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Phone +40 264 405352

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**“RESTES EN EXIL” .
LA COMMUNAUTE ROUMAINE DE HONGRIE APRES LE TRAITE
DE TRIANON**

**“REMAIND IN EXILE”. THE ROMANIAN COMMUNITY AFTER
THE TREATY OF TRIANON**

Gabriel Moisa*

Résumé:

Jusqu'en 1918, les Roumains de Transylvanie, membres du même groupe ethnique, faisaient partie des structures organisatrices communes, soit qu'il s'agît des associations culturelles, économiques ou politiques. Ainsi, on trouve de nombreux exemples où des Roumains originaires des villages qui aujourd'hui font partie de la Hongrie étaient engrainés dans des diverses activités et projets au niveau de l'entière Transylvanie ou même au-delà des Carpates. Un exemple éloquent de ce point de vue était Moise Nicoară, l'une des plus fortes personnalités des Roumains d'Ardeal et le représentant dévoué des intérésses des Roumains de la Hongrie.

Mots clefs: Roumanin, groupe ethnique, Traite de Trianon

Abstract:

The considerations on the history of the Romanians in Hungary provide the image of a community almost assimilated today, with a population share that has been continuously decreasing after the Treaty of Trianon. In the '90s only the number of the Romanians in Hungary fell be 25% and the trend has continued even after 2000. The destiny of the Romanian community has always assumed a persistent

* Gabriel Moisa, Professor PhD, University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, Department of History. Fields of interest: the contemporary history of Romania, Historiography, the history of the Romanian community in Hungary.

Contact: gabimoisa@hotmail.com.

struggle to preserve its investigate aspects of the history of this community were doomed to failure. The present research introduces us to some very interesting conclusions on the history of the Romanians in Hungary, and even offers a series of projections on its future, a future that several present leaders of the community do not see in very bright colours.

Keywords: Romanians, Hungary, Treaty of Trianon, assimilated

Jusqu'en 1918, les Roumains de Transylvanie, membres du même groupe ethnique, faisaient partie des structures organisatrices communes, soit qu'il s'agît des associations culturelles, économiques ou politiques. Ainsi, on trouve de nombreux exemples où des Roumains originaires des villages qui aujourd'hui font partie de la Hongrie étaient engrainés dans des diverses activités et projets au niveau de l'entière Transylvanie ou même au-delà des Carpates. Un exemple éloquent de ce point de vue était Moise Nicoară (1784-1861). Originaire de Gyula, instruit à Oradea, Arad, Bratislava et Vienne, il devient l'une des plus fortes personnalités des Roumains d'Ardeal et le représentant dévoué des intérêts des Roumains de la Hongrie. Grâce à lui et à ses relations avec la Cour viennoise où il avait été le professeur de roumain de l'archiduc Ferdinand, la ville d'Arad a bénéficié, à partir de l'année 1812 d'une école pédagogique roumaine, d'un institut théologique (1822) et d'un évêque orthodoxe. En 1825, Moise Nicoară va à Bucarest où il a vécu jusqu'à sa mort, en 1861. À côté de Moise Nicoară, les localités roumaines de la Hongrie d'aujourd'hui ont donné de nombreuses personnalités qui se sont engrainées dans la lutte culturelle et nationale des Roumains transylvains avant 1918, la majorité d'eux étant impliqués politiquement dans le Parti National Roumain de Transylvanie et moins dans le Parti Social-Démocrate¹. Les uns d'entre eux, restant dans la Grande Roumanie, ont continué leurs activités politiques et culturelles entre les deux guerres mondiales, ainsi que Nicolae Roxin de Micherechi, député dans le Parlement de Bucarest.

Dans l'automne de l'année 1918, les Roumains du territoire de la Hongrie d'aujourd'hui ont participé activement aux démarches initiées par leurs leaders pour l'union de ces territoires avec la Roumanie. Au temps de la constitution du Conseil National Roumain d'Oradea et Bihor, le village

¹ Aurel Suci, Moise Nicoară, David Voniga etc.

de Micherechi y a eu un représentant dans la personne de Nicolae Roxin², à Micherechi se constituant aussi la Garde Nationale Roumaine conduite par le cadet aspirant Alexandru Roxin³. Parmi les délégués participants de la part des cercles électoraux du Comitat Bihor à la Grande Assemblée Nationale d'Alba Iulia le premier décembre 1918 on retrouve George Mureșan, économiste de Bedeu, Teodor Pățcaș, prêtre de Peterd, Ioan Bodor, économiste de Vecherd, Victor Domocoș, propriétaire de Vecherd⁴. Tous ont exprimé le désir de leurs communautés de s'unir avec la Roumanie, désir resté sans conséquences à cause de la frontière établie entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie.

La séparation du bloc ethnique roumain a créé de grands problèmes à ceux restés dans l'intérieur de l'État hongrois. Les liaisons naturelles existantes avec ceux qui vivaient en Crișana, Banat et Transylvanie ont été interrompues et la communauté est restée pratiquement suspendue, sans aucun appui. L'organisation dans une structure minoritaire institutionnelle pour le soutien des intérêts de la nationalité manquait totalement, ce type de structure existant avant 1918 dans le Parti National Roumain de Transylvanie, Banat, Crișana et Maramureș.

Après 1920, l'État horthyste hongrois a mené une politique hostile aux minorités. On y a toléré seulement les activités locales (des cercles culturels, des chœurs etc.), les communautés roumaines étant isolées sur un espace très large sur la frontière roumaine-hongroise. Mais ces activités se sont également diminuées. Pas même du point de vue religieux elles n'étaient pas mieux organisées⁵. La majorité des chercheurs roumains de la Hongrie ne sont pas catégoriques quand ils parlent du statut de la minorité roumaine entre les deux guerres mondiales. À leur opinion les conditions historiques spéciales en sont coupables⁶. Tout de même, l'expression dit beaucoup pour ceux familiarisés avec l'histoire de la Hongrie d'entre les deux guerres mondiales et sa politique à regard des minorités⁷.

² 1918. *Bihorul în epopeea unirii*, Oradea: CCES, 1978, p. 121.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 317.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 240.

⁵ Mihai Cozma, "Evoluția istorică a identității noastre românești/Ce s-a întâmplat și de ce?", în *Convișuirea (Együttélés)*, Seghedin, no. 4, 1998; no. 1, 1999, p. 105.

⁶ Gheorghe Petrușan, Emilia Martin, Mihai Cozma, *Românii din Ungaria*, Budapesta, Editura Press Publica, 2000, p. 89.

⁷ *The Romanians in Hungary. Dynamics of an Ethnic Genocide*, Bucharest: Globus Publishers, 1992, pp. 28-55.

La capacité organisatrice de la minorité roumaine a été extrêmement réduite dans cette période-là, ainsi qu'après la deuxième guerre mondiale, quand le nouveau contexte politique a fait possible cette chose, la création d'une nouvelle structure roumaine est accomplie avec des convulsions⁸. L'impulsion organisatrice a été donnée non de l'intérieur de la communauté, mais de l'extérieur. "Coupable" de cette situation a été la nouvelle réalité politique de la Hongrie ainsi comme elle a été ébauchée dès le Novembre 1944 dans le programme d'action du Parti Communiste Hongrois⁹. Les formes d'organisation de type front populaire patriotique étaient similaires aux autres États du bloc communiste¹⁰. Conformément aux directives de l'époque et au mode d'organisation des "masses populaire" de la période communiste, les Roumains ont été également obligés de structurer des formations qui répondaient aux modèles établis et pas du tout à leurs intérêts. Ces formations étaient, comme appréciait Mihai Cozma, "*programmées avant tout pour la représentation démonstrative, formelle de la minorité*"¹¹ et les activités où elles s'engrenaient étaient dans plusieurs cas inutiles pour la cause des Roumains¹².

Le 21 mars 1948 à Gyula, sous la coordination de "la direction d'État et de parti de l'organisation socialiste" a été créée l'organisation l'Union Démocratique des Roumains de la Hongrie dont le premier président a été Gheorghe Alexici et le secrétaire général Gheorghe Năbădan. En 1949 la direction de l'Union a été modifiée, Ioan Borbely devenant son président, vice-président Gheorghe Bodea, secrétaire général Petru Pomuț et caissier Ilie Modovan. L'activité de l'Union a été assez faible, presque fictive, pour longtemps. Dans la première décennie de son existence, le plus active a été le caissier Ilie Moldovan, originaire de Gyula. Tant Gheorghe Alexici, devenu secrétaire d'État dans le Ministère de la Culture dans le gouvernement de Budapest¹³ et, par conséquent, détourné de ses principales obligations en tant que président, aussi que Gheorghe Năbădan ont été relativement peu visibles dans cette position. Certainement que sur

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *** , *20.századi magyartörténelem 1900-1994*, Szerkesztők: Pölöskei Ferenc, Gergely Jenő, Iszák Lajos, Budapest: KoronaKönyvkiadó, 1994.

¹⁰ François Fejtő, *Histoire des démocraties populaires*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1992, passim.

¹¹ Mihai Cozma, "Evoluția istorică a identității noastre românești/Ce s-a întâmplat și de ce?", în *Conviețuirea (Együttélés)*, Seghedin, no. 4, 1998; no. 1, 1999, p. 105.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ Elena Csobai, "Români din Ungaria după 1945", în *Simpozion (Giula)*, XVI, 2007, p. 84.

cet état de fait le régime politique de Budapest a laissé son empreinte aussi. À peine dans les années '70, quand le contenu de ce régime s'est amélioré, l'Union Démocratique des Roumains de Hongrie a été plus présente dans la vie des Roumains¹⁴. Mais toutes les actions de l'Union supposaient la présence d'un représentant de l'autorité politique.

Entre les années 1957 et 1983 le *lieder* de la formation a été le secrétaire général, Petru Silaghi. Depuis 1960 on a organisé des séances plénières auxquelles participaient les Roumains de toute la Hongrie. La même année on a introduit la fonction de président commun, détenue jusqu'en 1983 par Vasile Marc de Micherechi. Après lui, à la tête de l'Union a été élu Gheorghe Petrușan (1983-1988), et entre 1988 et 1990 Gheorghe Mihăiescu. Entre 1983 et 1990 Gheorghe Marc a été le secrétaire général. Depuis l'année 1972, l'Union Démocratique des Roumains de Hongrie a eu des congrès tous les quatre ans¹⁵. À l'occasion de ces congrès on a remarqué le fait que dans le cadre de la minorité roumaine de la Hongrie il y avait assez de divergences liées en particulier des rapports avec le pouvoir de Budapest. Ces divergences se sont manifestées de plus en plus évident au long des années '80 quand le processus de détente était visible en Hongrie. Le point culminant de ces tensions a été atteint à l'occasion du congrès du décembre 1988, quand les délégués de Seghedin ont refusé d'y participer en signe de proteste vis-à-vis "de la politique de vitrine de l'union", c'est-à-dire de l'attitude réservée des leaders dans le problème de l'obtention des droits pour la minorité roumaine. À cette occasion, Mihai Cozma a envoyé une lettre au congrès, adressée à Petru Silaghi, celui qui a conduit l'Union pendant des décennies en bonne concordance avec les directives politiques et idéologiques de l'État hongrois et qui avait un rôle important dans l'élaboration de la ligne politique. Mihai Cozma, autour duquel s'est réuni un group réformateur formé de Gheorghe Petrușan, Petru Cămpian, Ștefan Frățean, Tiberiu Boca, Tiberiu Bordaș, a attaqué durement la direction de l'Union et Petru Silaghi a considéré ce geste comme une provocation par laquelle on essayait la discorde des Roumains de Hongrie. La lettre, publiée même dans le numéro de début de la revue était au fond aussi une critique extrêmement dure de l'organisme de la direction de l'Union, considérée incapable de changement et d'adaptation au monde en mouvement des

¹⁴ Gheorghe Petrușan, Emilia Martin, Mihai Cozma, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

années 1988-1989. Mihai Cozma soutenait que *“des expériences de deux décennies m’ont persuadé que les propositions douces, communes, faites à nos diverses réunions ont toutes les chances de se perdre sans avoir des résultats: les discours soutenus aux congrès n’ont été pas pris en considération dans une telle mesure qu’on changeât quelque chose (puisque les documents des congrès prouvent que les mêmes problèmes concrètes sont actuels. On pose donc la question: pourquoi quelqu’un croie que la méthode des propositions, celle des discours habituels sera la plus utile juste à ce moment ? N’y-a-t-il pas naturel qu’on arrive à la conclusion que seulement une intervention tumultueuse sera la plus utile, comme a été ma lettre ?”*¹⁶. Il semble que le groupe de Seghedin était l’un qui essayait la modernisation et l’actualisation du discours des leaders de l’Union Démocratique des Roumains de Hongrie. La revue *Informatorul* était la tribune où les contestataires de la direction de ce temps-là pouvaient se manifester. Quoiqu’on annonçât dans la cassette rédactionnelle que les premiers six nombres par an allaient suivre, après les premiers deux nombres la revue a cessé sa parution. Il reste un mystère pourquoi après seulement deux nombres, où la modernité du discours journalistique et les critiques consistantes et constructives de ses pages amenaient un air frais dans la communauté, la revue a cessé sa parution. Probablement le temps du changement n’était pas encore venu. Cependant, c’était le début de l’année 1989 et les autorités de l’État hongrois ne pouvaient pas risquer une discussion ouverte de plus concernant les questions des minoritaires et les complicités de quelques-uns d’entre leurs leaders avec l’autorité communiste de Budapest.

Les années suivantes jusqu’à l’année 1990 ont été assez tendues au fond d’une ambiance générale assez tendue. 1989 a marqué la radicalisation du groupe d’intellectuels réunis autour de la Chaire de Langue et Littérature Roumaine de l’Institut Pédagogique “Juhász Gyula” de Seghedin, qui étaient extrêmement mécontents de l’activité de l’Union Démocratique des Roumains de Hongrie dans la direction de la promotion des droits de ses propres minorités. Pratiquement, en 1989 ceux-là ont refusé de collaborer avec la direction de cette organisation. On trouve le motif même dans la publication de la chaire, *Informatorul*, où a été exposé par le rédacteur de la publication, Mihai Cozma, professeur dans la chaire y mentionnée, qui chez une rencontre avec le secrétaire général de l’Union

¹⁶ Mihai Cozma, “Plic deschis”, în *Informatorul*, Seghedin, no. 1, 1989, pp. 8-9.

Démocratique des Roumains de Hongrie, Gheorghe Marc, lui transmettait le fait que "... l'Union continue d'activer dans un cadre et ayant à la base un contenu et un mécanisme qui se sont prouvés être jusqu'à ce moment-là dépassés et inutiles"¹⁷.

Depuis 1989 les choses ont commencé à changer. Premièrement, on a gagné la possibilité d'organisation suivant les principes volontaires de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie, même si beaucoup d'imperfections organisationnelles de l'ancien régime y étaient présentes¹⁸.

Le 15-16 Décembre 1990, à l'occasion d'une réunion générale au Lycée "Nicolae Bălcescu" de Gyula s'est constituée l'Union des Roumains de Hongrie dont le président est devenu Gheorghe Petrușan. Cela a été l'institution de représentation des Roumains de Hongrie, tant sous l'aspect culturel aussi que politique, jusqu'en 1994. Le 5 Juin 1995, l'Union des Roumains de Hongrie est devenue l'Union Culturelle des Roumains de Hongrie, en s'assumant exclusivement des missions culturelles-professionnelles. Tiberiu Herdean a été le président, suivi par Ioan Ciotea¹⁹.

Cette transformation est due à la création en 1993 de la Loi des Minorités Nationales et Ethniques de Hongrie. Cette loi devait assurer des droits égaux pour les minorités nationales et ethniques en vue de la garde de leur culture et du spécifique national. Par cette loi on a établi le nouveau type de représentation des minorités. Ceux-ci allaient choisir des autogouvernements locaux qui ultérieurement choisissaient un autogouvernement sur le plan national²⁰. Ces structures étaient élues à l'occasion des scrutins locaux généraux de Hongrie et recevaient des compétences dans les problèmes d'enseignement, culture, presse etc. de la minorité, inclusivement dans le financement.

En ce qui concerne la minorité roumaine, pour les élections de 1994, 11 tels autogouvernements se sont formés. Ceux-ci se sont constitués, conformément à la loi, en mars 1995, à Gyula, dans un Autogouvernement National des Roumains de Hongrie (ANRH) dont le président a été Ioan Budai jusqu'en 1998 et vice-présidents Gheorghe Ardelean et Gheorghe Netea. Aux élections complémentaires de 1995 s'est constitué le 12-è

¹⁷ *Informatorul*, Seghedin, no. 2, 1989, p. 9.

¹⁸ Mihai Cozma, "Evoluția istorică a identității noastre românești/Ce s-a întâmplat și de ce?" în *Conviețuirea (Együttélés)*, Seghedin, no. 4, 1998; no. 1, 1999, p. 105.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ ***, *Românii...*, p. 23.

autogouvernement minoritaire, celui de Seghedin. Parce que cet autogouvernement n'a pas participé à la séance de constitution d'ANRH de Gyula, il n'est pas devenu membre de cette organisation nationale de représentation²¹.

Pour les élections de 1998 ont été également créées des structures locales, inclusivement 12 autogouvernements de secteur à Budapest²². Mais la majorité des membres n'étaient pas Roumains. La loi des Minorités Nationales et Ethniques de Hongrie prévoyait que les citoyens avaient la liberté totale de choisir leur identité ethnique, ainsi que nombreuses personnes qui n'étaient pas Roumains ont constitué des autogouvernements ainsi-dits roumains. Conformément aux leaders des Roumains de Hongrie, des "Roumains" qui jusqu'à ce moment-là ne se sont pas découverts cette appartenance ethnique ont fait leur apparition du néant²³. Ensuite ce phénomène s'est amplifié d'une élection minoritaire à l'autre, ainsi que beaucoup "d'autogouvernements roumains" n'avaient pas dans leur structure aucun minoritaire roumain de Hongrie. On est arrivé dans la situation qu'aux élections minoritaires de l'automne de 2006 fussent élus non moins de 46 autogouvernements roumains²⁴. La situation est dans une absolue discordance avec la baisse du nombre des Roumains de Hongrie. On a élu 46 autogouvernements roumains, dont 15 à Budapest, 13 dans le district de Bichiş, 11 en Bihor, 5 dans le district de Csongrád et 1 dans les districts de Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén et Peste. L'association de l'actuel Autogouvernement National a des représentants dans 32 localités, l'Association des Femmes Orthodoxes dans 15 localités et l'Association Roumaine de la Capitale dans 5 emplacements²⁵.

Davantage, aux séances ordinaires et extraordinaires des plusieurs gouvernements, surtout au niveau d'ANRH, on rencontre une situation bizarre conformément à laquelle les discussions ont lieu exclusivement dans la langue hongroise, conséquence du fait que "les membres" de la communauté roumaine ne connaissaient pas en fait la langue roumaine ou purement et simplement ils n'étaient pas Roumains²⁶. La situation n'est pas

²¹ Gheorghe Petruşan, Emilia Martin, Mihai Cozma, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

²² ***, *Românii...*, p. 24

²³ Eva Iova, "Fraudă electorală de proporţii", în *Foaia românească*, 13 octombrie 2006, p. 3.

²⁴ "Rezultatele alegerilor minoritare 2006", în *Idem*, 6 octombrie 2006, p. 3.

²⁵ ***, *Românii...*, p. 24

²⁶ Eva Iova, "Cine sunt ei?" în *Foaia românească*, 13 octombrie 2006, p. 3.

du tout confortable pour les Roumains de Hongrie, ce fait étant signalé par beaucoup de représentants de la communauté roumaine et le journal *Foaia românească* a attiré plusieurs fois l'attention sur les anomalies existantes suite aux résultats "impressionnants" des élections quand nombreuses personnes qui n'étaient pas Roumains apparaissaient sur les listes électorales et ensuite, entre les députés des autogouvernements²⁷. Les résultats des dernières élections (2006) en sont concluants de ce point de vue aussi. Voilà qu'en disent les rédacteurs du journal *Foaia românească*: "*Aux élections minoritaires des années antérieures le nom des candidats a été transcrit en roumain dans notre journal. Mais au cours de la rédaction du matériel actuel nous nous sommes rendu compte que nous connaissions de plus en plus moins les personnes qui posaient leur candidature et qui arrivaient dans les gouvernements roumains. Premièrement, aux candidats de Budapest nous avons eu de grands problèmes. Les personnes connues dans la communauté (parce qu'elles se sont remarquées d'une manière ou d'une autre dans notre vie culturelle et religieuse roumaine) nous les écrivons en roumain*"²⁸.

Conformément aux représentants de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie tout ce contexte était entretenu par la direction d'ANRH qui a été en fonction depuis 1998 jusqu'en 2014²⁹. Le président Traian Cresta a été élu en 1999 et depuis il a été voté à chaque élection, bénéficiant bien sûr du compliqué et permissif (expres) système électoral qui offrait également aux personnes qui n'étaient pas de Roumains la possibilité de voter³⁰. Pratiquement, dans la direction d'ANRH il y a un statu quo dès 1999. À ce moment-là, le président Traian Cresta a été secondé par les vice-présidents Gheorghe Oros, Gheorghe Gulyas et Ioan Tănăsiu. Aux élections de 2002, la fonction de Gheorghe Oros a été prise par Gheorghe Ardelean, le reste des fonctions étant gardé³¹. La situation est restée inchangée après les élections minoritaires de l'automne de 2006, quand Traian Cresta a gagné grâce au même mécanisme électoral un nouveau mandat de quatre ans à la tête d'ANRH. Certains leaders des Roumains de Hongrie accusent l'actuel président d'ANRH que pour perpétuer cet état de choses il recourt à toute

²⁷ "Rezultatele alegerilor minoritare 2006", în *Idem*, 6 octombrie 2006, p. 3.

²⁸ "Numele candidaților", în *Foaia românească*, 6 octombrie 2006, p. 3.

²⁹ Eva Iova, "AȚRU s-a constituit cu ușile închise. Traian Cresta va fi și în următorii ani președintele AȚRU", în *Idem*, 7 martie 2003, p. 3.

³⁰ Eva Iova, "Un cetățean-un vot", în *Idem*, 30 ianuarie 2009, p. 3.

³¹ Gheorghe Petrușan, Emilia Martin, Mihai Cozma, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

sorte de subterfuges et attaques à l'adresse de ses contestataires. L'un de ces subterfuges a été la tentative de museler le journal *Foia românească* par un sous-financement, dans les conditions où le journal *Cronica*, plus jeune, avait des sources de financement assurées car il lui était favorable³². D'ailleurs, disent-ils, *Cronica* a paru comme une institution de presse parallèle au journal *Foia românească* parce que celui-ci avait parfois une attitude critique vis-à-vis d'ANRH et il ne pouvait pas être contrôlé. Dans la même situation se trouve le nouveau *Centre de Documentation et d'Information de l'Autogouvernement National des Roumains de Hongrie*, créé en 2003 à Gyula³³ qui voudrait être le concurrent de l'*Institut de Recherche des Roumains de Hongrie*, trouvé également en opposition avec l'organe politique des Roumains en Hongrie. Le soupçon est également entretenu du fait que les activités de l'*Institut de Recherche des Roumains de Hongrie* sont de plus en plus moins financées après la création du *Centre de Documentation et d'Information de l'Autogouvernement National des Roumains de Hongrie*, tel au journal *Foia românească*.

La situation ne semble pas changer ni au futur parce que dans la Hongrie on ne parle pas d'une modification de la Loi des Minorités. Eva Iova, le rédacteur en chef de la plus ancienne publication roumaine de Hongrie, *Foia românească*, tirait, au début de l'année 2009 un signal d'alarme dans la perspective des futures élections minoritaires de l'automne de 2010 : *La situation peut être beaucoup plus tragique que nous pouvons nous imaginer. Ces jours-là ont déjà commencé les sondages précédents au recensement qui aura lieu en 2011. Après seulement quelques mois suivant les prochaines élections minoritaires de l'automne 2010 (auxquelles, sans la modification de la loi et, surtout, sans l'appui intense de Bucarest, on n'a pas aucune chance de se débarrasser des ethno-spéculants et des non-roumains) on va faire le recensement de la population de la Hongrie et le résultat catastrophique est déjà prévisible. Non, nous ne croyons pas qu'il y aura moins Roumains qu'en 2001, quand 7995 se sont déclarés Roumains. Nous croyons que le résultat du recensement sera aussi faux et pas du tout représentatif que les élections minoritaires roumaines et l'entier système de l'autogouvernement roumain ayant en tête l'Autogouvernement National des Roumains de Hongrie et*

³² "O decizie care pune în pericol Foia românească", în *Foia românească*, 24 aprilie 2009, p. 3; Eva Iova, "Trădarea din Joia Mare", în *Idem*.

³³ Eva Ruja Bánayai, "Centrul de Documentare și Informare al Autogovernării pe Țară a Românilor din Ungaria", în *Lumina 2004*, Giula, 2004, pp. 30-37.

*l'Autogouvernement Roumain de la Capitale. De "nouveaux" Roumains apparaîtront dans des localités ou secteurs de Budapest ou il n'y a jamais été et il n'y a pas ni aujourd'hui d'institutions roumaines, des églises ou des écoles et les citoyens de Micherechi ou Chitighaz, qui ont un passé et un présent, mais un futur en péril, auront honte de se déclarer Roumains*³⁴.

De plus en plus peu leaders marquants de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie ont pris position vis-à-vis de cette situation. Par exemple, Mihai Cozma considère que l'activité institutionnelle des Roumains de Hongrie est *"sur politisée et sur formelle. Le nombre de pseudo-activités n'est pas moindre que celui des activités réelles"*³⁵. Mihai Cozma a le même point de vue car il qui considérait que ni jusqu'à présent *"on n'a pas trouvé - mais on ni ne cherche pas- des formes par lesquelles la majorité des Roumains puissent se considérer entraînés et appréciés dans la vie minoritaire et sentir l'appartenance à cette communauté"*³⁶.

"L'exil" de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie le long du dernier siècle a été de plus en plus grevé par des réalités où elle a évolué. L'élite roumaine a eu beaucoup à souffrir, soit qu'on parlât de la période du régime hongrois horthyste ou de celui communiste de Budapest. L'affirmation de la propre identité a été beaucoup alourdie, même après la chute du régime communiste du pays avoisinant. Même les représentants de cette élite affirment ça et ils parlent sans réticence des efforts dans la direction de l'assimilation des Roumains. L'une des plus autorisées voix est celle de Gheorghe Santău, qui affirmait dans un de ses études que *"dans mon village, Chitighaz, quelques Roumains ont été obligés de magyariser leur nom pour pouvoir acheter de la terre. Cela s'est passé entre 1930-1940. Certaines autorités, par leurs représentants, lui ont mis la condition que la transcription des terrains agricoles sur son nom pourra être faite seulement s'il magyarisait son nom. Ainsi, le nom roumain de Sălăjan (qui d'ailleurs été forcément écrit Szelezsán) s'est forcément transformé en Szépfalusi, Sziklás, Honfi; celui de Frătean (qu'on écrivait Fretyán) est devenu Fenyoesi. Dans d'autres cas la magyarisation des noms roumains a été due à l'obtention des fonctions à payement mensuel, donc était déterminée de la possibilité d'une existence matérielle stable,*

³⁴ Eva Iova, "Un cetățean-un vot", în *Foaia românească*, 30 ianuarie 2009, p. 3.

³⁵ Mihai Cozma, "Evoluția istorică a identității noastre românești/Ce s-a întâmplat și de ce?", în *Conviețuirea (Együttélés)*, Seghedin, no. 4, 1998; no. 1, 1999, p. 105.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

par exemple un emploi au chemin de fer ou un emploi d'administrateur à la mairie du village etc.

On a trouvé un cas analogue à Micherechi aussi. Un roumain, à son nom Roșu, était cantonnier, c'est-à-dire il avait soin des chemins (útkaparó), mais il n'était pas bien payé. Autrefois, on lui a proposé de magyariser son nom roumain, fait qui l'a étonné. Mais quand on lui a insinué qu'il pourra perdre son emploi s'il n'a pas un nom hongrois, qu'est-ce qu'il fasse ce pauvre homme pour ne pas perdre la ressource de vivre pour sa famille, il a pris le nom de Réthelyi. Au XXe siècle, dans un pays européen, un cantonnier ne puisse pas garder son emploi parce qu'il n'a pas un nom hongrois c'est difficile à croire, mais c'est vrai.

Tant dans le cas des citoyens de Chitigaz aussi que dans celui des citoyens de Micherechi, on ne peut pas penser à autre chose que l'État hongrois a essayé de démontrer que dans ce pays il n'y a pas beaucoup de citoyens de nationalité, que cet État est homogène. Quoiqu'en réalité les choses ne soient pas comme ça"³⁷.

Disant ces choses à la fin des années 90, Gheorghe Santău avait pris une attitude manifeste contre le décroissement continu de la communauté roumaine de la Hongrie. Sa position conséquente se basait sur de nombreuses dates rassemblées le long des décennies, il pouvant en tirer une conclusion douloureuse pour les Roumains de la Hongrie.

La plus grande partie de l'élite roumaine de la Hongrie est d'accord avec ce point de vue. Nous n'insistons pas sur celui-là parce que nous l'avons déjà fait dans le contexte de la description de la révuistique de spécialité. Pourtant, il y a des opinions qui n'ont pas été exprimées aussi catégoriquement que les autres. Mais toutes comprennent des à-propos plus ou moins directs à cette réalité. Soit qu'on écrit des statistiques en laissant le lecteur d'en tirer les conclusions, soit qu'on les exprime verbalement, la réalité de l'assimilation de la communauté roumaine de La Hongrie est une vérité.

On ne pouvait pas parler de l'assimilation et implicitement du décroissement du nombre de la communauté avant 1990 dans les écritures des Roumains de Hongrie. Mais, dans les dernières décennies, de plus en plus personnes discutent ouvertement et directement sur ce sujet. Beaucoup d'observations critiques appartiennent aux mêmes personnalités issues du système (pensionnées). Mais on y trouve également des points de

³⁷ Gheorghe Santău, "Vechimea și starea românilor în Crișana", în *Simpozion*, VIII, Giula, 1999, pp. 104-105.

vue exprimés par des chercheurs actifs, premièrement à La Chaire de la Langue et la Littérature Roumaine de l'Université de Seghedin. Le nom le plus engagé dans cette attitude est celui du professeur Mihai Cozma, secondé par Mihaela Bucin, plus jeune que celui-ci. Mais Gheorghe Petrușan n'a pas eu la même attitude, car dans la dernière décennie du siècle passé il s'était engagé dans la mise en évidence des réalités existantes dans ce sens et depuis la fin de la même décennie il a renoncé d'être assez conséquent. Ce changement d'attitude s'est produit après la publication de *l'esquisse d'histoire des Roumains de Hongrie*³⁸, dans la revue *Simpozion* de 1997, où il sanctionnait implicitement la réalité de l'assimilation de la communauté roumaine, pour que trois ans plus tard il soufint que les Roumains de Hongrie *"ont eu toujours conscience patriotique hongroise, conscience de hungarus, ils n'ont pas participé à la création de la nation roumaine, c'est pourquoi ils n'ont pas été conscients de l'appartenance nationale ..."*³⁹.

Presque toutes les études et les livres faisant référence à l'histoire de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie pendant les XIXe et XXe siècles parlent de ce phénomène même s'ils ne prononcent pas explicitement le syntagme d'assimilation ethnique. Soit qu'on y parle du décroissement de la population roumaine le long du temps, en soulignant que cette réalité est très visible entre le recensement hongrois de 1990 et celui de 2001, période dans laquelle la population roumaine a diminué avec 25%, un décroissement sans précédent dans l'histoire, soit qu'on y offre des dates statistiques où on évite de réclamer ouvertement l'existence du phénomène, l'idée est comprise dans la majorité des ouvrages de l'élite roumaine de Hongrie.

La majorité considère que la perte de l'identité nationale des Roumains de Hongrie est due au contexte historique où ils ont vécu et elle s'est réalisée dans plusieurs étapes. Paradoxalement, en dépit d'une politique systématique de magyarisation des nationalités de Hongrie, surtout dans la période dualiste, le procès d'assimilation ethnique des Roumains a trouvé jusqu'en 1918 une résistance considérable et il a eu un succès limité. La cause principale, considère Mihai Cozma, en a été que les Roumains qui habitaient dans l'aire de la Hongrie actuelle faisaient partie

³⁸ Gheorghe Petrușan, "O schiță a istoriei românilor din Ungaria", în *Idem*, VI, Giula, 1997, pp. 91-98.

³⁹ Gheorghe Petrușan, Emilia Martin și Mihai Cozma, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

d'un bloc unitaire roumain qui les protégeait de la perte de leur identité, surtout par l'intermède de l'orthodoxie⁴⁰. On y ajoute le fait que le Parti National Roumain de Transylvanie et de Hongrie était attentif en égale mesure à tous les Roumains de Hongrie. En plus, l'un des leaders de cette formation politique, Aurel Suci, était originaire de Chitighaz.

Les problèmes sérieux ont paru après 1918-1920, quand la minorité roumaine de Hongrie est restée isolée du bloc national après l'établissement des frontières⁴¹. Restée sans élite et soumise à une politique d'assimilation de plus en plus agressive, la communauté roumaine s'est perdue dans la majorité hongroise. Les pressions en étaient de plus en plus fortes. Mihai Cozma considérait qu'après 1918, *"pendant 25 ans, les minorités de ce pays ont souffert dans plusieurs formes concrètes à cause de l'attitude hostile de la politique et de l'administration, comme une réaction de vengeance pour la culpabilité des pays avoisinés commise contre la Hongrie de lui avoir volé l'Ardeal, les Régions de haute et d'autres territoires"*⁴². Ces pressions, dit Mihai Cozma, étaient accompagnées par des tentatives mieux ou moins pacifiques de magyarisation : *"pendant ces décennies d'entre les deux guerres mondiales il pouvait se passer que le citoyen d'ethnie non hongroise arrivât sur la liste des ceux avantagés par l'État pour recevoir un lot de terre ou de maison seulement s'il magyarisait son nom (par exemple de Flueraș>Şipoș) ou celui-là arrivait à la situation où il n'était pas engagé par l'État à cause de son origine ethnique"*⁴³.

L'étape d'isolation des Roumains de Hongrie a été suivie par celle de leur intégration qui, dans l'opinion de Mihai Cozma, correspondait aux dernières environ 50 années *"marquées de l'intégration massive dans la société hongroise plus large"*⁴⁴, quoi qu'apparemment en Hongrie on assurât à tous les minoritaires de grands droits. La situation paraît contradictoire, dit Mihai Cozma, parce que juste dans les années 70-'80-'90 du XXe siècle le rythme de l'assimilation des Roumains s'est intensifié.

À l'opinion de Mihai Cozma, le phénomène de l'assimilation continue à présent aussi, à cela contribuant pleinement même les leaders de

⁴⁰ Mihai Cozma, "Despre un proces numit asimilare etnică. (Analiză de caz: românii din Ungaria)", în *Conviețuirea (Együttélés)*, Seghedin, no. 3-4, 2002; no. 1-2, 2003, pp. 15-20.

⁴¹ Idem, "Evoluția istorică a identității noastre românești. Ce s-a întâmplat și de ce?" în *Idem*, Seghedin, no. 4, 1998, an 3, nr. 1, 1999, pp. 102-103.

⁴² Idem, "Despre un proces numit asimilare etnică. (Analiza de caz: românii din Ungaria)", în *Idem*, Seghedin, no. 3-4, 2002, no. 1-2, 2003, p. 21.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

la représentante officielle des Roumains de Hongrie (l'Autogouvernement National des Roumains de Hongrie). En plus du fait que le système d'organisation par les ainsi-dits "autogouvernements" est totalement inapproprié pour la minorité roumaine de Hongrie, dit le professeur Mihai Cozma, *"aujourd'hui les Roumains de Hongrie composent une microsociété pleine de tensions qui divisent, dépourvue surtout de la solidarité due entre institutions et individus, fait qui détermine beaucoup de Roumains de se retirer du collectif dont ils devraient appartenir activement. Ce fait contribue fortement à l'assimilation avec les Hongrois. On y doit chercher, parmi d'autres choses, l'incapacité aussi des Roumains de Hongrie de collaborer effectivement et efficacement avec la Roumanie..."*⁴⁵.

Des points de vue similaires sont exprimés résolument par d'autres représentants aussi de l'élite intellectuelle roumaine de Hongrie. Analysant profondément ce problème, Mihaela Bucin, professeur à la Chaire de la Langue et la Littérature Roumaine de l'Université de Seghedin, parle actuellement d'un dilemme de la conscience civique des Roumains du pays voisin dans les conditions d'un permanent balancement entre deux cultures majeures, roumaine et hongroise. Elle remarque que *"Les Roumains de Hongrie sont dans leur écrasante majorité bilingues, un bilinguisme inégal, où la balance se penche vers la langue hongroise; la langue roumaine qu'ils utilisent a une forme archaïque et dialectale, peu intelligible à cause de l'abondance des emprunts hongrois"*⁴⁶. Au début du III^e millénaire le procès d'assimilation ethnique des Roumains était très accentué on parlant même d'une double identité des Roumains, double identité qui ne se divise également entre la qualité de Roumain et celle de Hongrois. Mihaela Bucin remarque que dans les conditions données le Roumain de Hongrie *"a adopté la solution à la portée, avantageuse et recommandée: la langue et la culture hongroise"*⁴⁷, le pays mère n'ayant aucun argument supérieur au pays où il vivait. Les conditions étant nombreuses, les Roumains de Hongrie continuent de choisir la solution *"avantageuse et recommandée"* pour eux: l'intégration dans le paysage hongrois jusqu'à leur union, c'est-à-dire assimilation.

D'ailleurs, la condition de l'élite roumaine est assez ingrate surtout quand il y a une tendance pour l'exploration du passé personnel ou pour

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁴⁶ Mihaela Bucin, "Textul folcloric și recuperarea istoriei", în *Idem*, Seghedin, no. 1-2, 2002, p. 9.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

l'affirmation de l'identité. *"Il sera difficile pour nous de publier une histoire objective de notre communauté si nous avons en vue les opinions des historiens hongrois (...) tu dois écrire en hongroise aussi et, dans le cas où tu veux publier dans des revues de prestige ou publier un livre en hongroise tu seras avec certitude lu par les historiens hongrois, fait qui te mettra dans une situation professionnelle et morale pénible. Dans le cas où tu éviteras les historiens et les organismes ou les maisons d'édition, tu mettras en danger ta carrière professionnelle, dans le meilleur cas tu seras toléré mais dans le même temps, marginalisé"*⁴⁸, disait le professeur universitaire Gheorghe Petrușan de Seghedin dans un article publié dans la revue *Simpozion* en 1997. C'est une conclusion à laquelle l'auteur est arrivé à la suite des efforts soutenus dans la direction de la réalisation d'un ouvrage de synthèse concernant l'histoire de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie.

Premièrement il faut dire que les Roumains de Hongrie ne bénéficient pas d'un enseignement historique dans la langue roumaine qui produise des chercheurs qui aient diplômes d'historiens. En 1999, Mihaela Bucin, professeur à la Chaire de la Langue et la Littérature Roumaine de l'Université de Seghed (l'ancienne Chaire de la Langue et la Littérature roumaine de l'Institut Pédagogique "Juhász Gyula" de Seghedin) s'exprimait clairement dans ce sens. *"L'enseignement des minorités de Hongrie ne permet pas la formation institutionnalisée des professeurs d'histoire"*⁴⁹, disait-elle. Cela ne signifie pas, ainsi comme on l'a déjà vu, que l'histoire de la communauté n'est pas recherchée, surtout après 1990, par les professionnels des disciplines philologiques, de la muséographie ou de la presse.

Mais cette réalité grève sur la connaissance du passé de la communauté roumaine de Hongrie. Le manque des archéologues roumains fait, par exemple, impossible la recherche des traces matérielles qui éventuellement pourraient être de facture romaine et roumaine, les archéologues hongrois étant, presque naturellement, pourrait-on dire, totalement désintéressés de cet aspect. Après nos connaissances, en Hongrie il n'y a aucun archéologue d'origine ethnique roumaine engagé dans une institution publique hongroise qui ait parmi ses objectifs les

⁴⁸ Gheorghe Petrușan, "O schiță a istoriei românilor din Ungaria", în *Simpozion*, VI, Giula, 1997, p. 92.

⁴⁹ Mihaela Bucin, "Avem nevoie de istorie?", în *Conviețuirea (Együttélés)*, Seghedin, no. 4, 1998; no. 1, 1999, p. 81.

recherches archéologiques concernant les Roumains de Hongrie. En plus, quelques chercheurs roumains suggèrent qu'il n'est pas *pratique* d'avoir des préoccupations liées d'Antiquité ou de Daces et Romains comme éléments principaux de l'ethnogenèse roumaine car la mention des Daces et des Romains dans ce contexte provoque aujourd'hui aussi une phobie acute, issue tout d'abord "*de l'omission volontaire des Hongrois de cette période historique-là quand dans cette partie du monde vivaient les Thraces et les Daces*"⁵⁰.

La même réalité est présente en ce qui concerne les autres époques historiques aussi. Les seuls chercheurs appartenant à la communauté roumaine de Hongrie dirigent leurs recherches des institutions où y travaillent dans la sphère de l'ethnographie et du folklore. Il s'agit d'Emilia Martin et Elena Csobai. Leurs écritures dans la zone de l'histoire de la communauté se sont publiées en dehors du système d'État, dans des institutions culturelles roumaines, surtout dans *l'Institut de Recherches des Roumains de Hongrie*.

Dans ces conditions ce n'est pas étonnant que presque tous les ouvrages consacrés à l'histoire des Roumains de Hongrie écrits par l'élite minoritaire commencent avec le XVIIIe siècle. D'une part c'est une période acceptée par l'historiographie hongroise, d'autre part on y peut trouver des dates historiques, surtout du domaine religieux orthodoxe. Certains auteurs sont d'accord que ces dates concernant les débuts de la communauté roumaine dans cette zone sont incomplètes et erronées. Elena Csobai nous offre la solution de ce problème, elle considérant que pour dépasser "*ces dates erronées on doit rechercher l'histoire se basant sur le matériel d'archives car seulement à l'aide de la recherche on peut trouver les empreintes nécessaires contre les fautes produites*"⁵¹.

Mais peuvent les chercheurs roumains de Hongrie faire concrètement quelque chose dans ce sens? On ne doit plus gloser sur la nécessité de la correction de ces manques *programmés*, car les choses en sont évidentes. On trouve des réponses à la question adressée, mais pas trop encourageantes d'autant plus qu'elles viennent d'une réalité historique et historiographique postcommuniste qui suppose la liberté d'exprimer. Le plus éloquent dans ce sens est l'ancien chef de la Chaire de langue et littérature roumaine de l'Université de Seghed, Gheorghe Petrușan.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

⁵¹ Elena Csobai, "Rolul bisericii ortodoxe în păstrarea identității la românii din Giula", în *Simpozion*, VII, Giula, 1998, p. 85.

Gheorghe Petrușan considère que pour être créées les conditions scientifiques optimales en vue de la reconstitution de l'histoire des communautés roumaines de Hongrie est nécessaire la clarification des questions de nature politique et confessionnelle qui grèvent sur la possibilité d'exprimer de l'élite roumaine. Sans la dire directement parce que cette chose se remarque clairement, Gheorghe Petrușan affirme implicitement que les chercheurs roumains de Hongrie peuvent publier une étude ou un livre sur le passé de leur communauté dans une maison de publication hongroise seulement après la lecture du texte par des historiens hongrois qui font leurs "observations". Juste alors l'ouvrage peut être publié. Ce phénomène je l'ai personnellement observé suivant la production historiographique des Roumains de Hongrie. Toute publication qui apparaît en dehors de la Maison d'édition *Noi* ou sous l'égide de *l'Institut des Recherche des Roumains de Hongrie* est extrêmement attentive à plusieurs aspects sensibles pour l'historiographie hongroise, respectant pleinement ses points de vue exprimés. Même dans les publications éditées sous l'égide des deux institutions culturelles on y observe une sorte d'autocensure, surtout aux chercheurs engagés dans une institution culturelle ou d'enseignement de Hongrie qui hésitent d'être très catégoriques dans la manifestation des points de vue sensibles car, conformément à Gheorghe Petrușan, au cas contraire ils mettent en danger leur carrière professionnelle⁵². Cela se passait dans les conditions de l'année 1997 quand a été publié l'étude du professeur de Seghedin.

