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SINGULARITÉS FRANÇAISES LA FRANCE, SON ÉTAT, SON IDENTITÉ ET L'EUROPE

Jean-Thomas Lesueur*

Abstract

As shown by its history, France is essentially the political construction of its State. By that, in quite clear contrast with most of its European partners, it represents the ideal-type of the Nation-state. In its every-day contestation of the authority and legitimacy of its State and leaders, one can read not only the fatigue of its social model or the institutional balance, but obviously the questioning of its identity model. These singularities distance France from most of its European partners, better accustomed to the exercise of the diversity. These misunderstandings are the source of some of their misunderstandings. The European construction model privileged up to the present day, based on the "consensual objectives" and on the "constructive ambiguities", has denied these fundamental identity differences. This point is not indifferent of the serious gap that the European Union is confronting at the moment.

«Les Français ont amassé toutes leurs idées dans une enceinte. Nous y vivons dans notre feu»¹. A ceci près que le feu a sans doute faibli depuis le temps où elle fut écrite, cette formule de Paul Valéry nous paraît encore exacte et toujours valide.

Nous voudrions en effet défendre dans les présentes pages (1) l'idée, déjà bien connue, que la France est l'œuvre politique de son Etat et qu'elle est par là, à la différence assez nette de la plupart de ses partenaires européens, le modèle-type de l'Etat-nation; (2) l'idée que, dans la remise en cause de l'autorité et de la légitimité de son Etat et de ses dirigeants, ce n'est pas

* Jean-Thomas Lesueur, is director of the Thomas More Institute, France (www.institut-thomas-more.org)

¹ Paul Valéry, « Lettre d'un ami », *Monsieur Teste*, Paris, Gallimard, 1946, p. 82.

seulement – mais c’est aussi... – un équilibre institutionnel ou social qui est en cause, mais, du fait du rôle qu’a joué l’Etat dans la constitution de la nation, c’est le problème de son identité qui est posé ; (3) l’idée que ces singularités françaises tranchent nettement avec les modèles identitaires de la plupart de ses partenaires européens et qu’elles sont à la source de quelques-uns de leurs malentendus ; (4) l’idée que ces différences foncières, ainsi que le refus de prendre en compte la réalité prégnante de ces divergences constitutives des identités européennes, ne sont pas indifférentes à la panne et à l’inanité de l’Union.

L’État, c’est nous

L’« enceinte » de Valéry, c’est un Paris métaphorique, c’est un centre, c’est une unité.

La France s’est faite par son centre : nous entendons par là qu’elle est l’œuvre essentiellement politique d’une volonté perpétuée à travers les siècles et par delà les régimes. L’histoire de France est l’histoire de l’unité contre la diversité : « rassembler le semblable, le séparer du dissemblable »². Elle est, logiquement, l’histoire de la lutte contre « tout ce que notre culture politique a tendance à repousser : le pluralisme, la division, l’hétérogénéité »³. Et l’acteur central de cette histoire a pour nom : l’Etat.

Comment lire autrement l’histoire de France que comme la lente agrégation de provinces et de populations autour d’un noyau central si significativement baptisé « Île-de-France » ? Comment ne pas voir que le combat pour les « libertés françaises », comme dira Montaigne, est bien, nous venons de le dire, celui de l’unité (le roi) contre la diversité (les féaux, à l’intérieur, l’Empereur, à l’extérieur) ? Que toute la « théorie de la souveraineté » bâtie par les légistes de la couronne, dès avant Bodin et bien après Le Bret, aboutit à l’établissement et à la légitimation d’une monarchie *absolue*, prompte à développer tous les outils d’un Etat centralisé ?

² Julien Benda, *Esquisse d’une histoire des Français dans leur volonté d’être une nation*, Paris, Gallimard, 1932, p. 97.

³ Thierry Chopin, *L’héritage du fédéralisme ? Etats-Unis/Europe*, Paris, Note de la Fondation Robert Schuman, 2002, p. 6.

De ce point de vue, oui : un fil relie Bouvines à Valmy. De ce point de vue, oui : la Fronde, dernier soubresaut d'une France féodale, bouillonnante, diverse, est fille de la Ligue et la conclue – Retz dit bien d'ailleurs dans ses *Mémoires* que les armes qui servirent sur les barricades de la Fronde étaient celles qui « dormaient dans les greniers » depuis la Ligue...

La France, donc, « ne résulte nullement d'un état de fait »⁴ : elle est le fait de l'Etat. Ni évidence géographique, ni évidence ethnique, ni évidence linguistique, la France est cet ensemble politique patiemment assemblé, démonté et remonté, par des régimes successifs. Quel autre sens donné à la « certaine idée » du général de Gaulle ?

La France est une idée⁵ ; une idée servie par le seul instrument pérenne de son histoire : l'Etat.

Ce n'est pas ici le lieu d'approfondir la démonstration de cette thèse historique. Nous n'avons fait que rapidement l'effleurer. Nous n'ignorons pas que d'autres lectures sont possibles. Il suffit que le lecteur sache – et veuille bien admettre le temps de ces pages – que nous nous rangeons sans réserve derrière les tenants de la dite thèse, dont le grand ancêtre est Michelet. Elle est le socle de l'analyse que nous souhaitons développer.

Et lorsque, dans le monument érudit des *Lieux de mémoire*, élevé par Pierre Nora, on lit en ouverture de la partie consacrée à l'Etat : « L'Etat : opérateur de l'identité nationale, instrument de la conscience et foyer de permanence de la nation »⁶, on croit que ce socle est solide. La formule est d'ailleurs puissante : trois mots désignant trois réalités concrètes et suggérant le mode de l'action (« opérateur », « instrument », « foyer ») qui enchâssent trois mots désignant trois réalités abstraites fondatrices de l'être (« identité », « conscience », « permanence »). Un être ici collectif : la nation.

⁴ Colette Beaune, *Naissance de la nation France*, [1^{ère} édition, Paris, Gallimard, 1985] Paris, Gallimard, coll. Folio, 1993, p. 455.

⁵ Et, répétons-le, une idée essentiellement politique. Ni plus, ni moins qu'une idée : nous ne croyons en effet absolument pas, à l'exemple de Fernand Braudel, à une quelconque « essence » de la France. Voir *L'identité de la France*, « Espace et histoire », tome I, Paris, Arthaud-Flammarion, 1986, p. 19.

⁶ Pierre Nora (sous la direction), *Les lieux de mémoire*, « La Nation », volume II, Paris, Gallimard, coll. Bibliothèque des histoires, 1986, p. 143.

Cette aventure historique singulière a produit, croyons-nous, une identité singulière, toute politique. En France, quand l'Etat « opérateur de l'identité nationale » craque – comme nous le voyons aujourd'hui –, la nation doute et le « vivre ensemble » est touché.

L'identité en jeu

Pour le dire un peu nettement: il n'y a pas d'identité française hors de l'Etat. Il peut – il put? – y avoir *des* identités françaises, mais c'est justement contre elles, et les germes de division qu'elles pouvaient porter, que l'Etat a lutté avec force, en particulier à partir de la fin du 19^{ème} siècle. Nous vivons dans le face-à-face permanent et presque exclusif de l'Etat avec le citoyen. Toutes les appartenances communautaires – donc toutes les identités – intermédiaires ont été amoindries et gadgétisées, sinon effacées. La société civile est, paradoxalement, la grande muette de notre « vivre ensemble », confié presque intégralement aux soins de l'Etat⁷. L'histoire du centralisme et de la lutte contre les particularismes français est-elle à faire?

Il est certain que, sur cette base – construite sur la longue durée – d'un Etat qui s'est imposé comme le seul acteur politique légitime, quarante années d'Etat providence, d'interventionnisme économique et de ce qu'il ne faut plus hésiter à nommer un assistanat institutionnalisé, ont accentué l'hyperdépendance des Français contemporains à l'Etat. En France, la « citoyenneté multiple »⁸, naturelle, évidente, constitutive des identités dans bien d'autres pays européens, ne va guère de soi – pour certains, elle irait même *contre* soi...

C'est donc à bon droit que l'universitaire américain Dick Howard peut dire que « les Français sont spontanément étatistes alors que les Américains

⁷ Nous nous permettons de renvoyer à notre article « La société civile... malgré tout », *Entrée libre*, septembre 2006, N° 1. Disponible sur <http://www.institut-thomas-more.org>.

⁸ Voir Guillaume Badie, « L'Etat-nation, un acteur parmi d'autres ? », *Label France*, Paris, Janvier 2000, N° 38. Disponible sur http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/label_france/France/DOSSIER/2000/05etat.html.

sont spontanément antiétatistes, sinon toujours individualistes »⁹. Le remarquable dans la phrase est le choix de l'adverbe ...

Oui, c'est désormais *spontanément* que les Français se tournent vers l'Etat en cas de grande chaleur comme en cas de grand froid, en cas de sécheresse comme en cas d'inondation. C'est *spontanément* qu'ils demandent – et obtiennent – des « primes de rentrées scolaires », et que les personnes considérées précaires touchent une « prime de Noël ». C'est *spontanément* que l'Etat, anticipateur et protecteur, invente un beau matin le concept qu'il espère rassurant de « patriotisme économique ».

C'est la logique du *toujours plus* appliquée au monde ouaté de la *grande nurserie*¹⁰ !

Seulement, comme nous l'avons dit dès l'introduction, nous ne croyons pas que soit seulement en cause l'essoufflement d'un « modèle social » ou d'une énième République. Oui, l'Etat en France est impuissant à force d'obésité. Oui, le système fiscal français est confiscatoire. Oui, tout en France dissuade l'entrepreneur d'entreprendre. Oui, l'université française est mal en point. Oui, la cinquième République est moribonde. Mais le « problème de l'Etat » en France est infiniment plus essentiel encore: c'est l'identité même de la communauté qui est en jeu.

L'année 2005 nous en a livré deux illustrations historiques: le « non » au référendum sur le traité constitutionnel européen et l'embrasement de violence dans nos banlieues en fin d'année. Ces deux épisodes disent selon nous la même chose: le modèle *identitaire* français craque.

Il craque du dehors en même temps que du dedans. Du dehors, avec une construction européenne de plus en plus politique qui réclame aménagements institutionnels et transferts de souveraineté (avoués ou non). Du dedans, avec une frange de la population française – car il est faux de dire que c'est un problème qui concerne « les immigrés » – qui se vit

⁹ Dick Howard, « Les Américains sont spontanément antiétatistes, pas les Français », *Le Monde*, 14-15 mai 2006, p. 16. On notera l'inversion significative de la proposition dans le titre de l'entretien...

¹⁰ Selon les titres des essais percutants, et écrits à plus de vingt ans de distance, de François de Closets, *Toujours plus !*, Paris, Grasset, 1982 ; et Mathieu Laine, *La grande nurserie*, Paris, JC Lattès, 2006.

abandonnée et méprisée et qui, à force d'échec scolaire, d'illettrisme et d'inculture¹¹, de précarité, de chômage et de désespérance, trouve dans la violence ses seuls moyens d'expression.

Or c'est bien l'Etat qui est pris en tenaille entre ce dehors et ce dedans. C'est bien lui, à la fois opérateur de la construction européenne au nom du peuple français et « opérateur d'une identité nationale » dans laquelle ne se reconnaît pas cette frange de la population, qui doit répondre à des angoisses de plus en plus violemment exprimées mais, selon nous, relevant d'une commune logique.

Encore une fois, seul acteur politique légitime, seul dépositaire et seul garant du bien commun et de l'intérêt général, il doit désormais faire face à la crise d'identité qui était en germe dans son modèle.

Identité française, identités européennes

Ces questions d'une identité française en crise et du rôle qu'a joué et que joue l'Etat dans son façonnage, ne peuvent être appréhendées hors de leur humus européen. Le nombrilisme, on le sait, est l'un des plus grands défauts français. Hélas, mille fois hélas, l'Europe ne tourne pas autour de la France comme l'univers tournait autour de la Terre avant Galilée... On ne peut en effet sérieusement traiter de ces questions en ignorant « le rôle pesant de l'Europe, qui nous presse, sculpte notre destin comme le sculpteur modèle, de son pouce, le bloc de glaise où il ébauche son œuvre. L'Europe est chez nous, comme le monde est chez nous »¹².

Au chapitre historique, faut-il rappeler que la plupart des autres pays européens n'ont pas connu le processus d'unification de la nation sous la férule de l'Etat qu'a connu la France? Que dans bon nombre de pays, on a vu la nation – ou un sentiment national – produire une organisation politique constituée en Etat, et non l'inverse? Que d'immense portions de

¹¹ Voir Alain Bentolila, *Une jeunesse abîmée. Illettrisme et destin social*, Paris-Bruxelles, Tribune de l'Institut Thomas More, N° 8, janvier 2006. Disponible sur <http://www.institut-thomas-more.org/showNews/78>. Egalement publiée dans la livraison de janvier 2006 de la *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

¹² Fernand Braudel, *L'identité de la France*, « Les hommes et les choses », tome II, volume 2, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

l'Europe continentale furent terres d'empire – et longtemps – avant d'être des nations?

Ces réalités, rapidement rappelées, ont produit des modèles identitaires nombreux, divers, originaux, variés. Pour paraphraser, en l'inversant, la formule de Julien Benda citée plus haut, on pourrait dire qu'ils avaient pour ambition de « rassembler le dissemblable »...

L'héritage impérial en particulier est à ne pas négliger. On trouve dans ces pays – nous pensons en particulier à ceux qui composaient l'empire austro-hongrois avant 1918 – l'héritage d'un écheveau d'identités provinciales, villageoises, communautaires, culturelles, identités croisées et mêlées, qui composait une richesse, une complexité parfaitement étrangère à l'esprit centralisateur français. Il n'est qu'à se souvenir, ultime point d'histoire dans ces pages, avec quel constance les plénipotentiaires de la République une et indivisible poursuivirent leur objectif de démantèlement de l'empire de Vienne...

Et qui n'a pas lu les articles que consacra la presse britannique à la crispation française de 2003-2004 sur la laïcité – crise ô combien significative! –, ne peut comprendre l'éloignement de la conception française d'avec celles de la plupart de ses partenaires.

Le ministre des Affaires européennes du précédent gouvernement Blair, Douglas Alexander, prononça le 13 octobre 2005, au Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) de Bruxelles une passionnante conférence sur les identités européennes¹³. Suivons-le un moment pour comprendre comment et pourquoi la France ne peut se retrouver dans cette conception. S'il commence par une affirmation toute britannique – « Voit-on désormais émerger une identité politique européenne? Non »¹⁴ –, il poursuit par une formule qu'aucun dirigeant français ne désavouerait: « La dynamique de l'Etat-nation est la composante fondamentale de l'Union européenne, les briques et le mortier qui lui donnent sa légitimité »¹⁵. Seulement, de quel Etat-nation parle-t-il? Du français, unitaire et centralisé, ou de l'anglais,

¹³ Texte disponible sur <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

¹⁴ « Does that mean that we are now seeing the creation of a European political identity? No ».

¹⁵ « The strength of the nation state is the fundamental building block of the European union, the bricks and mortar that gives it its legitimacy ».

souple et ouvert à la diversité? La réponse est sans ambiguïté: « Au Royaume-Uni, on rencontrerait sans peine un Britannique dont les grands-parents étaient des Juifs gallois et des Asiatiques de Londres, d'une loyauté politique parfaite à l'égard du pays, mais porteurs d'un spectre beaucoup plus large de loyautés culturelles »¹⁶... Loyautés multiples, éprouvées dans la diversité, inconcevable dans une France où, encore une fois, seul l'Etat est prescripteur d'identité.

L'Europe au crible des identités

Ces différences fondamentales rejaillissent inévitablement sur la construction européenne telle qu'elle se fait sous nos yeux – ou, pour être exact, telle qu'elle ne se fait pas. Ça n'est pas le lieu ici de traiter de front l'épineuse question de la panne et de l'inanité européennes: nous n'offrons qu'un biais dans ces pages. Il nous apparaîtrait en tout cas bien irresponsable de ne pas profiter de la crise qu'elle traverse pour reposer les questions essentielles des finalités politiques de la construction européenne – pourquoi et pour quoi fait-on tout cela? –, questions essentielles au premier rang desquelles nous inscrivons celle des identités et du rôle qu'elles doivent jouer dans le processus d'unification du continent.

Car aux yeux des Français, comment la construction européenne pourrait-elle être le moins du monde, à côté de leur cher Etat, prescripteur d'identité? Réduite à l'état de bureaucratie budgétivore et de machine à fabriquer du règlement, empêtrée dans les pleutres conceptions de la doctrine profondément anti-politique des « ambiguïtés constructives », l'Union européenne est désormais un simple espace d'échange à faible teneur politique: le contraire d'un Etat¹⁷, une expérience profondément étrangère au modèle identitaire français.

De même qu'il y a, selon nous, une franche opposition entre lui et le courant de pensée constitutionnaliste, qui inspire et irrigue tant Bruxelles. Sa figure de proue est le philosophe allemand bien connu Jürgen

¹⁶ « In the United Kingdom it would be entirely feasible to meet a British-born person whose grandparents were Welsh Jews and London Asians, with political loyalties to the United Kingdom, but with a much wider spectrum of cultural loyalties ».

¹⁷ Voir Thierry Chopin, *L'héritage du fédéralisme ? Etats-Unis/Europe*, op. cit. , p.33 et sq.

Habermas. On connaît le concept de ce-dernier de « patriotisme constitutionnel », et le pas que ce courant de pensée souhaite désormais donner dans le processus européen à la Constitution sur les Etats : « L'Europe s'est construite par les traités, c'est-à-dire par la volonté des Etats ; elle ne peut se poursuivre que par la Constitution, c'est-à-dire par la volonté des citoyens »¹⁸. A quoi Habermas ajoute: « Ce glissement qui s'opère de l'Etat vers la Constitution permet de dégager la structure d'une solidarité entre personnes n'ayant d'autre lien entre elles que juridique, une solidarité abstraite et garantie par le droit »¹⁹.

Comment une France, qui a changé seize fois de régimes – donc, de constitutions... – depuis 1789 mais qui toujours depuis maintint, si l'on ose dire, le mètre et le préfet, pourrait-elle s'engager dans un tel processus, encore une fois, si contraire à son modèle?

Le culte des « objectifs consensuels » et des « ambiguïtés constructives »²⁰ sur lequel on bâtit l'Union européenne pendant cinq décennies, permettait de jeter un voile pudique sur la réalité prégnante de ces divergences constitutives des identités européennes. Comment les maintenir à l'heure d'une Europe qui veut – et doit – *faire* de la politique? Elle se tromperait en tout cas si elle voulait en faire contre les Etats, le français comme les autres. Elle n'existe encore que de leur somme²¹ : ce n'est pas en vain que Jean Pisani-Ferry a justement écrit qu'« à la différence des nations, l'Union européenne doit en permanence justifier son existence »²².

¹⁸ Dominique Rousseau, « Pour une Constitution européenne », *Le Débat*, N° 108, janvier-février 2000, p. 57.

¹⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *Sur l'Europe*, Paris, Bayard, 2006, p. 38.

²⁰ Voir notamment Nicole Gnesotto, *Halte à la conspiration du silence !*, Le Figaro, 18 octobre 2005.

²¹ Et, nous l'affirmons clairement, ce n'est à nos yeux pas une « Constitution » qui lui donnera un être : ce sont des drames et de l'arbitraire... bref de la politique.

²² Jean Pisani-Ferry, *L'Europe sert-elle encore à quelque chose ?*, 19 mai 2006. Disponible sur <http://bruegel.org>.

Conclusion

Que la « question de l'Europe »²³ ait partie liée avec le « problème de l'Etat » et la question de l'identité française, voilà une conviction que nous espérons avoir fait partager au lecteur... Là où nous sommes sans conviction en revanche, qu'on nous permette de l'avouer, c'est sur la capacité actuelle de l'Etat de se réformer en profondeur et de proposer, selon sa norme, un nouveau modèle identitaire pour demain.

La crise d'identité est vive dans notre pays, tous les freins sont serrés et bien des catégories de populations sont à cran. C'est d'une nouvelle synthèse dont le pays a besoin, de responsables capables de recoudre ensemble des trames de plus en plus disjointes. Y a-t-il place parmi elles pour un peu de diversité? Ou bien y a-t-il en France comme une fatalité de l'unité?

Gageons en tout cas que cette question identitaire, plus encore que celles de l'insécurité et de l'immigration, qui sont ses petites sœurs obligées, sera au cœur du débat présidentiel du printemps 2007.

²³ Selon le titre d'un article publié en Anglais, « The question of Europe », par Paul Valéry dans le *New York Herald Tribune*, le 29 avril 1928. Extraits reproduits dans *Le Monde des livres*, 26 mai 2006, p. 2.

FÜR UND WIDER EUROPA ODER: WAS WILL DIE SCHWEIZ?

Tamara Ehs*

Abstract

Switzerland was – and sometimes still is – considered as a model of Europe or as a small image of the future “United States of Europe”. It therefore surprises that this country is not a member of the European Union and does not aim joining it in foreseeable time neither. The essay focuses on what keeps Switzerland away from Europe and finds answers in the Swiss identity that is self-assertion and differentness as well as the old consciousness of having the mission to bring freedom to Europe. The strifle of Switzerland between approximation and absence is described by the meaning of the “European Idea” for the once so difficult way to a common Swiss identity. Moreover, the current constellation is analyzed in its historical and mythological reasons.

I. Vom Enthusiasmus der Anfänge und dem heutigen Zögern

Anders als aktuell bei der Türkei oder der Ukraine stellte sich bei der Schweiz nie die Frage, ob sie denn zu Europa gehöre oder gar zu Europa passe. Die reiche Alpenrepublik wäre in der Europäischen Union stets herzlich willkommen. Immerhin galt und gilt sie mit ihren friedlich nebeneinander lebenden Sprach- und Konfessionsgruppen in gewisser Weise auch als Vorbild oder als kleines Abbild Europas. Denn sie verkörperte damit die Realität einer alten europäischen Idee und hob diese aus dem Bereich der Utopie in die Erfahrbarkeit des Machbaren. So sah schon der große Visionär eines geeinten Europas, Victor Hugo, in der Schweiz die Lösung für die europäischen Probleme seiner Zeit:

* Tamara Ehs, Dr. phil. (Thesis: “Helvetisches Europa – Europäische Schweiz“, 2005, Frankfurt am Main/Bern/Vienna: Peter Lang) is a researcher and lecturer at the Department of Political Science of the University of Vienna and an analyst for the Oxford Council on Good Governance (Government Section).

Es wird einst der Tag kommen, an dem die Waffen auch Euch aus der Hand fallen werden, an dem der Krieg gerade so absurd scheinen und ebenso unmöglich sein wird zwischen Paris und London, zwischen Petersburg und Berlin, als er jetzt unmöglich ist zwischen Basel und Zürich, zwischen Glarus und Schwyz. Ein Tag wird kommen, an dem du, Frankreich, du, Russland, du, England, du, Deutschland – an dem ihr alle, ihr Länder des Festlands, euch eng zu einer höheren Einheit zusammenschließen werdet, so wie die Kantone der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, die sich vereinigten zu unserer Schweiz, ohne ihr verschiedenen Eigenschaften und ihre rühmlichen Eigentümlichkeiten zu verlieren.¹

Bloß, die Schweiz ziert sich heute, hält sich den EU-Beitritt zwar als Option offen, wie auch jüngst der Europabericht 2006 bekräftigte, hat aber doch Bedenken, was u.a. eng mit ihrer Auffassung von Freiheit und Souveränität zusammen hängt.

Nach dem Nein des Volkes zum Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR) 1992 geht die Eidgenossenschaft daher den bilateralen Weg. Um die zunehmend schwererwiegenden, nicht nur wirtschaftlichen Nachteile einer Nichtteilnahme an der Europäischen Union zu verringern, wurden in den letzten Jahren deshalb zwei bilaterale Verträge unterzeichnet. Diese sektoriellen Abkommen mit der EU ergänzen das im Wesentlichen auf den klassischen Warenverkehr beschränkte Freihandelsabkommen von 1972, indem sich die Schweiz schrittweise der Europäischen Union öffnet und an ihren Aktivitäten teilnimmt. Mittlerweile umfassen die Verträge Bereiche wie Personenfreizügigkeit, Land- und Flugverkehr, Forschung sowie seit Neuestem auch die Sicherheitspolitik: Durch das Assoziationsabkommen mit Schengen/Dublin, das am 5. Juni 2005 in einem Referendum vom Volk bestätigt wurde, nimmt die Schweiz auch an der europäischen Sicherheits- und Asylzusammenarbeit teil und rückt zugunsten einer pragmatischen Kooperation mit der EU in Teilbereichen immer mehr von ihrer einstigen “splendid isolation“ ab.

¹ Hugo, Victor cited according to Rotten, Elisabeth (1942), *Die Einigung Europas. Sammlung von Aussprüchen und Dokumenten zur Versöhnung und Organisation Europas aus eineinhalb Jahrhunderten*, Basel: Haus der Bücher, 17.

Ich möchte in diesem Beitrag – gestützt auf Erkenntnisse meiner Dissertationsschrift “Helvetisches Europa – Europäische Schweiz“ – der Frage nachgehen, was die Schweiz von einer weitergehenden Integration fernhält, und als eine unter mehreren möglichen Antworten aufzeigen, dass auf der emotionalen Ebene die Ursache v. a. in der spezifischen schweizerischen Identität, der in langen Jahrhunderten eingeübten Notwendigkeit zur Selbstbehauptung und dem damit einhergehenden Sendungsbewusstsein zu suchen ist.

Für die Schweiz war Europa nämlich immer ein Thema, war die europäische Einigung immer Anhaltspunkt, um die eigene nationale Identität auszubilden; und die Schweiz hat sich stets als Teil dieser zu verwirklichenden “Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ verstanden. Besonders im 19. Jh., als die Schweiz unter dem Druck nationalistischer und imperialistischer Bestrebungen ihrer Nachbarn eigene Konzepte von Staat und Nation bildete, kam der “Idee Europa“ große Bedeutung zu. In jener Zeit der schwierigen Identitätsfindung als “unvollkommene Nation“, wie Max Weber die Schweiz nannte, entwarfen zahlreiche schweizerische Juristen, Politiker und Wissenschaftler Gedankenskizzen und sogar ausgearbeitete Pläne für ein geeintes Europa.

Aus der Angst der Schweizer vor einem Untergang im kriegerisch-nationalistischen Europa, aus dem Antrieb zur Selbsterhaltung des Kleinstaats inmitten von deutschen, französischen und italienischen Ansprüchen auf deren “nationalen Anteil“² an der Schweiz wurde sie in diesen Plänen als Motor des gemeinsamen Freiheits- und Friedenskampfes für Europa konzipiert, nahm die kleine Alpenrepublik eine Vorreiterrolle in den europäischen Integrationsbestrebungen ein.

Die in jener Zeit erstellten Europapläne spiegeln die Bemühungen wider, zu nationalstaatlicher Identifikation zu finden, die sich in der Schweiz anders als über Sprache und/oder Religion definieren muss(te), um die Eidgenossenschaft als solche zu bewahren. In dieser Entwicklung spielte

² Da in der Schweiz der Staat mehr als nur eine Nation umfasst – will man “Nation“ objektiv-kulturell über die Sprachgemeinschaft definieren –, fiel es ihr im Laufe des 19. Jh. besonders schwer, sich als Nationalstaat zu identifizieren und damit gegenüber ihren Nachbarn zu behaupten. Denn v. a. von deutscher Seite wurde die Nation als Kultur- und Sprachgemeinschaft verstanden; besonders Johann Gottfried Herder trug zur Verbindung und Popularisierung der Begriffe Volk, Vaterland und Nation über gemeinsame Sprache und Poesie bei.

der Gedanke der europäischen Einigung eine tragende Rolle, sah sich die Schweiz doch lange Zeit als Vorhut dieses künftigen Europas, ja, als Mutterland der Freiheit und des Friedens für Europa.

Für die Prosperität der Schweiz sind gute Beziehungen zur EU zwar grundlegend und sie passt sich seit den 1980ern im autonomen Nachvollzug³ den europäischen Standards an. Dennoch trifft man in Gesprächen mit Schweizern immer wieder auf die Meinung, nicht die Schweiz solle sich europäisieren, sondern Europa müsse sich erst helvetisieren, bevor die Eidgenossen der Union beitreten könnten. Denn als emotionales Fundament helvetischen Staats- und damit Identitätsverständnisses gilt die Selbstbestimmung, die sich in direkter Demokratie und Föderalismus äußert. Aber dies sieht die Schweiz in der EU nur unzureichend verwirklicht.

Nachdem sich die Schweizer am 6. Dezember 1992 in einem Referendum gegen den Beitritt zum Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR) ausgesprochen hatten und auch bisher weitere Initiativen keine Mehrheit für die Mitgliedschaft in der EU finden konnten, ist die Schweiz mit diesem Integrationswerk heute nur durch sektorielle Abkommen verbunden. Laut Meyer und Kohler regen sich Widerstand und Zögern der Schweiz aber "weniger gegen die Idee Europa als gegen das Szenario einer europäischen Verwaltungsbürokratie".⁴ Die grundsätzliche Bejahung des europäischen Projekts beweist auch der Umstand, dass die Schweiz an den Anfängen der heute realisierten europäischen Einigungen in hohem Maße beteiligt war und wichtige Vorarbeit leistete:⁵ So wird in der Literatur der Beginn der Aktivitäten der gegenwärtigen europäischen Vereinigung oftmals mit der Gründung der *Europa-Union* 1934 in der Schweiz angesetzt, so wird die *Union Parlementaire Européenne* oft als erstes europäisches Parlament genannt, das 1947 in Gstaad eingesetzt wurde; im selben Jahr fand in Montreux der erste Kongress der *Union Europäischer Föderalisten* statt, im

³ "Autonomer Nachvollzug" (auch Eurokompatibilität genannt) bezeichnet die Anpassung des nationalen Rechts an das Recht der Europäischen Union.

⁴ Meyer, Martin; Kohler, Georg (eds., 1998), *Die Schweiz – für Europa? Über Kultur und Politik*, Munich/Vienna: Carl Hanser, 9.

⁵ See Schneider, Heinrich (1959), *Europäische Erziehung. Die Europa-Idee und die theoretische und praktische Pädagogik*, Basel/Freiburg/Vienna: Herder.

Jahr darauf in Interlaken der Kongress der Parlamentarierunion, die den inhaltlich bis heute wegweisenden "Interlaken-Plan" verabschiedete, einen Verfassungsentwurf für einen europäischen Bund. Zu nennen ist auch die Gründung des *Europäischen Kulturzentrums* 1950 in Genf, das die Betonung des Gemeineuropäischen zum Ziel hatte. Romain Kirt erachtet diese Beiträge der Schweiz als "influence without power" und erinnert: "Unter Berufung auf Carl Hilty hat auch Jacques Santer den Kleinstaat in einem nach wie vor lesenswerten Aufsatz als 'moralische Macht' bezeichnet und an Hand von zahlreichen Beispielen nachgewiesen, dass auch ein Land ohne *politische* Macht durchaus Einfluss haben kann".⁶

Basis der Aufbauarbeit einer europäischen Gemeinschaft in den Nachkriegsjahren wurde aber v. a. das "Hertensteiner Programm": Die *Europa-Union* lud 1945 europäische Föderalisten zu einer Konferenz und wählte als Veranstaltungsort Hertenstein am Vierwaldstätter See, wo zwölf Thesen für eine künftige Europäische Union verfasst wurden. Diese Begebenheit wurde bekannt als "Hertensteiner RütliSchwur". In Erinnerung an die schweizerischen Anfänge auf der als "Rütli" bekannt gewordenen Wiese nahe dem Vierwaldstätter See, wo der Sage nach mit dem Schwur am 1. August 1291 die Eidgenossenschaft begründet worden war, wollte man den eigenen Mythos von der Verbindung der Freien an die europäische Einheit knüpfen. Einmal mehr wurde das Sendungsbewusstsein und die Mission für Europa verdeutlicht, die mittlerweile so sehr zur schweizerischen Identität geworden war. Somit verband die Schweiz ihre Anfänge, ihren eigenen Mythos vom einigenden Freiheitskampf nicht nur topographisch mit dem Beginn der europäischen Einheit.

Doch diese der europäischen Integrationsgeschichtsschreibung weithin bekannten Beiträge sind eben nur ein Teil der Vor- und Mitarbeit, die Schweizer an der europäischen Einigungsidee tatsächlich leisteten. Denn all den Bemühungen des 20. Jh. gingen zahlreiche Überlegungen zum Europagedanken voraus, die bis weit ins 19. und sogar 18. Jh. zurückreichen. In jener Zeit, in der sich die Schweiz zu einem Staat und einer Nation zu entwickeln begann, wurde auch die Idee Europa aktuell.

⁶ Kirt, Romain (2002), "Der Beitrag der kleinen Staaten zur 'exzentrischen Identität' Europas", in: Elm, Ralf (ed.), *Europäische Identität: Paradigmen und Methodenfragen*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 135-144 (143).

Aufgrund der Besonderheit der Schweiz als politische Willensnation wurden die Diskussionen um mögliche "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa" in der Eidgenossenschaft sogar ausführlicher und intensiver geführt als andernorts. Diese sog. Willensnation ist getragen vom Willen, in einem Staat zusammen zu leben, weil man politische Überzeugungen teilt, die man bedroht sieht. An vorderster Stelle jener Überzeugungen steht für die Eidgenossen die Idee der Freiheit, die in der Schweiz für ganz Europa Heimat und Schutz gefunden habe. Die Idee der Freiheit ist Basis der Mission, die die Schweiz verpflichten würde, Europa als Nationalitätenstaat Vorbild zu sein. Im Jahre 1902 hielt der Staats- und Völkerrechtswissenschaftler Carl Hilty seine Rektoratsrede über "Die Zukunft der Schweiz", worin er die bestehenden Staaten einem größeren Gemeinwesen entgegen schreiten sah, wie es die schweizerischen Kantone und Nationalitäten bereits 1848 vorgemacht hätten, und erinnerte an seine schon 1875 gehaltenen "Vorlesungen über die Politik der Eidgenossenschaft", in denen es über die schweizerische Willensnation als Vorbild für Europa hieß:

Nicht Rasse, nicht Stammesgemeinschaft, nicht gemeinsame Sprache und Sitte, nicht Natur und Geschichte, haben den Staat schweizerischer Eidgenossenschaft gegründet. – Er ist vielmehr entstanden im vollen Gegensatz zu allen diesen Großmächten, aus einer Idee, aus einem politischen, sich zu immer größerer Klarheit entwickelnden Denken und Wollen und beruht darauf noch heute.⁷

Warum nun ist die Schweiz nach Jahrhunderten der Bemühungen um ein geeintes Europa und 60 Jahre nach dem "europäischen Rütli Schwur" nicht Mitglied der Europäischen Union, die sich ja selbst als Werk des Friedens und der Freiheit bezeichnet? In die Diskussion zur Beantwortung dieser Frage möchte ich zwei Thesen einbringen: Ich behaupte einerseits, dass die Idee der Freiheit, die den Zusammenhalt der Schweiz ausmacht(e), jene Idee der Wehrhaftigkeit und Selbstbehauptung, den heutigen Ausschluss von der EU ebenso begründet wie andererseits das Sendungsbewusstsein, in Europa jene helvetische Auffassung von Freiheit zu verwirklichen.

⁷ Hilty, Carl (1875) cited according to Imhof, Ulrich (1991), *Mythos Schweiz. Identität – Nation – Geschichte, 1291 – 1991*, Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 169.

II. Von der Selbstbehauptung wider die Europäische Union

Der Freiheits- und Selbstbestimmungswille gegen alle Fremdherrschaft, wie er in der für die Schweiz so zentralen Identifikationsfigur des Wilhelm Tell zum Ausdruck kommt, ist für die Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Union von besonderer Bedeutung. Er stellt klar, dass die mit Pathos zitierte Idee der Freiheit im Grunde "Befreiung", Emanzipation, meint – sei es nun Befreiung von der Herrschaft der Habsburger, Befreiung von überkommenen Strukturen durch die Bildung eines modernen Bundesstaates oder Befreiung Schwächerer aus den Fängen eines Tyrannen.⁸ Dahingehend meint auch Hans Küng:

Die politische Geschichte der Schweiz ist bei allem Versagen, allen Zwängen und Niederlagen eine Geschichte der Freiheit gewesen. Die Abneigung gegen Machtpolitiker aller Farben ist uns geblieben ... Aber Geschichte ist nur bedingt eine Orientierungshilfe für die Zukunft, vor allem dann, wenn sie mit *Mythen* vermischt wird.⁹

Aus diesem Grund verlangt er eine Entmythologisierung der Schweiz, um sich nicht länger der Wirklichkeit gewordenen europäischen Einigung zu entziehen. Küng sieht, dass sich die Idee der Freiheit als Idee der Unabhängigkeit v. a. im 19. Jh. zu einer Identität der Selbstbehauptung oder – wie Karl Schmid es bezeichnete – einem Mythos der "Gegenläufigkeit" wandelte.

