

DRUGS, FLIGHT, AND MIGRATION. A COMPARISON OF NORTH AND WEST AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND EUROPE

ERHARD SCHULZ¹, HUSSEIN ALMOHAMAD², SANI IBRAHIM³

ABSTRACT. *Drugs, Flight, and Migration. A Comparison of North and West Africa, Near East and Europe.* Even foreseeable, the migration wave of 2015 did confuse Europe profoundly. For long time one argued on “push and pull” or on implantation in the demographic transition as the backgrounds of immigration. Moreover, an enforced and constant immigration was claimed for the Central European countries in order to assure the life standard. On the other side, it was impossible to develop standards for migration and flight- beyond the Geneva Convention. In parallel to that, the weight of the “informal” part of production and trade was widely neglected on the official as on the academic level. Thus, a – time wise – tight connected economic system of drug trade/traffic and the transport of migrants or refugees developed since the 1990s. By now, it is interwoven with the various terror-groups, militias or officials too. Both parts of that well-organised system see Europe as their main destination, but Africa is systematically developed as a future market for drugs too. It is clear, that the civil population is suffering most in all the regions. Maps for five time slices – the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1990s, 2015, and 2018 will present the different interconnections of drug traffic and migration/flight. They show the traditional system of migration and flight up to the 1990s, when the international drug traffic interconnected with the various terror groups and shaped a new economic system. The initiatives of the European Union to stop or channelize migration and future chances for the region will have to cope with them.

Keywords: *Drug trafficking, flight, migration, North and West Africa, Near East, Europe*

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1. INTRODUCTION

Migration was a constantly disputed item during the last years. It had an academic approach until the 1990s when the EU was faced to the reality of a continuous so called “illegal” immigration from northern Africa and the Balkans. The Central European countries were comfortable with the “Dublin treaty” (EU 1997) up to the massive immigration via the “Balkan road” in summer and fall 2015. Since that time the term “migration” was seen as a threat for European economy and society, and the political reactions and activities were mainly driven by desperation, actionism and election campaigns. However, on the level of the UN it was not possible to achieve a general definition and action plan to react to the phenomena of migration and flight (UN 2018, UNHCR 2018, see also Rekacevicz 2009, Sunjic 2000).

This article tries to analyse the terms “migration” and “flight” and to put them into a regional scheme globing Europe, western and northern Africa, as well as the Near East. It also will explain the different trade and economic schemes which act as parallel drivers with a perfect organisation, but which are for the most ignored in the economic and geographic literature. The commercial webs of drug traffic and organised migration as well generated an enormous amount of money, which might counteract some ideas of development aid (Abou Chabake 2000, Julien 2011). Moreover, the EU did establish a system of externalisation of its southern borders far to the Sahelian countries (Boyer 2019, Brachet et al. 2011).

With help of a series of maps we will try to explain these complex developments. They describe the decisive years of migration: 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and 2015 and the winter 2018. They show the migration routes, the development of drug commerce and mutual interactions of them.

2. WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

The terms “migration” and “flight” got a negative character in the last years, and also the attempts of the UN – see above- were not successful at all because out of political reasons they were obstructed. Thus, only the Geneva Convention of 1951 (ICRC 2014, UN 1951) works to define refugees for their position and rights. “Displaced people” are considered to be protected but with lesser civil rights.

In the academic discussion migration was long time considered as a phenomenon reacting on “push and pull” (cf. De Haas 2006, 2011, Galtung 2000, Lucas 2005, Massey 1998, MPI-Team 2013, Parnreiter 2000, White and Woode

1986). However Zelinsky (1971) tried to explain it on the background of the demographic transition (cf. Kiziak 2019). As Figure 1 might explain, it needs a certain time before poor people may accumulate the necessary finances for the travel in order to seek their fortune abroad. Ideas for migration rise high but the capabilities develop slowly (stage one, high birth and death rate, low level of population growth). They grow from stage two on (decreasing death rate, slight rise of population growth) and at stage four (decreasing birth rate and population growth) they reach their highest level, when the ideas to migrate already decrease from stage three (decreasing birth and death rate and rising population growth) on.




Fig. 1. The mutual dependencies of migration and demographic transition (after De Haas 2010, modified).

As a result, emigration is active as long as there is the necessary money available and it has its peak at stage three. In contrast to that, immigration remains low until stage three but rises high afterwards. A smaller but well situated population needs other people to do the necessary work.

Two studies from the Bertelsmann foundation (Fuchs et al. 2015, 2019) demonstrated a principal need of constant immigration ranging from about 300000 to 700000 people per year alone to Germany in order to secure the life standard of its population.

However, these reflections do not stay for the cases of war or catastrophes. Nuscheler (1996) already pointed to the mixing of migration and flight in the academic discussion as well as in reality. Oltmer (2017) resumed

that the general migration from countries of the South to those of the North remained low and stable the last 50 years, and the greater part of migration happens in West Africa, South America and eastern Asia (see also Muthumbi et al. 2018).

