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CONSTANTIN DOBROGEANU-GHEREA: WRONG TIME, WRONG FACE, WRONG PLACE¹

Michael Shafir*

Abstract

Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea might have become an internationally famous socialist thinker and/or one of the founding fathers of the sociology of knowledge. He became neither, and this was largely due to his having settled in a country where socialism was regarded as a "foreign plant" and where his Jewish origins were a serious hindrance, of which he was keenly aware. Advocating assimilation, Gherea was not a Zionist. Advocating gradual socio-economic development, he was suspicious of Leninist voluntarism. There is a striking resemblance between Gherea and "young Karl Marx", to whose writings he is unlikely to have had access. His perceptions of the role intellectuals play in society place him along such later figures as Antonio Gramsci, Karl Mannheim or Roberto Michels.

In May 1990, some six months after the toppling of the Communist regime in Romania, I paid a first visit to Bucharest, the town where I was born. In the twenty-nine years that had passed since I had emigrated from the country, a lot had certainly changed, and as far as I could tell, nothing had changed for the better. The city had doubled in size, and I would have been certainly lost in any of the new typical communist neighborhoods that had sprung up like mushrooms after rain and, just like them, looked exactly the same: some larger, some smaller, and all full of mud. The city-center, on the other hand, looked quite familiar, but triggered in me a strange, oneiric feeling: I knew I had been there before, but faces were different; I understood the language people were using, yet pronunciation

¹ This article uses, amends and updates Shafir, 1984b, 1985a, and 1985b.

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seemed to have changed and linguistic violence somehow lingered in the air. The buildings around the seat of the Central Committee of the former Romanian Communist Party (PCR) were bearing the scars of the still-unclarified events that followed the flight from the Central Committee roof of communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, executed after a sham-trial on 25 December 1989, three-days after his ignoble departure. The shooting had been attributed to “terrorists” faithful to the former PCR leader, but, strangely enough, the Central Committee building, where the new leadership had gathered, was nearly untouched. Right across, at the corner of what was now called Revolution Square and the Dem I. Dobrescu street, laid one of the most affected buildings. I was told the building used to serve as a Securitate (communist secret police) citadel for Ceaușescu personal guard. The street’s name had been recently altered, and it now bore the name of a former Bucharest mayor. When the events that brought about Ceaușescu dismissal were taking place, the street used to be called Onești. The word has a double meaning: on one hand, it designates a town in eastern Romania; on the other hand, it also means “the honest ones.”

The reader is probably wondering by now what could possibly be the connection between this article’s title and its author’s autobiographical and geographical reminiscences. It is time to clarify this point: on Dobrescu street, at that time, was the main office of the historical Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR). I was heading at the time I first came into contact with these geographical marks to interview Constantin Avramescu, first PSDR deputy chairman (I was then working on an article on Romania’s post-communist political parties). Both the PSDR and Avramescu are since dead. The latter of age, the former of impotence, leading to its being swallowed up by for the second time in history by a much larger political “fish.” Whereas in 1948 the PSDR was forced to merge with the PCR (at that time called Romanian Workers’ Party [PMR]), on 15 June 2001 the PSDR was merged into the main leftist political formation, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (Stoica, 2004, p. 87), a chief-inheritor of the PCR’s outlook, wealth and personnel. But unlike in 1948, when the PSDR had been deprived of its name, in 2001 it was “merely” deprived of its identity: instead of joining the larger “sister-party” under a new name as in 1948, in 2001 it was the “sister-party” that took up the denomination of the PSDR. Times had certainly changed: in 1948, Romania was embracing the Stalinist Soviet model, in 2001 it was “chic” to pose as a western

democracy. Or had they? In the interior courtyard of the reborn PSDR headquarters in Bucharest I passed by a bust of a bald, goateed gentleman. I asked Avramescu whom did the bust represent, "Oh, he replied, it is Dobrogeanu-Gherea. We saved it from destruction. Many people believed it represented Lenin and wanted to smash it."

While Gherea's physical traits might have reminded one of Lenin, the resemblance certainly stopped there. The posthumous socialist thinker's fate is to a great extent a repetition of the story of his life. He was, and continues to be, the wrong person, at the wrong time, in the wrong place, as a famous Ella Fitzgerald tune would have described him. Who was Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea? Why were his person, work and legacy subjected to so many ordeals and misinterpretations, and why do they continue to be so are among the main questions that this article attempts to clarify. To do so, it first briefly reviews some biographical details and it raises the question of the importance for Gherea of his Jewish roots. Second, it reviews the isolation of Dobrogeanu-Gherea as reflected in his approach to literary criticism and the political premises of his literary production, while at the same time pointing out that this isolation was by no means a matter of simplistic anti-Semitism among his ideational opponents. Finally, the article reviews the pioneering contributions of Gherea to the sociology of knowledge, which remain to this day practically unknown.

A Jew and a Country in Search of Identity

Born as Solomon Katz in the Ukrainian village of Slavinka (Ekaterionoslavsk district) in 1855, Gherea first set foot in Romania when he was twenty years of age. By that time, he was on the run from the Czarist secret police, the *okhrana*. Already during his high-school times in Kharkov, he had become involved in the *narodnik* movement. In 1875, when he first arrived in what was to become his country of adoption Gherea was totally unfamiliar with the country's language, culture or traditions. Yet he would eventually become the head of a school of literary criticism, produce one of the most incisive analyses of the country's social and historical evolution, and even earn a decoration for cultural merits from the

authorities, which he refused to accept as a matter of principle.² He did not intend in 1875 to settle down in what were still called the Romanian Principalities. Gherea traveled on to Switzerland, but was entrusted by the movement in which he was active with smuggling revolutionary literature into neighboring Russia and had to soon return. The 1877-8 Russian-Turkish war marked a traumatic experience, for the *okhrana's* "long arm," now present in the principalities alongside Czarist troops, finally reached him. Although he then carried a false American passport under the name of Robert Jinks, the Czarist secret police abducted him and Solomon Katz landed in the notorious Petropavlovsk fortress, being later banished to Menzen, on the shores of the White Sea. One year later, he managed to escape via Norway, London, Paris and Vienna, and by September 1879 he was back to Romania.³ His wife, Sonia, was at that time expecting their second child, Alexandru (Sasha) (Ornea, 1982, p. 142).

It is very probable that Solomon Katz's encounter with Sonia Parchevska, the sixteen-years-old daughter of a Jewish-Polish refugee but a Romanian citizen by birth, greatly influenced his decision to make Romania his adopted home-country, as witnessed by the petition addressed by Sonia to the local authorities following his abduction, in which the core argument was based on her citizenship (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, pp. 339-40). The petition apparently had some effect, for when the Norwegian authorities inquired about the identity of their unexpected guest", the authorities' reply was sympathetic (Ornea, 1982, pp. 141-2). In view of these personal experiences, it is hardly surprising that Gherea turned into a bitter foe of "Europe's gendarme," as Karl Marx and many others called Russia.⁴ Indeed, when in 1916 Romania once more found herself allied with Russia,

² Cf. his interview on the occasion in Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. III, p. 513.

³ Gherea described this experience in an article first published in 1907, as well as in letters addressed to poet Dimitrie Anghel, as well as in letters addressed to his daughter and son-in-law, Ștefania and Paul Zarifopol. Cf. "Amintiri din trecutul îndepărtat" in Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 388-400 and Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, pp.3-4, 109.

⁴ Cf. his articles "Politica externă" in Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II (pp. 396-409), "Un semn bun," Vol. III, pp. 90-4, "Asupra socialismului în țările înapoiate," Vol. V, pp. 43-75, "Conflictul româno-bulgar," *ibid.*, pp.83-118, "Social-democrația și epoca cadrilateră," *ibid.*, pp.119-158, "Despre oligarhia română," *ibid.*, pp. 176-231, "Război sau neutralitate," *ibid.*, pp. 237-76 and *Neoiobăgia: Opere complete, ibid.* Vol. IV, pp. 40-2.

Gherea thought it wiser to leave the country temporarily, for, as he put it in a letter in 1909, by then he had learned that an involuntary visit to Russia was easy enough, but the return home was a lot more difficult (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, p. 4). Indeed, other refugees from Russia, such as Dr. Nicolae Russel (Nicolae K. Sudzilovski)⁵ or Dr. Nicolae Zubcu Codreanu⁶ shared the same sentiment and apprehensions (Shafir, 1984b, p. 298). Foremost among these was Constantin Stere, who shared with Gherea a *narodnicist* past and enforced banishment in Russia, but unlike him, would travel ideologically to other shades of the Romanian political spectrum. Stere went as far as to oppose Romania's entry into the Great War on the side of the Entente, advocating instead an alliance with Germany, as he believed Russia was, and would for ever remain, Romania's arch-enemy (Ornea, 1989, pp. 21-129, 1991, pp. 7-138).

The outbreak of the 1917 revolution and the victory of the Bolsheviks produced no radical change in Gherea's attitude towards Russia. Unlike his Bulgarian-born friend and disciple Christian Rakovski—who in 1913 had condemned the Romanian bourgeois oligarchy for having "remained impassive before the annexation of Bessarabia" by Russia, but who, six years later, as a Bolshevik official, would deliver an ultimatum to Romania demanding the evacuation of Bessarabia *and* Bukovina, and plan the

⁵ Russel's life could easily make the subject of a Hollywood motion picture. Expelled from Romania in 1881, he settled down in Sofia as a general practitioner. He later emigrated to France, from whence he proceeded to the United States. By 1891, carrying now the name of Kauka Luchini, he was in Hawaii, where he became president of the Senate in a rebel-led armed insurrection. Following defeat, Sudzilovski-Russel-Luchini was once more on the run, and after a short spell during which he became the owner of a large sugar-plantation in a Pacific island, this unrepentant rebel arrived in Japan, where he became engaged in revolutionary propaganda among Russian prisoners of war. He met his death in China in 1930, at the age of 83, not before having re-married a Japanese of noble birth. Cf. Ornea, 1982, pp. 208-209 n. On Russel see also Petrescu, 1944, pp. 53-5, 63-9, 71, 177, 200, 343-4 and Hitchins, 1994, pp. 128-9.

⁶ No kin of Romania's Iron Guard leader, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Cf. on him Ornea, 1982, pp. 27, 85, 87, 93-5, 97-101, 106-7, 110, 113, 115-7, 120-23, 125-7, 131,133, 180-8, 194,197,206, 384, as well as Petrescu, pp. 52-4, 67, 71, 343-4 and Hitchins, pp. 128-9.

country's invasion for joining-up with Béla Kún's forces⁷—Gherea ventured no sign of changed national loyalties. The difference most likely stemmed from the two leaders' opposite orientation on the side of the emerging socialist barricade. Having evolved from vaguely Bakuninist positions to Marxism, Gherea was essentially a Plekhanovist. He always insisted on the indispensability of the bourgeois revolution and of industrialization as prerequisites of socialism. Rakovski, of course, was first a Leninist and then a Trotskyite, for which he would pay with his life under Stalinist rule. The same fate would await Sasha Dobrogeanu-Gherea, one of the founders of the RCP, who met his death in the Stalinist Gulag in 1938 (Tismăneanu, 2003, p. 283, n.71). Unlike either of them, Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea seemed to have a remarkable vision on what revolution would bring about in the absence of its prerequisites. Socialism, he wrote in November 1919, was not supposed to "organize starvation and a glistening poverty." Shortly before his death in 1920, he warned—in a manner reminiscent of Marx's *Early Writings* and of the *Critique of the Gotha Program*—that, should the endeavor be attempted before such evolution had been brought into fruition, society might "develop regressively, towards medieval society, towards primitive communism."⁸ It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why, upon coming to power, the then Soviet-orientated Romanian communist leadership castigated the "Menshevik" orientation of Gherea and of the early Romanian socialists (Gheorghiu-Dej, 1952, pp. 518-19). Although Gherea-the-literary-critic was used in the 1950s in juxtaposition to "bourgeois" literary criticism, Gherea-the-socialist-theoretician was denounced as late as 1961 (Gheorghiu-Dej, 1961, pp.426-27). It was only in late 1970s and early 1980s that the official PCR publishing house Editura Politică would release an 8-volume edition of Gherea's complete works. By then, national communism required that Romania demonstrate that socialist thought had ample roots in the country's tradition. But this, of course, was precisely what socialist thought

⁷ *România muncitoare*, 3 February 1913, as quoted in Clark, 1927, p. 185; Degras, 1983, pp. 155-7; Conte, 1975, Vol. I, pp. 240-243. On Rakovski cf. also Shafir, 1985a, pp. 9, 11, 14-21, 23, and Tismăneanu, 2003, pp. 42-5, 50, 61-2, 74, 124.

⁸ Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, "Dezorienteare: Tot in chestiunea interviului meu" Vol. V, p. 326. Compare with Marx, 1963, p.153, as well as Marx, Engels, 1969, pp. 323-5.

lacked in Romania. Rather than being an exemplification of the rule, Dobrogeanu-Gherea was an outstanding exception.

These positions are all the more remarkable, as Gherea is unlikely to have had access to “young Marx’s” writings. As David McLellan notes, the essays published in 1844 in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* “were long out of print and forgotten”, and the 1845-published *Holy Family* (on which the Romanian thinker could hypothetically draw) was such a rarity that Marx himself did not possess a copy till 1867 (McLellan, 1972, pp. 266, 269). It was not until 1927-32 that D. Rjazanov edited a complete edition of Marx’s *Early Writings* (a partial reprint was produced by Marx’s biographer Franz Mehring in 1902), and by then Gherea had been dead for several years.

It is therefore natural to wonder whether the Romanian Marxist thinker did not make the wrong choice when he returned to Romania from Switzerland. He apparently chose the wrong place, at the wrong time. Had he stayed in the West, his name might have become widely known among socialist circles. It was not to be. As Gherea wrote shortly after the death of his friend, playwright Ion Luca Caragiale, “Poor and unfortunate are our small, underdeveloped countries, but poorer and more unfortunate the great men born there” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, p. 41⁹). Caragiale had moved to Berlin in 1904, having left Romania in disgust, but the words could stand as an epitaph on Gherea’s own grave. Just like Caragiale, who died in 1912, Gherea was still pondering in 1905-1906 whether to move to Germany (Ornea, 1982, pp. 408-10).

One would, indeed, search in vain for even a single paragraph dedicated to Romania in Leszek Kolakowski’s seminal three-volume (1978) work on Marxism’s main currents. For Romanians, who were just beginning to forge their national identity and lacked a proletariat in the Western sense of the word, a doctrine preaching the withering away of the state had little chance of gaining popularity. When Gherea first came to Romania, the principalities had hardly been united for less than two decades and

⁹ The letter (addressed to V. G. Korolenko) refers to Russia and Romania as belonging to the same category.

Transylvania was still part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. By the time of his death, the nation-building process was just in the throgs of birth. This meant that options other than those based on nationalism stood little chance (Livezeanu, 1995). The Romanian intellectual elite - unavoidably functioning as chief socializer into the new national identity—perceived socialism, as Gherea would put it, as an “imported exotic plant” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 216-7; 1976-83, Vol. I, pp. 369-74, 386-94, 404-7 and Vol. II, pp. 60-61). The émigré from Russia born as Solomon Katz was considered by many to be its chief prophet. The accusation was not without foundation, for, as Gherea confessed in a letter to Karl Kautsky in 1894, when he had “first arrived in Romania as a Russian refugee, not even the word ‘socialism’ was known” there (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, p. 35). After some time spent in the country in Gherea’s company, Pavel Axelrod had predicted that “not even the greatest optimist would dare entertain hopes that modern socialist ideas could take root” here (cited in Haupt, 1967, p. 31). Yet Gherea did not lack notoriety among international socialist personalities. He had met in person Engels, Axelrod, Georgi Plekhanov, Trotsky and Vera Zasulich, and regularly corresponded with others, among them Karl Kautsky.

In vain did Gherea attempt to demonstrate that the accusations of “cosmopolitanism” or “rootlessness” were irrelevant, pointing out in one of his articles that their proponents belonged to the bourgeoisie, which “wears foreign suits, studies with foreign books...convalesces at foreign health-resorts and in exchange, exports...the national nutrition to the cosmopolitan market, while the national producer, the peasant, is starving (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. III, p. 41. Emphasis in original). In the absence of any real proletarian electorate, and both unable and unwilling to cope with the stigma of “rootlessness”, the handful of intellectuals who in 1893 had constituted the backbone of the Romanian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (PSDMR) joined the National Liberal Party in 1899, in an act later to be known as the “treason of the Generous”. Significantly, this splinter group originally decided to change the party’s name into *National Democratic* and was opposing demands to extend suffrage rights to Jews (Institutul de Studiistorice, 1969, pp. 684, 689, 701-7). The rebirth of a socialist party in Romania had to await a decade.

What chiefly made Gherea's views unacceptable among the bulk of Romania's intelligentsia and political class of his time were his views on the nation. The "family-nation"—a concept he attributed in 1886 to the Romanian Liberal revolutionaries of 1848— was in his eyes but a "sentimental ideological utopian fallacy" which "never existed, does not exist and never will exist" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II, p. 134). These differences were not only a matter of ideological options. They had immediate consequences for practical politics too, and particularly led to clashes concerning the most important issue of the times—the feasibility of a "Greater Romania" and its envisaged ethnic and geographical borders. Gherea opposed Romania's entry into the Second Balkan War in 1913, seeing it as an imperialist reflection of the ruling oligarchy's internal policies; instead, he supported the Rakovski plan for a Balkan federation, as a possible solution to the region's border conflicts. In the wake of the war, Gherea condemned the incorporation of the "Cadrilater" into Romania, warning that the conflict with Bulgaria would only play in the hands of the Czarist and—at various stages and for a variety of reasons, all somehow connected with his anti-Russian views—advocated either neutrality or an alliance with Austria-Hungary against the "Eastern menace." Although a supporter of the Romanian claims in Transylvania, once the hostilities of the First World War had broken out, he rebuked the voices calling for an immediate march on Transylvania, warning that, at worst, the Habsburg Empire's designs on Romania could lead to a temporary loss of *state independence*, whereas an alliance with Russia would endanger Romanian *nationhood*. Although both the Russian and the Austrian-Hungarian empires were multinational, he wrote, Transylvanian Romanians had been capable of safeguarding national rights and a separate identity, whereas an eventual incorporation into the Czarist empire - as demonstrated by the 1878 Bessarabian, and by other precedents—would be followed by enforced Russification (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. V, pp.237-76). Once more, it is quite obvious why Romania's Stalinist rulers of the late 1940s-early 1960s, subservient as they were to the "Great Friend from the East" could not possibly allow Gherea's political writings to circulate. What is remarkable, however, is also Gherea's anticipation of the difference social science would make later that century between the processes of "nation

building” and “state building” and his warning that both processes could be “unbuilt”.

Such stances led to an interpellation in Parliament, where deputy Gheorghe D. Dobrescu accused Gherea of lack of loyalty towards the host-nation (and of personal corruption as well), demanding the revocation of the citizenship he had acquired in 1890 (Ornea, 1982, p. 449). Though without further repercussions (after all, such foremost “genuine” Romanians as Titu Maiorescu and Stere had also advocated an alliance with the Central Powers), the incident was symptomatic. Already in 1888 he had been forced to request an audience with Maiorescu, at that time a minister in the Conservative government, fearing expulsion on grounds of socialist agitation. Remarkably, Maiorescu, who had been the target of Gherea’s attacks in polemics that would become a milestone in Romanian literary criticism, assured him that there was no intention to expel Gherea from the country (Ornea, 1982, p. 359). Yet the legal mechanism for such steps was not lacking: a “Law on the status of foreigners,” adopted in 1881 in the wake of socialist demonstrations commemorating the Paris Commune, had already been applied to Axelrod and Dr. Russel, and would be invoked against Rakovski in 1907 (Ornea, 1982, p. 207, Haupt and Marie, 1974, pp. 393-5, Conte, 1975, Vol. I, pp. 93-97). Furthermore, Gherea had grounds to fear that he might be expelled just because he was Jewish. His reputation as man of letters would not have stopped such intentions: In 1885, the authorities had expelled Moses Gaster, a reputed pioneer of comparative ethnography¹⁰, alongside a plethora of Jewish journalists. And while Gaster (like Gherea) was engaged in the struggle for the naturalization of Jews—though not as a socialist—other prominent Jewish intellectuals would soon follow suit despite of having opted for baptism. This, for instance, was the case of philologists Haiman Tiktin—the author of the first Romanian etymological dictionary— and Lazăr Șăineanu, winner of an important prize of the Romanian Academy of Sciences (Iancu, 1996, pp. 214-15, 277; Voicu, 2003, pp. 139-41). Against this background, it is all the more remarkable that though Gherea had polemized against Maiorescu’s views of aesthetics (vulgarly later presented by the communists as “Art for Art’s Sake”), he supported Gherea’s naturalization in the Chamber of Deputies

¹⁰ On Gaster cf. Eskenasy, 1998, Stanciu, 2003 and 2004.

— to the dismay of its anti-Semitic opponents (Ornea, 1982, pp. 31-33, 338-340).

Incidents involving attempts to establish a connection between Gherea's Jewish origins and his socialist outlooks repeatedly occurred during his lifetime. In one of the more ostentatious instances, poet Alexandru Vlahuță, who once had been close to socialist circles, wrote in winter 1904 that he "found consolation" in the sentence which had enabled him to "abandon" the [socialist] ship in time, before she had sailed for the ocean's wilderness, for the shore was still in sight and I could jump into the first life-saving boat."¹¹ In May that year, Vlahuță distributed a ferociously anti-Semitic pamphlet directed against Gherea, with pornographic inscriptions in Yiddish added as ornament (Drimer, 1923, pp. 51-53). Gherea did not react. In fact, he seemed to be scared. Likewise, when in 1911 his Jewish socialist friend Emmanuel Socor attempted to enroll his expertise on behalf of the defense, in a libel suit brought before the courts by the "founding father" of modern Romanian anti-Semitism, A. C. Cuza, whose *opus magnum* Socor had revealed as crude plagiarism, Gherea did his utmost to eschew the assignment (Socor, 1911; Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, pp. 83, 85, 139¹²).

In his own literary work, Gherea occasionally made use of the Jewish stereotype, and at times such use also slid into other productions. It was crystal-clear to him, for example, that Jews were—and should be depicted as—cowards. In 1890, he found unsatisfactory a *finale* of a short story written by his friend I. L. Caragiale because, instead of being molested or killed, a Jew turns into a torturer of his would-be executioner. "It goes without saying," he explained, "that all nations have their cowards, but surely nowhere is the sentiment as common as among Jews" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 92-8). Nearly twenty years later, the European powers were reminding him of "the Jew in that anecdote who, finding himself at loss...provokes and threatens everyone, because he is so terribly

¹¹ Cited by literary critic Horia Bratu in his notes to Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. II, p. 469n.

¹² Socor was eventually cleared of the libel. This was not the only instance in which Cuza's "scholastic" work proved to be a forgery. One of his more famous anti-Semitic pamphlets was plagiarized after Édouard Drumont.

scared" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. III, p. 155). Were instances such as these a typical case of self-projection triggered by the thinker's own personal situation? Gherea appears to have been indeed inhibited by his ethnic origins. Occasionally, he was even willing to make what must have been humiliating efforts to hide them. It is not irrelevant that the adopted name that was to make him famous in Romania—Gherea— derived from the Hebrew *Ger*, i.e. stranger, or foreigner, as revealed by his close assistant and collaborator Barbu Lăzăreanu (Haupt, 1967, p. 31). His Romanian biographer, Zigu Ornea (1982, p. 29), seems to have been unaware of Lăzăreanu's testimony, but reaches the same conclusion. In 1892, Gherea wrote to historian, politician and literary critic Nicolae Iorga (founder of the so-called "sowist" — Sămănătorism — school) that his name at birth had been Constantin Cass—thus clearly indulging into an attempt to efface the genealogically obvious Katz (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, p. 33). In his application for citizenship, on the other hand, the literary critic indicated his name was Constantin Cassu Dobrogeanu. According to historian Georges Haupt, in the naturalization papers submitted to the authorities Gherea gave his name as "Cass" to conceal his Jewish identity; but his biographer writes that "Cassu" was a Romanianized formulation of Katz and that Gherea was aware it would be useless to hide it, as his record was well-known by the *okhrana* and at the Russian diplomatic representation in Bucharest. That information was leaked to opponents of his naturalization, and the newspaper *Poporul* [The People] was revealing on 27-28 June 1890 that the name under which naturalization had been requested was "nothing but the pseudonym of a kike raised in Bessarabia, namely Nukim Katz." The source of the information was disclosed to be the Russian legation, and *Poporul* wondered why should "yet another side-curved" citizen on whose loyalty to the Romanian nation one could not count, and who on top had a nihilist past, be received in its midst (Ornea, 1982, p. 31).

The Commissar, the Lotus and the Latke: The Social Democrat, the Literary Critic, the Jew

In 1945, Arthur Koestler published in London a book that juxtaposed the "Yogi" and the "Commissar." The book was divided into three parts. The first two, "Meanderings" and "Exhortations", were essays

on literature, politics and problems of his time. The third part, "Explanations," was a well-documented survey of the Soviet intellectual experiment by the author of *Darkness at Noon*. The first essay began by imagining "an instrument which would enable us to break up patterns of social behavior as the physicist breaks up a beam of rays." Such a "sociological spectroscopy" would "spread out under the diffraction-grating the rainbow-colored spectrum of all possible attitudes of life." According to Koestler, on "one end of the spectrum, obviously the infra-red end, we would see the Commissar". He is the one who "believed in Change from Without," who is persuaded that "all the pests of humanity, including constipation and the Oedipus complex, can and will be cured by Revolution", by "a radical reorganization of the system of production and distribution of goods." The Commissar is also convinced that "this end justifies the use of all means, including violence, ruse, treachery and poison;" He is no less persuaded "that logical reasoning is an unfailing compass and the universe a kind of very large clockwork in which a very large number of electrons once set into motion will forever revolve in their predictable orbit." In other words, Koestler's Commissar is a strict determinist and in the writer's imaginary "sociological spectroscopy" the end at which the Commissar stands "has the lowest frequency of vibrations...but it conveys the maximum amount of heat" (Koestler, 1971, p. 9).

At the other end of the spectrum, however, "the waves become so short and of such high-frequency that the eye no longer sees them, colorless, warmthless but all-penetrating." It is at this end that the Yogi "crouches" as it melts away in the ultra-violet. The Yogi "has no objection to calling the universe a clockwork, but he thinks that it could be called, with about the same amount of truth, a musical box or a fishpond" (Koestler, 1971, pp. 9-10). One learns from Koestler that "All attempts to change the nature of man by Commissar methods have so far failed" but also that "The attempts to produce Change from Within on a mass-scale were equally unsuccessful" (Koestler, 1971, pp. 10, 11). "Obviously," he concludes, "the prospects for the masses of common people are not brighter under this inverted Machiavellianism [Yogi] than under the leadership of the Commissars." Koestler's way out of a dilemma in which

the two adversaries “may call it quit” (p. 12) need not preoccupy us beyond this point. For Gherea never acted like Koestler’s Commissar, nor has he ever *dovened* [prayed] while murmuring to himself some exotic socialist mantra. A skilled pamphleteer, nay, even a musketeer always ready for turning words into swords, he was as far as can be imagined from those who “organize saintliness by exterior means,” —to use once more Koestler’s depiction of the Yogi. And he insisted that what Koestler calls Commissar action would lead to counter-Utopias.

So who *was* Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea? If one were to stick to Koestler’s oriental metaphor, I believe the Romanian socialist thinker’s specter was bipolar, though not necessarily polarized. At one end there was Gherea-the-Lotus-man, and at the other Gherea-the *Lotke*-eater. The Lotus embodies both preoccupation with aesthetics *and* with social justice. The *Lotke* (a potato pancake served at Hanukah feasts) was the main hinder Gherea encountered on his way to rejoicing the Lotus. Gherea definitely did not like *Lotkes*. But as a Man-of-Lotus he had to stand up for the rights of those who believed they could eat *lotkes* and *matzoth* and still be loyal citizens of Romania. This subchapter illustrates some aspects of the clash triggered by the two spectral poles of Gherea’s personality.

In the realm of aesthetics, Gherea’s main divergences emerged in opposition to both those who were either inclined to universalize rabble patriotism (and who were just one contingent among the day’s Romanian literati) or to those who would appraise his analytical work.

Yet it was not just anti-Semitism as such that triggered adversity towards Gherea, but also his refusal to forego his socialist credo. The relationship with Stere was emblematic. The Generous, to which Stere belonged, would therefore gradually turn into victimizers of their former friend. Albeit never formally a member of the Romanian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), Stere had been close to the party’s leadership and to Gherea, sharing with many RSDWP founding members *narodnik* influences brought from Bessarabia. However, Stere would gradually evolve in nationalist directions. Attempting to justify this transformation, he explained that young intellectuals who arrived in Romania with noble

socialist ideas valid for other environments had founded the RSDWP, only to realize after a while that they had been militating for a practically nonexistent social class. Such intellectuals, he wrote, were “spiritually foreign” to the people in the midst of whom they lived. They followed the “tyranny of abstract formulas” while the peasant “in vain keeps waiting for the liquidation of ancient debts.” While *narodnicist* ideas were still powerfully present in Stere, he faulted the “tyranny of abstract formulas” with another cardinal sin, namely the disregard of “national essence” — a *leit motif* later to be embraced by Romanian extreme right thought:

I do not understand a socialist...if he feels no...compassion for genuine people around him; *I do not believe* in the sincerity of a fighter for a juster and more humane a social structure if he tells me “let the whole Romanian nation perish, as long as socialism is victorious,” if he does not comprehend...that people do not exist for socialism, but rather socialism for the people...*I do not admit* the identification of *internationalism* with *nationalism*, as this disregards the people’s vital political, economic and cultural interests (cited in Ornea, 1972, p. 42. Emphasis in original).

The solution, according to Stere’s “poporanist” (populist) doctrines, rested in avoiding the evils of capitalist industrialization and in creating a society with institutions corresponding to the peasant national character, and serving rural interests. Little wonder, then, that Stere would eventually land in the National Peasant Party.

Such disputes as that in which the socialists confronted the “poporanists” had an echo larger than one would expect, for, just as Gherea, who launched in 1881 a socio-cultural review called *Contemporanul* (a translation of the Russian *Sovremel'nik*), his ideological adversaries were also combining politics with literature and an interest in the arts. Gherea antagonized not only the “poporanists”, but even more so the nascent (yet increasingly powerful) *Volkish*-oriented “sowists”. In his opinion, the partisans of this literary current were drawing inspiration

from an imaginary idyllic past and evincing a falsified perception of patriotism:

When in our national and patriotic dramas of the last [1877-1878] war, soldiers...peasants in the Grivița fortifications, utter patriotic speeches, these, of course, are not art but a parody of art, because they are lies. The Romanian peasant is not in the habit of pronouncing patriotic speeches anywhere, least of all when he dies of hunger and bullets. Similarly, in our historic-patriotic national dramas, the heroes utter a plethora of patriotic words, such as "our country", "Romania," "Romanian bravery," which seemingly never stop flowing. But such types are not real, they are talking engines...Their speeches could have been pronounced by phonographs [and with an equal measure of verisimilitude] (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 30).

He dubbed "reactionary democratism" the idealization of the "organic" unity of peasantry and gentry, typical of the "sowists," and criticized the *Weltanschauung* of Romania's national poet, Mihai Eminescu, precisely on those grounds that had determined the "sowists" to idolize the writer. Eventually, this stance would provoke one of the foremost literary historians of the interwar period, George Călinescu, into writing that "like many Jews," Gherea was "incapable of contemplating ideas" and hence unable to "overcome his foreignness" (Călinescu, 1941, pp. 485-6).

Gherea was and remained painfully sensitive to the accusation of "foreignness," which apparently influenced to no little extent his political activity. In a letter addressed in 1902 to his daughter and son-in-law, Ștefania and Paul Zarifopol, he complained "in our country I am, and always was, in a false situation, for I am not a native Romanian, and *after all, I remain but a foreigner.*" (Emphasis mine). He went on explaining:

To be capable of standing up alone, against everyone else, one must by all means be a native, one must enjoy secure civic and

national rights. Otherwise, any ne'er-do-well [secătură], who nonetheless was lucky enough to be born a native, has the right to ask you "But who invited you to mingle in our affairs? If you don't like it here, go back to wherever you came from"...Consequently, I sense perfectly well what should be done in this country, what should be said, and how important it would be to speak up, but I cannot do it myself. I must be silent and squash that which I should be...shouting from the top of my lungs in the middle of the street (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, p. 113).

Ten years on, in a letter addressed to Russian *narodnicist* writer V.G. Korolenko, Gherea complained that the Romanian government and the ruling classes were keeping the bulk of the Jewish population "in a state of total political slavery." While the Jews "fulfill all the civic and political duties of the Romanian citizen", they "have absolutely no political rights." With but a few exceptions, he added, Romania's intellectuals were just as anti-Semitic as the Russian intelligentsia, and possibly even more so. As political leaders, these intellectuals were guilty of bad faith, he said, for, following Western pressure, Romania had undertaken to enfranchise its Jewish population in exchange for recognition of its independence. In practice, however, citizenship had been extended at a rate of three Jews every year, which meant that the obligation "shall be fulfilled in the course of the forthcoming one hundred thousand years" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1972, pp. 41-2). Obviously, Gherea was referring to the famous Article 7 in the 1866 Constitution, which stipulated that only foreigners of the Christian faith could be naturalized in Romania. The article was amended in October 1879, in the wake of the Berlin Congress, which made recognition of Romanian independence conditional on granting civil rights to foreigners regardless of confessional belonging; yet instead of granting the naturalization right collectively, it did so only individually, provided the applicant could prove residence in the country for at least 10 years, as well as "demonstrate by deeds his activities are useful to the country." Furthermore, each individual application required the approval by parliament by special law, which practically meant the 1866 Constitution amendment's many opponents could procrastinate

endlessly (Iancu, 1996, pp. 173-205, text of amended Article 7 on p. 200). As Gherea put it in 1913, right after the Second Balkan War and the annexation of Dobrudja by Romania, the government wished to enforce the “Romanianization” of some 300,000 Bulgarians, while a quarter of million Jews, otherwise fully integrated in the country’s social and economic life, had to make desperate efforts to acquire Romanian citizenship. The situation was of “such inconceivable absurdity,” he added in a sarcastic note, that one was tempted into concluding that the entire affair was “nothing but a malicious invention of international Jewry” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. V, pp.168-9).¹³

Apart from Maiorescu, Gherea’s naturalization request was also backed in parliament by Petre P. Carp and by Theodor Rosetti (Ornea, 1982, pp. 30-31). All three belonged to the “Junimist” school, most of whose members were also political pillars of the Conservative Party. Ideologically, they all shared mistrust in the attempts of the Liberals—and, of course, the Socialists—to emulate Western models to Romanian realities. Maiorescu spoke in this sense of “forms without essence”. According to the memoirs of Junimea member Gheorghe Panu, with the exception of Carp, all these prominent Romanians shared one more thing: anti-Semitism (G. Panu, *Amintiri de la “Junimea” din Iași*, as quoted in Petreu, 2006, pp. 72-3). As Marta Petreu demonstrates, the generalization was grossly exaggerated. While Maiorescu—in a display of what I call “utilitarian anti-Semitism” (Shafir, 2001b, pp. 419-20, 2002, p. 57)—in 1879 backed legislation taking the wind out of Jewish emancipation’s sails¹⁴ (Cf. *supra*), his gentleman-like support of Gherea’s naturalization, as well as numerous other instances in which he (like Carp) supported gradual Jewish emancipation and integration, hardly put him in the category of economic anti-Semites of the likes of Mihai Eminescu and Vasile

¹³ Between 1879 and 1900, Parliament approved the naturalization of only 85 persons; 104 were naturalized between 1901 and 1911 (Iancu, 1996, p. 212).

¹⁴ He did so, as Petreu shows, under the pressure of street demonstrations against the Berlin Treaty provisions mandating the amending of Article 7 in the 1866 Constitution. In his memoirs, Maiorescu (1994, p. 112) nonetheless called the wording of that article by the 1866 Constitutional Assembly “thoughtless” and “bound to be punished at some point” [*nechibzuita redactare a articolului 7 trebuia să se pedepsească odată*].

Alecsandri, not to speak of Romania's first racial anti-Semite, the philosopher and historian Vasile Conta (Petreu, 2006).

In his major work, *Neo-Serfdom* [*Neoiobăgia*], Gherea refuted both the *poporanist* and the Junimist argument of "forms without essence". To do this, however, he proceeded in a Marxist manner, i.e., adopting the Junimist epistemology and producing its critique "from inside out." Gherea's theory concerning the evolution towards capitalism in underdeveloped nations, which constitutes the backbone of his argument in *Neo-Serfdom*, had been outlined as early as 1896, in his first theoretical pamphlet, "What Do Romania's Socialists Want". The Liberal revolutionaries of 1848, he claimed, had indeed imported from the West ideas which were "foreign" to local conditions, but, far from having committed a "crime," they had actually acted as the (mostly unconscious) tools of social evolution. History's *List der Vernunft*, to use Hegel's term, of necessity required that advanced capitalism should spread its influence in search of markets, whereby smaller, less-developed nations would benefit by being pushed into the modern world (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II, pp. 7-126). Without claiming that the underdeveloped nations of Europe had vegetated in a state of "oriental despotism", as Marx did in his critique of colonialism in Asia, Gherea's argument nonetheless stemmed from similar premises concerning modernization (Avineri, 1969). And from these premises Gherea was to prophesy in *Neo-Serfdom* that socialism would be brought to the underdeveloped countries of Eastern Europe on western wings. Gherea's theory, however, is closer to Immanuel Wallerstein's "World System" approach than is to Marx's views on the paradoxical benefits of colonialism (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979, 1980¹⁵).

The introduction of contemporary capitalist models in the Romanian principalities, indicated Gherea, had not been accompanied by corresponding social transformations. Whereas in Western Europe the introduction of a capitalist superstructure had in fact been an outcome of the process of economic growth, in states such as Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, the process had begun at the level of the superstructure, as a result

¹⁵ This is implicitly indicated in Chirot, 1976, pp. 132-6.

of the influence of the more developed nations. But it had also stopped there. The situation, he believed, was dissimilar to that of Russia, where the feudal superstructure, i.e. authoritarian rule, had not yet disappeared. Its special characteristic consisted in the gap between the *pays légal* and the *pays réel*. What is striking in this analysis is not merely its relevance for the past, but—one dares say—for the present. All one has to do to grasp this relevance is to substitute the protocapitalist superstructure of late 19th-early 20th century with the postcommunist superstructure of early 21st century. Was Gherea the first Romanian “analyst” of postcommunism? Moreover, was he the first “analyst” of Russian postcommunism, as one might conclude by juxtaposing Gherea’s *pays légal* vs. *pays réel* and Richard Pipes’ concept of “patrimonialism” (2005)?

Having outlined these historical developments, “What Do Romania’s Socialists Want” proceeded to lay down the future tasks of socialists at the local level, in a section unmistakably inspired by Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s *What Is To Be Done?*, and bearing the same title. But if the title was identical to Lenin’s book of similar inspiration (published, nevertheless, sixteen years later), the solution envisaged was totally different. Rather than planning Leninist tactics, the Romanian socialists copied the Erfurt Program of German social democracy (Ghelerter, 1980, p. 246), which Gherea had transposed to local conditions. Socialist activity, according to Gherea, should be directed at “pouring content” into empty “forms”; the “content,” should be bourgeois, however, though this would eventually further socialist aims as well. Romania’s socialists, as he put it in several articles in 1894-5, must be “legalists,” for strict adherence to the letter of bourgeois law meant universal suffrage, the extension of other civil rights, and land reform bringing capitalist forms of production to the countryside as soon as possible, all of which would hasten the approach of a socialist order (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. III, pp. 183-5, 186-210, 249-56). In other words, before the socialist order could be envisaged, the bourgeois order of things had to be universalized. Once more: the wrong face, at the wrong time, at the wrong place. Gherea was preaching universalism in a place obsessed with its emergent particularism; what is more, he was writing his own sentence for the first decade of communist rule, when the emulation of the Leninist

model would constitute the *sine qua non* of pseudo-Marxist Stalinist “political correctness.”

Intellectual Sociology in the Bud

Applying to Gherea the Leninist formula of “two cultures in one” (“we take *from each* national culture only its democratic and socialist elements; we take them *only* and *absolutely* in opposition to the bourgeois culture and the bourgeois nationalism of *each* nation”¹⁶) but doing precisely the opposite of what was claimed by the formula, Gherea’s legacy in the early communist period was subjected to selective exploitation. His polemics with Maiorescu on literature were blown out of proportion, aiming to justify Zhdanovist “socialist realism,¹⁷” while his social-democratic legacy was either criticized (cf. *supra*) or (as more often was the case) ignored. Yet at closer examination, Gherea-the-literary-critic¹⁸ is just as surprisingly innovative for his times as Gherea the socialist-theoretician is. It is within this latter framework that in 1891, in the second volume of his *Studies in Criticism*, that he published an article purposing to analyze the causes of pessimism in literature.¹⁹ Arguing against those who assumed pessimism to be basically an inborn inclination, the literary critic attributed the somber tones of such artistic output to socially determined conditions. Thus far, no Zhdanovist would raise objections. But one is immediately struck by Gherea’s echoing of “young Marx,” as well as by his pioneering of an academic discipline that was non-existent at the times he put his thoughts on paper. I have in mind the sociology of knowledge, of which, I dare claim, Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea is the still-unacknowledged

¹⁶ Lenin, 1970, pp. 43-4, citation from “Critical Remarks on the National Question”, 1913. Emphasis in original.

¹⁷ As Ion Ianoși (1996, p. 106) shows, Maiorescu, who was gradually leaving behind preoccupation with literature and the arts, hardly responded to Gherea at all and left this task to his many disciples.

¹⁸ This literary activity practically ceased in 1897, when Gherea began concentrating his publicist activities exclusively on social and political aspects.

¹⁹ “Cauza pesimismului în literatură și viață,” in Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I., pp. 129-61.

founding father. If there ever has been justification for the so-called Romanian "protochronism,"²⁰ it is Gherea that best provides it.

Modern (capitalist) society, according to Gherea, is above all characterized by de-personification. This affects the entire gist of human relationships and is the direct consequence of universal mercantilism. Modern man lives under a constant sense of dependency, of being unable to cast his own part in life, for, as all other things, his fate hinges on the division of labor and on the requirements of the market. Capitalist dependence is, however, qualitatively different from the master-servant relationship which characterizes medieval society, for under feudalism dependence was personal: "Medieval man dependent on the person of the feudal baron, on king or emperor." Even God, wrote Gherea, echoing Ludwig Feuerbach with whose writings he was familiar²¹, was "severe, punishing, powerful, and at the same time good and just." Deity was therefore a "combination of the real master, which any man could see before his [own] eyes, and the ideal master, which he wished he had." On the other hand, modern man's dependency is wholly impersonal:

He does not depend on a cruel master, who nonetheless would be a person, a human being. He depends on the social circumstances, on something undefined, very vague, faceless. And this dependency manifests itself throughout his life, step by step, and in most cases, man does not even understand on whom he depends or why.²²

To be sure, such faceless dependence does not affect the creative artist alone. "In any merchandize-producing society," Gherea wrote in 1892, "once produced, the goods escape the control of producers." Since the product "is destined for selling, for exchange, and not for the producer's

²⁰ A Romanian approach to universal culture reminiscent of the Stalinist attempt to transform all mankind's major achievements into Russian inventions. The protochronist school was based on the use and abuse of an article written in 1974 by literary critic Edgar Papu (ironically enough, a converted Jew!). Cf. Verdery, 1971, pp. 167-214.

²¹ Cf. his citation of, and elaboration on, Feuerbach's *Das Wesen der Christentums* in Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 137, 142 and "A. Vlahuță" in *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp.162-3.

²² Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 141-2.

own use, it leaves him and enters the world of merchandize" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, pp.18-9). This can have quite unexpected results for capitalist and worker alike. The former, for instance, might find the guns he has produced turned against himself. The latter might produce a highly sophisticated engine which would make him superfluous as producer. Capitalist division of labor, in any case, "transforms modern civilized man into a wheel of the enormous social machinery. The whole life of this wheel-individual depends on the totality of the social machinery: the individual himself is but a small screw in it, thereby depending on, but unable to control, it" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I., p. 251).

Modern man, in other words, is alienated man. Though Gherea never employed the term, the similarity to Marx's *Early Writings*—which, one must repeat, he could not possibly have read— is striking since it does not stop here. From whence the Romanian thinker drew his inspiration is impossible to establish. One possible source might have been the writings of the British romanticists and their echoes in the British labor movement.²³ Gherea's "faceless dependency" and his "wheel individuum" recall Thomas Carlyle's "universe," which is "all void of life, or purpose, of volition, even of hostility," that "huge, dead, immeasurable Steam-engine, rolling out on its dead indifference" (Carlyle, 1907, p. 133). Yet, again, Carlyle is never mentioned in Gherea's writings. On the other hand, the same *esprit du temps*, in one variation or another, was present in the writings of Shelley and of Thomas Hardy, whom he greatly admired, and *mutatis mutandis*, in positions adopted by Carlyle's disciple, the Labor leader James Keir Hardie, whose pacifist stances Gherea applauded.²⁴ It is possible (though by no means certain) that via his readings of these, and perhaps other sources, Gherea managed to bridge between Feuerbach and

²³ Cf. I am grateful to my friend Professor Jonathan Mendilow, Rider University, for drawing my attention to this source.

²⁴ Cf. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp.301, 305 for Shelley and *ibid.*, p. 344 for Hardy. For Hardie cf. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. V., p. 82. Although the British Labor leader is mentioned only in his pacifist stance, it is almost unconceivable that Gherea, who was familiar with practically every line written by Western socialist contemporaries, would not be acquainted with the British socialist's views on capitalism-induced alienatory phenomena.

“late” Marx’s “fetishism of commodities (cf. Marx, n.d., pp.81-96), reconstructing Marx’s own philosophical evolution.

Proceeding to apply these premises to an analysis of intellectuals and of creative activity under capitalist conditions, the Romanian Marxist indicated that this social stratum, through its training and education, was naturally more sensitive than other categories to social injustice (Dobrogeanu Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 246-7). While *narodnicist* echoes are unmistakable here, Gherea is at the same time innovating. As Antonio Gramsci would eventually put it²⁵, out of its own needs the capitalist system generates a social stratum that is both articulate and trained to be critical and raise questions. But such questioning is not altruistic. Being dominated by demand and supply fluctuations, the capitalist system is often unable to satisfy the social needs of the stratum it has produced out of its own needs. In other words, the ideational “market” is periodically overflowed, due to a “crisis of intellectual and scientific overproduction” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 139, 352-6). Intellectual propensities to pessimism are therefore rooted in that foremost aspect of modern society which is “lack of security” derived from a constant “struggle for existence”. This struggle “is not regulated through any form of intelligence, human consciousness or a rational plan, but by a blind and unconscious form which is called *free competition*”:

Let us exemplify, not by taking the case of a person, but that of the whole class which gives pessimism its greatest contingent...the so-called liberal professions: lawyers, physicians, professors, architects, musicians, journalists, etc. In a merchandize-producing society, such as ours, intellectual work becomes also merchandize, subject to buying and selling...it is dependent on the market, on the economic law of supply and demand, on competition; and if the supply is greater than the demand, then any offer of merchandize, in our case of intellectual produce, loses its value; its owner, the

²⁵ Cf. “The Formation of Intellectuals” in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 10-12 and Davidson, 1978, p. 49. On the centrality of Gramsci’s views on the intellectuals cf. Cammett, 1967, pp. 201-3, 206-9; Merrington, 1968, pp. 160-9; Boggs, 1976, pp. 75-9; Davidson, 1977, pp. 256-9.

physician, the professor, the engineer, the musician, the journalist, the book-keeper, is free to starve as much as he likes...

Consequently, “just as under the present social conditions, man does not dominate social living conditions but is dominated by them, so the intellectual does not dominate modern science, but is dominated by it” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 139. Emphasis in original). Gherea thus anticipates Gramsci, according to whom modern society entrenches “the possibility of vast crises of unemployment for the middle intellectual strata,” as a result of “competition” and of “overproduction in the schools” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 13-14).

The Romanian socialist thinker precedes not only Gramsci, however, but also Robert Michels. According to Michels’ 1932-published article, the oversupply of intellectuals, stemmed by critical reductions in job opportunities, creates an “intellectual proletariat.” But this is precisely the terminology Gherea employed in his 1891-written article on pessimism, and on which he further elaborated two years later. It is often, he indicated, that one encounters the unwanted association of “proletariat” and “poor.” Yet the brawler who makes a living out of “electoral operations” is “as much of a proletarian as a shopkeeper, no matter how poor.” What determines one’s being or not a proletarian is one’s position *vis-à-vis* capital. If one’s sole means of existence is acquired through the sale of one’s labor, then he belongs to the proletariat. Viewed from this vantage-point, there are two categories of proletarians: “the *manual* proletariat, who earns its living through manual labor, and the *intellectual* proletariat, or the *cultured* proletariat, who earns it through intellectual labor” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 245-6n.). Marx would have approved of the distinction, for he defined himself as “a head-worker, not a hand-worker” (cited in Shafir, 1985b, p. 326).

At first sight, this might read as reflecting the basic premises of dichotomist polarization in the social stratification process. Not only would such reading be consistent with the *Communist Manifesto*’s “precipitation” of the intellectuals into the proletariat, but it would also fit neatly into Paul

Lafargue's prediction that the "swarming and famishing throng of intellectuals whose lot grows worse in proportion to the increase in their numbers...belongs to socialism" (cited in Brym, 1980, p. 14). However, Gherea's elaboration on the issue is considerably richer and many-faceted.

To begin with, the social stratification process as viewed by him refutes a simplistic grasp of class antagonism. In every class, he indicates, "there are elements which have something in common with several classes at one and the same time." Such multi-class affiliation creates a mosaic which complicates and even pre-empts a dichotomist polarization analysis. Not only the intellectuals, but even the manual proletariat "have their own aristocracy, which in its upper-strata—economically speaking—touch on the privileged classes" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 246n). As Gramsci (1971, pp.13-14), then, Gherea was aware of the fact that some intellectuals are close to the ruling elite, while others are less so. Moreover, social stratification in capitalist society was also affected by the process of social mobility. The "intellectual proletariat," he deemed it necessary to specify, was neither the elite-supporting intelligentsia nor the aristocracy of the manual proletariat. The term referred only to those affected by the "struggle for existence."

This was a necessary, yet by no means sufficient condition for the intellectual to become a potential ally of the manual proletariat. Protest against social conditions, Gherea indicated in 1894, could also generate self-introspection and detachment from society as such. He called this the "reflexive propensity" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 269). Some forty years later, Karl Mannheim would write in *Ideology and Utopia* (first published in 1935) that one of the alternatives open to the intelligentsia in modern society was to "shut [itself] off from the world" and consciously renounce "direct participation in the historical process." Faced with the same problems, according to Mannheim, another group of intellectuals "takes refuge in the past and attempts to find there an epoch or society in which an extinct form of reality-transcendence dominated the world, and through this romantic reconstruction it seeks to spiritualize the present." A similar function, according to the Hungarian-born sociologist, "is fulfilled by attempts to revive religious feelings, idealism, symbols and myth"

(Mannheim, 1968, p. 233). In other words, the intellectual proletariat may also turn itself into the chief socializer of a reactionary ideology²⁶, a point also stressed by yet another prominent sociologist of knowledge, Edward Shils (1974). On his part, Gherea was indicating in 1894 that empathy for the declining classes under capitalism (the peasantry and the landed gentry), sometimes led the intellectual proletariat into postures of “reactionary democracy,” by which he meant the attempt to advocate return to an idealized image of social harmony, unrealistically attributed to past society (Dobrogeanu Gherea, 1956, Vol. I., pp.248-9).