Die Abneigung gegen "fremdes Recht und fremde Richter" ist mythologisch-historisch begründet und zu einem schweizerischen Charakteristikum geworden. Olaf Mörke spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von "bewusster Abgrenzung zu der vertikalen Herrschaftsorganisation der sie umgebenden Fürstenstaaten", dieser schon in der Frühzeit der Eidgenossenschaft bestehenden Gemeinsamkeit, die mit der "Freiheit" als erstem Attribut der Republik eine übersprachliche und überkonfessionelle Identität ermöglicht: "In dieser Interpretation bleibt die Gemeinde ... mit

⁸ See Flacke, Monika (1998), *Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama*, München/Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 15.

⁹ Küng, Hans (1992), *Die Schweiz ohne Orientierung? Europäische Perspektiven*, Zurich: Benzinger, 52.

ihrer nicht-herrschaftlichen Gesellschaftsorganisation Grundlage des normativen Selbstverständnisses“.¹⁰ Da die Idee der Freiheit in hohem Maße eine Idee der Unabhängigkeit darstellt, steht zur Frage, wie überhaupt ein Zusammenschluss mit Europa möglich wäre, warum überhaupt jemals in der Schweiz Pläne für eine europäische Einigung entworfen wurden.

Die Verwunderung ist jedoch gelöst, wenn man die Entstehung zahlreicher Europaentwürfe unter dem Diskurs “Europa als Trost“ betrachtet: Gegen die v. a. ökonomisch begründete fortschreitende Zentralisierung und Erweiterung bundesstaatlicher Kompetenzen seit der Staatsgründung 1848, die von vielen freiheitsliebenden Schweizern als immenser und teilweise untragbarer Eingriff in ihre Eigenverantwortung und Souveränität empfunden worden ist, wurde das tröstliche Argument ins Treffen geführt, diese Form der Staatlichkeit sei als “Zwischenstufe“ notwendig, um in einem noch zu gründenden geeinten Europa (der Kantone oder der Regionen) die alte Freiheit – verstanden als Souveränität – auf Dauer zu erhalten. An dieser Stelle setzte der Europagedanke an, der den Bundesstaat als Notwendigkeit darstellte, im Europa der Nationalstaaten zu überleben, und zugleich als die einzige Möglichkeit vorgebracht wurde, die Mission der Freiheit und des Friedens für ganz Europa zu erfüllen, eine Mission, ein Sendungsbewusstsein, das die Schweiz über Konfessions- und Sprachgrenzen hinweg zusammenführte.¹¹

Die “Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ wurden den Eidgenossen zum Gedankenkonstrukt, in dem sich am Ende jede Staatlichkeit auflösen würde. Diese Auflösung entsprach der schweizerischen Idee der Freiheit, wie sie in Mythen transportiert und zum Merkmal der Identität wurde. Denn die Freiheit gehört auch heute zu ‘den spezifisch eidgenössischen Werten, deren Sicherung der bündische Zusammenschluss gewährleisten sollte“ und verkörpert “eine Lebensart, die sich durch einen gewissen, nicht untertänigen Freimut der Äußerung der ‘Svizzeri liberissimi et

¹⁰ Mörke, Olaf (1996), “Bataver, Eidgenossen und Goten: Gründungs- und Begründungsmythen in den Niederlanden, der Schweiz und Schweden in der Frühen Neuzeit“, in: Berding, Helmut (ed.), *Mythos und Nation. Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewusstseins in der Neuzeit*, vol 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 104-132 (111).

¹¹ See Ehs, Tamara (2005), *Helvetisches Europa – Europäische Schweiz*. Frankfurt am Main/Bern/Vienna: Peter Lang.

armatissimi' (Machiavel) auszeichnet, auch einige anarchoide Züge aufzuweisen vermochte und sich in der Ausbildung von Begriffen eines Widerstandsrechts gegenüber der Obrigkeit manifestierte.“¹²

Das Anders-Sein (als Republik, als Demokratie, als Kleinstaat, als Nationalitätenstaat) wurde im ausgehenden 19. Jh. trotz Untergangphantasien unter dem Vorzeichen, in dieser Andersartigkeit als Vorbild die Mission eines freien Europas erfüllen zu können, als bester ideologischer Schutz angesehen. Dadurch wurde der Mythos der freien Schweizer, die ihre Selbstbestimmung stets aufs Neue behaupten müssten, noch verstärkt. Die Geschichtsschreibung erzählte damals v. a. von der Unterdrückung der Schweiz und ihrer (Versuche der) Auflehnung. Seit ältesten Zeiten, wohl seit der Erwähnung der besiegten Helvetier in Cäsars "De Bello Gallico", hätten die Schweizer um ihre Freiheit kämpfen müssen.

Die Erlangung und Behauptung von Freiheit, die Befreiung von fremden Mächten und gegenseitigem Völkerhass stellt aber ebenso eine tragende Komponente der Anfänge der heutigen Europäischen Union dar. Achille Albonetti schrieb voll Pathos zu diesen Anfängen:

Der glänzende wirtschaftliche Aufschwung der europäischen Staaten darf nicht irreführen. Der nationalistische Keim sprießt schnell und mächtig hervor. Sollte er sich verbreiten, wären die Folgen heute noch verheerender als jemals zuvor. Er würde nicht nur Krieg und Zerstörung bringen, sondern weit Schlimmeres: vielleicht das Ende der europäischen Zivilisation und die Knechtschaft. Um frei zu leben, müssen wir uns zusammenschließen, und um uns zusammenzuschließen, müssen wir dies wollen, aus tiefster Seele wollen.¹³

Diese gesamteuropäische Idee der Freiheit ist demnach im Grunde kongruent mit der schweizerischen. Beide Ansätze erkennen, dass im Zusammenschluss die Freiheit der/des einzelnen am besten gewährleistet

¹² Bernhard, Roberto (1994), *Die Schweiz als Wille und Vorstellung. Beiträge zu einem Dauerthema*, Aarau/Frankfurt am Main/Salzburg: Sauerländer, 20.

¹³ Albonetti, Achille (1961), *Vorgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*, Bd. 22 der Schriftenreihe zum Handbuch für europäische Wirtschaft, Baden-Baden/Bonn: Verlag August Lutzeyer, 253.

wird. Dennoch gibt es heute in der Schweiz Stimmen wie diejenige der AUNS¹⁴, die sogar die bloß bilateralen Abkommen der Schweiz mit der Europäischen Union mit dem rhetorischen Zweihänder "fremdes Recht und fremde Richter" als Bedrohung für die zentralen Werte der Eidgenossenschaft – Unabhängigkeit und Neutralität – bezeichnen. Die Anerkennung einer Autorität nach Brüsseler Zuschnitt widerspricht demzufolge dem Selbstverständnis der Selbstbehauptung. Anouchka von Heuer beschreibt daher das Abseitsstehen der Schweiz in Europa so:

Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, so scheint mir, dass die Schweiz bisher die Europäische Union abgelehnt hat, nicht aus nationalem Egoismus, wie man uns das oft unterschieben will, sondern aus Treue zu ihrer Geschichte und ihren jahrhundertealten föderalen Strukturen ... Ich persönlich bin der Überzeugung, wäre das gegenwärtig im Aufbau befindliche Europa föderalistisch, die Schweizer wären dessen eifrige Befürworter.¹⁵

Habe ich in diesem Kapitel bereits die mit Mythen behaftete Identität der Freiheit als möglichen Grund für die Ablehnung eines Beitritts zur EU geortet, so eröffnet sich daraus nun ein weiterer: Europa ist nicht nach dem Vorbild der Schweiz errichtet, ist nicht föderalistisch. Die Schweiz hat deshalb ihre Sendung, ihre Mission noch nicht erfüllt.

III. Vom Mythos der Schweizer Freiheit für Europa

In ihrer Identität der Gegenläufigkeit definiere sich die Schweiz noch immer als "omnis determinatio negatio est", meint Franz Blankart und gibt zu bedenken, dass die Schweiz heute längst nicht mehr exklusiver Hort des

¹⁴ Die "Aktion für eine unabhängige und neutrale Schweiz" (AUNS) ist eine rechtskonservative Organisation, die [1986](#) aus dem damaligen Aktionskomitee gg. den [UNQ](#)-Beitritt der Schweiz gegründet wurde. Sie setzt sich für die Wahrung der Unabhängigkeit u. Neutralität der Schweiz ein und bekämpft jedes internat. Engagement der Eidgenossenschaft, speziell auch jegliche Annäherung an die EU.

¹⁵ Heuer, Anouchka von (1994), *Späte Würdigung für Denis de Rougemont. Der Föderalismus, die Schweiz und Europa*, Vortrag gehalten vor der Alliance française, AUNS-Publikation, 36.

europäischen Wertes der Freiheit ist, den es gegen alle zu verteidigen und allen in messianischer Manier zu überbringen gelte.¹⁶

Hat sich die Schweiz von Europa distanziert, um ihre Mission zu verwirklichen? Beziehungsweise: Ist im oben erläuterten schweizerischen Beitrag an der europäischen Einigungsidee, der ja einen ebenso großen Beitrag an der Staats- und Nationswerdung der Schweiz ausmacht, der Ursprung des heutigen integrationspolitischen Zurückhaltung der Schweiz zu sehen?

Bei ihrer Konstituierung als Staat und Nation im 19. Jh. hat die Schweiz in hohem Maße auf Europa gesetzt. Das vereinte Europa galt als Versprechen der Auflösung von Staatlichkeit. Müssten auch zuerst noch Zweckbündnisse eingegangen werden, um imperialistische Bestrebungen der Nachbarn einzuschränken, müsste Europa erst noch ähnlich einem Staat organisiert sein, so würden schließlich, am Endpunkt des zivilisatorischen Fortschritts – an den das 19. Jh. ja so sehr glaubte –, diese immer größeren Organisationseinheiten zugunsten der Gemeinde oder der Talschaft weichen. Doch das vereinte Europa, wie es nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg Wirklichkeit zu werden begann, erfüllte dieses schweizerische Versprechen nicht. Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenschluss, die Freiheit des Marktes, wie sie sich in der EWG offenbarte, entsprach nicht der schweizerischen Auffassung von Freiheit. Im Sammelband „Die Schweiz und die Integration des Westens“ erschienen 1965 folgende Anmerkungen zum Abseitsstehen der Schweiz:

Die Schweiz ist ein europäisches Kernland, weil sich in ihr europäische Sprachen und Kulturen begegnen und friedlich vereinigen und weil in ihr die Freiheit in Gestalt der persönlichen, der politischen und der genossenschaftlichen Freiheit eine Heimstätte gefunden hat.¹⁷

und

¹⁶ Blankart, Franz (1992), „Die europäische Schweiz im historischen Rückblick“, in: Feller, Markus; Weibel, Ewald R. (eds.), *Schweizerische Identität und Europäische Integration*, Bern/Stuttgart/Vienna: Paul Haupt, 211-217 (216)

¹⁷ Haug, Hans (1965), „Ist die schweizerische Neutralität noch zeitgemäß?“, in Röpke, Wilhelm et al. (eds.), *Die Schweiz und die Integration des Westens*, Zurich: Schweizer Spiegel, 51-74 (63).

Wichtiger als größtmögliches Teilhaben am wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung und an den neuesten geistigen Modeströmungen ist, dass wir uns selber bleiben, mit unserer Art zu leben, unserer Auffassung der Freiheit, unserem demokratischen Stil. Das können wir in der EWG nicht.¹⁸

Demnach ist die Schweiz noch immer auf Mission, weil die Freiheit in der EWG, später in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften unter dem Dach der EU auch jetzt noch vorrangig eine wirtschaftliche ist, aber zu wenig Freiheit im Sinne des Föderalismus und der demokratischen Ordnung darstellt. Hier ist das alte Sendungsbewusstsein noch lebendig, die Annahme, nicht die Schweiz müsse sich europäisieren, sondern die EU müsse sich erst "verschweizern", bevor ein Beitritt möglich sei. Die Freiheit, wie sie im Föderalismus zum Tragen, aber in der Europäischen Union zu kurz kommt, trennt bis heute die Schweiz von der europäischen Einigung. Auch in der aktuellen Literatur wird die Ansicht vertreten, dass eine echte Chance für den europäischen Föderalismus nur zum Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegeben war. Die Gelegenheit sei aber damals verpasst worden, was den Ausstieg der Schweiz vom Mitwirken an der europäischen Einigungsidee nach sich zog.¹⁹

Doch diese Idee von der "Helvetisierung" Europas ist keineswegs alleine einem Sendungs- und Auserwähltheitsbewusstsein der Schweizer anzulasten. Immerhin wurden der Schweiz von außen zahlreiche Aufgaben in der Entwicklung der europäischen Staaten und darüber hinaus hinsichtlich einer Vereinigung dieser Staaten zugeordnet, als sie selbst noch mit ihrer Identität als sonderbarer republikanisch-demokratischer Kleinstaat zu kämpfen hatte; Aufgaben, die die Schweiz vor allem ab ihrer Öffnung für den Internationalismus seit den 1870ern gerne annahm;

¹⁸ Roth, Daniel (1965) "Weltverbundener Kleinraum Schweiz. Utopie Europa", in: Röpke, Wilhelm et al. (eds.), *Die Schweiz und die Integration des Westens*. Zurich: Schweizer Spiegel, 75-89 (76).

¹⁹ See Freiburghaus, Dieter (2002), *Auf den Spuren des Föderalismus*, Bern/Stuttgart/Vienna: Paul Haupt.

Aufgaben, die zum Beispiel unter dem Schlagwort der "Guten Dienste"²⁰ maßgeblich zum Teil schweizerischer Identität wurden. Gleich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg erneuerte Karl Jaspers diesen alten Gedanken des schweizerischen Vorbilds, indem er vorbrachte, Europa stünde vor der Wahl zwischen Balkanisierung und Helvetisierung, und letzterem den Vorzug gab.

Und immer wieder traten und treten die Mythen um Wilhelm Tell (als Personifizierung des Freiheitsgedankens), Arnold Winkelried (als Symbol des eidgenössischen Zusammenhalts "Einer für alle – Alle für einen")²¹ und Heinrich Pestalozzi (der nach Winkelried's militärischem Opfer nun die zivile Variante der Selbstaufopferung verkörpert)²² als Zeugen für die Mission der Schweizer auf. "Politische Mythen versichern der Gemeinschaft, in der sie gelten, dass das, was geschehen ist, geschehen musste, dass die Ereignisse nicht zufällig, sondern notwendig vonstatten gingen und dass sie mehr waren und sind als bloße Ereignisse, sondern ihnen eine heilsgeschichtliche Dimension eigen ist"²³, weiß Herfried

²⁰ Die "Guten Dienste" umfassen über die spezifisch völkerrechtlichen Schlichtungsprozeduren hinaus zugleich einen Kreis weiterer Aktivitäten zur Überbrückung internat. Konflikte durch die Schweiz als Mediatorin. Die aus ihrer Neutralität fließende Glaubwürdigkeit ließ die Schweiz schon früh zu einer bevorzugten Trägerin solcher Dienste werden, die heute jedoch überwiegend von den Vereinten Nationen ausgeübt werden.

²¹ Dem Mythos nach umfasste Arnold Winkelried im Verteidigungskrieg gegen die Habsburger in heroischer Selbstaufopferung möglichst viele feindliche Speere und drückte sie in seine Brust, so dass eine Lücke in der gegnerischen Phalanx entstand, durch welche die Eidgenossen dann siegreich vordringen konnten.

²² Pestalozzi hatte in den Revolutionskämpfen des Jahres 1798, als die Schweiz für kurze Zeit frz. Protektorat gewesen war, ein Heim für Kriegswaisen errichtet und als Mitglied der Helvetischen Gesellschaft die Volksbildung propagiert. Er ist durch seinen ital. Namen, seine Zürcher Herkunft und seine Tätigkeit in der frz. Schweiz das Modell des modernen Gesamtschweizers, der auch die Mission der Schweiz für Europa thematisierte: "Erste Männer des Vaterlandes! Die Retter Europas ehren in euch die letzten Republikaner und haben das Heil unserer Nachkommen in eure Hand gelegt ... Ihr seid dem Vaterlande, euren Zeitgenossen und unseren Nachkommen, ihr seid der Menschheit verantwortlich." (Pestalozzi, Heinrich [1815], "An die Unschuld, den Ernst und den Edelmut meines Zeitalters und meines Vaterlandes. Ein Wort der Zeit", in: Bosshart, Emilie et al. [eds.], [1946], *Heinrich Pestalozzi – Gesammelte Werke in zehn Bänden*, vol. 6 "Politische Schriften". Zurich: Rascher, 254).

²³ Münkler, Herfried (1994), "Politische Mythen und nationale Identität. Vorüberlegungen zu einer Theorie politischer Mythen", in: Frindte, Wolfgang; Pätzold, Harald (eds.), *Mythen*

Münkler dazu anzumerken. Gerade weil Mythen Deutungsangebote bereitstellen und als Quelle politischer Legitimität sowie als Träger politisch mobilisierender Botschaft fungieren²⁴, gerät die schweizerische Identität am Beginn des 21. Jh. in eine Krise: Europa hat sich in Frieden und Freiheit organisiert, ohne sich zu helvetisieren, und ohne die Schweiz als Mitglied zu benötigen. Der Schweizer Sonderweg wird immer mehr zu einem europäischen Sonderling. Einst kam in den Entwürfen für Europa die Schweiz als Hort und Hüterin der Freiheit ins Bild, als Alpenfestung der europäischen Werte. Nun warnt Küng: "Der Stolz auf die nationale Tradition ist in Gefahr, zu einem nationalistischen Traditionalismus zu werden"²⁵ und fordert zur Entmythologisierung auf, um endlich tätiges Mitglied in der europäischen Einigung zu werden. In gleicher Weise verlangt auch Koslowski, die europäische Gemeinschaft erst gar nicht auf einem Mythos zu begründen, denn "(d)er Mythos als politischer Mythos ist Selbstermächtigung durch Fiktion und Poesie".²⁶

Jede Entmythologisierung ist nach Max Weber eine "Entzauberung" in der Tradition Kant'scher Aufklärung. Bereits Johann Wolfgang von Goethe berichtete mit spitzer Zunge über den Freiheitsmythos der Schweizer:

Frei wären die Schweizer? frei diese wohlhabenden Bürger in den verschlossenen Städten? frei diese armen Teufel an ihren Klippen und Felsen? Was man den Menschen nicht Alles weismachen kann! besonders, wenn man ein so altes Märchen in Spiritus aufbewahrt ... nun erschuf ihnen die liebe Sonne aus dem Aas des Unterdrückers einen Schwarm von kleinen Tyrannen durch eine sonderbare Wiedergeburt ... und nun sitzen sie hinter ihren Mauern, eingefangen von ihren Gewohnheiten und Gesetzen, ihren Fraubasereien und Philistereien, und da draußen auf den Felsen ist's auch wohl der Mühe

der Deutschen. Deutsche Befindlichkeiten zwischen Geschichten und Geschichte, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 17-26 (22).

²⁴ See Liebhart, Karin (1998), *Zur Funktion von Mythen für politische Inszenierungen*, University of Vienna: unpublished doctoral thesis, 3 and passim.

²⁵ Küng, Hans, op. cit., 29.

²⁶ Koslowski, Peter (1997), "Vaterland Europa. Über europäische und nationale Identität", in: Brague, Rémi; Koslowski, Peter, *Vaterland Europa – Europäische und nationale Identität im Konflikt*, Vienna: Passagen, 41-70 (60).

werth, von Freiheit zu reden, wenn man das halbe Jahr vom Schnee wie ein Murmeltier gefangen gehalten wird.²⁷

Goethe verstand die Mythen als Einengung, als "in Spiritus aufbewahrte Märchen", die in Wahrheit Unfreiheit begründen, weil sie Handlungsalternativen verschließen. Echte Freiheit wäre nämlich der mündige Umgang mit der Geschichte, nicht bloßer Mythenglaube, meint auch Adolf Muschg und rät zu einer Rationalisierung, in der die Idee der Freiheit wieder als Idee der Mündigkeit erkannt wird.²⁸ Karl Jaspers hat schon 1946 in seiner Rede bei den *Rencontres Internationales de Genève* die Freiheit als Kennzeichen Europas benannt, womit er die Freiheit des Geistes im Sinn hatte. Deshalb fordert er zu einem mündigen Umgang mit der Geschichte auf, weil Freiheit nach Jaspers Auffassung ein mündiges Verhältnis zur Vergangenheit bedeutet:

Nicht die Kontinuität zwischen dem Denken der Väter und dem der Söhne erscheint da als fruchtbar, sondern als natürlich und fruchtbar gilt der rebellische Akt, in dem die Söhne sich von den Vätern absetzen, ja sich gegen sie auflehnen. Die Freiheit gegenüber dem Erbe macht das Erbe fruchtbar und erwürdig, nicht der Gehorsam denen gegenüber, die es hinterlassen haben.²⁹

IV. Vom bleibenden Beitrag, den die Schweiz will

Die Schweiz hat im Zuge der Feierlichkeiten "700 Jahre Eidgenossenschaft" (1991) und "150 Jahre Bundesstaat" (1998) bereits zahlreiche Etappen ihrer Geschichte aufgearbeitet und dabei auch auf eine Entmythologisierung hingewirkt. Die Mythen und das Sendungsbewusstsein, Europa Frieden und Freiheit zu bringen, sind jedoch noch immer fixer Bestandteil ihrer

²⁷ Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1797), cited according to: Schnyder-Seidel, Barbara (1989), *Goethe in der Schweiz: anders zu lesen. Von der Wahrheit in der Dichtung letztem Teil*, Bern/Stuttgart: Francke, 104.

²⁸ See Muschg, Adolf (1990), *Die Schweiz am Ende – Am Ende die Schweiz. Erinnerungen an mein Land vor 1991*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 62.

²⁹ Jasper, Karl (1946), cited according to Schmid, Karl (1966), *Europa zwischen Ideologie und Verwirklichung. Psychologische Aspekte der Integration*, Zurich/Stuttgart: Artemis, 93.

Identität. Der Mangel der EU an Föderalismus und direktdemokratischen Elementen, also der Mangel an Komponenten "schweizerischer Freiheit", hindert die Eidgenossen am Beitritt, zumindest was die emotionale Entscheidungsebene anbelangt. Mit einem Rekurs auf Wilhelm Tell und Arnold Winkelried lässt sich auch heute noch von populistischer Seite auf die öffentliche Meinung einwirken. So stellt allen voran Christoph Blocher die EU-Kommission gerne als "Brüsseler Vögte" hin, gegen welche die Nachkommen Tells ihre Freiheit verteidigen müssten.

Die aus der Schweiz stammenden Europagedanken leisteten einen gewichtigen Beitrag zur Formulierung einer schweizerischen Identität, die sich statt über Sprache und Religion besonders über Geschichte(n) etablieren musste. Diente die Idee Europa damals als großer Schutzschild gegen äußere Bedrohungen und Unstimmigkeiten im Inneren, so festigte sie sich nach und nach zu einer unverrückbaren Idee eines nach eidgenössischem Vorbild organisierten Europas. Da die EU heute aber weitgehend andere Wege als jene der Helvetisierung beschreitet, befindet sich die Schweiz in einem Dilemma, das zu lösen wohl noch viel Aufklärungsarbeit verlangen wird – nicht nur vonseiten der Schweiz!

Die Schweiz ist heute für Europa kein Vorbild im Sinne der starren Nachbildung schweizerischer Einrichtungen. Schon der bekannte Rechtswissenschaftler und Politiker Johann Caspar Bluntschli schrieb einst:

In der Schweiz begegnet man hier und da dem Glauben an einen schweizerischen ‚Musterstaat‘ ... Dieser Glaube schmeichelt der Selbstgefälligkeit und reizt zur Selbstüberschätzung, aber er hat keinen realen Boden und keinen Kern; er ist hohl und eitel.³⁰

Er fügte jedoch auch an, dass

die Schweiz in ihrem Bereiche Ideen und Prinzipien geklärt und verwirklicht [hat], welche für die ganze europäische Staatenwelt segensreich und fruchtbar, welche bestimmt sind, dereinst auch den Frieden Europas zu sichern.³¹

³⁰ Bluntschli, Johann Caspar (1915), *Die schweizerische Nationalität*, Schriften für Schweizer Art und Kunst 5, Zurich: Rascher & Co., 15.

³¹ *Ibd.*, 24.

Bluntschli dachte dabei an das friedliche Nebeneinander und Zusammenwirken verschiedener Sprach- und Konfessionsgruppen, an eine Einheit in der Vielfalt, wie sie zahlreiche schweizerische Verfasser von Europaplänen für einen europäischen Staat verwirklichen wollten.

Selbst die seit Jahren geführte Debatte um eine europäische Identität, die nun in den Diskussionen über eine Verfassung für die EU neu entfacht wurde, könnte Anleihen bei den alten Europaentwürfen aus der Schweiz nehmen. An die Identität als gemeinsames Werk dachte bereits Ernest Renan, als es zu beantworten galt, was eine Nation sei: "Nicht, dass man die gleiche Sprache spricht, macht eine Nation aus, sondern, dass man vereint Großes vollbracht hat und es auch in Zukunft tun will".³² Was in der Schweiz als Identität durch den Mythos der Freiheit überhöht wurde, nämlich gemeinsam Großes zu schaffen, indem man Europa Frieden und Freiheit bringt, könnte in entmythologisierter Form auch für die Europäische Union geeignet sein. José Ortega y Gasset sah bereits 1930 als Identität Europas, in einem gemeinsamen übernationalen und überstaatlichen Werk, die Schrecken des Nationalismus zu überwinden. Für ihn war Europa das "mitreißende Zukunftsprogramm"³³, über das wie bei Renan in einem "plébiscite de tous les jours" entschieden wird – Identität als gemeinsames Werden, als kontinuierliche Teilnahme, als ständiger Prozess.

In dieser Hinsicht ist der Beitrag der Schweiz als Vorbild für Freiheit und Eigenverantwortung ein bleibender, der das europäische Einigungswerk noch intensiver beschäftigen sollte. Die Ideen der Schweizer skizzierten basierend auf der schweizerischen Realität ein Europa, dessen Identität nicht auf Sprache, Religion, nicht auf einem "Nation" genannten Amalgam beruhen muss. Sie konstruierten zumeist Europa als pluralistische Gemeinschaft unter den Ägiden des Subsidiaritätsprinzips, das dem föderalistischen System inhärent ist. Damit ist zwar nicht ein Muster, ein Beispiel gegeben, das als solches vom Kleinstaat Schweiz auf den

³² Renan, Ernest (1995), "Was ist eine Nation?", in: Renan, Ernest, *Was ist eine Nation? Und andere politische Schriften*, Vienna/Bolzano: Folio, 41-58 (52).

³³ Ortega y Gasset, José (1978), "Der Aufstand der Massen", in: Ortega y Gasset, José, *Gesammelte Werke in vier Bänden*, vol. 3. Stuttgart: DVA, 7-155 (147).

Großraum Europa umsetzen ist, aber immerhin eine Orientierungshilfe zur Lösung anstehender Probleme.

Karl Jaspers schrieb einst über die Freiheit: "Vielleicht sind die tiefsten Gegensätze der Menschen durch die Weise ihres Freiheitsbewusstseins bedingt"³⁴ und benannte damit das heute die Schweiz von der europäischen Einigung wohl am meisten trennende Element. Die Schweiz, gefangen im Mythos einer europäischen Einigungsidee, die einst während der schwierigen Staats- und Nationswerdung Identität stiftete, nun jedoch längst eine Krise jener Identität verursacht? Für die deutsch-französische Schriftstellerin Annette Kolb, die sich um die europäische Versöhnung bemühte, war die Schweiz "wie ein herrlicher, aber auch für mich nach allen Seiten hin verbarrikadierter Garten".³⁵ Dabei steht für die Zukunft trotzdem in Frage, ob dieser "verbarrikadierte Garten" Schweiz tatsächlich nur eine Isolation vom geeinten Europa darstellt oder nicht auch die Integration und Bewahrung zutiefst europäischer Ideen, die die europäische Identität erst ausmachen. Es ist zu reflektieren, ob das Projekt Europa in seiner gegenwärtigen Ausformung dem Scheitern anheimfällt, ob die teilweise Helvetisierung Europas nicht ein gangbarer Weg wäre, europäische Solidarität zu verwirklichen und das oft beschworene "Europa der Bürger" zu erreichen. Viele gesamteuropäische Traditionen sind in der Schweiz vorhanden; die Vielfalt Europas fand in der Schweiz zu einer lebberen Verknüpfung.

Was die Schweiz für sich (um beitreten zu können) und für die Zukunft der Europäischen Union mindestens will, ist, dass jene eine Willensnation ihrer Völker nicht nur ihrer Politiker werde, dass sie sich ein wenig mehr helvetisiere. Denn nur einem derart geeinten Europa könnte die Eidgenossenschaft unter Wahrung ihrer Identität beitreten. Zurzeit bleibt der Schweiz jedoch nur die Suche nach einem Mittelweg, hin- und hergerissen zwischen der Verantwortung gegenüber der eigenen Geschichte und Identität und den Vorteilen einer engeren Kooperation mit der Europäischen Union.

³⁴ Jaspers, Karl (1949), *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, Munich/Zurich: Piper, 194.

³⁵ Kolb, Annette (1921), cited according to Lemp, Richard (1970), *Annette Kolb. Leben und Werk einer Europäerin*, Mainz: von Hase & Koehler, 16.

PROJECTS FOR THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Miroslav Došen*

Abstract

One of the burning issues of European international relations in the 19th century was the so called "Eastern Question". What was to become of the decaying Ottoman Empire It was closely connected to the problem of growth of national liberation movements throughout Europe- German and Italian unification and especially peoples of Hapsburg Monarchy. It culminated in the "Great Eastern Crisis" that was to lead to the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Throughout that turmoil, various official and unofficial plans have been devised regarding the re-composition of Europe. What they all had in common was their goal- to secure a lasting peace in Europe by keeping the delicate balance of powers intact. In this paper we are going to present some of these projects and analyse how they coped with aforementioned problems.

The paper covers the 1860's and 1870's, the period in which majority and the most influential of these projects were put forward. First, the paper explains the broad notion of the Eastern question and gives an overview of the interest of the Great Powers in the region. All the projects for South East Europe Federation were essentially proposals of how this question can be solved on a federalist basis. On one hand they were product of their time, the time of great national resurrections and re-composition of the political map of Europe. On the other, they were the expression of the specific needs of the peoples concerned (South East Europeans). In many of these plans the wishes to identify ones own national liberation with those of bigger national movements (notably those of Germans and Italians) is evident. In some cases these were seen as role models and even potential allies.

The authors of these projects include: Lajos Kossuth (Hungarian revolutionary), Ilija Garašanin (father of Serbian foreign policy), Giuseppe Mazzini (Italian revolutionary), Vladimir Jovanović (one of the first Serbian liberals) etc.

In the conclusion we see that none of the projects had any immediate effect. However their ideological legacy gave birth to many subsequent projects (e.g.

* M.A. Student in European Studies, University of Novi Sad

Yugoslavia). More important than that, they represented the first attempt to settle national disputes of the South East European nations through agreement along common interests. The ensuing conflicts in the Balkans showed all the advantages of this peaceful solution.

Introduction

The possibility of reconstitution of some European regions by dissolving old empires and/or by uniting neighbouring or congenial peoples on federalist basis, was considered ever since 1830's when the national movements started to pick up momentum.

If we place the starting point for our research of major federalist projects for the Balkans (and they were as we already explained, part of the wider European agendas) at the beginning of 1861- failure of October Diploma- we can trace the roots of the situation that ushered these projects, back to wars of 1859-66 for the Unification of Germany and Italy of which the Habsburg Monarchy was the main victim. To mark the end of this era we took two events- the Austro- Hungarian Settlement of 1867 and the completion of unification of Germany and Italy in 1870. By that time major powers that propelled these utopian dreams- German and Italian nationalists and Hungarian oligarchy- already fulfilled their agendas. Under the momentum of the developments in the 1860's the Balkan liberation movements provoked the great Eastern crisis 1875-8 in a vain attempt to settle the Balkan question alongside the Italian and the German ones.

The main focus of the European policy in the East was the question of the decline of Ottoman Turkey and the ensuing events, regarding the consequences this will have on the various European interests. Second problem was Habsburg Monarchy: aging multinational absolutist monarchy whose foundations begun to shake before the ever growing wave of national movements in the 19th century. What would happen if these two fell? As Duke of Gramont illustrated, "Austria and Turkey resembled two disintegrating edifices, leaning on each other and you

couldn't budge one without disturbing the other"¹. For our paper this connection is even more important if we remember that many Balkan peoples lived in the two empires daubed "the sic men of Europe" (namely Hapsburg and Ottoman) - some even divide in both. How this influenced the federation plans for the Balkans is also to be shown later in this paper.

The entire period until 1867 was marked in the Monarchy by political struggle between three concepts:

1. **centralism**- that is by that time unattainable
2. **dualism**- that, over time, gain the most support with both official Vienna and Hungarian ruling class.
3. **federalism**- which gave birth to numerous projects and proposals from different sides of the political spectre and with different intentions.

This political struggle gave rise to a "war of ideas" between theorists advocating one concept or the other. As a result, great multitude of different proposals for the settling of these questions started to emerge ever since 1830's, reaching its peak in 1860's and 1870's.

Another process took place in the same time. That was the process of unification of Germany and Italy. Dimitrije Đorđević gives a very concise explanation of how the German and Italian question relate to the Eastern question: "The Balkan region became for Europe an area where diversion tactics were conducted... the objective was to use the Balkans in order to start a revolution in Hungary, which would break the Habsburg monarchy from within. This international conspiracy was backed by European public and secret diplomacy, first by Napoleon III, Cavour and Bismarck and later by Garibaldi, Kossuth and Klapka"².

Both German and Italian question and the problem of Austria derived from the same historical fact and that is the emergence of the national principle onto the political scene ever since the beginning of 19th century. In Austria this principle gained even greater importance in and after the Great revolution of 1848/49. However, the implementation of the

¹ Popović, Vasilj, (1966) *Istočno pitanje. Istorijski pregled borbe oko opstanka Osmanlijske carevine na Levantu i Balkanu*, Beograd: Institute for Balkanology of Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences p. 179

² Đorđević, Dr Dimitrije (1970), *Projects for Federation of South-East Europe in the 1860's and 1870's*, Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, p 129

national principle was impossible to be carried out to the letter. Ethnic boundaries between peoples could not be drowned. Especially in the Balkans, different ethnic groups, frequently separated by civilisation, religious and cultural differences, lived side by side. Creation of pure national states, especially if they were to pursue to encompass all the members of one nation was simply impossible. That is one of the reasons why federal/con-federal structure came to be the most dominant view on the solution for national aspirations of people striving to free themselves from foreign, notably Austrian and Turkish rule.

A further remark have to be added: notwithstanding that the topic of our study is different projects for Federation of South-East Europe we will use the term Balkans as a synonym (being aware of the ambiguity of it) in those instances where the sources we used have done so. Also we were not able to restrict just to this geographical area since many of the plans included territories outside its limits- sometimes even as far as Poland. From that a conclusion can be drawn that the main factor of connectivity for most (if not all) of the projects was commonness of interest- a highly pragmatic approach. Finally, throughout the paper we will use terms federation and confederation interchangeably- depending of the nature of the projects to which they are applied.

Very few of the projects we will be discussing can be observed separate from the others. This arises from the fact that the main reasons for these proposals were to settle the same problems. The differences between them arise on the other hand from the difference in interests (nations) their authors represented or the political situation in which they were drafted. They range from the domain of pure political theory to practical political agendas.

The main aim of this paper is to put on display most prominent of these plans taking as criterion their immediate relation to the Balkan people and Balkan (especially Serbian) political life in the 1860's and 1870's. Therefore the predominate presence of Serbian and/or Yugoslav authors in this paper only natural. **What we hope to show is the genesis of the idea of a federal state on this South- East European theatre.** With no intention to draw any parallels we aim to enable the reader to compare these alternatives with the benefit of hindsight and the experience of two Yugoslav states that have been created in the past century.