The number of wars or civil wars rose during the last 30 years (Schreiber 2016, Zand 2014). With the development of the various self-declared health armies, independence fighters, and religious terror groups it was the civil population taken as main target. Even near to Europe it was not realised as an important threat. Theories of “clash of cultures” (Huntington 1996) or the postulation of a “terror banana” (Keenan 2013) were discussed to explain these phenomena. However, in 2015 the invasion on the “Balkan Road” and the constant arriving of migrants via the Mediterranean with its horrible death rates surprised the EU enormously. It was declared “illegal migration”- with the exception of Syrians, accepted as refugees in the system of the Geneva Convention. From that time on, the official politics remained chaotic, whereas on the community level the situation arranged astonishingly with time. Attempts on the UN-level to understand these problems and to prepare solutions failed (see above). The memoranda on refugees and migration (UN 2018, UNHCR 2018) were not accepted unanimously and thus, a common base to react to these phenomena remains open.

In parallel-but less recognized in its dimension, a perfect organized economic and trade system is following the routes of migration. Very often it interferes with the market or it organizes the migration too, especially when it is considered as “informal /illegal”. As Europe is the main market for heroine and cocaine the trade routes are often the same as for migrants. *Cannabis* however, is the old and long times accepted drug in Muslim countries which have a firmly rooted production and distribution system. Today, *Cannabis sativa*, *C. indica*, *Erythroxylon coca*, and *Papaver somniferum* are genetically modified plants with an enhanced content of psychoactive substances (CSRO 2002, Financial Times, 2004, Grotanhermen and Göttsche 2019, Mertens 2008, Page 2005). In addition, artificial drugs like opiates (cf. Tramadol) or amphetamines (cf. Captagon) became important in the last years. They work as stress killers and are also known as “army and terrorist drugs” (Becnas 2015). Moreover, as the financial dimension is as important, the trade is necessarily organized by involving officials and government members of the respective states, which are crossed (Gregoire 2001, Kraehe 2008).

Khat is the classical drug of migration and replacement economy. *Catha edulis*, Khat is a medium sized shrub or tree. Their leafs comprise the mild stimulant cathinone, which, however, oxidizes within 48 hours after harvest.

Thus, it cannot be stored and transported dry. Khat is chewed normally in a group of men during the afternoon and evening. It is traditionally cultivated in East Africa and Yemen. In these regions, it got the history of replacement cultivation (Cochrane & O'Reagan 2016, Omar and Mbugua 2019). With the coffee crisis in the 1970s, it became the favoured cultivation in Yemen and Ethiopia, where it represents today the major export good. As it cannot be stored it depends on the infrastructure and its area enlarged with the extension of roads or air transport. Moreover, the drug is directly connected to migration. The flight and emigration waves after the wars in Ethiopia, Somalia or Yemen created a diaspora, which today is the major clientele of Khat. With the ban of Khat in the UK and China, it became illegal in large areas and the economy of smuggle started. Today it is still legally cultivated in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen having Somalia as the greatest client (Cochrane & O'Reagan 2016).

3. MAPS AS A WAY OF UNDERSTANDING

Maps of northern and western Africa, the Near East and Europe shall help to explain the evolution of the last fifty years. They shall elucidate the interdependencies of these regions, which are mostly regarded separately. These maps show the main routes of migration and drug trade/traffic. Information comes from own observation during fieldwork and from the large literature body. It is clear, that an investigative research is risky - especially in the informal/ illegal environment. However, there is enough information accessible (for the most IOM 2018a-h, UNODC 2007, 2010, 2016, 2017). The long-time fieldwork and expeditions provided information on routes and tracks, which are inserted into a commercial satellite image map (TCDB 2004). A map can be easily overcrowded, and the scale limits the amount of information. Thus, we decided not to note the state's borders, instead we gave the main cities and action points. As there is no generally accepted definition of migrants and refugees we follow the differentiation of Sejal (1993) between voluntarily (including transhumance) and involuntarily migrations / vulgo refugees. For the last we use the blue of the Geneva Convention. We also decided not to give any quantitative information because it would make the maps unreadable. Moreover, quantitative information is often too imprecise in these topics. Thus, these maps indicate the respective items in time slices for the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and 2015 as well as for the winter situation in 2018.



Fig. 2. Drug trade and migration in the years 1960. The map shows the traditional migration and transhumance in West Africa, the exodus from the Maghreb to Europe, the migration to Algeria and Libya, the recruitment from Italy, Greece and Turkey to Central Europe, the traditional commerce of *Cannabis* and the opium/heroine trade from Afghanistan to Europe. War and refugee streams in Biafra, Congo and Lebanon.