In a manner similar to Mannheim, then²⁷, Gherea implies that the division of labor in capitalist society, on one hand *does* affect the intellectuals as a group, but that, on the other hand, this impact is of less deterministic a nature than in the case of other social categories. To emphasize this aspect, which encompasses a certain measure of “freedom of choice,” Mannheim is reputed to have innovated the sociology of intellectuals by introducing the concept of the “*relatively* classless stratum” or the “socially unattached intelligentsia” (*relative freischwebende Intelligenz*). But the concept’s primogenitor is, once more, Gherea—though in all likelihood Mannheim, who borrowed it from Max Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy (Mannheim, 1968, pp. 136-46. Emphasis in original), was not aware of it. The “*relatively independent*” intellect (Emphasis mine), albeit surrounded by wretchedness and by pain, is capable of discerning history’s true course. Consequently, “the same social conditions that provoke pessimism in some, may trigger optimism in others. The struggle for existence, which creates a large majority of vanquished, creates also a small minority of victors.” These “optimists” understand that “in its evolution, a social organization produces, on one hand, the conditions for its self-disintegration, but on the other hand, in its very bosom germinates a superior social organization,” Thus capitalism itself produces “ a class which represents the interests of future society, which comprehends that today’s society will give birth to another, by far its superior, that today’s

²⁶ One wonders whether Mircea Eliade was familiar with Mannheim’s work.

²⁷ This point is incisively discussed in Brym, 1980, pp. 57-8. He emphasizes that Mannheim’s “classlessness thesis” concerning the intellectuals has been often exaggerated and distorted.

pain is the condition of tomorrow's happiness" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, pp. 159-61).

Obviously, the "class" Gherea was mentioning was the proletariat, but it should be noted that membership in that class was not, in his eyes, a sufficient guarantee for sharing such "optimism." One should also be capable of *comprehending* history's *List der Vernunft* and, as we shall eventually observe, it was the intelligentsia's task to help bring about such comprehension to the proletariat, and thereby contribute to universal liberation—one that can be achieved by none else but a conscious working class. In other words, the intelligentsia's "social being"—understood in the sense originally envisaged by Marx—put it in the unique position of being capable of *choosing* its future path. As we remarked, that choice was by no means a matter of determinism. Even the intellectual proletariat could opt for the road of salaried alienation (as did the professor who "teaches the required hour of his course only because he is paid—and only when he cannot eschew it," or the student who "studies because...he must make a career, marry a girl with a dowry, all of which require a diploma") (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 237). He could opt for dropping out or for taking refuge in an imaginary past. Yet, as Gherea put it in *Neo-Serfdom*, the intellectual was also in the unmatched position of being able to "liberate himself from the original sin of *petite bourgeoisie* origin and feel the true interest of the oppressed working masses" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. IV, p. 177).

In this optional sense, Marxism was to Gherea not merely an economic or social doctrine, but also a code of ethics, and ethics are always a matter of conscious choice. Addressing his intellectual contemporaries in 1907, he stressed that at any given stage in social development, ethics, as indeed society itself, were never homogenous. Roughly, ethical attitudes corresponded to class divisions. "In each historical epoch there are...superior ethics and inferior ethics; the firmer represent precisely the ethical aspects of that epoch's strive towards light." Consequently, once he had understood history's course, it was up to the intellectual to choose sides. And if persuaded he had cast his part on the side of progress, the intellectual could "follow...[his] course undisturbed and let people talk."

The citation (*segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti*) was from Dante and — certainly not by coincidence—it had served Marx in his closing words of *Das Kapital's* first edition (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 415-6 and Marx, n.d., p. 16).

The argument, to be sure, is both tautological and self-defeating for, once history's course "understood" (provided there is only *one* possible course) there is hardly any room left for choice. Moreover, ideological adversaries are either supposed to be incapable of "understanding"—and therefore of "choosing"—or to have chosen the side which they *know* to be "regressive", which makes even less sense. However, to impute such fallacies to Gherea is tantamount to imputing him his Marxism, and it is not Marxism as a belief-system that is the subject of scrutiny in this section of my article, but rather a sociology of knowledge constructed from Marxist premises.

That Gherea should attribute to the intellectual the quality of lonely visionary, implied in the *segui il tuo corso* plea, is nonetheless surprising for (to employ George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi's distinction) his analysis of intellectuals as hither unfold reflects a genetic rather than a generic approach. The former "entails a description of the functions their cultural mission serves and the interests it articulates in specific social contexts;" the latter emphasizes "the intellectuals' tendency toward transcendence" viewing it as the "essence of their function...quite independently of historic ages and modes of production" (Konrád and Szelényi, 1979, pp.11-12). Yet there can be little doubt that Gherea's grasp of the intellectual combines both these approaches. To him, the intellectual was not only a member of a potentially progressive stratum, but also an individual distinguished from others precisely by his timeless quality of *homme révolté*. As such, the intellectual acquires a symbolic essence, present in human history from its dawn. He is the "demon", sometimes called Prometheus, other times Faust or Mephistopheles, who, revolting against his condition and against fatality, opens new roads for others to follow (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. II, p. 9). Gherea's admiration for Shelley, for example, went far beyond mere appreciation of his poetry. Above all, he saw in the author of

“Mount Blanc” the mountain-like solitary genius that could be judged only by “akin spirits” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 315).

Intellectual activities were consequently viewed in hierarchic perspective. The ingenious revolutionizer of human scientific knowledge, or the artist, were to be evaluated by a different yardstick than that employed for measuring the high school teacher or the journalist. He was to be subjected to qualitative, rather than to quantitative criteria. This “category within a category” constituted the *creative workers*. Just as Raymond Aron (1955, pp. 213-16), in the 1950s, would distinguish between qualitatively different intellectuals (*scribe—expert—lettré*), so Gherea in 1894 visualized “creative work” as a superior form of intellectual performance. Set apart from what he termed as [intellectual] *exercise-work*. The latter, nonetheless, was not to be frowned at, for no “creative work” could emerge without earlier accumulation of existing knowledge and its diffusion, both of which fell in the realm of “exercise.” In a similar manner, Shills would make a distinction between “productive” and “reproductive” intellectuals, specifying that all “production” (Gherea’s “creative work”) was conditioned by “reproduction” (“exercise-work”) (Shills, 1972, pp. 21-22). The Romanian socialist thinker, it should be added, was not the only Marxist to indulge into such differentiation, but was the first Marxist to do so.²⁸

Of these latter days theoreticians, it is naturally with Gramsci that Gherea’s affinity is strongest, for, as Marxists, both were preoccupied not merely by a “theory” of intellectuals, but also—and mainly—by questions concerning the revolutionary *praxis*. As Gramsci put it in “The Study of Philosophy and Historical Materialism,”

Critical self-consciousness signifies historically and politically the creation of intellectual cadres: a human mass does not

²⁸ According to Gramsci, “intellectual activity must...be distinguished...according to levels which...represent a real qualitative difference—at the highest level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc, at the lowest level the most humble ‘administrators’ and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual wealth” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 13).

“distinguish” itself and does not become independent “by itself,” without organizing itself (in a broad sense), and there is no organization without intellectuals, that is, without organizers and leaders, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus distinguishing itself concretely in a stratum of people who “specialize” in its conceptual and philosophical elaboration (Gramsci, 1970, p. 67).

On his part, Gherea pointed out in 1892 that European literature had hitherto “exaggerated the insignificance of the cultured stratum in social transformations;” that scientific socialism would be inconceivable without the foundations laid by Marx and Engels, who were hardly proletarians; that German social-democracy would be much poorer without the leadership of Karl Liebknecht or Augustin Bebel; and that French socialism had been retarded by the liquidation or banishment of its intellectual leaders in the wake of the defeat of the Paris Commune. Yet, “it was sufficient that a number of cultured and conscious organizers, such as Deville, Guesde, Lafargue, etc., appeared or returned from exile, for the organization of the proletariat to advance with gigantic steps.” It was thus the task of the intelligentsia to “*organize the proletariat and make it conscious*” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, vol. II, p. 444. Emphasis mine). This may sound as an earlier version of Ilich’s *What Is to Be Done*, the more so as Gherea was not only acquainted with the works of the spiritual fathers of Leninism (Haupt, 1967, p. 34), but also mentioned the need of a “strong enough core, conscious of its aim” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II, pp. 439-40).

However, Gherea was no more of a “Leninist” than Gramsci. In fact, Carl Boggs’ words (1976, p. 75) concerning the latter could perfectly well suit the former: “While the intellectual stratum articulates a new conception of the world by guiding, teaching and inspiring, it does not—in the strict Leninist sense—become the final repository of revolutionary ideas or the vehicle for constructing socialism.” Time and again, Gherea stressed that socialism could not conquer the “state” before it had triumphed in “society,” i.e., before it had become victorious in the minds of the masses. No intellectual leadership could substitute itself for the proletariat, and no

lofty ideas could deliver the world—or the proletariat intellectual—from capitalist conditions except via a conscious proletariat. Already in his first pamphlet of some theoretical proportions, published in 1886, Gherea warned his fellow-socialists:

...[We] cannot organize, we cannot impose such organization on the people, we cannot raise demands for it and in its name—that would be a sure recipe for failure. Not by constituting ourselves into a supreme court of judgment, not by taking over the government shall we be capable of organizing production, not by decree—that would be utopia; not we, but the working people themselves must demand land, for [setting up] rural communities; not we, but the workers' societies must demand credits for organizing [self-managing] factories; our activity is perhaps less glistening, but no less beautiful: on the contrary, it is moral and useful, we must enlighten the people on the country's real situation, on the demands it must make, how to make them and how to organize itself; our activity must be directed at organizing the working people, at lifting its moral and intellectual powers, at building up its political and economic strength, and all these through the people and by the people (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II, p, 113).

Social transformation, Gherea argued in 1901 against the anarchists, must precede the final act of revolutionary takeover, because “society does not evolve from morals, but vice-versa.” Should the attempt be made to implement change without having first brought about an alteration of societal values, it would either fail completely or generate “empty forms” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. III, pp. 353-4). Under post-communism, of course, this sounds very much as a debate about the angels' sex, only *after* the fall of the Byzantium. But is it really so? Gherea's argument sounds very much as Gramsci's theory concerning the intellectual's mission to bring about social change by “hegemonic” transformation, i.e., a persuasion that change cannot be imposed by “state” on “society”, but rather springs from, and is conditioned by, the institution of an earlier “hegemony” of the values pursued (cf. Gramsci,

1971, pp.52, 57, 211-76, as well as Davidson, 1968, pp. 44-53 and Boggs, 1976, pp. 36-54 and *passim*). Dares one assume that neither Gherea nor Gramsci figure on the list of “required readings” that US President George W. Bush received from his aids before deciding to “bring democracy” to Iraq?

Conclusion: A Dialectical Post-communist Tragicomedy

My memorable 1990 visit of the late PSDR headquarters in Bucharest ended with Avramescu’s embarrassed admission that his political formations had ties to neither workers nor intellectuals—the electoral backbone of socialist parties anywhere in the world. The former, he said, were “Ceașescu’s animals”, whereas the latter were “allergic to the word socialism.” Besides, “socialism” was still associated with the Soviet Union (at that time still in existence) and with “Judeo-Bolshevism.” In a generation or two, things might change, he said; but till then, all his party could hope for was to survive. It did not.

Dobrogeanu-Gherea would recognize the circumstances. Whether or not he would have agreed with Avramescu is open to debate. It never occurred to Gherea that socialist thinkers elsewhere were envisaging a different solution for the identity dilemma he was torn by. Or, if it did, he was careful never to mention it in writing. This well-informed observer of international turmoil—including the plight of Russian Jewry, which he indicted in most unambiguous language (cf. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 348-50) makes no mention of the Zionist movement. One must conclude that for Gherea there was no solution to the “Jewish problem” other than assimilation.

The “Jewish problem” was quite extensively dealt with by Gherea in 1910, in *Neo-Serfdom*, where, among others, he rebuked Stere for laying the blame for the 1907 peasant uprising at the door of Jewish leaseholders (*arendăși*). Much of the same line of thought, however, could be distinguished in earlier writings. In 1887, and again in 1901, he requested his opponents to provide an explanation for the wretched state of the peasant in those parts of the country where there was hardly any land

leasing to Jews (Dobrogenu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. IV, *Neoiobăgia*, pp. 161, 181-2; 1956, Vol. II, pp. 248-72 and 368). Romanian anti-Semitic publications which raised these—or related—arguments were repeatedly ridiculed in his articles, one of which stated that Jews would gladly devour their victimizers, were they not prohibited from doing so by dietary laws (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. I, p. 385).

That Jewish exploitation of “native” labor existed in Romania was not denied. According to Gherea’s views, however, such exploitation was nothing but an essential feature of emerging capitalist forms of production. In other words, it was part and parcel of the process of giving real “content” to hitherto empty “forms.” It is, however, pertinent to remark that Gherea’s argument bore a striking resemblance to that developed by “young Marx” in his two articles on the *Judenfrage*. Marx, as is well known, had identified Judaism with the practice of selling and buying, and consequently viewed bourgeois society as the embodiment of the Jewish spirit (Avineri, 1964). Distinguishing “human” from “political” emancipation, Marx rejected Bruno Bauer’s argument against the emancipation of Jews, arguing that the latter, which was basically a recognition of political rights, can and should be achieved by the bourgeois polity, which is basically the “civil society” dominated by the “profane basis of Judaism,” i.e., practical need, self-interest, huckstering and money:

The Jew has emancipated himself in a Jewish manner, not only by acquiring the power of money, but also because *money* had become through him and also apart from him, a world power, while the practical Jewish spirit has become the practical spirit of the Christian nations. The Jews have emancipated themselves in so far as the Christians become Jews (Marx, 1963, pp. 34-5. Emphasis in original).

In the aforementioned “What Do Romania’s Socialists Want,” Gherea pursues a similar argument. For Marx, bourgeois society has “Judaized” even family relations, for “the relation between man and woman becomes an object of commerce. Woman is bartered away” (Marx,

1963, p. 37). For Gherea, the bourgeois family is “family transformed into a business affair, accompanied by prostitution and adultery” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II, p. 66). It is perfectly true that such lines could have been inspired by Marxist literature of great circulation, such as “The Communist Manifesto” or “The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State” (cf. Marx, Engels, 1969, pp. 49-51, 504-8). But it should be noticed that in writing of the family which turns into a “business affair,” Gherea employs the word “*gesheft*” [*gheșeft*]—which in Romania is solely and unmistakably associated with Jews—an association absent from the “Manifesto” or “The Origins of the Family,” but one which forms the backbone of Marx’s argumentation against Bauer. Furthermore, describing the process leading to what Gherea would eventually label as “Neo-Serfdom,” he notes that the old aristocracy leased its lands to “*kikes [jidani] of Mosaic or Christian rites,*” plunging into a life of pleasure and gluttony on the income provided by the lease (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. II, p. 76. Emphasis mine). As a Russian native, Gherea was certainly aware of the distinction between *evrey* and *zhidy* and of the fact that—in both languages—only the latter carries a pejorative connection—one he did not hesitate to employ. But he extended the pejorative to the entire Romanian land-leasing gentry. In other words, exploitation by private entrepreneurship, and not the religious faith of the exploiter, is the essential feature of the phenomenon, one in which, as Marx put it. “The Christians have become Jews.” One year later, arguing once more against the attribution of rural Romania’s plunder to Jews alone, Gherea wrote: “According to Mr. Gherghel, it would seem that all Moldovan fields are in the hands of *kikes*, that all big Moldavian landlords are *kikes*. We are inclined to believe him, but *they are kikes of Christian rite, with Moldovan blood running in their veins*” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. II, p. 250. Emphasis mine). And if for Marx the “politically free inhabitant of New England” had made Mammon into “his idol which he adores not only with his lips, but with the whole force of his body and mind” (Marx, 1963, p.135), in Gherea’s eyes the entrepreneurial Liberals, who had launched the country’s industrialization, served “God and Mammon at one and the same time” (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 138, 141).

Just as for Marx mere *political* emancipation was to be loathed—and yet to be viewed as a prerequisite stage for capitalist transcendence (*Aufhebung*) of the system's inherent alienatory features, for Gherea, the universalization of rights—including Jewish emancipation—was a *sine qua non* of future transition into socialism, and precisely for the same reasons. Gherea, as noted, described the capitalization of the countryside in the darkest colors—and yet it was the task of the socialists to work for land reform, which would induce such capitalization, as a transitional stage to socialism. In a similar manner, Gherea (and indeed Marx) denounced bourgeois democracy, yet regarded Jewish emancipation as part and parcel of its necessary universalization. In Romania's case, where the Jewish minority played an important part in the country's industrialization, the necessity of giving "content" to "form," according to Gherea, was of a twofold nature: it was required by the infrastructural prerequisite of capitalist development, and it had to be reflected in the superstructural order. "We demand the irrevocable amalgamation of the Jewish masses into the organism of the Romanian lands," he stated in an interview on the "Jewish question," "both because it is of great necessity and of great utility for the entire future development of the country" (Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1976-83, Vol. V, p. 170). In other words, not only should Jews be granted civic rights, but, as agents of modernization, they should be encouraged to take an active part in the process. This was precisely the position adopted in parliament in 1879 by P. P. Carp. Unfortunately, Carp's was a voice in the wilderness.

Enough, I believe, has been said to convince the reader that Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea's thought was strikingly similar to that of "young Marx" at a time when he was more than unlikely to have been familiar with Marx's early writings. It is an old saying among historians that research in the discipline should never be undertaken using the "as if" approach; and there is probably no rule other than the Seventh Commandment that has been broken more often. "Counterfactuals" have actually squeezed into history, political science and the discipline of international relations (Nye, 2003, pp. 50-1). Avoiding "iffy" questions remains a virtue, but it endangers virtuosity. I do not believe Gherea's "wrong face, at the wrong time and in the wrong place" would have

changed history if he were to land in the West at the turn of the last century. But I incline to believe it might have changed Gherea's personal story. In the field of literary criticism and in the sociology of knowledge Gherea might have made a difference. After all, such East European Hungarian-born Marxist Jews as György Lukács and Karl Mannheim made a name for themselves, and so did in later years Gherea's compatriot and coreligionist Lucien Goldman.

In the last year of his life, at least, Gherea saw one of his dreams come true. Had he (another "if!") lived twenty years longer, he would have witnessed the same dream crumble, for as of 1938, Romanian Jews began losing first civil, then property, and finally citizenship and life rights. As a "Judeo-Bolshevik" Gherea would have been a prime candidate, no matter he rejected Bolshevism from its earliest days. The Yad Vashem Memorial Institute's archives are in possession of a document issued in autumn 1940 by the Iron Guard authorities ordering the exhumation of Gherea's bones from the Christian cemetery where he had been laid to rest in 1920. In a supposedly transcendental world, the thinker was not to be allowed to transcend his Jewishness.

Now—from transcendence to "transition": I never visited again the headquarters of the PSDR after 1990. Passing by, however, I noticed that the building was taken over by the larger party that captured the name (PSD) after their 2001 merger. I wonder whether Gherea's bust is still in the courtyard. Many former PCR members are leading figures in the new PSD. If the bust survived, they must find Lenin's face quite familiar.

Does Gherea's story have morale? I cannot speak for the reader. But it has one for me. Although a "veteran Romanianologist," I am also a "comparatist." I believe one learns precious little if one's interests exclude reasonable similitudes, and I am certain exceptions may only be explained in comparative parameters.

In an article published back in 1984, and in a book published the next year I was noting that under communist rule "revisionism" and political reform were conditioned by the presence of a Marxist intellectual core capable of formulating demands for change in "an elite-penetrative"

Marxist jargon. While this was not a sufficient condition for launching a reform process, I was stressing, it was a strictly necessary one. In both works I emphasized that this condition was “totally absent in Romania, where Marxist tradition was all but non-existent.” The notable exception was Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea. Consequently, I wrote, “even assuming that a revisionist faction had come into existence *ex nihilo* within the Romanian PCR national leadership” in the 1950s, 1960s or later, “its prospects of success would probably have equaled those of an officer corps without an army” (Shafir, 1984a, p. 457, 1985a, p. 20). The article was based on a comparison of Romania with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. My conclusions were challenged by Vladimir Tismăneanu (1989, pp. 336-7, 1995, p. 25), among other places in an article titled “The Tragicomedy of Romanian Communism”. They were, however, wholly embraced by Tismăneanu in his life-long opus on Romanian communism (2003), which I am glad to note. I am, however, less happy to observe that he forgot to mention his change of opinion, while making my insight into one of the main pillars of his otherwise exceptional tome. The tragicomedy of *pays réel* vs. *pays légal* has definitely spilled over the ocean. One wonders whether in Washington there is a street called Onești.

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**REMAPPING THE MIND:
EAST AND WEST IN POST - COMMUNIST EASTERN AND
CENTRAL EUROPE**

Attila Pók*

Abstract

The world of academia is on the move in science just as much as in social sciences and humanities. Borders, at least in this sphere of life, seem to be vanishing. One semester here, another there, joining project teams paralelly in various parts of the world, talking to publishers via Internet, submitting manuscripts without paper from a distant hideaway are natural elemnts of contemporary academic life - East and West alike. For my generation of East Central European intellectuals, when we, the so called 1968-er generation¹, started our careers in the first half of the 1970s, the probability of this way of life was identical with having week-end houses on the Moon or the Mars. From a purely technical-scientific point of view, even life on these distant planets seemed to be feasible-sooner or later. The real question was what kind of a passport and visas shall we need in order to get there, to what an extent the political tensions of the bipolar Cold War world will allow us to travel there. The two decisive political experiences that basically shaped our minds took place in 1968: the student revolts in the West and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In this paper I would like to address a seemingly simple issue that, however, like a drop of the seawater reflects the composition of the ocean, mirrors the remapping of the minds of numerous intellectuals in Eastern and Central Europe during the last nearly four decades: the changing contents of the concepts of East and West in these minds.

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¹ Cf. the website: www.single-generation.de/kohorten/68er.htm that gives an interesting list of some better known, mainly German members (writers and scholars) of this generation and hosts a debate on their achievements.

A Homogeneous East vs. A Homogeneous West

During the time of our high school and college education both culturally and politically we were thinking in terms of a bipolar world: East and West. America was generally considered to be the avantgarde, the leader, the decisive force of the West, be it in political and military confrontation with the Soviet Union, in economic, technological development, in all fields of culture, everywhere. That was the case in the anti-Western official communist propaganda as well, but, of course, with a negative connotation: American imperialism was presented as the quintessence of the Western enemy. Early anti-Stalinist and reform-communist dissent did not care about differences between Western Europe and the US either. A number of its representatives were looking for spiritual stimulation in the West at large, because the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist official New Faith (as Cz. Milos called the official Communist ideology) was incapable of fully satisfying these needs. In the 1950s and 1960s the US-led West for many reform-communists just as much as for the dissidents of the 1970s and 1980s was not a social-political model based on private property but a source of vibrant intellectual stimulation. The West meant primarily not IBM, GE, big multinational corporations, not so much Adeneauer, De Gaulle, Nixon, not even Kennedy but much more Polanski, Hemingway, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Pasolini, Amerigo Tot, students of Adorno, the Frankfurt School, Marcuse, Fellini, Brigitte Bardot, Sophia Loren, Lawrence Olivier, Kerouac, Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*, Steinbeck, Stanley Kubrick (especially his *Clockwork Orange*), the Nobel Prize for Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*, famous musicals as the *Hair*, *West Side Story*, David Ojstrah, Leonard Bernstein etc. ²

On a *non-intellectual level* the rhetoric of Radio Free Europe appealed to lots of people who developed a far from realistic image of a way of life in the free and prosperous West where everything is of much better quality than in the East, where everything always perfectly functions. Top quality equalled Western quality. Those average citizens of the Soviet Bloc countries, who were not interested in culture, when defining the WEST,

² Cf. Gábor Klaniczay (2003), *Ellenkultúra a hetvenes-nyolcvanas években (Counter-Culture during the Seventies and Eighties)*, Budapest: Noran.

focused on consumption from Coca Cola and blue jeans to western made cars and not on the political or economic system.

Throughout the period of the Cold War in official Moscow or local Communist Party foreign policy strategies just as much as in most reform communist and anti-communist dissident rhetoric it was basically assumed that in spite of all regional peculiarities the US stood for and represented on the highest level the **West** and the SU the **East**.³ US-SU summits were by far the most important events of international politics and experience showed that the decisions taken on this level were indeed crucial for the fate of the whole world. The SU-led East was the OTHER for the US-led West and the other way round. This was true in spite of the pretty fast emerging other fault lines: following the acceleration of the decolonisation process, the Third World appeared on the stage of world politics and the Chinese-Russian rift seemed to be weakening the Soviet position.

Eastern Reservations about the West in the Bipolar World

On the other hand, numerous reform-communist or anti-communist Eastern intellectuals of the Cold War were also quite suspicious of the West that in spite of the great human and material losses of the wars never experienced the level of destruction that Eastern Europe had to face. For many of them, many of us parallel with the tribute paid to the West there existed also a longing for the Marxist-Leninist *Method*, the dialectical comprehensive understanding of the complex phenomena of the world.

This is the starting point of my argument that tries to explain how this bipolarity gave way to a gradual remapping of the mind. When Cz. Milos published his *Captive Mind* in 1951, he was 40 years old and has just broken with the communist system. The *Method*, he argued, "exerts a magnetic influence on contemporary man because it alone emphasizes, as has never been before done, the fluidity and interdependence of phenomena...."⁴ The *Method* also has some mystery about it, but this "only enhances its magic power"⁵ Milos argued. When I went to university in

³ John Lewis Gaddis (1997), *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1-53.

⁴ Czeslaw Milosz (1990), *The Captive Mind*, New York: Vintage International Edition, 51.

⁵ idem

Budapest during the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a loud call for going back to the "real" non-Leninist, even less Stalinist Marx (we were frequently quoting Marx defining himself as a "non-Marxist" and wanted to read only the pre-Communist Manifesto, early Marx) and made an effort at understanding György Lukács and Gramsci. With all our tribute to the culture of the West, we liked Che Guevara, rediscovered Rosa Luxemburg and organized demonstrations against the dictatorship in Greece and the American imperialists in Viet Nam. At the same time we certainly loved recordings from the performances of the Metropolitan Opera in New York as much as the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Tom Jones songs or reports from Woodstock. Works by Djilas and Marcuse together with Pasternak, Solschenicin, Orwell and Koestler were being circulated. Under the spell of the events of 1968 many of us started to believe that the real front lines in the modern world were not so much between East and West but among generations, between North and South, in general between those inside and those outside power. We, the "1968-er generation of intellectuals", sincerely believed that by the time we are "Sixty-Four"⁶ we shall have created a New World.

Terminating Eternity

Most influential minds on both sides of the bipolar world's "front-line" were captivated by the assumed eternity of this "balance of power" until 1968. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 was, of course, also a crucial factor in shaping the thinking of Eastern and Central European intellectuals, freeing numerous captivated minds, but by the early sixties anger and disappointment gave way to hope. The Hungarian party leader, János Kádár at a party congress in 1962 declared that " whoever is not against us, is with us".⁷ As 1956 had clearly shown that the Eisenhower slogan of the liberation of the captive nations is just campaign rhetoric and not a political action programme, Central European intellectuals got more interested in reforming than dismantling the forcefully imported Soviet system. Most of these hopes vanished with the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In my part of the world this event shaped our

⁶ As the famous Beatles song put it.

⁷ VIIIth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, November 20-24, 1962.

thought just as much as the news of the "Western" student movements. The next wave of hopes was attached to Poland but the declaration of martial law on 13 December, 1981, to say the least, cooled down great expectations.

Still, the atmosphere of detente, especially the new German Eastern policy seemed to be promising. Promising what?

The Promise of Modernization

One of the most important preoccupations of many outstanding and not so outstanding Eastern and Central European minds has - since the early 19th century - been backwardness, underdevelopment, lagging behind of their homeland, of their historical region. The great hope attached to changes was to get impetus, help to this catching up process.

The backwardness was perceived in terms of political culture (representative democracy, secularization), various economic indicators (level of industrialization, per capita GDP, energy efficiency, overall efficacy of labour, transportation and communication network etc.), culture (number of functioning cultural institutions, level of illiteracy, per centage of respective age groups in institutions of primary, secondary and higher education etc.). One of the most fundamental dilemmas for patriotic politicians and political thinkers of partitioned Poland, Habsburg controlled Bohemia and Hungary, the Ottoman-ruled Balkans was the relationship between the implementation of the aims of national self-determination and modernization. After all, from a merely pragmatic point of view, larger territorial-political units can better deal with the construction of modern systems of transportation and communication, with modernization in every field of life than competing small sovereign states. On the other hand, it was frequently argued, the antiquated, pre-modern structures of political and economic rule, petrified social structures of conservative empires lacking mobility can also be major obstacles to modernization.

But even if the program of dismantling the outlived empires is successfully implemented and the incoming new national states prefer cooperation to rivalry, another dilemma might still stay on the agenda: will the import of modern Western institutions not endanger the integrity and cohesion of smaller Eastern nations? All these issues are brilliantly

summarized in a most insightful book by the outstanding Polish historian, Jerzy Jedlicky.⁸ What he writes about 19th century Polish intelligentsia, applies in a chronologically and geographically much wider Eastern and Central European circle: "/19th century Polish intelligentsia/ regarded its own country as a poor and neglected suburb of Europe, a suburb that looked at the metropolis with contradictory feelings of envy, admiration and distrust".⁹

For many captive minds socialism - communism promised (and at a terrible price but seemed to implement) fast, comprehensive modernization: industrialization, urbanization, easy access to education and medical care as parts of some kind of an overall redemption. 1956, 1968, 1981 but also the news about Soviet domestic politics, domestic social life (via anti-Communist dissidents and occasionally anti-dogmatic reform-minded communists) helped to get out of the magic spell but the discard of the official communist ideas and program was not always coupled with the elaboration of feasible alternatives.

The Politics of the Concept of Central Europe

Another major intellectual historical development of in the course of the history of the historical-political interpretations of East and West during the 1980s was the fast spread of the concept of Central Europe. The concept that emerged long before Kundera's famous 1984 article on the tragedy of Central Europe defined a region by transgressing Cold War political and mental borders: it included "Eastern" (Czech, Polish, Hungarian) territories together with "Western" (Austrian, North Italian) regions and parts of the non-aligned Yugoslavia (Croatia, Slovenia). The discourses on and with the help of this concept directly, indirectly addressed one of the most important problems of our 68-er generation, the responsibility for communism.¹⁰ What is the proportion of external and internal factors in the gaining ground of authoritarian regimes, especially communism, in our countries? Was communism imposed on our country

⁸ Jerzy Jedlicki (1999), *The Suburb of Europe. Nineteenth Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization*, Budapest: CEU Press.

⁹ Jerzy Jedlicki, op. cit.

¹⁰ László Péter (1999), "Central Europe and Its Readings into the Past" in *European Review of History* 6, No, 1, 101-111.

only by Soviet imperialism or it had internal roots as well? In other words and from a broader perspective: do the societies of the countries of the Soviet Bloc show any structural, historically determined similarities? Is it a pure coincidence as Jenő Szűcs put it in 1979 that the Iron Curtain was drawn almost exactly along the line that after 1500 divided off the eastern part of Europe as the scene of the second serfdom? He also pointed out, on the basis of the spread of dioceses, architectural styles, legal institutions etc. that "the line of the old Roman *limes* would show up on Europe's morphological map, thus presaging right from the start the birth of a "Central Europe" within the notion of the West." ¹¹

Euphory and Disappointment, 1989-90 and the Aftermath

The euphory of 1989-90 temporarily veiled the complexity and the difficulties of the transition. Ralf Dahrendorf's insightful forecast (you can build up democratic political institutions in six months, market economy in six years but to change deep-rooted attitudes, mentalities calls for at least sixty years)¹² was not taken very seriously.

"Where are we heading"? was the great question in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Block. If I now look back, the first major item on the post-communist Central European agenda was the problem of the fast proliferation of new national states (successor states of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and primarily the Yugoslav disintegration process). It was believed that the removal of unwanted bonds, the gaining ground of national self-determination goes hand in hand with the democratization of the societies/countries concerned. To the most shocking extent Yugoslavia but to a lesser extent, the experiences of all the East Central European post-communist countries showed that this was not the case, xenophobia and the emergence of authoritarian leaders, the lack of a fair ruling of the position of national minorities ranked high on most of the new national agendas.

It was clear that in order to prevent greater disasters direct or indirect external intervention could not be avoided. Experience had quickly

¹¹ Jenő Szűcs (1983) "The Three Historical Regions of Europe" in *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29, Nos 2-4.

¹² Ralf Dahrendorf (1990), *Reflections on the Revolution*, New York: Crown.

shown that consolidation, peace and security could be implemented only if the EU and NATO made substantial financial, political and military efforts in the region. Numerous influential politicians inside and outside East Central Europe assumed that ultimately this was to be achieved only if all the countries of the former Soviet Bloc were integrated into these two organizations. This became an axiom for the political leaders and most of the leading intellectuals of these countries.

The EU was most appealing as it preached and seemed to truly establish unity in diversity, creating a cohesive unity without destructing particular identities. Being no melting pot, its political philosophy well fitted into the broader post-modern understanding of the world. It was assumed that in contemporary America this view was shared, Richard Rorty's pragmatic but humanitarian philosophy was frequently quoted. Rorty's post-modern, anti-Platonic philosophy accepts solidarity as a basis of ethical norms but denies the existence of a reason-guided Kantian overall axiomatic transcendent truth. It was exactly this approach that appealed to intellectuals disappointed in comprehensive *Methods* based on class, race, nation or religion.¹³

There was, however, a wide-spread worry: Just the same way as 19th century intellectuals of and with an interest in the region, their late 20th century followers feared chaos and anarchy if the West leaves the East alone.

A Divided West Faces a Divided East

The first stage of the NATO-US intervention on the Balkans was promising, led to the November 1995 Dayton agreement. Dayton had the message that you can intervene from outside efficiently in the interest of saving human rights and human lives without imposing an alien political system on the perpetrators and victims. Later developments, however, gave food for more worries than hope. From the perspective of changing mental borders, the changing historical-political content of East and West,

¹³ Béla Bíró: "A "nagy történet" feltámadása? (Resurrection of the Grand Narrative?)" *Egyenlítő*, 2003/I/ 27-30. For a good insight into Rorty's debates with Jürgen Habermas and some other outstanding contemporary thinkers cf.: Józef Niznik and John T. Sanders (eds.) (1996), *Debating the State of Philosophy*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

four events can be pointed out: the air-raids against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, 9/11, the beginning of the Iraq war and the accession of the 10 new EU member states in May 2004.

In philosophical terms, for many of us the war on terrorism seemed to signal the termination of the so much desired pluralism, it gave an inspiration for the resurrection of a protestant-messianistic "Grand Narrative" that many of us feared. Let me explain!

NATO Enlargement, 1999 Air Raids against Yugoslavia

Hungary, together with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Roumania, Bulgaria joined NATO in order to fill a security gap, to find safety under a protective umbrella. A few weeks after the festivities in Washington NATO planes were dropping bombs on Yugoslavia, destroying among others one of the most important bridges over the Danube, a few miles away from the Hungarian border. Refugee Serbs from Kosovo started flooding into this region with a substantial Hungarian minority, adding ethnic tension to material suffering. Intellectuals of the region were divided on the issue. One of the most prestigious Hungarian intellectuals, György Konrád wrote numerous articles in German and Hungarian papers arguing that although there was clear evidence on the crimes committed by the Milosevic regime, external interference into the conflicts of radical nationalisms could only worsen the situation and would support radical Albanian nationalists. In a most passionate way did he refuse arguments that supported the intervention as a preventive action to avoid prospective greater disasters.¹⁴ Others praised the intervention going as far as saying that just the same way as in both World Wars, again it was only America that could help freedom-loving Europeans in times of crisis.

9/11

9/11 had a great intellectual echo in my part of the world. Numerous East Central European minds thought that a most promising time period, starting with the fall of the Berlin wall, with free elections in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, came now to an end. During the

¹⁴ E. g. in the most widely read Hungarian daily, *Népszabadság* on July 12, 1999. Quoted by Béla Bíró: op. cit. 29.

1990s the democratic changes in Eastern and Central Europe together with similar Latin-American developments, with the new waves of international NGO movements that tried to increase the awareness of the world's decision makers of health, social and environmental hazards in what used to be called the Third World, seemed to offer a chance to make our globe a better place to live in. In the aftermath of 9/11 fear, worry, strategies of self-defence with all kinds of preventive actions came into the foreground.¹⁵ When dealing with this situation Europe both on a political and an NGO or social level turned out to be very much divided. In the course of trying to look into the deeper lying causes of the Fall of the Towers, much political and scholarly interest was devoted to looking for structural differences between the US and Europe.

Iraq War

This tendency continued after the beginning of the Iraq war in the spring of 2003. Some outstanding minds, however, have changed their views concerning the legitimacy of external intervention. For example, György Konrád who four years earlier, as I have mentioned, powerfully criticized the air raids against Yugoslavia, now argued as follows: " We, Central European dissidents are interested in decreasing the number of dictatorships in the world. That is why we do not like the renewed anti-imperialist propaganda...that - just as much as during the Cold War - shows a grotesque understanding for murderous dictatorships. That is why we do not support the despot of Iraq against his own country and the neighbouring peoples... Just as much as cities, the world also needs policemen. We demand security and not rhetorics from the policeman."¹⁶ He also added that hostility towards America was a new kind of Anti-Semitism. He was here arguing not only against those who were against the war by definition but also against those who demanded UN

¹⁵ Miklós Tamás Gáspár: "A katasztrófa. (The Catastrophy)", *Magyar Hírlap*, September 13, 2001. A good survey of reactions to 9/11: László Andor: "Nekünk New York kell" (We Need A New York, in Hungarian this is reference to a great Hungarian historical tragedy in 1526, when Ottoman Turks defeated the Hungarian army at a place called Mohács. We need a Mohács in Hungarian means that it is only after a great disaster that we can seriously face our problems!). *Eszmélet*, 52 (2001)

¹⁶ *Népszabadság*, March 1, 2003. Quoted by Béla Bíró: op. cit. 29-30.

authorization on the basis of clear evidence on arms of mass destruction in Iraq, as, for example, Günter Grass and numerous former East Central European dissidents.

EU Enlargement

The splits further increased after May 1, 2004, a day we had been looking forward to for so many years. The restraints on sovereignty resulting from EU membership turned out to be conspicuous, the help, support came with a tremendous bureaucratic burden and great delays. Still, and this is already taking us up to our days, in the course of debates about medium and longer terms perspectives of our region's social and economic development, most recently on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the creation of the Polish system-changing trade union, the Solidarnosc and the 15th anniversary of the 1989-90 changes gave food for much public debate about the post-communist transition.

In these debates America frequently appears as the incorporation of the worst and most disgusting features of capitalism: imperialist expansion, lack of sensitivity for social, especially welfare problems, disregard of human rights. Much less attention is paid to impressive American indicators of economic efficiency, cultural diversity combined with cultural and scholarly success. The European **West**, the EU of the 15 is generally perceived as a tamed form of capitalism where social solidarity is still a much more important issue than in the US: This point played an important role in the official pro-EU campaigns before accession. Mutatis mutandis, this evaluation, this approach could be compared to the debate on *socialism with a human face* in the 1970s¹⁷, in comparison with the harshness of "real" socialism in pre-perestroika SU and Eastern Germany. Now the US presents the brutal aspect of capitalism, the EU *capitalism with a human face*. For numerous leading politicians (both right and left) in East Central Europe the rising stars are China, India, smaller Far East and South East Asian countries and strangely enough the lack of social care is rarely referred to when praising these small and larger tigers.

17. Cf. the works by Rudolf Bahro, especially *Die Alternative*, Köln, 1977.

The Multiplication of the West in Eastern Eyes

Whereas even 15 years earlier it was widely believed that capitalism is basically the same in the US and Western Europe with the US politically and economically taking the lead, now, as Tony Judt put it a recent *New York Review of Books* article: "It is becoming clear that America and Europe are not way stations on a historical production line, such that Europeans must expect to inherit or replicate the American experience after an appropriate time lag."¹⁸

An important question is what similarities and differences with foreign cultures shape European and American identities? Generally defining what one does not share is more important than a normative list of the ingredients of this identity. Jürgen Habermas suggests¹⁹ that focusing on transatlantic value differences could be of great use in generating cohesion in Europe but this could hardly be a successful scenario in the time of global threats of all kind. Strangely enough from an East Central European angle the US in some ways shows more resemblance to Russia than Western Europe. Tony Judt summarized these assumed similarities in his above-mentioned *New York Review of Books* article as follows: "... its suspicion of dissent, its fear of foreign influence, its unfamiliarity with alien lands and its reliance upon military strength when dealing with them". In some other argumentations on US-Europe basic value differences the large scale use of the death penalty in the US (not tolerated in EU member countries) and what in the longer run seems to be especially significant, the role of God and religion in American politics are given prominence. For numerous East Central Europeans, however, the US is still the country of the Jeffersonian compromise (in Richard Rorty's words: trading a guarantee of religious freedom for the willingness of religious believers not to bring religion into discussion of political questions), we learnt about the civil rights, civil society, anti-racism, feminism, the idea of self-government, protection of environment and the consumer) from the US.²⁰ I think that some of our great debt to America could be repaid if in the spirit of Timothy Garton Ash's "Declaration of Interdependence", i.e. "America

¹⁸ *New York Review of Books*, vol.52., No. 2.(February 10, 2005)

¹⁹ Quoted by Tony Judt in the article referred to in footnote 18.

²⁰ Miklós Tamás Gáspár, "A katasztrófa" in *Magyar Hírlap*, September 13, 2001.

should want Europe to be a benign check and balance on its own solitary superpower"²¹

In addition to that in the recent East Central European debates, the West is differentiated not only along the very marked US-Western Europe divide but also along the lines of clashing political, economic and military interests within the European Union as well.

Conclusions

An obvious consequence of the fall of the Soviet Bloc was the total vanishing of the homogeneous concept of the East as well. The first major step along the line of redrawing the mental borders in this respect was the spread of the concept of Central Europe during the 1980s that I have already referred to. After 1989-90 the very differing paces of postcommunist transition, the differing schedules of EU and NATO accession, the differences and similarities of party political landscapes present the Eastern part of the continent much more colourful, much more heterogeneous than in the early times of the Cold War.

East Central European enlarged minds are now perhaps more perplexed than ever. They are no more captivated by Milos' *Method* but by the idea and achievements of European integration. No more a vague West, but the concept of Europe became the democratic counterpoint to authoritarian or in some cases despotic communist rule that in the longer run led to economic decline and at best to overall stagnation in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. It is, however, clear that without the economic and military strength, political influence, the immense cultural potential of the US, hardly any global problem can be tackled. The concept of an abstract, homogeneous West gave way to a much more realistic picture of differences and competition.

During the last decade and a half it was not only the political maps of Eastern and Central Europe that were redrawn but the mental, intellectual landscape of the region did undergo an equally substantial change as well. We can no more think in terms of clearly defined homogeneous poles: a culturally or politically attractive West and an authoritarian, anti-

²¹ Tony Judt: op.cit.

democratic East. The redrawal of this mental landscape of my generation of East and Central European intellectuals started long before 1989-90 but it certainly speeded up after the "Year of Miracles" and we are still looking for the new compass that helps us in finding our way on this map.

CONSTRUCTING A BETTER DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

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Abstract

At the risk of oversimplification we can distinguish between pessimist and optimist research programs on European security. In the present paper I focus on the optimistic democratic peace theory, since the empirical evidence seems more supportive of it. After reviewing the democratic peace literature, I find that the normative/cultural strand provides most of the explanatory power of this research program. I suggest that constructivism has the potential to improve this component because it is specialized to deal with norms. Finally, I draw hypotheses based on this social constructivist interpretation of the normative/cultural strand, and specify a test for it regarding European enlargement. As a caveat, the paper is a first draft and as such a work in progress, and thus it certainly needs further work to overcome its present limitations.

I. Introduction

As we look back to the past, we can easily notice that Europe hosted the most and most intense armed conflicts.¹ However, since the end of the Second World War the European Union seems to be peaceful. While realist theories explain the Long Peace² of the Cold War with the existence of a common enemy (the Soviet Union), from this perspective it is not so clear why the post-Cold War EU remains peaceful. As we look at the literature on the European security, two categories of answers become clear: optimistic and pessimistic ones. In the former we primarily find (neo)realist

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¹ Gleditsch, N. P., "Democracy and the Future of European Peace," *European Journal of International Relations*, No. 4, Vol. 1, pp. 539-572.

² John L. Gaddis, (1987), *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press.

theories, while in the latter we find mainly (neo)liberal and constructivist theories. The structure of the paper is the following: first, I take a brief look at the empirical evidence about conflicts in the EU, and I claim that the pessimistic approaches offer unsatisfactory explanations for it. Second, I review the democratic peace literature, which seems to be able to better account for the post-Cold War EU security outcomes. I also find that the normative/cultural approach provides most of the explanatory power of the democratic peace thesis. Therefore, in order to improve the theory and through it our understanding of empirics I suggest a social constructivist approach to it since this latter is better able to handle normative analyses (where normative means based on norms). Finally, I propose hypotheses and a test geared to European enlargement for this constructivist democratic peace approach.

II. The Pessimistic Research Program and the Empirical Record

1) *The Pessimistic Research Program*

After the end of the Cold War, several neorealists expected a return to the conflictual Europe of the past. This was a logical consequence of their reasoning which located sources of the Long Peace in Europe in the equality of military force, nuclear weapons, and the bipolar structure of the international system including a common enemy (USSR). Since these factors evaporated, many of them in the front with Mearsheimer expected that the post-Cold War period in Europe “would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years.”³ It is certainly true that offensive realism is not the only realist strand, and others can better account for the post-Cold War European security outcomes. For instance the defensive realist Waltz claims that Europe moved so far toward unity that probably cannot progress more, but it also cannot go back.⁴ Similarly,

³ John J. Mearsheimer (1995), “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War”, Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, p. 79.

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz (1995), “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” in *ibidem*, p. 68.

based on Walt's balance of threat⁵ theory one could reach a more optimistic prediction about European security. Since states balance not against power per se, but against threat, there is no good reason for an intra-European conflict. Next, Schweller's balance of interest⁶ approach could serve as a basis for the deductive statement that European peace can be explained by the fact that member states bandwagon for additional gains rather than balance. Wohlforth, as a supporter of the Gilpin-type hegemonic transition version of neorealism would probably explain European peace by the presence of a powerful hegemon with 100000 troops.⁷ Finally, optimist realists sharing Glaser's "contingent realism," would argue that structural realism "properly understood predicts that, under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, choose cooperation when these conditions prevail."⁸

While for these latter approaches the post-Cold War peaceful Europe is not as anomalous as for Mearsheimer, they usually do not give satisfactory answers to the following questions. It is not enough to say that European states did not have an interest in fighting each other, or that they did not perceive each other as threatening. The real question is why this was the case. Why is it that European states do not perceive each other as threatening and have similar interests so they can bandwagon? Why can they cooperate under a wide range of conditions if the international system is anarchic, relative gains matter? Rather than answering the question regarding the lack of intra-European conflict, these approaches merely push it back with one step. In order to discover these deeper causes I will turn to democratic peace theory. Until then, let us briefly look at the empirical record.

⁵ Stephen M. Walt (1995), "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," in *ibidem*.

⁶ Randall Schweller (1995), "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in *ibidem*, p. 251.

⁷ William C. Wohlforth (1995), "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in *ibidem*, pp. 3-41.

⁸ Charles L. Glaser (1995), "Realists as Optimists," in *ibidem*, p. 378.

2) The Empirical Record

On the 1st of May 2004 the European Union had its biggest enlargement ever, with ten new member states included in the EU. Throughout the past fifteen years there was a considerable effort not only to widen, but also to deepen the EU. For instance the Maastricht Treaty, The Treaty of Amsterdam all arguably contained important steps in this direction; the Treaty of Nice is especially relevant in this regard, providing for instance new rules on closer co-operation. While in 1999 Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined the NATO, on 29th of March 2004, seven more countries formally joined. This was the fifth, and the largest, round of enlargement in the Alliance's history. Thus, if one takes a look at the European map, Kant's enlarging zone of peace comes into mind.

Of course, this is only half of the story. Let us now look at the post-Cold War conflicts, focusing on Europe. I use Eriksson and Wallensteen's data, who count armed conflict those situations where the number of battle-related casualties reaches 25 per year, and count as war those with minimum 1000 casualties.⁹

Looking at the data below, at the first glance it seems that the realists were at least partly right, since Europe is the third most conflictual region after Asia and Africa in terms of number of conflicts. However, if we take an intra-European look, Appendix 1 below shows us that most of these conflicts occurred outside the EU. While there was some conflict in Spain and Northern Ireland, both of these were intra-state ones (not the interstate one anticipated by realists) and they did not reach the level of war. The other conflicts occurred *mostly* at the periphery of Europe and were mostly intra-state ones, not the conflicts for regional hegemony anticipated by realists.¹⁰ This is clearly not to say that there were no conflicts of interest among states in the EU, but these were solved at the table of negotiations. Indeed, war between European states seems unthinkable to most people today. One has to ask why this is the case, if the world is indeed anarchic and based on self-help.


⁹ Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen (2004), "Armed Conflict, 1989-2003", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 625-636.

¹⁰ See Appendix 1 in Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, (2001), "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 5, p. 637.

Table III. Number of Armed Conflicts by Region, 1989-2000

	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Middle East</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Americas</i>
1989	2	4	19	14	8
1990	3	6	18	17	5
1991	6	7	16	17	5
1992	9	7	20	15	4
1993	10	7	15	11	3
1994	5	5	15	13	4
1995	5	4	13	9	4
1996	1	5	14	14	2
1997	0	3	15	14	2
1998	2	3	15	15	2
1999	3	2	14	16	2
2000	1	3	14	14	1

Figure 2. Number of Armed Conflicts by Region, 1989-2000



In conclusion, it seems that pessimistic approaches do not give a satisfactory explanation of the post-Cold War EU peace. As mentioned above, wars are unthinkable, or, as Bourdieu would put it, EU peace is part of *doxa* (of that which is taken for granted).¹¹ I turn now to the democratic peace explanations, which not only better fit the empirical evidence, but have the potential to shed light on its deeper causes.

¹¹ Pierre Bourdieu, (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 166.

*Appendix 1. List of Armed Conflicts in the World, 1989–2000**

Location/ government	Incompatibility	Year of activity												
		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	
Europe														
Azerbaijan	Territory (Nagorno-Karabakh)				■	■	■	■						
	Government				□			□						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Territory (Serb) ¹				■	■	■	■	■					
	Territory (Croat)				■	■	■	■						
Croatia	Territory (Bihac)				□	□	□	□						
	Territory (Serb)				■	■	■	■	■					
Georgia	Government			□	□	□	□							
	Territory (South Ossetia)				□									
	Territory (Abkhazia)				■	■	■							
Moldova	Territory (Transnistria)				□									
Romania	Government		□											
Russia	Government						□							
	Territory (Chechnya)							■	■	■	■	■	■	■
	* Opposition organization in 2000: Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)													
Soviet Union	Territory (Dagestan)												□	
	Territory (Azerbaijan)			□										
Spain	Territory (Nagorno-Karabakh)			□	□									
	Territory (Basque)			□	□									
United Kingdom	Territory (Northern Ireland)	■	■	■	■	■	■	■					■	
Yugoslavia	Territory (Croatia)				■									
	Territory (Slovenia)			□										
	Territory (Kosovo)												■	■

* The list in Appendix 1 is revised and updated and replaces that of our previous report (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2000). For 2000, Kristine Høgland was responsible for Burundi; Patrik Johansson for Israel; Destee Nilsson for Sudan. Margareta Sollenberg and Mikael Eriksson were responsible for data on the remaining conflict locations. Detailed information on the coding of earlier years is found in previous versions of this report, published annually in this journal since 1993.

