, his remarkable qualities, and his initial

⁵⁴ Augustin Deac, "Constituirea și activitatea Comitetului Național Antifascist" in *Comitetul Național Antifascist Român* (București, 1985), p. 138-139.

⁵⁵ *Scântea* 52, 12697 (19 June 1983), p. 2.

⁵⁶ Augustin Deac, p. 141; Pavel Câmpeanu, p. 34.

⁵⁷ *România Literară* 16, 3 (20 January 1983), p. 12.

prestige among the members of the small community of the workers' movement. The most quoted statements were those of Professor Petre Constantinescu-Iași, the vice-president of the NAC and that of Ion Popescu-Puțuri, the secretary of the RCP Organization of Bucharest⁵⁸.

Pavel Campeanu denies this version of the events by using the pieces of information offered by Tudor Bugnariu. He has declared to Campeanu that a greeting on the part of the young people's House of Culture of the Foisorul de Foc area was included in the program of the NAC. The youth's delegation, including Nicolae Ceaușescu, arrived, waited, but the Committee, because of some disturbances in its official schedule, did not receive it. Thus, the delegation left without presenting its greetings⁵⁹.

The forgery of this episode of Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary youth is based on a half-true. The NAC existed as an organization, the Ceaușescu's visit to its head-quarters took place, but it failed to accomplish its objective. Ceaușescu's nominalization to the NAC's leadership by the RCP Organization of Bucharest⁶⁰ or by the Central Committee of the RCP⁶¹ is a pure invention. Pavel Campeanu mentions that this falsification was an attempt of disclosing Nicolae Ceaușescu out of the real and anonymous world of his comrades in order to bring him into the imaginary proximity of some important national and international personalities⁶².

In my opinion, Nicolae Ceaușescu's implication in the NAC activity has another explanation, too. The creation and the statute of NAC as an auxiliary organization of RCP, and especially the significance attached to its activity (that of organizing the fight against the dangerous fascist elements through employing the tactics of the united front) were used in order to reinforce the so-called national character of the RCP activity during the inter-war period. Its activity supposedly included-besides the organization and the coordination of the workers' protests against the old regime-that of "the preservation of the country's major interests by preventing the extreme danger represented by the revisionist Hitlerism and Fascism"⁶³. Thus, the

⁵⁸ For example, *România Literară* 19, 4 (23 January 1986), p. 8. The same testimonies are also cited by Augustin Deac, p. 140-141.

⁵⁹ Pavel Câmpeanu, p. 34.

⁶⁰ Olimpiu Matichescu, *Tineretea revoluționară a tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu. Exemplul eroic al luptătorului neînfricat pentru triumful idealurilor comuniste* (București: Bucharest, 1981), p. 4.

⁶¹ See for example, *Scânteia* 58, 14518 (23 April 1989) p. 1; *Scânteia* 53, 12965 (29 April 1984) p. 2.

⁶² Pavel Câmpeanu, p. 35.

⁶³ Augustin Deac, p. 141.

NAC episode has been manipulated for a double legitimating purpose. Firstly, the interest of the RCP was to define itself as the only defender of the national interest and as a national party opposed to the foreign fascism represented by the Romanian organization of the Iron Guard. Secondly, Nicolae Ceaușescu's image also took some advantages in his involvement in the activity of the NAC leadership. This involvement was meant to anticipate two of his other representations, also parts of his cult of personality, that of guarantor of national unity and independence.

Nicolae Ceaușescu was also included (besides Matei Socor, Grigore Preoteasa, Constanța Crăciun, Nicolae Pascu, Costică Albescu and others) among the leaders of the National Antifascist Committee of Youth in 1933, the year of its inauguration. This new episode was artfully presented as another opportunity of Nicolae Ceaușescu's demonstrating his qualities as a good organizer. He was reported as having a decisive role "in the intensification of the activity of the Communist party within the young generation, the development of its unity of action against the hitlerist and revisionist danger for defending the country's independence and sovereignty, its territorial integrity"⁶⁴.

The strikes of the railways men and oilfield workers marked the beginning of the year 1933. The event itself was used to integrate the Ceaușescu's first arrest as a part of this event under the accusation of "the instigation to strike" and for distributing leaflets that threatened "the security of the state". He was presented to the Prosecutor's Office of the Ilfov Law court on November 23, 1933 and he was released soon after⁶⁵.

In 1933, after his release from the police custody, Nicolae Ceaușescu became a member of the Union of Communist Youth⁶⁶. This represents the third element of Sorin Șerban's typology, namely *the entrance into the party*, usually made under the supervision of "the elder workers"⁶⁷. Pavel Câmpeanu underlines the fact that the Romanian communist leader never mentioned any detail about the circumstances relating to his entry in the underground activity as if the party had never existed before his engagement⁶⁸.

⁶⁴ Constantin Petculescu, „Comitetele naționale antifasciste ale tineretului și femeilor, organizații de acțiune și luptă contra pericolului fascist” în *Comitetul Național Antifascist Român*, p. 213-214.

⁶⁵ *România Literară* 16, 3 (20 January 1983), p. 12; *București – Omagiu marelui erou*, p. 38.

⁶⁶ *România Literară* 21, 4 (21 January 1988), p. 12.

⁶⁷ Sorin Șerban, p. 138-139.

⁶⁸ Pavel Câmpeanu, p. 33.

b) *The 1934 Craiova trial*

As I have already mentioned, the description of the events related to the 1933 strikes was used only to mark out Ceaușescu's first contact with the Siguranta. Consequently, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the rest of the group, active at that time, were thrown into the shade.

At the age of 16, Nicolae Ceaușescu and other delegates, Gabor Vasile, Vasile Pogaceanu, Ion Brad etc., was arrested on June 25th 1934 in Craiova when trying to enter the law court in order to vehemently protest against the charges against the organizers of the strike⁶⁹.

Starting from 1983, the subsequent versions on this event reveal a major alteration. The other members of the delegation sent to Craiova by RCP are mentioned only if their testimonies can contribute to the laudatory outlining of Nicolae Ceaușescu's portrait as a remarkable young revolutionary. For example, one of the most cited testimonies is that of the Vasile Pogaceanu. He mentioned the events related to their arrest, pointing out the Ceaușescu's behavior at the police interrogatory: he "declared that he had come to Craiova on his own accord, as the one who had had participating in gathering the signatures on the memoirs of protest and solidarity also brought by him"⁷⁰.

In the homage volume published in 1988, Pogăceanu's testimony is included without mentioning the identity of the author. The information offered by this volume left out the existence of the other members of the RCP delegation who were sent to Craiova. Thus, Ceaușescu is reported to be the single representative of the workers' organization of Bucharest that came to Craiova to hand in the list of signatures and to sustain the cause of the railway men who were judged there⁷¹.

The content of Nicolae Ceaușescu's declaration during the police interrogatory also changes. The initial version states that Nicolae Ceaușescu came to Craiova on his own accord and that he participated in collecting the signatures for the motions of protest against the trial, but the later accounts mark a important alteration, namely he was the only who had gathered these signatures. Under the pressure of the public opinion, the Prosecutor's Office of the Dolj County, had to close the file, as it contained no evidence, and freed the young men, including Ceaușescu⁷².

⁶⁹ Ion Spălățelu, *Izbânzi prin veacuri. Comuniștii – o istorie trăită* (Craiova: Scrisul Romanesc, 1981), 80.

⁷⁰ *Scânteia*, 52, 12697 (19 June 1983), p. 2.

⁷¹ *București-Omagiu marelui erou*, p. 38.

⁷² *România Literară* 16, 3 (20 January 1983), p. 12.

The presentation of this new episode of Ceaușescu's biography contains an authentic event and a partial truth. Nicolae Ceaușescu was indeed caught carrying some lists of signatures in supporting the men accused of organizing the 1933 strikes, but he was paid for this job and he had not participated in gathering them⁷³. This testimony belongs to Ion Gheorghe Maurer and it is confirmed by Ceaușescu's declaration made during the police interrogatory. According to this statement, published in a volume of documents regarding the history of the working movement in Romania, the young Ceaușescu accepted 400 lei, a considerable sum in 1934, from "a tall, well-built, fair-haired man" in order to go to Craiova with many subscription lists and motions of protests against the trial, to protest against the court and to make a statement in the support the railway workers under trial⁷⁴.

In my opinion, these two episodes, his first arrest and the Craiova trial of Ceaușescu's revolutionary youth, are meant to introduce the future Romanian leader as an active participant in one of the most important event related to the interwar activity of the RCP by granting him a central, significant role. The press' accounts regarding the Craiova trial are mentioning only the Ceaușescu's action of bringing the lists of signatures. They do not reveal any information about those who were charged or about their personal identity.

Nicolae Ceaușescu was arrested on 26 August under the accusation of spreading revolutionary leaflets and organizing actions against the regime⁷⁵. On 20 September 1934, he was arrested again during a secret meeting of the National Antifascist Committee⁷⁶.

As soon as he was set free, he was sent to his home and he was required to live with his parents in his native village, Scornicești, and to sign each day at the local post office. According to Michel-P. Hamelet, Ceaușescu was sent to his parents' home that was 200 km distant and he had to walk all the way, barely eating or sleeping⁷⁷.

The prestige and the significant role of Nicolae Ceaușescu within the NAC were underlined in a protest of this organization addressed to the Minister

⁷³ Lavinia Betea, *Maurer și lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României* (Arad, 1995), p. 171.

⁷⁴ I.S.I.S.P. Archive, Collection no.VII, File no. 1801, Folder no. 21 apud Florea Dragne, Ioan Scurtu, *Culegere de texte privind istoria mișcării muncitorești din România* (București, 1981), p. 119.

⁷⁵ Michel-P. Hamelet, p. 18.

⁷⁶ *București-Omagiu marelui erou*, 38; *Scânteia*, 52, 12697 (19 June 1983), p. 2.

⁷⁷ Michel-P. Hamelet, p. 19.

of Interior. The forth point of this document mentioned "the manhandling of the Bucharest Police of Nicolae Ceaușescu, member of the NAC"⁷⁸. According to Teodor Bugnariu's testimony, the NAC secretary of Cluj⁷⁹, Ceaușescu's single contact with the NAC was an unsuccessful visit. Thus, the true motives of his arrest remain an unsolved question.

The suffering and the humiliation did not discourage the young Ceaușescu. Disregarding the confinement imposed on him by the police, he decided to return to Bucharest to continue his revolutionary activities. His father sold the family's last two sheep in order to help him⁸⁰. In 1935, Ceaușescu became the secretary of the Union of Communist Youth (later abbreviated as UCY) in Bucharest and then the secretary of the Oltenia Union of Communist Youth Regional Committee. He quickly defined himself as a "reliable organizer", "remarkable agitator". In the autumn of 1935 and the first part of 1936, he also led the UCY in the working region of Prahova upon instructions from the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party⁸¹.

c) *The Brasov trial*

Nicolae Ceaușescu was arrested again in the Ulmi commune (Dambovita County) during a conspiratorial meeting.⁸² After being sent to the Brasov jail, he and his other comrades were submitted to the Court of the Command of the Army Corps V in the same city in May 1936. The trial took place between May 27-June 5 1936⁸³. All the press articles related to the Brasov trial included fragments from the accusation act especially paragraph 19 and 23⁸⁴ and from the Bucharest Prefecture Police rapport regarding the Ceaușescu's political activity.

The critical lecture of the accusation act made by Pavel Campeanu questions the so-called qualities of Ceaușescu as a good organizer. In organizing the Ulmi meeting, he ignored some elementary rules for such a clandestine meeting. For example, he did not preceded smartly by organizing this kind of meeting with many participants or by distributing the communist leaflets in the countryside⁸⁵.

⁷⁸ Petre Constantinescu-Iași, *Pagini de luptă din trecut*, (Bucharest:Politica, 1972), p. 280.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰ Michel-P. Hamelet, p. 20; *România Literară* 21, 4 (21 January 1988), p. 12.

⁸¹ *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 29.

⁸² Michel-P. Hamelet, p. 22.

⁸³ *România Literară* 50, 23 (5 June 1986), p. 12.

⁸⁴ *Anale de istorie*, 32, 3 (1986), p. 39-40.

⁸⁵ Pavel Câmpeanu, p. 28-29.

The most significant episode of this trial involving Nicolae Ceaușescu took place on May 30. When one of the defendants, Tarnovski, was arbitrarily excluded from the courtroom, Ceaușescu urged all the defendants to leave the court⁸⁶.

In my opinion, Ceaușescu's gesture was an irrational one. He did not gain anything; on the contrary Tarnovski was excluded from the courtroom and he was charged of the offence of outrage towards the court. The explanation of Ceaușescu's act resides in his need to become the main character of the trial. Moreover, the information offered by the accounts of the press and the archival documents cannot be verified and we should not exclude the possibility of their falsification and fabrication.

At the end of the trial, Nicolae Ceaușescu was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of 2000 lei, six months for contempt of court, and one year of confinement to domicile after serving the sentence⁸⁷.

The event enjoyed a wide publicity because Paul Moscovici, one of the defense attorneys, had arranged a press interview for Nicolae Ceaușescu and Tarnovski. The meeting between these two and the journalist Eugen Jebeleanu was described by the latter in his article, "Impression from a trial", published in *Cuvântul liber* on June 6, 1936⁸⁸.

Marry Ellen Fischer confirms the authenticity of this article in her volume dedicated to Nicolae Ceaușescu's biography. She mentions that she has seen the original newspaper and she concludes that Jebeleanu's interview has become a part of Ceaușescu mythology⁸⁹.

Indeed, the "Introduction" to the first homage volume "Homage to Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, the President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania" published in 1973⁹⁰ or the Hamelet's book⁹¹ contains Jebeleanu's article.

The presentation of this new episode of Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography follows the same pattern previously identified: the narrative is concentrated on the person and the actions of Nicolae Ceaușescu during the

⁸⁶ *Flacăra* 35, 21 (23 May 1986) p. 7; *Anale de istorie* 32, 3 (1986), p. 48; Pavel Câmpeanu, p. 29.

⁸⁷ Nicolae Ceaușescu. *Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p. 30.

⁸⁸ Ion Ardeleanu, ed., <*Cuvântul liber*> În apărarea independenței și integrității României (București, 1982), pp. 650-652.

⁸⁹ Marry Ellen Fischer, pp. 275, 29.

⁹⁰ Nicolae Dragos, Tudor Olaru, "Introducere" in *Omagiu tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al PCR, președintele Consiliului de stat al RSR*, p. 11-12.

⁹¹ Michel-P.Hamelet, p. 26.

trial. The importance of the event arises from the direct involvement of the main character Ceaușescu in it. The general rule is that the identity of the other comrades is blurred; nevertheless, the militants whose testimonies can contribute to the laudatory outlining Nicolae Ceaușescu's portrait as a remarkable young revolutionary (for example, Ion Stănescu's or Gheorghe Dumitrache's testimonies⁹²) are taken into account.

The growing importance attached to the Brasov trial episode in Nicolae Ceaușescu's biography is suggested by the organization of several commemorative actions that marked the passing of 45, respectively 50 years from the event.

On 25 May 1981, in Bucharest, the "Stefan Gheorghiu" Academy, the Academy of Social and Political Science of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Union of Communist Youth organized a symposium dedicated to the anniversary of 45 years since the Brasov trial⁹³. The county committee for political education and socialist culture organized in the city of Brasov other symposiums on the same theme⁹⁴.

Different to the previous manifestation organized in 1981, in 1986, the commemoration of 50 years since the Brasov trial started few days before the official date of the beginning of the event and shortly after the party jubilee, covering the entire period of the judicial action (May 13–June 5) and it included a higher number and a more diversified types of celebration activities.

The first activities were organized in two important towns, in Brasov and Fagaras and consisted of meetings between writers and the population. During these meetings, the participants underlined the importance given to the Brasov trial by the Nicolae Ceaușescu's exemplary attitude and his revolutionary behavior within the heroic fight of the RCP⁹⁵.

These conferences were followed by the inauguration of an exhibition entitled "The Great Revolutionary Battles of the Working Class Led by the RCP during the Years of the Underground Combat, the Heroism of the

⁹² *Scântea* 50, 12055 (27 May):3 and Olimpiu Matichescu, *Tinerețea revoluționară a tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu*, p. 21.

⁹³ *Scântea* 50, 12054 (26 May 1981), p. 4.

⁹⁴ *Scântea* 50, 12054 (26 May 1981), p. 4.

⁹⁵ *Scântea* 55, 13600 (15 May 1986), p. 5.

Working Class in the Vast Activity of Building the Communist Society" at the "Dalles" Hall in Bucharest⁹⁶.

At the beginning of June 1986, the county committees of the RCP, for example those of Arad, Argeş, Bihor, Bistriţa-Năsăud, Braşov, Buzău, Covasna, Hunedoara, Neamţ, Olt, Satu Mare, Vrancea⁹⁷, Caraş-Severin, Călăraşi, Dâmboviţa, Mureş, Sibiu, Timiş, Vaslui, Vâlcea⁹⁸, Dolj, Giurgiu, Teleorman⁹⁹, organized other symposiums in order to commemorate the Brasov trial.¹⁰⁰ Also, on June 3rd, the Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth, the Council of the Union of the Communist Students' Associations, the National Council of the Pioneers organized in Bucharest a national symposium on "The Revolutionary Youth of the Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu. The Union of Communist Youth—the Continuator of the Revolutionary Traditions of the Party and of the Romanian People"¹⁰¹.

The series of the commemorative activities ended on June 5, 1986 with a homage scientific conference entitled "50 years since the trial of the communist and antifascist militants in Brasov. Nicolae Ceauşescu's Revolutionary Activity, the Brilliant State and Party Leader, an Example of Patriotic Dedication to the People Cause, to the Independence and Sovereignty of the Country" organized by the National Council of Science and Education, the Romanian Academy, the "Stefan Gheorghiu" Academy, the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party¹⁰².

Besides underling the importance ascribed to the 1936 Brasov trail as being an essential part of the RCP's battle against the fascist danger using the approach of the united front, these commemorative activities highlighted Nicolae Ceauşescu's contribution to this end, his exemplary attitude during the trial, and the continuation of the his revolutionary activity, especially after 1965, during the epoch of the building socialism in Romania¹⁰³.

⁹⁶ *Scântea* 55, 13611, (28 May 1986), p. 4.

⁹⁷ *Scântea* 55, 13616, (3 June 1986), p. 4.

⁹⁸ *Scântea* 55, 13618 (5 June 1986), p. 4.

⁹⁹ *Scântea* 55, 13619 (6 June 1986), p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰¹ *Scântea* 55, 13617 (4 June 1986), p. 3.

¹⁰² *Scântea* 55, 13619 (6 June 1986), p. 1, 2.

¹⁰³ See for example, *Scântea* 55, 13618 (5 June 1986), p. 4; *Scântea*, 55, 13617 (4 June 1986), p. 3, etc.

d) *The Detention in Doftana*

Nicolae Ceaușescu was imprisoned in the jail of Doftana. This prison was included in the general legitimizing mythology of the RCP as being the "Romanian Bastilia" because of the horrors inflicted on the communist prison held there.

Comparing the accounts related to Nicolae Ceaușescu's detention periods, one could observe the special attention given to that of Doftana. This fact cannot be explained without a proper and a complete understanding of the significance of Doftana prison in the inter-war RCP history.

Doftana was the only prison transformed in museum after 1944. In my opinion, this special position is the result of several factors. Doftana was the jail where the majority of political communist prisoners were detained after 1936. It was also the symbol of the old regime oppression against communists and thus, the symbol of communist resistance to it. The communist resistance succeeded in transforming the jail into a "Marxist university" where the prisoners could learn the fundamental notions of the Marxism-Leninism. Doftana was the place of the political battle against the state representatives for acquiring the political regime and other rights for the political prisoners. The prison was also the symbol of the supreme sacrifice of the Romanian communists, the place where many of them died during the investigations, the hunger strikes against the abuses of the prison administration or during the earthquake that destroyed the prison on November 10, 1944¹⁰⁴.

The official accounts on this period in Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography will be submitted to essential alterations in order to offer him an important role in the organization of the party group in Doftana.

The comparison between the two volumes about "The Doftana Museum", first published in 1960 and the second from 1968 reveals the militant Nicolae Ceaușescu as one of the RCP leaders imprisoned there and a well-organized communist organization as a result of a collective contribution. There is no information regarding any unusual or exceptional actions of the future Romanian leader¹⁰⁵.

The press articles and the homage volumes published at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s presented Ceaușescu's detention in Doftana from a

¹⁰⁴ *Anale de istorie*: 16, 6, 1970; Ion Ardeleanu, *Muzeul Doftana* (Bucharest, 1968); Ion Spălățelu, *Izbânzii prin veacuri. Comuniștii-o istorie trăită*; Olimpiu Maticescu, *Doftana, simbol al eroismului revoluționar* (Bucharest, 1979), 129; *Muzeul Doftana* (Bucharest, 1960), etc.

¹⁰⁵ For additional information, see *Muzeul Doftana* and Ion Ardeleanu, *Muzeul Doftana*.

different point of view. They underlined his important role in the life of the party cell which was formed there. Ceaușescu's activity in the harsh conditions of Doftana included his "essential contribution" to the (re)organization of the entire activity of the communist militants. He resorted to indoctrination, to organizing the protest stirring against the beatings, maltreating, the isolation regime, starvation etc. Nicolae Ceaușescu was also entrusted another important tasks, such as that of recruiting new adherents for the communist cause and of getting news and information from the outside that he transmitted to the other communist detainees¹⁰⁶.

Thus, the young militant Ceaușescu became a model for others communist detainees that "affectionately and appraisingly called him <the quick silver of Doftana>". He also became known as a "refractory" element, "a dangerous communist agitator", suspected of "subversive activity in the prison" for the jail administration¹⁰⁷. He was also recognized as one of the most active "instigators" because of his relentless attitude toward the abuses of the prison's staff¹⁰⁸.

My investigation on the press articles and the homage volumes reveals the fact that from the end of 1970s and during the 1980s, Nicolae Ceaușescu was the only figure evoked in an amorphous mass of communist militants imprisoned in Doftana. The apologetic discourse voluntarily overlooked the existence of the real leaders of the inter-war RCP, such as Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica, Emil Bodnăraș, Al.Moghioroș and attributed to Nicolae Ceaușescu the organization of the major political activities of the communist collectivity with the prison. For example, the protest choruses were not Nicolae Ceaușescu's invention. They were an instrument used by the political communist prisoners of Doftana against the abuses and aggressive methods of the prison guards and they became the symbol of the communist resistance in Doftana, long before Ceaușescu's arrival there¹⁰⁹.

The most important fact usually omitted is the central role played by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as the real leader of the communists in Doftana and Nicolae Ceaușescu's position as a simple member of this group¹¹⁰. I have identified one commemorative event related to the symbol of Doftana

¹⁰⁶ Olimpiu Matichescu, p. 31-41; *România Literară*, 19, 33 (14 August 1986), p. 3; *Flacăra*, 35, 33 (15 August 1986), p. 3; *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p.31.

¹⁰⁷ *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁸ *Scântea* 55, 13678 (14 August 1986), p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ *Muzeul Doftana...*(the pages of this volume are not numbered).

¹¹⁰ For more details, see Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate. O istorie politică a comunismului românesc* (Iași: Polirom, 2005), pp. 81, 101, 104-105, 121-122, 164.

and the representation of Nicolae Ceaușescu as a young revolutionary, namely the anniversary of 50 years since his imprisonment in Doftana. *Scanteia* published on August 14 -16th 1986 several articles about the life of communist detainees in Doftana, their fighting for acquiring the political regime and other rights and to Ceaușescu's exceptional and "multilaterally" activity within the party cell of Doftana¹¹¹. Later, the same newspaper described the visit of the presidential couple at the Doftana Museum on September 25th 1986. The organization of this visit to Doftana represented another opportunity for the development of Nicolae Ceaușescu's cult around the axis of the young revolutionary figure¹¹².

The official version on this episode of Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography is based on the authentic fact (his detention in Doftana), it omits several disturbing elements (his true position within the party cell), exaggerates his role by overlooking the existence of other characters (Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and others) and ascribes him the initiative in preparing important elements of the revolutionary actions (for example, the collective protest choruses).

On 8 December 1938, Nicolae Ceaușescu was released from Doftana. According to the Romanian communist leader's official biography, the Party entrusted him with two main tasks: the reorganization of the Union of Communist Youth and the continuation of the "revolutionary" activity with the guilds of workers¹¹³.

e) The 1st May of 1939

The workers' manifestation of May 1st 1939 was another event used by the propaganda apparatus to complete the Nicolae Ceaușescu's representation as a young revolutionary. The celebration of the 1st May 1939 was to coincide with the first congress of guilds. The event was organized under the royal regime at the initiative of Mihail Ralea, the Ministry of Work. This congress was to be followed by the workers' public demonstration¹¹⁴ in support of the monarch and his regime¹¹⁵.

The tactic of the RCP was to turn the workers' manifestation organized by the royal apparatus into an antifascist one. Thus, the Party entrusted this

¹¹¹ *Scântea* 55, 13678 (14 August 1986), p. 3; 13679 (15 August 1986), p. 3; 13680 (16 August 1986), p. 3.

¹¹² *Scântea* 55, 13715 (26 September 1986), p. 1, 3.

¹¹³ Olimpiu Matichescu, *Tineretea revoluționară...*, p. 43.

¹¹⁴ Ion Petcu, Ceaușescu, *Ceaușescu, un fanatic al puterii. Biografie neretușată* (Bucharest:Romanul, 1994), p.89.

¹¹⁵ Pavel Câmpeanu, p.35.

task to a party conspiratorial commission composed of the best communist militants such as Ilie Pintilie, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Constantin David, Al. Iliescu¹¹⁶. It had to arrange the preparation of the demonstration on the part of the RCP and the organization of the meeting with workers, intellectuals and students¹¹⁷.

At the end of the guilds' first congress of the¹¹⁸, the participants and other inhabitants of Bucharest took part in the manifestation in front of the Royal Palace¹¹⁹. When the king appeared at the balcony of his Royal Palace in order to receive the ovations of the guilds, twenty thousands people started shouting slogans of the RCP: *Down with Fascism!, Down with War!, We want a Free and Independent Romania!*¹²⁰.

Although the so-called Ceaușescu's contribution to organizing and participating in the 1st May manifestation was an established element of his official revolutionary biography during 1970s, in the 1980s the press accounts on this subject became more specific and detailed, especially around commemorative dates such as those celebrating 45, respectively 50 years since the workers' manifestation on May 1st 1939.

In 1984, the celebration of the 1st May and of 1st May 1939 included one major event. On April 28th 1984, the Romanian Athenaeum housed a national scientific conference on "The Conception of the RCP regarding the Historical Significance of the Unity of Action of the Working Class, of the All Progressive Forces in the Battle for Preventing Fascism and War, for the Victory of Revolution and Construction of Socialism. The Conception of the Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu regarding the Fundamental Role of the Unity of the Democratic, Anti-imperialist Forces in the Combat for Progress and Civilization, for Defending the Independence, liberty and the Life of the People". The subjects of the papers presented during this conference

¹¹⁶ *România literară* 15, 12 (18 March 1982), p. 12.

¹¹⁷ Nicolae Ceaușescu. *Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, 32. For more details regarding the activity of Nicolae Ceaușescu and the party commission see for example, Olimpiu Matichescu, *1 Mai 1939 moment semnificativ în lupta poporului român împotriva primejdiei fasciste, pentru apărarea independenței și suveranității naționale* (Bucharest: Politica, 1974), pp. 40-43 and *Luceafărul*, 32, 17 (29 April 1989), p. 7.

¹¹⁸ For more details about the organization of this congress see Olimpiu Matichescu, *1 Mai 1939*, 43-51. *București-Omagiu marelui erou*, 43; *România literară* 21, 18 (28 April 1988), p. 12; Ion Petcu, p.90.

¹¹⁹ Olimpiu Matichescu, 51. *Luceafărul* 22, 17 (28 April 1979), p.3.

¹²⁰ Nicolae Ceaușescu. *Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, 32. See also, *Luceafărul* 32, 17 (28 April 1979), p. 3.

included the contribution of the RCP to the accomplishment of the unity of the working class in the anti-fascist combat and Nicolae Ceaușescu's contribution to this end within the context of the workers' manifestation on the of 1st May 1939¹²¹.

In 1989, the commemorative events were diversified so as to include different events: debates¹²², exhibitions of books¹²³, of documentary photos¹²⁴, art exhibitions¹²⁵, documentary films¹²⁶, a national scientific conference organized on April 26th 1989 entitled "The Historical Significance of the Patriotic, Antifascist and Antiwar Demonstration of May 1st 1939, the Decisive Contribution of Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu and Comrade Elena Ceaușescu in its organization. The Heroic Revolutionary Activity of Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu Dedicated to the Party and People, to the Triumph of Socialism and Communism in Romania"¹²⁷. Other ones in Beijing, Berlin, Ulan Bator, Hanoi, Madrid and Moscow followed this conference¹²⁸.

The official program dedicated to the anniversary of 1st May of 1939 also included a festive assembly housed by the Hall of the Republic Palace in Bucharest¹²⁹, a new photo documentary and book exhibition opened on April 30th 1989 at Dalles Hall in Bucharest¹³⁰.

Pavel Campeanu explains the circumstances and the purpose of this meeting. He confirms that the meeting took place on May 1st 1939 and that it was one of the biggest manifestations of this type of the interwar period. The royal apparatus organized it and it was meant to gain popularity on behalf of the crown. The same author mentions that during the preparation of this meeting and its manifestation, he personally did not see Ceaușescu. He concludes that the future Romanian leader was neither the organizer of this mass action as the RCP representative, nor one of the few communist militants participating in this popular rally¹³¹. The May 1st 1939 manifestation completes the representation of Nicolae Ceaușescu as a young revolutionary

¹²¹ *Scântea*, 53, 12965 (29 April 1984), p. 2-3.

¹²² *Scântea* 58, 14524 (30 April 1989), p. 5; 14525 (1 May 1989), p. 4.

¹²³ *Scântea* 58, 14524 (30 April 1989), p. 5.

¹²⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁷ *Scântea* 58, 14520 (27 April 1989), p. 1, 3.

¹²⁸ *Scântea* 58, 14522 (28 April 1989), p. 5.

¹²⁹ *Scântea* 58, 14524 (30 aprilie 1989), p. 1, 5.

¹³⁰ *Scântea* 58, 14525 (1 May 1989), p. 1.

¹³¹ Pavel Câmpăanu, p. 35.

by ascribing him an important role in changing the character of this meeting (the turning of the workers' manifestation organized by the royal apparatus into an antifascist one.). He did not do this alone, but with the aid of the party commission and following the party line.

From our point of view, the significance attached to Nicolae Ceaușescu's participation in the preliminary activities of this meeting is also very important. Thus, his nominalization in the party commission was considered an official recognition of his revolutionary achievements and merits and a guarantee of the success of the communist action¹³².

This official interpretation on this event is irregularly and alternatively mentioning the party commission and the significant role ascribed to the future presidential couple in preparing the 1st May 1939 rally¹³³. Moreover, the existence of the party commission is exclusively related to the activity of Nicolae Ceaușescu. This organizational framework and Ceaușescu's central role within it confers him an opportunity for reveling his exceptional qualities and his revolutionary enthusiasm. The other members of the party commission are barely mentioned in press articles and other volumes related to the subject¹³⁴.

Ceaușescu's successful activity related to 1st May manifestation resulting in some major consequences of the demonstration highlights the international resonance of this event¹³⁵, the growing influence of the RCP within the working class¹³⁶, the establishment of the unity of action between the two parties of the working class (the Social-Democrat Party and the RCP)¹³⁷ and the intensification of the antifascist activity within the guilds of the militants of the Social-Democrat Party and RCP¹³⁸.

In my opinion, the falsification of this event must be included in the general strategy of the "nationalization" of the RCP image and of its interwar history especially after the first signs of the Romanian-Soviet conflict at the beginning of the 1960s. Building its image, as a defender of the major aspirations related to the national independence, sovereignty and unity, in the conflict with its main ideological enemy, Fascism, relied upon the effort of introducing the RCP (RCP) in the Romanian history. Thus, the so-called

¹³² *Luceafărul* 32, 17 (29 April 1989), p. 3

¹³³ *Scântea*, 58, 14522 (28 April 1989), p. 1.

¹³⁴ *România literară*, 15, 12 (18 March 1982), p. 12.

¹³⁵ For more details, see, Olimpiu Matichescu, *1 Mai 1939*, pp.57-64.

¹³⁶ *Ibidem*, p.65.

¹³⁷ *Luceafărul*, 22, 34 (23 August 1979):3; *Luceafărul*, 32, 33 (19 August 1989), p. 1, 7.

¹³⁸ Olimpiu Matichescu, *Doftana, simbol al eroismului revoluționar*, p. 211-212.

implication of the RCP in turning 1 May 1939 meeting into an action of protest against the Fascism and its “Romanian agents” (the royal regime and the Iron Guard) is a relevant example of this RCP “national” strategy and of its need to hide its inter-war political and its revolutionary insignificance as a political force. The 1 May 1939 rally is also an example of the manipulation of an event for the purpose of legitimizing the communist rule in Romania by invoking a false episode of the so-called RCP’s ceaseless combat against the old and fascist political regime¹³⁹.

The introduction of this May 1939 meeting in the revolutionary biography of Nicolae Ceaușescu bears a connection with my previous considerations related to the RCP. His participation in this event is used on one hand to demonstrate his exceptional qualities and his unusual revolutionary enthusiasm that recommends him as a prospective leader. On the other hand, the nature of the Nicolae Ceaușescu’s action, namely its antifascist and thus, national character, represents an prologue and the beginning of his future actions as a defender of national independence and territorial integrity.

f) Nicolae Ceaușescu’s contribution to the reorganization of the Union of Communist Youth

In the summer of 1939, between June 26–July 26, Nicolae Ceaușescu attended the classes of the first party school sheltered in a secret house in Ploiesti, where Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu and other party leaders prepared the courses¹⁴⁰.

After graduation, Nicolae Ceaușescu led the Central Commission for the reorganization of the UCY. The Conference for remaking the UCY took place in Bucharest, in October 1939, in a secret house on the Giurgiu road. Nicolae Ceaușescu delivered the report on the reorganization of the UCY. Other delegates analyzed the national and international political situation.

¹³⁹ For more details on the nationalization strategy of RCP, see, Robert King, *History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Stanford, 1980); Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania 1944–1963* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971); Michael Shafir, *Romania. Politics, Economics and Society* (Boulder, 1985).

¹⁴⁰ Olimpiu Matichescu, *Tinerețea revoluționară...*, p. 39; Florea Dragne, „Contribuția esențială a tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu la reorganizarea UTC” în *Contribuția esențială a tovarășului NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU la reorganizarea UTC, la unirea mișcării de tineret în lupta împotriva fascismului, la asigurarea unei dezvoltări noi, socialiste a patriei. Sesiune științifică, 30 octombrie 1979*, (București, 1980), p. 52; Nicolae Ceaușescu. *Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p.33. For more details regarding the organization of this party school see, Olimpiu Matichescu, *Doftana, simbol al...*, p.215.

The conference established an activity plan, UCY's pressing tasks and it elected the first Central Committee of the UCY, composed of Miron Constantinescu, Constanța Crăciun, Stere Nichifor, Alexandru Demeter etc. Nicolae Ceaușescu was elected UCY secretary¹⁴¹ or, according to other opinions, he was a member of the Central Committee Secretariat of the UCY¹⁴². The Romanian Police arrested Nicolae Ceaușescu on May 27 1939 and released him because of insufficient evidence against him. Soon after, the same authorities decided to put him under arrest and prosecute him under the accusation of "communist agitation"¹⁴³. Thus, the young Ceaușescu continued his activity of the reorganization of the regional and county committees of the UCY in different parts of the country in illegality¹⁴⁴.

Because the police could not find him, he was trialed in absence. The Army Corps II in Bucharest sentenced him to 3 years of prison and a fine of 20000 lei. The police caught Ceaușescu on July 29, 1940 while he was preparing a demonstration against the war. He was sent to jail and forced to carry out the sentence issued against him in his absence¹⁴⁵.

The first mentioning of Ceaușescu's contribution to reorganizing the UYC was related to the anniversary of 50 years since the creation of this communist organization¹⁴⁶ in 1972.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, the Museum of the History of the Communist Party, of the Revolutionary and Democratic Movement housed a scientific session on "The Place and the Role of Youth in the Social-Political Life of Romania". Among the 150 titles of working-papers mentioned by *Scântea*¹⁴⁸, only one referred to Ceaușescu's contribution to the re-

¹⁴¹ Fl. Dragne, Al. Șiperco, 171. *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, pp.34-35.

¹⁴² *România Literară* 12, 43 (26 October 1979), p. 13; *Flacăra* 28, 44 (1 November 1979), p. 3; Michel-P. Hamelet, p. 40.

¹⁴³ Olimpiu Matichescu, *Doftana, simbol al...*, pp.218-219.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 219.

¹⁴⁵ Michel-P.Hamelet, p.41; *România Literară*, 21, 4 (21 January 1988), p. 13; *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p.35.

¹⁴⁶ Este vorba despre conferința de constituire a organizației tineretului socialist care a avut loc la București, între 19-20 martie 1922. Uniunea Tineretului Socialist își va schimba denumirea în luna mai 1924 în Uniunea Tineretului Comunist apud C. Petculescu, „Crearea Uniunii Tineretului Comunist” în C. Bărbulescu, Fl. Dragne, C.Mocanu, C. Petculescu, Al. Șiperco, N.Tue, *File din istoria U.T.C.* (Bucharest:Politica, 1971), p.89.

¹⁴⁷ *Săptămâna* 71 (14 April 1972), p. 3.

¹⁴⁸ *Scântea* 41, 9089 (16 March 1972):4; 9090 (17 March 1972):4; 9091 (18 March 1972), p. 4

organization of UYC¹⁴⁹. A number of documents included in the exhibition entitled “Moments of the History of the UYC” revealed “extraordinary contribution of comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu to the remaking the UYC in 1939, his role in organizing and leading the communist youth in Romania”¹⁵⁰.

Nicolae Ceaușescu’s contribution to the reorganization of the UYC was also the subject of several commemorative events in the subsequent years, namely two scientific conferences organized in 1979¹⁵¹, respective in 1982¹⁵². Contrary to the previous event related to Ceaușescu activity within UYC, these remembrance events were transformed into an homage paid to his entire revolutionary activity, and especially to his outstanding contribution to the remaking of this communist organization for youth¹⁵³. In 1982, the commemorative actions diversified as to include a celebratory assembly followed by an homage spectacle, both dedicated to presenting Ceaușescu’s actions as a professional revolutionary within the UYC.¹⁵⁴

Without offering any additional information on this subject, Vladimir Tismaneanu mentions that Miron Constantinescu was in fact the leader of the group entrusted with the task of reorganizing UYC, not Nicolae Ceaușescu.¹⁵⁵

f) The Detention in Jilava, Caransebeș and Târgu- Jiu

Nicolae Ceaușescu was imprisoned in Jilava (August 1940–February 20, 1942), in Caransebeș (February 21–July 21, 1943) and Targu-Jiu (August 19, 1943–August 4, 1944)¹⁵⁶. The data related to this period of Ceaușescu’s biography have a general character and they are reduced to mentioning his contribution to the reorganization of the party cells (for example, that of

¹⁴⁹ *Scântea* 41, 9090 (17 March 1972), p. 4.

¹⁵⁰ *Scântea* 41, 9092 (19 March 1972), p. 4.

¹⁵¹ See *Contribuția esențială a tovarășului NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU la reorganizarea UTC, la unirea mișcării de tineret în lupta împotriva fascismului, la asigurarea unei dezvoltări noi, socialiste a patriei. Sesiune științifică, 30 octombrie 1979* (Bucharest: Politica, 1980).

¹⁵² *Scântea* 51, 12305 (16 March 1982), p. 5; *Conceptia PCR, a secretarului său general, tovarășul NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU, privind locul și rolul tineretului, al organizațiilor sale revoluționare în viața social-politică a României socialiste* (Bucharest: Politica, 1982); *Scântea* 51, 12308 (19 March 1982), p. 4

¹⁵² *Scântea* 51, 12309 (20 March 1982), p. 3.

¹⁵³ *Contribuția esențială a tovarășului NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU la reorganizarea UTC*, pp.9-133; *Scântea*, 51, 12305 (16 March 1982), p. 5.

¹⁵⁴ *Scântea* 51, 12309 (20 March 1982), p. 5.

¹⁵⁵ Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate*, p.197.

¹⁵⁶ Olimpiu Matichescu, *Tineretea revoluționară*, p.67.

Caransebes) and to the improvement of the educational and ideological activity of the communist within the prisons¹⁵⁷.

Several observations can be made about the way in which the official version on this period is presented. Nicolae Ceaușescu is the only character nominally mentioned within the community of the communist militants imprisoned in the above-mentioned prisons (that included among others Gheorghiu-Dej)¹⁵⁸. The second observation is related to Ceaușescu's organizational activity in prisons. Pavel Campeanu offers a detailed description of the community of communist detainees in Caransebes, showing that the future Romanian leader found in this prison a well-organized communist group and there was no need for further organization¹⁵⁹. The same author makes a moral and physical portrait of the young Ceaușescu that contradicts the romantic, and the exceptional image created for Ceaușescu by the official propaganda¹⁶⁰.

A special but not often mentioned episode of Ceaușescu's detention period took place in Jilava prison. On September 26-27, 1940, a group of Iron Guard members broke into Jilava and killed most of the dignitaries of the former regime that had opposed it, but when the murders reached the communists' cells, the soldiers protected these prisoners. The salvation of the communist militants was considered to be the result of Ceaușescu's political discussions with the military guards of that prison¹⁶¹.

In my opinion, there is little chance that the salvation of the communist militants was the result of Ceaușescu's activity to win over the military guards. In the first place, if he had really tried to have discussions with the guards on ideological problems, it would have been very difficult for him to discuss them with all guards in a very short period (a month and a few days). Then, there is also a small possibility that a political communist prisoner will try to have a conversation with a guardian, in fact, the representative of an oppressive system against which he fights and whose victim he is. In the second place, the Iron Guards entered Jilava to kill the ex-political personalities that had opposed the Iron Guard. Thus, this Iron Guard's action was the revenge against these former dignitaries¹⁶².

¹⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, pp.62-74.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁹ Pavel Câmpăanu, pp.39-99.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, pp.17-25, 70-71.

¹⁶¹ Olimpiu Matichescu, p.65; Michel-P. Hamelet, 43-45; Nicolae Ceaușescu. *Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p.37.

¹⁶² For more details, see Armin Heinen, *Legiunea <Arhanghelul Mihail>. O contribuție la problema fascismului internațional*, (Bucharest, 1999), pp. 422-424 and Francisco

Admitting that the Iron Guards had tried to kill the communist militants in Jilava, the intervention of the prison guards was a normal reaction. The task of the guards in any prison is to maintain order inside the jail and to guard the detainees in order to ensure their carrying out the sentence.

Marry Ellen Fischer do not exclude the possibility that Ceaușescu managed to established some relationship with the guards but she finds other possible explanations for the Iron Guards spearing the communists imprisoned in Jilava: that the Guardists had exhausted their need for bloodshed and/or the soldiers organized themselves to resist as the violence neared the communist prisoners¹⁶³.

3. After 23rd August 1944

In contrast to the period before August 1944, the press accounts and other homage volumes on Ceaușescu's political activity after this moment until his election as the secretary general of the RCP are vague and limited to the chronological account of the positions held by him.

According to Ceaușescu's official biography, after the 23rd August 1944, Nicolae Ceaușescu was named the General Secretary of the UCY¹⁶⁴ and in October 1945 the National Conference of the RCP elected him member of the Party's Central Committee¹⁶⁵. Pavel Campeanu offers some pieces of information related to the real activity of the Romanian future leader after his releasing from Targu-Jiu camp. The author mentions that the RCP did not named Nicolae Ceaușescu as Secretary General of the UCY. In fact, the Party decided that a collective body, the Secretariat of the UCY's Central Committee, should form the leadership of this organization. The Secretariat of UCY included Ceaușescu among its members. After a few months, another organization, "The Progressive Youth" replaced the UCY. Its General Secretary was elected not Ceaușescu, but a young intellectual, Calin Popovici. Campeanu adds that Ceaușescu's election to the Party's Central Committee was an unexpected fact: the candidate for this position, also a shoemaker, had renounced to it¹⁶⁶.

Paul Sfetcu attributed the dissolving of UYC to Ceaușescu's failure of properly reorganizing it. The same author mentioned that the future communist leader holding the position of the secretary general of UYC had

Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier 1919 – 1941. Mistica ultranaționalismului*, (Bucharest, 1995), pp. 290-295.

¹⁶³ Marry Ellen Fischer, p. 30.

¹⁶⁴ Nicolae Ceaușescu. *Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, p. 41.

¹⁶⁵ *România Literară* 21, 4 (21 January 1988), p. 13.

¹⁶⁶ Pavel Câmpeanu, p.235.

transformed it into a semi-clandestinely "closed organization", therefore determining his dissolution¹⁶⁷.

My findings confirm Ceaușescu's election as a member in the Central Committee of UYC and as a full member in the Central Committee of the RCP in October 1944¹⁶⁸.

After 1948, Ceaușescu held different positions within the party and the state apparatus. The official accounts on this period of Ceaușescu's political activity are limited to vaguely mentioning several important positions held by him. In my opinion, this selective presentation takes into consideration only those political positions that presented a connection with the current activity of the leader Nicolae Ceaușescu (such as the period spent in the Minister of Agriculture or in the National Defence, his membership in the Great National Assembly, his position as a prime secretary of Oltenia region and his accession to the leading party structures until 1965).

The archival documents corroborated with other bibliographical resources help us to reconstruct the complete political trajectory of Nicolae Ceaușescu. Within the state apparatus, he became general secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture between 1948-1949 and in the following period 1949-1950, he was deputy of the minister of Agriculture¹⁶⁹. This new position coincided with the begging of the collectivization of agriculture. During 1950-1954, Ceaușescu held simultaneously the position of the deputy of the Minister of Defence and that of the chief of the Higher Political Direction of the Army. He also became member of the Great National Assembly (1946-1954) and for a short period of time he was elected member in the Presidium of the Romanian parliamentary¹⁷⁰. In 1952, he was, also, elected in the Higher Military Council and in 1961 he was leading the party group in Great National Assembly¹⁷¹.

At the end of first congress of the Romanian Working Party held in February 1948, Ceaușescu was not elected a full member of the Central Committee of the newly created party. He became full member of this leading structure after May 26-27, 1952 Plenum, being constantly re-elected in this position until 1965¹⁷².

¹⁶⁷ Paul Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej* (Bucharest, 2000), p.171; Stelian Tănase, *Clienții lui tanti Varvara. Istoria clandestină*, (Bucharest, 2005), p.490.

¹⁶⁸ CNHA, *Fund CC al PCR- Sectia Organizatorica*, d. 166/1944, f. 3, 32,

¹⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 27.

¹⁷⁰ Florica Dobre (ed.), *Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989. Dictionar* (București, 2004), p.141.

¹⁷¹ CNHA, *Fund CC al PCR-Sectia Organizatorica*, d.166/1944, f. 27.

¹⁷² *Ibidem*, f. 7, 37, 54, 60, 73, 75.

After the physical elimination of Lucretiu Patrascanu, on the occasion of Plenum of the CC of RWP on April 19, 1954, Ceaușescu was elected candidate member of the Political Bureau¹⁷³ and member of the RWP's Secretariat, being released from his position of deputy of the Minister of Armed Forces¹⁷⁴. At the December 20 1955 Plenum, he became full member of the Political Bureau of the RWP¹⁷⁵. Within the Secretariat, Ceaușescu was put in charge of different sectors. He coordinated the Higher Political Direction of the Army, The Political Direction of the Ministry of Interior, of Agriculture and of Romanian Railroads Company, the Administrative Section of CC of RWP, the Union of the Working Youth, the Agrarian Section of CC of RWP, The Red Cross, The CC Section of Heavy Industry and Transportation (or Transportation and Telecommunications), the Section of the Party, Union and Union of the Working Youth leading organs (previously, in 1952, he was a member of the Organizational Bureau) between April 22, 1954- January 16, 1956. In 1955, Ceaușescu was responsible of the Section for Verifying Cadres¹⁷⁶. From January 16, 1956 he continued to co-ordinate the Section of the party leading organs, the Administrative Section of CC of RWP, the CC of Union of the Working Youth, the Higher Political Direction of the Army. On October 10, 1956 Ceaușescu was put in charged of cadres' policy, and therefore, renouncing at the Agrarian Section of the CC of RWP¹⁷⁷.

Nicolae Ceaușescu played an important role in the political struggles within the RWP, supporting Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej position in his conflicts with Miron Constantinescu și Iosif Chișinevski or with the so-called Doncea group. Also, in his capacity of CC secretary responsible for cadre policy, he organized the purge of those party members opposing to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's policies¹⁷⁸.

4. The Making of Nicolae Ceaușescu's Representation as a Young Revolutionary. Sources and Methods.

The fabricated character of Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography is based on a pattern. The official hagiography usually omits certain unfavorable details (such as the fact that he was not named the leader of the

¹⁷³ *Ibidem*, f. 8, 79.

¹⁷⁴ DANIC, *Fund CC al PCR-Sectia Administrativ-Politică*, d. 2/1954, f. 6.

¹⁷⁵ DANIC, *Fund CC al PCR-Sectia Organizatorica*, d. 166/1944, f. 10.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 46, 49, 23, 25, 58.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 25, 27, 58.

¹⁷⁸ Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From the De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism*, Cold War International History Project, Working Papers, No.37, pp. 27-30.

UCY). Thus, it improves some aspects of Ceaușescu's activity (for example, during the detention periods or especially the Jilava episode of September 1940) or even erroneously attributes him the organization of certain actions (the organization of 1st May 1939 rally).

I also notice an evident tendency of presenting several events related to the interwar history of the RCP (the 1933 railways men and oilfield workers' or the Craiova trail) from Ceaușescu's point of view in order to individualize him and to confirm his exceptional qualities. The propensity towards ascribing Nicolae Ceaușescu the main role during an event is underlined by the overlooking of the real RCP leaders and of other communist militants imprisoned with him. The exception regards those militants whose testimonies can contribute to the laudatory outlining of Nicolae Ceaușescu's portrait as a remarkable young revolutionary. The RCP has a double role in his biography. Firstly, RCP is the supreme instance of legitimating his revolutionary actions and the motives for his deeds. Secondly, the RCP offers the young Ceaușescu a flexible institutional framework (for example, UCY, NAC, etc.) that stimulates and demonstrates his exceptional native qualities in extreme situations.

In my opinion, the building of Nicolae Ceaușescu's representation as a young revolutionary is exclusively done from an indirect perspective. This perspective is exemplified by several elements: 1) different types of article/volume regarding the Nicolae Ceaușescu's past as an underground militant; 2) the structure of these materials; 3) symposiums, exhibitions, debates having a commemorative role.

The articles on this subject can also be divided in several categories: a) articles regarding Ceaușescu's entire revolutionary youth¹⁷⁹; b) articles on a specific topic (such as Brasov trial¹⁸⁰ or 1st May 1939 rally¹⁸¹); c) articles about Nicolae Ceaușescu's detention periods¹⁸².

¹⁷⁹ For example, *România Literară* 16, 3 (20 January 1983), p. 12-13; *România Literară* 21, 4 (21 January 1988), p. 13; *Scântea* 55, 13677 (13 August 1986), p. 3.

¹⁸⁰ For example, *Flacăra* 35, 21 (23 May 1986), p. 6-7; *România Literară*, 19, 23 (5 June 1986), p. 12-13; the series of articles by Emil Poenaru, *Luceafărul* 30, 20-23 (17, 24, 31 May, 7 June); *Scântea* 55, 13616 (3 June 1986), p. 1; 13609 (25 May 1986), p. 4; *Scântea*, 50, 12055 (27 May 1981), p. 3.

¹⁸¹ *Scântea* 51, 12344 (30 April 1982), p. 2; *Luceafărul* 22, 17 (28 April 1979), p. 3; *Luceafărul* 32, 17 (29 April 1989), p. 7; *Luceafărul* 32, 17 (29 April 1989), p. 3; *Săptămâna* 17 (28 April 1989), p. 1,3, etc.

¹⁸² *România Literară* 19, 33 (14 August 1986), p. 3; *Flacăra* 35, 33 (15 August 1986), p. 3; *Scântea* 55, 13678 (14 August 1986), p. 3; 13679 (15 August 1986), p. 3; 13680 (16 August 1986), p. 3.

The data related to Ceaușescu's revolutionary youth are included in volumes about the history of the communist movement in Romania¹⁸³ and in the homage volumes¹⁸⁴. These articles and volumes contain the testimonies of different eyewitnesses at the events involving Ceaușescu (see for example, that of Petre Constantinescu-Iasi¹⁸⁵ or Vasile Valcu¹⁸⁶), fragments of the police reports¹⁸⁷ or of the prison guards' reports¹⁸⁸, parts of articles published by the press of that time (see for example, Eugen Jebelleanu's article¹⁸⁹ or an article published in *Arena* and reproduced by *Scanteia*¹⁹⁰). In my opinion, these documents are introduced in the articles or other volumes in order to reinforce the veracity and the credibility of the information given by them.

The subject of Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary youth was also the subject of several literary productions. *Luceafarul* published between 1978-1980 a fragment of the play *The Road* by Valentin Munteanu¹⁹¹ and two fragments of the novel *The Youth of a Hero* written by Petru Vintila¹⁹². This novel was finally published in 1980¹⁹³ and fragment of it was included in a homage volume¹⁹⁴.

¹⁸³ C. Bărbulescu, Fl. Dragne, C.Mocanu, C. Petculescu, Al. Șiperco, N.Tue, *File din istoria U.T.C.*; Ion Spălățelu, *Izbânzi prin veacuri. Comuniștii-o istorie trăită*; Olimpiu Măcișescu, *Doftana, simbol al eroismului revoluționar*.

¹⁸⁴ For example, Olimpiu Măcișescu, *Tinerețea revoluționară a tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu. Exemplul eroic al luptătorului neînfricat pentru triumful idealurilor comuniste*; Michel-P.Hamelet, *Nicolae Ceaușescu. Biografie și texte selectate; București-Omagiu marelui erou; Omagiu tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al PCR, președintele Consiliului de stat al RSR; Nicolae Ceaușescu. Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman*, etc.

¹⁸⁵ *România Literară* 19, 4 (23 January 1986), p. 8.

¹⁸⁶ *Flacăra*, 27, 4 (26 January 1978), p. 4.

¹⁸⁷ *România Literară* 15, 3 (20 January), p. 12; *România Literară* 22, 4 (26 January 1989), p. 12.

¹⁸⁸ Michel-P. Hamelet, p.33.

¹⁸⁹ *România Literară* 21, 4 (21 January 1988), p. 13; *România Literară* 16, 28 (14 July 1983), p. 12-13.

¹⁹⁰ *Scântea* 55, 13618 (5 June 1986), p. 2.

¹⁹¹ *Luceafărul* 21, 4 (28 January 1978), p. 4-5.

¹⁹² The series of articles by Petru Vintila published in *Luceafărul* 22, 45-46 (10, 17 November 1979), p. 4-5; 23, 4 (26 January 1980), p. 3.

¹⁹³ John Sweeney, p.39.

¹⁹⁴ Petru Vintilă, „Tinerețea unui erou” in *Cinstind un om, sărbătorim o țară. Omagiu celui mai iubit fiu al patriei* (Bucharest: Eminescu, 1988), pp.553-559.

The same homage volume also included a part of Marin Preda's novel *The Delirium* whose one character's biography, Ionica, also young underground militant, resembles to that of Nicolae Ceaușescu's¹⁹⁵.

Not only was the entire revolutionary biography of the Romanian leader the subject of the literary productions, but also a single event. For example, in 1989 a small volume containing verses about the 1 May 1939 rally was published¹⁹⁶.

In my opinion, the organization of several activities (such as symposiums, scientific conferences, exhibitions, etc.) celebrating Ceaușescu's birthday or the passing of a significant number of years since an event was another opportunity of endorsing and consolidating his cult. My conclusion is based on several elements, such as the title of these commemorative events, the laudatory content of the works presented and of the telegrams agreed on by the participants, the mode of the organization and display of the exhibitions and festive shows.