List of capitals and action centres mentioned in the maps

1 Oslo, 2 Stockholm, 3 Helsinki, 4 St. Petersburg, 5 Reval, 6 Dublin, 7 Copenhagen, 8 Riga, 9 London, 10 Den Haag, 11 Bremen-Hamburg, 12 Vilnius, 13 Calais, 14 Brussels, 15 Berlin, 16 Warsaw, 17 Minsk, 18 Moscow, 19 Paris, 20 Praha, 21 Kiev, 22 Salzburg, 23 Passau, 24 Vienna, 25 Bratislava, 26 Brenner, 27 Budapest, 28 Ljubljana, 29 Zagreb, 30 Szeged, 31 Madrid, 32 Marseille, 33 Belgrade, 34 Bucharest, 35 Lisbon, 36 Rome, 37 Podgorica, 38 Sofia, 39 Napoli, 40 Bari, 41 Tirana, 42 Skopje, 43 Idomeni, 44 Istanbul, 45 Almeria, 46 Ankara, 47 Lesbos, 48 Athens, 49 Izmir, 50 Bodrum, 51 Ceuta, 52 Melilla, 53 Algiers, 54 Tunis, 55 Lampedusa, 56 Malta, 57 Latakia, 58 Aleppo, 59 Raka, 60 Deir Alzour, 61 Mosul, 62 Teheran, 63 Bagdad, 64 Beirut, 65 Damascus, 66 Tel Aviv, 67 Amman, 68 Kuwait City, 69 Rabat, 70 Canary Islands, 71 Tindouf, 72 Tripolis, 73 Bengasi, 74 Cairo, 75 Manama, 76 Doha, 77 Abu Dhabi, 78 Dubai, 79 Muscat, 80 Adrar, 81 Sebha, 82 Kufra, 83 Riad, 84 Bodji Moktar, 85 Tamanrasset, 86 Jeddah, 87 Nouakchott, 88 In Guezzam, 89 Madama, 90 Dakar, 91 Gao, 92 Agadez, 93 Dirkou, 94 Faya Largeau, 95 El Fasher, 96 Khartoum, 97 Asmara, 98 Sanaa, 99 Bissau, 100 Bamako, 101 Ouagadougou, 102 Niamey, 103 Kano, 104 Diffa, 105 N'Djamena, 106 Conakry, 107 Freetown, 108 Abuja, 109 Djibouti, 110 Addis Abeba, 111 Monrovia, 112 Abidjan, 113 Accra, 114 Lome, 115 Cotonou, 116 Lagos, 117 Douala, 118 Yaounde, 119 Bangui, 120 Juba, 121 Camp Bidi Bidi, 122 Mogadishu, 123 Kampala, 124 Nairobi, 125 Camp Dadaab.

3.1. THE YEARS 1960 (FIGURE 2)

These years created a new mosaic of migration in the whole area. It was the period of independence of the former colonies. The end of the Algerian war provoked a massive exodus of the French colonisators and the Harkis – their collaborators – to France as well as from Morocco and Tunisia too (cf. Cote 1988). The Jewish population also exiled either to France or directly to Israel (Sejal 1993). The Sahelian and Sudanian countries showed an important mosaic of working migration/-exodus, the traditional transhumance or nomadic movements (cf. Breville 2018, Zachariah and Conde 1981). A special case was the complete exodus of the French from Guinea after independence (Gerrits 2019). However, a northwards migration tradition from the Sahelian countries was established, which answered the strong demand of work force for reconstructing infrastructure and building for the growing petrol-industry as well as agriculture projects in Algeria and Libya and which still prevails today (Cote 1988, Scheele 2010, 2011). These migrants used the century old commercial routes between the Sahel and the Mediterranean (Bensaad 2002, Brachet et al. 2011, Pliez 2000, 2002). Migration from Egypt and Tunisia was directed to Libya for working in agriculture, commerce and administration. In parallel people migrated from Egypt, Sudan and Palestine to the Arabian Peninsula (De Bel-Air 2018).

But also refugees were numerous. The Biafra war provoked an enormous amount of internal refugees as it developed in the eastern Congo too (cf. Ki Zerbo 1981, Schreiber 2016). Here the civil war started to burn as it still does today (cf. Schreiber 2016). The Near East saw the Lebanon civil war and its refugees (Zand 2014). Europe was impregnated by two phenomena. The iron curtain closed definitely, and people were massively recruited from Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey as well as from the Maghreb countries to Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and France in order to assure the industrial development (cf. Calavita 2009, Stacher & Demal 2000).

The drug scene was still simple. *Cannabis* as the traditionally allowed drug for Muslims was mainly grown in Morocco and widely traded: to Europe via Spain and to Africa via the West African coast (cf. Duvall 2018, Klantschinig et al. 2016 a, b). However, in several countries *Cannabis* was cultivated too for the local consumption. Later on it became a compensation culture when the ordinary revenues from agriculture diminished too much (Perez and Laniel 2004). Also Lebanon and Turkey were important producers. For both *Cannabis* and opium/heroin the Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey –Balkan Road developed strongly as the Soviet Union was supplied via Kazakhstan to Moscow for further distribution (Buddenberg and Byrd 2010, Kteutzmann 2005, UNODC 2010, 2016). Khat cultivation and consumption was restricted to East Africa and Yemen (see Cochrane & O’Reagan 2016).

3.2. THE YEARS 1970 (FIGURE 3)

During this period the climate changed definitely in northern and western Africa. The humid period, which lasted with interruptions from the mid 19th century cf. (Nicholson et al. 2012) terminated. Degradation/desertification ruled in Africa (UNCOD 1978). Nomads and pastoralists loosed their herd almost completely and the nomad society collapsed. Many transhumances moved southwards or were given up. People fled to the neighbour countries, where large refugee camps were organised near the borders. This was the first wave of climate or environmental refugees. A phenomenon as well discussed for the future (Ioneco et al. 2017, Nouaillas 2013).