Dans l'un de ses textes les plus incitants concernant l'histoire des Roumains de Hongrie, Gheorghe Petrușan décrivait le contexte culturel où les chercheurs roumains déroulaient leur activité, à l'exception, bien sûr, de l'environnement culturel institutionnalisé de Gyula. Nous croyons que celui-ci est illustratif pour la réalité historiographique circonscrite aux recherches roumaines. Ainsi, disait-il, *"j'ai reçu une offre d'une maison de publication de Budapest pour faire une présentation succincte de l'ethnie roumaine de Hongrie, qui allait être publiée dans un volume destiné aux minorités de Hongrie. Comme c'était prévu, les référents hongrois (lecteurs), historiens bénéficiant d'une réputation, ont fait quelques observations qui reflétaient éloquent les différences d'opinions dans beaucoup de problèmes concernant l'histoire des*

⁵² Gheorghe Petrușan, "O schiță a istoriei românilor din Ungaria", în *Idem*, VI, Giula, 1997, p. 92.

deux peuples, plus précisément leur cohabitation et ses conséquences. Cette fois, au centre de la discussion ont été le caractère et les contradictions des contacts pendant la période dualiste 1867-1920). La fixité dont l'un d'eux a fait preuve à propos des raisons qui ont mené au démembrement de l'Autriche-Hongrie et aux circonstances où l'union de la Transylvanie avec la Roumanie a été faite laisse à penser, d'autant plus que les derniers ans assez beaucoup d'historiens hongrois ont analysé la politique nationale de l'État dualiste en reconnaissant ses tendances de déjouer les intérêts nationaux des non-hongrois et les discriminations imposées par l'État surtout dans le domaine de l'auto organisation politique des nationalités. Et cet exemple tire au clair les dissensions qui existent depuis longtemps entre les historiens hongrois et ceux roumains en ce qui concerne beaucoup de problèmes historiques, par exemple la continuité des Roumains sur le territoire de la Hongrie actuelle, respectivement leur date d'apparition dans cette zone, le rôle joué par les Roumains pendant des temps incertains, en 1848, entre 1918-1920, pendant le Dictat de Vienna, les tendances de magyarisation par l'enseignement, les tergiversations dans l'applications des lois concernant les minorités etc. Donc pour nous sera difficile de publier une histoire objective de notre communauté si nous avons en vue les opinions soit des historiens hongrois, soit des historiens roumains ou si nous sommes dépendants d'une manière ou d'une autre des historiens (et par eux de l'opinion publique) des deux pays. Et nous sommes dépendants ! Si tu veux être compris par la majorité de l'État où tu vis, tu dois écrire et parler en hongroise et, au cas où tu veux publier dans les revues de prestige ou publier un livre à une maison d'édition hongroise tu seras assez sûrement "lu" par les historiens hongrois en te mettant dans une situation pénible du point de vue professionnel et moral. Dans le cas où tu éviteras les historiens et les organismes ou les maisons d'édition, tu mettras en danger ta carrière professionnelle, dans le meilleur cas tu seras toléré mais dans le même temps, marginalisé"⁵³.

Tout cela représente seulement une partie de la problématique complexe avec laquelle se confronte le chercheur roumain de Hongrie quand il s'agit de la reconstitution de son passé. Pratiquement, ce processus est difficile à réaliser par les potentiels jeunes d'origine ethnique roumaine désireux de se perfectionner dans ce domaine dans la langue maternelle et ultérieurement de chercher leur passé dans des institutions culturels ou

⁵³ *Ibidem*, pp. 91-92.

d'enseignements de l'État hongrois car "à l'heure actuelle en Hongrie, il n'y a pas pratiquement de l'enseignement roumain"⁵⁴.

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THE POLITICAL EXILE OF ROMANIAN SCHOLARS IN ITALY

Anca Stângaciu*

Abstract:

The existentialism of the other Romania, or of the alternative Romania, as the Romanian scholars themselves named it, is shaped around three main markers: the political, the cultural or the spiritual resistance towards the communist regime of the native country. This was an assumed resistance, resulting in the attributes, the purposes, the ideals or the fears of the exile. It also meant the sensible shades of unity existent in the Romanian communities and, of course, the perspectives of identity redefining in the destination country as well as the care for conserving Romanian-ism, especially after the '50s, when the prolonging of the exile period became more and more evident.

Keywords: exile, resistance, identity, anti-communist militants, refugees, communist regime.

In the once a while ago Paris, Mircea Eliade was talking about the role of the Romanian exile as being “a cultural role played in the human civilization, which has to be recognized and shared in the same way as all other great diaspora – the Hebrews, the Armenian – recognized and shared theirs and continue to do it”¹. It is a known fact that the *catharsis* of the forms of exile arose from the Romanian people’s philosophy of the sacred, it being nothing else but “the revelation of the real”².

In Italy, the same as in other countries with relevant Romanian participation, the exile of Romanian scholars was expressed by the attempts of political organization, reflected in the structure of the Romanian National Council,

* Anca Stângaciu is Ph.D Associate Professor at the Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. She followed professional training stages in France (1995-1996), Belgium (1999), Italy (1998, 1999) and lectured courses at the Universities of Studies of Milan and Padua.

Contact: astangaciu@euro.ubbcluj.ro.

¹ Titus Bărbulescu, *Ființa neamului românesc*, Bucharest: Vestala, 2005, p. 184.

² *Ibidem*.

but also by a trend of deep cultural rediscovery. The peculiarities of the Italian political system after the war, but also the reticence towards the political problems of East Europe, abandoned more and more to the claws of Russian power, in the attempt to shield the Western values from the peril of the “red” ideology, did not encourage a political organization of the Romanians, similar to those occurring in the United States of America, France or Spain. Better settled in time and space, the resistance by culture gathered at Rome, around the Society of the Romanian Academy, an alternative academy, free and competent, along with significant personalities of the Romanian culture in exile, from Mircea Eliade, Monica Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca, Dinu Adameșteanu, Vintilă Horia, Ovidiu Bârlea to Gheorghe Caragață, Teodor Onciulescu, Mircea Popescu, Paul Miron or to some Italian close collaborators, such as Bruno Manzone, the ex director of the Italian Institute of Culture of Bucharest.

Thus, the fight in the exile undergone, concomitantly with the changes in the international frame, more metamorphoses: the first wave, in between 1945-1953 being known as the anti-totalitarian Romanian exile, bore the hope of changing the Communist regime, seeing the political resistance as predominant and expressed by memoirs, protests, resistance or social organizations; the second wave, in between 1954-1968, was the stage of a new period of waiting for the defeat of Communism and last but not least, the third wave, in between 1968-1989, was the stage of the “spring” of lost hopes.

Regarding the helplessness of the Romanian communities in exile to organize themselves in unity we must say that this was reflected also upon the group of scholars established in Italy, their cultural and political preferences being dominated by vanity and lack of credibility despite the efforts, often successful, to communicate with the scholars from other countries of Europe or America. Much more, some of them, once out of the communist influence, did not continue to spread the anti-communist spirit, after signing the Faustian pact with the Securitate (the Romanian Secret Service), while others refused to let go of the past, of the traditions, of the origins, in their strive to acquire a second identity, some of them, especially the ones who ran away during the second and third wave, choosing to keep the double citizenship.

The Securitate documents, which exist in the CNSAS (the National Council for the Studying of the Securitate Archives) archives, refer to a series of aspects which allowed the political institution to radiograph the state of being of the Romanian exile and to indicate the strategy of the anti-exile fight. Some of the

most daring monitoring were the ones regarding the institutionalization of the exile in its extent, the political social or professional configuration of the groups, the relationships from within, the level of anti-communist involvement of their members, the activity and the role of the elite. Due to the fact that the informative activity of the Securitate abroad was strictly related to the functions and to the organization of the exile, SIE (External Intelligence Service) focused mainly on the political exile and on the anti-communist militants, who expressed themselves by speeches and effective actions against the dictatorship regime from Bucharest.

The anti-totalitarian political exile was mainly formed by ex members of the diplomatic and consular body abroad, who remained outside Romania after August 23, 1945, when they did not answer Petru Groza's request to return to the homeland, thus consolidating the exile and giving it an anti-communist dimension. The same as it happened in France, in the Great Britain and overseas in the United States of America, Italy offered asylum to a significant number of ex-diplomats, politicians and scholars who asked for political asylum, the CNSAS indicating the Securitate's concern for the Romanian community from the Italian peninsula and even for the social and political reality in Italy.

The years of terror and repression following the installation of the communist regime were followed by the deceiving de-Stalinisation period, which started in 1955, two years after Stalin's death, by decree 253, which promulgated the initiative of repatriation of the Romanians remaining in the Western countries after World War II³; all these occurred on the background of the geopolitical reality of Romania being accepted into the UN and as a consequence it was shaping its entrance on the international political stage⁴. In such internal and international context, on October 25, 1955, the Securitate opened by Direction I, the problematic dossier 779, which took under analysis "the unification attempt of the resistance from Italy"⁵. The document did not explicitly expose the problem of attracting the exiled on the part of the regime, but it inventoried with extremely "meticulous" ideological spirit the evolution of the phenomenon of the anti-communist resistance in Italy, having as a landmark to chronologically depict the action of the exile at that moment represented by August 23, 1944. The stress was

³ Nicolae Petcu, "Problema repatrierii mitropolitului Visarion Puiu reflectată în documentele securității", in *Caietele CNSAS*, Bucharest, year II, no. 2 (4) 2009, p. 229.

⁴ Ion Calafeteanu, *Exilul românesc. Erodarea speranței. Documente (1951-1975)*, Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 333-339, 341-348.

⁵ Archives CNSAS (ACNSAS), Bucharest, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 7.

upon the radiography of the political activity but also on following the ecclesiastical and cultural movements, especially derived on political orientation and on the degree of involvement of the exiled, which either established in Italy before 1944 or after the end of the war, when they found it proper to “act intensely against the interests of the RPR (Romanian Popular Republic)”⁶. Actually, despite the multiple corrupted, lapidary or inexact formulations, the text was realistically recording the fact that the fleeing “elements” “contributed to the formation of a reactionary Romanian movement in Italy, with all the contradictions [...] and interests of each of those, [being nevertheless] united amongst them by the hatred bore to the popular democratic regime”, the anti-communism constituting the essence of the Romanian exile, or, better said, the common thread of all its manifestations, even if not all the participants continued to be vigilant, critical and awake up to the very end.

According to the DIE (External Information Bureau) estimations, the number of Romanian colonies in the Italian territory reached a few thousands in the '50s, out of which only a small part represented the population established in Italy before August 23, 1944, that is the merchants, the ministries officials, the Romanian language and literature foreign lecturers and the diplomacy of the “old bourgeois diplomacy”, starting with Vasile Grigorcea, the lyrical artists present at the La Scala opera theatre of Milan, such as Toma Spătaru, Ionel Perlea and Puiu Cucu, as well as members of the Romanian Academy from Rome, all advocates of a “shameless political action” towards Bucharest and thus favourable to the “past regimes”⁷.

In the first decade after the end of the war, the Securitate appreciated, realistically, the fact that the majority of the exiled were, from a social point of view, scholars, then in a lesser measure merchants, businessmen and last but not least workers, which were almost insignificant in numbers. Of course there were also the priests, driven either by the “Anglo-American imperialist interests”, or by the Italian ones, of the Vatican. The political orientation, or, better said, the political tagging, was the most important element in the documents of the repressive institution of the Romanian State, from the general tag of political refugee to the tag of legionary, which were particularly targeted, members of the National Peasants' Party, liberals or social democrats, the diplomats also belonging to a special category, that of the “reactionary trends” and which, even if not all of them

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 94.

⁷ *Ibidem*, ff. 92-93.

belonged to a political party, "maintain an unfavourable atmosphere towards the homeland regime"⁸.

The political resistance of the Italian exile was initiated and configured by the Romanian diplomats from the peninsula. From a political party's point of view, the main power was detained by the members of the National Peasants' Party which were the majority and then, in a lesser measure by the liberals and social democrats that had fewer personalities with significant say, reality reflected by the Securitate documents. In the area of diplomatic representation, the documents of the communist regime especially targeted the following diplomats: Alexandru Gregorian, Vasile Grigorcea and Teodor Scoteșcu, but also Augustin Popa, theologian, journalist and ex Romanian parliamentarian, who was not also a diplomat, contrary to the Securitate classification, but who fraternised, during his exile in Paris and in London, with the members of the Yugoslavian National Peasants' Party and respectively with the Monsignor Aloisie Tăutu and with the linguist Sever Pop, who accomplished with their ecclesiastical and cultural representation attributes. For Alexandru Gregorian, press consultant in between 1940-1944 at the Romanian Diplomatic Bureau from Venice, the anti-communist fight was reflected in the eight years of Italian exile especially in his journalist work from Radio Rome and Radio Free Europe, where he was director of the Romanian language department. In his turn, Vasile Grigorcea, Iuliu Maniu's representative in Rome, held also important functions, including leadership functions, in the architecture of the Romanian exile. In which regards the good collaboration with the Vatican and particularly with cardinal Tisserand, this was a natural consequence of the diplomatic mission that Grigorcea had in between November 1940 - August 1941 and October 1943 - January 1st, 1946, when, as plenipotentiary minister in Vatican, he negotiated the relationship of the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church with the Pontifical Forum, his replacement in 1941 with general Dănilă Papp actually upsetting the Vatican. Following the same logic of the relationships with the pontifical institution, Teodor Scoteșcu represented Romania at the Vatican in between 1942-1944, and Augustin Popa, became during 1945-1948 (?), the period of his Italian exile, predecessor of Iuliu Maniu and the leader of the Manist trend in the peninsula "Maniu's representative at the Vatican"⁹.

⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 96.

⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 112.

In fact, we can undoubtedly affirm that in such climate of the attempt to politically exist, the majority of the exiled appealed to the philosophy of national unity promoted by Iuliu Maniu, about which they said, as the documents of the communist regime critically show, it was “the only element which could maintain the equilibrium of powers between the labour parties and Romanian bourgeoisie”.

“The subversive fight” against the communist regime and “the united resistance from abroad” initiated in the Manist spirit, by the involvement of the diplomats and of the ex members of the political parties had different intensities by the middle of the '50s, when it started to become more and more evident the fact that neither the governments of the western states nor the public opinion from Eastern Europe was willing to sustain the cause of democracy in the states dominated by communist regimes. In 1946, Grigore Gafencu was Minister of External Affairs (1938-1940) and ambassador of Romania at Moscow (1940-1941), and contacted the “resistance from Italy”, as the Securitate documents show, sustaining Vasile Grigorcea in elaborating the memoriam which was supposed to be sent to the Great Powers in the occasion of the Paris Peace Conference. Both the ex diplomats and the diplomats on the role at that time “agreed with the propaganda hostile to the communist regime” refusing to consider themselves “representatives of the government, but they did consider themselves Maniu’s people”¹⁰.

In February 1947, Grigore Niculescu-Buzești, ex Minister of External Affairs in the Sănătescu government (August 23 – November 2nd, 1944) designated by Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Brătianu and Titel Petrescu as representative of the abroad opposition, participated to the “reaction Conference of Geneva” together with Grigore Gafencu and Augustin Popa, the representatives of the Romanian exiled from Italy. At that time the communication between the opposition from the country and the exiled could still be assured by various channels, the same as it was still high the hope of the political resistance to break down the communist regime. For instance, Dinu Adameșteanu, during his years as secretary of the Romanian Academy, established liaisons with the homeland by the diplomatic courier of the Italian Embassy at Bucharest, reality which was well known by the Securitate, Augustin Popa corresponded with members of the National Peasants' Party by means of the Apostolic Nunciature from Romania, and Ilie Olteanu by

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 105.

“Nicolae, the diplomatic courier from the Ministry of External Affairs”¹¹. Some of the exiled were liaison couriers between different geographical parts of the world or between the Western countries. In this way, Puiu Cucu succeeded to assure the couriering with Latin America, Spain and Portugal, while as Mihail Popescu did the same thing for Switzerland and France.

Shortly after the abdication of King Michael I and the proclamation of the Republic, the resistance movement from the Italian exile becomes radical under the careful managing of the actions of the “three big members of the Romanian resistance in Italy”: Augustin Popa, Aloisie Tăutu and Sever Pop¹². In the spring of 1948, when in Romania the Groza government was preparing the antidemocratic law of nationalization and in Italy the Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi was strengthening his beliefs in favour of a United Europe, the elite of the Romanian exile from the peninsula was establishing the bases of the National Freedom Committee, “formed with the moral support”¹³ of the Italian state, which had sent already two representatives at the initial meeting.

Under the presidency of Vasile Grigorcea, the representative in Italy of general Rădescu, and of the Caroman society, the Committee numbered also Teodor Scorțescu, ex minister at Rome, Teodor Galița, ex embassy secretary at the Vatican, Sever Pop, Scarlat Lambrino and Dinu Adameșteanu, ex cultural councillor respectively ex director and secretary of the Romanian School from Rome, V. Constantin, ex lecturer at Bologna, Mircea Moschuna Ston, ex prime minister of Rome Embassy, Augustin Popa, Maniu’s representative at the Vatican and Ilie Olteanu, as well as Nicolae Petrescu Comnen, “Gafencu’s representative in Italy” whose adherence was “principled”¹⁴. After a new redefinition, the Resistance Committee of the Romanian exiled from Italy, new personalities adhere, such as Lucia Trancu-Iași, Aloisie Tăutu, the leader of the Greek-Catholic Church in Rome, Teodor Solacolu, doctor in medicine and natural sciences in Paris¹⁵ and ex minister to the Vatican, replaced in 1948 as a consequence of the “cleaning” process of the central and external apparatus of the MAE (Ministry of External Affairs) and Vadimir Ionescu, a quite controversial character, ex press

¹¹ *Ibidem*, f. 110.

¹² *Ibidem*, f. 101.

¹³ *Ibidem*, f. 112.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ D. Gr. Constantinescu, *Profesorul Dr. Theodor Solacolu: viața și opera lui: (1876-1940)*, Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice "Lupta" N. Stroilă, 1941, pp. 5-14.

consultant under the Antonescu regime, reason for which the Securitate used to tag him a “legionary”, respectively general consul and custodian of the ex royal house from Venice.

The Committee was composed of five departments, adapted to the need of helping the refugees at the end of the '40s. The Help office was constituted, as it was only natural, of Greek-Catholic priests such as Aloisie Tăutu and Ovidiu Bojan, as well as Ilie Olteanu, who accumulated experience in helping the refugees in the concentration camp from Aversa and then in the Greek-Catholic Parochia from Rome. The Press and Propaganda office was represented by Pascal Teodorescu Valahu, journalist who later, was employed at the Associated Press in the USA, Vladimir Ionescu, ex press consultant under Ion Antonescu regime and Teodor Solacolu, ex in charge with the affairs *ad interim* at the Vatican. The Coordination department was based on the activity of the National Peasants' Party representatives in the peninsula, Augustin Popa, and of two other scholarship owners from the Romanian School from Rome, Puiu Cucu and Scarlat Lambrino. The diplomatic representation was assured by Teodor Scorțescu, ex diplomat at the Vatican, “very close to the democrats and [especially] to De Gasperi”, a diplomat with powerful liaisons at the Italian Ministries of External and Internal Affairs, concerned with the “faith of the Romanians from Italy”, Mircea Moschuna Ston, who had “relations in the Chigi palace” and Augustin Popa who had “relations at the Vatican”¹⁶; while as the Consular department was organized under the supervision of Dinu Adameșteanu and of the priest Carol Capros.

In order to grant a larger opening and shelter itself from the political speculations, from the intrigues and from the vanities which were more and more evident overseas, at Washington, the Committee of Political Resistance from Rome was dominated by the association of the ones without political orientation, more precisely nine diplomats (S. Pop, T. Solacolu, V. Grigorcea, Al. Gregorian, T. Galița, M. Moschuna Ston, V. Ionescu, M. Popescu and T. Scorțescu), three priests (A. Tăutu, O. Bejan, C. Capros) and three personalities without political colour (M. Moschuna Ston, S. Lambrino, L. Trancu-Iași). The political algorithm inclined towards a majority representation of the National Peasants' Party members, out of which some were also diplomats (A. Popa, S. Pop, T. Galița, T. Scorțescu, Puiu Cucu), followed by the minority, but no less suggestive of the legionary (I. Olteanu, D. Adameșteanu, V. Ionescu, Ș. Popescu); to which we add Vladimir

¹⁶ ACNSAS, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 113, d. 1463, f. 6.

Ionescu, “the representative of the ex King Michael” and Pascal Teodorescu Valahu “the well known agent of the Americans”¹⁷.

In its rush to tag them politically, the Securitate classified differently its political adversaries, the Greek-Catholic priest Aloisie Tăutu being labelled as “Manist”, probably by association to the belonging to the PNTȚ National Peasants' Party of the majority of the personalities involved in the institutionalized politics from Italy, but also as a legionary sympathiser, due to the fact that he helped the members of the Legionary Movement, which was an “ideological” exaggeration; actually the help being offered generally speaking to all of the exiled. The data from the personal history of the priest Tăutu prompt to the fact that he intersected the Manist formation starting with the summer of 1919, when he returned to Big Romania from the faculty of theology of the University from Vienna, through Yugoslavia, helped by a transportation organized by Vaida and Maniu¹⁸; the exile making the collaboration with the representatives of the National Peasants' Party from Rome a natural fact. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies, the inaccuracies and the erroneous interpretations made by the Securitate employees went as far as considering an exile such as Moschuna Ston both a “Manist” and a personality “without political colour”¹⁹; as a matter of fact, the great majority of the diplomats were invariably considered to be “Manists”. The tagging, the disinformation and the lies, as well as the actions of political processing of the exiled, be them members of the National Peasants' Party, liberals, legionaries etc., were well known practices of the Securitate abroad.

The president Vasile Grigorcea, was the representative in Italy of the only general who had the courage to oppose the soviets, Nicolae Rădescu, and Teodor Scorțescu was the person liked by Grigore Niculescu-Buzești, designated by the leaders of the historical parties – I. Maniu, V. Brătianu and T. Petrescu – to represent the country in exile.

Actually the Securitate associated the appearance of the Committee to the “official entrance of general Rădescu in the political arena [when] the unification activity [started to become more and] more evident” which was true, in fact. Coming from the school of economics, Rădescu succeeded to build an exceptional military career and then become prime minister of Romania, actually the last

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 114.

¹⁸ Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *O contribuție la istoria exilului românesc*, vol. VIII, Bucharest: Vremea, 1999-2011, tome VIII, pp. 164-165.

¹⁹ ACNSAS, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 113, ff. 114.

prime minister of a democratic government, demitted after the soviet vice deputy for external affairs A.I. Vâșinski, the one who imposed to the King on February 27, 1945 the government change, came to Bucharest. Forced to clandestinely leave the country in 1946 due to the persecution for his attitude towards the Communist Party and towards the soviet occupant authorities, the general – a dignified figure, covered by the drama of the times he lived – becomes a landmark of the exile by shaping the Rădescu trend, which resulted in the Resistance Committee, in 1948, at Washington, which was to become later the Romanian National Council and also by creating a cultural organization. With the help of the funds provided by Nicolae Malaxa, general Rădescu sustained publications of the Romanian exile and after he resigned from the presidency of the Committee he created the League of the Free Romanians.

The Greek-Catholic priest Augustin Popa and the member of the National Peasants' Party Emil Ghilezan formed the Council of the Democratic Parties. The CNR (Romanian National Council)²⁰ vanguard, created May 10, 1949 at New York played symbolically the role of government for the Romanian exile, statute which was not recognized by any of the big powers and not even by the United States, who “tolerated within certain limits” the constitution of such committees of national freedom of the occupied nations and even permitted the existence on its territory of the formula the Organization of the Captive Nations, but did not proceed to encourage any of the claims or actions of the exiled to contest the legitimacy of the governments from the socialist space²¹. Up to the middle of the '50s, the Council was concerned with “attracting the attention of the entire world upon what was happening in Romania, before the new regime entered in constant relationships with the free countries”, insisting upon the lawful right order and claiming real peace and independence of all people. In the notes of the Council for State Security, the Committee was described as a “private organization of propaganda against the socialist countries, which gradually was subordinated to the State Department and to the CIA the USA organism, which funded it and used it [...] in terms of intelligence and anti-communist propaganda”²², in conformity to the principle of “the universal enemy”, imperialist, and directed against communism.

²⁰ Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, pp. 343-348.

²¹ Neagu Djuvara, *Amintiri din pribegie (1948-1990)*, Bucharest: Humanitas, 2005, p. 35.

²² Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, *Securitatea. Structuri, Cadre, obiective și metode*, Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2006, vol. II, p. 136.

As the founding principle of the CNR (Romanian National Council) was not a consultative one, in which concerns the exiled, but of representation for the historical parties which had an overwhelming majority at the rigged elections 1946²³, the first disputes in the forum arose once with the decision of the political algorithm. Finally, April 23rd, 1949, King Michael approved that four independents and respectively six political figures, members of the National Peasants' Party and social democrats, enter the Council lead by Rădescu, the last democrat prime minister. In the perspective of the repressive institution of the communist party, the Committee represented "an attempt to unite the fleeing traitors with the help of international bourgeoisie and with the purpose of intensifying the attack against the popular democratic regime"²⁴.

In November 1950 and not in 1953, as a note of the Securitate specifies²⁵, Rădescu's group (Gafencu, Caranfil, Fărcășanu), recognized as a "political organization", broke with the Committee, forming the League of the Free Romanians. Among the contributors to the League's newspaper, *Românul* (*The Romanian*), we can name Emil Ghilezan, established in Italy after 1961 and Vintilă Horia, who left Italy in 1948²⁶.

In fact, the dissatisfactions created around the "Cretzianu fund"²⁷ triggered the most violent discussions, to it being added the supposed sponsorship of Rădescu by the Romanian industrial magnate Malaxa, the influential and judgement lacking stile of general Rădescu, "incapable of representing the Romanian interests abroad"²⁸, the assumption of actions which could not be rigorously controlled, the vanities of the two groups Rădescu - Buzești (which included Vișoianu and Cretzianu) and, of course, the lack of direct sustaining from the East European countries. Emil Ghilezan himself, as general secretary of the Committee, ended in being marginalized in its attempt to side with both parties. The Committee enters in disgrace starting with 1972 when it is

²³ Neagu Djuvara, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²⁴ Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, *Securitatea. Structuri, Cadre, obiective și metode*, Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2006, vol. I, p. 291.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 566.

²⁶ See, Mihail Fărcășanu, *Viitorul libertății: publicistică din țară și din exil (1944-1963)*, Iași: Polirom, 2013.

²⁷ See Mircea Ciobanu, *Convorbiri cu Mihai I al României*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1997, p. 288, Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Ion Pătroi, *Documente franceze privind începutul organizării exilului românesc*, Bucharest: Vremea, 2003, p. 12.

²⁸ Neagu Djuvara, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

left without external funds and in 1975 it gets dissolved, its main sponsor, the *National Committee for a Free Europe* starting to reduce funding at a half at the middle of the sixth decade, due to the new American politics of “building bridges” towards the USSR.

Within the committee, each of the members had specifically determined functions. Exiled in Italy, Augustin Popa’s responsibility was to edit the publications and to continue the “anti-governmental propaganda”²⁹. Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen was among the 12 representatives of CNR (Romanian National Council) outside the United States of America. Their nomination, made directly by the King, starting from the principle of its prestige, was much more important that it was thought, since we speak about a Western country chosen as exile place by many “representative Romanian scholars” and which contained “the passing points of the Romanian refugees”³⁰. Starting from the discussions he had with the Pontifical Sovereign and with the minister Sforza, Comnen showed himself interested in representing the Romanian National Committee “with the utmost discreet prudence”, reason for which C. Vișoianu proposed him to collaborate with a “vice representative” or “deputy” which was supposed to keep the correspondence with the “compatriots from Italy” in the person of Vladimir Ionescu, ex General Consul at Florence (at Rome)³¹, although, Comnen liked D. Popescu. Thus, Comnen was supposed to maintain contacts with the Italian government as well as with the Italian journalist and publicist circles, while as Ionescu was supposed to keep giving administrative assistance. The fact that Italy never accepted an “official representative of the Committee” is evident from the correspondence between Comnen and Cretzianu; Scelba, the minister of Internal Affairs being “contrary” to such “diplomatic clandestine” which could very well be “spies, agitators or amateur diplomats”, and the Italian Council of Ministers being contrary to such a formula because they were fearing the “danger of animosity from the Soviets” or because they did not want any “occasion to aggravate the tension existing between the government and the powerful Italian Communist Party”.³²

²⁹ ACNSAS, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 103.

³⁰ Ion Calafeteanu, *Exilul românesc. Erodarea speranței. Documente (1951-1975)*, Bucharest: ed. Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 97-98.

³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 69-70, 84-85, 87.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 62.

We must say that each of them consolidated the exile, giving it an anti-communist tenure, as answer to the sovietization and communistization of the country and thus understanding to lobby in favour of imposing economic sanctions against the Romanian communist authorities, to participate at the European Council and UN Assemblies as well as to the Captive European Nation Assembly, to militate for the installation of democracy in Europe, to incriminate the abuse of the communist leaders and even to organize censuses of the Romanian refugees³³.

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LES MEMOIRES DE LENA CONSTANTE ET L'EXIL AU
LABYRINTHE

THE MEMOIRS OF LENA CONSTANTE AND THE EXILE IN THE
LABYRINTH

Marius Popa*

Résumé:

*Dans l'espace privilégié des mythes, Minos, le roi légendaire de la Crète, a capturé le Minotaure dans un célèbre palais – création de Dédale – qui constitue le modèle originaire du labyrinthe – étant, par excellence, le lieu de l'exil – et qui a déterminé, dans l'histoire culturelle, une analyse presque standardisée de ce symbole, visant sa qualité d'espace, reconnu dans les termes d'une configuration et d'une dimension propres. Dans le même ordre d'idées, on peut évoquer les différentes variantes d'existence du labyrinthe, qui ont été inventoriées – de manière diachronique – par Paolo Santarcangeli¹ (le rêve, le jeu, le dessin, le poème, etc.) et qui peuvent constituer l'objet de nos préoccupations par leur propre oscillation dans les mémoires de Lena Constante. D'ailleurs, le labyrinthe devient – dans l'*Évasion silencieuse*² et dans l'*Évasion impossible*³ – un modèle de configuration aux différents niveaux de la forme*

* Marius Popa is a PhD student, in first year, at the Faculty of Letters, „Babeş-Bolyai” University, in the Romanian city of Cluj-Napoca. He is writing a thesis about the presence of French classicism in the Romanian literary criticism. He has published many articles and studies on Romanian literature in magazines such as *Steaua*, *Vatra*, *Cultura*, *Studia Universitatis Philologia*, *Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Philologica* etc.

Contact: popaamarius@gmail.com.

¹ Paolo Santarcangeli, *Cartea labirinturilor [Le livre des labyrinthes]*, vol. I-II, traduction de Crişan Toescu, Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1974.

² Lena Constante, *Evadarea tăcută. 3000 de zile singură în închisorile din România [L'évasion silencieuse. 3000 jours seule dans les prisons de la Roumanie]*, édition, étude introductive et notes par Ioana Bot, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2013.

³ Lena Constante, *Evadarea imposibilă. Penitenciarul politic de femei Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961 [L'évasion impossible. Le pénitencier politique de femmes Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961]*, édition, étude introductive et notes par Ioana Bot, Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2013.

et du contenu, tout en formant un espace des mémoires (par les représentations «sensoriales», fragmentaires et non-congruentes, de la cellule), mais aussi aux niveaux de la temporalité et de la discursivité (la solution de l'exil étant représentée, au fond, par l'évasion).

Mots clefs: exil, labyrinthe, cellule, histoire culturelle, mémoires, évasion, configuration, forme, contenu, temporalité, discursivité, espace, représentation, fragment, sens, dimension, mythe

Abstract:

*In the privileged space of the myths, Minos, the legendary king of Crete, captures the Minotaurus in a famous palace – a creation of Dedalus – which represents the primary model of the labyrinth and which implicitly determined, in the cultural history, a consecrated interception of this symbol, in its sense of space, recognizable in the terms of a configuration and of a peculiar dimension. The labyrinth, however, repeatedly abandons the condition of space, similar to the pendulum that can be detected (every time) in a different hypostasis within the successive becomings of its course. In this matter, distinct variants of the existence of the labyrinth can be evoked, diachronically catalogued by Paolo Santarcangeli⁴ (the dream, the game, the clothing, the poem, etc.) and can constitute the object of our concerns, through their own pendulation in the memoirs of Lena Constante. Above all, the labyrinth establishes itself, both in *Evadarea tăcută*⁵ and in *Evadarea imposibilă*⁶, as a configurative model, at distinct levels of form and content. This materializes itself not only as a space of the memoirs (through the "sensorial", thus fragmentary and incongruent representations of the cell), but also - within our subsequent approaches of the motif – at the level of temporality or of discursivity (whose sequencer solution is, after all, the escape).*

Keywords: exile, labyrinth, memoirs, narrative, escape

⁴ Paolo Santarcangeli, *Cartea labirinturilor [Le livre des labyrinthes]*, vol. I-II, traduction de Crișan Toescu, București: Meridiane, 1974.

⁵ Lena Constante, *Evadarea tăcută. 3000 de zile singură în închisorile din România [L'évasion silencieuse. 3000 jours seule dans les prisons de la Roumanie]*, édition, étude introductive et notes par Ioana Bot, București: Humanitas, 2013.

⁶ Lena Constante, *Evadarea imposibilă. Penitenciarul politic de femei Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961 [L'évasion impossible. Le pénitencier politique de femmes Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961]*, édition, étude introductive et notes par Ioana Bot, București: Humanitas, 2013.

La cellule – *topos* labyrinthique

La cellule, l'espace prototypique des expériences restituées dans les mémoires de Lena Constante, détient, par excellence, l'allure d'un labyrinthe transformé en *topos* de la torture (par ses différentes formes de manifestation). La valeur de prototype qu'on attribue au leitmotiv de l'évasion est générée par l'option de l'auteure de reconstituer les douze années de prison (qu'elle a vécues presque entièrement dans la cellule), mais aussi par la possibilité de comprendre l'univers de l'époque (à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur de la prison) – de manière métaphorique – comme une grande cellule (c'est une vision qui actualise, dans les mémoires de Lena Constante, la théorie foucauldienne du panoptisme, présentée dans la célèbre histoire de la naissance de la prison moderne⁷). Le *panoptique* de Bentham représente, d'ailleurs, une formule moderne du labyrinthe, dans laquelle la victime devient l'objet d'un piège éternel et dans laquelle la privation absolue de l'intimité détermine une *scission identitaire* de l'individu (qui essaye en vain de trouver un espace de la salvation – dans lequel il pourrait reconfigurer, en solitude, son *moi* intérieur – équivalent au centre comme solution du labyrinthe).

Une première concrétisation de ce modèle, évoquée plusieurs fois par Lena Constante, est représentée par « l'architecture même des anciennes prisons où elle habite. Parce que ces prisons – étant construites à l'époque de l'Empire Austro-Hongrois, en Transylvanie – essayaient de copier la forme de la 'prison parfaite', rêvée par Bentham à l'époque des Lumières, tout en constituant un *nexus* du texte foucauldien »⁸. L'apogée du projet benthamien – représentant une situation hypothétique, selon Foucault – constitue, paradoxalement, l'un des épisodes les plus labyrinthiques (et, par conséquent, l'un des épisodes les plus terrifiants) de l'expérience concentrationnaire décrite par l'auteure (« Sans mes lunettes, je ne vois pas bien. La cellule est assez obscure [...] Hypnotisée, j'avance vers le mur. Avant d'y arriver, je rencontre un obstacle invisible. C'est un mur

⁷ «Le *panoptique* est polyvalent dans ses applications ; il sert à amender les prisonniers, mais aussi à soigner les malades, à instruire les écoliers, à garder les fous, à surveiller les ouvriers, à faire travailler les mendiants et les oisifs » (Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir*, Paris: Gallimard, 1975, p. 17). Or, une telle fonctionnalité générale du modèle dans le contexte historique évoqué par Lena Constante devient évidente dans la restitution des expériences carcérales.

⁸ Ioana Bot, *Tăcerea cuvintelor [Le silence des mots]*, étude introductive, *Ibidem*, p. 23.

de verre. Derrière, il y a un couloir étroit [...] Il y a, peut-être, quelques cellules similaires. Seulement quatre ou cinq, car la sentinelle se trouve de nouveau devant moi»⁹), dans laquelle les métaphores choisies par Lena Constante coïncide, selon Ioana Bot, avec les métaphores-clés de la terminologie foucauldienne («Cette cellule n'est pas une cellule. Ils m'ont enfermée dans une cage. Une cage d'animaux. L'animal, c'est moi»¹⁰).

Une autre cellule transformée en labyrinthe – ayant comme objectif la *désorientation morale* de la victime – est représentée par la fosse des rats qui a été évoquée par l'un des enquêteurs et qui a déterminé la renonciation (temporaire) de Lena Constante. Dans une description effroyable que l'enquêteur réalise, plusieurs fois, avec enthousiasme, il imagine « avec un bonheur indicible ce lieu de plaisir... Il y avait, disait-il, dans les souterrains de ce bâtiment, une cellule étroite. Obscure. Là-bas, plusieurs rats étaient fermés»¹¹. Une telle construction diégétique place le lecteur dans une pratique *labyrinthique*, à cause de l'impossibilité d'attribuer au discours un certain type de référentialité (c'est-à-dire, l'impossibilité de faire la différence entre la véridicité et la fictionnalité d'une telle narration falsifiée, qui altère – de manière insidieuse – son rapport avec la réalité): « Je reviens chassée dans la cellule. Je me demande si les paroles de l'enquêteur peuvent être réelles. Je veux croire, à tout prix, qu'il ment. Je lutte avec toute ma volonté. Ce ne peut être qu'une astuce. Mais si ce n'est pas une astuce? L'incertitude était elle-même suffisante pour que j'expérimente une tension extrême »¹².

Une autre séquence, dans laquelle le labyrinthe est configuré dans l'espace extérieur (mais un espace qui garde, presque entièrement, les coordonnées de l'univers carcéral), surprend Lena Constante qui a été conduite « dans le centre de la ville. Un boulevard. Une place. Beaucoup de gens. Libres »¹³ (l'auteure devine l'intention de ses enquêteurs: « Plus tard, leur but me paraissait clair. Ils ont voulu que je vécusse la tentation de la liberté »¹⁴). Or, un tel voyage, ayant un trajet illusoire, peut être associé au

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 135-136.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 95.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 83.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

modèle du labyrinthe que Paolo Santarcangeli intitule « le rêve¹⁵ du voyage empêché » et qui représente également, selon l'historien italien, « une prison d'où celui qui est entré ne pourra sortir, au moins jusqu'au moment de son éventuelle 'régénération' »¹⁶.

De même, on peut remarquer, dans le dessin labyrinthe, les premières *cellules* de la liberté, des espaces où Lena Constante ne se reconnaît pas et qui infirment, petit-à-petit, ses attentes concernant la liberté rêvée. Par exemple, les épisodes de la gare de Bucarest (qui devient, elle-même, un labyrinthe) surprennent une désorientation décrite en détail (« j'avais lentement, étourdie par les bruits de la foule [...] Dans la gare, parmi des cris et des sifflets, étourdie, frappée [...], je regardais autour de moi un visage amical »¹⁷), qui lui rappelle le monde carcéral (« Tout en me glissant entre la foule en mouvement, portée par ses vagues, je me suis retournée à la porte de l'office. Je me sentais déconcertée et j'avais le cœur lourd, triste. Pourquoi est-ce que je me trouve si près de ma maison et, quand même, si loin? »¹⁸).

Le discours de l'évasion et l'appropriation du labyrinthe

Selon Paolo Santarcangeli, « le labyrinthe n'est pas seulement une expression spatiale, mais aussi une expression temporelle »¹⁹. La souffrance de Lena Constante ne concerne pas seulement, dans cet ordre d'idées, l'espace de la prison, mais aussi le *temps* concentrationnaire. En analysant le même motif du labyrinthe, Santarcangeli observe que « la durée de notre expérience au milieu de ses difficiles contournements est toujours rapportée à deux facteurs: l'aire et le degré de complication du dessin (la situation objective) et le niveau de notre intelligence ou de notre intuition

¹⁵ On va associer le rêve à l'épisode mentionné et il représente, par conséquent, une illusion de la liberté, proposée à Lena Constante : « Le rêve m'apporte l'inquiétude, mais l'heure est arrivée... je la connais... C'est l'heure de la prison... Je suis égarée dans un labyrinthe de rues inconnues... tout en cherchant, désespérée, une certaine maison..., ils m'ont donné seulement quelques heures de liberté [...] Je me perds dans ce labyrinthe de rues... » (p. 61).

¹⁶ Paolo Santarcangeli, *Cartea labirinturilor [Le livre des labyrinthes]*, vol. II, p. 17.

¹⁷ Lena Constante, *Evadarea imposibilă. Penitenciarul politic de femei Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961 [L'évasion impossible. Le pénitencier politique de femmes Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961]*, pp. 275-276.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 276.

¹⁹ Paolo Santarcangeli, *Cartea labirinturilor [Le livre des labyrinthes]*, vol. II, p. 237.

(la situation subjective)»²⁰. Si on pense à la relation de l'expérience de Lena Constante avec cet ample symbole, on remarque la capacité de l'auteure d'apprivoiser le labyrinthe carcéral (c'est-à-dire, selon l'historien, la *situation objective*) – dans sa propre spatialité, mais, surtout, dans sa propre temporalité – par l'intermédiaire de ce qu'on appelle le *discours de l'évasion* (c'est-à-dire la *situation subjective*, salvatrice, qui doit saper le labyrinthe).

Le discours devient évasion, car, selon Paul Ricoeur, toutes les constructions de mots impliquent « l'accès d'un monde au langage par l'intermédiaire du discours »²¹. La force ontologique du *logos* représente, également, sa force libératrice, puisque le discours configure un monde nouveau et se transforme en agent ordonnateur et signifiant; un tel labyrinthe, étant terrible par son obscurité, réussit à devenir structuré, chronologique, porteur de signification et, par conséquent, subjectivisé²².

L'Évasion silencieuse raconte donc l'histoire d'une salvation en silence, grâce à l'art qui s'oppose au supplice carcéral, au labyrinthe qui est devenu infernal (car son dessin chaotique n'est pas congruent avec les ressorts de l'existence humaine). Or, les mots assument cette fonction – d'isoler la victime de l'univers labyrinthe et d'instaurer un nouveau univers, qui représente le produit de la réalisation artistique et qui s'identifie totalement, par conséquent, avec son créateur. Lena Constante avoue fréquemment cette pratique salvatrice: « Mais j'avais découvert, dans ce néant, un filon. Les mots. La force des mots. J'avais des mots et j'avais du temps. Beaucoup de temps, je ne savais pas comment je pourrais le vivre. Temps perdu. Mais, perdu ou non, ce temps m'appartenait [...] J'y ai survécu. J'ai même réussi à être contente... Parfois... »²³.

Le même procédé salvateur reste valable, au fond, dans *L'Évasion impossible*, bien que – restituant l'expérience des quatre années vécues dans les cellules communes de la prison de Miercurea-Ciuc – ce volume évoque une évasion qui ne se situe plus sous le signe du *silence*. La nouvelle expérience de l'évasion suppose la même création discursive des mondes compensatifs, mais elle devient une expérience communautaire. Le

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Paul Ricoeur, *Eseuri de hermeneutică [Essais d'herméneutique]*, Paris: Seuil, 1969, p. 96.

²² *Idem*, *Temps et récit*, I, Paris: Seuil, 1983, pp. 85-137.