The Eastern question is in the basis of all of the projects we will present, as it was the crucial agent that sparked all the discussions and actions for the re-composition of political map of South-East Europe. Hence the issue of federalisation of Balkans inseparable from the Eastern question. In most cases the authors of these projects presented them in broader works dedicated to European question and offered their proposals how it should be resolved. Therefore, before we give the overview of, in our opinion, most remarkable of these projects, we will first give an explanation of all the conflicting interests that formed the Eastern question.

The Eastern Question

This term covered the problems caused in the nineteenth century through the decline in power of the Ottoman Empire. Lord Morley summed up the Eastern Question as "that intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths". The Eastern Question revolved around one issue: what should happen to the Balkans if and when the Ottoman Empire disappeared as the fundamental political fact in the South-East Europe? The Great Powers approached each crisis with the hope of emerging with the maximum advantage. Sometimes this led one or another to support revolutionary change. More often, state interests led them to support the status quo. So what were the interests and the politics of great European powers in the East in 1860's and 1870's?

I. Russia

Russia's emergence onto the wider world stage coincides with the emergence of the Eastern Question as a focus of international politics. Under the 1774 Kuchuk Kainarji Treaty, Russia gained access to the Black Sea. More important, the same treaty gave Russia important rights to intervene on behalf of the Orthodox peoples and to conduct commerce within the Ottoman Empire. Most of Russia's subsequent policies expanded on these two concessions.

After autonomous or independent Christian states appeared, Russian policy was complicated by the need to find reliable client states in

the region. When a state like Serbia fell under Austrian influence, the Russians would switch their support to a regional rival, such as Bulgaria.

A second aim of Russian Balkan policy was preservation and expansion of rights of navigation from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.

The greatest check to Russian expansion took place after the Crimean War. By the Treaty of Paris of 1856, Russia lost much that she had gained. All warships were barred from the Black Sea, and it was opened to merchant ships of all states: by these actions, Russia lost her special status. All the Great Powers and not just Russia became the guarantors of the Balkan Christian states like Serbia and Romania.

II. Great Britain

During the period 1815 to 1878 (and in fact up to 1907, when Russia and England allied against Germany) Great Britain was Russia's most consistent rival for Balkan influence. British interests led to intermittent support for Ottoman rule. Britain intervened against the Turks in the Greek revolution in the 1820s because of Philhellenism and to block Russian influence, but went to war against Russia in 1853 on Turkey's behalf, again to block Russian power. British Balkan interests derived from interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Given Britain's position as the most industrialized European state in the early 1800s, economic interest played a large role, different from simple geo-political interest. For example: Britain needed to secure the shipping lanes to India.

Britain also had humanitarian interests in the Balkans: with the most developed system of representative government in Europe and the most influential popular press, London cabinets were under pressure when Ottoman misrule led to uprisings, atrocities and repression. In 1876, William Gladstone (a past and future Prime Minister) wrote a pamphlet called "The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East" condemning the massacres that the Turks carried out while suppressing the latest Balkan revolt. After that year, no British cabinet could provide unlimited support for the sultan. In 1853, Britain had gone to war rather than see Russian influence grow in the Balkans, but when the Russians invaded and defeated Turkey in 1877-78, Britain stood by. British leaders instead

adopted a new policy to protect the sea lanes to India. In 1878 Britain took control of the island of Cyprus, and in 1883 occupied Egypt and the Suez Canal. With those outposts under control, Britain's need to intervene on the Balkans waned, although Britain did keep an eye on Greece and Russia's privileges at the Straits.

III. France

During the Napoleonic wars, France was a major threat to Ottoman rule. Napoleon himself invaded Egypt in 1798.

In the 1820s, France joined Britain and Russia to intervene on behalf of the Greek insurgents, partly to protect commercial interests, partly out of philhellenic sympathy for the Greeks, partly to prevent a Russo-British condominium in the area, and partly to regain a role on the world stage after the defeat of 1815.

Napoleon III took as a basis of his foreign policy the principle of nationality and this meant support for rebels against the Ottomans. There was a special feeling of affinity in the case of Romania. Many Romanian leaders had a French education and cultural ties. The Romance roots of their language made Romania seem like an outpost of Latin culture in a Slavic sea.

IV. Austria

At one time Austria had been the main threat to Ottoman rule, but after Kuchuk Kainarji Russia replaced Austria as the real threat to Ottoman survival. However, Austria retained a major interest in the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans was bordering Hungary: Vienna had no desire to see a weak Ottoman neighbour replaced by a potentially strong Russia, or by compliant Russian clients in Serbia or Bulgaria.

Plans for federation on the territory of European Turkey revolved around the independence of ethnic minorities: because Austria too was an empire of nationalities, any precedent set in Turkey was a potential threat to Habsburg power. The empire could not afford to let that region fall under the control of a hostile Great Power or a growing Balkan nation.

After the defeat of 1866 made it clear that Germany, not Austria, would be the leader of Central Europe, south-eastern Europe remained as Vienna's only available arena for the exercise of power. At the same time, the 1867 *Ausgleich* with the Magyars made the annexation of Slavic areas less attractive. The Magyars made up barely 50% of the population in Hungary and had no desire to end up as a minority by annexing more Slavic or Romanian lands. The Austrian Germans were already experiencing complaints from the Slavic Czechs. Neither of the two ruling ethnic groups wanted to annex any Balkan districts. For strategic reasons, Austria-Hungary occupied and administered Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1878, but thirty years passed before the province was legally annexed.

The Habsburg dynasty, rulers of a multi-national empire, also wished to avoid setting an unfortunate precedent by dismantling another multi-national empire, Turkey. Because Austria was too weak to absorb the Balkans, she preferred to sustain a weak Ottoman Empire.

V. *Italy*

Until 1859, there was no unified Italy. After successful wars against Austria in 1859 and 1866, the Kingdom of Piedmont united the peninsula and sought a position as a new Great Power.

Italy lagged behind the other Powers in terms of economic and military might. What influence Italy could exercise came at the expense of the nearby Ottoman Empire, which was even weaker. Habsburg domination was a serious treat to Italian plans. Italian dreams of taking the whole Dalmatian sea-coast away from Austria on the grounds that an Italian minority lived there. In some phases of *Risorgimento* Italians even made plans with some Balkan states (e. g. Serbia) and revolutionary forces for joint action to destabilise Austria.

In subsequent years these Balkan ambitions made Italy a rival not only of Turkey but also of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece.

VI. Germany

Germany, like Italy, was a newcomer to Great Power status. It was only after the unification by Bismarck between 1862 and 1870 that Germany gained real power.

Thanks to military and economic might, Germany had more influence than Italy but no direct interests in the Balkans. Bismarck remarked that the region was "not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier."

After defeating Austria in 1866, Bismarck was able to make Austria-Hungary the cornerstone of his alliance system because no unsettled issues remained between the two states. To retain Habsburg loyalty, however, Germany had to support Austrian needs in Balkan affairs.

VII. Turkey

The Ottoman Empire was the weakest of the Great Powers. As an ally of Britain and France when the 1856 Treaty of Paris ended the Crimean War, the Turks gained a legal status that was beyond their real powers. Ottoman Balkan policy was simple: to prevent the loss of additional territory in the Balkans. In many instances, the sultan had to be satisfied with nominal control: the lands of the disobedient pashas, like Ali Pasha of Jeannine or the purely legal vassals like Serbia and Romanian principalities.

The Ottoman regime mistrusted all the other Powers, in part because those states were made up of infidels and in part from practical experience. However, Russia was clearly Turkey's greatest enemy because tsarist policies implied or required dismantling the empire.

From the time of the Greek War of Independence up to the 1870s, Britain most often acted as Turkey's guardian. After 1878, Germany largely replaced Britain as an economic and military sponsor.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire stretched from Asia Minor to North Africa. It was still substantially intact and in South-east Europe, bordered Austria and Russia. In Europe the Sultan still ruled over some 616,417 square kilometres and some 8 million people, mostly Christians.

The Projects

In this part we will give a short overview of individual federal concepts for South-East Europe which seem in our opinion as the most important, either because of the extent to which they explain the future federation/confederation (Mihajlo Polith-Desančić) or because of their connection with the wider movement of national uprisings in Europe (Vladimir Jovanović). Some of them give detailed description of a new federation; some just outline its borders or the peoples that are going to create it. Some projects include just Balkan peoples, some only the ones living under Hapsburgs and some both.

Lajos Kossuth

Donau Staatenbund

Kossuth saw that Hungary could not survive as a little Central European country, nor would he accept such a solution, so he began to plan a greater federation of multitude of nations (the list changed over the years as political situation shifted) but in which the Hungarians would always play the leading role. In the beginning (Constitutional draft for Hungary written and edited between 1851-1859), Kossuth pictured his creation as a Danubian *Federation*, which was to include Poland, Bohemia, Croatia, Romania and Hungary. Later he based his plan on a union with Balkan nations. This illustrates the dilemma that haunted the Hungarian independence movement throughout the 19th century: whether to incorporate Hungary in the Group of Central European or Eastern European nations and how to reconcile the integrity of historical Hungary with the principle of nationality.

The best known among the projects for a Balkan federation is Kossuth's proposal for a *Donau Staatenbund* published in 1862. It is to be noted that this is only the culmination of Kossuth's state-making endeavours. Ever since the end of the Great revolution in 1849, Kossuth was in exile- Turkey, Britain, even United States. But throughout that time he kept strong links with other Hungarian (and not just Hungarian) émigrés. He and his associates (e.g. gen. Klapka) drafted a number of proposals of how Hapsburg Monarchy should be reorganized. In all those

projects, interests of the Hungarian people were (naturally) the main guidelines. How will Hungarians keep their dominant role within the historical borders in the era of national-liberation movements? Pressed between Austria (which itself was to undergo crucial transformations) and Russian Pan-Slavistic enterprise, Hungary needed a new solution. She needed allies.

Kossuth's project was envisaged as a confederation with 30 million inhabitants comprised of Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and possibly Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was to be a federal Parliament and executive in charge of the crucial affairs of the state: defence, foreign affairs, transport and communications, trade, customs and excise. Apart from this each member state would have its own executive and public administration. For Kossuth Balkan and Central European questions are entwined, and the proposed confederation was just a part of his general project for settling these burning issues of Europe in that time. Its main role would be to tie Slavic peoples to Hungary thus strengthening its position as an independent state- that was the corner stone of Kossuth's political agenda. Hungary was to have the leading role in that confederation. Instead of letting Russia or Austria rally the Slavs Hungary would do the same through this confederation.

The same year (1862) Kossuth gave his plan for *Donau Staatenbund* to Kannini, an envoy of the Italian government. He was just on his way on a mission in Balkans and presented the same plan to Garašanin in Belgrade. This was a part of Italian official policy towards the Balkan peoples since 1848 and this was to form an alliance of all revolutionary forces in a joint action to destabilise Austria. Italy was just completing her unification (e.g. Venetia was still under Austrian domination) and supported national movements in the Monarchy as a distraction. Some agreements were made between Mazzini and Hungarian émigrés for the landing of Garibaldi's Red Shirts in Dalmatia. Second part of that plan was to be Serbian military action. However this plan came to nothing since Serbia was reluctant to commit without any concrete guarantees of her gains. In the meantime Italy found a new ally in Prussia who faced the same obstacle on her way for unification. In 1866 Austria was defeated (again) and had to back off from German provinces and evacuate Venetia. Afterwards Italy was not

interested any more in supporting unrests and actually wanted stability in the region.

As all Kossuth's previous projects, from the Revolution of 1848 onwards, *Staatenbund* neglected national aspirations of other nations that it was to include so it failed to gain their support (e.g. Croatian question was to be solved by means of personal union). It also alienated ruling circles in Budapest, which relied on Vienna in their plans to secure the existing (dominant) position of the Hungarians within the historical borders (that was to result in Austro-Hungarian Settlement 5 years later).

Here I would also like to mention a most prominent project of gen. Đerđ Klapka drafted towards the end of the Crimean war (1851-1856). His confederation was to encompass very much the same area as the one proposed by Kossuth, but he was more receptive to the aspirations of other nations that lived under the crown of St. Stephen. He dreams of union between three federal states- Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania in which all nations enjoy their autonomy. As it will be shown in this paper, he was not the first to mention Yugoslavia as a state.

Ilija Garašanin

from Načertanije to an all-Yugoslav outlook

In 1844 Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin prepared a long term plan of Serbian foreign policy. Aptly named *Načertanije* it is probably the most (in)famous policy document in Serbian 19th century history. Little is known, however, that Garašanin also devised a broader agenda which was in line with the general impetus of national unification that swept through Europe. More than that, it was an instrument for joining the forces of Balkan peoples as a means of their liberation and as a framework of their future development. In a program that he sent to Strossmayer in March 1867 Garašanin proposed the "unification of all Yugoslav tribes within a federal state".³ The same idea was expressed in the circular letter of "Central Committee of Beograd for the Unification of all Southern Slavs" addressed

³ Đorđević, Dr Dimitrije, (1970) *Projects for the Federation of South-East Europe in the 1860's and 1870's*, p 138 Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences

to the insurrection committees⁴ outside Serbia. In it, a federation of Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Greeks and Romanians is depicted. Garašanin argues that confederation of all these peoples is their only alternative to Austrian or Russian domination under which each of them would surely fall if they were to stand against it alone. That same year Serbian government signed a treaty with Bulgarian liberation committee in Bucharest with the aim of creating a Serbian-Bulgarian “empire” under the rule of prince Mihailo. Both peoples were to retain their autonomy, their self-governance in the way that they will have proportional representation in Parliament and in the government; they were to have their own civil services and right to use their own language in official relations. Although inclusion of other Balkan peoples was frequently mentioned in practice cooperation never exceeded military alliance against Turkey. However small the impact of this project may appear it is in fact the only one that gave any practical results (in the form of several alliances and the agreement that we mentioned above).

At this point I would also mention a letter written by Ilija Garašanin to Napoleon III in September 1866. In it Garašanin analyses in depth the problem so of liberation of Balkan peoples. He considers the collapse of Austria and Turkey as inevitable. Turkey is doomed because the peoples of the Balkans will no longer suffer injustice and oppression and will fight for their freedom and unification along the principle of nationality, like Germans and Italians. Garašanin also criticises support that European powers are giving to Ottoman Empire saying that it only drives the oppressed peoples of European Turkey into Russian hands. Here he uses ever growing fear of Western powers of Russian pan Slavism to gain support from Napoleon III.

Austria is also crumbling and will have to satisfy the need for liberty of their citizens. It can not be reformed; neither dualism nor federalism will solve the crisis: dualism would antagonise the Slavs and federalism would not please aspirations of Hungarians.

⁴ These committees were the result of long term foreign policy of Serbian government that was carried out according to the mentioned *Načertanije*. Amongst the Serbs (and other Balkan peoples) living on the “Serbian non liberated territories” a network of committees as unofficial representatives of Serbian government was formed. Their purpose was to incite resistance to Ottoman rule.

Mihailo Polith-Desančić
a Serbian politician from Vojvodina

The core of the Eastern question is the conflict between the desire of Balkan peoples for independence and the interests of the great powers in the Balkans. The way to reconcile them is a Balkan confederation that would warrant internal independence and external neutralization to the rest of Europe. The principle of nationality, which conquered Europe in the 19th century, had, according to Desančić, a twofold effect: in the case of one people divided into several states it tends to lead to unification (Italy, Germany). In multinational states, it helps to break them up into number of national states. Main concern of the two major powers of Europe (and the World) in that time was fear of Russians expansion in the Balkans and its breaking out into the Mediterranean. The control of Bosphorus became of vital importance. They saw that the best way to check Russia was to keep Ottoman Empire artificially alive. Any kind of division of the Balkans between European powers would cause a general conflagration and to allow the creation of many (mostly Slavonic) national states in the region, looked like helping the Russians. Understanding all this and hoping to gain support for national liberation of Balkan peoples he proposed an alternative:

The Balkan peoples are natural successors of the European Turkey. The confederation of all Slavs, Romanians and Greeks occupying that space would not only guard the independence of these peoples but would also be the best safeguard of Europe's interests. Drawing from some previous Serbian projects (e.g. Ilija Garašanin) Desančić proposed a closer union state between Serbia and Bulgaria within that confederation. He even drew up the boundaries, mainly in favour of Serbia: it was to include Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Old Serbia- including a large part of Albania and Macedonia (approximately to the line between Bay of Saloniki and the mouth of river Vijose in nowadays Albania). Greece would get Thessaly, part of Epirus and Macedonia. Saloniki and Constantinople were to be free cities. With a nice touch of historic romanticism, Desančić puts the capital of that confederation in Prizren. Therefore three states would be formed Serbian-Bulgarian kingdom, Romania and Greece, joined on basis of equality in a confederation, to protect their common interests

and prevent foreign interference and economic exploitation. The union was also a safeguard from any potential conflicts between the new national states themselves. For the Turks and Albanians, Desančić provides only a partial autonomy under the supervision of Christian peoples in the confederation. Albanians would be allowed their own national state as soon as they prove their “capability for culture”.⁵ As for the ethnic Turks, Desančić believe that they will gradually move out to Asia. The Muslims with Slavic origin, whose forefathers converted to Islam only for the privileges it entailed, will return back to Christianity as soon as those privileges are gone. We can see today how wrong he was.

This project bares the characteristics of all Balkan alliances from 1866 until the Balkan wars: the principle of association of Balkan forces, non-interference of –European powers and action against Ottoman and Habsburg empires.

Svetozar Miletić

the leader of the Serbian National Party in South Hungary (Vojvodina)

Although a firm national revolutionary (with undying reputation from 1848 onwards) Miletić at first supported Hungarian liberals: he was prepared to accept a dual monarchy but of two federal states (Austria and Hungary) in which all nations would enjoy full internal autonomy. In that time Polith-Desančić also made his plans for Hungary to be transformed into an “eastern Switzerland” divided into cantons. As we saw he altered his views in favour of total independence and

In 1863 Miletić published a series of articles discussing the Eastern question. The most remarkable thing about his work is that he made a comprehensive analysis of the Eastern Question showing that he understood the political situation much better than other Serbian politicians in that time.

⁵ Polith-Desančić, Mihailo (1986), *Istočno pitanje i njegovo organsko rešenje*, iz Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju no. 33, p. 171, citation from Bešlin, Branko (2005), *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku*, Novi Sad: PhD thesis, Philosophical Faculty, department for history

Miletić first gives a short history of the Eastern question from 1739. He distinguished three stages in it: purely Russian (until 1829 –the end of Russo-Turkish war and Greek independence); Russian-European (until 1856- the end of Crimean war) and the current Balkan stage. He also identified three groups of interest that shaped the Eastern question: the interest of great powers directly concerned in Turkey (Austria, Russia), the interests of the powers with regard to European balance, and the interests of the Balkan peoples. The role of the Austria in the Balkans became negative at the beginning of 19th century: by keeping Russia at bay it resisted, at the same time, the normal development of the Balkan peoples. Russia also pursued a policy of domination in the Balkans aspiring to become the core of the Slavs. England and France had also interest in checking the Russia thus keeping the balance of powers. All this helped to keep Turkey artificially alive. Miletić afterwards explains that this so called balance of powers instituted after the Crimean war is untenable.

As opposed to this, the interests of Balkan peoples were quite simple: they wanted freedom of foreign domination. The union of these independent national states would safeguard also the interests of European powers by creating a neutralized area on the Balkans, which would not allow any of the powers to gain dominance. French and English commercial interests would also be satisfied. It would also suite Russia, as it would form a protective zone of friendly Slav states at her borders. Miletić also take some time to justify the wish of Christian peoples in Turkey for liberation and to prove their capability for self-government.

Regarding the type and the extent of the union that should be formed between Balkan peoples, he accepts the master plan of Polith-Desančić almost entirely. His plan concerns only the division of European Turkey and does not include the people under Austrian rule. The reason for this is perhaps that in his work Miletić deals only (and primarily) with disintegration of Turkey. Question has been raised in historiography about the original nature of Miletić's work (Kosta Milutinović, Nikola Petrović). For us this question is without any grounds. The fact is that Miletić takes almost the same borders for his confederation (with minor changes) and the same internal organisation as Polith-Desančić in his work written a year before Miletić's. But Miletić himself recognises in his articles that the project he is going to propose as a substitute for Turkey is not his own but

of his “young friend” thinking obviously on Desančić. As we said, the true value of Miletić’s work is the in depth analysis of the history, causes and the solution of Eastern question. Also the personality of Miletić and his political (practical) work make his plans worth presenting here.

Because of his activity Miletić was imprisoned by the Austro-Hungarian authorities in 1876 in the wake of the Great Eastern Crisis and spent more than 3, 5 years in prison. In 1877 his friends translated his articles into German and had them published as a book *Die Orientfrage*.

Imbro Ignjatijević-Tkalec
Middle-class leftist Croatian politician

In his brochure⁶ from 1866, Tkalec gives a very good overview of how Austrian and the Eastern Question related to each other. Both of them had the common basis: the desire of the oppressed peoples for liberation and unification. Tkalec saw the Habsburg monarchy as the source of all the troubles plaguing Europe in 1860’s. Moreover, the cure was simple: a revolution of the oppressed peoples (where he particularly meant Serbs and Croats) backed up by Hungarian uprising and the advent of Garibaldi. The Europe would have to accept this, under the pressure of its democratic public and of France and Italy. The same faith awaited Turkey that was the “sister of Austria” the dungeon of the peoples. Tkalec proposed that a free federation of Slavs, Romanians, Hungarians and Greeks, joined possibly by Poles, replace both Austria and Turkey.

The principles of the federation would be internal independence and joint defence against aggression. He goes even further: his Danubia-Balkan federation would become a part of an “all- European federation” which would be born out of the association of free European peoples. In this peace of Tkalec’s work, we see how strong and indisputable the principle of nationality was in those times.

⁶ Ignjatijević-Tkalec, Imbro (1866), *Pitanje Austrijsko, kome, kako i kada valja rešiti ga?*, Paris

Vladimir Jovanović

a mixture of European liberal and Serbian romantic-nationalist

In his work *The Serbian Nation and the Eastern Question* doesn't give any concrete solutions like for example Miletić. We mention him because of two things: his mission in London and his connection with European revolutionary movements, especially Mazzini. This cooperation between "freedom fighters" and theorists that sprang multitude of various plans of restructuring Europe was characteristic of the entire era.

After the bombing of Belgrade in 1862 (after the incident at Čukur česma) Serbian diplomacy started a vigorous campaign to win the support of Western powers for a favourable settlement of its dispute with Turkey.⁷ In the same time (as it was mentioned earlier) government led negotiations with Italy (officials and Mazzini) and Hungarian revolutionaries about joint action against Turkey and Austria⁸. In that time, a prominent Serbian liberal (latter founder of United Serbian Youth in 1866) Vladimir Jovanović, found himself in London on a mission to win England's favour for Serbian national liberation movement. There he assisted an official mission headed by princess Julija who came from Serbia Few months later. In London Jovanović met many important public figures of England including the bishop of London Archibald Tate and the leader of British liberals William Gladstone. Here it should be noted that Jovanović, like all Serbian liberals, looked upon British parliamentary system as a role model for a modern and just society. In their view "however much the western European countries are led by selfish goals, in them, and especially in England, enlightenment and civil rights rule."⁹ Although Jovanović's pleadings received allot of sympathy from Gladstone, as a member of government had to support official British policy in the East and that was to keep Turkey alive in the Balkans.

⁷ The crisis ended by Turks being obliged to leave Serbia. Only garrisons in the towns were left.

⁸ As we said before these negotiations ended with no results. Prince Mihailo hesitated, Kossuth failed to gain larger support and Italy eventually lost interest as she found new and stronger ally in Prussia. This alliance will end up with victory over Austria, but also a change of politics of Italy towards her, as Cavour shifted his politics to maintenance of status quo.

⁹ B. Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam*, Novi Sad 2005. p. 486

Jovanović published his work in English in 1863 while still in London, as it was an instrument for win over public opinion in England. Therefore it does not include any concrete plan for the future state in the Balkans, as he considered, wisely, that open talk of dismemberment of Turkey would turn pro Turkish English public against him.¹⁰ Instead of that, he tries to persuade English that Serbs deserve to be free and form their own state. Instead of appealing on Christian solidarity like others, he emphasized the natural and historical tendency of Serbs to liberty and democracy. Trough number of examples from history Jovanović proves that liberal social institutions are in the nature of Serbian people and all that is despotic and absolutistic came from foreign occupiers and foreign influence (Byzantine, Ottoman, Austrian, Russian)¹¹. The ability of Serbs to create a liberal and parliamentarian state is beyond doubt. They have inherent sense for self-government, democracy and cooperation. Finally Jovanović describes the capabilities of Serbs and other Christian peoples in the South-East Europe to free themselves from Turkey, without outside help. Very optimistically he estimates Serbian, Montenegro and Herzegovina can muster 260.000 fighters, thought to be warriors from early childhood and braver than Turks. Joined with Greeks and Bulgarians they were bound to defeat Turkish army.

In his later writings (e. g. *Les Serbes et la mission de la Serbie dans l'Europe d'Orien*, Paris 1870) Jovanović mentioned explicitly a confederation of the peoples in South-East Europe as a counterbalance to Austrian pressure. The Balkans should be reconstituted only by the reinstatement of nationalities, on the principle "the Balkans to the Balakan peoples". Serbia would be the democratic nucleus in that process.

Apart from his lobbying with English politicians, MP's and cabinet ministers and extensive action to gain favour of English public for Serbian cause Jovanović met representatives of various revolutionary movements. Trough Russian émigrés familiar to him since his previous visit, he got to meet fabled Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin "the apostle of anarchism". In their conversations Jovanović openly expressed his federalist inclinations

¹⁰ B. Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam*, Novi Sad 2005. p. 490

¹¹ This story about the fight between democratic ideas of the people and despotism of foreign rulers was a common place for English and French liberal writers of the time. B. Bešlin, *I Evropski uticaj na srpski liberalizam*

and even gone so far as to suggest general union of all Slavs. Bakunin introduced Jovanović to Giuseppe Mazzini, the leader of Italian nationalism and the preacher of the national idea. The founder of [La giovine Italia](#) (Young Italy) Mazzini was always shrouded in mystery made a strong impression on young Jovanović and became his role model¹².

Mazzini criticized Kossuth because of his “anti-liberal” policy toward other nations. He suggested that Hungarians have no future in Europe- that they will, like all other Asiatic newcomers blend into the peoples of European culture (Germanic, Romanic, Slavic).

Both Mazzini and Jovanović were unsatisfied with indecisive action of their respective governments and ready to take some independent action. Mazzini proposed the plan made by Italian and Hungarian émigrés in 1861- that famous Giuseppe Garibaldi lands with his Red Shirts in Dalmatia as support for the general uprising in Hungary backed by Serbian forces. As we mentioned before this plan was widely discussed between Serbia, Italy and Hungary on various levels: from governments to émigré circles.

On his way back to Serbia, Jovanović met with Kossuth who was in that time in exile in Turin. Jovanović gave him a copy of his work *The Serbian Nation and the Eastern Question*. Kossuth spoke optimistic about creation of his *Donau Staatenbund* and asked for Serbian involvement in the revolution. He proposed that Serbia send 10.000 trained soldiers (disguised as volunteers!) and provoke uprisings in Hungary. Jovanović favoured the idea but saw that there was little chance that it could be carried out.

Giuseppe Mazzini
father of popular democracy

Mazzini became a member of the famous Carbonari in 1830. Because of his revolutionary activities he had to leave for France; first of his many exiles stated when he was 26. In 1831 in Marseille he founded his Young Italy

¹² Impressed by the organisation of Mazzini’s movement Jovanović created Ujedinjenu omladini srpsku (United Serbian Youth). First meeting was held in Novi Sad in August 1866. “Everyone who felt young in heart and soul” was invited to join Serbian patriots from all countries on the common task of “serving for the liberty and progress of the people, on the basis of truth and science”; *Autobiografske beleške Vladimira Jovanovića*, Beograd 1936.

with the purpose of unification of Italy.¹³ Through his life-long theoretical and practical work dedicated to this single goal he gave biggest ideological contribution to the promotion of the principle of nationality Europe-wide. During the Revolution of 1848 Mazzini became the main leader of the short-lived Roman Republic. We mention him in this paper because of the role his movement played in the plans for Balkan revolution and the actions against Austria.

In his early writings on redefinition of Europe he didn't have much confidence in Slavic peoples. When he first contemplated about Danubian confederation in 1833 he gives the leading role to Hungarians (great contrast to the statement he made in his conversation with Jovanović!) and the Balkan peoples should rally around Greece. After the Revolution in 1848 his views changed to favor Slavic movements for independence. As a democrat, he also resented Hungarian nationalism expressed during the Revolution, as it was too anti-liberal and intolerant to other nations living in Hungary.

Mazzini expressed his view of the Eastern question in a series of articles published in 1847 and 1857, called *Lettere slave* (Slavic letters). Under the influence of Pan-Slavists in the Polish émigré circles, he became more inclined to aspirations of Slavic peoples. Still he feared the influence of Russia on Slavic peoples but instead of preservation of Turkey and Austria as a safeguard from Russian expansion, he proposes peoples living in these territories form their national states. These states will then unite in two confederations: Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians will form one; the other would encompass Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Bulgaria.

Mazzini was ideological father of Italian unification. However, it was up to others to put his ideas into practice. After the 1848 revolution, the Italian nationalists began to look to the king of Sardinia and his Prime Minister Count Cavour as the leaders of the unification movement. This meant separating national unification from the social and political reforms advocated by Mazzini. Mazzini never accepted a monarchical united Italy

¹³ Subsequently he helped founding of similar organizations in other nations: *Young Germany*, *Young Poland* and finally *Young Europe*. As we said already, Jovanović's United Serbian Youth was created under Mazzini's influence.

and continued to work for a democratic republic. In 1870, he was arrested by officials of new Italian kingdom and sent again into exile.

Matija Ban

secret committee for Balkan uprising

In 1860 Matija Ban a writer and a politician set up in Belgrade a secret committee for preparation of the general Balkan uprising. His concept of a Balkan federation is unique not so much for its composition but for its reasoning and the aims it was suppose to achieve. He expected main support for the implementation of his program to come from Russia. That is why he presented the Balkan federation as a factor of Russia's policy in his letter to the Russian ambassador in Vienna. As Miletić, Desančić and Jovanović, he recognizes that peoples under the Turkish rule have a natural and unalienable right for self-government and that same goal is the link that unites them. But once they have obtained their freedom Balkan nations are bound to clash with each other in pursue of their territorial claims based on historical or ethnic principle (depending on which suited them best). To prevent such disputes Ban proposes a federation. Probably to obtain Russian support he claimed that the federation was to be under the patronage from Moscow. For Russia this federation would provide a sure access to Bosphorus and the Mediterranean. It would also encourage Slavic people of Austria to break free and join in with their brothers in "general Slav Confederation".

In 1866 Ban shifted towards the views of Polith-Desančić and Miletić, arguing that the only sustainable solution for the liberation of Slavic peoples would be a federation independent from all foreign influence, neutralised and therefore acceptable for the European powers. He distinguished three groups of Slavs that were under foreign domination and should join forces to liberate them selves. First group was **Western** (Czech- Moravian- -Silesian), second **Yugoslav** (Serbian- Croatian- Slovene) both under the dominance of Hapsburgs and **South-East** group (Serbian-Bulgarian). Together with Romanians, Greeks and Hungarians who suffered from the same tyrants, Slavs were to create a strong and independent federation that was to replace two weak empires (Austria and Turkey).

Josip Juraj Strossmayer

leader of the national movement in Croatia

Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the bishop of Đakovo is widely considered as the ideologist of Yugoslavian idea. Disappointed by the dualistic solution of the crisis in Hapsburgs Monarchy, Strossmayer begun to advocate a Yugoslav union outside Austria. Although a latecomer, Strossmayer's project (drafted in 1874) is important because it expressed strong determination of Croatian national leaders towards the idea a unified Yugoslav state. The same feelings were conveyed at the Yugoslav Congress in Ljubljana in 1870. It is to be noted that Strossmayer limits the scope of his federation only to South-Slavs, Yugoslavs (Croats, Serbs, Slovenes and Bulgarians) in the Monarchy and outside. This was the echo of the new political situation in Europe after the turbulent period of German and Italian unification was over.

Svetozar Marković

the first socialist

Under the influence of Paris Commune in 1870's the socialist idea swept trough Europe. Influenced by European socialist, Marxists and utopians of his time, young Serbian politician Svetozar Marković brought forth his vision for the settlement of the eastern question which by that time has entered the final faze. Just like Miletić, Marković sees revolution as means for obtaining freedom from foreign oppression. But he also ads a new element, and that is "internal liberation" from "domestic tyrants". He rejects the historical principle and sets the right of peoples to self-determination as the only justified principle on which states can be created. Federation is for him only the natural course because it suits the best to satisfy the needs of free peoples and people. "As free people, equal workers, as a union of municipalities, districts, states- in the way that suits them best".¹⁴

¹⁴ Marković, Svetozar (1937), *Izabrani članci. Srbija na istoku* Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, p. 221.

Conclusion

As we said, the core of the Eastern Question was the conflict between the interests of the Great Powers and the wish of the struggle of South-East European nations for liberation. The principle of nationality which was gaining increasing importance in this period went in favour of the later. But its implementation was hampered by the ethnic mixture of the Balkan peoples which made it difficult to draw borders between them. The other factor that complicated peaceful resolution of the Eastern Question was aggressive nationalistic plans of young Balkan nations that usually clashed with each other. The concept of a federal system was regarded as the best defence from external pressure and as a way to settle internal disputes and reconcile conflicting national interests of the Balkan peoples themselves, after liberation. In the same time these projects were frequently expressions of ideological convictions of their authors. Also, as we said in the Introduction, most projects were designed from a nationalist point of view, as a tool for obtaining national recognition.

Most of these projects were written by émigrés or members of revolutionary movements and did not represent official policy of their national governments.¹⁵ We can see the numerous similarities among different authors regarding the extent and the territory of the federation. This comes from the fact that they all dealt with the same problem which hampered their national liberation and/ or unification. Second reason is that frequently these projects were actually results of negotiations between leaders of different national movements.

It strikes as very interesting that quite a few authors made radical changes in their concepts for settling the Eastern question and restructuring Europe. This is one more argument supporting the hypothesis that most of the authors of the Federalist projects for South-East Europe had a rather pragmatic approach.

On the other hand they differed greatly on the subject of internal organisation of the federation and relations between the nations that would have form it. Plausible assumption is that each author was led by sometimes unconscious desire to satisfy aspirations of its own nation. They

¹⁵ I point to the plans of official Belgrade for „reconquista“ of old Serbia and the alliance with Bulgaria in that respect as an exception.

also differed regarding the means that will be used to realise the plan. Some proposed compromise and counted on help from the Great powers (e. g. Polith- Desančić), other preached revolution and presenting Europe with a *fait accompli* (e. g. Miletić).

Another characteristic of the whole corpus of these works is that they rarely go into detailed elaboration of political and legal questions. The reason for that can not be lack of expertise since many of them were experienced lawyers and politicians.

As we said, the foundation of the union in all these projects was nominally principle of national self-determination and free association based on equality. But these principles were rarely carried out to the letter. We saw how Kossuth regarded the issue of other peoples that lived on the territory of so called "historical Hungary" and how some peoples were denied their national recognition in the Balkans. The reason for that was sometimes wish for maintaining the dominant position for ones own nation in the future federation. Sometimes it was genuine (however maybe wrong) belief in other peoples "cultural deficiency" for creation of independent nation.

As we saw, none of the projects was actually ever realised. In most cases they had no real backing in any kind of broader popular movement or official policy of a government. Although in some instances some of them were examined even on the governmental level. We spoke already about the plans of Italian and Hungarian revolutionaries for general Balkan uprising which included help from Serbian army and was presented by Kanini to Garašanin. We saw what factors caused that it should stay just in the phase of negotiations and how parties lost their interest. The same happened with the famous agreement between Serbia and Bulgarian liberation committee, when Bulgarians found other, more powerful partner.

The Eastern Question was allegedly resolved in the Great Eastern Crisis of 1876/ 78. Serbia and Bulgaria got their independence; Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the Austrian administration. But that didn't mean the end of the disputes in the Balkans. The same national aspirations that stirred up the peninsula were still not satisfied, Turkish retained allot of its European possessions and the influence of the Great powers remained heavy.