¹ Possibly more than 1,000 deaths in 1994 and 1995.

□ Minor Armed Conflict ■ Intermediate Armed Conflict ■ War

II. A Review of Democratic Peace Theory

According to Jack Levy “the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,”¹² while Bruce Russett states that democratic peace contains “one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations.”¹³ This research program challenges realism’s pessimism and its systemic level approach. In this subsection I first turn to the roots of the democratic peace thesis. Next, I look at the definition problematique and I continue with discussing the different strands of explanations. Finally, I review critiques of democratic peace and I conclude with the argument that the normative/cultural strand provides most of the explanatory power of the democratic peace research program.

1) The Roots of the Democratic Peace Thesis

The roots of the democratic peace thesis date back to the Kantian idea of perpetual peace.¹⁴ The growing zone of peace mentioned by several supporters of the democratic peace is quite similar to Kant’s “*foedus pacificum*.” Although at the individual level Kant seems a pessimist like Hobbes, at the supra-individual level he is more optimistic, believing in the progress of humanity toward perfection and peace. According to the Kantian idea republics are more cautious to declare war because the people who decide have also have to support to burden, an also it is difficult to justify war against other republics.¹⁵ However, most supporters of

¹² Jack S. Levy, (1989), “Domestic Politics and War,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,, p. 88.

¹³ Bruce Russett (1990), *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, p. 123.

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant (1972), *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, New York: Garland Publishing Inc.; see also Kant’s Definitive and Permissive Articles for instance in Howard Williams (1992), *International Relations in Political Theory*, Milton Keynes, PA: Open University Press, p. 87. Although Kant clearly distinguishes between democracy and republicanism, today’s democracy fits his definition of republicanism.

¹⁵ Immanuel Kant (1991), “Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch,” in H. Reiss, (ed.), *Kant. Political Writings*, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 100.

democratic peace are skeptical about the restraint the cost-benefit analysis suggests to democratic citizens, because it seems not to work against nondemocracies. Most of the contemporary theoreticians draw on the second section of Perpetual Peace, containing the Definitive Articles of a Perpetual Peace¹⁶ according to which:

1. The civil constitution of each state shall be republican (constitutional law): this constitution includes equality of citizens, common legislation for all subjects, freedom, and the consent of citizen to wage wars.
2. The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states (international law): this refers to an alliance of a particular kind, *foedus pacificum*, which differs from a peace treaty (*pactum pacis*) in that the latter is meant to end one war, the former is meant to gradually end all wars.
3. The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality (cosmopolitan law).

As an increasing number of states accept Kant's three definitive articles, the pacific union is enlarging and Perpetual Peace gets closer.

Closer to our times, starting with the behavioralist revolution in political science, several quantitative studies found that democracies seem to be more peaceful with each other. Thus, Dean Babst argued that democratic states did not fight interstate wars.¹⁷ Similarly, in a very comprehensive study Rummel has reached the same conclusion that democratic states do not fight each other.¹⁸ Subsequently, a large body of literature was produced on this phenomenon. Maoz and Abdolali find that although democracies seem to be as war-prone as other regime types, "the proportion of disputes in which [democracies] participate that escalate to war is significantly lower than that of nondemocratic polities."¹⁹ This result is supported by the findings of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, who look

¹⁶ Kant, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-140.

¹⁷ Dean V. Babst, "A Force for Peace," *Industrial Research*, Vol. 14 (April), pp. 55-58.

¹⁸ Rummel, R.J., (1975-1981), *Understanding Conflict and War: Vols. 1-5*, Los Angeles: Sage Publishing.

¹⁹ Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, (March, 1989), p. 18.

at European militarized conflicts and find that regime type of both the target or the initiator state independently increases the chances of avoiding escalation of conflict; even if only one of the states is democratic, the chances of peaceful conflict resolution significantly increase.²⁰ Also, Bremer's analysis focused on all dyads of the international system from 1816 to 1956 indicates that war between nondemocratic regimes is approximately four times as likely as between democratic and nondemocratic or only between democratic regimes.²¹

2) The Definition Problematique

A key component on which the validity of democratic peace depends is the definition of democracy and interstate war. Based on these one can dismiss or accept the alleged exceptions to the democratic peace proposition. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the paper, but I will briefly provide the main definitions on which the theory builds. Russett defines democracy in terms of elected government, voting rights of the majority of the adult citizens, popularly elected executive or one which is accountable to elected legislature.²² According to Owen, liberal democratic countries are states "where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions."²³ Free speech and election of the representatives who are competent in declaring war are important features of these democratic regimes. This type of liberalism values self-preservation, considers material well-being as the universal goal of all peoples, and perceives freedom and tolerance as the best way to achieve it. According to Ray democracy is defined as a "form of government in which the identities of the leaders of the executive branch and the members of the

²⁰ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict," *World Politics*, Vol. 41, pp. 1-20.

²¹ Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36 (June), pp. 309-341.

²² Bruce Russett (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 11-16.

²³ John M. Owen (1996), "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Peace*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, p. 118.

national legislature are determined in fair, competitive elections."²⁴ A regime is sufficiently democratic if at least two formally independent political parties compete for votes, at least 50% of the adult population exercises voting rights, and there is precedent of peaceful power transfer from one party to another. Another variable often introduced is perception. It is argued that it is not enough that a state is democratic, but it must also be perceived as such by the fellow democracies (see Owen or Russett below).

Regarding the definition of war, usually the Correlates of War project is followed by the supporters of the democratic peace proposition.²⁵ According to this, only those armed conflicts qualify as wars which involve at least 1000 battle casualties. Parties at war can be considered those with at least 1000 troops committed to battle, or with 100 battle fatalities. Finally, to be considered interstate wars, these conflicts must take place between sovereign states.²⁶

Based on these and similar definitions, supporters of democratic peace based the main thesis of the research program: mature democracies of the right type, which also perceived each other as such, do not fight interstate wars against each other. But what are the explanations? What causal mechanisms underlie this phenomenon? The next subsection deals with these questions.

3) Explaining Democratic Peace

Since the thesis itself establishes only a correlation between democratic regimes and the lack of war between them, theories are needed which can explain this correlation, or can specify causal mechanisms which underlie this phenomenon. Although there are several possibilities to categorize the different attempts of democratic peace approaches, there are three widely recognized strands: (1) the structural/institutional, (2) the normative/cultural, and (3) the economic interdependency variants. Their arguments are briefly the following:

²⁴ James Lee Ray (1995), *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*, Columbia: South Carolina Press, p. 97.

²⁵ See for instance the acceptance of the COW definitions in ibidem and Russett, *op.cit.*

²⁶ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, (1982), *Resort to Arms*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing.

1. The institutions of democratic regimes constrain the ability of leaders to wage wars. Institutional constraints in democracy such as checks and balances, separation of powers, and public debate slow down or block ways to war. Democratic leaders perceive each other as being constrained, and they do not fear surprise attacks.²⁷
2. The shared domestic norms of democracies cause a peaceful perception about each other. According to the cultural/normative model the ideas and norms of democracy lead to peaceful conflict resolution between democracies, but not necessarily between democracies and nondemocracies. Democratic decision makers tend to externalize domestic norms of peaceful conflict resolution when dealing with other democracies since they expect reciprocity, but they are suspicious of nondemocracies and use nondemocratic norms of conflict resolution with these latter.
3. Democracies are characterized by economic interdependence, which in turn lowers the probability of wars between democracies since war is not profitable.

In the following I will try to present the arguments on democratic peace organized around the most important authors. After reviewing their works, I will summarize the causal mechanisms of the three strands.

Reviving Democratic Peace-Doyle's Kantian Mixture

The contemporary father of democratic peace is Michael W. Doyle, who, drawing on Kant's ideas, analyzed the influence of liberalism on the conduct of foreign affairs.²⁸ Doyle argues that liberalism can at least partly disrupt the realist balance-of-power type international relations, producing

²⁷ Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-40.

²⁸ Michael W. Doyle, (1996), "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-58.

a qualitative change in international relations among democratic states.²⁹ He is cautious enough to assert that while democratic war is not impossible, it is highly unlikely.³⁰ While liberal states are as war-prone as any other regime (or even more so) in their relations with nonliberal states, liberal democracies are peaceful among each other. His explanation for democratic peace is almost identical to that of Kant, because it involves the constitutional guarantee of caution, the international law's guarantee of respect, and the cosmopolitan law's material incentives (rights to hospitality is conducive to free trade). These three sources together connect in Doyle's vision democracy with peace. An important component of his explanation is the normative/cultural strand, which emphasizes the externalization of domestic democratic norms and importance of perception: "In short, domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation."³¹ Thus, it seems that the trust between democracies mitigates the power of security dilemma and promotes friendly relations between democracies. In contrast, while nonliberal states indeed act sometimes against democracies, at least "part of the atmosphere of suspicion can be attributed to the perception by liberal states that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people."³²

The Normative Strand is the Best-Russett

Russett shares Doyle's claim that while democracies are peaceful with each other, they are not necessarily so with non-democratic regimes. He nicely breaks down his interpretation of democratic peace to its components: "(a) Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) because (b) they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do not need to fight each other (a prudential statement), and (c) they perceive that democracies should not fight each other (a normative

²⁹ Doyle in *ibidem*, p. 4.

³⁰ Doyle in *ibidem*, p. 10.

³¹ Doyle in *ibidem* p. 26.

³² Doyle in *ibidem* p.32.

statement about principles of right behavior), which reinforces the empirical statement."³³ He analyses several "alleged exceptions" to the democratic peace thesis from Athens versus Syracuse to conflicts in the post-Communist world (Armenia-Azerbaijan, Serbia versus Croatia etc.) and using his definitions of interstate war and democracy he finds that none of them constitutes an exception to democratic peace.³⁴

Russett argues that democracies adopted an anti-war norm among each other at the end of the nineteenth century, as the 1895-96 Venezuelan Crisis demonstrates when American and English leaders appealed to shared liberal values. After that as the number of democracies grew, democratic peace became increasingly important and statistically significant. This argument is in conformity with his analysis of the imperfect democratic peace of Ancient Greece, where he finds 14 wars between democracies.³⁵ Russett explains this with weak democratic constitution and ideology. Institutions provided weak constraints on war, perceptions about each other were very varied, in the sense that the political entities did not always perceived each other as democracies. He considers that the democratic peace thesis that democracies do not fight each other was just being born by that time, and its infantilism and misperceptions about each other reduced its efficiency.³⁶

Russett also discusses the two models which offer explanations regarding democracy's pacifying effect: the cultural/normative model and the structural/institutional model. He regards them as complementary and competing at the same time. It is hard to distinguish between them because norms shape institutions, and also all depends on whether democracies perceive each other as democracies. But he still thinks that we can devise tests which tell us which model is better. Such a test is carried out by Russett and Maoz.³⁷ They formulate three distinct hypotheses and analyze them through multivariate statistical methods. The hypotheses are the following: "1. The more democratic are both members of a pair of states

³³ Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

³⁴ Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-125. See also Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.

³⁵ Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "The Imperfect Democratic Peace of Ancient Athens," in *ibidem*, pp. 43-62.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 62.

³⁷ Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, "The Democratic Peace since World War II," in *ibidem*, pp. 72-98.

(dyad), the less likely it is that a militarized dispute will break out between them, and the less likely it is that any disputes that do break out will escalate. This effect will operate independently of other attributes such as wealth, economic growth, contiguity, alliance, or capability ratio of the countries. 2. The more deeply rooted are democratic norms in the political processes operating in the two states, the lower the likelihood that disputes will break out or escalate. (Normative/cultural model) 3. The higher the institutional constraints on the two states, the lower the likelihood that disputes will break out or escalate. (Structural/institutional model)³⁸ They look at all dyads of independent states from 1946-86, the unit of analysis being pairs of countries per year (dyad-year). The degree of institutional restraint is measured on a scale from 4 to 22, composed of degree of concentration of power, degree of executive constraint, centralization, and scope of government action. The measure of normative influence on conflict behavior is seen as the persistence of the regime in years. The other independent variables are wealth, economic growth, alliance, contiguity, and military capability ratio. Russett and Maoz use logistic regression to analyze the data, since the dependent variable is dichotomous (war/ no war; dispute/no dispute). Their findings indicate that democracy is an important predictor of the dependent variable even when one controls for the alternative independent variables. These findings are consistent with those of Bremer, and a previous study of Maoz and Russett.³⁹ The more democratic the countries of the dyad are, the less likely a crisis between them or its escalation. Further, the results indicate that the normative/cultural model is superior to the structural/institutional one. Normative restraints are conducive to avoiding both the occurrence of disputes and the outbreak of war, whereas institutional constraints seem to prevent the outbreak of war, but do not prevent states from involvement in lower-level disputes.⁴⁰ Overall, all three hypotheses are supported, but 2 is

³⁸ Russett and Maoz, "The Democratic Peace since World War II," in *ibidem*, pp. 72-73.

³⁹ Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," *International Interactions*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 231-249; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict between Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 245-267.

⁴⁰ Russett and Maoz, "The Democratic Peace since World War II," in Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-90.

more significant than 3. Reflecting on the future of democratic peace Russett thinks that “[t]he spread of democratic norms and practices in the world, if consolidated, should reduce the frequency of violent conflict and war.”⁴¹ Thus, he clearly claims that the normative/cultural strand is superior within the democratic peace theory.

An important point made by Russett is that “[r]epeating the proposition that democracies should not fight each other helps reinforce the probability that democracies will not fight each other.”⁴²

Refining the Causal Logic-Owen

An important contribution to the democratic peace argument is provided by John Owen, who refines its causal mechanism.⁴³ Since one of the main vulnerabilities of democratic peace is the lack of theoretical foundation which clearly explains why democracies do not fight each other, Owen tries to rectify this. In his opinion liberal ideology and democratic institutions “work in tandem to bring about democratic peace.”⁴⁴ Echoing one of Russett’s points, Owen agrees that perceptions are crucial for the democratic peace argument: democracies must perceive each other as democratic. He points out that the normative strand is very important, but if the countries do not consider each other democratic, the normative check on war will be absent.⁴⁵ Neither structures nor norms alone account for democratic peace, but together they can, such as a car cannot run separately on gasoline and engine, but needs both.⁴⁶ In his research design liberal

⁴¹ *ibidem*, p. 120.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 136.


⁴³ John M. Owen (1996), “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 116-154.

⁴⁴ Owen (1996) in *ibidem*, p. 118.

⁴⁵ Owen (1996) in *ibidem*, p. 120. Owen tests 7 hypotheses in four cases of crisis: the Franco-American crisis of 1796-98, and the Anglo-American crises of 1803-1812, 1861-1863, and 1895-1896. The examination of four cases of crisis between liberals shows that when they perceived each other as democracies, war was avoided. However, in the second Anglo-American crisis, when England was not perceived liberal democracy, war broke out.

⁴⁶ Owen (1996) in *ibidem*, p. 121.

ideas figure as the independent variable, which produces liberal ideology and domestic democratic institutions (intervening variables), which in turn push for democratic peace. The mechanism is the following:⁴⁷



Ideologically, liberal democracies trust liberal democracies. Institutionally, citizen's leverage on government's decisions is important. Another argument added to the institutional stand of the democratic peace is that democratic leaders want to be reelected, and thus they are concerned about policy failures.⁴⁸ As a consequence, they are more cautious about engaging in war. If they do, they fight in wars which they think they can win, and they also fight harder to avoid defeat.

Owen introduces another qualification of his argument: illiberal democracies. Those states which have a democratic regime in the sense of a popularly-governed polity, but do not follow liberal ideology or define

⁴⁷ See figure 1: Causal Pathways of Liberal Democratic Peace in Owen (1996) in *ibidem*, p. 131.

⁴⁸ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No. 4, (Dec., 1999), pp. 791-807.

themselves not as abstract individuals but parts of a cultural-religious community, will not necessarily enter the zone of peace, and the democratic peace thesis does not necessarily apply to them.⁴⁹

Economic Interdependence-Weede and Co.

These arguments follow Kant's idea that the cosmopolitan law of hospitality favors commerce between democracies. As a consequence, trade between democracies will be more intense than between other regimes, and war will be more costly for them, since it disrupts the profit making through trade. Such an argument was made by Russett and Oneal, who analyze the politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era, and find that the pacific effects of trade were very significant.⁵⁰ In a similar argument stressing the importance of trade, Weede argues that democratic peace is actually part of something broader: the "capitalist peace."⁵¹ He shows how the promotion of prosperity reinforces democracy, and argues that peace rests on prosperity, capitalism, free trade, and democracy.⁵² His empirical case is the Marshall plan's role in reinforcing democracy in post-World War II Europe. The causal chain is that trade creates prosperity, prosperity creates democracy, and democracy creates peace. Bliss and Russett test the hypothesis that democratic states will trade more with each other. According to some arguments, international trade seems to reduce conflict.⁵³ Their results are consistent with this argument: they find that trade promotes peace and in turn peace promotes trade.

Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares however, try to answer the question whether trade between two states reduces the likelihood of conflict

⁴⁹ Owen (1996) in *ibidem*, p.127.

⁵⁰ See for instance John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 267-293.

⁵¹ Erich Weede, "Capitalism, Democracy, and Peace," in Gustaaf Geeraerts and Patrick Stouthuysen, eds., *Democratic Peace for Europe: Myth or Reality?* (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1999), p. 67.

⁵² Weede, "Capitalism, Democracy, and Peace," in *ibidem*, pp. 61-73.

⁵³ Bruce Russett and J. Oneal (1998), "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations also Matter," in Zeev Maoz and A. Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*, New York: Columbia University Press.

between them.⁵⁴ Their conclusion is that conflict is the result of the interests of states and joint characteristics of their institutions, rather than trade.

4) Criticizing the Theories

In this subsection I briefly discuss some of the major criticisms. The most frequent criticisms refer to the arbitrary definitions used by supporters of the democratic peace theory, to its statistical insignificance, to alternative causes of democratic peace, and that democracies are not that stable and can regress to totalitarianism.

Probably one of the strongest attacks on inside out explanations of peace can be found in Waltz's *Man, the State and War*.⁵⁵ According to Waltz the second image idea that domestic characteristics of states cause wars is wrong.⁵⁶ In the neorealist vision inside-out explanations cannot be correct, since war has important systemic/third image causes. Thus, the democratic peace theory would be correct only if all the causes of war were dependent on the regime type of the state.

Mearsheimer also often criticized the democratic peace arguments.⁵⁷ According to him the economic interdependence argument is not convincing because states are primarily concerned with survival not prosperity, and in the anarchical international system relative gains matter. Further, interdependence can lead to conflict as well as to cooperation, and it means vulnerability. The democratic peace argument is also weak because the mass of democratic citizens can easily support aggression. One of the sharpest critiques of democratic peace is Layne.⁵⁸ He tests realism and democratic peace on four "near misses," that is "crises where

⁵⁴ James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa E. Tabares, "The Wages of Peace: Trade, Democracy, Interests and International Conflict Among the Major Powers, 1907-1965," in Geeraerts and Stouthuysen, op. cit., pp. 91-105.

⁵⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz (1959), *Man, the State and War*, New York: Columbia University Press.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 83.

⁵⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, (1995), "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", in Brown, Lynn-Jones, Miller (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, pp. 78-129.

⁵⁸ Christopher Layne (1996), "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.), op. cit., pp. 157-201.

two democratic states almost went to war with each other:"⁵⁹ the Anglo-American Crisis I-the Trent Affair, 1861; Anglo-American Crisis II: Venezuela, 1895-96; The Anglo-French Struggle for Control of the Nile: Fashoda, 1898; Franco-German Crisis: The Ruhr, 1923. He deduces testable propositions from realism and the normative/cultural democratic model. His dependent variable is how democracies behaved in diplomatic interactions in crisis. Layne examines the crises by process-tracing method, and finds that realism is a better predictor of international outcomes. While democracies avoid wars, they do so not because of shared democratic norms, but based on calculated national interest, which is well predicted by realism. Layne concludes that the causal logic of democratic peace has small explanatory power. The problem with this critique is that it assumes a benefit-calculating state acting according to the logic of consequences, and this might not always be the case. Also, even if the state acts based on calculated national interest, this does not exclude the influence of the normative component of democratic peace. Since there is no objective national interest,⁶⁰ what states perceive as their national interest and how they go about achieving it depends on what is included in their utility function. They might not perceive that it is in their interest to fight other democracies not because for instance materially it would not be advantageous, but because their utility function contains the normative check on war with other democracies.

While Layne uses small N study to disprove democratic peace, Spiro takes look at large N quantitative studies, and tries to show that the 0% of democratic wars is actually statistically insignificant.⁶¹ Before 1945 there were very few democracies, and so a low chance of war between them. Thus democratic peace might well be the result of random chance. Ray argues that is actually it is statistically unlikely that democracies would have avoided wars with each other, had they not been more peaceful towards each other.⁶² Spiro thinks that supportive evidence for democratic

⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 158.

⁶⁰ Martha Finnemore (1996), *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁶¹ David E. Spiro (1996), "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), op. cit., pp. 202-233.

⁶² Ray, op. cit., p. 203.

peace theory is based on the manipulation of definitions of war and democracy, and specific statistical methods. He speculates that democratic peace rests not on the peacefulness of democracies, but rather on the interest of democracies.⁶³ However, this does not answer the question of why democracies have similar interests, and thus avoid wars with each other. Russett's reply is that Spiro takes year-by-year approach and since he slices up the data to too small elements, no wonder that he finds democratic peace insignificant. He shows that a pooled-time series analysis or one which takes regime-dyad as unit of analysis shows that democratic peace is statistically significant.⁶⁴ Another problem with statistical analyses trying to prove the significance of democratic peace is the interdependency of the annual observation of dyads, which means that the number of cases on which the significance tests are made is not really the N the authors put forth. Also, if the difference between wars involving other regimes, and those involving democracies is very low, the small numbers of exceptions to democratic peace, if proven to be right, might make this difference insignificant. Finally, democracies can become nondemocracies, so "all interactions among states involve states that are potentially *autocratic*."⁶⁵ This might mean that democracies cannot really mitigate security dilemma.

Faber and Gowa find both the normative and the structural explanations of democratic peace unconvincing.⁶⁶ The norm on which democratic peace is based, the norm of peaceful conflict resolution, is characteristic to all types of states since wars are expensive. The structural/institutional explanation is undermined by democracies' propensity to fight with nondemocracies. They find democratic peace statistically significant only since 1945, and explain it as the product of Cold War. Systemic variables explain peace and war better than regime type. However, Gowa and Faber cannot explain why the norm of peaceful resolution is not used by democracies when dealing with nondemocracies, if it would be rational to do so. Also, not all democratic wars would be

⁶³ David E. Spiro (1996) "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," in in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), op. cit., p. 233.

⁶⁴ Bruce Russett (1996), "The Democratic Peace-And Yet It Moves," in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), op. cit., pp. 337-350.

⁶⁵ Ray, op. cit., p. 204.

⁶⁶ Henry Faber and Joanne Gowa (1996), "Politics and Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), op. cit., pp. 239-263.

expensive, in fact some might be profitable: why is that strong democracies do not take weak ones over? Finally, if the democratic peace was a product of the Cold War, why does it persist in the post-Cold War period? These questions can be answered referring to the normative strand of democratic peace theory.

Ido Oren has an interesting argument against democratic peace.⁶⁷ It is not that countries which consider each other democratic do not go to war with each other, but countries which have interest in avoiding conflict define each other as democracies. Coding and judging regime type is always dependent on political relations. However, as discussed above, Owen showed that changing democratic labels of counterparts according to momentary interests does not work. These labels are not as manipulative as Oren thinks they are.

A widely cited finding is that although “mature democracies” usually do not fight each other, countries in the process of democratization are much more war-prone.⁶⁸ Their examples include Britain in the Crimean War, Napoleon III’s France, Wilhelmine Germany’s lead to WWI, and Japan’s democratization in the 1920s. Some of the reasons they give is the new and old elite’s appeal to nationalism when competing for power in the new domestic arena, the newly mobilized public is hard to control, and if new democracies collapse their return to autocracy increases chances of going to war. New democracies do not have stable and stabilizing institutions. Since promoting democracy might cause wars, the authors propose alleviating measures.

A sharp criticism is put forth by Denny Roy, who argues that democratic peace supporters (he refers specially to Sorensen) often mix three weak arguments (normative/cultural, structural/institutional, and economic interdependence) in a supposedly stronger united one to support their thesis.⁶⁹ After showing how each of these separate arguments is vulnerable, he questions the strength of their united explanatory power.

⁶⁷ Ido Oren (1996), “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany,” in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), op. cit., pp. 263-301.

⁶⁸ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1996), “Democratization and the Danger of War,” in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), op. cit., p. 302.

⁶⁹ Denny Roy, “Neorealism and Kant: No Pacific Union,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), pp. 451-453.

Based on the overview above I argue that these three strands are not weak, and as the overview discussion shows they have explanatory power not only together, but also independent from one another.

5) Summing Up the Causal Mechanisms

The following graphs⁷⁰ (see Figures C1, C2 and C3 below) nicely depict the comprehensive mechanisms of these different approaches.

First, the institutional/structural strand has two main components. On the one hand, liberal ideas materialize in checks and balances type of institutional restraints, and in free public debate, both of which constrain the government. Thus, there is longer time to peacefully solve the conflicts, and lower chances for surprise attacks or misperceptions, which contribute to democratic peace. On the other hand, one of the main goals of democratic leaders is to be reelected, and thus they are less likely to engage in wars, or if they do, they engage in wars with weaker adversaries, to win quickly, without major material losses and casualties. The problem with the institutional argument is that it does not explain why the institutional restraints would function against democracies, but not against nondemocracies. As we have seen in the literature review, democracies are as war-prone (if not more) against nondemocracies than any other regime. The argument could be that since democracies are tougher adversaries in war, and is more difficult to defeat them,⁷¹ democracies avoid fighting with each other. The problem is that not all democracies are strong, and there are several asymmetric relations between democracies. Why do strong democracies avoid taking over weaker ones? Also, the institutional argument in itself is unconvincing, because it superficially excludes the normative component. Since institutions cannot function without being embedded in a normative context which gives meaning to them, this strand is weak without the normative component. In conclusion the institutional argument is unconvincing because it excludes norms, and thus cannot

⁷⁰ For the graphs see www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1346/MR1346.appc.pdf.

⁷¹ David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 24-37.

explain why sometimes democratic leaders can mobilize and pursue war fast against autocracies, but not against democracies. It also does not address the security dilemma problem properly, and thus cannot explain well why rational leaders would not try to benefit from the fact that other democratic leaders are institutionally constrained and take them over.




Figure C.1—Institutions and Democratic Peace

Second, economic interdependence arguments emphasize that democracies tend to trade more with each other than with other regimes, and thus want to avoid war which means losses, and try to gain through commerce. However, economic interdependence can also increase the chances of conflict between two nations, since there are more things to argue on. Further, it is not clear whether this interdependence is cause or effect of peace. Also, if relative gains matter more and states value survival

more than economic benefits, then countries which gain less from the trade than their counterparts, but have a stronger army, might be tempted to take over the other country. Finally, very often we can see that interest is regime-blind. China for instance is a major trading partner of today's democracies. Democracies trade with those who by what they sell, or sell what these democracies want. Thus, the economic interdependence argument might not be satisfying, as Norman Angell for instance could testify.




Figure C.2—Norms and Democratic Peace




Figure C.3—Interdependence and Democratic Peace

Third, according to the normative/cultural argument democracies externalize their domestic norms of peaceful conflict resolution when dealing with each other. They also trust each other, and assume that they have peaceful intentions. The shared norms provide a common understanding of the situations, are conducive to communication, and restrain the options available for decision-makers. Thus, there is no fear of surprise attacks, and there is more openness to solve conflicts peacefully. Finally, institutions are based on norms, and cannot function without them.

Based on our literature review, we can state that the cultural/normative strand provides most of the explanatory power: for instance, Doyle shows the importance of externalization of domestic norms with other democracies; Owen and Russett emphasize the importance of perceptions for the democratic peace argument; Russett demonstrates that the normative/cultural constraint against war is much stronger than the institutional one etc. Without looking at the normative/cultural component, we cannot explain why democracies exercise constraint with each other, but not with autocracies; we cannot understand why weak democracies do not go to war against infinitely weaker ones; we cannot understand why and how the security dilemma between democracies is mitigated; and we cannot see the previous two strands in context.

If we accept that the normative/cultural explanation offers most of the explanatory power to the democratic peace, then the next step should be to understand its practical implications and to improve it. One possibility could be to use a constructivism for this purpose, since it is better equipped to deal with norms and principled beliefs.

IV. Constructing a Better Normative/Cultural Approach

1) Theoretical Improvement

A normative/cultural democratic peace argument which focuses only on the inherent peacefulness of democracies could not challenge the realist security dilemma, and its structural constraints. Thus, a proper normative explanation must show how democracies can substantially mitigate the

security dilemma; it also must include the level of international interactions, and not only unit-level analysis.⁷² Thus, it must show not only that democracies are peaceful with each other, but also that they can modify the logic of anarchy through their interaction. The constructivist interpretation seems very useful in this respect and improves the normative/cultural approach at least in three respects:

First, the main argument of constructivism is that the entire international political system is a social construction which shapes and is shaped by the (inter)actions of the agents. As a consequence, "anarchy is what states make of it,"⁷³ and so, it must be problematized, and not just taken as given and objective. This means that democratic states could modify the logic of anarchy (however, this does not imply that such change would be easy). Constructivism can well show why at the third image level interactions among democracies do not follow the Hobbesian logic of anarchy, but instead are closer to a Lockean anarchy.⁷⁴ Also, besides constructing the environment of interaction, democracies also construct their friends and enemies by inferring friendly or aggressive intentions from the domestic structures of their counterparts. When dealing with democracies they externalize their peaceful conflict resolution norms, and expect reciprocation, but with nondemocracies they do not. Attribution theory's claim that there is a tendency to judge others' behavior in dispositional and own behavior in situational terms is also useful to understand this phenomenon. Thus, cooperative behavior is associated with fellow democracies, and competitive one with nondemocracies. The presumption that the other fellow democracy is essentially peaceful leads to trust, the mitigation of security dilemma, is reinforced by interactions, so is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fears of cheating are reduced, relative gains lose preeminence. Both democratic peace and aggressiveness towards nondemocracies is the result of learning the rule from previous interactions that external behavior and aggressiveness of the counterpart can be

⁷² Thomas Risse, "Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," in Geeraerts and Stouthuysen (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁷³ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992.

⁷⁴ For different cultures of anarchy see Alexander Wendt (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, esp. pp. 246-308.

inferred from the degree of violence from the domestic structure of the counterpart.

Second, besides letting the analysts to see better how the interaction environment and the perceptions about the others is constructed and changing, a constructivist approach deals better with norms. Norms are very difficult to study, because they are hard to operationalize, measure, "see," know when they matter and where do they come from etc.⁷⁵ However, recent constructivist approaches such as the Norm Life Cycle help us to better grasp how norms come into being, become stronger, are internalized by the international actors, and then disappear.⁷⁶ This approach might help us to understand when the normative/cultural constraints against war are strong or weak,⁷⁷ what we can do to strengthen them, how we can socialize an increasing number of states in these norms, and how we can persuade them to internalize them.

Finally, Drawing on Dessler I think that the ontology (substantive entities and configurations of the approach) is the basis of explanatory power of theories.⁷⁸ Thus, the more comprehensive the ontological basis of an approach is, the higher its ability to reduce independent phenomena, the better the theory is. While traditional IR theories see a constraining international structure which is material and is the unintended consequence of the interaction of units, constructivism sees an international structure which is also ideational and the result of both intended and unintended consequences. Thus, I argue that constructivism can extend the ontological basis of democratic peace, and thus serve as the basis of a progressive more successful research program.

⁷⁵ For a representative constructivist study on international security see Peter J. Katzenstein, (1996) (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

⁷⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norms and Political Change," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887-917.

⁷⁷ For a representative work on conditions when international norms are adopted in the domestic context see Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Relations: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2000, pp. 65-87.

⁷⁸ David Dessler (1989). "What's At Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?," *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3

2) Practical Implications and Test

If the normative approach is indeed the one which provides the explanatory power of the democratic peace theory, then we have to look at what can it tell us about the European peace. One important development in Europe is the inclusion of most Central and Eastern European countries in the EU. If it is true that normative constraints matter more than institutional ones, then one should pay more attention to the former in order to avoid armed conflicts. These new members have strong enough institutional constraints against war, and they adopted the “*acquis communautaire*,” so it is reasonable to say that the institutional dimension of the democratic constraints is fulfilled by them. However, it is not equally clear that they fully internalized the normative constraints. It is doubtful whether they are fully socialized in “good countries do X.” And as the literature review suggests, countries with strong institutional restraints, but weak normative ones might go to wars easier. Also, these countries can be perceived by fellow democracies as not fully democratic or even unstable, and thus wage war against them. While this possibility seems unrealistic now, it cannot be ruled out on the long run. This especially is the case if we think about future enlargement possibilities towards Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. To diminish the chances of potential armed conflict (both inter- and intrastate), one should work to strengthen the normative constraints in these new EU members.

In this regard, a modified “spiral model” could be useful.⁷⁹ The model basically “serves to operationalize the theoretical framework of norm socialization, to identify the dominant mode of social interaction in each phase (adaptation, arguing, institutionalization), and, ultimately, to specify the causal mechanisms by which international norms affect domestic structural change.”⁸⁰ It consists of five phases through which states evolve (but not necessarily in a linear fashion): repression and activation of socialization network, denial of norm validity, tactical

⁷⁹ Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) (eds.), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁸⁰ Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction,” in *ibidem*, p. 19.

concession (followed by self entrapment), prescription, and rule-consistent behavior. Of course, in our case the first two phases are not needed. However, the others are useful, because we might suspect for instance that some of the new members made only tactical concessions to get into the European Union without internalizing the respective norms of peaceful conflict resolution. In the last phase of the spiral model norms become constitutive of the collective identity of the state, and “cause” behavior in the sense that “good states do X.” This kind of causality might provide better explanatory power than the traditional ones, based on cost-benefit analysis. Instead of calculating the costs and benefits of a war with another democracy, democracies might simply not see it as an option, if they internalize the norm which prohibits war with other democracies.

At different stages different socialization processes are dominant, although they always appear combined: in early phases strategic bargaining, later persuasion, argumentation, and finally institutionalization. The model involves activity at four levels: international-transnational interactions among INGOs, international regimes and organizations, and Western states; the domestic society of the target (norm-violating) state; links between domestic opposition and transnational networks, the national government of the norm-violating state.⁸¹

To relate the spiral model to European security, we could focus on the normative status of the new members: In which phase of the model are they? How can we get them to the final phase which involves not only institutionalization and internalization? After assessing their status, the appropriate socialization process can be used, depending on how advanced a country is in internalizing the norms.

My hypotheses would be the following:

1. *The more/less a new member state internalizes the normative constraints, the more/less likely that it will avoid armed conflict. More specifically, as a country advances in the stages of the spiral model, the less war-prone it becomes.*
2. *The more/less a new member state internalizes the normative constraints, the less/more likely that fellow democracies will consider it an unstable*

⁸¹ Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction,” in *ibidem*, p. 17.

democracy, and thus it is less/more likely that their normative check against waging war will not work when dealing with it. More specifically, as a country advances in the stages of the spiral model, the less war-prone others (who already internalized the norm) become towards it.

3. *The more/less member states completely internalize these norms, the less/more likely an intra-European interstate war is. More specifically, the more countries reach the final stage of the spiral model, the less likely a war among them will be.*

In terms of a test, the independent variable would be degree of norm internalization (or stage in the spiral model), while the dependent variable would be presence/absence of conflict. If we choose a quantitative study, we could use multivariate logistic regression since our dependent variable is dichotomous. However, process tracing case study seems more appropriate, since it is more difficult to quantify the factors we are dealing with. To analyze in which stage of the spiral model a country is, one could use process tracing method, with special attention to discourse analysis. The indicators could be the following: Are the actions and utterances of a state consistent with each other? Do the discourses in the country suggest that the norm is an organic part of the collective identity of the state? Does the state follow norms even when it is more costly for it than alternative actions? We also need to set up more specific criteria for putting a country in a stage or another. The case of the new Central and Eastern European states could be a test for these hypotheses, because most of them are not yet in the final stage of the spiral model. As they evolve, we should be able to see an increasing tendency toward peaceful conflict solving. One problem we might have is that at present we do not have too much variation in our dependent variable. However, we could still see (based on discourses, public opinion, negotiations) an increased tendency in these countries towards avoiding conflict with other democracies. A good indicator of internalization of the norm is when in the crisis situation a country does not even consider a non-peaceful resolution option.

An improvement in our understanding about how the norm works not only helps us improve the normative/cultural strand of the democratic peace argument, but it can also be conducive for the preservation on the long term of the European peace. After briefly outlining the hypotheses, the

next step of this project will be to test them on the case of European enlargement to new member states, most of which do not belong to the narrowly defined Western core which center on Western Europe.

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**PATTERNS OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT:
ROMANIAN-UKRAINIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS, 1992-2006**

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Abstract

The Eastern European space proves itself full of instable spots and old disputes between States, regions, populations. The peaceful relations are constructed here by overcoming these legacies of the past, and through cooperation on multilateral levels. The relations between Romania and Ukraine are an example of this twofold trend. Inheriting a disputed border since the Ribbentrop – Molotov pact, and large minorities on their territories, the two States signed a Treaty of friendship and good neighborhood in 1997, when Romania was under pressure to fulfill the NATO accession criteria. After that, disputes re-emerged concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea, and the question was brought before the International Court of Justice in 2004. On the other hand, Romania and Ukraine were partners in the attempts to give a solution to the Transnistrean conflict or in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

Observing the development of the relations between Romania and Ukraine since 1992, when the two countries established diplomatic relations, to 2004, we will argue that these relations follow a pattern of cooperation when conducted in a multilateral framework or when pressured by international organizations, while they are more prone to conflict when no other international actors are directly involved. These empirical findings support a liberal institutionalist approach to international relations in Eastern Europe, which will be the main theoretical approach adopted in our paper.

The empirical research will be based upon interviews with former Romanian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and secretaries of State, official documents, and press articles.

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of the relation between two neighbor countries in Eastern Europe: Romania and Ukraine, in order to understand the patterns of conflict and co-operation that emerged between them in the last fourteen years. While both States can be said geographically belonging to Europe, the political aspects of their positioning are not very obvious. Romania is a former communist country, placed in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union after the Second World War, but having had a “non-conventional” foreign policy during the communist regime. In 2006, as we speak, Romania is a NATO member country, and is expecting an answer from the EU as to the date of its accession. Ukraine, on the other hand, is a former Soviet Republic which is undergoing a rather recent process of democratization which authentically started only with the Orange Revolution in 2004. Both countries are, in a certain way, placed in a peripheral area, a “buffer zone”¹ between Western Europe and the Russian Federation. This is why their relationship is important for international stability from several points of view. First, by entering the EU, Romania will have to manage one of the Union’s external borders, comprising the border with Ukraine, too². Secondly, both countries are gateways to Central Asia and the Russian Federation, be it for pipelines, trade, or trafficking. Finally, they have a common interest and a common foreign policy purpose: getting closer to the Western international organizations and, especially for Ukraine (but for Romania too in the first years after 1989), emancipating from dependency on Russia. In spite of this common interest, the relations between them have not always been smooth in the last fourteen years. As we will try to demonstrate in this paper, historical legacies that hinder this relationship were very difficult to overcome. If this finally happened, it is due, on the one hand, to the pressures of international organizations, and on the other hand, more recently, to very strong national interest issues, as perceived by the decision-makers.

¹ Martin Wight (1978), *Power Politics*, London: Leicester University Press, p. 25.

² In this context, V. G. Baleanu is wondering: “To what extent will Romania’s north-eastern border become the new line of inclusion-exclusion for the new Europe?”, in “In the Shadow of Russia: Romania’s Relations with Moldova and Ukraine”, *Conflict Studies Research Centre Working Paper*, G85, August 2000, p. 16.

Thus, we will try to understand the way in which the relations between the two countries evolved from a mutual distrust marked by their historical legacies to a more cooperative stance. We will start from the hypothesis that the external environment was a very strong factor in influencing the foreign policies of the two States towards each other. On the one hand, the external factor will be examined from a liberal institutionalist point of view, and we will show that international organizations have put strong incentives on both States to cooperate. On the other hand, we will argue that the external factor can also be addressed from a realist point of view, especially in times of crisis, and the case in point will be the energy crisis in Ukraine, in January 2006, when the two States were pushed into cooperation out of fear of Russia. The external factor that influences decision-making is doubled by two other variables: historical legacies, which in Central and Eastern Europe have an overwhelming weight, and domestic regimes.

The paper will be organized as follows. In the first part, we will draw a theoretical framework which will guide our research into the subject. Then, we will analyze the historical legacies that weight on the relationship between Romania and Ukraine, and the reasons why it proved rather ambiguous, and even conflicting, in a first phase. Then, we will try to assess the way in which different forms of co-operation emerged, and why this happened, insisting on the role of the international organizations and the need for survival in an anarchical system. The final part of our paper will be dedicated to a general assessment of the impact of the different variables that we took into consideration on the bilateral relations.

1. Theoretical framework

The main theoretical framework at our disposal in order to study bilateral relations between Romania and Ukraine is foreign policy analysis (FPA). Various branches of FPA propose a number of variables which can go to more than 50, in certain cases. In an effort to simplify the framework proposed by traditional foreign policy analysis, we chose to limit the number of variables that we will take into consideration to three.

An aspect which we consider very important – as in all Central and Eastern Europe – is the historical heritage, which, for these countries has not yet been overcome, like in the case of Franco - German relations. The historical heritage models the attitudes of one country to the other, especially in the first years after independence, when the two governments do not have any experience on bilateral relations and must start from a zero point. For the case of Romania and Ukraine, we will see that historical heritage was an important factor that hindered cooperation in a first stage of bilateral relations. If decision-makers have managed to overcome it, it is surprising to still see in the Romanian media allegations based on the 'historical enmity' between the two peoples. Thus, we chose not to insist too much on the public opinion as a variable in Romanian and Ukrainian foreign policy decision-making, as we will briefly assess its minor impact.

What we took instead into account was the variable of the domestic regime – which is, the political color of the different governments that were in power after 1991. The political color is of interest here inasmuch as it models foreign policy decisions, and not in what concerns internal reforms. This is why we will try to assess whether the different governments had a rather pro-Western, neutral or pro-Russian general orientation. Then, we will see whether there exists a correspondence between this general orientation and bilateral relations between the two countries.

Finally, a variable that always intervenes in foreign policy-making concerns external factors that influence decision-making. In our case, we took into consideration the main orientation of the important powers in the system. We did not treat separately the USA and the EU member countries, because they share a set of common values and norms of international conduct that channels the behavior of Romania and Ukraine in the same direction. Thus, even if they were treated separately, they would have certainly converged, as both the USA and the EU are interested in stability, cooperation and good relations among the countries in the East European region.

The other main power in the system that impacts on both countries' foreign policy is Russia. For Romania, Russia is a very powerful State in its not very far abroad, whose past imperial tendencies have had a great impact on the country's internal regime. In the case of Ukraine, we cannot speak of a simple calculus of power: Ukraine is part of Russia's 'near

abroad' and, during the last decade, it managed to get into the most important zones of Ukrainian internal politics³.

2. Patterns of conflict: the weight of historical legacies as national interest

The end of bipolarity brought about instability and allowed old historical legacies to spring out to surface. The relations between Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Republics are not framed by the Warsaw Pact and the strong hold of the USSR anymore. After 1991, they are to be re-built. But the issue here is how to find a foundation on which to build the relationship between Romania and Ukraine. Where to start over? The 1945 situation? But Ukraine did not exist as a State then. Actually, the two countries do not have a history of bi-lateral relations before 1991 at all. This is why it was very difficult to create such a relationship out of nothing.

Moreover, after 1991, each of the two countries strived for gaining a distinctive foreign policy identity. The issue is even more complicated in the case of Ukraine, whose problem was one of national identity building *tout court*, as it existed as an independent modern State only between 1918 and 1919. Perceived by everyone as naturally belonging to Russia's sphere of influence⁴, Ukraine had to fight for its own statehood. As for Romania, it was rather reluctant to engage in cooperation with its Eastern neighbors⁵, fearing a resurgence of Russian imperialism.

This mutual fear comes on the background of historically unstable borders between Romania and the territory of nowadays Ukraine. Ukraine has inherited from the USSR some territories that were part of the "Greater Romania" in 1918. The Union of 1918 is one of the foundational myths of the Romanian State; the yearly commemoration of the Union is celebrated as Romania's national day. These territories are northern Bukovina, the Hertza county, which seems to have been given to the Soviets because, at

³ See Janusz Bugajski (2004), *Cold Peace. Russia's New Imperialism*, Westport, Connecticut, London: Palgrave, pp. 79-95.

⁴ Anne de Tinguy, «L'Ukraine, la Russie et l'Occident, de nouveaux équilibres dans une nouvelle Europe», in IDEM (ed.) (2000), *L'Ukraine, nouvel acteur du jeu international*, Bruxelles, L.G.D.J., Paris: Bruylant, p. 10.

⁵ Moldova is, here, a case of its own.

Yalta, when they drew the frontiers, the pencil of Molotov had a bold top, which went over this county, initially not included in the negotiations; the Khotyn county, and the South of Bessarabia. All these territories belonged to Romania between 1918 and 1940⁶.

These territories were mentioned in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, as desired by the USSR. They were given to the USSR in 1940, along with the rest of Bessarabia, which forms now the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The Paris peace Treaty, in 1947, establishing the responsibility of Romania as an aggressor State, left them to the USSR. Thus, nowadays Ukraine has more than 40% of the territories lost by Romania to the USSR in 1940.

But the most controversial issue here is probably less territorial than economic. It's that of the Serpents' Island, a very small island (only 17 ha, not inhabited and with no water sources) situated near the Romanian town of Sulina, where the Danube flows into the Black Sea.

The Island belongs to the Romanian state since the Berlin Congress in 1878, being taken into consideration among the Dobruđjan territories that Romania was entitled to in exchange for the southern Bessarabia (given to the Russian empire). It continued to be Romanian till 1948. The island got to the Soviets in very ambiguous circumstances. It was neither part of the discussion at the moment of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, nor in the Paris Treaty, and it was never mentioned as belonging to the USSR until the moment of 1948. But in 1948, a team of Romanian and Soviet engineers went on the field in order to establish the exact configuration of the border, which was to be traced according to the Paris Treaty. It seems that the Soviets claimed that the Serpents' Island should be theirs, and the communist Romanian government of Petru Groza signed the Protocol on the trajectory of the State frontier between Romania and the USSR, the 4th of February 1948, which foresaw that the island was to be part of the USSR. The Romanian or the Soviet Parliaments never ratified this Protocol, and this is the basis on which, after 1991, the Romanian Government contested the legality of this act.

⁶ We only took into consideration historical events after the creation of the Romanian modern State in 1859, as before, the Romanian Principalities were either under Ottoman, Habsburg or Russian rule.

Being very small, not inhabited and with no water sources, the island did not have great importance at the time. But it acquired it after the fall of the Soviet Empire, from several points of view. First, resources of oil and gas were discovered in the sea, around the island⁷. Being located between Romania and Ukraine, the island counts for the delimitation of the territorial waters of each of the two countries, and by way of consequence, for the exploitation of the underwater resources. Moreover, it is significant for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones whether the island is inhabited or not; this is why Ukraine sustains it is. And indeed it is, in a way, because the Soviets established a strong military basis there, which surveyed the naval and aerial traffic in the Black Sea all through the Mediterranean. Now, the military facilities belong to Ukraine. But with the 1997 bilateral Treaty, an agreement was reached as to their disaffection.

Meanwhile, the local mythology went so far as to link (especially by way of etymology) the name of the Serpents' Island to Atlantis and to trace a history of the island which goes as far as the Trojan war: it seems that Achilles had built some temples on the island⁸. Fortunately, this mythology does not have a very large audience in Romania; what can be striking is the fact that a Romanian author who writes on the international law takes it over when writing about the legal status of the island⁹.

In 1961 was signed the "Treaty between the Government of the Popular Republic of Romania and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the regime of the Romanian-Soviet State frontiers, collaboration and mutual assistance in problems regarding frontiers", but this Treaty did not contain provisions on the delimitation of the territorial waters, exclusive economic areas and continental shelf. During the communist regime, starting with 1967, there were several attempts at the delimitation of the territorial waters, the continental plateau and the exclusive economic areas. The negotiations did not lead to an agreement, and they were abandoned in 1987. Thus, there was no bilateral

⁷ Stefan Deaconu (2005), *Principiul bunei vecinatati in dreptul romanesc*, Bucuresti: Ed. All Beck, p. 92. For a lengthy overview of the resources in the continental shelf, see George Damian, "Insula Serpilor, piatra de incercare a diplomatiei romanesti", in Victor Roncea (ed.), *Axa. Noua Romania la Marea Neagra*, (2005), Bucuresti: ed. Ziua, pp. 206-209.

⁸ www.tomrad.ro/iserpi.

⁹ Stefan Deaconu, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

treaty between Romania and the USSR concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea.

As showed by the declaration of the Romanian government on the occasion of the Ukrainian independence, Romania tried to found the relations with Ukraine on the recognition of the injustice done through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, thus trying to make possible the retrocession of its former territories. Negotiations for a political basic Treaty between the two countries were blocked until 1995 mainly because of the Romanian request for the inclusion of a condemnation of the Pact, which would imply the recognition of the injustice of the border. The initial position of Romania towards Ukraine demanded the denouncement of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and a solution to the problem of the Serpents' Island, which, according to the Romanian part, did not legally belong to Ukraine. This radical position slowly changed in time, and one should look for the causes of the change. On the other hand, Romania was interested in not having a direct border with the Russian Federation, and, by way of consequence, in a real independence of Ukraine. This interest develops in the middle of the 1990's, along with an interest of all the Western countries in having a democratic Ukraine between the European Union and Russia.

But during these first years, the stake was greater for Ukraine, which was struggling for its own survival as a State. The position of Ukraine towards Romania can only be understood in the broader context of regional relations among Russia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania.

Firstly, Ukraine has a problem of national identity. Medieval historiography calls Ukrainians "the little Russians" (along with "white Russians" – the population of nowadays Belarus, and Russians), since the XIth century, while the name Ukraine seems to signify, etymologically, "border land", "periphery"¹⁰. Moreover, just like the majority of former Soviet Republics, it had on its territory a very large Russian minority: around 22%, while the percentage of Russian native speakers was even

¹⁰ See Alain Ruze, (1999), *Ukrainiens et Roumains, IXe – XXe siècle. Rivalites carpatopontiques*, Paris: L'Harmattan, p. 9.

bigger: 33%¹¹. The Russian minority is concentrated in the industrialized East, while ethnic Ukrainians populate the agrarian West, where there are also important Romanian, Hungarian and Slovakian minorities. At the moment of the declaration of independency, the Western countries manifested a lot of skepticism as to its possibilities of real autonomy¹². This is why Ukraine had to prove, first of all, its capacity to be a real player in the regional system.