The conflict over West Sahara caused the long-lasting refugee camps near Tindouf in North-West Algeria where the Polisario movements declared the RASD (République arabe sharaoui démocratique) soon (San Martin 2010). The northwards migration in Africa continued and also the emigration to Europe by recruitment was still active (see Calavita 2009). Migration from Egypt and Tunisia to Libya was active too as it was for the Sudan for the Arabian Peninsula. Here the immigration tradition from Asia began, which still continues today (cf. Asian Century Institute 2014, De Bel Air 2018, Seyal 1993). The 1970s were also the period of several wars or civil wars as in Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel,

The drug scene developed slowly. The Afghan trading routes remained the same. The connections of Soviet Union with Ghana and Nigeria also fostered the “diplomatic suitcase” for the heroin exchange to Moscow and further distribution (cf. UNODC 2010, 2016). “Swinging London” also prepared the road of direct delivery to Europe, where the great ports became the doors to arrive to the main markets (Conesa 2007). Khat was still restricted to East Africa and South-West Arabia. However, the coffee crisis and the Yemen war provoked an extension of cultivation and the slight amelioration of infrastructure supported the Khat trade (Gebissa 2010, Rivera 2012).

3.3. THE YEARS 1990 (FIGURE 4)

This period was of great changes. The most important was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which created new gates for migration (Macung 2011, Samari 2007). The civil war in the states of the former Yugoslavia did send great waves of refugees to Central Europe. The wars in Afghanistan, in the Gulf region, Darfur, Ruanda, Congo, Somalia as well as in Liberia and Sierra Leone enlarged the amount of refugees as the genocide in Rwanda resulted in a continuing militia theatre in the eastern Congo (Belkaid 2011, Prunier 2009, Schreiber 2016, Zand 2014).

These years were those of the Algerian civil war and the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali, which disturbed the civil exchanges to Algeria but fostered any kind of smuggle.

At the end of the Algerian civil war a great part of the Islamic rebels filtered to North Mali and built up their hinterland (Ousseini et al. 2009, Schulz et al. 2001). Further on they acted as founders of the various Islamic terror groups still active in these regions. The contact with the drug traffickers became fruitful, and a long cooperation started, financially lucrative for both parts (Alexander 2017, Coulterwood 2015, Gabriel 2019, Holmgren 2014, Ibrahim 2019, Julien 2011, Lounnas 2018).

Most refugees remained in the surrounding area (Rekacevicz 2009). Anyway, a great number got on the move in direction to Europe and prepared the routes via Ethiopia and Sudan either to Egypt or via Kufra to the Libyan coast (Morice 2012, Servant 2009). From here there was a dangerous boat transport to Italy or Greece and many of them drowned (Vermeeren 2008). The system of acceptance and integration in Europe was trained. Refugees from Afghanistan followed the Iran-Turkey road and then through the Balkans. The civil emigration from Tunisia-Egypt to Libya or from Sudan and Palestine to the Gulf States continued as the emigration waves from India, Pakistan and South-

East Asia did (Asian Century Institute 2014). They also used the air transport via Moscow in order to filter into Europe afterwards.

A third evolution started in Mexico. The Colombian cocaine cartels lost their war with the Mexican ones and were obliged to seek another way to deliver their goods to their main market – Central and Western Europe (cf. Smets 2011). Thus they targeted West Africa for the transport routes.

The delivery to West Africa was by air and ship to the islands of Guinea-Bissau or directly to the surroundings of Gao (Mali), where the freight was unloaded and the vessel burned afterwards (see AFP 2011, Bossard 2014, Gregoire 2001). From there the Sahara was crossed by lorries or 4-wheel-cars. At the same time they started to prepare West Africa as a future market.

However, the road was already paved before. Unlicensed cigarettes from Asia were shipped to Nigeria and then to Cotonou (Benin). From here in official convoys of tens of lorries to the Niger border and further on to Agadez and via Dirkou to the Libyan border. In Niger they profited from the World Bank's philosophy of privatisation. The World Bank asked the Niger government to decline state-owned firms. Thus, the system of cereal stores for times of drought was ceased but taken up by the BAT (British-American-Tobacco) in order to preserve the cigarette's quality. Finally, a win-win situation in the sense of privatisation (see Gregoire 2001).

So, at the Niger border at Madama the lorries checked out officially, paid the legal duties, crossed the border somewhere and arrived in Sebha, where the transport was directed to the North-West or North-East for further distribution. Other ways were those from Agadez to Algeria or from Nouadhibou to Morocco and Algeria. Thus, the cocaine- and heroine- mafias in a kind of cooperation took up these roads. Cigarettes became less important but worked as a façade anyway. The Libya road was frequented by the civil transport activities too including the transport of people (Ousseini et al. 2009, Schulz et al. 2000). Niger did not participate to the official boycott of Libya. Cocaine was also transported by air directly to Moscow or Belgrade from Monrovia or Lagos. In parallel, the artificial drugs like opiates (Tramadol) or met-amphetamines (cf. Captagon) became popular, especially as the drug of the warriors (Becnas 2018, Signer 2018).

In these years, the economic connection between drug trade, migration, and militias became an important item.

Khat developed to a classical drug of migrants. Contrary to the other drugs, cultivation and trade were still legal. The diaspora from the Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea wars became an important clientele and the improvement of the road and air transport created an international trade to North America, Europe and East Asia.




