

# The beginning of the Sino-Soviet Split: two different approaches

**Mihai Croitor**

*Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of History and Philosophy,  
Cluj-Napoca, Romania*

Email: mihai\_croitor@yahoo.com

**Abstract:** The emergence of the Sino-Soviet split and implicitly the contestation of the ideological primacy of the Kremlin would have a negative impact on the unity of the Communist monolith. Both sides will relate differently to the events that had contributed to the tensioning of the Sino-Soviet relations, trying to underline the legitimacy of their own interpretation. Based on unpublished documents from the Romanian archives, this article aims to analyze the main views promoted by the USSR and China towards the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split, while trying at the same time to capture, on the basis of declassified documents, the elements omitted by both sides in explaining their own position.

**Keywords:** Marxism-Leninism, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Stalin, Sino-Soviet split, communism

**Rezumat:** Emergența rupturii sino-sovietice și, implicit, contestarea primatului ideologic al Kremlinului aveau să se repercuteze negativ asupra unității monolitului comunist. Ambele părți se vor raporta în mod diferit la evenimentele care au contribuit la tensionarea relațiilor sino-sovietice, încercând să sublinieze legitimitatea propriei interpretări. Bazat pe documente inedite din arhivele românești, prezentul articol își propune o analiză a principalelor poziții promovate de către URSS și China față de emergența rupturii sino-sovietice, încercând în același timp să surprindă, pe baza documentelor declassificate, care au fost elementele omise de către ambele părți în explicarea propriei poziții.

**Cuvinte-cheie:** marxism-leninism, Nikita S. Hrușciiov, Mao Zedong, Stalin, ruptura sino-sovietică, comunism

The beginning of the Sino-Soviet split had definitively shatter the illusion of the unity of the Communist monolith, an illusion which was attentively created and developed by the Kremlin decision makers. Besides, the direct and open action of disapproval from the Beijing authorities of the ideological primacy of the Kremlin was not left unanswered because in a short time Albania got engaged into an action which was similar with the one initiated by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Moreover, between 1963-1964, Romania will commence a policy of detachment from the Kremlin by

taking advantage of the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split. Therefore, the consequences of the Sino-Soviet split were major for the unity of the Communist camp. In the following, starting from these ascertainments, we intend to resort to a comparative analysis of the causes of the emergence of the Sino-Soviet disputes, by illustrating the way in which both, the Kremlin and the Zhongnanhai, reported to, at the beginning of the '60s.

### **The Chinese view**

According to the version accredited by the Beijing decision makers, the Sino-Soviet disagreements had started in February 1956, with the convening of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).<sup>1</sup> As a consequence, the Chinese Communist leaders rejected the version sustained by the Soviets, according to whom the Sino-Soviet disputes had started in April 1960, with the publishing by the Chinese side of the brochure entitled "Long Live Leninism".<sup>2</sup> Referring to the ideological positions promoted by the Soviets, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were talking about a dual nature of 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU, underlying the fact that even if some of the adopted decisions had indubitably a positive aspect, others had a strongly negative aspect.<sup>3</sup> The archive documents prove that two main aspects of the Congress in question seem to have disturbed the Chinese Communist leaders: the denunciation of Stalin's cult of personality<sup>4</sup> (and, implicitly, the launching of the de-Stalinization process), and the enunciation of the "parliamentary path" (of the peaceful revolution), related to the question of transition from capitalism to socialism.<sup>5</sup>

Admitting the fact that during the years when Stalin was in power he committed errors, Beijing still considered that there were some mistakes that he had not committed, "wrongly attributed" to him.<sup>6</sup> As a consequence, by completely denying the role played by Stalin within the International Communist Movement, the Soviet leaders engaged on the path of revisionism, once with the convening of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU.<sup>7</sup> According to the Chinese side, "criticizing Stalin at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU was wrong, both as principle and as method. The life of Stalin was the life of a great

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<sup>1</sup> Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (National Central Historical Archives - hereafter, ANIC), CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 4.

<sup>2</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, f. 10.

<sup>3</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 38/1963, f. 6.

<sup>4</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 5.

<sup>5</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 65/1964, f. 12.

<sup>6</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 73/1963, ff. 4-5.

<sup>7</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 5.

Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary. For thirty years after the Lenin's death, Stalin was the main leader of CPSU and of the Soviet government, was also recognized as the leader of the International Communist Movement, and considered the guide of the worldwide revolution. During his life, Stalin committed some serious mistakes, but in comparison with his great and meritorious facts, the mistakes he had done are only secondary."<sup>8</sup> Obviously, the critics formulated by the Chinese authorities couldn't avoid Nikita S. Khrushchev, these being especially concentrated on the discourse delivered by him at the closed session on February 25, 1956.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, referring to the attitude adopted by Nikita S. Khrushchev as well as by other members of the Soviet leadership towards the previous leader from Kremlin, the Chinese side underlined the followings: "They did not treat Stalin as a comrade, but as an enemy."<sup>10</sup> Equally, the Beijing decision makers reproached the Kremlin the fact that they did not resort (before the convening of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU) to a prior consultation with the other communist and workers' parties regarding the decisions that were about to be adopted, trying to impose a *fait accompli* on them.<sup>11</sup>

Concerning the question of "transition from capitalism to socialism", the position assumed by the CCP leaders to the "parliamentary path" (the peaceful transition), promoted by Khrushchev, was an explicit one, underlying the fact that "the violent revolution is a universal law of the proletarian revolution."<sup>12</sup> Thus, in Beijing's view, the formulation by Nikita S. Khrushchev at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU of the thesis on the transition from capitalism to socialism through the "parliamentary path" actually meant a revision of Marxism-Leninism, as well as a clear denying of the universal significance of the October Revolution<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, the Chinese Communist leaders sustained the fact that the thesis of the "peaceful transition" could not have been put into practice, arguing their position in the following manner: "It is absolutely impossible to make such a fundamental social change relying on parliaments or bourgeois governments. Because the state apparatus is under their control, the reactionary bourgeois can cancel the elections, dissolve the Parliament, exclude the communists from the government, outlaw the Communist Party and resort to barbaric means of violence for the repression of the masses and

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>9</sup> For a broader perspective on the secret speech delivered by Nikita S. Khrushchev, see: ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 23/1956, ff. 1-61.

<sup>10</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 73/1963, f. 10.

<sup>11</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 9.

<sup>12</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 65/1964, f. 8.

<sup>13</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 7.

the progressive forces.”<sup>14</sup> Equally, the doctrine of the peaceful coexistence, formulated by Nikita S. Khrushchev at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU, would form the nucleus of the Sino-Soviet differences. According to the Chinese side, Khrushchev had distorted the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence among different states, proclaiming the doctrine of peaceful coexistence as “USSR’s general line of foreign policy.”<sup>15</sup> Thus, according to Beijing, the Kremlin had adopted a revisionist political line through the doctrine of the peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev joining the American imperialism.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, placing the peaceful coexistence as the foundation of Soviet foreign policy was perceived by the Chinese policy makers as impairment of the unity of the communist camp and of the International Communist Movement.<sup>17</sup>

The question of the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism will become the object of the Sino-Soviet differences during the Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ parties held in Moscow, in November 1957. Thus, the CCP delegation, headed by Mao Zedong, would reject the draft declaration elaborated by the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU, motivating the fact that in this declaration was mentioned only the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the CCP representatives will write their own views on question of the “transition from capitalism to socialism” in a document addressed to the CC of the CPSU.<sup>19</sup> As a result of the opposition manifested by the Chinese Communist leaders, the CC of the CPSU would propose a second draft declaration in which, besides the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, was also mentioned the non-peaceful transition.<sup>20</sup> In essence, the CCP delegation will succeed to add to the 1957 Moscow Declaration the following statement: “Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily.”<sup>21</sup>

According to Beijing, between the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 22<sup>nd</sup> Congresses (February, 1956 and October, 1961), the leadership of the CPSU, using the great power chauvinism, laid the foundation for a “complete system of revisionism.”<sup>22</sup> Sustaining this idea, the CCP leaders reminded the requests formulated by the Kremlin in 1958 (referring to the construction of a radio

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<sup>14</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 65/1964, f. 34.

<sup>15</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 8.

<sup>16</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 102/1964, f. 27.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>18</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 65/1964, ff. 13-14.

<sup>19</sup> For a broader perspective on this document see: ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 8C/1960, f. 93-96.

<sup>20</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 65/1964, f. 14.

<sup>21</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 19.