Secondly, there were territorial disputes with the Russian Federation, too¹³: mostly, the statute of Crimea. Crimea was transferred from the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the 'reunification' between Russians and Ukrainians. The peninsula, in which the majority of the population is ethnically Russian, attempted at declaring independence in 1992, but the Crimean Parliament withdrew the decision in a few days. One year later, the 9th of July 1993, the State Duma in Moscow declared in unanimity Sebastopol, a "Russian city". Russia also maintains its XIVth army in Transnistria, at the border between Moldova and Ukraine, thus having means of military pressure from both East and West. This is especially useful in the context of the Russian foreign policy doctrine of the "near abroad", which is another way to assert the Russian sphere of influence on the former Soviet Republics. It is not difficult to see that territorial claims from both Russia and Romania, along with the lack of confidence and support from the West, made Ukraine feel very threatened in the first years after independence, and to adopt a realist approach of international relation relying on self-help¹⁴.

¹¹ According to a 1989 counting of the population, quoted in Rainer Munz and Rainer Ohliger, «L'Ukraine post-soviétique: une nation en formation entre l'est et l'ouest», in Anne de Tinguy(ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 79 – 107.

¹² Anne de Tinguy, *art. cit.*, pp. 12 - 15.

¹³ Roman Wiolczuk thinks that the main controversial issues in Ukrainian-Russian relations can be synthesized as follows: the recognition of borders (the problem of Crimea), the military balance between the two countries (the problem of the nuclear arsenal), the economic relations, the energy relations and the CIS integration. See his book *2003 Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy, 1991 – 2000*, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, pp. 29 - 45.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

Under these conditions, Ukraine tries to distance itself from Russia, firstly by a policy of non-alignment. Some authors even say that “Ukraine’s drive to escape Russian domination was one of the single most important factors behind the collapse of the USSR”¹⁵. The newly independent Republic is very reluctant to advance with the integration into the Community of Independent States, especially in the field of security. Instead, it engages in regional cooperation with other former Soviet Republics willing to emancipate from Russia, by participating at the informal union of GUAM (Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova), founded in 1997. It also enhances cooperation with Poland and Germany, in an attempt to gain an identity of central European country: “it made the policy of a ‘return to Europe’, from which it says was artificially separated, the central element of an approach that allowed it to distance from the USSR and to get closer to the USA and the Western European countries”¹⁶. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation is and remains, during these years, the main economic partner of Ukraine. In 1993-1994, Russia raises the price of the oil delivered to Ukraine in order to align to the market prices¹⁷. In 1996, a new tax of 20% is imposed by Eltsin to all importations coming from Ukraine. Russian takeovers of Ukrainian economic assets were an important trend in 2000-2004. The latest development of the energy relation between Russia and Ukraine is the major crisis in January 2006, which, as we shall see, has an impact on the Romanian – Ukrainian relations as well.

Ukraine also used its nuclear arsenal as a means of pressure for both Russia and the Western countries. In 1991, Ukraine made a real breakthrough when, two days after the Moscow putsch (August 24, 1991), it placed under its jurisdiction all military facilities on its territory, which comprised 30% of the Soviet tanks, 25% of the aviation, the Black Sea fleet and 176 ICBMs and 1180 warheads¹⁸. Having accepted at first to give up its

¹⁵ Kathleen Mihalisko, « Security Issues in Ukraine and Belarus », in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), (1993), *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*, New York=: Oxford University Press, pp. 225-257, p. 237.

¹⁶ Anne de Tinguy, *art. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁷ About energy dependency, also see Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, “Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine”, in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 50, no. 2, Mar. 1998, pp. 257-286.

¹⁸ Cf. Roman Wolczuk, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Kathleen Mihalisko confirms the number of missiles, but she raises the number of warheads to 1240 (see *art. cit.*, p. 243).

nuclear facilities, it comes back on the decision when it realizes that it can use them as a strong instrument of negotiation.

This new assertive position of Ukraine determined the Western countries to take it into account as a possible balancer for Russian imperialism in the region. This is why the relations between Ukraine and the Western countries went smoother and smoother; in 1994, the USA even offered security guarantees in exchange for the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by which Ukraine gave up its nuclear capabilities.

This overview of the Ukrainian position in the region in the very first years of independence allows us to make several remarks concerning its situation. Ukraine had all the reasons to feel insecure from several points of view. First, by being seen rather as an appendix of Russia, than as a country of its own, it had to strive for a distinctive national identity and statehood. Secondly, it had to confront territorial claims from its neighbors – let us remember that, besides Russia and Romania, Poland could have had such claims, too. Third, it had to emancipate from the Russian sphere of influence. Last, but not least, economic and energetic dependence on Russia was, and still is, an important threat.

All these legacies, be they more ancient, as the territorial or minorities questions, or more recent, like the economic dependency, deeply modeled the international and regional behavior of Ukraine since 1991. Consequently, they also affected its relations with Romania.

3. Some facts in bilateral relations

One can reconstitute several important moments in the bilateral relations between Romania and Ukraine, which we shall consider turning points for our analysis. The first stage of the relationship is marked by rather cool relations and mutual distrust. This might be considered normal, given the declaration of the Romanian government on the occasion of the independence of Ukraine: “The recognition of Ukraine’s independence and the desire to develop mutually beneficial Romanian-Ukrainian relations do not entail the recognition of the inclusion in the territory of the newly independent Ukrainian state of northern Bukovina, the Hertza region, the Khotyn region or the region of southern Bessarabia, which were forcibly

annexed by the USSR and thereafter incorporated into the territorial structure of Ukraine on the basis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact¹⁹. This declaration is followed by a similar one adopted in the Parliament.

The bilateral diplomatic relations were established on February 2, 1992, and during the first year in office, the Ukrainian foreign Minister visited Bucharest (September 1992). It's an occasion for the official start of negotiations of a basic political treaty. The visit was not returned by his homologue until 1997, when the Treaty was finally signed. The two Parliaments sent visiting delegations to each other in 1992-1993. Nevertheless, the first forms of cooperation between the two countries appeared at a multi-lateral level, in June 1992, when both were founding members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, an initiative launched by Turkey and joined, besides Romania and Ukraine, by Bulgaria, Russia, the Republic of Moldova, Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Albania.

Both countries were also involved in the four-sided framework of talks concerning the situation in Transnistria, where the conflict had erupted on the 3rd of March, 1992. But Romania renounced to participate at these talks since 1993.

While Ukraine manages to set up very good relations with Hungary and especially Poland²⁰, negotiations for the Treaty with Romania are deadlocked during the period 1992-1995, mainly because the Ukrainian side does not accept the inclusion in the basic Treaty of a condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It is only in 1995 that the two sides agree on the general form of the bilateral agreements: they were to be formed by a Treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation, a common Declaration of the two Heads of State which was to condemn the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and a document containing guidelines for the establishment of the regime of common frontiers, which was to touch the issue of the Serpents' Island, too. Negotiations are speeded up with the coming into office of the Romanian President Constantinescu. Having political basic Treaties with all the neighbors was one of the preconditions for NATO accession; or, NATO was to take a decision on this issue in 1997, at the Madrid summit (7-9 July). The Treaty was signed a few weeks before the NATO summit, on

¹⁹ Declaration of the Romanian Government, 29 November 1991.

²⁰ The Treaty of Good Neighborliness with Poland was signed in May 1992, only a few months after Ukrainian independence.

the 2nd of June, and it comes into force, after ratification in the Parliaments, on the 22 of October 1997. It was heavily criticized by a significant part of the Romanian public opinion. While Romanians usually agree on foreign policy goals, it seems that this Treaty split the public opinion into those in favor of the overcoming of the past, who also sustained the Treaty as a means of showing our good will to NATO, and those who consider it as a historical treason of the Romanian ideal of re-unification and of the Romanians that live in nowadays Ukraine.

The provisions of the Treaty were rather ambiguous concerning the disputed issues. The reference to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is replaced by a very vague allusion, in the Preamble, to the "condemnation of the unjust acts of totalitarian regimes and military dictatorship"²¹. The Parts agree that their common border is inviolable (art. 2) and that their relations are founded on the respect, among others, of the Helsinki Final Act (which is the last international agreement mentioning that borders in Europe are recognized by all signatory parties and cannot be changed forcefully) (art. 1). Some vital issues are postponed: the regime of the common frontier is not decided upon, and the Treaty specifies in article 1.2 that it will be set by an ulterior Treaty (which has only been signed six years after, in 2003). This also involves the issue of the delimitation of territorial waters and the Serpents' island. The article 5 states that the Parts "will sustain each other in their efforts for integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures". The most significant provisions are those concerning the statute of minorities, set out in art. 13. The Romanian side obtained an important victory through the inclusion of a reference to the Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe, which enhances the rights of minorities. Nevertheless, the Treaty specifies that "this recommendation does not refer to collective rights and does not oblige the contracting Parties to grant to the respective persons the right to a special territorial autonomy status based upon ethnic criteria" (art. 13.1).

Most of the Romanian foreign policy decision-makers are rather optimistic about the Treaty, especially for the article 13 concerning

²¹ "Treaty concerning the good neighborliness and cooperation between Romania and Ukraine", *Monitorul Oficial, partea I*, nr. 157/16. 07. 1997, Preamble.

minorities²². Nevertheless, former foreign minister Melescanu (1992-1996) thinks that, although in general the Treaty reflects the Romanian position, the way in which it is applied by the Ukrainian party is discriminating for the Romanian minority: "Ukraine applies it on a reciprocal basis: the rights that you grant to the Ukrainian minority in Romania will be hold by us to the Romanian minority: they will have as many schools as ours have etc, thus ignoring the huge difference that exists between the two minorities, in terms of numbers as well as in terms of its creation through political decisions that have nothing to do with the right to self-determination..."²³.

The first bilateral visit at Presidents' level took place on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty, when Leonid Kutchma came to Bucharest. The first Romanian President to visit Kiev was Emil Constantinescu, in May 1999. Later, Ion Iliescu went to Kiev, Odessa (2002) and Tchernautsi (2003). Traian Basescu visited Kiev in December 2004 and in February 2006.

The border question was not completely set up until now. In 2003 was signed a "Treaty concerning the regime of the Romanian – Ukrainian State frontier, collaboration and mutual assistance on border issues", which entered into force in May 2004. The Treaty foresees the recognition of the borders agreed upon in the Romanian – Soviet Treaty in 1961. But the issue of the territorial waters remains unsolved. Between 1998 and 2004, there were 24 rounds of negotiations. Romania has given up the idea of getting back the Serpents' Island; the only issue that separates now the two sides is the delimitation of the continental shelf, which depends on whether the island is considered as inhabited or not. Romania brought the case before of the International Court of Justice in Hague, on the 16th of September 2004. It is the first case involving Romania before the ICJ.

2004 is also the year of the construction, by Ukraine, of the Bastroe channel (begun on May 11). Before, the Ukrainian ships transiting the Danube had to use the Romanian channel of Sulina. It seems that this was bringing important losses to the Ukrainian economy, so it tried to find alternative solutions for navigation through the Danube Delta. But it also

²² Interview with former Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Severin, Bruxelles, March 23, 2006; interview with former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, Bucharest, January 2005.

²³ Interview with former Romanian foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, Bucharest, October 7, 2005.

seems that the construction of the Bastroe channel brings about very important ecological consequences for the Danube Delta, underlined by various ecologist organizations²⁴ and by the Romanian government, who protested against the channel. The Ukrainian part infringed the Treaty signed in 1997 and other international conventions²⁵ by not consulting the Romanian part before the construction of the channel, which affects the Romanian portion of the Delta, sustains the Romanian government. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian part considers that, the works taking place on its territory, it should not have done so.

The issue had an important international impact. Among the states, the governmental and non-governmental organizations which mobilized against the construction of the channel, because of its apparently disastrous ecological consequences, are the USA, Germany, the EU, Ramsar-UNESCO, the Environmental Danube Forum, etc²⁶. The international media also gave accounts of the story²⁷. After numerous requests from the Romanian part, bilateral talks on the issue began on July 20, 2004, at experts' level. But they did not lead to significant evolutions.

²⁴ The reports of several NGOs are quoted on the official site of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, www.mae.ro.

²⁵ These are: "The Convention on the conservation of wild life and natural habitats in Europe", Berna, 19 September 1979, under the aegis of the Council of Europe; "The Convention on internationally significant wet areas, especially as habitat for the aquatic birds", Ramsar, 1971; "The Convention on the evaluation of trans-border impact on the environment", Espoo, 1991; "The Convention on the cooperation for the protection and sustainable utilization of the Danube river", signed in Sofia, 1994; "The Convention on the access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice concerning environmental issues", Bonn, 1979; "The Convention on the protection of the world cultural and natural patrimony", Paris, 1972; "The Agreement between the Ministry of environment and territorial management of the Republic of Moldova, the Ministry of waters, forests and environmental protection in Romania and the Ministry of the environment and natural resources in Ukraine concerning the cooperation in the protected areas of Danube Delta and Lowe Prut", Bucharest, 2000; "The Agreement between the Romanian and Ukrainian governments concerning the cooperation in the field of trans-border waters management", Galati, 1997, and last, but not least, "The Treaty between Romania and Ukraine on the regime of the Romanian-Ukrainian State frontier, collaboration and mutual assistance in border issues", Cernauti, 2003. Cf. the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mae.ro.

²⁶ Cf. the official site of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mae.ro

²⁷ See, for example, *L'Express*, 28 June 2004; *Berliner Zeitung*, 31 August 2004; *Der Tagesspiegel*, 31 August 2004; *Le Figaro*, 27 September 2004.

In order to solve this type of problems, in 2005 was created the Joint Presidential Commission Basescu – Yushchenko: the two Presidents thought that a direct high-level relation would smooth bilateral relations. And indeed it did: they met three times in 2005 and Basescu paid a visit to Kiev in February 2006, right after the energy crisis in Ukraine. They talked about setting up joint energy projects that would allow both countries not to depend on energy from Russia anymore, while Yushchenko declared that “The enhancement of our dialogue [with Romania] is the most characteristic feature of the year 2005”²⁸.

Thus, if we were to trace some distinct periods of bilateral relations between Romania and Ukraine, we find the following:

1. 1992-1995: divergent initial positions, when negotiations do not lead to any result, as none of the two countries wants to distance itself from the initial position.

2. 1995-1997: negotiations are unblocked by a more pronounced tendency to compromise

3. 1997-2003: the most important Treaties are signed and several high-level visits take place.

4. 2003-2005: the issues of the Bastroe channel and the delimitation of the continental shelf divide the two countries.

5. since the end of 2005, new peak of cooperation, based on joint energy projects and Black Sea Cooperation.

4. Domestic factors and foreign policy

We will now move on to examine the second variable that we took into account in order to analyze the relations between Romania and Ukraine: the internal political regime. In applying this variable, we must look into the interaction between the domestic regimes of the two States, paying attention to the changes in the internal political configuration in each case. This is why a brief overview of the different governments and their foreign policies is necessary. Then, we will try to mirror the changes of governmental majority in the two countries with the periods of ups and downs in the bilateral relation.

²⁸ Cf. Ukrainian Presidential site, ww7.president.gov.ua/en/news/data/print/5817.html

In Romania, the first years after 1989 were of confusion about foreign policy. The turn towards West was not yet very obvious under Iliescu, who had a very bad external image, being considered a neo-communist. The decisive move that he makes towards a Western orientation of foreign policy comes with the signing of the Partnership for Peace, in 1994, and the Snagov Declaration in 1995, by which the entire Romanian political class (represented by all the parliamentary parties) affirms its intention to support the objective of the European integration for Romania.

The change of government in 1996 brings in Emil Constantinescu, a known intellectual (former President of the Bucharest University) and member of the "democratic opposition". He has a very good image with the Western countries. He speeds up the negotiations for the Basic Political Treaty with Ukraine – observers say that in order to get a positive answer about Romania's accession to NATO membership, which was to be decided in 1997²⁹, but the former President denies it³⁰. The Treaty is finally signed in 1997. The way in which Romania accepted, in 1997, to sign the Treaty in its present form is significantly due to the change of government in 1996. While former Minister of Foreign Affairs Melescanu thinks that maybe we could have obtained more³¹, which means that he would have continued negotiating, for the new President in office it was important to show determination in overcoming legacies from the past and showing good will to the international community. So, firstly, the new President had to prove his commitment to international norms of cooperation and good neighborliness. Second, he had to prove that he was able to sign a Treaty that was not very popular among Romanian public opinion. The former President says that it was only possible to conclude this Treaty in his first year in office, because the great capital of trust he was enjoying in the country, and because he was known for his anti-communist orientation and thus would not be perceived as selling his country to the Russians³². The

²⁹ Among others: V. G. BALEANU, *loc. cit.*, p. 24; Roman WORONOWYCZ, "Romania, Ukraine settle territorial dispute", in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 8, 1997, vol. LXV, no. 23 etc.

³⁰ Interview with Emil Constantinescu, former President of Romania, January 2006.

³¹ Interview with former Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, Bucharest, October 7, 2005

³² Interview with former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, Bucharest, January 2006.

former President seems to be ready to forget the past and found bilateral relations on new bases, on the model of Poland which, he says, had much more to lose than Romania if we think in terms of historical borders, and yet signed a treaty with Ukraine some time earlier³³. He is also the one who came up with the idea of a network of tri-lateral cooperations around Romania, the first of which was Poland-Romania-Ukraine.

The debates around the Treaty can also tell us more about the way foreign policy decisions are made in Romania and the weight of different internal factors, such as the relations between the responsible institutions or the public opinion. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adrian Severin, seems to have had some disagreements with the President on the way negotiations were run: "The fact that M. Ceausu³⁴ almost constantly made declarations in the media about the negotiations before telling me what was happening, or the way in which he tried to take his mandate directly from the President, did not serve the cause too well"³⁵. Moreover, the Minister even reversed some of the decisions of the chief negotiator appointed by the President³⁶. As for the influence of the public opinion, we can say that the Treaty was signed in its present form in spite of vociferous protests of mass-media or civic associations, a fact that even confirmed by the former Minister³⁷. Several critics were brought to the Treaty, beginning with the « historical treason » of leaving behind Romanian territories. Dominut Padurean, Professor of History at the Romanian Naval Academy and author of the single monograph of the Serpent's Island³⁸, thinks that the Treaty is "the worst and the most criminal Treaty signed by Romania in the last decades"³⁹. Paul Nistor points out that all the public debate around the Treaty only emphasized the problematic historical heritage, instead of revealing the positive aspects of the bilateral relations⁴⁰. The attitude of the

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ The chief negotiator of the Treaty, appointed by the President.

³⁵ Adrian Severin, Gabriel Andreescu, (2000), *Locurile unde se construiește Europa*, Iasi : Polirom, p. 49.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

³⁸ Dominut Padurean (2002), *Insula Serpilor*, Constanta: Ed. Muntenia.

³⁹ Mircea Lungu, interview with Dominut Padurean, in Victor Roncea (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁴⁰ Paul Nistor, "Problema memoriei in relatiile internationale. Tratatul romano-ucrainean (1997)", in *Xenopoliana*, X, 2002.

public opinion towards Ukraine is also showed by a recent opinion poll. Measuring the “temperature” of the sentiments of the Romanian population towards foreign countries, the poll placed Ukraine in the “rather cold” zone, followed only by Russia and the Arab States⁴¹.

We should not look for the impact of public opinion on decision-making in Ukraine either, where observers say that “as the civil society is weak, the State defines by its own the country’s national interests”⁴².

The next legislature brought back Ion Iliescu as a President and a very strong government who had to deal with the issue of the Bastroe channel. Since 2004, the new president, Traian Basescu, continuously asserts his role in foreign policy and his strong orientation towards the strategic partnership with the USA, while having a rather cold relation with Russia. This stance, combined with the new orientation of Ukrainian foreign policy brought about by the Orange Revolution, led to a rapprochement between the two countries.

As for the Ukrainian part, the first elections after the independence were won by the incumbent President, Leonid Kravtchuk. He is a former communist party leader who managed to take power by taking advantage of the 1991 *coup d’Etat* in Moscow, and who tried to gain legitimacy by playing the independence card. His orientation in foreign policy was towards distancing Ukraine from Russia, by avoiding to be attracted into a reconstruction of the former USSR through the CIS; in order to do this, he sought alliances with Central European states, such as those of the Visegrad Group and Germany. In a documented study about foreign policy during the Kravtchuk regime, Charles Furtado shows that nationalism was certainly not an important determinant of Ukraine’s foreign policy⁴³. On the contrary, Ilya Prizel sustains that Kravchuk’s foreign policy was nationalistic, following a post-colonial pattern in which leaders try to legitimize themselves through foreign policy. Thus, Kravchuk’s pro-

⁴¹ Institutul pentru Politici Publice (Institute for Public Policies), *Percepția opiniei publice din România asupra politicii externe și a relațiilor internaționale*, October 2005.

⁴² Oleksandr Dergatchev, “L’Ukraine entre l’Europe et l’Eurasie, une voie semée d’embûches», in Anne de Tinguy (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 111 – 125, p. 121.

⁴³ Charles F. Furtado, Jr, “Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine”, in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 109, no. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 81-104.

Westernism is a mere instrumentalization of foreign policy for electoral purposes. But it didn't pay, as he lost the 1994 elections⁴⁴.

They were won by Leonid Kutchma, originating from the Eastern part of Ukraine and former director of the biggest nuclear missile plant in the world. Kutchma became Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1992, under Kravtchuk, and ever since there was a marked rivalry between the two leaders in order to gain support from the population. While Kutchma was seen as rather pro-Russian, predicating an Eurasianist doctrine that linked Ukraine to the former Soviet space⁴⁵, he managed to pursue some important economic reforms which made him popular. A marked pro-Russian orientation in foreign policy is characteristic of his first term in office, while beginning with 1997, he becomes a virulent critic of the CIS and he pushes for alternative forms of regional integration, such as GUAM. Another shift intervenes in 2000, when Kutchma has to face an internal scandal that might have costed him his position; he is now supported by the Russians, with whom he is obliged to make important compromises.

Both countries changed government in 2004. While in Ukraine, that was the result of violent mass protest against the falsified elections that tried to impose the pro-Russian Yanukovitch as a winner, the Romanian President Basescu adopted the orange as the official color of his electoral campaign, with a direct reference to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. He also went to Kiev in order to assist to the confirmation of Yushchenko as a President. Thus, the relation between the two Presidents debuted under very promising auspices. Yushchenko, the new Ukrainian President, is well-known for his anti-Russian and pro-American orientation, as well as President Basescu. In spite of this, during 2005, there were several confrontational declarations from the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs linked to the Bastroe Channel and to the negotiations for the settlement of the Transdnistrian problem⁴⁶. But the personal relation established between Basescu and Yushchenko seems to contribute to a better relation

⁴⁴ Ilya Prizel (1998), *National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 374.

⁴⁵ See Kuchma's inaugural Presidency speech, quoted in Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 7, November 1995, p. 1138.

⁴⁶ See especially the Romanian newspaper *Ziua*, 13 and 14 June, 2005, but also Victor Roncea (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 45-51.

between the two countries. Ukraine and Romania are new partners in the framework of the Black Sea Cooperation (we should not forget that the Black Sea area is the main foreign policy preoccupation of Basescu's administration), along with Georgia; it is with these two countries that Romania is trying to build a strategic partnership, and we must also note that these are the most pro-American countries in the Black Sea region. President Yushchenko announced, after Basescu's visit to Kiev in February, that Ukrainian bilateral priorities in 2006 are agreements with USA, Poland, and Romania⁴⁷. As for Poland, it is the country that had best relations with Ukraine since 1992.

Period	Romanian domestic regime	Ukrainian domestic regime	Bilateral relations
1991-1992	Iliescu, undecided	Kravchuk – pro-Westerner	Beginning of diplomatic relations and negotiations on the Treaty
1992-1994	Iliescu, undecided then becomes lightly pro-Westerner	Kravchuk, pro-Westerner	Transnistrean issue Beginning of cooperation in multilateral framework (BSEC)
1994-1996	Iliescu, rather pro-Westerner	Kutchma - Eurasianist	Unblocking of negotiations
1996-1999	Constantinescu, markedly pro-Westerner	Kutchma – pro-Westerner	1997: Basic Treaty First bilateral Presidential level visits
1999-2000	Constantinescu	Kutchma	
2000-2004	Iliescu, pro-Westerner	Kutchma forced by the Russians into	2003: Treaty on State frontier 2004: construction

⁴⁷ ww7.president.gov.ua/en/news/data/print/6045.html

		their camp	of Bastroe channel Romanian case to the ICJ on the delimitation of the continental shelf
2004-2006	Basescu, pro- American	Yushchenko, pro-Westerner	ICJ and Bastroe issues, then Joint Presidential Commission High-level visits Energy cooperation Black Sea Cooperation

The comparative table shows no superposition between the mandates of the different legislatures in the two countries and the evolution of bilateral relations. It is very difficult to find a linkage between domestic regime and foreign policy especially in the first years of bilateral relations between Romania and Ukraine. Both countries were in transition; both were rather preoccupied with internal reforms, economic and social problems. It is true that the basic political Treaty was signed once the democratic opposition gained power in Romania, but the Treaty was being negotiated for a very long time already. Moreover, the fact that Ukraine had no problem in finding agreements on basic Treaties with her other Eastern European neighbors in the first years after independence (like Poland or Hungary) does not point to any reluctance of its domestic regime in strengthening ties with neighboring countries, in spite of the existing problems of minorities or borders. The only regularity that we can notice is that relations were better between Romania and Ukraine when both Presidents had a pronounced, almost emphatic, pro-Western orientation and a very marked reticence to Russia: Constantinescu with Kutchma in his anti-Russian period (1996-2000), and Basescu with Yushchenko (2005-2006).

5. External factors: distribution of power and/or institutional pressures

For almost 50 years, the international system could only be thought in bipolar terms. There were the two superpowers and their allies, while very few countries in the world were genuinely neutral. The end of the Cold War was followed by a rather brief period of euphoria, which led some analysts to consider that the 'end of history' was approaching⁴⁸. In time, States began to re-define their national interests, by re-considering the international distribution of power. The relations between Romania and Ukraine can also be viewed through the lens of national interest, defined, as in Morgenthau, in terms of power⁴⁹. Meanwhile, if we look at the international distribution of power, this will not tell us much in terms of variables: power as such is not a variable in our case, since we cannot assess whether the power of the USA, for example, increased or decreased since 1991. Moreover, if measured in absolute terms, the power of Ukraine was greater in the first years of the 1990s, when it had control over the nuclear weapons and over the Black Sea Fleet. Nonetheless, with no allies, it was rather isolated on the international arena. Thus, we can say that Ukraine is a more powerful state nowadays, through the good relations that it maintains with her Western neighbors and with Western powers in general.

So, instead of taking power, measured quantitatively, as a variable, we should rather consider the attitude of the significant powers in the system towards the international arena and towards the two countries that we study.

If Romania starts with a great capital of international sympathy after 1989, it loses it soon because of internal unrest (the events of June 1990, student's manifestations in Piata Universitatii and the arrival of the minors), and because the new government in Bucharest is seen as a neo-communist⁵⁰. As for Ukraine, the Western States are rather skeptical about

⁴⁸ Francis Fukuyama (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, The Free Press.

⁴⁹ Hans Morgenthau (1948), *Politics Among Nations*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

⁵⁰ Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu (1992 – 1996) complains about the very bad image of the government in international for a, which was the most important challenge that he had to fight (Interview with Teodor Melescanu, former MAE of Romania, October 2005). We should nevertheless place his statement in the context: he changed party and is now member of the PNL, the main challenger of his former party.

its capacity to be an independent State⁵¹. Moreover, the refusal of Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal attracted the mistrust of the West, at a time when relations between USA and Russia went rather smoothly: "This only brought a great amount of Western criticism of Ukraine's policy as short-sighted, irresponsible, and dangerous. Kravchuk's intransigence and misplaced assertiveness created a perception of Ukraine as a spoiler state bent on obstructing the emergence of a new security system stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok"⁵².

Both Romania and Ukraine had a cautious start in foreign policy orientations. Geographical proximity and historical ties with Russia prompted the two countries not to be very audacious in their orientation towards the West. This is why, in a first stage, both tried to keep their options open. Moreover, for Romania, the dismantling of the USSR was an opportunity to try to re-gain the territories lost after the Second World War: this is why its relations with Moldova were very romantic in a first period. Northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia were also concerned. This is why, taking into account national interest, Romania pressed for the recognition of the historical injustices done through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. On the contrary, Ukrainian national interest went in the opposite sense: as we showed in the first section, this country had to consolidate its statehood, being threatened by minorities and territorial claims from several of its neighbors⁵³. As documented by John Dunne in 1994, "Ukraine still lacks a consistent and detailed security policy. This lack of a detailed policy is evidenced in the mutability of policies such as Ukraine's 'block free' status and its 'non-nuclear' identity. As it struggled to take account of domestic and international circumstances, Ukrainian policy has been reactive rather than pro-active"⁵⁴. Under these circumstances, the relation between the two States can be seen as a zero-

⁵¹ Jean-Yves Haine, «La politique occidentale vis-à-vis de l'Ukraine», in *L'Ukraine et la stabilité en Europe*, Actes du Colloque organisé par l'Institut Royal Supérieur de défense, Bruxelles, 1994, pp. 15-27, p. 19-20. He also says that "All through 1992 and 1993, it was only the nuclear aspect that interested the West" (p. 24).

⁵² Ilya Prizel, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

⁵³ Kathleen Mihalisko, *art. cit.*, p. 246.

⁵⁴ John F. Dunne, «Ukraine's Continuing Security Dilemma. A Summary Update», in *L'Ukraine et la stabilité en Europe*, Actes du Colloque organisé par l'Institut Royal Supérieur de défense, Bruxelles, 1994, pp. 29-41, p. 29.

sum game: what is lost by one of them is gained by the other: mutual gains are not possible. Thus, a cooperative logic cannot be reached in the bilateral relation.

By 1995, Romania manages to define its two most important foreign policy objectives: accession to NATO and integration into the EU. As these organizations impose very strict membership political criteria, revision of the existing frontiers cannot go hand in hand with the Romanian objective of integration. This is why getting back the territories in question is not a viable perspective anymore. Once having renounced to territorial claims, the relations with Ukraine can start afresh.

By this time, Ukraine too settles to a policy of non-alignment with Russia and gains recognition from the USA and Western European countries. It manages to stay away from deepened integration with the CIS and signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty and START I, in 1994: both treaties are mediated by the USA, which in turn offer security guarantees and financial aid to Ukraine. Western countries now overcome their doubts as to Ukraine's capacity to become an independent State; moreover, they are more and more interested in having a democratic country bordering both the EU (in the perspective of enlargement) and Russia⁵⁵. In 1994, Ukraine signs the Partnership for Peace; in 1995, it becomes a member of the Council of Europe; in 1996, it sets as a long-term foreign policy objective the integration into the EU. Thus, the second stage of Romanian-Ukrainian relations coincides with the rapprochement of both countries to Western organizations, while the third stage – signing of the bilateral treaties and high-level visits – intervenes while Romania hopes for accession to NATO – and finally gets it in 2002, and Ukraine tries to find alternative options to CIS integration.

It is interesting to note that both countries are preoccupied by the way in which they are seen at the international level, by submitting their position to international forums. The account of former President Constantinescu about the way in which the issue of the basic Treaty was settled is very relevant in this sense: "It all took place at the OSCE meeting⁵⁶ (...). Before going to Lisbon, I received a report from the SIE (Foreign Intelligence Service) on the position that Ukraine was to take at the OSCE.

⁵⁵ Cf. Anne de Tinguy, *art. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵⁶ In Lisbon, December 1996.

They were prepared for an attack against Romania, which was presented as a neo-imperialist State who does not want to sign the Treaty, maintains a situation of instability and does not recognize Ukrainian frontiers, unlike Poland (...) In the context of the change of government [in Romania], Kutchma, who had enough experience, postponed the manifestation of force in order to see our reaction in Lisbon (...) Having this report, I asked for a meeting with vice-President Al Gore and I insisted that this meeting should take place before Gore's meeting with Kutchma. And my meeting with Kutchma was fixed after his meeting with the Americans (...) I told Gore that we will solve the problem of the Treaty with Ukraine on the Polish model (...) and he told this to Kutchma (...) But I told him that the condition was a privileged attention in this Treaty to the Romanian minorities. And here, we would need American pressures (...). This was the basis of the Treaty"⁵⁷. The European Union and the USA seem both interested in the development of Romanian-Ukrainian relation, as they congratulated the two governments for the signing of the Treaty⁵⁸.

Meanwhile, the foreign policy orientations of Russia are an important determinant, especially for Ukraine, but for Romania too. But, unlike Romania, Ukraine is part of the geopolitical space considered by Russia to be its "near abroad", with which it pretends a very special relationship. Immediately after the dismantling of the Soviet empire, Russia had a period of internal instability which did not allow it to be too assertive in foreign policy. It was the period when the "new thinking" of the Gorbachev - Shevarnadze couple still survived, while Moscow also depended on the foreign aid for survival. This changed beginning with 1993: "Key policy documents adopted in the spring and fall of 1993, including the foreign policy concept and the new military doctrine, were characterized by marked suspicion of Western intentions, resentment against Russia's apparent subordination, complaints about painful economic reforms allegedly imposed by the West, and a resolve to restore

⁵⁷ Interview with former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, January 2006. The story is confirmed by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin, in Adrian Severin, Gabriel Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

⁵⁸ For the EU, see the statement of the Presidency, the Hague, 2 June 1997; for the USA, "Bill Clinton felicita presedintii Romaniei si Ucrainei pentru semnarea Tratatului de baza", in *Adevarul*, 4 June 1997, p. 9.

the country's global position"⁵⁹. Thus, at the end of 1993, the main objective of Russia's foreign policy becomes the re-integration of the former Soviet republics, including, of course, Ukraine⁶⁰. This line becomes even harder after the appointment of Evgheny Primakov as a Foreign Minister in 1996: he wishes to restore Russia as a great power and does not consider the former Soviet republics as sovereign States, but as Russia's 'near abroad'⁶¹. Relations with Ukraine are paid a special attention: in 1997, the two countries sign a basic political Treaty through which the irreversibility of the dismantling of the USSR is recognized. Thus, Russia tries to get closer to Ukraine so that the latter does not seek accession to NATO or the EU, while Ukraine accepts this, hoping to soften Russia's position on these issues. Meanwhile, it also tries to escape Russian influence by taking the initiative of the GUAM in 1997. In 2000, Russia elaborates a new military doctrine and national security concept that depicts NATO expansion as a threat⁶², and Russia's foreign policy becomes even more assertive. Thus, Russia manages to re-impose itself on the international arena. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, it softens its position on NATO enlargement, while still maintaining its claims to 'peace-keeping' in its 'near abroad'. Since 2003, through bilateral agreements and investments, Ukraine becomes more and more dependent on Russian state-controlled energy sector, as well as trade.

In the context of the need to integrate with the West and of the perceived threat from Russia, the relation between the two countries we study is not to be thought in terms of a zero-sum game anymore. If we are to put it in realist terms, Romania and Ukraine are balancing Russia on the issue of the energy. But we can also think of the latest evolutions of the bilateral relations in liberal institutionalist terms: by getting in touch with international institutions, the two States better understood and defined their interests and thus they came to cooperate for absolute gains, and not for relative ones, that is, by measuring whether the other has more to gain

⁵⁹ Janusz Bugajski, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 14.

from the cooperation⁶³. This change of perspective might also be linked to the socialization of decision-makers in international organizations: Adrian Severin, the Foreign Minister that signed the basic Treaty, appears to think in these terms: "I tried to convince the Ukrainian partners that this Treaty must not be seen as a trade contract (...), but as an association contract; not as a contract in which one side tries to sell the merchandise at its greatest price and the other to offer the smallest price, but a Treaty in which we must put together all that we have best in order to get something superior"⁶⁴.

Period	Attitude of Western powers to Romania	Attitude of Western powers to Ukraine	Russian foreign policy	Bilateral relations
1992-1995	Uncertainty as to Romania's foreign policy orientation	Lack of confidence and interest	Internal weakness leads Russia to seek cooperation with the West; Search for a new sphere of influence since early 1994	Divergent initial positions; Beginning of negotiations on the Treaty, but no compromise
1995-1997	Perspective of integration into NATO and the EU	Change of position: acknowledged need for the democratization of Ukraine	Harder line on former satellites; seeks equality with the Western bloc	Tendency to compromise; smooth negotiations

⁶³ For a theoretical account of the absolute/relative gains, see the debate between John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", in Michael E. Brown *et al.* (eds.), (1998), *Theories of War and Peace*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press, pp. 329-383, and Robert O. Keohane, Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory", in IDEM, pp. 384-396.

⁶⁴ Adrian Severin, Gabriel Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

			as a 'great power'	
1997-2003	NATO accession Preparation for EU integration	Western countries are increasing cooperation with Ukraine	Increasing assertiveness in foreign policy; Seeks good relations with Ukraine After 9.11, softens position on USA, but not on the 'near abroad'	Signature of the Treaties; bilateral visits
2003-2005	Romania continues to prepare for EU accession; Better relations with USA than the EU	Stress on the democratization of Ukraine	Russia enhances Ukrainian dependence on energy	Tensions on Bastroe channel and the continental shelf
2005-now	American military bases in Romania		Assertiveness in foreign policy; hardening of the position towards Ukraine	Joint energy projects Joint Presidential Commission

This overview of the complex relations established among the important powers in the international system allows us to seize some regularities that link the attitude of these powers to the two countries that we analyze and their bilateral relations. Thus, we can see that in the absence

of a marked interest from either Russia or the Western powers to the region (the period 1992-1995), the bilateral relations do not have a promising evolution. The two States are more preoccupied by survival and hard national interest than by cooperation. The situation changes in a second period, when, on the one hand, Western organizations are more and more interested in consolidating democracy in both Romania and Ukraine, and on the other hand, Russia begins to re-assert its sphere of influence. Better relations are thus supported by both the pressures from the West to democratize and to have good bilateral relations in the region (institutional pressures), and the danger that represents for both countries the re-emergence of Russia as a great power. The consensus reached by Romania and Ukraine can thus be explained following two paradigms of the International Relations theory: a liberal paradigm would stress the influence of the Western powers, exerted through institutions, while a realist explanation would purport to the need to balance Russia's increasing power.

After September 11, the two tendencies that we signaled soften: the West is more preoccupied by containing terrorism, especially in the Middle East, than by the democratization of Eastern Europe. Russia, in turn, seizes the opportunity of the fight against terrorism in order to deal with separatist tendencies at its borders, and seeks an understanding with the USA. Immediately after, in 2003-2005, problems appear in the bilateral relation between Romania and Ukraine. It is true nevertheless that, while the link between international pressure and the signing of the Basic Treaty is rather obvious, we cannot establish a direct link between these later events and the bilateral problems. What we can do is point to a regularity that appears in the superposition of the international evolution and the bilateral relations, which might prove significant.

Beginning with 2005, it seems that the region becomes more and more polarized: not only the position of Russia hardens, but also that of the USA, Romania and Ukraine. Now, we can almost see the creation of two camps which, if they are not yet in conflict, launch rather confrontational declarations. USA creates military camps on the Romanian territory; Russia cuts energy supplies to countries with pro-American regimes in its 'near abroad' (Ukraine, Georgia) and promotes internal legislation in order to stop foreign (i. e., European and American) funding for Russian civic associations. In the context of this polarization, Romania and Ukraine

cooperate for balancing Russia, whose rise is seen by the two countries as the most dangerous development in the region.

So, if the pattern of cooperation created by institutional pressures from Western powers and organization is more visible in the 1997-2003 phase, the recent polarization of the regional environment enhances a pattern of cooperation out of fear and points to a balancing behavior of the two States.

The analysis of our three major variables – historical legacies, domestic regime and international environment – leads us to several conclusions as to the impact of each variable on the relations between Romania and Ukraine. First, we can notice that historical legacies have more impact in the absence of other types of incentives. In the zero-point of bilateral relations, as well as in the absence of international pressures or external threat, the historical legacies are perceived as a hindering factor of cooperation.

Second, as far as the domestic regime is concerned, its impact seems rather low, as the changes of governmental majority does not superpose on the ups and downs of the bilateral relation. But we should stress an important aspect concerning the internal factor: when the two governments are markedly Western-oriented, the relations between them are smoother, like the periods 1996-2000 and 2005-2006. This does not happen when only one of the two is pro-Western (1992-1994 and 2000-2004).

Finally, the international and regional environments appear as very important factors that shape bilateral relations in our case. These can be interpreted from both a liberal institutionalist perspective and a realist one: in our case, the interpretations converge, even though they offer different explanations. From a liberal institutionalist perspective, we would say that the politics of different international organizations (such as the Council of Europe, the EU, or NATO) to consolidate democracy and good relations of neighborliness in the region managed to export rules of cooperation that were taken over by the two countries in question. From a realist point of view, it is rather the fear of Russia that determined the two countries to create ties that would help both of them to emancipate from their powerful regional neighbor.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP AS AN EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

Anna Czyż*

Abstract

After the fall of communism in 1989 Central and Eastern European countries started to change their political systems towards democracy. They also had to define their main aims in foreign policy. In 1991 Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland decided to create the Visegrad Triangle to be able to develop and to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia their mutual initiative was called the Visegrad Group. During nineties XX century this regional co-operation between Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia experienced different vicissitudes. Finally their dream about integration came true- they became the part of Western organizations. So now when they reached their most important goals they have to determine the direction of mutual co-operation. As neighbouring countries with similar historical tradition and thinking they can search together for the solution of current problems in Europe.

In Central Europe the centrally planned economic and socialist system collapsed at the end of the 1980s and the process of regaining of independence has started. As a first step, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) had to be dismantled. By the summer of 1991 both the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact had disintegrated. Moreover the Soviet Union collapsed too and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia's, Hungary's and Poland's territory became a fact. For the countries of this region the most obvious and logical choice in their foreign policy was a new political and economic orientation towards the West. The main aim was the process of NATO enlargement and integration with the European Union as a more developed and more dynamic group of countries. The president of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel was the first person who has presented a proposal concerning the

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establishment of closer connections between Central European countries. It was his idea to carry out such a concept after the Velvet Revolution. The formal foundation of the Visegrad Triangle (V3- Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, later after the separation of Czechoslovakia on 1st January, 1993 Visegrad Group- V4) came with the adoption of the Declaration on Cooperation at the first summit held on 15th February 1991 at Visegrad, the site of a medieval royal summit in 1335. The participants (Polish president Lech Walesa, Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel and Hungarian prime minister Jozsef Antall) pointed out that the Triangle was not aimed at forming any new block and was not directed against any other country or a group of countries. The aim of the tripartite cooperation was to become full members of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation but as Czechoslovak foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier said: 'the participants were not in a race to get there ahead of each other; the optimal solution would be to arrive there together'¹.

It was written down in the Visegrad Declaration that 'the similarity of the situation has determined for these three countries convergent basic objectives: full restitution of state independence, democracy and freedom, elimination of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system, construction of a parliamentary democracy, a modern state of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, creation of a modern free market economy, full involvement in the European political and economic system as well as the system of security and legislation'². The development of cooperation is ensured by the community of historical experiences, cultural identity, spiritual heritage, common roots of religious traditions, geographical nearness.

The cooperation was not always smooth because there were controversial issues between the member countries such as situation and rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, conflict over Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam project. The new Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus underscored that Visegrad is an artificial entity created at the request of the West and that the establishment of subregional structures has not

¹ *Magyar Nemzet*, July 2, 1991, J.C.Kun (1993), *Hungarian Foreign Policy. The experience of a New Democracy*, London.

² Visegrad Declaration 1991, <http://www.visegradgroup.org>

accelerated the process of integration with the EU and NATO³. In the first years following the collapse of the communist system when the primary challenge was to do away with its remnants (the Warsaw Pact, CMEA and the Soviet Union) the countries of the region had common interests and could act jointly. But it turned out that their commitment was diverse and insufficient to coordinate their actions in the process of integration with the EU.

In the V4 some worried that regional integration might slow down their progress towards becoming member of the EU. The Czech Republic and Hungary made it clear on various occasions that each state should be evaluated separately in compliance with the membership criteria. The break-up of Czechoslovakia, the arrival in power of Vaclav Klaus in the new Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia and other problems in bilateral relations have slowed down the Visegrad cooperation in political area- the meetings were irregular and without any results. The only real results in the economic area was liberalising trade which brought Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) signed in Cracow on 21st December 1992. In 1995 the Agreement on Accession of the Republic of Slovenia to the CEFTA was signed, in 1997 similar agreement was signed with Romania and in 1998 with Bulgaria⁴.

From the mid-1990s the Visegrad Group has never been able to 'speak as one' especially when it turned out that each state of V4 will be attended with their accession negotiations individually. The revival of the Visegrad cooperation began in 1998 thanks to two important factors which had a positive impact on the prospects of regional cooperation of the V4 countries. The first factor was the NATO's decision in July 1997 to invite three countries of the V4 (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) to join the alliance. The second one was the EU decision to start the accession negotiations with six countries among them with three ones from V4. An additional factor was the results of parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 1998. Because of some delay in political development Slovakia as the only one from V4 countries wasn't invited by the NATO and the EU into the first wave of their enlargement. The new Dzurinda's government has

³ M. Gwiazdowski, "Possibilities and Constrains of the Visegrad Countries Cooperation within the EU", *Foreign Policy Review*, Volume 3, Nos. 1-2/2005

⁴ <http://www.cefta.org>

changed the direction of Slovakia's domestic and foreign policy. This positive development was acknowledged by the decision of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 which opened up the possibility of accession negotiations for Slovakia⁵.

Visegrad countries re-established their cooperation at the Bratislava 1999 meeting of the prime ministers and at the presidential summit attended by Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Vaclav Havel, Arpad Goncz and Rudolf Schuster held in the Slovak town of Gerlachovo. In the so called Tatra Declaration the presidents confirmed their satisfaction with the renewed cooperation within the Visegrad Group. Since then the political objectives of this cooperation have focused on the promotion of the Visegrad countries' readiness for European integration and support each other in the preparation for EU membership. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland started to support Slovakia's efforts and aspirations to join NATO. Then the aim of the group was to ensure the West that the Visegrad region is characterized by political stability, economic prosperity and open to cooperate with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The idea of 'Return to Europe' after the iron curtain era in Visegrad countries was one of the objectives to achieve.

However, since the beginning of the 1990s the NATO countries were very reserved towards the Eastern declarations of joining the alliance. They feared that this might worsen its relations with Russia. The first proposal of cooperation was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) functioning since December 1991. Next instead of offering enlargement in respect of the repeated requests in 1994 NATO answered with a proposal to take part in the 'Partnership for Peace' programme as a platform of military and political cooperation. Bill Clinton, the president of the United States, emphasized that the question was not whether NATO will enlarge but when it will happen⁶.

On May 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced the NACC and after that at the Madrid conference of NATO heads of state and government on 8-9 July 1997 a decision was made to invite the

⁵ K. Dezseri, "Is it Feasible to Enhance the cooperation among the V4 countries within the EU? The economic aspects", *Foreign Policy Review*, 1-2/2005

⁶ F. Gazdag: "From Alliance to Alliance: Hungary's Path from the Warsaw Pact to NATO", *Foreign Policy Review*, Volume 1, no. 1/2004.

three states (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) to the first round of enlargement. Finally, on 12th March 1999 those three Visegrad countries became members of a military-political alliance that proved the most successful in preserving peace during the last half century and in assuring the security of its members. During the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 seven states received invitations to start negotiations. Slovakia was among them and its accession to NATO became a fact in 2004⁷.

The breakthrough of 1989 was the beginning of the new era in East-West relations. Western countries started to treat Central European countries as partners and support their economic and politic reforms by PHARE program. On 16th December 1991 the European Agreement was signed as a basis of association stage with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. During the EU summit in Kopenhagen (21-22 June 1993) the EU membership criteria were adopted. To become EU member each country is obliged to fulfill the following conditions: 'be able to take on member's duties, stability of democratic institutions, modern state of law, respect for human rights and minority rights, free market economy, economic capacity to face up the trade competition within the framework of European Union'⁸.

The next step on the way to the EU was to put in formal application for EU membership. Hungary applied on 31st March 1994, Poland on 8th April 1994, Slovakia on 27th June 1995, the Czech Republic on 17th January 1996. Those events have forced EU to set in motion the process of enlargement. Until now the EU was refraining from tightening the cooperation with Visegrad countries. The reason was the fear that enlargement will inhibit the European integration and EU efficiency. The EU was also afraid of the influx of immigrants from Central Europe which will increase the group of receivers of regional help. During the EU summit in Luxembourg (12-13 December 1997) on the basis of the European Commission recommendation six candidates were invited to start the accession negotiations in 1998. They were: the Czech Republic, Hungary,

⁷ H.Binkowski (2002), *Visegrad Group Countries' security and defence cooperation. Transformation in Central European Security Environment*, Warsaw.

⁸ M. Szczepaniak (1994), *Grupa Wyszehradzka w polityce Zachodu*. W: M. Szczepaniak: *Świat i Polska u progu XXI wieku*. Toruń.

Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. Slovakia was invited to negotiations during the European Council session in Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) together with Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta.

In 2002 the European Council in Copenhagen decided to close 31 negotiation areas with ten among twelve candidates (without Bulgaria and Romania). The solemn act of signing the accession treaty had taken place in Athens on 16th April 2003⁹. After that event the process of ratification according to national procedures has started. In Visegrad countries the national referendums were needed to accept the treaty- they had taken place one by one- firstly on 12th April 2003 in Hungary, then on 16th and 17th May 2003 in Slovakia, on 7th and 8th June in Poland, on 13th and 14th June 2003 in the Czech Republic. Finally, on 1st May 2004 Visegrad countries became the EU members.

Following the accession to the European Union some predicted the natural death of the Visegrad Group because the process of integration has come to an end. It turned out to be premature. Many issues like infrastructure, natural environment, tourism, migration, culture, education may be solved more efficiently within the framework of quadrilateral rather than bilateral cooperation. At the V4 summit in Kromeriz held on 13th May 2004 the New Visegrad Declaration was adopted and superseded the document adopted in 1991 upon the formation of the Group. Representatives of V4 decided that the originally set objectives were achieved and declared their readiness to develop cooperation between the four countries, already EU and NATO members. Among the areas of cooperation within the V4 there are such as: culture, education, youth exchange, science, continuation of the strengthening of the civic dimension of the Visegrad cooperation within the International Visegrad Fund and its structures, cross-border cooperation, infrastructure, environment, fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration, Schengen cooperation, disaster management, exchange of views on possible cooperation in the field of labour and social policy, defense and arms industries.

In the Kromeriz Declaration it is also said that the future cooperation will be developed in the area of cooperation within the EU, with other partners and within NATO and other international

⁹ B. Płonka (2003), *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Europy Środkowej*, Kraków.

organisations. As to the cooperation within the EU it will concern the consultations on current issues of common interest: 'active contribution to the development of the New Neighbourhood Policy and the EU strategy towards Western Balkans, consultations, cooperation and exchange of experience in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, Schengen cooperation including protection and management of the EU external borders, visa policy, creating new possibilities and forms of economic cooperation within the European Economic Area, consultation on national preparations for joining the EMU (European Monetary Union), active participation in the development of the European Security and Defense Policy as a contribution to the strengthening of relations between the EU and NATO and deepening of substantive dialogue between both organisations'¹⁰.