Fig. 4. Drug trade and migration in the years 1990 including the IL76/AN12 system (above). Collapse of the Soviet Union and new migrations in Europe. Extension of the immigration from South-East Asia to the Arabian Peninsula and to Libya. Entrance of the cocaine and artificial drug traffic in West Africa and establishment of the smuggle route from Cotonou to Tripoli and Cairo. War and refugee streams in Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Eritrea, Iraq, Ex-Yugoslavia, establishment of the deathly Mediterranean traverse to Europe. Establishment of the Islamic terror groups in Mali. Khat trade followed the migrants of the East African wars. Establishment of the IL76/An12 system for the weapon-drug exchange.

This ground mosaic was paralleled by a special system of air transport and trade. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Red Army caused an unexpected pool of military material (air planes, weapons and others) and experienced crews. Privatisation led to a great number of new airlines, which were obliged to find clients and jobs. Some of them were serious but a great number were devoted to the informal business. Thus, an IL76/ AN12-system developed. With Yekaterinburg and Vitebsk as supply centres in the back, Belgrade was a perfect hub for them (Potter 2011). The Milosevic regime was desperately looking to find finances from informal weapon transports to banned regimes like in Libya, Angola, or Iraq. IL76 or AN 12 were perfect planes for these activities and the crews had their experiences from Afghanistan. Other bases were Malta as fuel supply and Cyprus and Sharjah as perfect hubs with a limited or manageable control systems. Entebbe was perfect for the transport to Karthoum, Mogadishu or Angola, whereas Sharjah was suitable to reach Kabul. The business was twofold. Weapons and other military goods were mostly exchanged for drugs, and as the planes had a great capacity of overload, the crews had their chances to buy and sell valuable goods on their own account. However, as maintenance of the flying material was reduced in order to save money, there was a regular loss of planes and crews.

3.4. 2015 – THE YEAR OF SURPRISE (FIGURE 5).

The preceding decade changed the whole region profoundly. The Arab world was shaken by civil upheaval, which led in Tunisia to a civil government, in Egypt finally to a military regime. Libya and Syria drowned into chaos and civil war (Gresh 2012). The war in Afghanistan continued. In contrast to the years before, several military invasions and intervention started in Mali and Libya (Bayo 2018, Chataigner 2019, Daguzan and Moisseron 2011, Lacher 2019, Poupert 2019). The wars in Syria and Yemen became proxy-wars with Iran and Saudi Arabia as main actors (cf. Kozak 2015). Sahara and Sahel developed into a theatre of several terror groups, which made the region into an insecure area for the civil population (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018). Thus, the amount of refugees and migrants developed massively. However, as in the previous periods, the most of them remained in the region, as they could not afford a long journey. Mali became a war region and Libya collapsed as an ordinary state and got partitioned into regions of the respective militias. Algeria closed its borders for the civilian traffic and exchange. The Libyan borders got uncontrollable and all kind of traffic between drugs, migrants and refugees entered the country in order to seek work or chances to go to Europe (Altai Consulting 2015, Auti 2010, Ben Yahia et al. 2019, Bredeloup and Pliez 2018, Daguzan and Moisseron 2011, Deknatel 2016, Diaz and Hidalgo 2018, Ellis, 2009, Hammood 2006).

The organisation of the travel by the migrants up to the Libyan border was observed and described by Gatti (2009) and Tubiana (2017), while their European fate was analysed by Clochard (2017). The important development of telecommunication and of reliable cars fostered the traffic on new and dangerous

routes. The transport in the Maghreb and Mashriq countries is organised in a private manner and the migrants have to pay for it (see below). Thus, in many cases they have to earn the money for the next step and very often they are badly exploited. The oversea transport became a growing business, without any security measures. Anyhow, illegal immigrants were – and still are – an integral part of economy as the exploitation in irrigation projects in Almeria or in the Basilicata are only examples of that (Calavita 2009, Reching 2018).

And there arrived some new actors too. Chinese migrants settled in many African countries. They came aligned to official treaties or projects on industrial and agriculture projects or on a private base working in the service sectors (Alan et al. 2013, Mohan and Ton-Mullins 2008, Muttarek 2017).

The long time burning civil war in Syria provoked millions of refugees, which for the most were hosted in the surrounding countries. But as the food and medical supply of the refugee camps got uncertain in 2014, several hundreds of thousands took up the Balkan roads – to the surprise of Central Europe, which almost had ignored this evolution before. Since this year, the necessity of a common and adapted action of the European states is obvious.

However, there also is the migration wave of fighters for the IS coming from Maghreb and Europe (Masbah 2019, Peel et al. 2019).

The drug scene preserved the main traffic roads. But business got interconnected with the various warlords or militias and with government members on various levels too (see Beladi 2019).

The transport of people got a noteworthy part of their revenues too. Closed borders were no obstacles; the relations to the official persons were effective. The spectra of drug varied, but the part of the artificial drugs became more and more important.

At the arriving points near the coast, the two types of business separated again. People were dependent on the unsecure organisation of sea transport or on exploitation camps before. The drug transport, however, is carefully organised - between speedboats, ferries or freighters (Klaubert 2019, EUROPOL 2016). It explains why the connection of the two economies – drug and migration – finishes at the Libyan coast.