Sorin Șerban mentions that a professional revolutionary distinguishes himself by his *special traits*.¹⁹⁷

Nicolae Ceaușescu also distinguishes himself from the rest of the communist militants through his dynamism: his "unusual energy, firmness, un-fearful will to fight", "energy and revolutionary passion" and his omnipresence. The exceptional was the appropriate word used to define Ceaușescu's character: he "was a revelation from the beginning", "an exceptional gifted young man", "an exceptional force of organizing and mobilizing the mass". His physical and psychical qualities, also exceptional¹⁹⁸, brought him a special position within the community of the communist militants¹⁹⁹.

5. Conclusion

Nicolae Ceaușescu's revolutionary biography includes a mixture of omissions and inventions regarding its main episodes. Their fabricated character is meant, on one part, to hide the insignificance of Romanian leader's revolutionary activity and on the other side, to demonstrate and to

¹⁹⁵ Marin Preda, „Tânărul revoluționar” in *Ibidem*, pp. 406-415.

¹⁹⁶ Ion Segărceanu, *Sub flamuri purpurii de mai* (București, 1989).

¹⁹⁷ Sorin Șerban, pp.139-140.

¹⁹⁸ *Flacăra* 27, 4 (26 January), p. 4.

¹⁹⁹ See for example, Olimpiu Matichescu, *Tineretea revoluționară*, p.70; *Flacăra* 27, 4 (26 January 1979), p. 4.

sustain the justification and his predestination for the epochal achievements of the future Conducător, Nicolae Ceaușescu.

The general thematic lines integrated in the Romanian communist leader's revolutionary biography were established during the 1970s. In the next decade, the intensification of the manifestations of Ceaușescu's cult of personality brought the alteration of the previously established official version regarding his participation in the revolutionary events included in his biography. This revision included the omission of certain unfavorable details of Ceaușescu's political activity and consequently, improving some aspects of his actions or even erroneously attributing him the organization of certain actions (the organization of 1st May 1939 rally). Another tendency in reconstructing Ceaușescu's earlier political biography was to reinterpret the entire inter-war history of the RCP as to present Ceaușescu as its main character and therefore, overshadowing other Romanian communist personalities and their political activity.

Preliminaries for the history of the Romanian Communist Youth Union¹

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This study stands for the author's contribution to the Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, constituted in 2006 by the Romanian Presidency and chaired by Professor Vladimir Tismăneanu from the University of Maryland. So far, the history of the Romanian Communist Youth Union (CYU) was under-researched, mainly due to political reasons. Many of the post-communist politicians were connected to CYU and they had no interest to facilitate the disclosure of the communist archives. The files of CYU – which are in a good condition and well organized – have only recently become available for researchers.

The Romanian Communist Youth Union was part of the vast and complicate network of "mass-organizations" created by the communist regime in order to dissimulate its totalitarian nature. In Leninist terms, its main function was to be a "transmission belt" between the Communist Party and the society, specifically to its young part.

In inter-war Romania, CYU was an illegal and marginal organization, with an intermittent history, being strictly controlled by Comintern through the Youth Communist International. It became stronger and a genuine mass-organization only after the Second World War, under the Protection of the Red Army and of the Soviet "Counselors". After the installation of the communist regime, all the other youth organizations (political, religious, cultural and sport organizations) were disbanded.

CYU was a Comsomol-like organization, apparently autonomous but in fact subordinated the Communist Party. It was meant to function as a political instrument for the social and political mobilization, for the ideological socialization of the young population, for the selection and formation of the new elite and for the social control.

During Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the youth communist organization was repeatedly purged (mainly after 1949, 1952 and 1956) of social enemies (mainly "kulaks") and political adversaries (former members of the democratic parties and of other types of organizations). Nicolae Ceaușescu transformed the political regime into an "inclusion" type (the term belongs to Kenneth Jowitt), tending to include the entire population in communist organizations. At the end of the '40s, CYU included 1/5 of the young population; in the '50s, one third; in the seventies, half, and in the '80s the vast majority of the youth.

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CYU was often engaged in repressive campaigns, being part of the nationalization and collectivization process, of the anti-students campaigns in the second half of the '50s, of the purges of schools, universities, institutions, factories, of the army etc. Most of the CYU leaders subsequently had a significant career in the Romanian Communist Party.

Key words: Communism, Romania, Evolution of the Youth Communism Union, Youth Organizations of the RCP.

1. An organizational Leviathan

In a totalitarian state, the communist party dissimulates its single party status through a huge, dense and complicated organization network meant to include as much as possible from the country's population. The communist ideology refers to it as "mass-organizations". Lenin was the first who, in 1902, in the famous programmatic text „What is to be done?” distinguished between the functions of the avant-gardes party (subversive, disciplined, less numerous and composed only of professional revolutionaries) and those of the mass organizations (syndicates, which should be as numerous as possible, and under the secret control of the party should continue to influence all categories of workers)². Once the Bolsheviks took the power, Lenin opposed to the party's „left wing” represented by Trotsky, who, among many other things, asked the abolition of the syndicates and of other professional organizations considered as „revolute” in the new context. On the contrary, Lenin asked the taking over, the transformation and the strict control of all these in order to be used in concordance with the purposes of the single party. The aim of the mass organizations was, according to Lenin's belief in another famous text, to function as “driving belts” between the communist party (which, in order to protect its revolutionary character had to limit the number of its members) and the “mass of those who work”. „ A stronger opponent, the communist ideologue wrote, can be defeated only through a maximum strain of forces and only with the compulsory condition to use with a maximum of attention, care, prudence and skill any fissure, as small as possible, between enemies (...) as well as any possibility, to find a table allay even if he is temporary, hesitating, unstable, unsure, conditioned”³. This apparent gradualism that Lenin promoted had, exclusively, tactic reasons; the

² V. I. Lenin, *Ce-i de făcut. Probleme acute ale mișcării noastre*, in *Opere complete*, Second edition, tome. VI (January-August 1902), (Bucharest, 1964), p. 1-190.

³ Idem, *Despre syndicate, despre momentul actual și despre greșelile lui Troțki*, in *Lenin despre syndicate, 1895-1923*, (Bucharest, 1958), p. 767-789; also see Idem, „Stângismul” – boala copilăriei comunismului, the fourth edition, (Bucharest, 1953).

communist power was to make „compromises” with the old regime until the communism would take the leadership. Stalin overtook the theory of „driving belts” and made of it an organizational model for the Soviet Union and later on for all the communist countries from Eastern Europe.

In Stalin’s view, within the mass organizations there are: syndicates, cooperatives, plant’s organizations, women’s associations without political involvements, press organs, cultural-educative organizations, youth unions, soviets and other organs. They have humiliated roles within the communist party’s silage: to apply the decrees of the center, to debate the most efficient ways of “putting these into practice”, to mobilize the mass, to constitute in cadres reserve for the party and the state, to be the first school of the communism, to represent the party’s interests where this was not longer organized⁴. In fact, the functions of the mass organizations were superposed in a great extent on those of the party: social and political mobilization, re-socialization of the masses in accordance with the communist ideology, the recruitment, selection and the creation of the new elite, the social control⁵. Briefly, although the regime simulated through their means the democratic mechanisms, the mass organizations were only a power instrument at the disposal of the communist dictatorship.

2. The Soviet model

The totalitarian regimes distinguish themselves through the extraordinary attention that they offer to the political framework of the youths and to the primary political socialization⁶. The totalitarian project aims to include all children and young persons, from the very fragile ages, in an organized framework and their systematic indoctrination in order to create „the new human being”. The communist ideologists shared together with other authors of social engineering from the XIX and XX century the belief in the radical malleability of the human being and in the transforming, unlimited powers of propaganda and organization. This belief was doubled by a structural misanthropy, based on dark suppositions as concern the human nature and society, which opened the way to use, at a great extent, at social level, the coercive and control instruments. Although it is collectivist, the Marxism-Leninism mixed the fascination towards the mass with fear and

⁴ I. Stalin, *Problemele leninismului*, second ed., (Bucharest, 1948), p. 119-121.

⁵ Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred Greenstein, Nelson Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. III, (Adison Wesley, 1975), p. 208-211.

⁶ Julius Gould, "The Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend", *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 2, (no. 4, Dec. 1941), p. 305-314.

distrust. The ambivalence is noticed very well in the attitude's case towards the young persons who, on one hand, due to the weak relations with the old regime were perceived as the perfect hypostasis of the "new human being" and as a mass of ideal maneuver, and on the other hand were treated with countless suspicion. Moreover, the net of the communist organizations expended especially towards the population categories to which the regime tied the interests and who, at the same time, were ideologically suspected: young persons, peasants, intellectuals, soldiers and not at last the workers.

The Leninist and Stalinist's writings and the Soviet experience in youth's organization were decisive for the attitude towards the young persons in the communist countries after the Second World War. Lenin was preoccupied since his adolescence by the "stupid, philistine," theme towards the youths. "We need young forces. I would say that those who allow to say that persons are difficult to find should be shot....We have to recruit young persons on a larger scale without being afraid of them, Lenin wrote in the period when he was preparing the revolution against the tsarist regime and urged them towards terrorist acts ⁷. Once the Bolsheviks took the power, the new regime moved to the organization of the youths in a unique communist organization. Consequently, the Comsomol (*Kommunisticeski Soiuz Molodioji* – Communist Youth Union) was created. It held its first congress in October-November, 1918. Initially, auto declared as „independent” organization and „interdependent” only with the Communist Party, the Union admitted its subordination towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the following congresses.

In a discourse that proved to be canonic for the communist propaganda, Lenin made clear, at the third Congress of the CYU (October, 1920) the "tasks of the Youth Unions" In his opinion, the main "task" for the youths was to learn the communism through the mixing of the study with practical activities. Consequently the way towards the massive indoctrination of the young persons was open, on one hand, and their involvement, since the school period, in economic activities under the patronage of the new regime, on the other hand. Lenin also said that the young persons have to appropriate the "communist ethics" which is "completely subordinated to the interests of class struggle" and have to defend the new regime⁸.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Scrisoare către A. A. Bogdanov și S. I. Gusev și Către S. I. Gusev*, in V. I. Lenin, *Despre tineret*, second ed., (Bucharest, 1963), p. 149-155.

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Sarcinile Uniunilor Tineretului*, eleventh ed., (Bucharest, 1959).

Similar prescriptions are in Stalin's ideas. For him the CYU was the transmission belt through which the party educated the young generation and created young reserves for the party and other mass organizations. "This, said Stalin in a dialectical manner, is a mass organization of the working and peasantry youth; it is not a party organization, but it is directly linked to the party. The CYU had to strengthen the proletarian nucleus and "to fight very hard" against "the completely decomposed elements" from the Union. The youths had to involve in the construction of the communist society and to defend the country against the outside and inside enemies"⁹.

Consequently, the CYU had a triple function: ideological, economic and military. During the Civil War the youths of the CYU activated as agitators, commissioners and shock troops. At the fifth Congress (October, 1922), the Union took under its patronage the naval force. In the Second World War the persons enrolled in the CYU constituted an important human resource for the Red Army. From the economic point of view, the CYU was mobilized, as it was the case of the other mass organizations, to fulfill the five-year plans which started in 1928. A great part of the Stakhanov's supporters was recruited from the CYU's members. The young activists were sent in a great number-thousand of them-to participate to the killing of Kulaks and to support the collectivization. They played an important role in the deportations from the educational system. The CYU dealt with different stages of deportations. The Great Terror ended with the decimation of the central apparatus of the organization. Anyway, the old guard of the party was affected in a greater extent by Stalin's repression, so that, from the fourth decade the CYU's members took over the positions within the party and state that had been vacant. After the war the interest of Cosmopol moved from economy towards political education, and cultural "sportive activities"¹⁰.

The affiliation to the organization was reserved, until the mid of the 30's, to the proletarians and to the poor peasantry. Later on, in order to increase the number of the members, the "class criterion" was replaced by that of the loyalty towards the Soviet regime. If at its first Congress the CYU had

⁹ I. Stalin, *Despre sarcinile Comsomolului*, (Bucharest, 1953).

¹⁰ Ralph Talcott Fisher, *Pattern for Soviet Youth. A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954*, (New York, 1959); Merle Fainsod, "The Komsomols - a Study of Youth under Dictatorship", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 45, (no. 1, March 1951), p. 18-40; M. I. Kalinin, *Drumul glorios al Comsomolului*, second ed., (Bucharest, 1948).

only 22000 members, at the end of the Second World War it reached gigantic dimensions, 15000000 youth, almost half from the young population of the Soviet Union. Pioneers Organization, created in 1922, played an important role, reaching 13-14 millions. The CYU controlled also the Pioneers Organization (pupils between 9 and 14 years old) and that of "October's supporters" Organization (children up to eight years old).

3. The Communist Youth Union from Romania

The Communist Youth Union from Romania has many birthdays. Its early history is ephemeral, non continuous, ambiguous being, once the communists took the power, false and reinvented.

In 1951, the RWP created a Commission to settle down the creation date for the CYU, but this could not decide a precise moment¹¹. Finally it was adopted 19-20 March, 1922, when, in Bucharest, the "General Conference of the Socialist Youth" took part. In fact, the conference was only an attempt of the autochthon communists, guided by the Internationalization of the Communist Youth (KIM) to radicalize the left oriented youth and to misappropriate the social democratic youth organizations in order to create a communist mass organization. KIM was created by COMINTERN in November, 1919, at Berlin to serve as an international inter-face of the Bolshevik regime from Moscow in the effort to bring together the youth from different regions on the communists side¹². The receipt that KIM applied was the same used in its own creation: the infiltration, radicalization and division of the social democrat and socialist organizations, followed by the creation of a unitary communist organization.

It is the case of Romania, too, where the local communists and the KIM tried to take over the youth organizations of the Socialist Party (the former Social Democrat Party from Romania re-baptized in 1918). After the splitting up of the Socialist Party during the Congress from Bucharest, May, 1921, (known in the communist historiography as the first Congress of the Romanian Communist Party) and the arrest of the delegations that voted for the affiliation to the Third Internationalization, the free communist youth tried to provoke a similar splitting up in the social democrat youth movement. The "unification" attempts of the youth organizations all over Romania's territory under the leadership of the communists and their affiliation to the KIM failed, due to the social democrat opposition, to the

¹¹ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP-Organizational Section, file no.106/1951, f1-6

¹² Gh. Moș, V. Ștefănescu, C. Mocanu, *Contribuții la istoria organizației marxist-leniniste de tineret din România*, vol. I, (Bucharest, 1959), p. 79 sqq.

General Commission of the Syndicates but especially to the punishment measures of the authorities, which considered the communist group as an anti-system movement. The only result was the detachment from the socialist and syndicate organizations of some leaders and radical groups that activated under different names. The most active group was the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Movement which decided in March, 1923, the changing into The Socialist Youth Union, deceiving name in order to attire the social democrat supporters. This group convoked The General Conference of the Socialist Youth; chosen by the communist regime a birthday of the CYU¹³. Meanwhile, the Romanian Communist Party, reorganized abroad by the COMINTERN, took the initiative, announcing for the first of May, 1924, the changing of the SYU in the CYU from Romania and its affiliation to the KIM. It was a formal act, on a paper, subversive, and a real congress of constitution never took place¹⁴.

The first status of the CYU from Romania, elaborated in 1925, specified in the first article that the Union is a section of the KIM, and at the third article that it is "completely subordinated" to the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) from political point of view. In order to be a member it was compulsory to recognize not only the RCP's status but also that of KIM's. The members had to respect, under the menace of the sanctions, the rules of the strict revolutionary discipline and the conspiracy standards¹⁵

In the same period, between April and December, 1924, the authorities issued more decisions to forbid the activities of the communist organizations, reaching the high point with Marzescu Law that outlawed the RCP and the CYU from Romania. The communists activated in illegality, until the end of the Second World War, having a status of a marginal movement. The activity of the CYU from Romania (which had only a few hundreds of members-¹⁶) resumed to clandestine publicity and propaganda and to strikes and secret actions. The leadership of the Union, which was named and controlled by the KIM, was grounded, as the leadership of the Communist Party, by countless internal fights and depositions. Moreover, it was harassed and decimated by authorities. In 1936, due to its weak performances the CYU from Romania self dissolved, as a consequence of

¹³ Constantin Petculescu, *Crearea Uniunii Tineretului Comunist*, (Bucharest, 1972).

¹⁴ „Tineretul Socialist”, 1 May, 1924.

¹⁵ "Provisory status of the Romanian Communist Youth Union" in *Documents from the history of the Romanian Communist Youth Union, 1917-1944*, (Bucharest, 1958), p. 103-115

¹⁶ CNHA, fund 3 (CC of CYU), file no. 1066/1929, f. 2; *Ibidem*, file no. 615/1933, f. 1-7.

the KIM's decision. The Communist Youth Internationalization will disappear together with the dissolution of the COMINTERN in 1943¹⁷

In February, 1939, the RCP considered the dissolution of the CYU from Romania as a "mistake" and decided the re-establishment of the Union. The CYU from Romania did not have liberty movement and did not succeed to bring together many persons, the organization being persecuted by Antonescu's regime.

The CYU reactivated itself after the 23rd of August, 1944, this time in a much friendlier environment, being under the protection of the Red Army, of the authorities and of a stronger Communist Party. The first general secretary of the CYU was Nicolae Ceausescu, who activated in the Union in the inter-wars period and after 1939, being for many times sent to jail. As a leader of the CYU, Ceausescu kept the clandestine used methods in the inter wars period, and, not seeing the new political context, he received other tasks, far from the capital¹⁸.

The CYU was an important piece in the strategy of the "popular front" that the CP used in its ascension toward power. As the CP, the CYU followed the "compromises" policy recommended by Lenin, trying to associate with other youth groups, under the generous name of some umbrella-organizations, to obtain mass support. As Theohari Georgescu explained, the CYU arrived to be considered by the communist leaders, in the first years after the war, "a too narrow organization, narrow from the political point of view through its name that stopped a part of the youth to enroll in the Communist Youth Organization, and narrow from the point of view of its small number of members"¹⁹. In 1945 the CYU had almost 63000 members²⁰.

Consequently, different organizational screens were created around the CYU: The Unique Front of the Working Youth (constituted in September, 1944, using the model of the Unique Working Front, made up of young communists and social democrat supporters), the National Democrat Youth Front (constituted in October, 1944, using the model of the National Democrat Front) and the Movement of the Progressive Youth from

¹⁷ *Documents from the history of the Romanian Communist Youth Union ...*, p. 93 and next.; C. Bărbulescu., *Pages from the history of the CYU*, (Bucharest, 1971), *passim*.

¹⁸ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Cadres Section, file C 2050, Nicolae Ceaușescu, f. 1-24; Paul Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej*, (Bucharest, 2000) p. 171

¹⁹ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 84/1949, f. 4-5.

²⁰ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP- Office, file no. 32/1945.

Romania (January, 1945) made up close to communists, social democrats, Petru Groza's party 1923, Ploughmen Front, and other groups that gravitated around the RCP. None of these organizations obtained the evaluated results. In the Plenary, March, 1945, the CYU admitted this aspect and a month later decided the creation of another umbrella-organization, the Progressive Youth, which proved to be a little more efficient. The president of the PY, Constantin Dragoescu was also the secretary of the CYU. In the PY will be enrolled communists, social democrats, ploughmen, young supporters of Anton Alexandrescu's faction, liberal supporters of Gheorghe Tatarescu's faction and other small groups. In order to offer credibility to the new organization, the CYU officially self dissolves in June, 1945. The program of the PY was general and generous, promising the promoting of the youth's interests mentioning vaguely about the communist command troops. The communist activists were instructed not to make "Marxism parade" and to dissimulate the political activity behind some cultural, sportive or trade union actions. The branches of the organizations were constituted around some particular "initiative committees". Elections were to take place only when the victory of the communists was sure. Are we legalists? We are communists. We say: elections are good as long as they offer democratic results, Miron Constantinescu said in the spring of 1946 when he was attending a training course with the young activists²¹. „Democratic" means in the communists idiom „favourable to the communists". The PY's activity was stopped by the boycott of the liberal, peasantry, social democrats organizations, by the opposition of some trade union, professional, religious organizations as well as the resistance of the free youth, especially of those from universities and rural areas.

As a consequence at the Plenary, January, 1946, the Communist Party reconsidered the dissolution of the CYU as a mistake, asking its reactivation. At the same time it continued to create mass satellite organizations. In August, 1946 was created the National Federation of the Democrat Youth from Romania as an internal interface of the World Federation of the Democrat Youth, created in October, 1945 by the Soviet Union to assume some of the KIM's functions. In the following period, as the Communist Party was consolidated its power, youth organizations were created :Academic Democrat Front transformed in May, 1947, in the National Union of the Romanian Students (with 40000 members in 1948 of a total number of 59000 students), The Rural Youth Organization (February, 1948, 235000 from a number of 2 million young peasants), The

²¹ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 41/1948, f. 1-22.

Union of Pupils Association (February, 1948, 200000 members from a total of 380000 pupils), The Youth of the Hungarian Popular Union (1948, 32000 members from a total of 90000 Hungarian youth, The Jewish Democrat Youth Front (30000 members from a total of 50000 Jewish youth)²². After the creation of the Romanian Working Party through the unification of the RCP with a part of the DSP, February, 1948, the Union of Working Youth was created. ²³In that period, the General Secretary was Mihai Dalea, In the Union of Working Youth were enrolled at the beginning of 1948 300000 members from a total number of 450000 working youths and 3300000 youths from Romania²⁴

4. The Union of Working Youth

Starting with 1948²⁵, after the complete conquer of the power, the RWP discussed about the problem of unification and depuration of the youth organizations. At the same time the youth were arrested in different stages. Initially, the participants at the anti communist manifestations were arrested, and in 1948 the arrests on different categories started, being purchased especially the liberal, peasantry, iron guard members. The political and religious youth organizations were dissolved²⁶. The Central Committee Plenary of the RWP, 22-24 December 1948 decided the creation of the single youth organization, after Comsomol's model²⁷. Comsomol had a decisive role in taking this decision, the unification being asked during a visit of the Union of Working Youth at Moscow, 1948²⁸. The announcement of the RWP's intention and the „fabrication” of the RWP's resolution in the youth organizations started protests and violent incidents in many places in the country²⁹. The „unification „ congress of all youth organizations in

²² *Ibidem*, file 124/1948, f. 35-43.

²³ CNHA, fund 3 - CC of CYU, file nr. 4/1948. The WYU was at the origin the name of an organization made up of railway workers in February 1947 that was overtaken by the RCP

²⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 36; CNHA, fund CC of RCP - Organizational Section, file nr. 86/1949, f. 7.

²⁵ In 1948 the leadership of the WYU was made by Gheorghe Florescu - general secretary, Petre Lupu, Pavel Lala, Drăgan Ilie, Manea Anton - secretary; CNHA, fund 3 (CC of CYU), file nr. 52/1948, f. 24.

²⁶ Ioana Boca, "Studentii în anii '50", *Anuarul Institutului Român de Istorie Recentă*, vol I, 2002, p. 234-235; Maria Someșan, *Universitate și politică în deceniile 4-6 ale secolului XX. Episoade și Documente*, (Bucharest, 2004), p. 241 sqq.

²⁷ *Rezoluția Ședinței Plenare a CC al PMR din 22-24 decembrie 1948 asupra activității Partidului în rândurile tineretului*, (Bucharest, 1949).

²⁸ *Raport asupra problemelor discutate de delegația CC al UTM cu conducerea Comsomolului la Moscova*, CNHA, fund CC of RCP - Organizational Section, file nr. 124/1948, f. 6.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, file nr. 74/1949, f. 103-106.

the Union of Working Youth took place in the presence of the communist leaders, at Romanian Athenaeum Room, 19-21 March, 1919. Gheorghe Florescu, a former printer, aged 38; president of the National Front of Democrat Youth became prime secretary of the Union of Working Youth until 1952³⁰. The Congress Resolution presented the tasks of the Union of Working Youth in a precious style that defined the epoch: the organization had to mobilize the youth in production in order to achieve and overpass the state plan in industry and agriculture; to select personnel for the party and state positions; to educate the youth according to Marx and Lenin's spirit; of the proletarian ethics; of patriotism and heroism; of love towards the Soviet Union, Stalin, Romanian Popular Republic and RWP; to cultivate the class vigilance, the hate against the exploiters, against the slave agents of the class enemies outside and inside the country; to contribute to the increasing of the professional preparation and to the cultural level of the youth; to the liquidation of the analphabetism, to the development of mass sports; to fight against the rottenness of the bourgeois ideology; hooliganism, drunkenness, non comradeship attitudes towards the women, the unfair bowing down towards the culture of imperialism and bourgeois habits³¹. All these will be presented in the status of the Union of Working Youth, the disobeying to the rules could lead to sanctions or even to the exclusion from the organization. As it can be seen, the Union of Working Youth, the same as the RWP did not resume to a single set of political demands. It imposed ethic standards of attitude and character (both of them with ideological content) through which aimed a norm in extenso of the thoughts and behavior of its members. This will allow the intrusion in the personal life of the youth, every biographic detail from their private life could constitute a pretext for a political sanction. The status and organization structure of the Union of Working Youth copied the Comsomol model-the defining of the organization, the nature of the relations with the party, the organization, the functions and the way of functioning being almost the same. The leaders of the Union of Working Youth and the leaders of the Comsomol a lot of meeting took place at the end of the 40's, the Soviet part guiding attentively the structure of the Union of Working Youth³². The leaders and the members of the Union of Working Youth participated frequently at different meetings in Moscow and tens of them attended the Central School of Cadres of the Comsomol³³.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, file nr. 88/1949, f. 1..

³¹ *Rezoluția Congresului de unificare a tineretului muncitor, 19-21 martie 1949*, Bucharest, Publishing House Tineretului, 1949.

³² CNHA, fund CC of RCP- Organizational Section, file nr. 84/1949, f. 39-66.

³³ *Ibidem*, f. 21-29; *Ibidem*, file no. 65/1949, f. 1-10; *Ibidem*, file no. 36/1950, f. 19-27 etc

Materials, brochures, books concerning the Comsomol experience were translated or written down in huge amounts³⁴. Every discourse concerning the youth from the 40's and 50's started with the invocation of the Soviet model. At the same time, the structure of the Union of Working Youth reproduced and doubled the structure of the RWP, an exactly copy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union³⁵. The Union of Working Youth was under the coordination of The Section of the party leading, syndical and youth organs of the Central Committee of the RWP, known as „the organizational section”. The Congress was the „supreme organ” of the Union of Working Youth, and in exceptional cases the National Conference. Between Congresses, the Union was led by a Central Committee (45 members in 1949), but the real power was exercised by an Executive Bureau (11 members) and more precisely by the Secretariat of the Bureau (5 members) led by a prime secretary. The leading organisms were elected by the organizations of the Union of Working Youth, but the elections were formal, the party fixed previously the results. There were also sections and commissions among with the Central Committee and in the territory the leadership was assured by the district committees. A number of instructors inspected the territory and verified the application of the decisions³⁶.

The sections had a variable geography during time, the most important ones being: the organizational section (it exercised the control upon the organizations of the Union and verified the biography of the UWY members); the propaganda and agitation section(it spread the messages inside and outside the organization, coordinating the press sector), the administrative section (it dealt with the funds and the patrimony of the organization), the pioneers section (it coordinated the activity of the pioneers), the international relations section (it facilitated the contact with the World Federation of the Democrat Youth, the International Union of Students, Comsomol and other Youth organizations)³⁷. For the instruction of the cadres, the Union of Working Youth had a central school named Filimon Sarbu, 1949 (almost 100 graduates every year) and a complete network of part time schools or sections near the party schools (thousands

³⁴ *Să învățăm din experiența glorioșului Comsomol al lui Lenin și Stalin*, (Bucharest, 1948); *Ce cere Comsomolul de la comsomoliști*, (Bucharest, 1949); *Din experiența propagandiștilor comsomoliști*, (Bucharest, 1952) etc.

³⁵ CNHA, fund CC of RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 23/1950, f. 2-55; *Ibidem*, file no. 64/1955, f. 1-50

³⁶ CNHA, fund 3 (CC al UTC), file no. 3/1949, f. 1-19.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, fund CC of RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 86/1949, f. 1-6; *Ibidem*, file no. 87/1949, f. 1-6; *Ibidem*, file no. 141/1952, f. 1-21 etc.

of activists graduated every year). In all these schools are taught classes of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the RWP, of universal history, of dialectic materialism, political economy, general culture (notions of Romanian, Russian, mathematics, physics, geography, natural sciences), organization and propaganda techniques. Common members were submitted to indoctrination through different methods-lessons, circles, meetings, "fabrication" through which thousands of persons passed every year³⁸

In 1958, in a full political crisis Filimon Sarbu School was dissolute due to its inefficiency, the instruction of the young cadres being taking over by Stefan Gheorghiu³⁹. During Ceausescu's regime a Central School of the Union's cadres functioned.

The most important periodical publications of the Union of Working Youth and of the Union of Communist Youth were: „Tânărul Muncitor” (1947-1949, with the supplement „Brigadierul”), „Scânteia Tineretului” (1944, the second series from 1949), „Tânărul Leninist” (1951-1974), „Din experiența Comsomolului” (it became supplement in „Tânărul Leninist”), „Pionierul” (1949, between 1953-1967 „Scânteia Pionierului”), „Instructorul de pionieri” (1951-1958), „Pogonici” (1949, since 1967 „Luminița”, between 1956-1979 had the supplement „Arici Pogonici”), „Licurici” (1947, between 1953-1967 „Cravata Roșie”), „Cutezători” (1967), „Șoimii patriei” (1980; Hungarian edition „A Haza Solymai”), „Știință și tehnică” (which also edited „Colecția de povestiri științifico-fantastice”, „Tehnum”), „Racheta cutezătorilor” (1966-1974), „Viața Studențească” (1956), „Amfiteatru” (1966), „Ifjúmunkás” (1948), „Pionir” (1950-1967, followed by „Jóbarát”), „Napsugár” (1957), etc. The periodicals that were to translate for every young person the communist ideology were mentioned under a strict control by the Union of Working Youth and by the RWP being censored systematically.

Right after the creation of the single organization, the RWP asked its depuration which, in a first phase will be achieved under the pretext of re-enrollment of the members in the Union of Working Youth-equivalent to the "verifying" campaign of the RWP members. As the CP the youth organization oscillated between the role of avant-garde and mass organization, registering fluxes and refluxes depending on the political situation. Especially in Dej's period, any political campaign was followed by strong depuration campaign. The effort from the mid 40's to enroll as

³⁸ CNHA, fund 3 (CC of CYU), file no. 14/1956, f. 220-222; *Ibidem*, file no. 4/1958, f. 135; *Ibidem*, file no. 30/1958, f. 129-131.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, file no. 4/1958, f. 140.

many young persons as possible in the pro communist organizations made that, after unification, within the RWP to find members who did not correspond anymore to the political, ideological and class criteria, instituted through the party's instructions. Although the status of the RWP approved at the Congress foresaw that any young person "within the hard working and studious youth, from villages and cities", aged between 15 and 25, who knew the program, status and the decisions of the Union⁴⁰ could be a member, the 1949's instructions indicated that the RWP members „are to be recruited within the working youth and poor peasants, within the best middle class peasants, young clerks, students and pupils close to the proletarian ideology"⁴¹.

The re-enrollment was made on these criteria. Those who were accepted in the Union of Working Youth had to, according to the status, have recommendations from a RWP member or from two members of the Union of Working Youth and to present an autobiography, the documents were to be verified afterward. According to the procedure, 538 members of the leadership apparatus of the Union were expelled ("hostile elements", meaning former iron guard supporters, former members of the democrat parties, religious activists especially of the minority religions, leaders of the Union of Working Youth that did not respect the RWP's decisions) and other 5.500 were sent to "undignified jobs" due to the fact that they did not have "proper social origins" (especially the kulaks) or because they did not respect the status and the proletarian ethics accordingly (every attitude or behavior that was considered improper by the communist leaders). Also, 33800 persons, mainly "hostile elements" were expelled within the common members of the Union of Working Youth.

The exclusion from the Union of Working Youth was not a simple administrative procedure. Since the first years of the communism, the exclusion could mean a social exclusion, the professional marginalization and could also open the way for an inquiry. The social origin and the affiliation to a communist organization were the most important criteria that filtered the political, social, professional ascension in Dej's period. The re-enrollment was one of the important ways through which the institutions, faculties, schools, army units, plants were deputed, excepting the branches of the Union of Working Youth. The procedure provoked violent incidents (ex. the killing of some members of the Union). Due to the fact

⁴⁰ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 124/1948, f. 123, art. 8.

⁴¹ *Instructions for the re-enrolment of the youth in the Union of Working Youth*, in *Ibidem*, file no. 87/1949, f. 7.

that the communist organizations were becoming more and more numerous (in 1950, one fifth of the youth, at the end of the 50's half of them, in the 80's the great majority) we can say that their depuration had a major social impact, contributing to the rapid and brutal changing of the society's profile. Through the re-enrollments, other 30000 youths were recruited, so that the Union of Working Youth, once the operation was finished, counted 650000 members. The social composition, according to the communist categories, was as follows: 30,99% workers, 40,38% working peasants, 6,20% clerks, 18,65% pupils, 3,78% students. In the leadership organisms the situation is as follows 62,5% workers, 12,7% peasants; 80,78% were Romanians, 19,22% other nationalities¹⁰.

"We succeeded in abolishing the old heritage of the youth organizations before the unification" the author of a report wrote triumphantly, regarding the re-enrollments, who, warning that „ there are miserable agents of the Anglo-Americans imperialists and of the internal class enemy unknown among us". „The tendencies to capture the whole youth must be fought against" he added¹¹. The depurations will continue, under the form of „improving the class composition campaigns", in the following period, in „hot" years: 1952, 1956 and 1968.

The workers were the main target of recruitment policies in Dej's period. The bigger their presence in the Union of Working Youth was, the better "the social composition" was.

At a certain moment, during the 50's a peak of 35% ¹² was reached, but in Dej's period their proportion ranged between 25-30%. With all the efforts of the Union, in the mid 50's only 50% from the youth from the plants was part of the organization¹³. In the 80's, the quantity of the workers (foremen and technicians were also included) oscillated around 50%¹⁴.

The inclusion of the workers in the communist organizations was a form of legitimacy, and especially a method of mobilization to reconstruct the after wars period and to implement communist decisions to the economy¹⁵.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, file no 25/1950, f. 1-48; *Ibidem*, file no. 66/1949, f. 1-28.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, file no. 25/1950, f. 17. The demand had a Leninist comand „The only governing party from all over the world which is not preoccupied by the increasing of its members but by its qualitative increase, by the „cleaning" among members is the party of the revolutionary working class"; V. I. Lenin, *Opere*, vol. 30, Bucharest, 1956, p. 46.

¹² CNHA, fund 3 (CC of CYU), file no. 13/1957, f. 119.

¹³ *Ibidem*, fund CC of RCP – Organizational Section, file 45/1956, f. 49.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, fund CC of CYU, file no. 62/1984, non inventoried and non paged.

¹⁵ Gheorghe Florescu, *Despre sarcinile Uniunii Tineretului Muncitor în îndeplinirea planului cincinal*, (Bucharest, 1951).

The youth were engaged in the transforming policies of the régime: nationalized plants, „youth construction site”, communitarian works. They participated to all these either through a forced mobilization or through the setting of a system of material rewards (the facilitation of the migration from the villages towards cities, the stability of a job, the possibility to obtain easier an apartment, trips, free holidays) and also of symbolic rewards (for example through the awarding of the title of „foremost people”, „innovator”, „Stakhanovism supporters” in the „socialist competitions”. The Union was a lever to mobilize and to control the private and professional life of the workers. The first major dilemma of the regime was linked to the degree of inclusion in its organizations of the rural population. As it is known this was a historic dilemma of the communist movement, for which Lenin founded the formula of an “alliance between workers and peasants”. In communist Romania, we saw that in a first period especially the poor peasants were enrolled in the Union. 40% of those which had been expelled through re-enrollment were the peasants. This fact brought into discussion the issue of the representation in the Union taking into account that $\frac{3}{4}$ from Romania’s population was made up of peasants. Moreover, the start in 1949 of “the socialist transformation of the agriculture” demanded a massive presence of the communist organizations in villages; the discourses reserved to the youth the role of collectivization’s pioneers. Soon afterwards, it was demanded the enrollment in the Union of all youth engaged in “Stations of machines and trucks”, “Collective Agricultural Farms”, “State Agricultural Farms” and the “best workers that sustain the party’s policy”¹⁶, in this last category the poor peasants from the particular sector who were in total agreement with the party were also enrolled. In the file to adhere to the Union there was a column concerning the „profession and the estate” of the parents¹⁷ in order to reveal the children of the „landowners”.

The enrollment of the peasants in the Union was an issue during collectivization’s period. On one hand, the Union’s activists tried to include a huge part of the rural youth in the organization, and on the other hand they tried to decrease their number in order to “improve” the social composition.

Towards the end of the 50’s, the Union succeeded to include almost 28,5% of the framed rural population¹⁸. In the Union we have 30-35% peasants.

¹⁶ CNHA, fund CC of the CRP – Organizational Section, file no. 35/1950, f. 31.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, file no 56/1953, f. 25.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, file no. 37/1958, f. 3.

They decreased towards the 60's to 25% due to the changing of the social profile of the population, and around the 80's fewer than 20%.¹⁹.

Starting with the 50's the Union's activists were mobilized to help to the success of the collectivization. They participated to the propaganda actions that the communist regime initiated. During the meetings they were asked to convince their relatives to offer the land in order to be collectivized, to denounce the "landowners" and to oppose to the marriages between "landowners" and poor girls. The documents registered constantly the discontent of the party's leaders towards the manner in which all these were put into practice, meaning that in territory the situation was sometimes different²⁰.

After 1952, as a consequence of revealing the "right deviation" a new depuration started in the Union. The "factionist" group led by Ana Pauker was accused that through "block enrollment method" a great number of iron guard supporters and "enemy elements" were allowed to be a part of the party. Ana Pauker publicly admitted this aspect in her "self-critics" being forced by the party²¹. Consequently a new hunting against them started in the RWP, in the communist organizations and in institutions. The Union was one of the main targets of this depuration campaign. Between August 1952 and June, 1953 were excluded 1000 activists and more than 18000 members due to their „right deviation“. It is worth mentioning that between October 1950 and August 1952 the exclusions did not surpass 12.000 persons²². The crisis had effects on the leaders of the Union, too, the prime secretary being changed for many times. Gheorghe Florescu was replaced in August 1952, being followed by Vasile Muşat a lathe man enrolled in the party in 1945²³, who was in charged only for two

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 23/1958, f. 3; *Ibidem*, file no. 14/1968, f. 3; *Ibidem*, fund CC of the CYU, file no. 62/1984, non inventoried and un paged.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, fund CC of the CRP- Organizational Section, file no. 96/1951, f. 17; *Ibidem*, file no. 97/1951, f. 1-12 etc.

²¹ *The letters of Ana Pauker in which she autocratically analyses the mistakes of her activity (right deviation)*, *Ibidem*, file no 58/1953, f. 2; *The 2nd Congress of the Romanian Working Party. 23-28 December 1955*, (Bucharest, 1956), p. 128.

²² CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), FILE NO. 49/1953, f. 42, f. 53-54.

²³ In the CYU's documents, Vasile Muşat was described as follows: He is a hard working person with an organized spirit. In the youth work he made remarkable progresses. He expresses himself very easily. He goes in the core of the issues. He is not very open. He is a little bit a slow. " (CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 123/1948, f. 1); He is a healthy working element. He attended the School of Cadres of the RWP, Constanta .He has knowledge .He is a comrade with a political level; he is a good speaker having theoretical knowledge. He has energy and he plans his work. Sometimes he is a little bit stubborn, and he does not admit the critics. " (*Ibidem*, file no. 88/1949, f. 7; see also CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 105/1951, f. 3).

years (August 1952-July 1954). Two years was the period for Cornel Fulger, a former electrician (July 1954-June 1956).

By the help of Virgil Trofin²⁴, an activist from the new wave (mechanic assistant and coppersmith of locomotives) who worked as an officer at the Political Superior Department of the Army, the Party found the iron hand that it wished to control the Union. He occupied the position from June 1956 until June 1965, surviving the successive crises within the party in the second half of the 50's. After the Revolution from Hungary, 1956, the students and the pupils became an issue for the Union. From ideological considerations these were seen suspiciously by the communists. The students were highly involved in the anticommunist manifestations during 1945-1945, being in fact an important target of the communist repression. When the youth organizations unified, Miron Constantinescu proposed that UNSR and UAER should not be immediately accepted in the Union, they must use depuration, first²⁵. In the end they were accepted. In the instructions given in 1950 for the enrollment of new members, it was said that will be accepted in the Union "eminent pupils and students, devoted to the organization and to the Party"²⁶.

Ideological filters were fixed for the entrance in the higher education system, on the basis of social origin and political affiliation of the youth or their parents before the installment of the communism²⁷. The absorption of the students in the Union was very high, almost 80-90% from the number of 57000 students²⁸, the status of student being very difficult to obtain

²⁴ *Ibidem*, fund CC of the RCP – Cadres Section, file T 313, Virgil Trofin, f. 1; He is described in the Union of Working Youth as follows: He works in the youth organizations immediately after 23rd of August. He has energy, is capable and possesses an organizational spirit. He succeeds in being a good organizer. He has a good political level and he is a good observer. He is arrogant manifesting superior attitudes towards some comrades; is a little bit sentimental" (*Ibidem*, fund CC of the RCP – Organizational Section, file no. 88/1949, f. 3); „ He is devoted to the party. He is honest. He is active. He has organizational experience. Sometimes he is slow. He over appreciates. Sometimes he judges with his heart. He has real increasing perspectives if he is helped." (*Ibidem*, file no. 123/1948, f. 3; see also *Ibidem*, 105/1951, f. 3). For Trofin's portrait see Vladimir Tismăneanu, "Virgil Trofin sau scurta memorie a Nomenclaturii", in *Arheologia terorii*, second ed. (Bucharest, 1998), p. 119-124.

²⁵ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP – Office, file no. 63/1948, f. 3.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, – fund CC of the RCP – Organizational Section, file no. 35/1950, f. 31; In 1956 there were similar conditions „To be enrolled in the CYU those pupils and students who had a correct attitude towards discipline and learning, appropriate through facts the party and government policy, proving by all their activity that they are worthy of being a part of the revolutionary youth organization“; *Ibidem*, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 13/1957, f. 201.

²⁷ Ioana Boca, *Studentii în anii '50*, in *loc. cit.*, p. 210.

²⁸ CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 3/1956, f. 4.

without the fulfillment of enrollment in the Union. The quantity of the pupils and students in the Union rose until 30% in 1953²⁹, but it started to reduce severely after 1956. In 1957, the percentage decreases below 20%, and in 1958-1959, below 10%, with a minimum of 7,7% in December 1958³⁰.

The explanation is found in the series of tragic events registered in the second half of the 50's. The echo provoked by the Hungarian Revolution, 1956, created protests in the Romanian academic institutions. Consequently the authorities answered back with arrests and massive depurations³¹. Afterwards, Hrusciov's "Secret Report", February, 1956, in which Stalin's murders and the "personality cult" was denounced, it had echo in Romania, provoking the failed attempt of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevski to discharge Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, through the revealing of the personality cult and abuses made under his leadership. Dej's counter offensive brought new depurations in the RWP and in the Union³². The mid of the 50's let the impression of a relaxing atmosphere in the communist camp. Stalin's death in 1953, "Geneva's spirit" (an apparent improvement of the relations between East and West in 1955) and Hrusciov's discourse, 1956, seemed to be signs of a de-freezing. In Romania, the early suppression of the collectivization after the 1952's crisis, the World Festival of Youth, held in Bucharest, 1952 in order to present the "happiness" of the communist youth, the appearance of the Students' Associations in 1956 that seemed to be a democratic alternative to the Union, the contagious effect of the Revolution from Hungary-all these were interpreted by the youth as changing signs³³. The minimal concessions that the communism made had the perverse effect of expectations' increase³⁴.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, file no. 49/1953, f. 59

³⁰ *Ibidem*, file no 15/1957, f. 2; *Ibidem*, file no 15/1958, f. 40; *Ibidem*, file no 23/1959, f. 59; *Ibidem*, fund CC of the CRP - Organizational Section, file no. 37/1958, f. 1.

³¹ Ioana Boca, 1956 - *Un an de ruptură. România între internaționalismul proletar și stalinismul antisovietic*, Bucharest, Foundation Academia Civică, 2001.

³² Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate. O istorie politică a comunismului românesc*, translated by Cristina Petrescu and Dragoș Petrescu, (Iași, 2005), p. 173 sqq.

³³ *Oglinzi retrovizoare. Istorie, memorie și morală în România*. Alexandru Zub in dialog with Sorin Antohi, (Iași, 2002), p. 38 and next.; Florin Niculescu, "Festivalul mondial al tineretului, București, 1953", in Romulus Rusan (ed.), *Anii 1949-1953. Mecanismele terorii. Comunicări prezentate la al VII-lea Simpozion al Memorialului de la Sighetu Marmăției (2-4 July 1999)*, (Bucharest, 1999), p. 83-86.

³⁴ The theory of "expectations' increase" within the social sciences was inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville's writings who observed that a tyrannical regime becomes vulnerable not necessarily in extreme poor conditions or as a result of the excesses of the repressors, but in the moment in which it makes concessions, when it starts the reforms or makes promises that can not respect.

After Hrusciov's report, the regime organized thousands and thousands of „fabrications” in the party's organizations from all over the country in order to impose its version upon its significance. But the detailed reports sent by the territory activists revealed that the “fabrications” produced a wave of non purposed effects. Stalin's critics, even with sotto voce, created a huge confusion: for several years the party's members were suffocated by the pro Stalin propaganda, and at the same time, the first public courageous discussions took place after the installment of the communism.

Accordingly, during the debates there were heard voices that asked the replacement of the RWP's leaders, that denounced the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics, that criticized the Party (for the lack of internal democracy, for the exclusions and sanctions, for the making up of imaginary enemies, for the exaggeration of “landowners” power, for the abuses towards peasants and intellectuals)

The Securitatea and Militia were also criticized (for the using of their members in the party's missions, for persecutions, arrests, abusive sentences, for brutal methods during interrogations), together with the propaganda apparatus (for the encouragement of personality cult, political education (for dogmatism), state institutions (for bureaucracy and non observance of the legality).³⁵ Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevski, in their attempts to discredit Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej launched similar accusations, underlining the non observance of collective principle, as well as the abuses made by the Securitatea and the Internal Affairs Ministry³⁶.

After the outbreak of Revolution from Hungary, a new campaign of „fabrication” was organized, ended up with half-free discussions in a few parts of the country. During the Union meeting, especially in Bucharest and Transylvania (Timisoara, Cluj, Targu Mures), solidarity manifestations with the revolutionaries from Budapest were registered and anti soviet positions. At the same time, the regime from Romania was accused of presenting in an unnatural way the reality and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country was asked³⁷.

³⁵ CNHA, fund CC of the CRP - Organizational Section, file no. 26/1956, f. 1-30; *Ibidem*, file no. 58/1956, f. 1-7; *Ibidem*, file no. 59/1956, f. 1-11.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, fund CC of the RCP - Office, file no. 32/1956, f. 1-116; *Ibidem*, file 182/1956, f. 1-25.

³⁷ CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 38/1956, f. 5; 1956. *Explozia. Percepții române, iugoslave și sovietice asupra evenimentelor din Polonia și Ungaria*, ed. by Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai Retegan, (Bucharest, 1996), p. 97, 104, 136-137, 145-146, *passim*.

More students' protests in the autumn of 1956 took place within the Union's meetings or the Students' Associations. In Bucharest, the protests from September started when a new bureau of the Union representing the fourth year students within the Philology was to be elected. At Cluj, in October, a group of students within the Faculty of Philology and History, „Bolyai” University elaborated, according to the creation of Students' Association a program project where was stipulated that the association is “free, democratic and autonomous”³⁸.

As Jean Francois Revel mentioned „the de-freezing was not a dream, it was a trap”. Hruscirov also suppressed the Hungarian Revolution. In Romania the party and Union's members who, during the debates (summer and autumn, 1956) attacked the central leadership of the RWP or criticized the Soviet Union were excluded from the organizations, even more, some of them were arrested. Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevski were no longer accepted. The regime realized that through these debates Pandora's Box was opened. Consequently measures to freeze the public discussions and to punish the protestors were taken. Students' protests were a shock for the Union of Working Youth. From the mid 50's the RWP discussed seriously the problem of mobilizing the students. The responsible persons from the RWP and Union were unsatisfied due to the students' lack of involvement and apolitical feelings. As it is known, during the communist regime the ideological neutrality and the un-involvement were considered as sins.

Consequently, in the summer of 1956, the idea of creating the Students Associations occurred, which, using a more relaxed framework had to bring students³⁹. President of the organization committee of students associations was designed Ion Iliescu, a young activist, and aged 26, who had a spectacular career in the communist youth organizations. In 1957 he will become the president of the new Union of Students Associations from Romania⁴⁰. The idea to constitute the Students Associations did not meet

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 372-373.

³⁹ The report of the meeting of the CC of the U of WY, 15 May, 1956, in which the party's direction is discussed in CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 3/1956, f. 2-23.

⁴⁰ Alexandru Iliescu's son he enrolled the CYU in August, 1944; he activated in the Progress Youth and later on in the UAER (as responsible with organization, then secretary of the sport section), being co-opted due to the unification, March, 1949 in the CC of the U of Working Youth. He was a student in Moscow where he was secretary of the Union Committee of Romanian students who were at studies in the SSRU (in 1952 their number was of 2500, AINC, fund CC of the CRP-Organizational Section, file no 122/1951. F3). Once he returned in the country. In 1954 he entered the CC Bureau of the U of WY, and in 1956 he became secretary. because he did not attend a party school he was

the consensus of the members of the CC Bureau of the Union, some of them being afraid that the associations will be used for other purposes and will not be controlled by the party, thing that really took place⁴¹. In the afterward period, the Union decided to take measures during the meetings that were supervised by Nicolae Ceausescu, at that time member in the Political Bureau and in charge with the Organizational Section. Ceausescu demanded the exclusion, if necessary, of all students from the faculties and their sending to "humiliated jobs" and also the decreasing of the Union activists among students from 80% to 20% and 80% of the students to have work class origin⁴².

The first Union's secretary, Virgil Trofin, launched more critics against the students and ordered that the Union's meeting and of the Associations to be supervised by workers. Trofin understood that everything started from Hrusciov's report, but, in his opinion, it was impossible to say that "Stalin's epoch was a shame" because it was "the most glorious epoch from the history"⁴³.

Towards the end of the 50's, Ion Iliescu, the leader of the communist students showed his indignation towards the attitude of "a crass conciliatorism within the students", accused the teachers that "they don't know to arm the students with Leninism-Marxism theory" or to take position towards the attempts of the enemies. He assured that "measures against the „hostile elements" were taken and he presented his involvement in exclusions⁴⁴.

recommended to attend the three year courses, part time, of the Institute „A. A. Jdanov", school of cadres (CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 10/1957, f. 184-185). The party's characterizations present him as follows "working social origin...Devoted to the party. He has initiative. He has knowledge-a certain theoretical level. Being young sometimes he judges in a hurry He has good perspectives „(CNHA, fund CC of the CRP - Organizational Section, file no. 123/1948, f. 10); „He is attached to the party and organization. He has initiative and power to work. His political and ideological levels are good. He always fulfilled his tasks. He has influence among the youths. He is a hard working and perseverant comrade; he does not make efforts to improve his political level and sometimes he is in a hurry. He has good perspectives for improvement. "(*Ibidem*, file no. 88/1949, f. 9-10; see also *Ibidem*, file no. 105/1951, f. 6). Ion Iliescu's cadres file was not found in the CNHA, but his file occurred in a supplement of Catavencu review. (www.catavencu.ro/pdf/supliment_Iliescu.pdf).

⁴¹ CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 3/1956, f. 3-23.

⁴² *Ibidem*, file no. 16/1956, f. 70; *Ibidem*, file 11/1957, f. 193.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, file no. 38/1956, f. 92-111.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, file no. 15/1959, f. 40-41; *Ibidem*, file no. 7/1958, f. 189-190. Ion Iliescu offers many examples of expulsions in which he got involved. The first is the case of a student from Bucharest, The Faculty of Philosophy, third year, who spread „external ideas" and he was expelled at the intervention of the CC of the U of WY. In the post communist press the narrative of a former students at philosophy, Constantin Eretescu, occurred, who said that Ion Iliescu asked his expulsion, see

During the students' protests in 1956, the Union's activists were trained to prevent, discourage, denounce, reveal and combat "the hostile manifestations" and were mobilized, together with the party's activists and workers, to supervise the students meetings, to stop the protest manifestations, to guard the strategic objectives and to contact the liberal activists. In Bucharest, groups of Union's activists were created in order to beat the "bandits", meaning the protesting students, and in Cluj, in 1957, the Union's activists participated to the catching of some protesting youth⁴⁵.

After 1956, some thousands of students were retained and tens of them were arrested. Numerous revealing meetings were organized by the Party and Union's activists. For a short period of time it was stopped the creation of students associations in problem areas and also the enrolment of students and pupils in the Union. Massive exclusions took place-according to monthly statistical data 300-500 exclusions per month at national level in 1957⁴⁶ and between 600-1.500 exclusions per month in 1958⁴⁷. The total number of the Union's members varied: for the first time in 1948 the Union admitted a digit regress. In January, 1956, the Union had 1.498.381 members, in January, 1957, 1.165.170, in October 1957 1.373.562, and in February, 1958, 1.271.827⁴⁸. In that period, a spectacular changing of „social composition" is registered. It was controlled by the enrolment and exclusion procedures from the organization.

Between the 1st of July, 1956 and the 1st of July, 1957 the proportion of the workers within the Union increases from 27% to 35%, and that of the pupils decreases from 14% to 9%⁴⁹. The youth from the theological institutes were excluded from the Union of Working Youth⁵⁰.

Evenimentul Zilei, 27 August, 2005 and Iliescu retorted, in *Ibidem*. 3 September, 2005. The second example is the case of some students at Maxim Gorki Institute that he does not name, but from the documents we have Ion Covaci, the poet, punished for his anti soviet lyrics and Paul Deutsch (Paul Drumaru) expelled due to the fact that he was on Ion Covaci's side (see *ibidem*. File no.22/2959,f.216). Ion Iliescu mentions about the expulsion of some students who participated in Cluj and Targu Murescu at the nationalist manifestations held on the 24th of January 1959, a century since the union of the Principalities.

⁴⁵ CNHA, fund CC of the CYU – Organizational Section, file no. 45/1956, f. 1-57; CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 7/1958, f. 217.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, file no. 1/1956, f. 1-48; *Ibidem*, file no. 15/1957, f. 2-163; *Ibidem*, file no. 15/1958, f. 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, file no. 15/1958, f. 35-117.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, file no. 1/1956, f. 1; *Ibidem*, file no. 15/1957, f. 2; *Ibidem*, file no. 13/1957 f. 113; *Ibidem*, file no. 15/1958, f. 35.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, file no. 13/1957, f. 119.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, file no. 34/1958, f. 27-28.

The plenary from 1957 and 1958 that led to the marginalization of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevschi had repercussions on the Union. Moreover, the massive exclusions from the Union of WY, 1957-1958, were highly tied with the depurations from the RWP. In July, 1957, the U of WY's leaders were humiliated in the presence of Nicolae Ceausescu. They were forced to express the adhesion towards the plenary resolution where Constantinescu and Chisinevschi were de-masked and to criticize themselves if they had had relations with these two⁵¹. A telegram in which was rejected „ with indignation” the position of these two was sent to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej⁵².

In 1958 the RWP asked for another tribute from the U of WY's side, being decided the sanction or the exclusion of a number of members of the CC of the U of WY⁵³, who knew the same humiliating auto critics in the presence of Ceausescu. All these are explained through the fact that, after 1956's experience, the RWP leadership focused its attention on the strengthening of the control on the party and mass organizations. The measures had results, the authorities having peaceful atmosphere during the 60's.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, file no. 25/1957, f. 12-54. Ion Iliescu remarks himself, he is the only one with two auto critical interventions in which he admits that he collaborated with Miron Constantinescu and affirms: “After the events from Hungary and Poland we can imagine the danger that would have had for our country the orientation that Constantinescu and Chisinevschi wanted to implement to the debates of the XXth congress documents and now we can appreciate more the orientation that our party gave ;we knew how to use all these debates in order to baffle the attempts of the reaction”.