Visegrad Group was always the forum of consultations without any institutional form. The only V4 institution is the International Visegrad Fund based in Bratislava which has been operated successfully for years starting in 2000. According to relevant decision of the prime ministers the Fund disposes of an annual budget of 3 million euros from 2005 onwards (the budget is created by V4 countries' payments). From this amount can be financed small and standard grants, the Visegrad Strategic Programme, scholarships, also the Ukrainian scholarship programme launched in 2005 as well as the Visegrad Award¹¹.

The mechanism of cooperation is based on meetings at various levels- meetings of Presidents of V4 countries, of Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers, with National Coordinators at Ministries of Foreign Affairs taking the crucial role of initiators and rotating one-year presidency with its own presidency programme. Each presidency is closed in June by organising Visegrad summit to sum up all the activities and to set new challenges and to contribute to the achievement of the common goals of the V4 countries. At the beginning of July 2004 Poland had taken over the presidency of the V4 from the Czech Republic and after a year Hungary became a visegrad leader for the period of 2005/2006. As it can be read in the programme of the Hungarian presidency 'the first new months passed since accession have confirmed that close cooperation among the four member countries will continue to be of outstanding importance also

¹⁰ Declaration in Kromeriz on 12th May 2004, <http://www.visegradgroup.org>

¹¹ <http://www.visegradfund.org>

in the framework of the European Union'¹². It is said in the Document that the priorities are: ' Strengthening the V4 identity and developing a V4 communication strategy with a view to bringing the V4 even closer to citizens. Enhancing the V4 cohesion, capacity of consultation and cooperation on issues figuring on the EU agenda and on major international issues in other fora; consistent representation of adopted common positions on issues of common interest.

Promoting transformation and modernisation efforts in Central and Eastern Europe; contributing to efforts to improve the EU's competitiveness, particularly in infrastructure development'¹³. Within the V4 framework the area in which the V4 states decided to strengthen their cooperation is culture (folklore festivals, plans for launching a joint TV channel focused on culture), education (youth exchange), tourism (preparation of thematic brochures, maps, updating and development of the www.european-quartet.com webpage). The civil dimension of the Visegrad is supported and it will be supported by the International Visegrad Fund especially by Visegrad Scholarship Programme. The increase of the number of applicants show a growing interest and need to continue the incoming, intra-Visegrad and outgoing scholarships. For youth exchange within V4 the most important are intra type scholarships which promote greater mobility and willingness to get to know each other within the group. In addition small and standard grants for joint projects realized by non-governmental organizations can be also financed by the Fund.

It seems that sectoral dimension of Visegrad cooperation, local initiatives in different fields aimed at promoting modernisation in Central Europe and development of regions can be the most essential part of the Visegrad regional cooperation. Meetings and consultations at various levels are important to initiate joint ventures. It can be cross-border cooperation within euroregions focused on environmental protection, public transportation (the harmonisation of the timetables of international trains and buses), coordination of regional infrastructural development- the main transport lines traversing the Visegrad countries connect the Western

¹² Programme of the Hungarian V4 presidency, <http://www.visegradgroup.org>

¹³ ibidem

Europe to the former Soviet Republics but there is still much to do on North-South directions¹⁴.

Within the EU national and regional interests can be better represented and implemented by each regional country group. The Visegrad countries could use their bargaining power to protect their common national priorities. The overriding priorities of the Polish presidency were the consultations on the New Financial Perspective of the EU for 2007-2013. The remaining priorities were the cooperation on the road to Schengen, participation in forming and implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, cooperation in energy, infrastructure and scientific research. The V4 states sent their first clear message of cooperation in EU budget negotiations during the V4 prime ministers meeting in Warsaw in December 2004. The shared interest of all Visegrad states was to support the budget proposal of the European Commission which provided that within 2007-2013 at least half of the structural funds would be absorbed by the new EU members¹⁵. Later on Luxembourg proposal was offered- the majority of aid would be lost by the reach members but the Czech Republic would lose 15 percent while the loss of Hungary would come to 6,5 percent, Poland's would be 4 percent, Slovakia would lose the least portion so it would bring the Czech Republic closer to Spain and Italy than to its V4 partners¹⁶.

During the EU summit in Brussels (16-17 June 2005) V4 countries one by one were joining the Poland's appeal which declared its readiness to reduce the absorption of funds in the name of rescuing the EU budget. The work on the EU budget perspective for 2007-2013 showed that cooperation among the V4 countries was possible in case of a failure to adopt the budget which could pose threat to the new EU members. After budgetary negotiations' fiasco in June 2005 during British presidency the discrepancies within EU seemed to deepen due to budget cuts which were proposed by Tony Blair. To bring the compromise closer the meeting between Visegrad representatives and British prime minister was organised in Budapest (2nd December 2005). Finally the EU budget for 2007-

¹⁴ K. Dezseri, "Is it Feasible to Enhance the Cooperation among the Visegrad Countries within the EU?", *Foreign Policy Review*, Volume 3, Nos. 1-2/2005

¹⁵ <http://www.visegradgroup.org-joint> press release

¹⁶ A. Słojewska, J. Bielecki, *Polska straci najmniej*, 'Rzeczpospolita' 11.06.2005

2013 was adopted but it wasn't the only EU problem. Another issue is the future of the treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe after rejecting it by France and the Netherlands. At first Visegrad countries had taken the position that the process of ratification of the treaty should be continue because its adoption is the best way for the Union to be ready to face up to future local and global challenges. Currently this topic faded into the background partly because of negative attitude of the visegrad leaders. Presidents of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus and Poland Lech Kaczyński openly admit there's no need to adopt the European Constitution. Following its enlargement on 1st May 2004 the European Union faced a completely new situation at its eastern borders- its direct neighbours became such former Soviet Republics as Belarus, Ukraine, Russia (the Kaliningrad Oblast) as well as Moldova following the planned accession of Romania in 2007. This new situation requires to prepare the new Eastern Policy.

It seems obvious that part of the responsibility for shaping this sphere of the EU external activity should rest with the new Central European members states. Among Visegrad countries the eastern border of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia became the European Union's eastern borders and this border is the most important dividing line in Europe. Beyond this line there are three countries- including the two largest European non-EU states in terms of size and population being Russia and Ukraine- they will remain on the EU visa list¹⁷. Visegrad countries are particularly interested in formulating the EU Eastern Policy and they should be the co-makers of this policy. Ukraine, Belarus and Russia have established ties which stem for cultural, linguistic, historical closeness and geographical proximity.

Above that Visegrad countries are strongly economically linked to their eastern neighbours, especially to Russia. The position of Russian enterprises in the energy sector is dominant in Central Europe. This area is particularly attractive for Russian investors because of the most important transport corridors (road transport routes, railway lines, oil and gas pipelines) that connect Ukraine, Belarus, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The new Russian project includes building the pipeline under the Baltic Sea

¹⁷ K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, *Polityka Wschodnia Unii Europejskiej: perspektywa krajów wyszehradzkich*, Warszawa 2003.

to avoid crossing the Polish territory and eliminate transit dependency¹⁸. The energy dialogue between EU and Moscow plays very important role in bilateral relations because Russia has become one of the major players on the world energy market. EU members could notice how significant issue it is at the beginning of 2006. As a result of Russia-Ukraine conflict gas supplies were reduced in Visegrad countries. This fact has reminded them how dependent on Russia's energy they are and how urgent the necessity of supply diversification is. The Visegrad states should focus on inventing a more resolute energy procurement policy but as it can be observed these countries are not able to take a common stand on this matter and to exercise effective influence on EU policy towards Russia.

All Visegrad states were components of the Soviet block with historical experiences (Soviet invasion in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, the events of 1956 in Hungary). Russia's veto on NATO enlargement and the obstacle in building friendly relations was still alive memory of historical past (second world war crimes) In respect of the V4 Eastern policy, Poland is the most committed country but due to historical reasons also the one with the most problematic bilateral relationships with Russia which can be confirmed by last political event. The Russian president Vladimir Putin decided to visit two Visegrad capitals- Budapest and Prague in March 2006 but by excepting Warsaw he had given a strong signal that there's still no political will to improve mutual relations especially after Polish commitment in Orange Revolution in Ukraine (named so after the colours of Viktor Yushchenko's campaign). Ukraine bordering on three out of four V4 states is a neighbouring country with special significance. Since the beginning of nineties Poland has underscored that strengthening of the Ukrainian state is an important factor in greater stability in Europe¹⁹. Poland was perceived as a Ukrainian ally and advocate on the West. When demonstrators gathered in Kiev fighting for democracy proved their attachment to Western values, Polish representatives with president Aleksander Kwaśniewski expressed their support for Ukrainian aspirations and became mediators between two sides of Orange Revolution- Viktor Yanukovich and Viktor Yushchenko. Common Visegrad initiative was

¹⁸ K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (2003), *Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union*. Bratislava.

¹⁹ E. Wyszkiwicz, „Ukraina w polityce zagranicznej państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej- podobieństwa i różnice”, *Biuletyn (PISM)* 2003, No. 41 (145)

sending a joint team of observers to the presidential elections and inviting the Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Timoshenko as a guest at the V4 summit in Kazimierz Dolny (June 10, 2005) and launching in 2005 Ukrainian Scholarship Programme by the International Visegrad Fund for Ukrainian applicants. Within V4 a counterbalance for the Eastern direction of Visegrad Group efforts is the increased interest in the Western Balkans. Hungary supports the inclusion of Austria and Slovenia into Visegrad and was active advocate of Croatia's aspirations towards the EU and NATO.

The split within the V4 emerged over the disputes on the commencement of accession negotiations with Zagreb-Poland did not opt for the commencement of negotiations²⁰. From the standpoint of the future of the Visegrad Group within the EU the enhanced cooperation in implementing the Schengen remains a great challenge. The most favourable solution would be the removal of border check-points for passenger traffic by all states at the same time. Otherwise this could entail negative social and psychological consequences, discredit the idea of Visegrad within V4 societies. The fifteenth anniversary of the formation of the Visegrad group gives the opportunity to sum up its accomplishments.

The Visegrad Group reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest. The formation of the Visegrad Group was motivated by four factors: the desire of eliminate the remnants of the communist bloc in Central Europe, the desire to overcome historic animosities between Central European countries, the belief that through joint efforts it will be easier to achieve the set goals, i.e. to successfully accomplish social transformation and join in the European integration process, the proximity of ideas of the then ruling political elites. It was especially in the initial period of its existence (1991-1993) when this regional group played its most important role during talks with NATO and EU. In the following years the intensity of cooperation between the V4 countries began to slow down due to the prevalence of the idea that individual efforts towards accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures will be more efficient. Visegrad Group was resumed in 1998 and since then closer contacts and meetings on various levels have been intensified. In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became

²⁰ *Rocznik Strategiczny 2004/2005*

NATO members, in 2004 Slovakia joined the same organisation. All the V4 states together reached their mutual aim- EU membership on 1st May 2004. Their integration is another step forward in the process of overcoming artificial dividing lines in Europe because they've always been part of one civilization sharing cultural, intellectual values and common roots of religious traditions. It seems that the potential for political cooperation of the Visegrad countries on the EU forum is not massive but it can be useful in certain situations as a platform for articulation and implementation regional political interests.

The regional cooperation of V4 states can be effective and useful even despite the fact that these countries form other temporary coalitions from time to time depending on the issue concerned. As neighbours they can focus on enhancing the civil dimension of V4 cooperation by the International Visegrad Fund. As an example of regional cooperation it can develop on the lower level based on contacts between local governments and national departments to coordinate common initiatives.

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EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: A TOCQUEVILLIAN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The recent rejection of the proposed EU constitution gives credence to the conclusion that the goal of “ever closer union” will not be achieved by legal or economic means alone, and that the forging of a community (as against a common market) requires the promotion of a widespread sense of “Europeanness” among the citizens of the member states. The expansion of Union to include countries not traditionally associated with “Western Europe” rendered such project ever more necessary yet complex. The question has been examined from several vantage points: the horizontal (the impact of tourism, and the closer meshing of political and economic systems), bottom-up (the contribution of local level experiences to wider concepts of community), and top to –bottom (the effect of common institutions on the way people understand their identity). It seems odd that a dimension critical to all these perspectives has hitherto been neglected: the impact of the Internet on the production and communication of knowledge and symbols that could serve as basis for a projected pan European “imagined community” (Benedict Anderson).

*The appeal of de Tocqueville in this regard lies in the connection he had made in *Democracy in America* between space and community building. Despite the obvious difference between the cyberspace and the geographical dimensions he had in mind, his ideas can be applied to the modern situation. A less well-known thesis advanced in *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* is however no less relevant. There he argued that underlying the sense of community is a narrative that directs the citizen’s understanding and hence behavior in the ‘real world’. Because it operates on the ‘here and now’ such a narrative is in constant flux. Old premises are discarded and new ones incorporated to become part of the general consciousness. What causes legitimacy crises is lack of synchronization between such shared narratives and the world of the here and now.*

The Internet extends the range while shortening the process of communication. Global in reach, it recreates the multi directional one on one

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communications that defines groups of people who link up with one another to pursue common interests. This may be conducive to the European project. Yet such communities may well be built on specialized interests, establishing spheres in which the broader public has little say. From the temporal perspective, this may lead to growing disjunction between two measures of time: one marking the tempo of change in the realm of individuals, the other the tempo of change in the operation of public structures. Collective Narratives take time to establish themselves, percolate through society, become translated into symbols and activities, and eventually change. Yet a situation may develop where the growing rapidity of the production and assimilation of knowledge will create a situation where it is only assimilable by limited groups. The impact on social norms and identity may increasingly vary, reflecting a plethora of narratives gradually nibbling away at the common one. Should such conditions develop, the public may well be defined by its individuals primarily in terms of the consumption of the same services and the ability to produce an imagined territorially based community will be hampered.

If, as Carl Hilty asserted, failure is “unsurpassed as a means to self-knowledge and therefore to regeneration”, then the defeat of the referenda on the European constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands may prove highly instructive to disappointed advocates of greater European unity. Prior to the two plebiscites, the constitution had been ratified by overwhelming Parliamentary majorities (59 to 3 in the Austrian upper house with almost unanimous vote in the lower, 304 to 9 in Hungary, etc.) in nine EU constituent members. Yet in eight the issue was barely debated in public, and the vote was guaranteed by strong party discipline. Spain conducted a consultative referendum in which almost 77 percent voted in favor, but the turnout was the lowest since the restoration of democracy, a mere 42 percent. In contrast, France and the Netherlands witnessed vigorous public debates and relatively high rates of participation (roughly 70 and 63 percent respectively). The rejection of the draft constitution by large majorities in two of the founding EU members (close to 55 percent in the one, 61.6 percent in the other) despite the support of both governments and main oppositions is therefore of special significance.

This is not the place to examine the reasons that account for this result. Suffice it to state the obvious, namely, that the EU had failed to

generate a sense of belonging sufficiently strong to counter whatever domestic and pan - European reasons may have been at play¹. Six months after the referenda Bernard Henri Levi could explain to American audiences that there is a European identity that resembles that of the USA, so that he identifies himself as a European of French origins, just as his listeners would describe themselves as Americans from Carolina or New Jersey². But the fact that the proposed constitution comprised mainly of existing EU treaties, and that its rejection could hence be interpreted as widespread recoil from the commitment to a full fledged Union, indicates that such a feeling is largely restricted to political and cultural elites. It was precisely general dissatisfaction "with the fact that Europe is a project of the elite, not the ordinary people" that the ballot in both countries reflected, according to senior Dutch Socialist and leader in the 'yes' campaign Michiel van Hulst³.

¹It is important to note that at least some of the reasons cited by critics are country specific. Among the most common are unemployment and the state of the economy, repudiation of unpopular governments, questions of immigration, concerns about Turkish accession, and, especially in the Netherlands, fear that the country would be overwhelmed by an emerging European super- state and that a strong Europe would force the scrapping of liberal policies such as those concerning prostitution and euthanasia. Overarching European reasons critics mention include the rejection of the 'one size fits all' approach, especially in such spheres as foreign and defense policies, concerns about bureaucracy and lack of democracy in Brussels, and the inaccessibility and complexity of the draft constitution. See, among others, John C. Hulstman, "Cataclysm: The Rejection of the European Constitution and what it Means for Transatlantic Relations", *Research Europe*, June 20, 2005; Michael Radu, " Europe : The Breaks Are On", *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, <http://fpri.org/www/0604200506.radu.europebrakeson.html>. (Downloaded 13 March, 2006). An especially insightful analysis may be found in Alberta Sbragia, "An American Perspective On the European Union's Constitutional Treaty " , *Politics* 27 (February , 2007) pp. 2-7. The argument is that the EU constitution is a mirror image of the American one . The latter gave the federal government the right to regulate foreign affairs and interstate markets , but to this day the states have a good deal of independence in all that relates to domestic affairs. By contrast, the logic of the proposed EU constitution was of gradual pooling of sovereignty in the domestic areas while leaving the members their external sovereignty. Under such conditions, the addition of new, poorer member states , was resisted by many Europeans as elite interference in their own economic wellbeing .

² Interview with Charlie Rose, *NPR*, 28 January, 2006.

³ Interview, *BBC I News hour*, 1 June 2005. See also his BBC interview 5 May, 2005.

All this casts doubts on some of the basic assumptions made since the early 1950's⁴ by the architects of the European unity. Despite a long tradition of cross-national exchanges and various versions of an 'idea of Europe'⁵, it was clear to them that no accepted understanding of what it means to be a 'European' exists. It was likewise clear that support of European integration will be contingent on widespread pan-European attachments. To become a reality, the European project required therefore the emergence of an identity based on common historical, cultural, and ideological contents. In the forceful words of Robert Schuman, "Europe ...must have a soul, recognition of its historical affinities, present and future responsibilities, and political fortitude in the service of a single ideal."⁶ The novel nature of what was envisaged rendered such attachments all the more crucial, for the new entity was not expected to substitute current national and cultural affiliations. Nor did it aim at the maintenance of territorial distinctiveness and boundary delineations required by federative arrangements; nor yet did it seek, in light of its expansive character⁷, to establish clear distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. The answer lay in the conception of European identity as an emergent quality. Growing coordination and common institutions were expected to create an optimistic horizon and gradual change in the perceptions of the nations involved, so that increasing economic prosperity and interdependence would lay, in the famous words of the Rome Treaty, "the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"⁸. This was elaborated and further clarified in the Document on the European

⁴ The assumptions discussed below were already adumbrated in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May, 1950. "Europe", Schuman stated, "will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements." http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm. (Downloaded 17 May, 2006).

⁵ For a recent excellent collection of papers discussing the question see Anthony Pagden (ed.), (2002), *The Idea of Europe*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Of special interest are G.P.A. Pocock, "Some Europes in Their History," pp. 55-71 and Arian Chebel d'Appollonia, "European Nationalism and European Union", pp. 171-190.

⁶ Robert Schuman (1963), *Pour L'Europe*, Paris: Les Editions Nagel, p. 48.

⁷ The signatories of the *Treaty Establishing the European Community* (Rome, 25 March 1957) expressed in the preamble the determination to "confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries" and "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."

⁸ *Ibid.*

Identity (1993). The signatories, it proclaimed, “have established institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation. All these are an essential part of the European identity. [that] will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe”⁹. In the meantime, they had to make do with the glue of common allegiance to the procedural and substantive principles of democracy (general, abstract and diversely interpreted as they may be) and reciprocal respect to “the rich variety of their national cultures”, what the draft Constitution for Europe was to call ‘unity in diversity’¹⁰.

Research into the results of some fifty years of experimentation with such conceptions has produced mixed assessments. Optimists point to surveys in which a majority of young respondents (below 25 years of age) stated that they feel “European to some extent” as a sign that “the European polity... [is able] to coexist and co-evolve with a growing sense of European identity”¹¹. Pessimists point to the widespread tendency to prioritize local, national and European identities, and to the fact that large majorities view the two former as paramount while ranking the latter last and far behind¹². Still other critics emphasize the absence of unanimity as to what exactly “Europeanness” means. In the cautionary words of Thomas Risse¹³, if European identity means quite different things to different people

⁹ *Document on the European Identity*, Copenhagen, 14 December, 1993, clauses 1,22.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, clause 1. See the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*, preamble: “[the signatories are] convinced that, while remaining proud of their own identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united evermore closely, to forge a common destiny...thus ‘united in diversity’, Europe offers them the best chance of pursuing ...the great venture which makes of it a special area of the human race.”

¹¹ Pippa Norris (2005) cited in Walter van Gerven, *The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 48-9; Thomas Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?” , Richard K. Herrmann et .al. (2004), *Transnational Identities :Becoming European in the EU*, Oxford :Roman and Littlefield, p. 270.

¹² Loek Halman (2001), *The European Values Study: A Third Wave, Source Book of the 199/2000 European Values Study Surveys* (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, pp 252-4; Jack Citrin, John Sides ,“More than Nationals :How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe” , Herrmann et. al. , pp. 161-185.

¹³ Risse, p. 253. For the ‘emptiness’ of ‘Europe’ as an identity category see Glynis M. Breakwell, “Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union Institutions”, Herrmann et al., pp. 25-39.

it does not mean much if we find in survey data that people identify with 'Europe', at least we should not draw any major conclusions for the European polity.

The two 'no' votes on the constitutional treaty offer the opportunity to put such interpretations to test. It seems undeniable however that what especially requires reevaluation is a tacit postulation that the founding fathers shared with most 19th and early 20th century political thinkers : that if the right principles would be discovered and carried out, smooth uninterrupted progress would ensue. This was equally true of the Liberal's hidden hand of the market, the Socialist advancement towards the classless society, or the conservative seamless development of the values and forms inherited from the past. In the same vein, the architects of the European project believed in the inevitable spillover from economic cooperation and institution building to perceptual change and the formation of identity¹⁴. If indeed it is this that has been proven faulty, then there may be more than a grain of truth in Jose Maria Aznar's comment, that the French and Dutch ballots were the price of "attempting to build a new Europe without providing people with sufficient explanation"¹⁵. What is needed, then, is an examination of European identity formation as a process. And yet, most research has focused on the measurement of its results. Relatively neglected were precisely the kinds of questions we need to look into: what propels and what hinders the translation of common interest into a sense of community, what factors influence the tempo and direction of such processes, and to what extent is it possible to fine-tune them.

Since what is under consideration are contacts among members of a society whose members do not share national frameworks, it is appropriate to begin by taking note of the changes in the way people communicate and perceive one another since the architects of European Unity made their

¹⁴ In the words of the *Treaty on European Union* (Maastricht 29 July, 1992), "to implement policies ensuring that advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields [including the spheres of foreign and defense policies ... is to] thereby reinforce the European identity"

¹⁵ Cited in Radu, "Europe the Breaks are On" .See also the Charta on European Identity http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm : " the driving force behind European Unification was economic, though at the same time it had become clear that achievement in this field alone is insufficient for the development of European identity. Despite economic success, something is obviously missing at present."

assumptions. A term commonly associated with the space –time compression affected by the “digital revolution” is ‘globalization’, indicating interactions across boundaries and beyond the control of territorial governments. This immediately brings to mind Marshal McLuhan’s notion of “global village”. To some extent it is a valid association. And yet, the notion hinged on the unidirectional potentialities of the previous generation of mass communication media, mainly the radio and TV. The Internet differs from these in that it is interactive, creating nodes where like-minded individuals can come together in the oxymoron of a global-intimate village. Another famous saying, “the medium is the message”, may help to clarify this. McLuhan meant that the medium determines the type of organization by which it is employed. Thus, the modern nation state would be unthinkable in the absence of mass media that spatially extended the range of communication. But the Internet recreates the multi- directional, one- on -one communication that defines the intimate community, on a global scale.

The possibilities this opens up are of special significance in light of the fact that Internet penetration among the members of the European Union (49.8 % of the inhabitants) is among the highest in the world. The combined EU population (in June, 2006, 7.1% of the world inhabitants) account for 22.5% of the global Internet usage¹⁶. Sweden (f 74.9%) and Denmark (69.4%) surpass the USA (68.6%), falling only behind Iceland and New Zealand, whereas Holland (65.9%) is a close competitor. Germany (59.0%) and France (43.0% in early 2006¹⁷) lag behind the other original founders, but the removal of regulatory barriers and governmental investment in promoting Internet access resulted in yearly double digit growth (in France 10% in 2004, 14% in 2005¹⁸). Thus, in spite of the persistence of socio economic and educational discrepancies between Internet users and non- users, diffusion has reached a level where the changes it has brought about had irrevocably permeated society as a whole.

¹⁶ Internet World Statistics, Usage and Population statistics <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm>, accessed 4 June 4, 2006.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ See especially European Travel Commission, *New Media Review*, <http://www.etcewmedia.com>, accessed 2 May, 2006. See also, Index Online Research newsroom, http://www.idexonline.com//protal_FullNews.asp?id=25534, accessed 1 May, 2006.

As with all explorations, the inquiry into the implications of cyberspace for the process of European identity formation could benefit from the casting of a fresh look at preceding investigations that could either add to our empirical knowledge or heuristically direct our thought. Alexis de Tocqueville is among the few 19th century thinkers who did not subscribe to the deterministic beliefs mentioned above. Rather, what fascinated him was the impact of space on the process by which disparate individuals form meaningful associations without surrendering what sets them apart, and the impact of change on the sense of identity that underlies communities. This paper aims to draw attention to some of his conclusions that are readily applicable to our time, in the hope that they may suggest some useful directions to pursue in the effort to better our understanding of the European project in the digital age.

II

Tocqueville's theory of voluntary associations was propounded in *Democracy in America* as an optimistic counterweight to his forebodings about the threats to liberty attendant on democratization and the spread of political equality in Europe of his day. Such trends, he believed, were inescapable; but whereas egoism in the Old World was liable to render them a vehicle of "servitude ... barbarism ... [and] wretchedness", individualism in the New World could make them usher in "freedom ... knowledge ... [and] prosperity"¹⁹. The key to this difference lay in the territorial vastness of America. An expanding and seemingly unlimited frontier allowed enterprising persons to leave the places where fate caused them to be born, and roam until they come across like-minded individuals with whom they can collaborate in getting things done. The outcome was decentralized communities that truly represented the dispositions and concerns of their members. Contractual relations and local freedom "perpetually bring men together and forces them to help one another in spite of the propensities that sever them". Irrespective of the fact that members "think of their fellow men from ambitious motives", the growth of a communal identity is inevitable, for where the selfish good of the member coincides with the good of all, people "frequently find it, in a

¹⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville (1945), *Democracy in America*, N.Y: Vintage Books, vol. II, p. 352.

manner, their interest to forget themselves"²⁰. The limitation of nationwide authority to overarching issues such as defense, thereby forges a federative relationship among communities, and relations between them and the central government, that parallel those between each and their members. Simultaneous and mutually supportive identities are thus formed, with each individual's advantage lies in seeking the good of the whole and participating in its affairs without foregoing local affinities or the fountainhead of personal interest.

The drawing of an analogy between cyberspace and the geographical extent of the New World entails online associations that resemble the offline communities Tocqueville had in mind. It likewise implies the crystallization of a nexus between individuals, online networks, and the largest territorial political unit (in our case, the European Union) akin to that he discerned in the U.S.A. According to such a view, the Internet's inherent tendency to loosen political attachments to local territorial communities would be balanced by the formation of online networks whose limits are set by the ability to collectively pursue goals bound by cross national frameworks and policy making institutions. The possibilities of moving the process ahead in time are obvious. European institutions and cooperation at the supranational level could be enhanced by forms of horizontal (perhaps Internet based) participation and symbolic means, and be made to serve as 'turf' upon which the formation of online networks could be encouraged. Cross European groups dedicated to the furthering of specific policies or more general ideologies, boundary-escaping art and entertainment networks, socio-occupational pressure groups, and even associational groups are among the most evident mechanisms that suggest themselves.

Such a parallel between space and cyberspace, and the sunny conclusions it leads to, could raise doubts. Tocqueville spoke about the actual terrain and the structure of society in the phenomenal world. Internet users, by contrast, do not converse with the network in the 'real world', and even in chat rooms they do not meet their partners nor necessarily know who they really are. These are communities that exist only in the mind, and they cannot replace actual organizations. Moreover,

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 111, 110.

it could be argued²¹ that much of the Internet traffic consists of personal communications (emails), entertainment, and commercial utilizations such as advertising and shopping. These tend to enhance individualism and be egoistically motivated. In this sense, the Internet is frequently cited among the reasons for the growing provincialism and disengagement from politics in most Western democracies²².

Nevertheless, recent national surveys of political discursive participation²³ reveal that at least in the USA, where commercialism is widely perceived as having reached its peak, the Internet affords a growingly important outlet for civic discussions that counter the erosion of what Putnam called "social capital"²⁴. Within the year prior to answering the questionnaire, only 25% of the respondents participated in either formal or informal face- to- face deliberation of socio political questions. However, 24% reported talking about politics several times a month, either through the email or through Internet networks, and additional 4% participated in Internet deliberations (chat room discussions, message boards, or online discussion groups) dedicated to such issues. Such contacts afford the users opportunities to locate like- minded partners, to articulate , negotiate and collectively build up shared ideas , and thereby become incorporated into online social networks. The similarity to what so impressed Tocqueville in America is unmistakable, and the fact that such groups are cyberspace-

²¹ See e.g. Mary J. Cronin,(1996) *Global Advantage on the Internet: From Corporate Connectivity to International Competitiveness*, N.Y. : Van Nostrand Reinhold, and her *Doing Business on the Internet: How the Electronic Highway is Transforming American Companies*, Van Nostrand Reinhold, second edition, 1995.

²² See, e.g., an interesting analysis (influenced by Herbert Marcuse) reminiscent of Tocqueville's warnings of the leveling trends and weakening of communal bonds attendant on such commercially based globalization in Benjamin Barber, "Democracy at Risk: American Culture in a Global Culture," *World Policy Journal* 15 (Summer 1998) pp. 29–41. See also his "Can Democracy Survive Globalism." *Government and Opposition* 35 (Summer 2000) pp. 275–301.

²³ Fay Lomax Cook et. al. "Who Deliberates? Discursive Participation in America," Shawn Rosenberg (ed.), *Can the People Decide? Theory and Empirical Research on Democratic Deliberation* (in press) .See also , among others, Roza Tsagarousianoa, Damian Tambini, Cathy Bryan (eds.) (1998), *Cyber democracy: Technologies, Cities and Civic Networks*, London: Routledge.

²⁴ Robert Putnam (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, N.Y.: Simon &Schuster, esp. chapter 1.

based does not account for much since all large scale human groupings are, in Anderson's famous phrase, "imagined communities"²⁵ Interestingly, Tocqueville himself foresaw the formation of non- territorial communities created and held together by the mass communication media. The penchant to form voluntary associations, he argued, leads to the situation where

"as soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world , they look out for mutual assistance ;and as soon as they have found one another out , they combine²⁶ .

Newspapers thus serve as beacons, uniting "wandering minds which had long sought each other at darkness. The newspaper brought them together, and the newspaper is still necessary to keep them united"²⁷ . One reason why phenomena that Tocqueville noted over 176 years ago escaped attention in America of today could be that the Internet, much more than the newspaper of yesteryear, brings about the diminution of the meaning of geographical propinquity. Networks established through it tend consequently to break out of the close territoriality of the American federal political system²⁸ , focusing instead on issues such as the environment, the morality of abortions, or the US involvement in Iraq. And yet, it is precisely such issues that are likely to enhance the importance of the Internet as a venue for the articulation of interests and symbolic forms of linkage among members of communities that lie outside of the centers of European decision making.

Of special importance in this context is the demographic profile of those who reported participating in sociopolitical Internet discourses²⁹. 22% of those who took part in email discussions belong to the 16% of college graduates, and additional 17% belong to the 9% with terminal

²⁵ B. Anderson (1994), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, revised edition.

²⁶ *Democracy in America*, vol. II p. 117

²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 119-20.

²⁸ See Roger Gibbino, "Federalism in a Digital world", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol 33 (December 2000) pp. 667-689.

²⁹ Lomax Cook, et al.

degrees. Discrepancies are even more marked once the more intensive forms of Internet deliberations are concerned: 19% of the chat room users are collage graduates, and 23% of them have terminal degrees. No less significant are the findings relating to age. It is common to bemoan the paucity of political involvement among young adults. At the same time, research consistently points to the high level of participation among the elderly. Yet young adults (18 to 29 years old) engage in Internet sociopolitical conversations at a rate far exceeding their portion of the general population. Of the email talkers, 32% were of the young group (as against 22% of citizens between the ages of 50-64, and 14% of the 65 plus group). Among the users of the intensive (deliberative) category, 31% were 18-29 years of age as against 20% of the 50-64 group and a mere 4% of those over 64 years of age. In short, the use of the Internet for socio-political networking is especially prevalent among the young and well educated, who are expected in the future to carry a progressively increasing weight in the shaping of public opinion. Studies of Internet sociopolitical discursive participation in Europe are much in need, yet comparable demographic figures lead one to expect broadly similar results. Since it is still behind the major European countries in Internet penetration, France offers an especially interesting example. As in the US, there are marked differences in Internet usage along generational lines. Although their share of the general population does not exceed 28%, 52% of the Internet users are under 35 years of age, and no less than 93% of French adolescents (ages 12-17) are familiar with the PC³⁰. Class distinctions are still noticeable, but less marked than in the US. Thus, 40% of Internet users belong to the 'cadre superior' whose share in the overall population is roughly 22%. Yet 80% of the children (ages 12-17) of blue-collar workers are computer savvy, virtually equal to the 81% of White collar workers³¹. At first blush, then, one tends to adopt the optimistic view that the French and Dutch referendums reflect a transitional stage that would be overcome as the primary and secondary effects of the Internet spread across the European societies in ripple effects.

³⁰ European Travel Commission, *New Media Review*; studies by CREDOC, <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intenet/inimir-ri.nsf/pr/gr124521f.html>. Accessed 6 June, 2006.

³¹ Ibid.

Up to this point, however, the discussion of telecommunications was limited to their capacity to establish networks in the midrange stretching beyond the local but within the overall supranational framework. Yet the Internet could well serve to forge truly global political ties. This can be illustrated by the NGO phenomenon, but also by the activities of multinational corporations. Even before the advent of the Internet, these established spheres where states had little say as to the circulation of information, capital, and even investment decisions. One could raise the question, then, whether the fate of local identities could await cross-national frameworks such as those of the European Union. Even should we ignore such questions as relevant only to the few, and to spheres that lie beyond the immediate day to day life, one should still inquire about the political ramifications of non directly political networks. At this point one could refer to a less widely known theory springing from the same source that may offset our optimistic diagnosis.

In the *Old Regime and the French Revolution*, Tocqueville advanced the view that “in all human institutes, as in the human body, there is a hidden source of energy, the life principle itself”³². This permeates formal institutions, lending them their distinct character and distinguishing the particular societies from others on the one hand, and from mere aggregations of unrelated individuals, on the other. Such ‘sources’ are nevertheless “independent of the organs which perform the various functions [of society]” and do not inhere only in the political dimension. Reminiscent of Burke’s notion of ‘prejudices’, Hegel’s *sittlichkeit*, or Carlyle’s “Soul of the state”³³, what Tocqueville had in mind were bodies of tacit, axiomatic premises, regarding the permanent features of the collective and its environment, and what Edward Shils called “the center”³⁴, that is, the broad ethical standards that determine the distribution of resources, the permissible range of disagreements, the unarticulated understandings of what society should strive for, and the benchmarks for the evaluation of the

³² Alexis de Tocqueville (1955), *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, N.Y.: Garden City, p. 79. See also Alexis de Tocqueville (1962), *Memoirs, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville: Translated by the translator of Napoleon’s Correspondence with King Joseph*, Boston: Ticknor and Fields : vol . II, p. 336.

³³ See Jonathan Mendilow, “Waiting for the Axe to Fall: Carlyle’s place in the Study of Crises of Authority” *Political Research Quarterly* 46 (Sept. 1993), pp. 1–18.

³⁴ Edward Shils (1972), *Center and Periphery*, N.Y.: Random House.

workings of authoritative institutions. Such bodies are sufficiently expansive and flexible to allow considerable variation, and the range of institutions and behaviors they permit is similarly wide. But whatever the differences, to enjoy longevity institutions must be firmly rooted in the 'life principles' of their society, and to meet social approval individuals must behave in the predictable manners they prescribe. When writing about America, for instance, Tocqueville could assert that what made it stable irrespective of its dynamism was the fact that its institutions were firmly anchored in "the practical experience, the habits, the opinions, in short the customs" of its founding populations³⁵. Because what is referred to is not a logically structured construct but a meta-logical world picture, Tocqueville often employed the term "passion" for the political sentiments deriving directly from this 'life principle' –a sense of collective identity in which "general goods immaterial to a certain degree, are in sight; [but even more importantly] an ideal of society a picture that raises souls above contemplation of private interest and carries them away"³⁶.

A brief comparison with Gramsci's notion of hegemony may lend the issue greater clarity. For him, this meant the legitimacy conferred upon a class whose philosophy has been absorbed by society at large to become the people's "common sense", or "philosophy of non –philosophers": a worldview compounded of the accumulated experiences, opinions, beliefs, and assumptions that are "uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed". Language, popular religion, customs, and ways of life in which the common sense is embedded thus become instruments of hegemony. As the "'folklore' of philosophy" such a worldview gives society its coherence and directs the activity of its members³⁷. If the similarity to Tocqueville's notions is striking, so are the differences between the two thinkers. Both held the 'common sense' or 'life principle' to be dynamic composites. Yet, writing from within the Marxist tradition, Gramsci devoted his analysis to class conflict .His 'common sense' comes

³⁵ *Democracy in America*, I, 47.

³⁶ Alexis de Tocqueville (1985), *Selected Letters on Politics and Society*, ed. R. Boesch, trans. J. Toupin, R. Boesch, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 192.

³⁷ Antonio Gramsci (1971) *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare, Geoffrey Nowell Smith, N.Y.: International Publishers, p. 419.

from class ideology and serves to justify class interests. The failure of a class-based government in some major political undertaking, or the rise of a powerful contending class, may terminate the hegemony of the ruling ideology and bring about an upheaval that would only end in the advent of a new hegemony. Since the pursuit of class interests brings about the conditions for the rise of the rival class, he held such processes inevitable. For Tocqueville, in contrast, the very fact that the "life principle" underlies and is embedded in diverse institutions and practices means that none of its manifestations can be absolute and that change constitutes the very condition of its existence. All behavior is defined by the reality in which it is situated. But realities are human constructs, formed in time by societies as they give meaning to their world. What is involved is not "the thing in itself" but what we make of it, and what we make of it is a function of what we bring to it. This is not to say that individuals give identical meanings to changing realities, or that the construction of meaning is a onetime affair. Rather, it is a dynamic process that works itself out on several interrelated levels, reflecting the changes in each on the one hand and the synchronization among them on the other.

Under normal circumstances, then, the principles underlying social identity gradually change as conditions alter and new realities come into being. Such modifications ensure the viability and continuity of the 'life principle', as well as the institutions and behaviors it supports. If England escaped the revolution experienced by France, it was precisely because adjustments were "gradually and adroitly introduced into the old order ...without impairing its stability or demolishing ancient forms, [thereby giving] it a new lease on life and a new energy"³⁸. Not that perpetual consensus prevailed, but "that certain organs may be faulty matters little when the life force of the body politic has vigor"³⁹. In contrast, the fermentation that led to the explosive end of the ancient regime resulted from the attempt of those in power to prevent change. The retaining of structures, laws, and customs irrespective of shifts in their contexts rendered them "meaningless anachronisms ...emptied of substance". An inverse relation was thereby established between the antiquity of institutions and customs and their credibility: "the older they grew, the

³⁸ *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, p. 18.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 175.

more they were discredited [and]...the weaker they became"⁴⁰. Growing detachment from institutions and codes that had lost their justification loosened the bonds that tied the citizen to them, and the glue that held society together in its common apprehension of reality and in the values and goals deriving from it dissolved.

Every Frenchman was dissatisfied with his lot and quite decided to better it. And this ranking discontent made him at once impatient and fiercely hostile to the past; nothing would content him but a new world utterly different from the world around him⁴¹

A potential danger inherent in the digital revolution is that a disjunction would once more build up between two measures of time: the one marking the tempo of change in the realia of individuals, the other the tempo of change in the institutions, government outputs, and codes of social behavior. The culprit however is not likely to be resistance to change, but lack of correspondence between the pace of knowledge production and expansion and the pace of changes in what Tocqueville called the "life principle" of society. A basic common denominator between him and Gramsci, and for that matter Burke, Hegel, or Carlyle, was the supposition that Shifts in our comprehension of reality, and consequently in our basic assumptions and sets of socially constitutive general principles, though varying in rate, nevertheless proceed at a more or less moderate, or at least comprehensible, speed. Tocqueville's "life principle", Gramsci's "hegemony", Burke's "prejudices", or Carlyle's "idea of the state", all require time to establish themselves, percolate through society, become translated into the language of action, and eventually change. Yet the characteristic of the Internet age is a revolution in the acquisition, transmission and indeed the very nature of information and knowledge, all leading to new and constantly changing social linkages. A situation is foreseeable where specialized branches of knowledge will become assailable only by limited groups within a society stretched to global dimensions, and at different rates according to needs and interests.

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 30, 17.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 171.

Examples of specialized “realities” and “languages” to treat them are not necessarily limited to particularized bodies of scientific knowledge. They may already be discerned, for instance, in the ‘hate.com’ phenomena (not to mention Jihadist and other terrorist networks)⁴² or even in entertainment networks where entire universes cyberspace come into being. One can stipulate that the unconscious impact of such bodies of knowledge on perceptions of reality, social values, norms, and attitudes will increasingly vary, resulting in a plethora of “life principles” replacing any common one. At the same time, as Lyotard already observed more than thirty years ago, “the increasing strength of the principle that society exists and progresses only if the messages circulating within it are rich in information and easy to decode” gives rise to a situation in which the general political framework is progressively perceived as a mere “factor of opacity and ‘noise’”⁴³.

This, of course, does not mean that an explosion akin to that of the French revolution is about to tear us all apart, and that the wisest course of action is to head to the hills. Over and above the obvious dissimilarities in the situations, Tocqueville, unlike Gramsci, did not perceive social cohesion in terms of ‘either /or’. Instead he regarded it as a continuum stretching between the poles of what one may call active and passive identification. The former obtains where people identify with the community to the point where their private interest and that of the collectivity merge. The latter is when a growing number of people become alienated from the collective, its government and codes, but nevertheless persists in old behaviors and obedience to institutions that have grown outdated in their eyes, mainly because of habit and the unavailability of choice. In Tocqueville’s words, this is where the “vital flame burns low, the whole organism languishes and wastes away, and though the organs seem to function as before, they serve no useful purpose”. To use another, almost modern, metaphor of his, society becomes like “a vehicle still moving with the motor shut off”⁴⁴. In such situations, whatever social solidarity existed is lost. As the common apprehension of reality and the values deriving from it wear away, society

⁴² See e.g. Nadya Labi “Jihad 2.0”, *Atlantic Monthly* 298 (July/August 2006) pp. 102–9.

⁴³ Jean F. Lyotard, (1984), *The Post Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington, B. Nasswin, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville (1959), *The European Revolution and Correspondence With Gobineau*, trans. J. Lukas, N.Y. Doubleday, p. 164.

itself splits into “thousands of small groups”, each “living only for itself and, quite literally, minding its own business”⁴⁵. It is then that the state becomes susceptible to revolution. As governments lose their moorings in accepted principles, and are seen as serving narrow elite interests, a “state of unstable equilibrium”⁴⁶ prevails. The critical moment comes when already weakened authorities encounter problems of serious magnitude. It is then that they find themselves unable to count on the support of their citizens, and may even encounter active hostility.

That at least in the democratic world of today there is little fear of a final “crunch”, does not mean that contemporary society is immune to the situation of passive identification described above. It simply means that this may be restricted to specific segments of the population, and even if it becomes widespread no massive disruptions are likely. To elucidate the point it is worth noting the Tocqueville’s central thesis in both *Democracy in America* and *the Old Regime and the French Revolution*. It is that the sense of belonging to society hinges on a balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces: the interests of individuals and particular publics defined by the pursuit of their gain, and the interests of the community that justify behaviors that override such immediate individual and group interests. Where the two clash, the preservation of social cohesion becomes a function of the priority given to the latter as individuals identify their long term interest with the prosperity of the whole. Should this not be the case, society must rely on specific interests to support its institutions and codes and on the imposition or threat of sanctions on nonbeneficiaries. It is in this situation that affinities to society are eroded and society fragments into unrelated and interest-based groups.

At both individual and collective levels, identity derives its meaning through the exclusion of the self from the nonself, the ‘us’ from the ‘other’. The unique capabilities of the Internet present us with an ever deepening problem of collective identity: how does one define the ‘us’ where the user can join in a global network, literally in real time and with only the aid of a mouse and modem? One answer lies in the voluntary association model that Tocqueville identified in the America of his day. The rapid expansion of the technologies of knowledge and the fragmentation of

⁴⁵ *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, p. 96.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 203.

the community of users into specific groups renders the alternative no less possible. The closer online groups are united by common knowledge and realities that set them apart, the more they acquire concreteness and meaning at the expense of the territorial ones. It is then that we may expect the spread of general apathy and persistent demands to strip central authorities of as much power as possible, so as to allow powerful members within the European Union, and powerful individuals and groups within these members, to pursue selfish interests. Rather than a vehicle for a closer union, the Internet will then drain existing affinities away.

III

This paper is highly speculative and hence it is appropriate to conclude it with some “down to earth” comments. The point of departure was the need raised by the failure of the referenda in France and the Netherlands to examine European identity in terms of process rather than of telos. We have noted that such a consideration requires placing the question in the context of the here and now, especially as it relates to cross-boundary communications. This in turn means the necessity to raise the more general question regarding the future of territorial identities in the age of the Internet. The barrier-eroding and time compressing proclivities of the new media and their homogenizing effects are widely discussed in the literature. The convergence in consumer patterns, modes of work and entertainment, and in norms, is likewise well documented. It is easy however to exaggerate. As Barber already showed in the mid-1990s (and as news headlines tell us virtually every day), such standardization may ignite a “Jihad vs. McWorld”⁴⁷ and defensive efforts to reestablish barriers against encroaching “others”. Beyond this, however, linkages outside the cyberspace are still critical to the conduct of life: roads, schools, or simply the satisfaction of the craving for social (offline) contact are among the needs that immediately come to mind. The question should not be cast therefore in absolute terms. Rather, it relates to the balance that could be struck between the territorial and cyberspace networks. Tocqueville’s reflections on what he had witnessed in America as well as on the past and future of his own France helps to discern two opposing tendencies. One is

⁴⁷ Benjamin Barber (1995), *Jihad vs. McWorld*, N.Y.: Ballantine.

to recreate the kind of setup that so impressed him in the US of the early 19th century. This is directly linked to the permeability of local and state boundaries and the loosening of constraints on individual mobility under the impact of the new technologies. It is easier for enterprising individuals to move their ideas, assets, and even actual bodies across territorial space than ever before. Moreover, at the same time as the Internet facilitates the migration of minds and bodies to places that they regard as fitting them best, it also loosens the barriers to horizontal participation. While this may constitute 'bad news' for federal systems, *Democracy in America* shows that the effect could actually be the strengthening of overarching decision making frameworks in entities such as the European Union. The other, counter tendency that could be gleaned from *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* is towards the fragmentation of territorial entities and downgrading of authorities into transmission belts whose job is to facilitate the flow of services to individuals who can afford them without commitment to any but their online partners and the limited circles of family and friends.

What will determine the balance between the tendency to support the institutional and political visions of the current political and cultural elites, and the tendency to render them progressively more detached from realities? At this juncture, it is worth recalling the cautionary note made by Christine Bellamy and John Taylor, that we should not be mesmerized by the technologies that had so changed our life. These will inevitably be eclipsed by new machineries, and are therefore of mere ephemeral importance. Of greater consequence are the general patterns that underlie social and political realities. Like any other age, that of the digital revolution, "is being shaped as much by the economic, social and political arrangements ...as it is by the technological innovations on which so much emphasis is placed" ⁴⁸. Much will depend on policies taken by governments, at the national as well as supranational levels, to strengthen the one tendency and limit the other. Much will also hinge on causes from within and without Europe that lie beyond the power of authorities. In this context one should perhaps only mention the recent furor about the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in European

⁴⁸ Christine Bellamy, John Taylor (1998), *Governing in the Information Age*, Buckingham, Open University Press, p. 19.

press. The fact that the Danes and Norwegians, of all people, were vilified in places as far away as South East Asia, and the publication of the offensive cartoons by European newspapers in sympathetic outrage, forgettable occurrences as they surely are, illustrate forces that may turn the Internet into a tool fostering the sense of a European 'us' versus the non European 'them'.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. A QUEST FOR A NEW PARADIGM

Frank Delmartino and Valérie Pattyn*

Abstract

The first quinquennium of the 21st century started in a promising way for the EU's institutional development, but is ending in uncertainty regarding its future. After the Nice- (2000) and Laeken (2001) declarations and the innovative and successful Convention (2002-2003), finally an agreement on a Constitutional Treaty was reached in the Intergovernmental Conference.

In October 2004 this Treaty was solemnly signed by all member states and the candidate countries. Despite this apparent breakthrough, during the ratification process all demons of the past re-emerged. The nicely formulated parts 1 and 2 of the draft Constitution could not dissimulate the fundamental lack of clarity in the 'finalité politique' of the Union.

Is the EU in 'crisis' (Juncker, Delors), or is this just a setback as there have been many in the 55 years of European integration? Can we go on with 'business as usual', neglecting the signal of so many citizens, especially if one takes into account the very probable 'no' in the rather eurosceptic countries where a referendum was on the agenda?

The political class has learned to live with rather vague definitions as "an ever closer union" that dissimulate the lack of consensus among the member states on the very nature of the project and its institutional development. The problem is not new: exactly 30 years ago, the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans formally raised the issue in the newly born European Council (1975). His colleagues were most embarrassed and found a way-out by commissioning a report that, although well elaborated and very much to the point, was never seriously discussed.

This time the debate no longer takes place behind closed doors or in academia. By organizing referenda, the general public has been invited to participate in a decisive

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way. Although in depth sociological studies on the negative response are not available yet, it is clear that for some voters the EU is perceived as a threat to national identity and sovereignty. For others, it paves the way to an ongoing process of enlargement that jeopardizes the existing welfare state model. A few groups, on the contrary, have regretted the lack of a 'social model', of a 'projet de société'.

Whatever the arguments might have been for the citizens' negative reactions and whatever our opinion might be on their validity, one cannot deny the serious clash between the 'inner circle' of European policy-and decision-makers- both at the national and European level- and the general public, even in strongholds of 'believers' such as Luxembourg. The European Commission announced a period of reflection and launched its Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate.

It this contribution we would like to embark on a more structural approach. In our view the fundamental problem lies with the refusal by some member states of clarifying the state concept behind the Union. Of course, the European experience is a unique feature and its structures are 'sui generis'. However, an unbiased analysis of the EU's institutions, its decision-making processes and its policy formation, reveals quite a number of federal-type arrangements. Far from expecting any solution from an explicit qualification of the Union as a European Federation, we nevertheless start from the assumption that a more transparent and constitutionally entrenched division of tasks between member states and Union would contribute to clarifying the issue. Reference could be made to well-established federations, such as Germany, however without taking it as a model.