²³ Lena Constante, *Evadarea tăcută. 3000 de zile singură în închisorile din România [L'évasion silencieuse. 3000 jours seule dans les prisons de la Roumanie]*, p. 108.

labyrinthe est collectif, donc l'évasion doit être commune: «Le premier soir a été décisif. Je leur ai offert le cadeau d'une heure d'oubli, mais aussi de souvenirs [...] Dès ce soir-là, j'avais un métier. J'étais 'conteuse'. Jusqu'à la fin de ma détention, j'ai toujours raconté»²⁴. Racontant ou écoutant des histoires (« Dans les grandes cellules, où j'habitais plus tard, j'ai eu le bonheur d'écouter »²⁵), Lena Constante affirme la valeur de la narration-communion, unissant – de manière salvatrice – les destins des labyrinthes («Provoquer le rire ou le pleur, jouer en utilisant les mots»²⁶) dans un destin singulier de l'histoire.

Le texte dans le miroir. Les labyrinthes amoureux

Il y a, dans une telle histoire interne du labyrinthe, deux expériences significatives: les événements présentés par les mémoires de Lena Constante (qui restent un grand réseau d'épisodes labyrinthiques) se reflètent à l'aide des artifices rhétoriques et formels. C'est-à-dire, ces expériences surprennent les labyrinthes « amoureux » des contenus qui se tournent vers les labyrinthes des formes, mettant en évidence l'authenticité et la qualité stylistique de la remembrance.

L'organisation même des mémoires sous la forme d'un journal (dont la datation – bien qu'elle suggère une précision factologique – est reconstituée sélectivement, tout en s'avérant approximative et «labyrinthique») révèle les zones de l'*indicible*, car le trajet carcéral ne pourrait jamais être restitué entièrement à l'aide d'une telle espèce discursive.

Le même mécanisme est visible dans la reconstitution « incomplète » des tortures, puisque le compte suggère, implicitement, l'*indicible* («Je ne dois pas crier. Il m'a dit de ne pas crier. Est-ce qu'ils vont me frapper de nouveau? Je ne comprends pas. J'entends quelques coups courts. Ils coupent l'air. Un coup, deux, trois. Douleur. Douleur»²⁷). Les mots deviennent non seulement incapables de restituer la gravité de l'expérience concentrationnaire, mais

²⁴ Lena Constante, *Evadarea imposibilă. Penitenciarul politic de femei Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961 [L'évasion impossible. Le pénitencier politique de femmes Miercurea-Ciuc: 1957-1961]*, pp. 76-77.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 80.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

²⁷ Lena Constante, *Evadarea tăcută. 3000 de zile singură în închisorile din România [L'évasion silencieuse. 3000 jours seule dans les prisons de la Roumanie]*, p. 78.

aussi impropres, parce qu'ils devraient raconter quelques horreurs que Lena Constante refuse de décrire ouvertement.

Conclusions

Le labyrinthe s'impose – par les variantes analysées à l'aide de *l'Évasion silencieuse* et de *l'Évasion impossible* – comme un modèle de configuration central dans les mémoires de Lena Constante. C'est, en fait, un symbole fondamental de l'histoire culturelle, qui réussit à structurer, au niveau du chronotope et du langage, ces mémoires, tout en représentant, sans doute, l'un des modèles parfaits pour transmettre les sens éthiques désirés par l'auteure.

Dans un autre ordre d'idées, les exercices d'herméneutique et de stylistique concernant les mémoires de Lena Constante – présentés dans l'ouvrage – confirment, au fond, la valeur esthétique de ces écrits, une valeur essentielle qui les authentifie et qui rend efficient leur dialogue avec le lecteur.

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TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND POST-SOCIALIST PROLETARIANISATION IN A RURAL ROMANIAN PROVINCE

Gabriel Troc*

Abstract:

The aim of the article is to explain the amplitude of transnational migration and of the strong social competition of one of Romania's most isolated regions, the Oaş Country. Analysing historically the organisation of labour within the region's communities, the article reveals that a traditional organisation of work found the structural conditions to reproduce during socialist times, as a result of an incomplete proletarianisation process. A particular subsistence system, defined by collective organisation of work and by geographical mobility, explains both the success in transnational migration after 1990 and the intensifying of the social competition within the region's communities. The article also makes clear that transnational migration represents the path for a complete proletarianisation of these groups.

Keywords: post-socialism; social competition; labour organisation; migration; proletarianisation; Oaş Country

Background

During the socialist years tens of millions of peasants from the CEE countries were driven towards joining the ranks of the proletariat. While this social phenomenon was indeed fast and sizeable, it was not as comprehensive as the communist bureaucracy envisaged. Due mainly to economic constraints, many peasants were held on their places, and were even forbidden to move to towns and cities, being still dislocated for employment, either as temporary workers or as commuters. Neither city-

* Gabriel Troc is assistant professor at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.
Contact: gabrieltroc@socasis.ubbcluj.ro.

dwellers, nor full-time peasants, these rural “peasant-workers”, who worked for smaller salaries in mines, workshops or forestry and also toiled the land, formed, together with their families, a group of people that were never fully proletarianised. They may be considered as the true “industrial reserve army” of the real existing socialism, a “flexible group” that could have been employed or disemployed, in accordance with developmental needs, cycles of production, marginal labours and so on.

Particularly fit for this category were, in Romania, the inhabitants of the mountain regions, especially from the places where socialist collectivisation of the land was never enforced, the more infra-structurally isolated areas, but also populations inhabiting less urbanised regions. Due to incomplete proletarianisation, less social intervention and lack of important capital investments, the populations from the aforementioned areas continued to reproduce local social relations and lifestyles that were still linked to archaic patterns.

I am interested in this paper to cover a different but consequential undertaking, which deals with the incentives for completing the proletarianisation process, as a consequence of social changes brought by the new position of Romania in the capitalist world system after the fall of the socialist regime.

Transnationalism, local development and social competition

The subject of this paper is related to the transnational migration of a rural population from Northwestern Romania, known under the name Oaş Country, to Western Europe.

I am particularly interested not in migration per se, but in the outcomes of this migration, and in the explanations that were given to it.

This migration started very early after 1990 and was one of the more intense from Romania; its main destination was France, and it passed through very different forms and stages: irregular, asylum seeking migration, for work circular migration, temporary and long-time migration.

The phenomenon was scrutinised by a number of researchers, especially due to its striking outcomes in terms of local development of the sending villages. More precisely: while a vast literature on migration describes how remittances are used for improving life standards in the sending localities, by investing in long-time goods like houses and

productive tools, as well as the emergence of a competition among migrants to make visible migration success through these goods, what happened in Oaş Country is somehow of a spectacular scale.

Namely, not only that very large houses were built everywhere, but individuals regularly demolish parts of their house in order to rebuild it to respond to a newer building of a neighbour or a relative, or to keep up with a more recent fashion in terms of design, ornaments, types of building materials, and so on. This fact has transformed the region in a very lucrative area, a vast building site, but most important, in a field of a fierce social competition which involves entire communities. A sense of excess is visible everywhere and a proper term for comparison would be the post-socialist villas of the suburban nouveau riches of most of CEE's larger cities.

To all these should be added that Oaş Country is, geographically, one of the most isolated region from Romania, a mountain area that was not collectivised during socialism, a place where close-knit communities are bound together by strong social norms, some of them still archaic. I could observe and analyse these norms in my field research that I did in 2013 and 2015 in some of region's villages, especially in the village of Certeze¹.

Shortly put, about these norms: kinship relations are still very strong, marriage is highly endogamous, marriage alliances are strongly guided by status positions; people wear sort of highly elaborated traditional clothes in ritual contexts, and various items of prestige, which have only local value, are praised.

As I mentioned, different researchers tried to give account of the scale of the social competition within the area, and of the particular development produced by it. They tried to explain it through two main dynamics, more often interlinked: the specificity of Oşeni's transnational

¹ The methodology involved in the research combined first-hand qualitative data, collected through field observation and 40 semistructured interviews, with secondary data from public archives and published researches.

The 2013 fieldwork was done with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU 89/1.5/S/61104, with the title "Social sciences and humanities in the context of global development - development and implementation of postdoctoral research".

migration², or the supposed cultural autarchy, which would have preserved and transformed some archaic competitive practices up to the present³.

If both perspectives (transnationalism and cultural autarchy) are valid in certain regards, and may explain some of the developmental features of the Oaş Country, they both suffer from theoretical reductionism and ethnographic presentism. Their main shortcoming is, in my view, that they tend to disregard the long-term social history of the place and the changes of the villagers' working practices during time, which are central in my view. More important, they tend to disregard the slow but continuous process of proletarianisation of these peasants, which had started during socialism and is on its way to completion in the present. I will focus in this paper on this dynamic - of proletarianisation - by following the main facts of the social history of the area, which may also better explain the local competition and its recent aggrandisement.

My thesis is that, starting with the beginning of the 20th century, the peasant population of Oaş Country has been gradually hauled into the country-wide process of proletarianisation of the rural population. However, the "Oşeni" have shared with other groups - peasants located in isolated or resourceless areas, or rural Roma - the path of a weak integration in the formal labour market. In the context in which the agriculture of the region was not collectivised during socialism, this position both constrained and enabled them to search for and be involved in various economic activities that were less formalised within the socialist organisation of labour. As a consequence, they benefited of certain productive and reproductive autonomy, which enabled them to be both connected to the labour opportunities inside and outside the region and to preserve a strong sense of identity and community, objectified through strong social norms. Their peculiar partial proletarianisation may explain

² Dana Diminescu; Lagrave, R.M., "Faire une saison, pour une anthropologie des migrations roumaines en France: le cas du pays d'Oaş", in *Migration Etudes*, No. 91, 1999.

³ Daniela Moisa, "Du costume traditionnel a Barbie. Formes et significations du costume 'traditionnel' de Certeze, Roumanie (1970-2005)", in *Martor. Revue d'Anthropologie du Musee du Paysan Roumain*, No. 13, 2008; Daniela Moisa, "Du couteau a la maison. Pratiques et materialites de la reussite au village de Certeze", in *Martor. Revue d'Anthropologie du Musee du Paysan Roumain*, No. 16, 2011, Nicoară Mihali, *Țara Oaşului. Lumea tradițională și vendeta*, Cluj-Napoca: Limes, 2013.

their economic success during socialism and post-socialism. However, with the post-1990 transnational migration the incentive to speed up the development would embark them, as we will see, on the path of complete proletarianisation, with the associated changes in their individual and collective social life. Focusing the investigation on the evolution of their working practices could explain, in my view, the specific development of the area, the preservation of local cultural norms, the success in transnational migration and could envision further social changes.

Proletarianisation concept

Rooted in the marxist tradition, proletarianisation is seen originally as the result of the primitive accumulation of capital, understood as the historical process of divorcing the producers from the means of production. Otherwise put, proletarianisation reflects the condition of the producer liberated from a previous bonding (initially feudal) relation and dispossessed of his/her direct access to the means of production, who is both free and constrained to work for a wage within a capitalist organisation of production⁴. While the concept was less used in the 80s and the 90s' analysis, it resurfaced more recently, as a useful tool for grasping social phenomena produced by the neoliberal organisation of work and of society, more general. Nuanced as "de-proletarianisation", "re-proletarianisation", "incomplete proletarianisation", it readdresses contemporary aspects related to working patterns, like working for wages, free and forced labour, deprivation of direct means of subsistence, spatial and temporal dislocation of the labour force, lack of control of the labour processes⁵.

⁴ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume I, Penguin Books, 1990 [1867]), p. 875.

⁵ See Tom Brass, "Debating Capitalist Dynamics and Unfree Labour: A Missing Link?", in *The Journal of Development Studies*, 50:4, 2015; Julien-Francois Gerber, "The Role of Rural Indebtedness in the Evolution of Capitalism", in *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 41:5, 2014; Bryan D. Palmer, "Reconsideration of Class: Precariousness as Proletarianisation", in *Socialist Register*, Vol. 50, 2014; Norbert Petrovici, "Neoliberal Proletarianisation along the Urban-Rural Divide in Post-socialist Romania", in *Studia UBB Sociologia*, LVIII, No. 2, 2013.

Going beyond the obsolete perspective that links the process of proletarianisation only with the classical image of masses of dispossessed workers toiling in foggy factory environments, I use this concept due to its ability to still better address, within a historical-materialist paradigm, the transformations of the world of labour under a capitalist regime, which imply today, as in the past, a set of opportunities and constraints the workers face and have to deal with. In contrast with the literatures that link migration mainly to individuals or families' impediments, choices, opportunities and interests (which represent different variations of rational choice theory), I was particularly interested to stress the objective structural factors, historically rooted, which may force some groups of people who were still in possession of their means of subsistence to abandon them and to join, as new proletarians, the global, metropolitan production regime.

Subsistence system and social relations

Against the perspective that the geographical and occupational mobility of the people from Oaş is a recent phenomenon, as the above mentioned studies of the region assume, I will argue that this is an older feature and is structurally built within the subsistence system of the region. I will discuss this system along the following lines: 1. the land and its productivity; 2. the property system; 3. the main economic activities; 4. the social status system.

Within a dominant hilly landscape, the land of the area has a low agricultural productivity. Compared to other Romanian territories, the availability of arable land is reduced to a third of the total, with the other usability being, in equal proportions, that of pasture lands and orchards.

Consequently, up to the middle of the 20th century, the main occupations of the locals used to be, in this order, cattle breeding, fruit growing and grain and vegetable production. While historically large forests dominated the area (and are still bordering the region), the present structure of the productive land had been acquired through gradual deforestations, a process that started with the formation of some of the present villages, in the 17th century, continued steadily during the next two centuries and was accelerated by the systematic capitalist exploitations in

the first decades of the 20th century⁶. The property structure of the land was defined from the 18th to the middle of the 20th century by the free peasant's private ownership of the productive land and by the nobility's and collective village's ownership of the forests. The productive land property was organised around the patriarchally-led households, which had in possession rather small surfaces of land (an average of 3-5 ha), hereditarily inherited on the male line⁷, and composed of all three categories: arable land, pastures, and orchards. As well-documented cases of forms of Romanian peasant ownership underscore⁸, this structure is a later form of a previous collective ownership. This collective form of property required a communal organisation of labour, be that of agricultural activities, or of livestock breeding. This archaic practice of collective livestock breeding tended to diminish and to disappear in the Romanian areas with high agricultural production after the private segmentation of the land, but was preserved in some, few, mountain areas due to the constant need for soil fertilisation⁹. In the Oaş Country the practice (which exists in a diminished arrangement till the present day) was maintained in an elaborate form until the sixth decade of the last century, and, I would argue, gives the key feature for understanding the particular local social organisation, local culture and recent development. In order to underline its centrality I will present it within the framework of the overall economic activities of the area.

As I already mentioned, the need for a constant fertilisation of the soil required the breeding of important amount of livestock. While cattle breeding was individualised, being linked with the households' current working routines and consumption needs, sheep breeding was a communal endeavour, having the function of fertilising the land allocated for fodder production and providing the main products for being exchanged on the market. Producing goods for the market was here not a marginal activity, like in the case of other agricultural groups, but central for the Oaş

⁶ See Gheorghe Focşa, *Țara Oaşului. Studiu etnografic. Cultura materială*, vol II, Bucureşti: Muzeul Satului, 1975, p. 150.

⁷ Lucian Cucuiet, "Vechi obiceiuri juridice în țara Oaşului", in *Acta Musei Porolissensis*, vol. X, 1986, pp. 673-680, *apud* Nicoară Mihali, *op. cit.*

⁸ Henri H. Stahl, *Contribuții la studiul satelor devălmașe românești*, vol. III, Bucureşti: Editura Academiei RPR, 1965; Gheorghe Iordache, *Ocupații tradiționale pe teritoriul României*, vol I+II, Craiova: Scrisul Românesc, 1985.

⁹ Gheorghe Iordache, *op. cit.* vol I, pp. 83-84.

subsistence system, while the households' grain production, which is of a key importance in a self-sufficient agrarian economy, was of a low quality and was not sufficient to last from one productive cycle to the other¹⁰. The communal organisation of sheep breeding, under the lead of specialised herdsmen, was determined both by the high level of land fragmentation and by the variety of the labors that the peasants had to carry out on a daily and seasonal basis. The sheep collective herding took place from the beginning of May to late November on the upper hills of villages' perimeters, and had to conciliate a number of different interests of the locals.

Namely, there were the interests of the herdsmen chiefs, who were members of the villages, and often prominent owners in terms of land and number of sheep. Their interests were to fertilise their larger parcels of land, to collect as much as possible of the dairy products of the collective herds, and to get an advantageous pay for herding. There were also the interests of the villagers associated for herding, associations that were composed of about 10 households, with 10 to 20 sheep each, who grouped themselves on the principle of kinship and vicinity relations. Their first interest was, obviously, to have their animals cared for (at the lowest price), but also they had the interests of having their land fertilised and of getting the fair amount of dairy products produced by the herdsmen according to the number of the sheep they associated in the herd and to their productivity. A third category of interests belonged to the people employed by the herdsmen chiefs to help with the herding routines and labors. They were generally poorer and younger members of the villages, with less or with no land or sheep ownership. They worked for a wage, paid in money and goods, under the direct command of a close relative (generally a son) of the herdsmen chiefs¹¹.

These common yet also divergent interests produced strong social interactions, but also sparked intense conflicts, which often led to feuds between families and, as many sources indicate, to murders¹².

This set of interests accurately represents the status system of the villages: a higher status defined by sizeable land and sheep ownership, a

¹⁰ Gheorghe Focşa, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 160.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p.178.

¹² Nicoară Mihali, *op. cit.*

middle strata, defined in terms of the well organised, self-sufficient households, and a lower one, with scarcer possessions. This system regulated the social life, in respect with occupying positions in the church councils, in the town hall, and within the very important institution of god-parenting or wedding sponsoring. Marriages were a good reflection of this system, being in the past, as in the present, very complicated arrangements, in which people seek to make good alliances, to marry within their own strata (*neam*), and to avoid old rivalries.

Thus, while everybody had interests in the collective sheep breeding, and its organisation was an arena where central social relations and statuses were played, I consider it as a total social phenomena, in Marcel Mauss's meaning, which structured the social reproduction of these communities for a long period, and have consequences up to the present.

As elsewhere in Romania, socialism produced important transformation in the Oaş Country. However, because only one out of the 22 villages of the area was collectivised, these transformations were different, had a lower pace and a different amplitude than in other regions. The peasants maintained their agricultural subsistence system with few changes up to the end of the 1950s, when the production quotas and property taxes required by the socialist state produce a pressure for change¹³. Namely, while larger amounts of their production was taken by the state, the incentive to produce a surplus diminished. For example, if before the 1930s in some of the villages there were organised 20 to 25 collective sheepfolds, in 1969 there were only 5 to 7 sheepfold¹⁴, numbers that give a good insight about the occupational changes during this period of time.

What actually happened, was that peasants started to looking for work outside the region. Importantly, though, while they were still committed to agriculture, they were not full-time employable, and they seldom follow the path of the peasants belonging to other mountain regions, who used to work as commuters in the near-by towns' factories or mines.

Instead, starting with the 60s, and then consistently during the 70s and the 80s, they traveled within the country looking for type of labors that

¹³ Gail Kligman; Katherine Verdery, *Țăranii sub asediu. Colectivizarea agriculturii în România (1949-1962)*, Iași: Polirom, 2015, p.122.

¹⁴ Gheorghe Focșa, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 79.

could be fulfilled seasonally. The labors they performed were always marginal, but intensive labour jobs, especially deforestations, or agricultural land cleaning, bridges and high voltage electric pile painting, and the like. While these were hard jobs, at the beginning especially people from the lower and the middle strata, as well as the younger ones, pursued these activities.

The work was organised in teams, in a similar way in which the sheep breeding was organised: in groups of people related through kinship or vicinity. The jobs were contracted by some team-leaders, who in time got accustomed to dealing with socialist bureaucrats, and were paid not with an individual wage, but on the basis of a wholesale negotiated agreement. Their interest, consequently, was to fulfil the job as fast as possible in order to maximise the number of contracts they could engage during a season.

During these displacements they regularly worked all day long, lived in very precarious conditions, and spent as little money as possible. The result was that they earned and saved considerable amounts of money, which were sufficient to invest in the construction of new, modern houses back home.

What happened thus is that from the middle of the 60s onwards, their communities became slowly dependent on money, and money could be made in large amounts by working outside the area. Gradually, the hierarchy of the villages, previously defined in terms of land and sheep ownership, was partially redefined by money ownership, which was codified through a new status landmark: the modern house.

Nevertheless, while Romanian socialist economy had never been truly oriented towards consumption¹⁵, and being also hit by a deep crisis in the 80s, the informal system of the townsmen for providing food from the countryside kept up the impetus of the peasant from Oaş country for farming, and preserved important parts of the farming-related superstructure.

Transnational migration

The changes that begun in 1990 affected very early the people from Oaş Country, especially those who relied on internal migration for earning

¹⁵ Katherine Verdery, *Compromis și rezistență. Cultura română sub Ceaușescu*, București: Humanitas, 1994.

a wage. Soon after 1990 the collective farms, as well as state forest exploitations, who used to provide seasonal jobs for Oșeni, shut down.

However, due to their high mobility, they were in a good position to try their fate abroad. A classic push-pull factor combination¹⁶ set the path for their transnational migration: lacking work at home met the availability of social financial compensations in western countries. While initially they searched for work, the peasants of Oaș discovered, especially in France, the mechanisms of social aids for the asylum seekers. They took advantage of it by developing in the 90s a “faux migration” routine¹⁷. Shortly put, they managed to illegally pass borders to EU countries, reach capital cities (especially Paris), and after asking for political asylum they lived for several months in very precarious conditions in order to save the financial compensations for later consumption at home. After their applications were rejected, they were sent back to Romania, and other members of their families took their place. While in France, they received 1200 F per month (which was double the Romanian monthly income of the time), sell the poor peoples’ newspaper *L’itinerant*, and slept in abandoned houses or even on the street. They used to call this routine “making a season”¹⁸, obviously linking this practice with their previous seasonal migrations within Romania.

As a consequence of these practices, a culture of migration¹⁹ emerged within the villages, putting pressure on individuals and families to join the migration path. Kinship networks were once again activated in order to ease the migration difficulties, and the local competition has been reset on the bases of the newer laboring strategies and available resources.

The migration episode of the 90s is remembered today with great embarrassment, especially by the older people, as “something that we don’t want to talk about any longer”.

¹⁶ Douglas Massey et al., *Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

¹⁷ Doina Petrescu, "The Tactics of Faux Migration", *Pavilion. Journal for Politics and Culture*, 2014, [<http://pavilionmagazine.org/doina-petrescu-the-tactics-of-faux-migration1/>], accessed on 05.03.2016.

¹⁸ Dana Diminescu; R.M. Lagrave, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Horváth István, "The Culture of Migration of Rural Romanian Youth", in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 5, 2008.

This episode was, still, instrumental for their later successful migration because: a. it provides an enculturation context (at one point in time the Oşeni made almost a monopoly in sending *L'itinerant*, a practice that enabled them to socialise and to learn the basics of the french language), and b. it accustomed them to live within a transnational space, while at any point in time some members of the kinship network were left abroad.

More importantly, it broke down the rhythm of time they were previously accustomed to, a time that used to beat according to the natural seasons and religious feasts in relation with the farming practices. Now any time of year was as proper as any other for “making a season”, namely, for working outside their home place.

After 2002, when visa was no longer required for Romanian citizens, living transnationally became a collective life-style, involving adults as well as children, and working patterns have changed once again: most men are working in construction, while women have specialised in housekeeping.

Labour is still collectively organised: some men, who in time acquired the needed social and managerial skills, get contracts in construction sites or in refurbishing apartments, and assemble and lead teams of workers. Women, on the other side, help each other when the load of work in a household is high, replacing one another at times, and recommending other women from their kin or village when there is a request.

Consequences of transnational migration

Back at home, the former continuous display of statuses when attending churches, visiting regional fairs, or in a daily context, has been replaced by punctuated community gatherings, taking place during the most important events of the year, especially with the occasion of Christmas, Easter and Saint Mary feast. Weddings have also become a very complicated business in terms of calendar: because they are celebrated only in the home villages, in time a “wedding season” was set, precisely between the 15th of August, when the fasting time that anticipated the Saint Mary celebration ends, and around the 1st of September, when the holiday period ends in France, and many are required to be back at work.

Most visibly, the “battle of houses”, as they call it, or the objectification of the status competition in the modern house possession, which started, as we saw, during the 60s, reaches a whole new level. It involves constant refurbishing of the old houses, building new houses, providing houses as dowries for the children’s marriages and so on. All these houses have become less and less inhabited, or inhabited by older people, while many of them, especially the younger generations, live and work most of the time abroad.

Conclusions

In this paper I identified a central pattern of organising labour in the Oaş Country, which is related to their past agricultural subsistence system and which explains their status system, the local competition and their geographical mobility.

My analysis traced how the collective labour organisation was reproduced across time and adapted to the changes of the social and economic context brought by socialism and post-socialism.

The Oşeni’s preservation of their autonomy in organising labour had as results the preservation of the local competition, of the communitarian values and of some archaic norms and practices and made a pressure for surplus production. This need for surplus, as well as the specific socialist constraints in regard with their farming practices, made them prone to search for work outside the region. Consequently, they slowly entered on the path of proletarianisation, being more and more dependent on wages. This proletarianisation process was incomplete during socialism, while farming was still a secondary occupation, and while their relation with land and agricultural temporality remained unchanged; however, their internal competition and status systems were strongly affected by the money influx, with the consequence of changing the logic of prestige accumulation from the possession of land and sheep to the possession of a “modern house”.

In the context of transnational migration agriculture lost most of its previous importance and labour became dependent not on natural seasons but on the metropolitan needs. Working abroad brought into the villages a high influx of money in a short time. As a result the local competition has been ignited at a new level, determining a development comparable with those specific to the post-socialist neighbourhoods from the larger cities.

Their inhabitants live and work most of the time abroad, being now entirely dependent on wages, which fluctuate according to economic cycles and crises, and while the younger generations are more and more detached from the village life, I can assume that a process of complete proletarianisation is, at least in their case, on its way.

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TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ROMANIAN MIGRATION IN SPAIN AND ITALY AFTER 1990

Anca Stângaciu*

Abstract:

After the fall of the communist regime, the opening of the frontiers, the passage to market economy and the début of economic reforms, the phenomenon of migration, in which regards the Romanians, suffered a substantial change both in the dynamics of internal migration, and in the early stages of external migration. This article engages an analysis of the phenomenon of Romanian migration for work purposes in Spain and Italy, from the perspective of the theories of trans-nationalism, by taking into account essential aspects regarding the circulatory migration, be it seasonal, temporary, periodical or not periodical, but also other forms in which migration presents itself such as transit, definitive or return migration.

Keywords: circular migration, transnational space, probable transnational community, migration regions and fields, community capital

1. Transnationalism. Concept, approach, methodology

Transnationalism, as a global phenomenon, generates new models of dual life, incorporating, in transnational spaces both the origin and the destination values¹. Similar opinions, such as those of Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, define it as a „process by which immigrants move slowly but constantly and have multiple simultaneous social relationships which link the origin society to the destination society”², while Vertotec relates it to different cultures, having as basis

* Anca Stângaciu is Ph.D Associate Professor at the Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. She followed professional training stages in France (1995-1996), Belgium (1999), Italy (1998, 1999) and lectured courses at the Universities of Studies of Milan and Padua.

¹ Alejandro Portes, „Introduction. The debates and significance of immigrant transnationalism” in *Global Networks*, 3, 2001, p. 184.

² Nina Glick-Schiller, Linda Basch, Christina Szanton Blanc (1999), “From immigrant to transmigrant: theorizing transnational migration”, in Ludger Pries, *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Vermont: Ashgate PC, 1999, p. 74.

the actions of non institutional actors, which develop on several levels: social, economical, cultural and political³. This is why the transnational approach to the migration phenomenon allows besides the analysis of classical aspects regarding migration (socio-demographic events, collaboration with the state institutions etc.), also the deep understanding of the non-institutionalized processes and dynamics initiated by the migrants transgressing frontiers.

Spain and Italy are the European states which attracted the bigger number of Romanian migrants after 1990, the Romanians being also the most numerous foreign community with the highest migration rate increase, from the above mentioned states. The transnational perspective of the approach to the phenomenon of migration fluctuations⁴ focuses on defining the permanent relationships developed by the migrants with the people from the country of origin, thus allowing the shaping of organization, mobilization and interaction peculiarities with the destination society (Spain, Italy), and the origin society, as well as the identification of own traits in contrast with other types of migrants.

Between the traditions from home and the practices of the new social and cultural life assumed in Spain or Italy for over two decades, the Romanian migrants are actors in search of equilibrium between the old and the new identity structure, thus, relating to their daily, institutional or philosophical dimension, becomes of capital importance.

The purpose of the current study is to analyse comparatively the characteristics of the Romanian migration in Spain and Italy, to identify the psychological, social and cultural traits of the Romanian migrants found under the influence of trans-nationalism, to observe new behavioural patterns resulting from the preservation or reconfiguration of some individual or collective identity values, as well as from assuming other cultural values, belonging to the destination countries. It is thus compulsory to attentively reflect upon some elements of collective imaginary but also of real society, such as solidarity, entrepreneurship, spirit of criticism, work cult, the attitude towards family, health and spare time, preoccupation towards education and instruction, the civic spirit,

³ Steven Vertotec, "Conceiving and researching transnationalism" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2, pp. 1-25, 1999, p. 3
[<http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/conceiving.PDF>], 20.06.2016.

⁴ The migration fluxes refer to the number of entrances and exits from a state, being a parameter which is frequently used in the statistics regarding international migration, along with the migratory stocks (the number of emigrants registered at a given moment in a given state).

the non-institutionalized organizations, attitude towards institutions, the new philosophy of life. Other points of interest of the analyses shaping more clearly the Romanian migration phenomenon in the two Neo-Latin countries are: the migration routes, the attitude to the political, legislative, economic or cultural conditions of the two countries, the causes of main interest addressed to such countries, the Romanian model of migrating.

The debate about trans-nationalism refers to the medium and long-term extent of the migration process, that is the phenomenon of establishment of the Romanian migrants in the destination countries as residents or non residents, including the process of becoming citizens of those countries for a longer period of time which could become permanent, but with a frequent relating, directly or indirectly, spiritual or material, to the origin country. The relevant terms to be used in such cases are: circulatory migration (come and go), temporary habitation abroad and, of course, definitive settling. The return migration is another stage of trans-nationalism, supposing the return home of some migrants, undoubtedly transformed spiritually, materially, socially and from the point of view of behaviour, which could in time be followed by other stages, such as migration in steps. Trans-nationalism, considered as “a socially spontaneous form of post-December Romanian transition”⁵, can be also understood by relating it to the urban and rural space. In which regards this last aspect, Dumitru Sandu believes that villages with high rates of temporary emigration abroad, that is the villages in the North-East of Transylvania and the West of Moldova, had in the '90s a distinct well shaped profile. Their main characteristic was the preminance of ethnic and religious minorities, with high education level, located in areas with high possibility of communication with the global society⁶.

Methodologically speaking, such a subject, with social, cultural or economic significations required a multi-disciplinary approach, which used quantitative methods, exemplified by the method of analysis of official statistics, especially census, offered by the specialized institutions: the Romanian Office for Immigration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Western Europe-Central

⁵ Dumitru Sandu, *Viața socială în România urbană*, Iasi: Polirom, 2006, p. 19.

⁶ Dumitru Sandu, “Cultura și experiența de migrație în satele României”, lucrare susținută la simpozionul *Probleme ale migrației și drepturile minorităților*, Bucharest, Institutul Goethe 1-22, Bucharest, 2004, p. 5

[http://www.mentality.ro/content_docs/exploring_mentality/research_papers/DumitruSandupd], 20.06.2016.

Europe Direction, the National Institute of Statistics, in Romania; respectively: Instituto Nacional de Estadística-INE, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, in Spain; and respectively: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica-ISTAT, Caritas Migrantes, Caritas from Rome, in Italy; as well as: *EUROSTAT*, the International Organization for Migration - IOM. The trends in migration research and migration fluxes tend more and more to refer to the opportunity of using qualitative methods, appealing to instruments belonging to the field of anthropology, sociology or ethnography, which may highlight the different peculiarities of the phenomenon. That is why, the present study focuses on correlating the analysis of statistical data allowing us to follow closely the scenarios of migration fluxes increases, as well as the demographical, cultural or educational aspects with the results of some empirical investigations (interviews, enquiries), realized in the territory of Romania, Spain or Italy, which offer a large array of information regarding occupational aspects, economic objectives, perspectives of integration, representation or identity image of the Romanian migrants. The historicist perspective illustrates the recent history of Romanian migration, the bilateral relationships and the tradition of collaboration with the states taken under observation.

2. The transnational dimension of the Romanian migration in Spain

The deep relationships between Romania and Spain were built, in the last two decades, by consolidating the diplomatic liaisons which were initiated in 1967 by the Paris agreement, by the economic or cultural partnerships, but also by the district cooperation in justice and internal affairs. From the point of view of Romanian-Spanish commercial exchange, its total volume reached in 2012 over 2190 million Euro, Spain detaining, despite the progressive increase of commercial values over the last years, only 2,36% of the external commerce of Romania, that is occupying the 9th place as commercial partner⁷. Spanish direct investments were situated on the 12th place in the total of foreign investments present in Romania in 2012, descending from the 10th place it occupied a year before⁸.

The presence of a numerous community of Romanians in Spain, but also the presence of Spanish businessmen in Romania confer the bilateral relations

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations, Kingdom of Spain* [www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations], 20.05.2016.

⁸ The National Bank of Romania, *Direct Foreign Investments in Romania* [<http://www.bnr.ro/Investitiile-straine-directe-%28ISD%29-in-Romania-3174.aspx>], 20.05.2016.

between the two countries an extremely important social and economic dimension. In 2002, the Romanian and the Spanish government signed an agreement for the work-force recruitment.

The intensity of migratory fluxes between Romania and Spain should be considered both from the perspective of the Romanian socio-economic reality after the fall of the communist regime, but also from the point of view of the politics of integration of the migrants. Conform to the most recent theories, the selection of migration destinations depends on the politics of immigration but also on the role of the migration networks⁹. Regarding the first aspect, it is well known that the West Mediterranean countries, Spain, Italy and Portugal are much closer to the European model of good practice in respect to the integration of the immigrants in the destination countries, especially by granting access to the workforce market but also to long-stay permits or family reunification.

Since the selection factors often depend on the opportunities identified by the migration networks, especially on the workforce market, we can speak, in the case of most of the Romanians who have chosen Spain (at least in the first three stages), of options which suited best their professional qualifications, which, in most of the cases, were under the average in Romania. We are talking about unqualified or under qualified migrants (professional schools graduates) or holding mid-qualifications (high school graduates). Another aspect to be taken into consideration is the openings on the Spain workforce market, starting from its economy. In 2001, Spain was offering 64% workplaces in the service sector, 11.7% in the construction sector and the rest in the manufacturing, tourism hotel services and agriculture sectors¹⁰. Many of the workplaces available on the workforce market, unaccepted by the locals, were in constructions, a sector which consecrated the excellence of the Romanians the way the Polish gained fame as excellent electricians, or in agriculture, domain much familiar to many of the Romanian migrants. To this was added the permissive Spanish legislative context, which favoured the entrance of the Romanians on the territory of Spain, their accommodation, work and finally obtaining a legal statute. Last but not least, the cultural and language similarities favoured the decision of migrating, but also the integration of the Romanians in the Iberian space.

⁹ Dana Diminescu, Sebastian Lăzăroiu, *Migrația circulatorie a românilor după 1990*, Bucharest: OIM, 2002, passim.

¹⁰ *Instituto Nacional de Estadística-INE, Censo di Población, 2001* [www.ine.es], 25.05.2016.

In the long process of shaping new social and economic traits linking the origin societies to the destination societies, the transnational actors go through an entire series of steps, starting from creating the social networks to the development of social capital, economic and social integration and, last but not least, a new identity¹¹. The phases of the recent Romanian migration to Spain, similar, in which regards its periodicity with the Romanian migration to Italy, highlight the similar profiles of migrants communities. Thus we can speak about the period in between 1990-1992, as a period of creation of networks, development of the social capital, respectively sedimentation of economic resources. Years 2002-2006 represented a period of sedimentation of transnational behaviours; while the period after 2007 introduced a period of maturity of the new identity valences. The first three periods were characterized by circulatory migration, but after 2007 the forms of permanent migration or of return migration became more and more visible.

In the '90s, the migration of the Romanians to Spain proved to be temporary, on short or medium term, periodical or non periodical; all these types of migration, including seasonal working (of up to three months) being forms of circulatory migration. The true solitary individual entrance attempts of the first migrants have paved the way in constructing the clandestine migration routes to Spain. Although it had signed the Schengen Agreement in 1991, thus securing its borders, the Romanians preferred Spain to other European destinations. The preference of the Romanians is due partially to the fact that Spain is a Neo-Latin country with an ascending economy, but also to the fact that it had a permissive reception context, which allowed the development of migratory fluxes. The Spanish state manifested a certain institutional tolerance towards the immigration of citizens from the ex-communist states, an immigration which could solve the workforce deficit in some domains of economy or social assistance system. Such tolerance was translated in the fact that a migrant declared (*empadronad*) at the city hall of a locality was still clandestine, but was no longer in danger of being ousted. In the first years after the 1990, the solution to legal entrance in Spain was occasioned by the tourism tours and by the commerce with transit visas, obtained for countries such as France, it being a state with a system which was less favourable to migrants and with more evidently selective policies. Finally, in

¹¹ Jan Niessen, Thomas Huddleston, Laura Citron, *Migrant Integration Policy Index*, Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group, 2007, passim.

numerous cases, the political asylum requests insured the passing to legality. Thus, transit migration functioned, in the case of Romanians, from other countries to Spain and less from Spain to other countries.

The creation, up to the late '90s of the migration networks, had strong religious connotation. An anthropological research evaluating the connection between the origin area Nenciulești, Teleorman and the destination area, Madrid, highlighted the importance of the networks built around the 7th day Adventist Church¹². In fact, the first large Romanian migration flux to Spain, occurring in between 1996-2000 registered an increase of 260% of the migrants, being characterized also by a religious component¹³. The Adventist communities, explorers of the Spanish space since 1990, were constituting, at the end of the decade, the majority Romanian migrating population from Castellón, Corredor del Henares and Comunidad de Madrid; despite the fact that they represented, at that time, only 0,37% of the population from Romania¹⁴. Defined by a horizontal organizational architecture, moral and material aid or clear rules of mutual aid and resource redistribution within the community, these neo-protestant structures were capable to activate very efficiently the solidarity mechanisms. In fact, the post-national, or better said the global dimension (in contrast of course with the Orthodox Church which was national by definition), the predominance of external financing, especially American, and help coming from the communities of Adventist migrants towards the communities of Adventists of the origin country needing help, confer to the Adventist Church an obvious transnational dimension. The trans-nationality of the Adventist communities from Spain is also given by the moral and economic liaisons with the members which remained in the origin country.

The pattern of the Romanian migrant in the first two stages of the migration towards Spain was that of the male in working in the constructions sector and of the female working in the household sector, both unqualified, little or medium qualified, arriving from the rural space. An increasing number of Romanians begin to be employed in agriculture or industry, some of them being high school graduates. Gradually there appears the phenomenon of the

¹² Monica Șerban, "Trasee de migrație internațională către Spania", in Dumitru Sandu, *Locuirea temporară în străinătate. Migrația economică a românilor: 1990-2006*, Bucharest: Fundația pt o Societate Deschisă, 2006, p. 120.

¹³ Data elaborated by Padrón Municipal, 2009 [www.psoe.es/source-media pdf], 25.05.2016.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

Romanian free lancers, who create small companies, especially in the constructions sector, where they employ their own co-nationals belonging, usually, to the same religion or ethnic group. The phenomenon was quite largely met in the neo-protestant churches and less known in the Orthodox church, where the communitarian relationships are quite sporadic. Transnational working practices of the migrants were also marked by transnational entrepreneurship: commerce with products based on periodical travels, tourism related businesses, shops offering Romanian products which were opened in Spain, or investments in similar businesses when returning to the country of origin.

The favourable context of the third migration wave was created by the European Commission CE 2414/2001, known also by the name of the *Schengen White List*, which regulated the annulment of the visa request for the non communitarian citizens found for a shorter than 3months period of time in a European Union country. The new legislative frame was exploited by many Romanian migrants, the so called „turistas-trabajadores”, to the advantage of working under the pretext of tourism activities¹⁵. It is a known fact that the number of Romanian migrants in Spain knew in between 2000-2004 an unprecedented increase of 3.103%, out of which 3.136% men and 3.062% women¹⁶. One of the characteristics of the architecture of Romanian migration was its concentration in the medium sized towns of in the rural municipalities (of under 2000 inhabitants) such as Castellón (61% of the foreign residents in 2001) or Coslada (72%) and less in the big cities such as Madrid (6,5%) or Barcelona (1,8%)¹⁷. Having as reference the domains of activity, in 2001, most of the Romanian migrants were working in constructions (27,1%), agriculture (15%), manufacture industry (14%), and the rest in the domestic (12%), hotel (8,5%) and commerce (8%) domain¹⁸.

From the point of view of migration networks, we must say that while the process of spreading the social innovation of finding work abroad continues to progress, more and more mechanisms of social contamination begin to be

¹⁵ Rafael Viruela Martínez, “Inmigrantes rumanos en España: aspectos territoriales y procesos desustitución laboral” in *Scripta Nova. Revista electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales*, 222, 2006, p. 6 [<http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/sn/sn-222.htm>], 20.06.2016.

¹⁶ Data elaborated by Padrón Municipal, 2009 [[www.psoe.es/source-media pdf](http://www.psoe.es/source-media/pdf)], 20.06.2016.

¹⁷ Rafael Viruela Martínez, “Inmigrantes rumanos en España: aspectos territoriales y procesos desustitución laboral” in *Scripta Nova. Revista electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales*, 222, 2006, p. 11 [<http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/sn/sn-222.htm>], 20.06.2016.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

activated, so that the Romanians find work abroad through members of their families, through the church, but also through publicity on the Internet or organisms and public services such as Ayuntamientos, Empresas de Empleo Temporal etc.

Nevertheless, the Romanian adherence to the European Union and implicitly the new gained statute of communitarian citizens (2007) did not lead to a major migration flux towards Spain, a country limiting by moratorium, in 2007, and then by law, in 2012, the free circulation of Romanian workers, who were thus forced to detain a work permit (*permiso de trabajo*). The fact that the Romanian migrants continued the actions towards an autonomous regime tuned out to be a suitable way for obtaining the work permit. In 2008, 41.880 of the Romanian migrants were performing independent activities; that is 18% out of the total number of foreign migrants in Spain¹⁹.

The statistical data indicate that in between 2008 and 2009 the number of the Romanians from Spain increased with only 7,95%, the situation of the small number of entrances being given not only by the legislative climate regarding the workforce market, but also by the effects of the crisis in economy, felt in Romania as well as in Spain²⁰. Besides, the number of entrances of male migrants increased in the same years with only 7,2% because of the depression in the constructions industry, in comparison with the female entrances, which increased with 9 %²¹.

The last six years of Romanian presence in the Spanish space lead not only to an increase in their number, from 527.019 in 2007 to over 900.000 in 2013²² but also to the sedimentation of the social and economic integration process. The acceptance respectively the integration of migrants is directly conditioned by the degree of institutional permissiveness, in the case of Spanish public authorities, cultural and social, in the case of the members of the destination society. The Spanish policies in matters of migrants integration applies the European model of good practice to all the levels of permissiveness: access to the workforce market, family reunification, granting long time residence, political participation and access to nationality²³. Thus, Spain offered the Romanians criteria of eligibility in similar conditions to those required to the Spanish themselves, allows integration

¹⁹ Data elaborated by Padrón Municipal, 2009 [www.psoe.es/source-media pdf], 25.05.2016.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), Censo di Población, 2001 [www.ine.es], 21.05.2016.