⁵² *Ibidem*, file no. 13/1957, f. 147-149.

⁵³ Ion Brad, alternate member in the CC of the U of WY, punished with blame vote and exclusion from the function he detained (responsible of the review Cravata Rosie) because he did not mention the „enemies manifestations” of Doina Salajan from the Hungarian Revolution (he affirmed that the soviet tanks should not be on Budapest streets) and because he permitted the editing of some materials with religious connotations; Fred Mahler. Alternate member, blame vote for the same reasons; Domolos Gheza, member of the CC Bureau of the U of WY and responsible of the publication “Ifjúmunkás”, blame vote for „damaging” articles, Camenco Petrovici, alternate member, professor at the Economics Institute receives blame vote and afterwards he is excluded from the CC and education system for having an „hesitant attitude” during the Hungarian Revolution and because he did not denounce his colleagues who criticized the socialist economy. Dumitru Popescu and Radu Cosasu(the latter is dismissed) from *Scînteia Tineretului*, Asztalos Istvan and Ion Farcas from *Napsugar* are also sanctioned.; *Ibidem*, file no. 7/1958, f. 39-61, 84-87, 95-257; *Ibidem*, file no. 8/1958, f. 40-87, 133-137.

Virgil Trofin was promoted in the party in 1946, letting the prime secretary position to Petru Enache, a lathe man, graduate of Party Superior School "Stefan Gheorghiu", who made career in the U of WY. He remained in the function until 1967 when he was replaced by Ion Iliescu (1967-1971).

Ceausescu promoted the majority of the activists with whom he collaborated in the 50's and in the first half of the 60's, especially the leaders of the youth-Petre Lupu, Ion Ioniță, Virgil Trofin, Ion Iliescu, Cornel Burtică, Ștefan Andrei, Maxim Berghianu, Petre Blajovici, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Cornel Onescu, Gheorghe Pană, Ion Stănescu, Ilie Verdeț etc.⁵⁴ The great majority of the members of the CC of the RWP after 1965 had had a previously career in the U of WY⁵⁵.

A part of Ceausescu's favorites, such as Virgil Trofin, Ion Iliescu, were no longer appreciated at the beginnings of the 70's, once the Ceausescu's regime degenerated towards an extreme form of patrimonial status, characterized by the personalization of the power, personality cult, nepotism and dynastic tendencies, clientele and corruption, uncertainty of the functions, the unclear demarcation between party and state, between public and private sphere⁵⁶.

5. Communist Youth Union

The re-founding ambition of Ceausescu had immediate effects on the Union of Working Youth. After the model of re-baptizing the party, the enlarged plenary of the Central Committee of the Union of Working Youth, 4th August, 1965, the name of the youth organization was changed in the Communist Youth Union. Moreover, the 4th Congress of the Communist Youth Union was reencountered, becoming the 8th Congress, considering, in an abusive manner, that the first congress was the General Congress of the Socialist Youth, March, 1922. Accordingly, a new campaign of history falsification started. If in 1949 the canonic gallery of

⁵⁴ Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate*, p. 294.

⁵⁵ See *Membrii CC al PCR, 1945-1989. Dicționar*, (Bucharest, 2004).

⁵⁶ Ronald H. Linden, "Socialist Patrimonialism and the Global Economy: the Case of Romania", *International Organization*, vol. 40, (no. 2, 1986), p. 346-380; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore and London, 1996, p. 344-357) use in order to name the Ceausescu's regime the term „sultanism” through which they understand an extreme form of patrimonialism see also H. E. Chehabi, Juan J. Linz, *A Theory of Sultanism*, in H. E. Chehabi, Juan J. Linz (eds.), *Sultanistic regimes*, (Baltimore and London, 1998), p. 3-48.

the communist youth heroes was made of Pavel Tcacenco (Ukrainian, leader of the CRP after 1926, who died in the basement of Securitatea), Lazăr Grünberg, Bernat Andrei (who died during the Holocaust, in Transnistria, at Râbnița), Ștefan Plavăț (who died in the partisans fights against the Germans), Filimon Sârbu (antifascist activist), Iosif Clisch and Olga Bancic (involved in the French Resistance), Nicolae Cristea, Haia Lipșiț (who died due to the hunger strike in jail), Constantin Tudose, Vasile Roaită (the fake hero from Grivița)⁵⁷, after 1965 Nicolae Ceausescu distinguishes himself, becoming in the writings of the court historians, the most important inter wars period hero of the CYU.

Nicolae Ceausescu confronted the youth problems since the beginning of his regime, in 1968. On the 24th of December 1968, on the Christmas's eve a spontaneous manifestation took place: some tens of students protested against the regime and declared their support for Czechoslovakia which was dealing with a Soviet intervention. Initially, the students wanted to carol, but, led by the student Ana Sincai, they started to dance in the capital's squares, becoming more and more violent once they saw the party and Securitatea's activists among them

The group wanted to move forward towards the American Embassy, but it was stopped, moment in which Ana Sincai said "Freedom, freedom for students". The riot provoked by them attired the sympathy and the attention of the capital's inhabitants. Finally, at the North Railway Station and in Grozavesti Complex the students met the activists, led by Cornel Pacoste, deputy of the secretary of the Party Committee of the Academic Center from Bucharest, and Marin Radoi, secretary of the Party Committee of Bucharest, who convinced the demonstrators to disperse.

The authorities took disproportionate measures, arresting Ana Sincai ⁵⁸ and other two persons, expelling many others and convoking meetings in the faculties in order to reveal those who participated at the event. The operation of control reestablishment was conducted by the Securitatea and the party and youth activists. In the address towards the Central Committee Bureau of the CYU that was made by the prime secretary of the

⁵⁷ The list is found in the preamble of the first status of the U of WY, CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the RCP), file no. 3/1949, f. 6.

⁵⁸ She was jailed at Vacaresti and afterwards moved to Hospital No. 9 (Hospital for mental illness where were brought, as in many parts of the countries, opponents of the regime) and after a penal trial, May 1969, she was sent to Ploiesti, see also *Colindul studentesc din 24-25 decembrie 1958*, interview with Ana Șincai made by Cezar Paul-Bădescu, *Revista 22*, VI, (no. 51, 20-27 Decembrie 1995), p. 6.

Union, Ion Iliescu—who was also the minister of youth, he spoke about a „hooligan manifestation” to which thousands of persons participated at and which ended up with arrests. Iliescu showed his intrigue concerning the lack of reaction from activists’ side: “When the turbulent elements appeared, the students, the cadres from the Union should have taken positions. The students, on their ways towards the hostels were screaming—come with us and these were going along with them. Some members of the CC made the auto-critics for their lack of reaction and measures were decided in order to avoid similar situations⁵⁹. After that the party asked for the resuscitation of the ideological command units. Starting with the 60’s, the Union began to give up to its exclusivist character, giving up also to the class orientation in order to become a mass organization. The party asked for the “huge majority” of the youth⁶⁰. The status was modified successively in order to enlarge the sphere of the eligible ones: in 1956, at the 2nd Congress of the Union of WY, the age was enlarged 14-26 years, in 1960, the 3rd Congress from 14 to 28, in 1966, at the 4th Congress (renumbered as the 8th Congress) the superior limit is 26 years with the possibility to extend up to 30 years; in 1971, at the 9th Congress there is no possibility to extend the age, at the 10th and 11th Congress, 1975 and 1980 keep the previous provisions; the plenary from 1982, confirmed by the 12th Congress, 1985, extends the limits to 14-30 years. These changes are reflected in the spectacular increase of members’ number.

In 1960, the U of WY had 1.900.000 members, in 1966, 2.250.000, 2.400.000 members in 1971, almost 3.000.000 in 1975, in 1985 3.900.000 members, 4.100.000 in 1988⁶¹. In the 80’s the Union had more than 500.000 cadres⁶².

The recruitment of the Union’s supporters started in the 8th grade, the absorption of the pupils from this level being of 25% in 1983 and of 40% in 1988. In 1983, 90% from the ninth grade pupils were members; in 1988 the ninth grade pupils were members of the Union, and in 1988, 98% to enrol in the organization. Starting with the tenth grade, all the pupils were members of the Union, the enrolment being mandatory⁶³.

⁵⁹ CNHA, fund 3 (CC of the CYU), file no. 15/1968, f. 130.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, file no. 5/1968, f. 39.

⁶¹ *Congresul al III-lea al UTM, 18-20 august 1960*, (Bucharest, 1960), p. 7; *Congresul al VIII-lea al Uniunii Tineretului Comunist din Republica Socialistă România, 23-26 martie 1966*, (Bucharest, 1966), p. 62; *Congresul al IX-lea al Uniunii Tineretului Comunist din Republica Socialistă România, 18-22 februarie 1971*, (Bucharest, 1971), p. 83; *Congresul al X-lea al Uniunii Tineretului Comunist din Republica Socialistă România, 3-5 noiembrie 1975*, (Bucharest, 1975), p. 18; CNHA, fund CC of the CYU, file no. 60/1985, non paged, f. 205-208; *Ibidem*, file 43/1988.

⁶² *Ibidem*, file 7/1984, f. 74.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, file no. 63/1983, f. 142; *Ibidem*, file no. 42/1988.

The internal use instructions' concerning the enrolment in the CYU from the 70's and 80's mixed the political criteria with the worth ones⁶⁴. First, in the CYU were enrolled the eminent pupils with clear personal or familial background. In the end, all the others were enrolled.

The satellites of the CYU-Pioneers Organization, RSAU, Soimii Patriei reached mass sizes.

In 1949, there were 13.500 de pioneers (pupils between 9-14 ages), in 1960 their number reached one million and in the 80's the Organization of Pioneers numbered more than 2.500.000 members, including the overall pupils aged up to 14 years old.⁶⁵

In 1976 the RCP decided the creation of a mass organization for pupils aged between 4 and 7, named Soimii Patriei. It numbered 1.100000 children and ten years later it had 1.500.000 members⁶⁶.

The Union of Romanian Students Associations had, at its beginning, in 1957, around 50000members. In 1973, it changed the naming in the Union of the Romanian Communist Students Associations and had more than 100000 members reaching in the 90's 150000 members⁶⁷.

Hereby we present the situation of the position as a prime-secretary of the CYU, after Ion Iliescu's mandate: Dan Marțian (1971-1972) - graduate of the ML Lomonosov University, Moscow who detained the position of secretary of the Committee of the O of WY of the Romanian students, having also a political career in the U of WY; Ion Traian Ștefănescu (1972-1979), a legal representative transformed in an activist; Pantelimon Găvănescu (1979-1983), a worker, graduate of Stefan Gheorghiu School; Nicu Ceaușescu (1983-1987), Nicolae Ceausescu's son and a possible heir of the party's leadership; and a non important person, Ioan Toma (1987-1989), graduate of Stefan Gheorghiu School.

The positioning of Nicu Ceausescu, in the 70's, at the leadership of the Union of the RCSA and the taking over, starting with 1983, of the first

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, file nr. 67/1983, f. 141-175.

⁶⁵ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Secția Organizatorică, file no. 32/1950, f. 31; *Ibidem*, file no. 7/1984, f. 74; The third Congress, p. 55. During Ceausescu's regime the presidents of the National Council of Pioneers Organization were : Traian Pop (1966-1968), Virgiliu Radulian (1968-1975), Constantin Boștină (1975-1980), Mihai Hârjău (1980-1983) and Poliana Cristescu (1983-1989).

⁶⁶ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 104/1977, f. 77-90; *Ibidem*, file no. 5/1977, f. 1-18.

⁶⁷ UASR/UASCR's leaders were (1957-1960), Cornel Burtică (1960-1962), Ștefan Bârlea (1962-1966), Mircea Angelescu (1966-1969), Ion Traian Ștefănescu (1966-1973), Constantin Boștină (1973-1975), Ion Sasu (1975-1980), Tudor Mohora (1980-1985), Ani Matei (1985-1989).

function within the CUY, shows, on one hand the importance that the youth organizations had within the mechanisms of the communist power, and it is, on the other hand one of the most evident signs of the deviation of the regime towards dynastic communism, nepotism and clienteles. Nicu Ceausescu's wife, Poliana Cristescu, detained around the 80's the function of secretary of the cc of the CYU and the presidency of the National Council of the Pioneers Organization. A great part within the functions of the youth organizations was detained by close friends of president's son. His bad reputation contributed to cynicism, corruption, indifference in youth organizations.

The CYU's activity entered in a sort of ritual pattern, the fervour of the first decades disappearing. The main function of the youth organizations was to serve the cult personality of the leader. The meetings of the CC Bureau of the CYU transformed themselves in meetings to eulogize the general secretary⁶⁸.

The personality cult was not only a form of strengthening of the presidential family's power, but also a complex mean to exercise the social control. It was one of the "nationalisation forms of time"⁶⁹, to capture the private energies in order to reduce the natural spontaneity of the society and especially of a permanent exposure in a supervising environment.

The role of the youth organization was that of levers, which bureaucratically used produced mass manifestations. The occasions for the popular meetings were numerous, the most important ones being the national celebrations, the birthday of the president, and historical celebrations. In 1989, for example, Ceausescu made 38 work visits maintaining the rhythm of good periods. As concerns the celebrations, the year offered numerous opportunities :130 years since the creation of the Romanian modern state, 112 years since the independence war, 45 years since the revolution's victory, 23rd of August, 1944, 50 years since the outbreak of the fascist war, 50 years since the manifestation of the 1st May, 1939, linked to Ceausescu's biography, 100 years since the declaration of the 1st of May as labour day, 24 years since Ceausescu's leadership and 15 years of presidential mandate, 96 years since the creation of the first Romanian Working Party, the fourth year from the eighth five year plan, 100 years since Eminescu's death, 40

⁶⁸ See for example CNHA, fund CC of the RCP - Organizational Section, file no. 7/1984, f. 1-38. Among the members of the CC Bureau we mention Tudor Mohora, Ana Ferencz, Dinu Drăgan, Florea Voinea, Ani Matei, Ioan Toma, Dan Silviu Pavelescu, Ion Moraru, Dorel Mustăţea etc.

⁶⁹ Katherine Verdery, *Socialismul. Ce a fost și ce urmează*, translated by M. Stroe and I. Codreanu, (Iași, 2003), p. 71-106.

years since the creation of the Pioneers Organization, 40 years since the creation of Militia. All these meant meetings, spectacles, symposiums in which the youth played an important role. The most important ones were the 23rd of August and the 1st of May that gathered thousands of youths, trained tens of hours for the choreography of the personality cult.

6. Inclusion regime

In 1989 Nicolae Ceausecu affirmed that "in Romania there is no citizen who is not enrolled in an organization"⁷⁰. The declaration was formally true. Once that Ceausescu took the power, the political regime changed, following its unitary vocation, in an inclusion regime (according to Kenneth Jowitt's formula), tending to absorb the entire society in structures found under its control⁷¹. Unlike the communist Central European states which in the 60 are developed towards post totalitarian regimes⁷², reducing the pressure upon the society, the Romanian communist regime maintained an extremely high mobilization level.

In order to control the whole population the regime created a network of organizations which since the 70's will be united under the umbrella of the Socialist Unity Front (SUF). The SUF was created in 1974 and had, among the RCP almost 40 mass organizations, syndicates, unions, associations, including also the CYU⁷³. In the 80's the RCP had 3.800.000 people⁷⁴,

⁷⁰ „Scânteia”, 3rd of June 1989, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 15 August 1989, p. 6, interview for „Newsweek”.

⁷¹ Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes", *World Politics*, vol. 28, (no. 1, Oct. 1975), p. 69-96.

⁷² The features of post totalitarian regimes were described by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *op. cit.*

⁷³ The SUF was made up of: the Democracy and Socialist Unity Organizations, the General Union of the Trade Unions, the CYU, Pioneers Organization, the National Council of Women, the Workers Councils of Hungarian, German, Ukrainian, Serbian Nationality, the National Union of Co-operative Farms, the Central Union of Domestic Industry, the Central Union of the Co-operative, Acquirement Farms, Researchers Association, the National Council of Engineers and Technicians, the Union of Medical Sciences, the Union of Teachers, Medical Vet Society, the Writers Union, the Plastic Artists Union, the Composers Union, Journalists Council, the Architects Union, the Association of Art People within Theater and Musical Institution, the Cinema Workers Association, the Jurists Associations, the Committee of Former Fighters and Veterans of the Anti-Fascist War, the National Committee for Peace, Red Cross Association, the National Council for Physical Education and Sport, the General Association of Sport Hunters and Fishermen, the Beekeepers Association, religions.

⁷⁴ *Scânteia*, 29th of June 1989.

meaning more than 15% from the country's population. It was the biggest party in Eastern Europe, being compared with the country's population. The General Union of the Syndicates, made up of all the working persons, numbered no less than 7.800.000 members⁷⁵. The organizations of Socialist Democracies and Unity, reserved to those who were not party members numbered 4.100.000 people⁷⁶. The Front which since 1980 will be named the Front of Democracy and Socialist Unity held three congresses (1974, 1980, and 1985) and prepared in detail the fourth which was to take place in 1990. The structure of the executive Bureau of SUF did not let any doubt upon its direct dependence on the CRP. Nicolae Ceausecu was the president and the functions of vice presidents, secretary, members were detained by high level communists or by long term career activists within the youth organizations. The FDSU has multiple tasks. Through the ambiguity of its status attired in the leading structure personalities who avoided to associate publicly with the RCP-intellectuals, artists, sport personalities, religious leaders, specialists in different fields and also a big mass of people who were not members of the party.

Afterwards, using the Front, Ceausecu simulated inside and outside the country the democratic mechanisms. The Romanian communist leader declared in 1989 that Romania is the most democratic country in the world, as Stalin declared in the 30's about the Soviet Union⁷⁷. The propaganda described the „democratic environment” within the country as a „ direct, participative democracy” or as a plebiscite democracy⁷⁸. With the help of the FDSU Ceausecu used a scenario of „people against elite” model, counterbalancing the power of nomenclature through the invoking in the arena of the society, from which he called for, without the help of the party. This complicated organizational “texture” did not resist to the earthquake from 1989 during which the youth played an important role in the overthrow of the communist regime.

⁷⁵ Mihnea Berindei, „România lui Ceaușescu – un naufragiu planificat”, I, *Revista* 22, no. 46, (17-23 November, 1998), p. 10.

⁷⁶ CNHA, fund CC of the RCP – Organizational Section, file no. 26/1989, non paged.

⁷⁷ *Scântea*, 27 January 1989, p. 3.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem.*, 2 September, 1989, p. 1; *Ibidem.*, 28 March 1989, p. 1.

The death as a propagandistic element. Aspects of the funerary ritual in studying the Romanian Communist Elite

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Introduction, aspects of the approaches in the study of the communist funeral ritual

Death has been a delicate subject throughout the human history. Understanding it, and to be more precise, understanding his role in different societies it is as hard today as ever. Even the past, seen as a time of the people who are no longer among us, disappears partially when those people die. What we manage in our endeavors as historians is to recover only bits and pieces, who present one of the images of what that time was. Our work field will never allow a full view over the events where we weren't direct witnesses, nor the one we can conceal in one of the "realities", from where they were spawn.

With the help of various fields of study which history has to offer, and certainly, using a whole range of compulsory and independent science, from physiology, sociology, to social anthropology, we can make nowadays a more viable image of the past to better understanding the present.

Why a history of death, of the obituary, of the official elite image in the communist Romania? What would such an approach offer, especially by using the party newspaper "Scînteia"? And how could a communist funerary ritual be in any way different from any other types seen in the past fifty years? Those are the questions we are trying to answer in this study.

First of all, if we made a sociological analysis of the Romanian communist regime, we would notice the placement of the funerary mainly in the public space. This is done as a way to legitimate a self obtained power, which could not be explained either by the political past of the party – between the two World Wars – nor by the number of members, merely a thousand before the arrival of Soviet forces in Romania.

Thus the party needs heroes, models to be identified with by the people, public figures whose support will explain the ruling place of the communist ideology and elite. This is done by commemoration, remembering and reinventing the past.¹

¹ We will use here the term ideology to create a synonym somewhat misplaced to the term conscience (who implies a series of moral values, a certain form of those being understood by the participants at a discursive moment), and representation (how, and what images are proposed, what are the lines required in an official problem), idea represented by Catherine Verdery, *Compromis si rezistență, cultura romana sub Ceausescu*, (Bucharest, 2004), p. 27-29, mentioning also that the author is talking mainly about the official nationalistic ideology of the late 70's and 80's, our endeavor to place the same concept, being at least controversial here.

But the regime has another ace which, at least until the late 1970s will be used lavishly. It's about presenting all types of elite members to create a communist mythology in tone with the real power of the party. If we talk about members of the political leadership or intellectuals devoted to the ideological cause, the so called "road comrades" who get to live and die in the good graces of the party, and whose purpose is related to a sort of political continuity, or even incidental heroes, they are all enlisted after their death to rewrite their own history, and in doing so, to rewrite the party's history and past, putting without their knowledge a cornerstone to the regime's mythology.

Key words: Romania communism, Funerary Rithuals for the Communist Elites, Death as a Propagandistic Element, wooden language.

In the study of the problem we have chosen to approach, we have observed initially the lack of a particularized study on this specific subject. It is true that general approaches have been made, especially abroad, on the subject of contemporary funerals and death related rituals, as well as on the communist understanding of the process. In the Romanian case a few studies exist, some on the "Cenușa" Crematory in Bucharest, but their main interest is centered on the final resting place.

Our area of interest is centered on a more direct relationship between the official propaganda and the people, and not only on the representation of propaganda themes and images. We have chosen the party newspaper "Scînteia" as base material for our endeavor, considering its importance as one of the primary means in sending the official message.

In this state we have observed an interest of different authors² for three types of particular science, who could lead to a better understanding of the Romanian communist regime. The first is philology, which is focusing on the "wooden language"³; sociology, underlining the relation between regime and the masses, and how it is made; and finally psychology, to better

² All the autors quoted refer at a interdisciplinar aproach needed in understanding the problems of ideology in a totalitarian regime, and its forms or represenntation in a lingvistic and visual frame.

³ A rethorical thern, „wooden language”, or „langue de bois” in French, „limba de lemn” in Romanian, is very easy recognisable as in practice, but very hard to define as an ideal-tip. Its numerous aspects are described in Francoise Thom, *Limba de lemn*, (Bucharest, 2005). In its extreme form, the "wooden language" does nothing but mimic the official slogans and ideology. It was also described as a more extended form of the Orwellian Newspeak, see <http://www.netcharles.com/orwell/books/1984-Appendix.htm>

understand the mechanism of how the nomenclature thinks and acts, reporting again itself to the people.

In the empirical linguistic study that we undertook we have noticed an interest of different authors for the construction of the phrase, for syntax, and also for the obtuse quality of the “wooden language”. The severe lack of creativity, the strict placement of the text in the boundaries imposed by the official propaganda, observed by numerous studies in Romania and abroad, has made us a very useful model in approaching the problem.

The second aspect used was represented by the sociological inquiries on the matter. Using notions as leader, masses, message, individual, the works used from this category represented different faces of the elite-elite and elite-masses interactions, which was a clear objective of our endeavor.

Finally, the last domain studied, psychology, gives an interesting insight in the leaders’ psychic and of those who follow them. There are some theories who speak of the communist elite as group stuck in a permanent submission, incapable of seeing the world otherwise than an immense prison. The society created by them was in all ways a copy on that containment space only at much larger scale. Or on the contrary, they are perceived as very dynamic, chameleonic persons, in reaching one or another objective⁴.

Other types of science such as anthropology, rhetoric, philosophy could explain singular funerary episodes. But they could not offer general directions of study on the historical stream of almost 50 years, represented by the communist regime in Romania.

The most important part was represented by the gathering of the press articles from “*Scînteia*”, including funerary texts, unsigned or signed by collective, articles about the deceased which are complementary to the obituary. Other materials include information about the funerary ritual, or evocation on the memory of the deceased, on the moment of inhumation or cremation, with all the discourses and practices used. We have followed aspects of the language, syntax, ideology, etc. in a qualitative analysis, and also the numerical evolution of certain phrase elements as repetitions, number of articles, in a quantity approach on the matter. Working on the press, on such a long historical period was essential for underlining some patterns, mentioned in the following pages.

Presenting a quantitative approach, our study uses a number of 172 deaths of high ranking officials, who appear described in the official party

⁴ Valdimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate: o istorie politica a comunismului romanesc*, (Iași, 2005).

newspaper. We are not referring to the intellectual elite. A different study is recommended on this matter.

The number of deaths structured by decades is as follows:

Decade	Number of obituaries
1948-1959	33
1960-1969	62
1970-1979	57
1980-1989	27

It could be observed that in the first decade of communist rule the number of those presented is small. In the second and third decade this number is doubled, the cause being the death of some old top level party officials and also the reinstatement of some who were a victim of the original party struggles. For the last decade their number begins to decrease, the official funerary ritual being replaced by the commemoration as a key nationalistic frame for the Ceausescu's type of communism. More specific in the late 1980s the living elite are furthermore placed in an almost invisible spot, from the official propaganda's point of view.

That being said, what is the "political dead body" as Catherine Verdery refers to it?

As an explanation, we must understand the idea of politics as an activity involving social actors who on their part are aiming towards particular means, with a certain degree of risk, means which are in opposition or identical. Also by using propaganda, they try to present their objectives as being those of the whole nation, often using such terms as "unity", "entire people..." The prime purpose of those actors is in fact to place their own agenda in the public domain, and to make it of public interest. But for the communist regime that is identical with being assumed "by heart", by large numbers of people, introducing elements which are not a part of the day-to-day interests of individuals.

The placement of the leader and the elite in the funerary moment keeps a series of anthropological elements. Like Arnold Van Gennep had stated, the funerary ritual seen as a moment of passage exists regardless of the religion and the existence or lack of it, geographical space, laic or profane. The dead is placed in a different space from the living, "out there" as a totem, a symbol, a sacred statue. To bring him close again the propaganda uses elements of unity, social aggregation, remembering, and homage⁵

⁵ Arnold Van Gennep, *Riturile de trecere*, (Iași, 1996), p. 132

The place of the deceased in this political scenario is to be a tangible part of the communist mythology. In the broader frame of the XX-eth century, a corpse has a mystical-religious role, which in our case is known to the atheist state. The term mystical here has more of “how to” sense, than one with magical connotations. It represents a way to idealize the past, using the memory related to the dead.

It also has a symbolic role, the dead body by simply being there, as a material, tangible part of the party’s history, transcends that history into the present. The deceased legitimates the whole system by the importance given to him, by the remembering of other party members about his facts. The symbolism uses such terms as “national unity, in front of the party’s loss”, the “heroic death” of a person who in fact died of natural causes, “the fight in the name of communist ideals”, or “model for the generations to come” with the same purpose, to legitimate a political rule. Also as a more religious term than a laic one, it could not be missed the usage of a sort of immortality in this world by the “forever remembered” related symbols.⁶

Also, what could be a communist specificity is the perversion of the secular traditions, meaning the huge difference between communist and traditional funerary traditions. Wanting to continue reinventing him, and also the society, it discards all elements of day to day death related practices, using a more ideological discourse. But here the funerary practice is not an exception. The commemoration and the festivities are integrated in the same basic Marxist-atheist model (see the communist festivities on 23 August, 15-23 February).⁷

In the understanding of this type of propagandistic frame, the press becomes a central reference for the party and implicit for us as researchers. The focus is mainly on the presentation of funerary rituals, the discourse technique, the condolence telegrams, and if the case presents itself, on some articles emphasizing different aspects of the deceased’s life and activities.⁸

⁶ Katerine Verdery, *The political life of dead bodies*, (Columbia Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 21-26

⁷ Lavinia Betea, *Psihologie Politică – Individ, lider, mulțime în regimul comunist*, (Iași, 2001) pp. 9-18 for the individual – environment frame, pp. 37-40 on the communist ethics, pp. 45-72 on social representation in the communist regime

⁸ Mary Bradbury, *Representations of death – a social physiological perspective*, (London, 1999), p. 3-5. The author talks about general changes in contemporary societies, regarding death, but is limited to the English example. Nevertheless she provides with a general outline on understanding the phenomena from a text related, discourse perspective, which is useful to our endeavor.

Characteristics of the Romanian communist funerary ritual

A subject not yet fully understood the funerary ritual of the Romanian communist elite, presented under the aspect of a press related image, is still an un-researched area for the historians. This study can offer several conclusions in the hope that further research will offer additional details. From a social history point of view, the funerary discourse would have an important role, and it could represent a special part in a more elaborated study on the communist society.

Even in this so called "empirical" state we could draw some clear lines on what is characteristic for the official message regarding a political "dead body".

1. *The explicit propagandistic role of the message.* This could be explained by the type of discourse the regime uses, a discourse that emphasizes party-declared values such as "fight for peace" "the brotherhood of the workers class" "the fight for democratic values" "party for the people" "anti-imperialism" etc., repeated obsessively throughout the whole communist period, no matter of the person in cause - we are talking about the funerary frame.

The two examples that could explain better this thing are the obituaries of Voicu Danciu and Jena Serbanescu in 1950s. In the first case "the Popular Republic of Romania and the Romanian Workers Party are losing a beloved son, devoted to the fight on the worker's class behalf for the consolidation of the popular-democracy regime, for the construction of socialism, for the transformation of the Lenin's and Stalin's cause".⁹ In the second case, "In the comrade Jena Serbanescu, we are losing a devoted member of the worker's class and of the party; an active militant for the idea of proletarian internationalism and for the making of socialism. Her memory will remain forever untouched in the hearts of her working and fighting comrades."¹⁰ The signature was: "A group of comrades", repeated often, especially in the first two decades of communist rule, announcing group solidarity to the ideas the deceased is supposed to have sustained.

The discourse has an active role in presenting different qualities considered important for an official biography. In the Mihai Gh. Bujor's obituary we could see a list of all those elements:

"even from when he was a student, he was involved actively in the socialist movement from Romania, being a part of the circle of The Socialist Students... having a close relation with the revolutionary workers and military, he has made an

⁹ *Scinteia*, XXII, nr. 2491, (28th October 1952), p.4

¹⁰ *Scinteia*, XXII, nr. 2596, (1st March 1953) p.4

*unbeaten activity for the organization and developing of the worker's movement... (1907) he is the head of a wide campaign for helping the rebellious peasants... (1916) He is situated on an opposite position towards the imperialist war... is a part of the socialist parties conference from the Balkan states, undertakes revolutionary actions in Moldavia, where he is arrested... he works in the mist of Romanian workers and soldiers which were on the Russian soil... he helps the enactment of the document of the Bucharest section of the Socialist Party for affiliation to the International Communist movement."*¹¹.

It is clearly observed the usage of the pronoun at the first person, like the deceased was still alive in the moment the article is written. This element has a visual aspect, a translation of the reader in the past, where he could see the actions of the deceased as they happen.

2. *The formalism of discourse.* Widely speaking, the language used in obituaries, on the funerary discourses or in articles is marked by a large degree of identical patterns. Like setting on the same level all kind of different persons, the technique, the "wood language", leaves out almost any remark on particular, personal aspects that could emphasize personal traits of the deceased. The technique has the role of placing the dead in an intangible, perfected place, beyond any critic that could come post-mortem. This technique exists also in any state or public related funerary event, but in the communist case, an extreme one, it is impossible to distinguish between one obituary and another, like all the deceased are the same, only the names are changed. The most seen recurrence appears at the second degree party members; sometimes the text referring to two different persons is identical.¹²

Even more, typological themes related to the obituary appear repeatedly in the discourse. Presenting a second rank aparatnik, Dumitru Olteanu, Romanian ambassador to the Korean Democratic Republic, we could observe a series of patterns on what the regime considers important: "...*he has taken part in different actions organized by the Communist Party. The repressive organs of the regime's Siguranța arrested and imprisoned him on different occasions*", and post 23 August 1944, "*he made a continuous work for making possible and real the*

¹¹ Scânteia, XXXII, nr. 4775, (17 January 1963), p.3

¹² Françoise Thom, *Limba de lemn*, Bucarest, p. 31-33; the author considers the totalitarian language as a front image for the ideas transmitted by the party elite. The purpose of the language is not only to create a message, but, most important to create an effect on the listener. The ceremonial of any kind makes this thing possible but the language is the one which puts a decisive mark on the "education of the masses". This could be done, so they thought, by repetition, and slogans so everybody should know the message.

party's policy... on which he made a successful job".¹³ We noticed some classical elements of the "wooden language", and also the traditional thematic on a revolutionary struggle in the pre-war period, followed by a hard work after the war for installing the party's directives. A second case is that of Margareta Cosma "she began to work in the hardships of capitalist exploitation from 15 years of age... became a P.C.R. member form 1945... we lost a good comrade, a useful and active fighter for the party's cause". A masculine term in Romanian the substantive "fighter" is used here in the promotion of egalitarian values of the official ideology, in a broader picture this being the case of all language elements that define egalitarian values. The recurrent themes, in a statistic way, are the same with those used by the official propaganda texts. Through this voluntary repetition it could be possible to emphasize what is important from the party's way of thinking. At a number of 17 funerary moments described as news by the Scînteia in the second half of the 1950s, we could observe this recurrence of terms:

In describing the pre 1944 moments:

The expression used	Frequency
Old member of the workers movement	13
Attracted by the workers movement/a part of the workers movement	5
Taking part in different actions	4
Arrested ± by the oppressive state organs	10
...In the conditions of the capitalistic (burghezo-mosieresti) oppression	10
Has a role at the events/ plays a part at the 23 August...	7
Fighter for the cause...	6
Illegalist	7
Antifascist	5

After the 1944 moment:

The expression used	Frequency
Unstoppable Work	6
Had acquitted himself with great pride	7
work ± and fight comrade	4

¹³ Scînteia, XXXIX, nr. 4859, (14 June, 1960), p.3

Has been trusted with different tasks	8
The line/policy of the Romanian Workers Party	6
Devoted fighter for the cause of...	12

3. *Legitimizing the regime.* The deceased are “enlisted” in after-dead solidarity with the party, by the recurrent remarks on his “numerous” fidelity related facts or sayings. The communists will also create heroes from simple party members, sometime fictive ones, will use forgery in presenting various “activities” regarding the period before 1944, or will put out of context declarations of various intellectuals related to the system. The scope is to present images of the “new man”, that is to be copied by the people.

By the fact that the communist propaganda says that the power is drawn from the ruling place of the worker’s class, the elite members are being presented as models for the future world scale revolution, as antifascist heroes, as servants in the name of the proletariat. All those elements and more – and the official discourse is using lavishly this theory – give them the right to rule, and implicitly to know what is best for the people.

We would use a sequence from a funerary discourse made by Chivu Stoica at Dumitru Petrescu’s funeral. It is slightly noticeable a nationalistic flavor, characteristic to Ceausescu’s early leadership, somewhat different from the internationalist and then nationalistic frame from the Dej era: “our people, in fact the wishes of our worker’s class for which we have fought, all the progressive forces of the nation are giving their whole attention to those who have placed their life to the country’s independence and liberty, to the progress and prosperity of the socialism. In the ranks of those people, the comrade Dumitru Popescu has written his name at a top place, by servicing without pause the ideals of the people from which he was born, until the last moment of his life. His deeds will remain always forever in the memory of the communist, of the whole people.”¹⁴ The reference to the people as an instrument to legitimate the communist ideal, the slide towards some of the nationalist ideas is evident from the use of the “independence and liberty” form. The deceased becomes also a man attached to the people’s values, which could not be different at a discursive level from those of a good communist, a “new man”.

4. *Omission.* Like in other types of regimes, the views of the deceased could be different from the official ones. But unlike other, a totalitarian regime punishes any deviations from the “single truth” line. If we talk about dissidents from the official line, integrated back in the system,

¹⁴ Scântea, XXXIX, nr. 8186, (16 September 1969), p.1, 4

or intellectuals who were a part of the old elite, but now are related to the communist regime, in our case, we could notice the veil of silence on those aspects that are considered incompatible with the hero status. The deceased past is rewritten so that it reflects an all bright relation with the present power. There is not even a blank spot on his obituary. As a part of the official rewriting of the past, the lies have a major role in all communist texts.

The fusion between the Social-Democrat Party and the Romanian Communist Party, and how it is remembered, is a good example of rewriting the past: "as an old fighter of the worker's movement and as a member of the Social-Democrat Party, he has taken a decisive role at the fight undertaken by the Communist Party and the left wing of the Social-Democrat party for the creation of the United Workers Front, to eliminate the gap between the worker's class, for the making of the Romanian Workers Party... he has served with confidence the cause of our party and people." In reality it was a sham union, whose purpose was to eliminate a competitor for the workers votes, and implicitly one of the last actors in a semi-democratic, post-war Romania, who stood in the way of absolute communist control.¹⁵ But here the story is transformed in something more than more than bending the truth. The text creates an opposition between those who want the good of the workers and those, undefined here, who don't want it.¹⁶

The omission has a role in rewriting some of the party member's biographies, such being the case of Petre Pandrea. As a communist intellectual, close to Lucretiu Patrascanu, he has been in a long detention under Dej. It is interesting to see how the reintegration of this man is seen in the official obituary: "Even from the years he has studied in Germany, in the period of the rise of Hitlerism, he becomes a part of the antifascist and workers' movement. Back in the country, he makes possible to appear, and runs until suspension the "Future of Socialism" publication, a stand-off for democratic and antifascist fights. Great scholar, writer with a noticeable originality, a hard working social activist, intellectual with a burning patriotism and humanism, Petre Pandrea has been a model for the Romanian culture, constituting an example of a militant writer in the service of the high and

¹⁵ Stelian Tanase, *Elite si societate: guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, 1948-1965*, (București, 2006), p.100

¹⁶ Those undefined here are Constantin Titel Petrescu, and his own group of social-democrats, who didn't want the union with the communists. His opposition will cost him his freedom. He was arrested on May 6, 1948 and liberated after 7 years in 1955. Two years later, in September 1957, he died in Bucharest.

generous communist ideals. Forever will remain the memory of Petre Pandrea in the conscience of writers and on all our intellectuals."¹⁷

5. *The party-people relationship using the dead.* It is noticeable especially at the high party elite, where it doubles the funerary message. Its purpose is not to explain the life and facts of the deceased, nor to mourn for him. It is related exclusively to the world of the living as a proof of continuity, by its top language and ceremonial element: unity. The discourse uses a top phrase "to make a monolith¹⁸ wall around the party", there are presented to us funerary frames with the elite and the people standing side by side – it is true that the elite has a central role, and the people have an intermediate one, but they are represented altogether. Even the text uses "the party and the people loss", as a top formula.

This kind of discourse has two parallel directions of presenting itself. The first and the most preeminent one, uses the party as a guaranty and symbol for the people's rights, and demands. It is noticeable especially in the references of the working's class ideals, made possible thanks to the regime. The second image presents the ruling place of the party, noticeable in placing the Central Committee, or at least of a number of representatives of that institution in a central position. The people watch from distance how that elite is fulfilling its attributions, as a carry-on group of the party's ideal.

It is best exemplified by the procession at the Gheorghiu-Dej's funeral. Even if it is not a unitary base article, we could notice some aspects of the procession. The main body of the presentation is integrated in a text named "Adio Scump Tovaras" (Goodbye Beloved Comrade). The article begins by underlining the frame in which the ceremonial will take place: the Republic Square, which is for the communists identical with the mass manifestation, "the same square seems now motionless under the dome of a solemn and grave silence." In the same time, in the room where the body of the deceased has been posted "the honor guard from the room is formed by state and party leaders, the comrades Nicolae Ceauşescu, Chivu Stoica, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, Emil Bodnăraş, Petre Borilă, Alexandru Moghioroş, Alexandru Drăghici, Dumitru Coliu, Leonte Rautu, Leontin Sălăjan...".

The dead is placed on a carriage, and then the final procession. At the front stands the military band, then the orders and decorations received by Dej in

¹⁷ Scânteia, XXXVII, nr. 7758, (9 July 1968), p.5

¹⁸ The term "monolith" is used in a series of articles regarding the death and legacy of Dej. It implies the continuity of the communist leadership, in spite of the recent loss. More important the term suggests the folly of any attempts to weaken the political power of the communist party.

his life, then beyond the funeral chariot, all the communist leaders, national and international, in fact a huge list of names, presented with the purpose of emphasizing the importance of the deceased, the intellectuals, party members, members of numerous delegations. At the resting place:" on the eight lines of stairs, the casket is moved up higher and higher, from level to level, until the upper platform from in front of the Monument. A command: the honors are given by a battalion of youngsters born in 1944, the same age as the Freedom. At 14:30 hours, in the sounds of the State Anthem, the casket is placed on a black support, guarded by the fight comrades of the deceased... the sirens with their plain and powerful voice are heard; as long as the eye could see from the Monument to far away even at the Liberty Square, the human gathering stands with hats off; it's the moment when the locomotives, the engines, the cars are halting all around the country... it's the time when all the country at the moment of saying goodbye, stands united in a single thought and assures the beloved comrade that the cause for which he has fought and worked, until the last moment will be continued, with unrelenting confidence, under the banner of the Romanian Workers Party."¹⁹

6. *The messianic character of the discourse.* The deceased is represented as a man full of virtues, his life being marked by the struggle for the oppressed ones – the worker's class and the peasants – which had "rewarded" by giving him a ruling role. The dead becomes a sacred, immaculate, intangible character manly because he represents the fight for the proletariat's ideals.

Second aspects of this messianic façade are the numerous references to the past full of hardships, endured by the deceased. Understanding the problems of the worker's class, he has the sole right to rule, to be honored, and to make absolute statements, all considered true.

The text also recovers in a different tone the deceased, placing him a different frame, a live organic one. He could not be dead; he is still alive, as the new ideology does not permit a simple passing away. In the case of Grigore Preoteasa, it seems as if his accident is opposed to a Marxist determinism, the organic element being undead, and reborn in a heroic way. The usage of numerous epithets such as "bright", "alive", "passionate", "dynamic", in referring to the funerary picture is subscribing to this idea.²⁰ "Nothing seems more opposed to death and her immobility

¹⁹ *Adio Scump Tovarăș* in Scânteia, XXXIV, nr. 6569, (25th March 1965)

²⁰ Françoise Thom, *op.cit.*, p. 56, "the organism metaphor doesn't support only with her authority the idea of a finality towards a given nature; it also legitimates the planning in an society frame"

than his dynamism, his passionate way to think and work. No doubt that the majority of the people didn't know this man, on which even the portrait reproduced the bright look, intelligent, behind those glasses with thick frame, or knew him only for his name."²¹

7. *The communism atheism as a form of the new type of funerary discourse element.* Different by the normal, philosophical atheism, the communist one desecrates the religious space, not just combats him. In exchange it uses as a new dogma (!?!), of a religious type we might add, the elements of communist Pantheon: "The Internationale", a hymn, the preference for funeral marches, substituting the religious songs, funerary guards formed by soldiers, peasants and especially workers, the cremation as a specific option in a burial based society. What is interesting is that the communist atheism has the purpose to transform the dead in a sacred monument, a saint in a perverted way.

In using an example we could mention the discourse of Constantin Parvulescu at Alexandru Moghioros's funeral: "he has formed himself at the hard school of class struggle, has affirmed himself even from the hard years of illegality, of confrontation with the bourgeois and the reactionary elements as a responsible and active militant of our communist movement. His will to fight could not be beaten by the police, nor by the long years of detention. Like other communists who have transformed the prisons in revolutionary schools, he has faced with dignity the hard regime of dungeons from Jilava, Doftana, Caransebes, Tg. Ocna, giving all around him confidence, winning the friendship of his fighting comrades, of the Communist Party. His activity, like the activity of other militants of the Communist Party has prepared his members in the spirit of confidence towards the revolutionary forces of the people and towards the destiny of the country and the communist rights."²² It is obvious that the thematic is beyond the simple frame of homage, of presenting the memory of the deceased. If is to be analyzed gradually the way in which this discourse is or not a political one it would be noticed that it is one of influence. The emitter transmits a message that could modify, or change the perception of the receiver, about a given thing. With all the political-historical links on whom he is referring to, the illegality period, the fight of communist, it is not a political one under those aspects because of the lack of analysis from the author's part on the concepts exposed. The dramatic character could be mentioned under the aspect of putting a play in stage, under a very well orchestrated ritual, a special typology and, for this period, very predictable -

²¹ Scânteia, XXVII, nr. 4059, (12th November), p.1

²² Scânteia, XXIX, nr. 8204, (2nd October, 1969) p.1

after some two and a half decades of communist rule. The listeners already know the discursive stages used, the syntax being ossified and marked by repetitions – with the role of educating (to read indoctrinating) the people by forcing the collective memory. In front of this pseudo pedagogic endeavor, the dead becomes an example of a correct led life. The impression of a copycat with what we could observe in the Christian religious frame from the “Life of Saints” is remarkable and somewhat shocking, if we think that the communist state is an atheist one by definition. But the pattern is identical: a dramatic life, heroic in the name of an ideal beyond anything else, opposition to bad people and actions, of the profane humans, who do not understand “The Way”, of the pagans, the emphasizing on some special traits of character, the death transformed in a symbolic-totemic thing, the post mortem recognition of his qualities, the almost eternal memory on this earth as a model.²³

8. *Creating heroes.* Even if they die of natural causes, most of the local communist leaders have heroic funerals. This element is somewhat logic, since the propaganda is also marked by numerous references to the fight for different ideals, from where it could be possible to understand the heroic direction in the end.

The lexicon uses a series of military terms in describing the political activity of the deceased: “he faced”, “he continued the fight”, “communist fighter”, pacing the obituary in the broader picture of communist propaganda. A second aspect is related to the antithesis we/good – they/bad, such as in “a group of antifascist fighters/the fascist oppression”. Also the placing in talking about someone’s activity of positive epithets alongside party-related terms: “the high title of Marxist...”, “the party ideals”, “firm communist worker and fighter”.

A series of elements most commonly define this trait of the communist propaganda. In the Rebeca Bartok’s obituary we could notice some of them: “she had join at a young age the fight of the Romanian workers class for social justice and freedom. In the illegality years of the party she is a part of the fight actions directed by the Romanian Communist Party, having different tasks in the party apparatus and in the press. For her revolutionary activity, she was arrested and condemned by Antonescu’s military and fascist regime. Released from prison, thanks to the victory of the armed

²³ Cristiana-Nicula Teodorescu,(2005) *Patologia limbajului comunist totalitar*, Bucharest, Humanitas, p. 63. “The Way” has here more of an ideological connotation, and not a religious one. It represents the sole direction in which humanity must go towards a “new society”, egalitarian and almost perfect, as the marxist-leninist dogma predicts.

insurrection from 23 August 1944, Rebeca Bartok has worked in the state and party apparatus... a work and fight comrade, all those who have known her, will keep her memory forever alive."

9. *The insertion of the official discourse in funerary moment.* Different from moment to moment, the references to the official policy of the party exist regardless of the dead. For the 50's the friendship with the Soviet Union is inserted, also the fight for the world revolution, and for the victory of international worker's class. In the 60's the agenda is somewhat different, now the deceased has seen the need for unity between the socialist parties and peoples and he is even a patriot, a fighter for peace. The final years 1970s, 1980s, know a graduate slip towards nationalism, with two different moments. The first period uses a semi-liberalization of the discourse. The last, appears in the final years of the Ceaușescu dictatorship, when the dead is presented as a patriot and as a man who understood the genius of the Secretary General.²⁴

10. *The absence of the family in the funerary central frame.* Replaced with a "political family", the biologic one is at best remembered in a secondary context – the presence at a discourse, in the final march, etc. Its loss is replaced with the loss of the party and the people. Even in the Dej's case, his daughters are giving some thanks after a week from their father's funeral, in a small text. In the funerary moment described by the propaganda, the blood family is placed in a second place, the party family being the most important one. In all the communist funerals, the family members have at best a fugitive remark and that's all.

A series of elements are visible at a communist funerary picture. As Zoe Petre emphasized, the funerary music, the cremation as a communist option, the form of the epitaph, the lack of gender related elements, the party as a main family, with the relatives and friends in a secondary position, the usage of the discourse as a means of paying respects to the deceased, the power as an hereditary element, the relation with the masses, the gathering as a reflection of the communist world including representatives of all the "new society" categories.²⁵

²⁴ Eugen Negrici, *Poezia unei religii politice - patru decenii de agitatie si propaganda*, (Bucharest, 1996), p. 350-357

²⁵ Zoe Petre, "Adio scump tovarăș – schiță de antropologie funerară" in Lucian Boia, (coord), *Miturile Comunismului Romanesc*, (Bucharest, 1998), p. 272-287, even if the author's analysis is based on the "Cenusa" crematory in Bucharest, and more precisely on the inscriptions on the urns there, she begins her presentation by making a general outline on the Romanian funerary composing elements as a whole.

Conclusions:

Even if united under the same propaganda banner, the different funerals presented have some superficial differences, related to the official message that the party presents. Those fluctuations are most of the time minor.

But how are those aspects different from those used in other types of contemporary societies?

First of all the model for the Romanian communist funerary discourse is the soviet one. The placement of Lenin in the Red Square²⁶, and then of Stalin were propagandistic elements used at maximum by the propaganda. The dead leader becomes a symbol and is integrated in a mythology manufactured for him. His purpose is to legitimate the regime as a mentor, a visionary, a genius, whose work is continued by the party. Even if the soviet burial or cremation is not the object of our study, it is important to observe it as a model. This is mainly because the discourse is almost the same in the Romanian and soviet case²⁷.

A different aspect is related to the Nazis model of propaganda, a more nationalistic type, observed especially in the late 1970s and thought the 1980s, in Ceausescu's communist regime, a pattern observed even in the former Yugoslavia until 1993. It transforms the deceased in a national hero, a fighter for his country's rights and aspirations. In the both cases the role of the people as a historical weapon and of martyrs who fought against foreign invasion surpasses the role of contemporary models, such as old aparatniks who died in this period²⁸.

The Nazis model requires a more complex approach, but some elements must be summarized. First, the small duration of the regime and his accent on the vitality of the German Reich, rather than on the construction of models creates a broader frame for the funerary elements. The simple fact, that his leader is alive thought the entire period doesn't give as a comparative model. There are indeed processions glorifying the Reich's

²⁶ Nina Tumarkin, "Religion, Bolshevism, and the Origins of the Lenin Cult", *Russian Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1, (Jan., 1981), pp. 35-46

²⁷ Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 92, No. 3, (Sep., 2002), pp. 524-547

²⁸ In the Yugoslav case, the genocide and reburial of those found in mass graves became a frame for nationalistic and xenophobic manifestations. See Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (May, 1994) pp. 367-390

martyrs, but those are referred as a collective not as individuals. The blood lost for the cause, the history, is part of the propaganda, and is referred in the commemoration moments.²⁹

The democratic model is based especially on the fear of death, even biological, or physiological³⁰. There, the variables on which the explanation is constructed are celebrity, fame, fashion, and place in the spotlights. The power of television in the death of Kennedy is such an example of what is important for capitalistic societies.³¹

A whole chapter could be written on the symbolism of the message. Two principal objectives can be extracted from the examples presented in dealing with the various aspect of the funerary propaganda. First, the role of the symbols is to legitimate the regime, and his power. The dead becomes a hero, a model for whose ideals the living leaders must continue to fight. Second, it is obvious the indoctrination role of the message. Using repetitions, slogans, and standard formulas of speech, the party wants to place his agenda in the public space. The party's objectives become the masses objective, and standards.

As a general picture, the discourse is monochrome, regardless of the dead, and does not leave room for any kind of interpretation. The rewriting of the past, "reinventing" of biographies has as a primary effect the loss of the somewhat real life of the deceased. What remains is a perverted image, which tries to hide parts of the evil of the totalitarian regime. Like in an Orwellian play, an all powerful Ministry of Truth, represented by the propaganda, even transforms the dead.

²⁹ Jay W. Baird, "Goebbels, Horst Wessel, and the Myth of Resurrection and Return", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 1982), pp. 633-650

³⁰ Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Grenberg, Jeff Schimell, Jamie Arndt, Tom Pyszczycy, "Human Awareness of Mortality and the Evolution Of Culture", in Mark Schaller, Cristian S. Crandall, *The Pshihological Foundations of Culture*, (London, 2004). They see the mortality awareness as a sum of biological and cultural elements, interrelated and interdependent, and bringing new aspects of the funerary moment from a psychological point of view.

³¹ Bradley S. Greenberg, "Diffusion of News of the Kennedy Assassination", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2, (Summer, 1964), pp. 225-232, or Martin Luther King, "John F. Kennedy", *Transition*, No. 15, (1964), pp. 27-28, for the sentimental approach. It is evident Dr. King's case that a sentimental note exists. The difference between his discourse and that of an communist high party official regarding a deceased colleague is not so much the emergence of propaganda messages, but the way those are presented. In the first case, morality, acceptance, peace are terms often use, in the latter, fight, work, enemy.

Between Marxism and Revisionism. The Sino-Soviet Relations : 1956-1959

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In Western historiography, the research upon the real and expository rationale of the Soviet-Chinese conflict does not reveal a new approach. However, it is for the first time that our historiography places under the same paradigm of analysis both the deterioration of the Soviet-Chinese relations and the factors yielding this rupture. Hence, the contributions of our research are significant, as most of the analyzed aspects have not been considered by the Romanian historiography. The scope of this approach is to reveal, on a selective basis, the main contributions of our historiographic endeavor in relation with the Romanian historiography environment.

The drive of analysis is the mere nature of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. To start with, we must emphasize the mistaken understanding by expert writings of the Soviet-Chinese dispute, termed scission. Ab origine, the term scission comes from Latin scissio, described as being a rupture caused by ideological differences within a group which had been firmly united. Hence, let alone the increasingly ideological connotation (Marxism vs. Revisionism) of the conflict, it would be mistaken to consider the Soviet-Chinese dispute unilaterally, caused by ideological differences, when the actual reasons were concrete events.

Key words: sino-soviet conflict; marxism, revisionism, Maoism.

Internationally, the historiography pertaining to the Soviet-Chinese conflict reported a spectacular evolution after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991. If the roles of the USA or the USSR in the Cold War have been plainly debated in very numerous syntheses, studies and articles, the role of the Popular Republic of China in the international system's dynamics has been quite insignificantly considered. This is mainly due to the restrictive access of historians to Chinese archives. Until the 1980's, contemporary Chinese newspapers and the Western secret services were the main sources of information for historians. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the grasp of power by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 would provide favorable conditions for scientific research on the Popular Republic of China, leading to important progress in the study of declassified Chinese documents. Although most of these documents have remained secret, the publication of printed corpora from the Chinese archives yielded further inquiry on this matter. The publishing of the first volume of „Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic" in 1987 was unprecedented in this respect.

Apart from the more permissive access to the former Soviet and Chinese archives, the last decade of 20th century also made possible the publishing of exceptionally scientific periodicals. We mention here, among others, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* published under the aegis of *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*. Following an agreement with *Russia's Presidential Archives*, an impressive number of documents were declassified and published in the above-mentioned periodical. Subsequent studies and articles treated of the documentary sources from a double perspective: technical (by emphasizing the illegible fragments from the documents) and semantic-political. For a more extensive dimension of the present approach, we have added several syntheses rigorously elaborated by experts in the history of the Popular Republic of China. Of great importance are the countless and vast syntheses of the following American and British historians: Chen Jian, Roderick MacFarquhar, Maurice Meisner, Bernkopf Nancy Tucker, Franz Schurmann and Richard Thornton. With a rigorous consideration of China's internal evolutions in parallel with the main mutations occurred in international relations, they managed to present, with objectivity, the entire rule of Mao Zedong in communist China, simultaneously disclosing significant information on the implementation and institutionalization of the communist regime in this country. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the Romanian historiography pertaining to our research is in an early stage and, so far, no article or study has been elaborated with respect to the Soviet-Chinese conflict.