However unsuccessful these project may seem (or just intellectual exercises), they launched idea of a federal rearrangement of South-East Europe as a plausible and acceptable solution. They gave reasonable solutions how conflicting interests of Balkan nations can be reconciled. The idea didn't fade away, and it remerged couple of times during the past century.

**THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE
NGOs IN HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.
WHY IS THE EUROPEAN UNION NOT A MAJOR HUMANITARIAN
ACTOR?**

Alina Vasile*

Abstract

The European Union is an international actor with unique identity and institutional structure. During the past years, theories have been concerned with the role of the EU in the world as a soft power.

The following paper tries to analyze to what extent is the EU's 'humanitarian policy' successful, but most of all to what extent we can talk about EU as a humanitarian actor. Through examining the relation between the Commission and the humanitarian NGOs, I will try to assess if the criteria of "actorness" (Bretherton & Vogler) are met by the EU on the international humanitarian scene.

Introduction

"The European humanitarian policy represents one of the most concrete projects of the EU. Especially, it is one of its most beautiful expressions, because it contains our founding values: solidarity, human dignity respect, equality, tolerance and personal engagement." (Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid¹)

* M.A. in European Affairs, Lund University, Sweden

¹ Louis Michel, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid. Speech at the Conference on cooperation for development, Wallonie, Namur- Château Mélot, March 4, 2005. Reference: SPEECH/05/175

The EU plays a multiplicity of roles in a range of policy areas in the international system (**Edwards**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:61) and the global context is increasingly seen as the stage on which the Union must act. However, the EU is not a traditional global actor -it has a rather distinct and unique international identity due to its institutional structure and decision-making procedures (**Vanhoonacker**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:86). Several theories have attempted to grasp this unique identity and are concerned with the question of how significant a global actor the Union is (**Andreatta**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:19). The following paper tries to assess the role of the EU in humanitarian assistance affairs, as part of its "mission civilisatrice" (**Kagan**, 2003:61, cited in Hill & Smith, 2005).

The Commissioner in charge of humanitarian aid² of the European Community of the Santer Commission, Emma Bonino, contributed largely, in the mid 1990s, to the notoriety of this relatively new external activity of the European Union, as well as to the endorsement of the idea of an EU "humanitarian policy". The European Community Humanitarian Office, created in 1992 within the Commission, is the institutional embodiment of this new political vocation. However, this policy has been, from the beginning, linked to the humanitarian organizations and especially the NGOs, who are the field operators. Since then a lot of questions sprang: who decides what? How do the Commission and the NGOs collaborate, and at the same time allocate the tasks between them? Does the EU become a "humanitarian actor" per se, thanks to ECHO, or it remains just a donor of the humanitarian organizations? The consistency of a European "humanitarian policy" itself is questioned.

The paper begins with a historical overview of the cooperation between the EU and the NGOs and a general presentation of the ECHO. The main issue I will focus on is the relation between the EU and the NGOs in elaborating and implementing humanitarian actions. By analyzing the

² "The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters...", as defined by UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 and by the OECD DAC. To be distinguished from [development aid](#), which seeks to address the underlying [socioeconomic](#) factors, which may have led to a crisis or emergency.

relation between the Commission and the NGOs and its consequences for the European cooperation and humanitarian action, I will try to answer whether it is possible to talk about the EU as a major humanitarian actor.

EU and the NGOs

The relation between EU and the European NGOs goes back to the 1970s, when the community financing of NGOs started. The significance of international aid in the EU external relations explains this old collaboration. The international aid, managed by the Commission, (**Vanhoonacker**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:76) (more than 55% of the international aid today) represents one of the oldest community policies. First of all it pertained to the relations with the African francophone countries, signatories of the Yaoundé Convention, and afterwards with the ACP countries, signatories of the Lomé Convention. In the beginning of the 1970s, the Community had progressively expanded its cooperation to the Mediterranean, Latin America and Asia. This policy of cooperation combined preferential commercial agreements with financial aid destined to economic reforms or development projects. Through the development of this policy the EU has managed to evolve from an inward-focused regional economic organization to an outward-focused global political actor. The EU's foreign policy capabilities are complex and varied, and in economic terms involve both carrots and sticks. And, according to Smith, the most prominent economic carrots involve development and humanitarian aid (**Smith**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:165), for which the EU is the world's largest donor (**Vanhoonacker**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:74).

The Commission, however, did not have the human resources necessary for the implementation of the development projects. Therefore, it relied more and more on NGOs. Once the international community aid started to include humanitarian interventions, for the same reasons, the Commission collaborated furthermore with NGOs and international organizations.

NGOs have become active players on the international scene, but most of all, important actors in the international humanitarian aid

community (Börzel & Risse, 2004). The relations between the EU and the NGOs are manifestly connected with the European values of international solidarity, democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Present in the official EU discourse, these values create the image of Europe as an international actor. These relations are much formalized today, and are an expression of the interest of civil society organizations in different aspects of the EU's international policy (**Lord**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:131): the Liaison Committee of European NGOs to the EU (CLONG) is the main interlocutor with the Commission (gathers approx. 900 NGOs); within CLONG, VOICE (Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies) gathers the NGOs specialized in humanitarian action. The eligibility criteria for community co-financing are very precisely regulated and refer mainly to the European origin, the experience in international cooperation and ability of financial, administrative management.

Collaboration Commission-NGOs: the ECHO

The community financing of international humanitarian actions is one of the newest dimensions of the EU' status of international power, in the 1990s. In fact, if in 1987, less than 3% of the community aid was destined for humanitarian actions, the financing of humanitarian actions has since then known a spectacular increase, reaching 15% of the community aid in 1995, after the Rwanda genocide and the war in Bosnia. In order to manage this increasing intervention of the EC in humanitarian aid, the Commission created in 1992 the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), under the subordination of the Commissionaire in charge of DG Development (since the Prodi Commission³). Furthermore, a Council regulation was adopted in 1996 specifying the modalities of community financing of humanitarian actions⁴.

³ Starting with the Prodi Commission, the Commissioner for Development also oversees the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) which used to have its own Commissioner. In Borzel & Risse.

⁴ Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of June 20th, 1996, concerning humanitarian aid, Official Journal L 163, 02/07/1996 P. 0001 – 0006.

Since 1993, approximately 40% of the community humanitarian aid has been financed through ECHO budget (Chapter B7-21), the rest coming from the European Development Funds, but still managed by ECHO. The global ECHO budget changes considerably from one year to year, according to the importance and the number of "humanitarian crises" (500 ml euros in 1998, 800 ml in 1999, because of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, 600 ml euros in 2003). Between 1992 and 1999, ECHO financed humanitarian interventions for an amount superior to 4 billions euros, on a very extensive geographic area (67 countries between 1996 and 1998). Thus, ECHO soon became a real multilateral donor and an important humanitarian actor on the international scene.

Disposing of own staff, although not very numerous, ECHO works in coordination with the big international organizations and the NGOs. ECHO's main function is actually to finance the humanitarian actions, whose implementation is entrusted to the organizations that signed a "partnership contract". The adhesion of each organization to this contractual relation is subject to an evaluation procedure by the ECHO services. More than 130 organizations had signed this agreement with ECHO at the end of the 2003⁵.

The NGOs were beneficiary of 56% of the ECHO funds during 1996-98, the UN agencies of 25%, the other international organizations (especially the International Committee and the International Federation of the Red Cross) 11%, the last 8% being attributed to governmental institutions or consultancies, or just spent directly by ECHO. As we can see, the financing of NGOs by ECHO is considerable. Therefore, some of the NGOs have grown dependent on ECHO financing: for example, Action against Hunger has 47.5% of the budget covered from EU money, in 2004⁶.

The cooperation between ECHO and the NGOs is thus the core of the humanitarian interventions financed by the EU. Nevertheless, a fundamental question arises. Are we witnessing a situation in which the

⁵ European Commission, UN Forum, Ref: EC03-278EN, 6.11.2003.

⁶ Action against Hunger, Activity Report, 2004. Retrieved from www.actioncontrelafaim.org/pdf/rapport_activites_2004.pdf

NGOs decide, manage and implement the interventions, and ECHO serves just as source of financing, in which case the EU is a mere donor? This is just a depiction of the classical situation of humanitarian NGOs that profit from public funds. Or, are we really witnessing a "humanitarian policy" of the European Union, supported by NGOs as "operators"? This situation would be very different than anything before, because it would lead to the integration of the NGOs action into the European public action.

EU, "humanitarian actor" or mere sponsor of humanitarian NGOs?

This debate is even more complex because the NGOs working with the ECHO favour the first interpretation, while the actors of ECHO the second one. In order to compare the two interpretations, I have succinctly analyzed a few documents connected with the functioning of ECHO (annual activity reports, external evaluations, reports of NGO VOICE)⁷.

For the community actors, there is, if not a "policy", at least a humanitarian activity of the European Community: the 1996 Council regulation defines what "Community humanitarian aid" is and the Commission talks about "the humanitarian activities of the Community"⁸. Moreover, the Commission thinks of ECHO as of "an essential actor of the world humanitarian stage"- and sometimes takes credit for different actions, as if the Commission staff actually took part in these activities: "(...) it should be borne in mind that the Commission has succeeded in deploying an unprecedented amount of aid using relatively limited resources in particularly difficult areas suffering from conflicts. The EU's contribution to the international community's urge to show solidarity is a major achievement for which the Commission must take the credit."⁹

The Commission considers that "humanitarian aid is an important element of the European Union's external identity" and that ECHO

⁷ VOICE, Publications and materials. At www.ngovoice.org.

⁸ Commission Communication, 1999.

⁹ Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/97, concerning humanitarian aid from the Commission, Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 143/1, 12.5.1997.

“succeeded in increasing EU's visibility on crisis theatres”¹⁰. When ECHO was established, it was expected it to build up its own capacity for direct action in the field. But, most of its funds are channelled through European NGOs, UN agencies and the International Red Cross organisations. And the proportion of the budget spent through European NGOs has risen substantially, reaching a record of 65% in 2000. A possible reason for this is visibility: “ECHO can obtain more visibility by funding NGOs than from large-scale UN programmes, where it is difficult to distinguish the contributions of the various donors; furthermore, the negative perceptions of the UN's performance; the view that funding NGOs directly rather than through UN agencies, which often subcontract NGOs anyway, is better value for taxpayers' money; and the identification of shortcomings in UN security” (Mowjee, 2002).

This competition for visibility can actually be measured concretely if we take a look at the framework partnership agreement (FPA) of ECHO with the humanitarian organisations that it finances. There is a clause stating that NGOs must ensure “the visibility of the humanitarian Operations financed by the European Community”. This search for visibility also explains the attention given to mediatization of ECHO¹¹

Nevertheless, in order to have a European humanitarian policy, ECHO should give the orders and the NGOs “obey” them. More specific, ECHO should provide: (1) a *doctrine* of humanitarian intervention; (2) *selection and control* of the financed NGOs; (3) *operational modalities* of the humanitarian interventions, (4) their *follow-up and evaluation* (Ginsberg, 1999).

Are these criteria met?

(1) The *humanitarian doctrine* of ECHO, this appears as relatively minimalist. First of all, the 1996 Council regulation states that the Community's humanitarian aid covers "non-discriminatory assistance,

¹⁰ Commission Communication 468, 26/10/1999.

¹¹ Wharmby, Delphine, « La gestion de l'image de l'Union européenne : le cas de l'aide humanitaire » Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec, August 1-5 2000.

relief and protection operations" for the victims of "natural disasters" and "man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting" (Art.1). ECHO's actions have the merit of including humanitarian interventions in situations of political-military conflicts¹², but do not, contrary to Article 1, include measures of "protection" for menaced populations, which would suppose military measures for their protection¹³. Or, this type of measures is obviously beyond the competences of ECHO and the Commission, and enters the field of ESDP, which is of intergovernmental competence. Consequently, ECHO is unable to secure the humanitarian aid that it is financing, nor are its providers, nor the beneficiaries.

Last but not least, in spite of the participation of ECHO representatives to conferences on humanitarian action, ECHO does not seem to be a first hand actor of the international debate on humanitarian intervention¹⁴. The institutional fragility of ECHO, its restrictive mandate focused on emergency, the lack of real competences of the Commission in foreign policy matters are enough factors for the confinement of the humanitarian doctrine of ECHO to that of an "apolitical emergency intervenient". On the contrary, the NGOs that work with ECHO do not appear as the executants of a community humanitarian doctrine. This is just a first element that limits the capacity of ECHO to impose itself as giving orders.

(2) On the other hand, ECHO makes the *selection and controls* to a certain extent the NGOs that it finances. According to the 1996 Council regulation, the NGOs must meet certain criteria in order to be selected for financing¹⁵. Besides, a thorough financial and administrative control is

¹² Sanches, A.A. 1999. "EU Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from Angola", ECDPM Discussion Paper 11, Maastricht: ECDPM.

¹³ Art. 2 of the Regulation specifies that the humanitarian actions of the Community have for objective the protection of "humanitarian goods and personnel, but excluding operations with defence implications". But of what kind of protection are we talking then?

¹⁴ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament on Linking relief, rehabilitation and development, COM/96/0153.

¹⁵ They have to be constituted in "non-profit-making autonomous organizations in a Member State of the Community under the laws in force in that Member State; have their main headquarters in a Member State of the Community or in the third countries in receipt

made a priori and a posteriori to the signing of the FPA. Lastly, ECHO does not omit to proceed to regular audits of NGOs' finances. Thus, paradoxically, this control is limited and focused on administrative and financial management of NGOs, to the disadvantage of the evaluation of their ground actions¹⁶.

(3) Under these circumstances, ECHO's capacity to determine the *operational methods* of humanitarian interventions, to ensure their follow-up and their evaluation is weak. The NGOs don't lose their autonomy in choosing the areas for interventions or in conducting the operations. The negotiations of the financing with ECHO can lead NGOs to modify their projects on different aspects that ECHO decides not to finance, but modifications thus operated are seldom very significant.

(4) As for the *follow-up* of operations, the NGOs admit to have generally rather regular contacts with the representatives of ECHO on the ground, but really it is not a question of evaluations. *The operational management of humanitarian interventions financed by ECHO is thus very largely delegated to humanitarian organizations.* Besides, the Commission admits that "the room for manoeuvre it has to influence the operations it finances and those it implements is not always as broad as it wished"¹⁷. This situation can be easily explained by the lack of operational capacity, the shift in the number of simultaneous interventions financed by ECHO and

of Community aid." Besides these conditions, the organizations are selected on multiple criteria: "administrative and financial management capacities; technical and logistical capacity in relation to the planned operation; experience in the field of humanitarian aid; the results of previous operations carried out ; readiness to take part, if need be, in the coordination system set up for a humanitarian operation; ability and readiness to work with humanitarian agencies and the basic communities in the third countries concerned; impartiality in the implementation of humanitarian aid" (Art. 7 of Council Regulation 1996)

¹⁶ Questioned in this respect on the absence of policy evaluation of the "performances" of the humanitarian organizations financed by ECHO, the Commission retorted that it uses nevertheless "indicators of withdrawal "(budgetary!), that "the evaluation of results takes much time" and that "budgeting by line-heading and control remain one dominant culture in most of the administrations " (Commission Communication 468, 26/10/1999, p.13-14)

¹⁷ Commission Communication 468, 26/10/1999, p.14.

the number of staff it disposes of¹⁸. The capacity of ECHO to ensure the follow-up and the evaluation of all financed interventions would suppose more human resources than it actually has, that is to say a hundred people in the Commission and some 70 correspondents on the ground (80% of the personnel under contract belonging to the international delegations of the Commission).

Several scholars have been concerned with the concept of "actorness" (**Bretherton & Vogler**:2002) in relation to the EU's external role and most of them concluded that some criteria have to be met in order to assign a considerable significance to the EU's role (**Ginsberg**, 1999:447), in an international humanitarian context, in particular.

(a) *Recognition* describes the degree to which outside actors accept the international competence of the EU. The ECHO is responsible for the coordination of humanitarian aid in the EU. Since its creation in 1992, it has significantly enhanced EU visibility, effectiveness and consistency in this area and has become one of the world's main sources of humanitarian aid. Thus, the EU has extensive competence in the area of humanitarian assistance, which is increasingly recognised by other actors. An example for the formal recognition of the EU's competence would be the Framework Partnership Agreements (FPA's), which was discussed above.

(b) *Authority* defines the legal competence of the Union to act in a global context (the degree of EU-legitimacy, which is mostly based on the EU-treaties). The legal basis of ECHO's competence is described by **Klages** (2001)¹⁹. First, on the basis of Article 179 of the TEU, the Council Regulation on humanitarian aid was adopted in June 1996. This Regulation provides a clear definition of the European Union's humanitarian aid policy and establishes ECHO's mandate. Second, the Council Regulation (EC) No

¹⁸ Let us recall that ECHO finances interventions in about sixty countries per year and, in each country, several tens of operations simultaneous. Report from the Commission, of 16 July 2003, Annual Report 2002 (Humanitarian Aid Office - ECHO), [COM 430/2003 final](#). For the only ACP zone, it is more than 1000 projects that were financed by ECHO over the period 1996-98

¹⁹ Klages, Roland (2001), "The European Union's Aid Policy: A Political Tool?," in *Europe, Diplomacy and Development*, Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, ed., 180-190.

2258/96 emphasizes the significance of rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries. Third, the Commission Communication on linking relief, rehabilitation and development addresses the 'grey zone' between humanitarian aid and development cooperation policy and stresses the need to achieve long-lasting solutions. And lastly, the Framework Partnership Agreements with humanitarian organizations²⁰ establishes the role, rights and obligations of partners and the legal provisions, which apply to humanitarian aid operations.

(c) *Autonomy* stands **for** the degree to which the EU has autonomous decision-making power and is distinctive and independent from other actors in the international system (**Bretherton & Vogler**, 2002: 20). Based on the above considerations, I think there is a mutual dependency and concomitant empowerment of the European Commission and NGOs, especially after the Cotonou Agreement negotiations. On the other hand, due to intergovernmental processes and institutional arrangements, the position of ECHO, and consequently the Commission's, is weaker than in other fields. This is due fairly to the Commission's poor internal organization, and partly to the character of complementarity of the policy (Vanhoonacker, in Hill & Smith, 2005:78). The Commission also answers to the consultants who evaluated ECHO and permanently assumes responsibility in front of the Member States and the Parliament for the way in which it manages the budget assigned for the humanitarian aid.

(d) *Cohesion* describes the extent to which the European Union acts in a unitary way externally²¹, in humanitarian affairs. The tensions among Pillars and within Pillars tend to impede overall policy coherence and lead to coordination problems. The parallel humanitarian policies and decisions taken by Member states, at the national level, increase the lack of consistency of a European humanitarian policy and diminish the importance of EU's role. ECHO, and the Commission, gave problems in becoming "policy entrepreneurs" (**Vanhoonacker**, in Hill & Smith, 2005:78).

²⁰ Since January 2004.

²¹ See Ginsberg, 1999 and Bretherton & Vogler, 2002.

On the whole, the analysis of the co-operation between ECHO and NGOs, in the implementation of humanitarian operations shows that, if ECHO is certainly a little more than a simple financial backer, it is not, however, an autonomous actor of the international humanitarian action.

Conclusion

The emergence of ECHO as a major actor in humanitarian assistance has had an important impact on the evolution of humanitarian coordination. The European Council pressed for a greater focus by ECHO on cooperation with the UN and the Red Cross, and the European Parliament argued that ECHO should coordinate Member States' emergency aid during major natural disasters. Despite these ambitions, from the outset there has been ambiguity as to ECHO's coordination role, both internally and with external actors²². ECHO's coordination with other agencies and donors has also been difficult. There have been individual efforts to address these coordination difficulties²³, but problems have persisted.

ECHO makes the choices of the areas of interventions, selected by the NGOs that it finances, but its humanitarian doctrine remains loose, its participation to large collective humanitarian debates limited, and most of all, the operational management of the humanitarian interventions, from their logistics to their control on ground, is entirely delegated to humanitarian organizations (NGOs and international organizations). Thus, ECHO finds itself in a situation of functional dependence on the latter in respect to the achievement of its mandate. This situation questions strongly

²² The need for improved coordination between different services was highlighted by the Court of Auditors in 1995, and again by an independent evaluation of ECHO's activities published in 1999.

²³ Including the Standing Interdepartment Working Party (GPIS), set up November 1994 to define the EC's position with regard to UNHCR.

the idea of a "European Community humanitarian policy" rather than a *policy of Community support for the humanitarian organizations*.

Nevertheless, the EU's ability, as civilian power, to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations needs to be given greater attention (Manners, 2002:241). The trend today is towards "bilateralisation" of the humanitarian financing, management and operations (Macrae, 2002:9). In other words, donors seek a much greater proximity and influence over humanitarian decision-making and in some cases operations themselves. In this context, the collaboration of the European Union with the humanitarian NGOs does not seem menaced by the prospects of EU acquiring the "features of an imperial power" (Cooper, in Hill & Smith, 2005) in humanitarian assistance. Although the humanitarian action remains a fundamental tool of the "European soft diplomacy", the EU does not meet yet the criteria for a major actor in humanitarian assistance.

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SECURITY STRUCTURE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW CHALLENGES

Selcuk Colakoglu*

Abstract

This paper aims at investigating security environment of the Black Sea region. We firstly review regional organizations and their security agendas. While the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) appears to be as the most organized and largest regional organization, it will be given to the BSEC much more importance. Then, it will be investigated the non-regional organization, namely NATO and the EU, both of which pursue their security agenda on the Black Sea region. NATO is mainly a security organization, which has an enlargement policy toward in the Black Sea region. The EU is dominantly economic and political organization which has also enlargement toward the Black Sea region. Finally, we analyze the security system of Black Sea region consisting of the BSEC, NATO and the EU.

1. Introduction

The Black Sea region includes the littoral states of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The Greater Black Sea region also includes some other countries in the Balkans and in the South Caucasus such as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, and Serbia & Montenegro¹.

In the history, the region experienced the dominance of the Byzantine, Ottoman and Russian empires those successfully closed the Black Sea to the outside world. During the Cold war, except Turkey, the members of Warsaw Pact (Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria) surrounded by the Black Sea away from the outside influence. After the

* Assistant Prof., Adnan Menderes University, Department of International Relations in Nazilli, Turkey

¹ Although Montenegro has gained its independence after the referendum in 2006, we consider Serbia & Montenegro as a single state in the article.

end of the Cold War, geopolitics of the region have led to entirely new setting in the greater Black Sea area, with more pluralistic environment.²

The loosening of Russia's control on the Black Sea region, the emergence of an independent Ukraine, the enhanced influence of a dynamic Turkey, the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU has made the Black Sea as a factor of in these international changes. The region can also become influential tool for the democratization process of the Greater Middle East as well as Eurasia.³

Internal weakness of post-Soviet states, their vulnerabilities to foreign pressures, reemergence of old enmity, regional rivalries and disputes, and insufficient integration into security structures are required a new security agenda in the region. The Black Sea countries have commonly believed that their domestic and regional problems would be solved by NATO and the EU.

This article aims to investigate security environment of the Black Sea region. We firstly review regional organizations and their security agendas. While the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) appears to be as the most organized and largest regional organization, it will be given to the BSEC much more importance. Then, the non-regional organization, namely NATO and the EU, both of which pursue their security agenda on the Black Sea region will be investigated. NATO is mainly a security organization, which has an enlargement policy toward in the Black Sea region. The EU is dominantly economic and political organization which has also enlargement toward the Black Sea region. Finally, we analyze the security system of Black Sea region consisting of the BSEC, NATO and the EU.

2. Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as a Regional Organization

The BSEC stands out as the most institutionalized organization in the region. The BSEC has served as an informal and flexible forum of cooperation to achieve multilateral cooperation and to foster their

² Mustafa Aydin (2005), "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood", in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, No.2, Vol.5, May, 258.

³ Alexander Rondeli (2004), "Black Sea Regional Security: The South Caucasus Component", in *Insight Turkey*, No.2, Vol.6, April-June, 28.

economic, technological and social progress. Despite first summit in 1992 in Istanbul, upon entry into force of its charter, the BSEC officially became a full-fledged “regional economic organization” in 1999. It is only organization including all six Black Sea countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia), as well as five neighboring countries in the Caucasus, the Balkans and in Eastern Europe (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Moldova). Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro became a full member in 2004. Moreover, Poland, Slovakia, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Egypt, Israel, Tunisia have the observer status in the BSEC.⁴

Permanent Secretariat (PERMIS) was established in 1994 in Istanbul and Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC) was founded in 1993. The Assembly meets twice a year and has three committees. Association of Black Sea Capitals (BSCA) was established following an initiative by PABSEC. Business Council (BSEC BC) was established in 1992. Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) was on the agenda in 1994, but became operational in 1999. Black Sea Universities Network has founded in 1997.⁵ The main decision-making body of BSEC is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which meet twice a year. There is a six-monthly rotating Chairmanship of BSEC.

BSEC’s main purpose was the cultivation of a climate of trust and understanding among its 11 members. BSEC’s security agenda included the soft security measures of combating organized crime. The issue of security and stability has been considered as a matter of high politics dealt with by political declarations at the highest level. However, BSEC has no legal compulsory character. The BSEC was planning to reach an engagement to peace, security and stability through economic cooperation. Security issues of the BSEC based on its overall experience in confidence-building through economic cooperation.⁶

After 9/11, hard security issues, including fight against international terrorism appeared in the BSEC’s cooperative mechanism. Decennial Summit Declaration in Istanbul in 2002 adopted a new security approach

⁴ Aydin, “Europe’s New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood”, 267.

⁵ Aydin, “Europe’s New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood”, 269.

⁶ Ioannis Stribis (2003), “The Evolving Security Concern in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, No.3, Vol.3, September, 135.

for the BSEC. With the declaration, the center of gravity moves towards purely security concerns, such as further efforts towards security and stability in the Black Sea region and the mandate given to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider ways of enhancing contribution of the BSEC to strengthening security and stability in the region.⁷ The declaration is clearly mentioned that the Black Sea area needs more security and stability and that the efforts of the BSEC should focus on the regional approach of these issues. Security issues will be more intensively presented in the future by BSEC. The Decennial Summit of Istanbul called the Council of Ministers to consider ways of enhancing the contribution of BSEC to strengthening security and stability in the region. Now, the hard security cooperation in the BSEC region is on the agenda.⁸

Table 1: Participation of 13 BSEC Countries in Selected Organizations⁹

BSEC Members	CIS	EU	NATO	OSCE	WTO
Albania			Accession	Member	Member
Armenia	Member			Member	Member
Azerbaijan	Member			Member	Observer
Bulgaria		Accession	Member	Member	Member
Georgia	Member			Member	Member
Greece		Member	Member	Member	Member
Moldova	Member			Member	Member
Romania		Accession	Member	Member	Member
Russia	Member			Member	Observer
Turkey		Accession	Member	Member	Member
Ukraine	Member			Member	Observer
Macedonia				Member	Observer
Serbia&Mont.				Member	Observer

Note: CIS=Commonwealth Independent States, EU=European Union, NATO=North Atlantic Treaty Organization, OSCE=Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, WTO=World Trade Organization

⁷ Stribis, "The Evolving Security Concern in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation", 157.

⁸ Aydin, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood", 268.

⁹ Adapted from Panayotis Gavras (2004), "The Black Sea and the European Union: Developing Relations and Expanding Institutional Links", in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, No.1, Vol.4, January, 26.

Countries that do not have bilateral relations (e.g., Turkey and Armenia, and Azerbaijan and Armenia) are contacting within the BSEC umbrella. All this could be managed more easily within multilateral environments with non-threatening programs. For instance, the European countries have failed to find ways to affect positively political reform in Belarus, ethnic problems of Georgia, and territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians. Conflicts and instability in the Caucasus especially affect trade, security and regional cooperation. The European countries might also be affected by increasing threat of religious radicalism emerging in Northern Caucasus. Some of the groups in the region, with or without Islamic discourse, are fighting for their rights, autonomy, national consolidation or independence. None of the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia, Chechnya, Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transdnistria have yet been solved satisfactorily. Moreover, illegal immigrants, drug trafficking and increasing criminal activities in general cause concern in Europe.¹⁰ Without reaching a solution of the region's problems, BSEC could not move ahead.

There exist various other regional cooperation projects and programs in the region with and without the participation of international organizations such as the UN, the EU and the NATO. A number of initiatives began in the early period of post-Cold War era, and cooperation on the environment, transport, energy infrastructure and soft security issues.

In 2000, six Black Sea littoral countries have established a multinational naval force, namely the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor), to cooperate in search-and-rescue operations, mine-clearing, humanitarian assistance, environmental protection, goodwill visits between Black Sea countries and peace-support operations in conjunction with the UN and the OSCE. Royaumont Process, the Southeast Cooperation Initiative (SECI), South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), Stability Pact, the Central European Initiative (CEI), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the GUUAM Group (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), SEEBRIG a

¹⁰ Tuncay Babali (2006), *Caspian Energy Diplomacy: Since the End of the Cold War*, Ankara: Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, 57-64.

multinational peacekeeping force for Southeastern Europe are some other regional cooperation initiatives.¹¹

One of the main problems of all regional initiatives for the greater Black Sea region is the weak regional identity. Even without considering Asian part of Russia, the distance from Albania, the westernmost BSEC state to Azerbaijan, to the easternmost BSEC state is over 2000 km. The wider Black Sea region also includes numerous mountain ranges as well as five seas other than the Black Sea.¹² Black Sea countries comprise with a very diverse economic and political background deep rooted capitalist and democratic countries (Turkey and Greece) in one side, on the other side and ex-communist and newly democratic countries (Bulgaria, Romania, the ex Soviet and ex-Yugoslav republics).¹³ Political, economic and social differences of Black Sea countries also negatively affect to build up a common regional identity.

The lack of leadership (US for NATO, Franco-German Partnership for the EU, and Russia for the CIS) for the regional cooperation, especially for the BSEC is appearing one of the major problems. Turkey played an important role for the establishment of BSEC, however there is much more effort in economic and political means to strength institutional structure of BSEC. The closer relationship between Turkey and Russia may create an opportunity for the BSEC.¹⁴ The Action Plan for Developing Cooperation signed in 2001 between Turkey and Russia presented fundamental changes of historical dimensions of bilateral relations and characterized new opportunities for regional cooperation.¹⁵ Turkey and Russia, historical powers of the region, could play a strong common leadership role in the BSEC. Turkish-Russian common leadership will not disturb any regional country and will able to keep away any single power's dominance.

¹¹ Aydin, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood", 273.

¹² Gavras, "The Black Sea and the European Union: Developing Relations and Expanding Institutional Links", 27.

¹³ Juan L. Suarez de Vivero; Juan C. Rodrigez Mateos (2002), "The Mediterranean and Black Sea: Regional Integration and Maritime Nationalism", in *Marine Policy*, Vol.26, 387.

¹⁴ Fiona Hill (2003), "Seismic Shifts in Eurasia: The Changing Relationship between Turkey and Russia and its Implications for the South Caucasus", in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, No.3, Vol.3, September, 57.

¹⁵ Elena Urazova (2002), "Russia and Turkey: Eurasian Integration Processes", in *Insight Turkey*, No.2, Vol.4, April-June, 93.

3. The EU and the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea may be the outskirts of Europe for the Western Europeans, but for the regional countries the Black Sea is a factor in integration with European and Euro-Atlantic world. European interests in the Black Sea are basically perceived in terms of defending Europe against threats coming from unstable parts of Eurasia. "Greater Black Sea Region" is perceived a periphery of Europe and an important linkage to the Greater Middle East and larger Central Asia.¹⁶

The expected enlargements of the EU, taking in Romania and Bulgaria by 2007 and Turkey possibly by 2015 will carry the EU to the shores of the Black Sea. The Black Sea has become an important region for the EU, establishing various forms of cooperation. Apart from Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey having EU membership perspectives, Ukraine and Moldova have already announced their interest in being member of the EU. Russian and Belarus are definitely not interested in the EU, and South Caucasian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) are currently excluded from the EU agenda, even those countries will meet membership requirements. The EU has only signed Partnership and Cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine and the agreement entered into force in 1998 and 1999.¹⁷ With the latest round of enlargement, there is a general recognition that the EU is reaching toward its final borders. This will require new and creative policies toward non-member states of the EU, so that they will not feel abandoned.

The EU wishes to extend and deepen its relations with regional countries, especially with Russia and Ukraine, without giving membership perspective. However, traditional Russian policy towards the Black Sea since Czarist Russia that has been keeping away the great powers from coastline of the Black Sea. Therefore, EU's dealing process with Russia is not easy task.¹⁸

There are three possible cooperation areas between the EU and the Black Sea region: Energy cooperation, regional cooperation and security cooperation. The Black Sea region is at the crossroads of the Eurasian

¹⁶ Rondeli, "Black Sea Regional Security: The South Caucasus Component", 27.

¹⁷ Karen E. Smith (2005), "The Outsiders: The European Neighborhood Policy", in *International Affairs*, No.4, Vol.81, 760.

¹⁸ Aydin, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood", 261.

energy market at the moment. The pipeline transporting Caspian oil to the Western Europe could play a great role in ensuring EU energy security in the coming decades, rescuing the EU from its dependence on Russian energy supplies. As European dependency on Middle Eastern oil and Russian gas continues, the safe supply form the Caspian Basin through the Black Sea assumes utmost importance. Disagreement on the status of Caspian Sea, competition among regional countries to host pipelines toward Europe and domestic instabilities of regional states would clearly affect energy security of Europe.¹⁹ For the energy supply and transportation security, the BSEC has potential for deeper cooperation with the EU.

In the framework of the regional cooperation, most of the BSEC institutions are designed along the lines of the EU institutions, and BSEC members try to strengthen their institutional relationship with the EU. The Platform for Cooperation between the BSEC and the EU in April 1999 listed opportunities for cooperation that the BSEC might offer the EU to consider the possibility for the European Commission to obtain observer status in the BSEC. Furthermore, during the BSEC 10th Anniversary Summit in Istanbul in June 2002, member countries declared their determination to increase cooperation with the EU. Thus, BSEC is a preparation ground for integration with larger Europe.²⁰ On the other hand, the EU clearly prefers individual country approaches to institutional arrangements in the region.

Now, the Black Sea region includes a number of different groups of states in terms of relations with the EU. Greece is a member country since 1981, while Romania and Bulgaria are accession countries for early 1990s, and Turkey with Association Agreement since 1963 and the Customs Union since 1995. Turkey's accession process to the EU is not a purely economic decision, but also a security choice. Turkey's military forces are larger than those of any of the West European Countries. This would make to cut some defense budgets in other countries in the EU since there is increasing returns to country size or population.²¹ Non-EU countries with Partnership Cooperation Agreements (PCA), but no membership prospects, include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and

¹⁹ Babali, *Caspian Energy Diplomacy: Since the End of the Cold War*, 155.

²⁰ Rondeli, "Black Sea Regional Security: The South Caucasus Component", 30.

²¹ Sacit Hadi Akdede; Selcuk Colakoglu (2006), "Increasing Returns to Diversity and Public Goods: Contribution of Turkey's Accession to the EU", in *Studia Regionalia*, Vol.18, 24-25.

Russia since the late 1990s. Non-EU countries in the Stabilization and Association Process, with Eventual EU membership prospects, include Albania (BSEC member), Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro (newly BSEC members).²²

The EU has an important role to play for the promotion of stability in the region. The Black Sea still remains a risky region for potential conflicts. One of the most efficient ways to deal with regional security problems would be to establish crises management mechanisms that can be developed easily with European help. Integration of Black Sea market with Europe would be an important addition from economic perspective, but beyond that, threats to the stability of the Black Sea region would eventually affect European economies. Therefore, the EU is interested in solution of many problems in the region. The multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea is already creating a positive environment for the settlement of conflicts. In this context, one point gains importance, the BSEC was not established with the initiative of the EU: Since the EU plays an important role in the economic and political agendas of individual BSEC members, most BSEC countries concentrate on improving their bilateral relations with the EU. This attitude has pushed multilateral initiatives into the background.

Despite a number of EU-sponsored projects, European involvement in the Black Sea region has been largely limited to the energy sphere, lacking a political and strategic dimension. The EU has no systematic attempt to develop a common policy toward the Black Sea region as a whole. Since the end of the Cold war, the EU has strongly encouraged its neighbors to develop regional cooperation. With the EU encouragement, various Baltic Sea and Barents Sea organizations were established under the Northern Dimension, Mediterranean countries were brought together around the Barcelona Process, and the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe covered up the Balkans. The missing part of the European periphery is the Black Sea region. Surprisingly, the EU has not so far targeted the Black Sea region, with its own regional projects.²³ The EU could play an important role in regional cooperation among especially BSEC countries. If the BSEC members want the EU to take it more seriously, the regional countries

²² Aydin, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood", 265.