²³ Jan Niessen, Thomas Huddleston, Laura Citron, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-19.

to the workforce market without requiring language or acquired labour skills, due to the fact that most of the available work offers require a relatively low qualification level. It also offered similar opportunities to the family of the migrant, thus favouring family reunification. Reporting to the family from the country of origin or taking the family to Spain are two transnational coordinates of Romanian migration. The Spanish specialized literature attributes it a strong individualism, due to the reduced relationships with other communities, favouring the pure nucleus family, since over 60% of the Romanian families had family members in Spain²⁴.

For the Romanians, who in 2012 represented 17,35% of the total number of foreigners registered in Spain, the political participation and the access to nationality took different forms: over 100 Romanian associations, quite scattered in fact, two federations, 60 orthodox congregations, as well as representatives of the neo-protestant churches. In Observatorio Permanente Inmigracion, the Romanian and Ecuadorian associations from Spain are considered to have at their bases the “étnicas”²⁵. Of course, the coherence of a community of migrants, the representativeness at the level of the central and local administration, or the exercise of the lobby phenomenon towards the authorities of the adoption state are directly proportional not only with the capacity of solidarity and promotion in matters of *branding* but also with its seniority or persistence. Responsible, efficient and with a high degree of professional experience which shape a true „marca de origen”, the Romanian migrants undergo a progressive “rumanización” of immigration in most of the Spanish territory²⁶.

The trans-nationality of the Romanian migrants from Spain is defined by two essential values: labour as reason for migrating and family as existential landmark. That is why the means of transmitting social remittance are materialized around the periodical, annual or biannual visits to the origin community or around the voyages or vacations of the members of the families in Spain, or of the Spanish colleagues’ travels to Romania, or around the sending of money and other goods. The consequences of migration can be analyzed both

²⁴ Rosa Aparicio, Andrés Tornos, *Las redes sociales de los inmigrantes extranjeros en España. Uno estudio sobre el terreno*, Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales y Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2005, p. 108.

²⁵ *Idem*, *Las asociaciones de inmigrantes en España. Una visión de conjunto*, Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración y Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2010, p. 99.

²⁶ Rafael Viruela Martínez, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

from the perspective of modifying the identity valences of the migrants at the destination but also from the point of view of the impact that the permanence in Spain has upon the family from home. Much more, the influence of the transnationality phenomenon shaped, in the last years, a possible wave of returns of the migrants to the origin community. In the case of return migration, the motivation as well as the period after which the mobility is accomplished is quite essential. In Spain as well as in Italy, the returns are mainly due to the exits from the workforce markets or to the desire to reunify the family or to the intention of origin renovation.

The architecture of the new behavioural patterns of the migrants at the destination refers to the new work culture, based on rigor and quantity, private initiative, modernization of the life style and increase of the living standards, care for preserving health and hygiene, promotion of a new type of social and civic attitude, based on involvement and critical spirit. The money earned in Spain is used in entrepreneurship activities, buying houses, terrains or other goods, or insuring progress in the education level (school, university), investments in the benefit of the local or religious community.

Multiple influences are also exercised by the migrants upon the communities from home. Thus the migrants who returned home or the community from home are inevitably exposed to a modernity process, which in its turn is reflected upon the modernity of the state or of the area. Besides the alteration of traditions and the fact that children are often left in the care of grandparents or third persons represent two of the negative consequences of the migration experience. The data obtained by the Pool of the Romanian Community from Spain (CRS) indicated the fact that the orthodox family generally holds on less to the shocks imposed by the temporary separations caused by migration²⁷.

3. The transnational migration of the Romanians in Italy

The signing of bilateral economic cooperation agreements²⁸, as well as the complementariness between the Romanian and the Italian economy, lead to an intense economic convergence: for a decade, 1997-2007, Italy became the main

²⁷ Dumitru Sandu, *Lumi sociale ale migrației românești în străinătate*, Iași: Polirom, 2010, p. 122.

²⁸ The economic bilateral agreements signed by Romania and Italy after 1989 were: The Agreement regarding the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (1990), The Agreement regarding Financial Assistance (1992), the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Cooperation of Small and Middle Enterprises (2002).

commercial partner of Romania, while as Romania became the 16th commercial partner of Italy. In between 2008-2012, Italy was surpassed by Germany, which then became the main commercial partner of Romania. The particular character of bilateral relations was highlighted by the migration phenomenon: Italian citizens in Romania, Romanian citizens in Italy. The number of small and medium firms with Italian capital from Romania arrived in 2012 to over 32.000, and the number of Romanian firms from Italy amounted to approximately 50.000²⁹. In macroeconomic terms, the Italian capital contributed in the last years to Romania's IBP with approximately 8%, while as the Romanian migrants from Italy contributed with about 1% to Italy's IBP³⁰.

The Romanians' preference for Italy was partly due to cultural and linguistic affinities, which facilitated the process of adaptation and integration in the peninsula, and partly due to the Italian legislative climate, favourable to migration. Italy itself a state with a strong migration tradition in the XIXth century and the first half of the XXth century, became, after the '70s an immigration country, fully developed in matters of economy. Based on a mostly traditional industry, with big workforce needs requirements, Italy proved to have in the '90s much more permissive laws in matter of migration and delinquency in comparison with other European countries. In fact, the first law regarding immigration was adopted in 1986 - Law nr. 943/1986 – up until then, the state hardly interfered in the dynamics of migration fluxes: the Turco-Napolitano law of 1998 facilitated the granting of long term stay permits for foreigners, based on quota, with the obligation of the immigrants to have an actual working contract³¹. Despite the fact that the ascension of nationalist formations, such as the North League and Forza Italia, led to the implementation of more restrictive policies in matters of immigration (the Bossi-Fini law³²; the Decree of expulsion of the immigrants of 2008) Italy continued to manifest a certain institutional tolerance regarding the immigration of citizens from the ex-communist countries, who would compensate the deficit of workforce in some domains of economy. The matter of controlling immigration and implicitly the integration of the immigrants constitutes nowadays in Italy an important issue in political debates, in the operative intervention

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations, Republic of Italy* [<http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations>], 201. 2012.

³⁰ Anca Stângaciu, *România și dimensiunea sa europeană*, Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2011, p. 50.

³¹ Sabin Drăgulin, "Fluxul migrațional din perspectivă istorică. Studiu de caz: Românii din Italia (1990-2010)" in *Sfera Politicii*, 166, p. 102 [www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/166/art20], 20.06.2016

³² The Bossi-Fini law was supposed to be a solution to clandestine immigration, its main provisions referring to the immediate extrusion of clandestine immigrants, but also to the maintaining of the residency permit for those who demonstrated they had a place of work.

of the government, of local administration and of the non-governmental organizations³³.

The conclusions of an anthropological investigation realized in 2006-2007 among the Romanian communities of Marginea (Suceava, Bucovina) and Torino (Piemonte) show that the Romanian migrants perceive the Italian state institutions as fragile, their vulnerability deriving, as in the case of the Romanian institutions from the faulty implementation of norms. Thus Romanians found in Italy many of the imperfections of Romanian public or institutional life, such as the evasive relationship between citizens and institutions, high tolerance to black market labour, flexible interpretation of rules³⁴.

In the Italian space, the Romanian migrants' trans-nationality was defined in a few stages: 1990-1995, the period of firsthand exploration of the Italian space; 1996-2001, the period of consolidation of the emigrant network; 2002-2006, the years shaping the memory of mobility, respectively the period after January 2007, when the phenomenon matured, gaining strong transnational traits. We must state the fact that although in the '90s the seasonal migration constituted the beginning of the Romanian migration phenomenon, its trans-nationality gained visibility by the later circulatory temporary migration, definitive migration or, sometimes, by the return migration.

In between 1990 and 1995, years in which the Romanian space was getting acquainted with democratization, the number of Romanians legally or illegally settled in the peninsula increased little over 8.000³⁵. The prototype of the migrant was that of the single man, with medium studies willing to experience economic gain but without benefitting from the migrant community's help. This was a period in which we could not speak about the identity of the Romanians from Italy, since the stay used to be usually short, repetitive or not in nature and motivated by work or study purposes.

³³ Paula Benevene, Roberta Rondini, Oliviero Forti, Calogero Iacolino, „Il lavoro come agente di integrazione: indagine su un gruppo di immigranti romeni in Italia”, in Antonio Ricci, *Caritas Italiana, Romania-Immigrazione e lavoro in Italia. Statistiche, problemi e prospettive*, Roma: Idos, 2008, p. 192.

³⁴ Pietro Cingolani, „Prin forțe proprii. Vieți transnaționale ale emigranților români în Italia”, in Remus Anghel, István Horvãth, *Sociologia emigrației. Teorii și studii de caz românești*, Iasi: Polirom, 2009, pp. 183-184.

³⁵ *Caritas Italiana-Fondazione Migrantes-Caritas diocesana di Roma*, Rome, 2008.

After 1995, when Romania formally requested integration to the European Union, a new dynamism of the migration phenomenon was felt, being reflected in the significant increase of departures (the legal departures arriving in 2001 to 75.000)³⁶, the increase in the female participation and the balancing of the gender statistical proportions leading also to the creation of personal and familial networks. The statistical data show that „in this period, over 40% of those who emigrated received help”, that is they used the migration networks, based on either familial or friendship, or religious ties, with predilection Neo-Protestant³⁷. In the context of a developed horizontal migration mobility of unqualified or medium qualified workers, with high school or technical professional school graduates, male preferring constructions, female hotel or domestic services, work became the main vehicle of social integration, even if, in the background, the problem of family reunification remained³⁸.

The third stage is the most relevant in the process of emigration towards Italy, because it is the stage in which the phenomenon becomes a mass phenomenon, gaining consistency, growing through a process of feminisation and becoming more and more transnational. The obtaining of the short-term stay permit in the Schengen space lead to the shaping of a new stage in the Romanian migration, which was defined by a change in structure, a new migration strategy and new social and cultural connotations. The number of Romanians living legally in Italy increased from 95.039 in 2002 to 342.200 in 2006, which in percentage means an increase of 260%³⁹.

The possibility to perform work activities legally, on a period of maximum 3 months, favoured the consolidation of the circulatory migration tendencies, by departures and returns, in the same domains already assumed by the communities of Romanians: constructions and domestic assistance (*baby sitter* and *old sitter*). In other words, the work related penetration occurred in sectors which required less qualified workforce in which the Romanian often performed activities which were much lower than their level of education. The need to emigrate was so evident in many of the Romanian families, that it shaped a true “memory of mobility”⁴⁰. Nevertheless, we assist to a process of feminization of the Romanian migration, in the sense that

³⁶ Istituto Nazionale di Statistica-ISTAT [www.istat.it], 28.05.2016; Caritas Italiana-Fondazione Migrantes-Caritas diocesana di Roma, Rome, 2008.

³⁷ Pietro Cingolani, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-189.

³⁸ Maria Macioti, “Senza di loro l’Italia starebbe peggio”, in Antonio Ricci, *Caritas Italiana, Romania-Immigrazione e lavoro in Italia. Statistiche, problemi e prospettive*, Rome: Idos, 2009, p. 167.

³⁹ [www.hotnews.ro/stiri-diaspora], 10.05.2016.

⁴⁰ Pietro Cingolani, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

women represent between 50-55% of the total of Romanian migrants, which proves to be still, predominantly individual and not familiar in nature⁴¹. The statute of extracommunitarians, the limited rights and the effective costs of the stay determined the option of transferring the entire family to the destination country to be only at a starting point⁴²

Found among the traditions and customs of the new social structure, the social and cultural life of the Romanian migrants gained, before, but especially after Romania's adherence to the European Union, a transnational dimension. The starting point of trans-nationalism was circularity in its complexity, it being focused on the characteristics of continuous and particular relationships of the ones abroad with the origin country.

Year 2007 proved to be a decisive year for the trajectory and quality of Romanian migration from the Italic peninsula. In which regards the Romanian-Italian bilateral relations the political and diplomatic crises between Bucharest and Rome, triggered by the largely mediatised Mailat case, which became even more acute along 2008, lead to the emergence of an anti-Romanian trend, both at a political level and at the level of the Italian collective mentality. The Italian politicians approached the issue of Romanian immigration as a national security issue, and thus asked that some restrictive measures be applied; some of them even contradicting European norms⁴³. Paradoxically, the same political class recognized the Romanian immigrants' contribution to the economic development of Italy. At a macro group level, the anti-Romanian feelings grew even more acute among the traditionally conservative social categories (elder people, people with a medium or even under medium education level) and among the unoccupied persons (the unemployed, the housewives the retired); but they started to appear even among the younger people or people with over average education⁴⁴. The elitist categories and generally speaking the intellectuals reacted positively in the sense of dissipating the Romanian-Italian crisis. Manifest-type reactions had also the Italian investors from Romania, as category directly interested

⁴¹ Andreea Raluca Torre, "Integrazione sociale e lavorativa. Il punto di vista della colettività romena in Italia", in Antonio Ricci, *Caritas Italiana, Romania-Immigrazione e lavoro in Italia. Statistiche, problemi e prospettive*, Rome: Idos, 2008, p. 170.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 174.

⁴³ Stefano Braghiroli, "România și Italia: Povestea unei logodne lipsite de dragoste, dar de conveniență reciprocă", in Ovidiu Pecican, *România în UE: Trei ani de la aderare*, Cluj-Napoca: Limes, 2010, pp. 40-73.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 62-71.

in maintaining the Italian-Romanian collaboration. Statistically speaking the number of the Romanians from Italy increased with 15% after the Mailat case, sign that this highly politicized episode did not have a negative impact upon the mobility of the Romanians on the workforce market in the peninsula, but still it prejudiced their image⁴⁵. On January 1st 2010, the number of the Romanians established in Italy was appreciated at approximately 953.000 people (according to ISTAT data) or around 1.165.000 people (according to the Caritas/Migrantes organization data)⁴⁶; their working activity producing approximately 1% of Italy's IBP. In January 2011, in Italy there were 4.570.000 foreign residents, that is 7,9% of the country's total population 1.200.000, percentage out of which 21,2% being represented by the Romanians, which was the most numerous foreign community in the peninsula⁴⁷. Still we must state the fact that the ISTAT data regarding Romanian immigration from the last years do not correspond to the Caritas Migrantes data, according to which the Romanians represented 21,5% of the foreign population from Italy since 2008.

The Romanian emigration in Italy received after 2007 more and more transnational traits, reflected in the progressive widening of the temporal perspective. In fact, the same three types of departures occurred, except that the long-stay type gained consistency: the seasonal emigration, really small in proportion, the temporary one, which is characterized by the fact that the years spent in Italy or in other transfer countries (i.e. Germania, Anglia) alternate with returns in Romania respectively the definitive one, characterized by the sporadic return home during vacations or holydays.

After 2007 the architecture of the Romanian community was rather gender unbalanced, being characterized by a predominance of men, who enjoyed a better occupation on the workforce market, that is 71,9% out of the total migrants from Italy, but also brought a higher level of professional skills, 72,3 of them owning a diploma⁴⁸. Regarding this last aspect, we must say that academic recognition of studies diplomas achieved in Romania lead to a vertical development of migration, in the sense that it gradually, became visibly ranked; the new pyramidal form being: unqualified workers, medium qualified ones, qualified ones and last but not least university

⁴⁵ *Gândul*, Bucharest, 12 March 2009, p. 10.

⁴⁶ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bilateral Relations, Republic of Italy* <http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations>, 20.05.2016.

⁴⁷ ISTAT, *La popolazione straniera residente in Italia* [www.istat.it], 28.05.2016.

⁴⁸ *Rapporto sugli immigranti in Italia, December 2007* [http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/15/0673_Rapporto_immigrazione], 12.05.2016.

graduates, who were overqualified most of the time by masters and PhDs. Even the domains in which the Romanians find interest broaden by migration of specialists which are recognized for their competence and performance in constructions, health, IT, tourism. Italy did not promote selective migration politics, unlike other states such as France, the Scandinavian countries or Great Britain, which developed, in the last years, politics in order to attract specialists. As a consequence, the Romanians were occupied in the sub-medium or medium qualified Italian workforce market, where the request was high. In 2007, 47,4% of the Romanian migrants were working in industry, especially in constructions, based on gender the male being hired in a percentage of 67% in industry while women 38,9% in domestic services⁴⁹.

The familial component started gradually to be the second reason, after work, for identity reconfiguration. The increase in the number of children, born in Italy or schooled in Italian schools, shows clearly the Romanian's wish to permanently settle and integrate into the Italian society. Shortly after Romania's integration, 53% of the employed Romanian women had their children with them in Italy, in comparison, the Ukrainian women succeeded in that in a percentage of 59,6%⁵⁰. The statistical data show the fact that the number of Romanians present in Italy out of familial reasons is a lot smaller than in the case of other categories of migrants. In 2007, 68% of the Romanians were in Italy for work purposes and only 28% for familial reasons, while as in the case of Albanian families, for example, the familial motivation was of 42,5%, and in the case of Serbians of 35%⁵¹. That means that the Romanian migrants still deal with the challenge of meeting the professional and the emotional life by family reunification in Italy. It is possible that some migrants not be able to gain a stabile, definitive identity in Italy, feeling and thinking in terms of precise sequences of time, or projecting on long terms a new social life. The fact that essential autonomy does not always coincide with gaining social or economic independence makes it that part of the migrants live in a "permanent make-do"⁵². Some specialists in migration consider nevertheless that the trans-nationalism of emigrant actors occurs around the family which, most of the time, remains in the origin country. This explains the fact that for most of the Romanians from Italy the priority of transnational investments is buying a house, meaning an existential reference.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ ISTAT [www.istat.it], 28.05.2016.

⁵² Pietro Cingolani, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

Another mechanism of strong solidarity is realized by means of the transnational church, it having a strong identity charge. The Church creates moral bridges between the origin society and the new one, links which are less evident in the Orthodox communities, but really deep among the neo-protestant communities. In Italy, Torino, for example, trans-nationality is strongly sustained by the Pentecostal Church where transnational links are spiritual but also economic: the ministers from Romania keep in touch with the Torino migrant believers in order to maintain order in a dismantled community. They use the recommendation letters thus granting for the good behaviour of the believers willing to migrate. The representatives of the Pentecostal communities from Italy periodically organize visits in Romania and fundraising meant for the sustainment of social projects for the Pentecostal communities from Romania, sustaining also the renovation of cult places⁵³.

The Romanian migration in the Italian space by its depth, length and substance confers a special note to the particularity of the relationships between the two countries. Although they still show insufficient solidarity by scattering into more than 73 de associations, the Romanian migrants from the peninsula undergo a process of identity maturity, trans-nationality but also social and cultural integration in the Italian space.

4. The Romanian migrants from Spain and Italy, similar destinies

After the fall of the communist regime, the main form of migration for work purposes of the Romanians towards Spain or Italy was circulatory migration, which knew a spectacular growth after 2002, to which was added the definitive migration, which was relatively low in between 2000-2007 (approximately 11.000 persons/year) and more visible after Romania's adherence to the European Union⁵⁴. The world economic crisis, the new economic reality from the destination countries, the potential of the migrants (economic, social capital) or the social and economic perspectives from the origin communities have shaped after 2007 the trend of return migration, which is still hard to estimate. The phenomenon of the returns was not significant though, because the Romanians succeeded in identifying adaptation strategies, becoming unemployed or migrating intra-sectors or intra-territory.

The structure of temporary migration from the '90s is characterised by selectiveness. Thus we notice the predominance of men in respect of women, of Moldavians and Transylvanians in respect of individuals from the southern district of

⁵³ *Ibidem*, pp. 87-89.

⁵⁴ Dumitru Sandu, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

Olt or the highlanders, of high school or professional technical school graduates in respect of university or post-university graduates. It can also be observed the predominance of job openings in constructions (jobs opened for men) and in the domestic sector (jobs opened for women), in respect of liberal or autonomous occupations. The structure of migration became more homogenous after 2000; while as beginning with 2007 it tended to have a much more vertical direction, by the increase in number of the specialized or even overspecialized migrants (medical students, physicians, computer engineers, engineers), especially in Italy.

Both in Spain and in Italy the maximum intensity period of temporary leaves had been registered in between 2001-2006, when the Romanians earned the right of free movement in the Shangen space, and the mass migratory fluxes resulted to be religious in nature (most of the migrants being from amongst the Pentecostal, Baptist or Adventist confessions) but also ethnic in nature (Hungarians, Romanians) and then familial in nature, in the networks perpetrating family reunification. The settlement of the Romanians in the areas of Rome, Milan, Torino, but especially in the Madrid area, had a familial character, the politics of integration of the migrants at the destination, applied by the Italian and especially by the Spanish state, stimulating family unification, granting similar conditions for the members of the families coming from Romania, free schooling and integration in the system for the children, according to the communitarian model of good practice in the domain. The Romanian preference for the two states depended much on the favourable legislation, on the type of request from the workforce market, not qualified, medium qualified and little overqualified, on social and cultural tolerance and on the Neo-Latin languages spoken there.

The identity related feelings such as attachment towards the family, the origin locality or the origin region can be seen in the migrants intending to return to Romania and are affectionately linked to it, in the migrants who intend to remain in Spain or in Italy, being, at the same time, attached to the origin community, but also at the ones who are oriented both towards the country of destination and towards the country of origin, and, last but not least, at the ones which are little linked both to Romania and Spain or Italy (the eradicated). One can clearly notice the four types of identity orientation of the Romanian migrant, which is also equivalent to the four types of traditionalism. The fact that there are Romanians, who do not wish to return home, but live with the constant idea of opening businesses in Romania, is the

strongest sign of trans-nationalism associated with migration⁵⁵. Buying a house in Romania despite the decision of remaining in Spain cannot mean but that one is still deeply attached to the origin community. The trans-nationalism of Romanian migration is mostly given by its mainly familial nature. Over 70% of the Romanians living in the Madrid area have at least one other member of the family with them in Spain⁵⁶. Much more, giving birth to Romanian babies abroad, in Italy but also in Spain, determined in the last years, the migration of the grandparents to the destination countries. Both the Romanians in Spain and the ones in Italy actually live a partially trans-nationally charged daily life: some of them have shops where they sell specifically Romanian products and use Romanian raw materials brought from the native country, they are organized in associations or federations or benefit from the services of some Romanian professionals (lawyers, hair dressers, teachers).

The quantitative studies upon migration indicate that the Romanian experience of living abroad makes Romanians richer, but also changes some mentalities in the sense that they change their way of thinking, being much more optimistic and trusting, gaining a broader perspective upon life, becoming more responsible, more organized, thinking more constructively, and gaining also a different type of work cult, based on efficiency, punctuality and seriousness. They also tend to show more interest in their spare time, considering friends as being very important in their life, but they also tend to get divorced quicker pleading for a more restricted family demography, and they develop a more pronounced civic spirit and interest for the political live and promoting also the entrepreneurship spirit.⁵⁷ The migrants returned home or members of the origin community suffered, in their turn, an inevitable process of modernity, which then was reflected on the modernity of the village or town or area. The new behavioural patterns of the migrants returned home or of the families which remained home refer to the care for health keeping, hygiene and external aspect, to the lifestyle changing and increase of living level, as well to the care and attention dedicated to the education of their children, and then to the increase of the degree of civic involvement and interest in investments and businesses.

⁵⁵ Data resulting from the Pool of the Romanian Community from Spain (CRS), September 2008, interviewed a lot of 832 Romanian immigrants from the Autonomous Region Madrid, data taken from Dumitru Sandu, *op. cit.* p. 129.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 131.

⁵⁷ Data resulting from the Pool Locuirea temporară în străinătate (*Temporarily living abroad*) (LTS / TLA), 2006, performed in Italy, Rome and in Spain, Madrid, data taken from Dumitru Sandu, *Locuirea temporară în străinătate. Migrația economică a românilor: 1990-2006*, Bucharest: Fundația pt o Societate Deschisă, 2006, pp. 181-185.

For the Romanians from Spain and Italy, for those who have returned home for “missing home too much and feeling estranged from home”, or for the families remaining in Romania, remittance becomes the most relevant factor of transnationality, contributing to the development of individual, familial or small community from Romania life strategies. The money sent as remittances by the Romanians from Spain, the situation being similar in the case of the Romanians from Italy, are used for current expenses, to pay debts, to finance businesses in constructions, to improve, build or buy new houses, to buy goods for the family or as investments in the children’s education⁵⁸.

To conclude, we can affirm that both in Spain and in Italy, the individual or collective histories of migrants prove to be profoundly marked by trans-nationality, such transformations being translated by equilibrium in adaptation, by appealing to traditions, customs, cultural or personal values, but also by acquiring some Western social and cultural values. From the perspective of shaping new destinies and identities, the Romanian migrants are, knowingly or not, responsible for promoting the image of the origin country. Last but not least, the influences brought by the migrants upon the communities from Romania are evident, from the spreading of new behavioural patterns to the spreading new ideas and practices at an individual or micro-group level to the encouraging the civic spirit or to the modernizing of the macro-space, be it urban or rural.

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⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 132-133.

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THE MIGRANT CRISIS – THE GREAT CHALLENGE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Dorin Mircea Dobra*

Abstract:

The refugees' crisis puts pressure on the whole European system. The means of managing this crisis will influence the further evolution of the European Union. The entire treaty system of the EU, referring to asylum seekers and refugees, had to be transformed and upgraded in order to face the dimension of the 2015 phenomenon. EU's interstate internal solidarity was severely challenged and the future configurations of the refugees' crisis still ask for enormous efforts on behalf of the European Union institutions.

Keywords: refugee crisis management, regional conflicts, insurance measures for refugees' existence, European solidarity, risks and opportunities for refugees' inclusion

At almost 65 years since the initiation of the European project, the European Union is going through the most difficult period in its history. But we have to say from the beginning, this crisis that the old continent is seen handcuffed, is one of non-violence, held its own evolution toward civilization and welfare.

Three major conflictual aspects are outlined more strongly today, once went out from the great danger of the economic crisis of 2008-2010.

The crisis of solidarity, the crisis of EU projection in the future, and on the background of two, the refugee crisis. Practically and obviously the

* PhD, Dobra Dorin-Mircea, Lecturer, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of European Studies

Contact: dorin_dobra@yahoo.com.

last of them is putting pressure on the entire European project, both questioning the solidarity between the European states and also the projection on the future of European construction. Starting from the pursuit of fundamental principles of the modern world, such as freedom, prosperity and respect for human rights, the EU is seen today in front of a considerable effort required to maintain these ideals, or reported to its own citizens, to the citizens of other states or for the refugees' crisis, to the citizens of other continents.

Intercommunity solidarity crisis, suffered during the year of 2015, is not a crisis likely to cause long-term concerns. The very term "crisis" explains certain behaviors of conservation in two stages, of the affected countries. In a first step, the countries crossed by thousands or tens of thousands of refugees daily, facilitated the route of these people to the concerned countries, based on a phenomenon later called, such as "Wave through approach"¹. Later, countries like Greece, Albania, Hungary, Croatia or Slovenia, have resorted to various measures to strengthen the national security, observing, more or less, a European regulation applicable in such situations ².

At this point, we shall make the first assumption of this material: the Dublin Regulation, even by changes brought until 2015, was not taking into account a crisis of a magnitude as perceived later as being "the greatest crisis of refugees from the second World War ."³ For these reasons, configurations and reactions that states had during the crisis, could not be controlled nor, much less, coordinated, in a situation which that exceeded any prediction. During 2015, more than one million refugees or immigrants have entered the European Union territory, where it is today.

¹ Back to Schengen, COM (2016) 120 final, Brussels, 04.03.2016, p. 7; http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/docs/communication-back-to-schengen-roadmap_en.pdf , accessed on 09.09.2016.

² Dublin Regulation, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l33153&from=RO>, accessed on 09.09.2016;

³ Back to Schengen, COM (2016) 120 final, Bruxelles, 04.03.2016, p. 2.

The preview of an anticipated crisis?

In some publications in the last year⁴, we have tried to show that in institutional terms, the EU set up in time some programs that sought to strengthen, on the one hand, and to secure on the other hand, the obtained status quo, the continental peace and the safety of their citizens. Whether we talk about the European Security Strategy or the European Neighborhood Policy, along with many other documents produced by the European institutions, the EU as a whole has correctly assessed the potential risks and was involved in projects that cultivate and strengthen the stability spaces within its own borders or in the "distant neighborhood."

"Violent conflicts or the frozen ones, which remain also at our borders, threaten the regional stability. (...) The conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for weapons of mass destruction." ⁵

Five years later, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, showed the European Council a "Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy". Starting from the reality on the ground, the report highlights the EU contribution to the global peace and security: "Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need."⁶ Did not remain unhighlighted, the regional conflicts included in 2003 in the chapter "threats" within ESS. "Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighborhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy."⁷. And the

⁴ Dorin Dobra, "Overview of the European future", On-line Journal *Modelling the New Europe*, Issue no. 15, June 2015.

⁵ European Security Strategy, A sure Europe in a better world, Bruxelles, December 2003. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed on 09.09.2016.

⁶ European Security Strategy, Bruxelles, 2009, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

end of the material available for the Council, the security and stability of the remote neighboring countries is assumed as an overall objective of ESS.

"The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests ITS beyond immediate neighborhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability."⁸

"Surprised, therefore, in the "threats" chapter, the instability in the Middle East have its well placed positioned in the European Security Strategy since 2013. Today, a year since the Great Migrant Crisis, we can only wonder whether the EU has done enough prevent and control, more exactly where it was possible to act more constantly to prevent the outflow of refugees in 2015. The EU approach and involvement in the events of "Arab Spring" may provide some explanation, but the main question remains: "How could EU to involve more to prevent and eventually to diminish the migration of millions of people in the conflict zone?"

Year 2013 – "The comprehensive approach" of the Syrian crisis

In 2013, the phenomenon of "Arab spring", was already set up its major results across the entire region. Becoming, day by day, obviously that the size of the crisis situation was still evolving, and further evaluation needed assessments and direct proportionated measures. Once again, the European institutions proved to be able to correctly assess and even predict the possible consequences of the conflicts in the region and the document dedicated to this issue took the form of the Commission Communication entitled "Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis." The pace of the deterioration of the Syria conflict in recent months is such that a humanitarian catastrophe is spreading throughout the whole region."⁹

Moreover, on the basis of international relations and the positioning towards the EU crisis, in the chapter on the measures to be taken, the European Commission announces the humanitarian position towards the Syrian refugees. We emphasize this paragraph as having enormous implications for the further development of the "refugee crisis": "From the beginning of the crisis in April 2011 until the end of 2012, some 32,000

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

⁹ JOIN (2013) 22 final, Bruxelles, p. 1.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0022>, accessed on 10.09.2016.

persons claiming to be Syrian nationals applied for protection in the EU, with an estimated further 7,500 in 2013 so far. Currently, there seems to be a general consensus that Syrians present in the EU should not be returned to Syria, irrespective of their legal status. Recently, the High Commissioner for Refugees called, in a letter addressed to the Commission and the Member States, for the humanitarian admission of 10,000 Syrian refugees from countries in the Middle East and North Africa and for the resettlement of an additional 2,000 Syrian nationals, mainly particularly vulnerable refugees, including serious medical cases and disabled persons.

The Commission calls on Member States **to respond positively to this call by making resettlement or humanitarian admission places available to these people**. In addition, the Commission calls on Member States to **adopt a generous attitude towards the granting of humanitarian visas to persons displaced by the Syrian crisis** who have family members present in the EU, and also to **admit any Syrians arriving at the external borders of the Union**. Currently, eleven countries which are part of the Schengen area impose airport transit visas on Syrian nationals. In light of the current circumstances, the Commission believes that it is not appropriate to add Syria to the common list of countries subject to the airport transit visa requirement as requested by certain Member States in the framework of the on-going annual revision of the national airport transit visa requirements."¹⁰

Without negatively assessing the whole presented paragraph, we emphasize that in 2013, the declared intentions were the right attitude. Institutionally speaking, more that were set measures both to stabilize the situation in Syria and complementary, funds and actions to strengthen the capacity of Turkey to host refugees from the conflict zone. "Turkey has needed to carry a significant financial burden of approximately EUR 600 million to date, with little support from the international community. The EU has pledged an overall package of EUR 27 million, notably to support UNHCR and local organisations and communities to deal with the refugees."¹¹

We have underlined the provisions of the Communication in 2013, because we believe that, politically speaking, we have contributed to the configurations of the crisis during the year of 2015. The humanitarian

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

opening announced, the correctly politically attitude assumed by a European official document, have all contributed to strengthening the view that in the European continent, the refugees can find protection and peace and also ensuring respect for fundamental living conditions.

Europe, victim of its own success?

If always concerns about the European security could take into account the regional instability as a risk factor, certainly none of the European establishment could not foresee the great exodus of refugees from the year of 2015. Leaving Turkey to go to Greece, and from there, on the mainland, it was the main source of exodus of more than a million of people with whom Europe had to be faced, later accommodated, fed and maintained a certain standard of living. Today, it remains to ask how and why it was possible such an exodus, obviously qualified as a "humanitarian crisis", but, especially, why Europe, and more specifically its center, was converted to a destination of refugees.

The answer to this question can stand as a confirmation also in one EU official document, namely "Commission Communication to the Council" dedicated to the emergency support granted to the countries receiving refugees." Today, more than 60 million people have been displaced as a result of war, protracted conflict or severe natural disasters. Between January 2015 and February 2016, over 1.1 million people – refugees, asylum seekers and migrants – have made their way to the European Union, either escaping conflict in their countries of origin or in search of a better and safer life."¹²

Withdrawal of population before inter-ethnic and religious conflicts is therefore the source of mass refuge and the seek for a better and safer life is the motivation for the EU as a final destination.

From this perspective, our question regarding the current situation of the EU as a "victim of its own success" in a interstate and supranational draft, that has managed to create a space of welfare and continental peace, becomes easier to understand. Because as it may seem obvious or not, the current situation shows that regional instability, also being from another continent, endangers, or at least puts pressure on a system from thousands

¹² COM (2016) 116 final, Bruxelles, 2.03.2016, p. 2.

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/EU_Emergency_Support/EC_Communication_Provision_en.pdf, accessed on 10.09.2016.

of kilometers away, just because of the reality of its tender : peace and prosperity. Assessment under the chapter "threats" of the regional instability, proved to be correct, but the exact configuration of the phenomenon of "mass migration" could not be provided.

Today, however, the EU is facing with an urgent reality: more than a million refugees are already in its territory, Turkey continues to record substantial inflows with risk of moving towards Europe, Greece records real difficulties in managing the reception and accommodation of refugees and in the Middle East, conflicts are far from being resolved.

Refugees: a burden or an opportunity?

Today, at the end of 2016, on a realistic assessment of the situation, is underlined, that first are need to be provided asylum to over one million refugees and, later, are required legislative mechanisms to ensure a better coordination of a possible new humanitarian crises of this kind. Nothing that happens today in the same areas of conflict can not provide any assurance that the migration phenomenon shall continue, though perhaps at a lower intensity than that registered in 2015. "Migration has been and will continue to be one of the defining issues for Europe for the coming decades. Underlying trends in economic development, climate change, globalisation in transport and communications, war and instability in neighbouring regions, all mean that people will continue to seek to come here – for refuge, for a better life or following their close family. European countries will continue to stand steadfast in meeting their legal and moral commitment to those who need protection from war and persecution. And, as their own demographics evolve, they will need to take advantage of the opportunities and benefits of attracting foreign talents and skills."¹³ The realistic note, is therefore included in the Communication on the "Possibilities to reform the system of European common asylum and to improve the legal channels for migration." Furthermore, making reference

¹³ COM (2016) 197 final, Bruxelles, 06.04.2016, p. 2;
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160406/towards_a_reform_of_the_common_european_asylum_system_and_enhancing_legal_avenues_to_europe_-_20160406_en.pdf, accessed on 10.09.2016.

to population figures registered in the EU, the phenomenon is seen as one that can bring "opportunities and benefits."

For a minimum clarification of the context of communication to which we refer, we specify that this is one of the steps of the overall effort of the EU equitable and solidary solutions of distributing the refugees throughout the European Union, effort framed in the broader context of the European Agenda on Migration ¹⁴.

The equation to ensure asylum in the Union territory is complicated, but when you have to set the length of time for which an asylum seeker has secured this right, and the Union complies with this obligation. "The EU has one of the most protective and generous asylum systems in the world, and the granting of international protection status in EU Member States has in practice almost invariably led to permanent settlement in the EU, while its original and primary purpose was to grant protection only for so long as the risk of persecution or serious harm persists. Once the circumstances in the country of origin or the situation of an applicant change, protection is no longer needed. However, although the Qualification Directive contains provisions on cessation of status, currently they are not systematically used in practice."¹⁵

All these aspects have made clear the need to reform and reshape the "Dublin Regulation" which I have already stated that it was not intended to deal with a crisis of the magnitude of that in 2015. Precisely for these reasons, this effort of this communication intended to address the shortcomings of practice on asylum, to establish the Member State responsible for examining the asylum application, to strengthen the EURODAC system - for information on the identity of asylum seekers and to prevent secondary movements within the EU territory – those of the joining country in EU and the migration target country.

¹⁴ COM (2015) 240 final.

¹⁵ COM (2016) 197 final, Bruxelles, 06.04.2016, p. 2.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160406/towards_a_reform_of_the_common_european_asylum_system_and_enhancing_legal_avenues_to_europe_-_20160406_en.pdf, accessed on 10.09.2016.

At the same time, the EU has to administrate, as I said, the situation of over one million asylum seekers in its territory. Efforts in this respect, of burden-sharing to ensure living conditions for them are aimed to avoid a crisis, complementary to what may occur in the absence of necessary financial support. "Unfortunately, whilst waiting for these measures to become fully effective, the European Union is facing, for the first time in its history, the potential of wide ranging humanitarian consequences on its own territory. Immediate and exceptional additional coordinated action is required in order to complement and support the Member States' response and ensure that the EU can avert a full-blown humanitarian tragedy within its borders."¹⁶ The very title of the cited document "Communication regarding the provision of urgent support on the Union territory", show the objective of the supported approach.

Returning to the stresses exerted by the "refugee crisis" on the whole European system, we emphasize the reference to what I called "crisis of solidarity" shown between the European countries on the burden of sharing tasks to provide the conditions for asylum in the EU. Precisely in this perspective, we remind that in early of the year 2016 of the more than one million refugees, only a few tens of thousands were resettled in another Member State to have assumed this responsibility.

The appearance presence a major importance from the point of view of the functioning of the whole European system, and the findings of the "First report on the transfer and relocation of the European Commission" did not look very optimistic realities at that time.

Under regulations established were identified as the main obstacles and challenges: the insufficient number of commitments for the acquisition of transfers, long response time to such requests, unjustified rejections of such applications¹⁷. This type of situation, unsatisfactory, subsequently brought the European institutions in a position to propose penalty measures penalties for countries that do not assume the tasks of resettlement and relocation.

¹⁶ COM (2016) 116 final, Bruxelles, 2.3.2016, p. 2,
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/EU_Emergency_Support/EC_Communication_Provision_en.pdf, accessed on 11.09.2016.

¹⁷ COM (2016) 165 final, Bruxelles 16.03.2016.

Conclusions

We sent a material even from our title a "big challenge" when we referred to the "refugee crisis" because, as a close observer of legislative measures of the European institutions have followed the evolution of the Union's efforts in this regard. I have surprised over this development, in addition to some sluggish of the decision-making process, institutionally attributable to the crisis, especially, times and ways to avoid tensions that are inherent in this process.

Today, the end of 2016, we can say that the main effort of the EU institutions was to balance and model problems and solutions to maintain European unity body and ensure its stability.

Currently, the balance between the effort to protect lives of over one million people, and the potential opportunities and benefits of them, still leans toward the first aspect. Only time, and especially the institutional capacity of the EU to rationally shape the whole process will be able to say which is the outcome of the "the largest humanitarian crisis after the Second World War." And directly related to it and which shall be the future of the European Union.

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LE BERGER DE L'ÊTRE, LE HEROS ET LE SAINT: SOLUTIONS AU PHENOMENE MIGRATOIRE?

SHEPHERD OF BEING, THE HERO AND THE SAINT: MIGRATORY PHENOMENON SOLUTIONS?

Claire Bressolette*

Résumé:

Le phénomène migratoire n'a pas que des causes économiques et politiques, mais aussi et surtout philosophiques. L'auteur propose d'analyser philosophiquement le rapport entre le sujet et l'objet, selon trois modes de penser l'homme: le berger de l'être, pour Heidegger, l'homme du sacrifice pour Patočka, et le saint pour Maritain. Avec ce dernier, le plan éthique, articulé sur le plan ontologique permet de poser les bases d'un humanisme intégral à redécouvrir comme pensée du vivre ensemble de l'homme contemporain, à partir de la contemplation et d'une intégration de la subjectivité dans le rapport à l'objet.

Mots clefs: phénomène migratoire, nature de l'homme, éthique, ontologie, bien commun

Abstract:

The migratory phenomenon has not only economic and political causes, but also and most of all philosophical ones. The author suggests analyzing philosophically the relationship between the subject and the object, according to three ways of considering man: the shepherd of the being for Heidegger, the man of sacrifice for Patočka and the saint for Maritain. With the last one, the ethical level, articulated on the ontological level, allows the laying of the foundations of an integral

* Claire Bressolette, professeur de lettres au lycée Clemenceau, Montpellier, France, enseigne à l'Institut Français de Cluj-Napoca. Licenciée en philosophie et théologie, elle prépare un doctorat sur Jacques Maritain à l'Université Babeş Bolyai de Cluj-Napoca. Elle est également titulaire d'une médaille d'or en orgue.

Contact: augildom@gmail.com.

humanism to be rediscovered as the thought of life together for contemporary man, through contemplation and an integration of subjectivity in relation to the object.

Keywords: migratory phenomenon, man's nature, ethical, ontological, common good

1. Les flux migratoires ou la convocation de l'éthique

Le phénomène du flux migratoire met en question notre monde comme aucun événement ne l'a fait jusqu'ici. Les goulags et camps d'extermination ont montré la limite d'une civilisation, ébranlant tous ses fondements jusqu'au plan religieux, ébranlement cristallisé autour de la question de l'existence d'un Dieu après Auschwitz. Les flux migratoires montrent la limite, non plus d'une civilisation mais de la globalisation, et posent en deçà de la question de Dieu, celle de l'homme, autant pour ce qu'il est devenu dans la figure du migrant désespéré au point d'envisager une survie dans un exil incertain, en balance égale avec les risques de mort, que dans la figure de l'homme civilisé, lui-même phagocyté par les données de l'économie, des lois, politiques, sociales, et administratives, et de sa propre difficulté à vivre. L'un frappe à la porte, l'autre se trouve dans une incapacité factuelle et non intentionnelle, de lui ouvrir. Tous deux sont tributaires d'un immense rouage qui pose la question d'un retour du *Fatum* antique, via le caractère apparemment inéluctable de ce phénomène migratoire, révélateur d'un fonctionnement mondial qui oblige à repenser la définition de l'homme.