The international Khat trade faced some backlashes. Khat was declared illegal in the UK and in China and so the system got the character of legal cultivation but illegal trade (Cochrane and O'Reagan 2016) with a dynamic of smuggle.

The IL76/AN12 system still was active. NGOs and the UN were important clients as these planes were perfect to reach remote and poorly equipped airstrips. Material for medical aid or for refugee camps was bulky but not heavy. So, the load capacity was big enough to maintain flourishing drug commerce, mainly cocaine and heroine. The Congo region, Sudan, the Horn of Africa or Afghanistan were the most important regions of their activities. In addition, direct flights to South America via the Canary Islands were numerous to buy cocaine and to transport it

to Moscow or to St. Petersburg for further land transport to the West. A direct supply of cocaine by Boeing planes was still active to Dakar or Guinea-Bissau. However, the IL76/AN12 system faded out caused by the lack of maintenance of the planes by the airlines. Thus, there was a regular loss of material and crews.




Fig. 5. Drug trade and migration in the year 2015 including the IL76/AN12 system. Eclipse of migration and refugee streams to Maghreb and Libya. Eclipse of migration on the Balkan-route. Migration of ISIS-fighters to Syria. Continuation of migration from Southeast-Asia to the Arabian Peninsula. War and refugee streams in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. Chinese migration to Africa. Informal gold mining in the Sahara. Large presence of Islamic terror groups in West Africa. Various foreign military missions

3.4.1. The informal gold mining

Surprisingly, an informal gold mining started in the Sudan and continued westwards to Chad, Niger and Mauritania in those years. Metal detectors became affordable in the early years of 2000. Via Dubai a great number was imported from the Sudan. Some hundred thousand gold miners were active in the Red Sea Hills. They exploited gold bearing quartz veins, and in 2008 the country became the third gold producer in Africa.




Fig. 6. The epicentre of migration. Informal gold mining in the Sahara. The map refers to the situation of 2017/20128 and demonstrates the direction of the gold rush form Sudan to Mauritania (big yellow line). The highly militarised situation is obvious. The drawings explain the deep mining in a gold bearing quartz vein (Tchibarakaten, Air Mts./Niger) and the superficial mining in the weathered Precambrian in the Djado area/Niger. Source: Gregoire (2017), modified. See also figure 5.

The detection of gold veins in the northern border region to Libya (cf. Chanda 2018, Chataigner 2019), Darfur, in the Djebel Amir, boosted the informal exploitation. In this period about a million gold miners should have been active in Sudan, and also a gold smelter was constructed (Afane and Gagnol 2016, Chevrillon et al. 2019, Deltendre 2012, ECA, AMC 2018, Graz 2014, Gregoire and Gagnol 2017, OCDE 2013, Pellerin 2017). In 2012 some important sites were detected in Chad. Especially the Tibesti Mountains were attractive. The Misky valley in the South and Koura Bougoudi and the Libyan border were the richest sites. However, in the Misky area a battle with the Chadian army led to the closing of the site. Gold mines in the South – at Fitri – were closed in 2016. It was in 2014, when some people, expelled from the Tibesti Mountains, discovered the gold bearing sediments in Djado. Here, nuggets and flitters could be (relatively) easily extracted. And within days some thousand people arrived; a short time later, traders assured the complete service as water, food, tools, chemicals or entertainment. Regulation was by gold. A barrel of 200 l water counted for about 45 dollars – in gold. The government tried to regulate the activities at least registration and for a minimum of equipment, and surely for all kinds of taxes. It tolerated the informal exploitation, also to avoid some upheaval in this area. But in 2016 the site was closed, officially out of security reasoning. The miners were transported to Agadez. The same year the French army took over in Madama in order to survey the circulation in the sensitive border region to Libya (cf. Chanda 2018, Chataigner 2019). From Agadez, most of the miners headed to the Tchitabaraden site in the North at the Algerian border. A deep vein is exploited here which continues to Algeria too. The gold bearing quartz is extracted in a long series of deep wells by several thousand miners. The quartz is mortared and the gold is enriched with the help of mercury. Market and services are present. Solid structures are banned in order to avoid permanent installations. A regular transport to Arlit and Agadez is assured too. In the market a series of traders will buy the gold. Afterwards they will sell it to some authorised traders in Arlit or Agadez. Only those are taxed by the state. The entire amount of gold is exported: either directly to India by the first traders or to Dubai, with its smelter and its huge gold market. In 2017 some sites in North Mali near Kidal were exploited too, but controlled by the regional movements. In 2016 the gold miners led by the Soudanians serving as experts started to dig in the vicinity of the copper mine in northern Mauritania. Some of them are supposed to explore already in northern Algeria too.

Information of the results is rare. For Niger there is an estimation of about 10 tons of gold extracted per year. However, the revenue of the miner itself is risky, by luck he could extract a kilo in some months, but he also could fail completely. One gram gold is sold by 16000 CFA / 24 Euro on the site, in Agadez by 19000 CFA / 29 Euro and in Niamey by 20-22000 CFA / 34 Euro.

This development could hold about 200,000 people in the country, gave them a chance to earn there a life in a civilian manner and diminish the number of people heading for the North. However, the most assured income is by the traders, or more and more by bandits – it means that the whole chain of revenue is assured. Figure 6 explains this situation.