²³ Aydin, "Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighborhood", 267.

should pay more attention to the BSEC. However, the EU has had negative implications within BSEC for cooperation between EU accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and non-potential candidate members. The EU accession countries change standards and rules concerning the flow of goods, people, capital and services, which build barriers against non-potential EU candidates.²⁴

4. NATO and the Black Sea Region

Throughout the 1990's, NATO tried to redefined its roles and policies. Extending democracy to the former communist bloc was at the top of its agenda, while strictly military-strategic objectives declined their importance. NATO's strategy was reformulated as defense cooperation through political instruments. Post-Cold War Europe faced the persistence of multiple insecurities. The crises of disintegration of Yugoslavia had affected regional peace and stability. Uncertainty in Russia's long-term geopolitical goals continued to remain as security challenges of Central and East European countries during 1990s. The process of Euro-Atlantic integration (EU and NATO) had increased the proximity to a less stable periphery to the East.

The enlargement agenda toward the Baltic States was heavily criticized by Russia. Under the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security of 1997, NATO and Russia established the Permanent Joint Council, which provided assurances that NATO programs and its enlargement to Eastern Europe would not be directed against Russia.²⁵

Three Central and Eastern European counties- the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland- joined NATO in 1999. The Prague Summit in 2002 had been expected to take a decision on the candidacy of new ten countries in the region. However, the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001 in the US

²⁴ Gavras, "The Black Sea and the European Union: Developing Relations and Expanding Institutional Links", 33.

²⁵ Boyka Stefanova (2005), "NATO's Mixed-Policy Motives in the Southeast-European Enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics", in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, No.1, Vol.13, 44.

radically changed the strategic context of NATO enlargement. 9/11 put a new set of military threats in regard to NATO's continued existence in the post-Cold War era. The threat of international terrorism gave importance to the military preparedness and capacity to response the existential threats of military-strategic nature.

The war on international terrorism brought a consolidation of NATO's geopolitical goals beyond collective defense. After 9/11 NATO's target would no longer be to combat communism, but terrorism. In this process Russia became a crucial US ally in the war against international terrorism.²⁶ The Black Sea appeared as a significant strategic and tactical asset in the conduct of military operations in Central Asia. By 2002, membership of the former Soviet Baltic States was no longer problematic, as the center of the US-Russia relations had shifted towards war on international terrorism. The founding of NATO-Russia Council in 2002 envisaged Russian cooperation with NATO and removed much of the direct military threat of second enlargement.

After 9/11, the issue of eastward enlargement acquired priority. NATO's second eastward enlargement became the largest single expansion in the history of the alliance. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO as new members in 2004. Since the Kosovo campaign, these countries had supported NATO members by providing logistic and operational support in its peace-keeping mission. Memberships of Slovenia and Slovakia means shortening NATO's border region. NATO's enlargement to the Baltic States helped the strategic objective of political consolidation in Northeast Europe confronting the Russian spheres of influence. NATO's expansion toward the Black Sea region by including Romania and Bulgaria shows the prevalence of geostrategic consideration. The remaining candidates from the Balkans or wider Black Sea area- Albania, Croatia and Macedonia- received assurances for future membership from NATO.²⁷ Many countries, also outside geographical border of Europe, are involved in cooperation with NATO. The Istanbul Summit in 2004 reconfirmed that NATO's door remains open to new

²⁶ Stefanova, "NATO's Mixed-Policy Motives in the Southeast-European Enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics", 340-341.

²⁷ Stefanova, "NATO's Mixed-Policy Motives in the Southeast-European Enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics", 41-51.

members and NATO encourages Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to continue the political reforms necessary to progress toward membership. Hikmet Çetin, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, has also referred that NATO's next enlargement is toward Balkan countries.²⁸

Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia currently aspire to acquire eventual NATO membership. Moldova insists on preserving its neutrality because of Russian military presence in the country.²⁹ Ukraine is also very conscious to the fact that the country's strategic orientation because of Russia. The majority of Ukrainians believes that non-alignment is indispensable to good relations with neighbors, as well as internal stability. On the other hand, NATO is also leas keen on having Ukraine as a member because of possible Russian reaction. Therefore, neither NATO nor Ukraine has clear membership agenda.³⁰

Prague Summit in 2002 developed the military concept for defense against terrorism. It was planned the formation of high-readiness rapid reaction forces toward NATO's southern flank covering the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Central Asia. The Black Sea emerged as a logical choice of an additional regional center for operational support. A synthesis of political and military-strategic objectives clearly explains NATO's decision to grant membership to Bulgaria and Romania. If the enlargement logic, valid during the first eastward enlargement in 1999, had been preserved, the 2004 enlargement would not have been carried out in political and military terms. Bulgaria and Romania have not meet membership criteria. In the 2002 enlargement only Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia were comparable to Poland, the NATO member with the lowest expenditures (\$ 14,727 per capita). While the median figure for NATO members was \$ 82,602 (Italy), Bulgaria's per head expenditures were \$4,313 and Romania's \$3,470. Against the background of such disparities, NATO's

²⁸ 2nd *International Conference on Security: Challenges to Peace Operations in the 21st Century*, 5-7 April 2006, Izmir University of Economics, Izmir, Turkey.

²⁹ Vladimir Socor (2004), "Threats New and Old: Addressing the Hard Security Threat in the Black Sea-South Caucasus Region", in *Insight Turkey*, No.2, Vol.6, April-June, 12.

³⁰ James Sherr (2005), "Ukraine: Reform in the Context of Flawed Democracy and Geopolitical Anxiety", in *European Security*, No.1, Vol.14, March, 168-169.

enlargement in the Black Sea region was determined by broader security conditions in this critical region.³¹

The war on terrorism considerably increased the strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey sits at the shores of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Caucasus and beyond to Central Asia, controlling the only connection between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea waters.³² NATO's expansion to the Black Sea begins to increase in regional cooperation. NATO troops on their way to Afghanistan used the Trabzon airbase on the Turkish Black Sea coast as the only transfer point. Romania and Bulgaria could serve as alternative routes for reinforcing NATO's logistic capacity. Both countries are willing to host US or NATO bases. Bulgaria and Romania, despite their ethnic fragility, have preserved civil peace during the post-communist transition. Bulgaria, under the communist regime that is a country of intolerance against its Turkish minority, has displayed a stable model of its inter-ethnic relations. Bulgaria and Romania's membership to NATO has expected to improve security in the Black Sea, as both countries have good relations with crucial members of NATO in the region- Turkey and Greece.³³

US-led NATO interests in the Black Sea region lay to create stable, reform capable strong, Western oriented, secure energy transit routes and able to join US-led coalitions or NATO operations. The Black Sea region forms a new border of the enlarging West. This function is likely to increase its significance for the US and NATO. An enlarging NATO will look like an energy supply route to its member countries and NATO itself has defined this periphery as a strategic tool for new missions- Afghanistan, Greater Middle East. Nevertheless, NATO seems to be excluded the Black Sea region from the list of its peace-support priorities for the foreseeable future. Those priorities now include Afghanistan, Iraq and the Greater Middle East operations. Any NATO peace-support operations in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia would be low-risk with the cooperation of the EU

³¹ Stefanova, "NATO's Mixed-Policy Motives in the Southeast-European Enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics", 47.

³² Sevgi Drorian (2005), "Rethinking European Security: The Inter-regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus", in *European Security*, No.4, Vol.14, December, 432.

³³ Stefanova, "NATO's Mixed-Policy Motives in the Southeast-European Enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics", 52.

as in the Balkans.³⁴ In this manner, NATO should pursue a more cooperative policy with the BSEC as a separate organization. However, NATO has no separate regional policy for the Black Sea region and there is no institutional contact between NATO and the BSEC.³⁵

Basically, Euro-Atlantic security interests in the Black Sea region are represented by US-led NATO policies, while the EU remains in a secondary position. The simultaneous enlargements of NATO and the EU to Eastern Europe provided comparative advantage of the two institutions in the area of security. Enlargement resulted different geopolitical functions for NATO and the EU. Candidate countries are expected NATO to solve their security problems by protecting their independence. Candidate countries are also expected to receive the economic benefits of regional integration through membership to the EU.

5. Conclusion

When we outlook at the regional security environment of the Black Sea, there are three important regional or international organizations (BSEC, EU, NATO), which operates independently to create a security system. The wider Black Sea region including the Balkans and the Caucasus has vulnerable for regional security and the region needs more organized and cooperative security system to settle regional problems as well as international terrorism.

The BSEC appears the leading and the largest regional organization in the Black Sea area. However, the BSEC with present institutional structure can unable to manage the regional security issues. Contested borders, mixed ethnic groups, enforced migration, economic weakness, and authoritarian regimes still create risks for regional security. In the first decade of establishment, the BSEC tried to solve its security problems to create a cooperative base through economic cooperation among its members. After 9/11, hard security issues, including combating with

³⁴ Socor, "Threats New and Old: Addressing the Hard Security Threat in the Black Sea-South Caucasus Region", 13-14.

³⁵ Stefanie Babst, Head NATO Countries Section-Public Diplomacy Division, stressed that NATO has no common regional policy toward the Black Sea during the Visit by Turkish Academics at NATO's Headquarter in Brussels on 30th March 2006.

international terrorism put into the BSEC agenda. As the BSEC is still too disorganized in the sense of regional interests, the BSEC needs to redefine its role and policies. It also has to develop a conflict management system.

As the EU gets closer to its next round of enlargement, Black Sea issues should be into EU agenda. However, the EU has not adopted a comprehensive approach for engagement and interaction with the greater Black Sea region. Common regional policy toward the Black Sea will allow the EU to deal with successfully with the enlargement problems in a vast region from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea. The Black Sea region already includes three large European actors (Turkey, Russia and Ukraine), those are necessary to create "wider Europe".

NATO and its main sponsor, the US has also no cooperative common policy with the BSEC. Extending democracy to the former communist East European countries was at the top of NATO agenda during 1990s. Currently, NATO policies in the region focus on the new security threats associated with international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, arms and drugs trafficking etc. That focus does not include the traditional threats, including military ones, to countries in the region.

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TO HAVE OR NOT TO HAVE A “NEW” IDENTITY: THE CASE OF POST-COLD WAR NATO

Andreea Mocanu*

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to demonstrate how the end of the Cold War affected one of the most important security international organizations, NATO, without causing its disappearance from the international arena as it did for the Warsaw Pact. The dimensions discussed throughout this paper will concern the identity and the legitimacy issues in relation to NATO, bearing in mind the fact that the international environment had fundamentally changed with the collapse of the Soviet empire. In order to respond to the new international environment, NATO needed a new identity (as a result of a transformation, not a revitalization process which was impossible to be an immediate one). The questions which rise at this juncture are (1) to what extent has NATO managed to find its new identity and, consequently, (2) how deep its transformation has been.

It is rather common to find in academic papers the agreed idea that the end of the Cold War was an event, which fundamentally changed world order up to that point of history. The scholar that best highlighted this transformation of the international system is Samuel Huntington in his article “The Clash of Civilizations”, where he noted that

“The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples’ identities and the symbols of those identities...”

As in this study we are interested in NATO, bearing Huntington’s assertion in mind, we can admit that this international organization fits very well into the above framework. What is even more important is that NATO is not a singular case in the international arena, as most of the

* B.A. (Hons) in Politics, Nottingham Trent University, E-mail: andreea_1_us@yahoo.com

international/regional organizations had to adapt to a new, fluid and complex security environment¹. At the end of the Cold War, contrary to the prediction that the Alliance would wither away, NATO persisted and is still considered to be the core security organization in the western hemisphere².

In spite of the fact that it has kept its name, the Northern Alliance has suffered a transformation process³, which delivered us the present NATO. Until the moment of the Soviet Union's dissolution, the Alliance was able to mobilise its long-standing identity as the expression and military guarantor of Western civilisation. Starting with the end of the Cold War, NATO has been provided with a motivating and legitimating vision of a new role: the consolidation of a 'western' civilization which had been illegitimately torn asunder by the Cold War⁴. Furthermore, Williams and Neumann continue their argument (p.365) by stating that the loss of the Soviet threat – the 'other' so often analyzed in assessments of NATO's identity and cohesion – did not mean that the Alliance was left without threat. The idea of *uncertainty of the future* soon gained more and more supporters. "Old" NATO was not able to deal with the challenges of the new security environment; consequently, there was a stringent need for a fundamental change and not for a mere revitalization.

The "old" NATO

As NATO acts in an international system, it is wisely to bear in mind at this stage Henry Kissinger's idea that "every international system has a relatively short life...with every century, the development of an international system has shrunk⁵". If we are to look at the evidences provided by history, then the American specialist's thesis is confirmed. The post-Westphalia system lasted 150 years, the international order in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress was maintained for another one hundred

¹ NATO REVIEW, *The Need for Change*, online at: www.nato.int, p.12

² SJURSEN, H. (2004), On the Identity of NATO, *International Affairs*, 80 (4), p. 687.

³ It shall be demonstrated in this paper how deep this process has been.

⁴ WILLIAMS, M. C. and NEUMAN, I. B. (2000) *From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity*, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2 (29), p.361.

⁵ KISSINGER, H. (2003), *Diplomatia*, 3rd ed., BUCURESTI: BIC ALL, p. 701.

years, while the system fingerprinted by the Cold War collapsed after only 40 years.

From the international law point of view⁶ and according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charta⁷, the Northern Alliance is an association of sovereign states, united in their commitment to maintain their own security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other states⁸. The idea of creating this international organization was the consequence of the dramas experienced by the Western Europe's states during the World War II. The Treaty of Brussels, signed in March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, was the perfect opportunity for these countries to express their determination of building a common defence system in order to resist to any perils that might have occurred and might have put in danger their security. Soon, negotiations with the United States of America and Canada followed, with the purpose of creating a unique alliance of the Northern Atlantic, founded on security guarantees and mutual arrangements between Europe and North America. Denmark, Island, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited to participate to this process as well. Negotiations finalized in April 1949 by signing at Washington the *Treaty of the North Atlantic Organization*.

The problem of identity related to NATO during the Cold War is not a controversial one as it became after the collapse of the bi-polar system instituted at the end of the WW II. In the context of the Cold War it was demonstrated that international organisations identify themselves in most of the cases, just as individuals or nation-states do, in relation with *the other* rather than with *their own selves*. In our particular case *the other* was the expansion of the Soviet troops in the Western Europe. Consequently, during the Cold War era, NATO was created as a security organisation, its essential *raison d'être* being the military dimension. Furthermore, we have to bear in mind the territorial aspect, which was very important at that

⁶ The Romanian specialist in international law, Raluca Miga-Besteliu, considers NATO an international organization which is defined in her study as "an association of states, founded on a treaty, endowed with a constitution and common institutions, possessing a different judicial personality compared to the member states"(Miga-Besteliu, 2003, p.135).

⁷ Article 51 of the United Nations Charta affirms every state's natural right to self or collective defense (Barna, 2004, p.2).

⁸ BARNA, C. (2004), Reconfigurarea NATO in contextul international de securitate, *Studii de securitate*, 1 (2), online at www.studiidesecuritate.ro, p.2.

stage, because the treaty's provisions were focusing on an area restricted to the states that had signed it. From the French historians' point of view, Pierre Milza and Serge Bernstein⁹, the Alliance achieved its major objective, in spite of its imperfections and uncertainties, *i.e.* providing security and peace in the area covered (in terms of territory) by the treaty.

NATO's Transformation

As stated above, the end of the Cold War brought a new balance of power (or imbalance?), not only in Europe but at the global level too. NATO had been created to deter a Soviet attack against Western Europe and, if necessary, to defend against such an attack. With the fading away of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Moscow was no longer in a position to launch a surprise attack on Western Europe¹⁰. Consequently, not having *the other* to act against or to define/identify its mission, NATO lost, for a moment, any reason that would have demonstrated the need for its existence.

If we take into consideration the traditional assumptions about international politics, *i.e.* the basis for cooperation was inexistent, then why NATO should be permitted to survive? The supporters of the theory of constructivism in international relations try to explain NATO's survival and, implicitly, its transformation by stating that this fact was facilitated by the norms and principles used by NATO during the Cold War. Helene Sjursen criticises those supporters of the constructivist approach who claim that NATO was never only a military alliance held together by a sense of a common external threat, but it was and is a community of liberal democratic values and norms¹¹. However attractive the perspective offered by the constructivist approach might seem, I incline to think that Sjursen is right when she criticises this overreaction. NATO was a military organization when it was created: its mission, purpose and mandate

⁹ MILZA, P. and BERSTEIN, S. (1998), *Istoria secolului XX: Lumea intre razboi si pace (1945-1973)*, vol.2, BUCURESTI: BIC ALL, p.154.

¹⁰ BROWN, M. (1999), "Minimalist NATO: A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench", *Foreign Affairs*, 78 (3), p.205.

¹¹ Sjursen, p.687

reflected the military institutional design¹². After the end of the Cold War, the original purposes of NATO receded into the background¹³.

When the issue of NATO's reforms comes into discussion, the focus is on its military forces. However, in the context of the end of the Cold War the analysis needs to be expanded to other dimensions as well. Therefore, in terms of military forces, NATO made deep cuts in its conventional forces in Germany, while the US operated the same cuts in its nuclear arsenal in Europe. Equally as important is the fact highlighted by the US Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, which refers to NATO's transformation from the territorial point of view. According to Mr. Burns, "NATO's past focused inward on Cold War threats directed at the heart of Europe. NATO's future is focused outward on the challenges posed by global terrorist networks and, in particular, to the security of its members from the arc of instability that stretches from South and Central Asia to the Middle East and North Africa¹⁴".

As stated few lines earlier, NATO's transformation does not refer only to its military structures, but to its mission too, which reflects the *identity* issue we tend to look at. In the aftermath of the 1989 and 1990 events, the Alliance's leaders announced that they would develop a new military strategy that would "de-emphasize" forward defence and enable NATO a more 'political' role in European affairs¹⁵. The discussions about NATO being more "political" or more "military" appeared immediately in the aftermath of the Cold War. The trend was towards a greater political role of the Alliance, which corresponded to all the changes the organization was facing. In spite of the fact that NATO establishment tried to maintain a balance between the old purpose of the institution and the new one, the more the Alliance became more political in its dealings with non-members,

¹² In order to harmonize all the military decisions, there was created an international military major staff which supervises four distinct commandments: in Europe (general headquarter: Roquencour-France, in the Atlantic (Norfolk, Virginia), in the Sleeve Sea (Northwood, Great Britain) and a regional-strategic group Canada-US (Washington) (Milza and Berstein, p.154).

¹³ SCHIMMELFENNIG, F. (2005), *Multilateralism in Post-Cold War NATO: Functional Form, Identity-Driven Cooperation*, p. 2.

¹⁴ BURNS, N. (2004), "NATO Remains Our Essential Alliance", *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, June 2004, p.5.

¹⁵ Brown, p. 205

the more it lost its centrality in the development of the foreign policy of its own members¹⁶.

In November 1991, at the NATO summit in Rome, the idea expressed earlier materialized in a new strategic concept, which according to Michael Brown¹⁷, had four fundamental tasks:

1. NATO had to continue “to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe...in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation”
2. NATO would continue to serve as a “transatlantic forum” on security issues
3. NATO would “deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any member state of the Alliance”
4. NATO would work to “preserve the strategic balance” in Europe.

How Deep the Transformation has been

Understanding how deep the transformation of the Alliance was in those particular moments requires an analysis of the driving forces behind the Alliance cohesion. As I have tried to underline above, transformation does not refer only to the organizational and force structure, but to the purpose of NATO as a whole and at the rules that guide cooperation. As it is stated on the Alliance’s official web site, “the emergence of non-traditional threats since the end of the Cold War has made the negotiations about a shared perception of security difficult. At the same time, responding to these threats has demanded greater openness and flexibility in strategic planning to prepare the Alliance for a wider range of tasks¹⁸”. Therefore, we can easily identify as main features of NATO’s transformation - **flexibilization**

¹⁶ ROPER, J. (2000), “Strategic Implications of the End of the Cold War”, in CROFT, S. and TERRIFF, T. (eds), *Critical Reflexions on Security and Change*, LONDON: FRANK CASS, p. 110.

¹⁷ Although in his study he presents in a magnificent manner NATO’s transformational process, highlighting as many controversial issues as possible, Michael Brown is skeptic regarding the way in which NATO’s mission was formulated as this would undermine the Alliance’s effectiveness, credibility and long-term durability.

¹⁸ NATO Review, p.12

and **diversification**. To be more precise, the radical change has been the development of a set of new forums and frameworks to institutionalize the new relation with the Central and Eastern European countries. This was the path chosen by the leaders from the West to put an end to what had been created at the end of the WW II. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was opened for all countries that escaped from the “protection” offered by the Red Army.

a) Organizational change

Bearing in mind the features exposed above, it is not an overreaction to state that at the organizational level the most visible changes were the new institutional design and the new “cooperation”. There are many theoretical explanations for this sort of changes, but in this study the focus will be only on three of them which seemed to be relevant for the general idea of this paper.

Firstly, according to the functional theory of international institutions, institutional design will vary with the type and seriousness of international cooperation problems. If we extend this to the case of security institutions, then the argument can be stated as following: *institutional design varies with the nature of the threat and the problems of security cooperation that arise from countering it*¹⁹. Analyzing one of NATO’s features – “flexibility” – makes us to understand that a higher flexibility of post-Cold War NATO is a functional response to the deadlock problems it faces by means of creating those “*coalitions of willing*”, *i.e.* those member states that share security concerns on specific issues²⁰. As much as this theory might seem plausible, it has its own shortcomings.

Secondly, we will focus on the constructivist theory which states that “the institutional design will vary with the collective identities and norms of the international community that establishes them and with the requirements of community-building and community representation²¹”. This theoretical approach seems to apply very well to the new international environment created with the collapse of the Cold War. However, it reflects

¹⁹ Schimmelfennig, p. 17.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.23.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 25

a variation in identity concerning NATO members: while full members are assumed to share the common liberal identity, values and norms of the transatlantic community, partners still need to learn them. Therefore, the change of the institutional design in this case can be summed-up to PfP and the new waves of enlargements.

Thirdly, we need a realistic view over NATO's transformation. At first glance, this perspective seems to be a pessimistic one because it has as its core argument the US's hegemony. As the US is the primary donor of this security institution, it is rather common for them to have an extremely high importance in decision-making and decision-taking. Following this argument, then we could admit that Schimmelfennig is right when he notes that hegemonies generally seek to avoid being bound by decisions of other governments or supra-national organizations.

b) Changing the mission

Perhaps the greatest change that NATO dealt with has been the focus on promoting democracy as a core principle in its actions. Whereas security came before democracy for NATO during the Cold War, this is no longer the case. Adherence to democratic norms within NATO is seen as crucial in the context of enlargement, and on this basis NATO is often described as the most important democratizing agent in Europe. Alexandra Gheciu is one of the supporters of NATO's role in spreading democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. In her study²² she argues that "NATO was especially heavily involved in the eastern projection of liberal-democratic norms in area of security, including norms governing relationships between different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defence policies and between the state and civil society (transparency and accountability in the area of national defence, the division of powers within the state, including the "checks and balances" principle, government oversight of the military through civilian defence ministries)".

But is NATO such an important agent on the European continent to be qualified as the "best exporter" of democratic values, compared to the

²² GHECIU, A. (2005), *Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization: NATO and Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe*, p. 2.

EU for instance? In the end, the big question is how democratic is NATO to have the right to claim itself an exporter of democratic values?

In order to provide a possible answer to this question, I think a starting point is the idea that nowadays *democracy* and *legitimacy* are intimately connected and that many international organizations lack legitimacy. From my point of view, legitimacy is needed as a fundamental basis for any action, especially if you act outward your legal area of action. On the one hand, NATO possesses indirect legitimacy, which immediately portrays it as a traditional intergovernmental organization, where the common manner of taking decisions is the *consensus*. There is necessary one veto and everything that has been built vanishes. Contrary to this view, NATO, although an intergovernmental organization, always finds a solution in case of a deadlock: the US takes action without waiting for a green light from the other members. On the other hand, NATO needs direct legitimacy (which it lacks) if it wants to act democratically. Therefore, if there is no direct legitimacy within NATO, then the conception of NATO as a “liberal democratic security community” is a problematic one. It gives an illusion of democratic legitimacy to an organization, which has neither a democratic mandate nor a democratic structure of decision-making such as majority voting²³.

Conclusions

Throughout this paper I have tried to prove why and how NATO changed itself with the collapse of the Soviet Union under all aspects taken into consideration above. Its transformation is obvious for most of us taken into consideration the events in the last 16 years. However, as I have stated above, NATO's changed mission and structure do not gratify it as *the main exporter of democracy*. Its means of action and the unilateral role assumed by the American part in this Alliance sustain this thesis. It may be consider a *tool* for promoting democracy, but no more than that. Indeed, NATO needed to have a new identity in the aftermath of the Cold War in order to respond to all the changes and challenges of the *new* environment. But if it managed to handle its own new identity, that is a matter of subjectivism.

²³ Sjursen, p. 695

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CHALLENGES OF E-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN LITHUANIA

Renata Korsakiene*

Abstract

The paper explores the development of e-business practice in Lithuania putting emphasis on the main factors impacting the adoption of e-commerce. The empirical data allow concluding that the lack of need, convenience to buy in supermarket, problems related with safety and trust are seen as the main reasons influencing the low participation of individuals in e-commerce. On the other hand, the slow penetration of Internet hinders the further development of e-commerce in Lithuania. Hence, the ability to attract customers is seen as one of the main problems of e-business. At the end of the paper, the results of the survey are summarized and the conclusions are presented.

Introduction

The Internet has dramatically affected the conduct of business. Therefore, markets, industries, and businesses are being transformed. For instance, some authors point out that U.S. firms are considered world leaders in e-business¹. However, the rapid growth of the number of businesses that use the Internet is a global phenomenon.

Anyway, business conducted over the internet has the potential of generating tremendous new wealth. Hence, the problems related with e-business have attracted the attention of scholars in the fields of entrepreneurship and strategic management.

Electronic transactions are becoming ever more commonplace in our daily lives. However, the small number of firms engaged in e-commerce in Lithuania allows concluding that some obstacles that hinder the development of e-business exist. Various research findings allow

* Assoc. Professor, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Business Management Faculty, Department of Enterprise Economics and Business Management, Sauletekio av. 11, LT-10223, Vilnius, Lithuania, Phone: +370 682 30462, e-mail renatakorsa@takas.lt

¹ Amit, Raphael, Zott, Christoph (2001), "Value creation in e-business" in *Strategic Management Journal*, 6/7, Vol. 22, 493-521.

distinguishing external factors influencing e-business adoption. Notably, market forces and government are seen as the major forces impacting e-business adoption. On the other hand, uncertainty of the online environment influences consumer trust.

Aim of this paper is to explore the development of e-business practice in Lithuania putting emphasis on the factors influencing e-business adoption. Presented investigation is based on questioning of Lithuanian customers.

E-business and e-commerce definition

The scholars define e-business as the business conducted over the Internet. Hence, the rapid growth of the number of businesses that use the Internet is seen as a global phenomenon². It is agreed that the domain of e-business covers such business functions as transferring of funds, communication with customers, electronic buying and selling of goods and services, servicing customers, collaborating with business partners, and conducting transactions within organizations³.

According to Amit and Zott, e-business has the potential of generating tremendous new wealth, mostly through entrepreneurial start-ups and corporate ventures. On the other hand, it is also transforming the rules of competition for established businesses. For instance, Sharma emphasises that on its marketing-side, e-business enables a firm to create value for its current and potential customers and also for itself by sending cost-effective customized communications about new and existing product and service offerings in addition to receiving real-time feedback from them for solving their existing problems and/or developing new product⁴. Additionally, e-business enables a firm efficiently increase its speed of new product introduction.

Geoffrion and Krishnan point out that e-business consist of three areas: consumer-oriented activity and business-oriented activity supported

² Amit, Raphael, Zott, Christoph (2001), "Value creation in e-business" in *Strategic Management Journal*, 6/7, Vol. 22, 493-521.

³ Turban, Efraim, David King, Jae Lee, Merrill Waricentin, and H. Michael Chung (2002), *Electronic Commerce 2002: A Managerial Perspective*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

⁴ Sharma, Varinder M. (2005), "Export management companies and e-business: impact on export services, product portfolio and global market coverage" in *Journal of Marketing Theory & Practice*, 4, Vol. 13, 61-71.

by the e-business technology infrastructure⁵. The consumer-oriented activities comprise business-to-consumer, consumer-to-consumer and government-to-consumer activities. The business-oriented activities comprise business-to-business, business-to-government and government-to-business activities. The technology infrastructure relates to network infrastructure, network applications, decision technologies, and software tools and applications. Taking into account this broad definition of e-business activities, we will restrict our attention mainly to business-to-consumer oriented activities.

Notably, Olson and Olson define business-to-consumer e-commerce as the activity in which consumers get information and purchase products using Internet⁶. Hence, some features of e-commerce can be distinguished. For instance, Ba and Pavlou stress that the spatial separation between consumers and Web vendors increases fears of seller opportunism related with product and identity uncertainty⁷. It is agreed that personal information can be collected and exploited by multiple parties not directly linked to the transaction. Koufaris explain that consumers must actively engage in extensive IT use when interacting with a vendor's website⁸. On the other hand, some problems related with the reliability of the open Internet infrastructure have arisen. Hence, the scholars distinguish the uncertainty of the online environment and emphasize the importance of consumer trust. Additionally, the reduced consumers' perception of control and confidence are seen as the main factors negatively impacting e-commerce adoption.

Factors impacting e-commerce adoption

Some scholars point out that e-commerce responds to the principles of network externalities in that the drivers of adoption are more often found in the social system of the organization than in the attributes of the

⁵ Geoffrion, A. R. Krishnan, (2001), "Prospects for operations research in the e-business era" in *Interfaces* 31, 2, 6–36.

⁶ Olson, J. S., and Olson, G. M., (2000), "i2i Trust in e-commerce," in *Communications of the ACM*, 43,12, 41-44

⁷ Ba, S., and Pavlou, P. A., (2002), "Evidence of the Effect of Trust in Electronic Markets: Price Premiums and Buyer Behaviour," in *MIS Quarterly*, 23,4, 243-268.

⁸ Koufaris, M., (2002), "Applying the Technology Acceptance Model and Flow Theory to Online Consumer Behaviour," in *Information Systems Research*, 13, 2, 205-223.

innovation⁹. Therefore, market forces (suppliers, customers and other business partners) are seen as the key drivers for the adoption of e-commerce¹⁰. On the other hand, organizations that perceive market forces as ready for e-commerce are likely to adopt e-commerce or embark on more sophisticated e-commerce implementation from fear of competitive disadvantage, perceived e-commerce benefit, or simply “to catch up with the trend”¹¹.

Notably, government plays an important role in adoption of innovations. For instance, Kuan and Chau state that a government can encourage private sector to adopt e-commerce by providing infrastructure, legal and regulatory frameworks¹². The investigations have proved that the adopter firms perceived higher government pressure than non-adopter firms. Oxley and Yeung explained that the readiness of government to promote e-commerce defines the institutional environment within which businesses operate and influences their confidence and level of e-commerce aspirations¹³.

The conclusion we can draw is, that if a government shows a clear commitment to e-commerce, this becomes apparent in its policy measures, which in turn can encourage e-commerce utilization.

Analysis of factors impacting e-commerce adoption in Lithuania

The theoretical framework presented above created preconditions to analyse factors impacting e-commerce adoption in Lithuania.

At first, let's start from overview of factors that indicate user access infrastructure. One of the most important factors is Internet usage among individuals. Examination of recent data provided by Eurostat in Graph 1

⁹ Au, Y.A., and Kaufman, R.J., (2001) “Should we wait? Network externalities, compatibility and electronic billing adoption” in *Journal of Management Information Systems*, 18, 2, 47–75.


¹⁰ Dos-Santos, B.L., and Peffers, K. (1998), “Competitor and vendor influence on the adoption of innovative applications in electronic commerce” in *Information and Management*, 34, 175–184.

¹¹ Chwelos, P.; Benbasat, I.; and Dexter, A.S., (2001) “Research report: Empirical test of an EDI adoption model” in *Information Systems Research*, 12, 3, 304–321.

¹² Kuan, K.K.Y., and Chau, P.Y.K., (2001), “A perception-based model for EDI adoption in small businesses using a technology-organization-environment framework” in *Information & Management*, 38, 507–521

¹³ Oxley, J., and Yeung, B., (2001), “E-commerce readiness: Institutional environment and international competitiveness” in *Journal of International Business*, 32, 4, 705–724.

(comparison of Internet access in households and enterprises for European countries and throughout the EU25) illustrates the lowest rate of access in Lithuania for households (16%). Other Baltic States Latvia and Estonia had a higher rate of Internet access in households with 42% and 39%, respectively. On the other hand, provided data demonstrate large disparity in Internet access between households and enterprises.



Graph 1: Internet access in 2005 in households and enterprises¹⁴

In 2005, 30% of private individuals in Lithuania accessed the Internet on average at least once a week (Fig. 1). However, according to this benchmark Lithuania is behind EU-25 level (43%). On the other hand, Latvia and Estonia had higher percentage of regular Internet use with 36% and 54% of private individuals, respectively. The same tendencies are observed analysing Internet usage by gender and employed persons. Only students are the regular users of Internet. Notably, in Lithuania 85% of

¹⁴ Statistics in focus. Population and social conditions 12/2006, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>

students used Internet at least once a week. Hence, according to this benchmark Lithuania is ahead EU-25 (79%) and Latvia (81%).




Fig. 1. Regular Internet usage in 2005 by gender and professional activity¹⁵

Such low rate of Internet usage can be explained by low rate of Lithuanian households possessing personal computer (29%) and low rate of households having access to the Internet at home (14,4%)¹⁶. Hence, from the recent data, presented above, we can draw a conclusion that the slow penetration of Internet is seen as one of the obstacles hindering further development of e-commerce in Lithuania.

On the other hand, the main private purposes of using Internet are communication (78,8%), search for information about goods and services (62,7%) and services related to education (63,6%).

Further, we can distinguish the main reasons influencing the low Internet usage by private individuals (Fig. 2). The data allow concluding that the lack of need (56,2%), expensive equipment (28,2%) and expensive network (21,9%) are seen as the main reasons impacting attitude towards Internet usage.

¹⁵ Statistics in focus. Population and social conditions 12/2006, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>

¹⁶ Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, www.std.lt




Fig. 2. The main reasons influencing the low Internet usage by private individuals¹⁷

Anyway, close look at the categories of goods and services most frequently purchased on the Internet by private individuals in 2005 allow concluding that Lithuania lags behind EU-25 and other Baltic States Latvia and Estonia (Table 1).

Table. 1. The goods and services most frequently purchased on the Internet by private individuals in 2005 (%)¹⁸

	EU-25	LT	LV	EE
% of persons who bought in the last 12 months	23,1	2,2	4,8	6,8
Books/magazines/e-learning	7,9	0,8	0,7	2,3
Travel and holiday accommodation	7,8	0,4	0,8	2,2
Clothes, sports goods	7,5	0,2	0,6	2,4
Films/music	7,4	0,5	1	u
Tickets	5,6	0,1	0,8	u

¹⁷ Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, www.std.lt

¹⁸ Statistics in focus. Population and social conditions 12/2006, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>

Judging from data, presented above, Lithuanian costumers are not active participants in e-commerce. The statistical data allow concluding that the lack of need (79,8%), convenience to buy in supermarket (39,5%), problems related with safety (12,3%) and trust (11,4%) are seen as the main reasons influencing the low participation in e-commerce (Fig. 3).




Fig. 3. The main reasons influencing the low participation of private individuals in e-commerce¹⁹

Let's take a closer look at e-commerce on the Internet in enterprises. According to the data presented by Eurostat, enterprises use the Internet for buying rather than selling goods (Table 2). Anyway, Lithuanian enterprises are not active participants in e-commerce. According to this benchmark EU-25 and Estonia is ahead Lithuania.

¹⁹ Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, www.std.lt

Table. 2. E-commerce on the Internet in enterprises 2004 (%)²⁰

	EU-25	LT	LV	EE
Buying	36	15	7	23
Selling	11	6	2	7
Internet sales as % of total turnover	2,5	1,8	0,6	0,9

In January 2005, 41% of enterprises in Lithuania had Internet access and were equipped with a website. However, this rate was lower comparing with the EU-25 (62%). On the other hand, Lithuanian enterprises used their own websites for marketing own products (79%), facilitating access to product catalogues and price lists (55%) and providing after sales support (5%).