In this article, we would firstly like to enumerate the many federal-type arrangements that can be observed in the EU's present-day functioning. Confronted with the theories on federalism and federation developed in literature (M. Burgess e.a.), the EU appears as a quasi-federation, lacking the political philosophy of federalism. This imperfection should not prevent us from presenting the EU as a federal arrangement, since this model is widely appreciated for its clear division of competences and the constitutional guarantees it offers to the (hard core of) national sovereignty.

Belgium is known for the strong federalist views of its political leadership and most of its citizens. Since Tindemans and Martens, prime-ministers as J.-L. Dehaene and, presently, Guy Verhofstadt, have played a pro-active role in

promoting the process of constitutionalisation of the Union. Recently, M. Verhofstadt published an essay with the somewhat provocative title "The United States of Europe". Those countries that would be unwilling to join the ongoing process of integration, should, in his eyes, be left out from the 'avant-garde' (Delors) and just take part in a free trade zone, called 'Organization of European States'.

Our contribution is not aiming at defending and propagating any particular Belgian view or position. However, in the current period of 'reflection' it may be interesting to notice the benefits of a structural approach, trying to elucidate the weaknesses of the present model instead of blaming the uninformed citizens.

It was Robert Schuman who already had a federation in mind when presenting his Coal-and Steel Community. After realizing a 'Pax Belgica' in their highly complex country, many Belgians think that a federal solution would indeed be meaningful for Europe as a whole, combining a clearly defined 'self rule' for the member states with forms of 'shared rule' for the Union.

Giving a name to the game would in any case make the exercise more transparent and, hopefully, more enjoyable.

Introduction

The first quinquennium of the 21st century started in a promising way for the EU's institutional development, but has ended in uncertainty regarding the future. After the Nice-(2000) and Laeken (2001) declarations and the innovative and successful Convention (2002-2003), finally an agreement on a Constitutional Treaty was reached in the Intergovernmental Conference. In October 2004 this Treaty was solemnly signed by all member states and the candidate countries. Despite this apparent breakthrough, during the ratification process some demons of the past have re-emerged. The nicely formulated parts I and II of the draft Constitution could not dissimulate the fundamental lack of clarity regarding the 'finalité politique' of the Union.

According to authorities as the then president of the European Council, Prime Minister Juncker of Luxembourg, and the former Commission president Jacques Delors, the EU is in 'deep crisis'. In this contribution, therefore, we will not recommend a strategy aiming at saving

the Constitutional Treaty (CT) by agreeing on cosmetic changes or conceding 'opt out' facilities, as was done in the past. Neither do we advocate a fundamental choice to be made at short notice between two diverging models, either a 'maximalist', federal type Union, or a 'minimalist' free trade area that could expand into the countries currently covered by the 'neighbourhood policy'.

In our eyes, the process of European integration can be seen as a succession of breakthroughs and setbacks, of attempts at defining the objectives and failures in implementing some of them. Truly supranational institutions have been set up, but they happen to serve national interests as well. Out of recent overviews the EU neither appears as a federal state in the making, nor as an intergovernmental organization. William Wallace probably comes close to the reality by qualifying the EU as a 'system of governance without statehood'.¹

Until recently, this 'sui generis' character did not prevent the EU from functioning and even achieving remarkable successes in quite some policy fields, first and foremost in realizing the Single European Market. However, the wish for institutional clarification is regularly re-emerging and most strikingly since the Nice Treaty. The agreement on the technicalities of the process of enlargement has drawn the attention on the imbalance with the 'deepening' of the institutions. For the first time, the European Council was feeling the need of announcing a reflection on the basics of the balance between Union-and member states commitments (Nice Declaration).

In our view, despite the signing of the Constitutional Treaty, this period of reflection is ongoing. Apparently the CT did not offer the citizens the clear *balance* referred to. The French and Dutch negative votes are only signalling a huge iceberg of cleavage between the inner circle of decision-makers and the general public. No lasting constitutional arrangement can be made unless a kind of permissive consensus can be reached among all actors involved, first and foremost among the citizens in an EU that claims to be founded on representative and participatory democracy.²

¹ H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. A. Pollack (eds.) (2005), *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford University Press, fifth edition, p. 482 and ff.

² EUROPEAN COUNCIL, "Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe", I, Art. 46 and 47.

In this article we would like to proceed in two steps. The first one aims at reminding us at earlier *moments of reflection* that were equally ambitious but only partially successful: the Tindemans report in 1975 and the Laeken declaration in 2001, both under Belgian supervision. These exercises highlight the ongoing character of constitutional reflection and the pitfalls of wishful thinking in the EU.

The second step is a plea for developing an *alternative paradigm* for the institutional development of the EU. One should avoid approaching the issue from a maximalist or a minimalist view, but start by simply referring to the features of the present-day policy-making process. By doing so, one discovers a lot of federal-type arrangements, however without having to conclude on a particular 'state form'. Using a model as multilevel governance brings us probably closer to reality than claiming a straightforward federalist paradigm.

Finally, by way of conclusion, we will suggest a reorientation of the constitutional debate in view of overcoming the present-day institutional deadlock.

1. An ongoing constitutional reflection.

Following the negative referendum results on the CT in two founding member states, France and the Netherlands, the European Council explicitly announced a 'period of reflection' to enable a broad debate on the future of Europe and of the CT itself (European Council, 16/17 June 2005). The present constitutional undertaking, as initiated by the Convention, can indeed be considered as *unprecedented* in terms of intensity and scope, but clearly not as *unanticipated*.

We can argue that the history of European Integration is in fact a continuous sequence of interrelated moments of reflection, the one being much more explicitly developed than the other. As such, shedding light on previous moments of reflection can be helpful in getting a better understanding of the current constitutional crisis and help us in finding any successful remedies. For the purposes of this paper, two examples of evident 'momentum' will be highlighted: the Tindemans Report on the European Union (1975) and the more recent Laeken Declaration (2001).

Though both are of mainly Belgian origin, this paper explicitly wants to avoid an exclusive 'Belgian narrative'; since we acknowledge that other equally valuable initiatives could have been selected as well.

1.1. Tindemans' Report on the European Union. A qualitative step forward?

The initial impetus to the drafting of the Report on the European Union, at which the Heads of State and Government decided at the Paris Summit of December 1974, originated already two years earlier, at the Paris Summit of October 1972.³ In a Declaration of Intent, following the 1972 First Summit Conference on the Enlarged Community, national leaders "assigned themselves the key objectives of converting (...) all the relationships between Member States into a *European Union*".⁴ For the first time, the adage 'European Union' was officially launched, as a comprehensive concept, including a diversity of common policy areas.⁵ Though, even the proponents of this text did not unanimously agree how to reach this common goal.⁶

Recognizing the need for an overall approach, the Paris Summit of December 1974, charged Leo Tindemans, Belgian Prime Minister at that time, with the task to report how this *qualitative step forward* might be exactly understood and realized; this "on the basis of the reports received from the institutions and of consultations with the governments and with a wide range of public opinion in the Community".⁷ Some observers were surprised about the momentum chosen for this challenging undertaking, as Europe was plunged into a deep economic crisis, caused by the collapse of

³ H. Schneider, *The Constitution Debate*. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 7, (2003), 4, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-2004a.htm> (WWW).

⁴ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Statement from the Paris Summit", in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 10, (1972), p. 26.

⁵ F. Delmartino (2001), *Profiel van de Europese Unie. Een inleidend handboek*, Leuven, Garant, 47.

⁶ L. Tindemans (1995), "Het Rapport Tindemans twintig jaar later", in *Internationale Spectator*, 49 12, p. 642.

⁷ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Communiqué of the meeting of heads of Government of the Community (Paris, 10/12/1974)", in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12, (1974), pp.7-12.

the Bretton Woods system; and the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. Also politically, there was still a lot of frustration (notably in France) due to the failure of the 'Fouchet-plan'.⁸

Tindemans nevertheless accepted the challenge and gave it a maximalist interpretation; though respecting the limitations set by the Heads of State and Government. As such, the report submitted⁹ did not entail a (federal) constitutional blueprint which would be the right one for Europe in the future. It was not nor a mere summary of the proposals received from the different institutions and civil society actors. Instead, Tindemans advocated a *moderate* and *pragmatic* approach, pointing out the necessary practical commitments feasible in the near future; and essential to make the qualitative step forward towards the 'Union'.¹⁰

Accordingly, taking the input of public opinion on the common future of Europe as a point of departure, the Report advocated a set of policy and institutional prescriptions, essential to safeguard a truly European identity and strengthen Europe's voice in the world.

Tindemans first of all stressed the importance of pursuing a common European foreign policy, able to give a suitable 'common' answer to the following four key challenges, being of fundamental importance in that period of international détente (though not being of less relevance in the current post Cold War world order, as Tindemans pointed himself in an article published twenty years after the presentation of the Report): the new world economic order; relations between Europe and the United States; security; and the crises in the immediate geographical surroundings of Europe.¹¹ The Report provided a legal framework to agree on a common position by majority vote, where necessary, and binding on all the member states. As far as security and defense are concerned, the establishment of a European armaments agency was proposed. Precisely this element, in

⁸ L. Tindemans, *loc. cit.*, p. 642

⁹ The 'Report on the European Union' was published on 29 December 1975. On 2 April 1976, it was presented to the European Council in Luxemburg.

¹⁰ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Statement by Leo Tindemans", in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12, (1975), pp. 5-7; Van De Meerssche, P., (2006), *Internationale Politiek 1815-2005. Deel II: 1945-2005*, Leuven: Acco, 2nd edition, 225-226.

¹¹ L. Tindemans, *loc. cit.*, p. 645 ; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Report on European Union", in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1, (1976), pp. 11-35.

addition to the extension of qualified majority voting, went too far for most member states.¹²

In order to ensure a common front to non-member states, the Report further advocated parallel practical measures which needed to be taken in the Union's internal structure. In this respect, Tindemans emphasized the need to re-establish a political consensus on the development of a common European economic and monetary policy, an objective already set by the States themselves at the Paris Conference of 1972, though without any significant progress so far.

Because of the lack of a general agreement and objective difficulties of certain states to move ahead, the Report explicitly defended that progress should initially be sought between member states which considered themselves in a position to advance further (suggesting to start with those countries who already cooperated in the framework of the so-called 'Snake', a nucleus of monetary stability). Other states would be offered aid and assistance to enable them to gradually catch the others up.¹³ Also this proposal, labeled by observers as a 'Europe with two speeds', was not positively accepted by all member states, the UK in particular.¹⁴

In line with the policy reforms proposed, the Report further underlined the need to strengthen the existing institutional machinery, crucial to prevent a return to intergovernmental cooperation and to handle the qualitative step forward. In Tindemans' words: "The European Community has integrated markets. The European Union must integrate policy".

Reforms were henceforth especially suggested with regard to the European Parliament and the European Council. In accordance with the 'quality' principles of performance, authority, legitimacy and coherence; Tindemans emphasized the need to improve the legislative and controlling powers of the soon-to-be directly elected European Parliament. In his view, the Parliament should share the right of initiative with the Commission; a proposal which was considered as highly controversial. The Parliament should in addition be given a greater say in the Commission's President

¹² L. Tindemans, *loc. cit.*, p.644.

¹³ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Report on European Union", *l.c.*, pp.11-35.

¹⁴ D. Dinan (2004), *Europe Recast. A history of European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 162-163.

appointment. Complementary to a strengthening of the European Parliament, particular attention was given to the European Council. To ensure its authority and efficiency, it should act in accordance to the procedures prescribed by the Treaties (including majority decisions) and consequently indicate the institution entrusted with executing its decisions. After all, according to Tindemans, only the Heads of Government could guarantee the "continuing political momentum needed for the construction of Europe".¹⁵

In order to assert the support of the 'European citizen' towards the entire undertaking, the Report finally encouraged initiatives for the protection of fundamental rights; consumer and environmental protection; and for the extension of freedom of movement in education.

In spite of this deliberately pragmatic and realistic approach, close to the citizen, the Report did not arouse much enthusiasm among the Nine member states at that time.

As Dinan states: "Each member state rejected one or more of Tindemans' key proposals", France and Britain being the most reactionary. We already pointed to the resistance with regard to the extended qualified majority voting, and the proposed differentiated integration. Also the strengthened powers of the European Parliament were not positively welcomed. Although supporting the idea of a 'European Union', the member states were not willing to take any major qualitative step forward, in a time of severe economic and political recession.

While no immediate action was taken after the presentation of the report, a lot of Tindemans' suggestions were nevertheless realized at a later stage, notably with the Single European Act and the Treaty on the European Union. Hence, the Report on the European Union nonetheless provided a valuable point of reference in the path towards the Union.¹⁶

A second key 'act of reflection', of significant importance for the current 'state of affairs' in the Union is the Declaration of Laeken.

¹⁵ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Report on European Union", *l.c.*, pp. 11-35.

¹⁶ D. Dinan, *op. cit.*, 163-164.

1.2. The Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe¹⁷

“Europe at a crossroads”. The opening sentence of the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union (2001) clearly marks the atmosphere in which this document has been written.

The Belgian Presidency, taking over the torch from Sweden in July 2001, came at a crucial moment for the European Union. The suboptimal outcome of the Nice Summit (December 2000) had generated a widespread feeling of malaise in the European arena. The ‘mathematical’ agreement reached, to prepare the Union for the forthcoming enlargement (by introducing a new system of qualified majority voting, a new distribution of seats in the European Parliament, etc.), was generally not considered as sufficient to tackle the core challenges which the ‘widened’ EU would face. Uncertainty remained whether the Union would überhaupt stay manageable; nor was there any clear consensus about the final ‘telos’ where the Union was heading to.¹⁸ The European leaders, assembled in Nice, realized that a wide and deep debate about the EU’s future development was of utmost priority, to counter the general negative attitude of the ‘European citizen’ about the integration project (as e.g. clearly demonstrated by the ever decreasing voter turnout at the European Parliament elections).

To this end, the European Council agreed to attach a ‘Declaration on the Future of the Union’ (Declaration No. 23) to the Treaty of Nice, in which they explicitly requested the coming 2001 Swedish and Belgian Presidencies to encourage wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties, which would form the basis for a new Intergovernmental Conference in 2004.

In concreto, the debate should address four core issues:

- how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.
- the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

¹⁷ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, *The Future of the European Union- Laeken Declaration*, 15/12/2001.

¹⁸ H. Voss, E. Bailleul, *The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 102, 2002, http://www.zei.de/zei_deutsch/propro_neu/fpg_zeic_europeangovernance.htm (WWW).

- a simplification of the Treaties.
- the role of national parliaments in the European architecture.¹⁹

In conformity with the Declaration, in March 2001, Sweden launched the official discussion; but the debate was really pushed forward during the Belgian Presidency.²⁰ As already stated in its Presidency priority note (May 2001), Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was decisive to give a maximalist interpretation of its European mandate (the first sentence of the conclusion being much illustrative: "The Belgian Presidency is ambitious").²¹ One can in this respect point to the political voluntarism of the Prime Minister himself, being determined to break with the until then relatively low profile role of Belgium on the international and European scene. But also external circumstances (11 September attacks) urged the need to critically reflect on the future of the EU. Taking full opportunity of the momentum, G. Verhofstadt didn't want to restrict the debate to the four topics identified in the Declaration on the Future of Europe; but intended to initiate a qualitative different discussion, including more fundamental and symbolic issues.²²

The 'Laeken Declaration', presented at the end of the Belgian Presidency ride (December 2001), describes the main parameters of this debate: i.e. "the agenda (...), the methods to be employed and the timetable".²³

The Laeken Declaration was innovative in many respects. Not at least in terms of the *methods* adopted for the debate. Starting from the acknowledgement that the IGC's proved twice (in Amsterdam and Nice) unable to revise the Treaties as much as deemed necessary; the European Council agreed to 'test' a different approach, in the form of a Convention. This method already demonstrated its efficiency for the setting up of the

¹⁹ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, "Treaty of Nice" in *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C80, 10/3/2001.

²⁰ H. Voss, E. Bailleul, *op. cit.*

²¹ BELGIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, *The Belgian Presidency of the European Union, 1 July-31 December 2001, Priorities Note*, May 2001, <http://www.eu2001.be> (WWW).

²² P. Bursens (2003), "Het Belgische optreden tijdens de Europese Conventie", in *Internationale Spectator*, 57, 9, p.415.

²³ BELGIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, *op. cit.*

Charter of Fundamental Rights. Ideally, by installing a Convention it should be avoided that the discussions would immediately be hijacked by national interests. By including all interested parties (i.e. European Commission, European Parliament, National Parliaments, civil society organizations) on an equal footing in the debate, it should further be guaranteed that the reached outcome would be considered as more democratic and legitimate.

The agreement on the creation of a Convention, which would hold its deliberations in public, is already an enormous breakthrough in itself. Though, the Laeken Declaration itself is of course the result of purely intergovernmental bargaining. Not all member states, the large states (Britain, Spain and France) in particular, were initially so enthusiast about Verhofstadt's activism and the idea of a Convention. Primarily concerned that the institutional issues agreed upon in Nice would be renegotiated again, it was compromised that the Convention would only be a 'preparatory body' for the 2004 IGC, and that the main treaty reforms would remain entirely in hands of the governments. In addition, by applying a strict timetable and introducing a 'cooling-off' period between the end of the Convention and the beginning of the IGC, a second 'safety measure' was incorporated to reduce the potential impact of the Convention, and to ensure the (veto) power of the Heads of States and Government.

A second element in which the Laeken Declaration distinguishes itself, is the *agenda* adopted for the debate (if we can at all name this an 'agenda' *stricto sensu*).

In order to avoid constraining the discussions in a certain direction, the agenda was formulated in a very open and comprehensive way. The Laeken Declaration listed more than fifty questions to be ideally addressed, grouped into one of the four subsections: 'A better division and definition of competence in the European Union', 'Simplification of the Union's instruments'; 'More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union'; and 'Towards a Constitution for European citizens'.

As such, the Laeken Declaration is the most open text ever adopted by the European Council.²⁴ The 'open format' should enable the

²⁴ P. Magette (2005), "In the name of simplification: Coping with constitutional conflicts in the Convention on the Future of Europe", in *European Law Journal*, 11, 4, pp. 434-435.

Convention to start discussions with a 'tabula rasa'.²⁵ Verhofstadt's deliberately vague attitude about its intentions, and the ambiguous formulation of questions on the most contentious issues, made it possible that the Laeken Declaration would be adopted by the most critical member states.²⁶ The subsection titled 'Towards a Constitution for European Citizens' clearly testifies this strategy. The title itself gives a clear indication of the intended finality; the questions listed however are not so unambiguous. The reorganization and simplification of the existing Treaties has to be envisaged; though an adoption of a constitutional text is presented as something for the distant future: "The question *ultimately* arises as to whether this simplification and reorganization might not lead *in the long run* to the adoption of a constitutional text" (emphasis added).²⁷

However, once the Convention on the Future of Europe started its work (on the 1st of March 2002), it soon became clear that a large majority was eager to give an extended interpretation to the Laeken Declaration.²⁸ The future will show if this ambition was mature enough for being successful.

1.3. Does "l'histoire se répète"?

The qualification 'period of reflection', as announced by the European leaders last June 2005, should be cautiously interpreted, and put in a right perspective. Having focused on two earlier 'points of reflection' on the European integration timeline, we wanted to 'nuance' the novelty of the present constitutional discourse and to underline the dynamic and ongoing character of the reflection period.

Without going so far as to argue on the aptitude of 'path dependency theories' in this discussion, it should nevertheless be clear that the CT, currently pending for ratification, would definitely not exist in its

²⁵ P. Bursens, *ocl. cit.*, p. 416.

²⁶ P. Maignette, *loc. cit.*, p. 434.

²⁷ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, *The Future of the European Union- Laeken Declaration*, 15/12/2001, *o.c.*; P. NORMAN, *The Accidental Constitution. The Story of the European Convention*, Brussel, EuroComment, 2003, pp. 22-23.

²⁸ P. Maignette, *loc. cit.*, p.435.

present form without previous 'manifestos' presented in the course of European history, all calling for a more qualitative discussion on the future of the Union. As can be concluded from the presentation of the Tindemans Report and the Declaration of Laeken, one should not underestimate the importance of individual leadership in this respect. Though difficult to compare, also the pragmatic approach characterizing both initiatives, proved probably one of the determining factors, explaining their success (be it in the long run in case of the Tindemans report).

2. The name of the game.

At first sight, one could wonder why the EU's reflection on its very *nature* is such a laborious exercise. Is there any other international organization that spends that much time and energy questioning its 'finalité politique'? If only the debates could corroborate the common understanding of the project, the attention given to 'constitutional' issues would be fully legitimate. However, neither after the Laeken declaration, nor even after the signing of the Constitutional Treaty by all member states, a full consensus has been reached.

In the public debate preceding the ratification of the CT, either via the national parliaments or via referendum, the signatories have interpreted this agreement in different ways. Instead of assuming their role of exegetes of the Treaty they have signed, some of them played the political card of eurominimalism or even euroscepticism when dominant on the home front. Why are European 'elites', belonging to the inner circle of decision-making, so double-headed: eager, on the one hand to find a consensus in Brussels, and, on the other hand, reflecting the main trend of public opinion in their capital cities?

In our view, a decisive element in explaining such ambivalent behaviour has to do with the deficient conceptual framework regarding the institutional *formula* defining the Union. Despite all efforts, especially of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht), the recent Convention and the CT itself, the key concepts are open to a huge variety of interpretations. Actually, nobody should be blamed for this lack of consistency. The experience of European integration is without precedent and this unique

endeavour at sharing sovereignty among member states has given rise to a very particular set of institutions that can hardly be compared to traditional models.

The EU is indeed a 'sui generis' creation, not fully comparable to whatever international organization and certainly not to a nation state. Everybody agrees that the EU is *not* a state. It is rather a *polity*, however difficult to qualify. Nevertheless, right from the start of the European Communities, efforts have been made towards theorizing about the process. Political scientists have elaborated on the factors explaining the willingness to cooperate and even to integrate after decades (if not centuries) of antagonism. Politicians and academics, alike have focused their attention on 'the name of the game'.²⁹

For many of the founding fathers, to start with Robert Schuman himself in his famous 9th of May 1950 Declaration, the ultimate aim was a kind of European federation, i.e. a solid and stable institutional arrangement among states taking collective responsibility in certain policy fields. This *federal idea* was a very general one, mobilizing a significant part of the political class and of civil society. The slogan "United States of Europe" has been launched by Winston Churchill in 1946, although at that time no longer in government.³⁰ However, as soon as the *federalist movement* made the crucial choice of a particular institutional model, the consensus broke down. The General Assembly of all European Federalists in The Hague (May, 1948) was most disappointing in this regard. As an architect of the European Coal-and Steel Community, Jean Monnet therefore did not refer to any particular state theory as a model.

The Communities proved to be successful without an explicit reference to any 'finalité politique'. One could even say that the mere questioning of the formula was considered 'not done' within the system. It was left to activists from the federal movement and to academics. The Tindemans report can be seen as a remarkable exception to that rule, exactly as the Spinelli revolt in the European Parliament (1984) proposing a draft constitution. The 'system' took notice but did not alter its preference for 'business as usual'.

²⁹ An overview of all theorizing efforts can be found in: B. Rosamond, (2000), *Theories of European Integration*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 232p.

³⁰ Speech delivered at the University of Zürich on 19 September 1946.

Nevertheless, the teaching on the EU at universities and advanced training colleges, such as the College of Europe in Bruges, was mainly in the hands of 'believers' in the federal destiny of the integration process. Even scientific historiography had a federal bias, as Desmond Dinan is arguing in his latest work.³¹ The elites in the core countries of the EU were exposed to a scheme of interpretation that did not fully coincide with the realities on the policy-making scene.

The Intergovernmental Conference preparing the Treaty on European Integration (1990-1991) was offering a new opportunity for a fundamental turn into the 'politicisation' of the mainly economic-oriented project, thus bridging the gap between the single market and the 'finalité politique'. Most leaders were indeed prepared to a major 'constitutional shift': a dramatic extension of the policy horizon, a new role for the European Parliament, more qualified majority voting among themselves, the introduction of the concept of citizenship, and, rather symbolically, a new name for the common project: *Union* instead of *Community*. However, mainly due to British resistance, no consensus could be reached on the federal character of the newly-born Union. The principle of *subsidiarity* was introduced instead of a federal-type catalogue of competences, and both Berlin and London claimed this innovation as a breakthrough of their views on, respectively, a reinforcement or a toning down of 'Brussels'.

In exposing his views on the future of Europe, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, was the last prominent leader explicitly claiming federalism as the guiding constitutional model for Europe.³² This time, not only the British government, but quite some member states in Northern and Southern Europe were not prepared to share that view. The German federal government and especially the German Länder had to give up their quest for a specific state philosophy, turning their efforts towards a federal-type competence delimitation in the oncoming Constitutional Treaty.

Paradoxically enough, despite reluctance to confess to a particular state model, the member states in 2004 agreed on a 'Constitution', be it that its article 1 simply states that member states "confer competences upon the

³¹ D. Dinan (2006), *Origins and Evolution of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 297 and ff.

³² Speech delivered at the Humboldt University, Berlin on 12 May 2000.

Union to attain objectives they have in common". Any mentioning of or reference to the very *nature* of this 'Union' is carefully left out.

One should thus not be surprised that this constitutional charter is 'read' in different ways. To some, this EU with its constitutionally enshrined objectives, values, structures and policies, is the anticipated European polity, an ever closer Union on its way to become one day a kind of 'United States of Europe' as the Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt put it.³³ Others, not only in the peripheral or new member states, are stressing that actually not too many innovations have been introduced in terms of policies. So, the CT is rather seen as a cosmetic operation, loaded with symbolism, but with limited impact on the functioning of the institutions.

The citizens, however, called to express their agreement with the CT, have taken the opportunity for sending a signal to the signatories. Having no part in the 'inner circle' political culture of European leaders who can 'live' with conceptual ambiguities, a significant number of citizens has rejected (or intended to reject) the draft constitution. Most of them perceive the EU as a threat to national identity and sovereignty. In their eyes 'Brussels' represents a bureaucracy that infringes on the achievements of national welfare systems and cannot submit clear results in policy fields that really matter, such as employment or security.³⁴ In other words: the output legitimacy of the Union is questioned.

As mentioned above, among a variety of factors, the unclear mission statement of the EU should be blamed for the current crisis of democratic legitimacy. Due to the inconsistency in the views of the leaders, no coherent picture on what the EU is all about can be presented to the general public. As a result, the credibility of the project is fatally undermined.

Is this conceptual inconsistency congenitally determined? Is there, in other words, no way out from the 'impasse' that since decades is affecting the Union? In our view, politicians and academics should cope with the present democratic deficit by giving up for a while their stubborn preference for a particular institutional model that does not reflect the realities of the day but rather refers to the state form they are familiar with.

³³ G. Verhofstadt (2005), *De Verenigde Staten van Europa. Manifest voor een nieuw Europa*, Antwerpen, Houtekiet, 92p. This manifesto is now available in all vehicular languages.

³⁴ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, *Standard Eurobarometer no. 63*, Spring 2005, Brussels, 2005.

In their eyes, the European construction should mirror the national political traditions they are attached to. One can indeed observe some *state analogy* in the way issues as leadership, transparency, accountability, democratic legitimation and many other structures and values are approached. By doing so, expectations are created the EU cannot meet at all.

Without fully adhering to the views of Domenico Majone or Andrew Moravcik on the non-existence of a democratic deficit, one should not underestimate the impact of reflecting in terms of state analogy when discussing EU affairs.³⁵

Why not assess the EU on its own merits, elaborating on its achievements and deficiencies, on the policies that benefit to all (or most) people and to the sectors or dimensions that have been neglected? A transparent account on de facto-objectives, on the functioning of the institutions as well as on the successes and the setbacks, would probably be more credible and attractive to citizens than suddenly being confronted with an ambitious charter that rather raises questions and even hesitations instead of mobilizing support.

Therefore, in the present situation, there is an urgent need of developing a *paradigm* on what the EU is actually performing, before developing a theoretical discourse on its teleological dimension. In the next paragraph building blocks for such paradigm are presented by qualifying the EU as a system of multi-level governance that proceeds via federal-type arrangements.

3. The EU as a system of multi-level governance

If one observes the EU from some critical distance, with an open eye for the actors and the system, the power games and the policy outcomes, the overall picture is much broader and more colourful than the Treaties would suggest. As in most political systems, the legal framework primarily sets limits and fixes procedures: competence delimitations and 'rules of the game' to be observed.

³⁵ For a discussion of these issues, we refer to: S. Hix (2005), *The political system of the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, second edition, 516p.

Within this arena for policy-making new ideas flourish and become objectives. Political dynamics are convincing actors to develop new policies at the edge of national interest and collective benefit. We have already quoted William Wallace qualifying the EU very correctly as 'a system of governance without statehood'.³⁶ If the EU is indeed, properly speaking, not a state, its decision-making processes are genuinely political and its decisions legally binding.

The actors involved in this process are of a great variety. The member states are omnipresent, not only at the tri-monthly European Council's 'grand-messe' and the frequent Council of Ministers' meetings, but first and foremost at the Permanent Representatives' headquarters with their expert knowledge and bargaining capacities. The European Parliament, on the other hand, has shown its determination in rejecting or amending directives or budgetary proposals that it judges inappropriate, thus highlighting the increased powers it was given in recent years.

The most emblematic institution, however, is still the European Commission. No longer the 'chef de file' it was in the Delors period (1985-1995), sometimes confronted with a legitimacy and credibility deficit, it functions nevertheless at the focal centre of the policy-making process. Governance is indeed more than a power game. The terms of the debate are taking shape, the expertise is located, the 'dossier' is constituted at the crossroads of the institutional actors just mentioned and numerous informal actors representing interest groups and, ultimately, civil society. The *White Paper on Governance*, issued by the Commission in 2001, explicitly refers to this type of interactions as a guarantee for efficient and effective policy-making.³⁷

Next to the variety of actors in the Brussels-Luxembourg-Strasbourg arena, it should be acknowledged that no policy of any complexity is dealt with at the EU-level only. In a *globalizing* world, the *continental* (in casu: European) level constitutes for sure a crucial tier of governance in many fields, however, next to the *national*, sometimes *regional* and in any case *local* ones. Issues as energy, for instance, the hot topic on the March 2006

³⁶ H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. A. Pollack (eds.), *op .cit.*, p. 482 and ff.

³⁷ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "*European Governance. A White Paper*", COM (2001), 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001.

European summit, illustrate the point. The core question is not the one of *delimitation of competences* but of *convergence of strategies*. In other words, the EU should not become the master of the game, but is well positioned for the role of a *broker*. It has the size for being recognized as a global player and has the know-how and the legitimacy for being accepted as a fair representative of public and private interests. The concept of multi-level governance refers exactly to both horizontal and vertical dimensions of coordination.

This paradigm, therefore, reflects a reality most political-, business- and societal elites are actively involved in. They have understood their interest in joining policy networks that compensate for the rather small size of most players. Thanks to the EU, their voice has world-wide to be taken into account. It is not by coincidence that all European countries, Russia and Belarus excepted, but including the non-member states, are actively involved in all or some common strategies. In other words: the EU offers unique opportunities to member- or associated member states, rather than being a super-state in itself.

The problem arises when this practice of 'shared sovereignty' has to be communicated to citizens.

First, the degree of policy integration varies considerably. Monetary affairs in the eurozone have been fully integrated, as was the external representation in foreign trade affairs. But in most fields the competences are *shared*, let alone the cases where the EU is mainly coordinating or supporting national efforts. It's a difficult message to pass, especially since some minor policy fields sometimes attract major attention, student mobility, for example. In the worst case scenario, the EU is blamed for not taking action in fields where it has no competences at all...

Secondly, and even more importantly, referring to a federal vocabulary for expressing these shared responsibilities, unfortunately evokes a federal practice that is not European at all. The USA has evolved into a highly integrated federation in which all major policy decisions are centrally taken. The U.S. experience has, for sure, its own merits, but is definitely not a model for the European integration process.

How to characterize and to visualize then an institutional model uniting national identity and common European interest into a dynamic equilibrium? All European states are indeed involved in a balancing act

between national political systems and a “collective political system”.³⁸ The perfect design has not been invented yet, but a series of concentric circles comes close to the reality of a system of multi-level governance.

What could be the institutional characteristics of this paradigm? How can the balance between all actors involved be guaranteed? Paradoxically enough, the institutional *practice* of well developed federal states offers the crucial rules of the game. Federal-type arrangements are solidly built on a clear division of tasks, not that much allocating an entire policy field to a single actor, but distinguishing between *functions*. Which level, for instance, gets responsibility for establishing the problem definition (“What is an endangered species?”), for setting and assessing the quality standards, for precisising the rules of operation, for financing the efforts, for implementing this policy in a concrete situation?

Depending on the issue, the operational aspects can greatly vary, but one can clearly notice an emerging space in Europe for social and economic strategic decisions, whereas the welfare state models are still national and the implementation is primarily local. The success of a policy - food safety, for instance- will greatly depend on the way the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of policy-making will be interacting. Centralistic planning models have clearly failed, but we are still lacking well-established alternative models. The federal-type arrangements offer the advantage of stressing an *integrated* approach, including all levels of governance in a single endeavour. On the other hand, they avoid the temptation of a hierarchic interference from the ‘centre’, since they are based on the legally supported respect for the specific role each level has to play.

In his well known treatise on federalism, Daniel Elazar has specified that “federalising involves both the creation and maintenance of unity and the diffusion of power in the name of diversity”.³⁹ Federal-type arrangements start from the assumption that the social, economic and political reality is diverse and that power should be spread over all actors in society on all relevant levels of governance. But collective action should be as well coherent and consistent if it wants to be effective. “Unity in

³⁸ H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. A. Pollack (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 482 and ff.

³⁹ D. Elazar (1987), *Exploring Federalism*, Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, p. 64.

diversity” happens to be the motto of the EU, as introduced by the Constitutional Treaty.⁴⁰

Since, for historical reasons, classical federalism is not appealing to the European Union as a whole, we would like to advocate a less ideologically sensitive conceptual framework for characterizing the functioning of the Union’s policy-making. Federal-type arrangements are by no means an anticipation on a desired ‘finalité politique’, but a set of legal principles and quality standards, framing the paradigm of multi-level governance in the European context.⁴¹

4. The ongoing constitutional debate

By way of conclusion, we would like to suggest a new understanding of the constitutional challenge, and, consequently, a new approach of the present-day impasse.

First, it is important that the European elites, both the national leaders and the Brussels-based technocrats, should provide the European citizens with a clear picture of their understanding of the key role the EU is playing in safeguarding and promoting national and continental interests. The communication strategy, launched by the European Commission, should not only stimulate citizens and NGO’s to express their views. A real debate should be based on a *mission statement* presented by the ‘leadership’ in Europe as a stepping stone for open discussion.

Based on the convergence among Europeans, europhiles and eurosceptics alike, on the ‘core business’ of the EU, the aims, values and basic institutional arrangements could be entrenched in a *charter*, that, per definition, will be of a constitutional nature since it solemnly fixes the ‘rules of the game’. However, one should avoid all resistance merely resulting from the terminology used. If the notion ‘constitution’, exactly as what happened with the concept of ‘federalism’, is dividing people (or even peoples) rather than uniting them, such symbolism should not jeopardize the overall exercise.

⁴⁰ EUROPEAN COUNCIL, “*Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*”, Article I, 8.

⁴¹ For a present-day overview of the debate on ‘Multi-level governance’, see the work of I. Bache and M. Flinders (2004), *Multi-level governance*, Oxford University Press, 237p.

The elaboration of a basic charter is crucial indeed, both for the purpose of clarification vis-à-vis the outside world as for the understanding of the common endeavour within the Union. Actually, in our view, not so much should be altered in the wording of parts I and II of the present Constitutional Treaty. But these articles, i.e. their *message*, should be understood in reference to the mission statement that was mentioned as a first step in the exercise of clarification of the minds.

The third part of the Constitutional Treaty is, of course, essential in legal terms but indigestible for the general public. This is no constitutional charter at all, but a status quaestionis of the existing arrangements. This synthesis of the *acquis communautaire* and overview of intergovernmental compromises is, per definition, subject to review and amendment as soon as there is evolution in the policy context or in the power positions. Therefore, part III should keep its status as a *treaty*, not as a constitutional text.

Perhaps, somewhere in the future, the 'crise grave' of 2005 will be qualified by historians as a moment of fundamental change in approaching the basic arrangements within the EU. For the first time the general public, not of *one* member state but of *most* member states, has expressed its rejection of a formula of *consultation* once the fundamental *decision* has already been taken by the political elites.

We can no longer go on with this dichotomy between decision-makers and general public. The future of the European construction lies in the hands of all actors involved, including the citizens. This public opinion should become an informed and active partner, very much in line of what a democratic process is ought to be.

The aims of the current constitutional debate should therefore reach beyond the 'yes' or 'no' to the signed Constitutional Treaty. This constitution, however valuable as a decisive step in the self-definition of the integration process, is only the crystallization of the institutional balance in the first decennium of the 21st century. New challenges will arise in the coming years and new arrangements will have to be negotiated, shaping a new profile for the Union. So, we should be prepared for a never ending constitutional dialogue, exactly as the first half a century of European integration has taught us.

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NEW AND OLD FRONTIERS OF EUROPE - RHETORIC OF EMOTION IN THE MEDIA

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Abstract

Fear or enjoyment?

This paper proposes a comparing analysis of French, German and Romanian media and their discourses concerning the European integration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

*How does the printing press present the integration of these countries? Referring to the period of October 2005, this study will base its interest on the different levels of fear and enjoyment appearing in the national media discourses. A discourse analysis of *Le Monde*, *Die Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Ziua* reveals several ways of speaking about the integration and points out, at the same time, various stereotypes of emotions like fear, enjoyment, ignorance and confidence which close and open mental frontiers in Europe.*

The present article proposes a comparative analysis of French, German and Romanian journals and their discourses concerning European integration. How does the press - we focus on *Le Monde*, *Die Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and *Ziua* - present the incorporation process of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey? We concentrate on the media coverage of October 2005, period of the latest European Commission report. Certainly, our analysis - including only one paper per country - has its limitations, but our aim in this study is not to judge editorial implications, but to reveal emotional implications and stereotypes via discursive constructions. Our study is framed by several theoretical premises, primarily based on discourse analysis and semiotics, and will integrate and discuss fundamental conceptions of stereotypes and emotion.

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“The pictures in our heads” – stereotypes and emotion as mental frontiers

The first chapter of Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* (1965), entitled “The world outside and the pictures in our heads”, reflects up on our perceptions and on the intermediary factors that create a feeling of knowing what is going on in the world. Illustrating his ideas by referring to the First World War, Lippman’s proposal remains up to date:

The symbols of public opinion, in times of moderate security, are subject to check and comparison and argument. They come and go, coalesce and are forgotten, never organizing perfectly the emotion of the whole group. (Lippmann, 1965, p. 8)

According to Lippmann, symbols of public opinion are incarnated by political persons, important events or they concern the picture of the other (Lippmann, 1965). As Lippmann emphasises, they can never entirely correspond to the emotion of one group, so we can conclude, due to their instability or their submerging and emerging, that these symbols are employed in moments of crisis or stability. In other words, there has to be a media or an institution creating and recreating these symbols; symbols that are potentially always present, but which need to be refreshed by an act of selection, often linked with a special national or international event.

The semiotic and logic work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1978) reflects this point in a more general way. His conception of *firstness*, *secondness* and *thirdness*, the theoretical foundation of his sign-theory, can be transferred to our approach. *Firstness*, the state of potential, emotion or quality, coexists beside our world of representation. If *firstness* enters the world of experience, *secondness*, emotion or qualities are shaped by the rules and the act of differentiation between one quality and another. This level corresponds to the idea of *thirdness*.

The potential adhesion of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union, an unfulfilled and not realised act, creates emotions - and those are, as we will point out, represented by rhetorical and symbolic medial constructions. Consequently, we find ourselves in a situation where

the experience stays a potential, an experience which has begun, but which is not in the state of being completely actualised. This might be the general condition for all (media) events. Always being in transition, but waiting for the integration, creates an atmosphere of complex and insecure emotion. This is the difficulty of the actual situation that is on the one hand dominated by a potential, and on the other hand ruled by differentiation. The potential state, in our context the one which is created by the media of print journalism, becomes a field of unknown experience for the newly applying as well as for the member countries.

Besides travelling and interpersonal communication, our means of experiencing the potential integration are, mostly dominated by media coverage. The pictures of the world that we have in our heads are rarely due to personal and corporal experiences of the events themselves, but emotions and feelings can occur when we see an accident on television or when a friend speaks about the birth of his child. Lippman (1965, p. 11) describes this in an explicit way:

For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in this environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.

Obviously, for the simple reasons of space and time, we cannot be everywhere in the world at the same time, not even in the era of the Internet. We learn things about the world via personal perception, communication with others and via media that plays an important role in our society, the so-called society of information or communication. Our actual social systems are not only characterised by this omnipresence of communication, but also by emotion, becoming a significant factor for (media) events. Wars and world conflicts can transmit feelings of fear, sadness, anger or helplessness; the victory of a football team can provoke enjoyment, ecstasy and tears of joy. These kinds of events are often punctual, explicit, and of nation- or world-wide importance, meanwhile the emotion which is linked to the European integration of the named

countries is less evident or less articulated and is often hidden behind incrustated clichés and stereotypes, which, of course, also exist for more *visible* events. Stereotypes and clichés are especially dangerous or delicate when they appear in a non-experienced situation, because we can not confirm or reject them; we do not know if the stereotyped version of a country or people would correspond to our own experience. We are therefore often dependent upon our intermediary, able to criticise and to challenge the pictures we get, but finally at the mercy of a version of the other that is constructed by our culture.

In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that what we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture. (Lippmann, 1965, p. 55)

We will not dare to define the notion of culture here, but replacing this term by an aspect of it, we mean media, it becomes evident that most stereotypes, shaped by culture, are reinforced by media discourse. Most of our comprehension of the world is associated with discourses. These can concern films, texts or pictures: an enunciation taking place and talking to us about the world. As spectators or lectors we decode and reconstruct these discourses with the help of our linguistic and culture skills, including stereotypes and clichés, which are sometimes helpful to guide our orientation. If I look at a picture and I see a man wearing leather pants and drinking beer in front of a mountain range, I might connote, due to the different signifiers, due to the “trait which marks a well known type” (Lippmann, 1965, p. 59), that I see a typical German man in front of the German Alps. Even if I saw him myself in Germany, I would simply recognise a part of this country. Furthermore, concerning this picture, it could also be a Swedish man who is posing for an advertisement in a studio in Tokyo. Important to underline is the fact that the real experience or the image of it does not present the main problematic in our context. The feeling I have of this stereotype is significant and also the fact that I automatically think of it. Why do I connote this and not that? How does the press (re)construct stereotypes and why are emotions linked with them?

Bird flu and information flow

In October 2005, the printing press is predominantly concerned with the contemporary issue of the “bird flu”. The H5N1, a danger, first detected in Asia, is now invading Turkey and Romania. This new chapter of the European Crisis points out the major difficulties of the European enlargement, and constitutes a new kind of fear dominating the European countries and people starting with that month (October 2005). Of course, Roma, corruption and the instability of Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish economies are omnipresent in the media discourses, but the bird flu invasion comes from the East and might pass geographical frontiers. This discursive perspective is privileged in this period and it marks a new mental frontier in the European Union. By the end of October, bird flu cases are detected in the European Union countries and this moment presents a turning point in the media discourse. For this reason, on October 27, *Ziua* newspaper presents an analysis revealing important information concerning the European integration of Romania: bird flu does not affect the countries potential adhesion to the EU.

This media analysis is important, because two days earlier, the European Commission had published the last report concerning the progress of Bulgaria and Romania after the signature of the Adhesion Treaty in April 2005. This report of the European Union restarts and accelerates the functions of the European stereotypes concerning Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. In *le Monde* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the old issues (economy, corruption, agriculture, justice etc.) are represented in another way; it appeared that the duo Bulgaria – Romania forms one single country, a poor one, where old peasants forced themselves to understand the institutional activity of a superior entity, the EU.

The case of Turkey is dissimilar and involves other series of stereotypes, such as the cultural and the religious differences. The German and the French press, both countries often described as the traditional couple of Europe, enunciates similar subjects and reveals a sort of a homogeneous discourse concerning Bulgaria and Romania, but the “Turkey question”, which is due to the historical past of Turkish people in Germany, is treated in a special way by the German press. The French,

Romanian and German newspapers have their own way to construct ideas concerning the integration, sometimes sharing opinions and sometimes disagreeing for reasons we will analyse.

***Le Monde* and the Romanian public opinion**

The European Union subject and the question of the integration of Romania and Bulgaria dominates the French press in the period of October 2005 and is characterised by one important item: *the warning*¹. The journalist seems to be a passive actor who presents the demands of the European Commission and copying its vocabulary: *serious efforts, to ameliorate, protection, immediate actions (le Monde)*. There are no other additional comments; things appear so clearly that an entire report concerning the adhesion of the two problematic countries from the East is summarised in a few lines. In contrast to this minor discussion about the EU integration, the bird flu is of paramount importance. Referring to *le Monde*, the frequency of the October articles talking about Bulgaria and Romania shows that 93% of these articles are concerned with the bird flu issue, 6% with the integration process and 3% speak about the Romanian prime minister's visit to Paris. The final report of the EU concerning Bulgaria and Romania is presented in the single article quoted before.

Starting with October 13, "tests confirm bird flu in Romania". This topic does not include Bulgaria, having disappeared in the media discourse until October 27. This element marks a new phase of the crisis' representation in France concerning the Romanian case: one country from

¹ "La Commission avertit Sofia et Bucarest", *le Monde*, 27.10.2005: "Si elles veulent entrer dans l'Union à la date prévue, c'est-à-dire le 1er janvier 2007, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie ont encore de sérieux efforts à faire pour améliorer la sécurité alimentaire, la gestion des fonds communautaires, la lutte contre la corruption et la protection des frontières extérieures. Tel est l'avertissement lancé à ces deux pays par la Commission européenne dans ses rapports sur l'état d'avancement de leurs préparatifs publiés mardi 25 octobre. Au cas où des actions immédiates ne seraient pas entreprises, leur adhésion effective pourrait être reportée d'un an. Les rapports soulignent que la Bulgarie et la Roumanie satisfont, pour l'essentiel, aux critères politiques (Etat de droit) et économiques (économie de marché viable), mais invitent les deux pays à redoubler d'efforts dans la transposition des législations communautaires. Leur situation fera l'objet d'un nouvel examen en avril-mai 2006."

the initial duo (Bulgaria) was replaced by Turkey, leading to the apparition of another perspective, the Evil (the bird flu menace) came from the East and the East was equated with Romania and Turkey. This becomes another argument for the non-acceptance of the two countries into the European Union, a non-explicit argument, but an evident one being linked with the emotion of fear.

As regards the integration main theme, we can easily recognise the case study-style of Mirel Bran, the correspondent of *le Monde* in Romania. The basis² of his article is the portrait of the Romanians, a sort of reality effect of the transition period giving the impression of an exhaustive exam that confirmed the quotidian difficulties of the Romanian society. For example, an article published on October 27, stresses Romania's social incapacity to accomplish the European integration's requirements. The theme of the article evolves around the new land property legislation that concerns 38% of the population in Romania (the rural inhabitants) and that would allow the economic integration of Romania.

Les paysans âgés sont incités à vendre leur terre. "Nous devons tout reconstruire avant que notre pays soit intégré à l'Union". L'homme se penche sur une liasse de papiers, remplis d'annotations : la loi sur les terres agricoles. Il a 73 ans et peine à intégrer les subtilités d'un texte dont le but est de lui rendre justice, seize ans après la chute du régime communiste roumain. Dans sa maison de Lunguletu, petit village situé à une cinquantaine de kilomètres au nord de Bucarest, Matei Barbu s'efforce de comprendre les nouvelles règles qui gèrent la propriété foncière et qui concernent 38 % des 22 millions de Roumains vivant en milieu rural. (*Le Monde*, 27.10.2005)

² This perspective is given by Mirel Bran. A better example is the presentation of Bush's visit to Bucharest in November 2002, that explains an editorial choice and, at the same time, the social representation of a legend: the American myth existing in Romania since the Second World War: the President of the United States is finally coming to Romania and confirms the acceptance of the country in the NATO structure. But the article's approach uses the portrait of the Romanian society as a pretext in order to clarify the impact of the American legend. In this case, the journalist is using the portrait in order to amplify the "bad" image of the country that made some social and political efforts for the European integration, without having a real political, social and historical chance to do that.

A clear interest for the subject of the European integration of Romania was, in this case, linked with fear. People feel both excitement and threat, but they do not lose their great expectations related to their country's integration. And even if it is difficult to understand the whole implications of the adhesion, everyone in the Romanian villages tries to accept and to assimilate in his own way the costs and the risks of this integration process. But, there was another picture remaining in the reader's mind: an old mentality of an aged people trying in vain to assimilate and comprehend a legislative text that contains all the specific demands of the European Union. Such an image seemed to be stressed from the first paragraph: the example of Matei Barbu is considered as representative for 38% of the Romanian nation.

Is there enjoyment or is there fear concerning the integration of the mentioned countries? This is one of the major questions of this communication. At the same time, this analysis reveals another fundamental interrogation: what about fear or ignorance in the French printing press concerning the new campaign of enlargement? Of course, we can advance a preliminary hypothesis, which confirms the choice of the fear perspective dominating the European citizens: fear of losing their jobs, fear of being "invaded" by the poor, uncivilised and communist people from the East. We can also discuss the media coverage of the phases in the Bulgarian and Romanian assimilation of the integration process as an important part of their future European lives. As the integration comes closer, people have started to ask themselves about the consequences and the real costs of the adhesion. For these reasons we can differentiate two important phases of the emotional assimilation of this new reality: the first one concerns the enjoyment, which coincides with a positive attitude consisting in regarding the European integration as an adventure, a distant and unknown experience (*firstness*); the second one underlines the current reality (*secondness*) – the fear of starting another period of uncertainty, another transition, that seems an endless one. For the purpose of our study we consider that it is very important to offer a pertinent explanation concerning this kind of fear. We allude to the popular emotion transforming and becoming expression of a general feeling such as inconvenience regarding the implications of the European integration. Romanians sincerely express their popular emotions, which for the

journalist remains the most worthy and representative element indicating public opinion³. The relevance of the journalist's credibility explains the expression of the popular emotion.

Is it fear or ignorance in the case of the media discourse of *le Monde*? Ignorance could explain the lack of reference to the European integration for the duo Bulgaria/Romania and even for their homogenisation as a couple. The European crisis does not allow the assimilation of the information regarding a new enlargement. That might be one of the reasons for this scarcity in the media's agenda. At the same time, there is excessive media coverage of the bird flu menace and this fact confirms the crisis context. People need to hear and read about that type of information, which corresponds to their social context. This reality becomes the most important criteria of the media's selection. The fear is exclusively linked with the bird flu and there is no other explicit reference to the European fear of integrating Bulgaria and Romania.

The current stereotypes in Europe concerning the possibility of integrating Romania into the EU are reiterated when the Romanian prime minister comes to Paris on October 6. The same day one article is published in the hard-copy paper and two others are registered on the Internet site of *le Monde*. One cannot speak about Romania without remembering Bulgaria. The first article, integrated in the rubric of *Europe* is an intermediate media study about the imminence of the European Commission's report state October 25. Some problematic chapters of the communitarian *acquis*, such as the justice reform, the concurrence, the sanitary rules and the environment are recalled in this article. The third one refers to another difficult problem: corruption. For us it is important to point out the fact that the real reason of this visit was the ratification of the Adhesion Treaty by the French Parliament. Calin Popescu Tariceanu came to Paris in order to show the progress registered by the Romanian government regarding a possible European integration for January 2007. The Internet edition of *le*

³ A study made by the SfK Society from Nuremberg in 2004 reveals that from a panel of 19 European countries and US, the index of trust accorded to the journalist by the public opinion the Romanian case can be considered as the most relevant from the statistical point of view (69/100). Cf. "Jurnaliștii din România - cea mai ridicată credibilitate", in *Adevărul*, 11.08.2004.