3.4.2. The financial dimension of the drug and migrant trade

Estimation of the revenues from the interdependent drug and human trafficking is difficult.

For the most it is based on drug seizures or interviews. However, the published data may give an idea on the dimension of the financial impact (see Barzoukas 2017, Elefteriou-Smith 2016, EUROPOL 2016, Holmgren 2014, Laleix, 2015, Lounnas, 2018, Olson and Gordon 2018, Samuel Hall 2017, UNODC 2010, 2018).

- Human trafficking:

The general value of the migration to Europe is estimated to about 5-6 B. \$. per year

The revenues for Libya counted at about 255-323 M. \$ in 2015.

Travel fees in 2017 for the migrants.

The passage from Agadez to Dirkou in Niger was about 600-800 \$ per person. About 70-80 convois per year with about 20-25 passengers per car gave around 2 M \$ per day in the region and 10,000 \$ revenues per trip for the car owner. A driver had an income of about 4-6000 Euro per week.

The passage from Libya to Europe might have costed 1500-1900 \$.

The town of Dirkou earned about 3-4 M CFA (7000 Euro) of taxes.

Finally, around 5-6000 persons lived from the transport. For several years the economy of Agadez was marked by the service for the migrants.

- The value of migration for the home countries is remarkable and important.

Money transfer in % of the GDP counts for Senegal 11, for Morocco 9, and for Niger 5.8.

- Drug trafficking

Cocaine:

The general value of cocaine trafficking is estimated for 5-7 B. Euro per year. And the transit Africa-Europe accounts for about 13% of the world's trade.

Heroin:

The general value of heroine trafficking is estimated at 6-8 B. Euro per year.

As an example, the revenues of the Taliban in Afghanistan for 2014 are estimated at about 150 M \$.

3.5. WINTER 2018 OR THE DESPERATE ATTEMPTS TO DIMINISH MIGRATION

The map demonstrates continuity. Continuity of the wars in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Mali, Libya, Sudan, Congo without any sign of an end (Farah 2019). Continuity of the refugee movements as well as of the migration into the North in West and North Africa (Gänslar 2019, Molenar and Hamouni-Janssen 2017, Tubiana et al 2018). Continuity of the drug trade and migration as well as the attempts to externalise the EU borders.

As the map stands for the wintertime, it represents the desperate hope of the EU politics to diminish the passage on the Mediterranean. In fact, the West Mediterranean passages are active as the Balkan road still is. Here the repression augments, but there are new side ways, even border fences are numerous now.




Fig. 7. Winter 2018/2019. Avoiding of the Central Mediterranean passage by migrants and growing importance of the western Mediterranean and of the Balkan routes. Externalisation of the southern borders of the EU to the Sahel. Partly change of the migration routes to Niger. Militarisation of the Sahel countries. Intensification of the various drug traffics.

The Sahelian countries are still marked by the activities of the various terror groups (Gregoire 2013, Seignobos 2019). The direct military interference by European and American troops continues too (Chanda 2018, Perouse de Montclos 2019). And there are the various military interventions of the UN too (United Nations 2019).

There is the attempt of the EU to externalise its southern border (cf. Boyer 2019, Jacob 2019). First by the enforcement of the Libyan coast navy in order to return boat people to Libya and to place return camps in the Maghreb states. Second to close and to control the northern border of the Sahelian states. Niger as the main target for migrants got modified to a police state of control of all African people. It violates the general freedom of mobility of people and trade of the ECOWAS, however the EU interventions were strong enough to install a general control and survey of people. Anyway, the military accompanied convoys from Agadez to the Libyan border still continue – as well as the convoys of the “illegal” migrants do (see Draper and Maitre 2019).

However, there are some results.

As the roads to and via Kufra became too dangerous, there is a development of migrants to cross the Chad for Zouarke at the northwestern border. From there they will continue to the North or they turn southwards to N’Djamena or via the Dirkou-Agadez road to Niamey. The knowledge spread that the UNHCR runs camps in N’Djamena and in Niamey, where they treat people acceptably. Moreover, they select people for the asylum in Europe. For several times French policemen came to those camps and selected a certain number of asylum seekers. They were flown to Paris or to Istanbul respectively. Thus, Niger is confronted with a growing number of asylum seekers now (IOM 2018 b, IOM 2019).

The drug scene in North and West Africa by now remained comparable to 2015. However, the cocaine imports – estimated from seizures – are more and more assured by container transport to the main ports such as Dakar or Abidjan, or also in Guinea-Bissau. It is the strategy of mass. A noteworthy control is hardly possible facing the enormous number of containers (Roger 2019). The African drug market will be developed systematically, but the transit to Europe is still important. East Africa or the Horn of Africa evolved to a promising market and as a transit region to South Africa (Bell and Lavellin 2017, Haysom et al. 2018, Lindskov-Jacobsen & Hoy-Carsco 2018). As the drug trade got officially forbidden in Niger, one tried new roads along the borders. Cigarettes lost in importance, but their transport is still active. Besides cocaine, heroine or *Cannabis*, the artificial drugs gained importance. West Africa is quite addicted as well as the Maghreb states of Libya and Egypt. The stress killers indicate the social divide. *Cannabis*, opiates or methamphetamines are for the

ordinary people, whereas heroine and cocaine are destined for people with the necessary financial background. Moreover, they are the war or terror drugs and the terror groups are large importers. And there is a geographical divide too. Africa belongs to Tramadol (opiates), whereas Captagon (metamphetamines) is the war drug of the Near East.