In recent years, Lithuania has made progress of improving the economic and institutional regime and developing infrastructure for information and communications technology. Lithuania has participated in the EU research programs, prepared a white paper on science and technology, adopted various information society and e-government strategies and signed a memorandum of understanding on information society development between the private sector and the Government. However, the low usage of the Internet by households, the lack of need to use the Internet and lack of need to participate in e-commerce are seen as the urgent issues that require undertake active state policy aimed to encourage adoption of e-commerce.

Development of e-business in Lithuania: case of ticket distribution business

The analysis of situation presented above created preconditions to analyse problems encountered by companies developing e-business in Lithuania.

The ticket distribution by the Internet is provided by two enterprises, which were established in 2004 (www.tiketa.lt; www.bilietai.lt). Anyway, ticket distribution by the Internet is seen as the new activity in Lithuania. E-commerce system that was developed by Web vendors provide possibility for customers to choose ticket (theatre and

²⁰ Statistics in focus. Population and social conditions 12/2006, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>

concert ticket, cinema ticket, bus and plane ticket and etc.) in any time and for desirable price. Additionally, the physical trading systems are developed for individuals who do not use the Internet. Such trading systems, allowing to process business transactions, strengthen trust of customers. However, the further development of ticket distribution by the Internet depends on customers' attitude towards e-commerce.

This section presents the results of survey carried out in Lithuania in order to indicate approach of Lithuanian customers towards e-commerce. Another purpose of the survey was to indicate the possibilities for the development of ticket distribution by the Internet. The survey is based on responses to a questioner, which was distributed by e-mail. 144 customers participated in the investigation. 53% of women and 47% of men filled questionnaires.

Respondents for queries have been chosen randomly. However, the group of ages 25-34 dominates in the survey (Fig. 4).





Fig. 4. Distribution of respondents by age group


Majority of respondents indicated that they accessed the Internet at home and at work place equally * (Fig.5).



- Formulation of question was: "Where do you access internet?"

Fig. 5. Places of internet access


It occurred, that majority of respondents use the Internet for their own purposes until three hours per day * (Fig. 6).



- Formulation of question was: "How many hours on average do you use internet for your own purposes?"

Fig. 6. Frequency of internet usage for own purposes


Customers obtain information about goods and services always on the Internet, on the Internet and in other sources of information* (Fig. 7). Hence, the Internet is seen as important source of information.



- Formulation of question was: "Where do you look for information about products and services?"

Fig. 7. The main sources of information about products and services

80% of respondents indicated that they purchased goods and services on the Internet and 20% of respondents indicated that they did not. Such high rate of individuals who purchased goods and services on the Internet can be explained by the fact that the group of age 25-34 dominates in the survey. This group of customers, according to the survey, has higher than average incomes per month. Questions* about the frequency of purchased goods and services on the Internet let us to reveal that majority of respondents (43%) purchased more than five times per six months (Fig.8).



- Formulation of question was: “How many times did you purchase goods and services on the internet per six months?”

Fig. 8. Frequency of purchased goods and services on the Internet

The survey allow concluding that the frequency of purchased goods and services is related with such factors as 1) buyers are served better and get guarantee; 2) it is easier to submit order and 3) it is more convenient to pay for goods and services (Table 3). Hence, customers who purchased goods and services on the Internet more times express positive attitude towards e-commerce.

Table. 3. Correlation between positive features of e-commerce and frequency of purchased goods and services

		Frequency of purchased goods and services on the internet
1. It is easier to cancel the order	Pearson Correlation	0,082
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,329
	N	144

2. Buyers are served better and get guarantee	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,199(*) 0,017 144
3. Sellers fulfil the order more rapidly	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,129 0,124 144
4. It is easier to submit the order	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,180(*) 0,030 144
5. It is easier to communicate with sellers	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,129 0,124 144
6. Sellers provide comprehensive information about goods and services	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,133 0,111 144
7. It is more convenient to pay for goods and services	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,174(*) 0,037 144
8. Prices of goods and services are lower	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	0,151 0,070 144

* Correlation is significant $p=0.05$ (2-tailed).

The e-commerce environment is obviously risky. Many of the risks it entails pertain to the information available to the parties in a transaction. Responses to the following question are commensurate with assumption about convenience and perceived risk purchasing certain types of products and services. Majority of customers indicated that it is convenient to

purchase theatre tickets, tickets for sports, travel tickets, music, films and books. On the other hand, customers indicated the lowest perceived risk purchasing these products on the Internet.

One of the enterprises, developing ticket distribution business in Lithuania, has introduced e-ticket in the market. Hence, taking into account the convenience purchasing certain products and services, the possibility to sell tickets and other products together is seen as the option to develop established business. Notably, the strongest relationship exists between e-tickets and such products as software, films, books and music (Table 4).

Table. 4. Correlation between e-tickets and other goods and services

		E-tickets
1. Services of lawyers	Correlation	0,00
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,48
	N	144
2. PC equipment	Correlation	0,25**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,00
	N	144
3. Glasses	Correlation	-0,01
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,45
	N	144
4. Shares	Correlation	0,30**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,00
	N	144
5. Software	Correlation	0,35**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,00
	N	144
6. Films	Correlation	0,50**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,00
	N	144
7. Drinks and	Correlation	0,14*

food	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,05
	N	144
8. Clothes	Correlation	0,13
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,05
	N	144
9. Books	Correlation	0,38**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,00
	N	144
10. Music	Correlation	0,40**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,00
	N	144

** Correlation is significant $p=0.01$ (1-tailed).

* Correlation is significant $p=0.05$ (1-tailed).

The survey allows concluding that further development of ticket distribution by Internet should take into account various needs, expressed by age group 25-34. Notably, this age group uses Internet longer and has experience in purchasing goods and services. On the other hand, this age group is more informed about transactions on the Internet.

Conclusions

The analysis of scientific literature allows concluding that business-to-consumer e-commerce is seen as the activity in which consumers get information and purchase products using internet. However, uneven development of e-commerce in different countries allows distinguishing factors impacting e-commerce adoption. Market forces and government are seen as the external factors impacting e-commerce. On the other hand, such factors as the spatial separation between consumers and Web vendors' that increases fears of seller opportunism related with product and identity uncertainty and reduced consumers' perception of control and confidence are seen as the main factors negatively impacting e-commerce adoption.

It has to be noted that Internet usage in Lithuania is relatively low comparing with the EU average. This can be explained by low rate of Lithuanian households processing personal computer and low rate of

households having access to the Internet at home. On the other hand, low penetration of the Internet is caused by lack of need, expensive equipment and expensive network. Therefore, private individuals are not seen as the active participants in e-commerce activity. Hence, the ability to attract new customers is seen as one of the main problems of e-business. Anyway, the lack of customers' need influences the low number of firms engaged in e-commerce. Therefore, despite some actions taken by the government, active state policy aimed to encourage adoption of e-commerce is needed.

The survey of Lithuanian customers revealed the positive attitude towards ticket distribution by the Internet. It should be noted that customers who belong to age group 25-34 are seen as a target group important for further e-commerce development. This age group is more informed about transactions on the Internet, has certain experience and has more than average income per months. Anyway, in order to develop e-commerce firms should take into account the possibility to sell tickets together with other products such as software, films, books and music.

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WOMEN IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Felicia Macarie*

Abstract

The massive presence of women in institutions, companies and other organizations is not reflected in the same way in the management structures. The majority of women have only an execution job whereas their presence in the middle and high management is rather low. The current trend in management style is for shared (democratic) management that is adopted especially by women because it responds better to their features. This paper contains a study regarding the presence of women from Bistrita-Nasaud county in the leadership of political parties and public institutions and it contains also an analysis of the presence of women in high education institutions - in our case Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca.

Management is a relative new field of scientific research, and the women's presence in middle and top management represents a subject for more recent studies and debates. The research and literature about women and management has two dimensions: the first, focused on individual and the second, focused on organization. Individual-oriented approaches tend to accuse the victim, making the woman responsible for organizational changes. Organization-oriented approaches refer to organizations' policies and strategies and to their organizational culture.

In most cases, the researchers use the individual-oriented approach, studying women and men's actions in their competition over winning and maintaining the power as managers.

Most national and international studies regarding this subject have focused on private organizations. The emergence of public management as a new domain of the management science brings the issue of women's presence in the board of public organizations in the debate of both theoreticians and practitioners .

* Felicia Cornelia Macarie, PhD, is Lecturer at „Babeș-Bolyai” University Cluj-Napoca.

Charles Handy said once: *for managerial jobs, organizations need quality people, well educated and trained, adaptable [...] they want people who exploit instinct and intuition, analysis and rationality, people that can be tough but sensitive, firm but friendly, people that can meet these necessary contradictions. They want, actually, as many women as possible.* [Handy, Ch., 1994:179, apud Vinnicombe, S., Colwill, N., 1998:10].

The questions that management researchers have to try to give an answer to are:

1. Are there differences of career build-up between women and men in public organizations?
2. Are men better managers than women ?
3. Does the manager of tomorrow have male or female features?
4. Are there differences between men and women regarding their abilities, qualities and leadership styles?

These questions and many more are found in recent management literature and gender studies. There are only a few studies looking for answers to these questions within the public organization space. The distinct emphasis placed on these organizations is determined by their being under constant contextual political influence and ,in most cases, the sole providers of social services.

In a study, Alice Eagly and Blair Johnson [1990:233-256] conclude:

1. In leadership, women tend to be more democratic and participative and men tend to be more autocratic and directive;
2. Male managers are more assignment-oriented;
3. Female managers are more oriented to interpersonal relationships, work atmosphere and individual welfare.

Susan Vinnicombe, professor at Cranfield University, together with Nina L. Colwill, approaches in a systematic manner this theme in the book *Essence of Women in Management*, edited by Prentice Hall Europe in 1997, translated, and published in Romania by Teora in 1998.

S. Vinnicombe is a member of several magazines' editorial boards, including *Women in Management Review* – UMR [ISSN 0964-9425] edited by Emerald Group Publishing Limited, that publish studies regarding women's situation in the management of organizations.

In vol. 19, no. 8/2005, in the study *Gender and feminine identities – woman as managers in a UK academic institution* [pp. 421-430], based on

interviews with managers and academics (women and men), Vincenza Priola conclude that there are some stereotypes associated with women managers' activities: care and support, communication skills, multiple tasks commitment, and team work predilection/bias.

In vol. 20, no. 3/2005, J.O. Okpara, M. Squillace and E. A. Erundu published the study *Gender differences teachers in the United States* [pp. 177-190]; they analyzed gender gaps in academics' work satisfaction. There were applied 1.100 questionnaires in 80 universities from the USA, recording a response rate of 51%. The conclusions show that, in universities, there are significant differences between men and women: women are satisfied by teamwork and work itself while men found satisfaction in salary, promotions, supervising and the overall activity.

The same magazine published in vol. 20 no. 4/2005 Fiona Wilson's study *Caught between difference and similarity: the case of women academics* [pp. 234-248] in which the author intends to find out what women from two British universities think about the assumption that they are appreciated and treated differently.

The conclusion was that women do not necessary feel like being appreciated differently but men consider them having different and sometimes inferior qualities. Women are seen as *something* else when they are measured by male norms and standards.

Beverly Dawn Metcalfe and Marianne Afanassiena published, in vol. 20 no. 6/2005 [pp. 397-411] the study *Gender, work and equal opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe*. They consider that political and economic transition is a re-masculinization process in which the gender hierarchies and gender power relationships in Central and Eastern Europe private and public sectors are reaffirmed.

An interesting opinion is Sharon Mavin's opinion expressed in *Sisterhood, queen bees and female misogyny in management* [UMR vol. 21, nr. 5/2006, pp. 349-364], according to which manager women have in their female subordinates opponents and not natural allies, because they recognize the male in women manager.

This subject also concerns international organizations with attributions in the field. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published on its official site, on the web page Public Governance and Management, a comprehensive study- *Measuring Gender*

(In)equality: Introducing the Gender, Institutions and City Development Data Base (GID) [Working Paper no. 247, 6 March 2006], signed by Johannes P. Jütting, Christian Morrison, Jeff Dayton-Johnson and Denis Drechsler.

This database (GID) represents a new, innovative tool used to determine and analyze obstacles to women's economic development. The database was compiled from various sources and combines empiric evidence regarding the socio-economic status of women from 162 countries with the help of 50 indicators used for measuring women discrimination, grouped in four main categories:

1. Family Code, including information on marriage customs (age, inheritance and polygamy) and decision-making power within a household (parental authority, repudiation).
2. Physical Integrity, capturing violence against women through traditional practices such as female genital mutilation or other attacks (rape, assault, harassment).
3. Civil Liberties, measuring the extent to which women can participate in social life, either through running for political office or moving freely outside the house (without wearing a veil or being escorted by male relatives)
4. Ownership Rights, indicating the quality of women's most basic economic right to hold property, either in the form of bank loans, land, or other material assets.

GID includes institutional variables, ranging from domestic behaviour to social norms. The information regarding the cultural and traditional practices that influence women's economic development is coded in order to measure the discrimination level. GID is the first tool that combines gender variables with focus on social institutions, becoming therefore an useful tool for researchers and political accountable persons interested in discovering the obstacles of women's economic development.

There are great differences of GID values among countries. First place is occupied by Sweden with zero (the country with the lowest discrimination level) in comparison with Sudan with a 0,868 value (the country with the highest discrimination level). Romania occupies the 24 position with a 0,045 value.

In our study, we intend to observe the validity of these conclusions in Romanian context. The hypotheses we are going to investigate are at least the next:

1. Women are barely represented in the top management of public organizations
2. Women's proportion in the leading positions within public organizations is much lower than their proportion within the overall organization;
3. Women work more than men do and men are promoted more quickly than women are.

The researches made lately in Romania show a situation close to that in Western Europe regarding the situation of woman in society and in leadership positions.

The public opinion survey [www.osf.ro], published in the 22nd .11.2005 having as a base a survey made in the period 22nd October- 4th November 2005 states that *some of the traditional prejudices regarding women and men still exist in Romania*.

Half of the Romanian population still believes that men are better political leaders than women and 43% consider that men run businesses better than women. 31% of those questioned consider that a wife who doesn't work is as accomplished as one that has a paid job. But only 17% believe that university studies are more important for a boy than for a girl.

It is interesting to find out that these prejudices do not belong exclusively to the male population. 40% of the questioned women claim that men are better political leaders and 38% agree that men run businesses better than women.

Another survey [www.curs.ro] made by the Centre of Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) for the National Council Against Discrimination in December 2005 evaluating men's and women's situation in Romania shows that 48% of the questioned people consider the men's situation as being better than that of women and 40% claim that men and women from Romania are equal. The perception of a better situation for men than that of women's belongs to the younger population (52%), those with university studies (63%), those from the cities (55%) and those unmarried (51%). The equality between women and men is claimed by the

elder population (45%), by those who graduated maximum 8 years of school (45%), by those married (43%), by those living in villages (46%).

The equality of chances between men and women is defined as:

- “having equal rights” – 58%;
- “taking the decisions in common” – 15%;
- “equal family obligations” – 11%;
- “understanding inside the couple” – 7%;
- “access to the same jobs” – 6%;
- “both partners having jobs” – 2%;
- “both partners having the same spare time” – 1%.

Almost half (48%) of those questioned recognize that nowadays in Romania there is not a real equality between men and women. The main reason of women’s discrimination on the Romanian work market is that: “women work more at home” – an opinion expressed by almost half of those questioned.

There were identified also traditional attitudes expressed as prejudices: “women cannot practice some professions” (40%); “there are biological differences between men and women” (35%); “the Christian moral makes the difference between men and women” (24%).

The role of men and women in the couple is regarded in a traditionally and stereotypically way by the majority of people: 76% consider that “the man is the head of the family”, 67% believe that “it is rather men’s duty to bring money in the house” and 64% believe that “it is more women’s duty to do the housework”.

Contrasting the socio-demographic categories analyzed, the traditional attitudes are present in higher values in Oltenia and Crisana-Maramures, in the rural areas mainly, at persons with a low level of school training, at the elderly and among men.

The persons characterized by modernity are resident in Transylvania and Banat, they come from cities and they have university studies.

In order to study the feminine presence in the top management of the public organizations ,we had as a study sample organizations from Bistrita-Nasaud (political and public organizations) and the Babes-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca.

The information was gathered directly having as a basis the interview and statistics reports from the following sources: the local

political organizations, the Prefecture of the Bistrita-Nasaud county and the Personnel Salary Service of the Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca. The gathered information refers to the following date: 31st December 2005.

In Bistrita-Nasaud county there is no woman at the leadership of the political parties at any of the existing structures: county, municipality, town and commune. However all parties have women organizations structured after the model of the mother organization.

Bistrita-Nasaud county has no deputy woman or senator woman in the Romanian Parliament and not a single woman has been elected mayor in the 62 territorial administrative units of the county.

From the total of 792 local counsellors that form the municipality, cities and communes local council, only a number of 53 counsellors are women representing 6,7% of the total number of counsellors.

The Bistrita-Nasaud county council is formed of 31 counsellors of which 4 counsellors, representing 12,9%, are women. The chairman and the two vice-chairmen of the Bistrita-Nasaud county council are men.

The prefecture of the county is ruled by a male prefect and two vice-prefects of whom one is a woman. Her profile corresponds very well to the needs of the career woman: single and without children.

This situation can be found also at the level of the entire Romanian society. 'Capital' magazine published the "Top 2006- 100 successful women". The coordinative editor Adriana Halpert says: *the field in which women are represented the least continues to be politics [...] Why are not women attracted by politics? [...] The majority of the questioned women claim that: "politics is an area of controversies, fights, chase in which women can find quite hard the necessary weapons for survival" or "politics is dirty, a marsh where they have no place."*[pp.3]

In Bistrita-Nasaud county there are 22 public institutions of which 16 are disconcerted public services of the ministers and of other central authorities organized in the county and six are other structures organized in the county (police, gendarmerie, army etc.). Of these, only three are ruled by women, namely 13,6%.

The low number of women in top management can be explained by the naming on political criteria and the conditioning of the selection by the affiliation to a political party. The modest presence of women in politics is

reflected also in their weak promotion at the leadership of public institutions.

Babes-Bolyai University is a state high education institution structured in 21 colleges where a number of 1273 permanent teachers unfold their activity of whom 516 are women, namely 40,53% of the total. Of these teachers 28% are professors and university lecturers and 72% are lecturers, assistants and tutors.

The university senate has 117 members of whom 28 are women, namely 23,9%. The rector's office is formed by 8 members of whom only one member is a woman (12,5%). Of the 21 deans only one is a woman, namely 4,76%.

It can be noticed that in the zone of top management women don't have the same weight they have in the total number of staff. One of the explanations except those with general character is that the majority of women have inferior didactic ranks. This implies didactic activities manifested in more classes and seminaries than those with superior didactic ranks. Men are better represented in the superior didactic rank, which implies less class and seminary activities.

In conclusion, the investigated hypotheses were confirmed in all the organizations from our research:

1. Women have a low presence at the top management of the political and public organizations even if they have a massive presence in the organization.
2. The organizations implied in the superior (high) public education have a massive feminine presence in the didactic structures but this fact cannot be found also at the management of colleges and universities.
3. Women have a high presence at the bottom of the organizational pyramid in higher education, namely they work more, and they are less represented at the top of the pyramid, namely they get promoted more difficult.

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ROLE OF ECONOMIC SIZE IN THE HUNGARIAN TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS

Ferencz Árpád
Nótári Márta*

Abstract

We would like to find the answer to the question how some significant products of the South Great Plain Region in Hungary can provide the families with the income that they can live on. We aim at the economical examination of the follow cultures: Asparagus grown in Homok and Cucumber grown in Méhkerék. To do this we will apply the so called Standard Gross Margin. The agriculture of the states of the European Union is measured with the help of this method. It can also help us in the future to decide whether the different farms belonging to families are economically viable in Hungary. We make suggestions regarding the sizes of the area, which would be required to provide a livelihood for a Hungarian family.

Agriculture has been and probably will be a significant branch in the south part of the Great Plain in the future as well. Besides the mass products and in many cases instead of them when forming the agricultural structure, this region has to pay more attention to the branches that were important in the past. Hungarian experts who are famous in foreign countries as well deal with these branches and they provide excellent products. The rules referring to these products are more liberal in the market places of the European Union and their development is not controlled by strict quota systems. In the south part of the Great Hungarian Plain a lot of unique products of excellent quality are produced.

Introduction

The Hungarian food industry and agriculture is one of the most important areas of the national economy. Most agricultural products get to the consumers after food industry processing. The market possibilities of a

* Department of Economics and Rural Development, Faculty of Horticulture, College of Kecskemét

nation and the competitiveness of the agriculture products are defined by the standard and the state of development of the food industry (Hofmeister, Tóth & Totth 2003). From among the changes of the economy of a nation the series of changes of the agriculture are the most particular. Privatisation reorganised the property structure of the food industry to a great extent. In the following years a group of companies run by families and being competitive in Western Europe as well will probably separate from the many people involved in agriculture and they will represent the majority of the Hungarian agricultural production (Hajduné & Lakner 1998). Because of its geographical situation Hungary is extremely suitable for producing a lot of products of high quality. The fame of these cultivated areas is important for our export-oriented economy of nation (Józsa 2003).

The image of the cultivated area is diverse and besides the particular products the characteristic features of the area, the atmosphere of the place, the characteristic features of the people living there, the past and the history of the area also play a significant role. In case of the unique Hungarian products processed here the consumers have to be familiar with the quality and have to recognise it (Deli 2005).

Methods

The Standard Gross Margin (SGM)

The concept of Standard Gross Margin (SGM) is used to determine the economic size of farms, which is expressed in terms of European Size Units (ESU). This concept is also used in the Farm Structure Survey organised by Eurostat. Definition :

For each region all crop and livestock items are accorded an SGM. The Liaison Agencies calculate the SGMs themselves on the basis of empirical data collected from farms. To avoid bias caused by fluctuations, e.g. in production (due to bad weather) or in input/output prices, three year averages are taken. SGMs are expressed in Commission publications in European Currency (EUR/ECU). SGMs are updated every two years and are calculated on a regional basis for more than 90 separate crop and livestock items. This large number of items not only reflects the diversities of agriculture within the European Union but also indicates the level of

detail that is required to ensure that the results of FADN and other surveys are both comprehensive and reliable.

Our calculations were carried out with the help of a method worked out and applied in the European Union. In the European Union the agricultural enterprises have been regularly assessed (since 1966) and comparative data have been given to the decision-making organisations of the Union (Berde & Pakurár 2002). Because of the number and the variations of the enterprises more than one form of measuring was applied such as the territory of the factory, the number of the employees, the number of the animals bred and the price of the products sold. As it was experienced the achievement of the agriculture in a state could not have been defined by these forms of measuring and by the combination of them. Similar to this they were not sufficient to determine the economic size of an enterprise and to compare the different factories from economic aspect (Kovács, 2001).

The unified classification system (the economy typology) was accepted in 1978 that pays attention to two aspects, the type of farming (the structure of production) and the size of the economy. In order to define the economic size the Standard Gross Margin (SGM) was worked out (Kovács 1999). The natural data referring to the structure of the factory cannot say anything about the achievement of the agriculture of a country and they are not good for economic comparing. The size of the factory is defined the best of all by the potential profitable capacity which equals with the total standard gross margin (SGM) of the particular factory -which is the same as the added value (Agriculture in the European Union 2001).

The calculation of the Standard Gross Margin

According to the regulations of the European Union, in cultivation of plants the costs of the seeds, the propagation, the artificial fertilizers, the insecticides, the heating, the irrigation, the processing, the classification, the packing, the insurance and other variable costs that are connected with the particular production activity have to be taken into consideration among the direct variable expenses. The indirect variable costs are also defined. The variable expenses in connection with the machines belonging to the factory (such as fuel, lubricants, repairing costs) are listed here. These two

groups together mean the variable costs of the economy. It does not include the costs of amortization and the rent of the agricultural land.

This method takes into consideration every wages and their complementary costs as constant expenses without paying attention to whether they were paid to the owner of the farm or to a family member or to an employee. The amortization costs of the tangible assets, the rent of the agricultural land and the general costs are referred to as constant expenses. The SGM1 and SGM2 index numbers can be calculated on the basis of the relations mentioned above.

SGM1 = sales – direct variable cost (direct material costs)

SGM2 = sales – direct variable cost – indirect variable cost (the direct material costs and the direct costs of machine work are deducted from the sales). The SGM2 index number is in fact the gross income.

The necessity of live labour

The basis of the economy producing unique Hungarian products is to deal with growing plants that assure the costs of living for a long time; can be easily produced in the south of the Great Hungarian Plain, can be easily sold in the market and can be produced by own live labour (Ferencz,2003).

The necessity of live labour has to be determined especially in the harvesting and the selling period. It can be calculated on the basis of detailed producing technology. In this essay we determine the area that a family can cultivate on its own – without employing workers seasonally. If we take a family with four members we calculate with three manpower units. In our earlier research the working days and working hours in cultivation of plants were defined. These data are essential to calculate the necessity of live labour especially when we plan the working peak. In the harvest phase we calculate with 7-10 working hours per manpower units a day. The family can perform 200-250 hours every ten days.

Results and discussion

European Size Units

The economic size of farms is expressed in terms of European Size Units (ESU). The value of one ESU is defined as a fixed number of EUR/ECU of

Farm Gross Margin. Over time the number of EUR/ECU per ESU has changed to reflect inflation.

As stated above, those farms which exceed a certain economic size in ESU are defined as commercial, and thus fall into the field of observation. However, because of the different farm structures in the European Union, it is necessary to specify separate thresholds for each Member State.

The economic assessment of the cucumber grown

The training system for growing cucumber assures bigger quantities and better quality comparing to the plough-land cultivation. The cost of it is 3600-4400 euro per hectare that does not include the farmer's labour. This system can be planned for ten years and can be applied when growing tomatoes as well. A particularity of growing cucumbers intensively is that the size of the desired product is in inverse relation to its yield and average price. The yield is lower if we pick cucumbers every day which are 1cm-3cm, 2cm-5cm and 3cm-6cm big and their price is higher. In the model we plan to pick 3cm-6cm and 6cm-9cm big cucumbers every two days.

From among the direct variable expenses the costs of artificial and organic fertilizers, pesticides, plants, irrigation and other variable costs were calculated in our project. The direct variable cost of the cucumbers grown on family farms with the help of training system and irrigation is 600 euro per hectare. In our technology 800 euro per hectare variable cost was calculated taking into consideration the running and the repairing costs of the machines of own property. The total variable cost in a year (1.400 euro) was compared to the probable income. The yield can reach 80 tons per hectare in the south of the Great Hungarian Plain if irrigation is applied. The 0,24 euro/kg average price could assure the farm a 19.200 euro income. We must not forget about the fact that such an intensive planting culture requires 800 euro costs per hectare at the beginning taking only an average data. This cost cannot be taken into consideration among the expenses (according to the terminology of the European Nations). Similarly to this the salary cannot be deducted although the application of live labour is the highest in case of growing plants in the fields.

$$\text{SGM1} = 19.200 \text{ euro income} - 600 \text{ euro direct variable cost} = 18.600 \text{ euro/year/hectare}$$

SGM2 = 19.200 euro income – 600 euro direct variable cost – 800 euro indirect variable cost = 17.800 euro / year / hectare.

The need for live labour is the greatest first when planting starts. If own labour is used, the work can be finished in time. The next peak of work appears during harvest when 540 working hours of live labour per hectares are needed. Taking into consideration the number of the working hours, one family can manage 0.51-hectare-post system area without employing working seasonally. The area that can be cultivated by the family on average assures only 9.076 euro SGM.

The economic assessment of the asparagus

The basis of the production is the asparagus plantation, which has a good effect on the farming. After planting there are three or four years without harvest but the field must be cultivated although there is no income and no other plants can be grown meanwhile to utilize the area. The cost of plantation and cultivation is 8.0000 euro in the proportion of 85+5+5+5 every year. Besides this 1600 working hours are needed. The factor cost of one hectare is 10.400 -12.000 euro. The length of the period when there is harvest is 6-8 years. The accountable depreciation is 15% a year. During this period the quantity of the yield is not the same: in the first two or three years it is growing, then it is stagnating for two or three years and after that it is decreasing. In this model we calculate with the yield of a stagnating year.

The variable cost of the enterprise is encumbered with almost 220 euro per hectare. This includes the costs of the materials, the artificial and organic fertilizers, the pesticides, the packing and the processing. The indirect variable cost of the farm – according to our survey - is 170, which gives a result of a total 400 euro variable cost. In the south of the Great Hungarian Plain – taking into consideration the areas not abounding in nutrients – we can calculate with a five- tonne average yield per hectare.

The distribution must be calculated with care with a 16 euro/kg - average price. The income is 8.000 euro per hectare. The biggest peak of work appears during the harvest. Taking into consideration the number of working hours 0,97 hectare of asparagus plantation ripening at the same time can be accomplished without employing workers for this season.

SGM1 = 8.000 euro income – 220 euro direct variable cost = 7.780 euro / year / hectare

SGM2 = 8.000 euro income – 220 euro direct variable cost – 170 euro indirect variable cost = 7.610 euro / hectare/ year.

The SGM2 for a 0,97 hectare is 7.390 euro.

Conclusions

Procedure for determining farm size in ESU

There are five steps in the determining of farm size in ESU:

- Identify the enterprises present on the farm
- Determine the scale of each enterprise (hectares or number of animals)
- Multiply the scale of each enterprise by the appropriate SGM to give the enterprise standard gross margin
- Sum up the different enterprise standard gross margins for the farm. This gives the farm standard gross margin (i.e. the total of the enterprise standard gross margins for the farm)
- Define the economic size of the farm by dividing the farm total gross margin by the value of the ESU

The breadwinning of cucumber in Hungary

- In order to get the income expected the cucumber should be grown with the help of post system on a 0,72 hectare big area.
- On such a big area other workers have to be employed during the harvest period for 540 working hours. The cost of it is 780 euro.
- This kind of cucumber growing makes it possible for the family to make ends meet. On the basis of the significant export, the market for the cucumber can be said to be steady.
- The income depends on the Hungarian sale ring and the processing.
- The cost of introducing the post system is high but the income of the first year can cover this cost on a successful farm.

The breadwinning capacity of the asparagus grown in Hungary

In order to get the income expected the pale asparagus should be grown on a 1,66 hectare big area. On such a big area other workers have to be employed during the harvest period for 469 working hours. The cost of it is 680 euro. The kinds of the asparagus make it possible for the family to make ends meet. On the basis of the significant export, the market for the asparagus can be said to be steady. The income depends on the Hungarian sale ring. Because of the frost in late spring it is not recommended to base the whole income of the farm on the asparagus. Other recommended products can be the ones the harvesting time of which is not the beginning of April or the middle of June.

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IT STRATEGIES IN INCREASING BUSINESS COMPETITIVENESS

Alina Andreica*

Abstract

Within the framework of the present information & knowledge-based society, business competitiveness necessarily requires adequate IT strategies. The paper focuses on proficient principles of designing IT strategies and implementing adequate software systems. The implementation of dedicated software systems - the top level of any IT strategy - has to comply modern management and business requirements; therefore business software should model & integrate activities from all business compartments, distributely access the company's integrated database and offer relevant synthesis for management levels. The paper underlines the most important principles in implementing such dedicated software systems and discusses their advantages in increasing business competitiveness.

1. The Working Framework

Implementing adequate ICT (Information and Communication Technology) strategies is essential for increasing activity and management efficiency within organizations [3]). The implementation of dedicated information systems for managing organizations' activity - the "top" level of an ICT strategy - is detailed in [4].

The adaptation of information systems to the organization's characteristics and needs is indispensable for increasing its efficiency in specific activities and management. It is important that management strategies take into account the dedicated software's potential in significantly increasing organization efficiency, provided that it is properly designed and implemented.

* Alina Andreica, Ph.D. is Lecturer at the Faculty of European Studies, „Babeș-Bolyai” University Cluj-Napoca.

The main goal of implementing information systems within an organization is to induce overall activity efficiency by IT means – automatic information processing, adequate information and document management. The system's implementation will also improve management strategies since on-line synthesis of most relevant information from organization's compartments / system's modules will turn into genuine electronic management assistants.

IT strategies should find their appropriate place within designing organization's management strategies [5] since, based on their business impact, both in required resources, work impact and gained competitiveness, if properly implemented, IT management becomes a key component in organization management.

Within this framework, the present paper focuses on the most important principles in designing an IT strategy adapted to the company's targets and resources and in efficiently implementing dedicated software systems for managing organization activity.

2. Stages in Developing Companies' IT Strategies

Within this paragraph, based on the theoretical framework established in [3], [4], which can be synthetically formulated as adaptation to organization's target field and goals, organization resources and management strategy, we propose IT strategies adapted to organization characteristics. Therefore, all IT strategies recommended below take into account the company's goals & resources and the available human and financial resources.

It is essential that IT strategies be integrated within management strategies since they have high costs and, if properly designed, can significantly increase organization competitiveness (or waste resources otherwise). When designing IT strategies it is important to take into consideration the necessity to innovate, to design future upgrades both in IT infrastructure & software systems, in order to ensure company's adaptation to the dynamic business environment.

2.1. Small Companies

Small companies are the most flexible, their IT strategies have quite moderate costs and are relatively easy to be designed according to their goals. Most small company managers acknowledge the importance of IT in business competitiveness and invest in the company's adequate IT infrastructure. Taking into account the primary promotion goal of any small company, the next important step in the IT field is acquiring the company's website, mainly designed for promotion purposes [4] Web marketing is nowadays one of the most efficient means in marketing strategies, with relatively low costs.

The promotion web site launching generally attracts customers from wider geographical areas and statistically increases the company's turnover [3], bringing more resources into its business activity, which often leads to growing the business and, if corroborated with other efficient management strategies, also to enlarging the company.

Regarding the human resource field, small companies do not generally afford and do not really require their own IT personnel, therefore using part-time employees or acquiring IT maintenance services from specialized firms

Dedicated software usually includes finance & accountancy applications, with a fairly high degree of standardization for the business environment and, consequently, relatively moderate costs. Nevertheless, it is recommended that future integration necessities be taken into account (see medium companies in next section) for investment proficiency.

2.2 Medium Companies

Moving towards medium size companies necessarily implies hiring own IT personnel, mainly for network administration and full-time managing the IT infrastructure and basic software; as the company develops, the IT team will turn into the IT department

In order to model the company's activity, an integrated ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system is required since the information system has to integrate all relevant modules (Sales, Customers, Acquisitions, Human Resources, Finance & Accountancy, etc.) modelling the activities from all inter-related compartments by accessing an

integrated information database. The integration necessity is obviously motivated by the interdependence of most company's activities (for example, sales, as well as acquisitions or wages, have to be taken into account by the finance & accountancy module, the human resource module has to be correlated with wages, etc.). Relevant syntheses from all modules are to be integrated into a top management module with the role of an electronic management assistant (decision assistance systems).

Even if companies do not have all necessary funds available in order to acquire the entire ERP system, management levels have to adapt their investment strategy to the obvious integration goal of the modules.

The company's IT strategy also has to focus on developing dedicated systems oriented towards growing the business and increasing the company's competitiveness according to its goals & target field (education, consultancy, production, services, etc.). For example, human resources and consultancy companies can invest in upgrading the promotion web site into a company portal, offering client communication facilities, on-line registration (the company has already built its reputation and client trust), providing on-line training facilities, possibly by acquiring & developing e-learning systems.

The company's IT strategy has also to take into account the fact that once any dedicated software system is implemented, *the company will become dependant on the designer* (the software company which designed & implemented the software) for the system's maintenance, or any future update, upgrade or adjustment in the system. Therefore, it is highly recommended that these topics be covered in the initial contract / agreement.

When acquiring a software system, companies may either face the situation in which there exist fairly standard solutions in the field, for which specific customisations are nevertheless often needed, or the situation in which the problem is fairly new or peculiar, and a specific software system has to be designed. Both in the case of customisation, and in the case of designing the system from scratch, *system specifications* are of utmost importance because *their accuracy guarantees that the software system will meet user needs* (see next section)

Improper or incomplete system specification given by users will lead to time and resource waste, both from financial and human resources

points of view. Taking into account the high costs of software systems, generated by their high complexity, it becomes obvious that designing adequate system specifications are to be given proper attention and resources. Moreover, *adequate investments in efficient software systems will highly increase the company's competitiveness.*

2.3 Large Companies

Although large companies possess considerable resources, their activity, consequently their *IT strategy* as well, are characterized by a *higher complexity*, therefore it is important to be appropriately designed.