Monde presents an article confirming our first presupposition, the first possibility stressed above:

Calin Tariceanu tentera de convaincre les parlementaires de voter le traité d'adhésion, ratifié jusqu'ici par trois pays. (...) Après une rencontre avec Dominique de Villepin, le chef du gouvernement roumain prononcera un discours devant le Parlement français pour convaincre les députés et les sénateurs de voter le traité d'adhésion à l'Union européenne (UE), signé au Luxembourg le 25 avril, avant la fin de cette année. (*Le Monde*, 2.04.2006)

Bulgaria and Romania and the European Union – tasks and emotions

The articles about Romania and Bulgaria as potential members of the EU are rare in the German press and for this reason we refer to the period covering June 2005 until March 2006.

In the German press one can notice the same predominance of the “bird flu” issue. In a certain way, the European preoccupation and the fear of the virus indicates a profound problem: the lack of a real and a public reflection concerning the integration of the two countries. The link with the European discourse is not of an obvious type, one can not identify structured arguments that revealed “bird flu” as a danger for the EU, but this danger, which came out of the East, represents an indirect way to integrate Romania in a negative sense. Alongside this “bird flu” problem there are recurrent issues that mark the German discourse; those being similar to the subjects identified in the *le Monde*.

First of all it is important to underline the special lexical use of a *trial vocabulary*. The commissions’ report is presented as a *sine qua non* condition, being more one of a critical type than an indulgent one. We can notice the existence of a relationship of *giving* and *demanding*, remembering the *symbolic exchange* pronounced by Jean Baudrillard (1976). If the two candidate countries fulfilled the European demands, the EU would validate their efforts. Romania and Bulgaria seem to follow the European guidelines, especially regarding their rhetoric. Tariceanu (*FAZ*, 26.10.2005) describes the report of the commission as an “objective one” and

underlines the Romanian motivation concerning the fight against corruption, as well “zero tolerance” relating to the misuse of power. Meanwhile, the commissions’ report, underlining the progress of Romania and Bulgaria, criticises the lack of severe reforms and demands *the construction of effective official administrations, the protection of the boarders and the fight against corruption*.

At the same time, the press never gives details, as seen in *le Monde*, which could show a progress or a more considered opinion linked with the general issue of corruption. The silence around “simple” facts transposes the problem at a level of clichés and stereotypes. If you think about Romania and Bulgaria you will not find cultural aspects or profound arguments in the press, aside from romantic travel notes or diaries dealing with matters of tourism (*FAZ*, 23.06.2005). The information factor dominates the discourse and simplifies the conclusions one could extract from media about the demanding countries.

The positive aspects are always linked to the economy and are formulated by expressions like “impressive progress on the economical level”. (*FAZ*, 22.08.2005) Those statements are not marginal and lead finally to remarks referring to the European interest, “German companies glance at the European neighbours”.

On the other hand, in Germany and in France, the negative connotation of corruption and Mafia crimes becomes the major subject in the media discourse. In almost all analysed articles we can observe this preoccupation. Old pictures, the Italian Mafia ones, emerge, not only as a potential connotation belonging to the recipient reading words like “corruption”, but even as a signifier and as a rhetoric link to the corruption problems in Romania and Bulgaria. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* remembers the operation *Mani pulite* of the nineties in Italy (*FAZ*, 11.03.2006) and proposes, in a subtle way, a European comparison: Romania is verbally connected with Italy and that shows a sort of “European amalgam”. Romania enters into an argumentative comparison with Europe, but at the same time this rapprochement is a pejorative one, because most people are not really pleased with their past, neither Italy with the Mafia, nor Germany with the terrorism problem in the seventies.

Secondly, and related to the previous remarks, the presentation of emotion is hidden in the discourse as a silent and almost invisible element of rhetoric. Taking into account the evoked positive and negative points represented by the German and the French press, we can discover different levels of emotion.

Behind the obvious enunciated emotion of the German press, terms like *scepticism* and *doubts* appear in almost every article. On that basis, one can extract three types of fear, expressed by the Romanian and Bulgarian government via citation in the German press, as well as a national and a European fear expressed by German journalists. The first one concerns Bulgaria and Romania, represented mainly as a homogeneous couple in the press, whose fear concerns the eventual new deadline of their entry in the European Union⁴. The reason for this fear is that a delayed entry could provoke *anger* in Romanian public opinion (FAZ, 24.03.2006).

An article in the FAZ, was supposed to reject common Romanian stereotypes. It describes the German fears of "being invaded" (FAZ, 30.10.2005) by the Sinti and Romanies. A non-valid argument, according to the German journalist, who mentions the fact that those who wanted to come are already in Germany. This article tries to overcome the clichés and stereotypes, but in the end, the simple fact of stating them represents more an ironic reduction than a well-discussed revalorization. The European fear is, in addition to corruption and mafia problems, a financial one. One question dominates the press' discourse: Can the EU afford the entry of these countries?

Finally, we can primarily observe the existence of negative emotion. German people are afraid of losing their jobs, of being invaded; in fact, these are national arguments based on a lack of intercultural exchange and a scarcity of detailed information. Even if the press occupies a large part of the *public sphere* (Habermas, 1990) aiming at a free circulation of information and the possibility of debate, and also being concerned with public opinion, it is always delicate to speak in the name of one nation. If German people are generally afraid of losing their jobs, a German reader could feel a kind of restraint, feeling forced to feel like German people. Sometimes the stranger is not the other: I am a stranger to myself.

⁴ The report which had been announced for May 2006 was rescheduled to October 2006.

Represented indirectly by the respective national press, European arguments are, beside the commission report-preoccupations, more positive and refer especially to economical perspectives in the demanding countries. At the same time, the negative arguments refer to the financial problems of the integration. At this point the stereotypes are reinforced, so if the EU can not afford the integration, what will happen on a national level?

And finally the fear is expressed by the candidate countries. They express on the one hand the will to be a part of Europe and, on the other, the fear of stagnation and frustration if the deadline for their entry will be held off until 2008. These negative emotions are not only a sign of current mental frontiers, but they have also created new ones; the latter are frontiers based on silence and fear, which should disappear before and not after the integration. In our opinion, an open discourse, overwhelming tourist or preoccupying matters, would contribute to a better understanding between the members of the EU and those of the demanding countries. The economical neighbours could also become European neighbours and not only countries that would like to be a part of Europe.

***Ziua*: Voices of the Romanian press**

This is the first time that the European Commission report is not interpreted as a threat by the Romanian media. It is classified as an encouraging one, “a positive message” that confirms the social progress of Romania:

The two dominant points (of the report) did not bring new data, but confirmations: Romania continued to progress towards adopting the standards negotiated with Brussels; but there are important things to do and the efforts must be doubled to assure the process and to avoid the “activation” of the “safeguard clause”. (...) A positive report (in general) that points out the problems still in debate. A normal report which brings us closer to adhesion, on the 1st of January, 2007. (*Ziua*, 27.10.2005)

The evaluation of the Romanian media regarding the European Commission report includes Bulgaria. Other articles dealing with the corruption issue refer to Bulgaria and Turkey and mention that Romania is generally, in the EU reports, portrayed as the most corrupt country in Europe. An entire article, in English, analyses the duo Bulgaria-Romania on October 27. This text deploys the main European perspective: it presents the different European positions regarding the European Commission report, so the journalist had to consider the two countries together. However, the second part of its title is relevant: "Romania is better than Bulgaria".

"Romania and Bulgaria have got 15 months left before accession. If we compare the state of things in these two states to that in the 10 new members before they were admitted, we can see Romania and Bulgaria are in any case at the same level, if not with a slight advancement." This is what Graham Watson, leader of the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe, said after the European Commission released reports on Romania and Bulgaria on Tuesday. Baroness Emma Nicholson, expert from the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe, commented: "They have made all preparations for accession in 2007. Romania's efforts have been successful." She added Romania would make "an excellent member of the EU". Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, expert in the above-mentioned group for Bulgaria, mentioned: "The European Liberals still plead for Bulgaria's accession." He added: "We expect Sophia authorities to go on with the reform program and intensify efforts, especially in the problematic fields: the fight of high level corruption, judiciary reform and the social integration of the Roma community." He warned: "Only this way they can get consent from all national parliaments and rapid ratification" of the treaty of accession to the EU. (*Ziua*, 27.10.2005)

The mention referring to Bulgaria seems to be an argument for the implicit expression of the Romanians' enthusiasm regarding the adhesion of their country to the EU. The fear disappeared and the fact that for the first time "Romania is better than Bulgaria" might confirm the popular

emotion. We consider that the effect which consists in analysing the two countries together by the Romanian press is the sign of a European perspective, chosen by the Romanian journalists in order to prove their involvement in the construction of a European vision, needed in each adherent country for a better formulation of its identity. The fear is no longer present: journalists are reassuring the public opinion that the EU reports reward the efforts made by the countries. The representation of media expectation focused on January 1, 2007 as the date of Romania and Bulgaria's integration.

Turkey – clash of stereotypes and emotions

Besides the couple Bulgaria and Romania, the integration of Turkey dominates the French and the German press. First of all we would like to point out the differences between these two types of discourse, and afterwards we will reconsider the role of the mental frontiers and the emotions emerging in the three countries and the EU.

Regarding Bulgaria and Romania, a homogeneous discourse becomes apparent in *le Monde* and *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The chosen arguments are mostly quoted from the report of the EU, the journalist does not really comment upon the facts and he presents them under the emblem of a European common sense.

This "objective" position, which is, as discussed before, not as objective as it seems to be, changes if you take a closer look on the presentation of Turkey. There are not only political divergences inside the EU. Countries like Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia would like to discuss the potential entry of Croatia at the same time as the Turkish one. Furthermore, you can observe different national matters of dispute appearing in the member countries. In Germany and France political parties are not able to find a compromise and even in Turkey there are voices against the entry in the EU.

Various matters could and should be analysed, such as the mentioned disagreements and the critical situation concerning Turkey's democracy, but as our major interest concerns stereotypes, emotion and

mental frontiers, we would like to concentrate on their rhetorical construction in the French and the German press.

Linguistic and cultural frontiers

In comparison to Romania and Bulgaria, the “definitions” of Turkey are broader. In the French and in the German press Turkey is described as a friend, as a partner, as if Turkey would be closer to the EU than the two other countries. This fact creates a new kind of frontier, due to the fact that naming a candidate country as a “candidate country” (Romania and Bulgaria) creates another atmosphere than calling a country a friend or a partner. At the same time, the “neutral” treatment of Bulgaria and Romania does not create the same polemics. Turkey becomes a “pity case” for different reasons. The EU demands the respect of democratic liberties, the rights of minorities, the recognition of the Armenian genocide as well as the recognition of Cyprus. The relation of *giving* and *demanding* coexists, but the creation of stereotypes is broader than the link between Bulgarian corruption and the Italian Mafia. The conflict is enlarged and it touches the religious components, the opposition of the Occident and the Orient, the famous and often cited clash of civilisation pronounced by Samuel Huntington. The German press is prudent and often avoids a clear statement, which might be due to the historical situation. Turkish people were invited to work in Germany in the sixties and they present an important population in this country. New generations are born and they are German, with Turkish origins. This special relationship, even if it seems to be a superficial example, is often revealed during the Eurovision Song Contest. The Turkish music contribution gets mostly the highest German evaluation, which shows the intimate feeling with the origin country.

The mentioned Occident/Orient opposition is not only evident in the press, but concerns an especially important problem, the translation of Turkish quotations. On October 4, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs is quoted in *le Monde*: “We will listen to the people, not only to Turkey, but to the whole world, from Russia to Palestine.” This significant, geographical and mental aspect is ignored in the German press. The same quotation can be found the same day, “We will listen to what our neighbours will say”

(FAZ, 4.10.2005). The reader of the German journal will not be able to know who the quoted neighbours are in the French press. The same day, Erdogans' opinion about the EU is translated in the FAZ, "If the European Union wants to become a global power and if the EU wants to avoid the clash of cultures, she has to support a unification of cultures and she cannot reject Turkey." *Le Monde* quotes Erdogan in a shorter, but precise way: The European Union has to decide "if she wants to become a global power or to confine herself into a Christian club". These quotations reveal a fundamental problem. The first argumentation (FAZ) refers to the principal of cause and effect, and is at the same time a sort of menace: if you do this, you will have that, which interchanges the relation of *giving* and *demanding*. The second quotation is implicitly linked with Turkey, Europe without Turkey would be a Christian club, so Europe has the choice: being powerful or a Christian club. This expression does not only underline the clash of cultures, but also the almost arrogant position of Erdogan. He seems to justify his arguments by opposing two religions, he is already creating a rhetoric clash. One of the real frontiers concerns consequently the translation and the interpretation of the other's voice. As very few are able to speak all European languages, and as there is no European Esperanto, the reader has to accept the information in the press. And in addition to that, he has to be confident concerning this information. One of the mental frontiers, leading to larger mental frontiers, is the language problem, including the problems mentioned in the beginning of this text.

The patterns of emotion are more obvious concerning the case of Turkey. Europe is more expressive and Turkey occupies an important counter-part.

Le Monde and the FAZ are both concerned about the *insecurity*, which is a reference to the problems of terrorism. Turkey presents a *danger*, a *risk*, and a *problem* for the European balance. The shaped emotion here is also dominated by fear. The emotions of scepticism and doubts are inverted this time. Turkey is disappointed and feels itself discriminated and rejected by the EU.

Finally, and valid for all three demanding countries, one emotion is predominant: The feeling of being for or against the entry in the EU. You are PRO European, COUNTER European, PRO Turk or ANTI Turk and there seems to be no grey zone permitted to reflect in another way on the

situation. This *Black and White* effect seems to invade the discourse and leaves no place for a common overcoming of the mental frontiers.

***Ziua* – the European stereotypes' influence and Turkey**

The “historical adhesion” of Turkey is presented by *Ziua* with reference to a general European context of crisis. Turkey’s demand is defined as a European “compromise” that “will allow the acceptance of a Muslim country in the great family of Europe” (*Ziua*, 04.10.2005). The religious stereotype is the most frequent one, it is often quoted and this is not the explicit effect of the editorial position. Those “evident difficulties” to integrate Turkey present the image of a non-unitary Europe, a Europe that “hesitates”. That attitude has some suggestive effects in Turkey where “thousands of nationalist and communist Turks protested against their country’s adhesion to the EU”. Another stereotype, the political one, refers to nationalism and communism and has a negative perception in Romania. The single political argument that cannot be considered as a stereotype refers to the accomplishment of the Copenhagen criteria. The informative articles reproduce the European “arguments” concerning the “Turkish provocation”.

An editorial campaign that starts on October 5 is relevant for this study. Some editorials present the torment of the Turkish history regarding the Kurds and the Armenians and link these facts to a positive journalistic attitude to the adhesion to the EU. These editorials reaffirm the Romanian support⁵ for the European integration of Turkey.

Only a good collaboration of all the parts representing the EU, which benefit from the open expression of Romania’s support, could generate stability, progress and prosperity. For everybody. (*Ziua*, 5.10.2005)

The editorial tradition of this paper integrates an “evaluative” issue concerning the situation of each country in the moment of the national holiday. That is why on October 29 a special supplement of this journal

⁵ The journalists of *Ziua* have already detailed this attitude in October 2004.

approaches the actual social context of Turkey and presents the final decision of the EU to integrate Turkey as the “major media event” of the month. This is a pretext for referring, once again this year, to the partnership existing between Turkey and Romania. Defining the EU as a “world wide actor”, that issue of *Ziua* already recognised the Turkish accomplishments as real “democratic transformations”, and the whole paper integrates the cultural and religious stereotypes in a “strategic European decision”. We could also quote some positive political declarations coming from the Romanian officials; the emotion seems to be forced: *entire satisfaction, historical moment*. This expression of emotion is an argument for the “good bilateral relations” between Turkey and Romania: “the enlargement process represents one of the most successful politics of the EU, which could contribute to the transformation of the Union” (*Ziua*, 29.10.2005).

In search of lost Europe

Is Europe on the way to losing itself in a complex construction of pictures, stereotypes and emotion? We do not think that Europe is lost, but sometimes you can get the impression of confusing and bizarre circumstances creating an emotional atmosphere of insecurity and commonplaces.

This modest contribution which tried to show the emotional perspective, constructed by media discourse, can not propose absolute solutions helping to overcome stereotypes and negative emotions and we do not want to establish a moral statement. At the same time, our results are a hint, a kind of indicator, concerning new mental frontiers which are due to a stereotyped construction of the other and to the emotion coming along with these discourses. As for television (Tétu, 2004), the press creates a feeling of participation in the emotional world, the world outside, being recreated inside the articles. The analysis of effects could be an additional study for our proposal and might reveal the influence on the reader. Without having effectuated this kind of work, we might suppose that the emotional effect is not shared in a homogeneous way. In spite of the actual crisis, the French and the Dutch rejection of the European Constitution, the

national crisis (Clearstream affair in France, the high rate of unemployment, the rate of ageing etc.), the crisis and the problem of the integration present at the same time a new potential (*firstness*) of discussion which should be actualised (*secondness*) in a common European debate.

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THE CASE FOR COMPETITIVE AREAS OF INTEGRATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW

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Abstract

The work attempts to substantiate the conjecture of an optimum competitive area, tentatively referred to as a certain pattern of spatially-defined areas conducive to competitive development for industries or firms in such a way that benefits from competition are maximized.

This paper does not provide a theoretical exposition of the existence of an optimum competitive area, but the framework against which this sort of economic phenomenon may be investigated. It attempts to expound by means of an overview of the existing theoretical literature if one could plausibly consider it. There are arguments that speak for the meaningfulness of the quest for the geographical scale at which the sources of competitive advantages are optimally exploited.

There are however reasons to believe that no strict spatial definitions of competitive economic areas exist; instead, one should tackle with spaces of variable geometry depending on factors like economic similarities, geography, cultural traditions or social habits. Even if this sort of definitions is deemed to remain rather vague, this material suggests that an economic definition is not only realistically substantiated by several characteristics, but also pragmatically required because of its tangible policy implications for development.

Introduction

In a recent economic analysis of trade developments in Eastern Europe, the World Bank singularizes three particular regional groupings, i.e. the eight new members of the European Union, the twelve countries of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), and the seven countries of South Eastern Europe (Broadman, 2005), for apparently circumstantial

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motivation only. Other institutional observers of the region like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2004) or the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 2005) follow similar taxonomies, by which the reader gets the message that economic progress by implication is conditional upon regional conditions of development, even if definitions of what a region is supposed to be match more easily with political rather than economic circumstances of the integration processes.

From that by now familiar approach, one may infer, for example, that neighbouring Poland and Byelorussia are somewhat deemed to pursue distinct paths of growth in spite of their rich historical legacy of being part of the same customs territory for centuries and sharing common cultural traditions. It is for this reason that a taxonomic approach to regions of development is unconvincing unless it is substantiated by more than mere incidental evidence. That is why a proper understanding of the integration processes requires a more refined analytical framework as to what appears to consolidate itself as a distinct area of research, that is, the regional development effects at the level of competitive areas of integration. It is the purpose of this material to provide an overview of the conceptual developments to date of this line of thinking and to propose a synthetic terminology around the concept of "optimum competitive area" or "competitive area of integration" based on the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. This material thus concentrates on one major investigative question: What are the theoretical arguments that could define a geographical scale at which the regional economies become optimally exposed to the benefits of competition?

The presentation divides the theoretical arguments in two sections corresponding to the standard and the eclectic view, respectively, as to the conditions of development in integration areas. The standard perspective has become known for the ALA effects, i.e. economic effects resulting from *allocation of resources, location of economic activities and accumulation of growth outcomes*. The eclectic approach includes contributions from a variety of fields, hardly discernable in a field of study of its own, although economic geography and regional planning may suggest the main lines of investigation. The final comments attempt to provide a synthetic answer to the question, What are the conditions of competition in terms of geography

and self-supporting resources for development that allow for maximized benefits from integration of markets? Standard explanations, as well a bundle of connected, even if disparate economic, politic, social, and cultural conditions make up the profile of an *optimum competitive area*, tentatively referred to as a certain pattern of spatially-defined areas conducive to competitive development for industries or firms in such a way that benefits from competition are maximized.

The standard perspective: the ALA effects

From the clear-cut representations of customs unions in the Viner-inspired literature to the present-day complex institutional forms of integration, the basic tenets of the theory of economic integration have changed little. In this respect, two confirmations may be deduced from the contemporary literature. One comes from the difficulties the researchers find in proposing a distinct analytical framework or at least a substantially improved one. For example, Drabek (2005) states, that "most recent RIA [Regional Integration Arrangements] initiatives have been directed towards deeper arrangements; that is, going beyond the simple tariff-cutting exercises. But that is where the agreements among observers would end." A similar point is also suggested by the multitude of new explorations that has hardly found a connecting point to the traditional thinking in so far as the considerable intake of new concepts in the literature has failed to move things on toward new paradigms (Cojanu, 2005: pp. 36ff). Overviews of both these perspectives are provided in the following on the underlying assumption that one possible theoretical development may consist in substantiating the case for competitive areas of integration, a synthetic concept built on the traditional view of the advantage of competitive exposure and the modern one of regions of development, to be detailed in the next section.

This part focuses on the standard perspective of the theory. The core of this approach consists of the three basic effects of integration: from allocation of resources, from location of firms and industries, and from accumulation of experience and knowledge. Each of them is by and large associated with distinct fields of study in economics, as is for example

allocation with international trade, location with agglomeration economics, and accumulation with growth theory. However, the preference is given to a topic-based exposition rather a field-based one as the former reflects with increased insight the very pillars of any new theoretical proposal.

The allocation effects

In conformity with the optimization approach, the issue of resource allocation has always been considered to result in maximized results at the largest geographical scale of economic activity. The formation of regions of integration, as second-best policy options, is treated under the same premises. Because they keep tariff-walls against third countries, there are chances that more efficient producers stay outside the region and thus add to the economic costs of trade discrimination. In this perspective, the optimum area is by definition the world trade arena, where each country gains from commercial exchanges on the basis of its comparative advantages.

Jacob Viner devised an analytical investigation based on the paired concepts of trade-creation and trade-diversion effects of regional integration to measure the net gains from integration. His approach is static as it attempts to measure the economic effects of resource allocation after imposing a common external tariff and removing all internal barriers to trade. The results are however dependent on variables, such as the tariff rates or the volume of trade before and after forming the customs union, which inevitably leaves the option of including as many member countries as possible the most preferable course of action. The particular relevance this inquiry might have had on the economics of regional integration has been considerably weakened by successive series of modest estimates on these gains from integration as presented in Cojanu (2005: 42-45). That makes economists conclude that indeed trade liberalization makes sense only in a multilateral framework of agreements.

However, the Viner approach has been complemented with a dynamic perspective on the integration process, which puts forth arguments to strengthen the view that the movement toward freer trade could bring positive large benefits on the whole area of integration even

after deducting for trade diversion. Two explanations stand out for their significance. For one thing, an enlarged market enables a better use of resources through the realisation of *internal* economies of scale, as well as a facilitated consolidation of the existing advantages from local production through the existence of the *external* economies of scale or externalities. The latter effect gives rise to agglomerations of economic activities a point to be discussed in a separate section below. As for the former, the integration benefits are again strictly correlated with the economics of the respective industry and only secondarily with the economics of integration.

The other argument however is more directly connected to the proper nature of the integration process. It refers to the advantage of competitive exposure which appears to be "the greatest dynamic benefit" of the formation of a customs union (Salvatore, 1990: 295): exposure to foreign imminent or potential competition usually yields superior returns (Pelkmans, 2003: 247), about five to six times larger than the static gains (Salvatore, 1990: 296; Dyker, 2000) in comparison with the allocation efficiency benefits.

The benefits of open and increased competition have anyway been a landmark of the international trade theory, but its importance gains in significance and visibility in a regional context. The main justification rests on the fact that it is this smaller geographical area that creates a more favourable context for realisation of one of the conditions more likely to lead to increased welfare, that is, the more competitive rather than complementary are the economies of member countries the stronger the gains from trade become. One may assume that "competition" more than "factor endowments" displaces the resources toward more productive utilisations, whether for producers to become more efficient to meet the competition of other producers or to find innovative ways to stimulate the development of new technology or to get higher returns on their investment.

A variant of this condition has taken the form of "the natural trading partners", mostly exposed by the gravity models of trade. According to this theory, the integrating partners have to consider the size of markets in partner countries as well as the existing ties with a given country. Drabek quotes several results when a country's definition is based on "income category": integration among low income, developing countries

is unlikely to benefit from major efficiency gains. This is primarily because gains from specialization between partners will be limited as those economies are not diversified. In contrast, similarity in income levels will reinforce the gains from regional integration: "The proximity to markets and the likely similarities in the way neighbours organize their societies is conducive to more trade and other economic relations" (Drabek, 2005: 25). So, the choice of partners matters: the size of countries and for that matter the size of markets; similarities will increase the degree of competitiveness of countries joining an integration arrangement.

The main insight of the "similarity" condition thus consists in implying that regional integration is conducive to accelerated growth in a much quicker fashion than it had been possible within a larger area of trade, say, the world trade arena. On a relatively smaller geographical area, the member countries face soon the impact of fierce competition, for a variety of reasons (e.g. transportation costs, external tariff, cultural barriers or administrative procedures) still concur in making competitive threats from distant places a more affordable prospect. They also face the opportunity of more rapidly seizing on emergent niche markets, by being forced to differentiate in order to stay competitive. It is in this sense that the "gravity" analysis should be regarded; the natural partners arise more as matter of strong similarities irrespective of their geographical proximity. Two neighbouring countries, with complementary trade structures would find negligible benefits from integration, as their economies have been left with costly alternatives to make efficient use of their resources: the producers either outsource in non-member countries through investments their productive capabilities in order to stay ahead of competition, or become complacent as to the existing specialization in production.

Nevertheless, taking full advantage of resource allocation makes the whole picture look unfinished in its explicative purposes. Even if one admits that regional integration eventually represents a faster lane to prosperity under conditions of similar economic structures, one may also plausibly admit that the economic activity does not stop at borders, as it is conventionally assumed in the perspective of atomistic nation-states. Especially under circumstances of "deep" integration, the free movement of productive factors and monetary regulations make political frontiers permeable and trans-national economic activity a pervasive nature of

national industries. The large integrating area should more plausibly be regarded as a fragmented space of different conditions of development, where efficiency gains include but do not confine themselves to those from resource allocation. Geography and other local conditions become major determinants of the benefits from integration as well.

The location effects

Integration arrangements create conditions for growth also in the form of agglomerations of economic activities. This line of thinking is similarly rooted in the old tradition of economics. The adoption of the external customs tariff (ECT) is often viewed as a distinctive mark of an integrated area with evenly dispersed opportunities for growth. It could nevertheless be the case that some industries be better situated than others as regards resource endowments, climatic conditions or demand volumes and thereby inherit historically location advantages; or it may be that some regions come closer through integration to markets, which disproportionately attract a bigger slice of the productive pool of factors (labour, innovation, technology and so on).

The economists' view on spatial distribution of production is double-sided. It concerns, on one hand, the localization of particular industries on small geographical areas. Industries tend to cluster in particular areas thanks to location external economies. These externalities arise from the ability of producers to share specialized providers of inputs; the advantages to both employers and workers of a specialized labour market; and localized spill-overs of knowledge, especially through personal interaction. The birth of such clusters plays a significant role in sharpening the competitive advantages of the incumbents, especially when the existing business and technological networks are used to reinforce their capabilities.

On the other hand, the location effects also encompass spatial phenomena related to economic agglomeration on very large scale, which is usually referred to as the "centre – periphery" model. Some regions– the centre–could become more interesting for industries characterized by lower average costs the larger the volume of production–or "increasing returns to scale" in the economists' parlance–as location places to serve a bigger,

integrated market, while others—the periphery—experience acute de-localization of economic activity. While trade liberalization is the necessary ingredient in order that such specialization pattern become more visible for industries and national states, the existence of a tariff wall and the adoption of a common commercial policy essentially contain their magnitude to that particular economic and political boundaries.

Even if modern industrial linkages as described for example by Puga and Venables (1996) make this reasoning apparently flawless, there still remains the question of the geographical scale at which the expected benefits of regional specialization become visible. The standard approach leaves a sort of geographical indeterminacy. The impact of trade costs on agglomeration or spatial division of industry tends to have a U-shaped path. At very high trade costs, there cannot be agglomeration: industries will be forced to develop locally. At very low costs, there is little incentive for agglomeration: necessary inputs can be delivered to wherever the factor costs are lowest. There will necessarily be some intermediate range where agglomeration is possible and hence the geographical scale of the *optimum* integration space becomes a function of costs dispersion and formation within that area.

In a complementary way, other studies (e.g. Rodriguez-Pose, 1994; Peschel, 1998) support the view that a regionally more relevant model of spatial organization should go beyond the familiar picture of long established disparities—urban-rural, centre-periphery, agrarian-industrial—and place less developed locations in a more dynamic perspective as well. The organization of modern business increasingly demands for a large geographical configuration of value-chain activities in order to use geographically dispersed opportunities for growth. That process may involve relocation of production systems—data collection, financial service centres, production units or research and development centres—to peripheral areas. This enhanced flexibility of production systems allows the genesis of new development poles in previously isolated or lagging areas. A redefinition of policy implications would mean, in a way suggested by Vickerman et al. (1999) that a more credible alternative to spending on infrastructure connecting agglomerations with low-

income regions would be investment programs in transport links within and between peripheral regions.

The perspective on location so provides a more credible picture of the boundaries of a competitive integration area: equally dispersed opportunities for growth are more plausibly replaced by poles of development of a rugged competitive landscape. An arbitrary combination of geographical distance, economics of industry, administrative centres of decision, value chains and adaptive capabilities of local productive units models a variable geometry of an economic space with different conditions for competitive development. Competitiveness of an industry is by consequence likely to be affected not only by reductions or increases in tariffs, but also by regional factors which become visible and effective once a member country adopts the ECT and faces free movement of factors of production.

The accumulation effects

Finally, a strand of literature which deals with the development of an integration area in a conventional sense takes its inspiration from the growth theory. Econometric tests are devised to measure growth correlations dependent on such variables as political governance, market distortions and market performance, investment, sector production, openness, ownership, education, or macroeconomic stability. Laborious though these tests may be, the rationale behind the analytical framework is quite obvious: national economies depend for their economic progress on two main sources of growth, the extensive use of resources like capital, labour and the technological progress. On that basis, economists are able to make predictions about the national economies' capability to perform conditional on their level of development at the outset of the process. The implications come in two main variants of the concept of convergence. They are called *β -convergence* to describe a situation when poor economies tend to experience faster growth rates than the rich ones, and *σ -convergence* when the dispersion in their levels of real GDP per capita tends to decrease over time. Even if this discussion is formally somewhat detached from the circumstances of an integration area, one may again assume that its

member countries, as well as their regions are subject to a continuous process of growth, conducive to a level playing field for competitive advance.

Results reported by empirical studies as surveyed by Cojanu et al. (2004: 15-17) however alternate optimistic visions of increasing convergence among regions with pessimistic forecasts of increasingly uneven regional development. What analyses of European regional development from 1950 onwards in fact find is a picture of slow and inconsistent convergence punctuated by tendencies of regional per capita income disparities to widen relatively faster over small periods.

Evidence on a larger scale reported in Sala-i-Martin (2002), with a sample of 110 countries over 30 years beginning in 1960, shows the absence of any relationship between the initial level of income and subsequent growth rate. Some poor countries grew very little and some rich countries grew very little. On the other hand, some poor and middle-income countries as well as some rich countries experienced considerable growth. Evolution of the dispersion of income across the same countries points to a similarly disconcerting result: income inequality across these 110 economies increased.

A closer look at how economies behave however suggests that the broad picture substantially dismisses particular evolutions that are principally subject to *homogeneous conditions of growth*. It is so that a sub-sample of richer countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2002) reveals that the relationship between growth and the initial level of income is significantly negative and income inequality among the OECD economies has declined since 1950, so these economies exhibit both convergence types. More relevantly, the closer the economic conditions are to representing a space of equal opportunities for growth, the greater are the chances that the theoretical predictions hold as the measurements confirm for a smaller subsets of countries like Japan, US and five European countries (UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and France).

At the same time, the case for convergence of national economies along similar growth conditions has been particularly strengthened by the theory of *optimum currency area*. This theory says that an effective currency union—an area with a common currency and fixed-exchanged rates—

depends on how well-integrated its economy is. On that basis, it predicts that fixed exchange rates are most appropriate for areas closely integrated through international trade and factor movements. The very criterion that makes an *optimum* feasible, that is, the balance between benefits—avoiding uncertainty and transaction costs—and costs—giving up ability to use monetary policy for the purpose of stabilizing output and employment—is however highly sensitive to the correlation with synchronization of business cycles. If the topic of "deep" integration seems to be uncontroversial, the extent to which business cycles are synchronized remains a "critical" theoretical debate (Drabek, 2005: 39). That raises further serious doubts on the macroeconomic correlation supposition affecting an area of integration.

Adopting a common currency is nevertheless a good indicator of the feasibility of a region to exhibit optimum conditions of growth. Its premises are expressed in macroeconomic terms that make its evolution conditional on a trade-off between membership scale and policy heterogeneity. Following the representation of Alesina and Barro (2001), equilibrium conditions co-exist with local conditions of growth: "As the size of the union increases with new entrants, more and more transaction costs of trade are saved. However, as the size of the union increases, the less the monetary policy of the anchor can be tailored to each member. The marginal entrant is the client that is so far from the anchor that its benefits from commitment [to price stability] and trade just compensate for a monetary policy that is little correlated with the entrant's disturbances."

A justification to explain why regional conditions may be in certain circumstance a better explanation for macroeconomic development has been advanced by a rich scholarship of economic geography. According to these theories, the spatial organization of industries is more relevant characterized by much smaller and more localized clusters than those broad spatial units used by either theory or policy-makers. Specialization may be accordingly less indicative of the spatial tendencies of industrial development than local processes of industrial diversification. Strong, competitive nuclei of groups of industries display a better capacity to withstand adverse demand shocks and localized structural crises and may be thus more indicative of "the most appropriate regional development policy route" (Martin and Sunley, 1996).

The eclectic perspective: towards a definition of the optimum competitive area

The conventional theories offer only a partial image to understand the conditions of development on areas larger than the national level, as the case currently is in regions of integration. The image is incomplete because the focus on welfare is somewhat detached from or only accidentally linked to the actual circumstances of development. An integration country may derive certain benefits from the process, benefits that are associated with the way resources are allocated, industries exploit the scale advantages or macroeconomic conditions favour convergence of growth indicators. There is little left to how the *area* factors as such influence the competitive development of national economies. Arguments of an *eclectic* perspective differentiate themselves from the standard approach mainly because of their treatment of competitive development.

The frontiers of the economic activity are strongly influenced by the economics of the industry, but at the same time it is recognized (e.g. Enright, 2001) that "region" may be used in the sense of either sub-national regions, regions within nations, or supranational regions, regions that encompass several nations to frame equally meaningful conditions on the formation of competitive advantages. The last circumstance suggests the elusive role of political borders in contrast to the economic ones as both theoretical underpinnings (e.g. Enright, 1993) and empirical evidence (e.g. European Commission, 2002: 28-38) show that cross-border regions of economic agglomerations are a familiar development of the present industrial landscape.

At the same time, the regional milieu is not necessarily more important than the national environment particularly when the latter still plays a central role through policies of innovation, legislative initiatives and cultural attitudes in spurring entrepreneurship and regulating businesses. For example, a study of Asheim and Dunford (1997) shows that an examination of the watch-making industry on either side of the Swiss-French border is indicative of profound differences in the two regional production systems which reflect the different national systems of which these two regional economies are a part. A model of economic geography based on growth centres and political influence developed by Paelinck and

Polese (1999) assumes a distinction between nations where the political capital (the national core) is located near the continental core (the UK) and those where the capital is located at some distance (Austria, Spain, Italy, Poland). For these nations, continental integration will strengthen calls for regional fiscal autonomy and against centrally administered regional income redistribution policies as are the cases of Northern Italy and Catalonia.

What all these suggest is that an accurate representation of a competitive area has to include by necessity a much broader view on the sources of development. The following overview shows that a combination of social, cultural, political and economic factors is at work in determining a certain course of evolutions. Arguments are given for areas either transcending or limited to the national borders.

The supra-national level

The discussion at this level enables a perspective on what happens on vast geographical areas or *economic spaces*, sufficiently large to encompass several regions or countries, but correspondingly small to represent significant developmental evolutions.

As in the standard approach, the international arena represents the spatial reference of any effort to think of the benefits of internationalization. This time, a more confident view on the advantages of *regional* rather than *global* type of economic integration seems to emerge. For UNCTAD, the increasing interdependencies in the world economy remain a more or less beneficial circumstance of development according to each economy's capability to absorb the adjustment costs generated by discontinuities, shocks and potential conflicts of interest. From this perspective, the real challenge is not so much about the extent or the sequencing of liberalization, but about finding "the particular combination of international market forces, policy space and collective action needed by countries with different institutional and industrial capacities, to ensure that the integration process is welfare-enhancing for all participants in the international division of labour" UNCTAD (2004: 81). The issue of development is thus multi-faceted: along with the market economics

("market forces"), particulars of the scale of evolutions ("policy space") and of the group influences ("collective action") equally affect the competitive impact throughout the integrating area.

It is appropriate to recall here the gravity theory of trade flows, and see that if one gives distance a broader significance, the implications as regards the way countries interact and the benefits they derive thereof may appear less obvious than the existing relationship would imply. If for instance geographic proximity may not add much to the transportation costs, other characteristics of the economic environment, like for example dimensions of cultural, administrative and geographic scope, influence different businesses in different ways (Ghemawat, 2001). This is in fact a perfect match with studies like that of the Institute for Regional Research (quoted in Peschel, 1998), which prove that there are four groups of barriers to economic interactions separating regions from one another: (i) distance-bridging costs such as transport and communication costs, (ii) linguistic and cultural dissimilarities, (iii) differences in the scope of social and political life, (iv) political strategies, deliberately or unintentionally resulting in the separation of states.

That is, distance matters not only in a pure geographic sense, but also by reference to a constellation of proximities. It could be the case that geographic delineations may represent strong determinants of integration, like, for example, the basins of the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Pearl River Delta, and the Mississippi Delta, but also manifest irrelevance when geography obscures value chains interruptions or complementary economic structures. The analysis seeks to identify those regions which are functionally integrated by competitive links. What is understood in the literature by a proper scale of development is suggested by the following two definitions on *economic space* and *regional identity*, respectively, both relegating the national (political) borders to an arbitrary role:

"An economic space is a region, the economic agents of which are more strongly related to each other than to those of other regions. Such relationships are cause and consequence of trade and capital flows, of the transfer of knowledge and technology as well as of the various forms of communication and cultural exchange. They tend to mutually reinforce each other." (Peschel, 1998)

"Regional identity, at least its economic identity, is more and more dependent on the interaction and information flows among individuals, firms, and institutions, than on territorial details. It also indicates that an interdisciplinary approach, one that takes tastes, culture, productive capabilities, and institutional structures into account, is required to address issues of regional identity." (Enright, 1993)

According to these definitions, competitiveness relative to an integrating *economic space* decisively depends on elements which favour strong mutual relationships and the emergence of a *regional identity*. Peschel (1998), for instance, chooses to represent the Baltic area as a homogeneous, functional C-region (C for competence, culture, communication, and creativity) of a new economic structure based on the increasing importance of knowledge-handling occupations. In another example, Sparke takes the example of *Cascadia*, a trans-national region bridging British Columbia (Canada) and the Pacific North-Western United States of Washington and Oregon. Simple though its promoters' focus may be ("to combine the plan to bring in more tourists with a larger attempt to put the Cascadian cities of Vancouver, Seattle and Portland on the national consumption maps of would-be wealthy residents"), it is however suggestive, at the broader scale of global competition and North-American integration process, of "an anticipatory geography that calls out for political, cultural and economic investigation" (Sparke, [2006]).

The sub-national level

For confederated states like the U.S., Germany, Austria or Switzerland the issue of development at the level of sub-national entities is already a matter of history and tradition. The way these administrations have decided to share the responsibilities of governance with autonomous but accountable centres of decisions is worth investigating in its own right. Nonetheless, this sort of territorial divisions is a result of administrative rather than economic rationale. One of the first attempts to consider them both probably was the EU policy to define recipients of regional aid according to NUTS (*Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales à des fins Statistiques*), a statistical definition according to which regions of various sizes,

populations and economic structures are comparable units for analysis. In the 1970s, the EU adopted three regional levels (NUTS 1-3) and two local levels (NUTS 4 and 5) corresponding to the existing administrative borders. At NUTS 2 for example, which represents the official level of analysis of regional disparities at an intermediate level between the local and the national level, differences range from 100,000 to 10 million inhabitants. In May 2003, the NUTS system was amended for the last time. The EU regions are now classified according to their population into three categories: NUTS 1 – with the population ranging between 3.000.000 – 7.000.000 inhabitants; NUTS 2 - with the population ranging between 800.000 – 3.000.000 inhabitants; and NUTS 3 - with the population ranging between 150.000 – 800.000 inhabitants (European Commission, 2005). As this classification underpins the EU regional policy for development, its very existence is noteworthy for proposing a definite criterion, i.e. *population*, for thinking of a relevant space of homogeneous economic activity.

A step further is taken in an OECD analysis (2002) that provides a territorial configuration by introducing a more detailed description of the workings of local/regional economies. Much in accordance with the EU approach, it pays close attention to sub-national territorial levels of two categories, namely large regions (territorial level 2) and small regions (territorial level 3). This study's importance is twofold. First, it elaborates on the notion of "functional regions", where the most typical concept used in defining a functional region is that of labour markets. Second, it remains faithful to the representation of a "self-sufficient" space, in "that the number of workers living and working there is higher than the number of workers migrating to another centre, or it must attract a number of workers that is substantially higher than the number of workers leaving the centre to work outside" (OECD, 2002: 15).

Even if there is only circumstantial justification to consider them "the most appropriate units for analytical and empirical work" as they are "relatively stable", it should not be overlooked the practical implication that these areas "serve to some extent as a frame for regional policy implementation." (OECD, 2002: 3) Their widespread use—most OECD member countries, bar five (Japan, Mexico, Korea, Spain and Turkey), either on an official or a semi-official basis, define or delineate functional regions in terms of local labour markets—speaks for itself about the role

played by homogeneous regions of development as a framework for socio-economic territorial analysis. Differences in the conceptual basis suggest that a distinction can be drawn between delineations around a given urban centre [e.g. Canada, France (urban areas), Germany, Portugal and United-States (metropolitan areas)] and delineations without reference to an urban centre [e.g. Finland, France (employment areas), Italy and the United States (commuting zones)] (OECD, 2002: 11). Moreover, as the US experience suggests, in spite of the tendency to use commuting data, in part because the data are available and in part because labour is a critical factor, when it comes to industrial development, business ties—flows of goods, services, and information—would seem an equally valid criterion. The coincidence of these two types of functional areas (i.e. commuting and industrial) seems open to empirical analysis.

In sum, the eclectic perspective plays an essential role in revealing the inner workings of a competitive area. Many coordinates help distinguish how competitive advantages are formed through spatial interconnectedness between economic activities, political administration, social preferences or cultural values. Nonetheless, the discussion leaves unchanged two sorts of indeterminacies. First, the issue of geographical scale is deemed to remain an unknown variable. Self-promoting may be a helpful policy that draws attention to such areas. That is the case, for example, of Hyogo-Kobe area (www.hyogo-kobe.jp/his) which asserts itself as the principal area of Kansai, Japan's second largest economic bloc. Second, another question which is left open, namely, what does a *significant economic evolution* mean? One of the main features in representing a competitive area is that it is conducive to self-sustained development, but, once the political factor is not counted any more, it remains an inescapable dilemma: Development for whom? Who are the beneficiaries? Where are they located? For instance, China's spectacular growth reigns over a hideous discrepancy between a luxurious and effervescent coastal territory and the vast inland space where most of the country (800 million inhabitants) (The Economist, 2005) is reserved a destitute life. There is a hard truth of the economic landscape that the competitive advance may be only weakly related, if at all, to the political administration of a nation's population.

Final remarks

The case for competitive areas of integration shows that it would be too simplistic to think of the world arena as the optimal scale at which development could evolve. As reported anew (UNCTAD, 2004: 98), a rich scholarship of modelling exercises, country studies and regression analyses persists in connecting increased trade openness to both positive and negative economic welfare and concludes that "the whole case has been exaggerated." This overview of the theoretical arguments points to an eclectic view in which development originates on a geographical scale that combines in a singular way competitive influences from all strata of human activities and interactions. A definition of an optimum competitive area would thus more plausibly be based on the following assumptions:

- The case of the economic advantage of competitive exposure: the economic boundaries confine a territory where companies and institutions undergo a maximized process of competitive development. They confront competitors of similar economic and technological prowess, and hence become motivated to innovate and outperform what they perceive as a direct, not remote or insuperable, threat to their actual performance.
- The case of political governance centred on the flows of information, much related to knowledge and regional expertise. The administrative centres of governance are replaced by functional centres of decisions that enable a widespread use of sources of competitive power, bereft of political influences or bureaucratic hindrances.
- The case of social preferences: important issues for any development advance like inequality gaps, work motivations and conflict resolution, or the workings of underground economy find their quasi-identical resolve over a large space of economic activity.
- The case of cultural values: tastes, work attitudes, consumerism inclinations all pave the way for effective business strategies that target an easily identifiable market. A level of integrity based on economic history and cultural identity reinforces the premises of enriched flows of knowledge and information.

The end-product of this type of inquiry consists of drawing the economic boundaries of an area governed by a self-enforcing mechanism for development, with high similarity in terms of economic structures,

cultural identities, political attitudes, and social preferences. Normally, it should represent the stage before acceding to or forming a common currency area; its conditions are rather to be met first in this context. Far from requesting a clear-cut mathematical exposition, the use of *optimum* means an analytical search for the best conditions of competitive development on a regional basis, that is, an area sufficiently large to allow for efficient levels of production, but fittingly small to expose adaptability in absorbing economic shocks. The national authority may render a helpful role in speeding the formation of such area, even if it eventually saw itself engaged, in the case of a large territory, in simultaneous but disparate processes of integration. This discussion would help it concentrate on meaningful policy initiatives for competitive development and stay away from the void of both "borderless world" rhetoric and nationalistic flames that still flicker in some parts of Europe.

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IT STRATEGIES IN INCREASING BUSINESS COMPETITIVENESS

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Abstract

Within the framework of the present information & knowledge-based society, business competitiveness necessarily requires adequate IT strategies. The paper focuses on proficient principles of designing IT strategies and implementing adequate software systems. The implementation of dedicated software systems - the top level of any IT strategy - has to comply modern management and business requirements; therefore business software should model & integrate activities from all business compartments, distributely access the company's integrated database and offer relevant synthesis for management levels. The paper underlines the most important principles in implementing such dedicated software systems and discusses their advantages in increasing business competitiveness

1. The Working Framework

Implementing adequate ICT (Information and Communication Technology) strategies is essential for increasing activity and management efficiency within organizations [AndP04]). The implementation of dedicated information systems for managing organizations' activity - the "top" level of an ICT strategy - is detailed in [And05]

The adaptation of information systems to the organization's characteristics and needs is indispensable for increasing its efficiency in specific activities and management. It is important that management strategies take into account the dedicated software's potential in significantly increasing organization efficiency, provided that it is properly designed and implemented.

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The main goal of implementing information systems within an organization is to induce overall activity efficiency by IT means – automatic information processing, adequate information and document management. The system's implementation will also improve management strategies since on-line synthesis of most relevant information from organization's compartments / system's modules will turn into genuine electronic management assistants.

IT strategies should find their appropriate place within designing organization's management strategies [Kot00] since, based on their business impact, both in required resources, work impact and gained competitiveness, if properly implemented, IT management becomes a key component in organization management.

Within this framework, the present paper focuses on the most important principles in designing an IT strategy adapted to the company's targets and resources and in efficiently implementing dedicated software systems for managing organization activity.

2. Stages in Developing Companies' IT Strategies

Within this paragraph, based on the theoretical framework established in [AndP04], [And05], which can be synthetically formulated as adaptation to organization's target field and goals, organization resources and management strategy, we propose IT strategies adapted to organization characteristics. Therefore, all IT strategies recommended below take into account the company's goals & resources and the available human and financial resources.

It is essential that IT strategies be integrated within management strategies since they have high costs and, if properly designed, can significantly increase organization competitiveness (or waste resources otherwise). When designing IT strategies it is important to take into consideration the necessity to innovate, to design future upgrades both in IT infrastructure & software systems, in order to ensure company's adaptation to the dynamic business environment.

2.1. Small Companies

Small companies are the most flexible, their IT strategies have quite moderate costs and are relatively easy to be designed according to their goals. Most small company managers acknowledge the importance of IT in business competitiveness and invest in the company's adequate IT infrastructure. Taking into account the primary promotion goal of any small company, the next important step in the IT field is acquiring the *company's website*, mainly designed for promotion purposes [And05] Web marketing is nowadays one of the most efficient means in marketing strategies, with relatively low costs.

The promotion web site launching generally attracts customers from wider geographical areas and statistically increases the company's turnover [AndP04], bringing more resources into its business activity, which often leads to growing the business and, if corroborated with other efficient management strategies, also to enlarging the company.

Regarding the human resource field, small companies do not generally afford and do not really require their own IT personnel, therefore using part-time employees or acquiring IT maintenance services from specialized firms

Dedicated software usually includes finance & accountancy applications, with a fairly high degree of standardization for the business environment and, consequently, relatively moderate costs. Nevertheless, *it is recommended that future integration necessities be taken into account* (see medium companies in next section) for investment proficiency.

2.2 Medium Companies

Moving towards medium size companies necessarily implies hiring own IT personnel, mainly for network administration and full-time managing the IT infrastructure and basic software; as the company develops, the *IT team* will turn into the *IT department*

In order to model the company's activity, an *integrated ERP* (Enterprise Resource Planning) *system* is required since the information system has to integrate all relevant modules (Sales, Customers,

Acquisitions, Human Resources, Finance & Accountancy, etc.) modelling the activities from all inter-related compartments by accessing an integrated information database. The integration necessity is obviously motivated by the interdependence of most company's activities (for example, sales, as well as acquisitions or wages, have to be taken into account by the finance & accountancy module, the human resource module has to be correlated with wages, etc.). Relevant syntheses from all modules are to be integrated into a top management module with the role of an *electronic management assistant* (decision assistance systems).

Even if companies do not have all necessary funds available in order to acquire the entire ERP system, management levels have to adapt their investment strategy to the obvious integration goal of the modules.

The company's IT strategy also has to focus on developing *dedicated systems* oriented towards growing the business and increasing the company's competitiveness according to its *goals & target field* (education, consultancy, production, services, etc.). For example, human resources and consultancy companies can invest in upgrading the promotion web site into a company portal, offering client communication facilities, on-line registration (the company has already built its reputation and client trust), providing on-line training facilities, possibly by acquiring & developing e-learning systems.