Si les solutions de meilleure répartition des denrées, de diminution de la consommation carnée, de réductions des besoins de l'homme occidental ne sont pas appliquées, c'est d'abord, nous semble-t-il, en deçà des freins politiques, économiques et financiers, pour des raisons philosophiques comme nous aimerions l'esquisser ici. Le retour de l'éthique dans la réflexion de Judith Butler nous paraît à cet égard tout à fait symptomatique:

«La question éthique me semblait une manière de fuir la politique, ou de la rejeter; mais je ne vois plus aujourd'hui les choses de la même façon. Je pense que les situations de pouvoir donnent naissance à des problèmes éthiques, et je ne crois

pas, par conséquent, que la politique et l'éthique constituent des domaines radicalement hétérogènes. Je refuserais toute distinction absolue entre eux.»¹

Repenser Aristote dans le monde d'Adorno, telle est l'orientation suggérée à partir d'une réflexion sur l'homme dans son état minimal d'humanité, où cependant, comme en témoignèrent les rescapés des camps de concentration, l'humain peut toujours se dire:

«Dans les conditions contemporaines de l'émigration forcée, des populations entières vivent aujourd'hui privées de l'assurance d'un futur, comme de celui d'une continuité de leur appartenance politique, et ressentent au quotidien les atteintes de néolibéralisme dans leur chair.[...] En d'autres termes, dans les situations de danger et de précarité extrêmes, les dilemmes moraux ne disparaissent pas ; ils demeurent justement dans la tension qui oppose la volonté de vivre et la volonté de vivre d'une certaine manière avec les autres. Fût-ce donc sous une forme minimale et vitale, raconter ou écouter une histoire, c'est encore «mener une vie», puisque cela revient à affirmer que nous pouvons, dans n'importe quelle condition, reconnaître la vie et la souffrance des autres.»²

En distinguant dans la notion de précarité, celle de «l'invivabilité», qui concerne les migrants parqués en attente d'une solution, Judith Butler met en perspective la question de la migration avec celle du statut de l'esclave, décrite comme une «mort sociale»:

«La question de savoir quelle est la meilleure vie possible (telle que je pourrais donc mener moi-même une bonne vie), si ma vie n'est pas considérée comme une vie, si elle est d'emblée traitée comme une forme de mort, ou si j'appartiens à ce qu'Orlando Patterson a appelé le royaume de la «mort sociale» à propos de la condition de vie des esclaves?»³

Penser ce qui fait l'humain à partir de cet extrême, ne nous semble pas séparable d'un autre aspect, en pleine expansion, du phénomène migratoire, et encouragé par les pays dans le cadre d'échanges linguistiques et culturels, comme, par exemple, ceux que financent les

¹ Judith Butler, *Qu'est-ce qu'une vie bonne?*, Paris: Éditions Payot&Rivages, 2014, p.8, citant une déclaration de 2006.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 75-76.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 72.

bourses *Erasmus*, échanges promus sous le vocable de «mobilité». Entre ces deux pôles de la «mobilité» promue en occident et de la «migration de l'invivabilité», se situe, au milieu, le phénomène migratoire que nous qualifions d'«exil consenti» pour une meilleure vie au plan économique, ce, de manière temporaire pour la plupart du temps, comme c'est le cas pour la migration roumaine en Italie, Espagne, France, et Angleterre où les parents partent, le temps de rassembler des fonds pour construire une maison pour leurs enfants confiés aux tantes, oncles et grands-parents.

Quoi qu'il en soit du degré de précarité, notamment pour le cas extrême de «l'invivabilité» et souvent pour celui de «l'exil consenti», ou, au contraire d'un degré de parfaite intégration à l'injonction néo-libérale de la «mobilité», les trois aspects du phénomène migratoire sont liés à la technique: les techniques de communications par internet, «skype», portables téléphones, semblent réduire les distances quasiment abolies par le développement des vols à très bas-prix.

À chacun des deux bouts de la chaîne, le rapport à la technique fonde la situation éthique de l'homme: par nonaccès à cette technique, ou par suréquipement. Par défaut, l'homme est «mort», par excès, est-il pour autant plus vivant?

On répondra que tout dépend du plan d'analyse, qu'il est possible d'être socialement mort, mais éthiquement vivant: toute la démarche de Judith Butler est de montrer que les plans sont imbriqués les uns dans les autres et que le plan politique ne peut être séparé de celui de l'éthique. Le débat sur la déshumanisation de l'homme n'est pas neuf. Le phénomène migratoire dans sa forme la plus dramatique est le symptôme le plus extrême qui soit d'une manière qu'a l'homme d'habiter le monde. Le néo-libéralisme mettant en lumière la volonté de maîtrise du monde par l'homme, peut être considéré comme la traduction, au plan philosophique, de la promotion du sujet aux dépens de l'objet. La ligne de partage entre sujet et objet est aussi celle qui marque l'avènement des temps modernes, caractérisés par celui du sujet. Peut-on penser un autre rapport entre objet et sujet, différent de celui qui donne la primauté à l'objet, comme dans la métaphysique de l'être, et de celui qui la donne au sujet comme dans l'idéalisme cartésien, relayé par celui de Kant, puis par les approches phénoménologiques? Telle est la question posée par le phénomène migratoire pris au sens large, englobant la mobilité promue pour l'homme

occidental, l'exil pour le pauvre, et la migration désespérée arc-boutée sur la mort, dont le phénomène croissant qui laisse l'homme occidental désarmé, est le signe d'une humanité parvenue à une extrémité indépassable et inacceptable quant à son propre fonctionnement.

Le drame des naufrages de migrants et de corps humains déposés par les vagues sur le sable des grèves, révèle, en négatif, celui de notre modernité qui a cependant envisagé la question de la nature de l'homme à travers trois pensées philosophiques qui proposent de le penser en tant que «berger de l'être», héros capable de sacrifice, ou saint.

2. Paris ou le village?

Est-il possible de lire dans la mise en garde heideggérienne de l'impact de la technique sur l'homme et de la perte de l'être, la revendication d'une transcendance, qui serait pensée chez lui à partir des présocratiques, et qui pourrait se rapprocher du débat engagé dans la Roumanie de l'entre-deux guerre sur la nécessité d'encourager ou non l'ouverture à l'occident? L'écart entre le village roumain et Paris regroupe celui entre l'homme qui vit dans l'univers de la transcendance, et celui qui n'y vit plus, cet état étant lié à la technicisation, à l'urbanisation, en un mot au progrès et à son cortège de figures de proue comme la raison, la science, le goût de l'exact et du nombre, etc.

L'unification de l'État national en 1918, propulse en effet la Roumanie sur la scène des nations modernes. La dimension internationale de l'avant-garde, dont la Roumanie fournira des artistes de renom, depuis Tristan Tzara jusqu'à Benjamin Fondane en passant par Brancusi, est corrélative d'une tension entre identité et ouverture à la modernité, ce que résume le discours d'entrée de Lucian Blaga à l'Académie, «Éloge du village roumain », où est souligné l'esprit roumain

«qui aspire à atteindre, par contemplation, un monde de stabilité, la curiosité scientifique, la soif d'épanouissement moral, le goût de l'action et du triomphe humain ne [trouvaient] trouvant pas de sens, tous ces éléments étant tellement typiques à la culture occidentale.»⁴

⁴ Daniela Dunca, «La dynamique des valeurs morales dans la citoyenneté», *La Citoyenneté*, actes du XXXIV^{ème} Congrès de l'Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de langue française, (ASPLF), Louvain-La-Neuve/Bruxelles 21-25 août 2012, publiés par la Société Philosophique

La transcendance «naturelle» vécue quotidiennement dans le village roumain, identifiée par Lucian Blaga comme caractéristique de la Roumanie, interroge le bien-fondé de la poursuite du modèle occidental, passionné par la conquête du monde, ce, depuis la Renaissance, et, de manière plus aigüe, depuis l'essor du positivisme, des sciences et de l'industrialisation. Le paysan roumain nous semble pouvoir incarner la figure de l'homme «berger de l'être», en opposition avec celle de l'homme de la technique, pour reprendre les deux catégories heideggériennes.

Au plan de la culture, cette opposition prend une autre forme, celle du contenu opposé à la forme vide, à un jeu sans enjeu sinon de faire du monde une immense scène : c'est le point de vue de Constantin Noica sur la culture française fascinée par la référence à Voltaire.

«Mettons qu'un recueil de fragments de *Candide*, de *Micromégas* et le dictionnaire philosophique du grand Voltaire soient lus, par hasard, par quelqu'un qui ne sait rien sur ce grand Français. Que peuvent encore lui dire toutes ces blagues, qui ont quelquefois une grande importance historique, d'autres fois une valeur littéraire, mais qui ne traitent presque jamais du drame de l'individu d'ici et de maintenant, où que se place cet ici et maintenant dans l'espace et dans le temps? Ce sont des blagues réussies. Et après? L'intelligence et la verve de cet illustre érudit sont vraiment extraordinaires. Et à part cela?»⁵

La fascination pour le modèle français, et pour Paris, encore capitale internationale de la culture, même si New-York commence déjà à la faire vaciller comme centre de gravité, s'accompagne d'un flux migratoire tout à fait circonscrit et particulier: celui des intellectuels et artistes, dont la plupart ne font qu'un séjour à Paris. Le rapport au modèle français n'est pas sans un certain paradoxe : passer par Paris est la condition de la croissance culturelle et de la reconnaissance internationale de la Roumanie, et, en même temps, l'importation du modèle français freine le développement d'un caractère culturel spécifiquement roumain. D'un côté, on célèbre cette amitié filiale entre les deux pays où la France, est mère de

de Louvain, sous la direction de Jean-Michel Counet, Louvain-La-Neuve: Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain, n°93, Peeters, 2015, pp. 571-576, p. 572.

⁵ Constantin Noica, «Voltaire și lectură unică», *Universul*, année LVII, no. 97, 8 avril 1940, pp. 64-65, in *Eseuri de duminică*, București : Humanitas, 1992, p. 65, cité par Ciprian Valcan, «La génération de Cioran et la critique du modèle culturel français», *La Citoyenneté*, p. 645.

la nouvelle Roumanie, instance tutélaire dont l'effervescence culturelle a permis l'avènement de l'âge d'or roumain,

– «tout ce qui est survenu nous a fait sortir de l'éternité!»⁶ –,

d'un autre côté, est déploré par Mircea Eliade, Constantin Noica, dans sa campagne menée contre l'esprit voltairien, non seulement la perte de profondeur, mais également celle de la spiritualité, toutes deux formant un empêchement à l'éclosion de la véritable identité roumaine, ce que ne manquera pas de souligner l'essayiste à l'influence considérable dans la période de l'entre-deux guerres, Nae Ionescu, parlant

«dans un article de 1926 de l'élimination du rationalisme cartésien afin de permettre le développement d'une nouvelle spiritualité»⁷.

Mircea Eliade se fait l'écho avec virulence, au plan littéraire, de la pensée de Nae Ionescu, prônant un détachement nécessaire vis-à-vis de la culture française, afin de retrouver la virilité d'une culture roumaine:

«Crétinisés, comme n'hésite pas à le dire dans des termes extrêmement durs Eliade, par un excès de sensibilité et de mentalité parisiennes, les intellectuels roumains [produisent] une culture efféminée, dépourvue des tensions et de l'extase de l'esprit, du courage de l'affrontement avec la folie et le désespoir, c'est une culture dépourvue d'héroïsme, une culture dominée par le sentimentalisme doux de la Moldavie, qui est mis sous le signe d'un romantisme 'issu de sang slave et de lectures françaises'.»⁸

Ce que donne à penser l'exemple roumain au plan de la matrice du phénomène migratoire, analysé ici dans sa forme la plus positive puisque la migration a lieu en vue d'un échange culturel et de l'accès d'un pays, – la

⁶ Constantin Noica, *Pagini despre sufletul românesc*, București: Humanitas, 2008, p. 32, cité par D. Dunca, *Ibidem*, p. 573.

⁷ Nae Ionescu, «Sufletul mistic», *Cuvântul*, 31 iulie 1926, *Roza vânturilor*, pp. 23-24, cité par Ciprian Valcan, «La génération de Cioran et la critique du modèle culturel français», *La Citoyenneté*, pp. 641-653, p. 646.

⁸ Ciprian Valcan, «La génération de Cioran et la critique du modèle culturel français», *La Citoyenneté, ibid.*, pp. 644-645 citant M. Eliade, «Împotriva Moldovei», *Cuvântul*, no. 1021, 19 février 1928, pp. 1-2, in *Profetism românesc*, I, p. 88.

«grande» Roumanie de 1918 –, nouvellement né à son identité et à sa reconnaissance sur la scène mondiale de la culture, c'est au fond une exigence de transcendance. Si le rejet de la culture occidentale, et, tout spécialement, de l'apport français passe par une revendication nationaliste qui, dans sa requête de virilité, conduira vers des positions politiques extrémistes, c'est au fond la demande de séparation entre deux cultures, contre une fusion nivelante qui ne peut avoir lieu que par une survalorisation du signe sur le signifié, de la forme sur la matière, du quantitatif sur le qualitatif, en un mot, du rapport entre le sujet et l'objet. Comment ne pas percevoir dans la synthèse que Ciprian Valcan fait de la critique de Constantin Noica, le même argument qui ébranla le crédit fait à l'Europe civilisée, capable dans ses représentants SS, fins lettrés, philosophes d'envergure, et amateurs d'art, d'abattre froidement des millions de juifs, à savoir, la perte du sens de l'homme, pourtant placé, en tant qu'image de Dieu, au centre de la religion chrétienne – qui a façonné l'Europe –, dont la vertu théologale la plus fondamentale, la charité, en exprime l'importance puisque elle seule peut donner la véritable jauge de l'amour du prochain?

«Noica reproche au modèle français transplanté 'l'obscurantisme de l'intelligence vide', en considérant que, si dans le cadre de la culture française, une intelligence du type de celle de Voltaire peut être célébrée au nom d'un rationalisme parfaitement intégré et complètement assimilé, alors elle ne peut rien offrir à l'humanité en tant que contribution spirituelle, car elle est insensible aux drames et aux souffrances des individus concrets, en gardant sa pose sceptique et lucide, en se maintenant au-delà de toute interrogation fondamentale sur les sens et les mystères de l'être.»⁹

Le débat roumain, dans sa défense de la romanité du village, propose bien une expression de l'homme «berger de l'être», si l'on songe à la puissance poétique de ce folklore, à la permanence de pratiques de cultes «cosmiques» comme le sont les rites du mariage ou de l'enterrement, ainsi qu'à la revendication d'une transcendance, qui, sous la plume de Nae Ionescu, est aussi celle de Dieu trinitaire, même si sa défense de l'orthodoxie est liée à celle de la nation.

⁹ Ciprian Valcan, «La génération de Cioran et la critique du modèle culturel français», *La Citoyenneté*, p. 645.

Mais la limite de cette figure de l'homme comme «berger de l'être» est le caractère impersonnel de cet appel de l'être heideggérien: là s'arrête la comparaison avec la transcendance chrétienne qui est celle d'un Dieu personnel. La Roumanie, dans sa période communiste, peut cependant illustrer le deuxième mode d'être humain, celui de l'homme du sacrifice tel que le pense Jan Patočka.

3. Le sacrifice

Pour Lajos András Kiss, la réponse de Patočka «dans sa conférence au Congrès mondial de philosophie à Varna en 1973», pour «résister au monde technicisé», technocrate, marxiste et positiviste, réside dans son «interprétation particulière du concept de sacrifice»¹⁰:

«Il considère que le positivisme réduit tout à la fonctionnalité impersonnelle, dissimulant ainsi la question de la liberté et celle de la responsabilité. En radicalisant la conception de la technique de Husserl et Heidegger, Patočka s'efforce d'aider ses semblables à s'extirper de la dimension (horizontale) de l'espace-temps monotone et neutre du monde technicisé. Et c'est ici qu'apparaît le sacrifice, l'un des concepts clés du philosophe tchèque. Le sacrifice d'un individu pour une cause plus haute qui rompt avec la mouvance horizontale de l'histoire et appelle à la verticalité.»¹¹.

Est réaffirmée ici la nécessité du plan éthique comme sortie de l'impasse de l'utilitarisme et du totalitarisme, ce qui renvoie dos à dos le capitalisme et le communisme. L'éthique permet à l'homme de retrouver sa liberté par la résistance: «Résister à la clôture du sens au nom de la transcendance, c'est vivre conformément à l'éthique» affirme Richard Kearney¹². De fait, pour L. A. Kiss dont nous proposons ici des extraits de deux de ses articles,

¹⁰ Lajos András Kiss, «Une citoyenneté monstrueuse», *La Citoyenneté*, pp. 681-692, p. 690.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 690-691.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 688, citant Richard Kearney, «La question de l'éthique chez Patočka», dans *Jan Patočka – philosophie, phénoménologie, politique*, Paris: Étienne Tassin; Marc Richir (eds.) Jérôme Millon, 1992, p. 203.

«Patočka¹³ pense percevoir l'esprit destructif du monde moderne technicisé et dans le capitalisme et dans le socialisme existant: 'C'est cette même métaphysique du mécanisme qui a rendu possible le phénomène social typique de notre temps, à savoir le capitalisme moderne : système qui provient d'une attitude objective extrême envers les affaires humaines, soumettant la condition humaine au calcul réglé et imposant un modèle mécanique des relations humaines'». ¹⁴

L'appel à une éthique qui fasse droit à la nature humaine prise en tant que telle et non réifiée en vue de buts utilitaires, est corrélatif d'une redécouverte de la dimension spirituelle, non au plan communautaire, mais personnel. Il s'agit d'affirmer la grandeur de l'homme dont la liberté est tronquée sans la dimension spirituelle.¹⁵ Avec Patočka, c'est la prise en compte de l'histoire qui réintroduit le rapport à l'objet dans ses deux formes, le monde et l'autre, posant d'une certaine manière l'éthique au premier rang dans la définition de l'homme de laquelle dépend l'ontologie, ce que résume R. Kearney:

«Le souci ontologique de l'être est subordonné au souci éthique de l'âme. Le sacrifice introduit le conflit, la lutte pour le bien.»¹⁶

¹³ Lajos András Kiss, «Le sacrifice et l'identité du sujet: Emmanuel Lévinas et Jan Patočka», *Bulletinul*, vol. LXII, n°3/2010, 3-8, seria filologie, p. 3.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, citant R. Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, citant R. Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 205, «Les systèmes socialiste et capitaliste sont également dominés par la métaphysique du mécanisme. Aucun doute: tous les deux systèmes appartiennent à l'ère de la globalisation, tous les deux systèmes symbolisent l'essence de celle-là. [La résistance] n'est possible à construire que sur la base spirituelle intérieure constituant la base de l'esprit européen. Et cela exclut l'application de la morale à des fins tactiques. L'éthique est quelque chose qui, 'dans son essence même n'a rien de technologique, rien de purement instrumental'».

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, citant R. Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 210, «Le concept du bien ne peut apparaître que sous forme de traces imaginaires dans l'expérience humaine intérieure de portée limitée. Cependant cela signifie aussi que sans activité intérieure la liberté est inaccessible à l'homme. La liberté est une sorte de lutte pour que l'homme puisse échapper à sa prison intérieure. La liberté se crée par l'imagination productive. [...] Le sacrifice se charge du souci du monde. Mais il ne répond pas à l'appel de l'être impersonnel heideggérien, mais à l'appel venant de l'histoire, à celui qui apparaît dans le visage de l'autre homme».

Avec des accents lévinassiens en ce qui concerne l'innocence du visage, l'homme du sacrifice est à la fois un homme de volonté et de vulnérabilité dans sa porosité au monde sans calcul:

«L'homme spirituel s'expose précisément au négatif ; sa vie est une vie à découvert.»¹⁷

La réflexion éthique peut évoquer la révolte de l'homme chez Camus, tout comme l'aboutissement de la pensée du soi chez Paul Ricœur, ceci n'étant qu'une preuve de plus que l'éthique a poussé ses limites aux confins de l'ontologie, du plan spirituel et anthropologique:

«Pour Patočka le sacrifice est l'acte moral de se perdre pour l'autre et de se retrouver soi-même comme un autre.»¹⁸

Ces aperçus de la pensée de Jan Patočka qui esquisse une épistémologie du sacrifice sans lien avec l'origine sacrée du sacrifice présente dans l'étymologie même du mot, se réfèrent en premier lieu à la résistance des opposants au régime communiste restés dans leur pays. Mais la sphère référentielle couverte par le sacrifice tel que le pense Jan Patočka n'exclut pas le sens religieux, au contraire, elle en est comme le substrat matriciel permettant, par exemple, l'intégration du sens chrétien, à savoir du martyr en tant que témoignage, selon le modèle des chrétiens des trois premiers siècles qui suivirent l'exemple du Témoin par excellence qu'est le Christ. Le phénomène migratoire ne décrit plus seulement une migration géographique, mais bien une migration intérieure, dont la migration physique ou pas n'est, au fond, qu'un épiphénomène. Ainsi peut également se lire l'exemple des réfugiés politiques dont le choix peut rester un sacrifice de «résistance et lutte», d'une manière tout intérieure, outre celui

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, citant R. Kearney, *op.cit.*, p. 247, «Celui qui se sacrifie doit être capable de décider raisonnablement sur les grandes questions de l'être et pour cela on peut le qualifier d'intellectuel. Il est certainement un intellectuel mais pas dans le sens le plus strict du mot, c'est-à-dire pas purement du point de vue sociologique».

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, citant R. Kearney, *op. cit.* p. 210, «L'homme du sacrifice personnifie aussi l'homme rebelle. Il semble qu'à ce point Patočka suit en partie la conception de Camus: pour lui aussi la révolte est une sorte d'*a priori* anthropologique. Dans la révolte l'existence s'expose constamment à la menace, puisqu'elle déclare son besoin d'être autonome notamment en exposant sa fragilité et sa vulnérabilité».

bien tangible de ceux qui sont chers, de la patrie natale et de l'ancrage dans une culture qui fait la personnalité de chaque homme.

Dès lors, si le plan éthique permet de sauvegarder ce qui fait l'homme, en dehors des conditions extérieures, les pires soient-elles, depuis celles des totalitarismes jusqu'à celles des migrants du XXI^e siècle, et si, de l'autre côté, le seul plan éthique permet à ceux qui ont leur part de responsabilité dans la maintenance de ces conditions, ainsi qu'à ceux qui sont spectateurs des migrations, de rentrer dans cette éthique du sacrifice, par une migration intérieure, alors comment expliquer la croissance du monde dans un sens si inégalitaire, voire cynique ? C'est que la pensée du sacrifice a été élaborée, nous semble-t-il à partir du totalitarisme communiste. Or la situation actuelle au plan mondial enregistre le phénomène de «la migration de l'invivabilité» comme une fatalité. Le monde de la globalisation s'apparentant ainsi à celui du monde antique marqué par le *Fatum* du destin et des astres, fait apparaître qu'il y a un manque, un impensé qui en l'occurrence concerne les trois phénomènes de migration décrits supra: celui du bien commun.

Être homme ne peut signifier seulement «dans n'importe quelle condition, reconnaître la vie et la souffrance des autres», comme l'énonce Judith Butler. Il y a davantage que la reconnaissance, il y a l'amour, cet élan qui prévient, veille, anticipe et s'incarne dans ce souci du bien commun. La conception du sacrifice selon le philosophe tchèque, ne prend pas en charge le monde au sens de bien commun, même si le «sacrifice introduit le conflit, la lutte pour le bien»¹⁹: lui manque sa dimension d'incarnation communautaire. Penser cette dimension n'est autre que la construction de la cité, d'où les liens étroits entre éthique et politique. Dès lors, le point de départ n'est plus celui de la lutte contre un régime politique totalitaire, y compris jusque dans ses formes extrêmes de dégradation de l'homme dans les goulags et camps de concentration, mais celui, positif, de la construction d'un monde. En ce sens le phénomène migratoire, appelle, de manière pressante, une pensée du bien commun à laquelle la figure du saint proposée par Jacques Maritain dans *Humanisme intégral*, offre une réponse.

¹⁹ Lajos András Kiss, «Une citoyenneté monstrueuse», *La Citoyenneté*, p. 691.

4. Le saint

Pour J. Maritain, l'apport de la modernité est celui de la prise de conscience du sujet de lui-même, ce qui induit un mouvement critique de la pensée. Avec la Renaissance, et l'avènement du sujet, c'est l'apparition de «l'âge réflexe», opposé à «l'ère sacrale» médiévale. L'originalité de la pensée de J. Maritain est de tenir compte de manière positive de ce passage marqué par l'anthropocentrisme moderne pour intégrer la subjectivité dans le rapport à l'objet, sur lequel se fonde le réalisme critique.²⁰

La figure du saint est toute intérieure, et si elle se rattache à celle du témoin au sens de martyr, c'est d'abord par une migration intérieure, qui a pour nom conversion permanente, non par un effet volontaire du sujet, mais par une ascèse préparatoire à la réception des dons du Saint-Esprit. Si le saint reste la figure exemplaire, tout homme est appelé, en vertu de son humanité, à cette construction de la «cité humaine», où

«L'œuvre commune n'apparaîtrait plus comme une œuvre divine à réaliser sur terre par l'homme, mais plutôt comme une œuvre humaine à réaliser sur terre par le passage de quelque chose de divin qui est l'amour, dans les moyens humains et dans le travail humain lui-même. Ainsi, ce serait pour une telle civilisation le principe dynamique de la vie commune et de l'œuvre commune, ce ne serait pas l'idée médiévale d'un empire de Dieu à édifier ici-bas, et encore moins le mythe de la Classe, de la Race, de la Nation ou de l'État. [...] Ce serait l'idée, – non pas stoïcienne ni kantienne, mais évangélique, – de la dignité de la personne humaine et de sa vocation spirituelle, et de l'amour fraternel qui lui est

²⁰ La philosophie réaliste est déconsidérée depuis la critique heideggerienne de la mort de l'être en raison d'une onto-théologie qui ferait un collage abusif entre Dieu et l'être. Le point de vue de Paul Ricœur insiste sur la dissociation faite entre l'être et Dieu par Thomas d'Aquin, au profit d'une convergence qui a été le socle de quinze siècles de pensée : « Nous sommes aujourd'hui les contemporains d'une mise en question radicale, sous le titre volontiers infamant d'onto-théologie, de ce qui, de la Patristique grecque et latine jusqu'à Leibniz et Wolff, demeura la conviction commune, à savoir que le Dieu de la Révélation mosaïque et l'Être de la philosophie grecque se rejoignent, sans se confondre jamais, au sein de l'intelligence de la foi. Cette conjonction a valeur d'événement fondateur à l'égard d'un développement historique étiré sur quinze cents ans et plus. Avant donc de dénoncer dans cette rencontre une confusion intolérable, voire une perversion scandaleuse, il est équitable de se demander comment un consensus aussi ample et aussi durable a pu se constituer. » in André Lacoque, Paul Ricœur, *Penser la Bible*, Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 1998, p. 347.

dû. [...] C'est là une œuvre ardue, paradoxale et héroïque; il n'y a pas d'humanisme de la tiédeur.»²¹

L'articulation de l'héroïsme et du saint n'est cependant pas sans poser problème, ce qu'a souligné Benjamin Fondane dans sa recension d'*Humanisme intégral*²²:

«Peut-être bien que le christianisme n'est pas si héroïque que M. Maritain le pense et qu'il n'a pas besoin de l'héroïsme. L'homme occupé de son salut n'est pas précisément le plus propre à tourner ses énergies vers un réalisme social. Quand le christianisme est héroïque, il agit en raison de forces éthiques puisées dans la croyance, plus ou moins consciente, que l'homme est sa propre fin à lui-même où il renonce à être un chrétien.»

L'héroïsme pour J. Maritain est celui de la sainteté, ascèse intérieure qui permet la vie contemplative dont l'action n'est qu'une surabondance. L'exemple de saints, tels Thomas More, lui permet de dégager,

«Un humanisme pour lui-même et conscient de soi, qui mène l'homme au sacrifice et à une grandeur vraiment surhumaine, parce qu'alors la douleur humaine ouvre les yeux, et est supportée en amour, – non dans le renoncement à la joie, mais dans une soif plus grande, et déjà l'exultation de la joie. Peut-il y avoir un humanisme héroïque?

Pour moi, je réponds oui. Et je me demande si ce n'est pas de la réponse à la question que dépendent avant tout les diverses positions prises par les uns et les autres en face du travail historique qui se fait sous nos yeux.»²³

L'œuvre de J. Maritain peut être lue comme le développement de ce qu'implique la figure du saint, qu'il s'agisse du domaine métaphysique, où la connaissance mystique de saint Jean de la Croix est l'ultime niveau d'intellection de l'être²⁴, ou de la loi naturelle connaturelle à tout homme

²¹ Jacques Maritain, *Humanisme intégral*, Paris: Aubier, éditions Montaigne, Foi vivante, 66, 1968, p. 208.

²² Benjamin Fondane, «La philosophie vivante: l'humanisme intégral de Jacques Maritain», Bruxelles: *Le Rouge et le Noir*, n°28, 24-25 juillet 1937, in *Fondane Maritain Correspondance*, Paris: Paris Méditerranée, Cachet Volant, 1997, pp. 26-30, p. 30.

²³ Jacques Maritain, *Humanisme intégral*, Paris: Aubier, éditions Montaigne, Foi vivante, 66, 1968, p. 12.

²⁴ C'est en effet l'objet de la quatrième partie de *Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir*.

que la sainteté permet de mener à sa compréhension la plus accomplie. L'originalité de sa pensée vient du primat de la contemplation sur l'action, qui permet à celle-ci d'être bonne parce qu'elle s'ancre dans un «en deçà» d'elle-même. La contemplation, ou «contemplation sur les chemins» selon l'expression de Raïssa son épouse, est le régime normal de l'homme croyant; elle débouche sur une implication temporelle en radicale opposition avec

«Le titanisme de l'effort humain [qui] est la grande idole de notre temps»²⁵

Comment élaborer ce bien commun depuis la singularité de chacun dans un monde si technicisé qu'il favorise ce retour du *Fatum*, précisément parce que les mêmes gestes sont requis de chacun pour rendre opératoire ce monde de l'autoroute, de l'ordinateur, des codes, des clés et des aéroports? Même si la réponse de J. Maritain date de 1965, elle reste un repère, proposant le rayonnement comme critère au lieu du résultat et de l'efficacité. Elle pose le qualitatif en place du quantitatif, l'infime au lieu du titanisme, l'implication dans chaque instant en remplacement du cynisme de la volonté de puissance. Ce rayonnement s'articule sur la différence entre «agir en chrétien» et agir «en tant que chrétien», où la notion de bien commun, pour «agir en chrétien», est appréhendée à partir de ce qui est «commun à tous», à savoir,

«[le] rayonnement de l'Évangile à travers la tâche quotidienne elle-même. Alors le véhicule par lequel passera ce rayonnement, ce pourra être parfois un simple mot fraternel, un regard, un geste, la façon spontanée de réagir à un événement, un de ces signes presque imperceptibles (et tellement plus importants qu'on ne croit d'ordinaire), un de ces «microsignes» de la physique de l'âme qui s'enregistrent dans l'inconscient, et que le prochain perçoit avec une si redoutable infailibilité.»²⁶

De même que le sacrifice pensé par Jan Patočka pouvait servir de terreau nourricier pour une compréhension chrétienne, de même ici, et inversement, la pensée du rayonnement chrétien peut servir de matrice

²⁵ Jacques Maritain, *Le Feu nouveau, Le paysan de la Garonne*, préface et dossier critique de Michel Fourcade, Genève: Ad Solem, 2007, p. 325.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 297.

pour une lecture non chrétienne du rayonnement, lecture qui s'arc-boute sur ce bien déjà commun aux hommes, leur propre humanité, que seule une migration résolue vers ce qui la caractérise, la relation à l'autre, traduite par le souci du bien commun au plan de la cité, fera advenir. C'est bien en effet par ce rayonnement qui frappa ses contemporains, que J. Maritain, par exemple, fut remarqué du Général de Gaule lors de leur rencontre à New-York en 1942, et qui lui valut sa nomination à l'Ambassade de France près le Vatican à Rome de 1945 à 1948. Le rayonnement dans le « microsigne » reste inséparable de sa réflexion, notamment sur la loi naturelle, à partir de laquelle il élaborera une vision des droits de l'homme qui ne sera pas sans influencer la Déclaration universelle de 1948.

5. Conclusion

Peut-il y avoir pire dégradation de l'homme que la situation des migrants obligés de consentir à ce saut dans le « peu probable » d'une vie meilleure, non pas au seul plan des conditions matérielles, mais à celui de leur humanité? Le titanisme ne peut répondre: des philosophes d'horizons variés ont étiré, pour ainsi dire, le champ de l'éthique, tant la question est brûlante pour notre humanité. La réponse de J. Maritain est celle qui sort de la dichotomie de l'objectivité ou de la subjectivité. Il intègre l'apport de l'histoire, en l'occurrence de l'époque réflexe qu'est la modernité, pour penser non plus Aristote dans les catégories d'Adorno, mais Aristote à l'âge réflexe, autrement dit, une relation autre entre sujet et objet, dont la contemplation est le fondement. Engageant une épistémologie de la connaissance fondée sur la non-transitivité²⁷, ce qui entraîne une reconsidération du titanisme, de la fascination pour l'exact, pour le fait comme preuve scientifique et pour la volonté de maîtrise, il propose une philosophie qui est davantage celle de la relation entre sujet et objet, relation qui au-delà du plan métaphysique, est celle de la charité, que celle

²⁷ Jacques Maritain, *Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre*, Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, Bibliothèque française de philosophie, 1926, p. 50, «Le caractère le plus foncier du connaître, c'est qu'il est une activité, et une activité immanente, je veux dire qui ne consiste pas à agir sur autre chose ou à produire un terme. [...] Connaître une pierre ou un arbre n'est pas faire cette pierre ou cet arbre, ni agir sur leur être propre pour le modifier, ni agir sur notre être propre pour le modifier à leur occasion».

d'un thomisme rigide dans lequel on le range malgré ses propres invectives contre cette sclérose d'école.

Les trois philosophes retenus, Heidegger, Patočka et Maritain présentent trois rapports au temps différents dans leur réponse: l'homme berger de l'être nous semble correspondre à un tropisme vers le passé, l'homme du sacrifice, à une lutte qui fait apparaître une valorisation du présent, et le saint, à une orientation vers le futur à travers la construction du bien commun, assez cohérente avec la vision eschatologique chrétienne. Ces trois déclinaisons temporelles engagent le rapport de l'homme au monde et à l'autre. Or le phénomène migratoire, lié par défaut ou non à la globalisation technique, change ce rapport au temps, en faveur non pas du passé, présent ou futur, mais de l'instant. Ce serait un autre sujet de réflexion que de savoir si ce tropisme de l'instant est corrélatif de cette entreprise technique génératrice du *Fatum* dont la sortie la plus instinctive serait cette migration métaphysique d'un perpétuel mouvement où l'instant est surdéterminé et exacerbé.

Nous aimerions finir sur deux témoignages recevables comme réponse face à l'instant de la mort imposée. La réflexion sur les enjeux soulevés par le phénomène migratoire ayant eu pour nucleus la tension entre Paris et le village roumain, il semble à propos de terminer par un hommage à deux personnalités roumaines.

Le premier témoignage est celui de Benjamin Fondane, gazé le 3 octobre 1944 à Birkenau qui cherchait

«ce quelque chose que je savais déjà impossible, impossible et pourtant *souhaité au-delà du possible*».²⁸

Le second est celui du prince Vladimir Ghika, qui, dans la prison de Jilava où il mourut le 17 mai 1954, aimait à répéter ces mots de Jacob, parce qu'il avait atteint la liberté intérieure capable du rayonnement de la véritable charité, celle de l'homme berger de l'être, qui est aussi celui du sacrifice compris à partir de la sainteté:

²⁸ Benjamin Fondane et Jacques Maritain, *Fondane Maritain Correspondance*, Paris: Paris Méditerranée, coll. Cachet Volant, 1997, lettre du 14 mars 1947, de Geneviève Fondane à Jacques Maritain, p. 124.

«Cet endroit est saint et moi je l'ignorais».²⁹

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²⁹ Hélène Danubia, *Prince et Martyr, l'apôtre du Danube, Mgr Vladimir Ghika*, Paris: Pierre Téqui, 1993, p. 101.

THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS. WHICH CONSEQUENCES AFFECTING THE STABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Alexandru C. Apetroe*

Abstract:

The European Union was heralded as one of the most astounding successes of the post-war reconstruction (from both political and economic perspectives), an evolutive process which began after the Franco-German reconciliation and was deeply influenced by the fall of the Soviet Union and the Former Eastern Bloc accession in 2004 and 2007 respectively. However, the EU Construction Process was deemed as flawed by its celerity, the differences between the East and West being as evident as they come after almost half a decade of totalitarian rule in the former. The question posed then, "has the EU enlarged too fast?" seems now, in retrospect, as not only justifiable but obtusely legitimate. Leaving aside the economic perspective, the European construction process has left the EU Social-Democrats at a severe disadvantage, which in turn has only strengthened the Right and shifted the electorate's sympathy towards everything considered non-mainstream. The withering of the EU Social-Democracy, which relinquished its classic ideology in favour of that of the Construction Project, losing the trust of the people in the process, can be perceived as one of the Union's biggest political weakness. Yet the issue at hand is best explained not by trying to frame the consequences, but to understand the underlying causes: the recent Brexit and the promise of a Frexit, the rise of right-wing parties, the increase in racist and bigoted political rhetoric and the spreading of populism, are all of these separate incidents

*Alexandru C. Apetroe has a B.A. in Law ("Al. I. Cuza" University of Iași) and a B.A. in European Studies (Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj) and is currently enrolled in the Double-Diploma M.A. programme in Compared Political Sciences at Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj and Université Paris XII – Créteil.

Contact: alex_apetroe@yahoo.com.

or are they interconnected? Simplistically yes, but it is also associated with how the citizens of the member States identify themselves: economically as European, yet identity as National. This poses some serious questions on the capacity of a weakened EU to overcome the multiple crises which affect it.

Keywords: European Union, Migration Crisis, Asylum, European Identity, Political Ideology, Brexit

Introduction

The *2015 Migration Crisis* represents one of the most complex issues in the recent history of the European Union, literally dividing Europe into those which will accept the refugees and those which reject them. Taking a short look on the recent statistics courtesy of Médecins Sans Frontières which were published in June 2016, the background remains disturbing:

“Since 1 January 2016, 200,000 people have arrived on European shores by sea. The great part of them arrived through the Aegean Sea before the closure of the so called Balkan road and around 50,000 arrived in Italy through the dangerous Central Mediterranean route. At least 50,000 are stuck in Greece after the closure of the Balkan route, with the extremely dangerous Central Mediterranean becoming one of the few remaining opportunities to reach Europe for thousands of people. More than 2,800 people died this year at sea, 1,000 more than in the same period last year.”¹

However, the simple repartition of the number of asylum-seekers does not represent the principal issue at hand, the incapacity of the EU to provide a unitary approach, to show the world that it can transcend the differences of the member States and that it can overcome the string of crises which plagued Europe. In this respect the Migration Crisis is one of the biggest humanitarian disasters since the Second World War, in the sense that it affected not only the targeted member States, mostly Western, but the EU as a whole by showing the weakness and the feebleness of the European Project itself.

¹ Médecins Sans Frontières, “EU Migration Crisis Update - June 2016”, [<http://www.msf.org/en/article/eu-migration-crisis-update-june-2016>], 10 September 2016.

The *principal division*, between the original and the older member States on one hand, and the newest arrived Central and Eastern member States on the other was obvious, with the evident “East-west fracture”² making the foreign actors and non-EU states to perceive it as a superficial and immature construct. A *subsequent division* is also observed, between the so-called “arrival states” (Greece, Italy), the “transit states” (Hungary, Austria, Denmark and, in some aspects, France) and finally the “destination states” (Germany, Sweden, Holland). The frictions between the destination states and the transit states were particularly high with respect to the nearly-imposed *quotas*³ by the European Commission, with some member States, such as the UK, completely rejecting any decision taken at the supra-national level.

Yet the Migration Crisis is but only the latest of a series of problems affecting Europe. From the 2005 Constitutional Crisis, the 2010 Financial Crisis and the Greek Debt Crisis up until the Brexit and the Schengen Crisis (2015-2016), the EU member States have shown to be incapable to offer the world the image of a united Europe, let alone decide on long-term feasible solutions. We believe that this is caused by a *compound set of ingredients*: the poor results of the European Project, the deepening differences between the member States, the withering of the EU Social-Democracy⁴, the rise of the populist and far-right movements throughout Western and Northern Europe, the inability of Brussels to perfect the co-decision process and the differences in adopting common solutions to the problems which threatened the stability of the EU.

² Ferruccio Pastore, “The next big European project? The migration and asylum crisis: a vital challenge for the EU”, in Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *NUPI Policy Brief*, 25/20115, p. 2.

³ *The Guardian*, “EU governments push through divisive deal to share 120,000 refugees”, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/eu-governments-divisive-quotas-deal-share-120000-refugees>], 10 September 2016.

⁴ David James Bailey, *The End of the European Left? Social Democracy, Hope, Disillusion, and Europe*, [<http://nearfuturesonline.org/the-end-of-the-european-left-social-democracy-hope-disillusion-and-europe/>], 10 September 2016.

The poor results of the EU are viewed, in a subjective and pessimistic point of view of some authors, as either an “economic failure”⁵, or as a “failed experiment”⁶ which has tried, unsuccessfully, to eliminate the lingering importance of the nation-state, particularly from the cultural and identity perspectives. In another of these Eurosceptic opinions⁷ other authors consider that one of the first major signs of the failure of the European Project happened in 2005 when “it appeared to have been confronted by a mass of contradictions which might ultimately threaten its very survival”. Still, even the roots of the European Project via the EU’s Founding Fathers (Monnet, Spinelli and Spaak) are viewed as “deceptive” and “the most spectacular coup d’état in history”⁸. However, regardless of the strenuousness of providing a common solution to the migration problem, it is clear that the EU has taken certain measures towards solving at least the most evident symptoms of the recent crisis, even if the proposed measures are short-term tailored and reactionary. However, we do not believe that the EU is doomed to fail, because simplistically put, *it cannot fail*, lest we desire a return to pre-World War II situation. Yes, the EU has its share of shortcomings, but the truth of the matter is that we have no other way, we must try and try again until we manage to build a workable system.

In this article we will discuss the *complex of elements* which are widely used by the *euro-sceptic rhetoric* (failure of Europe’s progress – particularly economic prosperity, the democratic deficit and rising distaste for Brussels’ *technocrats*⁹) and their impact on the future of the European project, the shift in political ideology at the European level, the rise in the support for the populist and/or extremist tendencies and the shift towards the nation-state as opposed to the broader so called “mainstream” approach linked to

⁵ Bill Lee, *The European Union: A Failed Experiment*, [<https://hbr.org/2013/06/the-european-union-a-failed-ex>], 10 September 2016.

⁶ Bruce Thornton, *The E.U. Experiment Has Failed*, [<http://www.hoover.org/research/eu-experiment-has-failed>], 10 September 2016.

⁷ Christopher Booker, Richard North, *The Great Deception. Can the European Union Survive?*, Third Edition, Bloomsbury, London–New York, 2016, pp. vii–viii.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 3–4.

⁹ *The Guardian*, “Europe: the rise of the technocracy”, [<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/13/europe-rise-technocracyeditorial>], *The American Interest*, “The Failure of the EU’s Technocrats”, [<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/09/02/the-failure-of-the-eus-technocrats/>], 10 September 2016.

a slow progress in the direction of a supra-national, federalist, “United States of Europe” which represented the original European project as it was envisaged by its Founding Fathers.

The “Migration Crisis” – from “refugee” and “migrant” to “migratory flux” and “mixed-migration”

The “migrant-refugee” dichotomy is interesting to analyse for a multitude of reasons. *First*, we have the term of “refugee” which is used to refer to the individuals which are trying to escape civil war, rape, torture and modern slavery in their homelands. *Second*, employed by the more reticent Europeans, the term “migrant” is used for those which are viewed as “invaders” or as individuals which choose to abandon their home in search of a better life, reaping the benefits of the welfare-state, being labelled as “migrants” or more precisely “economic migrants”. In this case, the perception is that the whole situation might not be as grave and dire as it is portrayed and that the humanitarian aspect is overshadowed by those which take advantage of the sensibility and concern for the plight of others. *Third*, as a follow-up to the previous idea, the terminology of “migratory flux/flow” seems even more unorthodox by *dehumanizing the tragedy of the refugees*, since they are labelled as a wave or forward motion and not as rational sentient beings, alluding to a form of natural phenomena or simply by making them indistinguishable one from the other.¹⁰ Hence, a new terminology has started to be used, that of a “mixed migration”¹¹, however there is no consensus in defining it, with some definitions such as: “complex population movements including refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants; unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow”¹². In one opinion¹³, we find two terminologies: “mixed

¹⁰ Lena Kainz, *People Can't Flood, Flow or Stream: Diverting Dominant Media Discourses on Migration*, [<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/02/people-can%E2%80%99t>], 10 September 2016.

¹¹ *Mixed Migration Hub*, [<http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/about/what-mixed-migration-is/>], 10 September 2016.

¹² *IOM*, [<https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/Mixed-Migration-HOA.pdf>], 10 September 2016.