An adequate IT infrastructure and a consistent IT department are obviously required.

The strategies in implementing ERP & dedicated software systems, already necessary for medium size companies (see previous section), become essential for large companies, otherwise they can not be competitive enough to promote their business on the market. The **integrated ERP system** and its top *management assistance facilities* become of utmost importance for large companies, where the "distance" from operational levels to top management ones increases. The structure of large companies imposes the necessity of designing management strategies based on efficient and integrated information systems, which offer relevant management syntheses and adequate information at any moment, based on updated information from the system's integrated database.

Large companies possess considerable financial & human resources, therefore *can decide for sustaining their own software development team* within the IT department, in order to design and implement dedicated software for the company. Such a strategy has the enormous advantage of own software manageability, which is extremely important in companies with significant activity dynamics and is an optimal solution for companies with good potential in sustainable IT human resources, and good financial resources. On the other hand, this solution is not recommended under time constraints, since it requires a considerable amount of time. In cases of time constraints and very generous financial resources, possible corroborated with brand requirements including in IT (for example banks offering secured systems for on-line payments), the recommended strategy is to acquire the dedicated software from highly rated IT software companies.

Software system implementation is one of the most important and challenging aspect to be solved within IT strategies dedicated to large companies because such systems are definitely required, while their implementation has a huge impact on the organization, both from necessary resources and future impact points of view. An adequate solution is to be chosen by taking into account *good time management, corroborated with IT human resources and financial strategies, adapted to the company's targets*

3. Principles in Implementing Dedicated Software Systems – Users' Role

The stages in designing and implementing software systems are dealt with in [4]. In order to implement proficient dedicated software systems within organizations, it is important that companies' management levels be aware of the users' role in implementing such systems.

Users should be involved in:

- *Defining system specifications* – establishing system requests; in this respect, it is important that the following aspects are tackled:
 - The necessary information and the information to be processed – will constitute the system's *database*
 - Requested information *processing* – means in which the information is processed
 - *Reporting* – necessary reports, statistics, syntheses obtained by accessing the information database
 - *Connection with other modules* – information to be transferred to / from other information (sub)systems and requested formats (import / export operations). Such specifications are important even if the connected modules are under development or intended to be developed in the future because, as sustained in paragraph 2, module integration is essential for the organization
 - *Import requirements from previous systems* – if the system upgrades a previously implemented one, it is important that previously used database(s) be imported into the new one, otherwise users will have to re-introduce data
 - *Assistance and maintenance requests* - consequent to system implementation

- *Prototype Verification* – evaluating the first version of the system and indicating aspects to be adjusted
- *System Use & Monitoring* – using system facilities according to its documentation & specifications and, if necessary, indicating potential problems to be adjusted or necessary system modules to be designed & integrated in the future

Efficient implementations of dedicated software systems have to take into consideration the organization involvement in the above described implementation stages.

The analysis stage is to be performed by the IT team / company in cooperation with the (user) client organization. Incorrect or incomplete system specifications can conduce to repeated redesigning processes for the IT company / team, and to resource waste (time, finances, skilled human resources) both for the IT company and its client organization.

On the other hand, adequate management of the above described aspects ensures a successful system implementation for the organization and the adaptation of the contracted software to all the defined user requirements.

4. Romanian Case Study

According to an undergoing study within the Romanian business environment [2], based on administrating and interpreting an evaluation questionnaire in the county of Cluj, we can state, with a fairly good accuracy [2], that:

- Computer networks and Internet connections are used on a large scale – 95% in our sample
 - around 80% of the firms in our sample have their own *website*, mainly oriented on promotion purposes. The most important facilities offered by the implemented web sites are: *marketing and promotion* – 37% (ranks on top as expected, since it represents the first step in moving the business towards the web), *client communication* – 24%, *internal (employee) communication and product distribution* – 7-8%
 - 40% of the total employee number in our sample firms use their own computer

➤ Regarding the *software* that is used, we noticed almost equal proportions among: *office automation, database, Internet, financial and specific software* (around 14-16%). As predicted, management software, which imposes a consolidated integration of the most relevant information from all departments comes with a lower percentage – 9%. Human resources software was rated with 8%

➤ The most *used Internet applications* regard, as expected within the business environment, *e-business – 21%, e-payment – 21%, e-commerce – 12%* and *e-news – 12%*

➤ In our evaluation regarding the previous year investments in ICT made by small and medium enterprises, we found that: 18% declared total ICT investments higher than 75%, 14% in the interval (50%, 75%], 9% in the interval (30%, 50%] and 31% - investments lower than 30%

➤ *ICT created new jobs for 66% of our subjects*, in various percentages

➤ *A majority of 70% in our sample sustain that IT strategies influence human resources policies and management strategies*

Taking into account these results, we can conclude that although the infrastructure is in place, information system implementation is in its medium stages in Romania: integrated ERP systems and management assistants are not yet implemented on a large scale, but the trend and necessity in implementing such systems becomes more and more noticeable.

Therefore, it is very important that adequate IT strategies be integrated into Romanian organization management strategies and that the awareness of users' role in implementing dedicated information systems is appropriately trained.

5. Conclusions

Based on the huge impact that IT has in organization activity and management, we sustain that it is essential to integrate IT strategies within organization management strategies and to adopt appropriate strategies in implementing dedicated information systems.

We state that IT strategies should be designed according to the company's goals & resources and the available human and financial resources. IT strategies should also take into account the necessity of future

hardware & software upgrades. The paper proposes systematic IT strategies for small, medium and large companies designed on the above stated principles.

We also discuss the IT implementation stage in Romania, concluding that although the infrastructure is in place, information system implementation is in its medium stages in Romania: integrated ERP systems and management assistants are not yet implemented on a large scale, although the tendency in developing them becomes more and more clear. We consider that an improvement could be based on an increased awareness regarding the importance of integrating IT strategies in management strategies and of users' role in implementing dedicated information systems.

The implementation of information systems should be adapted to the overall IT strategy of the organization and must ensure flexibility and extendibility in the development and implementation of software systems.

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KOMMUNIKATION, ÖFFENTLICHKEITSARBEIT UND GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Kegyessné Szekeres Erika*

Abstract

Despite emergent linguistic problems, the popularization of the Gender concept, as well as the use of the Gender Mainstreaming term have an important relevance within the latest Communication and Public Relations campaign of the European Union. The article analyses the communication capability of the Gender Mainstreaming concept in various kinds of texts.

1. Einführung: Die Kommunikationsart des Gender Mainstreaming

Gender Mainstreaming – dieser politische Terminus/Slogan kommt im Sprachgebrauch der Europäischen Union in letzter Zeit immer öfter vor, aber kann auch außerhalb des engsten Bereiches des Brüsseler Eurojargons begegnet werden, vor allem in Pressemitteilungen, Plakattexten und in vielen verschiedenen Textsorten der öffentlichen EU-Kommunikation wie Kampagnetexten, Dokumentationen, Strategienberichten und Informationsbroschüren. Einen schnellen Beweis für diese Behauptung liefert eine einfache Wortsuche im Wortschatzlexikon Leipzig (www.wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de). Das Wort *Gender* kommt in dieser Datenbank von Texten in aktuellen Presstexten exemplarisch mehr als 1500 vor, und unter den durch die Suchmaschine gefundenen signifikanten Kollokationen finden wir in der Kollokationskala das Wort *Mainstreaming* an zweiter Stelle. Das bedeutet, dass das Lexem *Gender* fast immer in Begleitung von *Mainstreaming* auftritt. (An erster Stelle der Kollokationsliste ist das Lexem *Studies* plaziert worden.)

Beide Teile dieser kommunikativen Schlagwortverbindung *Gender Mainstreaming* stammen eigentlich aus dem Englischen. Im deutschen Sprachgebrauch wird öfters gefordert, für den Ausdruck *Gender*

* Department of Applied Linguistics, University of Miskolc, Hungary

Mainstreaming ein passendes deutsches Äquivalent zu finden. In deutscher Sprache vorgeschlagene Übersetzungen können zum Beispiel wie folgt lauten:

Textbeispiel (1)

„Integration der Gleichstellungsperspektive“, „durchgängige Gleichstellungsorientierung“, „Einbindung der Chancengleichheit in sämtliche politische Konzepte und Maßnahmen der Gemeinschaft“ (www.genderkompetenz.de)

Nicht nur die Eindeutschungen werden in den deutschsprachigen Länder stark kritisiert, sondern auch das Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming. Die Töne der Kritik lassen sich zum Beispiel im folgenden Text aus dem Magazin *Stern* auch nicht überhören: *„In Deutschland denken Bürokraten unter dem Stichwort „Gender Mainstreaming“ angestrebt über den kleinen Unterschied nach“* (Quelle: *Stern*, 22.03.2005). Die Redwendung „der kleine Unterschied“ wurde in Deutschland von der Feministin Alice Schwarzer in das Bewußtsein gebracht, und will ausdrücken, dass der „kleine“ biologische Unterschied große gesellschaftliche und soziale Ungleichheit zwischen den Geschlechtern hervorrief, d.h. „der kleine Unterschied“ ist allzu groß geworden. Auch im folgenden Textteil ist über Gender Mainstreaming ironisierend kritisiert:

Textbeispiel (2)

„Wenn man Entscheidungsprozesse in Organisationen mit dem Flechten eines Zopfes vergleicht, so werden bisher die Zöpfe mit den Strängen Sachgerechtigkeit, Machbarkeit und Kosten geflochten. Wenn überhaupt, wurde zum Schluß die Frage gestellt, in welcher Weise Frauen betroffen sein könnten. Der fertige Zopf wurde also noch am Ende mit einer kleinen Schleife versehen“ (Stiegler 2000, www.fes.de/asfo/00802toc.htm).

Nach überzeugten VertreterInnen des Gender-Konzepts ist nicht das Konzept falsch, sondern die Art und Weise, wie es kommuniziert wird,

ferner aber auch die diskursive Strategie, mit welcher die Genderfrage in Europa diskutiert wird.

Ein möglicher kommunikativer Fehlschlag mag es sein, dass das Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming mit enorm vielen Fremdwörtern und Neuschöpfungen der Terminologie belastet wurde. Solche Neologismen wie zum Beispiel *gendern* oder *Genderologe* (Quelle: Stern, 22.03.2005) werden von der Sprechgemeinschaft abgelehnt, und als Folge der Nicht-Akzeptanz kann eine negative Attitüde gegen Genderfragen entstehen. In Themenheften der Europäischen Union ist über *Genderkompetenz*, *gender-spezifische Ausgangsbedingungen*, *Genderperspektive* zu lesen. Da diese Termini in den deutschsprachigen EU-Texten oft vorkommen, mögen sie für die SprachbenutzerInnen nicht mehr so fremd und eigenartig klingen, und höchstwahrscheinlich werden mit dem Genderkonzept der EU auch leichter assoziiert, als die absoluten fachsprachigen Elemente der europäischen Verwaltungssprache.

Trotz auftauchender sprachlicher Probleme haben die sprachliche Popularisierung des Gender-Konzepts sowie der Sprachgebrauchs des Gender Mainstreaming in der letzten Kampagne der europäischen Kommission ihre besondere Relevanz innerhalb der Kommunikation und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Europäischen Union bewiesen. Auch aus diesem Grunde halte ich es für wichtig, die Kommunikationsweise des Gender Mainstreaming in verschiedenartigen Textsorten zu analysieren. Im Folgenden wird also nachgegangen, was die Kommunikation des Gender Mainstreaming charakterisiert und welche textsortenspezifischen bzw. textfunktionalen Eigenschaften die Texte des Gender Mainstreaming in deutscher Sprache aufweisen.

2. Die Textsorten des Gender Mainstreaming

2.1. Allgemeine Charakteristika

Die untersuchten Textsorten (Kampagnetexte, Informationsbroschüren, Pressemitteilungen, Berichte usw.) der Europäischen Kommission (Arbeitsstelle für Beschäftigung und Soziales) weisen in erster Linie die Besonderheiten der politischen Kommunikation und Massenkommunikation sowie der Werbesprache auf. Für diese ausschlaggebende textsortenspezifische Bindung gibt es viele Gründe.

Einer davon ist, dass die politische Kommunikation von heute ihre Sprachmittel dem Inventar der Werbung und Politpropaganda entleiht, und sich nur in einem geringen Maße nach den gut bewährten Formen und Stilfiguren der klassischen Rhetorik richtet (Mazzoleni 2002: 118), da die grundlegende Nachricht/Mitteilung bzw. Grundthese des Textes so kommuniziert werden soll, dass sie für das breite Publikum der Leserschaft glaubhaft erscheint.

Für die Glaubhaftigkeit sorgen auch die Elemente der Werbe- und politischen Sprache. Die Praktiken der politischen Kommunikation sowie der Werbung können von den sprachlichen Techniken der öffentlichen und massenmedialen Kommunikation natürlich nicht ganz getrennt werden. Alle drei Kommunikationsformen (politische Kommunikation, Werbung und Massenkommunikation) praktizieren eine regelrecht gesellschaftlich bestimmte Kommunikationsart mit ähnlichem, wenn nicht gleichem Ziel der Überzeugung.

Zugleich ist die Kommunikationsart des Gender Mainstreaming auch interkulturell und europäisch bestimmt, da es um die Bekanntmachung einer Europa übergreifenden politischen Strategie geht, die die politische Palette und die gesellschaftliche Organisation der Mitgliedstaaten weitgehend beeinflussen kann. In den EU-Ländern wird aber das Thema Gleichstellung und Chancengleichheit der Geschlechter weder politisch noch kulturell einheitlich behandelt, aus welchem Grunde die Intensität der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit des Gender Mainstreaming voneinander Land zu Land unterscheidet. In manchen Ländern wird die Chancengleichheit betont, während woanders Antidiskriminierungsgesetze in Kraft treten. Unanhängig von den regionalen Abweichungen lässt sich nachvollziehen, dass für die Akzeptanz des Konzepts des Gender Mainstreaming auf der Ebene des Landes und auf Europa-Ebene entscheidet auswirkt, wie darüber zuerst in der Fachpolitik diskutiert, und auf welcher Weise es für die Öffentlichkeit thematisiert wird.

Der Erfolgsfaktor des Gender Mainstreaming wird grösstenteils von seiner diskursiven Perspektive mitgetragen. Entscheidend ist die Kommunikationsstrategie, mit der das Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming in die Alltagsdiskussion eingebracht wird, wie es den BürgerInnen der Union bewußt gemacht wird, da die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit als eines der

wichtigsten Überzeugungsmittel in der EU fungiert. Demzufolge ist auf Unionsebene in letzter Zeit eine pragmatisch-rhetorische Wende in der Kommunikationsstrategie der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit zu erkennen: der herkömmliche frauenpolitisch ausgerichtete Diskurs über die Geschlechter wird allmählich in den Hintergrund gedrängt, während ein auch sprachlich intensiver formulierter, genderpolitisch betonter Diskurs in den Vordergrund trat. In den verschiedenen textlichen Apparaten der EU (z.B. Kommissionsberichte, Erstfassung und modifizierte Fassungen von Rechtsvorschlügen) wird sowohl thematisch als auch rhetorisch exemplifiziert, dass es nicht mehr über Frauenpolitik, sondern über Geschlechterpolitik gesprochen wird.

Für die von mir vor allem unter textlinguistischem Aspekt untersuchten Texte ist im Allgemeinen die textorganische Komplexität charakteristisch: sie haben nämlich Textmerkmale positiver Propaganda, überzeugender Manipulation sowie inhaltlicher Dichte gleichermaßen zu eigen. Die analysierten Texte sind teilweise gedruckte Schreibprodukte der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der EU, die auch durch das Internet zugänglich oder von der öffentlichen Referatsstelle direkt aus Brüssel zu beziehen sind, teilweise aber nicht als Druckmaterial publizierte, jedoch auch für das breite Publikum erreichbare Informationsmaterialien der EU. Die untersuchten sind alle mehrsprachig zugänglich. Aus diesem Grunde können sie auch als „Spiegelübersetzungen“ betrachtet werden, sie informieren in dem gleichen Stil über das Gender Mainstreaming, d.h. sie bedienen sich der gleichen Stilmittel und einer meistens englischsprachigen Terminologie. Sogar das Design und der Illustrationsapparat (wie z.B. Bilder, Tabellen und Graphiken) der Themenhefte sind meistens identisch.

Wie es auch schon oben darauf hingewiesen wurde, haben die analysierten EU-Materialien zum Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming die übergreifende Textfunktion: zu informieren und zu überzeugen, sowie für das Gender Mainstreaming zu werben. Zusammenfassend kann gesagt werden: sie verkörpern einen geplanten sprachpolitischen Ansatz, das Verhalten und die Motivation der Öffentlichkeit zu einem bestimmten gesellschaftspolitischen Thema zu beeinflussen, im Interesse und zur Verwirklichung einer bestimmten Zielsetzung durch verschiedene Medienkanäle.

Wir werden aber sehen, dass die Texte des Gender Mainstreaming nicht nur als Informations- und Werbetexte zu charakterisieren sind, da sie nicht nur anhand einfacher und leicht abrufbarer Schemata der Informationsvermittlung und Werbetätigkeit konstituiert werden. Sie sind aber auch nicht als simple Kampagnetexte zu bestimmen, da ihr Wortgebrauch nicht nur wohlklingende Slogans und leere Parolen beinhaltet. Im folgenden werden einige Textbeispiele nach den Textsortenkriterien der politischen und informativen massenmedialen Kommunikation und der Werbekommunikation charakterisiert. Aufgrund der Textanalyse kann die Kommunikationsmethode bzw. Diskurspraktik des Gender Mainstreaming kritisch betrachtet werden. Nach dem Modell der Reiss'schen Texttypologie (Reiss 1981 in Salánki 1999) können die Textsorten des Gender Mainstreaming in ihrer Komplexität sowohl für inhaltsbetont, als auch für effektbetont gekennzeichnet werden.

2. 2. Textkonstituierende Elemente der politischen Kommunikation in den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming

Eines der augenscheinlich wichtigsten textkonstituierenden Elementinventare bildet die Rhetorik der politischen Kommunikation. Dies beweist, dass die Sprache an der politischen Kommunikation als gesellschaftliches Institut zuteil hat (Fedel zitiert nach Mazzoleni 2002: 98), obwohl zahlen- und gruppenmäßig das Kontinuum der Angesprochenen fast immer begrenzt ist. Aus dieser Tatsache könnte leicht die Formel abgeleitet werden, dass die Politik des Gender Mainstreaming nur die Frauen anzusprechen hat. In den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming ist aber betont, dass Frauen und Männer gleichermaßen angesprochen werden und es wird bewußt gemacht, dass Gender Mainstreaming keineswegs eine neue Strategie der modernen Frauenbewegung ist, mit der sie sich selbst eine neue Form geben würde (Stiegler 2000, www.fes.de/asfo/00802toc.htm). Das Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming vertritt die Interessen der Geschlechter gleichermaßen, aber mit der Betonung der Eliminierung der Diskriminierung und Benachteiligung von Frauen in den Bereichen der Arbeit, Politik und Wissenschaft. Rhetorisch gesehen soll deshalb aus dem Stilmittelinventar der politischen Kommunikation die politisch korrekte Anredeform in den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming hervorgehoben werden.

Ein weiteres Element ausgeglichener Geschlechterverhältnisse ist, dass in vielen Handreichungen und Broschüren explizit formuliert wird: auch Männer können und sollen in den Prozeß des Gender Mainstreaming mit einbezogen werden:

Textbeispiel (3)

*„Gender Mainstreaming
... nimmt Männer nicht nur in die Pflicht, sondern sie erhalten auch
die Möglichkeit, den Prozess im Interesse beider Geschlechter
mitzugestalten und auch sich selbst mit ihrem eigenen Geschlecht
auseinanderzusetzen“.* (www.gew.de)

Eines der wichtigsten semiotischen Merkmale der politischen Kommunikation ist der Gebrauch der Symbole. Dieser Technik bedient sich auch die Kommunikationsstrategie des Gender Mainstreaming. Seit Durkheim ist es keine Neuigkeit, dass Symbole Ideen und Prinzipien verkörpern. Ein gut assoziierbares Symbol kann die verkörperte Idee sogar verstärken. Das meistbenutzte Symbol des Gender Mainstreaming ist die Brille, in dessen Gläsern die international traditionellen emblematischen Abbildungen der Geschlechter zu sehen sind. Damit wird ausgedrückt, dass die Gendersensibilität ein sozialer Prozeß ist, der zu lehren und zu lernen ist, aber einen besonderen Blickwinkel benötigt. Die Idee der symbolischen Brille ist auch in den Texten verbalisiert. Die Grundmetapher geht höchstwahrscheinlich auf die Gender-Brille-Theorie von Sandra Ben zurück.

Die Verwendung von Farben in den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming benutzt ein nonverbales Element der politischen Kommunikation. Über die Funktion der Farben meint Mazzoleni, dass die Sprache der Farben den verbalen Kerninhalt von politischen Texten nicht nur begleitet, sondern auch den zusammenfassend assoziierbar macht. Auf dem Titelblatt des Europa-Magazins (*Ausgabe 25, 2005*) sind zum Beispiel Spielkarten zu sehen, die in ihren beiden Hälften jeweils eine blaue männliche und eine rosarote weibliche Figur darstellen. Die Farbe Blau wird seit eh und je als männlich konnotiert, während die Farbe Rosa als weiblich.

Die politische Kommunikation versucht die Angesprochenen in ihrer Sprache, d.h. in ihrem Stil und Wortgebrauch zu überzeugen. Ein solches Element ist im Sprachgebrauch des Gender Mainstreaming die Benutzung von typisch weiblicher Rhetorik. Zum Beispiel ist in den Inhaltsverzeichnissen von Broschüren eine so genannte Frage-Antwort-Technik zu erkennen, die darauf zielt, Kernfragen und Kernantworten gleich auf den ersten Blick einzuprägen. In einigen Fällen können wir in den Texten Elemente einer typisch Frauenlexik erkennen: z.B. *„Zur Umsetzung des Gender Mainstreaming gibt es nicht DAS Rezept, nur ein ganzes Kochbuch.“* (Broschüre *Chancengleichheit und Gender Mainstreaming in der EU*, herausgegeben von der Europäischen Kommission, 2003). In den Slogans wird betont, Frauen sind in das europäische politische Konzept mit einbezogen, aber sie selbst dürfen nicht mehr passiv bleiben, sondern sie haben sich politisch zu engagieren: *„Europa für Frauen, Frauen für Europa“* – war zum Beispiel der Slogan zu den Europawahlen 2004.

In der Rhetorik des Gender Mainstreaming kommt deutlich zur Geltung, dass das Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming für die Frauen eine Chance bietet, die politische, wirtschaftliche und in Entscheidungsprozessen gesellschaftliche unterrepräsentierte Position der Frau umzuwandeln. Diese Zielsetzung wird sprachlich mit solchen Schlüsselwörtern in demonstriert, die im Sprachgebrauch der politischen Kommunikation eindeutig als Aktivität voraussetzende „Aktionswörter“ gelten. Solche sind zum Beispiel: *vertreten, verstärken, mitwirken, erkämpfen, sich einsetzen, vor einer Herausforderung stehen, erfordern, kämpfen, bekämpfen*. Im folgenden Textbeispiel kann die sprachlich aktive Darstellung der Frau auch erkannt werden:

Textbeispiel (4)

„Die Europäische Union hat durch ihre Politik und ihre Programme einen Anstoß gegeben. Auch Frauen selbst müssen sich der Herausforderung stellen. Frauen im Europäischen Parlament werden dazu beitragen, eine Veränderung der politischen Kultur zu bewirken und eine gerechtere Union zu schaffen, die den Anliegen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger besser gerecht wird. Es ist an der Zeit, Ihrer Stimme Gehör zu

Verschaffen. Frauen müssen sich in Europa stärker zu Wort melden.“ (Broschüre Chancengleichheit und Gender Mainstreaming in der EU, herausgegeben von der Europäischen Kommission, 2003)

In den letzten zwei Sätzen wird das Motiv der schweigenden Frau aufgegriffen, und es wird suggeriert, dass Frauen auch sprachlich aktiv sein müssen. Das Stereotyp der schweigenden Frau und das Stereotyp der nicht gehörten Frau soll beseitigt werden, da auch Frauen eine eigene Stimme haben. Auch in rhetorischer Hinsicht tritt die Frau in den obigen Sätzen als Agens, als Akteurin ihres eigenen Schicksals auf.

2. 3. Textkonstituierende Elemente der informativen massenmedialen Kommunikation in den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming

Die Texte, die in die Analyse mit einbezogen wurden, haben vor allem die Funktion, über das Gender und Gender Mainstreaming Informationen an ein breites Publikum zu vermitteln. Eine der Hauptquellen der Informationsdurchgabe liefern die Begriffserklärungen. Einerseits ist das Ziel, die Bekanntmachung und Fixierung neuer Termini, andererseits aber auch die Präzisierung von Begriffsinhalten. Die Fixierung des Informationsmaterials wird zum Beispiel durch Wiederholung von Informationen und Begriffsinhalten gesichert. Dabei ist das grundlegende Ziel, durch die Benutzung massenmedialer Kommunikationselemente der auf Stereotypen basierenden sexistischen Ideologie entgegenzuwirken, die in unseren Tagen die öffentlichen Medien weit und breit durchdringt. Als Beispiel kann eine offizielle Bekanntmachung der Europäischen Kommission gelten:

Textbeispiel (5)

„Förderung der Gleichstellung ist nämlich nicht einfach der Versuch, statistische Parität zu erreichen: Da es darum geht, eine dauerhafte Weiterentwicklung der Elternrollen, der Familienstrukturen, der institutionellen Praxis, der Formen der Arbeitsorganisation und der Zeiteinteilung usw. zu fördern, betrifft die Chancengleichheit nicht allein der Frauen, die

Entfaltung ihrer Persönlichkeit und ihre Selbständigkeit, sondern auch die Männer und die Gesellschaft insgesamt, für die sie ein Fortschrittsfaktor und ein Unterpfand für Demokratie und Pluralismus sein kann.“ (Auszug aus der Kommissionsmitteilung zur „Einbindung der Chancengleichheit in sämtliche politische Konzepte und Maßnahmen der Gemeinschaft“)(COM(96)67endg.Fassung:

(<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employmentsocial/equ/opp/gms/de.htm>)

In den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming kann zwischen den Effekten der Begriffsbildung und Meinungsbildung eine Parallele gezogen werden, da ein nicht verleugnetes Ziel der Texte ist, die Meinung und Attitüdeposition der UnionsbürgerInnen in Genderfragen zu ändern, und die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit auf die Genderfragen zu lenken bzw. die Gewichtung der Genderfragen innerhalb der europäischen Politik zu präsentieren. Aus diesem Grunde wurde in die Diskussion auch der Begriff des Gender und des Mainstreaming eingeführt. Sowohl fachexperimentell als auch terminologisch sind es die Begriffe, die der prägnantesten und transparentesten Erklärung in den EU-Texten bedürfen. Diese zwei Schlüsselbegriffe werden in den untersuchten Materialien in drei verschiedenen Weisen kommuniziert. Einerseits werden sie zum Beispiel in den Gleichstellungsberichten der Kommission sehr sachlich und fachlich erklärt, meistens werden die politischen Entscheidungen der EU oder Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Diskurse zitiert. Diese Art und Weise der Informationsvermittlung spricht die Experten und Zuständigen an. Zum Beispiel ist die Definition des Europarates durch die Anhäufung von Nominal- und Genitivkonstruktionen viel komplizierter formuliert, als auch für Laien leicht nachvollziehbar zu sein, wie es auch das folgende Textbeispiel zeigt. In der rhetorischen Konstruktion der Definition dreht sich der Sachverhalt um die Lexeme alles bzw. alle. Dies wird auch durch die mehrfache Wiederholung betont.

Textbeispiel (6)

Gender Mainstreaming in die (Re-)Organisation, Verbesserung,

Entwicklung und Evaluierung grundsatzpolitischer Prozesse, mit dem Ziel eine geschlechterbezogene Sichtweise in alle politischen Konzepte auf allen Ebenen und in allen Phasen durch alle normalerweise an politischen Entscheidungsprozessen beteiligten Akteure und Akteurinnen einzubringen. (Europarat (Hrsg.): Gender Mainstreaming. Konzeptuelle Rahmen, Methodologie und Beschreibung bewährter Praktiken. 1998. Straßburg.)

Andererseits werden für die Öffentlichkeit Definitionen konstruiert, die als vereinfachte Varianten der obigen Definition zu betrachten sind. Auch in dieser Hinsicht lassen sich zwei Typen des Definierens unterscheiden. Die so genannten Gender-Glossare bringen im Allgemeinen präzise, wissenschaftlich und EU-kompatibel definierte Begriffe in die Öffentlichkeit, jedoch auch für Laien verständlich formuliert. Diese Feststellung untermauert unter anderem das folgende Zitat:

Textbeispiel (7)

Gender (engl.)

Der sozial und kulturell bestimmte Geschlechterunterschied in Abgrenzung zum biologischen Geschlecht (engl. „sex“). Während dieses als unveränderliches biologisches Faktum betrachtet wird, ist Gender als soziale Konstruktion gesellschaftlich bedingt und folglich veränderbar. Gender bezeichnet also die gesellschaftlich geprägten Rollen von Frauen und Männern. In der EU wird Gender auch als „soziales Geschlecht“ bezeichnet. (Egalikon – Stichwörter zur Gleichstellung, eine Publikation des Kantons Bern, 2002)

Der letzte Typ des Definierens ist sloganhaft, da die fremdsprachigen Hauptbegriffe jeweils mit einem zielsprachigen Wort gleichgesetzt werden. Die begriffliche Äquivalenz wird mit dem Symbol ‚=‘ markiert. Die Eins-zu-eins-Entsprechung wird mit einer texthaften Definition ergänzt, die sich rhetorisch auf die Formel „X heißt Y“ aufbaut.

*Textbeispiel (8)****Gender = „soziales Geschlecht“***

Gender heißt, dass die gesellschaftlichen Geschlechterrollen, die Vorstellungen und Erwartungen, wie Frauen und Männer sind bzw. sein sollen, innerhalb und zwischen den Kulturen unterschiedlich sind.

Mainstreaming = „in den Hauptstrom bringen“

Mainstreaming heißt, dass ein bestimmtes Denken und Handeln in den "Mainstream" - in Politik und Verwaltung, Programme und Maßnahmen - übernommen und zu einem selbstverständlichen Handlungsmuster wird. Dass ein Sonderthema zu einem Hauptthema wird. Mainstreaming heißt, den "Mainstream" zu durchdringen und zu verändern.

„Gender Mainstreaming“ *heißt, soziale Ungleichheiten zwischen Frauen und Männern in allen Bereichen und bei allen Planungs- und Entscheidungsschritten immer bewusst wahrzunehmen und zu berücksichtigen. Alle Vorhaben werden so gestaltet, dass sie auch einen Beitrag zur Förderung der Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern leisten. (Bericht zur Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann, 2004)*

2. 4. Textkonstituierende Elemente der werbesprachigen Kommunikation in den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming

In vielen rhetorischen Elementen der Kommunikationsweise des Gender Mainstreaming sind die traditionellen Mittel der Werbesprache vorzufinden. Unter diesen erscheint der Slogangebrauch am wichtigsten zu sein. Die Slogans des Gender Mainstreaming spiegeln die Kernaussage des Konzepts wieder. Wie es in den folgenden Beispielen zu sehen ist, ist der Wortgebrauch in vielen Fällen neutral, einfach und alltäglich, jedoch sehr vielsagend und einprägsam. In manch anderen Fällen haben wir humorvollen Aussagen, Wortspiele, Reime, kleine rhythmische Versen vor

uns. Ganz oft ist die Abkürzung GM für Gender Mainstreaming vorzufinden, was auch als einer der Werbekommunikation entliehenen Elemente zu identifizieren ist.

Textsbeispiel (9)

*Das Einmaleins der Geschlechter besagt $1 \times 2 = 2$;
Geschlechterpolitik ist Menschenpolitik
Peking + 5-Prozess
EQUAL – Freizügigkeit guter Konzepte
Gender Mainstreaming: Ein Blick nach vorn
Frauen und Männer: eine Frage des Gleichgewichts
Gender Mainstreaming – eine praktische Aufgabe
EQUAL – Ungleichheiten in Europa bekämpfen
GM – die Integration selbst in die Hand nehmen
Gender Mainstreaming – eine neue Handlungsstrategie
GM ist mehr als ein Begriff (Quellen: Publikationsreihe der
Europäischen Kommission zum Thema Gleichbehandlung
von Frauen und Männern)*

Für die Werbesprache ist auch die Anwendung von Leitsätzen, d.h. gut formulierten und wohl klingenden Aussagen charakteristisch (s. in Tietz 1982). Bei Gender Mainstreaming werden die positiven, überzeugenden Inhalte vermittelnden Leitsätze meistens mit einem kleinen erklärenden Teil ergänzt, der grammatisch als ein erklärender Einleitungssatz aufzufassen ist. Sogar die optische Gliederung des Textes läßt auf die Werbesprache assoziieren, da die Visualität die Einprägung von Textteilen wesentlich erleichtert. Auch die angewandten Schriftzeichen haben die Funktion, die Aufmerksamkeit zu erwecken.

Textbeispiel (10)

*Gender bezeichnet gesellschaftlich und kulturell
geprägtes geschlechtsspezifisches Verhalten von
Frauen und Männern.
Mainstreaming beinhaltet, daß ein bestimmtes*

*Handeln zum normalen und selbstverständlichen Handlungsmuster einer Organisation gehört.
Also: Gender Mainstreaming = geschlechterbewußtes Handlungsmuster*

*Gender Mainstreaming ...
... ist eine Strategie der Frauen- und Geschlechterpolitik (europäischer Ansatz)
... fordert als Querschnittsaufgabe Sachkompetenz und Gerechtigkeitsbewusstsein von allen, d.h. auch und besonders von Männern.
... aktiviert und nutzt alle Potentiale zur Herstellung von Chancengerechtigkeit.
... verdeutlicht geschlechtsorientierte Handlungsmuster, d.h. tradierte (patriarchalische) Wahrnehmungsmuster, Werthaltungen und Vorgehensweisen und hilft diese zu verändern.
... bedeutet Chancengleichheit herzustellen, d.h. die unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen und Interessen von Frauen und Männern zu erkennen und bei der politischen Gestaltung zu benutzen.
... zielt auf die Integration der Chancengleichheit in alle Politikfelder und analysiert, wie sich Entscheidungen auf die unterschiedlichen Lebenssituationen von Frauen und Männern auswirken. (Europäische Frauenlobby, 2001)*

Ein weiteres Element aus der Werbesprache ist die Anhäufung eines positiv konnotierten Wortschatzes sowie die Hervorhebung von Wörtern, die die Effektivität des Konzepts semantisieren und mit Garantieanspruch für Lösungen bestimmter Probleme auftreten. Solche Wörter sind: (1) aus dem semantischen Umfeld des Konzepts: *Gleichstellung, Gleichbehandlung, Antidiskriminierung, Chancengleichheit*; (2) aus dem semantischen Umfeld der Problemlösung: *Vorbereitung, Durchführung, Bewertung, Verbesserung, Übermittlung, Optimierung, Umsetzung, Verbindlichkeit, Monitoring, Controlling, Überwachung, Reform.*

Es ist für die Werbung charakteristisch, dass sie direkt anspricht. Die direkte Ansprache und die konkrete Anrede mit der Sie-Form ist ein weitgehend wichtiges konstituierendes Element der GM-Texte. Dies zeigt sich auch in den folgenden Textteilen, die durch die persönlichen Anredeformen den Individualitätseffekt garantieren.