According to the Chinese version, the Soviet Union is the one which unleashed the split between these two countries since the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party, which took place in February 1956, was the first one held after Stalin's death on 5 March 1953. Out of the errors of the Stalinist age one can enumerate:

- the idea that it would be erroneous to concentrate the power at the center. From this point of view, the powers of the member republics of the USSR should be maintained and reinforced. The management of industrial enterprises from these areas should be transferred to and left at the competence of local authorities;
- the system of work planning in agriculture should be replaced and all the centrally planned bureaucratic elements should be eliminated. The state should only set the rate of taxes and the amount of acquired products;
- from an ideological and theoretical point of view, Stalin was not right and proved to be dogmatic in *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the Soviet*

Union, volume in which he said that an absolute crises of capitalism would totally stop the production in capitalist countries.¹

The climax of this Congress was represented by Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech which irritated deeply the Chinese delegation. Two aspects have disturbed the political factors from Beijing: on the one hand the denunciation of the atrocities committed by Stalin (the first step to Destalinisation), and on the other hand the introduction of the concept of *peaceful coexistence* as a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy. Both Albania and China raised objections to Khrushchev's discourse, but each of them on different grounds. For the Albanian communist leaders, Stalin was exerting a paternalist influence, being the one who supported Enver Hoxha opposing the suggestion of Albania becoming the seventh republic of Yugoslav Federation.² On the other hand the Chinese leaders had their own motives of discontent. Khrushchev delivered his speech referring to Stalin at a secret meeting at which the Chinese delegation had not been invited. Although afterwards the Chinese delegation was provided with a copy of Khrushchev's speech, the Chinese communist leaders were greatly offended by the fact that they had not been previously consulted.

As a result of Khrushchev's speech, Mao Zedong convoked a series of meetings (March-April 1956) with the most important Chinese communist leaders, aiming at adopting a joint position regarding the given situation. During the first meeting, in the evening of 17 March 1956, Mao Zedong opened the session emphasizing that Khrushchev's speech mentioned not only the problems faced by the Soviet Union under Stalin, but had also created a great confusion. Referring to Khrushchev's secret speech, Mao Zedong said at the meeting on 17 March 1956: "*Now at least two points can be made: he has taken the lid off, he has made a blunder. When we say he has taken the lid off, we mean his secret speech shows that the Soviet Union, the Soviet communist party and Stalin are not correct in every aspect, which helps do away with superstition. When we say he has made a blunder, we mean his secret speech contains grave mistakes both in content and method. Let us all make a study of*

¹ Lin Yunhui, *The 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong's Tortuous Path*, in *The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations*, Parallel History Project on NATO and The Warsaw Pact, June 2005, p.2

² Moreover, Enver Hoxha personally owed to Stalin the approval of removing from the governmental offices of Koci Xoxe and his pro-Tito associates, and also thwarting the Yugoslav conspiracy in 1948. Although he was totally convinced that Albania had a side role for Stalin's plans, this was not an impediment for criticizing the new leaders from Kremlin. For a larger perspective see: Joseph Rothschild, Nancy M. Wingfield, *The Return to Diversity*, (New York, 2000), pp.120-121

whether this is so or not".³ The communist leaders from Beijing underlined the fact that because of Khrushchev's criticism against Stalin, the myth according to which USSR had always acted as correct as possible has been demolished. Consequently, Khrushchev's criticism will lead to *rectifying Stalin's errors, and also to the replacement of the erroneous trend of treating the other parties as inferior within the framework of the international communist movement*.⁴

On the other hand, however, despite Stalin's mistakes, according to Mao Zedong, he should continue to be regarded as an authentic Marxist- Stalinist leader. In a consistent article dated April 5th, 1956, it was stated: *Some people consider that Stalin was wrong in everything; this is a grave misconception. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist, yet at the same time a Marxist Leninist who committed several gross errors without realizing that they were errors. We should view Stalin from an historical standpoint, make a proper and all-round analysis to see where he was right and where he was wrong, and draw useful lessons there from. Both the things he did right and the things he did wrong were phenomena of the international communist movement and bore the imprint of the times. Taken as a whole, the international communist movement is only a little over a hundred years old and it is only 39 years since the victory of the October Revolution; experience in many fields of revolutionary work is still inadequate. Great achievements have been made, but there are still shortcomings and mistakes. (...)*⁵

Moreover, Mao Zedong underlined that the human being is by excellence predisposed to making mistakes: *Stalin made mistakes, Khrushchev will make mistakes*, the Chinese communist leaders were not themselves exonerated of making mistakes.⁶ The Chinese communist leader even proposed some percentages regarding the former Soviet dictator's activity: thus, 70 percent of his actions were considered as being beneficial, whereas his errors

³ Lin Yunhui, *op. cit.* p.3, *apud Collected works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 7, (People's Press, 1999), p. 365

⁴ To everyone's amazement, Mao Zedong began enumerating Stalin's errors in his political relationship with PRC:

- during the Resistance War against Japan, Stalin supported Mao Zedong's rival, Wang Ming, thus placing the concept of a *united front* above the interests of the Communist Party;

- at the end of the war, Stalin suggested to the Chinese communists not to wage battle against the Gomindan regime;

- during Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow, between December 1949- February 1950, Stalin showed reticence regarding the signing of a new Sino-Soviet treaty;. See: Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill, 2001), p.65

⁵ See: "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, (Beijing 1959), pp.18-19

⁶ Chen Jian, *op.cit.*, p.65

represented only 30 percent. Due to the fact that the Soviets did not publish *Khrushchev's* secret report, a clear sign that the process of "destalinisation" was only in its beginning, CCP (Chinese Communist Party) took the initiative of publishing the official stance of the Beijing leaders. The article published on April 5th, 1956, in *People's Daily (Renmin Ribao)* and entitled *On The Historical Experience Of Proletarian Dictatorship*, stated that despite *serious mistakes*, Stalin ought to be considered a *great Marxist-Leninist*. In the same article, the Politburo of CCP included some considerations regarding the contradictions inherent to socialism, a subtle allusion to the new evolutions apparent within the Soviet Union: *Contradictions, as between progress and conservatism, between the advanced and the backward, between the positive and the negative, will constantly occur under varying conditions and different circumstances. Things will keep on like this: one contradiction will lead to another; and when old contradictions are solved new ones will arise. It is obviously incorrect to maintain, as some people do, that the contradiction between idealism and materialism can be eliminated in a socialist or communist society. As long as contradictions exist between the subjective and the objective, between the advanced and the backward, and between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between materialism and idealism will continue in a socialist or communist society, and will manifest itself in various forms. Since man lives in society, he reflects, in different circumstances and to varying degrees, the contradictions existing in each form of society. Therefore, not everybody will be perfect, even when a communist society is established. By then there will still be contradictions among people, and there will still be good people and bad, people whose thinking is relatively correct and others whose thinking is relatively incorrect.*⁷

But why did the Chinese communist leaders continue to defend Stalin even in the context of the beginning of the destalinisation process? Because they were defending themselves! Since the proclaiming of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese communist leaders have seen in the Stalinist model a way to be followed. It would be incorrect to say that Mao Zedong completely copied the Stalinist model, however, it is equally true that this model offered him the means of social transformation and economic reform. In practice, Mao *ad litteram* took from the Soviets the methods for establishing a centralized and planned economic system for controlling a rural society by collectivization, by placing an emphasis on the development of defense and heavy industry and by reinforcing the center's authority in comparison with the province.⁸ Therefore, denying Stalin meant for Mao repudiating his great accomplishment: *the myth of perpetual revolution*.

⁷ "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat..." pp.10-11

⁸ Chen Jian, *op.cit.*, p.66

During the meeting with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Pavel Yudin, which took place on the 31st of March 1956, Mao Zedong presented once again the Chinese stands regarding Khrushchev's critique of Stalin. Once more, the Chinese leader resorted to a retrospective analysis of Stalin's errors concerning his policy towards China, the most severe of which being the Kremlin leaders' inflexibility when it came to treating China as an equal partner (at the same time the Chinese leader enumerated some general mistakes made by Stalin: the dictatorial style of leadership, the illegal measures of repression, the abusive policies regarding some nationalities, foreign policy errors). The main argument to which Mao Zedong appealed was that, by China's adherence to the socialist bloc in 1949, its population rose from 200 million to 900 million inhabitants. Nonetheless, Mao did not hesitate to assert that: *Stalin is without a doubt a great Marxist and an honest revolutionary*. According to the memo of the conversation between Yudin and Mao Zedong, the latter resorted to a general classification of the errors made by Stalin. Here is how Yudin describes this stage of the meeting: *These fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, could be summed up in seven points: 1. Unlawful repressions; 2. Mistakes made in the course of the war, moreover, in particular in the beginning, rather than in the concluding period of the war; 3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow to the union of the working class and the peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this group of mistakes, in particular, the incorrect policy in relation to the peasantry, was discussed during Comrade Khrushchev's conversation with [PRC military leader] Zhu De in Moscow; 4. Mistakes in the nationality question connected to the unlawful resettlement of certain nationalities and others. However, overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy was implemented correctly; 5. Rejection of the principle of collective leadership, conceit and surrounding himself with toadies; 6. Dictatorial methods and leadership style; 7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy (Yugoslavia, etc.).*⁹

By means of his conversation with Yudin, Mao Zedong intended to transmit some important messages to the Soviets. First of all, despite *serious mistakes*, made by Stalin, the Chinese communist leader advised the Soviets that the perpetuation of the idea of complete Stalinist culpability was not beneficial to the Soviet Union and, all the less, to the international communist movement. Second of all, by criticizing the erroneous Stalinist policy concerning China, especially the Soviets' refusal of considering the Chinese partners as equals, Mao Zedong transmitted to the new Kremlin leaders, as most of all to Khrushchev, the idea that repeating these mistakes would be

⁹ „Document I Mao's Conversation with Yudin, 31 March 1956“, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHPB)*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, nr. 6-7, (Washington DC, 1995-1996), p.166

in the detriment of the both countries, and that, from now on, the new Sino-Soviet relationship would have to be based on the principles of *equality*.

By the end of 1956 the Sino-Soviet relations changed significantly. Although in official meetings Mao Zedong perpetuated through his speeches the idea of Moscow's role of leader of the socialist bloc, he assiduously believed in fact that he is more entitled than anyone else to establish the principles that should govern the relations between communists states from then on. We can hereby mention the meeting between Mao Zedong and the Yugoslavian delegation from September 1956. During this official meeting, the Chinese communist leader stated that: *We had no objection that the Soviet Union functions as a center [of the world revolution] because it benefits the socialist movement. You may disagree [with us] on this point. You wholeheartedly support Khrushchev's campaign to criticize Stalin, but we cannot do the same because our people would dislike it. In the previous parades [in China], we held up portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as those of a few Chinese [leaders] – Mao, Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], and Zhu [De] - and other brotherly parties' leaders. Now we adopt a measure of "overthrowing all": no one's portrait is handed out. For this year's "First of May" celebration, Ambassador Bobkoveshi already saw in Beijing that no one's portrait was held in parade. However, the portraits of five dead persons - Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin and Sun [Yat-sen] - and a not yet dead person - Mao Zedong - are still hanging [on the wall]. Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavians may comment that the Soviet Union no longer hangs Stalin's portrait, but the Chinese still do¹⁰.*

The new orientation of the Chinese foreign policy was revealed by Beijing's stands regarding the crisis in Poland and Hungary. Nonetheless, the political leaders from Beijing resorted to a dissociation of the causes that provoked the two crises. Thus, if the Polish crisis was the result of *great power chauvinism*, displayed by the USSR (in this case soliciting a peaceful solution by bringing Gomulka to power), the crisis in Hungary was seen (after a first period of uncertainty) as an essentially anti-communist one and therefore having to be repressed. In order to find a solution for the two crises Beijing supported two different ways of action. As soon as the CCP leaders found out of the Soviets' intent to militarily intervene in Poland between 19-21st of October, an official top level meeting was urgently summoned. As a result of deliberations, the conclusion that was reached was that a potential Soviet military intervention would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Poland. The soviet ambassador, Pavel Yudin, was summoned twice by

¹⁰ See: "Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [Undated], September 1956", in *CWIHPB ...* nr. 6-7, (1995-1996), p.149

Mao Zedong, each time having been warned that in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland, China would publicly protest. Between 21-23rd October 1956, a Chinese delegation, led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, traveled to Moscow in order to consult the Soviet leaders in reference to the Polish crisis (meanwhile the crisis in Hungary breaks out and therefore the meeting's agenda would become wider). The Chinese pressure on Moscow led to some important results: not only did the Soviets renounce the idea of using force in order to solve the Polish crisis, but they also signed, on October 30th, 1956, a *Declaration on Developing and Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries*, an official document through Moscow committed itself to fundaments its relations with other communist states on the principles of equality. Obviously, Beijing catalogued these measures as a great victory. Beijing attitude concerning the crisis in Hungary was, up to a point, similar to that regarding Poland. Thus, in a first stage, the Chinese communists considered that the roots of the events taking place in Hungary lied in Moscow's refusal to consider the Hungarian communists as equals. But as the Hungarian revolution gradually took anti-communist connotations, the Chinese communists leaders radically changed their opinion. After Mao Zedong was informed by Liu Shaoqi, who was in Moscow, regarding the Soviets' intention of withdrawing their troops from Hungary, on the 30th of October, the Chinese leader ordered a top-level meeting to be summoned, the unanimous decision of this meeting being a resolution to condemn the Soviet decision of abandoning Hungary to *reactionary forces*. The subsequent change of Moscow's attitude as well as the decision to militarily intervene in Hungary provoked great satisfaction in Beijing. China thus became the number one supporter of the invasion of Hungary and even saluted in the press, the execution of Imre Nagy, in 1958 ¹¹

However, in the eyes of the general public, the Chinese-Soviet relations between 1956-1957 seem to be on an ascendant trend. When the Soviet Union granted an economic and military support to China, the latter publicly supported the leading role of the USSR within the international communist movement. In the political backstage, however, the situation was much different. The certainty that China played an important role in resolving the two crises led the Beijing leader to live under the impression

¹¹ For a broader perspective see: Mark Kramer, „The USSR Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of the Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split September 1959”, *CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996)*, p.173 and Odd Arne Westad, „Mao On Sino-Soviet Relation: Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador”, *CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996)*, p.157

that PRC (People's Republic of China) played a prominent role in the international communist movement, one that was more significant even to that of the Soviet Union. Between the 7th and 18th of January, 1957, Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary. On his return home, in his report, Zhou Enlai made some more than explicit references to the Soviet leadership's incapacity to resolve the problems that appeared both within the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe. In practice, the report tried to underline the new role that the PRC now played in the framework of the international communist movement.

The critics brought by China's prime-minister to Kremlin leaders are more than explicit. Concerning the Polish crisis Zhou Enlai noted that:

"It is crystal clear that the Poland incident was a result of the historical antagonism between the Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of [the Second World] War, many [outstanding and potential] conflicts have yet to be appropriately resolved. The recent [Soviet] dispatch of troops to Warsaw caused an even worse impact [in Poland]. Under these circumstances the Polish comrades have good reason not to accept the policy of "following the Soviet leadership." The Polish comrades, however, admitted that they had yet to build a whole-hearted trusting relationship with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, [Wladyslaw] Gomulka is trying his best to retrieve the losses and reorient the Polish- Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland]. Neither regarding the Sino-Soviet relations do the estimations of the Chinese prime-minister abound in positive remarks: First of all, facing the [common] grave enemy, both sides have realized and accepted the necessity of promoting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual support, which had been taken as the most important principle. Second, now the Soviet Union and China can sit down to discuss issues equally. Even if they have different ideas on certain issues, they must consult with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are having some impact on the cadres and people in the Soviet Union, and even on some [Soviet] leaders. Third, the previous dull situation in which the brotherly parties and states could hardly discuss or argue with one another no longer exists. Now, different opinions can be freely exchanged so that unity and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, the majority of the Soviet people love China and feel happy for the Chinese people's achievements and growth in strength. Their admiration and friendship with the Chinese people are being enhanced on a daily basis. However, while [Russian] arrogance and self importance have not been completely eliminated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet leadership] gave us a splendid and grand reception which indicated its intention to build a good image in front of its own people and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and knowing little the ways of the world, some of their leaders have hardly improved themselves even with the several rebuffs they have met in the past

*year. On the other hand, however, they appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs or relations with other brotherly parties. Although they did sometimes speak from the bottom of their hearts while talking with us, they nevertheless could not get down from their high horse (...)*¹²

In a speech dated January 27th 1957, Mao Zedong reiterated the main guiding lines of Zhou Enlai report, presenting them, however, in a much more authoritarian manner. Being in fact dedicated to Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations, the Chinese leader's speech constitutes a harsh indictment of *great power chauvinism* exercised by the USSR, as well as some Kremlin leaders' greed and incompetence. In his speech, Mao Zedong stated that:

*"At present there exist some controversies between China and the Soviet Union. Their ways of thinking, behavior, and historical traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we must try to persuade them.(...) As far as I can see, circumstances are beyond what persons, even those occupying high positions, can control. Under the pressure of circumstance, those in the Soviet Union who still want to practice big-power chauvinism will invariably encounter difficulties. To persuade them remains our current policy and requires us to engage in direct dialogue with them. The last time our delegation visited the Soviet Union, [we] openly talked about some [controversial] issues. I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the phone that, as those people are blinded by lust for gain, the best way to deal with them is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is [their] asset? It involves nothing more than 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much does this count? It does not count for a thing. With this asset, however, their heads have gotten really big. How can they be communists [by being so cocky]? How can they be Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a hundred times bigger, these things do not count for a thing. They have achieved nothing but digging a few things out of the earth, turning them into steel, thereby manufacturing some airplanes and automobiles. This is nothing to be proud of! Regardless of the negative aspects stated above, the Chinese leader admitted that in some aspects PRC is deficitary and, therefore must learn from the Soviets: We still need to learn from the Soviet Union. However, we shall learn from them rather selectively: only accept the good stuff, while at the same avoiding picking up the bad stuff"*¹³

¹² „Report "My Observations on the Soviet Union", Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Leadership, 27 January 1957 (Excerpt)", CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996), pp.153-154

¹³ „Speech, Mao Zedong, "On Sino-American and Sino-Soviet Relations" 27 January, 1957", CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996), pp.152-153

In November 1957, with the occasion of celebrating 40 years since the October Revolution, a Chinese delegation, led by Mao Zedong, traveled to Moscow to take part in the communist parties' conference, which has been organized by Nikita Khrushchev with the purpose of reiterating the ideological Kremlin's supremacy.¹⁴ During this conference, the Chinese leader pleaded for all the communist parties to acknowledge the leading role of the Soviet Union. Moreover, by using a metaphor compared himself with the Kremlin leader, stating that *the flower called Khrushchev is more beautiful than the flower called Mao Zedong*.¹⁵ The Maoist rhetoric should, however, be read in other terms. By asserting the leading role of the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong placed himself in the pasture of a superior instance, whose moral stands permitted him to grant a vote of confidence or, on the contrary, not to guarantee the legitimacy of Kremlin's authority. Mao Zedong took the occasion to launch a veiled attack on the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, introduced by Khrushchev. Thus, the Chinese leader asserted that the socialist bloc should not fear a nuclear war because, although it will produce significant damage, it would also mean the end of the capitalist world.¹⁶

During the Moscow conference from November 1957, the Chinese minister of defense, Peng Dehuai, and his Soviet counterpart signed an agreement concerning the development of a joint naval program in East Asia. We mention that the signing of this cooperation agreement regarding the field of defense industry was not the first action of this kind between the two parts. On the contrary, China manifested a special interest for Soviet armament for as early as 1954. With the occasion of Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in May 1954, Mao Zedong showed interest in nuclear armament. Khrushchev, who was reticent concerning this issue, left the subject to further debate, limiting himself to mentioning that in the future there will be attempts to install a small nuclear reactor in China (serving civil purposes). Nonetheless, the Chinese began preparing for starting an atomic program. On April 27th 1956, the USSR and PRC signed a cooperation protocol in the area of atomic energy research. On January 15th, 1956, the Chinese openly solicited Soviet assistance in the field of nuclear energy, consisting in secret research data, raw materials and even funding. The Soviets proved once again to be very conciliatory, and on the 17th of September 1956 the Agreement for Technical Assistance in the Area of Nuclear Industry was

¹⁴ Vladislav M. Zubok, "Look what Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!" Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split", *CWIHPB* ... nr. 10, (1998), p.152

¹⁵ Chen Jian, *op.cit.*, p.71

¹⁶ *Ibidem*

signed. It should be mentioned that the Soviet aid was destined to the civil domain and under no circumstances to the military one. This happened under the conditions in which even since May 1957 it existed in China the Institute for Research Atomic Weapons, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, being thus put aside.¹⁷

According to the Soviet documents, the Chinese ambassador in Moscow send a memo to the Soviet Foreign Minister, on December 14th, 1957, in which he suggested forming a mixed Soviet-Chinese commission. In the Chinese officials' opinion the role of this commission resigned in controlling the armament industry, the new organization being formed from an equal number or members from the two states and which was supposed to meet once or twice a year.¹⁸ Much to the Chinese joy, in the following period of time the Soviet-Chinese cooperation significantly intensified, both by means of reciprocal exchange of scientific information, as well as by coordinating economic policies, doubled by the consensus manifested by both parts concerning foreign policy. The Soviet good will had, however, two clearly established reasons: building a wide range radio station (in order to ensure communication with Soviet submarines in the Pacific), and forming a mixed Soviet-Chinese naval fleet (which was to be, in fact, under Soviet command). During 1958, USSR began building the first nuclear submarines, the Soviet wish of possessing submarines that could navigate anywhere and on almost unlimited periods of time, thus coming true (the first Soviet nuclear submarine was launched in December 1958). The advantage gained by the Soviets did raise a significant issue: the communication between submarines and the decision factors on the continent. Following the discussions between the commanders of the Soviet fleet, two proposals

¹⁷ For a broader perspective see: Mori Kazuco, „A brief Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Political Process of 1957-1959”, *The Cold War. History of Sino-Soviet Relations*, Parallel History Project on NATO and The Warsaw Pact, (June 2005), p.2

¹⁸ In order to justify the Beijing government proposal, the Chinese ambassador in Moscow presented the creation of such an organization of being utterly necessary to strengthening the Chinese-Soviet alliance: *In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet cooperation and close links regarding national defense industry, the Chinese Government proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commission in charge of national defense industry be established which, consisting of several delegates from each side, is to meet once or twice annually(...). They established even the ways of paying the costs presupposed by the annual meeting of the new body: All costs of organizing the joint commission's meetings will be charged to the Government where the meeting is held, whereas each Government will be responsible for expenditures of its own delegation during the meeting.* For a broader perspective see: “9. Embassy of PRC in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 December 1957”, *CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996)*, p.160

were put forth to the Committee of National Defense. The first proposal concerned building a wide-range radio station on Soviet territory, but this idea was rejected on the grounds that it implied huge financial investment and that, in addition, it was not sure that such a radio station would assure a stable communication with Soviet submarines at sea. The second proposal wanted for two wide-range radio stations to be built as it follows: one on the territory of China (Hainan Island) with the purpose of ensuring communication with the Soviet submarines fleet in the Pacific, and a second radio station on the territory of India, thus ensuring the connection with the Soviet submarines in the Indian Ocean. Khrushchev rejected the plan of building a radio station on the territory of India, fearing a possible refusal from Nehru, which would have harmed the Soviet-Indian relations (India had “theoretically” assumed a neutrality position during the Cold War). When it came to building a radio station on China’s territory, the Soviet leader proved to be more than interested, relying on the fact that Chinese refusal on this matter would be nearly impossible: China was a socialist country which was just then developing its own fleet with Soviet aid.¹⁹

As a result, on February, the 6th, 1958,²⁰ the admiral Platonov sent a letter to the Chinese naval forces commander, Xiao Jinguang, questioning him in regard to the possibility of building (by both parts) a wide-range radio station. It must be mentioned that the Chinese naval forces needed such a radio station as well, ever since 1954, when the Chinese submarine fleet was established. Moreover, with Soviet aid, the Chinese have managed to build a short and medium radio station. On the 18th of April 1956, the Soviet minister of defense, Rodion Malinovski, in a letter addressed to Peng Dehuai, restated the idea of placing a radio station this time bringing forth supplementary technical data such as: installing a short range transmitter, of 1000 kilowatts and of an equally powerful receptor. According to the Soviet official, the whole investment numbered 100 million rubbles.²¹ Out of the total cost of the investment, the Soviet part would bear 70 percent of all expenses, while the Chinese part was to cover only 30 percent, the radio station being destined for the common use of both parts. Mao Zedong’s

¹⁹ Shen Zhihua, *Khrushchev, Mao and the Unrealized Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation*, Parallel History Project on Nato and the Warsaw Pact, (October 2002), pp.11-15

²⁰ According to other sources, the first Soviet request to place a radio station on China’s territory took place on the 18th of April 1956. See: Chen Jian,, *op.cit.*, p.73 and Mori Kazuko, *op.cit.*, p.6

²¹ Not even when it comes to assessing the costs of the investment, do the opinions of specialists converge. Thus, Shen Zhihua advances the figure of 110 million rubbles, while Mori Kazuko proposes the figure of 100 million rubbles.

reply to the Soviet request did not delay, as he appointed the Chinese officials who were in charge with the Soviet request to communicate the following to Kremlin:

The People's Republic of China accepts the placing of a wide-range radio station on its territory; The Chinese state will cover all expenses to build such a radio station; The Chinese state will be the sole owner of this radio station; However, the Chinese part will supply information to the Soviet part in time of peace and in case of a war will accept the presence of the Soviet delegates in the radio station, but under no circumstances will not accept the placing of Soviet military bases on the territory of the PRC (the proposal belongs to Peng Dehuai).²²

The Chinese decision was communicated on the 4th of June to the Soviet general counselor in Beijing. The discussions between Peng Dehuai and the Soviet representatives constitute the subject of a report send by the Chinese official to Mao Zedong. The report informed the Chinese leader that the Soviet part insisted in its intentions to jointly build the radio station, to send to China at the beginning of June a number of Soviet specialist who were to choose the place and the project of the future radio station as well as the elaboration of a plan regarding the two parts in using the radio station. The advice of the Chinese Marshal was to accept the arrival of the Soviet technical experts, following that the issues concerning financing and the form of ownership of the station to be resolved at an ulterior time date.²³ Although Mao Zedong accepted Peng Dehuai suggestion (concerning the acceptance of the Soviet experts), he nonetheless asserted that it is utterly necessary for the Chinese part to cover all building costs. Moreover, anticipating the possible pressures that the Soviets could exercise in regard to the joint completion of this project, the Chinese leader gave clear instructions to Peng Dehuai: in case of Soviet pressure, they should not be

²² Shen Zhihua, *op.cit.*, p. 14

²³ In the report to Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai underlined that: *With regard to Soviet Union's request for establishing long-wave radio stations in our country, the Soviet side insists on the original idea that the construction should be jointly invested by the two sides. They also propose to dispatch experts to China in early June to conduct such activities as selecting the proper location, making investigations and preparing for the design work, and drafting an agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In order not to hinder the investigation and design work, [we] may permit the Soviet experts to come to China to conduct some technical work, leaving the question concerning investment and operation to be solved as the next step.* „4.Report, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong and CCP Central Committee, 5 June 1958 (Excerpt)” in CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996), p.154

answered to until only after the CC of the CCP discussed the problem. To emphasize the importance of this matter, Mao Zedong insisted on stating that this was the official position of China and not only his personal opinion. Mao Zedong's reply to Peng Dehuai, despite its reduced dimensions, reveals the Chinese communist leader determination to oppose the Soviet proposal to finance the radio station at any costs:

"If they try to put heavy pressure on us, [we] shall not respond and shall let it drag on for a while, or [we] may respond after the central leadership discusses it. This issue must be settled through an agreement between the two governments (...) China must shoulder the responsibility of capital investment for this radio station; China is duty-bound in this case. [We] may have to ask for Soviet comrades' help with regard to construction and equipment, but all the costs must be priced and paid in cash by us. [We] may share its use after it is constructed, which ought to be determined by an agreement between the two governments. This is China's position, not purely the position of mine".²⁴

On 12th of June 1958, Peng Dehuai replied to Malinowski, reasserting the Chinese decision to fully cover the costs of building the radio station and emphasizing the necessity of signing an agreement between the two parts on this matter. The Soviet reaction was to send to China a team of Soviet experts led by Letvenski, who brought with them the plan of an agreement between the two sides in the matter of building the radio station. The Soviet part insisted once more on the issue of equally bearing the construction costs of the radio station, and the Soviet-Chinese discussions on this subject proved to be futile. On July, the 21st, 1958, Peng Dehuai sent a new letter to Malinowski, thanking the Soviets for their intention to provide technical aid in the radio station project, but reasserting one more time the refusal of joint financing. During the same day, the Soviets came up with a new proposal: the establishment of a common Sino-Soviet naval fleet. There were two hidden reasons from the part of the Soviets: China desperately needed Soviet aid to develop its own fleet and, in addition, such a project would have constituted an alternative solution for the Soviets in solving their problems of communicating with the submarines in the Pacific. During the Moscow conference of November 1957, Xiao Jinguang, the leader of the Chinese military delegation, requested admiral Gorshkov the commander of the Soviet naval forces, assistance in the area of building nuclear submarines. The Soviet admiral replied that the development of such a

²⁴ "5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the Soviet Request on Establishing a Special Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June 1958", in *CWIHPB ...* nr. 6-7, (1995-1996), pp.154-155

project by the Chinese part is useless because Soviet project to build nuclear propelled submarines was already underway and once it would be completed the Chinese side would be provided with all the necessary information. Upon reaching Beijing, the commandants of the Chinese naval forces addressed a memo (April 1958) to Peng Dehuai, in which they insisted on the necessity of Soviet aid for the development of the Chinese naval technology. Furthermore the Soviet naval forces now disposed of highly performant war ships and have developed a new type of armament for submarines: guided missiles and torpedoes. The Chinese building of military ships was still being done after the plans provided by the Soviets during the first Chinese five-year plan. As a consequence, the Chinese military navy desperately needed Soviet assistance. On June, the 28th, 1958, Zhou Enlai addressed a letter to Khrushchev in which he pleads for the necessity of Soviet assistance with regard to naval technology. In the same day the Chinese prime-minister, following the suggestion of Nie Rongzen, authorized the start of a research and construction program for nuclear submarines.²⁵

As a consequence, on July, the 21st, 1958, Yudin requested an emergency meeting with the Beijing leader in order to discuss the details of the recent Soviet proposal. Curiously Mao Zedong chose as location of the meeting the pool from Zhong Nan Hai ²⁶. During the meeting, which started at 22.00, Yudin, recently returned from a conference of the Politburo of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), supplied the Chinese leader with the information regarding all the issues discussed at the conference in Moscow. The discussion, which lasted 3 hours and a half, was centered on the issue of creating a joint Soviet-Chinese (possibly Vietnamese) naval force. According to Yudin, because of the USSR's geographical limitations, the nuclear submarine fleet could not be used at its maximum potential. China's geography (with large coastal areas) permitted this and thus the reason to form a joint Sino-Soviet naval force. Furthermore, in case of a war with the common enemy of the two countries (USA), the possibilities to manage this potential conflict rose considerably in the event that the PRC accepted the proposal of a joint fleet. The Beijing leader ironically commented Yudin's statements, asking if the Chinese participation in this project is a precondition for the continuation of the Soviet technical assistance to China. Yudin restrained himself to asserting that the Soviet proposal is merely a

²⁵ Shen Zhihua, *op.cit.*, pp. 11-15

²⁶ It is known that one of the many passions of the Chinese leader was swimming. Nonetheless choosing a location that was inappropriate for an official meeting suggests Mao Zedong's contempt toward the second Soviet proposal.

suggestion, which would be subjected to further discussions between the two parts. The Chinese leader's reply was once again a shocking one asking if this new proposal of Moscow concerns a true Sino-Soviet cooperation or if it wanted a unilateral Soviet implication? In the case of the second possibility, Mao Zedong threatened with a benevolent renunciation to the Soviet assistance in building Chinese nuclear submarines. Returned to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, Yudin and his collaborators reached the conclusion that the Soviet proposal was rejected.²⁷

On the morning of July, the 22nd, 1958, Mao Zedong summoned Yudin to Zhong Nan Hai. All the members of the Politburo of the CCP were present as well. The discussions resembled more a monologue, as the Soviet ambassador was offered few opportunities to reply to the allegations.²⁸ After a consistent and caustic digression related with the Sino-Soviet divergences starting with the mistakes made by Stalin in his policy towards China and continuing to Khrushchev, Mao Zedong approached again the issue of the recent Soviet proposal to establish a joint fleet. Not only did he categorically refused the Soviet proposal, but his speech was extremely harsh, openly stating the Chinese request to abandon Soviet assistance for constructing nuclear submarines. In Mao Zedong's opinion, accepting the Soviet proposal would have meant condemning China to a limited sovereignty, as the coastal areas would be under Soviet control. In order to ease a bit the tense atmosphere, Mao underlined that in case of a war, the Soviet troops would be allowed access on China's territory, but he was also keen on stating that it was only a matter of time until the People's Liberation Army would dispose of nuclear propelled submarines built without Soviet aid. During the same meeting, Mao Zedong requested the unaltered transmission of the Zhong Nan Hai discussions to Khrushchev: *Please report all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: you must tell him exactly what I have*

²⁷ From the beginning, Mao Zedong saw the two Soviet proposals as an attempt to limit China's sovereignty. Recent studies show that this was not the main reason for the Chinese refusal, in fact it was Mao Zedong personal desire to reinforce his authority internally in the eve of launching "the grand Chinese innovation": *The Great Leap Forward*. What else than an open confrontation with the Soviets could better legitimize the unquestionable authority of the Beijing's leader? In addition, the principle of *equality between all socialist states*, a principle conceived by the Chinese and on which they fully relied, conferred the Beijing leader the reason to condemn *the great power chauvinism*, manifested by the USSR in relation with the other states. In truth, the USSR did not want any immixture in the internal affairs of China. For a broader perspective, see: Vojtech Mastny, *China, the Warsaw Pact...* p.3

²⁸ Chen Jian,, *op.cit.*, p.74

*said without any polishing so as to make him uneasy. He has criticized Stalin's [policy] lines but now adopts the same policies as Stalin did.*²⁹

Alarmed by Yudin's report, Khrushchev visited Beijing between July 21st – August 3rd, 1958, when he met four times with Mao Zedong and other Chinese communist leaders.³⁰ Although the 1958 summit seem to have economic reasons, the transcripts of the two leaders' conversations point out that their divergences, beyond the political issues, had also a deep personal connotation.³¹ Referring to Mao, he was in the position of a chief of state who came to the power through his own efforts, without any Soviet help. Mao's aversion for the Soviet policy may be perceived in the terms of strengthening his personal authority in the eve of launching *The Great Leap Forward*, as well as the campaign against Formosa. During the first meeting, on the 31st of July 1958, Khrushchev assured Mao Zedong of the fact that the Soviets have no intention in interfering with China's sovereignty. Concerning the radio station, Khrushchev asserted that this was Malinovski's personal idea and not an official decision of the CC (Central Committee) of the CPSU. He admitted instead that although he offered financial and technical assistance for building the radio station, this station would be owned by the Chinese state. The second issue on the discussion agenda referred to the establishment of a joint Sino-Soviet fleet. Regarding this problem, the Soviet leader blamed Yudin (apparently ill at that time), who did not transmit correctly Moscow's indications, Khrushchev underlining the Soviet intent of treating the Chinese as equal partners. Despite Khrushchev's statements, Mao Zedong used once more the principle of great *power chauvinism*, manifested by the USSR, asserting that the last Soviet proposals were a clear example of this principle.³²

²⁹ The whole discussion practically centered around the idea of *great power chauvinism* practiced by the USSR in its relations to other brotherly states, the new Soviet proposal subscribing to the same pattern. "6.Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July 1958", in *CWIHPB ... nr. 6-7, (1995-1996)*, pp.155-159

³⁰ Although it is certain that there were four meetings of the two leaders, only the first and the last of them were declassified in 2000. See: Vladislav Zubok, "The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations, 31 July-3 August 1958 and 2 October 1959", in *CWIHPB ... nr.12-13, (2001)*, pp. 244-246

³¹ See: William Taubman, "Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split", in *CWIHPB ... nr.8-9, (1996-1997)*, pp.243-248

³² "Document No. 1 First Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing], 31 July 1958", in *CWIHPB ... nr.12-13, (2001)*, pp. 250-260, or „Document 17 First Talk Of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, 31 July 1958 in Huaiaren Hall [in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound]" in David

The fourth conversation between Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, from the 3rd of August 1958, seems to be a discussion without a special relevance, the dialogue emerging around the experiences in the field of nuclear armament and the important international political personalities. According to Khrushchev, Stalin was *senile*, John Foster Dulles was *an incompetent*, and Nixon was *worse* than Eisenhower, the latter being catalogued as *not a very bright* ex-military commander. While discussing about the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev convinced Mao Zedong that this principle represented more a temporary tactic than a strategy on the long term. The Beijing leader suggested that Khrushchev should act cautiously during his traveling across the borders, situations with a great risk for the Kremlin leader according to Mao Zedong. The meeting, which did not have a pre-established agenda, was closed by the signing of a common official statement.³³

The Sino-Soviet relations became tensioned again with the burst of a new crisis on 23rd of August, 1958 when Beijing attacked the islands Quemoi and Matsu.³⁴ The Soviet policy toward this incident has two stages. In a first stage (from the beginning of the bombing and until the end of September), on the one side the USSR announced its full support for the Chinese policy, and on the other hand tried to limit the amplitude of Chinese military actions. Immediately after the bombing on the 23rd of August, 1958, the Soviet embassy sent a telegram to the CC of the CPSU, emphasizing that the Chinese part did not provide any information regarding its intent of attacking the Taiwan straits until the military operations started. After receiving the telegram, Khrushchev asked the Soviet embassy in Beijing to transmit to the Chinese that the PRC was engaged in a process of socialist development, with a precarious economy, and consequently it could not

Wolff, "One Finger's Worth of Historical Events" *New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959*, Working Paper nr.30, Cold War International History Project, (Washington DC, August 2000), pp.51-56

³³ "Document No. 2 Fourth Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Hall of Qinjendiang, 3 August 1958" in *CWIHPB ...* nr.12-13, 2001, pp.260-262, or „Document 18 Fourth Conversation Of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, 3 August, 1958, in the Qinzhendian Hall [date handwritten on typescript]" in David Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp.56-59

³⁴ These two coastal islands (Quemoi is in fact a group of four little islands) remained under the control of the nationalist government which moved to Formosa in 1949. These islands, although of minor strategic importance, have always constituted a disputed element between the two states. The conflicts resulting in the bombing of these two islands began since 1954, but their amplitude rose in August 1958.

begin an ample war. The Beijing leader's reply was firm and intransigent: the two islands were a Chinese territory, and their liberation was a domestic problem.³⁵ Fearing that Beijing's actions might have significant international consequences, Khrushchev sent Gromyko in a secret visit at Beijing. Zhou Enlai met Gromyko on September, the 6th, 1958, explaining to him the reasons beyond the Chinese military actions. During this meeting, the Chinese part asserted that bombing the islands was meant to emphasize Taiwan's litigation and was not a first step for liberating the island.³⁶ The Soviet official underlined that the USSR supported the Chinese military actions, but urged to moderation.³⁷ Only after being informed about the content of the discussions between Gromyko and the Chinese leaders, did Khrushchev send an open letter to Eisenhower, as a response to John Foster Dulles' s threatening with nuclear retaliation against the PRC. The letter stated that any attack against the USSR's ally, friend and neighbor, the People's Republic of China, will be perceived as a direct attack against the USSR. The same issues were restated by Gromyko in his speech delivered at the UN General Assembly on the 18th of September, and in a second open letter sent by Khrushchev on September, the 19th.³⁸

In the second half of September, Khrushchev summoned to Moscow the Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, with the purpose of offering aid to the Chinese in the field of military aviation. After receiving Liu Xiao' memo, Zhou Enlai organized several meetings with the Chinese military leaders, starting with Peng Dehuai, to discuss the Soviet proposal. A letter addressed by them to Mao Zedong underlined the Chinese necessity of accepting the soviet offer. Mao Zedong accepted the result of the discussions organized by

³⁵ The Chinese attack on the two islands joins *the theory of intermediate areas*, promoted by Mao during the 50's. According to this theory, the Westerns used these intermediate areas to weaken the communist bloc, becoming necessary a communist control over these areas. For a broader perspective see: Dai Chaowu, *The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations*, in *The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations*, Parallel History Project on NATO and The Warsaw Pact, (June 2005), pp.1-4

³⁶ Chen Jian,, *op.cit.*, p.77

³⁷ During the meeting with Gromyko, Zhou Enlai also discussed the issue of a war with the USA, a war to which, according to the Chinese official, even in the case of American nuclear retaliation, the Soviet military intervention would not be necessary, China being prepared to deal with such a war despite the huge losses it might cause. Only an ample nuclear war would need the Soviet implication. A similar opinion was expressed by Mao Zedong in his dialogue with Gromyko. For a broader perspective see: Dai Chaowu, *op.cit.*, p.6

³⁸ Vladislav Zubok,, *op.cit.*, p.246

Zhou Enlai but requested the description of the real methods for implementing the Soviet proposal. After many discussions, the CC of the CCP rejected the Soviet proposal. The Chinese decision unpleasantly took by surprise the Moscow leaders. Khrushchev himself wrote twice to Mao Zedong (27th of September and 4th of October) asserting that, need be, the USSR could supply China with bombers C-75, which were supposed to carry ground-to-air missiles to Fujian, in order to strengthen the anti-aerial Chinese defense. Mao Zedong replied to Kremlin leader only on 14th of October 1958: *We were deeply moved by your unselfish contribution to Marxist-Leninist principles and internationalism. On behalf of the CCCPC I gave you our sincere thanks.* The Chinese leader wanted to state that: *For the ultimate victory we are willing to bear the first strike and to destroy the imperialism, even at the expense of many lives*³⁹

At the end of September, Mao Zedong decided to abandon the bombing of the two islands, their liberation being supposed to take place in the near future. The Soviet leadership was not informed about the new Chinese option until the 5th of October. The crisis of Taiwan straits ended the same abrupt way it began. The balance of this crisis was uncertain. However, two things were clear: the USSR would not support China in regaining Taiwan (the political Soviet leaders supported the Chinese military actions only from a declarative point of view), and the USA would not get involved in a war against the PRC only that in this way the nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek will remain in power. During a top conference of the CCP on the 5th of September 1958, Mao Zedong stated that he: *simply had not anticipated how roiled and turbulent the world would become if China fired a few rounds of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu.*⁴⁰

The year of 1959 represents the inexorable end of Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets informed the Chinese communist leaders on June, the 20th, 1959, that because of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, started with the purpose of prohibiting the atomic tests, the USSR could not supply any nuclear technology to China. According to the Soviets, if the Western countries found out about a nuclear cooperation between the USSR and the PRC, then *it was possible that the socialist countries efforts to fight for peace and for the relaxation of international tensions could be put in danger.* Consequently, the Soviets informed the Chinese about the fact that under these conditions they could not respect some of the obligations they contracted through the treaty signed between the two states on 15th of October 1957. The Soviets decision

³⁹ Dai Chaowu, *op.cit.*, p.7

⁴⁰ Mark Kramer, *op. cit.*, p.174

meant that they would not supply China with the prototype of the atomic bomb and with the technical data necessary to its building. Mao Zedong saw the Soviet decision as a pressure strategy, the USSR wanting to change the course of the Chinese communist policy. Such an opinion could only harm the relations between the two states. Despite the Soviet decision, China will test its first atomic bomb in 1964. Ironically, Mao Zedong thanked for the Soviet support in realizing the bomb, although the new documents declassified prove that the technical data delivered by the Soviets until the 20th of June, 1959 were more than useful in creating the first Chinese atomic bomb⁴¹

The dispute between China and the USSR became public in August 1959 with the emergence of a border Sino-Indian conflict. In March 1959, a revolt broke out in Tibet but it was bloodily repressed by the Chinese authorities. Dalai Lama managed to flee to India from where he brought into the international community's attention the atrocities committed by the Chinese authorities in Tibet. During the 50's, the PRC and India maintained friendly relations, but the acceptance of the authority of the Tibetan religious leader by India tensioned the relations between the two states. On 25th of August 1959, the Chinese border guards killed a few Indian soldiers along the McMahon frontier line, a border established in 1914 between the British Empire and Tibet but never recognized by the PRC.⁴²

The Sino-Indian conflict appeared in a difficult moment for the Kremlin leader who prepared to visit the USA, invited by the president Eisenhower. On the 9th of September 1959, the Soviet papers published a declaration of the Soviet communist leaders in which they asserted their *regret* for the beginning of the Sino-Indian conflict and urged moderation. The fact that this declaration did not underline the explicit Soviet support for the Chinese policy irritated deeply the decision factors from Beijing.⁴³

On the 30th of September 1959, after his visit in the USA and a short stop in Moscow, Khrushchev went to Beijing for participating to the 10th anniversary since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. On October, the 28th, 1959, at his return from the USA, Khrushchev received from Gromyko the well-known Zimyanin's Report, which summed up the political and economic evolution of the PRC, as well as the course of the Sino-Soviet relations during 1949-1958. The purpose of this report was to

⁴¹ Evgeny A. Negin, Yuri N. Smirnov, *Did the USSR Share Atomic Secrets with China?*, Parallel History Project on NATO and The Warsaw Pact, (October 2002), *passim*

⁴² Vladislav Zubok, *op.cit.*, p.247

⁴³ Chen Jian,, *op.cit.*, p. 80

assure the Kremlin leader a strong conversational base, regarding the fact that Sino-Soviet split was still in an incipient stage. At the beginning of September 1959, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, requested the director of the Department of Foreign Affairs Far East to come up with a report about the evolution of the PRC after 1949, which was to be presented to Nikita Khrushchev. The Kremlin leader had just announced his participation on the festivities organized on the occasion of the 10th anniversary since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. The aim of Khrushchev's visit was to diminish the Sino-Soviet tensions, which were not public yet. It's interesting to notice that Khrushchev refused at first to participate on the Beijing's festivities, due to a full public agenda, but at the CC of the CPSU's suggestion he agreed with the idea that a face to face meeting with Mao Zedong could improve the relations between the two countries. Zimiyanin came up with a secret report of about 30 pages referring to the economic, political and international evolution of the PRC. In his report, Zimiyanin asserts that the tensions between the two states appeared with the establishment of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, although he admitted that there was a dispute between the two countries, Zimiyanin could not see a split of Sino-Soviet relations, stating that: *An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations over the past decade confirms that relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year.* Despite the fact that the report did not describe the PRC as a suspicious ally, it confirmed that during the Stalinist era, the USSR did not respect the right to sovereignty and the interest of the PRC: *When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC (...).*⁴⁴

In the evening of the 30th of September, Khrushchev delivered a speech of 40 minutes at the newly completed *Great Hall of the People*. Khrushchev talked about the discussions at Camp David which, in his opinion, was leading to a relaxation in the East-West relations, without worrying too much about the hosts' reactions. The Beijing leader perceived Khrushchev's discourse as an offense regarding the fact that he was in China's capital for celebrating ten years since the proclamation of the PRC and not in order to discuss international issues, on which the two countries have different opinions. When the Kremlin leader supported that *it is not wise to use military means for*

⁴⁴ „Soviet-Chinese Relations”, in *CWIHPB ...* nr. 6-7, (1995-1996), pp.178-179

testing the stability of the capitalist system, Mao Zedong took that remark as a direct offense against him and the perpetual revolution.⁴⁵

The meeting between Khrushchev and Mao Zedong began under these circumstances, on the 2nd of October 1959. Although it was supposed that their discussions will determine the remedy of the divergences between the two states, these irrupted in a violent debate. At the beginning of the meeting, Khrushchev transmitted to the Beijing leader a message from the American president, Dwight Eisenhower, this being the request of liberating five American war prisoners, including two pilots arrested by the Chinese authorities. If Zhou Enlai refused to recognize the statute of POW (Prisoners of War) in the case of the five American convicts, Mao Zedong rejected completely the Washington's request, telling to Khrushchev that those five American prisoners would be eventually released, but not in the near future.⁴⁶

The next point on the discussions agenda was the Taiwan issue. Khrushchev criticized the Chinese for adopting a recklessness policy in managing the Taiwan crisis in 1958 and showed himself personally upset for not having been informed about Beijing's intent to bombing Quemoi and Matsu.⁴⁷ The Moscow leader sustained the necessity of the idea of a compromise with the enemy, using Lenin's example of creating a Republic of Far East as a bumper area between Soviet Union and Japan. Khrushchev suggested that in the future, the Chinese part should consult Moscow regarding the measures taken against Taiwan. Mao Zedong's response was extremely virulent, asserting that the forbidding of the use of force in reference to the Taiwan issue was an American proposal, and Khrushchev's attitude harmonizes perfectly with Washington's conspiracy in order to create two Chinese states.⁴⁸ During the same meeting Khrushchev began to talk about Beijing's policy toward India and Tibet. The Kremlin leader stated that the PRC made a mistake deciding to solve militarily the divergences with India. He questioned even China's sovereignty on a few locations situated at the Sino-Indian border, criticizing Beijing for the conflict with India, which had as an aim gaining the control *over a few square kilometers of sterile soil*. Regarding the Tibet issue, Khrushchev ridiculed the

⁴⁵ Chen Jian,, *op.cit.*, p. 80

⁴⁶ „Document No. 3 Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959”, in CWIHPB ... nr.12-13, (2001), pp.262-264

⁴⁷ Vladislav Zubok,, *op.cit.*, p.247

⁴⁸ „Document No. 3 Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959” ... p.265

Chinese for having permitted the spiritual Tibetan leader to refugee in India.⁴⁹ Zhou Enlai reply was a less diplomatic one, accusing the Soviet leader of being *incapable to distinguish between what it is right and what it is wrong*. The marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, charged the Soviets with publishing the CPUS's declaration from 9th September, according to which the Sino-Indian conflict represented a big mistake. If Khrushchev let the Chinese know that he would never accept the idea that the Soviets supported India on this matter, Mao Zedong sustained that the Chinese leaders would never accept the Soviet stand regarding India and Tibet. From this point of view, the whole dialogue became a series of reciprocal accusations between the two leaders.⁵⁰

Khrushchev left China on the 4th of October 1959. In his way to Moscow, he made a stop at Vladivostok, where on the 6th of October 1959 held a discourse concerning his recent visits to USA and to China. Being cautious about pointing out the tensions between the Soviet Union and China, Khrushchev praised the fraternal solidarity between Moscow and Beijing, catalogued as *a reference point in maintaining the world peace*.

Nothing seemed to reveal the imminent rupture between the two states. One year later, however, the Soviet-Chinese dispute would be made public and the perspective of a more friendly relationship was more and more improbable.

⁴⁹ Chen Jian,, *op.cit.*, p.81

⁵⁰ For a broader perspective see: „Document No. 3 Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959” ... pp.265-269

Key Documents on the History of Romanian Communism

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I. Through the Labyrinth of the Romanian Communist Archives. The Evolution of the Communist Power Structures Reflected in a Reference Material Created for the RCP Leaders' Usage

In the summer of 2006, as one of the experts of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, I carry out research in different national and local archives. During a documentary stage at the National Archives, I requested the file no. 166 of the year 1944 belonging to the Fond of the Central Committee's Office, the Organizational Department, whose archival cataloguing had triggered my attention. Its title was "Reference Material. The Situation Regarding the Leadership of the Party from 23rd August 1944 to 17th March 1961. (The Central Committee, the Political Bureau, The Organizational Bureau and the Secretariat of the CC of the RCP)". According to the stamp placed on the first page, this document was initially recorded as part of the Archive of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Working Party (the name of the Romanian Communist Party since 1948) under the no. 2057 of 1961. Besides the intrinsic value of the documents, I noticed that the dossier included 20 typed documents created between 1953 and 1962 by the specialized personnel of the central apparatus of the RCP. These documents reflected the statistical, nominal and structural evolution of the higher power echelons of the RCP during the years of 1944-1961.

The first question that need an answer relates to the way in which these documents had been recorded in a dossier placed in the archival inventory corresponding to the year of 1944. On the last page it was mentioned that the dossier was certified on January 9, 2004 and it included 85 files. Besides this indication, I did not find any data regarding the rationale supporting the cataloguing of the dossier for the year 1944. It is more likely that this documentary corpus was unintentionally separated from its original fond and year during the transfer of the dossiers from Bucharest to Pitești and back. Or, another hypothesis that I consider to be a grievous error, after a superficial evaluation of the dossier's content the archivist decided to integrate it into the fund of the Organizational Department. This seems to be a certainty as the chronologic limit of the documents is 1962 and not 1944.

Then, the stamp put on the first page of the dossier indicates that it was originally recorded in the Archive of the Political Bureau and not in that of the Organizational Department. Moreover, the analysis of the documents has revealed that only two of these papers were dated back in the year of 1944, the rest of them being created between 1953 and 1962. Accordingly, I can only hypothesize that this situation is the consequence of an incorrect archival ordination or that in the course of transferring the dossiers belonging to the former Archive of the CC of RCP occurred an accidental separation of some archival units from their original fund and also an erroneous classification of them. This last hypothesis seems equally serious to the first mentioned one because a certain situation represents an infringement of the archival principle of fund integrity. According to the testimony of the last chief of the records of the former CC, Silviu Curticeanu, the archive was extremely well organized despite its archaic structure. He also pointed out the risk of "the scientific reorganization" that usually resulted in a "process of selection" affecting the original content of the historical documents¹.

Despite its erroneously ordination, the dossier 166/1944 belonging to the fond of the Organizational Department of the CC of the RCP presents an unquestionable historical value. On the surface, it resembles to a dossier reconstructed by the archivist. It was unbound, its files were not integrated in distinct archival unit and they even contained a portfolio (file 15 containing "Tables with the members of the CC of the RCP, Political Bureau, Organizational Bureau and CC Secretariat, aspects about the work and also the repartition of the tasks within the party and state apparatus between 1944 and 1961"). This highlights the fact that the dossier is actually a collation of documents. Besides these formal observations, the analysis of these 85 files points out that the dossier was purposely created, being most likely drawn up or collated (in the case of the older documents) at the end of the 1961. The documents of the dossier 166/1944 consist of tables and other types of synthesis documents illustrating the evolution of the power structure on the top of the RCP. As one document (the first one) is dated on January 15, 1962 and its content synthesizes pieces of information included in other documents, I come to the conclusion that it has been introduced in the dossier afterward in order to supplement its content.

A second issue raised by this dossier is related to the utility given to these documents in the moment of their collation. According to the stamp put on the first page of the dossier, its creation dating back to the year of 1961 offers

¹ Ilarion Țiu, "Ceață și fum - Scoateți arhivele CC al PCR! Interviu cu Silviu Curticeanu", *Jurnalul Național*, 11.04. 2005.

the necessary clues for a possible answer. It is a reference material drawn up at the order of the RWP leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej on the eve of the well-known plenum of November 29-December 5, 1961. According to the record of the meeting of November 29, 1961, the preparation of this meeting included the drawn up of an impressive documentary material regarding the history of the Communist Party since 1944, which was put at the disposal of the members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the RWP². As the recently published documentary editions on this theme and bearing suggestive titles³ show, the meeting of the CC members of December 1961 also signified, besides its political implications, a verbal and authoritarian rewriting of the tumultuous history of the RCP between 1944 and 1961. It was not a second de-Stalinization because RCP never actually engaged in this kind of evolution⁴. Instead, the meeting represented the last settling / a historical one / of scores of Dej's team against those who had questioned the legitimacy of his power. The public character of this action also encompasses a specific symbolic value. For the first time, the CC members were openly and argumentative informed about the power struggle within Secretariat and Political Bureau. It was also explained the organizational failures, the complicated power relations at the highest echelons of the party and also the fate of those defeated (Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu).

None of these documentary editions mentioned above depict the communist leaders' preparations for this meeting and the content of its published records highlights the fact that most of them were prepared by the communist leaders based on reports and notes kept in the CC archive⁵. Therefore, I hypothesize that those 20 documents published in this volume might have been a part of the materials prepared for the CC plenum. These documents were quoted by some communist leaders' interventions on November 29, 1961. For example, when they discussed the inefficiency of the CC or its subordination to the Political Bureau, Organizational Bureau and Secretariat

² Elis Neagoe-Pleșa, Liviu Pleșa, eds., *Dosar Ana Pauker* vol.1, (Bucharest, 2006), p. 122.

³ The first volume of documents based on parts of these meeting records was edited by Dan Cătănuș (ed.), *A Doua Destalinizare. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej la apogeul puterii*, (Bucharest, 2005), 351 p. A more complete version of this historical plenum records was edited by Elis Neagoe-Pleșa și Liviu Pleșa, *op.cit.*, vol. 1 (585p)-2 (286 p), (Bucharest, 2006) although under an inappropriate title.