¹³ Sarah Wolff, “Migration and Refugee Governance in the Mediterranean: Europe and International Organisations at a Crossroads”, in *IAI Working Papers*, No. 15, Issue 42, October 2015, pp. 13-14.

migration flows” and “stranded migrants”. The former (*mixed migration* or “mixed migration flows”) refers to both *forced migration* and *economic migration* which follow similar migratory routes, whilst the latter (“stranded migrants”) refers to “vulnerable migrants” who are either in transit or at destination, but who do not have support from their government. A very important aspect, cited by the IOM recognizes that the crisis is amplified not only by the politically incapacitated EU, but also by the fact that “more and more migrants fall outside the provisions of the available instruments.”¹⁴

The UNHCR discusses *mixed migration from a legal perspective*: “migrants are fundamentally different from refugees and, thus, are treated very differently under international law [...] migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve their lives [...] refugees are forced to flee to save their lives or preserve their freedom”¹⁵. We believe that this distinction is important not because of the conflict of laws (with respect to the asylum procedure), but owing to the fact that the public perception of the phenomena and the political importance of the term are far more evident than any legal dispute, leading many to question the objectivity and ethics of media coverage which employ the abovementioned terminology¹⁶. For example, the media has used the two terms (“refugee” and “migrant”) interchangeably, contributing to the increase in the percentage of those who employ the term “migrant” in the sense of “economic migrant” and not by the common sense it has, that as opposed to “indigenous” when clearly referring to war refugees. The UNHCR issued a report on the press coverage on five European countries¹⁷ (Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK and Sweden), finding that “overall, the Swedish press was the most positive towards refugees and migrants, while coverage in the United Kingdom was the most negative, and the most polarised” and that “amongst those countries surveyed, Britain’s right-wing media was uniquely aggressively in its campaigns against refugees and migrants”.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

¹⁵ UNHCR, [<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16aac66.html>], 10 September 2016.

¹⁶ *The Guardian*, “Where media fails on the reporting of migrants and refugees”, [<https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/dec/17/where-media-fails-on-the-reporting-of-migrants-and-refugees>], 10 September 2016.

¹⁷ UNHCR, “Mixed Migration”, [<http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/56bb369c9/press-coverage-refugee-migrant-crisis-eu-content-analysis-five-european.html>], 10 September 2016.

We consider that this is not a direct reaction to the Migratory Crisis *per se*, but a symptom of the effect of the increase in *poverty*¹⁸ from more a decade of crises (2005-present) by which the trust in the EU has reached the lowest levels in history in 2013, with “60 percent of Europeans [which] ‘tend not to trust’ EU”¹⁹. Still we cannot ignore the social and psychological degrees of the issue. In this respect, we believe that the correct terminology should be that of “asylum-seeker(s)”: (1) the terms previously used are clearly aiding the confusion (willing or not) and do not emphasise the finality of both “refugees” and “migrants” alike – requesting aid to alleviate their dire circumstances, irrespective of their place of provenance; (2) while we do acquiesce to the importance of the legal distinction, we also consider that the humanitarian priority far exceeds the legal priority of the situation; (3) the negative effects caused by the intentional or unintentional mix between the two terms will be reduced and at the same time it will educate the public into understanding the difficult situation that the asylum-seekers are trying to escape; (4) in addition, this will be very useful by creating a specific set of rules, codified or not, which will help with the mitigation of future situations and avoid any deliberate or unintentional confusions.

Yet with all its underlining problems in offering clear reactions, the EU’s political leaders have issued *some solutions*²⁰. Launched in 2015, in the early

¹⁸ *The Conversation*, “How poverty has radically shifted across Europe in the last decade”, [<https://theconversation.com/how-poverty-has-radically-shifted-across-europe-in-the-last-decade-61047>], 10 September 2016.

¹⁹ *EurActiv*, “Record 60% of Europeans ‘tend not to trust’ EU”, [<https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/record-60-of-europeans-tend-not-to-trust-eu/>], 10 September 2016.

²⁰ From the legal perspective, both the EU migration system and the asylum law system are quite intricate. Notwithstanding the public order and national security matters of which are under the jurisdiction of the member States, the EU’s multi-layered legal system observes three principal forms: (1) *the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Additional Protocol (1967)*; (2) *the customary and positive International Humanitarian Law (among them the European Convention on Human Rights)*; (3) *the national competences of each respective Member State*. However, the sources and institutions of the EU migration and asylum law are further divided into: (1) *the Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 77-80*; (2) *the secondary EU legislation (the Reformed Dublin III Regulation)*; (3) *the case law of the European Court of Justice*; (4) *the EASO-FRONTEX*. This complex system of national laws, supra-national directives and international rules and rulings make it very difficult to actually know at a glance which system is competent or which entity has jurisdiction over a given situation. Furthermore, the EU asylum system operates with two legal presumptions: (1) *that all member States are party to the Geneva Convention and the ECHR (the so-called “safe states”)*; (2) *all of the member States are in compliance*

stages of the Migration Crisis, the *European Agenda on Migration* (EAoM)²¹ envisaged the implementation of article 78 para. 3 of the Lisbon Treaty²² citing the applicability of the so-called “provisional measures”. But the solutions decided by Brussels were not without heavy criticism from member States (the UK and some Central European countries) and international

with the EU and international obligations, provisions and principles. Previously, the so-called “Dublin format” (previously “Dublin II”) was in effect, however the applicability of the regime was quite cumbersome: when an asylum request is being made, only a single member State has the jurisdiction to analyse the request, which is the first member State in which the asylum request has been formulated, or the first member State in which the asylum-seeker has arrived illegally (*first arrival* criterion). In the case of an asylum-seeker/migrant/refugee which has left the Member State of first arrival, the person in question will be returned to the Member State in which it first arrived. The ECJ has amended the “Dublin format” (Dublin III or Reform of the Dublin System) in *three principal aspects*: (1) when “systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure” are being observed, a member State cannot return the asylum-seeker to the first member State in which he has illegally arrived; (2) a member State which is under normal circumstances is not responsible for examining an application for asylum, pursuant “humanitarian circumstances”, can be obliged to examine said request; (3) notwithstanding the “Dublin format”, any member State who wishes to examine an asylum request can do so.

European Commission, “The Reform of the Dublin System”,

[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160504/the_reform_of_the_dublin_system_en.pdf],

European Parliament, “The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation”,

[[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571360/IPOL_STU\(2016\)571360_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571360/IPOL_STU(2016)571360_EN.pdf)], ECJ, “Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 November 2012 -

K v Bundesasylamt”,

[<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131864&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=132020>], 10 September 2016.

²¹ *European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda on Migration”,* [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf], 10 September 2016.

²² “In the event of one or more Member States being confronted with an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.” Lisbon Treaty, [<http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-actions/title-v-area-of-freedoms-security-and-justice/chapter-2-policies-on-border-checks-asylum-and-immigration/346-article-78.html>], 10 September 2016.

organisations and NGO's alike. On this issue, a CEPS researcher²³ considers that the Agenda is plagued by a *series of obstacles*: (1) the Agenda was not affirmed by all of the EU member States, for example France has opposed the EU Commission's proposal of *migrant quotas*; (2) the suggested *resettlement scheme*²⁴ was deeply unpopular, particularly within the Central and Eastern European member States; (3) the Agenda does not have clear-cut priorities, with placing too much attention towards thwarting the smuggling networks and ignoring the proteiform aspect of the migration process, with added criticism concerning the limited options available for legal immigration and legal pathways past the EU borders. In this respect, we consider that a viable option should be *the creation of specialized encampments in the areas of interest* (Greece, Italy, Spain) in which the prospective asylum-seekers (irrespective of their place of origin and reasons to apply) will be processed so as to determine the best way of improving their situation. This scheme will mitigate, we believe, both the *unprecedented humanitarian emergency* and the subsequent *security aspects* (in the wake of the terrorist attacks throughout 2015 and 2016) of the crisis, and at the same time, show the world that the EU, while somewhat weakened by the Brexit, is still capable of showing a modicum of initiative in dealing with the situation.

An interesting proposal²⁵, albeit more technical and more akin the applicability of the EAoM with regards to the sensitive aspect of the distribution of asylum-seekers within the EU, involves the concept of "tradable refugee-admission quotas (TRAQs) system with matching", which is used to calculate a quota of asylum-seekers by employing certain indicators used in population dispersion such as: the GDP of the receiving State, the pre-existent population size in the receiving state and various other elements. However, this differs from the EU's proposal in *two different*

²³ Sergio Carrera, *Whose European Agenda on Migration?*, CEPS, [<https://www.ceps.eu/content/whose-european-agenda-migration>], 10 September 2016.

²⁴ *European Commission*, "Annex, European schemes for relocation and resettlement", [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_annex_en.pdf], 10 September 2016.

²⁵ Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Hillel Rapoport, "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas (TRAQs), the Syrian Crisis and the new European Agenda on Migration", in *IZA Journal of European Labor Studies*, 4:23, 2015, pp. 3-4.

aspects²⁶: (1) the preferences of the asylum-seekers need to be taken into account by giving them *the option to choose their preferred destination within the EU* and vice-versa, member States can indicate their own preferences; (2) the *possibility of the member States to 'trade' the assigned quotas*, thus insuring a more balanced distribution. Sadly we cannot accept this project, because it will only lead to political manoeuvrings by member States, the asylum-seekers will end up being used as pawns in a grotesque and byzantine fashion. Another opinion clearly states that is it adamant that the EU "[must] ensure [that the] member states' first reception obligations are fulfilled, so that refugees are not forced to move to a second or third member state [...]"²⁷ and that "the EU must establish an EU Migration, Asylum and Protection Agency (EMAPA)" which will address and process the influx of asylum-seekers²⁸.

Discussing about the issue of transits and arrivals, even before the EAoM proposal, the EU has made some changes with respect to the way in which the influx of asylum-seekers arrived on EU soil, decisions for which, again, the EU received a storm of disapprovals. One of the most condemned options was the replacement of the Italian-funded *Mare Nostrum Project* (recognized as a workable solution) with the EU-funded *Operation Triton* (a part of the FRONTEX Security Project) which was deemed by Amnesty International as a political and public image manoeuvre and not a humanitarian one²⁹. The two differ with respect to their purpose: *Mare Nostrum* was a *search-and-rescue effort*, whilst *Operation Triton* is a *border security operation*, revealing much about the real purpose of the latter.

Another decision was the launching of the military operation EUNAVFOR Med (better known as *Operation Sophia*), which targeted the smuggling and illegal routes which endangered the lives of asylum-seekers. However, the European Union Institute for Security Studies voiced its concerns on the feasibility of the Operation "on whether the operation will ever be able [...] to get to the core of its mandate, i.e. neutralising the

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

²⁷ Elspeth Guild *et al.*, "The 2015 Refugee Crisis in the European Union", in *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 332, September 2015, pp. 1-6.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ *Amnesty International*, "EU: New Frontex report underscores urgent need for safe and legal routes to Europe", [<https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/08/frontex-report-underscores-urgent-need-for-safe-and-legal-routes/>], 10 September 2016.

smuggling networks"³⁰. Citing sources from within the Libyan coastguard, EUobserver affirmed in June 2016 that "the EU's Operation Sophia [...] encourages people to risk their lives to seek a better life in Europe"³¹, confirming an earlier report of the House of Lords from May 2016, which affirmed that "however valuable as a search and rescue mission, Operation Sophia does not, and we argue, cannot, deliver its mandate. It responds to symptoms, not causes [...]"³².

Also on this issue, in February 2016, WikiLeaks released a *classified report* on the first six months of Operation Sophia's existence, citing difficulties in the "transition from Phase 2A (operating in High Seas) to Phase 2B (operating in Libyan Territorial Waters) due to the volatile government situation in Libya"³³. Another important aspect which is directly linked with Operation Sophia is represented by its *overtly military character* as opposed to what the public and some NGO's would have wanted to see. In our opinion, the EU took these measures simply to mitigate the increasingly unfavourable public opinion (both on the European and international levels) which severely criticised its slow reaction time and the fact that the proposed measures were not able to stem the influx of asylum-seekers, which at the time, was seen by some as a direct threat.

The consequences of the Migration Crisis on the already weakened EU

Discussing the deficiencies of the EU, the political aspect is always considered to be responsible for the decrease in both the public perception of the EU as a whole and is perceived as the cause of the difficulties in decision-making and policy implementation. With respect towards managing

³⁰ *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30_Operation_Sophia.pdf], 10 September 2016.

³¹ *EUobserver*, "EU boosts migrant smuggling, says Libyan coastguard", [<https://euobserver.com/tickers/133849>], 10 September 2016.

³² *The Telegraph*, "Operation Sophia: EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean deemed an 'impossible challenge' in House of Lords report", [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/13/operation-sophia-eus-naval-mission-in-the-mediterranean-deemed-a/>], 10 September 2016.

³³ *WikiLeaks*, "EUNAVFOR MED - Operation SOPHIA" - Six Monthly Report: June, 22nd to December, 31st 2015", [<https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf>], 10 September 2016.

the Migrant Crisis, one author considers that the raised mismanagement issue is defined “not a crisis of capacity but one of political leadership”³⁴. Some critics of the EU have voiced that the Migrant Crisis was, in part, due to the “no-border policy” of the EU (Schengen system), however some authors argue that there is no credible evidence supporting the fact that “the Schengen system has been under threat during these last months or that there is a need for legislative reform”³⁵. Furthermore, the suspension of the Schengen system was temporary and legal, since it is in accordance with Article 25 para. 1 of the Schengen Borders Code³⁶; to consider that the Schengen system inexplicably failed is not supported by facts³⁷.

In our opinion, one of the most important consequences of the Migration Crisis is *bleeding effect* that it had on other, less stringent, problems which the EU had to cope, inflaming the already sensitive public opinion. We consider that three previous issues were transformed and increased in their gravity after the onset of the Migration Crisis: the political battle between within the EU People’s Party and the Social Democrats, the Brexit and the increase in the numbers of those which are disillusioned and feel betrayed by the EU.

The Migration crisis and the political changes inside the EU

(1.1) The consequences of the Social-Democratic support for the European project, in particular for the EU integration, was no big news on the European scene. Motivated by the need to expand their interest within the expanding neoliberal economic paradigm of the early 1980s, or simply trying to preserve their place at the table, starting in the mid-1980s and continuing through-out the 1990s, the social-democrats believed in the international nature of socio-economic processes “could be harnessed through

³⁴ François Crépeau, Anna Purkey, “Facilitating Mobility and Fostering Diversity Getting European Migration Governance to Respect the Human Rights of Migrants”, in *CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe*, No. 92, May 2016, p. 3.

³⁵ Sergio Carrera *et al.*, “The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities”, in *CEPS Essay*, No. 20, December 2015, p. 15.

³⁶ “Where considerations of public policy or internal security in a Member State demand urgent action to be taken, the Member State concerned may exceptionally and immediately reintroduce border control at internal borders.” *EUR-Lex*, “Schengen Act”, [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32006R0562>], 10 September 2016.

³⁷ Sergio Carrera *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

coordinated activity with ideologically-similar parties and individuals operating collectively at the EU-level"³⁸. Indeed, at the time, the European social-democrats feared that the EU could become a 'capitalist club'³⁹ and wishing to counter this, they adopted a pro-European policy and considered the European institutions as perfect instruments for the implementation of their objectives.⁴⁰ One could say that the social-democrats "abandoned their ideology"⁴¹ so as to promote the European integration. However, their success was short-lived, as the EU began to feel the side-effects of accelerate successive enlarging processes, ultimately failing to achieve federalisation and gradually losing its traditional electorate⁴². David Bailey argues that the European social-democrats desired to create a "Social Europe", a term coined by the leftists to determine a series of reforms meant to transform the European Union into "an institution favouring equality, redistribution and social cohesion"⁴³.

Discussing the motivations for the social-democrat pivot towards the EU, David Bailey argues that there can be three possible explanations:

"Existing explanations for the social democratic turn to Europe can be placed into three broad groups: those that view the turn to Europe as an attempt to re-regulate what has come to be known as 'globalisation'; those that see it as a pragmatic adaptation to a new political environment;

³⁸ David James Bailey, *Legitimation through Integration: Explaining the 'New Social Democratic turn to Europe*, Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 2004, pp. 15-16.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 16

⁴⁰ "European integration came to be viewed by left parties as a means to challenge the unfettered market, the EU (or EC, prior to 1993) was also responsible for the creation of a single European market that would further threaten a number of the achievements reached by the European labour movement in the more favourable pre-1980 period". *Idem*, *The End of the European Left? Social Democracy, Hope, Disillusion, and Europe*, [<http://nearfutureonline.org/the-end-of-the-european-left-social-democracy-hope-disillusion-and-europe/>], 10 September 2016.

⁴¹ Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 280-284.

⁴² Tom Angier, *European social democracy is in danger of terminal decline unless it can reengage with its core values*, [<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/01/30/european-social-democracy-is-in-danger-of-terminal-decline-unless-it-can-reengage-with-its-core-values/>], 10 September 2016.

⁴³ David James Bailey, *The End of the European Left? Social Democracy, Hope, Disillusion, and Europe*, [<http://nearfutureonline.org/the-end-of-the-european-left-social-democracy-hope-disillusion-and-europe/>], 10 September 2016.

and, finally, those who claim the social democratic turn to Europe is part of a more general ideological moderation occurring within social democratic parties."⁴⁴

But more importantly, the third explanation is the one which we consider as the most valid, because the "ideological moderation"⁴⁵ of which Bailey argues was necessary to transform both the political parties, by abandoning their Eurosceptic traditional ideology, rejecting the traditional values which determined the anti-European sentiments and replacing it with a pro-European stance, and the European institutions themselves, shaping into ideologically compatible entities. Therefore, Bailey observes a transition from "traditional" towards "new" social democracy, characterised by both *elements of continuity* (some economic doctrines, fight against inequality, efficient public service) and *disruptive elements* (market interventionism, the promoting the interests of the working class, welfare state).⁴⁶ Fast-forwarding to the 2005 Constitutional crisis, Bailey considers that the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty by the French socialists was seen as a direct opposition towards the neoliberal tendencies which gripped the EU. However, the result was in fact contrary to what the French and Dutch socialists were trying to prevent – the disenfranchisement of the traditional leftist electorate and the corroboration between the failure of the social-democrats as a whole and the failed Constitutional project. Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis perceived by the public as a direct consequence of the surplus of neoliberal policies which resulted in the de-regulation of financial markets and reduction of state interventionism in the financial and banking sectors gave the social-democrats a second chance. Yet the poor decision-making and austerity programmes, coupled with collapse of the speculative bubbles and the subsequent economic failures within the EU resulted in a catastrophic loss of confidence⁴⁷.

The conclusion was that at the 2009 European Parliament elections, the social-democrats lost, event which echoed at the national level. The same happened during the 2014 elections, with European People's Party obtaining the relative majority in the EU Parliament, seconded by the Social

⁴⁴ *Idem*, "Legitimation through Integration...", p. 36.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 36, 45-46.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 63-64.

⁴⁷ *Idem*, *The End of the European Left...*

Democrats. Interestingly, the European social-democrats' bid for supporting European integration and failing to do so twice in history, has produced other effects, in particular the "disruption of established patterns of democratic competition in the member states"⁴⁸ and has strengthened the identity-driven opponents of European integration, particularly the populist right"⁴⁹.

(1.2) The rise of populism and the increasing support for extremist and right-wing parties, as observed in the recent decades, has become a major issue in the EU member States with very deep democratic roots such as France, the UK and some Nordic countries. Europe is now under threat from the rise in the support for extremist and far-right political factions which are using a highly controversial political discourse to try to break the traditional hegemony within the EU Parliament. The populist tendencies in Europe were recorded since the 1980s with the contemporary success of political leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Jörg Haider in Austria and Umberto Bossi in Italy⁵⁰. This trend was exacerbated by the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, when the austerity programmes imposed by the traditional political member States governments' trust plummeted in the polls, giving rise to the so-called "challenger parties"⁵¹ or anti-establishment (Podemos, Syriza) which rejected any ties with the EU, and which often mixed their populist discourse with nationalistic elements and even authoritarianist elements such as law, order and discipline⁵². The reasons for the success of challenger and anti-establishment parties are (1) *retrospective voting*, where the electorate punishes the political leaders for their poor economic performance; (2) based on the specificities of each party, they offer an alternative to the political *status quo* which attracts the disenfranchised and fringe elements of any given society⁵³.

⁴⁸ Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, "European Integration and Democratic Competition", in *Internationale Politikanalyse, Europäische Politik*, 03/2004, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ Annie Benveniste *et al.*, *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and 'Othering'*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 3-4.

⁵¹ Sara B. Hobolt, James Tilley, "Fleeing the Centre: The Rise of Challenger Parties in the Aftermath of the Euro Crisis", in *EES 2014 Conference*, November 6-8, 2015, MZES, University of Mannheim, p. 3.

⁵² Erik R. Tillman, "Authoritarianism and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties", pp. 2-7, [http://eeshomepage.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tillman_auth_radright_ees.pdf], 10 September 2016.

⁵³ Sara B. Hobolt, James Tilley, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-5.

The pre-existing political sensibilities in the aftermath of the financial, Eurozone and Greek debt crises which ended forming a precarious balance, became impossible to manage when the Migration crisis started. The far-right and nationalist parties had a field day when the news outlets portrayed the refugees as “invaders” and by the end of 2016, the mainstream politically-oriented population started to reject the traditional political parties and adopt *new forms of political engagement*⁵⁴.

(1.3) The European Identity at the crossroads.

The Brexit laid a very damaging blow on the image of the EU. In the aftermath of the 2016 UK Referendum, it was confirmed that the increasing levels of dissatisfaction with the EU were present in other member States. Capitalising on the ‘success’ of the Brexit, others have decided to follow suit, with terms such as “Frexit”⁵⁵ or “Czexit”⁵⁶ and even a specific *migrant referendum* plans announced by Hungary’s PM⁵⁷, a clear indicator that Europe is facing difficult times. The public anger over the botched European project is cynically speculated by virtually all Eurosceptic politicians, using peoples’ fear over *cultural alienation, loss of identity, poor economic prospects* and *unemployment* as proxies to blame Europe for its perceived failures and impending mass immigration which would result in diminishing prosperity and low quality-of-life by overcrowding public services, rise in unemployment and even a cultural regression. The EU’s top leaders, defended by the UN, are not making things easier, insisting obstinately that building borders⁵⁸ cannot keep people safe from terrorism and other security menaces, yet they do so in a very short and unequivocal

⁵⁴ Heather Grabbe, Stefan Lehne, *Can the EU Survive Populism?*, [<http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/14/can-eu-survive-populism/j1vb>], 10 September 2016.

⁵⁵ *The Guardian*, “Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who will be next to leave the EU”, [<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-who-will-be-next-to-leave-the-eu>], 10 September 2016.

⁵⁶ *Time*, “Is ‘Czexit’ Next? President of Czech Republic Calls for EU Referendum”, [<http://time.com/4391005/czexit-milos-zeman-referendum-nato-eu-czech/>], 10 September 2016.

⁵⁷ *Reuters*, “Hungary’s migrant referendum shows Europe’s post-Brexit challenge”, [<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-hungary-orban-idUSKCN0ZH54H>], 10 September 2016.

⁵⁸ *The Independent*, “Europe must not ‘cower behind borders’ in face of post-Brexit immigration crisis, UN warns”, [<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-referendum-europe-immigration-refugee-crisis-un-borders-schengen-article-50-a7204776.html>], 10 September 2016.

fashion, not have enough patience in explaining to people in fear and on the verge of throwing their lots in with Marine Le Pen or Geert Wilders.

European Identity has been long thought as difficult to fully achieve because of many elements which come into play, of which the most important one being the attachment to one's national identity and/or linguistic, ethnic and cultural particularities, as well as the feeling of exerting sovereignty. As Anthony Pagden explains, "peoples [...] do not willingly surrender their cultural and normative allegiances to their nation or their political system in order to exchange it for one that is neither better nor worse. They do so only in the hope of a brighter future."⁵⁹ This means that if the EU cannot support the hopes and idealized version of itself, the people will soon start to become more and more hostile by considering that the European identity is somehow being forced upon them. Yet Eurosceptics claim that the European identity is artificial, though they do not realise that the national identity is artificially constructed as well, either *imagined*, *invented* or *naturalised*⁶⁰. However, the EU does not have the time and space to manoeuvre and dabble in nation-building, because the Migration crisis and terrorist threats have "undermined citizens' faith that a Europe with open internal borders makes them safer"⁶¹ whilst at the same time legitimising the populist and right-wing extremist political parties.

Conclusions

Putting aside the details, the real problem of the EU is its slow decision process exacerbated by the fact that *the EU is becoming more and more an economic union in the guise of a political one*, or that it has inadvertently regressed to the last days of the EEC. If the latter is true, and we have serious concerns that it might be so in the wake of the Brexit and the so-called Frexit (if the FN wins the 2017 Presidential Elections in France) then we fear for the unravelling of the very political fabric of the EU, event which would bring unforeseen consequences for Europe and the international system itself. To overcome these difficult times, Europe has to

⁵⁹ Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe From Antiquity to the European Union*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 20.

⁶⁰ Annie Benveniste *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

⁶¹ *Reuters*, "Paradise Lost? - The decline of the European ideal", [<http://www.reuters.com/article/britain-eu-paradise-idUSL8N19X2A9j>], 10 September 2016.

find alternatives to regain the trust of the disenfranchised. The EU has first and foremost to be able to ensure political flexibility and at the same time stand by its core principles in dealing with both the migration crisis and the aftereffects of the Eurozone crisis. The EU integration process must be re-envisaged so as to cope with the demanding times, especially after the Brexit and the announced membership referendums.

The EU must also decide if it will continue to stand by its botched attempts to manage the Migration crisis, we consider that the EU must try new strategies by addressing the root cause of the influx of asylum-seekers and ensure a flexible asylum procedure. The aid for the member States which are directly affected by the growing number of refugees (Italy, Greece, Spain) must be increased and the EU must determine all of the member States to participate by negotiating and convincing the political leaders of the more reticent States to accept that being part of a community does not mean that you do not have responsibilities.

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**MIGRATION EN TEMPS DE GUERRE: POETES
ROUMAINS D'ORIGINE JUIVE DANS LA FRANCE DE LA
DEUXIEME GUERRE MONDIALE***

**WARTIME MIGRATION: ROMANIAN POETS OF JEWISH
ORIGIN IN FRANCE DURING WORLD WAR II**

Corina Croitoru**

Résumé:

Consacrée à Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca et Claude Sernet, quatre poètes roumains d'origine juive et d'expression française, l'approche s'intéresse à leur poésie écrite sous l'influence de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, événement historique qu'ils vivent en France en tant que membres de la Résistance. L'étude explore les différentes attitudes poétiques face à la guerre en fonction du contexte historique, du trajet biographique et de la sensibilité ulcérée de chaque écrivain en tenant compte de leur indéniable similitude qui est l'impossibilité du silence.

Mots clefs: Guerre, Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca, Claude Sernet

Abstract:

Dedicated to Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca and Claude Sernet, four Romanian poets of Jewish origin and French expression, the approach is interested in their poetry written under the influence of World War Two, historical event that they all lived in France as members of the Resistance. The study explores the different poetic attitudes to war observing the historical context, the

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**Corina Croitoru est assistante associée à la Faculté des Lettres, Université Babeş-Bolyai de Cluj-Napoca, Roumanie, docteur en philologie avec une thèse sur la politique de l'ironie dans la poésie roumaine écrite durant la période communiste.

Contact: corina.boldeanu@yahoo.com.

biographical trajectory and the ulcerated sensibility of each writer considering their undeniable similarity is the impossibility of silence.

Keywords: War, Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca, Claude Sernet

Les poètes roumains d'origine juive immigrants dans la France de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale ne sont ni peu nombreux, ni peu importants. Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca et Claude Sernet, pour les nommer dans l'ordre de leur installation à Paris, ne sont que quatre de tous ces «nombreux (...) artistes, originaires de Moldavie, de Transylvanie, de Valachie ou des Carpates, à être venus vivre, créer et parfois mourir à Paris»¹. Ce qui les rapproche à part leur provenance roumaine et leur origine juive c'est surtout l'adhésion à l'avant-garde historique, «un phénomène protéiforme et internationalement répandu (...) dans l'espace de l'art et de la littérature européens de la première moitié du XX^{ème}, un état d'esprit relativement unitaire»², selon la définition de Ion Pop qui souligne les traits dominants du mouvement : la rupture avec la tradition littéraire et la solidarité avec le rythme de l'époque sous l'impératif de la nouveauté. Mais si l'état d'esprit avant-gardiste est unitaire, c'est parce qu'il se situe dans la descendance directe d'un événement historique majeur qui est la Première Guerre Mondiale. Se révoltant contre la tradition, les avant-gardistes se dressent contre un modèle de société qui avait rendu possible les horreurs de la Grande Guerre et dynamitent les clichés de l'art tel que la guerre avait dynamité les consciences et la vision du monde.

Unis donc par l'origine juive, la provenance roumaine et par une indéniable participation fondatrice aux mouvements européens d'avant-garde durant la Première Guerre Mondiale et dans l'entre-deux-guerres, Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca et Claude Sernet seront réunis en France durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, le second

¹ Christophe Dauphin, *Ilarie Voronca. Le poète intégral*, Paris: Rafael de Surtis, 2011, p. 9. L'auteur fait référence à plusieurs artistes roumains installés à Paris depuis la fin du XIX^{ème} siècle et jusqu'à la moitié du XX^{ème} : Anna de Noailles, Hélène Vacaresco, Gherasim Luca, Paul Celan, Isidore Isou, Panaït Istrati, George Enescu, Emil Cioran, Constantin Brâncuși etc.

² Ion Pop, *La Réhabilitation du rêve. Une anthologie de l'Avant-garde roumaine*, Paris-Bucarest: Maurice Nadeau-Samuel Tastet Editeur, 2006, p. 9.

événement historique irrémédiable qui allait profondément marquer leurs biographies. De ce deuxième grand défi de l'histoire – qui les a surpris tous en tant que membres de la Résistance française sous l'Occupation allemande – témoigne aussi leur poésie et c'est un témoignage qui, vu les dangereuses récidives de l'histoire, mérite encore d'être invoqué.

Tristan Tzara (1896-1963)

Né en Roumanie, à Moinești, en 1896, Tristan Tzara (de son vrai nom Samuel Rosenstock) est un écrivain d'origine juive établi à Paris en 1920, après avoir vécu durant la Grande Guerre à Zürich, où il avait fondé, le 8 février 1916, avec Hugo Ball, Hans Arp, Marcel Janco, Richard Huelsenbeck, Emmy Hennings et Hans Richter le mouvement « Dada ». Une fois installé dans la capitale française, il est accueilli par André Breton et les surréalistes dont il se distanciera plus tard sans s'éloigner pourtant du milieu culturel français qui va se mobiliser entre 1940 et 1944 contre l'Occupation allemande. Par conséquent, après avoir été présent dans la vie littéraire française de l'entre-deux-guerres, Tristan Tzara va se retrouver également parmi les membres de la Résistance, même si, contrairement à beaucoup d'entre eux, sa manière de résister devant l'ennemi sera, l'observe Henri Béhar, le silence: « Juif, étranger, communiste (ou au moins communistant), Tzara est pourchassé, placé en résidence surveillée, dont il s'échappe (...), recherché par la Gestapo, il ne lui reste que la fuite (...), il trouve refuge à Souillac et s'enferme dans le silence. Ce sera sa manière à lui résister: ne rien publier tant que le pays est sous botte ennemie. »³. Mais rien publier n'est pas synonyme ni de rien faire, ni de rien écrire, car, d'un côté, Tristan Tzara va profiter de sa période de clandestinité pour renforcer ses liens avec la Résistance de sorte qu'en août 1944 « il est au cœur des combats pour la libération de Toulouse »⁴, et, de l'autre côté, il va publier après la Libération des poèmes qui, sans être explicites, garderont les traces de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.

Une route seul soleil, texte qui date de 1944, fournit un exemple d'engagement par rapport à une réalité que le poète n'arrive pas à mettre

³ Henri Béhar, *Tristan Tzara*, coll. « Les Roumains de Paris », dirigée par Basarab Nicolescu, Paris: OXUS, 2005, p. 168.

⁴ François Buot, *Tristan Tzara. L'homme qui inventa la révolution Dada*, Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2002, p. 358.

sous silence: «les couteaux sont debout/ le souffle nous manque/ les corbeaux répartis/ les départs annulés/ l'année de la pierre s'est abattue sur nous// que de fumée j'ai vu défiler/ de printemps interrompus/ la chaîne des brumes/ brisée sur la hutte/ et de liberté perdue (...)»⁵. Assez loin des impératifs dadaïstes qui narguent tout sens, ces vers révèlent humblement un paysage presque préhistorique surpris dans «l'année de la pierre» par le regard accablé du poète. Même si le thème de la liberté perdue fait son apparition de manière explicite, le contexte reste seulement devinable, puisque, chez Tzara, l'engagement de la poésie essaye toujours de ne pas trahir l'esthétique. C'est pourquoi, selon François Buot, «ce sont des poèmes de la Résistance, des chants de désespoir et de silence, marqués par le temps du mépris. Ce sont des chants de clandestinité, écrits en pleine guerre avec toujours une touche d'espoir (...). Sa poésie n'est pas toujours facile et, si le message est clair, Tzara se refuse toujours à écrire de l'agitprop, même pour la bonne cause.»⁶. La remarque est aussi valable pour *Ça va*, un autre poème de 1944, qui met en scène une chevauchée dans le même paysage mort où la voix poétique incite avec cynisme à tuer la vie à même la source pour que le dégât soit complet: «trotte trotte petit cheval/ la maison s'écroule/ les coups de la voix se brisent contre l'enclume/ la fumée vous happe/ hommes ou vous qui avez cru l'être/ pauvres petits morceaux de bois égarés/ les mots hachés/ enlevez-les tuez-les à même l'arbre/ les enfants/ eux au moins ont le sang menu/ (...) où vas-tu chargé de paysages morts/ à ne pas voir ni sentir le temps aux coutures/ je ne sais plus sable/ trotte trotte petit cheval»⁷. Cette tendance à ne pas céder aux évidences dans le discours poétique était d'ailleurs déjà visible dans les poèmes dédiés à la Guerre d'Espagne, conflit dans lequel Tristan Tzara s'est impliqué volontairement comme beaucoup d'autres intellectuels français et non seulement. *Espagne 1936* (« (...) sous la force mâle des oiseaux/ a percé le cri en armes de l'hiver/ pleurez femmes si le cœur vous en dit/ les matelots protégeront vos larmes (...)») où *Chant de guerre civile* (« (...) c'est moi qui ait écrit ce poème/ dans la solitude de ma chambre/ tandis qu'à ceux pour qui je pleure/ la mort est douce ils y demeurent»), deux

⁵ Tristan Tzara, *Oeuvres complètes*, texte établi, présenté et annoté par Henri Béhar, tome III (1934-1946), Paris: Flammarion, 1979, p. 408.

⁶ François Buot, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

⁷ Tristan Tzara, *op. cit.*, pp. 411-413.

textes qui travaillent le drame de l'innocence sacrifiée dans l'antichambre de la deuxième conflagration mondiale, confirment également que «sans tomber dans la poésie de propagande, il s'efforce de concilier l'écrivain et le militant.»⁸. C'est une condition très importante pour Tzara, militant antifasciste et sympathisant du communisme, puisque, après avoir autrefois causé la descente de la poésie dans la rue, le poète évite finalement de la laisser stationner trop longtemps sur la place de l'événementiel.

Benjamin Fondane (1898-1944)

Benjamin Fondane (pseudonyme de Benjamin Weschler) est né en Roumaine, à Iași, en 1898, dans une famille juive, raison de bonheur et de reconnaissance pour le poète qui notait dans un essai de jeunesse: «Heureusement je suis né à Jassy; si j'étais né à Bethléem, du temps d'Hérode, j'aurais été du nombre des enfants massacrés. Et je ne pourrais vous faire ce récit. C'est pourquoi je remercie souvent le Seigneur de ne pas être né à Bethléem!»⁹. Malheureusement, le temps d'Hitler allait être un nouveau temps d'Hérode, qui fera de l'écrivain une des 6 millions de victimes de la Shoah durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Ironie du sort et de la mort, c'est à Paris, ville de la culture et de la liberté de l'esprit, que Benjamin Fondane allait être arrêté en 1944 et envoyé à Auschwitz où il va trouver sa fin dans la chambre à gaz pour ne pas avoir voulu abandonner sa sœur Line, malgré la libération obtenue par sa femme et ses amis. Citoyen français depuis 1938 (mobilisé dans l'armée française en 1940 et ensuite membre de la Résistance), il aurait pu quitter sa sœur (encore citoyenne roumaine), mais il a refusé, assumant ainsi à sa propre manière l'identité d'un destin collectif, comme le témoigne symboliquement l'*Épithaphe*, poésie qui reprend le mythe du juif errant: «Ci-gît recouvert de poèmes/ Isaac Lacquedem/ un peu trop porté sur l'extrême,/ enfant du vieux Sem,// ayant fait le tour de la terre,/ le tour des vivants,/ où tout lui

⁸ François Buot, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁹ Benjamin Fondane, *Comment je suis né*, textes de jeunesse traduits du roumain par Marlène Braester, Hélène Lenz, Carmen Oszi, Odile Serre, présentation de Monique Jutrin, Paris: Editions Caractères, 2013, p. 18.

parut éphémère,/ et tout captivant,// bon bougre après tout – mais instable,/ (le mal des aïeux)/ partout écrivant dans le sable/ la langue des cieux.»¹⁰

Pour Benjamin Fondane, la langue des cieux est la langue de la poésie, qu'il parle depuis sa jeunesse roumaine, période marquée par la mort de son père en 1917 à cause du typhus répandu durant la Grande Guerre et par le suicide en 1918 d'un oncle très proche, à son retour du front¹¹. Ce sont ces tristes souvenirs de la Première Guerre Mondiale dont sa poésie se rappelle parfois («(...) j'ai vu ces paysans en 1914/ fuir les Autrichiens, quitter la terre au cou des bœufs/ (...) ils fuyaient la mort pour la mort/ la guerre était si longue, le naufrage infini (...)», [*Pourquoi l'océan...*]¹²), des amis d'école et d'université (F. Brunea Fox, Al. Philippide, Saşa Pană etc.) et plusieurs pseudonymes littéraires (Ofir, Ha-Shir, Alex Vilara, Wechslerescu etc.) que Benjamin Fondane laisse derrière lui en 1923 quand il quitte la Roumanie pour s'installer à Paris.

Entre 1923 et 1944, Fondane se livre à une intense activité de poète, philosophe, dramaturge, essayiste et cinéaste, se ralliant aux avant-gardes, notamment au surréalisme dont il fut le dissident à côté de Tzara et Desnos. Plutôt existentielle qu'avant-gardiste, car «dans sa propre création, Fondane a fait très peu «acte» d'avant-gardisme. Il a réservé l'expérimentation au cinéma»¹³, son œuvre poétique interroge dans l'entre-deux-guerres, non sans amertume, l'éternel périple du peuple juif : «(...) que de fois faudra-t-il que la mer rouge s'ouvre,/ que nous criions vers toi du fond de notre gouffre,/ la sortie de l'Égypte n'était qu'une figure/ de cette fuite éperdue le long de l'histoire future,/ et Jérusalem n'était-il que symbole et fable/ de ce havre qu'on cherche et qui est introuvable? (...)» ([*Il est l'agent d'une Compagnie maritime du Havre*]¹⁴). Tel que dans la vie réelle, le moi assume dans ces vers le destin d'une communauté damnée: «(...) Emigrants, diamants de la terre, sel sauvage,/ je suis de votre race,/ j'emporte comme vous ma vie dans ma valise,/ je mange comme vous le

¹⁰ Benjamin Fondane, *Au temps du poème et Poèmes épars*, in *Le mal de fantômes*, préface de David Gascoyne et Patrice Reousseau, Paris: Plasma, 1980, p. 289.

¹¹ V. Olivier Salazar-Ferrer, *Benjamin Fondane*, coll. « Les Roumains de Paris », dirigée par Basarab Nicolescu, Paris: OXUS, 2004.

¹² Benjamin Fondane, *Ulysse*, in *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹³ Petre Raileanu, Michel Carassou, *Fundoianu/Fondane et l'avant-garde*, Paris : Editions Paris-Méditerranée, 1999, p. 19.

¹⁴ Benjamin Fondane, *Ulysse*, in *op. cit.*, p. 43.

pain de mon angoisse (...)/ je suis de ceux qui n'ont rien, qui veulent tout/ – je ne saurai jamais me résigner.» ([*Mon père qu'as-tu fait de mon enfance?*]¹⁵). La métaphore de la valise, symptomatique pour l'imaginaire poétique de Fondane, dominé par le mouvement non-téléologique du juif errant («(...) La mort saisit le vif// en marche, juif errant, changeant de pose,/ tournant autour de quelque chose qui/ tourne à son tout autour de quelque chose...», XIV¹⁶), rejoint évidemment celle de la route («(...) La route qui marche et ne finit point.», *Chanson de l'émigrant*¹⁷). Ayant consacré une étude à cette dernière dans l'œuvre de Fondane, Tzara et Voronca, Ecaterina Grün constate que «l'exil (ou l'auto exil) semble mettre son empreinte sur leur création, en y imposant un motif profond qui pourrait être l'un des plus importants de leur imaginaire, celui de la route.»¹⁸. Chez Fondane, le moi poétique n'arrive pas à s'arrêter, puisqu'il serait attrapé par l'Histoire qui le poursuit. Alors, «(...) Il est un temps de marcher jusqu'à l'épuisement/ (...) un temps pour demander quel est le sens de l'homme/ (...) changera-t-il jamais le monde avec son cri?/ Il est un temps où l'eau est froide (...)/ le gaz irrésigné distend les parois et éclate/ il est un temps de mourir et un temps de ne pas mourir/ de révolte perpétuelle/ Un temps de folie et de haine ?// SANS DOUTE ! » ([*Toute l'histoire me suit*]¹⁹). Fuir le temps de folie et de haine, marcher jusqu'à l'épuisement, voilà la solution existentielle du juif errant.

En ce qui concerne la relation entre la poésie et la guerre, l'écrivain avait clairement soutenue sa position dans une *Enquête sur la guerre et la poésie* de 1940, en affirmant qu'«en général, on ne fait jamais de la poésie avec de la matière brute, vivante, actuelle. Il faut travailler cette matière, l'accrocher aux centres imaginatifs, rendre active une espèce de passivité, bref, il faut prendre du recul (...) On ne fait de la poésie qu'avec du passé.»²⁰.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

¹⁶ *Idem*, *Le mal des fantômes*, in *op. cit.*, p. 111.

¹⁷ *Idem*, *Ulysse*, in *Op. Cit.*, p. 48.

¹⁸ Ecaterina Grün, *La route chez Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane et Ilarie Voronca*, Cordes sur Ciel: Rafael de Surtis Editions, 2006, p. 11.

¹⁹ Benjamin Fondane, *Titanic*, in *op. cit.*, p. 188.

²⁰ *Idem*, «Enquête sur la guerre et la poésie», in *Cahiers Benjamin Fondane*, no. 6, 2003, pp. 50-51.