<sup>22</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1964, ff. 17-18.

station on the territory of the Chinese state and the establishment of a Soviet-Chinese common fleet), these requests having the sole purpose “to put China under the military control of the Soviets.”<sup>23</sup> Also, the Chinese decision makers brought to discussion the Soviet unilateral decision of cancelling the provisions from the agreement on new technology for national defense, (signed by the two parties in October 1957), refusing to provide the Beijing authorities the needed documentation for the manufacturing of the atomic bomb.<sup>24</sup> Nor the Soviet declaration from September 9, 1959, related to Sino-Indian border incidents, would not fall out of the Chinese severe indictment. Thus, according to Beijing, expressing their regret for the incidents that took place at the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets publicly convicted, for the first time, a “brotherly” socialist country, confronted at the time with an “armed provocation”.<sup>25</sup> Under these conditions, the CCP leaders published in April 1960 the brochure entitled “Long Live Leninism”, the declared purpose of it being “the defense of Marxism-Leninism” and the elucidation of “the ideological confusion” within the International Communist Movement.<sup>26</sup> Equally, the accusations formulated by the Chinese Communist leaders also referred to the Bucharest Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (June 24-26, 1960). Thus, according to the Chinese side, the purpose of convening the meeting in question by the Soviets was to discuss the tense international situation following the failure of the Paris Summit. To Beijing’s surprise, the delegations of communist and workers’ parties that had been present at Bucharest (except for the Albanian) would resort to extensive criticism of the Chinese ideological “heresies”.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, the Kremlin’s decision of withdrawing the Soviet experts from China, in July 1960, was perceived by the Chinese communists leaders as an explicit wish of the CPSU to enhance the Sino-Soviet differences.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, according to Chinese decision-makers, the withdrawal of 1390 Soviet experts from China was a violation of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (signed in February 1950), resulting in the termination of 343 contracts and the cancellation of 257 projects of scientific and technical collaboration.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 19.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 38/1963, ff. 11-12.

<sup>26</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 26.

<sup>27</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 38/1963, ff. 13-14; ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1964, f. 37.

<sup>28</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 30.

<sup>29</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1964, f. 18.

## **The Soviet view**

Referring to the Sino-Soviet split, the CPSU leaders expressed their surprise about the emergence of disagreements between the two states, given that in the period prior to the outbreak of tensions, the USSR had given a consistent economic support to the People's Republic of China. In order to sustain their position, the Kremlin made use of some statistical data: USSR had helped China to build more than 200 large enterprises; between 1950 and 1960 more than 10 000 soviet specialists had been sent to China; between 1951 and 1960, more than 10 000 Chinese engineers, technicians and workers were trained in the USSR, as well as about 1000 scientists; also, in this period, more than 11 000 Chinese students had already graduated from soviet higher education institutions; USSR had granted China, under very favorable conditions, long term loans worth 1 816 000 000 rubles.<sup>30</sup>

Unlike the Chinese political leaders, who considered that the Sino-Soviet split had started with the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU in February 1956,<sup>31</sup> the Kremlin decision makers considered that the "deviation" of Beijing from "the common line of the Communist movement" had started in April, 1960, with the publication of the brochure entitled "Long Live Leninism".<sup>32</sup> Occasioned by the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lenin's birth, the brochure consisted of three distinct editorials: "Long Live Leninism", "Forward Along the Path of the Great Lenin" and "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner".<sup>33</sup> According to the Kremlin, the three articles included numerous misinterpretations of the Leninist ideological percepts, being basically against the provisions of the Moscow Declaration of November 1957.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, according to the Soviet side, the Chinese communist leaders will again publicly manifest their own ideological views during the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the General Council of the World Trade Union Federation,<sup>35</sup> which had taken place in Beijing, on June 1960.<sup>36</sup> As a result, during the Bucharest Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties (June 24-26, 1960), "the representatives of fifty Communist and Workers' Parties had brotherly criticized" the ideological views promoted by CCP.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 123/1964, ff. 64-66.

<sup>31</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 4.

<sup>32</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, f. 10.

<sup>33</sup> See: *Long Live Leninism*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960, passim.

<sup>34</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, f. 10.

<sup>35</sup> For a broader perspective on this meeting see: ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 34/1960, ff. 1-13.

<sup>36</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund - Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, f. 10.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 11.