The company's IT strategy has also to take into account the fact that once any dedicated software system is implemented, *the company will become dependant on the designer* (the software company which designed & implemented the software) for the system's maintenance, or any future update, upgrade or adjustment in the system. Therefore, it is highly recommended that these topics be covered in the initial contract / agreement.

When acquiring a software system, companies may either face the situation in which there exist fairly standard solutions in the field, for which specific customisations are nevertheless often needed, or the situation in which the problem is fairly new or peculiar, and a specific software system has to be designed. Both in the case of customisation, and in the case of designing the system from scratch, *system specifications* are of utmost importance because *their accuracy guarantees that the software system will meet user needs* (see next section)

Improper or incomplete system specification given by users will lead to time and resource waste, both from financial and human resources points of view. Taking into account the high costs of software systems, generated by their high complexity, it becomes obvious that designing adequate system specifications are to be given proper attention and resources. Moreover, *adequate investments in efficient software systems will highly increase the company's competitiveness.*

2.3 Large Companies

Although large companies possess considerable resources, their activity, consequently their *IT strategy* as well, are characterized by a *higher complexity*, therefore it is important to be appropriately designed.

An adequate IT infrastructure and a consistent IT department are obviously required.

The strategies in implementing ERP & dedicated software systems, already necessary for medium size companies (see previous section), become essential for large companies, otherwise they can not be competitive enough to promote their business on the market. The **integrated ERP system** and its top *management assistance facilities* become of utmost importance for large companies, where the "distance" from operational levels to top management ones increases. The structure of large companies imposes the necessity of designing management strategies based on efficient and integrated information systems, which offer relevant management syntheses and adequate information at any moment, based on updated information from the system's integrated database.

Large companies possess considerable financial & human resources, therefore *can decide for sustaining their own software development team* within the IT department, in order to design and implement dedicated software for the company. Such a strategy has the enormous advantage of own software manageability, which is extremely important in companies with significant activity dynamics and is an optimal solution for companies with good potential in sustainable IT human resources, and good financial resources. On the other hand, this solution is not recommended under time constraints, since it requires a considerable amount of time. In cases of time

constraints and very generous financial resources, possibly corroborated with brand requirements including in IT (for example banks offering secured systems for on-line payments), the recommended strategy is to acquire the dedicated software from highly rated IT software companies.

Software system implementation is one of the most important and challenging aspect to be solved within IT strategies dedicated to large companies because such systems are definitely required, while their implementation has a huge impact on the organization, both from necessary resources and future impact points of view. An adequate solution is to be chosen by taking into account *good time management, corroborated with IT human resources and financial strategies, adapted to the company's targets*

3. Principles in Implementing Dedicated Software Systems – Users' Role

The stages in designing and implementing software systems are dealt with in [And05]. In order to implement proficient dedicated software systems within organizations, it is important that companies' management levels be aware of the users' role in implementing such systems.

Users should be involved in:

- *Defining system specifications* – establishing system requests; in this respect, it is important that the following aspects are tackled:
 - The necessary information and the information to be processed – will constitute the system's *database*
 - Requested information *processing* – means in which the information is processed
 - *Reporting* – necessary reports, statistics, syntheses obtained by accessing the information database
 - *Connection with other modules* – information to be transferred to / from other information (sub)systems and requested formats (import / export operations). Such specifications are important even if the connected modules are under development or intended to be developed in the future because, as sustained in paragraph 2, module integration is essential for the organization

- *Import requirements from previous systems* – if the system upgrades a previously implemented one, it is important that previously used database(s) be imported into the new one, otherwise users will have to re-introduce data
- *Assistance and maintenance requests* - consequent to system implementation
- *Prototype Verification* – evaluating the first version of the system and indicating aspects to be adjusted
- *System Use & Monitoring* – using system facilities according to its documentation & specifications and, if necessary, indicating potential problems to be adjusted or necessary system modules to be designed & integrated in the future

Efficient implementations of dedicated software systems have to take into consideration the organization involvement in the above described implementation stages.

The analysis stage is to be performed by the IT team / company in cooperation with the (user) client organization. Incorrect or incomplete system specifications can conduce to repeated redesigning processes for the IT company / team, and to resource waste (time, finances, skilled human resources) both for the IT company and its client organization.

On the other hand, adequate management of the above described aspects ensures a successful system implementation for the organization and the adaptation of the contracted software to all the defined user requirements.

4. Romanian Case Study

According to an undergoing study within the Romanian business environment [And04], based on administrating and interpreting an evaluation questionnaire in the county of Cluj, we can state, with a fairly good accuracy [And04], that:

- Computer networks and Internet connections are used on a large scale – 95% in our sample
- around 80% of the firms in our sample have their own *website*, mainly oriented on promotion purposes. The most important facilities offered

by the implemented web sites are: *marketing and promotion* – 37% (ranks on top as expected, since it represents the first step in moving the business towards the web), *client communication* – 24%, *internal (employee) communication and product distribution* – 7-8%

- 40% of the total employee number in our sample firms use their own computer
- Regarding the *software* that is used, we noticed almost equal proportions among: *office automation, database, Internet, financial and specific software* (around 14-16%). As predicted, management software, which imposes a consolidated integration of the most relevant information from all departments comes with a lower percentage – 9%. Human resources software was rated with 8%
- The most *used Internet applications* regard, as expected within the business environment, *e-business* – 21%, *e-payment* – 21%, *e-commerce* – 12% and *e-news* – 12%
- In our evaluation regarding the previous year investments in ICT made by small and medium enterprises, we found that: 18% declared total ICT investments higher than 75%, 14% in the interval (50%, 75%], 9% in the interval (30%, 50%] and 31% - investments lower than 30%
- *ICT created new jobs* for 66% of our subjects, in various percentages
- A majority of 70% in our sample sustain that *IT strategies influence human resources policies and management strategies*

Taking into account these results, we can conclude that although the infrastructure is in place, information system implementation is in its medium stages in Romania: integrated ERP systems and management assistants are not yet implemented on a large scale, but the trend and necessity in implementing such systems becomes more and more noticeable.

Therefore, it is very important that adequate IT strategies be integrated into Romanian organization management strategies and that the awareness of users' role in implementing dedicated information systems is appropriately trained.

5. Conclusions

Based on the huge impact that IT has in organization activity and management, we sustain that it is essential to integrate IT strategies within organization management strategies and to adopt appropriate strategies in implementing dedicated information systems.

We state that IT strategies should be designed according to the company's goals & resources and the available human and financial resources. IT strategies should also take into account the necessity of future hardware & software upgrades. The paper proposes systematic IT strategies for small, medium and large companies designed on the above stated principles.

We also discuss the IT implementation stage in Romania, concluding that although the infrastructure is in place, information system implementation is in its medium stages in Romania: integrated ERP systems and management assistants are not yet implemented on a large scale, although the tendency in developing them becomes more and more clear. We consider that an improvement could be based on an increased awareness regarding the importance of integrating IT strategies in management strategies and of users' role in implementing dedicated information systems.

The implementation of information systems should be adapted to the overall IT strategy of the organization and must ensure flexibility and extendibility in the development and implementation of software systems.

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Book Review

Dominique Schnapper : « Qu'est-ce que l'intégration ? » Gallimard 2007, 240 pages

Marina Pisica

De nos jours, la société contemporaine connaît des changements radicaux. Même si chaque nation garde sa spécificité, ses valeurs et ses traditions, aucune n'échappe aux transformations amenées par la modernisation au sein de chaque société. D'où la nécessité de revoir certains phénomènes qui ne peuvent plus être perçus de la même manière qu'avant. L'intégration n'est pas un concept récent, mais il reste toujours actuel puisqu'il accompagne la vie quotidienne de toute société.

Dominique Schnapper explique le contenu détaillé de ce concept dans son livre « Qu'est-ce que l'intégration ? » La France, l'Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis sont le lieu qu'elle a choisi pour son enquête sur l'intégration des étrangers à la société, aussi bien que celle de la société elle-même. En effet, avant de commencer son analyse, l'auteur distingue les deux aspects importants de l'intégration :

- a. L'intégration des étrangers à la société nationale
- b. L'intégration *de* la société nationale dans son ensemble.

Ces deux aspects vont constituer le principal sujet de recherche . Jusqu'à présent, un seul aspect est évoqué le plus souvent, celui qui établit le rapport société – étranger, alors que ce terme est beaucoup plus large. Il désigne aussi un principe de la démocratie moderne qui intègre tous les citoyens dans un processus commun, basé sur l'égalité et liberté.

Le terme d' « intégration » fait partie de deux domaines différents : la sociologie et la politique. Dans le cadre de la politique, l'intégration représente l'activité des politiques publiques chargées d'inclure l'étranger dans la société nationale. Dans le cadre de la sociologie, l'intégration désigne un processus beaucoup plus complexe, résultat des observations et des recherches sociologiques.

Dans le premier chapitre, l'auteur nous démontre que le terme d'« intégration » est beaucoup plus ancien qu'on ne le pense. Ses premiers éléments sont analysés chez Durkheim. Il définit l'intégration comme « produit direct du nombre des individus de la société et de l'intensité de leurs interactions »¹. Dominique Schnapper illustre la pensée de plusieurs sociologues, pour expliquer l'évolution du terme. En suivant la réflexion de chaque personnalité, deux éléments se définissent comme constantes : l'ensemble des individus et leur lien spécifique selon la « communauté »

La pensée sociologique américaine inclut le deuxième aspect de l'intégration. Elle a pour objectif de former une nation unique à partir des différents groupes d'immigrés. Il s'agit d'un processus plus compliqué, car l'individu subit d'abord une « désorganisation » (terme utilisé par William Thomas et Florian Znaniecki pour expliquer l'affaiblissement de l'influence des normes sociales dans le cadre du groupe), pour s'intégrer ensuite à la société d'accueil suivant la phase de « réorganisation » (l'acceptation progressive par les membres du groupe des règles et des institutions de la société).

Mais l'auteur se montre incapable d'analyser l'intégration en tant que telle, puisque ce processus n'est jamais achevé. Il varie selon les différents domaines de la vie sociale, d'où la possibilité d'analyser seules ses « dimensions ».

Le premier chapitre met donc en évidence les différentes formes de l'intégration, la nature du lien entre les individus quel que soit le groupe, les structures, les démarches faites sur le parcours et l'évaluation du degré d'intégration. La conclusion tend à affirmer que l'intégration d'un groupe à une société nationale représente une des dimensions d'un processus plus large – l'intégration de la société elle-même.

Le deuxième chapitre traite le premier aspect de l'intégration ou d'une de ses dimensions – l'intégration des migrants à la société. Ici l'auteur met en évidence et explique le fonctionnement de deux grands modèles d'intégration – américain et français.

L'assimilation représente le premier modèle d'intégration des migrants aux États-Unis, comme en France. Aux États-Unis, il n'impose pas une homogénéité ethnique et culturelle. Mais il suppose l'utilisation de la

¹ Dominique Schnapper « Qu'est-ce que l'intégration ? » Gallimard 2007, page 32

langue commune, la participation aux traditions américaines et l'adoption des mêmes techniques et modes de vie tout en gardant les particularismes spécifiques du groupe. Les nombreuses recherches sociologiques démontrent la tendance de la société américaine à former un autre modèle d'intégration des migrants, plus respectueux de leur diversité. D'après les Américains, l'assimilation est un vieux modèle des États européens. L'auteur explique l'évolution de la pensée américaine étape par étape à la recherche d'un modèle d'intégration plus sophistiqué et moins rigide.

En revanche, en France cette recherche parvient plus tardivement, avec l'apparition des « multiculturalistes ». Elle s'oppose au modèle classique « intégrationniste » et se rapproche du modèle américain. L'opposition entre les deux modèles se développe plus particulièrement dans les années 1980-1990. Selon l'auteur, la société républicaine française renonce difficilement à son modèle d'intégration classique, fondé sur « l'utopie républicaine » qui prévoit tous les citoyens égaux devant l'État.

Le Canada et l'Australie ont accepté plus facilement les politiques d'intégration multiculturelles qui ont pour démarche initiale la reconnaissance dans l'espace public du sens et de la dignité de la culture d'origine des immigrants.

Mais même si le modèle « intégrationniste » a déjà été reconnu comme inopérant, son opposant comporte aussi des risques qui peuvent mettre en danger la société d'accueil. D'où la nécessité du respect de certaines conditions.

D'après l'auteur, l'enquête est le meilleur moyen de compléter une analyse. Elle donne la possibilité de mesurer le niveau d'intégration des immigrants selon le pays. Les enquêtes faites en France, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne ont eu des résultats clairs concernant l'intégration des étrangers. L'acculturation rapide est spécifique aux trois pays grâce à la fréquentation scolaire. En Grande-Bretagne, le lien avec la culture d'origine est plus prononcé à cause de la politique du gouvernement britannique. Sur le plan politique, si en France et en Grande-Bretagne tous les étrangers doivent acquérir la nationalité du pays d'accueil pour réussir leur intégration, en Allemagne ce processus est moins répandu. D'où le sentiment de se sentir « moins allemand » que dans les deux autres cas. En France, l'intégration culturelle et structurelle est la plus grande alors que

l'intégration dans le monde du travail et de la politique reste la plus difficile.

Pour conclure, l'intégration des migrants à *la société* renvoie à la question d'intégration *de la société*. Il est donc important d'analyser non seulement l'intégration d'un certain groupe à la société, mais aussi l'intégration de la société elle-même.

Dans le troisième chapitre, l'intégration de la société dans une démocratie repose sur « la reconnaissance de l'égalité de tous les individus ». Ce phénomène se reflète dans l'exercice de la citoyenneté de chaque individu (le vote) et dans la participation à la production des richesses (travail – « grand intégrateur »). « L'individu souverain, né avec la modernité politique, est indissolublement le citoyen et l'homme qui travaille pour maîtriser la nature »

En conclusion de ce livre, on peut affirmer que la société démocratique s'interroge toujours sur l'intégration puisque c'est un sujet perpétuel. D'autre part, on peut le considérer comme un « concept - horizon » car la société n'a jamais atteint la définition théorique de l'intégration. Ce terme est à la fois sociologique et politique, d'où une possible confusion. Mais sa définition ne peut exclure ni l'intégration des migrants à la société, ni l'intégration de la société elle-même. Le débat actuel sur le multiculturalisme qui intègre la population de toute nationalité, est de plus en plus fréquent.

Julien Benda : „Discours à la nation européenne”, Gallimard, 1993

Emilie Chapuilliot

Essayiste, Julien Benda (Paris 1867 – Fontenay-aux-Roses 1956), auteur d'un pamphlet littéraire (*La France byzantine*, 1945) et d'une trilogie autobiographique (*La Jeunesse d'un clerc*, *Un régulier dans le siècle*, et *Exercice d'un enterré vif*, 1946), demeure surtout célèbre par sa réflexion sur *La Trahison des clercs* (1927).

Discours à la nation européenne vise à donner aux hommes portant le projet d'une Europe unie toutes les clés pour bâtir leur argumentation face à leurs détracteurs. Sous formes de pseudo leçons thématiques et commentées, Julien Benda déploie un raisonnement « pro-européen » avec force et vigueur. Abordant un à un des thèmes primordiaux – religion, paix, langues, nationalismes etc... - il se fait le défenseur de l'Europe de demain, unie dans la diversité. Sa démonstration – car il s'agit bien ici de prouver par l'expérience et par de nombreuses références l'existence d'une Europe potentielle – est riche d'enseignements. Quatre-vingts ans plus tard elle nous éclaire encore quant à la naissance, et l'avenir de l'Europe. Une Europe « super-nationale », en perpétuelle construction qui se retrouve aujourd'hui, à vingt – sept, face à de nouveaux défis.

Julien Benda et sa définition de la nation

Nous devons logiquement nous interroger sur le sens donné au terme « nation » et en l'occurrence ici à celui de « super-nation ».

« L'Europe ne sera pas le fruit d'une simple transformation économique, voire politique ; elle n'existera vraiment que si elle adopte un certain système de valeurs, morales et esthétiques ; si elle pratique l'exaltation d'une certaine manière de penser et de sentir, la flétrissure d'une autre ; la glorification de certains héros de l'Histoire, la démonétisation d'autres ».

À mon sens, sa conception de la nation se rapproche de la définition établie par le Dictionnaire *Zingarelli* de l'Académie italienne à savoir « un complexe d'individus liés par la même langue [on verra par la suite le point

de vue de l'auteur sur cette question], la même histoire, les mêmes intérêts et les mêmes aspirations, à condition qu'ils aient la conscience de ce patrimoine commun ». La nation – version Julien Benda - exige la piété, le dévouement et l'amour ; et la notion de territoire est totalement étrangère à ce concept. Pour Julien Benda, la nation européenne existe par elle-même ; elle a une existence propre, à part entière et légitime. En se lançant dans un tel argumentaire, l'auteur pense pouvoir donner l'impulsion à une dynamique européenne latente. La nation existerait avant même l'idée que les peuples s'en font. Entre les lignes, on devine que Julien Benda pense qu'il suffit de réveiller la conscience européenne pour faire du continent une nation effective. Mais ne nous voilons pas la face, Rome ne s'est pas faite en un jour ; la nation européenne non plus...

À noter que l'auteur a une confiance incommensurable dans les peuples. À aucun moment de l'ouvrage il n'évoque l'éventualité d'une quelconque construction politique ou institutionnelle ; la nation européenne se fera par le bas, par la force et la volonté de son peuple. L'Europe du peuple nous l'avons finalement laissée de côté privilégiant une Europe économique et des institutions. Aujourd'hui, nous recherchons le soutien populaire notamment par le biais d'une pseudo citoyenneté européenne. Est-ce là dans la logique des choses ? Julien Benda a compris que pour recueillir l'adhésion des peuples, il faut d'abord les fédérer et leur faire prendre conscience du passé, du présent et de l'avenir qu'ils ont en commun. C'est seulement dans une communauté d'intérêts et de destin qu'ils avanceront ensemble dans la même direction.

Quelles sont les bases d'une nation ? Sur quoi se construit cette idée ?

L'Europe de la culture est antérieure à toutes organisations politiques : l'Europe de la chrétienté, celle des monastères et des universités, celle des Lumières était plus unie culturellement que ne le fut, à partir de la fin du XVIII^{ème} siècle l'Europe des États – nations qui a semble t-il fragilisé et parfois compromis la conscience européenne. Si un certain cosmopolitisme culturel s'est maintenu à travers les âges, au niveau des élites, il demeure que les États - nations, ont non seulement fortifié et enrichi des consciences culturelles nationales, mais ont fait diminuer la part qui revenait au

sentiment d'appartenance commune. Celui-ci imprègne en profondeur toutes les cultures du continent européen dont le fondement culturel demeure l'héritage judéo-gréco-latin, quels que soient les apports extérieurs et très divers d'autres courants. Julien Benda insiste sur cette sensibilisation européenne qui nous distingue du reste du monde. Une idée défendue également par R. Condanhove-Kalergi :

« L'Europe forme un tout grâce à la religion chrétienne, à la science européenne, à l'art et à la culture qui reposent sur des bases grecques et chrétiennes. [...] L'unité de la culture occidentale nous donne le droit de parler de nation européenne qui se subdivise en divers groupes linguistiques et politiques ».

R. Coudhenvove relativisait la barrière de la langue, Julien Benda l'exalte : dans sa vision des choses, une langue commune devra se superposer aux langues nationales. C'est le français – pour sa clarté, son rationnel, son apollinisme -, qui selon l'auteur aura une certaine primauté morale. Julien Benda accorde lui aussi une place importante à la religion même s'il lui confère un autre rôle. Elle n'est pas selon lui, seulement une base pour l'Europe, elle ne renvoie pas seulement à un passé commun : elle doit concourir à faire de l'Europe ce qu'elle doit être. Les souvenirs douloureux du premier grand conflit mondial - « la der des ders » - résonne avec insistance dans un véritable éloge du pacifisme. Les clercs doivent aller dans ce sens en prêchant la modération face aux volontés d'expansion et la soif de s'accroître qui caractérisent l'homme moderne. C'est avec l'aide des hommes d'églises que la dimension militaire et guerrière de l'Europe disparaîtra au profit d'un pacifisme à l'européenne. La paix ne correspond pas pour Julien Benda à l'absence de guerre : c'est un état d'esprit à part entière. C'est donc nécessairement grâce à un changement de moralité publique que la paix s'imposera en Europe.

La naissance d'une nation ou d'une « super – nation »

Pour l'auteur, la nation est bipolaire, elle se construit à travers deux mouvements opposés dans leur finalité mais simultanés dans leur apparition. La nation naît en effet d'une volonté de « vivre ensemble » : fraternité, altruisme, association, partage, unité, union... les vertus que l'on

peut lui attribuer sont sans fin. Mais dans le même temps, ces individus qui s'unissent s'enferment dans ce nouveau cadre de référence qu'ils ont créé, imposant des frontières entre eux et les autres. Opposition, haine, arrogance... le deuxième versant de la nation a de quoi faire peur : il permet à l'homme de se confondre dans le collectif pour s'opposer aux autres et ainsi assouvir ses besoins et ses tentations les plus égoïstes. L'intérêt de la nation, du groupe primant sur celui de l'individu, l'égoïsme se transforme en engagement, devenant positif voire « sacré ». Julien Benda est persuadé que ce côté obscur et pervers s'effacera dans la nation européenne. Il croit en l'Europe et à sa capacité à unir des individus différents : moins attachés à l'Europe qu'à leur nation ou jadis à leur province, les européens vivront ensemble avant « d'exister contre » ou « en opposition avec ». Ce qui pour l'auteur fera l'atout de l'Europe, c'est le détachement qu'auront les individus vis à vis d'elle. Ce déficit identitaire est certainement aujourd'hui une des failles les plus sensibles en Europe. L'auteur y voyait une condition *sine qua non* au bon fonctionnement de l'Europe, désormais, on se bat pour faire naître un sentiment européen à part entière.

Selon Julien Benda, l'Europe a toutes les cartes en main pour devenir une « super-nation », même si le chemin risque d'être long et semer d'embûches.

« L'Europe se fera, comme se firent les nations. La France s'est faite parce que, chez chaque Français, à l'amour pour son champ ou pour sa province s'est superposé l'amour pour une réalité transcendante à ces choses grossièrement tangibles, l'amour pour une idée ».

Julien Benda prêche l'affranchissement du préjugé national - et plus largement du national -, mais surtout il insiste sur la notion de conscience qui, selon lui, constitue la condition de base de l'existence d'une nation.

« Ce qu'il faut enseigner aux hommes, c'est à abolir le sentiment de leurs différences en s'appliquant à se sentir chacun dans sa région d'humanité supérieure à ses différences »

Il reviendra à chacun d'abandonner sa moralité nationale, pour qu'enfin triomphe l'âme européenne supérieure. L'Europe ne doit pas, selon Julien Benda, devenir un assemblage artificiel de particularismes. Aujourd'hui plus qu'hier, c'est pourtant ce qu'elle est ! L'auteur sait que l'avènement de l'Europe sera difficile. Il a conscience que cela nécessitera

un long apprentissage, un processus complexe, de détachement et d'attachement. Ce qu'il vise fondamentalement à travers une construction politique de l'Europe, c'est un dépassement du principe nationaliste au sens le plus large. Il revendique la nécessité d'un point d'ancrage ou d'une base d'unité d'une communauté où les gens pourront se sentir unis dans un même projet. L'Europe actuelle ressemble-t-elle à celle espérée par Julien Benda ? Plus d'un demi-siècle plus tard les mêmes interrogations, les mêmes doutes, parcourent l'Europe. Avec le « retour en Europe » des pays du centre et de l'est, la question du nationalisme a plus que jamais refait surface. Le défi que lançait à tous les peuples Julien Benda n'est rien à côté de celui qui a consisté à produire, dans les années 80' et 90' chez les individus un sentiment d'appartenance à l'Europe. Lorsque les pays de l'est s'émancipent de la domination soviétique, ils retrouvent leur souveraineté au moment où la construction de l'Europe - elle est et sera toujours en perpétuelle construction - impliquait un dépassement du principe national dans sa version négative. Mais l'éclatement du communisme a fait éclater l'unité fictive (penchant positif) de l'est. Contre l'ancien pseudo - universalisme communiste incarné par l'État-parti, on a assisté, à cette époque, à des réactivations identitaires. Julien Benda ne pouvait bien sûr pas prédire l'élargissement de l'Europe ; cependant, il aurait pu se demander s'il n'y avait pas plusieurs manières de concevoir le lien national et de penser l'Europe...

Le vertige identitaire de l'Europe

Cet ouvrage a le mérite d'alimenter le débat actuel sur l'Europe, sa légitimité, sa lisibilité, et sa crédibilité. Les écrits foisonnent sur les défis que doit encore relever l'Europe pour exister aux yeux des européens. Serge Bernstein, dans *La Grande Europe ?* souligne que

« L'Europe n'est pas une réalité vécue par les populations, mais l'être de raison forgé par des intellectuels et qui n'a de consistance que pour les politiques, les hommes d'affaires ou les universitaires ».

L'Europe peut-elle devenir une « super-nation » ? Quelles sont ses atouts ? Ses faiblesses ? C'est précisément ce sur quoi nous pousse à nous interroger l'ouvrage de Julien Benda. En retournant les arguments qui font de la

nation des cadres de référence il nous montre à quel point la réalité européenne est fragile. À l'heure de l'élargissement, l'Europe, est à mon avis une « famille patchwork » et il ne semble pas du tout évident que nous nous acheminions vers une culture de plus en plus uniforme. Nous avons connu, on l'a évoqué précédemment, des époques où nous étions, semble-t-il, beaucoup plus proches qu'aujourd'hui et nous risquons d'évoluer vers des périodes de plus grande divergence. Notre rapprochement n'obéit à aucun déterminisme, à aucune nécessité et la mondialisation pourrait très bien réveiller notre « esprit de clocher ». Rien ne nous indique que l'ère des communications nous amènera à une meilleure compréhension mutuelle. Les identités se négocient par la reconnaissance avec d'autres, et l'Europe doit se lancer dans une « politique affichée de la différence » comme la nomme Charles Taylor, capable de reconnaître l'égalité et la dignité des cultures. La prise en compte et le maintien d'une altérité radicale restent la condition fondamentale d'un minimum d'intercompréhension.

EXPORTS AND GROWTH IN ROMANIA – A CAUSAL RELATION?

Monica Ioana Pop Silaghi*

Abstract

Is there a causal relation between exports and growth in Romania? This is the question to which in this paper we will try to answer. To separate a deterministic relation of a causal one is a very important task of the economists. A positive correlation between two phenomena does not necessarily imply the existence of a causality between them. The findings of the econometric analysis suggest that an outward-looking must be correlated with a good structure of exports in order to obtain a high level of economic growth.

1. Introduction

The relation between trade and growth was debated over more than one century. The controversy regarding the positive effects of trade still exists today because there are points of views which sustain that free trade is a cause of underdevelopment, due to the dependence of the developing countries on the developed ones. Nowadays, the world experiences, without any doubt, a trend of liberalization. Even if a lot of empirical studies confirm the existence of a positive effect of the openness to trade on growth, the debate is still in progress.

Edwards [1992] poses the normal question if the volatility or the unpredictability of the world market permits that the exports determine growth in the developing countries. The exports of the less developed countries can fail in determining the economic growth of these countries due to a weak multiplier of foreign trade. This point of view was sustained with the mention that the positive experiences of South East Asia or East

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Asia are some exception and cannot be applied in the case of other countries.

Todaro [1998, p.475] thinks that the exports' prospects of the less developed countries, especially in the case of the exports composed of primary goods, are pessimistic and the prices of these exports failed in comparison with the prices of the goods exported by the developed ones. Thus, the proposal of import substitution strategy seemed to be welcomed and the most suitable for reducing the external dependence.

However, the fails of the above mentioned strategy are not strange for anyone. We know that even in the countries that adopted this policy, the imports might not be reduced but modified in structure. The external dependence is not reduced; the production of some goods can be more expensive than importing them, fact that determines as a consequence the imminence of disequilibrium in the economy. For this reason, on long and medium term, even in the case of developing countries, the strategy of import substitution cannot be beneficial.

Our paper evolves as it follows: Section 2 surveys the empirical literature in order to find some positive arguments about the relation between trade and growth, Section 3 contains some results that we obtained in the case of Romania in testing Export led Growth Hypothesis and Section 4 focuses on concluding remarks. The objective of the paper is to see if there is a casual relationship between export and growth in Romania. The positive evidence of an ELG relation (export led growth) could be an evidence that the structure of exports is enough healthy in order to sustain the level of the economic growth.

2. Trade and growth – theoretical backgrounds

The roots of the relation between trade and growth can be found in the classical theories as well as earlier during the mercantilism. From the traditional theories, it is clear that the foreign trade represent a stimulating force for the development as it was proved by A. Smith (1776) and D. Ricardo (1817). The comparative advantage was and is still being considered a determinant characteristic of the foreign trade. The outward

orientation of the economy permits to obtain comparative advantages and to develop sectors in which can be obtained economies of scale.

The main flaws of the traditional theories were that, due to these theories, the openness to trade does not have any influence over the long term economic growth rate. Another flaw is the omitting of the situation in which trade flows are between countries with similar development levels and to the fact that almost all the world exchanges are formed by similar goods, respectively intra-industrial trade.

For explaining the intra-industrial trade and the connection with the differentiated rates of growth of the countries, there can be implied arguments of the new trade theories. Krugman & Helpman [1988] emphasize that an additional source of the gains obtained as a result of trade is the increase of the products' variety which are accessible for the consumers, as countries are open to imports. In M. I. Pop Silaghi [2004] we offered a complete survey of the new trade theories and we found a considerable numbers of positive arguments about trade and growth. The theories are important as they give a different point of view over trade; they draw attention over new implications as increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, product differentiation, technological gap, product life cycle.

Grossman & Helpman [1991] argued that countries which are more open to the rest of the world have a higher ability to benefit from the technological advantages generated by the developed countries. Barro & Sala I. Martin [1995] considered a world with two countries: one developed and the other developing, with differentiated inputs and immobile capital between them. The innovation takes place in the advanced country and the other country is in the situation of imitation products and new techniques. The equilibrium growth rate in the poorest country depends on the imitation cost and on the initial stock of knowledge. If the imitation costs are lesser than the innovation costs, the poorer country will grow more rapidly than the advanced one and it will exist a convergence trend of the economic growth rates. In this model, it is natural to make connection between the imitation costs and the degree of openness: the more open countries have higher potential of absorbing new ideas.

Hogendorn [1996, p.442] also confirms the hypothesis that the developing countries which are more open to trade know a more rapid

growth and they will be more able to reach the income level of the industrialized countries.

The positive view on the relation between trade and growth stresses the gains that can arise from the international specialization at which it can be added the additional support of a lot of internal effects in the developing of a country. The international exchanges determine gains of welfare and efficiency of which benefit all the countries, no matter what their initial situation, their level of development, their technological level or their natural resources endowment are. These gains are of different nature regarding their belonging and the specialization implied by the traditional theories or by the advantages of a large market, analyzed by the new trade theories.

Important roles in the sustaining the above positive view have the empirical studies. A lot of empirical works (Michaely [1977], Feder [1983], Tyler [1981]) were based on regressions between exports and growth. The studies based on regressions implied the rank methods and the least squares method between exports and output or GDP. The variable taken into account for the economic growth was the real GDP although some studies used GDP per capita or the manufactured output and in some situations GDP from which it was excluded export. For the exports, there were used different variables as the increase of the real exports, the manufactured exports, the weight of export in GDP, the weight of the changes of exports in GDP. The number of the considered countries varied from seven to more than a hundred, the time periods were different and different variables were used for export and economic growth.

In [Pop-Silaghi, 2005a)] we gave insights of the studies developed by the above mentioned authors. A problem that it was encountered in these studies was that some results can determine an instant correlation due to the exports which are part of the GDP. We will shortly expose some results of those studies surveyed by us.

The majority of these studies use regressions starting from the neoclassical production function with the following form:

$$Y = f(K, L, X) \quad (1)$$

where

- Y is the level of output; in fact it is the GNP from which exports are extracted, taking into account that exports are part of the GNP

- K is the capital stock, with growth approximated by the level of investments, I
- L is the labor force
- X are the exports

Regressions had the following form:

$$\hat{Y}_j = \beta Z_j + \beta_{n+1} \hat{X}_j \quad (2)$$

where

- \hat{Y}_j is the rate of the real growth of the GDP or of the output
- X is the rate of the real growth of exports, or of exports and imports as well
- Z is a vector of additional variables, usually containing the rate of growth of the employed population, as well as the percentage of investments in the GDP

Michaely [1977] started his analysis considering a sample of 41 countries, divided in the two sub-samples: the first one, composed by countries with low-income and the second formed of countries with medium income. The author made a correlative analysis of ranks between the growth of GDP and the growth of exports as part of GDP. In this case, the specification of his model was the following:

$$Y_j = \beta Z_j + \beta_{n+1} \frac{X_j}{Y_j} \hat{X}_j \quad (3)$$

We consider this approach too suspicious because as exports are considered a part of the GDP, this fact can induce a positive sign of the coefficient which expresses relation between trade and growth. On the other hand, the author concluded, after solving the regression, that there exists a strong and significant correlation between the growth of GDP and the growth of export, at a level of significance of 1% in medium income countries. For countries with low income, correlation was positive but insignificant. He undergoes also that growth is affected by the performance of exports only after the country knows a minimum of development.

Tyler [1981] worked on a sample of 55 developing countries. The sample covers 55 middle income developing countries, eliminating from the analysis the lower income developing countries, defined as having the GNP per capita of US \$ 300 or less in US 1977 dollars. From the 55 selected countries, 6 were oil exporters, belonging to OPEC. For some of the

analysis, they have been omitted from the sample. The rationale of omitting the poorest countries is that some basic level of development is necessary for a country to most benefit from export-oriented growth, particularly involving manufactured exports. The major economic performance variable analyzed is the annual average rate of the GDP during 1960-1977. Pearson and Spearman rank correlations between the GDP growth rates recorded positive values, at a level of significance of 1%.

The same paper also studied the bivariate relationship between the GDP growth rate and the proportional change in the country's net barter terms of trade. The literature associated with the Prebisch-Singer thesis emphasizing the importance of a country's terms of trade would hypothesize a positive relationship, which means that an improvement in terms of trade is associated with high growth rates. The analysis of Tyler, undertaken on an ordinal basis, does not support this hypothesis. He found that there is no readily apparent relationship between terms of trade changes and economic growth performance. This fact suggests that, rather than expressing excessive concern over terms of trade movements, policy makers in middle-income countries would do better to implement policies to increase export growth. The correlations found by the author reported bivariate associations not incorporating the effect of other variables. At this study, we remarked also that the author tries to make a more rigorous approach to explaining GDP growth, which involves the specification and estimation of a model seeking to explain such growth. The starting point was a Cobb-Douglas production function incorporating three productive factors such as:

$$X_i = AK_i^\alpha L_i^\beta E_i^\gamma \quad (4)$$

where

- X_i : country i 's GDP
- A : a technological constant
- K_i : country i 's capital stock services
- L_i : country i 's labor force inputs
- E_i : country i 's exports

The third factor, exports, has been included on the basis that there are scale effects and externalities associated with export production and sales. For example, because of export market competition non-exported

products may come to be produced more efficiently as well. With increased international specialization along comparative advantage lines of developing countries, they can attain a wider use of abundant labor resources and a fuller use of existing capacity. Moreover, following the law of international comparative advantage, country's exports should probably grow faster than otherwise. Tyler also used the time dimension by expressing all variables as function of time. By differentiating equation (4) and dividing through (4), the relative growth of exports is expressed by:

$$\dot{X}_i/X = \dot{A}/A + \alpha \left(\dot{K}_i/K_i \right) + \beta \left(\dot{L}_i/L_i \right) + \gamma \left(\dot{E}_i/E_i \right) \quad (5)$$

We think that this formalization is very important, because the differences between economic growth rates among countries are explained in terms of proportional growth of capital, labor force and exports, over the whole considered period. The author also tries to find the results after replacing total exports with manufactured exports as follows:

$$\dot{X}_i/X = \dot{A}/A + \alpha \left(\dot{K}_i/K_i \right) + \beta \left(\dot{L}_i/L_i \right) + \gamma \left(\dot{E}_m/E_m \right) \quad (6)$$

The coefficient of exports was found positive and statistically different from zero. Table 1 depicts the results of regressions considered by Tyler.

Table 1: Intercountry regression analysis of the GDP growth rates for middle-income developing countries, 1960-1977

Eq.	No. of obs.	Constant \dot{A}/A	Capital K	Labor force	Exports	Manufactured exports	Determination coefficient R^2
(4)	41	1,997	0,254 (5,921)	0,981 (2,576)	0,57 (1,694)	0,045 (2,227)	0,685
(5)	37	1,745	0,236 (5,272)	1,014 (2,704)			0,714

Source: W.G. Tyler, Growth and export expansion in developing countries, Journal of Development Economics 9 (1981) 121-130, North-Holland Publishing Company

The statistics t , respectively the value in brackets in table 1, has values high enough to express the significance of the parameters. The determination coefficient of 0,685 implies that about 69% of the variance in the intercountry GDP growth rates can be explained by the rates of growth of capital formation, the labor force and total exports. For their part, a 1% increase in the rate of growth total exports is associated with an increase of 0.057 of 1% in GDP growth. Incorporating manufactured exports into the model instead of total exports yields similar results. Under the assumption of Hicks neutral technological progress, the constant in our regression estimates represents an estimate of annual average technological progress. We can notice that in all estimates the technological progress has indeed been important in the middle-income developing countries. Since the technological change parameter estimates decrease in the equation with manufactured export growth included, the conclusion was that manufacturing export activity is accompanied by greater technological progress. The final conclusion of the author was that in developing countries, exports have a significant impact on economic growth that technological progress is important and that countries should insist on economic policies of promotion of exports.

Feder [1983] developed a two-sector model: one producing export goods, and the other producing for the domestic market. The sample chosen by the author contains middle-income countries as well as low-income countries. The conclusions of his study were that, those countries that adopted policies oriented to encourage exports, benefited of resources allocation closer of optimum and of a higher rate of economic growth. Instead of an aggregate national production function, each of two sectors' output is a function of the factors allocated to the sector. In addition, the output of the non-export sector is dependent on the volume of exports produced. The regression considered had the expression of equation 7.

$$\hat{Y} = \beta_1 \left(\frac{I}{Y} \right) + \beta_2 \hat{L} + \beta_3 \hat{X} \frac{X}{Y} \quad (7)$$

- I represents the investments
- Y output
- L labor force
- X exports

Incorporating exports, respectively externalities provided by the export sector, as an explicative variable, gave the following form of the regression considered:

$$\hat{Y} = \gamma_1 \left(\frac{I}{Y} \right) + \gamma_2 \hat{L} + \gamma_3 \hat{X} \frac{X}{Y} + \gamma_4 \hat{X} \quad (8)$$

Coefficients β_3 and γ_4 recorded positive values, significant from the statistical point of view as: $\beta_3 = 0.4$ and $\gamma_4 = 0.13$. This means that, on average, there are substantial differences between marginal productivities of factors from the two sectors. These differences are due to the fail of entrepreneurs of equalizing marginal productivities of factors, on one hand, and on the other hand, to externalities. These externalities are generated because the export sector produces positive effects over the productivities of the other sector, which are not reflected in the market price. The results of this phenomenon are found in the fact that social marginal productivities are higher in export sectors and that economies which allocate resources to this sector will gain more than those which are oriented on the sector dedicated to internal market. It is important to notice that these studies have never identified the existence of a negative relation between exports and economic growth, not even in the case of less developed countries. The problem which appeared consisted in determining the minimum level of economic development that countries have to achieve, in order to benefit from a positive effect of exports on growth.

The cross-countries regressions assure a weak support regarding the way in which the explicative variables affect the economic growth and the dynamic behaviors inside a country. Being given the simultaneity implied in these models, the positive association for the entire sample is compatible also with the hypothesis “growth led exports” and with the hypothesis “exports led growth” or with a feed-back relation, inside one country. In the same time, output and export can be in a causality relation with another unspecified set of variables. More than that, these models assumed that the parameters of the regressions are the same for each country, which means that the production function and the factors’ productivities in different sectors are assumed to be the same everywhere. These kinds of studies do not permit to observe the differences among countries in their institutional, political, financial structures and in their

reactions at the external chokes, differences which can be important even when the sample of countries should seem homogenous.

The recognition of these difficulties met in the regression studies between countries in trying to establish whether exports led growth or vice versa determined another study category which test causality.

By incorporating the time in the analysis, the causality studies have a major advantage on regressions ones. The need for using time series analysis is due to the one-dimensional character of the real time. The existence in time assumes that the phenomena succeed one after another, from past to present, from present to future. If the space is reversible, time is irreversible. In order to forecast the future, it is compulsory that we describe as proper as we can the time succession and the link between phenomena. The projection of the economic variables on time axis creates an investigation way of dynamics, respectively time series. The time series lie at the basis of the statistical analysis of the changes.

Giles & Williams [2000] show that 74% from the studies which analyze the problem of growth determined by the foreign trade of a country through the data generated of the economic process imply time series tools using the Granger causality concept. The Granger causality concept is based on the predictability concept in the sense that in a stochastic system the cause cannot be produced after the imminence of the effect. This approach is quite too general in the sense that it does not impose any economic restriction over the implied time series. In the case of two processes, X and Y, we say that Y causes X if the relevant information about Y from the past permits us to realize a better prediction of the process X than in the case that we didn't use this information [Bresson, 1995, p.275]. The Granger causality concept is very popular in the empirical literature which tries to determine the strengthen of the causality relationship, respectively of the direction in which this relationship must be studied. It is studied formally in the time series econometrics starting especially form the auto-regressive representation on the general case of the multivariate statistical methods [see Bresson, 1995].

In the next section we will expose the results that we obtained in the case of Romania, following the steps that the methodology implies.

3. Granger test on Romanian Data

Romania presents an interesting case for testing causality, as the degree of openness is increasing continuously. As we computed in Pop Silaghi [2005 b)] in 1991 the degree of openness was 36.55 and in 2004 it was of 65.61%. It almost doubled and the cause was the reorientation of trade to the EU and the Liberalization Agreements signed with this group. More than that, the elasticity of exports and imports relative to GDP are over 1 (2.56 for exports in 2004, 4.35 for imports in the same year see also Pop Silaghi [2005 b)] fact that demonstrates the positive answer of trade to one percentage change of GDP.

The correlation between trade and growth certainly exist as trade is connected to growth. The exports suppose production for the outside consumers, this certainly has a positive impact on GDP. But it is not clear the direction of the relation, the causality, we mean the succession of the phenomena.

One important task for us was the selection of the relevant information when we imply a causality relation. The selection of the variables which are to define the stochastic system is very important fact that determines a high degree of caution when we choose the econometric analyzed model. It is very important the term of the relevant information. When it is chosen the information, it must be considered correctly the information on which the model is based, how we will get the input data, if these data can be used as they are or they need adjustments, if we use nominal or real values.

In the case of Romania we considered quarterly data, from 1998 to 2004, using logarithmic data expressed in EURO in order to eliminate as possible the high inflation rates. The source of data that we used is Eurostat, an Institute that provides data for a considerable number of countries from the world. The number of the statistical observations is 28. The selection of the autoregressive order was also very important, as the observations were quarterly we used the value of 4. The methodology that we implied supposed the following steps

First step: The determination of unit roots

For determining the unit roots, we applied successively the Dickey-Fuller the Augmented Dickey-Fuller as in [Bresson, 1995]. We considered the autoregressive process of order $p=4$, differentiated.

$$\nabla z_t = \mu + \gamma z_{t-1} + \delta_1 \nabla z_{t-1} + \delta_2 \nabla z_{t-2} + \delta_3 \nabla z_{t-3} + a_t \quad (9)$$

We considered the hypothesis: $H_0: \gamma = 0$ and $H_1: \gamma < 0$. These hypotheses are being tested using the t test on the estimated values of γ . Dickey and Fuller [1979] showed that the distribution of this statistics under the null hypothesis is a non-standard one and provided statistical tables with the simulated values of this distribution. Mackinnon [1991] expanded the provided tables by Dickey and Fuller for larger sets of data and for more variables situated in the right side of the expression.

As recommended by Bresson [1995] and Box et. al. [1994], for determining the number of unit roots, first, the tests should be applied directly on the values of the series z_t , then on the first difference of the series z_t (∇z_t), then for the second difference ($\nabla^2 z_t$) etc. If the test accepts the null hypothesis directly on the values of the series, but the null hypothesis on the values of the first order differentiated series is rejected then the series has one unit root and it is integrated of order 1. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis directly on the values of the series and on the first difference, but rejects the null hypothesis on the second difference then the series has two unit roots and it is integrated of order two. The reasoning can continue in order to establish the number of the unit roots of the series. Table 2 presents the obtained results of unit root tests for the case of Romania.

The exports series have at least two unit roots while GDP has one unit root. Therefore, we obtained the case of non-stationarity, which requires us to perform further cointegration tests.

Table 2: The determination of the unit roots

Indicator		Initial series		First difference		Second difference		Conclusion
		v. calc	v. tab.	v. calc	v. tab	v. calc	v. tab	
Exp.	ADF, p=4	-2.733	-3.003	-2.574	-3.011	-2.904	-3.019	At least two unit roots
GDP	ADF, p=4	-0.801	-3.003	-3.081	-3.011			One unit root

Source: Own calculus based on data provided by Eurostat (www.eurostat.org)

Second step: The study of cointegration

In this phase, we will apply the cointegration tests for couples of indicators, for identifying if the series evolves towards long term equilibrium. The necessity of testing the cointegration, as we remarked previously, comes from the fact that it wasn't identified a stationarity of the stochastic processes after applying the tests of unit roots.

In what the cointegration test is concerned, we will expose first the representation from which we start and then we will apply the tests.

The testing for cointegration assumes non-stationarity of the processes component of the models and it is realized according with the method proposed by Johansen [1988].

This method assumes the estimation of the matrix Π and the testing of the rejection possibility of the restrictions implied by the presence of an inferior rank of this matrix. Cointegration exists if the rank of the matrix Π is different by zero and inferior to its dimension. In the case that the rank of the matrix Π is $r < K$, Π can be rewritten as $\Pi = \alpha\beta^T$. Every column of β gives us an estimation of the cointegration vector. The cointegration vectors cannot be identified without the setting of an arbitrary normalization, so that those r relations of cointegration must be determined for the first r variables from the system in function of other $k-r$ variables.

In our case, we will consider the cointegration hypothesis:

$$H_1(r): \Pi z_t = \alpha(\beta^T z_{t-1} + \mu_0) \quad (10)$$

The statistical software Eviews tests firstly the hypothesis regarding the rank of the cointegration matrix, testing first if no cointegration exists, then for 1 cointegration relation, next for 2 cointegration relations and so on.

Table 3 presents the results for the cointegration tests between exports and GDP, determining one cointegration relation. The cointegration equation (11) reveals that exports and GDP go towards long term equilibrium. From the economical point of view, the series of exports and of GDP prove to develop similar trends. Of course, this thing is a step toward proving the existence of a direct relationship between exports and GDP but does not tell us anything about the causality of this relation.

Table 3. Testing cointegration between exports and GDP

	Likelihood	5 Percent	1 Percent	Hypothesize
Eigenvalue	Ratio	Critical Value	Critical Value	d No. of CE(s)
0.830653	47.69488	19.96	24.60	None **
0.324393	8.627157	9.24	12.97	At most 1
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level				
L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level				

Source: Own calculus based on Eurostat data

$$\text{Log (EXP)} - 1.59 \text{ log (GDP)} + 6.61 = 0 \quad (11)$$

Third step: The study of causality

After testing the unit roots and the cointegration, we found out that the export series and the GDP series are not stationary, as they do not move around an average for long time, so they do not tend to an equilibrium. Following the method proposed in [Bresson, 1995, p.273] we applied the causality on VAR models (vector autoregressive) with the autoregressive order of 4, on the bivariate model exports- GDP.

The econometric soft Eviews implement the causality tests by applying Wald tests over the coefficients represented in a VAR form and the equation is it follows:

$$y_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + \alpha_p y_{t-p} + \beta_1 x_{t-1} + \dots + \beta_p x_{t-p} \quad (12)$$

In this equation, the Wald test assumes the testing of the restriction:

$$\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \dots = \beta_p = 0 \quad (13)$$

In order to obtain the representation of type VECM, we must estimate a VAR model in Eviews in which we must include the specific elements of equation (12). For the estimation of the representation VECM, we will realize the VAR estimation of the equation:

$$\nabla y_t = \alpha_0 + \gamma_0 c(y, x) + \alpha_1 \nabla y_{t-1} + \dots + \alpha_p \nabla y_{t-p} + \beta_1 \nabla x_{t-1} + \dots + \beta_p \nabla x_{t-p} \quad (14)$$

In the representation (14), the Wald test over restriction remains that of equation (13). With the help of Eviews, we estimated the equation (14) and after we applied the Wald tests over restrictions, we obtained the results from table 4.

Table 4. The Wald tests in the VECM model between exports and GDP

Nule Hypothesis	Obs	F-Statistic	Probabilit y
LOG_EXP does not Granger cause LOG_GDP	21	0.63046	0.6494
LOG_GDP does not Granger cause LOG_EXP		12.036	0.00026

Source: Own calculus based on Eurostat data (www.eurostat.org)

The first hypothesis due to which exports do not cause economic growth is accepted, being given the high value of probability. The second hypothesis, GDP does not Granger cause exports is rejected, being given the low level of probability (under 5%). In other words, the econometric test demonstrates that we do not have sufficient evidences for situating ourselves in the conditions in which exports represent a determinant of economic growth. The relation is valid vice versa, as states the second conclusion, which rejects the null hypothesis of non-causality on the relation GDP-exports.

The obtained results demonstrated us that the information of exports is not relevant for the prediction of GDP in Romania, on the data considered but vice versa, the GDP causes the exports (growth led exports hypothesis GLE). It is natural to think to this last implication, as a higher level of GDP means a higher level of output which can be consumed inside or outside the country.

Comparing our results with other, we would mention that the ELG hypothesis was verified in countries like Asian tigers as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malayezia but also for less developed countries as Latin America or some countries from Africa. In many countries, there was found as positive only the inverse relation that we found for Romania (i.e. Growth led exports GLE) which means that in these countries the economic growth determines exports (e.g. Norvegia, Japan, Canada on the period 1950-1985) [Axfentiou, Serletis, 1991].

5. Conclusions

It is not enough to experience an outward orientation if the structure of the exports is not healthy enough to cause economic growth. In this paper, we were interested to see the nature of the relation between exports and growth in Romania. As in the literature the theoretical arguments upon this relation are very convincing, the empirical literature is very rich in studies on this relationship. The well known regressions studies reached in almost all the cases the conclusion that exports is positive correlated with the economic growth. Even in the less developed countries, there was found a correlation, but indeed, a weak one. Because the result was, however, a predictable one (as exports are included in GDP) the literature made progress in finding new tools of testing the nature of relation. The most complex ones were those provided by the time series analysis. In this paper, we developed causality tests in the case of Romania and we found out that in Romania the exports are not a cause of GDP, but vice versa the relation exists. This conclusion was very important as it made us clear a thing: the structure of exports is not enough based on value added products which could contribute to the economic growth. A comparative advantage in textiles and clothes, we mean in labor intensive goods cannot

for sure constitute a favorable thing for a long time. Therefore, the structure of exports should be consisted of high technology intensive goods in order to attain a level of the GDP and not only to attain it, but to cause it.

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