⁴ I agree to Vladimir Tismăneanu's opinion on this matter stated in his volume *Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History of Romanian Communism* (University of California Press, 2003), 395 p.

⁵ See, for example, E. Pleșa, Liviu Pleșa, *op. cit.*, pp. 79, 115, *passim*.

during the 1950s, the reference to the statistics included in document no. 2 is obvious⁶.

Besides underlining the context of the creation and preservation of this dossier, it is also worth mentioning the historical value of these documents. They reflect concisely the dynamics of the communist power structure until 1961. It is a kind of *an essentially history* of the evolutions of the RCP institutions and structures after 1944. According to their content, the documents were based on records found in the archive of the Political Bureau of the CC of the RCP, namely the communist leaders' statements, the contemporary documents, the statistical notes or the personal dossiers. In my opinion, this is a valuable document not only from the point of view of the synthesis of documents, but also from that of the given references (for example, the episodes of autumn 1944 of document no.1 and 8). Moreover, this dossier includes clarifying pieces of information regarding the destiny, the promotion and the responsibilities assigned to the communist leaders. Considering one example, that of Nicolae Ceausescu, one can notice that besides several informational gaps (his political carrier omits the episodes of him being a political secretary of Oltenia Region between 1945 and 1946 and the chief of the Superior Political Department of the Army at the beginning of the 1950s) the documents underlined that his political promotion was ceaseless and that his position as the heir of Dej was sanctioned at the end of 1950s. The responsibilities assigned to him and the departments led by Ceausescu transformed him into a key character in the functioning of the RCP apparatus during the last decade of Dej epoch (see document no.10). As far back as in 1954, he became a member of the Secretariat and of the Political Bureau and he would maintain these positions until the end of his political carrier.

Other valuable elements included in the documents published below are related to the diachronic, concise and table array description of the composition of the main power structure of the RCP: the Secretariat, the Political Bureau, the Organizational Bureau, the Central Committee between 1944 and 1961. Consequently, these documents represent a referential standpoint leading to a more insightful comprehension of the communist elites and nomenclature at least for Dej's epoch⁷.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 122-123

⁷ See for example, Stelian Tănase's contribution (*Elite și societate. Epoca Gheorghiu-Dej*, ed. II, Bucharest, 2006) or that of Nicoleta Ionescu Gură (*Nomenclatura Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român*, Bucharest, 2006). Also see the dictionary edited by Floarea Dobre, *Membrii CC al PCR (1945-1989)*, Bucharest, 2004.

List of documents:

1. The situation regarding the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party, August 23rd 1944 - March 17th 1961 (Central Committee, Organizational Bureau and the Secretariat of the CC of Romanian Communist Party)
2. TABLES With the members of the CC of RWP, Political Bureau, Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat of the CC of the RWP concerning the aspects of their work, the allocation of their duties within the party and state apparatus during 1944 - 1961.
3. How it works Political Bureau, Secretariat and Political Bureau of the CC of RWP, 1950-1956.
4. EXTRACT from the Protocol of the meeting of the Secretariat of the CC of RWP of 7.10.1955.
5. EXTRACT from Protocol no. 4 of the meeting of RWP Secretariat of 16.01.1956.
6. The situation regarding the positions held by different leaders within the Party and State apparatus (1944-1961)
7. Positions held in Romanian Communist Party in 1944.
8. Data regarding the membership of the Party leading bodies (excerpts from address of CC of RCP addressed to the Allied Control Commission in Romania on October 21, 1944)
9. The composition of the Party organs in 1945 (before the National Conference of the Communist Party of Romania, 1945)
10. The evolution of Political Bureau 1948-1956.
11. Membership of the Secretariat of the Political Bureau, 1948-1959.
12. Membership of the Organizational Bureau of the CC of RWP (1950-1953)
13. Members of the CC of RWP in 1953
14. Members of the CC of RWP before the Plenary Meeting of CC in August 1953
15. Responsibilities of the members of CC in 1954.
16. Leaders of the RWP in 1955. Their positions and tasks
17. Members of the CC of RWP from Bucharest, 1956.
18. The Sections of the CC of the RWP, 1956.
19. The list of the sections of the CC of the RWP, October 5, 1955.
20. State Institutions and Mass Organizations ruled by the CC of RWP, 1955.

**The Composition of the CC of RCP, Political Bureau and Secretariat
resulted from the National Conference to the First Congress of the Party.**

**The Central Committee elected at the National Conference of the Party,
October 21, 1945**

Members of the CC

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Apostol Gheorghe | 15. Neagu Andrei |
| 2. Bodnăraş Emil | 16. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 3. Câmpeanu Constantin | 17. Pătrăşcanu Lucreţiu |
| 4. Ceauşescu Nicolae | 18. Pătrăşcu Andrei |
| 5. Chişinevski Iosif | 19. Pauker Ana |
| 6. Constantinescu Miron | 20. Popa Emil |
| 7. Coliu Dumitru | 21. Popa Ilie |
| 8. Crăciun Constanţa | 22. Rangheţ Iosif |
| 9. Georgescu Teohari | 23. Silaghi Leontin |
| 10. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej | 24. Stoica Chivu |
| 11. Luca Vasile | 25. Tudorache Elena |
| 12. Maurer Gheorghe | 26. Vaida Vasile |
| 13. Mârza Vasile | 27. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 14. Moghioroş Alexandru | |

Alternate members of CC

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Chişinevski Liuba | 5. Mujic Mihai |
| 2. Drăgan Ilie | 6. Petre Ion |
| 3. Drăghici Alexandru | 7. Radnev Gheorghe |
| 4. Focşeneanu Dumitru | 8. Roşianu Mihai |

On 22 October, the plenary meeting of CC of RCP elected:

Political Bureau:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej | 5. Chivu Stoica |
| 2. Ana Pauker | 6. Gheorghe Vasilichi |
| 3. Vasile Luca | 7. Miron Constantinescu |
| 4. Teohari Georgescu | |

Secretariat:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej
2. Ana Pauker
3. Teohari Georgescu
4. Vasile Luca

During the same meeting, Dumitru Petrescu was elected as member of the CC of RCP

The composition of the CC of Romanian Workers' Party, Political Bureau and Secretariat between 1948-1952.

The Central Committee of RWP elected at the 1st Congress, February 23, 1948

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Apostol Gheorghe | 22. Mateescu Constantin |
| 2. Alexa Augustin | 23. Noculi Ion |
| 3. Bodnăraş Emil | 24. Pauker Ana |
| 4. Borilă Petre | 25. Pas Ion |
| 5. Chivu Stoica | 26. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 6. Chişinevski Iosif | 27. Popa Emil |
| 7. Constantin Miron | 28. Rădăceanu Lotar |
| 8. Crăciun Constanţa | 29. Rangheţ Iosif |
| 9. Coliu Dumitru | 30. Răutu Leonte |
| 10. Chişinevski Liuba | 31. Rădăceanu Eugenia |
| 11. Dalea Mihai | 32. Radovanovici Nicolae |
| 12. Drăghici Alexandru | 33. Suder Viliam |
| 13. Florescu Gheorghe | 34. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 14. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe | 35. Solomon Barbu |
| 15. Georgescu Teohari | 36. Şerban Avram |
| 16. Iordăchescu Teodor | 37. Tănase Zaharia |
| 17. Luca Vasile | 38. Tenescu Olimpia |
| 18. Levin Micşa | 39. Voitec Ştefan |
| 19. Maurer Gheorghe | 40. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 20. Moghiroş Alexandru | 41. Vaida Vasile |
| 21. Moraru Mihai | |

Alternate members

- | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Bughici Simion | 4. Braeşter Aron |
| 2. Bunaciu Avram | 5. Ceauşescu Nicolae |
| 3. Bontea Ştefan | 6. Manea Anton |

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7. Doncea Constantin | 12. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 8. Drăgoescu Petre | 13. Roșianu Mihail |
| 9. Ionescu Vasile | 14. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 10. Manole Ofelia | 15. Vass Ghizela |
| 11. Mujic Mihai | 16. Vințe Ion |

The changes in the composition of the CC of RWP 1948-1952

1. The following persons were co-opted in the Central Committee:
Pintilie Gheorghe - at the Plenary Meeting, 10.VI.1948
Sorin Toma - at the Plenary Meeting, 3-5 III 1949
 2. The following persons were elected as full members of the CC:
Petrescu Dumitru, Bughici Simion - Plenary Meeting, 23-24 I. 1949
1. The following persons were removed from their Central Committee's positions:
Radovanovici Nicolae - at the Plenary Meeting, 23-24 I. 1949
Mișa Levin - during the meeting of Political Bureau, 4. V. 1950

On February 24 1948, during the Plenary meeting of CC of RWP the following persons were elected as the members of:

Political Bureau:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Apostol Gheorghe | 8. Luca Vasile |
| 2. Bodnăraș Emil | 9. Moghioroș Alexandru |
| 3. Chișinevski Iosif | 10. Pauker Ana |
| 4. Constantinescu Miron | 11. Lotar Rădăceanu |
| 5. Georgescu Teohari | 12. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 6. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe | 13. Voitec Vasile |
| 7. Iordăchescu Teodor | |

Alternate members of Political Bureau

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Chivu Stoica | 4. Tănase Zaharia |
| 2. Moraru Mihai | 5. Vaida Vasile |
| 3. Rangheț Iosif | |

Secretariat of the PB:

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | 4. Teohari Georgescu |
| 2. Ana Pauker | 5. Lotar Rădăceanu |
| 3. Vasile Luca | |

The changes in the membership of Political Bureau and in that of the Secretariat of PB, 1948 - 1952

1. During the meeting of the PB on 11.X.1948, Alexandru Moghioroș and Iosif Chișinevski were co-opted in the Secretariat.

2. At the meeting of PB of 30.IV.1952, comrade Chivu Stoica was promoted from his position as alternate member to the position of full member of the Political Bureau.

The composition of the Organizational Bureau of the CC of RWP elected at the Plenary Session of CC of RWP on January 23rd 1950

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Apostol | 10. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe |
| 2. Petre Borilă | 11. Georgescu Teohari |
| 3. Bunaciu Avram | 12. Vasile Luca |
| 4. Iosif Chișinevski | 13. Moghioroș Alexandru |
| 5. Chivu Stoica | 14. Pauker Ana |
| 6. Miron Constantinescu | 15. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 7. Constanța Crăciun | 16. Rădăceanu Lotar |
| 8. Alexandru Drăghici | 17. Răutu Leonte |
| 9. Florescu Gheorghe | |

Note: The Organizatoric Bureau was dissolved after the Plenary Session of the CC of the RWP, August 1953.

The changes in the structure of the CC of RWP during the period May 1952 - December 1955

The Plenary Session, 26-27.V. 1952

1. Vasile Luca was removed from his position as member of CC of the RWP.
2. The following persons were elected as full members of the CC of the RWP:

Ceașescu Nicolae; Stoica Gheorghe; Vass Ghizela; Rangheț Iosif

The Plenary Session, 19 -20 .VIII. 1953

Teohari Georgescu and Ana Pauker were removed from the CC of the RWP.

The Plenary Session, 19.IV. 1954

1. The following persons were elected as full members of the CC: Mujic Mihai; Roșianu Mihail; Fazecaș Ianoș
2. The following persons lost their positions held in the CC: Manea Anton and Tenescu Olimpia

**The list of the full members of the CC of RWP after the Plenary Session
of 19 April 1954**

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Alexa Augustin | 22. Mujic Mihai |
| 2. Apostol Gheorghe | 23. Niculi Ion |
| 3. Bodnăraş Emil | 24. Pas Ion |
| 4. Borilă Petre | 25. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 5. Bughici Simion | 26. Pintilescu Gheorghe |
| 6. Ceauşescu Nicolae | 27. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 7. Chişinevski Iosif | 28. Popa Emil |
| 8. Chişinevski Liuba | 29. Rădăceanu Eugenia |
| 9. Chivu Stoica | 30. Răutu Leonte |
| 10. Coliu Dumitru | 31. Roşianu Mihai |
| 11. Constantinescu Miron | 32. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 12. Crăciun Constanţa | 33. Şerban Avram |
| 13. Dalea Mihai | 34. Solomon Barbu |
| 14. Drăghici Alexandru | 35. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 15. Fazekaş Ianoş | 36. Suder Vilian |
| 16. Florescu Gheorghe | 37. Tănase Zaharia |
| 17. Gheorgiu - Dej Gheorghe | 38. Toma Sorin |
| 18. Iordăchescu Teodor | 39. Vaida Vasile |
| 19. Mateescu Constantin | 40. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 20. Maurer Gheorghe | 41. Vass Ghizela |
| 21. Moghioroş Alexandru | 42. Voitec Ştefan |

Alternate members:

Bunaciu Avram; Bontea Ştefan; Braeşter Aron; Doncea Constantin;
Drăgoescu Petre; Ionescu Vasile; Manole Ofelia; Vinţe Ion

**The members of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of CC after the
plenary meeting, 26-27 May 1952**

Political Bureau:

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu -Dej | 6. Chivu Stoica |
| 2. Chişinevski Iosif | 7. Bodnăraş Emil |
| 3. Moghioroş Alexandru | 8. Borilă Petre |
| 4. Constantinescu Miron | 9. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 5. Apostol Gheorghe | |

Alternate members:

1. Rangheț Iosif
2. Coliu Dumitru

Secretariat:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu –Dej
2. Chișinevski Iosif
3. Moghiroș Alexandru
4. Constantinescu Miron
5. Apostol Gheorghe

The members of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of CC after the plenary meeting 19.IV.1954:

Political Bureau:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu –Dej
2. Chișinevski Iosif
3. Moghiroș Alexandru
4. Constantinescu Miron
5. Apostol Gheorghe
6. Chivu Stoica
7. Bodnăraș Emil
8. Borilă Petre
9. Pârvulescu Constantin

Alternate Members:

1. Coliu Dumitru
2. Ceaușescu Nicolae
3. Drăghici Alexandru

Secretariat:

1. Gheorghe Apostol
2. Nicolae Ceaușescu
3. Dalea Mihai
4. Fazekas Ianos

The members of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of CC from December 1955 to June 1960

The Members of the CC elected during the Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party

1. Alexa Augustin
2. Apostol Gheorghe
3. Balalia Dumitru
4. Barna Ioan
5. Bereziñtchi Dumitru
6. Birlădeanu Alexandru
7. Bodnăraș Emil
8. Borilă Petre
9. Breitenhofer Anton
10. Bughici Simion
11. Bunaciu Avram
12. Ceaușescu Nicolae
13. Chișinevski Iosif
14. Chivu Stoica

15. Crăciun Constanța
16. Coliu Dumitru
17. Constantinescu Miron
18. Cozma Ion
19. Cotoș Ion
20. Csupor Ludovic
21. Daju Pavel
22. Dalea Mihai
23. Dănălache Florian
24. Drăghici Alexandru
25. Drăgoescu Petre
26. Dulgheru Radu
27. Fazekaș Janos
28. Florescu Mihai
29. Gavriliuc Mihai
30. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe
31. Gheorghiu Vladimir
32. Gluvacov Ioan
33. Guină Nicolae
34. Hosu Gheorghe
35. Ion Gheorghe
36. Iordăchescu Teodor
37. Joja Atanase
38. Kovacs György
39. Lascu Elena Iodăchescu
40. Moghiroș Alexandru
41. Mujic Mihai
42. Murgulescu Ilie
43. Niculescu - Mizil Paul
44. Pas Ion
45. Patilineț Vasile
46. Petre Lupu
47. Pârvulescu Constantin
48. Popa Gherasim
49. Preoteasa Grigore
50. Rădoi Gheorghe
51. Răutu Leonte
52. Sălăjan Leontin
53. Scarlat Constantin
54. Șerban Miron
55. Solomon Barbu
56. Stancu Aurel
57. Stoica Gheorghe
58. Toma Sorin
59. Turcanu Ene
60. Vass Ghizela
61. Voitec Vasile

Alternate members of CC:

1. Alexe Eugen
2. Almăjan Bujor
3. Bayerle Iosif
4. Banc Iosif
5. Berghianu Maxim
6. Bontea Ștefan
7. Catană Nicolae
8. Coșoveanu Iacob
9. Cristache Vasile
10. Dobre Ion
11. Doncea Constantin
12. Fulger Cornel
13. Gheorghe Dumitru
14. Giosan Nicolae
15. Ichim Ion
16. Ionescu Vasile
17. Ioniță Ion
18. Malinski Vasile
19. Manole Ofelia
20. Marinescu Aneta
21. Mateescu Constantin
22. Maurer Gheorghe
23. Moisescu Anton
24. Nădejde Costin
25. Răceanu Ileana
26. Roșianu Mihail
27. Simulescu Dumitru
28. Toma Ana
29. Trofin Virgil
30. Țugui Pavel
31. Vaida Vasile
32. Vasilichi Gheorghe

33. Verdeț Ilie

35. Zaharescu Barbu

34. Voicu Ștefan

**The changes in the membership of the CC of the RWP during the period
of December 1955 -July 1960**

During the plenary meeting of 9-13.VII.1958:

1. The following members were co-opted as alternate members of CC :

1. Isac Martin

3. Mihai Burcă

2. Vasile Vâlcu

4. Gheorghe Necula

2. Comrade Ion Gh. Maurer was promoted as a full member of the CC of the RWP

3. It was re-elected to the Party Control Commission:

1. Constantin Pârvulescu, president

2. Dumitru Coliu, vice-president

3. Ion Vințe, vice-president

4. Gheorghe Arsene, secretary

5. Anton Moiescu, member

6. Clement Rusu, member

7. Ion Guran, member

4. The following members were excluded from their position as alternate members of CC:

1. Doncea Constantin

3. Răceanu Ileana

2. Coțoveanu Iacob

4. Cristache Vasile

**The plenary meeting of 28.XII. 1955 established the following
composition of:**

The Political Bureau:

1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej

9. Alexandru Drăghici

2. Chivu Stoica

10. Borilă Petre

3. Chișinevski Iosif

11. Ceaușescu Nicolae

4. Gheorghe Apostol

5. Alexandru Moghioroș

6. Emil Bodnăraș

7. Miron Constantinescu

8. Constantin Pârvulescu

Alternate members:

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 1. Dumitru Coliu | 3. Leonte Răutu |
| 2. Leontin Sălăjan | 4. Ștefan Voitec |

Secretariat:

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| 1. Gh.Gheorghiu-Dej | 4. Fazekaș Janoș |
| 2. Chișinevski Iosif | 5. Cozma Ion |
| 3. Ceaușescu Nicolae | |

The changes in the membership of the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the CC of the RWP during 1956-1960

The plenary meeting of 21.VIII.1956 established the following composition of:

Secretariat:

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | 4. Fazekaș Janoș |
| 2. Chișinevski Iosif | 5. Gheorghiu Vladimir |
| 3. Nicolae Ceaușescu | |

The plenary meeting of 28 .VI-3. VII. 1957 established the following composition of::

Political Bureau:

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | 6. Constantin Pârvulescu |
| 2. Chivu Stoica | 7. Alexandru Drăghici |
| 3. Gheorghe Apostol | 8. Nicolae Ceaușescu |
| 4. Alexandru Moghioroș | 9. Borilă Petre |
| 5. Emil Bodnăraș | |

Alternate members:

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 1. Dumitru Coliu | 3. Leonte Răutu |
| 2. Leontin Sălăjan | 4. Ștefan Voitec |

Secretariat:

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | 3. Fazekaș Janoș |
| 2. Nicolae Ceaușescu | 4. Gheorghiu Vladimir |

*Iosif Chișinevski and Miron Constantinescu were removed from their positions as members of the Political Bureau.

During the Plenary meeting from 13.VII.1957:

The election of comrade Grigore Preoteasa as alternate member of Political Bureau and Secretary of CC of RWP

Secretariat:

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | 4. Gheorghiu Vladimir |
| 2. Nicolae Ceaușescu | 5. Preoteasa Grigore |
| 3. Fazekaș Janoș | |

The plenary meeting from 26.IV. 1960 established the following composition of:

Secretariat:

1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej
2. Nicolae Ceaușescu
3. Fazekaș Janoș

The membership of the CC at the Third Congress of RWP, 25.VI. 1960

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Alexa Augustin | 20. Csupor Ludovic |
| 2. Almășan Bujor | 21. Dalea Mihai |
| 3. Apostol Gheorghe | 22. Dănălache Florian |
| 4. Balalia Dumitru | 23. Drăghici Alexandru |
| 5. Banc Iosif | 24. Drăgoescu Petre |
| 6. Berghianu Maxim | 25. Duca Aurel |
| 7. Birlădeanu Alexandru | 26. Dulgheru Radu |
| 8. Bodnăraș Emil | 27. Fazekaș Janos |
| 9. Borilă Petre | 28. Florescu Mihai |
| 10. Breitenhofer Anton | 29. Furdui Petru |
| 11. Bughici Simion | 30. Gaston Marin Gheorghe |
| 12. Bunaciu Avram | 31. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe |
| 13. Burcă Mihai | 32. Giosan Nicolae |
| 14. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 33. Gluvacov Ioan |
| 15. Chivu Stoica | 34. Guină Nicolae |
| 16. Coliu Dumitru | 35. Hossu Gheorghe |
| 17. Cotoș Ion | 36. Isac Martin |
| 18. Cozma Ion | 37. Joja Atanase |
| 19. Crăciun Constanța | 38. Kovacs György |

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 39. Lascu Elena Iodăchescu | 60. Roșu Gheorghe |
| 40. Mănescu Manea | 61. Rusu Clement |
| 41. Marchian Nicolae | 62. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 42. Maurer Ion Gheorghe | 63. Scarlat Constantin |
| 43. Moghiroș Alexandru | 64. Sencovici Alexandru |
| 44. Moiescu Anton | 65. Șerban Miron |
| 45. Murgulescu Ilie | 66. Simulescu Dumitru |
| 46. Nicula Gheorghe | 67. Solomon Barbu |
| 47. Niculescu – Mizil Paul | 68. Suder Mihai |
| 48. Nistor Constantin | 69. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 49. Novacu Valeriu | 70. Toma Ana |
| 50. Onescu Cornel | 71. Virgil Trofin |
| 51. Pas Ion | 72. Turcanu Ene |
| 52. Patilineț Vasile | 73. Vaida Vasile |
| 53. Petre Lupu | 74. Vass Ghizela |
| 54. Popescu –Puțuri Ion | 75. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 55. Rădoi Gheorghe | 76. Verdeț Ilie |
| 56. Rădulescu Gogu | 77. Vâlcu Vasile |
| 57. Răutu Leonte | 78. Voicu Ștefan |
| 58. Rigani Zoe | 79. Voitec Vasile |
| 59. Roșianu Mihail | |

Alternate members:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Alexe Eugen | 17. Ionescu Vasile |
| 2. Bayerle Iosif | 18. Ioniță Ion |
| 3. Blajovici Petre | 19. Lăzărescu Constantin |
| 4. Bobu Emil | 20. Leica Adam |
| 5. Cazacu Virgil | 21. Levente Mihail |
| 6. Cincă Elvira | 22. Lixandru Vasile |
| 7. Cioară Gheorghe | 23. Malinski Vasile |
| 8. Ciocan Maria | 24. Marinescu Teodor |
| 9. Constantin Ion | 25. Mateescu Vasile |
| 10. Dindere Ion | 26. Nădejde Costin |
| 11. Drăgan Constantin | 27. Păcuraru Andrei |
| 12. Fulger Cornel | 28. Petre Nicolae |
| 13. Gheorghiu Dumitru | 29. Predescu Ion |
| 14. Gheorghiu Nicolae | 30. Vijoli Aurel |
| 15. Golea Petre | 31. Zaharescu Barbu |
| 16. Ionescu Manea | |

Political Bureau:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej | 6. Ceaușescu Nicolae |
| 2. Chivu Stoica | 7. Drăghici Alexandru |
| 3. Apostol Gheorghe | 8. Maurer Ion Gheorghe |
| 4. Bodnăraș Emil | 9. Moghioroș Alexandru |
| 5. Borilă Petre | |

Alternate members:

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Coliu Dumitru | 3. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 2. Răutu Leonte | 4. Voitec Ștefan |

Secretariat:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej | 3. Dalea Mihai |
| 2. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 4. Fazekas Janos |

**The plenary meeting of 17.III. 1961 established the following composition of:
Secretariat**

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej | 3. Chivu Stoica |
| 2. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 4. Dalea Mihai |

15.I. 1962, LV, IV / 2 ex.

Document no.2.

TABLES With the members of the CC of RWP, Political Bureau, Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat of the CC of the RWP concerning the aspects of their work, the allocation of their duties within the party and state apparatus during 1944 - 1961.

Year	Summary of the meetings of different Party bodies:			
	Secretariat	Political Bureau	The Organizational Bureau	Plenary meetings of the CC of the RWP
1944	7	-	-	-
1945	7	20	-	1
1946	-	12	-	4
1947	1	12	-	1
1948	26	28	-	2
1949	69	26	-	1

1950	22	12	11	4
1951	10	2	7	-
1952	3	43	9	7
1953	1	28	-	4
1954	38	50	-	4
1955	43	27	-	4
1956	50	67	-	4
1957	23	33	-	3
1958	12	18	-	4
1959	11	20	-	3
1960	6	15	-	6
1961	10	12	-	2

15.XI.1961

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Document no.3

The functioning of the Political Bureau, Secretariat and CC of RWP in 1950-1951, during rightist deviation within the leadership of the Party:

In 1950: The **Political Bureau** held 12 meetings where five problems regarding the Party and mass organization and thirteen related to economic and state problems were discussed.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held 22 meetings where 16 problems regarding the Party and mass organization, 18 related to economic and state problems were discussed.

The **CC of the RWP** had four plenary meetings.

In 1951: **Political Bureau** had two meetings during which two problems regarding the Party and mass organization and one economic problem were discussed.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held 10 meetings. During these meetings two problems regarding the Party and mass-organization and five economic and state problems were discussed.

The **CC of RWP** did not have any plenary meeting during 1951.

*The analysis of the party labor during the above mentioned years highlights the fact that the role of the Political Bureau diminished in the favor of the Secretariat that had taken over some of the prerogatives of the PB. Taking into consideration the fact that Central Committee did not hold any meeting during the year of 1951, this situation underrated its role within the Party. It also represented an evidence of the overlooking of the Leninist norms within the Party's life.[...]

The Activity of the Political Bureau, Secretariat and CC of RWP during the period 1952 - 1956.

In 1952, from June, after the removal of the deviationists, **Political Bureau** held 30 meetings discussing nine party and mass-organization problems, 31 economic and state problems, 5 problems regarding the Ministry of Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held only one meeting. The explanation for this situation considered the fact that all the comrades-excepting Alexandru Moghioros - had other important duties that affected their activity within the Secretariat.

The **Central Committee** held three plenary meetings.

In 1953, the **Political Bureau** held 28 meetings concerning 11 Party and mass-organization problems; 25 economic and state problems; 2 military problems.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held 1 meeting.

The **Central Committee** held 4 plenary meetings.

In 1954, **Political Bureau** held 51 meetings concerning 21 problems of the Party and mass-organization; 26 economic and state problems; 6 military problems.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held 38 meetings discussing 25 problems of the Party and mass organization and 12 economic and state problems.

The **Central Committee** held 4 plenary meetings.

In 1955, **Political Bureau** held 27 meetings during which 24 Party and mass organization problems; 20 economic and state problems; 4 problems concerning the Ministry of Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs were discussed.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held 43 meetings. 25 problems of the Party and mass- organization, 12 economic and state problems and 2 military problems were discussed.

The **Central Committee** held 4 plenary meetings.

In 1956, during the first three months of the year - **Political Bureau** held 11 meetings concerning 10 problems of the Party and mass-organization, 18 economic and state problems.

The **Secretariat of the CC of RWP** held 14 meetings during which 11 problems of the Party and mass organizations, 6 economic and state problems and 1 military problem were discussed.

In March took place the plenary meeting of the **CC of RWP**.

It should be mentioned that this documentary only exposed the most important problems resolved during this period of time. It is worth mentioning that many problems related to current problems, such as the nominalization in

state and party positions and visits abroad, have been solved. The analysis of the documentary basis concerning the decisions and the problems debated on the CC, PB and Secretariat leads to the rational conclusion that after the removal of the deviationists, and the Plenary meeting of the CC of August 19-20, 1953, the principle of the collective work related to the observation of Leninist norms in the Party life have been ceaselessly applied.

On the basis of the decisions of the CC of RWP held on August 19-20, 1953, measures were taken in order to improve the internal life of the Party: the development of the party internal democracy, the intensification of the critical and self-critical spirit, the regional and raional committees regularly organized their activity, the strengthening of the Party control on all domains of its activity.

Let's only mention the example of the elections for the party positions. Before 1951, the elections for the local party positions were not organized. The first voting for the election of the bureaus of the "basis organization", regional and raional committees were held during the period of 1951-1952. The next elections were held again in 1953-1954. In the year of 1955 took place elections for the bureaus of the "basis organizations" and town and raional committees.

The above mentioned details do not exclude the existence of certain mistakes in our work.

Certain drawbacks in the activity of the CC, PB and Secretariat of the CC of the RWP.

Central Committee:

- it continued the undermining of the role of the CC because its meetings did not approached the most important problems of our Party and our State
- not all the members of the CC were involved in preparing the materials necessary for the Plenary meetings of the CC, and after meetings they were not involved in the activity of organizing and controlling the implementing the decisions taken during these reunions.
- the plenary meetings of CC of RWP were not regularly adopted decisions and resolutions over the problems debated.

Political Bureau:

- it happened that some problems had never been discussed within the PB or that the decisions were only taken by a part of the members of the PB or by signing in circle of the decision.
- the meeting s of the PB were not always well prepared, materials were not transmitted in time to the members and they were not solidly documented. The activity of the Secretariat experienced the same situation.

We also should add that the members of the PB and Secretariat irregularly visited the different parts of the country and consequently, they were not capable of offering the necessary guidance to the local organs of the Party.

Document no. 4.

EXTRACT from the Protocol of the meeting of the Secretariat of the CC of RWP of 7.10.1955

After discussions it has been decided that the duties should be divided in as it follows:

Comrade GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU - DEJ: the Party Control Commission; the Central Council of the Trade-Unions; the Heavy Industry Section of the CC of RWP; the Agrarian Section of the CC of the RWP; the Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP; the Presidency of the Great National Assembly; the Council of Ministers; the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Comrade IOSIF CHIȘINEVSKI: the Section of Propaganda of the CC of the RWP; the Science and Culture Section of the CC of the RWP; the "Foreign Affairs" Section of the CC of the RWP; Section of the foreign affairs' cadres; the Plan, Finances and Trade Section of the CC of the RWP; the Women's Party Activity Section; the General Prosecuting of the Popular Republic of Romania; the Supreme Court of the PRR.

Comrade CEAUȘESCU NICOLAE: the Section for Superior Party Organs of the CC of the RWP; the Administrative Section of the CC of the RWP; the Transportations and Tele-communications Section of the CC of the RWP; the Superior Political Direction of the Army; the Political Direction of Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Political Direction of the Romanian Railroads; the Red Cross; the Association of the Sport Hunters and Amateur Fishermen's.

Comrade IANOS FAZEKAS: the Section Buildings of CC of RWP; the Consumer Goods Section of CC of RWP; the Section Schools of CC of RWP; the "Household of Party" Section of CC of RWP; permanent connection with Commission of Review of the Party ; the Central Committee of Romanian Youth Workers .

8.X.1955

Document no. 5.

EXTRACT from Protocol no. 4 of the meeting of RWP Secretariat of 16.01.1956

After discussions it has been decided that the duties should be divided in as it follows:

Comrade GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ: the Direction of Culture and Propaganda of the CC of the RWP; the Party Control Commission; the Direction of Affairs (*Treburilor*, n.n.) of the CC of the RWP; the Central Council of the Trade-Unions;

Comrade IOSIF CHISINEVSCHI: the Cadres' Recruiting Section; the Foreign Relations Section of the CC of the RWP; the Section of the foreign affairs' cadres; the Plan, Finances, Trade and Cooperation Section of the CC of the RWP; the Women's Party Activity Section; the Section of Household of the Party

Comrade CEAUȘESCU NICOLAE: the Section of Superior Organs of Party of the CC of the RWP; the Agrarian Section of the CC of RWP; the Administrative Section of the CC of the RWP; the Political Superior Direction of the Army; the Central Committee of the Romanian Youth Workers'.

Comrade IANOS FAZEKAS: the Constructions Section of the CC of RWP; the Consumer Goods Section of CC of RWP; the Commission for the Nationalities' Problems.

Comrade COZMA ION: the Heavy Industry Section of the CC of the RWP; the Transportations and Telecommunications Section of the CC of the RWP; the Political Direction of the Romanian Railroads.

In order to operatively solve the problems of the regional organizations of the party, comrades Secretaries of the CC of RWP will be responsible for:

Comrade Chișinevski Iosif - the region of Ploiești, Iași, Suceava, Bacău, Galați

Comrade Ceaușescu Nicolae - the region of București, Pitești, Craiova, Constanța

Comrade Fazekas Janos - the region of Stalin, Autonomă Maghairă, Hunedoara

Comrade Cozma Ioan - the region of Cluj, Baia Mare, Oradea, Timișoara

EM 2 ex., 24.III. 1956

Document no. 6

The situation regarding the positions held by different leaders within the Party and State apparatus

Comrade GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ: Minister of Communications (1944); Minister of Trade and Public Works (1945) President of the Superior Council of the National Economy (1945); Minister of National Economy

(1946), Minister of the Industry and Trade (1947); President of the Inter-ministerial Commission for Economic Recovery and Monetary Stabilization (1947); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers(1948); Secretary General of the CC of the RWP (1948); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1949); Member of the Organizational Bureau of the CC of the RWP; President of the Council of Ministers (1952); President of the Superior Military Council (1952); First Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1955); President of the State Council of Popular Republic of Romania (1961)

Comrade APOSTOL GHEORGHE: General Confederation of Labor (1945); Secretary of CC of RWP (1952); Member of the Organizational Bureau of CC of RWP (1950); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1952); Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (1953); First Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1954); President of the Central Council of Trade Unions (1955); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers(1961).

Comrade BODNĂRAȘ EMIL: President of the Superior Military Council (1952); Deputy President of the Superior Military Council (1952); Minister of the Armed Forces (1953); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1954); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1955); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Transports and Tele-communications (1957); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1961).

Comrade DRĂGHICI ALEXANDRU: Chief of the Administrative-Political Section of the CC of the RWP; Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Chief of the General Political Direction of Minister of Internal Affairs (1950); Minister of Internal Affairs and Ministry of State Security(1952); Minister of Internal Affairs (1957); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1961).

Comrade CEAUȘESCU NICOLAE: Deputy Minister of Agriculture (1949); Member of the Organizational Bureau (1952); Member of the Superior Military Council (1952); Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1955); Organizer of the Party Group within the Great National Assembly (1961).

Comrade ION GHEORGHE MAURER: First State Arbitrator (1952); Director of the Institute for Juridical Research (1953); Member in the Bureau of Branch (Juridical) in Council of Ministers (1954); Representative of Romania at the Haga Court of Arbitrators (1956); Vice-President of the Great National Assembly (1957); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957); President of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly (1958); President of the Council of Ministers (1961)

Comrade MOGHIOROȘ ALEXANDRU: President of the State Committee for Collection (1951); Member in Organizational Bureau (1952); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1957);

Comrade CHIVU STOICA: General Confederation of Labor (1945); General Director of the Romanian Railroads; Member of the Organizational Bureau

(1950); Minister of Metallurgical and Chemical Industry (1952); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1953); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1954); President of Council of Ministers (1955); Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1961); President of the Council of Ministers (1961)

Comrade BORILĂ PETRE: Deputy Minister, Minister of National Defense (1949); President, Commission of State Control (1951); Member of the Organizational Bureau (1950); Minister of Food Industry (1953); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1954, 1957); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1955);

Comrade STEFAN VOITEC: Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1949); President of Consume Cooperation (1951); Member of the Bureau for Light Industry (1951, 1954); Minister of Internal Trade (1955); Minister of Consume Goods Industry (1957); President of the Great National Assembly and Vice-President of the State Council (1961).

Comrade LEONTE RĂUTU: Chief of the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the CC of the RWP (1950); Membership in Organizational Bureau (1950); Chief of the Directorate of Propaganda and Culture of the CC of the RWP (1956).

Comrade COLIU DUMITRU: First Secretary of the Prahova County Committee of RWP (1950); General Director, Special Direction of the Council of Ministers (1952); First Secretary of the RWP's Regional Committee of Bucharest (1953); Civil Member in the Second Military Region (1953); President of the State Control Commission (1955); President of the Party Control Commission (1955, 1960); Vice-president of the Party Control Commission (1958).

Comrade SĂLĂJAN LEONTIN: president of the Commission for the Verification of the Superior Staff in the Army (1949); Minister of Constructions (1949); Member of the Superior Military Council (1952); Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy in the Minister of Armed Forces (1954); Minister of Armed Forces (1955)

Comrade DALEA MIHAI: Vice-President of the General Council of Unions (1951); Ambassador at Moscow, Popular Republic of Mongolia and Helsinki (1952); Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1954); the Minister of the Collections (1955); Ambassador in the USSR (1956); Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1961).

Comrade CHIȘINEVSCHI IOSIF: Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1948); Member in the CC of the RWP's Commission of Verifying (1948); Member of the Organizational Bureau (1950); Member in the Superior Military Council (1952); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1952); First Vice-

President of the Council of Ministers (1954); Removed from PB and CC of RWP in 1957;

Comrade MIRON CONSTANTINESCU: President of the State Committee of Planning (1949); Member of the Organizational Bureau (1950); Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1950); Member in the Superior Military Council (1952); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1954); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1955); Minister of Education and Culture (1957); Removed from PB, Vice-president of Council of Ministers and Minister of Education in 1957; Deputy Director of the Institute of Party History (1961).

Comrade TEOHARI GEORGESCU: Member in the Organizational Bureau (1950); Minister of Internal Affairs (1952); Removed from all positions in 1952.

Comrade VASILE LUCA: Member in the Organizational Bureau (1950); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1949); removed from all positions 1952.

Comrade ANA PAUKER: Member in Organizational Bureau (1950); Minister of Foreign Affairs (untill 1952); Vice-President of Council of Ministers (1949); Member in the Organizational Bureau (1952); removed from all positions in 1952.

Comrade IORDĂCHESCU TEODOR: Minister of Constructions (until 1949); Director of the Party Evening University; President of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Great National Assembly (1955).

Comrade RĂDĂCEANU LOTHAR: Minister for Social Labor (until 1952); Vice-President for the Permanent Committee for Defense of Peace (1954)

Document no.7

Postions held in Romanian Communist Party

Positions held in Party :1944

Central Committee: Pârvulescu Constantin; Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej; Teohari Georgescu; Rangepcz Iosif; Ana Pauker; Agiu Constantin; Pătrășcanu Lucrețiu; Bodnăraș Emilian; Ceaușescu Nicolae

Political Bureau: Pârvulescu Constantin; Gheorghiu - Dej, Minister of Communications (1944); Teohari Georgescu; Rangepcz Iosif; Ana Pauker

The Repartition of Duties:

1. Pârvulescu Constantin; Union of Patriots; Youth; Patriotic Defense; Region of Prahova, Dobrogea.
2. Gheorghiu -Dej; Agitation and Propaganda; Unions; Peasants; Region of Oltenia, Inferior Danube.
3. Teohari Georgescu: Staff and Organizational Sectors; Region of Banat.
4. Rangepcz Iosif: County Committee, Region of Brașov.

5. Ana Pauker: Central Commission of Women; Region of Inferior Moldova.
6. Agiu Constantin: Patriotic Union; Member of the Agrarian Sector.
7. Pătrășcanu Lucrețiu: Juridical Sector; Conjuncture Institute.
8. Bodnăraș Emilian; The Patriotic Combat Organizations; Specialized work
9. Ceaușescu Nicolae, Youth

Document no. 8.

Data regarding the membership of the Party leading bodies (excerpts from address of CC of RCP addressed to the Allied Control Commission in Romania on October 21, 1944)

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania, Aleea Alexandru no. 23

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Ana Pauker | street Gogu Constantin no.59 |
| 2. Vasile Luca | street C. No. 10, Parcul Cornescu |
| 3. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | street Bruxelles no. 17 |
| 4. C-tin Pârvulescu | street Bruxelles no. 17 |
| 5. Iosif Rangheț | street Naum Râmnicăeanu no.24 |
| 6. Teohari Georgescu | street Toamnei no. 62 |

The Central Committee of the Union of the Communist Youth, Aleea Alexandru no. 23

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Nicolae Ceaușescu | street Dr. Râmnicăeanu no. 27 |
| 2. Ivanca Sariisky | street Dr. Râmnicăeanu no. 27 |
| 3. Alexandru Drăghici | street Dr. Râmnicăeanu no. 27 |
| 4. Ladislau Ady | street Dr. Râmnicăeanu no. 27 |

The Central Sector for Women, Aleea Alexandru no. 23

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Ernestina Crenstein | Aleea Ferekide no.20 |
| 2. Maria Sârbu | Bd. Brătianu nos. 32-34 |
| 3. Loti Foriș | Bd. Filantropia no. 74 |

The Sector of Propaganda, Aleea Alexandru no. 23

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Iosif Roitman | street Iuliu Tetrar no. 29 |
| 2. Feodor Rudenco | Calea Victoriei no. 208 |
| 3. Elisabeta Luca | Str.C, no.10, Cornescu Park |

The leadership of Ilfov county, street. Slătineanu no.18

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Lobu Andrei | street Naum Râmnicăeanu no. 24 |
|----------------|--------------------------------|

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 2. Caisinschi Elvira | street, Caragea Vodă, no. 2 |
| 3. Tatu Antonie | street Județului no. 22 |
| 4. Popa Emil | street Gh. Lazăr no. 4 |
| 5. Neagu Andrei | street Pictor Luchian no. 3 |
| 6. Mauriciu Vasile | street Caracași no. 27 |
| 7. Stere Nichifor | street Naum Râmniceanu no. 24 |
| 8. Popa Ilie | street Gen. Popovăț |
| 9. Stoian Tudora | |
| 28.IX. 1961, GE. 2 ex. | |

Document no. 9

The composition of the party organs in 1945 (before the National Conference of the Communist Party of Romania)

Political Bureau: Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej (Minister of Communications and Public Works (6.III. 1945); Ana Pauker; Vasile Luca; Teohari Georgescu; Vaida Vasile; Miron Constantinescu; Chivu Stoica; Gh. Vasilichi; Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu; Gh. Apostol; I.Gh. Maurer; Iosif Chișinevski; Emil Bodnăraș

Secretariat: Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej; Ana Pauker; Vasile Luca; Teohari Georgescu

The sharing out of the duties:

CC Sections	Secretary	The
Bureau of the Section		
CC Sections	Secretary	The Bureau of the Section
The Organizational and Instructing	Gh. Gheorghiu -Dej	Miron Constantinescu, Vaida Vasile, Iosif Chișinevski, Gh. Apostol
The Patriotic Education		Iosif Chișinevski
The Agrarian		Vasile Vaida
Cadres	Teohari Georgescu	Iosif Rangecz
FUM (United Workers Front) - parties	Vasile Luca	
Military	Teohari Georgescu	Petrescu D[umi]tru +2
Foreign Policy	Vasile Luca	Emil Bodnăraș, L. Pătrășcanu, Gheorghe Gaston Marin, I. Chișinevski

Trade unions		Gheorghe Apostol +2
Youth	Vasile Vaida	
Women	Ana Pauker	Luiba Chişinevski
Administrative	Ana Pauker	Pintilie Bondarenko

The National Conference of the RCP October 21st, 1945

Central Committee: Apostol Gheorghe; Bodnăraş Emil; Câmpeanu Constantin; Ceauşescu Nicolae; Chişinevski Iosif; Constantinescu Miron; Coliu Dumitru; Crăciun Constanţa; Georgescu Teohari; Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej; Luca Vasile; Maurer Gheorghe; Mârza Vasile; Moghiroş Alexandru; Neagu Andrei; Pârvulescu Constantin; Pătraşcu Lucreţiu; Pătraşcu Andrei; Pauker Ana; Popa Emil; Popa Ilie; Rangheţ Iosif; Silaghi Leontin; Stoica Chivu; Tudorache Elena; Vaida Vasile; Vasilichi Gheorghe

The Alternate members of the CC: Chişinevski Liuba; Drăgan Ilie; Drăghici Alexandru; Focşeneanu Dumitru; Mujic Mihai; Petre Ion; Radnav Gheorghe; Roşianu Mihai

During the plenary meeting of the CC of the RCP on October 22, 1945, there were elected the members of the following party bodies:

Political Bureau: Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej; Ana Pauker; Vasile Luca; Teohari Georgescu; Chivu Stoica; Gheorghe Vasilichi; Miron Constantinescu.

Secretariat: Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej; Ana Pauker; Teohari Georgescu; Vasile Luca
The President of the Central Control Party Commission was named comrade Pârvulescu Constantin

During the same plenary meeting Petrescu Dumitru was elected as a member of the CC.

The sharing out of the duties: sectors (excerpts from record made by A. Pauker): I. Chişinevski (Propaganda); I. Rangecz (Cadres); Miron Constantinescu (Organizational); Bodnăraş, Coliu, Petrescu (Military); Apostol, Chivu Stoica (Confederation)

The sharing out of the duties:

Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej: The President of the Superior Council of National Economy (27.XI.1945); Minister of National Economy (XII.1946), Minister of Industry and Trade (17.IV.1946); The President of the Ministerial Commission for Economic Recovering and Monetary Stability (11.VII.1947 - 18.V. 1948)

Comrade Chivu Stoica (General Confederation of Labour, Plenary Meeting, 22.X.1945).

The Central Committee of RWP elected at the 1st Congress, February 23, 1948

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Apostol Gheorghe | 22. Mateescu Constantin |
| 2. Alexa Augustin | 23. Noculi Ion |
| 3. Bodnăraș Emil | 24. Pauker Ana |
| 4. Borilă Petre | 25. Pas Ion |
| 5. Chivu Stoica | 26. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 6. Chișinevski Iosif | 27. Popa Emil |
| 7. Constantin Miron | 28. Rădăceanu Lotar |
| 8. Crăciun Constanța | 29. Rangheț Iosif |
| 9. Coliu Dumitru | 30. Răutu Leon |
| 10. Chișinevski Liuba | 31. Rădăceanu Eugenia |
| 11. Dalea Mihai | 32. Radovanovici Nicolae |
| 12. Drăghici Alexandru | 33. Suder Viliam |
| 13. Florescu Gheorghe | 34. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 14. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe | 35. Solomon Barbu |
| 15. Georgescu Teohari | 36. Șerban Avram |
| 16. Iordăchescu Teodor | 37. Tănase Zaharia |
| 17. Luca Vasile | 38. Tenescu Olimpia |
| 18. Levin Mișa | 39. Voitec Ștefan |
| 19. Maurer Gheorghe | 40. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 20. Moghiroș Alexandru | 41. Vaida Vasile |
| 21. Moraru Mihai | |

The alternate members:

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Bughici Simion | 9. Ionescu Vasile |
| 2. Bunaciu Avram | 10. Manole Ofelia |
| 3. Bontea Ștefan | 11. Mujic Mihai |
| 4. Braeșter Aron | 12. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 5. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 13. Roșianu Mihail |
| 6. Manea Anton | 14. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 7. Doncea Constantin | 15. Vass Ghizela |
| 8. Drăgoescu Petre | 16. Vințe Ion |

The following persons were co-opted as members of the Central Committee:

1. Pintilie Gheorghe - during the plenary session of 10.VI.1948
2. Sorin Toma - during the plenary session of 3-5 III 1948

3. Petrescu Dumitru and Bughici Simion- they were elected as full members of the CC during the plenary session of 23-24 .I. 1949
4. Radovanovici Nicolae - removed from the Comitetul Central (during the plenary session of 23-24 I 1949)
6. Mişa Levin- excluded from the CC (during the session of the political Bureau Biroului of 4 V 1950)

The Political Bureau: (plenary session of February 24, 1948)

Apostol Gheorghe	Luca Vasile
Bodnăraş Emil	Moghioroş Alexandru
Chişinevski Iosif	Pauker Ana
Constantinescu Miron	Lotar Rădăceanu
Georgescu Teohari	Vasilichi Gheorghe
Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe	Voitec Vasile
Iordăchescu Teodor	

The alternate members of the PB

Chivu Stoica - co-opted as a full member of the PB (PB 30.IV.1952)
Moraru Mihai
Rangheţ Iosif
Tănase Zaharia
Vaida Vasile

The Secretariat: Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe, Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu and Lotar Rădăceanu

Certain functions were assigned within the Party and State apparatus:

1. **Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej:** The Organizational Directions (PB 14.V. 1948) - Instructors, The Military Section, The Government of the PRR, The Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (IV. 1948), The Member of the Organizational Bureau (23.I. 1950), The President of the Council of Ministers (de la 29.V. 1952 - 4.X. 1955), The co-ordination of the entire party and state activity (PB 29.V. 1952), The President of the Superior Military Council (5 XI 1955).
2. **Comrade Apostol Gheorghe:** The President of General Confederation of Labour (Plenary session of the CC 22. X. 1945); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (18.I. 1950); The CC Secretary of the RWP (PB 11/30.IV.1952); Member in the Organizational Bureau (26-

27.V.1952); The Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (PB 2/20.I. 1953) (H. 616 /28.V. 1952); The Minister of Agriculture (PB 18/29.IX.1953); The Prime Secretary of the CC of the RWP (Plenary session of 19.IV. 1954); The President of State Committee for Collecting (Plenary session of 30.IX. 1955 - 1.X. 1955)

3. **Comrade Bodnăraș Emil:** The Army General (H.1175/1951); The President of the Superior Military Council (PB 4.VII. 1952); The Deputy of the President of the Superior Military Council (PB 5.XI. 1952); The Minister of Armed Forces (PB 20.I. 1953); The Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (PB 38/1954); The Prime Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (PB 21/1955)

4. **Comrade Chișinevski Iosif:** The Section of Foreign Relations (PB 14.V. 1948); The Secretary of the CC of RWP (PB 11 X 1948); The Member of the CC of the RWP' s Central Commission of Verifying (Secretary 27.VII.1948); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (H. 2/18.I.1950); The Member of the Superior Military Council (PB 3 VII. 1952); The Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (PB 2/1953); The Prime Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (BP 38/1954); Secretary of the CC (Plenary Session of 30 IX - 1X 1955);

5. **Comrade Constantinescu Miron:** The Organization of Co-inhabiting Nationalities and National People's Party (PB 14V 1948); The President of State Committee for Planning- Secretariat 21.4.1949; The Secretary of the CC of the RWP- PB 30 IV 1952; The Member of the Superior Military Council (BP 17/1952); The President of State Committee for Planning -PB 2/1953; The Vice -President of the Council of Ministers (PB 38/1954); The Prime Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (Plenary Session of 30 IX - 1X 1955).

6. **Comrade Teohari Georgescu:** The Administrative Direction, The Ploughmen's Front, The sections and problems of the peasant and youth (PB 14.V.1948); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (H. 2/18.I.1950); In 1952 he lost the following positions: the membership in the PB, the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, the minister of Internal Affairs and after the Plenary Session of 19 / 20 .VIII. 1953 he was removed from the CC of the RWP.

7. **Comrade Iordăchescu Teodor:** He lost his position as the minister of Constructions (PB 16.IX.1949); he was named the Director of the Party Evening University (Secretariat 5.X. 1949); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History(H. 481/1955); The President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Great National Assembly (1955).

8. **Comrade Luca Vasile:** The Direction of Cadres; The National Council of Popular Democracy Front; The ecclesiastical problems (PB 14.V.1948); The

Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (PB 14.V.1948); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (H. 2/18.I.1950); On 4.3.1952 he lost the Ministry of Finance and after the Plenary session of 26-27.V. 1952 the following positions: the member of the PB, secretary and the member of the CC, member of the Organization Bureau

9. **Comrade Moghioroș Alexandru:** Secretary of CC of the RWP (PB 11 X 1948); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (H. 2/18.I.1950); He lost his position as the President of the State Committee for Collecting (H. 80/1951); The Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (PB 38/1954)

10. **Comrade Ana Pauker:** The Direction of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC and of the Women organizations (BP 18 V 1948); The Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (PB 14 IX 1949); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (H. 2/18.I.1950), The member of the Organizational Bureau (Plenary Session of 26-27 V 1952). She lost the following positions: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (29.VIII. 1952), member of the CC of RWP (Plenary session of 19-20 VIII 1953)

11. **Comrade Rădăceanu Lothar:** The Economic Section, Trade Unions (PB 14 V 1948); The Member of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History (H. 2/1950); The chief of the political economy department at the Parhon University (H. 1033 / 1951). He lost his position as the minister of the Social Assistance (H. 838 /1952). The Vice-president of the Permanent Committee for Peace Defending of the PRR (H. 265 / 1954)

12. **Comrade Vasilichi Gheorghe:** Popular Sport Organization (PB 14 V 1948); The Minister of Petroleum, Mines and Coal (Secretariat 21 IV 1949); The chief of the Light Industry Section (PB 12/1952)

13. **Comrade Voitec Ștefan:** The Section of the Political Education (BP 14 V 1948.; He lost his position as the vice-president of the Council of Ministers (BP 14 IV/1949). He lost his position as the President of the Retail Cooperative Shops' Section (H.636 /1951); He was named in the Bureau for Light Industry (H.636/1951) and in the specific sector of the Council of Ministers (H. 265 /1954); The Minister of Internal Trade (Plenary Session of 30 IX 1955)

14. **Comrade Chivu Stoica:** The membership in the Committee for the State Prize (H 80/01950); On 17.IV. 1952 he lost his position as the Minister of Metallurgical and Chemical Industry. He was co-opted as a full member of the PB (PB 11./ 30.IV. 1952). The Member of the Superior Military Council (BP 17 / 1952);The Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (PB 2/1952); The president of the Committee for the Available Personal Allocation (H. 643 /1953); Minister of Metallurgical and Building Machines Industry (H.

779/1953);The president of the Council of Ministers (Plenary session of 30 IX - 1 X 1955)

The assigning of the duties within the party and state apparatus for the members of the PB and Secretariat of the CC of the RWP during the period of 1952-1955

a. During the PB meeting of 29 V 1952:

[In the Party]

Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej - the leadership and the coordination of the entire party and state activity.

Comrade I. Chișinevski - The Propaganda Section; The Foreign Affairs Section; The Superior Political Direction of the Army; The Superior Political Direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; The Administrative -Political Section; The Section of the foreign affairs' cadres of the CC of the RWP;

Comrade Al. Moghioroș - The section of the party leading bodies; The sector for the cadres' valorization; The Party Household; The CC Office; The CC of the Union of the Working Youth

Comrade Miron Constantinescu - The Plan Finance Section; Comrade Gh. Apostol; The Agrarian Section; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; Trade Unions;

Comrade C. Pârvolescu - The President of the Party Control Commission;

Comrade Chivu Stoica - The Heavy Industry Section; The Light Industry Section; The Political Direction of Transportation.

Comrade Petre Borilă - The Ploughmen's Front; National Committees

Comrade Emil Bodnăraș - Minister of Armed Forces

Comrade Ana Pauker - UFDR (Democratic Federation of Women in Romania);

Ministries, state committees, commissions and general directions:

Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej: Minister of Internal Affairs; Minister of Armed Forces; The General Direction for Danube-Black-Sea Cana;

Comrade I. Chișinevski: The General Direction of the Available Working Forces; The General Direction of Press and Printings; The Central Commission of Sportive Aviation; The Romanian Press Agency; The Minister of Health; The Red Cross; The President of the Cultural Bureau

Comrade Chivu Stoica: The State Committee for Technique; The President for the Bureau for Heavy Industry;

Comrade Ana Pauker: Minister of Foreign Affairs; The membership in the Committee for the State Prize; The Minister of the Social Assistance; The Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

Comrade Miron Constantinescu: The president of (CSP) State Committee for Planning (the member of the Presidium); The General Direction of Industrial and Food Supplies; The State Commission; The General Directions of Prices; The commission for work, norms and salaries; The General Direction of Statistics

Comrade Borilă Petre: The State Control; The Minister of Justice; The State Arbitration; The Minister of Cults; The President of the Light Industry

Comrade Gheorghe Apostol: The President of the Bureau for Agriculture, Collecting, Food Industry, Trade

b. The PB meeting of **26 I 1953:**

Comrade Moghioroş Alexandru: The section of the party, trade unions and UWY's leading bodies; The Political Direction of the Minister of Railroads; The Secretariat's Office of the CC of the RWP; The Sector for Cadres' control; The Heavy Industry Section; The Transportations and Telecommunications Section; The Light Industry Section; The Plan -Finance Section; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Agriculture (it was responsible for political work in SMT, GOSCOL and TOZ associations); The Agrarian Section; The Party Household Section; The Archive of the CC of the RWP; The Revision Commission; The CC of the UWY; The CC of UFDR; The Hungarian Autonomous Region; Arad Region.