Regarding the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China in July 1960, the Kremlin decision-makers promoted a different view from that of the CCP. Thus, according to the Soviet side, CCP attempted to accredit the idea that the Chinese economy faced visible hardships precisely because of the withdrawal of those experts and not because of the failure of the economic policies implemented during the Great Leap Forward.<sup>38</sup> The reason of the withdrawal of these Soviet experts from China lied, from Kremlin's point of view, precisely on the Chinese authorities' behavior, who adopted an "unfriendly and offensive" attitude towards them.<sup>39</sup> As a result, the Soviet authorities declined the Chinese allegations that, by withdrawing the experts from China, the USSR would have violated the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.<sup>40</sup> On the contrary, the Kremlin underlined, "the Soviet Union respected scrupulously all the obligations deriving from this treaty".<sup>41</sup>

With the beginning of the Sino-Soviet open polemic, a controversial topic during the debates between the two sides was represented by the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPUS. On this matter, the Kremlin reclaimed that in 1956 the Chinese side had agreed to the decisions taken at 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU, in this regard citing fragments from the speeches delivered by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping during the 8<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CCP (September 1956).<sup>42</sup> Also, the Soviet leaders brought in discussion the article "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (published on December 29, 1956 in "Renmin Ribao") in which the Chinese decision makers praised the condemnation of Stalin's personality cult at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU.<sup>43</sup> Or, starting with the beginning of Sino-Soviet open polemic, the CPSU leaders accused the Chinese side of "having assumed the role of

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<sup>38</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 123/1964, f. 71.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 73.

<sup>40</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1964, f. 18.

<sup>41</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 123/1964, f. 66.

<sup>42</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, ff. 36-37.

<sup>43</sup> According to the article in question: "The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union showed great determination and courage in doing away with blind faith in Stalin, in exposing the gravity of Stalin's mistakes and in eliminating their effects. Marxist-Leninists throughout the world, and all those who sympathize with the communist cause, support the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to correct mistakes, and hope that the efforts of the Soviet comrades will meet with complete success. It is obvious that since Stalin's mistakes were not of short duration, their thorough correction cannot be achieved overnight, but demands fairly protracted efforts and thoroughgoing ideological education." See: "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, December 29, 1956", in *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1959, p. 38.

defenders of the personality cult, as propagators of Stalin's misconceptions."<sup>44</sup> In fact, according to the Soviets, the Sino-Albanian alliance was precisely the result of the common views promoted by the two sides regarding the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPUS. Thus, according to the Kremlin, "the Sino-Albanian Alliance is not an accidental fact. It appeared on the basis of opposition to the Leninist line of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU, based on the hostile attitude towards the liquidation of Stalin's cult of personality."<sup>45</sup>

Regarding the issue of the transition from capitalism to socialism, the leaders of CPSU will reject the allegations submitted by the CCP, according to which the Soviet side would have only recognized the peaceful transition. Thus, according to the Kremlin, the CPSU recognized both peaceful and non-peaceful (violent) transition, imputing to the Chinese authorities that they had only accepted the latter.<sup>46</sup> Equally, the Soviets accused the Chinese side of underestimating the threat of a thermonuclear war, reproaching Beijing authorities that they considered the atomic bomb as "a paper tiger".<sup>47</sup>

### **Final remarks**

Although the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU had contributed, on a long term, to the deterioration of the relations between China and the USSR, in 1956 the tensions between the two sides were not noticeable. Moreover, in an editorial entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (published in "Renmin Ribao" on April 5, 1956), the Beijing decision makers emphasized the following: "The 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union summed up the fresh experience gained both in international relations and domestic construction. It took a series of momentous decisions on the steadfast implementation of Lenin's policy in regard to the possibility of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems, on the development of Soviet democracy, on the thorough observance of the Party's principle of collective leadership, on the criticism of shortcomings within the Party, and on the sixth Five-Year Plan for development of the national economy."<sup>48</sup> However, within the same editorial, a careful observer would have noticed that with regard to the the condemnation of Stalinist abuses, Beijing was promoting a slightly different view from that of the Kremlin, stressing the following: "Some people consider

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<sup>44</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, f. 35.

<sup>45</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 123/1964, f. 23.

<sup>46</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 61/1963, ff. 50-51.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 20.