Khat, however, still has its regional importance. The legal trade has its centre in Somalia. The Somali-Ethiopian diaspora is more and more dependent on smuggle for its traditional habits.

There is little information on the former IL76/AN12 system or its remnants.

4. CONCLUSION

The cartographic approach of migration and flight as well as of the drug trade revealed several mosaics of these systems. It showed for the years 1960s and 1970s the combination of the classical transhumance and working exodus on the one side and on the other the recruitment-induced migration to North Africa as well as to Central Europe. The different wars and civil wars provoked large numbers of refugees, which however, mainly searched for shelter in the areas around. The intensive droughts in the 1970s led to the collapse of traditional pastoral societies and enlarged the tendencies to leave the regions. The drugs and their trade remained traditional with the exception of the opium/heroin trade to Europe via the Balkans and to the Soviet Union forced by the invasion of the Soviets from 1979 on. The 1990s saw a complete change of the systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the gate of new movements. Civil wars and revolutions in the Guinean countries reduced the traditional working exodus dramatically. The way to the North and Europe became more and more attractive. Work in the informal sectors provided income, which was retransferred to the home countries and which represented an important part of the states income too. The arrival of the well organised cigarette and heroine/cocaine trade to the North fostered the general tendency to go to Libya. Migration became part of this transport / trade system, which connected Africa and Europe. The other connection was India-Pakistan or South Asia with the Gulf countries. It was a large-scale system of informal economy and exploitation. The civil war in Algeria created the first Islamic terror groups, which filtered into Mali, evolved and spread into the whole Sahel afterwards. The wars in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan enforced the migration to the North, targeting Europe. Here, however, the second wave of exodus from the Balkans was the result of the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, founding the transition of a steady migration to Central, Western and Northern Europe. The wars in Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Iraq, also provoked massive refugee streams. The large amount of migrants and refugees fostered the informal economies in all parts of the region and the so-called "illegal" migrants became an important part of that (Klawitter 2019). The reflections on the dimension of migration, whether "illegal" or not, and on the chances to reduce them – as long as it is directed to the North – often ignore the fact that this situation was deliberately provoked, even fabricated. Three decisive interventions are responsible for the present situation:

A: The Gulf war of 1990-1991 with no idea for the future development of the region.

B: The 2011 intervention in Libya with no idea for the future development of the region.

C: The refuse to support UNHCR and UNICEF sufficiently in 2014-2015, to help them assure the life of the refugees in the camps around Syria.

The fall 2015 with its massive exodus from Syria via the Balkans confronted Central Europe with the results of its ignorance or silent arrangements (see above). However, it was only the result of the evolutions of the last decade, which became visible at that moment.

It revealed the well-developed trade and transport systems of drugs and of human beings, the growing informal economies, where the "illegal" migrants were a calculated part of it (Ben Yahia et al. 2011, Calavita 2018, Klawitter 2019, Lacoste 2011, Rechinger 2018, Saviano 2009).

Anyhow, the discussion on migration in Europe developed in two directions. First, into a panic-like politics in order to hold back any migration to Europe, and second on the incorporation of young migrants from the East and Central European countries into the western countries. Both regions are in the late period of their demographic transition but the western countries could arrive to a positive migration balance (Derens & Geslin 2012, Descamps 2019), whereas the Eastern Central European countries suffer from a lack of workforce. Two strategies of these countries are visible. Romania tries to hire systematically workers from Asia (Ledve 2019), while Hungary established an anti-migration policy. There is a natalisation initiative of many credits for young people getting children and on the other side the regime squeezes the remaining workers for more working hours. They passed a law allowing up to 400 additional working hours a year, which accounts for about a 13th month (Leotard & Lepeltier-Kutasi 2019, Seisel 2018).

Back to Africa: as the EU-politics are mainly centred on the avoiding of migrants, the declarations of a profound amelioration of the African economies as a chance for the youth are doubtful. Wars and civil wars continue in Africa as well as in the Near East such as the smuggle economy does (see Pienazek 2018). Moreover, as Clemens and Postel (2018) argue, an amelioration of the basic

income situation may even enlarge the tendencies to emigrate for long times. The networks of migrants who succeeded to arrive in Europe often cover the impact of the horror information of the travel. In general, the informal network is still a leading agent for motivation; even if there are tendencies to return (Adam et al. 2019, Breville 2018, IOM 2018 b-d) – or to seek for other chances.

The informal part of economy – in all fields – still grows. The demographic development of the Sahelian countries provides less chances of civil economics. Even if there is a progress of infrastructure, such as long-distance roads (Tchadinfos 2013), the general insecurity counteracts these developments. The overall presence of antipersonal and anti-vehicle mines represents a permanent danger for the civil population (GICHD 2017). Thus, the enforcement of borders alone will not help the European politics. The networks of migrants and their hopes or illusions are often stronger. Formation and skills are important motivations – also to have better chances after a possible return (see Sunjic and Kanert 2019). Moreover, as mentioned above, a steady immigration is declared necessary for the countries in late demographic stages as it is for the Central European countries.

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