Malheureusement, Benjamin Fondane n'aura pas l'occasion de prendre du recul pour écrire sur la guerre, car, avalé dès son présent, la guerre ne deviendra jamais pour lui du passé. Pourtant, il la thématise non seulement en réfléchissant aux autres («Et je pense à ceux/ que la guerre essaime./ os à peine vieux/ âmes qu'on écrème,// soit qu'on ai sur eux penché le poème(...)\», V²¹), mais aussi en se repositionnant lui-même par rapport aux autres, c'est-à-dire par rapport à une société injuste qui juge et condamne avec indifférence les différences, tout en ignorant les similitudes. Révolté contre cette cécité morale, Fondane passe, dans la *Préface en prose*²² écrite en 1942, d'un «(...) Oui, j'ai été un homme comme les autres hommes, (...)» à un «(...) Et pourtant non!/ je n'étais pas un homme comme vous./ Vous n'êtes pas nés sur les routes,/ personne n'a jeté à l'égout vos petits/ comme des chats encor sans yeux/ vous n'avez pas erré de cité en cité/ traqués par les polices,/ vous n'avez pas connu les désastres à l'aube,/ les wagons de bestiaux/ et le sanglot amer de l'humiliation/ accusés d'un délit que vous n'avez pas fait,/ d'un meurtre dont il manque encore le cadavre,/ (...) Un jour viendra, sans doute, quand le poème lu/ se trouvera devant vos yeux. Il ne demande/ rien! Oubliez-le, oubliez-le! Ce n'est qu'on cri, qu'on ne peut pas mettre dans un poème/ parfait, avais-je donc le temps de le finir?/ Mais quand vous foulerez ce bouquet d'orties/ qui avait été moi, dans un autre siècle,/ en une histoire qui vous sera périmée,/ souvenez-vous seulement que j'étais innocent/ et que, tout comme vous, mortels de ce jour-là,/ j'avais eu, moi aussi, un visage marqué/ par la colère, par la pitié et la joie,// un visage d'homme, tout simplement!». Âpre réquisitoire d'une discrimination criminelle, ce poème, rédigé deux ans avant la mort de l'écrivain à Auschwitz, effraye par son pouvoir d'anticipation. En effet, dans un autre siècle, quand l'histoire *semble* périmée, le poème nous rappelle le cri de l'innocence. Le jour est venu.

Ilarie Voronca (1903-1946)

Patronyme littéraire d'Eduard Marcus, Ilarie Voronca est lui aussi un poète d'origine juive né en Roumanie, à Brăila, en 1903 qui s'établit à Paris en 1925, après avoir animé le milieu avant-gardiste roumain et

²¹ *Idem*, *Au temps du poème et Poèmes épars*, in *Le mal de fantômes*, préface de David Gascoyne et Patrice Reousseau, Paris: Plasma, 1980, p. 281.

²² *Idem*, *L'exode*, in *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

théorisé *l'intégralisme*, une synthèse à bases constructivistes réunissant futurisme, dadaïsme et surréalisme. Membre de la Résistance et collaborateur des *Cahiers du Sud* tout comme Tzara et Fondane, Ilarie Voronca n'a pas survécu longtemps à la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, tel que Tzara, mais il n'a pas été non plus sa victime directe, comme Fondane, l'écrivain se suicidant, en 1946, suite à une déception amoureuse²³.

Ses poèmes écrits sur la guerre ne ressemblent eux non plus ni aux textes de Tzara, ni à ceux de Fondane. Contrairement au désenchantement sobre du premier et au ton tragique du second, la poésie de guerre de Voronca est, au moment 1940, d'un optimisme péremptoire: «Rien n'obscurcira la beauté de ce monde/ Les pleurs peuvent inonder toute la vision. La souffrance/ Peut enfoncer ses griffes dans la gorge, Le regret,/ L'amertume, peuvent élever leurs murailles de cendre,/ La lâcheté, la haine, peuvent étendre leur nuit,/ Rien n'obscurcira la beauté de ce monde (...)» (*Beauté de ce monde*²⁴). Deux ans plus tard, les poésies ne nomment pas les ravages de la guerre, mais ceux-ci commencent à transparaitre à travers les monologues que le moi passé au pluriel adresse à la nature, problématisant la nécessité de reconstruire le monde. *Les témoins*²⁵ («Vous, arbres, oiseaux, rivières,/ Nous vous avons chassés de nos cités,/ Vous étiez des témoins trop sévères,/ Trop clairvoyants dans votre cité (...)») et *Les bâtisseurs*²⁶ («Nous allons construire une maison (...)/ Apportez tous vos espoirs, vos pensées généreuses/ Nos demeures jamais ne seront des prisons/ Avec du ciel, de l'air, de musiques heureuses/ Avec nos joies et nos rires, nous construirons une maison») servent d'exemple. Puisqu'il vit avec la peur que le monde disloqué par la guerre ne pourra pas être réparé («(...) ceux qui dorment ne craignent-ils pas qu'à leur réveil/ Les morceaux épars du monde ne s'emboîtent plus?(...)», *Refaire le monde*²⁷), le poète commence à éprouver le besoin de le réinventer: «J'ai de belles promenades, des heures limpides,/ Mais nulle ville pour les accueillir. (...)// Oh! villes aujourd'hui si sombres/ Qui chassez ma ferveur de vos seuils/ J'arrache ici vos vêtements

²³ V. Carol Iancu, *Ilarie Voronca*, «12 scrisori inedite către Saul Axelrud», in *Apostrof*, nr. 6 (253), 2016 [http://www.revista-apostrof.ro/articole.php?id=1480], 8.07.2016.

²⁴ Ilarie Voronca, *Beauté de ce monde*, in *Poeme alese*, anthologie et traductions de Sașa Pană, tome II, Bucarest: Minerva, 1972, p. 188.

²⁵ *Idem*, *Les témoins*, in *Ibidem*, p. 233.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ *Idem*, *Contre-solitude*, in *op. cit.*, p. 284.

d'ombre/ Et vos brassards de guerre et de deuils.» (*Villes à inventer*²⁸). Tout doit être donc reconfiguré en fonction de la sensibilité de l'écrivain dont les « poèmes sont le témoignage, combien authentique, de l'éclatante sympathie humaine qui rayonnait de lui »²⁹.

Cette sympathie humaine que Tzara appréciait chez Voronca est visible aussi dans *Août 1942*³⁰ texte où le poète demande pardon aux combattants pour ne les avoir pas rejoints aux armes : « Je vous demande pardon, homme qui combattez/ Pour la liberté, vous qui tressez de vos sangs/ Des fouets pour chasser l'envahisseur/ Je vous demande pardon d'être à l'abri dans une ferme// (...) Ce n'est pas de mon âme mais de mon corps que vous avez besoin/ Et ma plume devrait être arme à feu, mes paroles des balles/ Mes mains convalescentes devraient nouer des fils barbelés/ Mais j'écris ce poème homme qui combattez// (...) Vivant de votre vie, mourant de vos morts/ Que ce poème soit faucon au poing du chasseur/ Qu'il soit aussi pigeon voyageur portant le message/ Que l'homme est libre, homme qui combattez. ». La posture du poète est extrêmement intéressante dans la mesure où elle contient un renvoi biographique (au refuge de Voronca à Marseille durant la guerre) qui reçoit une justification très sereine: «Ce n'est pas de mon âme mais de mon corps que vous avez besoin». Comme si le poète n'avait pas de corps, mais seulement de l'âme, il n'arriverait pas à être utile au combat. C'est pourquoi il préfère de mener sa propre lutte, à la plume, au nom de la liberté qui est un miracle: «Nul parmi nous ne sait comment s'est accompli ce miracle,/ Il y a un instant, nous étions des mendiants, des esclaves,/ Et nous voici soudain libres. (...)» (*Nous sommes des princes*³¹).

Si l'homme *intégral* de Voronca est, selon Christophe Dauphin, «un homme de joie et de fraternité»³², c'est au nom de celui-ci que la poésie *Où sont les hommes?* s'écrit, afin de rappeler que tout peut être récupéré d'une catastrophe moins l'homme: «(...) Quand nous souhaiterons enfin une présence humaine/ Quand nous aurons besoin d'une voix humaine/ Quand

²⁸ *Idem*, *Răzlețe*, in *op. cit.*, p. 342.

²⁹ Tristan Tzara, *Introduction*, in Ilarie Voronca, *Poèmes choisis*, portrait de l'auteur par Marc Chagall, Paris: Seghers, 1967, p. 8.

³⁰ Ilarie Voronca, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-341.

³¹ *Idem*, p. 85-86.

³² Cristophe Dauphin, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

l'homme que nous avons meurtri, crucifié/ pourra nous faire du bien avec son regard qui pardonne// C'est en vain que nous irons dans les prisons/ C'est en vain que nous appellerons dans les chambres de torture/ C'est en vain que dans les camps de la maladie et de la faim/ Nous irons recueillir ce qui reste de l'homme (...).» Projeté dans l'avenir, de même que la *Préface en prose* de Fondane, le poème de Voronca est dominé plutôt par la déception résignée que par la révolte. Son présage est un regret à la fois pour l'humanité tuée et pour l'humanité qui tue. Ainsi, au fur et à mesure, l'optimisme des années antérieures qui reconstruisait le monde cède sa place à la confusion, car l'avenir devient de plus en plus difficile à prévoir: «Ceux qui naissent en ce moment/ Ignorent les mots des obus et de balles,/ Ils n'entendent les roues de la pluie/ Qui broient leurs pères dans la boue./ (...) Où déposer clartés et rires?/ Le vent marche comme un aveugle,/ Il cherche des épis de blé/ Et ne trouve que baïonnettes.» («1943»³³). Trois ans plus tard, le «poète du bonheur et de la joie»³⁴ et «de cet amour pourtant si vaste [qui] n'est hélas qu'entrevu et non atteint»³⁵ n'allait trouver lui non plus aucune place dans sa vie pour déposer clartés et rires.

Claude Sernet (1902-1968)

Né à Târgu Ocna, Roumanie, en 1902, Claude Sernet, connu aussi pour son pseudonyme roumain Mihail Cosma et moins connu peut-être pour son nom réel Ernest Spirt, est un poète roumain d'origine juive, ami très proche de Fondane et beau-frère de Voronca. Dans ce carré de poètes roumains d'avant-garde établis à Paris dans l'entre-deux-guerres, il est le dernier à y arriver, en 1926, après avoir fini ses études en Italie. Durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, il a un trajet similaire à celui de Benjamin Fondane, étant incorporé en 1939 à Fontainebleau, fait prisonnier en 1940 pour s'évader finalement en 1941 et devenir membre de la Résistance. Il n'aura toutefois la fin tragique de son ami, car il sera, à côté de Tristan Tzara, celui qui survivra le plus à la guerre, s'éteignant en 1968.

Pareil à ses compatriotes, Claude Sernet n'arrive pas à taire la guerre, même si la poésie de circonstance est très loin des prérogatives avant-gardistes. C'est pourquoi, l'expérience de la guerre, à commencer par

³³ Ilarie Voronca, *Poèmes inédits*, Gard: Guy Chambelland Editeur, 1964, p. 289.

³⁴ Cristophe Dauphin, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

celle d'Espagne, fait son apparition dans l'œuvre du poète persuadé que le vrai malheur est justement celui d'ignorer le malheur: «(...) On tue, on frappe, on emprisonne –/ Serions-nous les complices du bourreau?/ Le crime est de laisser le crime/ Le vrai malheur est de le taire (...)» (*De l'Espagne à la Grèce*³⁶). Cette sensibilité pour le deuil du peuple espagnol le rapproche à Tristan Tzara dont la poésie n'était pourtant si visiblement engagée que la sienne: «Il faut que nous trouvions encore/ Les mots pour dire au crime: non! (...)» (*Pour Pablo Neruda*³⁷). D'ailleurs, chez Sernet l'engagement semble être un sacrifice nécessaire de l'esthétique en faveur de l'éthique, le seul possible afin de nommer le sacrifice des autres pour la mise en garde des générations suivantes: «(...) Un homme est mort parmi tant d'autres hommes/ Criant vers l'avenir le nom de l'espérance/ De la justice et de la liberté/ Un homme est mort qui saigne et lutte encore/ Forgeant d'amour les armes de ses frères/ Ton chaud printemps de joie de d'innocence/ Ton sort meilleur que ne l'était le nôtre (...)» (*Le Souvenir de Gabriel Péri*³⁸). Adressé à sa fille Catherine, le poème est dédié à la mémoire de Gabriel Péri, journaliste et homme politique français, résistant, fusillé par les Allemands en 1941 après avoir été retenu comme otage. Il y a, dans ces exemples de poésie engagée par rapport à la guerre, un changement de ton par rapport à la création antérieure, dont Michel Gourdet a déjà parlé: «Ses poèmes d'avant-guerre nous avaient surtout habitués à écouter les plaintes d'un homme pour qui l'espoir restait encore possible grâce à l'exercice de l'art. Dans la rupture de la guerre, le symbolisme et l'avant-garde ne sont plus suffisants pour tendre un barrage contre ce qu'il avait appelé 'son mal de vivre'»³⁹. En conséquence, ce «mal de vivre» se reflète dans le discours poétique durant les années de guerre comme un devoir de la mémoire individuelle envers la mémoire collective: «(...) Si ma mémoire est comme un arbre/ Ne fais jamais s'y taire/ Le frêle oiseau du souvenir// Perdue ici, rejointe ailleurs/ Inaccessible pour toujours// Aux jours de fièvre et de révolte/ Quel cri sera plus fort qu'un chant?» (*Coeur*³⁹). Il y a là plus

³⁶ Claude Sernet, *Poèmes dus*, Paris: Pierre Seghers éditeur, 1949, p. 17.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

³⁸ *Idem*, *Jour après Jour*, Paris: Pierre Seghers Editeur, 1951, pp. 22-23.

³⁹ Michel Gourdet, *Claude Sernet*, coll. «Les Roumains de Paris», dirigée par Basarab Nicolescu, Paris: OXUS, 2005, p. 149.

³⁹ Claude Sernet, *Fidèle infidèle*, in *Les pas recomptés*, Paris: Pierre Seghers Editeur, 1962, p. 174.

que de l'empathie pour la souffrance commune, il y a une responsabilité civique que le poète ne s'attarde pas à assumer: «(...) Douleur, je te reviens – Entends souffrir les hommes/ Si rien ne doit changer, restons souffrir près d'eux/ Si vivre est un remords, brûlons ce que nous sommes/ Je t'abattraï partant! – Restons tous seuls, tous deux.» (*Je suis un prisonnier*⁴⁰). Prisonnier de la douleur collective, le poète lui prête souvent sa voix, tendance fréquente chez Sernet qui assume également la révolte du monde entier et de l'individu singulier, le cas de son ami Benjamin Fondane, disparu à Auschwitz: «(...) J'assumerai ta veille et ta révolte/ Toi, mon aîné, mon frère, mon ami (...)» (*Super flumina Babylonis*⁴¹).

Vers la fin de la guerre, Claude Sernet va aussi assumer, comme la plupart des intellectuels de l'époque, un discours pacifiste («(...) – LA PAIX VAINCRA LA GUERRE/ La liberté vaincra la haine/ Les yeux de nos enfants vaincra la mort! (...)», *Le Deuxième Congrès Mondial des Partisans de la Paix*⁴¹) qui penchera vers le militantisme procommuniste, allant jusqu'aux hommages en vers à Staline à l'occasion de son 70^{ème} anniversaire. Pourtant, dans un *Essai d'autocritique*⁴², le poète avertira que ses engagements ne doivent pas être jugés que dans le contexte historique qui les a vu naître: «(...) – Enfants de nos enfants, merveille à naître/ (...) Vous les lointains chercheurs de témoignage/ (...) Ne me jugez selon vos certitudes/ Vos libertés, vos lois heureuses/ Et n'oubliez, malgré mes francs retours de joie/ Que je vivrais en France/ En mil neuf cent cinquante et un!». C'est pourquoi ce contexte historique ne doit pas échapper au regard du lecteur actuel.

Quatre poètes face à la guerre

Poètes roumains d'origine juive et d'expression française, Tristan Tzara, Benjamin Fondane, Ilarie Voronca et Claude Sernet ont vécu les horreurs de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale dans la France sous l'Occupation. Ils ont tous été membres de la Résistance, mais ils n'ont pas thématiqué la guerre de la même manière, car chacun l'a vécue selon sa destinée et perçue selon sa sensibilité. Réfugié à Souillac, Tristan Tzara a

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 60.

⁴¹ *Apud* Petre Raileanu, Michel Carassou, *op. cit.*, p.129.

⁴¹ Claude Sernet, *Jour après Jour*, Paris: Pierre Seghers Editeur, 1951, p. 27.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

choisi le silence durant les années de guerre et il a publié ensuite quelques poèmes qui se distinguent surtout par la désillusion sobre. N'ayant trouvé de refuge que dans la mort, Benjamin Fondane est disparu dans une chambre à gaz à Auschwitz, laissant derrière lui une œuvre poétique dominée par les angoisses tragiques du juif errant vivant sa propre expérience du gouffre. Quant à Ilarie Voronca, réfugié à Marseille, il s'est accroché dans ses poèmes à la vision optimiste de la beauté triomphante pour succomber peu à peu au désenchantement. Finalement, Claude Sernet a choisi d'engager sa poésie dans un combat contre l'indifférence et l'oubli de cet événement qui, avant de marquer des œuvres, a jalonné des vies. Malgré toutes les différences de vision ou d'expression, subsiste dans l'œuvre de ces quatre poètes en temps de guerre l'impossibilité du silence.

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MIGRATIONSPROZESSE UND DIE FRAGE NACH DER GERECHTIGKEIT

MIGRATION PROCESSES AND THE QUESTION ABOUT JUSTICE

Roxana Stoenescu*

Zusammenfassung:

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Untersuchung der verschiedenen Formen der Migrationsprozesse in West- und Osteuropa. Inhalt und Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Untersuchung der Probleme der Abwanderung von Arbeitsmigranten aus Entwicklungs- bzw. Schwellenländern wie Rumänien und der Zuwanderung von Migranten in Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Dabei soll die Frage nach der (Un-) Gerechtigkeit geprüft werden. Deshalb zieht die vorliegende Forschung einen Vergleich zwischen den Verhältnissen der Armut und des Wohlstandes.

Schlüsselwörter: Migrationsprozesse, (Un-)Gerechtigkeit, Armut, Arbeitsmigration, Wohlstand

* Roxana Stoenescu has been, since 2011, a Ph.D. student at the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Faculty for European Studies. The subject of her dissertation is „Work and existence. Metaphysics of modern society on the example of Romania.“ She has been, since December 2011, Junior-fellow at ZEWI, received a DAAD scholarship and is visiting Ph.D. student at the Bavarian Ph.D. Collegium „Political Theory“.

Contact: lenasvincent@yahoo.com.

Abstract:

The present work consists in researching the different forms of migration processes in Western and Eastern Europe. The topic and aim of this paper is to examine the issues of emigration or movement of labour force from the developing or emerging countries like Romania and the immigration of individuals in welfare states. These include the question about (in-)justice and how to deal with it. Therefore, this present research draws a comparison between the relations of poverty and wealth (prosperity).

Keywords: Migration processes, (in-)justice, poverty, work/labour migration, wealth/prosperity

Die Probleme, mit denen sich die heutigen europäischen Gesellschaften, auseinanderzusetzen haben, wurden durch die ökonomischen Folgen des Neoliberalismus und der ohnehin weitgehend eingeschränkten Demokratie – im Sinne der eingeschränkten Volkssouveränität –, durch den derzeitigen „Migrationsprozess“ um einiges sichtbar. Die religiösen und politischen Flüchtlinge die anderen Kulturkreisen, als denen der (christlichen) Demokratien angehören, untermauern mit ihren Einwanderungen in Europa die Probleme, die aufgrund der „Chrematistik“¹ der kapitalistisch entwickelten Länder und der „Ungleichzeitigkeiten“² der „demokratischen Entwicklungs- und Modernisierungsprozesse“ entstehen können. Von „liberaler Marktwirtschaft“ im Sinne von Adam Smiths *The Wealth of Nations* konnte in anderen Gebieten außer dem „Westen“ kaum wirklich je die Rede gewesen sein.³ So blieb ohne die liberale Marktwirtschaft auch die kapitalistische Entwicklung dieser Länder aus und folglich auch der

¹ Vgl. Aristoteles, *Politik*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2003, S. 81; 98 und Vgl. André Gorz, *Die Kritik der ökonomischen Vernunft*, Zürich: Rotpunktverlag, 2010, S. 369, zit. n. D. Übersetzung Olof Gigons, München 1973, S. 59 ff.

² Vgl. Reinhart Koselleck, „Fortschritt“, in Otto Brunner (Hg.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Vol. II (E-G), Stuttgart, 1994, S. 351-423; Achim Landwehr, „Von der ‚Gleichzeitigkeit‘ des ‚Ungleichzeitigen‘“, In Andreas Fahrmeier/ Lothar Gall (Hg.), *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 295, Heft 1, Aug. 2012, München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012.

³ Angela Harre, „Conceptul de progres: relația conflictuală dintre liberalism și intervenția statală“, [dt. „Das Konzept des Progresses: Die konfliktuelle Beziehung zwischen Liberalismus und staatlichem Interventionismus“], In: Victor Neumann/ Armin Heinen (Hg.), *Istoria Romaniei prin concepte - perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice*, [dt. *Die Geschichte Rumäniens mittels alternativer Konzepte – Perspektiven der sozial-politischen Sprachen*], Bucuresti: Polirom, 2010, S. 177.

Wohlstand und die damit verbundenen kulturellen Entwicklungsprozesse.

Die imperialistischen Mächte Europas haben am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts unter der Herrschaft der Monarchien verschiedene Regionen und Kontinente durch Fremdherrschaft besetzt und jegliche Modernisierungsbestrebungen der einheimischen Bevölkerungen unterbunden.⁴ Die Folgen dieser imperialistischen Politik und der damit einhergehenden ausgelassenen Modernisierungsetappen und der fehlenden Implementierung moderner sozio-ökonomischer Strukturen in diese Gesellschaften, sind die Ursache für den derzeitigen *Clash of civilization*.⁵

Prägend für Gesellschaften der zweiten und dritten Weltländer sind folglich die „materialistischen“ Wertorientierungen, die auf „ökonomische Gewinne zielen“ und weniger den „postmaterialistischen“ Wertorientierungen entsprechen, die auf die „Verfeinerung des Lebensstils“ zielen und den Erste Weltländern zugesprochen werden.⁶ Die Dimensionen von Wertorientierungen teilen sich nach der Analyse Ronald Ingleharts auf ein breiteres Kategoriensystem von „Überlebens – vs. Selbstentfaltungswerte“ aus und können auf zwei weitere analytische Dimension der „traditionalen“ und „säkular - rationalen“, Orientierung übertragbar sein.⁷ Für die „Zweite und Dritte Weltländer“⁸ trifft vorrangig die Wertorientierung des traditionell – religiösen Categoriesystems zu, das mit den „Überlebenswerten“ in Verbindung gebracht wird, während die „Erste Weltländer“ dem Categoriesystem der Selbstentfaltungswerten angehören und eine säkular – rationale Wertorientierung aufweisen.⁹

Die jahrelange politische und ökonomische Rückständigkeit der Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer, die anhaltende Korruption ihrer

⁴*Ibidem.*

⁵Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Great Britain: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 1997.

⁶Helmut Thome, „Wertewandel in Europa“, in Hans Joas/ Klaus Wiegandt (Hg.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005, S. 391.

⁷*Ibidem.*, S. 403-404.

⁸Vgl. Daniel Bell, *Die Nachindustrielle Gesellschaft*, Einleitung, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1975, S. 20-48.

⁹Vgl. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernisierung und Postmodernisierung. Kultureller, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Wandel in 3 Gesellschaften*, Frankfurt/ New York, 1998, S. 396-407; Ronald Inglehart; Wayne Baker, „Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values“, in *American Sociological Review*, 2000.

Führungseliten¹⁰ und die fehlende kulturelle Entwicklung dieser Länder begünstigen neben Faktoren, wie der (*Zivil*)religion¹¹ die Abwanderung aus diesen Regionen und massenhafte Ein- oder Zuwanderung von Armutsflüchtlingen nach Europa. Der Migrationsprozess mit dem sich derzeitige EU-Länder konfrontiert sehen, betrifft die Zuwanderung von Flüchtlingsmigranten,¹² die aus politischen, religiösen oder ökonomischen Gründen vertrieben wurden, geflohen sind oder einfach abwandern mussten, weil sich die Lebensbedingungen in ihren Ländern dramatisch verschlechtert hat. Damit in Zusammenhang erstarken nationalistische und populistische Bewegungen innerhalb der europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten, da die Migrationsprozesse (ethnischer und konfessioneller) Minderheiten¹³ von nationalistischen Bewegungen als Störfaktor betrachtet werden, weil sie innerhalb eines „homogenen“ Nationalkonstruktes weiterhin mit dem „Fremden“¹⁴ assoziiert werden.

Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt deshalb die Ambivalenz des Wohlstandes. Ambivalent, weil die Migrationsprozesse aus Gründen der Armut entstehen und besonders die Länder Europas von der Ein- oder Zuwanderung der „Armutsmigranten“ betroffen sind, die kapitalistisch entwickelt sind und einen gewissen ökonomischen Wohlstand erreicht

¹⁰ Europäische Kommission, Bericht der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat, Über Rumäniens Fortschritte im Rahmen des Kooperations- und Kontrollverfahrens, Brüssel, 27. 1. 2016, S. 11, [http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2016_41_de.pdf], 30 Mai 2016.

¹¹ Vgl. Eric, Vogelin, *Die neue Wissenschaft der Politik*, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004 S. 171- 172 und Vgl. Walter, Rothholz, *Die politische Dimension des Seelischen bei Platon*, Universität Szczecin.

¹² Vgl. Moritz Muecke, *Ein geistiger Vorhang zieht sich durch Europa*, 28.07. 2016, [http://www.achgut.com/artikel/ein_geistiger_vorhang_zieht_sich_durch_europa], 29.07.2016. und Vgl. Gerd Held, *Im Gefängnis der Worte (2): Die Rede von „den Flüchtlingen“*, 20.07. 2016, [http://www.achgut.com/artikel/im_gebraengnis_der_worte_folge_2]

¹³ Vgl. Georg Kneer, „Nationalstaat, Migration und Minderheiten. Ein Beitrag zur Soziogenese von ethnischen Minoritäten“, in Armin Nassehi (Hg.), *Nation Ethnie, Minderheit. Beiträge zur Aktualität ethnischer Konflikte*, Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1997, S. 86.

¹⁴ Vgl. Wolfgang Reinhard, *Lebensformen Europas, Eine historische Kulturanthropologie*, München: C.H. Beck, 2006, S. 325-330: „Im „Fremden“ sind die Nicht – Sesshaften - also die Nomaden und das fahrende Volk mit inbegriffen, da ein vollwertiges Mitglied der (europäischen - besonders abendländischen) Gesellschaft(-en), seit ihrem Auftauchen im 15. Jahrhundert, nur ein verheirateter Mann mit Haus und Hof war.“

haben, während der „arme Osten Europas“ keine Migrationszuflüsse, sondern „Abwanderungsströme“ erfährt. Zugleich werden das Konstrukt der Europäischen Union und ihre Prinzipien der Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit, durch die Migrationsprozesse herausgefordert, da die Grundsätze der Demokratie wie z.B. die Fragen nach der „(Un-)Gerechtigkeit“ ganz neu gestellt werden müssen.

Über die (Un-)Gerechtigkeit

In diesem Sinne ist es nützlich, die Theorie des Politikwissenschaftlers Rainer Forst heranzuziehen, der sich mit dem Thema der Gerechtigkeit bzw. der gerechten Distribution von Gütern auseinandersetzt und damit die Frage der ökonomischen Gerechtigkeit politisch aufwirft. Die Politik ist seines Erachtens dafür verantwortlich, die ökonomische Produktion von Waren und Gütern zu steuern und die *gerechte Organisation* dieser zu sichern, indem sie über die *Strukturen der Produktion und der Verteilung* entscheidet.¹⁵ Daraus erwächst seiner Meinung nach die *eigentlich grundlegende Forderung der Gerechtigkeit*, die in dem *Anspruch auf Güter* besteht, der nicht einfach *vorhanden* ist, sondern *diskursiv in entsprechenden Rechtfertigungsverfahren ermittelt werden kann*, an der sich *alle als Freie und Gleiche beteiligen wollen*.¹⁶ Schlussendlich stellt Forst fest, dass die güterfixierte Sichtweise die Frage der Ungerechtigkeit auslöst, da primär die Frage nach der Verteilung der Güter im Vordergrund steht und nicht die Ursache des Gütermangels oder der „ungerechten“ Güterverteilung. Seiner Meinung nach wird dadurch die Frage nach Gerechtigkeit nicht ausdifferenziert, die ja den Fragen der *Ausbeutung und des Unrechts* nachgehen müsste, und *differenziert nach der Art von Übel* fragen müsste.¹⁷ Die politische Frage drängt sich für Forst in Zusammenhang mit der Gerechtigkeit dann auf, wenn es um den Anspruch und dem *Grund - Recht* auf eine legitime Rechtfertigung politischer und sozialer Verhältnisse geht. Das bedeutet, dass alle politischen und sozialen Verhältnisse und die dafür vorgenommenen Maßnahmen seitens der „Macht“ gegenüber der

¹⁵ Rainer Forst, „Transnationale Gerechtigkeit und Demokratie: Zur Überwindung von drei Dogmen der politischen Theorie“, in Peter Niesen (Hg.), *Transnationale Gerechtigkeit und Demokratie*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2012, S. 31.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

Bevölkerung „adäquat“ gerechtfertigt werden müssen, da es ansonsten eine „Willkürherrschaft“ also *eine unzureichend gerechtfertigte Herrschaft ohne Grund* ¹⁸wäre; *es in der Gerechtigkeit aber darum geht wer bestimmt, wer was erhält.*¹⁹

Für Forst liegt die Ungerechtigkeit vor allem in der Ausschließung von Personen oder Gruppen am Produktionsprozess und der Güterverteilung, da Gerechtigkeit sich für ihn über die *gleichberechtigte Teilnahme der Mitglieder eines gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhanges an der sozialen und politischen Rechtfertigungsordnung*²⁰ konstituiert. Hierbei geht es vor allem um die gerechte Miteinbeziehung aller Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft in die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entscheidungsprozesse, um einen möglichst chancengleichen Zugang auf jedwelchen Wettbewerb innerhalb eines gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhanges zu ermöglichen, auf das sich der neoliberale Markt einer Demokratie gründet. Nun betrachten aber die Mitglieder vieler nationalistischer und populistischer Bewegungen innerhalb der EU-Länder, die „gerechte“ Einbeziehung von Migranten in die nationalen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entscheidungsprozesse, um die Chance ihrer „Integration“ erhöhen zu können, nicht als *gerecht*, sondern viel eher als eine an ihren Rechten – wie der Volkssouveränität – verübte *Ungerechtigkeit*.

Ohne diese gerechte Miteinbeziehung und dem Zugang aller Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft in und auf „öffentliche“ Entscheidungsprozesse bleibt die Chancengleichheit im neoliberalen Wettbewerb aber aus, durch das die Grundprinzipien und Werte der Demokratie Missachtung erfahren und das demokratische System lediglich formal funktionsfähig wirkt.

Wie sich diese *Ungerechtigkeit* angesichts der rumänischen (Arbeits-) Migrationsprozesse manifestiert, wird nun im Folgenden näher zu betrachten sein, um abschließend feststellen zu können, wie es gegenwärtig um die *Gerechtigkeit* der europäischen Demokratie steht.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, S. 33.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

Arbeitsmigration - eine Folge der Ungerechtigkeit

Die Migration der Bevölkerungsanteile ehemaliger Ostblockstaaten, die aufgrund schlechter ökonomischer Verhältnisse ihre Länder verlassen, um in besser gestellten EU-Ländern Arbeit zu finden, sorgt seit der „Flüchtlingkrise“ für weniger Aufruhr, als es bislang immer der Fall war.

Die Arbeitsmigration der Rumänen aufgrund der ökonomischen und sozialen Probleme, ist besonders den ineffizienten politischen Entscheidungsmechanismen verschuldet, die bis heute keine wirksamen Maßnahmen einsetzen konnten, um die ökonomischen und folglich sozialen Probleme des Landes wirksam und langfristig zu beheben.

Die neoliberalen Dogmen in einer ohnehin schon sehr schwachen und jungen Demokratie haben diesen Zustand noch um einiges verschärft. Die ökonomischen Fakten wie die Arbeitslosenquoten nach der Krise von 2008/09 sprechen für diese sozialen Schwierigkeiten des Landes. Daneben sind Probleme, wie das rural - urban Gefälle und der niedrige Bildungsgrad weitere ausschlaggebende Gründe für die massenhafte Abwanderung der Rumänen.

Rumänien war nach dem EU-Beitritt 2007 ganz besonders von der internationalen Börsen- und Finanzkrise von 2008/2009 betroffen,²¹ so dass der rumänische Staat, um nicht bankrott zu gehen, vermehrt auf große internationale Hilfspakete (emergency assistance package) vom IWF (Internationalen Währungsfonds), der EU und anderen internationalen Kreditgebern angewiesen war und sich genötigt sah, von 2009-2011 ein Hilfspaket im Wert von bis zu 26 Mio. Dollar zu unterzeichnen, der von weiteren Verträgen, Beschlüssen und Hilfspaketen in den nächsten Jahren gefolgt war.²² So entstand 2009 nach den hohen Zuwachsraten plötzlich ein Minuswachstum der Wirtschaftsleistung. Rumänien weist heute wieder ein höheres BIP als 2008/09 auf, da Kreditgeber und der Foreign Direct

²¹ Vgl. Philipp Ther, *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent. Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2014, S. 228; Bis 2008 lag der BIP Rumäniens pro Kopf in Kaufkraftstandards in Prozent des EU-27 Durchschnitts bei 47 % aufgrund der Angleichung Rumäniens an die EU durch die FDI und den Transferzahlungen.

²² Eubusiness, *Romania: Country overview*, 12. 07. 2012, last modified 29. 05. 2014, [<http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/romania>], siehe auch Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung, IWF: Rumänische Regierung hat Kredite zurückgezahlt, September 2015, [<http://www.adz.ro/inland/artikel-inland/artikel/iwf-rumaenische-regierung-hat-kredite-zurueckgezahlt/>], abgerufen am 07.06.2016 um 13.17 Uhr.

Investment (FDI) Rumänien vor dem Staatsbankrott retteten, allerdings die hohe Staatsverschuldung zur Folge hatte.²³ In der Krise von 2008/2009 und der hohen Verschuldung,²⁴ sah sich der rumänische Staat, der ohnehin mit diversen Strukturproblemen zu kämpfen hatte,²⁵ gezwungen drastische Sparmaßnahmen einzuleiten, die besonders die Sozialausgaben betrafen.

Die Kürzung der Sozialausgaben, vor allem des Arbeitslosen-, Kinder- und Rentnergeldes, evozierte einen enormen Bevölkerungsrückgang bzw. starke Migrations- und Abwanderungswellen der Bevölkerung. Betroffen von den Sparmaßnahmen waren vor allem die weniger städtisch entwickelten Gebiete Rumäniens und die rurale Bevölkerung, da ein weiteres Problem darin bestand, dass sich die Investitionsstandorte der ausländischen Konzerne auf die größeren Städte Rumäniens konzentrierten.²⁶ Die Großkonzerne errichteten ihre Stützpunkte in und um Städte wie Bukarest, Klausenburg oder Temeswar, nicht zuletzt auch, weil die Infrastruktur des Landes bis heute noch nicht effizient ausgebaut ist. Produktion, Angebot und Nachfrage von Arbeitsplätzen und Konsumgütern wurde somit in den urbanen Gebieten des Landes konzentriert, was ein enormes Gefälle zwischen den ruralen

²³ Vgl. Philipp Ther, *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent*, S. 232- 233, 234.

²⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, Rumänien - Wirtschaft, [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Rumaenien/Wirtschaft_node.html], 23. 06. 2016: „Die private Nachfrage hat sich vom starken Einbruch im Zusammenhang mit der internationalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise erholt. Die Umsätze des Einzelhandels stiegen in den ersten neun Monaten 2015 um 12 %. Nachdem die Inflation bereits Ende 2014 historische Tiefststände erreichte, lag sie im Oktober 2015 bei -1, 4 %. Hauptgrund hierfür ist die Senkung der Mehrwertsteuer auf Lebensmittel, die einen großen Anteil am maßgeblichen Warenkorb haben. Laut der Nationalbank drohe aber keine Deflation, da der Konsum weiter steige und die Öffentlichkeit keine Deflationserwartungen hege. Die Nationalbank geht für 2015 von einer Jahresinflation von -0, 7 % aus. Für 2016 wird eine Inflation von 1, 1 % prognostiziert. Die öffentliche Verschuldung bleibt mit rund 40 % des BIP im Vergleich überschaubar.“

²⁵ Vgl. Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)/ Council of Europe, *Fourth Evaluation Round, (Evaluation Report Romania), Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors*, Strasbourg, Adoption: 4. Dezember 2015, Publication: 22. Januar 2016, [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/Eval%20IV/GrecoEval4%282015%294_Romania_EN.pdf], 30. 06. 2016.

²⁶ Vgl. topagrar online, *Rumänien: Viel Land und wenig Geld*, Ausgabe 01/2010, [<http://www.topagrar.com/archiv/Rumaenien-Viel-Land-und-wenig-Geld-561814.html>], 27. 06. 2016.

und urbanen Gebiete und der ländlichen und städtischen Bevölkerung Rumäniens verursacht hat und gewaltige soziale Probleme nach sich zog.²⁷

Durch den Einzug der ausländischen Konzerne und der vermehrten Einfuhr westlicher Konsumprodukte nach Rumänien, ging die regionale Produktion der Bauern und Betriebe dramatisch zurück, viele wurden in den Ruin getrieben und es fehlte an staatlichen Subventionen oder politischen Gegenmaßnahmen.²⁸ Dies war einerseits den staatlichen Strukturproblemen Rumäniens zu verdanken, andererseits aber auch der neoliberalen Ideologie, die den Staat und seine Handlungsmöglichkeiten restringierte. Angesichts dieser ökonomischen Krise in der das BIP nach 2009 in Rumänien um 7, 1 % sank und allein im staatlichen Sektor über 100.000 Stellen gestrichen wurden,²⁹ die Arbeitslosenquote stieg, Sozialleistungen weiter abgebaut wurden, weitere soziale Diskrepanzen entstanden, regionale und landwirtschaftliche Wirtschaft einbrach, siedelten Millionen von Rumänen aus, um sich selbst und ihren Familien das Überleben ermöglichen zu können. Die meisten rumänischen Arbeitsmigranten arbeiten in der Landwirtschaft, auf dem Bau, oder im Privatsektor als Haushaltshilfen, Reinigungskräfte oder als Pflegehilfen in anderen EU-Länder wie Italien, Spanien oder Deutschland.

Im Jahr 2012 lebten 1.072.342 Rumänen und Rumäninnen in Italien, 865.752 in Spanien und im Jahr 2011 bereits 136.000 in Deutschland und 76.000 in Großbritannien.³⁰ Die Folgen der Arbeitsmigration bestehen einerseits darin, dass die Bevölkerungszahl und folglich die Fruchtbarkeits- und Geburtenrate seit 2009 stark zurückgingen. Der Bevölkerungszuwachs

²⁷ Vgl. Karen Macours/Johan F. M Swinnen, *Rural Poverty in Transition Countrys*, LICOS, Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, Discussion papers 169/2007, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, [<http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/licos/publications/dp/dp169.pdf>], 23. 06. 2016.

²⁸ Vgl. topagrar online, Rumänien: Viel Land und wenig Geld, Ausgabe 01/2010, [<http://www.topagrar.com/archiv/Rumaenien-Viel-Land-und-wenig-Geld-561814.html>], 27. 06. 2016.

²⁹ Sofort-Kredit. net, Rumänien steht vor dem Bankrott, [<http://www.sofort-kredit.net/rumanien-steht-kurz-vor-dem-bankrott.php>], 27. 06. 2016.

³⁰ Janka Vogel, *Transnationale Familien Rumäniens: Wie Kinder und Jugendliche die Arbeitsmigration ihrer Eltern miterleben*, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2013, S. 28, zit. n. Dumitru Sandru, *Romanians in the context of the migration system from the New to the Old European Union member states*. Präsentation, Konferenz: „Six years of labour market restriction in European Union“.

lag 2009 lediglich bei 1.66 Kindern pro Frau und ist bis 2013 weiterhin stark gesunken³¹ und auf die allgemein schlechten wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse zurückzuführen ist. Mitte 2007 schätzte man das 3, 4 Mio. Rumänen im Ausland beschäftigt waren und davon lediglich 1, 2 Mio. legal arbeiteten.³²

Nicht umsonst lautet der Titel des Kurzberichtes des *Institutes für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung* der Forschungseinrichtung der deutschen Bundesagentur für Arbeit nach der Einführung der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit für Rumänien und Bulgarien 2014 „Arbeitsmigration oder Armutsmigration.“³³ Dem Bericht zufolge lag das BIP, gemessen an den Kaufkraftparitäten, im Jahr 2011 in Rumänien und Bulgarien bei 47 % des durchschnittlichen EU-Niveaus.³⁴ Folglich fehlt es in Rumänien nach den Abwanderungen der jungen und arbeitsfähigen Leute an Arbeitskraft besonders in den ländlichen Gebieten,³⁵ was das Wachstum bremst und ausländische Investoren davon abhält, in die ländlichen Gebiete Rumäniens zu investieren. Zwischen 2009 und 2011 verzeichnete Rumänien Bevölkerungsverluste von „2, 4 Mio. Einwohnern, davon 1, 5 Mio. allein im Jahr 2011“ und insgesamt verlor Rumänien seit den 90er Jahren 4,2 von 23, 2 Mio. Einwohnern.³⁶

³¹ Eurostat, Marriages and births in Romania, Romania between modernisation and traditionalism, November 2015, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Marriages_and_births_in_Romania], 24.06. 2016, Vgl. dazu auch Eurostat: Geburtenraten und Fruchtbarkeitsraten 2000-2013, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Live_births_and_total_fertility_rate_in_the_2000-2013_period_in_Romania.png], [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Average_age_at_the_first_marriage_%28Eurostat_data%29.png] und Eurostat: Zahlen zu Eheschließungen in Rumänien 2000-2013, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Marriages_and_marriage_rate_in_the_2000-2013_period_in_Romania.png]

³² István Horvath, *Länderprofil Migration: Daten – Geschichte – Politik, Auswanderung*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 01.09.2007, [<http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/57804/zuwanderung-seit-1990>], 25.06. 2016.

³³ Herbert Brückner/Andreas Hauptmann/Ehsan Vallizadeh, *IAB- Kurzbericht, Aktuelle Analysen aus dem Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Zuwanderer aus Bulgarien und Rumänien, Arbeitsmigration oder Armutsmigration*, 16/2013, [<http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/2013/kb1613.pdf>], 24.06. 2016.

³⁴ Vgl. *Ibidem*.

³⁵ Eurostat, *Agricultural census in Romania*, November 2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agricultural_census_in_Romania#Labour_force], [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Table_Agricultural_labour_force_RO_2003_and_2010.PNG], 24.06. 2016.

³⁶ Philipp Ther, *Die neue Ordnung auf dem Kontinent*, S. 247.

Durch die immensen Bevölkerungsverluste wurde die Wirtschaftsleistung Rumäniens noch schwächer und Rumänien geriet selbst gegenüber allen anderen postsowjetischen Ländern in starken Rückstand. Der Bevölkerungsverlust und die Arbeitsmigration spalteten Rumänien aber auch in sozialer Hinsicht, weil der ländliche Raum, den urbanen Regionen gegenüber, besonders rückständig blieb und die soziale Kluft zwischen den Regionen Rumäniens und „den Generationen und bestimmten Berufsgruppen“ wuchs.³⁷ Die neuen flexiblen Arbeitsformen des Neoliberalismus stehen zugleich für eine neue spätkommunistische Generation, die im Dienstleistungsgewerbe tätig ist. Deren Arbeitsalltag unterscheidet sich stark von denen der vorgängigen feudal organisierten, kommunistisch oder postkommunistischen Generationen. Arbeitsroutinen, die aus sich wiederholenden Tätigkeiten bestehen und feste Arbeitszeiten stehen hierbei im Gegensatz zur modernen flexiblen Arbeit.³⁸

Fazit

Die Arbeits- oder Armutsmigration der Rumänen findet also aus Gründen der *Ungerechtigkeit* statt, die den schlechten ökonomischen Verhältnissen und den ineffizienten politischen Maßnahmen verschuldet ist. Die Abwanderung findet in Länder statt, die „wolhabender“ sind oder aufgrund besserer politischer Maßnahmen den Migranten zumindest einen Arbeitsplatz ermöglichen können. Die Ungerechtigkeit erfahren die weniger entwickelten Länder, einerseits aus Gründen der Armut und sozusagen doppelt begründet durch die Abwanderung ihrer Bevölkerungsanteile, die einen Mangel an Arbeitskraft schafft und langfristig schlechte ökonomische Verhältnisse aufrechterhält. Kapitalistisch entwickelte Länder hingegen erfahren die Kehrseiten der *Gerechtigkeit* durch das Aufleben eigener nationalistischer und populistischer Bewegungen, die durch den Zustrom von Migranten und durch die wiederholten Anschläge losgelöst wurden. So muss die Bevölkerung der kapitalistisch entwickelten Länder immer öfter den Zustand der Angst erleben, der das Sicherheitsgefühl und das Souveränitätsgefühl der Wohlfahrtsstaaten ins Wanken bringt. Nun stellt sich also heraus, dass der Wohlstand des „Westens“ gefährliche Konsequenzen nach sich zieht.