<sup>48</sup> "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, April 5, 1956", in *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, p. 1.



that Stalin was wrong in everything; this is a grave misconception. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist, yet at the same time a Marxist-Leninist who committed several errors without realizing that they were errors.”<sup>49</sup> It is equally true that after the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU, the Chinese Communist leaders continued to show Stalin’s portrait together with the ones of Marx, Engels and Lenin in various public manifestations.<sup>50</sup> The interesting fact is that in 1956 these issues did not cause tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. Moreover, in the Moscow Declaration of 1957,<sup>51</sup> the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU is illustrated in a positive light, a fact that was highlighted by CPSU at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet open polemic.<sup>52</sup> However, Beijing would justify its position adopted at Moscow in 1957 by invoking the compromise. Thus, according to the CCP leaders, although they did not agree with the inclusion in the Declaration of the issue of the significance of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU for the International Communist Movement, however, taking into consideration “the difficult position at which the CPSU was at that time”, they resorted to a compromise, accepting its mention within the document.<sup>53</sup> And yet, in 1956-1957 the disagreements between the CPSU and the CCP did not degenerate into an open polemic between the two parties. A possible explanation may be represented by the consistent Soviet economic aid received by China during that period.

The first significant tension between the two sides will occur in 1958 with the Soviet proposal for the construction of a long range radio station on China’s territory. The Soviet demand (doubled by a proposal regarding the establishment of a Sino-Soviet common fleet)<sup>54</sup> will, however, result in a definite refusal from the Chinese Communist leaders.<sup>55</sup> But this time, also, due to the secret visit of Nikita S. Khrushchev in China, between July 31 – August 3, 1958, the Sino-Soviet tensions seem to have been dissipated.<sup>56</sup> The year 1959,

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 18.

<sup>50</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 12.

<sup>51</sup> For a broader perspective on this Declaration see: “Declarația de la Moscova (noiembrie 1957)”, in Mihai Croitor (ed.), *În umbra Kremlinului: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej și geneza Declarației din Aprilie 1964*, Editura Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, pp. 430-446.

<sup>52</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 123/1964, f.122. See also: “Document 3. 10 iulie 1963, Moscova. Răspunsul lui Mihail A. Suslov la expunerea lui Deng Xiaoping din 8 iulie 1963”, in Mihai Croitor, Sanda Borșa (ed.), *Moscova 1963: eșecul negocierilor sovieto-chineze*, Editura Mega & Editura Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2014, p. 113.

<sup>53</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 71/1963, f. 21.

<sup>54</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 40/1964, f. 44.

<sup>55</sup> See: “6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Iudin, 22 July 1958”, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issues 6-7, 1995/1996, pp. 155-159.

<sup>56</sup> For a broader perspective on this visit see: “Document No.1 First Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing], 31 July 1958”, “Document No. 2

however, will witness the emergence of new tensions in the Sino-Soviet relations. The reasons for the worsening of the relations between the two sides lie in two separate events: the incidents at the Sino-Indian border (and the Soviet declaration on these incidents) and the “spirit of Camp David”, reluctantly viewed by the Chinese part.<sup>57</sup> In fact, the tensions between Mao Zedong and Nikita S. Khrushchev will be obvious during the meeting of October 2, 1959.<sup>58</sup>

Or, in this tense context, the Chinese Communist leaders published the brochure “Long Live Leninism”, in which, as already shown, they promoted some ideological precepts in contradiction to those disseminated by the Kremlin. Under such conditions, the split between the two parties became imminent. As a result, on June 24-26, 1960, at the Bucharest Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, the Sino-Soviet divergences exceeded for the first time the strict framework of bilateral relations, becoming known to all communist and workers’ parties. At the urge of the Kremlin, all delegations present in Bucharest (except the Albanian one) will unanimously condemn the ideological views promoted by Beijing.<sup>59</sup> The Sino-Soviet split was now complete.

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<sup>57</sup> ANIC, CC of the RCP Fund – Foreign Relations Section, file 38/1963, f. 11-12.

<sup>58</sup> For a broader perspective on this meeting see: “Document No.3 Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959”, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issues 12-13, 2001, pp. 262-270.

<sup>59</sup> For a broader perspective on the June 1960 Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties see: Mihai Croitor (ed.), *La București s-a scris: „Sciziune!” Consfătuirea partidelor comuniste și muncitorești din iunie 1960*, Editura Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2013, *passim*.

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