Comrade I. Chişinevski: The Propaganda and Agitation Section; The Science and Education Section; The Art and Literature Section; The Superior Political Direction of the Army; The Political Direction of the MSS (Minister of State Security) troops; The Political Service of Militia (subordinated to the MSS Party Commission); The Administrative- Political Section; The Foreign Affairs Section (including the Sector of foreign affairs and external trade); Bucharest Region

Comrade Chivu Stoica: Iaşi Region

Comrade Apostol Gheorghe: The Central Council of Trade Unions; Hunedoara Region

Comrade Constantinescu M.: Galaţi Region

Comrade Bodnăraş Emil: Suceava Region

Comrade Borilă Petre: Stalin Region

Comrade Pârvulescu Constantin: The Party Control Commission; The Great National Assembly; The Institute of the History of the Party; Craiova Region

Comrade Coliu Dumitru: Ploieşti Region

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers

The President of the Council: Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej

Vice - Presidents: Chișinevski Iosif, Gheorghe Apostol, Chivu Stoica, Vidrașcu Gheorghe

Members of the Presidium: Constantinescu M[iron], Petrescu Dumitru, Borilă Petre, Stanciu Emil.

The Bureau of Council of Ministers

Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej, Chișinevski Iosif, Gheorghe Apostol, Moghioroș Alexandru, Constantinescu Miron

Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej: The Minister of State Security; The Minister of Internal Affairs; The Minister of Armed Forces; The Minister of External Trade; The General Direction for Danube-Black-Sea Canal; The General Direction of the Council of Ministers 'Affairs; The Special Direction.

Comrade Chișinevski Iosif: Minister of Foreign Affairs; The Minister of Justice; The General Prosecuting; The Academy of PRR; The Union of Architects; The General Direction of Press and Printings; The General Direction of the Available Work Forces; The Romanian Press Agency; The Red Cross; The Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; The President of the Bureau for Culture and Protecting the Heath.

Comrade Constantinescu Miron: The General Direction of Industrial and Food Supplies; The State Commission; The General Direction of Statistics; The General Directions of Prices; The Commission for Architecture and Constructions; The Commission for Physical Culture and Sport; The Sportive Aviation

Comrade Chivu Stoica: The Geologic Committee; The General Direction of Non-Ferrous Metals; The General Direction of Hydro-Metrology; The General Direction of Metrology; The President of the Bureau for Heavy Industry;

Comrade Borilă Petre: Minister of Cults; The State Arbitration; Committee for the State Prize; The President of the Bureau for Light Industry

c. Decision No. 72 of 14 II 1954

Comrade Moghioroș Alexandru: The section of the leading bodies; The Agrarian Section (including the Political Direction of SMT); The Heavy Industry Section (that was to be unified with the Section of Transportations, also including The Political Direction of Transportations); The Consumption Goods Section; The Administrative -Political Section; The Women's Party Activity Section; The Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP (unifying The Office of the CC and the Party Household Section); The Sector for Cadres' Control

Comrade I. Chişinevski: The Propaganda and Agitation Section; The Foreign Affairs Section (it will include two other sections: external trade and foreign affairs); The Superior Political Direction of the Army; The Superior Political Direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

d. During the PB' s session of 22 IV 1954

The assigning of the duties within the Secretariat of the CC of RWP:

Comrade Apostol Gheorghe: The Agrarian Section; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; The Propaganda and Agitation Section; The Foreign Affairs Section; The Direction of the CC of the RWP; The Sector for Synthesis; The Central Council of Trade Unions

Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu: The section of the party, trade unions and UWY's leading bodies; The Superior Political Direction of the Army; The Superior Political Direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; The Sector for Cadres' control of the CC of RWP; The Administrative Section; The Union of the Working Youth

Comrade Dalea Mihai: The Heavy Industry and Transportation; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Transportations; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Constructions; The Women's Party Activity Section; The Committee of the Democratic Women of PRR.

Comrade Fazekas Janos: The Consumption Goods Section; AVTCF (Asociația Voluntară pentru Tehnică și Cultură Fizică - Voluntary Association for Technics and Physical Culture); The connection with the Revision Commission

Besides their attributions as the chiefs of the sections of the CC of the RWP, some of the above mentioned members of the CC of the RWP would be directly responsible for the following public organizations listed below:

Comrade Răutu Leonte: ARLUS (Romanian Association for Strengthen Connections with USSR); Permanent Committee for Defense of Peace; SRSC (Societatea pentru Răspândirea Științei și Culturii: Society for Promoting Science and Culture, 1951-1962) The Art Unions.

Comrade Vass Ghizela: The Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; The Red Cross.

The assigning of the duties within the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the PRR

Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej: Ministry of External Trade; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Internal Trade; The General Direction of Affairs of the Council of Ministers.

Comrade I. Chișinevski: Ministry of Culture; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health and Social Assistance; The Academy of the PRR; The State Commission for Architecture and Constructions; Agerpres; Ministry of Justice; The State Arbitration; The General Prosecuting of the PRR; The State Control Commission; The Press General Direction.

Comrade Al. Moghioroș: The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; The Ministry of Wood, Paper and Cellulose Industry; The State Committee for Collecting the Agricultural Products; The Ministry of Constructions and the Industry of Construction Materials; The Retail Cooperative Shops.

Comrade Chivu Stoica: The Ministry of Metallurgical and Building Machines Industry; The Ministry of Electrical Energy and of Electro-technical Industry; The Ministry of the Petroleum Industry; The Ministry of the Coal Industry; The Ministry of the Chemical Industry; The Geologic Committee; The General Direction of Metrology.

Comrade Emil Bodnăraș: The Ministry of Armed Forces; The Ministry of the Railroads; The Ministry of Naval and Aviation Transportation; The Ministry of Post Office and Tele-Communications; The Special Direction; The Committee for the State Prize.

Comrade Borilă Petre: The Ministry of Food Industry; The Ministry of the Light Industry; The Ministry of Local Household and Industry; The Retail Cooperative Shops' Section

Comrade Petrescu Dumitru: The Ministry of Finance; The General Direction of State Supplies; The General Direction for Allocating the Working Forces.

Comrade Drăghici Alexandru: AVTCF (Asociația Voluntară pentru Tehnică și Cultură Fizică - Voluntary Association for Technics and Physical Culture)

Comrade Bughici Simion: Minister of Foreign Affairs, will also be responsible for the Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Red Cross

e. During the PB meeting of 18 V 1954:

The assigning of the duties within the state apparatus:

Comrade Gheorghiu - Dej, Gh.: The State Control Commission

Comrade Gheorghe Apostol: The Section of the party, trade unions and UWY's leading bodies; Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CC of the RWP; The Direction of affairs of the CC of the RWP; The Foreign Affairs Section of the CC of the RWP; The „Scântea” newspaper; The Institute of Party History, The Central Council of the Trade Unions

Comrade Ceaușescu Nicolae: The Heavy Industry and Transportation Section of the CC of the RWP; The Agrarian Section of the CC al RWP; The Administrative Section of the CC al RWP; The sector for the cadres'

valorization of the CC al RWP; The Political Superior Direction of the Army; The Superior Political Direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; The CC of UWY

Comrade Fazekas Janos: Consumer Goods Section of CC of RWP; The Household of Party Section of CC of RWP; The Women's Party Activity Section; The Political Direction of the Ministry of the Railroads; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Constructions; AVSAP (*Asociația Voluntară pentru Sprijinirea Apărării Patriei* - Voluntary Association for Supporting the Defence of the Motherland) The Committee of the Democratic Women. Also Comrade Fazekas Janos will also be responsible for the connection between the Secretariat of the CC of the RWP and the Central Revision Commission of RWP.

f. During the Secretariat's meeting of 7 X 1955:

The allocation of the duties within the Secretariat of the CC of RWP:

Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej: The Party Control Commission; The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR; The Heavy Industry Section of the CC of RWP; The Agrarian Section of the CC of the RWP; The Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP; The presidium of the GNA; The Council of Ministers; The Ministry of Internal Affairs.

I. Chișinevski: The Section of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the RWP; The Science and Culture Section of the CC of the RWP; The Cadres' Recruiting Section of the CC of the RWP; The Foreign Affairs Section of the CC of the RWP; The Section of the foreign affairs' cadres of the CC of the RWP; The Plan, Finances and Trade Section of the CC of the RWP; The Women's Party Activity Section; The General Prosecuting of the PRR; The Supreme Court of PRR.

N. Ceaușescu: The section of the party's leading bodies of the CC of the RWP; The Administrative Section of the CC of the RWP; The Transportation and Tele-communications Section of the CC of the RWP; The Political Superior Direction of the Army; The Political Direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; The Political Direction of the Romanian Railroads; The Red Cross; AVSAP (*Asociația Voluntară pentru Sprijinirea Apărării Patriei* - Voluntary Association for Supporting the Defence of the Motherland)

J. Fazekas: The Constructions Section of the CC of the RWP; The Retail Cooperative Shops' Section; The Section of Schools of the CC of the RWP; The Household of Party Section of the CC of the RWP; The connection with Commission of Review of the CC of the RWP; The CC al UWY; The Political Direction of Ministry of Constructions.

g. During the meeting of the PB of 9 .III. 1950:

Petrescu Dumitru: Chief of The Section of the party, trade unions and UWY's leading bodies

Leonte Răutu: Chief of the Section of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the RWP

h. During the meeting of the PB of 7 .X. 1955

Lupu Petre: Chief of The Section of the party, trade unions and UWY's leading bodies

Leonte Răutu: Chief of the Section of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the RWP

The composition of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of the CC of the RWP after the plenary session of the 26-27 .V. 1952:

The Political Bureau

Gheorghe Gheorghiu -Dej	Chivu Stoica
Chișinevski Iosif	Bodnăraș Emil
Moghiroș Alexandru	Borilă Petre
Constantinescu Miron	Pârvulescu Constantin
Apostol Gheorghe	

The alternate members

Rangheț Iosif	Coliu Dumitru
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The Secretariat:

1.Gheorghe Gheorghiu -Dej	4.Constantinescu Miron
2.Chișinevski Iosif	5.Apostol Gheorghe
3.Moghiroș Alexandru	

Vasile Luca lost his position held in the CC of the RWP.

The following persons were elected as full members of the CC:Ceașescu Nicolae; Stoica Gheorghe; Vass Ghizela; Rangheț Iosif (decedat).

The Plenary meeting of 19.IV.1954 established the following composition of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat:

The Political Bureau:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu -Dej	Chivu Stoica
Chișinevski Iosif	Bodnăraș Emil
Moghiroș Alexandru	Borilă Petre
Constantinescu Miron	Pârvulescu Constantin
Apostol Gheorghe	

The alternate members:

Coliu Dumitru
Ceașescu Nicolae
Drăghici Alexandru

The Secretariat:

Gheorghe Apostol
Nicolae Ceașescu
Dalea Mihai
Fazekas Ianos

During the Plenary meeting of the CC of the RWP on 19 .IV. 1954:

1. Mujic Mihai was elected as a full member of the CC.
2. Roșianu Mihail was elected as a full member of the CC
3. Fazeks Janos co-opted as a member of the CC
4. Manea Anton lost his position from the CC
5. Tenescu Olimpia lost his position from the CC

The list of the members of the CC of the RWP after the plenary session of April 19, 1954

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|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Alexa Augustin | 21. Moghioroș Alexandru |
| 2. Apostol Gheorghe | 22. Moraru Mihail |
| 3. Bodnăraș Emil | 23. Mujic Mihai |
| 4. Borilă Petre | 24. Niculi Ion |
| 5. Bughici Simion | 25. Pas Ion |
| 6. Ceașescu Nicolae | 26. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 7. Chișinevski Iosif | 27. Pintilescu Gheorghe |
| 8. Chișinevski Liuba | 28. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 9. Chivu Stoica | 29. Popa Emil |
| 10. Coliu Dumitru | 30. Rădăceanu Eugenia |
| 11. Constantinescu Miron | 31. Rădăceanu Leonte |
| 12. Crăciun Constanța | 32. Răutu Leonte |
| 13. Dalea Mihai | 33. Roșianu Mihai |
| 14. Drăghici Alexandru | 34. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 15. Fazekaș Ianoș | 35. Șerban Avram |
| 16. Florescu Gheorghe | 36. Solomon Barbu |
| 17. Gheorgiu - Dej Gheorghe | 37. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 18. Iordăchescu Teodor | 38. Suder Vilian |
| 19. Mateescu Constantin | 39. Tănase Zaharia |
| 20. Maurer Gheorghe | 40. Toma Sorin |

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| 41. Vaida Vasile | 43. Vass Ghizela |
| 42. Vasilichi Gheorghe | 44. Voitec Ștefan |

The alternate members:

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| 1. Bunaciu Avram | 5. Drăgoescu Petre |
| 2. Bontea Ștefan | 6. Ionescu Vasile |
| 3. Braeșter Aron | 7. Manole Ofelia |
| 4. Doncea Constantin | 8. Vințe Ion |

The list of the members of the CC of the RWP elected at the Second Congress of the RWP, December 28, 1955

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|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Alexa Augustin | 28. Florescu Mihai |
| 2. Apostol Gheorghe | 29. Gavriliuc Mihai |
| 3. Balalia Dumitru | 30. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe |
| 4. Barna Ioan | 31. Gheorghiu Vladimir |
| 5. Berezințchi Dumitru | 32. Gluvacov Ioan |
| 6. Bîrlădeanu Alexandru | 33. Guină Nicolae |
| 7. Bodnăraș Emil | 34. Hosu Gheorghe |
| 8. Borilă Petre | 35. Ion Gheorghe |
| 9. Breitenhofer Anton | 36. Iordăchescu Teodor |
| 10. Bughici Simion | 37. Joja Atanase |
| 11. Bunaciu Avram | 38. Kovacs György |
| 12. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 39. Lascu Elena Iodăchescu |
| 13. Chișinevski Iosif | 40. Moghiroș Alexandru |
| 14. Chivu Stoica | 41. Mujic Mihai |
| 15. Crăciun Constanța | 42. Murgulescu Ilie |
| 16. Coliu Dumitru | 43. Niculescu - Mizil Paul |
| 17. Constantinescu Miron | 44. Pas Ion |
| 18. Cozma Ion | 45. Patilineț Vasile |
| 19. Cotoț Ion | 46. Petre Lupu |
| 20. Csupor Ludovic | 47. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 21. Daju Pavel | 48. Popa Gherasim |
| 22. Dalea Mihai | 49. Preoteasa Grigore |
| 23. Dănălache Florian | 50. Rădoi Gheorghe |
| 24. Drăghici Alexandru | 51. Răutu Leonte |
| 25. Drăgoescu Petre | 52. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 26. Dulgheru Radu | 53. Scarlat Constantin |
| 27. Fazekaș Janos | 54. Șerban Miron |

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|---------------------|-------------------|
| 55. Solomon Barbu | 59. Turcanu Ene |
| 56. Stancu Aurel | 60. Vass Ghizela |
| 57. Stoica Gheorghe | 61. Voitec Vasile |
| 58. Toma Sorin | |

The list of the Alternate Members of the CC of the RWP elected at the RWP's Congress of December 28, 1955

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Alexe Eugen | 19. Manole Ofelia |
| 2. Almăjan Bujor | 20. Marinescu Aneta |
| 3. Bayerle Iosif | 21. Mateescu Constantin |
| 4. Banc Iosif | 22. Maurer Gheorghe |
| 5. Berghianu Maxim | 23. Moiescu Anton |
| 6. Bontea Ștefan | 24. Nădejde Costin |
| 7. Catană Nicolae | 25. Răceanu Ileana |
| 8. Coțoveanu Iacob | 26. Roșianu Mihail |
| 9. Cristache Vasile | 27. Simulescu Dumitru |
| 10. Dobre Ion | 28. Toma Ana |
| 11. Doncea Constantin | 29. Trofin Virgil |
| 12. Fulger Cornel | 30. Țugui Pavel |
| 13. Gheorghe Dumitru | 31. Vaida Vasile |
| 14. Giosan Nicolae | 32. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 15. Ichim Ion | 33. Verdeț Ilie |
| 16. Ionescu Vasile | 34. Voicu Ștefan |
| 17. Ioniță Ion | 35. Zaharescu Barbu |
| 18. Malinski Vasile | |

**The plenary session of 28.XII. 1955 established the following composition of:
The Political Bureau:**

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | 6. Emil Bodnăraș |
| 2. Chivu Stoica | 7. Miron Constantinescu |
| 3. Chișinevski Iosif | 8. Constantin Părvulescu |
| 4. Gheorghe Apostol | 9. Alexandru Drăghici |
| 5. Alexandru Moghioroș | |

The alternate members:

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| 1. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 4. Leonte Răutu |
| 2. Dumitru Coliu | 5. Ștefan Voitec |
| 3. Leontin Sălăjan | |

The Secretariat: Gh. Gheorghiu – Dej, Chișinevski Iosif, Ceaușescu Nicolae, Fazekaș Janoș, Cozma Ion.

The plenary Session of 21.VIII.1956 established the following composition of:

The Secretariat: Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej, Chișinevski Iosif, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Fazekaș Janoș, Gheorghiu Vladimir

The Plenary Session of 28 VI – 3 VII 1957 established the following composition of:

The Political Bureau:

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Gh, Gheorghiu – Dej | 6. Constantin Pârvulescu |
| 2. Chivu Stoica | 7. Alexandru Drăghici |
| 3. Gheorghe Apostol | 8. Nicolae Ceaușescu |
| 4. Alexandru Moghioroș | 9. Borilă Petre |
| 5. Emil Bodnăraș | |

The Secretariat:Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Fazekaș Janoș, Gheorghiu Vladimir

The alternate members:Dumitru Coliu, Leontin Sălăjan, Leonte Răutu, Ștefan Voitec

The Plenary Session of 13.VII.1957 established the following composition of:

The Secretariat:Gh. Gheorghiu – Dej, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Fazekaș Janoș, Gheorghiu Vladimir, Preoteasa Grigore

After the Plenary Session of 9-13 VII 1958:

The following comrades were co-opted as alternate members of the CC of the RWP: Isac Martin, Vasile Vâlcu, Mihai Burcă, Gheorghe Necula, Comrade I.Gh. Maurer became a full member of the CC of the RWP.

The Plenary Session of 26.IV. 1960 established the following composition of:

The Secretariat : Gh. Gheorghiu – Dej, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Fazekaș Janoș

**The assigning of the duties within the Party and State apparatus 1956-1957
During the Secretariat meeting of 15 X 1956**

The assigning of the duties within the Secretariat of the CC of RWP:

Gh. Gheorghiu – Dej: The Direction of Propaganda and Culture of the CC of the RWP; Party Control Commission; The Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP; The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR

Iosif Chişinevski: The Foreign Affairs Section of the CC of the RWP; The Heavy Industry Section of the CC of RWP; The Transportation and Tele-communications Section of the CC of the RWP; The Women's Party Activity Section; The Household of Party Section of the CC of the RWP; The General Prosecuting of the PRR; The Supreme Court of PRR.

Ceaşescu Nicolae: The section of the party's leading bodies of the CC of the RWP; The Direction of Cadres of the CC of the RWP; The Administrative Section of the CC of the RWP; The CC al UWY; The Political Superior Direction of the Army.

Fazekas Janos: The Consumer Goods Section of the CC of the RWP; The Plan, Finance, Trade Section of the CC of the RWP; The Party Commission for the Nationalities' Problems

Gheorghiu Vladimir: The Agrarian Section of the CC of the RWP; The Constructions Section of the CC of the RWP

During the Secretariat's meeting of January 16, 1956:

The allocation of the duties within the Secretariat of the CC of RWP:

Comrade Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej: The Direction of Propaganda and Culture of the CC of the RWP; The Party Control Commission; The Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP; The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR.

Comrade Iosif Chişinevski: The Cadres' Recruiting Section of the CC of the RWP; The Section of the Foreign affairs' Cadres of the CC of the RWP; The Foreign Affairs Section of the CC of the RWP; The Women's Party Activity Section; The Plan, Finances and Trade Section of the CC of the RWP; The Household of Party Section of the CC of the RWP

Comrade Ceaşescu Nicolae: The section of the party's leading bodies of the CC of the RWP; The Agrarian Section of the CC of the RWP; The Administrative Section of the CC of the RWP; The CC al UWY; The Political Superior Direction of the Army.

Comrade Ianos Fazekas will be responsible for: The Constructions Section of the CC of the RWP; The Consumer Goods Section of the CC of the RWP; The Party Commission for the Nationalities' Problems

Comrade Cozma Ion will be responsible for: The Heavy Industry Section of the CC of RWP; The Transportation and Tele-communications Section of the CC of the RWP; The Political Direction of the Romanian Railroads.

During the Secretariat's meeting of 6 V 1957:

The assigning of the tasks within the Secretariat of the CC of RWP:

Gheorghiu - Dej Gh.;The Presidium of the GNA; The Council of Ministers; The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR; The Party Control

Commission; The Direction of Propaganda and Culture of the CC of the RWP; The Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP

Iosif Chișinevski: The Organizational Section of the CC of the RWP; The Administrative Section of the CC of the RWP; The CC al UWY; The Political Superior Direction of the Army; The Central Commandment of the Working Guards.

Fazekas Janos: The Household of Party Section of the CC of the RWP; The Women's Party Activity Section; The Party Commission for the Nationalities' Problems; The Central Commission of Review of the CC of the RWP; The Committee of the Democratic Women of PRR

Gheorghiu Vladimir: The Agrarian Section of the CC of the RWP; The Sector for Cadres' control of the CC of the RWP.

The list of the members of the CC of the RWP elected at the Third Congress of the RWP, 25 .VI. 1960

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Alexa Augustin | 26. Dulgheru Radu |
| 2. Almășan Bujor | 27. Fazekas Janos |
| 3. Apostol Gheorghe | 28. Florescu Mihai |
| 4. Balalia Dumitru | 29. Furdui Petru |
| 5. Banc Iosif | 30. Gaston Marin Gheorghe |
| 6. Berghianu Maxim | 31. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe |
| 7. Bîrlădeanu Alexandru | 32. Giosan Nicolae |
| 8. Bodnăraș Emil | 33. Gluvacov Ioan |
| 9. Borilă Petre | 34. Guină Nicolae |
| 10. Breitenhofer Anton | 35. Hossu Gheorghe |
| 11. Bughici Simion | 36. Isac Martin |
| 12. Bunaciu Avram | 37. Joja Atanase |
| 13. Burcă Mihai | 38. Kovacs György |
| 14. Ceaușescu Nicolae | 39. Lascu Elena Iodăchescu |
| 15. Chivu Stoica | 40. Mănescu Manea |
| 16. Coliu Dumitru | 41. Marchian Nicolae |
| 17. Cotoș Ion | 42. Maurer Ion Gheorghe |
| 18. Cozma Ion | 43. Moghiroș Alexandru |
| 19. Crăciun Constanța | 44. Moisescu Anton |
| 20. Csupor Ludovic | 45. Murgulescu Ilie |
| 21. Dalea Mihai | 46. Nicula Gheorghe |
| 22. Dănălache Florian | 47. Niculescu - Mizil Paul |
| 23. Drăghici Alexandru | 48. Nistor Constantin |
| 24. Drăgoescu Petre | 49. Novacu Valeriu |
| 25. Duca Aurel | 50. Onescu Cornel |

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 51. Pas Ion | 66. Simulescu Dumitru |
| 52. Patilineţ Vasile | 67. Solomon Barbu |
| 53. Petre Lupu | 68. Suder Mihai |
| 54. Popescu-Puţuri Ion | 69. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 55. Rădoi Gheorghe | 70. Toma Ana |
| 56. Rădulescu Gogu | 71. Virgil Trofin |
| 57. Răutu Leonte | 72. Turcanu Ene |
| 58. Rigani Zoe | 73. Vaida Vasile |
| 59. Roşianu Mihail | 74. Vass Ghizela |
| 60. Roşu Gheorghe | 75. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 61. Rusu Clement | 76. Verdeţ Ilie |
| 62. Sălăjan Leontin | 77. Vâlcu Vasile |
| 63. Scarlat Constantin | 78. Voicu Ştefan |
| 64. Sencovici Alexandru | 79. Voitec Vasile |
| 65. Şerban Miron | |

The alternate members:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Alexe Eugen | 17. Ionescu Vasile |
| 2. Bayerle Iosif | 18. Ioniţă Ion |
| 3. Blajovici Petre | 19. Lăzărescu Constantin |
| 4. Bobu Emil | 20. Leica Adam |
| 5. Cazacu Virgil | 21. Levente Mihail |
| 6. Cincă Elvira | 22. Lixandru Vasile |
| 7. Cioară Gheorghe | 23. Malinski Vasile |
| 8. Ciocan Maria | 24. Marinescu Teodor |
| 9. Constantin Ion | 25. Mateescu Vasile |
| 10. Dindere Ion | 26. Nădejde Costin |
| 11. Drăgan Constantin | 27. Păcuraru Andrei |
| 12. Fulger Cornel | 28. Petre Nicolae |
| 13. Gheorghiu Dumitru | 29. Predescu Ion |
| 14. Gheorghiu Nicolae | 30. Vijoli Aurel |
| 15. Golea Petre | 31. Zaharescu Barbu |
| 16. Ionescu Manea | |

The plenary meeting of 25 VI 1960 established the following composition of:

The Political Bureau:

- | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej | 3. Apostol Gheorghe |
| 2. Chivu Stoica | 4. Bodnăraş Emil |

5. Borilă Petre
6. Ceaușescu Nicolae
7. Drăghici Alexandru

8. Maurer Ion Gheorghe
9. Moghioroș Alexandru

The alternate members:

1. Coliu Dumitru
2. Răutu Leonte

3. Sălăjan Leontin
4. Voitec Ștefan

The Secretariat:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej
2. Ceaușescu Nicolae

3. Dalea Mihai
4. Fazekas Janos

The plenary meeting of 17 III 1961 established the following composition of:

The Secretariat:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej
2. Ceaușescu Nicolae

3. Chivu Stoica
4. Dalea Mihai

The assigning of the duties within the Party and State apparatus

Following of the meeting of the Political Bureau of 21 III 1961:

The assigning of the tasks within the Council of Ministers:

Ion Gh. Maurer: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Armed Forces; The State Commission of Planning; The Economic Council; IRRCS (Institutul Român pentru Relații Culturale cu Străinătatea -The Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)

Gheorghe Apostol: Ministry of Metallurgy and Building Machines; Ministry of Mines and Electrical Energy; The Geologic Committee; The Committee for Nuclear Energy; The Committee for the State Prize; The General Direction of the State Deposits; Agerpres; ASIT (Asociația Științifică a Inginerilor și Tehnicienilor din RPR - Scientific Association of the Engineers and Technicians in PRR).

Emil Bodnăraș: Ministry of Education and Culture; Ministry of Health and Social Assistance; Ministry of Justice; The Committee of Radiotelevision and Television; The Department of Cults; The State Arbitration; The Red Cross; The Art Unions; SRSC; The Academy of the PRR

Petre Borilă: Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical Industry; Ministry of the Light Industry; Ministry of Food Industry; The State Committee of Constructions, Architecture and Systematization; The Committee for New

Technology; The General Direction of Metrology, Standards and Investments.

Alexandru Moghioroș: Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Forestry Economy; The State Committee of Water; The General Direction for the problems of the local party and state organs; Centrocoop (Cooperatives Central); UCECOM (National Union of Handicraft and Production Cooperatives of Romania); The State committee for the valorization of the agricultural products; The Commission for calculating the value of the crop; The Commission for the mechanization of the agriculture.

Alexandru Bârlădeanu: The Ministry of Finance; The Ministry of Trade; The Committee for prices; The Committee for work and salaries; The State Bank; The General Direction of Statistics; The General Direction for the Recruiting and Repartition of the working forces; The Governmental Commission for coordinating the departures abroad; The Governmental Commission for economic and technical- scientific collaboration;

Sălăjan Leontin, Minister of the Armed Forces, will be in the connection with AVSAP (*Asociația Voluntară pentru Sprijinirea Apărării Patriei* - Voluntary Association for Supporting the Defence of the Motherland)

Murgulescu Ilie, Minister of Education and Culture, will also be responsible for: The Union of the Writers; The Union of the Composers; The Union of the Plastic Artists.

The Central Committee of the RCP

The National Conference of the RCP ended its sessions on October 21, 1945, electing the CC of the Party, composed of the following comrades:

The members of the CC:

1. Apostol Gheorghe
2. Bodnăraș Emil
3. Câmpeanu Constantin
4. Ceaușescu Nicolae
5. Chișinevski Iosif
6. Constantinescu Miron
7. Coliu Dumitru
8. Crăciun Constanța
9. Georgescu Teohari
10. Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej
11. Luca Vasile
12. Maurer Gheorghe
13. Mârza Vasile
14. Moghioroș Alexandru
15. Neagu Andrei
16. Pârvulescu Constantin
17. Pătrășcanu Lucrețiu
18. Pătrășcu Andrei
19. Pauker Ana
20. Popa Emil
21. Popa Ilie
22. Rangheț Iosif
23. Silaghi Leontin
24. Stoica Chivu
25. Tudorache Elena
26. Vaida Vasile
27. Vasilichi Gheorghe

The alternate members of the CC:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Chișinevski Liuba | 5. Mujic Mihai |
| 2. Drăgan Ilie | 6. Petre Ion |
| 3. Drăghici Alexandru | 7. Radnev Gheorghe |
| 4. Focșeneanu Dumitru | 8. Roșianu Mihai |

On October 22, 1945 the first plenary session appointed the Political Bureau composed of the following comrades: Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej; Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu; Chivu Stoica; Gheorghe Vasilichi; Miron Constantinescu.

And the **Secretariat** composed of comrades: Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej; Ana Pauker; Teohari Georgescu; Vasile Luca

The President of the Central Control Commission was named comrade Constantin Pârvulescu.

The Political Bureau of the CC of the RWP

The plenary meeting of 24 .II. 1948 established the following composition of:

The Political Bureau:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Apostol Gheorghe | 8. Luca Vasile |
| 2. Bodnăraș Emil | 9. Moghioroș Alexandru |
| 3. Chișinevski Iosif | 10. Pauker Ana |
| 4. Constantinescu Miron | 11. Lotar Rădăceanu |
| 5. Georgescu Teohari | 12. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 6. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe | 13. Voitec Vasile |
| 7. Iordăchescu Teodor | |

The alternate members of the Political Bureau:

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Chivu Stoica | 4. Tănase Zaharia |
| 2. Moraru Mihai | 5. Vaida Vasile |
| 3. Rangheț Iosif | |

The plenary session of the CC of May 25-26, 1952 appointed the following members of the Political Bureau:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe | 6. Chivu Stoica |
| 2. Chișinevski Iosif | 7. Bodnăraș Emil |
| 3. Moghioroș Alexandru | 8. Borilă Petre |
| 4. Constantinescu Miron | 9. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 5. Apostol Gheorghe | |

The alternate members of the Political Bureau: Rangheț Iosif, Coliu Dumitru

The composition of the Political Bureau after the plenary session of April 19, 1954:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghiu – Dej Gheorghe | 6. Chivu Stoica |
| 2. Chișinevski Iosif | 7. Bodnăraș Emil |
| 3. Moghiroș Alexandru | 8. Borilă Petre |
| 4. Constantinescu Miron | 9. Pârvulescu Constantin |
| 5. Apostol Gheorghe | |

The alternate members of the Political Bureau: Coliu Dumitru, Ceaușescu Nicolae, Drăghici Alexandru.

The plenary session of the CC of the RWP of 24 II 1948 elected the following members of the Political Bureau that they were also holding the position of:

1. Apostol Gheorghe, President of CGM (General Confederation of Labour)
2. Bodnăraș Emil, Minister of National Defense
3. Chișinevski Iosif, Secretary of the CC of the RWP (27.7.1948); Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
4. Constantinescu Miron, President of CSP
5. Georgescu Teohari, Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers; Minister of Internal Affairs
6. Gheorghiu –Dej Gh., Secretary General of the CC of the RWP, Minister of the National Economy, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (8.4.1949)
7. Iordăchescu Teodor, Minister of Constructions; Director of the Party Evening University (5.10.1949)
8. Vasile Luca, Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers; Minister of Finance
9. Moghiroș Alexandru, Secretary of the CC of the RWP (27.7.1948)
10. Pauker Ana, the Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers; Minister of Foreign Affairs
11. Rădăceanu Lotar, Minister of Labor and Social Assistance; Chief of the Department of political economy at the Parhon University (31.7.1951)
12. Vasilichi Gheorghe, Minister of Public Education, Member of the Bureau for Light Industry of the Council of Ministers (29.4.1951)
13. Voitec Ștefan, Vice-president of the Council of Ministers, Member of the Bureau for Light Industry of the Council of Ministers (29.4.1951)

The alternate members (having also the following positions):

1. Chivu Stoica, Minister of Metallurgy, Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (15.3.1953)

2. Moraru Mihai, Party Control Commission
3. Rangheț Iosif, Direction of Cadres, President of the Committee for Combustibles
4. Tănase Zaharia, responsible for CGM

The plenary session of the CC of the RWP of 26-27 V 1952 elected the following members of the Political Bureau who were also holding the position of:

1. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe: Secretary General of the CC of the RWP; President of the Council of Ministers (29.5.1952); President of the Superior Military Council (5.XI.52); Member of the Organizational Bureau.
2. Chișinevski Iosif: Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Member of the Organizational Bureau; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
3. Moghiroș Alexandru; Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Member of the Organizational Bureau
4. Constantinescu Miron: Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Member of the Organizational Bureau; President of the CSP
5. Apostol Gheorghe: Secretary of the CC of the RWP; Member of the Organizational Bureau; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers; Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
6. Chivu Stoica: Member of the Organizational Bureau; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
7. Bodnăraș Emil: Minister of the Armed Forces
8. Borilă Petre: President of the State Control Commission; Member of the Organizational Bureau
9. Pârvulescu Constantin: President of the Party Control Commission

The alternate members:

1. Iosif Rangheț: President of the Committee for Combustibles
2. Coliu Dumitru: General Director of the Special Direction of the Council of Ministers

The plenary session of April 19, 1954 elected the following members of the Political Bureau:

1. Gheorghiu - Dej Gheorghe: President of the Council of Ministers (29.5.52)
2. Chișinevski Iosif: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
3. Moghiroș Alexandru: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
4. Constantinescu Miron: Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
5. Apostol Gheorghe: Prime Secretary of the CC of the RWP
6. Chivu Stoica: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers; Minister of the Metallurgical Industry
7. Bodnăraș Emil: Minister of the Armed Forces; Vice-president of the Council of Ministers;

8. Borilă Petre: Vice-president of the Council of Ministers; President of the State Control Commission; Minister of Food Industry
9. Pârvulescu Constantin: President of the Party Control Commission

The alternate members:

1. Coliu Dumitru: Prime Secretary of the Regional Committee București; President of the State Control Commission
2. Ceaușescu Nicolae: Secretary of the CC of the RWP
3. Drăghici Alexandru: Minister of Internal Affairs

The plenary session of 28 XII 1955 elected the following members of the Political Bureau who were also holding the position of:

1. Gheorghiu – Dej Gheorghe: Prime Secretary of the CC of the RWP
2. Chivu Stoica: President of the Council of Ministers
3. Chișinevski Iosif: Secretary of the CC of the RWP
4. Apostol Gheorghe: President of the Central Council of the Unions
5. Moghioroș Alexandru: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
6. Bodnăraș Emil: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
7. Constantinescu Miron: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
8. Pârvulescu Constantin: President of the Party Control Commission; Director the Institute of History
9. Borilă Petre: Prime Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
10. Drăghici Alexandru: Minister of Internal Affairs
11. Ceaușescu Nicolae: Secretary of the CC of the RWP

The alternate members:

1. Coliu Dumitru: President of the State Control Commission
2. Sălăjan Leontin: Minister of Armed Forces
3. Răutu Leonte: Chief of the Propaganda and Culture Direction of the CC of the RWP
4. Voitec Ștefan: Minister of Internal Trade

11 IV 1956

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Document no. 10

**Membership of the Secretariat of the Political Bureau
The Secretariat of the CC of the RWP**

The Political Bureau meeting of February 24, 1948:

1. Gh. Gheorghiu – Dej: Secretary General
2. Ana Pauker: secretary

3. Vasile Luca: secretary
4. Teohari Georgescu: secretary
5. Lotar Rădăceanu: secretary

The Secretariat session of July 27, 1948 confirmed the Secretariat membership of the comrades Iosif Chișinevski and Alexandru Moghioroș
The plenary meeting of May 26-27, 1952: Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej; Iosif Chișinevski; Alexandru Moghioroș; Miron Constantinescu; Gheorghe Apostol

The plenary meeting of April 19, 1954:

1. Gheorghe Apostol: Prime secretary
2. Nicolae Ceaușescu: secretary
3. Dalea Mihai: secretary
4. Fazekas Janos: secretary

The plenary meeting of April 28, 1959:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej: Prime secretary
 2. Iosif Chișinevski: secretary
 3. Nicolae Ceaușescu: secretary
 3. Fazekas Janos: secretary
 4. Cozma Ioan: secretary
- EM 4 ex.
11 IV 1956

Document. no. 11

The composition of the Organizational Bureau elected after the plenary session of January 23, 1950:

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Gheorghe Apostol | 10. Gheorghiu – Dej Gheorghe |
| 2. Petre Borilă | 11. Georgescu Teohari |
| 3. Bunaciu Avram | 12. Luca Vasile |
| 4. Iosif Chișinevski | 13. Moghioroș Alexandru |
| 5. Chivu Stoica | 14. Pauker Ana |
| 6. Miron Constantinescu | 15. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 7. Constanța Crăciun | 16. Rădăceanu Lotar |
| 8. Alexandru Drăghici | 17. Răutu Leonte |
| 9. Florescu Gheorghe | |

The Organizational Bureau was dissolved after the plenary meeting of the CC of the RWP of August 1953.

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Document no. 12.

Members of the CC of RWP in 1953.

The members of the Central Committee of the RWP:

1. Tov. Gh. Gheorghiu
1. Tov. Iosif Chişinevski
3. Tov. Alexandru Moghioroş
4. Tov. Gheorghe Apostol
5. Tov. Miron Constantinescu
6. Tov. Chivu Stoica
7. Tov. Emil Bodnăraş
8. Petre Borilă
9. Constantin Pârvulescu
10. Dumitru Coliu
11. Alexa Augustin: General Prosecuting of the PRR
12. Bughici Simion: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
13. Ceauşescu Nicolaie: Ministry of Armed Forces
14. Chişinevski Luiba: Central Council of Trade Unions
15. Crăciun Constanţa: Literature and Art Section of the CC of the RWP
16. Dalea Mihai: Moscow
17. Drăghici Alexandru: Ministry of State Security
18. Florescu Gheorghe: AVASP
19. Iordăchescu Teodor: he is working at home, being ill
20. Mateescu Constantin: Centrocoop
21. Maurer Gheorghe: State Arbitration
22. Moraru Mihai: Central Council of Trade Unions
23. Niculi Ioan: Regional Popular Council of Iasi
24. Petrescu Dumitru: Ministry of Finance
25. Pas Ioan: Branch of the Union of the Writers, Stalin region
26. Pintilie Gheorghe: Ministry of State Security
27. Popa Emil: State Commission of Planning
28. Răutu Leonte: Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CC of the RWP
29. Rădăceanu Lotar: C.I. Parhon University
30. Rădăceanu Eugenia: he is unemployed, str. Lascăr Grunbergi
31. Stoica Gheorghe: Regional and Town Committee of the RWP Bucureşti

32. Sălăjan Leontin: Ministry of Armed Forces
33. Șerban Avram: Centrocoop, Financial Direction
34. Solomon Barbu: Law Court of Bucharest
35. Suder Vilian: Bureau for Industry of the Council of Ministers
36. Tov. Toma Sorin: Editorial staff of the newspaper „Scânteia”
37. Vaida Vasile: Regional Popular Council of Bucharest
38. Vasilichi Gheorghe: Light Industry Section of the CC of the RWP
39. Vass Ghizela: Comitetul Orășenesc de Partid București
40. Voitec Ștefan: he is at home
41. Zaharia Tănase: Central Council of Unions

The alternate members of the CC of the RWP:

42. Bunaciu Avram: C.I. Parhon University
43. Bontea Ștefan: Siderurgical Combine "Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej" Hunedoara
44. Braeșter Aron: Popular Council of Bucharest
45. Drăgoiescu Petre: Ministry of Public Education
46. Ionescu Vasile: Publishing house, polygraphy and distribution section
47. Manole Ofelia: Art Committee
48. Mujic Mihai: Central Council of Trade Unions
49. Roșianu Mihail: Radio Committee
50. Vințe Ion: Ministry of State Security

31 VII 1953

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The members of the Central Committee of the RWP:

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Tov. Gh. Gheorghiu | 14. Chișinevski Luiba |
| 2. Tov. Iosif Chișinevski | 15. Crăciun Constanța |
| 3. Tov. Alexandru Moghiroș | 16. Dalea Mihai |
| 4. Tov. Gheorghe Apostol | 17. Drăghici Alexandru |
| 5. Tov. Miron Constantinescu | 18. Florescu Gheorghe |
| 6. Tov. Chivu Stoica | 19. Iordăchescu Teodor |
| 7. Tov. Emil Bodnăraș | 20. Mateescu Constantin |
| 8. Petre Borilă | 21. Maurer Gheorghe |
| 9. Constantin Pârvulescu | 22. Moraru Mihai |
| 10. Dumitru Coliu | 23. Niculi Ioan |
| 11. Alexa Augustin | 24. Petrescu Dumitru |
| 12. Bughici Simion | 25. Pas Ioan |
| 13. Ceaușescu Nicolaie | 26. Pintilie Gheorghe |

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|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 27. Popa Emil | 35. Suder Vilian |
| 28. Răutu Leonte | 36. Toma Sorin |
| 29. Rădăceanu Lotar | 37. Vaida Vasile |
| 30. Rădăceanu Eugenia | 38. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 31. Stoica Gheorghe | 39. Vass Ghizela |
| 32. Sălăjan Leontin | 40. Voitec Ștefan |
| 33. Șerban Avram | 41. Zaharia Tănase |
| 34. Solomon Barbu | 42. Fazekas Janos |

The alternate members of the CC of the RWP:

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 43. Bunaciu Avram | 48. Manole Ofelia |
| 44. Bontea Ștefan | 49. Mujic Mihai |
| 45. Braeșter Aron | 50. Roșianu Mihail |
| 46. Drăgoiescu Petre | 51. Vințe Ion |
| 47. Ionescu Vasile | 52. Doncea Constantin |

29 VII 1953

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Document 13.

Responsibilities of the members of CC in 1954

The assigning of the tasks to the members of the CC of the RWP within their organizations at their working place:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 1. Tov. Gh. Gheorghiu - Dej | |
| 2. Iosif Chișinevski | The Council of Ministers |
| 3. Alexandru Moghioroș | The Section of the party, trade unions and UWY's leading bodies |
| 4. Gheorghe Apostol | the Ministry of Agriculture |
| 5. Miron Constantinescu | The State Commission of Planning |
| 6. Chivu Stoica | The Ministry of Metallurgy and Chemical Industry |
| 7. Emil Bodnăraș | The Ministry of Armed Forces |
| 8. Petre Borilă | The Ministry of Food Industry |
| 9. Constantin Pârvulescu | The Party Control Commission |
| 10. Dumitru Coliu | Base organization of the Active of Party Committee București |
| 11. Alexa Constantin | The General Prosecuting of the PRR |
| 12. Bughici Simion | The Ministry of Foreign Affairs |

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| 13. Ceaușescu Nicolae | The Ministry of Armed Forces |
| 14. Chișinevski Liuba | The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |
| 15. Crăciun Constanța | The Ministry of Culture |
| 16. Dalea Mihai | The PRR Embassy of Moscow |
| 17. Drăghici Alexandru | The Ministry of Internal Affairs |
| 18. Florescu Gheorghe | AVASP |
| 19. Iordăchescu Teodor | Base organization in his quarter |
| 20. Mateescu Constantin | Centrocoop |
| 21. Maurer Gheorghe | The State Arbitration |
| 22. Niculi Ioan | The Regional Popular Council of Iași |
| 23. Moraru Mihai | The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |
| 24. Petrescu Dumitru | The Ministry of Finance |
| 25. Pas Ion | The branch of the Union of the Writers, Stalin region |
| 26. Pintilie Gheorghe | The Minister of Internal Affairs |
| 27. Popa Emil | The State Commission of Planning |
| 28. Leonte Răutu | The Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CC of the RWP |
| 29. Rădăceanu Lotar | C.I. Parhon University |
| 30. Rădăceanu Eugenia | Base organization in his quarter |
| 31. Stoica Gheorghe | The Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| 32. Sălăjan Leontin | The Ministry of Armed Forces |
| 33. Șerban Avram | Centrocoop – The Financial Direction |
| 34. Solomon Barbu | The Law court of Bucharest |
| 35. Tov. Suder Wiliam | The Bureau for Industry of the Council of the Ministers |
| 36. Toma Sorin | The editorial staff of the newspaper „Scânteia” |
| 37. Vaida Vasile | The Regional Popular Council of Bucharest |
| 38. Vasilichi Gheorghe | The Light Industry Section of the CC of the RWP |
| 39. Vass Ghizela | The CC of the RWP, headquarter on street Ștefan Gheorghiu nr. 18 |
| 40. Voitec Ștefan | Base organization in his quarter |
| 41. Zaharia Tănase | The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |

The alternate members of the CC of the RWP:

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 42. Bunaciu Avram | C.I. Parhon University |
|-------------------|------------------------|

43. Bontea Ștefan	C.S. „Gheorghiu - Dej” – Hunedoara
44. Braeșter Aron	The Popular Council of Bucharest
45. Drăgoescu Petre	The Ministry of Public Education
46. Ionescu Vasile	The publishing house, polygraphy and distribution section
47. Manole Ofelia	The Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CC of the RWP
48. Mujic Mihai	The Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR
49. Roșianu Mihail	The Radio Committee
50. Vințe Ioan	The Ministry of State Security

April 19, 1954

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Document no. 14 Leaders of the RWP in 1955. Their positions and tasks

The members of the Central Committee of the RWP:

The Political Bureau:

1. Gheorghe Gheorghiu -Dej
2. Chișinevski Iosif
3. Moghiroș Alexandru
4. Constantinescu Miron
5. Apostol Gheorghe
6. Chivu Stoica
7. Bodnăraș Emil
8. Borilă Petre
9. Pârvulescu Constantin

The alternate members:

10. Coliu Dumitru
11. Ceaușescu Nicolae
12. Drăghici Alexandru

The Secretariat:

Gheorghe Apostol - prime secretary; Nicolae Ceaușescu - secretary; Fazekas Ianos - secretary

The members of the Central Committee of the RWP:

1. Alexa Augustin
2. Bughici Simion

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 3. Chișinevski Liuba | 18. Stoica Gheorghe |
| 4. Crăciun Constanța | 19. Sălăjan Leontin |
| 5. Florescu Gheorghe | 20. Șerban Avram |
| 6. Iordăchescu Teodor | 21. Solomon Barbu |
| 7. Mateescu Constantin | 22. Suder Wiliam |
| 8. Maurer Gheorghe | 23. Toma Sorin |
| 9. Moraru Mihai (tăiat) | 24. Vaida Vasile |
| 10. Niculi Ion | 25. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 11. Petrescu Dumitru | 26. Vass Ghizela |
| 12. Pas Ion | 27. Voitec Ștefan |
| 13. Pintilie Gheorghe | 28. Zaharia Tănase |
| 14. Popa Emil | 29. Mujic Mihai |
| 15. Răutu Leonte | 30. Roșianu Mihail |
| 16. Rădăceanu Eugenia | 31. Dalea Mihai |
| 17. Rădăceanu Lotar | |

The alternate members:

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 32. Bunaciu Avram | 36. Ionescu Vasile |
| 33. Bontea Ștefan | 37. Manole Ofelia |
| 34. Braeșter Aron | 38. Vințe Ion |
| 35. Drăgoescu Petre | 39. Doncea Constantin |

The assigning of the tasks to the members of the CC of the RWP within their organizations at their working place:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1. Tov. Gh. Gheorghiu – Dej | Direction of Affairs of the CC of the RWP |
| 2. Iosif Chișinevski | Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CC of the RWP |
| 3. Alexandru Moghioroș | Council of Ministers |
| 4. Gheorghe Apostol | Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |
| 5. Miron Constantinescu | Council of Ministers |
| 6. Chivu Stoica | Council of Ministers |
| 7. Emil Bodnăraș | Ministry of Armed Forces (<i>Council of Ministers</i>) |
| 8. Petre Borilă | Council of Ministers |
| 9. Constantin Pârvulescu | Party Control Commission |
| 10. Dumitru Coliu | State Control Commission |
| 11. Ceaușescu Nicolae | Leading Bodies Section of CC of RWP |
| 12. Alexandru Drăghici | Minister of Internal Affairs |
| 13. Fazekas Janos | Consum Goods Section of CC of RWP |
| 14. Alexa Augustin | General Prosecuting of the PRR |
| 15. Bughici Simion | Council of Ministers |

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| 16. Chişinevski Liuba | Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |
| 17. Crăciun Constanţa | Ministry of Culture |
| 18. Dalea Mihai | Minister of Collecting |
| 19. Florescu Gheorghe | AVSAP |
| 20. Iordăchescu Teodor | Base organization in his quarter |
| 21. Mateescu Constantin | Centrocoop |
| 22. Maurer Gheorghe | State Arbitration |
| 23. Niculi Ioan | Town Popular Council Iaşi |
| 24. Petrescu Dumitru | Council of Ministers |
| 25. Pas Ion | Ministry of Culture |
| 26. Pintilie Gheorghe | Minister of Internal Affairs |
| 27. Popa Emil | State Commission of Planning |
| 28. Leonte Răutu | Propaganda and Agitation Section of the
CC of the RWP |
| 29. Rădăceanu Eugenia | Base organization in his quarter |
| 30. Stoica Gheorghe | Minister of Internal Affairs |
| 31. Sălăjan Leontin | Ministry of Armed Forces |
| 32. Şerban Avram | Centrocoop – The Financial Direction |
| 33. Solomon Barbu | Law court of Bucharest |
| 34. Suder Wiliam | Petroşani |
| 35. Toma Sorin | Editorial staff of the newspaper „Scântea” |
| 36. Vaida Vasile | Regional Popular Council of Bucharest |
| 37. Vasilichi Gheorghe | UCECOM |
| 38. Vass Ghizela | Women’s Party Activity Section |
| 39. Voitec Ştefan | Ministry of Internal Trade |
| 40. Zaharia Tănase | Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |
| 41. Bunaciu Avram | Presidium of the GNA |
| 42. Bontea Ştefan | Factory Mao-Tse-Dun Bucureşti |
| 43. Braeşter Aron | Popular Council of Bucharest |
| 44. Drăgoescu Petre | Ministry of Education |
| 45. Ionescu Vasile | General Direction of Printing Houses,
Publications and Distribution. |
| 46. Manole Ofelia | ARLUS (Romanian Association for
Strengthen Connections with USSR) |
| 47. Mujic Mihai | Central Council of Trade Unions of the PRR |
| 48. Roşianu Mihail | IRRCS |
| 49. Vinţe Ion | the Administrative Section of the CC of the
RWP |
| 50. Doncea Constantin | Popular Council of Capital City Bucurteşti |

25 oct. 1955

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Document no 15. Members of the CC of RWP from Bucharest, 1956

The table containing the names of the members and of the alternate members of the CC of the RWP from Bucharest:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Alexa Constantin | 24. Stancu Aurel |
| 2. Bărlădeanu Alexandru | 25. Toma Sorin |
| 3. Breitenhofer Anton | 26. Vass Ghizela |
| 4. Bughici Simion | 27. Alexe Eugen |
| 5. Bunaciu Avram | 28. Ionescu Vasile |
| 6. Crăciun Constanța | 29. Ioniță Ioan |
| 7. Daju Pavel | 30. Malinski Vasile |
| 8. Drăgoescu Petre | 31. Manole Ofelia |
| 9. Florescu Mihai | 32. Marinescu Aneta |
| 10. Gavriliuc Mihai | 33. Mateescu Constantin |
| 11. Gluvacov Ioan | 34. Maurer Gheorghe |
| 12. Hosu Gheorghe | 35. Nădejde Constantin |
| 13. Iordăchescu Theodor | 36. Răceanu Ileana |
| 14. Lascu Elena Iordăchescu | 37. Roșianu Mihai |
| 15. Mujic Mihai | 38. Simulescu Dumitru |
| 16. Murgulescu Ilie | 39. Toma Ana |
| 17. Pas Ioan | 40. Trofin Virgil |
| 18. Petre Lupu | 41. Țugui Pavel |
| 19. Popa Gherasim | 42. Vasilichi Gheorghe |
| 20. Preoteasa Grigore | 43. Verdeș Vasile |
| 21. Scarlat Constantin | 44. Voicu Ștefan |
| 22. Șerban Miron | 26 V.1956 |
| 23. Solomon Barbu | |

Document no. 16

The Sections of the CC of the RWP

- 1.The Affairs Section of the CC of the RWP
- 2.Household of the Party Section of the CC of RWP
- 3.The Party Organs Section of the CC of RWP
- 4.The Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CC of RWP
- 5.The Science and Culture Section of the CC of RWP
- 6.The Schools Section of the CC of the RWP

- 7.The Direction of Propaganda and Culture of the CC of RWP
- 8.The Agrarian Section of the CC of RWP
- 9.The Cadres' Recruiting Direction of the CC of RWP
- 10.The Section of the foreign affairs' cadres of the CC of RWP
- 11.The Foreign Affairs Section of the CC of the RWP
- 12.The Cadres' Section of the CC of the RWP
- 13.The Heavy Industry Section of the CC of RWP
- 14.The Consumption Goods Section of the CC of RWP
- 15.The Administrative Section of the CC of RWP
- 16.The Section of Constructions of the CC of RWP
- 17.The Transportation and Telecommunications Section of the CC of the RWP
- 18.The Women's Party Activity Section of the CC of RWP
19. The Party Control Commission
20. Central Commission for Review
- 21.The Party Commission for the Nationalities' Problems
- 22.The Plan - Finance - Trade and Cooperation Section of the CC of the RWP

The list of the sections of the CC of the RWP, October 5, 1955

- 1.The Leading Party Organs Section
 - 2.The Propaganda and Culture Section of the CC of RWP
 - 3.The Science and Culture Section of the CC of RWP
 - 4.The Heavy Industry and Transportation Section of the CC of RWP
 - 5.The Agrarian Section of the CC of RWP
 - 6.The Consumption Goods, Plan, Finance Section of the CC of RWP
 - 7.The Foreign Affairs Section of the CC of RWP
 - 8.The Administrative Section of the CC of RWP
 - 9.The Women's Party Activity Section of the CC of RWP
 - 10.The Cadres' Section of the CC of RWP
 - 11.Haousehol of the Party Section
 - 12.Affairs Section of the CC of RWP
 - 13.„Synthesis" sector
- and
- 1.The Party Control Commission
 2. Commission for Review
- 2.5 X 1955

**Instituții de stat, organizații de masă și obștești, conduse de către CC al
PMR**

- 1.The Presidium of the GNA (*Great National Assembly*)
 - 2.The Council of Ministers
 - 3.The General Prosecuting of the PRR
 - 4.The Supreme Law Court of the PRR
 - 5.CCS (*Central Council of Trade Unions*)
 - 6.UWY (*Union of Young Workers*)
 - 7.ARLUS (Romanian Association for Strengthen Connections with USSR)
 - 8.The Committee of Democratic Women
 - 9.AVSAP
 - 10.The Red Cross
 - 11.FIAP (*International Federation of Photographic Art ?*)
 - 12.IRRCS (*The Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries*)
 - 13.Romanian National Group at the Inter-parlamentarian Union
 - 14.The Association for United Nations
 - 15.SRSC (*Society for Promoting Science and Culture*)
 - 16.The Art Unions
- [Hand writing: *Securitatea; the association of the Jurists*]
5 X 1955
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II. A new face of an old communist. Emil Bodnăraș Conversation with Harry G. Barnes on 1974.