³⁷ *Ibd.*, S. 149 f.

³⁸ Richard Sennet, *Der flexible Mensch*, Berlin: Berliner Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008, S. 39; 40; 58.

Während der „Osten“ sich zwar weiterhin als „arm“ dafür aber mittlerweile als „sicher“ entpuppt.

Schlussfolgernd kann man sagen, dass die Anhäufung von Reichtum - die „Chrematistik“ schon dahingehend einen „Irrweg“ bedeutet, da sie *Ungerechtigkeit* schafft und die Bedrohung der Sicherheit zur Folge hat. Andererseits könnten die derzeitigen Migrationsprozesse dafür sorgen West- und Osteuropa aufgrund der beidseitigen Ab- und Zuwanderungsprobleme zusammenwachsen zu lassen, da sich angesichts der „Flüchtlingskrise“ das negativ beladene Bild und die Einstellungen der entwickelten EU-Länder gegenüber Osteuropa gemildert haben. Die „westliche“ Akzeptanz und das Vertrauen gegenüber den Osteuropäern konnten wider etwas zunehmen, da die „Armut“ der osteuropäischen Länder nun zu einem Garant eines konfliktarmen, ruhigen und vor allem sicheren Ortes in Europa geworden ist.

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HERITAGE MANAGEMENT AND INTERPRETATION: THE MORTAL GOD BEHIND THE ARMOR

Vasileios D. Spanos*

Abstract:

The aim of this survey is to investigate the residents' perceptions about their own participation regarding cultural heritage displaying. The research conducted in the town of Pharsalus, central Greece. According to many indications modern Pharsalus is ancient Phthia, the homeland of Achilles. The results discovered a strong relation between the interpretation of a monument and public involvement which can provide a long term sustainable management. Along with the above results, a deep interpretation of what Achilles really represents as a human entity is cited.

Keywords: heritage, residents, participation, Phthia, Achilles

Introduction

While *community* is the apple of discord among scholars, since it is a vague term, its reputation is big in cultural tourism planning. Residents' opinions and involvement can secure proper heritage management and (cultural) tourism development.¹ This fact is of great importance, especially in rural regions, because cultural tourism can create jobs² and empower the

* Vasileios Spanos is a PhD candidate at University of Thessaly. He is dealing with ancient Greek myths regarding mainly the region of Thessaly, central Greece, origin of ancient Greek names and interpretation of ancient Greek myths, ancient Greek history and quest of non-found ancient monuments.

Contact: spanos7@yahoo.com.

¹ Pauline Sheldon, Teresa Abenoja, "Resident Attitudes in a Mature Destination: The Case of Waikiki" in *Tourism Management*, no. 22 (5), 2001, pp. 435–443.

² Aliza Fleischer; Daniel Felsenstein, "Support for Rural Tourism: Does it make a Difference?" in *Annals of Tourism Research*, no. 27 (4), 2000, pp. 1007 – 1024.

quality of life.³ In general, the development of local resources such as monuments can enhance local economy⁴ and any effort of cultural heritage displaying which is not connected to social and economic development is condemned to failure.⁵

Cultural heritage management is a very sensitive research field and unfortunately most times the outcomes are quite ambiguous since there is rarely a transition from theory to action. It seems that emphasis is given mainly on terms such as *conservation* and *preservation*. Though conservation and preservation are necessary for any monument in order to endure through time, they exclude one unique perspective; the chance and the right of the community members to experience it.⁶ Whenever this notion is adopted by those who are in charge, visit limitations may arise. However, the role of residents' participation is wider.

The paper reports the results of a resident survey conducted to crystallize the views of the residents at Pharsalus, a town consisted of approximately 9,000 inhabitants in the region of Thessaly, central Greece. The research questions which had to do with this specific survey were 1) Which should be the most important characteristic in the relationship between cultural heritage and residents? 2) Is everyone capable of participating in cultural heritage management processes? 3) Which is the best criterion for someone in order to participate? 4) Which motive is more attractive for participating? 5) How do they wish to participate? This case study is about the quest of the palace of ancient Phthia, the homeland of king Peleus and his son, prince Achilles. There are many indications that modern Pharsalus is ancient Phthia. Yet, there is no proof since no archaeological excavation has been done. However, nowadays, the majority

³ Christopher Tweed; Margaret Sutherland, "Built Cultural Heritage and Sustainable Urban Development" in *Landscape and Urban Planning*, no. 83 (1), 2007, pp. 62-69.

⁴ Sharr Prohaska, "Trends in cultural heritage tourism", in Michael Conlin; Tom Baum (eds.), *Island tourism: Management principles and practice*, New York: Wiley, 1995, p. 34.

⁵ Li Yang; Geoffrey Wall; Stephen Smith, "Ethnic Tourism Development: Chinese Government Perspectives" in *Annals of Tourism Research*, no. 35 (3), 2008, pp. 751 – 771.

⁶ Gordon Grimwade; Bill Carter, "Managing Small Heritage Sites with Interpretation and Community Involvement" in *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, no. 6 (1), 2000, pp. 33–48.

of archaeologists support this view and the acceptance that modern Pharsalus is ancient Phthia is made in this paper.

Study method

The methodology used involved mixed methods. As a participant – because of the proximity of the author’s permanent residence with the town of Pharsalus – the author joined every activity related to Achilles such as cultural events, speeches at Pharsalus’ cultural centre, various types of voluntary work, organization of the semi-Marathon called *Achilles*, guiding students from all over Greece etc. This whole process proved to be a great chance of recording the views of the residents who expressed their will to participate and most of all, which were their true incentives and how they perceived Achilles as a human entity. As an observer, many types of secondary data were gathered and studied such as newspaper articles, online publications and papers from the 1st international conference on Achilles which was held on June 2014 in the city of Lamia, brochures and other promotional material.

Another significant source of data was interviews. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 5 people from the Municipality of Pharsalus, 7 people from the organization *Active Residents*, 3 independent researchers, 6 history teachers at school and 20 local people. The answers were written by hand and when the interviews were over, a comparison of those views was made. The interviews took place on May 2015 in the town of Pharsalus after personal communication. Moreover, 110 questionnaires were distributed to residents of Pharsalus accidentally so that their views could also be recorded. This procedure took place also on May 2015. The completion of the questionnaires was made at the same time the author asked the residents to do so (10 min duration) while the presence of the author ensured the answering of any possible perplexity. Data’s elaboration was made by using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

Study results

Answering the first question, all the interviewees agreed that the relationship between residents and cultural heritage should be honest. Based on the fact that a monument belongs to the whole community and

not to individuals separately, people should care for the way that it could benefit the town in total. The Mayor of the town of Pharsalus stated:

“There is no doubt that we live in a globalized economy and money is a main element of everyone’s quest. Cultural heritage though is something different. It can unite and lead us to a common purpose; to spread the history of our homeland in the world. This can happen if the residents realize the long-term benefits of cultural heritage management and not focusing on ephemeral efforts to gain money. Judging by the residents’ behavior, I think we are in the right direction”.

Residents of Pharsalus seemed to have the same opinion. The results from the questionnaire showed that 70.9% believed that the relationship between residents and cultural heritage should primarily characterized by knowledge and understanding of the knowledge of cultural heritage, 0% by gaining economic profit, 1.8% by none of the previous two choices, 26.4% both of the two previous choices and 0.9% by something different (respect, admiration). Using the Chi-square test, no statistical significant differences were observed regarding sex, age and education level.

Consensus arose also for the capability of all the residents to participate in cultural heritage displaying. On the one hand, the interviewees admitted that referring to a quantitative framework, this is difficult especially when it comes to large cities and they underlined the fact that participation in their small rural community could be more feasible. This enhances Ostrom’s view.⁷ According to him, the development of participatory processes is more likely to happen in small rural communities. This opinion strengthens Murphy’s view⁸ that participation on a massive scale is something ideal. On the other hand, the most important thing – according to the interviewees – so that involvement can be realistic is the appreciation of the value of any monument and the understanding of the deeper meanings that it hides in its material context.

⁷ Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the commons*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 65.

⁸ Peter Murphy, *Tourism: A community approach*, London: Methuen, 1985, p. 14.

A resident of Pharsalus who often participates in various kinds of manifestations argued:

“Perhaps comprehensive participation is a utopia but this does not express pessimism. In my opinion, participation is not a static but a dynamic process which requires patience and persistence until a big percentage, if not all, of our compatriots can be persuaded about the meaning of the offering of those who already participate”.

Another resident pointed out:

“Participation should be seen from different perspectives. Everyone can be involved in his/her own way so that a good result can describe our efforts as well as possible. For example, bear in mind those residents who guide some romantic visitors from Austria, Germany and Great Britain who come to Pharsalus in order to seek Achilles’ palace. The image we create is of course extremely important”.

Regarding the residents, 62.7% answered that participation by everyone without exception is not feasible while 37.3% gave a positive answer. Statistical significant difference was observed between the feasibility of participation and the educational level (p -value=0.007). More specifically, high educational levels seem to perceive the feasibility of residents’ participation in a more negative way. No statistical significant differences were observed regarding sex and age.

The central object of the next question related to the best participatory criterion. The qualitative survey gathered four criteria: understanding of knowledge of cultural heritage,⁹ economic benefit,^{10 11 12}

⁹ Gordon Grimwade; Bill Carter, “Managing Small Heritage Sites with Interpretation and Community Involvement” in *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, no. 6 (1), 2000, pp. 33 – 48.

¹⁰ Einar Bowitz; Karin Ibenholt, “Economic Impacts of Cultural Heritage: Research and Perspectives” in *Journal of Cultural Heritage*, no. 10 (1), 2009, pp. 1–8.

¹¹ Jonas Rehmet; Keith Dinnie, “Citizen Brand Ambassadors: Motivations and Perceived Effects” in *Journal of Destination Marketing & Management*, no. 2 (1), 2013, pp. 31 – 38.

experience to previous participatory processes and total time of permanent residence¹³ with clear emphasis on the first one. The chief of the organization *Active Residents* stated:

“Through our efforts and events organization we have concluded that the notion of what a monument represents is basic and the most important conclusion is that the understanding of cultural heritage or history in general, maintains the interest of those who participate steady. It is like they are getting energy from the monument itself”.

The residents did not differentiate themselves since 70% agreed that the best criterion for participation should be the first one, 12.7% the second one, 10% the third one and 7.3% the last one. No statistical significant differences were observed regarding sex, age and educational level. The residents were also asked to answer if they would like to participate in a process related to their cultural heritage and what would be their motive.

More specifically, 60.9% gave a positive answer about their will to participate. No statistical significant differences were observed regarding sex, age and educational level. Of those who answered positively, 49.1% answered that their motive would be voluntarism and 11.8% economic benefit. This result contradicts other research conclusions where altruism seems to play no significant role.¹⁴ Statistical significant difference was observed between motives and age (p-value=0.049). It seems that proportionally, voluntarism has greater resonance to the older people.

Finally, the residents were asked to record their preference regarding their participation. The suggested answers were monument’s conservation,¹⁵ financial assistance,¹⁶ registration to a cultural

¹² Brent Ritchie; Mikko Inkari, “Host Community Attitudes toward Tourism and Cultural Tourism Development: The Case of the Lewes District, Southern England” in *International Journal of Tourism Research*, no. 8 (1), 2006, pp. 27 – 44.

¹³ Dogan Gursoy; Claudia Jurowski; Muzaffer Uysal, “Resident Attitudes: A Structured Modeling Approach” in *Annals of Tourism Research*, no. 29 (1), 2002, pp. 79 – 105.

¹⁴ Jonas Rehmet; Keith Dinnie, “Citizen Brand Ambassadors: Motivations and Perceived Effects” in *Journal of Destination Marketing & Management*, no. 2 (1), 2013, pp. 31 – 38.

¹⁵ Dalia Elsorady, “Heritage Conservation in Rosetta (Rashid): A Tool for Community Improvement and Development” in *Cities*, no. 29 (6), 2012, pp. 379 – 388.

organization,¹⁷ participation as local guide,¹⁸ ¹⁹ participation in various kinds of manifestations²⁰ and promotion of objects/goods related or not to the monument.²¹ ²² The residents were allowed to pick more than one answer if they wished so. The first choice gathered 27.3%, the second 7.3%, the third 23.6%, the fourth 22.7%, the fifth 45.5% and the sixth 20%. It is obvious that the fifth choice gather the biggest percentage since it is an option that is easier for anyone to choose.

At this point, it was considered appropriate to present the main aspects of Achilles' character as they derive from the opinions of the residents who participate in any process regarding ancient Phthia and also the independent researchers. A common view, without exception, was that there is an incorrect impression about Achilles – that was just a great and extremely powerful warrior. It seemed that all those who expressed wish to participate in displaying processes were distinguished for their deep understanding about what Achilles really represents. Below, an overall picture of Achilles is given as this emerged from the discussions with those active residents, teachers and independent researchers. Since the analysis could be very extensive, the opinions are presented here summarily but simultaneously comprehensively.

¹⁶ Nik Azhari; Mohamed Embong, "Public Perception: Heritage Building Conservation in Kuala Lumpur" in *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Studies*, no. 50, 2012, pp. 271 – 279.

¹⁷ Gordon Grimwade; Bill Carter, "Managing Small Heritage Sites with Interpretation and Community Involvement" in *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, no. 6 (1), 2000, pp. 33 – 48.

¹⁸ Gyan Nyaupane; Duarte Morais; Lorraine Dowler, "The Role of Community Involvement and Number/type of Visitors on Tourism Impacts: A Controlled Comparison of Annapurna, Nepal and Northwest Yunnan, China" in *Tourism Management*, no. 27 (6), 2006, pp. 1373 – 1385.

¹⁹ Noel Salazar, "Community-based Cultural Tourism: Issues, Threats and Opportunities" in *Journal of Sustainable Tourism*, no. 20 (1), 2012, pp. 9 – 22.

²⁰ Brian Garrod; Alan Fyall; Anna Leask; Elaine Reid, "Engaging Residents as Stakeholders of the Visitor Attraction" in *Tourism Management*, no. 33 (5), 2012, pp. 1159 – 1173.

²¹ Shadreck Chirikure; Gilbert Pwiti, "Community Involvement in Archaeology and Cultural Heritage Management" in *Current Anthropology*, no. 49 (3), 2008, pp. 467 – 485.

²² Yi Wang; Bill Bramwell, "Heritage Protection and Tourism Development Priorities in Hangzhou, China: A Political Economy and Governance Perspective: in *Tourism Management*, no. 33 (4), 2012, pp. 988 – 998.

i) *Fighting skills*: No man could stand against him since he was incomparable. Furthermore, Achilles is known as the best warrior of all times.

ii) *Brave morale*: Achilles did not hesitate in front of any danger.

iii) *Noble descent*: His grandfather Aiakos was one of the most equitable man of the world and after his death, Hades made him judge of the souls of the dead together with Minos and Rhadamanthys. His father, Peleus, was the dearest mortal to the gods because of the respect he showed to them. As a result, Peleus' soul did not go to the underworld but to the Elysian Fields.²³ Furthermore, his mother was a goddess, the Nereid Thetis.

iv) *Beauty*: Achilles was a tall man with glistening eyes and a strapping body. Even his hair was red-blond and he was shining like a small sun.

v) *Intellectuality*: His education and training near centaur Chiron, the wisest teacher in Greek mythology, made him a person with deep spirit.

vi) *Strength*: His peerless power is demonstrated by a Pindar's testimony where Achilles at the age of six killed lions and bears and put the carcasses in Chiron's cave²⁴ while, for instance, Heracles killed the Nemean Lion at his peak.

vii) *Integrated personality*: This aspect has to do with his training and education at Chiron's side. The wise centaur, apart from the art of war, taught Achilles medicine, music (even the Muse Calliope was leaving Olympus in order to teach Achilles music), astronomy, to respect the gods, to be patient but most of all to despise secular goods.²⁵

²³ Menelaos Stefanidis, "Aiakos and Peleus", in Menelaos Stefanidis (ed.), *Theseus and Perseus*, Athens: Sigma, 1992, p. 104.

²⁴ Theodoros Mavropoulos, *Pindar: Isthmionikoi, Nemeonikoi*, Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2008, p. 405.

²⁵ Athanasios Karatolias, *Pharsalus: From the Ancient Times to the Present*, Larissa: Self-edition, 2012, p. 34.

viii) *Honor/Justice*: His death was certainly inevitable, fated by destiny and defined by his own choices which were dictated by its commitment to honor. At the time he conquered 23 cities with his Myrmidons, Achilles gave Chryseis to Agamemnon in order to dignify him but shortly afterwards he blundered by detaching with violence Briseis from Achilles. Achilles behaved with justice in contrast with Agamemnon. In heroic society, honor was identified with the status and recognition of the individual.²⁶ Therefore, the loss of Briseis was not just a woman's loss. Achilles was the personification of honor and justice. The *Iliad* itself does not blame him. Neither Agamemnon nor Nestor blamed him for insubordination. They did not punish him and at the same time they did not challenge his right to withdraw from the battlefield. Royal strength should be combined with justice; this was the impeachment of Achilles against Agamemnon. That is why Achilles cannot be accused of selfishness; because everyone knew the integrity of his character.

ix) *Prudence*: The goddess Athena motivated Achilles not to pull his sword out during his disagreement with Agamemnon. This symbolizes the prevalence of reason in a situation very difficult to handle and proved Achilles' self-discipline.²⁷ Moreover, Achilles accepted the existence of a paradox which was not reasonable; although he knew that he was *ἄριστος* which means excellent, the best of all in every sector, the one who ruled was Agamemnon just because he had Zeus' scepter.

x) *Menis*: In the epic poems, the word *menis* which means redoubtable wrath was used only for the gods. The only case that this term was used for a mortal (human or demi-god) was Achilles,²⁶ not even Heracles. Zeus felt *menis* when gods defied him; Apollo felt *menis* when the Achaeans dishonored his priest, the father of Chryseis. The *menis* of a god could cause plague, war or burn a whole city.²⁷ This power had the *menis* of Achilles as well, with disastrous consequences. The anger of Achilles was beyond human limits and this makes him divine.

²⁶ Popi C-P, *Homer Iliad: Wrath (Menis)*, 2012

[http://archeia.moec.gov.cy/sm/7/rapsodia_a_new.pdf], 04 September 2016.

²⁷ Theodoros Mavropoulos, *Homer: Iliad*, Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2010, p. 37.

xi) *Excellence*: Achilles exceeded everyone regarding beauty, speed, power, spirit, rhetorical ability. His superiority was so great that it threatened the limits of human nature. One of the independent researchers stressed:

“Perhaps it is no coincidence that Apollo killed Achilles. If we analyze the aspects of Apollo we shall see that he is called as the god of music, medicine, spirit, athletics, light (literally and metaphorically because of his red-blond hair). These aspects can be observed in Achilles too. So, a good question for research is if Apollo could not tolerate a mortal (even though he was semi-god) to reach at his level”.

The exhortation of his father, *αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν*,²⁸ which means “always strive for excellence”, depicts the struggle of human to reach the peak of every sector in life and thus seeking and succeeding progress. This process though requires time, patience, persistence and internal struggle. It is no coincidence that Achilles in the ancient world stood as the ideal human figure and unattainable imitation standard. He fulfilled to the maximum the essence of *arete* (virtue) and this made him *ἄριστο* which means the excellent, the best. Another element that proves the *arete* (excellence) of Achilles is the exhortation of his teacher in Troy, Phoenix, who urged him *μύθων τε ῥητῆρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρὰ τε ἔργων*²⁹ which means “excel in speech when people are gathered just like you do in your actions”. Speech must be effective since it has the power to motivate people to be energetic. Achilles connected these two elements and achieved the harmony of the ultimate powers of speech and action. *Arete* is a combination of reason and power, a unity of theory and action.²⁹

xii) *Divine admiration*: All the gods, except Apollo, admired the semi-god. He was closely linked with Zeus (great grandfather) and Athena, the gods who were predominantly associated with victories; his horses (Balius and Xanthus – Poseidon’s gift) and weapons (no mortal man could raise his

²⁸ Theodoros Mavropoulos, *Homer: Iliad*, Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2010, p. 466.

²⁹ Martha Tsanaktsidou, *From Homeric to philosophical excellence*, Diploma Thesis, School of Philosophy, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, p. 16.

spear) were divine.³⁰ Even his armor, which was crafted by god Hephaestus, glittered so much as if he was a living god³¹.

xiii) *Formidable unarmed presence*: This is about an outstanding event from the Iliad when Hector killed Patroclus and the Trojans tried to dishonor his body. It was Hera that informed Achilles and told him to go as he was to a tomb so that the Trojans could see him. When they understood the presence of Achilles by a strong shout, the whole Trojan army moved back.³⁰

xiv) *Untamed vehemence*: In the Iliad, for example, Ares stood against Diomedes who beat him with the help of goddess Athena. No god dared to stand against Achilles though. Even Apollo killed Achilles with an arrow from Paris and the river god Scamander did not take a solid form in order to face him.

xv) *Agony/Friendship*: Reading the Iliad, it is very easy for anyone to observe that it was Achilles who cared about the troops when Apollo provoked the plague among the Achaeans and convoked board so that the cause of this bad situation should be discovered. Furthermore, he was the one that promised protection to the clairvoyant Calchas in order to reveal the truth (he knew that Agamemnon was responsible for Apollo's wrath and so he was afraid of announcing it). Last but not least, Achilles died for friendship, revenging the death of his friend.

xvi) *Fates*: Returning to the battlefield after Patroclus' death, the rage of Achilles was so big that even Zeus feared the fact that he might go against the Fates and conquer Troy by himself (the Fates had foretold that Achilles would die outside Troy). For this reason, he sent Apollo to help Paris kill him. At this point, it should be noted that even Zeus could not be above the Fates. This demonstrates the dynamic of the great hero.

³⁰ Menelaos Stefanidis, *Iliad: The Trojan War*, Athens: Sigma, 1992, p. 110.

³¹ Kai-Anne Clews, *A Comparative Essay on the Figures of Achilles and Heracles*, 2014 [http://www.academia.edu/2031944/A_comparative_essay_on_the_figures_of_Achilles_and_Herakles], 04 September 2016.

xvii) *Worship*: Along the Greek territory, in the regions of Thessaly, Epirus and Sparta, Achilles was worshiped as a god. Specifically in Sparta, there was a temple devoted to Achilles whose doors should never be opened and when the teenagers of Sparta wanted to participate in running contests, they should sacrifice to Achilles first.³² The close bonds between Achilles and Sparta lie in the fact that Achilles was a model for the Spartans. This can be seen in their community operation where there is a transition from the creation of just one excellent man to the creation of a whole society comprised of excellent men, adopting his virtues, way of life, death defiance; his whole philosophy in general. It is worth noting that Socrates considered that philosophy was older in Sparta, not in Athens.³³ Just how important he was, can be seen in a custom connected with the Olympic Games and the fact that Sappho considered him as the ideal bridegroom for a woman.³⁴ The traditional ceremony which inaugurated this seasonally recurring Pan-Hellenic festival centered on Achilles; on an appointed day when the Games were to begin, the women of Elis, the place where the Olympics were held, fixed their gaze on the sun as it set into the western horizon and began ceremonially to weep for the hero.

xviii) *Life after death*: This is perhaps the most important aspect of Achilles' mentality and life attitude since all those who participated in the interviews noted this fact. The principle that distinguishes Achilles from any other figure in Greek mythology is that he knew that his life was going to be very short. A resident from Pharsalus argued:

“Every human being in the Trojan War or in life generally, thinks of a possibility to escape from death. Achilles though seems to embrace death. Defying death is the highest form of freedom and this is why Achilles is divine and considered as the ideal human model in the antiquity”.

³² Athanasios Karatolias, *Pharsalus: From the ancient times to the present*, Larissa: Self-edition, 2012, p. 44.

³³ Ioannis Christodoulou, *Plato: Protagoras*, Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2004, p. 175.

³⁴ Gregory Navy, *The ancient Greek hero in 24 hours*, Harvard University: Belknap Press, 2013, p. 93.

One of the three independent researchers went a step further:

“In fact, Achilles’ death demolished the world of the gods since he proved that humans can make their own choices and in front of the darkness he answered with a defying smile. While the majority of people do everything they can to deceive death with many ways, he gladly chose the difficult path. Moreover, if we had the ability to subtract immortality from the gods, we would not know their attitude towards death. Perhaps it was positive (although I doubt it), perhaps negative. Still, we are talking about possibility. When we are referring to Achilles, we are talking about certainty”.

This life attitude derived from the training and education on the side of centaur Chiron who among other things, he taught him the most difficult but most important thing as well; the despise of secular goods.

This notion made him not fear death. A notion that is very rare today since humanity has chosen a life within naderism. Many interviewees expressed the opinion that Achilles is a counterweight to modern way of life.

Apart from his immortality because of the way he lived and died, Greek mythology made him immortal in a different way. In a lost epic poem named *Aithiopsis*, his mother Thetis transfers his body onto an island called Leuke (which means White Island) in order to live there as an immortal. But the main question is *“Why Achilles lives as an immortal alone”?*

The answer is hiding in the role his mother had in Greek mythology. Although Thetis did not belong to the Olympians and theoretically was considered as an inferior goddess, her existence is extremely important. Firstly, it was Thetis that saved Zeus himself after the rebellion of the other gods against him.³⁵ Secondly, the overwhelming superiority of Thetis against the other gods is that she could be the cause of Zeus’ dethronement.³⁶ The Titan Prometheus, when he was bound in chains in mountain Caucasus, threatened Zeus since he was the only one who knew a big prophesy; that of Zeus’ future crash. It was foretold by the Fates that the Nereid Thetis would give birth to a son much stronger than his father. Zeus and Poseidon quarreled for Thetis without any knowledge

³⁵ Theodoros Mavropoulos, *Homeric hymns*, Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2005, p. 519.

³⁶ Menelaos Stefanidis, *Prometheus*, Athens: Sigma, 1991, p. 30.

about what they would probably face. Consequently, Thetis was presented as a major challenge against Zeus' superiority and threatened the divine order. When Heracles set Prometheus free and he revealed the secret, Zeus abandoned Thetis to marry any immortal. Instead, the gods suggested she could marry the kindest of the mortal men and beloved to the gods, Peleus. From this union, Achilles was born but he was a semi-god and thus not a threat to Zeus anymore.

Achilles knew that his fate was changed by the will of Zeus and that instead of being the excellent man among mortals, he could be the first among all gods. Looking for the social interpretation of the myth, it is easily understood the resonance that the name of Achilles had at that time (the fact that a myth was created around his name with central content his possibility to be the next ruler of the world). In the end, Thetis took her son's body from the pyre and deposited it on the White Island so that he could live forever. There should be no confusion about the content of Odyssey which presents the soul of Achilles in the underworld. This is a usual phenomenon in Greek mythology; for example the one half of Heracles remained in Hades but the other lived an eternal life on mountain Olympus. But a final question remains: *"Why Achilles does not enjoy his immortality on mountain Olympus like Heracles or in the Elysian Fields like his father, Peleus, Menelaus, Diomedes, Cadmus etc?"*. The third independent researcher quoted:

"Perhaps this is also not a coincidence. The name of the island is Leuke, which means white, and metaphorically speaking, may represent the eternal peacefulness just like the Christian paradise. In addition to this, Achilles knew that he could be the first among all gods and this perspective was prohibited on purpose by Zeus. Living on mountain Olympus like Heracles, would mean his submission to him. Achilles was a man who pursued through his commitment and fulfillment of the heroic code to find his divine nature; he is more than a god".

Conclusion

The selected way of a monument's displaying and promotion plays a fundamental role. The advantage of displaying almost forgotten monuments is that strong foundations can be put from the beginning, proper and long-term management can exist and powerful bonds between

cultural heritage and residents can be created. If the local community has not a large population, these bonds seem to become even more powerful and it is much easier to succeed social cohesion. Deep interpretation gives meaning not only to any monument but also to the residents since they can focus on not what or how a monument can be preserved and displayed but why a monument should be preserved and displayed. Every cultural heritage item around the globe is a different place identity and the past plays a crucial role in forming it. This case study proved that residents acquired unity (Image 3) by the interpretation of a history long forgotten whose memories came back and a future they shall face together; for in those memories people live on.

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**Alistair Welchman (Ed.), *Politics of Religion/Religions of Politics*,
Springer, 2015, 191 p.**

Monica Meruțiu*

The collective volume *Politics of Religion/Religions of Politics*, edited by Alistair Welchman¹, Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy and Classics at the University of Texas at San Antonio, comprises most of the papers that were initially presented during a workshop dedicated to and benefitting from the presence of Simon Critchley², at the same University back in February 2010. The participants in this event had the opportunity to both analyze different aspects related to Simon Critchley's work as well as various other topics emerging from his work. Beyond the great variety of analyzed topics and perspectives presented the reader notices also the common grounds and convergence of most of these articles embodied and represented by Critchley's analysis of the intersection of politics and religion, the way these two realms impact each other and consequently the transformations affecting both politics and religion.

The 'Introduction' is authored by the editor, Alistair Welchman, and consists of a detailed presentation of the topics and authors of this collective volume which comprises ten articles, structured in three main parts: *Political Theologies Left and Right*, *Non-metaphysical Political*

* Monica Meruțiu is currently Lecturer in International Relations within the Department of International Relations and German Studies, Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University.

Contact: monica.merutiu@mail.ubbcluj.ro.

¹ Alistair Welchman has published widely on contemporary French philosophy (especially Deleuze) and the nineteenth century German philosophy that it develops (especially Schelling and Schopenhauer).

² Simon Critchley is Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York City, a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tilburg in The Netherlands and at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland. Among his most recent books are *Bowie* (2014) and *The Faith of the Faithless* (2013).

Theology, and Tragedy, Comedy and the Grounds of Political-Ethical Life to which is added a concluding interview with Simon Critchley conducted at the North Texas Philosophical Association meeting in 2012.

The article signed by Simon Critchley, 'You are Not Your Own: On the Nature of Faith' provides, as Alistair Welchman describes it, 'a supple re-reading of Paul and Paul's own significance for politics'. Concerned with the nature of faith, Critchley addresses this complex issue by making an appeal to St. Paul, while 'taking some of his recent philosophical interlocutors as guides' (p.15). One of the central interrogations posed by Critchley is relating to what he calls the *faith of the faithless*, in still other words, 'how can someone who is nominally or denominationally faithless (...) still have an experience of faith' (p. 15)? The author proposes faith as a *declarative act, as an enactment in relation to a calling, a proclamation that brings the subject of faith into being*, that he associates with a *situation of crisis*, a moment of struggle where a decisive intervention is called. Struggle is conceptualized by Critchley as *eschatological struggle*, a struggle as 'meaning of the future and the exact extent of the shadow that the future casts across the present' (p. 16). Consequently faith is conceived as the enactment in the present, between the past and the future, between the resurrection and *the parousia*.

In the third chapter of this section, 'Politics, Anthropology, Religion: Religious Particularism, Anti-Somatism,' Philip Quadrio analyses Critchley's 'Mystical Anarchism,' considered to be 'a rich and interesting engagement with Christian mysticism' and 'antinomian tendencies within it' (p.29). Stating that 'philosophy is seldom a hymn of praise', Quadrio presents two criticisms- one, more general, that he relates to 'the use of theological resources in political philosophy' and a second one, more particular, exploring 'how well the mystical tradition fits with an anarchist outlook' (p. 29). Quadrio is not however rejecting the idea that 'religion' could play a role in political thought and anarchist politics, however he raises questions about invoking a 'determinate religion' as well as 'the specific values animating any religious perspective brought into an anarchist politics' (p. 29). At the same time he rejects 'the idea that a religious view that devalues this world and orientates us on a beyond (of whatever description) could play much, if any, role in anarchist politics,'

and also that mysticism, 'always for the few and never for the many, has a tendency to end up as elitism' (p. 29).

The fourth chapter, titled 'Border Sovereignty' and signed by Alistair Welchman provides an analysis of the specific case of US-Mexico border. The essay is a comprehensive exploration of Carl Schmitt's and Giorgio Agamben's political theologies, while taking 'inspiration from the diversity of Critchley's political theologies to analyze the political presuppositions and consequences of a very specific theological doctrine' (p.5).

There are four articles subscribed to the section *Non-metaphysical Political Theology* and they address the 'faith of the faithless', 'the community of those who have no community or the polis, the a-political' (p. 6).

Anne O'Byrne's essay, 'The Gossip Circles of Geneva: Morals, Mores and Moralizing in Political Life,' begins with an interrogation on whether there can be attained a healthy and stable political life in the absence of 'substantial shared social life formed through some form of moralizing process' (p. 69). O'Byrne's questions become ever more acute and sharp when she enquires what sort of politics can there be without an ethos. As Simon Critchley would formulate: there needs to be a shared ethical framework but at the same time keeping the hope *that it need not involve what we think of as moralizing*, as expressed in his 2007 work 'Infinitely Demanding': 'infinitely demanding ethics of commitment and political resistance that can face and face down depoliticizing moralization' (p. 69). These queries are also echoed in the terms of Rousseau's 'Letter to d'Alembert': can there be a republic *without a set of intimately shared, constantly reinforced mores?* The author analyses Rousseau's conception of the *motivational binding of social substance* wondering whether it can be as *formal* as for Critchley. When relating to Rousseau's 'Letter to d'Alembert on the Theater' O'Byrne attempts, in fact, to provide an answer to the question whether the 'moralizing,' is a *necessary condition of political life* or not, offering an analysis on the dialectic mores-morality.

In the next article 'Nihilists, Heroes, Samaritans and I. The Question of Moral Motivation in Secular Politics,' Jill Stauffer provides a comprehensive comparison between Critchley's *non-substantive religiosity* and *the explicit Christianity* of Charles Taylor, both authors having addressed the motivation problem within secularism in their works.

Consequently the article is founded on these two pillars, it reflects a dialogue between two different ways of addressing the issue: one that stresses the imperativeness of *a substantial religious moment in the renewal of political motivation*, related to Charles Taylor's diagnoses, and the other one, distanced from theism, represented by Simon Critchley. Stauffer addresses the issues of 'the political lethargy associated with liberalism', of 'moral motivation' and of 'political disappointment.' At the heart of the essay stands the idea of motivation, the author reflecting on what motivates a person 'to act for the common good in a way that transcends or even contravenes private interest' (p. 79), but most of all 'what motivates persons to act on behalf of the good, in an age when we cannot assume a shared conception of the good' (p. 79).

Davide Panagia begins his paper 'Exposures and Projections' by exploring the premise that 'individuals or groups in pluralist democratic societies attend to the emergence of political subjectivities at the level of their appearances' (p. 100). In this sense, the political subject, Panagia observes, does not necessarily point to a specific cultural group or identity-formation but rather to what he calls 'a force of appearance, or power of monstrence, whose contour remains undetermined' (p. 100). Relating to a set of provocative remarks that Simon Critchley makes in his book 'Infinitely Demanding', Panagia explores the link between aesthetics and ethics, seeking to *substitute an ethics of appearance within democratic theory for an ethics of substance*.

Roland Champagne's 'Simon Critchley's Problem of Politics and Hannah Arendt's Idealism for the USA' provides a comparative analysis of Hannah Arendt's concept of 'pariah', its 'ethical and political efficacy', and Levinas's 'critique of metaphysically substantial conceptions of the ethical'.

Arendt envisages a world where the ethical is possible in political life, and sees 'the plurality inherent in the democracy of the USA' as a 'source of ethical activity by virtue of the dialogic opportunities it affords' (p. 124).

The author emphasizes how by 'espousing the survival of moral conduct in the body politic, Arendt moves toward the identification of infinity as the working concept of political time' and that she observes that 'the end of the story itself is in infinity'; consequently the actions of members of a community solidarily 'working and struggling together

toward common moral goals' reflect 'the openness of infinity', which stands in opposition to what Levinas expresses in *Totality and Infinity* (1969) when opposes infinity to totality and hence defining ethics as an affirmation of alterity' (p. 124). Champagne's concluding remark is that both Critchley and Arendt 'visualize ethical politics as a worldwide model for universal justice' (p. 125).

The last section of the volume, *Tragedy, Comedy and the Grounds of Political-Ethical Life* comprises two articles authored by Costica Bradatan and Tina Chanter followed by a concluding interview of Simon Critchley, and provides an insight into the varieties of art and the influence played in Critchley's understanding of politics and religion.

In 'The World as Farce' Costica Bradatan examines the problem of meaning, more specifically 'how is meaning possible in a world (experienced) as farce—be it a political, historical, metaphysical, or cosmic farce?' (p. 129). Founding his examination on Critchley's interpretation from his work 'Very Little, ... Almost Nothing' where he observed that 'the task, the labor of interpretation—whether religious, socio-economic, scientific, technological, political, aesthetic or philosophical—is the concrete reconstruction of the meaning of meaninglessness' (p. 129), Bradatan embarks on a complex and difficult journey through the world of Auschwitz and of the Gulag, the world of the totalitarianism, the world of meaninglessness, in order to show 'how meaning can be created against a background of meaninglessness' (p. 129).

In the last article of the volume, 'Exhuming the Remains of Antigone's Tragedy', Tina Chanter explores the Antigone myth, the intersection between the religious and the political, providing an analysis of Hegel's interpretation of Sophocles' tragedy. Chanter offers an overview of the traces that have been left by Antigone on the cultures of South Africa, Nigeria and Northern Ireland. The author's effort is to allow those traces 'to put into question, and re-inscribe, the traces that Antigone has left on a Western canon that ritually cites ancient Athenian culture as its origin, embracing Antigone as a tragic hero, without attending to the system of chattel slavery that facilitated her heroic status' (p. 168).

The volume concludes with an interview of Simon Critchley dating back in April 2012 during the annual meeting and conference of the North Texas Philosophical Association, where Critchley was keynote speaker.

The main arguments of Critchley relate to the connections between the religious and the political, and these are precisely what forms the leitmotif and ethos of this collective volume.

Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide, Third Edition: Leading Across Cultures*, London, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2006, 624 p.

Ionuț-Eugen-Radu Sava*

Living in a century when human interactions are animated by accessible modern technology represents the vital occasion for people of diverse backgrounds to initiate, even unconsciously, a paramount of upbringing aimed at constructing contexts focused on multidimensional dynamics. Whether I am talking about business, politics or arts, everywhere I turn my attention to has at least one element of *inter-national* or *multi-cultural*. But by beetling the architecture of the global socio-cultural scene it becomes easier to observe that most individuals are brimmed with stereotypes and misleading conceptions. As a result of these findings, Richard D. Lewis – a British cross-cultural specialist – publishes the reviewed book in an unprecedented 3rd edition which may be considered a continuous *fundamentum inconcussum* for those who seek to gain an introductory stock of knowledge upon various handsets, customs, and communication and relationship dimensions of each culture across the world.

Generally speaking, the book offers a practical guide whose objective is to project not a trivial, classical sort of guide, but a global oriented method of inner and outer analysis. The author himself being a cosmopolitan individual, the reflection of the topic debated throughout the book resembles fragments of communication, business, negotiation, management or global affairs etiquette. It is the type of guide I would say which is meant to offer its readers an introspective outlook, a preliminary stage or an incipient toward real life circumstances and professional contexts, yet not losing sight of many other aspects interconnected. These

*BA Student in International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University.

aspects are about a certain focus envisaged on societies, history, traditions and customs of one another.

Throughout the material, I can easily identify a series of figures and tables which are conceived in order for the reader to gain an unbiased overview of the interactions between cultures. Nevertheless, it is utterly important to bear in mind that most contents and, implicitly, the three parts of the book are in a close symbiosis affair. One cannot understand, for instance, why Koreans "believe that they can handle Westerners better than other Asians" if we do not dive into Korean "listening habits" and counterbalancing their likes and dislikes.²

Encouraging its readers to meditate and link such aspects discussed to their personal experience, Lewis is the sort of author who gives I believe the ideal start-up theoretical preparation to improving and achieving a certain level of cultural communication competence. The book is divided into three parts each of which bring up different approaches to culture, cultural interference and cultural interaction.

In the first part the author defines, for instance, the concept of culture and culture shock among others, trying to unlock a door to understanding our own perception upon "precious values and unshakeable core beliefs"³. I believe that it is essential to understand ourselves, our own cultural background in order to proceed to mutual understandings and interactions. And rightly, the first part of the work describes effectively how language or culture can affect the ways an individual may think, act or respond. However, in this part what captures my attention is the fluid narrative about a theory linked to "the use of time."⁴ Lewis argues that "The worldviews held by different cultures vary widely, as do a multiplicity of concepts that constitute and represent a kaleidoscopic outlook on the nature of reality. Some of these concepts—fatalism, work ethic, reincarnation, Confucianism, *Weltschmerz* and so on—are readily identifiable within specific groups, societies or nations. Other concepts—central and vital to human experience—are essentially universal, but notions of their nature and essence are strikingly different, such as

² Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide, Third Edition: Leading Across Cultures*, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2006, pp. 505 - 508.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

space and time.”⁵ Furthermore, he explains these mentioned notions which define a certain paddle of characteristics for a variety of cultures which for me was altogether fascinating. This being said differently, this first part examines “the cultural roots of behavior and assessed the effects of cultural diversity on people’s lives and destinies.”⁶

The main feature of the second part of the book is emphasized on the “world of business”, although not losing sight of various issues and “problems of international exchanges”.⁷

Onward, Lewis defines success, for example, from different national angles, accentuating strong points of each culture in terms of leadership or economic competitiveness. This analysis is very complex in its own nature because the latter dynamics put at stake are linked indeed to current issues within the international sphere in an attempt to determine universal solutions.⁸ This flow of ideas is still undergoing a series of re-shaping and political, business or academic debates are ongoing because the attributes of status, leadership or cultural organizational roots of the elite are rooted in different visons with regards to various national or regional circumstances.

In addition, a series of descriptive figures that are meant not only to complete but to stimulate a process of assimilation of information efficiently are provided to readers.⁹ Lewis stubbornly drags the readers' attention to the ever-changing “perspectives of management and strategy at the turn of the twenty-first century and shows that widely diverging horizons and credos can be managed.”¹⁰

The third and final part represents, as far as I am concerned, the zenith of the work, the most innovative section of the study. Surprisingly, all these aspects noted across the book are information provided by Lewis based on his various experiences, explaining “why the behavior” of people “follows certain paths and agendas”, giving “practical advice on how to minimize friction with each group.” It is the most comprehensive part, the

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 101.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 101.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 101 - 124.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 101 - 124.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. xx.

most practical, injecting methods of empathizing with people of other cultures, expressing their values or exposing assorted aspects of religion, patterns of communication or what features to avoid when interacting with people from "over 70 of the world's major countries and regions."¹¹ (i.e. "English-Speaking Countries", "The Baltic States and Central Asian Countries", "Middle Eastern Countries" etc.)

To sum up, the work itself has to be charged as something towards keeping pace with emerging and changing¹² facets of the twenty-first century. Its pragmatism and challenging manner of laying down facts and figures represent opportunities for engaging with trust and confidence into a world where citizenship might be just a tag.

Appraising the endeavor analyzed as a whole, I can asseverate that I endorse the majority of assumptions and conjectures presented throughout the pages of this book with the exception that the border between academic content and practical appealed is frail. However, I can contend that contemporary individuals witness a further vitalizing shift from what it is known, but imposing to a certain degree of extent an evaluation of such parameters are only for our common societal asset.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. xx.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. xxii.

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Herta Gongola, Laura (2005), "Modelul societății informaționale.O abordare sociologică", in Todoran, Horea (ed.), *Societatea informațională europeană*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 36-57

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