Textbeispiel (11)

*Sind Sie generell der Ansicht, dass...
Fall Sie zu einer Einschätzung gelangen, ...
Vor Beginn Ihrer Evaluation...
Ihre Meinung basiert bestimmt ...
Wie stellen Sie sicher, dass...
Wie gewährleisten Sie...
Haben Sie Ideen, wie... (EQUAL-Leitfaden GM, 2005)*

Es ist auch allgemein bekannt, dass die Werbung nicht nur interesseerweckend sein soll, sondern auch zum Handeln aufzurufen hat (s. in Tietz 1982). Dieses Element der Werbesprache fehlt in den Kampagnetexten des Gender Mainstreaming auch nicht. Meistens mit konkreten Imperativsätzen wird zum Handeln aufgefordert:

Textbeispiel (12)

*Studieren Sie Ihr Einsatzfeld!
Bleiben Sie offen!
Denken Sie politisch.
Denken Sie in komplexen Wegen!
Verstehen Sie das Konzept. (EQUAL-Leitfaden GM, 2005)*

2. 5. Die Elemente der institutionellen Kommunikation in den Texten des Gender Mainstreaming

Alle wichtigen gesellschaftlichen Organisationen erarbeiten ihre eigene Kommunikationsweise. Dies ergänzen sie mit Elementen der gesellschaftlichen Kommunikation bzw. ihren Ansprüchen nach mit Elementen der politischen oder werbesprachigen Kommunikationsart (s.

auch Szekfű 1999). Die institutionelle Kommunikation hat mindestens zwei Aspekte: interne und externe Kommunikation. Die letztere unterscheidet sich in der Art und Weise, wie eine politische oder gesellschaftliche Organisation mit einer anderen qualitätsmäßig ähnlichen Organisation kommuniziert, und darin, wie die Institution sich in der Rolle des Kommunizierenden nach außen vertritt (s. auch Szekfű 1999). Die verantwortlichen politischen Organe des Gender Mainstreaming wie zum Beispiel die Frauenvertretung im Europäischen Parlament oder Generaldirektion Beschäftigung, soziale Angelegenheiten und Chancengleichheit der Europäischen Kommission praktizieren alle drei oben aufgezählten Kommunikationsweisen aktiv.

Im *EQUAL-Leitfaden GM, 2005* wird zum Beispiel die externe institutionelle Kommunikationsweise ersten Typs dargelegt, da in dieser Ausgabe Empfehlungen zur praktischen Bekämpfung der Ungleichheiten zwischen Frauen und Männern auf institutioneller Ebene für andere Institutionen präsentiert werden. Da sind bestimmte Vorkenntnisse relevant, und manche Richtlinien der EU werden nicht zitiert oder zusammengefasst, wie in Informationsbroschüren für ein breites und öffentliches Publikum, sondern es wird auf diese lediglich nur hingewiesen. In diesem Heft des GM wird mit der Technik gearbeitet, die Schlüsselwörter rot hervorzuheben (wie zum Beispiel: *Unterschiede anerkennen, Segregation aufbrechen, Gleichstellungsorgane einbinden*). Diese werden aber weiterhin nicht bis ins letzte Detail erklärt, sondern es wird ohne lange Einleitung ein praktisches Beispiel erläutert, wie das aktuelle Schlagwort in die Praxis umzusetzen ist. Ein anderer *EQUAL-Leitfaden für Entwicklungspartnerschaften 2005* wendet sich ausschließlich an Organisationen, die an einem EQUAL-Programm zusammenarbeiten wollen. Diesem Kommunikationszweck entsprechend wird kommuniziert, d.h. nicht der Terminus EQUAL wird präzisiert, sondern das Programm selbst.

Das Faltblatt des Frauenreferates der EU mit dem Titel „*Gender Mainstreaming. Was ist das?*“ (2003) könnte ein Beispiel externer Kommunikation zweiten Typs sein. Hier wird das Gender Programm der EU kurz erläutert, danach sind Meinungen und Erfahrungen von Frauenreferenten aus Brüssel zu lesen. Der grundlegendste Kommunikationsaspekt ist, dass das GM-Programm den Menschen nahe

gebracht wird. Dies kann am besten verwirklicht werden, wenn sich bekannte Persönlichkeiten und Verantwortliche direkt an die Betroffenen wenden.

Als ein Beispiel der internen institutionellen Kommunikation können die Dokumente, Leitfäden und Richtlinien erwähnt werden, die an verschiedenen Sitzungen vorgeschlagen und debattiert werden. Diese bilden eine offizielle Dokumentation, sind aber von der Internetseite des Europäischen Parlaments in mehreren Sprachen herunterzuladen. So sind zum Beispiel unter dem Vermerk *PE 323. 524* auch die Änderungsanträge des Ausschusses für die rechte der Frau und Chancengleichheit von 1-17 zu lesen. Dieses Dokument der internen Kommunikation kann auch als Fachtext eingeordnet werden, und es kann nachgegangen werden, wie und warum manche Formulierungen sprachlich verändert werden müssen, auch sprachlich dem Prinzip des Gender Mainstreaming Folge zu leisten. Hier geht es um die folgende Stellungnahme: in den verschiedensten Berichten der EU sollte auch sprachlich zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, dass eine Bewusstseinsveränderung infolge der breiten Auswirkung des Gender Mainstreaming stattfinden soll. Als ein erstes Zeichen dafür ist es empfehlenswert, in den EU-Dokumenten sprachlich beide Geschlechter gleichermaßen zu berücksichtigen.

3. Zusammenfassung: Gender Mainstreaming aus sprachkritischem Aspekt

In erster Linie wird nicht das Konzept des gender mainstreaming, sondern seine Benennung kritisiert. Es wird dabei so argumentiert, dass Gender und Mainstreaming in vielen Sprachen der EU als Fremdwörter zu kategorisieren sind. Das Konzept des Gender Mainstreaming soll aber europäübergreifend sein, und gerade in den neuen Mitgliedstaaten der EU kann ein interkultureller Dialog eröffnet werden, wenn die Kommunikation durch internationale Slogans gefordert wird. Stiegler (2000) schreibt über die Vorteile dieses englischen Fachwortes so: „Die Benennung dieses radikalen Prinzips wird oft kritisiert, der Name sei unverständlich und nicht zu vermitteln. Dem ist entgegenzuhalten, daß die Benutzung englischer Worte in vielen Bereichen, insbesondere auch der

Medien- und Informationstechnologie, selbstverständlich wird. Das Festhalten an dem englischen Begriff Gender Mainstreaming hat den großen Vorteil, daß damit eine international entwickelte Strategie benannt wird und somit eine bessere Verständigung auf internationaler Ebene möglich ist“ (Stiegler 2000, www.fes.de/asfo/00802toc.htm).

Wie die obigen Beispiele gezeigt haben, haben der Europarat und die Europäische Union aus einer Begriffskombination (Gender + Mainstreaming) ein zentrales Element ihrer Politik postuliert (s. auch Artikel 3 des EG-Vertrages). Inhaltlich wird an diesem übergreifenden Konzept aber kritisiert, dass das Konzept von vielen so interpretiert wurde, dass es die konventionellen Maßnahmen der Gleichstellungspolitik ersetzen kann. Dies sei aber natürlich nicht der Fall. Deshalb ist die Rede in der EU von Ergänzung und nicht von Ersetzung, konkreter von einer *dual track* – Strategie, einer Kombination von konventionellen Ansätzen und Gender Mainstreaming (vg. Kroll 2002: 143).

Einen weiteren Punkt der Kritik bildet die Begrenztheit praktischer Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten der Strategie des Gender Mainstreaming, die unter dem Stichwort „globale Umsetzungslücke“ (Steffen 2006) zusammengefasst werden können. „Andererseits droht mit Gender Mainstreaming auch eine akute Gefahr der Verwässerung und Vereinnahmung genderspezifischer Interessen“ (Steffen 2006: 97), d.h. mit Gender Mainstreaming kann sowohl die Dethematisierung von Geschlecht im herkömmlichen Sinne des Wortes als auch die von Gender im modernen sozialpsychologischen Sinne des Wortes einen Anfang nehmen. Dies wäre aber natürlich kein Gewinn, sondern ein großer Verlust in der politisch ausgerichteten Genderdebatte.

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MULTICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES

Gabriel Troc*

Abstract

Beginning with an overview of the concept of multiculturalism, the article investigates further in details the ways in which some European universities involve this concept in their organizational structure. The aim of the article is to unravel the common patterns of this sort of organization for different universities, as well as the disparities, and to clarify to what kind of challenges these universities are trying to respond to by their multicultural organization.

Dealing with the subject of the multicultural organization of European universities has some advantages and some disadvantages. Among the disadvantages I would name the fact that the things are in motion, a general concern for making accommodation for cultural pluralism being present to many European universities. Among the advantages I would name that the number of European universities that are *actually* organized following the principle of multiculturalism – namely, which have precise rules for multicultural organization – is limited. So, at this level the subject could be researched in its entirety, by reviewing each of these universities.

Starting with a condensed recall of what multiculturalism is, I will try later on to uncover the actual ways in which each of these universities organizes itself in a multicultural manner, in order to draw in the end the common patterns that can be revealed.

As articulated by Charles Taylor, the pressures that are specific in contemporary societies for multiculturalism represent an expression of the

* Gabriel Troc, Ph.D., Lecturer at the Faculty of European Studies, « Babeș-Bolyai » University Cluj-Napoca.

demands for recognition that certain minority groups - defined through a group culture - address to the majorities¹.

Of course, the demand for recognition is not new. It is in fact something that is right on the core of the modern project of society, as shaped by the Enlightenment, and refined ever since. The solution that was found by the modern societies for solving this demand was expressed in the principle of equal dignity, which means recognition for each individual and which is politically expressed in the status of citizenship. The basis for this principle was the philosophical universalistic perspective on the equality of men, who are so both by nature and by reason. Equal dignity was than a right that results from the fact of sharing - as people living in society - something that is universal, common to every individual.

But from the same principle something else emerged as well. Namely, while being individuals, thus each being unique, we also share the fact of being different, each in his or her own way. Duplicating the logic of recognizing what it is shared by all people, a new demand for recognition was also shaped: the right for being recognized in our distinctness from everyone else. Later, this second demand for recognition split in two directions: an individual sense for authenticity was asked to be recognized at a moral level, while a group sense for a collective identity was asked to be recognized at a political level. This second direction is of interest for us and is directly linked with the issue of multiculturalism.

Consequently, the modern societies had to face two opposed demands for recognition that sprung from the same philosophical principle: one that asked for individual recognition, based on what is shared by all people from a possible modern society, and one that asked for collective recognition, based on something that is shared only by a group of people within a larger society. Facing this contradiction, the tendency of the modern societies till the middle of the 20th century was to recognize only the first demand as a legitimate one at a political level, while the second one was either repressed or tolerated in the private sphere. This fact was justified through the assumption that the ground of "civilization", understood as a culture in a large format, is sufficient for the first recognition and for a peaceful living of the different groups.

¹ Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "the Politics of Recognition"*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992

Precisely against this latest assumption multiculturalism was pointing when it was forged. It has entered on the scene in the moment in which the liberal democratic societies agreed, on the pressure of the minority groups, that endorsing only the first demand for recognition is not enough for maintaining a valid social contract. More than that, when they accepted that neither culture understood as "civilization" nor the "national culture" - supposedly isomorphic with a nation of people living within the border of a national state - could provide sufficient space for the expression of the groups' identities. Consequently, *multiculturalism was devised for enlarging and correcting the limitations imposed on people in a certain moment of the modernization of the western societies*. Coming back to Taylor terms, multiculturalism should be seen as a step forward in the modern societies' organization, a step through which "equal dignity" is doubled by "equal recognition".

Starting to be used in United States in connection with the Civil Rights Movement, mainly with the demands of the black community for separate and equal representation on colleges and other cultural institutions, multiculturalism became later a code word for the political and administrative demands of different minority groups that are using "culture" for defining themselves. They have imposed a concept of multiculturalism that expresses both a way of performing identity politics from the part of the minority groups and a way of responding to their requests from the part of the majorities. Shortly put, *multiculturalism means today an attitude shared by the minorities and the majorities that expresses the common will for changing an actual state of affaire considered of not responding any longer to the needs of recognition of all the social actors within a given modern pluralist society*. Or, as Terence Turner articulates it, multiculturalism "stands for a liberating recognition of the de facto heterogeneity of the cultural and ethnic makeup of contemporary metropolitan societies"².

Before starting to review the European universities that define themselves as multicultural, let see which minority groups are actually asking for a multicultural change in the contemporary society at large.

Will Kymlicka identifies three directions from which demands for equal recognition are coming: from the part of the *national minorities*, of the

² Terence Turner, *Anthropology and Multiculturalism*, Cultural Anthropology 8(4), p. 412

ethnic minorities and of the *non-ethnic minorities*.³ By “national minority” Kymlicka understands a group of people that belongs to a historical community, occupying a given territory or homeland and sharing a distinct language and culture, which at some point in history was incorporated in the territory of a state in which another nation is forming the majority. By “ethnic minorities” he understands various groups of immigrants that are accepted to live in the developed countries. Finally, by “non-ethnic minorities” Kymlicka understands a wide range of social groups which have, for various reasons, been excluded or marginalized from the mainstream of society. Each of these types of minority groups is addressing the call for multiculturalism in its specific manner. Thus, the national minorities are asking for a range of rights intended to reflect, protect and reproduce their status as distinct cultural communities. The ethnic minorities are asking for the right to integrate in the host society by maintaining some of their ethnic particularities. Lastly, the non-ethnic minorities are generally asking, by involving a constructivist meaning of culture, for a critical reconsideration of the patterns of the dominant culture, in order to accommodate the equal recognition for the historically excluded groups like the disabled, women, gay and lesbians, the working class, and others.

Now, taking Kymlicka’s elaboration as a reference, we have to consider the situations that are actually encountered in the today political context. It is quite obvious that all the democratic multinational states have to respond at a given moment to the specific requests for recognition of its *national minorities*. Due to the fact that the international agreement upon a unique standard response is not yet set, each country responds following some trends that are quite clear. In the same time they are assessed on the international scene by comparing their attitudes towards the minorities rights with the attitudes of the countries that are considered to be the most advanced in this regard. The recognition of the requests of the immigrant *ethnic minorities* has to be faced especially by the most industrialized countries. The trends here are to confer those rights for maintaining some cultural peculiarities which, on the one hand, are not conflicting with the western common culture that make possible the equal recognition for each

³ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, Chapter 2

individual, and which, on the other hand, do not obstruct the integration of the immigrants in the host society. The latest form of recognition, the recognition of the *non-ethnic minority* claims for respect and equal opportunity is specific yet only to the liberal democracies, more intense to the old western democracies, where the liberating movements actually took place throughout the '70's and 80's. However, being crystallized in the politically correctness code of behavior, many of these claims for rights are now exported from the western democracies to different liberal societies, along with other western cultural products.

Finally, I would add that in a given country all the combination of these three forms of demands for recognition is possible.

Let now see how the European universities are responding to the demands for multicultural organization and to what precisely sort of demands for recognition are they responding to. But first: which are those universities? I have identified seven European universities that explicitly have developed multicultural and multilingual structures and practices: University of Fribourg, Free University of Bolzano, University of Barcelona, University of Helsinki, Åbo Akademy, Babeş-Bolyai University and University of South East Europe in Tetovo.

In order to clarify how multiculturalism was expressed I researched their public available official documents, from the charters and regulations to their official websites. In each case I made a synthesis of the specific information regarding their multicultural organization. Let's take it one by one.

University of Fribourg, Switzerland

As well known, Switzerland is a federation that accommodates two ethno-cultural groups, one speaking German the other speaking French. We may speak of a country in which two nations live, each with its national identity. However, due to a long history of living peacefully together, the sense of the people is that they belong to only one nation, sharing a common loyalty to the federal state. In this context, University of Fribourg is defining itself as a bilingual university, which *"supports and develops the communication between persons that speak different languages and belong to different cultures"*,

as stipulated in the Law for University's Organization⁴. What should be note here is that the bilingual organization is not restricted to the French-German combination, even if this combination is particularly encouraged and is dominant in the actual process of education. As the rector puts it, this special support for this combination is intended "neither for excluding the access to other cultures - and the use of other language in education is supported whenever is justified - nor for inhibiting those who want to study in only one language⁵". No less important, the bilingual feature is intended to ensure a special profile of the university among other European universities, being more attractive for students that are living in a more open and pluralist Europe.

The multicultural/bilingual status of the university is stipulated by three documents: The Law for University's organization, which was issued by the Canton Assembly, The University's Charter and The Regulation of the Commission for Bilingual Education. The first document stipulates that the languages that are used in education and administration are French and German and that the faculties could use some other languages in education. The Charter set the framework for the existence of a Commission for Bilingual Education, while the Regulation of this commission makes proposals to the Universities Senate in regard with the measures to be taken for ensuring the balance of the two main languages in education and for enlarging the bilingual education. This commission has also the peculiar task of proposing measures for promoting a more comprehensive intercultural dialogue. The diploma issued by the university is a bilingual diploma.

Summing up, the University of Fribourg wants to face and to take advantage of a historical situation in which two nations are living side by side. No less important, it is open to enlarge its bilingual programs, to different combinations that might be required by the labor market, by the need of an international oriented education and by the needs for a broader intercultural communication.

⁴ Law for University's Organization of the Great Council of The Fribourg Canton, Article 6.3

⁵ Cf. the Fribourg University's official website

Free University of Bolzano/Bozen, Italy

In Southern Tyrol, where Bolzano is located, there is also a multinational environment. Three national communities are living within the Alto Adige Autonomous Province: the German speaking community, the Italians and the Ladins. The Free University of Bolzano is a newly-founded (1997) independent, state recognized University. It is defined as a trilingual, internationally oriented educational institution, having in the same time *“an important bridging role between the Italian and the German cultural and economic sphere”*⁶. The faculties are offering courses in three languages: Italian, German and English. The possibility for studying in only one language exists only for the case of the Faculty of Primary Education, which offers courses in Italian, German and Ladino, providing thus teachers for the local communities' primary schools. The candidates of the University are required to have language abilities for two of the languages of education, the university ensuring the conditions for learning the third language during the studies. The trilingual character of the university is stipulated in the University's Charter. From the same document, its multicultural feature is also made visible in the council structure. According to the Article 5 of the Charter the national communities of the province should be represented in the Council in the following formula: one representative of the towns in which the Ladin population forms the majority, one representative of the Local Council of Bolzano, one representative of the Local Council of Brixen and seven representative of the Autonomous Province Government. Two vice-presidents of the Council should be also members of the different linguistic groups.

As we can observe, the organization of the Free University of Bolzano is so design as to represent at the level of administration all the national communities of the Province. In regard with education, the university seeks both to take advantage of the local bilingual environment and to respond to the pressure of internationalization, by providing education in English also.

⁶ Cf. the Free University of Bolzano's official website

University of Barcelona, Spain

I took University of Barcelona as a representative for many others universities from the Autonomous Province of Catalonia. What should be remarked here is that Catalan language has in this province the status of co-official language, along the Castilian (Spanish) language. While the language that is used in administration is only Catalan, in education both languages are used. The candidates could choose any of these languages for the admission examination at university. The professors are also chosen freely the language they want to use in teaching. However, they should know, at least passively, the second language. Among the reasons for this requirement is that the students could choose any of the both languages for the regular examination.

All the universities from the Catalonia provide education in the two languages. What might differ is only the proportion. For the University of Barcelona this proportion is 66.4 % to 33.6% in the favor of Catalan. The University of Barcelona has a vice-rector who is the president of the commission for enhancing the use of Catalan. The reason for existing such a commission is the fact observed at different universities, including at University of Barcelona, that the use of Catalan might decrease over time.

What is interesting to be seen at the Catalonian universities is that the use of Catalan is higher at the undergraduate level. It tends to decrease at the postgraduate level and both languages tend to be replaced by English at the doctoral level. The reason seems to be clear: studies followed in Castilian grow the chances for finding a job throughout Spain, while studies followed in English grow the chances for finding a job at international level. Also worth to be noticed is the fact that no university in Catalonia provides education exclusively in Catalan.

Thus, in the case of Catalonian universities we can observe the existence of an extended bilingual education, which is by no doubt softened by their common roots. There is not a clear separation of the universities on the criterion of language. On the contrary, this organization clearly provides the conditions for multicultural communication within the society at large.

University of Helsinki and Abö Akademy, Finland

As it is well known, Finland is one of the most liberal countries in respect with the minorities issues. The most important national minority in Finland is represented by the Swedish community (6% of the total population). Along with Finnish, Swedish is official language in Finland. At the level of the higher education the most important universities where Swedish is used both in education and administration are University of Helsinki and Abö Akademy. The right of the Swedish minority for studying in Swedish at the university level is guaranteed by the Finish law for higher education, from 1997. This law, The Universities Act, is in fact stipulating in details the organization of the Finnish Universities, and precisely stipulates where the education in Swedish could be organized. In the same time, the law precisely indicates in which higher education institutions the language to be used in both education and administration would be Swedish.

Now, the two universities that I was focused on here could be considered as being complementary in regard with the relationship between the majority and the minority at the level of higher education. In the first case, The University of Helsinki, we find the situation of a Swedish Faculty within the university – The Swedish School for Social Sciences – where both education and administration is appointed in Swedish. The School is functioning in close link with The Faculty of Social Sciences, where education is provided mainly in Finnish. However, this School is not the single place where students could learn in Swedish. According to the Universities Act, there should be a minimum of 27 departments within the University that, at request, should provide education in Swedish. In addition, the faculties could also provide bilingual courses, both in Finnish and in Swedish. At the level of the management, the Swedish is represented by a vice rector, who is also in charge with a committee for providing and developing the instruction in Swedish. The university could provide a quota for including the Swedish speaking candidates. The case of the Swedish School for Social Sciences is particularly interesting when thinking about multicultural issues. And this because this School used to be an independent higher education institution, which has affiliated itself, in 1984, at the University of Helsinki, as an autonomous institution within the University. This affiliation was determined by the need of its community

for “a broader approach to research and education” and for “taking the advantages of being part of a larger university”, as the rector puts it. No less important, other pragmatic reasons were taken into consideration for this affiliation, especially the access of the graduates of the School to the postgraduate and doctoral programs of the University, many of them being taught in English.

Much smaller, Abö Akademy is in a different situation. Being situated in the city where the largest Swede community from Finland lives, Turku, this university is providing education only in Swedish. The language used in administration is also Swedish, but the members of the teaching staff are required to have language abilities in both Swedish and Finnish. In the last years some programs in English were also launched. What it is interesting for our concern for multiculturalism, is that 10 % of the Abö Akademi’s students have a background education in Finnish. The reason for the choice for studying in Swedish is their will for enhancing their bilingualism, bilingualism that is specific in the area.

Summing up, in the case of these universities we can observe a tendency for intercultural communication between the two national groups at the level of higher education, a situation made possible both by the state provision of large rights for education in Swedish and by the will of the Swedish community to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the majorities educational institutions.

Babeş-Bolyai University

Babeş-Bolyai University is explicitly defined as a multicultural university. Its multiculturalism is reflected in its organizational structure, as shaped in the University Charter, from 1995, which gives the possibility for all the three national traditional communities from Transylvania – Romanian, Hungarian and Saxon – to have full access to higher education at all levels, from BA to PhD. The education is provided in Romanian, Hungarian and German and in a smaller proportion in wide-spoken international languages, without any restrictions in respect with the language use. The instruction in the three languages is insured within the three lines of studies, which are forms of organizing the education that are to be found at all the levels of the university structure. As defined by the Charter, the line

of study “is the form of organizing the education within the faculties, departments and chairs for teaching in Romanian, Hungarian and German”⁷. Each of the three lines of studies is coordinated by a vice rector. The lines of studies are represented also in the Academic Council of the university, by two vice presidents.

Within a faculty, which is the main unit of organization, one or more lines of studies could be organized. Where this demand exists, the faculty organizes the requested Departments of the lines of study within the Chairs. The director of the Department of the line of study, together with the line of studies’ representatives from each Chair (each of them being also members of one of the Chairs’ Board), are in charge with the regular functioning of education in that language, with the politics for developing the line of study, with the department staff’s politics and with the curricula for the line of study. The proposals made by the Department of the line of study are voted in the Faculty’s Council. In the Board of the Faculty’s council the Department of the line of study is represented by the dean, the vice dean or the chancellor. This organization provides each linguistic group with the autonomy of decision within each line of study and with a large representation of each of them at all the levels of the university structure.

The reason for finding this solution of close-knit organization of the studies in the three languages within the faculties (which are set after the division of sciences and specializations) is to promote the intercultural communication between the local national communities. As stated in the Charter, the University takes as its mission “to provide a framework for multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious interferences”⁸. The same goal is aimed by the promotion of courses on Romanian, Hungarian and German culture and civilization developed within each lines of study in order to be taught for the students belonging to the other two lines of study⁹.

As a result of this framework provided by the Charter, at present at the bachelor level there are 88 specializations within the Romanian line of study, 50 specializations within the Hungarian line of study and 15

⁷ Babeş-Bolyai University Charter/2003, II.1

⁸ Ibidem, I.2

⁹ Ibidem, VI.3

specializations within the German line of study. A bachelor program in Hebrew was also organized more recently. At the level of master there are 72 programs in Romanian, 22 programs in Hungarian, 3 programs in German and one program in Jewish Studies. Also at the level of master, 55 programs in wide-spoken international languages, mainly in English and French, were set. Many of the masters are joint programs organized by the Babeş-Bolyai University with universities from Europe and United States.

Thus, Babeş-Bolyai University has designed a system of organization in such a way as to give complete access to education of the youngsters from the traditional national communities from Transylvania in their mother-tongue, on one side, and to provide an environment in which the local cultures could communicate both between them and with some other traditional or scientific cultures.

University of South East Europe in Tetovo, Macedonia

The University of South East Europe is defined as a multilingual university. It is in fact the university of the Albanian minority from Macedonia. It was set in 1994, by a group of Albanians intellectuals as a private university. From the beginning they demanded the Macedonian state authorities to recognize it as a state university, with all the rights that are implied by such recognition. At the end of '90's the functioning of this university became a reason for an open conflict between the Albanians and the Macedonians. The Albanians asks for the right to study in their mother tongue, while the Macedonians replied that according to the state regulations in regard with education the University was outlaw. In 2000, in order to solve the conflict, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has proposed to re-organize the university in such a manner as to be compatible with the Macedonian laws and also to permit the study in Albanian. The university functioned as a private university till 2003, when the Macedonian parliament voted for a change in the law of higher education that allowed the education in the language of the community for the national minorities that represent at least 20% of the total population of the country. From 2004 The University of South East Europe is functioning as a state university, providing instruction for around 10,000 students.

Under an international patronage, the university was organized as a multicultural, trilingual university. As stated in the university Statute, “the university would be open to all on the basis of equity and merit regardless of ethnicity; would contribute to the solution of the problem of Albanian language higher education; would promote inter-ethnic understanding to ensure a multilingual and multicultural approach to teaching and research and would develop its teaching programs in a broad international and European perspective”¹⁰. The three languages of education are Albanian, Macedonian and English. In the University Board, the national diversity of Macedonia is represented by three members. The language use is implicated differently at different levels of studies. So, at the first two years of bachelor level the education is provided in Albanian, Macedonian and English, in a formula that is called a “flexible use of language”, which implies “usage of Albanian language, with prerequisite of using the Macedonian as well as English language”¹¹. The students could follow the next two years, as well as the master studies in Albanian and English. At PhD level the language used is English.

As we can observe, in the case of the University of South East Europe the organization of the studies in a multilingual and multicultural fashion has been proved to be a solution for an agreement between the majority and the minority on the local disputed issue of the higher education for the minority. We can also observe that a strictly ethnic organization of the university was considered finally improper by both the majority and the minority.

Conclusions

After reviewing these universities we can clearly draw the general conclusion that European multicultural universities are responding through their organization mainly to the *demands for recognition that come from the national minorities*. While not reflecting in their structures the demands of the ethnic minorities and non-ethnic minorities (in the Kymlicka’s meanings of these categories), as is the case in some of the universities from United States, Canada and Australia, they remained open

¹⁰ South East Europe University’s Statute, Article 2

¹¹ Cf. the South East Europe University’s official website

to such demands by their intercultural commitments. In the same time, like other universities world-wide, they try to face the internationalization of education, by enhancing their local determined multilingualism with the promotion of English or other wide-spoken languages.

In regard with the linguistic politics two organizing patterns could be observed. The first pattern, embodied by The University of Fribourg and The University of Bolzano, implies the use of two or three languages simultaneously, by all the professors and students, in the educational process. The second pattern, embodied by The Finland's Universities and Babeş-Bolyai University, implies the possibility of using separately different local-spoken languages in the process of instruction. The University of Tetovo and the Catalonian Universities are somehow in-between, the trilingual education being a solution for the Albanians from Macedonia for learning also in their mother tongue, while the Catalonia bilingual education being a solution for not restricting the access of the Castilian speakers to the Catalonian Universities.

Finally, we can conclude that multiculturalism and multilingual education proves to be a good solution of responding to the national minority's quest for equal recognition, a solution which, by promoting intercultural communication, prevents in the same time the segregation, the enforced integration and the self-isolation of the minorities. On the contrary to all these, multiculturalism provides pluralism, democracy and the access to the culture of the other.

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BOOK REVIEW

Sergiu Mișcoiu, *La Formation de la nation. Une théorie socio-constructiviste*, Cluj-Napoca, Efes, 2006, 130 p.

Codrin Tăut

Dans les débats actuels d'idées, soit qu'ils trouvent leur origine à l'intérieur des sciences politiques, de la sociologie ou de l'histoire, il semble que la nation est un objet privilégié de recherche, sinon d'inquiétude. Jusqu'ici, il paraît que les chercheurs ont réussi à établir trois champs à l'intérieur desquels la problématique de la nation peut être comprise. En premier lieu, la nation représente un groupe d'individus qui ont une origine commune. En outre, elle peut représenter un groupe humain qui se caractérise par la conscience de son unité (qui peut être historique, sociale ou bien culturelle). Enfin, par nation on peut comprendre la personne juridique constituée par l'ensemble des individus composant l'Etat, mais distincte de ceux-ci jouant du droit subjectif de souveraineté.

D'un certain point de vue, le livre de Sergiu Mișcoiu, *La Formation de la nation. Une théorie socio-constructiviste* (Cluj-Napoca, Efes, 2006), se situe en dehors du courant théorique qui entoure la nation. Car l'auteur ne se propose pas de traiter la nation ni comme concept historique donc contingent, ni comme concept politique. Il semble que son intention est de faire une lecture immanentiste d'un mouvement qu'on pourra appeler le processus-nation. Cela veut dire que le sujet central de son livre est de déceler les structures qui permettent la cristallisation du champ oscillatoire d'une communauté.

Le début du livre est consacré à des préparatifs méthodologiques. Pour offrir au lecteur une sorte de panorama de la littérature qui s'est occupée avec le problème de la nation mais aussi pour se positionner lui-même à l'intérieur de ce réseau théorique, Mișcoiu opère une énumération des diverses définitions de la nation. Sans reprendre ici une telle démarche, on peut dire que, à travers l'analyse que Sergiu Mișcoiu applique aux

diverses définitions de la nation, on trouve à côté des éléments variables, deux aspects qui sont toujours présents. Il semble que toute définition de la nation se rapporte toujours à un patrimoine commun partagé par un groupe humain, et ce qui aussi important, à la conscience de ce patrimoine commun.

Même si le lecteur ne trouve pas une référence explicite, il semble, et l'échafaudage théorique développé au cours du livre le confirme, que l'opération fondamentale de l'auteur est de renverser la position privilégiée que la conscience collective occupe à l'intérieur de la théorie de la nation.

Le premier chapitre est destiné autant aux éclaircissements méthodologiques qu'à la réalisation d'une cartographie analytique de l'abondante littérature qui a comme objet la nation. C'est ainsi que l'auteur distingue deux filons thématiques : le pérennalisme et le modernisme. Selon l'auteur, le pérennalisme est la position qui identifie la nation à une sorte de potence qui se développe dans l'histoire. De l'autre côté, le modernisme considère que la nation est plutôt un produit qui résulte de l'assemblage des plusieurs facteurs (sociaux, économiques, culturels, etc.).

Sergiu Mișcoiu se propose de dépasser les deux théories sans ignorer toutefois l'appareil conceptuel de chaque direction. Le sens de ce dépassement, mais aussi l'axe méthodologique du travail peut être deviné du titre même du livre « une théorie socio-constructiviste » qui accentue la nature processuelle de la notion.

Une bonne partie de l'intention de l'auteur est condensée dans la définition, peut-être un peu trop abrupte, de la nation. Selon Sergiu Mișcoiu, la nation n'est autre chose que une communauté identitaire, autonome du point de vue politique. Cette définition veut dire que la nation représente en fait la superposition des deux pôles : celui de la communauté et celui du politique. A cause de cette définition, l'auteur doit orienter sa recherche sur ces deux paliers mais aussi repérer leur point de croisement.

En premier lieu, Sergiu Mișcoiu doit élucider une aussi vieille problématique de sociologie, c'est-à-dire le problème de la structure d'un groupe humain. Si par structure on entend ici les relations entre le membre d'une communauté, si on ajoute que ces relations mêmes constituent en dernier lieu le profil du groupe et lui assure la perpétuation, il convient

d'interroger ces aspects-ci. Il convient de dire que l'auteur adhère à une perspective évolutionniste, car la nation représente le point terminus d'un processus qui commence avec l'individu et passe par la famille, la gent, la tribu, et l'ethnie. Au-delà de ce fil génétique, la parenté évolutionniste est plus visible dans le modèle d'agrégation du groupe qui selon l'auteur s'opère grâce à des processus de sélection. Cette sélection sociale se manifeste tant sur le plan horizontal, imposant ainsi un modèle comportemental aux individus, que sur le plan vertical, assurant la reproduction du groupe et sa perduration.

Ce modèle théorique est ensuite complété avec une présentation du dispositif qui rend ces sélections possibles. Ce mécanisme n'est autre chose que le *habitus*. Ce concept, rendu célèbre par Pierre Bourdieu, représente un ensemble des dispositions qui règlent et conduisent le comportement d'un individu. Sergiu Mișcoiu reprend toutes ces déterminations mais insiste sur leur dimension collective. C'est pour cela que selon l'auteur la force du groupe s'explique par son inertie identitaire. Cela veut dire que, pour résister, chaque groupe doit maintenir son *habitus* et le défendre tant contre les individus du même groupe que contre les autres groupes.

Il convient dans ce point de notre analyse de récapituler les pas argumentatifs déroulés jusqu'ici. Le parcours de l'individu, qui représente le degré zéro, jusqu'à l'ethnie est rendu possible par la sélection sociale et par la cristallisation de ces processus dans le *habitus*. En outre, il faut dire que ce qui permet le passage d'un degré de développement de la communauté à un autre supérieur, c'est l'abstraction de la pratique communautaire.

Mais suivant quels processus s'opère la transformation de cette structure ? Par quels mécanismes, la communauté identitaire, dont le modèle le plus élevé est l'ethnie, devient nation ? Selon Sergiu Mișcoiu, tout cela se passe par la conversion de l'inconscient dans le conscient. Si l'ethnie est gouvernée par les éléments inconscients du *habitus*, la nation est réglée par le dispositif de l'agence. Une communauté ne peut pas survivre assurant seulement l'intégration des individus, elle doit aussi s'adapter aux diverses provocations lancées, soit par l'histoire, soit par les autres groupes. Cela n'est possible qu'à l'aide d'un autre processus de sélection. Mais celui-ci ne s'occupe plus de la reproduction des comportements inconscients, mais assure la circulation des élites. Les élites

ont pour fonction cardinale de trouver des stratégies susceptibles d'assurer la maintien temporel de la communauté. C'est ainsi qu'apparaît le processus d'agence. Mais l'intervention des élites, qui au cours de l'histoire ont formé le réseau des institutions administratives, produit à l'intérieur de la communauté une division entre le centre (représenté ici par le leadership) et la périphérie, représentée par les individus qui sont conduits par le centre.

Selon Sergiu Mișcoiu, la nation est le résultat de ce processus d'interpénétration de ces deux sphères. Pour consolider sa position, le centre produit des effets de standardisation de la communauté identitaire, tandis que la périphérie essaie de conserver sa structure. Mais ce qui est important ici, c'est que cette dialectique représente le moment d'intersection entre la communauté identitaire et les structures politiques.

Au-delà de ces éléments l'argumentation qu'il nous propose, Sergiu Mișcoiu offre une perspective nouvelle sur débats actuels qui concernent la nation. Si beaucoup des auteurs affirment que l'époque de la nation est finie à cause de l'effondrement de l'Etat, l'élément principal qui a assuré sa reproduction, l'auteur nous démontre que nation ne représente pas seulement une certaine étape de la communauté. Les phénomènes contemporains qui affectent les nations, tels la globalisation ou la régionalisation, ne doivent pas être analysés comme étant des aspects sociologiques autonomes, mais comme des processus dont l'intelligibilité réside dans les structures de la communauté politique.