Two pages enter here

SECRET/EXDIS

Page 1 of Encl[osure] no.1,
A-146 Bucharest

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: EMIL BODNĂRAȘ, Vice President, Council of State
 Teodor Dițulescu, Counselor, Romanian Foreign
Minister
 Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, American
Ambassador
 Edward A. Mainland, Political Officer, American
Embassy, Bucharest

DATE AND PLACE: May 17, 1974, 9.00-11.25, Council of State, Bucharest, Romania

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon on Political Subjects

The Ambassador's courtesy call, his first full meeting with Bodnăraș, stretched out nearly 2 ½ hours as the number two-ranked leader touched on nearly all Romania's key foreign policy preoccupations, often with surprising candor. Displaying a keen, detailed sense of history, Bodnăraș, now in his 71st year, prefaced the conversation with a 20-minute monologue about Romania's millennia-long struggle for national existence – background, he said, to today Romania's "socialism". Bodnăraș was lucid and forceful, occasionally slapping the table for emphasis. After meandering through an anecdote an aside, he never failed to snap the discussions back into focus in ways, which revealed that his discursiveness had some illustrative purpose.

Soviet "Imperialist" Mentality Described. As he had done with senator Scott several weeks before (refair A), Bodnăraș returned repeatedly to his thesis that the current soviet leadership is so thoroughly imbued with "imperialist" mentality that it has little to do with real "socialism". Lingering for effect over the phrase, he said the Chinese were entirely correct in terming the Soviet rulers "new tsars"; he recalled Peter the Great's last testament which, he argued, Moscow seemed to be following to the latter, notably in expanding into the Near East. Bodnăraș opined that while the word of an English gentleman or even a Chinese Communist, for example, was as good as his bond, not even a whole shelf of dictionaries would suffice to pin down the Soviets in negotiations and agreements.

Reviewing the USSR's internal scene, he characterized Soviet rule as similar of the old Tsarist guberniya system in which captive provinces were dominated primarily by raw military force as well as by imposed Russian satraps. When the Ambassador mentioned his having done historical research on the Bessarabian question in 1917-1918 and asked about the status of that area now Bodnăraș discussed at some length how some of the Romanian population in Soviet Moldavia had earlier been deported and bribed into going in Central Asia, but mused that with modern means of communication (seeming to include those beamed from Romania) it was becoming harder for Moscow to isolate such people as Moldavians (Romanians), whose identity he said was still intact. Bodnăraș lamented the tragic fate of the Crimean Tatar nation which had been packed of to Central Asia by Stalin "in two nights" with terrible loss of life. He again (refair A)

touched on Soviet mythmaking aimed at rationalizing Moscow's power grabs, citing the division of Germany into two "so-called" nations as comparable to the attempt to portray Moldavia something apart from Romania.

Bodnăraș recalled a half-gleeful, half-worrisome anecdote: when Gheorghiu-Dej on his own agreed to the stationing of two senior Soviet military officers in Romania to represent the Warsaw Pact's unified command after soviet forces had been withdrawn from the country in 1958. One of these, the Soviet naval representative, promptly began touring Romanian installations to recruit agents from among Romanian personnel who had been trained earlier in the Soviet Union. When he was called in and roughly ordered to stop by Gen. Ioniță, the Soviet officer sat transfixed ("like a bird watching a cobra") and at the end had only one question: "If there was so much as one Soviet regiment on Romanian soil, would you dare to treat me this way? Bodnăraș added, "he was right!" This was another demonstration, he said, of the Soviet reliance on force only; their policy he summed up is that of "diktat" and "hegemony". He went on to note that Romania has to try to maintain good relations with the USSR since the Soviet Union is, after all, a big neighbor, but Romania is in deep disagreement with the "anti-socialist" policies of what he referred to as the "transient (trecătoare)" Soviet leadership.

Low opinion of Brezhnev Revealed. Although Bodnăraș had little good to say about any current Soviet Politburo member and scorned them as a collective (he said Khrushchev was worth more than whole current leadership put together), he was particularly unflattering toward Brezhnev whom he termed an "apparatchik" of little breadth or depth, spread too thin for his abilities, and tired and ill despite a seemingly bluff robust exterior. Bodnăraș claimed that Brezhnev was the most poorly informed of any top leader he dealt with, a man who only penetrated superficially into his subject matter. Bodnăraș said this flaw made for unpredictability and danger, for Brezhnev was in large measure dependent for information on what the apparat fed him. Statecraft, Bodnăraș smiled sadly, is difficult enough even for well-informed leaders.

Bodnăraș recalled that in 1970 when serious floods had ravaged Romania, Moscow had decided the time had come to "force Romania to her knees". Brezhnev, however, made his case to Ceaușescu reading woodenly from briefing papers prepared by others, and Ceaușescu rather easily disposed of Soviet arguments. On another occasion, in early 1965 after the ouster of Khrushchev, Bodnăraș said, he had been present with Gheorghiu-

Dej when Brezhnev had called to say that the Chinese were proposing that Chiu and Liu come to Moscow ("everyone but Mao himself", Bodnăraş shock his head). But Brezhnev clearly had no idea what the purpose of this gesture was nor what to do, and simply floundered (here Bodnăraş lapsed into caustic mimicry, in good Russian, of a buffoon-like Brezhnev). Unfortunately, Bodnăraş went on, Brezhnev listened not to Romanian counsel but to that of marshal Malinovski's ilk and let slip by an historic chance to moderate Sino-Soviet tensions. Khrushchev, Bodnăraş added, should have finished off apparatchiks like Brezhnev before they finished him off.

Andropov and Soviet Military Also rapped. Soviet KGB Chief and Politburo member Yuriy Andropov, Bodnăraş said, was another example of a Soviet leader who "doesn't understand politics" and his narrow, limited insight, a shortcoming particularly regrettable in a security policeman, he added. Bodnăraş recalled that it had been Andropov's misleading reporting which had caused Khrushchev to mishandle the onset of what Bodnăraş termed the "revolt of the Hungarian military" in 1956. Bodnăraş was also scathingly contemptuous of the Soviet military leadership, whom he called the "most backward in all of Eastern Europe"; lacking any political sense, he said, they thought only in terms of brute power and force to achieve Soviet ends. Bodnăraş said he was "sure" that if the Dubcek regime had resolved to fight in 1968 and had made clear this intention to the USSR, there would have been no invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Bodnăraş Skeptikal About US-Soviet "Détente". Given the proclivities of the Soviets to rely on brute force, Bodnăraş continued, détente between the US and USSR can well amount nothing more than a tentative "armistice" arising from mutual fear of atomic weapons held by both. Detente will be mere "smoke, mist", Bodnăraş feared, until both sides understand in the same way, which is not now the case. Brezhnev thinks he now has free hand. The Soviets, Bodnăraş went on, feed in tension; he wondered who was more interested, for example in maintaining NATO, Brezhnev or Nixon. For the Soviets, NATO serves as the sole remaining justification for retaining the Red Army's "occupation troops" in Eastern Europe. The Soviets have never been seriously interested in a German peace treaty he charged, because this would mean talking about East Prussia, the unity of Germany, and other hard issues. Soviet leaders had brusquely dismissed Romanian queries about such a treaty saying the German question had been settled, the division was permanent, and Brandt's policy was not a guarantee: "As if Germans, east and west, will not eventually come together!" Bodnăraş exclaimed. He glumly maintained that Brandt had made far too many concessions to the Soviets for too little in return.

To the Ambassador's queries whether Bodnăraș saw any alternatives to the quest for a US-Soviet détente and whether demise of NATO would not be highly dangerous to Romania given the type of Soviet mentality Bodnăraș described, Bodnăraș had no ready answers. He tossed the ball back by saying the US need to think of some way to make use this "armistice" with the Soviets to reduce the utility to them of the NATO excuse. He appeared to believe that existing contradictions in the Soviet environment ((internal problems, China, etc.) would be effective brakes on Muscovite behavior even without the NATO factor as prominent as it now is. Seeming to favor letting the Kremlin stew in its own juice, Bodnăraș singled out the Soviet national minorities as a potentially serious "unresolved" problem with which the Kremlin has yet to learn to cope: "Brezhnev can expel one Solzhenitsyn", Bodnăraș remarked, "but hardly millions of Uzbeks or Azerbaidzhanians".

Middle East. In Bodnăraș's view, Moscow was clearly trying to undercut Secretary Kissinger's essentially constructive peacemaking efforts. He considered the terrorist incident at Maalot as probably a Soviet-sponsored provocation. He saw Soviet behavior in the Middle East as another example of Moscow's reliance on continued tensions and military force to gain influence. He cited Irak: Moscow had poured in weaponry to benefit whichever army general happened to be in control and the process had wrecked a promising Communist party with a substantial workers' base along with allied "progressive forces". The same lack of a Marxist class approach was seen in USSR's dealings with Syria, Jordan and especially Egypt, where Bodnăraș thought the irony was exquisite: "Soviet missiles guarding Egyptian cities, the jails of which are filled with Communist party members!"

The Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bagdash, Bodnăraș claimed, had returned to Syria only after having been turned by Soviets into a "human wreck, an alcoholic". Soviet weapons, he noted, had gone to work suppressing the Kurds whose leader Barzani the Romanians had assisted (Bodnăraș said he had personally been involved) in returning to Iraq during the late 1950's from the USSR where he had been forced to work with his brothers as a simple collective farmer because the Soviets had disliked his independent attitude.

Bodnăraș said the Soviets had gone so far as to dog the steps of Romanian commercial representatives in Arab countries (and in Latin America) and deliberately underbid them, even to the point of giving away free goods and services. Bodnăraș advised the US to be cautious in its policy

toward Egypt, but it was not clear whether he thought the US should avoid too close a diplomatic relationship with Egypt because this might provoke a Soviet counter-response and perhaps complicate progress toward a peace settlement, or whether by trying to replace the Soviets in running the Middle East show the US might thereby incur renewed Arab hostility.

Warsaw Pact. To the Ambassador's questions on Romania's position toward Warsaw Pact and CEMA, Bodnăraș first emphasized that in the Romanian view the two entities were entirely separate (perhaps reflecting previously rumored Soviet attempts to drag CEMA matters into April's Warsaw PCC meeting). He said Brezhnev had spent two hours at Warsaw trying to get Ceaușescu to agree to a condemnation of China in PCC communiqué, which was the reason the bilateral communiqué had referred to their meeting as only "comradely". Ceaușescu of course refused. Bodnăraș said Ceaușescu had won a point on inclusion of language on the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact which, although already embodied in the original text of the Pact itself, was "not so easy to get the Soviets to recognize lately".

Bodnăraș agreed with the Ambassador that in both the Pact and CEMA the Soviets were pursuing a dialectical approach of increasing efforts to tighten up as a reaction to the challenge of détente. Bodnăraș was categoric[al] that Romanian policy would continue to oppose Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil except for map drills and air defense exercises over Romania. He said Romanian forces in the past had used Soviet test ranges for tactical missileery but now had their own range from cape Midia to Sulina and no longer need Soviet help. Romania now manufactures some of its own military hardware, Bodnăraș noted. He said the GDR had proposed to the Soviets a joint fighter aircraft project, but when Moscow refused, Romania turned to the Yugoslavs and the British for the cooperation in this field, which is now underway. At the same time, Romania was trying to cut down its own military expenditures somewhat, figuring it might profit a bit from détente.

Bodnăraș stated that Romania gave some thought to withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact as the Albanians had done in 1968, but had concluded that it was better to stay inside the Pact's councils where, although without any influence in running the Pact's military affairs, Romania could at least ask questions and try to keep informed. He recalled that Ceaușescu had berated Brezhnev for not consulting with him about intervention in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev replied he had not because he knew Ceaușescu would oppose, to which Ceaușescu replied he would have told Brezhnev

how reckless and harmful an adventure it was. Bodnăraș reiterated in this context the constant use by the Soviets of the argument of existence of NATO against any loosening of the Pact bonds.

CEMA and Bulgaria. Bodnăraș stressed Romania's concept of CEMA's "openness" which he defined as the right of member states to cooperate only selectively according to their national economic interests and receptivity to other states to join in the organization. He stressed that the Soviets really mean "diktat" or "subordination" when they say "integration" as the Bulgarian and Hungarian experiences showed. He averred that although the "integration" in the title of 1971 CEMA complex program, they had been able to keep the concept out of the text itself except in terms acceptable to them. Romania does not accept, for example, the overall unified plan approach to the Soviets.

Bodnăraș touched briefly on the differences between advanced and underdeveloped CEMA partners. He noted that the Bulgarians despite their very successful agriculture had trouble provisioning their population because too much produce was being sent to the USSR. (In this same vein, he cited Habib Bourghiba's visit to Eastern Europe when the Tunisian leader had sought to see whether it was possible to build a socialist society in a small country and how Bourghiba had been appalled at the degree of Soviet domination of Bulgaria, and contrasting independence of Romania.) In an earlier remark in another context, however, he alluded to his belief that the Bulgarians are not always quite as docile as others think they are).

US-Romanian Relations. Bodnăraș hammered away at the political significance MFN could have for Romania. He argued that, above all, it was important that the Soviets not get the idea that Romania's relations with the US were a function of US-USSR relations, or that MFN for Romania was conditioned on the USSR's receiving similar status. Bodnăraș recalled that in 1969, Romania had wanted to welcome the visit of President Nixon even though it has caused friction with the Soviets (who had refused to send a high-level delegation to the Romanian Party Congress immediately afterward); nevertheless, Romania had hoped to show through this visit that the Yalta Agreement was dead, that Eastern Europe was not the exclusive province of one great power. He cited this behavior as an example of the fact that Romania has a very clear idea of its own interests and sees no point to doing things simply for the sake of words or gestures of "friendship".

He went on to say that it was important the way Romania was accorded MFN, and if the Soviets were not going to get MFN, as Bodnăraș now thought, MFN for Romania should not be held up further or tied to the

USSR's problems. (COMMENT: Although Ceaușescu had told US CODEL IPU members in mid-April just after his return from Warsaw, that it would be greatly preferable if MFN were given to all socialist states, including the USSR at the same time, both Manea Mănescu and now Bodnăraș have seemed to stress the original Romanian line that the GDR will be glad to receive MFN even if the Soviets do not).

Bodnăraș claimed that Husak in Czechoslovakia had wanted to invite President Nixon (he was not clear when) but had of course bowed to Soviet disapproval; similarly, the Portuguese Communist leader Alvaro Cunhal had refused to see Ceaușescu's recent emissary to Portugal Mihnea Gheorghiu because Cunhal had not obtained permission from Moscow. The Romanian CP, he pointed out, behaved otherwise.

Emigration and Jewish Transits. The Ambassador pointed out that Romania's record in emigration particularly that to the United States and transits from USSR to Israel would probably get more attention in the United States if the Trade Bill failed and legislation on MFN for Romania separately came under active consideration. Bodnăraș responded that it was hard for him to see how anyone could fault Romania's emigration record: 400 000 Israelis were left, less than 20 000 of whom had exit applications pending- Bodnăraș added that although it was known in general terms, Romanian diplomacy had been extremely active after the October 1973 war in the Middle East diplomacy, urging various Arab governments and groups toward a political solution. While this was not due to any altruism -if general Middle East hostilities again broke out, Romania would at best be troubled by Soviet overflight and transit requests and at worst could be occupied on various pretexts - it had affected what Romania could do in Jewish emigration. This was true especially in the transit operation, where an additional complicating factor was the presence of what Bodnăraș called "Soviet provocateurs" among the Jewish emigrants. Bodnăraș claimed perhaps 30 percent of Soviet Jews had signed some sort of agreement with KGB in return for permission to emigrate, and that not a few of these had staged anti-Soviet demonstrations at the Gara de Nord station in order to embarrass Romania. These he did not think were genuine since Jews going through Bulgaria (sic!) - he apparently meant by train - had been quite and had not caused trouble. With regard to the future, he added only that of conditions (unspecified) improved, Romania might consider allowing transit to resume.

On the more general question on emigration from Romania, he expressed some exasperation with Senator Jackson, the sincerity of whose

motives he questioned. He noted that Rabbi Rosen had returned from America and urged that another thousand Jews be allowed to leave for the beneficial effect this would have on MFN. Bodnăraș snorted that he doubted another thousand one way or other made any difference to Jackson.

China. Bodnăraș generally followed many of the lines of his discussion with Senator Scott (refair) but sounded somewhat less sure this time that Chou's position was altogether secure. He termed Chou as the "pivotal figure", throughout the last few years able to deal with all factions, whose resurrected "Bandung" foreign policy was again in force. Although discounting the "anti-Confucius" campaign however, he remarked on Chou's age and heavy work schedule; when Bodnăraș had visited China in August 1973 he had found Chou working from 5 a.m. to 1 a.m. He also spoke of how talented and individual Teng is. Bodnăraș, in answer to the Ambassador's questions, said he saw no chance at all that China would again withdraw into itself and shrink back from the world stage. By way of proving the point, Bodnăraș noted, the Chinese invited Makarios just a few days previous and had earlier step up relations with a country as relatively insignificant as Malta. He went on to quip that there may soon be Chinese submarines in the Mediterranean Sea along with others. Bodnăraș said Romania had long urged the Chinese to join the UN but Peking for many years had felt it could do better on the outside. Now, Chinese diplomacy feeling its way and gaining confidence; in time it was sure to be a powerful factor.

Why Khrushchev Withdrew Soviet Troops from Romania. Turning to recollections of Khrushchev, Bodnăraș termed him "open" in contrast to the current crop of Soviet leaders, a man with a lively intelligence who listened and could "assess and adapt to realities"; even he, though, at the end became a prisoner of the apparatchiki.

Responding to the Ambassador's question, Bodnăraș went into considerable detail on how Khrushchev had agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from Romania (Refair A), a story that spanned the years 1956-1958. By 1956 it had become clear, he said, that the Soviets were insisting on whittling down national military forces in Eastern Europe while maintaining the size of their own "occupation" armies. In May of that year just after the Soviets had insisted on another 10 000-man cut, an Observer correspondent by coincidence happened to ask a general question on this line in a list of questions submitted to Gheorghiu-Dej who was at the Black Sea shore with Bodnăraș. The query was checked out from Bucharest (without Dej's knowledge) by then Romanian Politburo Chișinevshi with Molotov, who responded that "no reply should be given".

The RCP leadership, who had been longing for a chance to raise the question themselves, meanwhile had decided to ask Khrushchev who was then visiting Bulgaria to stop in Bucharest on the way back and was not deterred by the complications of what Molotov said. Bodnăraş, who was given the job of speaking for the Romanian leadership, suggested to Khrushchev that it might be well to consider withdrawing Soviet occupation troops so that it would not appear, as Western propaganda was alleging, that socialism could not survive without Soviet weapons. Khrushchev got mad (*s-a supărat*) and refused to consider the suggestion.

In 1958, however, on the way back with Chivu Stoica from a trip to Asian Communist countries where the Romanians had made sure to include "withdrawal of foreign troops" in all communiqué signed, Bodnăraş and Stoica were asked to stop in Moscow. In the presence of the full Soviet Politburo they were the surprised recipients of Khrushchev's declaration that "at Romania's request Soviet troops would be returned to the USSR". A nine-hour luncheon followed at which all eleven Soviet Politburo members each gave three speeches and smothered the Romanians with "fraternal affection".

Why did Khrushchev do it? Bodnăraş said he probably saw the move as a trial, thinking that he could trust the Romanian leadership (a faith that was fully justified, Bodnăraş hastened to add) and that Romania's geographic position precluded too much contact with the West. Events earlier in other East European countries had probably moved him to reconsider the "occupation" policy in effect before.

Warning on Thelegraphic Transmission Security. At the end of the meeting, Bodnăraş, rethinking the frankness of his remarks about the Soviet leadership, asked the Ambassador that any report on them be sent by pouch, not cable, adding that "one never know who is listening in". He even remarked to the MFA officer present that it would not be necessary to have the usual transcript prepared. It was not clear whether Bodnăraş knows or thinks he knows something about US communications security but he seemed genuinely concerned that his comments be kept strictly confidential. Earlier in the conversation he remarked that he was being unusually frank with the Ambassador because he knew the latter had been present at both summit meetings between Presidents Nixon and Ceauşescu.

Pol: EA Mainland/ Amb: H.G. Barnes jr.: mob.

[National Archives Records Administration, Nixon -Europe, 1974, May].

Some considerations about the historiography of the former Romanian political police – Securitatea

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The 20th century faced an increasing number of secret services all over the world, which stirred the interest of mass media. All these are not coming out of the blue, but fed the fundamental attraction of mankind toward secrecy, mystery and violence. The academic wits could not be indifferent to these and were interested as everybody in studying the secret services. The reason to their approach derives from the important role played by secret services in military combats or in politics no matter the political regime: democratic one or totalitarian.

In Romania, the public learnt of the existence and the importance of some foreign secret services even since 1944. As a consequence the Romanian institutions of this kind were frequently analyzed in critical terms or highly praised¹.

The situation changed completely once the communist regime became a power. A top-secret label defined more and more the activity of the Securitate's institution. Actually it was functioning as a unique organization, taking over the role of all previous institutions of this kind: Political Police Department (Siguranța), Gendarmerie, Second Section of the Great General Staff, Special Service of Information (S.S.I.).

Romanian people's access to these documents during communist regime was distorted. They learnt only about those brave security officers who fight constantly against enemies, inside or outside, and these information came fictionalized, in detective stories' shape. More than that, in order to prepare people from the ideological point of view a lot of papers have been translated and published. Their main aim was to reveal the evil character of the foreign secret services, the devious ways they reached their

¹ Ch. Lucieto, *Răsboiul inteligențelor în misiuni speciale: memoriile unui agent din serviciul de spionaj și contraspionaj al Înțelegerii*, Pitești, Tipografia „Artistica” P. Mitu, 1928; G-ral. I. Teodorescu, col. Z. Goescu, *Pericolul spionajului: ce trebuie să știe și de ce trebuie să se ferească orice bun român*, București, Tipografia Bucovina, I.E. Torouțiu, 1937; Ray Oscar, *Spionajul: istoric, tehnică, spioni*, București, Tipografia ziarului „Universul”, 1938; Silvan Alexandru, *Tainele războiului nevăzut*, București, Institutul de Arte Grafice „Bucovina”, f.a.

purposes². On the other hand, this communist propaganda presented over and over again the Securitate's brave actions³ or the heroic deeds of some socialist agents⁴.

There were some history papers, talking about inside world of the Secret Services, but their research area was restricted to the period previous to the Second World War⁵. The Securitate's mystery lasted and even grew as an omnipresent and omniscient force.

The violent collapse of the communist regime in Romania, the continuous association of the Communist Party with the Securitate institution and its involvement in the blooded events in December 1989, justified the connection made between this institution and post-revolution political conflicts. In addition to these, an emotional touch damaged these conflicts because it led to extreme subjective positions in the public discourse.

The securitate's officers found themselves in a similar position to that of the ex-S.S.I. officers after 23rd August 1944. The political regime they had been worked for collapsed and those who were considered "objectives" till then began now to claim the political power. They also pretend that people who contributed to the political oppression, meaning crimes and abuses

² Annabelle Bucar, *Adevărul asupra diplomaților americani*, București, Editura de Stat, 1949; Julius Mader, *Mâna cenușie: secretele serviciului de spionaj al Germaniei Occidentale*, București, 1963; *** *Fapte din Berlinul Occidental: acțiuni subversive, război economic, revanșism îndreptate împotriva statelor socialiste*, București, 1962; Efrim Borisovic Cerneak, *Cinci secole de război secret*, București, Editura Politică, 1968; Ilie Mocanu, *Însemnări despre spionajul tehnico-economic*, București, Editura Militară, 1975; Paul Rönitz, *Spionajul economic*, București, Editura Militară, 1976; Paul Ștefănescu, *Agenți secreți și misiuni confidențiale*, București, Editura Militară, 1978; Ilie Mocanu, *Rețeaua cenușie*, București, Editura politică, 1978; V.P. Borovička, *Din culisele războiului secret*, București, Editura Politică, 1973, Idem, *Cifruri strict secrete*, București, Editura Politică, 1984

³ *** *Procesul unui grup de spioni, trădători și complotiști în slujba Vaticanului și a Centrului de Spionaj Italian, București, 10-17 septembrie 1951*, București, Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Științifică, 1952

⁴ Mihail Kolesnikov, *Richard Sorge așa cum a fost*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1977

⁵ Nicolae Minei, *Frontul invizibil*, București, Editura Politică, 1971; Neagu Cosma, Dumitru Marinescu et al., *Fapte din umbră*, vol. I-IV, București, Editura Politică, 1975-1983; Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete în România în preajma și la începutul celui de-al doilea război mondial*, București, Editura Politică, 1973, Idem, *Impact la paralela 45°. Incursiune în culisele bătăliei pentru petrolul românesc*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1986, Idem, *O istorie mai puțin obișnuită: în culisele frontului secret din România*, București, Editura Politică, 1987; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988

during the communist regime, to be punished. The situation was complex: the ex-Securitate's employers had been temporarily sent to Army forces and after some time, almost completely reintegrated in the Romanian Information Service. They looked, in the same time, for protection among the group of Communist party's members who formed now the F.S.N. and held, in fact, the political power. As a consequence all the battles on the political stage, more or less visible, found echoes in the researches and debates regarding the Securitate's institution. This way of dealing with facts had its contribution in unifying the perspectives upon Securitate and the discourses related to it in post-totalitarian Romanian society. It is quite obvious that nothing was new and Benedetto Croce was right emphasizing that history is always contemporary. Therefore, pragmatic attitude towards the past and its value judgment in the benefit of the moment were and still are common practice in historiography. Apart from its servants' will, history remained a way to influence reality in political power's interest⁶.

Regarding the special issue of Securitate's historiography we have to emphasize some ideas. First of all, we used the term historiography in its most general meaning: it includes both the papers which respect the minimum elements from the history methodological point of view, but also those which represents its sources: memories, diaries, interviews.

Secondly, we made use of two main groups of papers, distinction made not from the way they respect the principles of history research but according to their type of discourse⁷.

To be more precise, we identified papers where, in spite of the academical background of the authors and their display of historical research tools, the discourse was rather inadequate. Thus, they adopt a very emotional, militant, anticommunist discourse, full of a vehement and vindictive rhetoric⁸. Anyway, only some of these papers' authors are actually historians. They are, usually victims of the communist regime,

⁶ Al. Zub, *Istorie și finalitate*, București, Editura Academiei Române, 1991, p. 21

⁷ Initially, we intend to do a classical approach and make a analyze structured by main types of papers: edit sources, tools like dictionaries, encyclopedias, bibliographies, general writing, specially work, but we considered more useful a taxonomy based by a type of discourse adopted by the researcher in their work.

⁸ Florin Abraham, *Direcții ale cercetării represiei comuniste în România după 1989*, in „Arhivele Totalitarismului”, anul XIV, nr.52-53 (3-4/2006), p. 191; In this category we include most of the papers presented at the annual conferences kept in Sighet, under supervision of the Civic Academia. See, for example, the volume entitled *Memoria ca formă de justiție: comunicări prezentate la Seminarul de la Sighetu Marmației (10-12 iunie 1994)*, București, Editura Făt Frumos, 1994; also see next ten volume *Analele Sighet*.

journalists looking for a roaring success or some political militants who understood by anticommunism a source of gaining political legitimacy.

The second group of papers, entirely different, is characterized by a professional approach, as their authors respect the historian's code and make use of honest methods of research. They remained within scientific discourse criteria, avoided both the usage of uncertain data and calling names, and more important than that, they did not make connexions between the past and the present from political point of view. In the same time, we need to mention that there are some papers belonging to authors who are not very experienced in history research but show a deep understanding of the epoch's problems and have also pertinent discourses.

As a consequence, the historiography dealing with this epoch is rather unbalanced. There is an overwhelming number of papers embarked upon serving political objectives of any kind comparing with those which want "to learn in order to know and not to blame"⁹.

The first category can be split into two groups: one is formed by papers strongly anticommunist and anti-Securitate written by former victims of the regime or by their relatives and the other belonging to the Romanian Service of Information, ex officers or important figures of the communist regime, which put in front of the reader justificative papers.

Powerful anticommunist accents are to be found mostly in memorialistical papers, written by victims of the Securitate. Naturally, those who lived a living hell during the totalitarian regime wanted to break the silence surrounding communists' crimes, to make them public. As we said before, this kind of papers "make use of a very ideological discourse", which "recognizes only two categories: the heroes (those who resisted the dissidents) and the anti-heroes (the torturers, communist activists, security members etc)"¹⁰. It is constantly avoided to cast light upon "the silent majority" of the population, majority which is even retroactively blamed.

It is difficult to make a selection among the great number of papers published after 1989. Our interest is to focus ourselves only upon those, which transcend the personal experience of the author and enlighten the deepest reasons of the evil represented by the totalitarian system.

First in this inventory is the paper of an intellectual of communist formation, victim of his own convictions: Herbert (Bellu) Zilber, alias Andrei Șerbulescu¹¹. He was involved in the framed process against Lucrețiu

⁹ Florin Abraham, *loc. cit.*, p. 192

¹⁰ *Ibidem*

¹¹ Andrei Șerbulescu, *Monarhia de drept dialectic. A doua versiune a memoriilor lui Bellu Zilber*, București, 1991

Patrășcanu and the long years of detention, marked by endless tortures, helped him understand how devious the communism is. Due to his knowledge of the communist ideology and of its history between the two world wars, but also of the informers' activity, Zilber succeeded in revealing the secret aspirations of the regime and left us some interesting notes about the perfidious nature of Power. For example he talks us about the confession made to him by one of his investigators, named Mișu (Mișu Dulgheru?) – and Zilber's narrative talent and sense of humour are to be noted – regarding the future plan of the securists:

“First of all, the complete eradication of contra-revolutionaries, spies and traitors, then starting a file for every single man. Once this masterpiece had been finished, the entire population was to be “educated” from political and ideological point of view. I was listening, hypnotized, to the dream of a securist. (...) I saw with my mind eyes the town of the files, with high blocks guarded by armed people, with shelves full of files organized by age, professions, nations, all ordered in decimal system, and I saw the huge cathedral in the middle of the town having Mișu in the altar, preaching transported to an endless number of believers with files”¹².

It worth mentioning the paper of Ion Ioanid¹³, which in a scrupulosity manner almost to be envied presents an entire “hall of fame”. Here are figures of torturers and prisoners, countless places of human suffering reaching the paroxysm, all in a realistic fresco of a Romanian Gulag. Radu Ciuceanu's name must be mentioned in this Roman panorama. Reading his papers¹⁴ is not only an educative action, but also a pleasant one, because of his charming way of telling stories and subtle analyzes. The scientific value of these papers increase due to the notes made by a scholar, Octavian Roske, who researched the communist period.

Next to the memoirs published directly by the victims, we put the volumes of interviews. Among these we remember the volumes in which Corneliu Coposu¹⁵ and Elizabeta Rizea¹⁶, each of them a real symbol of anticommunist resistance, share with us their experiences and opinions regarding the communist totalitarian regime. It is important to be

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 133-134

¹³ Ion Ioanid, *Închisoarea noastră cea de toate zilele*, vol. I-IV, București, 1991-1994

¹⁴ Radu Ciuceanu, *Intrarea în tunel*, foreword and notes by Octavian Roske, București, 1991; idem, *Potcoava fără noroc*, București, 1994; idem, *Pecetea diavolului*, București, 2002

¹⁵ Corneliu Coposu, *Confesiuni. Dialoguri cu Doina Alexandru*, București, 1996

¹⁶ *** *Povestea Elisabetei Rizea din Nucșoara. Mărturia lui Cornel Drăgoi*, editated by Irina Nicolau și Theodor Nițu, București, 1993

mentioned also the volume of interviews about the anticommunist armed resistance, realized by the Institute of Oral History from Cluj¹⁷.

Unfortunately, most of these interviews, published as volumes or in diverse periodicals, are written in a journalistic manner, aiming firstly to the sensational and trying to reach the emotions of the reader. The specific of the sociological interview or oral history seems to be rather unknown in many situations, and this cause the fail of an adequate reconstruction of the epoch.

Neither the volumes having as a task to analyze the communism, in general, or the role played by the Securitate within the communist political system, in particular, are not free of futile pathetic notes. There are plenty examples, in this respect: "to machine-gun entire villages and after that destroy them by cannon fire and airplanes attacks."¹⁸ During the collectivization process over 2.000.000 (!) peasants killed¹⁹ or the number of political prisoners between 1945 and 1989, "estimated on a precautions base!" at 1.131.000 people²⁰. Not to mention those over 500.000 people who died in prison between 1948 and 1964²¹. This kind of horror display has its seduction, which should not be underestimated since important historians as Gheorghe Onișoru was convinced by it. He estimated, after a partial study of the Military Courts' archives, that 549.000 persons had been judged on political bases between 1949-1960²².

¹⁷ Cornel Jurju, Cosmin Budeancă, „Suferința nu se dă la frați...”. *Mărturia Lucreției Jurj despre rezistența anticomunistă din Apuseni (1948-1958)*, Cluj-Napoca, 2002; Denisa Bodeanu, Cosmin Budeancă (eds.), *Rezistența armată anticomunistă din România. Grupul „Teodor Șuşman” (1948-1958). Mărturii*, Cluj-Napoca, 2004; Also see methods for use the oral testimony in Doru Radosav, Valentin Orga, Almira Țentea, Florin Cioșan, Cornel Jurju, Cosmin Budeancă, *Rezistența anticomunistă din Apuseni. Grupurile „Teodor Șuşman”, „Capotă-Dejeu”, „Cruce și Spadă”. Studii de istorie orală*, Cluj-Napoca, 2003

¹⁸ Florin Mătrescu, *Holocaustul roșu*, București, Gerom Design, 1993, p. 43

¹⁹ Dr. Filip Păunescu, *Cunoașterea și combaterea comunismului*, în „Libertatea”, an VIII, martie, 1989, nr. 72 *apud* Florin Mătrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 43

²⁰ This amount is present in contradiction with a document realized by Securitate, in 1958, referring to the “dynamic of imprisonments” during the 1950-1958 years, where is mentioned a total number of 75.808 persons. Of course, we not make a fetish from this kind of documents, but we ask ourselves what interest had the Securitate to minimize this amount into a secret document, write “not for history”, in the words of A.D. Xenopol, but for a internal use. – cf. S.R.I., *Cartea Albă a Securității*, vol. III, București, 1995, p. 158-159

²¹ Gheorghe Boldur-Lățescu, *Genocidul comunist în România*, vol. II, București, Editura Albatros, 1994, p. 19-20

²² *Cu unanimitate de voturi. Sentințe politice adunate și comentate de Marius Lupu, Cornel Nicoară și Gheorghe Onișoru*, București, Fundația Academia Civică, 1997, p. 22

The situation is similar when historians by profession published valuable volumes on the whole, but not without certain flaws. We mean hasty judgments, inadequate parallelism or using dangerous numbers, flaws we are inclined to put on an emotional approach to these subjects, which deal with too recent and painful events for the majority of the population. We refer to assumptions such as: "actually Romania in the 80's was not fundamental different of that in the 50's, when the soviet advisers ruled all over the place and the country was filled with *Sovrom-uri*"²³, or: "in the middle of 50's the number of Securitate's troops where estimated to 165.000 officers and servicemen organized in brigades equipped with cannon and tanks"²⁴.

To draw the atmosphere in the communist Romania in dark colors, and to constantly refer to it using techniques of literary type, was not the way towards a discourse capable to add credibility to scientific paper. The only effect was to show the personal preferences of the authors. For example, Dennis Deletant claims that: "towards the end of the 1952, (...) travel were allowed only in professional purposes or for medical reasons", a false assertion but having as an effect re-creating the image of a society under besiege. The same author said: "the main supporter of the help P.R.M. ought to give to the soviet intervention in Hungary was the N.K.G.B. agent, Emil Bodnăraş. During the riot, he was appointed minister of Transports and Communication and, in this position, he supervised that the roads in key position to be opened for the soviet troops."²⁵

Even if we ignore the question if the soviet troops had to ask for permission to use the roads, the assertion has no cover in the epoch's realities. Related to the events in Hungary, the closest reshuffled of the R.P.R.'s Government took place on 3rd October 1955. Up to that moment, Bodnăraş functioned as minister of the Military Forces, (24th March 1951 – 3rd October 1955), and from 3rd October is appointed prime vice-president of the Minister Council (instead of Iosif Chişinevschi), position kept till 19th March 1957. This was the moment when he was designated minister of the

²³ Marius Oprea, *Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securităţii în documente. 1949-1989*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2002, p. 11 (Marius Oprea, *Banalitatea...*)

²⁴ Dennis Deletant, *Studiu introductiv* in Marius Oprea, *Banalitatea...*, p. 31; In fact, in may 1956, all effective force of the Interior Ministry was **139.461 functions** – cf. „Trupele de Securitate”, p. 104; In “Ceauşescu şi Securitatea”, p. 44, Dennis Deletant, quoting chapter „The Armed Forces” from Alexandru Cretzianu (ed.), *Captive Romania. A Decade of Soviet Rule*, Londra, Atlantic Press, 1956, offers a number of 55.000 persons in Security Troops, a more realistic estimation.

²⁵ Dennis Deletant, *Studiu introductiv* in Marius Oprea, *Banalitatea...*, p. 33

Transports and Communication (19th March 1957 - 17th April 1959)²⁶. During the riot in Hungary there was no such thing as a minister of Transports and Communication, but a Minister of Railway (railway board) led by Ion Cosma and a Minister of Naval and Aircraft Transport, under the leadership of Gheorghe D. Safer. Telecommunication was subordinated to the Minister of Post and Telecommunication, led by Dumitru Simulescu²⁷.

In the paper "Ceaușescu și Securitatea. Constrângere și disidență în România anilor 1965-1989" (Ceaușescu and the Securitate. Force and dissidence in Romania between 1965-1989) Dennis Deletant make visible some inadequacies. Even if the paper shows a lot of hard work - thorough archives investigations, many interviews with important personalities, a rich bibliography - the author could not prevent himself from using some stereotypes that took deep roots in Romanian people mentality. Thus, discussing the Securitate's actions to repress the strike of the coalmen from Valea Jiului, in August 1977, Deletant affirms: "it was opened an investigation to discover the core of the riot, and during the next months, approximately 4.000 coalmen have been moved in others mining areas; People said that some of them had been sent to work colonies from the channel Danube-The Black Sea"²⁸. There are some comments regarding the previous fragment: **the reality**, the Securitate' investigation (led personally by gen. Emil Macri, the chief of Economic Contrainformation Division II from D.S.S.) and R.S.R. Prosecuting (a brigade of procurators from General Prosecuting moved from Bucharest to Petroșani), is interwoven with **fiction**. The number of 4.000 coalmen moved in other "mining areas" is obviously without any base. The author did not ask himself neither which were those "mining areas" capable to absorb 4.000 new employees nor what would have been the consequences of this deportation for Valea Jiului²⁹. More than that, author proved he aimed at creating an emotional reaction judging by the type of language used in the paper. The work colonies in the site of the channel Danube-Tha Black Sea were no more similar to those between 1949-

²⁶ C.N.S.A.S., *Membrii C.C. al P.C.R. 1945-1989. Dicționar*, Florica Dobre (coord.), București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2004, p. 104

²⁷ Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, *Enciclopedia de istorie a României*, București, Editura Meronia, 2001, p. 148-149

²⁸ Dennis Deletant, *Ceaușescu și Securitatea. Constrângere și disidență în România anilor 1965-1989*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1998, p. 233 (Dennis Deletant, *Ceaușescu și Securitatea...*)

²⁹ According to a S.R.I.'s investigation founded by internal documents and interrogations of some people participated on the strike, "approximately 10-15 persons was convicted for different infractions, from criminal law, until 5 years maximum. After liberation, this peoples was reemployed in coal mines from Valea Jiului" - A.C.N.S.A.S., fund Documentar, file no. 117, vol. 5, f. 132-141

1953, when the site was enclosed by barbed wire, guarded by soldiers and their wolf dogs and machineguns' nests threatened everybody. Now, on most of these sites people volunteered themselves even if there were cases of imposition (the so-called "sites of the youth"). The convicts' labor was used less. So, the same words, different realities! We no longer discuss the assertion of an alleged witness, (quoted uncritical), of "35.000 coalmen, crushed underground, listening to Dobre, G. Jurcă - mine engineer - and a woman"³⁰. This could be a credible assertion only for those who have never seen a mine or 35.000 people gather together.

Dennis Deletant resumes and develops some ideas presented in the discussed paper in a new one devoted entirely to the period when Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej led the Romanian communists³¹. The author warns us that his paper is "more than a simple history of the Securitate during Dej's regime. It is rather an analyses of the role played by the terror, repression in maintaining Dej's power, in suppressing opposition and dissidence of any kind". Among the 13th chapters of the book nothing less than three chapters treat almost exclusively about Securitate: Chapter 6 - The Securitate and the terrorism, Chapter 9 - Romanian Gulag and Chapter 10 - The armed resistance. It is another example of important contribution to writing the Securitate's history from his part.

As we said previously, exaggerations and supportive discourse were not specific only to anticommunist writings, but, on the contrary, the vindicators of the communism and of the Securitate gave as good as one gets, their means of expression being various. Even if it is rather difficult to identify a clear pro-communist discourse in the Romanian mass media, there are many tendencies to deny, justify or explain some negative aspects of the communism regime.

To support this idea, of a subjective and justifying presentation, concrete data referring to particular practices of the Securitate or its involvement in an event or another could be found in memoirs such as those signed by important characters of the communist power: Silviu Brucan³², Dumitru Popescu³³, Gh. Gaston Marin³⁴, Paul Niculescu Mizil³⁵ or

³⁰ Dennis Deletant, *Ceaușescu și Securitatea...*, p. 231

³¹ Idem, *Teroarea comunistă în România. Gheorghiu Dej și statul polițienesc. 1948-1965*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2001

³² Silviu Brucan, *Generația irosită. Memorii*, București, 1992

³³ Dumitru Popescu, *Am fost și cioplitor de himere. Un fost lider comunist se destăinuie*, București, 1993

³⁴ Gh. Gaston Marin, *În serviciul României lui Gheorghiu-Dej. Însemnări din viață*, București, 2000 Paul Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej*, București, 2000

³⁵ Paul Niculescu Mizil, *O istorie trăită*, București, 1997

Paul Sfetcu³⁶. Similar information is to be found in sub category of the memoirs. We are referring to the interviews with participants in historical events, who want to share their past experiences³⁷. It is to be mentioned the interviews made by Lavinia Betea with some prominent figures of the communist nomenclature such as: Ion Gheorghe Maurer³⁸, Alexandru Bârlădeanu³⁹ or Corneliu Mănescu⁴⁰.

There is a rich list of memoirs written by the ex-personalities from the army who felt the need, being old now, to embellish their deeds and to try to explain them to the world and even to their own conscience. Unfortunately, many of them did not succeed more than to mislead, in the same way they did previously, as Securitate's officers on active list.⁴¹ To make use of this information is like a challenge for the researcher's judgment, all these because half-truth coexists with eighteen-carat lies or personal fantasies, in a classic and effective recipe. We limit our list to few names of such memoirist.

Thus, Neagu Cosma, ex chief of counter-espionage, in 60's-70's, proved himself rather prolific in publishing more volumes⁴² and articles in different magazines in order to sustain his ideas. His main thesis sustains that the abominable actions of the Securitate were almost exclusively the result of the foreign officers' interference, which monopolized the leading positions in the institution and were serving others interests than the national ones. If those people were removed, the Securitate had become a very important instrument to defend Romania and it would act within the limits of socialist legality.

Another insider in the M.A.I. and Securitate, general in the reserve, Ionel Gal, wrote a quasi-memorialistic paper, but prefer to deal with the

³⁶ Paul Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej*, București, 2000

³⁷ Interviews, as an oral history method, implicate numerous problems, because a memory's tendencies to "reconstruction" things and facts from the past. See, in this sense, some considerations made by Jean François Soulet in *Istoria imediată*, București, 2000, p. 66-72

³⁸ Lavinia Betea, *Maurer și lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României*, Arad, Fundația Ioan Slavici, 1995

³⁹ Idem, *Alexandru Bârlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu*, București, 1997

⁴⁰ *Convorbiri neterminate. Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea*, Iași, 2001

⁴¹ See the opinions of Phillip Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession. The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist and Whore*, London, 1986, p. 7

⁴² Neagu Cosma, *Cupola. Securitatea văzută din interior. Pagini de memorii*, București, Editura Globus, 1994; idem, *Contribuția unor „minorități” naționale la bolșevizarea României*, București, 1996; idem, *Securitatea, poliția politică, dosare, informatori*, București, Editura Globus, 1998

period between 1965-1989 even if he was active in M.A.I. during 50s⁴³. His preference is easy to understand because, according to him, "the activity of the Minister of Internal Affairs between 1946-1964 cannot be compared to that developed between 1965-1978 or even during the next years up to 1989". In his opinion, is "unanimously accepted the blame related to the unfair role played by the members of the Minister of Internal Affairs in the first two decades after the Second World War when Romania had a status of occupied country, included in the Soviet area of interests after the understanding among The Great Powers. Each and every act of individual and collective repression, all the actions of brutal trespassing against the human fundamental rights, including the change of the political regime, is known as imposed by The Red Empire"⁴⁴. In addition to this opinion we mention that according to which, after 1965, "the doctrine and the theory of class battle, the criteria to judge the enemy had been abandoned" and "law reinforcement became a cult, everybody had to apply firmly the law". We consider that is futile to prove the lack of support of such assumptions.

Dumitru Iancu Tăbăcaru signs one of the most tendentious papers⁴⁵. This becomes obvious only by enlisting the chapters' titles. Thus, the Securitate "was a legal organism of the Romanian state", "accomplished only missions to secure the nation", "it was not an organ of repression", "it did not serve the Ceaușescu's family interests", and "The Securitate's officers have no privileges". In spite of a very impressive plea for the Truth, the author, - counting on the idea the „many generations of authentic historians will not have the access to the documents"⁴⁶ - propose to the reader his own version of the Securitate's history. The paradox is that his history is based on "our direct or almost direct knowledge", but, in the same time, he declares himself faithful to the idea that "memory can serve only partly the history". It is remarkable his very strategic manner to cover the blamable aspects in the Securitate's activity by invoking, with abundant details, the law principles, quotations from law articles, definitions from different dictionaries, maxims belonging to important personalities in history. This author also plead for a complete split in Securitate's evolution, marked by the events happened at the half decade of the last century ("P.M.R.'s declaration from 1964", the Dej's death in 1965), saying that the measures took after these events transformed completely the institution:

⁴³ Ionel Gal, *Rațiune și represiune în Ministerul de Interne.1965-1989*, Iași, 2001, vol. 1-2

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, vol. I, p. 8-9

⁴⁵ Dumitru Iancu Tăbăcaru, *Sindromul Securității*, București, Ed. Paco, f.a.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 11

“For example, it is well known that in the middle of the 60s a very drastic process began in respect of this, with a great judicial effort compared probably only to that from Alexandru Ioan Cuza's time. **There were completely abolished the rules which contradict the principles by right or prejudice the citizens' rights and freedom.**” (Our underline, F.B.) In a modern perspective, according to the international one, but adopted to the social system specific to our country in that moment⁴⁷.

Referring to the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure, changed in 1968, the same author said: “From one end to the other and emphasized, the code under discussion **enlighten the respect towards the state by fact, of rights and constitutional liberties of citizens, the supremacy of law** (our underline, F.B), risking punishment in the case of insubordination”.

We are not dwell upon the value of truth of such assertions.

“Great” remembering has to share in a dialogue with Viorel Patrichi⁴⁸, the general Nicolae Pleșniță. Those “42 years of work in the information's field”, as he likes to say, are permanently underlined during the interviews. Nicolae Pleșniță avoids very smoothly the interviewer's uncomfortable questions or making no answer. He frequently uses “stuff and nonsense!” “That's my business!” “You kidding me!” and so on, to diminish the importance of the discussion. Full of cocky sayings⁴⁹ and spiced up with episodes so much like detectives' serials of second range⁵⁰, the paper has no doubt some qualities, offering useful information, which become even more useful when is related to other sources.

Gh. Ionescu Olbojan is another officer's pseudonym, used to get even with some important personality of the moment, Ion Mihai Pacepa. His books are to be praised because it brings into attention some Securitate's

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 61

⁴⁸ *Ochii și urechile poporului. Convorbiri cu generalul Nicolae Pleșniță. Dialoguri consemnate de Viorel Patrichi în perioada aprilie 1999-ianuarie 2001*, București, Editura Lumea, 2001

⁴⁹ Are significant, in this sense, numerous episodes where the former general related how he retorted to the important leaders, like Nicolae Ceausescu. In fact, the documents from archives mentioned something different – cf. Florian Banu, *Din paradoxurile Epocii de Aur – Ceaușescu versus Securitatea*, in „Dosarele Istoriei”, nr. 7(83)/2003, p. 38-39

⁵⁰ See, for example, the episode where is narrated how the Securitate set up the microphones in the shoes of the American ambassador in the moment when the shoes was repaired. – *Ochii și urechile poporului. Convorbiri cu generalul Nicolae Pleșniță. Dialoguri consemnate de Viorel Patrichi în perioada aprilie 1999-ianuarie 2001*, București, 2001, p. 63

practices, especially in the external affairs area, and presents a series of characters who remarked themselves more or less in this field⁵¹.

Pacepa is also the pretext for other ex security officers to write down their memoirs. Read with a critical eye this papers are useful to get a proper image of the "Securitate's world"⁵².

Naturally, we cannot end our review of these memoirs without mentioning the papers signed by Ion Mihai Pacepa, an extremely controversial character even now. Beginning with his first and famous volume *Orizonturi roșii* (*The red horizons*)⁵³ – well known to Romanian public before 1989, as it was made public through serials by some radio stations from Occident and then through *samizdat* – and then, till his latest volumes *Moștenirea Kremlinului* (*The Kremlin's heritage*) (Bucharest, 1993) or *Cartea neagră a Securității* (*The Securitate's black book*), (Bucharest, 1999), Pacepa's books are based on his own experience. What casts a shadow of the doubt upon them is the manner, perspective, related to their value of truth. There are some questions raised, for example, by the time of his first book appearance. It was after ten years since he defected, and Nicolae Ceaușescu's image in Occident was extremely bad. More than that, the book do not offer too many details about Securitate's organization and function, but emphasize almost exclusively the horrors made by Ceaușescu family, more or less confirmed by other sources⁵⁴.

Another example from his tendentious writing is also the book *Moștenirea Kremlinului*. For instance, the author wants us to believe that in Romania, as long as he worked to the Securitate, no spies were caught exception being only those parachuted in 50's. The reason to this was the

⁵¹ Gh. Ionescu Olbojan, *Good bye, domnule Pacepa!*, București, R.A.I. Isis, 1992; idem, *Fantomele lui Pacepa*, București, 1994; idem, *Fața neagră a Securității & Ion Mihai Pacepa*, București, 1999

⁵² Alexandru Nichita, *Pacepa contra Pacepa. O istorie a serviciilor secrete românești de la începuturi și până la căderea lui Ceaușescu*, București, 1996; Titu Simon, *Din culisele serviciilor secrete românești. Pacepa quo vadis?*, București, Editura Odeon, 1992

⁵³ Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Orizonturi roșii. Amintirile unui general de securitate*, București, Editura Venus, 1992 (first edition Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red horizons: The True Story of Nicolae & Elena Ceaușescu's Crimes, Lifestyle and Corruption*, Washington D.C., Regnery Gateway, 1987)

⁵⁴ Former comrades in arms inventoried the numerous inadvertences from the testimony of Pacepa, see Neagu Cosma, *Cum a fost posibil? Cârțița Pacepa*, Editura Paco, București, f.a., chapter „Mărturisirile” lui Pacepa, p. 113-130; for a “re-habilitation” of Pacepa pleaded people like Sorin Roșca Stănescu and Cornel Dumitrescu in book entitled *Autopsia. Demontarea unei înscenări securiste împotriva generalului Pacepa*, București, Omega Press, 1998; also see the book signed by Victor Mitran, ex-officer D.I.E., *Blestemul șarpelui. Cui îi e frică de I.M. Pacepa*, București, Editura Omega SRL, 1999

Occident's lack of interest in Romania. As a consequence, Pacea strongly affirms that today "not even the ex Soviet Union is not interesting for occidental informative structures" and ask himself in a rhetoric manner "the Occident is, by any chance, so stupid to spend its time and money to steal Romanian technologies and production secrets?"⁵⁵. The question was, at least, mean, especially coming from somebody who worked so many years in espionage and knew so well the interests and ways of action of this kind of services all around the world.

The next institution in line perpetuated this manipulation regarding the history of Securitate to serve political purposes. Romanian Information Service (S.R.I.) inherited in 1994 the logistics, archives and partially the employees of the former Securitate. It embarked upon a complex process to reassess its image in order to prove to Romanian society that it detached itself of the past and set on new basis, specific to a democratic state. In the same time, they made serious efforts to be able to maintain in the new organization a high number of officers. They justified it saying that there were "more than one Securitate": one formed by foreigners (Jews, Russians, Hungarians), and one of the Romanian people. The first was malefic, solving the problems of political police of the communist regime and the other with interests only in counter-espionage, anti terrorism and military technical-economic espionage abroad.

A part of this process was the publishing of five volumes from the so-called "*Carte albă a Securității*" (*The white book of the Securitate*), aiming to make public the entire institution's history (1948-1989)⁵⁶. Mihai Pelin⁵⁷ was the coordinator of the historians' group who selected the documents from the overwhelming number of files existing in the S.R.I.'s archive and also wrote the introduction for each volume.

The will to influence public opinion is clear through all over *the warnings and introductory studies* put in front of the documents. First of all, they want to impose the idea that the documents brought to light are absolutely true and their content has to be put above any reasonable doubt:

⁵⁵ Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Moștenirea Kremlinului. Rolul spionajului în sistemul comunist de guvernare*, București, Editura Venus, 1993, p. 503-504

⁵⁶ First four volumes, printed in 1994-1995, are treated, effectively, the history of the Securitate, and the fifth volume, entitled "Literary and artistically histories. 1969-1989". For the common people, only volume 1 and 5 was accessibly, the others were distributed in mass-media circles, never sold in bookshops.

⁵⁷ Mihai Pelin is nowhere mentioned like a editor or coordinator, his implication in this project was attested only by himself declarations made in mass-media and attributed to the old relationship between Pelin and Virgil Măgureanu (ex-classmate), the former director of S.R.I.

“...we are in front of a large number of documents whose authenticity cannot be disputed, and which write down thoroughly almost entire number of dissidence acts within Romanian arts and literature during the two decades before the events happened in December 1989”⁵⁸

Unfortunately, in spite of a change in tone, the publishers sent quite the same message: our people are the best and they fight with the imperialists agents. Thus, in their opinion, “the editors of cultural shows broadcast at *Europa liberă* (*The Free Europe*), even if they wanted to, could not use as simple instruments people like literary critic Nicolae Manolescu or art critic Andrei Pleșu, idea promoted by communist propaganda of the time. And the only argument was that someone less endowed simply couldn’t subordinate a man with higher intellectual qualities. (...) In other words, Monica Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca, and so many others, merely tried to do the best they could. The hard work has been made by those who engaged themselves in the battle here, in the country”⁵⁹.

The publishers had another constant concern, to create the most “human” possible image to the Securitate, denying the frequent accusations according to which the institution has been involved in acts of maltreatment or even murder of political dissidents of the regime. They laid the entire responsibility to Party’s charge and even insinuated a probable dissidence of the Securitate: “...we did not come across documents to prove that extreme solutions against well known opponents of the communist regime had been taken at this level, of the Securitate, or some brutal interference, from its part, into artists and writers affaires took place. All those drastic measures – to subordinate or to disorganize the artist’s unions; to destroy the solidarity among them, no matter if this could affect their lives – had been taken exclusively by the Party. More than that, some documents showed explicitly that the Securitate was not always supportive to those measures remembered above, as this created new problems for it, rising unjustified the number of her “objectives”. This is the truth and it is our duty to tell it apart the reaction they could cause”⁶⁰.

Disregarding the unsaid purposes of the Romanian Information Service, the publishing of those five volumes of the *Cartea Albă a Securității* (*The White Book of the Securitate*) meant a lot for history research. The introductory studies collected a serious documentation, and the documents put at researchers’ disposal are very valuable.

⁵⁸ Serviciul Român de Informații, *Cartea Albă a Securității. Istoria literare și artistice. 1969-1989*, București, 1996, p. VII

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. VIII

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. IX

The Romanian Intelligence Service's implication in writing the history of the Securitate goes beyond the publishing of these volumes, and we should mention the papers belonging to institution's personalities. An example in this respect is the paper written by the Service's manager, Alexandru-Radu Timofte, with the title *Originile și mărirea, declinul și renașterea lumii informațiilor secrete* (*The origins and the raising, the fall and the rebirth of the secret information's world*)⁶¹. This is an impressive paper: during 555 pages we experience the secret services' activity since Antiquity till today, in different geographical areas, everything sustained by a rich documentation. Naturally, the theme leads the author to analyze the "Romanian special services during totalitarian regimes" (p. 113-141), most of this subchapter being reserved to post-war period.

His analysis of the role played by secret services within the communist regime is sustained with arguments, but the author cannot detached himself of some stereotypies: the period of the 50s – when "the repression objectives were intrinsic to the fundamental values of the national identity and spirituality, aimed at denying our features, of a nation and a culture with deep Latin and European roots"⁶²; the period after 1964-1968, appreciated "as a moment when a new type of relationship settled among security officers and the population, based on trust, which explains why persons with a solid reputation accepted to collaborate. This is a reality we should not overlook if we want to respect the truth."⁶³.

We consider, based on our investigations in Secuitate's archives, that the realities of the moment needs further explanations: we cannot eliminate the possibility of some collaboration caused entirely by "patriotic feelings", but the common reason was fear. It was more like a conditional reflex formed due to the brutalities since 50's, than a patriotism they were fully aware of. It is worth mentioning that many collaborators revealed by C.N.S.A.S., but who preferred to keep silence upon these „patriotic“ activities till their revealing evoked this reason, of a patriotic impulse.

Beyond some deficiencies of the references, the book brings to light some information and documents which allow us to understand the evolution of the Securitate within the communist totalitarian state, not to mention that the appreciations regarding the role-played by secret services on the political stage are still actual.

⁶¹ Alexandru-Radu Timofte, *Originile și mărirea, declinul și renașterea lumii informațiilor secrete*, București, Editura A.N.I., 2004

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 122

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 127

A particular category of papers, with the Securitate as a subject, declaring themselves objective, but including countless partisan opinions, belongs to the journalists. An example in this respect is Teșu Solomovici's paper, *Securitatea și evreii. Despre călăi și despre victime*. (*The Securitate and the Jews Something about torturers and victims*)⁶⁴. Even if he declares officially: "I do not embellish, I do not expose, I do not judge, I do not give verdicts", the author develops most of his investigation based on some allegation belonging to Wilhelm Filderman: "a Jew who becomes communist is not a Jew any more"⁶⁵.

Thus, for Teșu Solomovici, most of the Jews who served the communist system, one way or another, did that because, like the officer of the Securitate, Marcel Blecher, "they believed in the communist movement!"⁶⁶. The same Blecher adhered to the communism because "he was very young and believed in the saying of the moment. He became an activist immediately after 23rd August 1944. He was glad when they proposed to him, after that, to follow an officer school, of the Minister of Internal Affairs"⁶⁷.

The solution is at hand when the investigation leads the author to characters that are so far for being suspected by idealism. Talking about general Grigore Naum, an ex soviet partisan, parachuted in Romania, backwards of the front, chief for so many years of the Military Counter information Bureau inside Securitate, Solomovici admits that he was "terrible fanatic both in ideology and in facts". But he continues to explain "The Jew nature of Naum? Completely denied, at least in its visible dimension. God knows what was really happening deep down his conscience!". A cruel torturer of the 50's, the colonel Ludovic Weiss, caused the following comments, from the author's part: "This mean and fanatic Jew, ceased to be a Jew when he became a securist, but once a securist he was meaner and more fanatic. This is a paradox which can be rejected, but I shall never stop repeating it every time we talk about Jews become communists or securists"⁶⁸. More than that, the torturer could be easily understood: "Ludovic Weiss was not an opportunist, he became communist out of conviction. A genuine conviction, even if it is a communist one, is

⁶⁴ Teșu Solomovici, *Securitatea și evreii. Despre călăi și despre victime*, vol. I, București, Editura Ziua, 2003; vol. II, *Teroare. Crime. Turnători. Colaboraționiști*, București, Editura Teșu, 2004

⁶⁵ Teșu Solomovici, *Securitatea și evreii. Despre călăi și despre victime*, vol. I, București, Editura Ziua, 2003, p. 328

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 119

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 120

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 254

praiseworthy. Weiss dedicated his entire life to a harmful ideology, but his option came after the nazi epoch, after Auschwitz. (...) Weiss tortured, tore false confessions and shot not because he was a Jew, mean, fanatic, but because his superiors and the ideology he believed in, the ideology of social class hate, asked him to be mean and fanatic"⁶⁹.

If idealism is not enough to excuse some political options, the author has other arguments: "The innocence suppose a pure heart, a clean conscience and naivety. But innocence if it is not next to ignorance, has no charm at all.

Out of ignorance, the Jews had the bad inspiration to salute soviet soldiers with flowers on 23rd August 1944. They will not be the only one who will pay for this innocence. The Jews had at least an excuse: the Russians released them from the nazi terror and now, the communism opened the gates of Hope in front of them"⁷⁰. Therefore, sincere convictions, idealism, innocence and ignorance, or, sometimes, the chance (!) are responsible for the enrolment of lots of Jews into the Communist Party or into the repressive system. We wonder if such honorable reasons would be acceptable when it comes to talk about the wearing of the green shirt or about the publishing of some texts written by young intellectuals from inter-war Romania. Could they have been innocent, idealistic, ignorant young men, or maybe, it was the chance that made them adhere, for a short period of time, to the "Frățile de cruce"(Brotherhood in Cross)! Or, would not be easier to sustain that, becoming legionaries, they ceased being Romanians, in spite of the ideology they adhered to? The pogrom and the death trains would be, in this case, less horrible?

"I am ready to begin my work. Let me stick to the truth without blushing..." Thus looked like a fragment from Maimonide's oath, evoked by Teșu Solomovici at the beginning of his paper. As far as we are concerned, we have lots of reasons to believe that the author blushed many times during writing his impressive volumes. In the same time, scrupulosity makes us to give some credits to the paper, which brings into attention valuable information, not only from archives but also from memoires or interviews with many ex Securitate's officers who live or have lived until recently in Israel. It is to be noticed that the bibliography suffers of some imperfections, as the pages for some quotations from the books consulted are not specified (see vol. I, p. 51, 395, 433, vol. II, p. 218), or, in other cases, only the name of the author is mentioned and the title is omitted. In the same way, fragments from the Political Bureau of P.C.R.'s documents (and,

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 91

in general, from the archives of C.C. of P.C.R.) are presented without any source indication (which, probably have not yet been accessible to the large public in the moment the author consulted it). But the quotations extracted from the documents belonged to the S.R.I.'s archives are reproduced with the exact number of the file or page.

Another journalist concerned by the Intelligence Services' area and author of a large number of books about this matter is Mihai Pelin⁷¹. Among his papers we choose to focus upon *Un veac de spionaj, contraspionaj și poliție politică. Dicționar alfabetic. (A century of espionage, counter-espionage and political police. Alphabetical dictionary)*. The paper aims at being a “history of Romanian special services, through their protagonists biographies, those who were haunted down by these services, of their countless victims, to a great extent innocent, as well as of the foreigners who have contacts with the special services from Romania or, one way or another influenced some Romanian people's destiny”. This is a very ambitious task and it is only partially fulfilled.

First of all, the cards of the personalities included in the dictionary are not realized with scientific criteria, as the space granted for each of them is not according to their importance or the role played in history, but to the more or less extended amount of information found by Mihai Pelin in archives or published papers⁷².

Secondly, some information is hard to believe and, due to the lack of bibliography (specific to a dictionary or a lexicon), we are to accept them only because of the author's credibility. For example, we learn that Dumitru Mazilu, born on 24th June 1934, was appointed between Augusts 1965-August 1967 “chief of the School for the Securitate's agents from Băneasa”. We find difficult to believe that a young man of only 31 years old, led the main school for officers, in spite of the communist regime's policy to promote young men (it was even a necessity as there were few members with a clear political record). Experienced officers, who, from one reason or another, were pushed away, occupied this kind of positions.

⁷¹ Mihai Pelin, *Culisele spionajului românesc. D.I.E. (1955-1980)*, Editura Evenimentul românesc, București, 1997; idem, *Genii și analfabeți. Militari și intelectuali sub lupa Securității*, București, Editura Universal Dalsi, 2002; idem, *Un veac de spionaj, contraspionaj și poliție politică*, București, Editura Elion, 2003

⁷² According to Paul Veyne, “the number of pages dedicated by the author to the different moments and the different aspects of the past is a average between importance agreed of this aspects by the author and abundance of documentation”– Paul Veyne, *Cum se scrie istoria*, București, Editura Meridiane, 1999, p. 25; In Mihai Pelin's case, this average is faraway to be honorable

In the third place, Mihai Pelin cannot restrain himself to adopt a journalistic language, to get even with some people from his past or to pay respects to those who helped him. Thus, in Virgil Măgureanu's presentation⁷³, he insists upon his scientific background – Ph. D. in 1971. Assistant in the former Academy of social-political studies Ștefan Gheorghiu. From 1968 till 1983, he published numerous papers of speciality (...) he became in 1995 lecturer at the sociology, psychology and pedagogy department of the University from Bucharest – preferring to overlook his activity within Securitate: “After graduation he was tempted to enter the External Affairs Department of the Security but he did not agree with the atmosphere there, and, after a short period into an occidental newspaper department he became civil again”. It is avoided to affirm strongly the fact that he worked for the Securitate through that “tempted” escape. His activity as a leader of S.R.I. is also praised, the author finds excuses for some less honorable aspects in his first years in that chair, and he has a compassionate attitude towards the S.R.I.'s chief, who was continuously attacked during his term of office. As a consequence the way in which numerous officers of security joined the new institution is put on the circumstances' influence, and “the intense accusations in the mass media that he would have been transformed S.R.I. into a new political police, as it was before the Securitate, is completely devoid of substance”.

The second important category of papers referring to the Securitate, those written without hate and bias, in a professional way, papers that have neither moral nor political tasks, but cognitive objectives, is unfortunately less represented.

We include here, in the first place, Cristian Troncotă's paper, *Istoria serviciilor secrete românești. De la Cuza la Ceaușescu. (The history of Romanian secret services. From Cuza to Ceaușescu)*⁷⁴. Among those 500 pages of the paper, almost 200 treat the history of Securitate during 1948-1965⁷⁵. The author made use of an thoroughly documentation within Securitate's archives and of other sources of information, and the effect was an objective research of the most feared institution's history. The paper displays not only aspects of political police, but also of the activity of gaining information, as well as the methods and techniques used by Securitate to achieve her purposes.

⁷³ Mihai Pelin, *Un veac de spionaj, contraspionaj și poliție politică*, București, Editura Elion, 2003, p. 182-183

⁷⁴ Cristian Troncotă, *Istoria serviciilor secrete românești. De la Cuza la Ceaușescu*, București, Editura Ion Cristoiu, 1999

⁷⁵ Idem, *Duplicitarii. O istorie a Serviciilor de Informații și Securitate ale regimului comunist din România. 1965-1989*, București, Editura Elion, 2003

The author analyzed on large spaces the employment policy of the institution, how was organized and functioned the informative network, the investigations and the post mail censorship, as well as the means of using the operative techniques. There were analyzed aspects related to the Securitate's abuses, and were not avoided even subject less treated previously, such as how the Army was under Securitate's surveillance, or the conexions among the Securitate and the similar structures in the socialist countries.

The paper, a real landmark for every research of the topic, has a weak point in the lack of footnotes, replaced by the author with a rich bibliography at every chapter's end⁷⁶.

It has to be reminded then, the Mihai Pelin's paper, *Culisele spionajului românesc. D.I.E. (1955-1980) (The backstage of the Romanian espionage. D.I.E. 1955-1980)*⁷⁷ This investigation of the dark side world of Department of External Information of the Securitate's, beginning with the great shock provoked by the Pacepa's defection, is a chance for author to present to his readers new aspects of the Romanian espionage, men and events which made history.

Regarding the Securitate's activities abroad, next to Mihai Pelin's works⁷⁸ we have to put the volumes signed by Stejărel Olaru. These are dealing either with punctual events such as the attack of the Romanian Legacy in Berna⁷⁹ or with processes which lasted for a longer period of time, for example the collaboration of the Securitate with the Stasi⁸⁰. Very important for explaining the Securitate's activity abroad is also the paper signed by Pierre Accoce and Daniel Pouget⁸¹. There are voices that viewed

⁷⁶ This deficiency was eliminated in next writing, *Istoria Securității regimului comunist din România. 1948-1964*, București, INST, 2003. Unfortunately, this writing is just a reformulation, with little modifications and bringing up-to-date of the sources, of the chapter dedicate to the Securitate from *Istoria serviciilor secrete românești. De la Cuza la Ceaușescu*. Also see idem, *Torționarii. Istoria instituției Securității regimului comunist din România (1948-1964)*, București, Editura Elion, 2006

⁷⁷ Mihai Pelin, *Culisele spionajului românesc. D.I.E. (1955-1980)*, București, Editura Evenimentul Românesc, 1997

⁷⁸ Mihai Pelin, *Operațiunile „Melița” și „Eterul”. Istoria „Europei Libere” prin documente de Securitate*, București, 1999; idem, *Genii și analfabeți. Militari și intelectuali sub lupa Securității*, București, Editura Universal Dalsi, 2002; idem, *Opisul emigrației politice. Destine în 1222 de fișe alcătuite pe baza dosarelor din arhivele Securității*, București, Editura Compania, 2002

⁷⁹ Stejărel Olaru, *Cei cinci care au speriat Estul*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2003

⁸⁰ Stejărel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, *Stasi și Securitatea*, București, Editura Humanitas, 2005

⁸¹ Pierre Accoce, Daniel Pouget, *Rețeaua Caraman: cei treisprezece români care au zguduit NATO*, București, 1999

as a flaw the unjustified importance given to some actions of the French Secret Services that were in fact controlled by it.

It appears that a very useful tool in researching the history is a dictionary of the field's specific terminology. This is justified by the special terms used, and this is actually the second burden someone has to surpass, after the difficulties of interpreting the historical sources. Such a dictionary is realized by an ex Securitate's officer, his pseudonym being Radu Cristescu. This is a volume including over 100 usual terms in the former Securitate's files, together with some biographical data of some prominent personalities inside the espionage world and also some data about the main secret services⁸². As the title says, this is not exclusively for specialists, succeeding in making more accessible some terms such as: *periere* (to brush), *legendă* (the Legend), *exploatare în orb* (exploitation in blind), *șipcă* (bugs) and creating thus a proper approach towards the Securitate's documents.

Useful for any researcher of the Securitate's history is also the paper written by Carmen Chivu and Mihai Albu, which refers to the way how public and private life reflect into these documents⁸³. The author, probably because of their professional background, deals with these problems in a sociologic way, but this is not a weakness of the paper, on the contrary. We refer, by saying that to the dictionary attached to the paper. It contains 71 terms and expressions frequently used in the Securitate's documents, and which become a valuable help in straight understanding of the information. In addition to these, the informational gain is increased by the first range documents included. We mean documents like: "The plan for searching information on the year 1979", "The plan for searching information regarding the art-culture problems on the year 1987" or "Report on how the people of the Securitate reacted for achieving the objectives and tasks settled in the programmes for art-culture, press-radio-television-polygraphy, medical system, justice". On the other hand, bringing into the light diverse aspects of private life, which interested the Securitate, is the best way to show the complete stiffening of the system.

We cannot overlook a little inadequacy between the title of the volume, sending to those aspects dealing with the "operative technique", and its content. Rich referring to home investigations, fragments of intercepted mail, and reports of the Securitate form this. It is also unpleasant the engaged tone present in some chapters or parts of them in the book. This is the case of chapter named *Sistemul sanitar și sănătatea populației* (The health

⁸² Radu Cristescu, *Spionajul și contraspionajul pe înțelesul tuturor. Mic dicționar al serviciilor secrete*, București, 2000

⁸³ Carmen Chivu, Mihai Albu, *Noi și Securitatea. Viața privată și publică în perioada comunistă, așa cum reiese din tehnica operativă*, Pitești, Editura Paralela 45, 2006

system and the population sanity), which deals almost exclusively with the legislation forbidding abortion. In addition to this, some information is contradictory⁸⁴ or false.

Another weaknesses of the paper are represented also by the presence of some definitely false data, the responsible for this mistakes being difficult to identify, they could be either the papers's authors or the documents' authors⁸⁵ not to mention some inadequate interpretations.

An important impulse for scientific research of the organization and function of the Securitate represented the appearance of the Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (National Council for Studying the Security's Archives). This meant, on one hand, that the institution put at the interested researchers' disposal their archives and, on the other hand, created its own department of research, based especially on studying the role played by the Securitate inside the communist regime.

This department work had as result the publishing of an important number of volumes and studies, which, generally, respect the rigors of a scientific research. Since their first volume ⁸⁶, the C.N.S.A.S. researchers dealt with aspects regarding the Securitate's employees problem (diverse criteria for payment, recruiting, the portrait of the typical employee and so on.), besides others problems such as the informative networks' organization and function, or the Securitate's implication in finishing up the armed resistance groups, the persecution of clergymen of diverse cults.

Next to the volumes concentrated on a theme⁸⁷, the department also published three numbers from an annual called, symbolic, *Arhivele Securității* (*The Security's Archives*)⁸⁸. This volumes put together valuable information about the informative network, the Securitate's interference in the destiny of some Romanian scientific, cultural and politic personalities, the collaboration with other repressive institutions (Securitate's troops, Militia, Frontier guard troops), the Securitate's contribution to impose the P.C.R. politics in diverse areas of activity.

It was also initiated a series of volumes which reflect, on a large scale the Securitate's organization and the ways of action in different situations.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 86

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 152

⁸⁶ C.N.S.A.S., *Totalitarism și rezistență, teroare și represiune în România comunistă*, coord. conf. univ. dr. Gheorghe Onișoru, București, 2001

⁸⁷ C.N.S.A.S., *Mișcarea armată de rezistență anticomunistă din România. 1944-1962*, coord. prof. univ. dr. Gheorghe Onișoru, București, 2003

⁸⁸ C.N.S.A.S., *Arhivele Securității*, vol. 1, București, Editura Pro-Historia, 2002; vol. 2, București, Editura Nemira, 2004; vol. 3, București, Editura Nemira, 2006

⁸⁹ Florica Dobre (coord.), „*Bande, bandiți și eroi*”. *Grupurile de rezistență din munți și Securitatea (1948-1968)*, București, 2003; Florica Dobre, Florian Banu,

Researchers wrote valuable studies strictly focused on studying the Securitate, as an institution, from institutes belonging to Romanian Academy. Some examples in this respect are Sorin D. Ivănescu's contribution⁹⁰ or Dorin Dobrinu⁹¹, both from the Institution A. D. Xenopol from Iassy, or Cristian Troncotă's⁹² from the National Institute for Studying the Totalitarianism.

We cannot finish our presentation without mentioning the name of Marius Oprea and his contribution in this field. Based especially on archive research, his numerous papers cast light upon a series of aspects regarding the appearance, organization and activity of the Securitate⁹³. His papers value the information from this primarily source combining it with samples of oral history and information from published papers or specific literature.

Camelia Duică, Silviu B. Moldovan, Liviu Țăranu (editori), *Trupele de Securitate (1949-1989)*, București, 2004; Clara Cosmineanu, Silviu B. Moldovan (editori), *Nicu Steinhardt în dosarele Securității. 1959-1989*, București, Editura Nemira, 2005; Camelia Ivan Duică, *Rezistența anticomunistă din Maramureș. Gruparea Popșa (1948-1949)*, București, I.N.S.T., 2005; Liviu Țăranu, Theodor Bărbulescu (editori), *Jurnale din rezistența anticomunistă. Vasile Motrescu, Mircea Dobre. 1952-1953*, București, Editura Nemira, 2006; Nicolae Mărgineanu. *Un psiholog în temnițele comuniste. Documente preluate din arhiva C.N.S.A.S.* ediție îngrijită de Cristina Anisescu, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2006, Adrian Nicolae Petcu (coord.), *Partidul, Securitatea și Cultele. 1945-1989*, București, Editura Nemira, 2005, C.N.S.A.S., *Securitatea. Structuri/cadre, obiective și metode*, coord. Florica Dobre, vol. I 1948-1967, vol. II 1967-1989, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2006

⁹⁰ Sorin D. Ivănescu, *Metodele de lucru ale Securității și consecințele lor în societatea românească postbelică*, în „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A.D. Xenopol»”, tom XLI, 2004, p. 437-456

⁹¹ Dorin Dobrinu (ed.), *Proba infernului. Personalul de cult în sistemul carceral din România, potrivit documentelor Securității. 1959-1962*, București, Editura Scriptorium, 2004

⁹² Cristian Troncotă, „Noua politică” în domeniul instituției securității regimului comunist din România. 1965-1989, în „Arhivele Totalitarismului”, anul IX, nr. 32-33, 3-4/2001, p. 112-133

⁹³ Marius Oprea, *Nașterea Securității*, în „Analele Sighet 6”, București, Fundația Academia Civică, 1998, p. 271-307; idem, *Tortura în anii '50*, în „Analele Sighet 8”, București, Fundația Academia Civică, 2000, p. 335-344; idem, *O istorie a informatorilor Securității*, în „Analele Sighet 9”, București, Fundația Academia Civică, 2001, p. 464-488; idem, *Pagini din „copilăria” Securității române*, în „Dosarele istoriei”, nr. 5, 1996, p. 34-39; idem, *Gheorghiu Dej, poliția secretă și puterea*, în „Dosarele istoriei”, nr. 3(8), 1997, p. 29-32, idem, *Informatorii Securității*, în „Magazin istoric”, nr. 10/2001, p. 26-29; idem, *Mijloace de tortură ale Securității*, în „Memoria”, 2002, nr. 38, p. 16-24; idem, *Partidul și Securitatea*, în Marius Oprea (coord.), *Securității partidului. Serviciul de Cadre al P.C.R. ca poliție politică. Studiu de caz: arhiva Comitetului Municipal de Partid Brașov*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2002

All these are enough arguments for solid papers, and a compulsory moment for every researcher studying the Securitate.

Among his papers failures we should mention firstly his incongruence in some appreciations. For example, in a study dedicated to the relationships between Communist Party and Securitate, Oprea sustains that Ceaușescu, unlike Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, "...preferred (...) a more powerful, direct and personal control over Securitate, and not an intermediate one through the instruments of decision at the party level"⁹⁴. Only two pages ahead, the author changes his opinion: "In the Political Bureau (**and nothing could make us to believe that things were much more different within C.P.Ex.** – Our underline, F.B.) it was not only established the components of the ruling crew of the repressive apparatus, but there were discussed details related to its functioning"⁹⁵. Or, *Comitetul Politic Executiv* (Executive Political Comitee, C.P.Ex.) was created by Nicolae Ceaușescu, and represented the superior level of ruling of the Party. So, who was drawing the lines of the Securitate's evolution: Ceaușescu, personally or C.P.Ex.? The Political Bureau and the C.P.Ex. were mere "shapes without any fundament" and the decisions were taken by the Dej, respectively, Ceaușescu? There was, from this point of view continuity or a breaking off between the two communist leaders' way of ruling?

In another paper, Marius Oprea declares himself the unconditional supporter of the Argentinean politologist, Ernesto Garzon Valdes' theories. He considers that the way power is used inside communist regime "took it as close as possible of the features specific to the totalitarian state from South America, described by Garzon"⁹⁶. We did not propose ourselves to discuss the similarities between the two political forms, which are not, in our opinion, important. We just wanted to notice that the author, in his obvious wish to strengthen them up, become, once again incongruent in assertions. Thus, Mariu Oprea considers that "the internal strict discipline inside the military structure of the communist political police looks like almost in a strange way, to the terrorism pattern in a stat from South America". In the same time, across the paper's pages we find lots of data which prove exactly the insubordination, the lack of discipline, or even the chaos which defined the various structures, more or less central, of the Securitate (see p. 69, p. 85, p. 145, p. 234).

⁹⁴ See the study *Partidul și Securitatea*, in Marius Oprea (coord.), *Securiștii partidului. Serviciul de Cadre al P.C.R. ca poliție politică. Studiu de caz: arhiva Comitetului Municipal de Partid Brașov*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2002, p. 19

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 21

⁹⁶ Marius Oprea, *Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securității în documente. 1949-1989*, introductory study by Dennis Deletant, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2002, p. 13

For the same paper it is to be emphasized the asymmetry characterizing the documentary part. Thus, *Part I: The members of Securitate*, contains 40 documents, as following: 6 for the year 1949, 19 documents for the 50s, 5 for the 60s, no document for the 70s, and 10 documents for 80s. *Part II, Internal orders and regulations of the Securitate* gathers 15 documents: one since 1948, one since 1951, one from 1977 and 12 documents since 80s. This structure gives inevitably a less firm value judgment, as large fields of activity and important periods of time cannot be covered with the necessary documentation. Of course, is not entirely the researcher to be blame for this reality, but more the difficulties he confronted with a long period of time after 1989.

To sum up, our presentation of the Securitate's historiography is far for exhausting all the papers related to the theme, but it is enough to permit us to draw some conclusions. First of all it is to notice that the great number of paper does not necessarily mean an improvement of the analysis's quality. Covered by some prejudices appeared in the last years of the communist regime, which became almost realities after 1990, by those inflammatory memoirs and interviews, the Securitate's historiography is, from scientific point of view, at the beginning. The few scientific papers, having as a topic the Securitate, surpassed a lot of obstacles. Parts of them were of political kind as, fearing "the skeleton in the cupboard", the political class preferred to maintain the ambiguity about the recent history, and stopped as much as they could an honest research.⁹⁷

As a consequence, **we do not have at our disposal, even now, a complete monograph of the institution**, or mere of one of its extreme important department as it is The Internal Inteligence or External Inteligence. Not even the environments or the objectives have not been researched yet, even if there were some attempts, especially about the religious cults or army movement of resistance – as objectives of the Security. **It has not been yet realized a complete bibliography of the papers dedicated to this institution's history**, in the same way, some informational services have⁹⁸. **Tools, as dictionaries, chronologies,**

⁹⁷ Symptomatic for the situation of the Romanian historiography is the volume realized in Poland by Krzysztof Persak, Lukasz Kaminski (eds.), „A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944-1989”, Warsaw, Institute of National Remembrance, 2005. In this volume, the chapter dedicated to Romania (p. 285-328) was write by the British historian, Dennis Deletant, and not by a Romanian researcher

⁹⁸ Robert Goehlert, Elizabeth R. Hoffmeister (eds.), *The C.I.A. A Bibliography*, Monticello (Illinois), Vance Bibliographies, 1980; Edward Smith, *The Okhrana. The Russian Department of Police. A Bibliography*, Stanford, Hoover Institution of War,

encyclopedia, is very few and suffers of numerous missing⁹⁹. In the same way, theoretical considerations regarding the role played by espionage and political police within the Romanian state in the 20th century are almost zero¹⁰⁰, unlike the large interest showed for these problems in the occidental research¹⁰¹.

Revolution and Peace, 1967; Max Gunzerhauser, *Geschichte der Geheimen Nachrichtendienst (Spionage, sabotage und Abwehr): Literatur Berichte und Bibliographie*, Frankfurt, Bernard und Graefe, 1968; Paul W. Blackstock, Frank L. Schaf, *Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Operations. A Guide to Information Sources*, Detroit, Gale, 1978; Walter Pforzheimer (ed.), *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, Washington D.C., Defense Intelligence College, 1985; Raymond G. Rocca, John Dziak, *Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services*, Boulder – Colorado, Westview, 1986

⁹⁹ In this direction, is meritorious the effort made by the researchers from I.N.S.T., concretized in the volume coordinated by Octavian Roske, *Mecanisme represive în România. 1945-1989. Dicționar biografic. A-C*, București, I.N.S.T., 2001; also, individually initiative must be mentioned, like Doina Jela, *Lexiconul negru. Unelte ale presiunii comuniste*, București, Editura Humanitas, 2001 or Cicerone Ionițoiu, *Cartea de aur a rezistenței românești împotriva comunismului*, vol. I-II, București, Hrisovul S.R.L., 1995-1996; idem, *Victimele terorii comuniste. Arestați, torturați, întemnițați, uciși. Dicționar*, vol. I-V, București, Editura Mașina de Scris, 2000-2003

¹⁰⁰ Alexandru Popescu, *Academia secretelor: intelectualii și spionajul. O istorie universală*, București, Editura Meronia, 2006; Lionede Ochea, *Comunitatea de informații a României: tradiție și modernitate*, București, Editura Paco, 2005; Gheorghe Nicolaescu, *Intelligence services and crises at the beginning of the millenium: monitoring and management*, Bucharest, Glykon and Fortuna, 2003; Mireille Rădoi, *Serviciile de informații și decizia politică*, București, Editura Tritonic, 2003

¹⁰¹ The bibliography in this area are enormous and we offer here just a few examples: Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, New York, Harper & Row, 1963; Christopher Felix, *The Spy and His Masters: A Short Course in the Secret War*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1963; Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1966; R.V. Jones, *Reflections on Intelligence*, London, Heinemann, 1989; Kent, Sherman. *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949; Ralph D. Sawyer, *The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China*, Boulder– Colorado, Westview, 1998; Abram N. Shulsky, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, New York, Brassey's, 1991; Abram N. Shulsky, Jennifer Sims, *What Is Intelligence?* Washington DC, Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992; John P.A. Von Hoene, *Intelligence User's Guide*. Washington DC, DIA, 1983; Ernest Volkman, *Spionaj*, București, Editura Rao, 1998; Alain Dewerpe, *Spionul. Antropologia secretului de stat contemporan*, București, Editura Nemira, 1998; Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Un secol de spionaj: serviciile de informații în secolul XX*, București, Editura Humanitas, 2000.

In spite of these weaknesses, the major steps made in the last years, both for the access to the documents and for the historian papers writing, give us credit to be more optimistic about the possibility to reconstruct the structure of this primarily importance institution, of its means of actions, of its tasks and, last but not least of the social-politic context it worked within.

As Alexandru Zub noticed, "the illusions of a perfect historiography past long ago What remains is the conviction that the historian is a man of his time and his duty is to be part the best he can, to the process of clearing up this time"¹⁰². In this particular case, the historians 'options are between "a history which teach us more and explain less and one which explain more and teach us less"¹⁰³. The difficulties come from the political nature of the problems, apart of its academic appearances.

In the present context, when the access to the fundamental archives funds in order to write a history of the communism, is easier, it is only a matter of choice what type of writing do you prefer. Apart of all these, we cannot sum up without some warnings against a new type censorship, the politically correctness censorship, which come to replace the political one from the communist period. In the same time, the appreciations like "Pulchra, bene, recte!" coming from mass-media part instead of historians, tend to give credit to some pseudo personalities in the field. We can only hope that their glamorous star will soon fade out in the same way their predecessors, some Roller or Iosif Chişinevschi, experienced, and, to be thoroughly, that the political mixture in the Romanian research historiography will be less and less.

¹⁰² Al. Zub, *Istorie și finalitate*, Bucureşti, Editura Academiei Române, 1991, p. 9

¹⁰³ Paul Veyne, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25

Between Memory and History. The Memoirs Volumes

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Memoirs volumes constitute an important part of the existing literature on the Romanian communist regime. After 1989, historians gained limited access to the Romanian Communist Party's archives. Furthermore, incomplete historical evidence regarding the informal aspects of the decision-making process within the state and its institutions, which the archival documents comprised, encouraged historians to search for other valuable resources for their investigations. As such, memoirs became a necessary and valuable instrument of research in approaching the entire communist period in Romania.

Over the recent years former political leaders (Alexandru Barladeanu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Corneliu Manescu, Silviu Brucan, Cornel Burtica, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Dumitru Popescu, Ion Iliescu, Nicolae M. Nicolae), former military leaders (Nicolae Plesita, Ion Coman, Ion Mihai Pacepa), members of the administrative apparatus (Silviu Curticeanu, Paul Sfetcu), former foreign ambassadors (David B. Funderburk, Jean Marie Le Breton), journalists (Boris Buzila, Sorin Toma, Mircea Carp), architects (Camil Roguski, Ion Mircea Ionescu) or members of the Ceausescu family (Mihaela M. Ceausescu, Emil Barbulescu, Zoia Ceausescu) published memoir literature. In addition, memoirs on the communist years include testimonies of ordinary citizens telling about their quotidian life (inhabitants of Bucharest during 1980s) and professional experience (a rural mayor during the period of 1974-1979).

Behind the "act of writing," authors placed various motivations. One would be to verbalize their side of the story, an endeavor that had to explain and legitimate both their past actions, and questionable decisions or privileges assumed during communism, and react therefore to public opinion's disapproval. Other pointed out towards an "altruistic" aim, which circumscribed former elites' benevolence to uncover a glimpse of the world through the eye of the very decision-making factor creating that event. Admitting the limitations of their statements by their memories' subjectivity, authors considered their work came to respond to an increasing public interest in communism and stressed on the very significance and originality of their writing. This originality in approaching the "history" they had previously made was underlined by their unique position(s) and personal experiences within the party and state apparatus. The last motive

invoked for justifying their decision of writing about the personal experiences is somehow related to what I call an *act of consciousness*. With some exceptions, most of the above mentioned authors were what Dumitru Popescu named “*sculptor of chimeras*”¹. They freely adhered to and promoted communist ideals widely and therefore, personal determination and perseverance prompted their activity within the RCP and the state apparatus. Consequently, their memoirs become an *act of consciousness*, a reflection of their own truth or the reality they perceived, combined with a supposedly genuine assumption of all the goods and wrongs they had done as former communist political elite.² For the members of the Ceausescu family, for instance, the memories were excellent opportunities to use evidence and personal experience to rectifying what they considered exaggerations, and falsifications of their personal or family life.³

The first volumes of memories printed in Romania were that of interviews, followed by the memoirs belonging to the former political leaders and of the persons whose professional activity facilitated a direct contact with Nicolae Ceausescu or with the local and central communist authorities. The last years brought very few contributions related to the quotidian aspects of the life of the ordinary people.

The interviews with the former political or military leaders were taken by Lavinia Beta (Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Barladeanu, Corneliu Manescu)⁴, Rodica Chenaru (Cornel Burtica)⁵, Ioan Tecşa (Dumitru Popescu)⁶, Vladimir Tismaneanu (Ion Iliescu)⁷ and Viorel Patrichi (Nicolae

¹ This is a part of the title of Dumitru Popescu’s volume *Un fost lider comunist se destăinuie: Am fost și cioplitor de himere*, București, Express, 1994.

² See for example, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, *O istorie trăită. Volumul I*, ediția a II-a, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2002, pp.6-7; Silviu Brucan, *Generația irosită. Memorii*, București, Universul și Calistrat Hogaș, 1992, p.9; Sorin Toma, *Privind înapoi. Amintirile unui fost ziarist comunist*, Editura Compania, București, 2004, pp.9-13; Silviu Curticeanu, *Meditații necenzurate*, Editura Historia, București, 2007, pp.9-23.

³ For example, Mihaela M. Ceaușescu, *Nu regret, nu mă jelesc, nu strig*, Editura Meditații, București, 2004, pp.12-13; Nicolae Bărbulescu, *Nicolae Ceaușescu a fost unchiul meu*, Editura Datina.

⁴ *Alexandru Bârlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu*, , Evenimentul Românesc, București 1997; *Maurer și lumea de ieri- mărturia despre stalinizarea României*, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca 2001; *Convorbiri neterminate - Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Beta*, Polirom, Iași, 2002.

⁵ *Culpe care nu se uită- Convorbiri cu Cornel Burtică*, Curtea Veche, București, 2001.

⁶ Dumitru Popescu, *Un fost lider comunist se destăinuie*.

⁷ *Marele soc din finalul unui secol scurt. Ion Iliescu în dialog cu Vladimir Tismăneanu*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2004.

Pleșită)⁸. The well-known architect of the communist period, Camil Rogusky was interviewed twice by Mirela Petcu⁹ and Chivu Florentina.¹⁰

In spite of the diverse contents of the memoirs volumes, it can be distinguished several main themes common to all of them. Related to this aspect, one should bear in mind that the contents of the volumes of interviews is very much determined by the interviewers and by their specific areas of interest (for example, Lavinia Betea proved to be very interested in Lucretiu Patrascanu affair or in the genesis of the so - called Romanian policy of independence).

The position of the eye -witness of the authors grants a biographical character of their accounts. For most of them, their political ascension within the party and the state hierarchy constitutes a biographical element and also an opportunity for revealing the specific structuring of the human and political relations and interactions or the inedited aspects regarding the informal functioning of state and party institutions.

Therefore, the memoirs volumes offer detailed pieces of information regarding the social and educational background of their authors, their involvement into the party activities during the interwar period until August 1944¹¹ and their subsequent political actions. In some cases, because of the age differences, the biographical accounts exclude references to the illegal period of the RCP, concentrating on the experiences of living, learning and working under the communist regime (the case of Silviu Curticeanu).¹²

The illegal period is usually reconstituted by describing the relation between the RCP and the Soviet counterpart, the struggle for power between the two internal centers of power, the specific and hierarchically structuring of the party cells within the Romanian prisons. The period after August 1944 is very often reduced to personal recollections of the main controversial events of the party history, such as the struggle for power that ended up with elimination of Stefan Foris and Lucretiu Patrascanu, of the

⁸ *Ochii și urechile poporului. Convorbiri cu generalul Nicolae Pleșită*, Ianus Inf SRL, București, 2001; *În culisele Securității cu și fără generalul Pleșită*, Lumea Magazin, București, 2004.

⁹ *Ceaușescu: adevăruri din umbră Convorbiri*. Evenimentul Românesc, București, 2001.

¹⁰ *Ceaușescu: Adevăruri interzise*, Editura Lucman, București, 2004.

¹¹ *Alexandru Bârlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu*, pp. 7-23, 79-81; *Maurer și lumea de ieri*, pp.29-61, *Convorbiri neterminate, Convorbiri neterminate*, pp.25-36; Mirela Petcu, Camil Roguski, *Ceaușescu: adevăruri din umbră*, pp. 59-72; Dumitru Popescu, *Cronos autodevorându-se...Aburul hallucinogen al cernelii. Memorii I*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2005

¹² Silviu Curticeanu, *Mărturia unei istorii trăite. Imagini suprapuse*, 41-94.

faction Ana Pauker – Teohari Georgescu – Vasile Luca or of the group made up of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevski, the beginning of the conflict between the so-called Romanian “national” and the pro-Soviet communists.¹³

An important part of the memories of the former political leaders is related to the subject of the so-called Romanian policy of independence towards Moscow. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Barladeanu, and especially Corneliu Manescu and Paul Niculescu-Mizil give a detailed account of circumstances of the Romanian distancing from the Soviet line. They interpret this evolution as a consequence not only of the disjunction between the Soviet and Romanian plans regarding the industrial development of the Romania, but also as an expected result of the supremacy of the “national” communists led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej over their counter – candidates supported by the Soviets. Therefore, the nationalist reinterpretation of the party history underlines the fact that Gheorghiu-Dej and other political leaders included in his inner circles of power were nationalists from the beginning but they were temporary forced to subdue to the Soviet demands because of the Soviet troops stationing in Romania and also because of the Soviet control over the state, party and military apparatus with the help of its puppets, namely the faction of Ana Pauker and the Chisinevski – Constantinescu group.¹⁴

Interesting recollections of the above mentioned leaders concerns the Romanian position during the Sino – Soviet split. Denouncing any Romanian attempt of assuming the role of a negotiator within conflict involving the Soviet and the Chinese leadership, CM and especially Maurer mention that the Romanian delegation’s visits to China was an effort for gaining the Chinese support in the ideological and political confrontation with the Soviets and their supporters.¹⁵

The apex of this policy of independence of the RCP towards Moscow was the Nicolae Ceausescu’s speech of August 22, 1968. Paul Niculescu – Mizil, Corneliu Manescu, Dumitru Popescu, Alexandru Barladeanu, and others give a comprehensive depiction over the circumstances of this event¹⁶

¹³ Alexandru Bârlădeanu *despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu*, pp. 40-108; Maurer *și lumea de ieri*, pp. 69-160; *Convorbiri neterminate*, pp.25 – 48.

¹⁴ See for example, Sorin Toma, *Privind înapoi*, pp.54-189, 239-288.

¹⁵ Maurer *și lumea de ieri*, pp.175-176 și *Convorbiri neterminate*, p.91.

¹⁶ *Convorbiri neterminate-Corneliu Mănescu*, pp. 187-208; Alexandru Bârlădeanu *despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu*, pp.190-192; Paul Niculescu- Mizil, *O istorie trăită. Memorii. II*, Editura Democrația, București, 2003, pp. 70-224; Dumitru Popescu, *Elefanții de porțelan. Scene și personaje în umbra cortinei de fier*, Match de București, București, pp.42-50.

and especially of the subsequent consequences of it for the general evolution of the Romanian political regime.

Another important theme of the memoirs volumes is the portraits made by their authors to different political and cultural personalities. For example, Sorin Toma offers interesting descriptions of the Chivu Stoica, Gheorghe Apostol, Ion Gh. Maurer, Emil Bodnaras, Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chisinevski, Al. Moghios, Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca.¹⁷ Dumitru Popescu excels in presenting not only the portraits of the political leaders but also those of the cultural personalities of the period.¹⁸ Paul Sfetcu provides a description of the Gheorghiu-Dej's closer collaborators (Chivu Stoica, Emil Bodnaras, Ion Gh. Maurer, Dumitru Petrescu, Constantin Doncea and Nicolae Ceausescu).¹⁹

A special attention is given to the portraits of the former political leaders of the RCP, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu. They are usually presented in a contradictory manner biased by the subsequent evolution of the relations between them and the authors, and the latter's need to legitimize their position towards the former party supreme leaders.

The recollections about Gheorghiu-Dej tend to present him as a good-hearted, modest person, good organizer, preoccupied of the general good of this people, cunning and courageous when it comes about the defending Romanian interests²⁰ or as a ruthless dictator, greedy of power, showing no mercy for his political opponents.²¹

The same contradictory perspective on Nicolae Ceausescu's personality is also offered by the authors of the memoirs volumes. A closer associate of Gheorghiu - Dej during the latter's detention period and after August 1944, he begins his political ascension following the year of 1955. Elected the secretary-general of the RCP as a result of the backstage negotiations on July 1965, he will gradually transform himself into an all powerful dictator. Ion Gh. Maurer, Alexandru Barladeanu, the members of the former party leader's old guard describe Nicolae Ceausescu as a perfidious, cunning, intelligent, patient individual, capable of dissimulating

¹⁷ Sorin Toma, *Privind înapoi*, pp. 91-94, 98-102, 128-132, 221-238.

¹⁸ *Cronos autodevorându-se. Panorama răsturnată a mirajului politic. Memorii II*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2006; *Cronos autodevorându-se. Artele în mecenatul etatist, Memorii III*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2006; *Cronos autodevorându-se. Angoasa putrefacției, Memorii IV*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2006.

¹⁹ Paul Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 2000, pp.143 - 181.

²⁰ For example, Paul Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej*, pp.51-132; *Maurer și lumea de ieri*, pp.144-156.

²¹ Sorin Toma, *Privind înapoi*, pp. 222-288.

his greedy of power under the mask of a weak, easily manipulated individual.²² On the other hand, Dumitru Popescu and Paul Niculescu – Mizil insist on describing the gradual and also unexpected transformation of Ceausescu after August 1968 into a ruthless dictator, unable of taking into consideration other opinions than his' ones or that of his wife, preoccupied of seizing absolute power and dominated by paranoia and fear of any internal defections.²³ Other authors underline the fact that Ceausescu was a traditional, even a religious man, dominated by his wicked and dominating wife.²⁴ Confirming Elena Ceausescu's baleful domination over his husband, Silviu Cuticeanu completes Nicolae Ceausescu's imagine by describing him as a loving and faithful husband, and also as a very difficult, suspicious boss, lacking of a rigorous education in any domain (legal, economical, ideological).²⁵

Relations between Ceausescu and the other members of the party and state also constitute the subject of memoirs volumes. Most of the authors underlined the importance of personal relations with the ruling couple in the political promoting, Ceausescu's incontestable dominance over the party and state apparatus and his increasing adulation and flattery, stimulated by the functioning of what Kenneth Jowitt termed as "*the familiarization of the party*".²⁶

Besides these general themes, each author of the memoirs volumes broaches specific topics related to their position within the party, state and military apparatus. Ion Mihai Pacepa and Nicolae Plesita emphasize the "patriotic" role played by the Security, its involving in all the domains of the state and party life and subordination to the Ceausescu's couple.²⁷ Cornel Burtica describes the functioning of the propagandistic segment during

²² Maurer și lumea de ieri, pp.204-279; Alexandru Bârlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu, pp.175-209.

²³ Dumitru Popescu, *Cronos autodevorându-se*, II-IV; Am fost; Mirela Petcu, Camil Roguski, *Ceaușescu: adevăruri din umbră*, pp.106, 148; Rodica Chelaru, *Culpe care nu se uită-Convorbiri cu Cornel Burtică*, București, Curtea Veche, 2001, pp. 194-195.

²⁴ For example, Mirela Petcu, Camil Roguski, *Ceaușescu: adevăruri din umbră*, pp.11-1216-17, 19, 79-83, 111,139-143, 149; Rodica Chelaru, *Culpe care nu se uită-Convorbiri cu Cornel Burtică*, pp.213-219.

²⁵ Silviu Curticeanu, *Mărturia unei istorii trăite. Imagini suprapuse*, Editura Albatros, București, 2000, pp. 92-149, 166-175, 184-186, 189-201; *Meditații necenzurate*, pp.52-142, 148, 154-197, 211-213.

²⁶ *Ibidem*; Rodica Chelaru, *Culpe care nu se uită*, pp.104, 107, 111-112, 117—119, 125-127, 142, 173, 216-219, 221.

²⁷ Ion Mihai, Pacepa, *Orizonturi roșii*, Venus, București, 1992; *Ochii și urechile poporului. Convorbiri cu generalul Nicolae Pleșiță*, Ianus Inf SRL, București, 2001.

1970s, underlining the mechanism of self-perpetuation of Nicolae Ceausescu's cult.

Grigore Răduica offers detailed observations over the previous events that lead to the rehabilitation of the Romanian communist leader Lucretiu Patrascanu, namely the establishing of a technical, respective of a party commission of investigation, the curious composition of these investigation teams made up of men personally picked up by Nicolae Ceausescu and finally, the political manipulation of the results of the investigation.²⁸

The specific aspects of the Romanian foreign policy constitute an important part of the memoirs literature. For example, Nicolae M. Nicolae depicts his diplomatic experience as the Romanian ambassador in the United States and also his role in establishing the diplomatic relation with the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁹ Coneliu Manescu offers inedited prices of information regarding his activity as the president of the 22nd General Assembly of the UNO and as a Romanian ambassador to France³⁰ while the three volumes published by Paul Niculescu-Mizil³¹ reconstitute the beginning and the development of the Romanian policy of independence towards Moscow from the perspective of nationalist interpretation of the party history. Sanda Stolojan describes the official visit of the French president, Charles de Gaulle, in Romania on July 1968, underlining the political significance of it for Ceausescu's international and domestic prestige and for his independent policy towards Moscow.³²

Two foreign ambassadors, David B Funderburk and Jean Marie Le Breton, wrote about the Romania during 1980s.

The American ambassador David B. Funderburk during the period 1981-1985 accomplishes a general evaluation of the American foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, condemning the mistakes of the State Department concerning its current applying of the so-called *policy of differentiation* in the bilateral relations between Romania and the United States. He underlines the violation of the human and religious rights, the repression directed against the dissidents, Nicolae Ceausescu's growing cult of personality and the lack of the real independence in the Romanian foreign and domestic

²⁸ Grigore Răduică, *Crime în lupta pentru putere*, Editura Evenimentul Zilei, București, 1999.

²⁹ Nicolae M. Nicolae, *O lume așa cum am cunoscut-o. Amintirile unui fost ambasador al României*, București, ProDomo, 2000.

³⁰ *Convorbiri neterminate-Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea*, pp.172-235.

³¹ *O istorie trăită. Volumul I; O istorie trăită. Memorii. II.; De la Comintern la comunismul național. Despre Consfătuirea partidelor comuniste și muncitorești, Moscova, 1969*, Editura Evenimentul Românesc, București, 2001.

³² Sanda Stolojan, *Cu de Gaulle în România*, Editura Albatros, București, 1994.

policy. Consequently, David B. Funderburk denounces the complicity between the Romanian communist leader and the State Department, asking for a realistic evaluation of the opportunity for the United States' continuing to support the Romanian independence towards the Soviet Union.³³

The French ambassadors, Jean Marie Le Breton describes the economic difficulties, the scarcity of the basis food, the generalized fear, the role of the Security as an instrument of repression and of sustaining the Romanian dictatorship, the hilarity of Ceausescu's public adulation and some of his quotidian eccentricities. The author also depicts the events of December 1989 from the perspective of a foreign and objective observer.³⁴

Two other memoirs volumes are concentrated on the final demise of the Romanian communist regime. One is signed by the former military and party leader Ion Coman and it represents a personal attempt of explaining his position during the Revolution of 1989 and therefore, of exonerating himself of the accusations brought by the Romanian judicial authorities.³⁵ Nikolai Morozov was an ITAR - TASS reporter in Romania on December 1989, and his volume represents a collection of articles concerning the events that led to the final collapse of communism in Romania.³⁶

The editorial work, the interaction and the subordination of the press to the political imperatives, conflicts between members of the editorial staff constitute the main subjects of the memoirs literature concerning the Romanian press during the communist period.³⁷

A unique volume of memories belongs to Mitică Georgescu, the inspector responsible for organizing the hunting for Nicolae Ceausescu in the county of Arges during 1975-1989. In addition to the technical elements regarding the preparations for such an activity, the volume presents a Nicolae Ceausescu passionate of hunting, willing to get easy hunting trophies and consequently, the mobilization and the competitions between local authorities for satisfying his personal need.

³³ David B. Funderburk, *Un ambasador american între Departamentul de Stat și dictatura comunistă din România 1981-1984*, Constanța, Dracon, 1994.

³⁴ Jean Marie Le Breton, *Sfârșitul lui Ceaușescu. Istoria unei revoluții*, București, Cavallioti, 1997.

³⁵ Ion Coman, *Omul se duce, faptele rămân, istoria însă le va analiza*, Editura Meditații, 2007.

³⁶ Nikolai Morozov, *Corespondentul Agenției TASS care a văzut totul*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 2002.

³⁷ Sorin Toma, *Privind înapoi*; Boris Buzilă, *În prezența stăpânilor. Treizeci de ani de jurnal secret la <România liberă>*, Editura Compania, București, 1998; *Cronos autodevorându-se... Aburul halucinogen al cernelii. Memorii I; Cronos autodevorându-se. Panorama răsturnată a mirajului politic. Memorii II.*

The memoirs literature written by the members of Ceausescu family denounces exaggerations, the planned lies and the attacks against them (especially Nicu Ceausescu's personal drama) after 1989 while offering unique accounts concerning the life of some parts of the Ceausescus.³⁸

The memoirs on the communist years include testimonies of ordinary citizens telling about their quotidian life and professional experience.

In the first case, the published volume is a collection of interviews with the inhabitants of Bucharest regarding their quotidian life during the 1980s. The materials is thematically organized in order to cover a large scale of subjects concerning the private (the queuing for food, holidays, the bribe, the fear, etc.) and public (participation to demonstrations and other cultural activities, the institutions of militia, the RCP and other associated organizations, etc.) life.³⁹

The second example is offered by an autobiography of the rural communist mayor of Todireni commune, the county of Botosani, Mihai Marcu, during the period of his mandate 1974-1975. This temporal segment of his biography completed with valuable archival pieces of information offers a comprehensive reconstitution of the life of the rural community of Todireni during the above mentioned period of time. The quotidian chronicle offered by the Mihai Marcu includes inedited aspects of the economic (the harvest of the crop), political (his election as the mayor, the electoral process, the party work, the organization and participation to official celebrations, his attendance to the courses offered by the inter-county party school, the work visits of the Romanian presidential couple, the rotation of the cadres) and of the cultural life (programs for political and ideological education, the organization of different mass art activities). The volume describes the relation between centre and periphery, namely the way in which the party and state decisions taken by Bucharest or by the county administration were implemented by the local officials, underlining the role of the mayor and also of the secretary of the communal party committee in this process and in the institutional communication between communal and the county authorities. A separate part of the volume concerns the certain life aspects of the people of the commune, namely the childbirth, the baptism of the newborns, the wedding and the burring of the deaths, the traditional religious celebrations, such as Christmas, Easter and the way in which political limitations regarding these events were deliberately ignored by the local authorities.⁴⁰

³⁸ Nicolae Bărbulescu, *Nicolae Ceaușescu a fost unchiul meu*, Ceaușescu, Mihaela M., *Nu regret, nu mă jelesc, nu strig*.

³⁹ *Mărturii orale. Anii ' 80 și bucureștenii*, Editura Paideia, București, 2003.

⁴⁰ Mihai Marcu, *Cincinalul unui primar comunist*, I.N.S.T., București, 2005.

The memoirs on the Romanian communism also included a mix type of literature combining biographical elements with the exigencies of scientific approach on the subject. Two volumes are worth to be mentioned.

Pavel Campeanu's tome⁴¹ is a parallel history of the RCP and of Nicolae Ceausescu's that combines the historical, sociological analysis with the autobiographical accounts covering the period 1941-1989. The author offers a comprehensive description of the group of the Romanian communists held in the prisons of Jilava and Caransebes, presenting relevant explanations for understanding the fanatical obedience of the prisoners, including him, towards their communist leaders of the party cells. Campeanu takes a great interest in clarifying several episodes of Ceausescu's biography, gradually dismantling the myths around his "revolutionary" activity within the RCP (the Brasov trial, the period of detention or the leadership of the Union of Communist Youth). The history of the RCP is presented using specific events of the life party such the power struggle that led to the elimination of Stefan Foris, Lucretiu Patrascanu, and the faction of Ana Pauker and in the last instance to the consolidation of Nicolae Ceausescu's power base. The last part of the book describes the economic difficulties that affected Romania during 1980s and the final demise of communist regime and its symbols, RCP and Nicolae Ceausescu.

Florin Constantiniu's volume is a combination between a biographical and historiographical investigation regarding the evolution of the Romanian historical research and historiography during the communist period. Actually, the changes determined by the political (re)evaluations of the national history are presented from the author's perspective in his position as a student at the Faculty of History, as a collateral victim of different conflicts of interests inside the community of historians and later as researcher within "Nicolae Iorga" Institute.⁴²

My approach limited itself to the memoir literature related to the historical aspects of the communist period leaving aside other similar contributions, for example, that of the Romanian writers⁴³ or architects.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu anii numărătorii inverse*, Polirom, Iași, 2002.

⁴² Florin Constantiniu, *De la Răutu și Roller la Mușat și Ardeleanu*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2007.

⁴³ See for example, Florența Albu, *Zidul martor (Jurnal 1970-1990)*, Cartea Românească, București 1994; Liviu Antonesei, *Jurnal din anii ciumei: 1987-1989. Încercări de sociologie spontană*, Polirom, Iași, 1995; Monica Lovinescu, *La Apa Vavilonului*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1999, 2001; Marin Preda, *Jurnal intim. Carnete de atelier*. Ediție îngrijită de Eugen Simion și Oana Soare, Editura Ziua, București, 2004; Mihai Beniuc, *Sub patru dictaturi. Memorii 1940-1975*, « Ion Cristoiu » S.A., București,

The identification of the most important memoirs volumes, of their authors, the underling their specific arguments for such a personal project is followed by detailed thematic accounts concerning the general and particular contents of each volume.

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