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STUDIA UBB EDITORIAL OFFICE: B.P. Hasdeu no. 51, 400371 Cluj-Napoca, Romania,
Phone + 40-264-405352, www.studia.ubbcluj.ro, office@studia.ubbcluj.ro

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CYBERSPACE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Melania-Gabriela Ciot*

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Abstract

*The present article is trying to bring into attention the new concept of **cyberization** of IR, by argumenting the importance of cyberspace and the instruments that it provides for the scholars and practitioners for a new international relations typology. The constructivist approach is used for the notion of state responsibility, for underlying the behavior of a state in cyberspace. The necessity of an international cyberspace policy is evidenced, as well as the proposed international norms for assuring the cybersecurity. The open international cyberspace will challenged national sovereignty and the state leaders will have to find ways of responding to this continuous and sophisticated threats that appeared recently.*

Key words: cyberspace, cybersecurity, digital world, international policy, world order

1. Introduction

The challenge of the process of *cyberization* of the International Relations opens a sophisticated debate that ask for an interdisciplinary approach. This debate will invite scholars and practitioners from different fields of activity to join the exploration of the relation between cyberspace and international relations.

* PhD, Associated Professor, Department of European Studies and Governance, Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania. Contact: Gabriela.Ciot@euro.ubbcluj.ro

The idea of this article and of coordinating this number of journal *Studia Europae* under the topic *Cybersecurity and the restructuring of the international system* came from the observation of the lack or insufficient contributions in discussions and/or debates (not mentioning the research) from scholars and experts from academic community on the topic of the influences that cyberspace exerts nowadays on the world order and the impact that it will have on restructuring of the international system or on the approaches of various subjects from the IR field, such as: decision-making, international policies, international politics, international security, peacemaking, conflict, cooperation, negotiations, diplomacy.

Our dynamic society brought into attention new challenges for our daily life, as terrorism, emotional implications of decision-making process, the increasing role of behavioral international relations, the threats of cyber-attacks and their increasing occurrence. We can say that we are living in a cyberworld and that we need cyber mechanisms to convert to this frame and tempo and to develop a sort of resilience to new threats coming from this new sort of non-state actor from international cyberspace that changes the perceptions of reality, our attitudes, and knowledge processes.

The present article will present the implications of the cyber dimension in the restructuring of the international system, the research opportunities for the scholars from academic community and some possible developments of the international relations' topology.

2. The cyberization of IR

Pablo A. Mazurier¹ (2015) proposes a division of the social world in four areas:

- a. *international arena* – with state actors searching for power.
- b. *transnational dimension* - developed after the last wave of globalization, based on multinational corporations (MNCs) searching for economic benefits.
- c. *global community* – facilitated by the work of international organizations, NGOs and social networks.
- d. *cyberspace* - all the actors from the other fields behave searching for cyberpower.

¹ Pablo A. Mazurier, *Facebook in Cyber Politics*, 2015, [http://www.cyberpolitics.eu/cyberpolitics_art_04_facebook.html], 4 June 2017

The author believes that cyberpowers are managed by cyber-actors depending on the knowledge and on the control of the infrastructure and of networks. Cyberspace is connected with the other three areas. The “cyber-actors exercises cyberpower in order to secure their own interests, not exclusively related with the cyberspace”².




Fig. no. 1: The dimension of social world (after Mazurier, 2015, http://www.cyberpolitics.eu/cyberpolitics_art_04_facebook.html)

As we can see from above figure, the cyberspace represents one dimension of social world, characterized by multiplayers which exerts cybpowers by knowledge, infrastructure and networks³.

Bruner⁴ (2014) refers to the cyberspace as an international, special environment, in which is hard to attribute some actions to a specific actors – and this brings novelty to the world order, because we cannot establish the responsibility. In his article, the author presents different models of state responsibility and applies it to the cyberspace dimension, focusing on the behavior of a state in cyberspace.

By using a constructivist perspective for approaching the notion of state responsibility as basis for prospecting it in cyberspace, Bruner⁵ identifies two models: vertical – communitarian model and horizontal – bilateral model:

² *Ibidem*

³ *Ibidem*

⁴ Tomáš Bruner, 2014, *States in cyber-space: perspectives of responsibility beyond attribution*, [<https://ecpr.eu/.../f1874dac-6e16-4d9c-b936-723754fcc869...>], 23 June 2017

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 3




Fig. no. 2: Models of state responsibility (after Bruner, 2015, p. 4).

The vertical model states that the state responsibility toward the international community and to its citizens and demands that the state responsibility should express the interest of people, rather than the states and serves to their protection⁶. The horizontal model underlines that the state's responsibility is understood in terms of bilateral relationships of states⁷.

The constructivist approach could be used by connecting these models with the constructed levels of anarchy proposed by Alexander Wendt⁸, as Bruner proposed⁹. He mentioned the three cultures of this anarchy introduced by Wendt: Hobbesian (deep enmity of states, continuous war), Lockean (rivalry of states, war as acceptable optional behavior) and Kantian (friendship of states, war is prohibited)¹⁰. According to him, the vertical ("communitarian" model) is specific to the Kantian anarchy and the horizontal ("bilateral" model) could be correlated with the Lockean anarchy.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 4

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 5

⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 246-311

⁹ Tomáš Bruner, *op.cit.*, p. 6

¹⁰ *Ibidem*

The cyberspace could be connected with the second Lockean culture of anarchy of Alexander Wendt¹¹. But this construction is a process, not an outcome, without a guarantee that the state responsibility in cyberspace may forever work¹². The limitations of this model is that it relies on territorialization and monopoly of state on coercive use of force, and in case on cyberspace cannot be applied.

But when we are speaking about the cyberspace, we haven't established the reference points. One could be the violation of international law norms, namely cyber-attacks. Without going on the legislative arguments, we could just mention the ten categories of state responsibility for cyber-attacks, relevant for policy-making¹³:

- state prohibited cyber-attacks;
- state prohibited but inadequate;
- state ignored;
- state encouraged;
- state shaped;
- state coordinated;
- state ordered;
- state rogue conducted;
- state executed;
- state integrated.

In cyberspace, the great powers will have no other choice but to cooperate and create rules, norms, and standards of new behavior and a new international order¹⁴. The international order in cyberspace implies the structural change, and a permanent negotiation of power and competition. The multipolarity structure of international system is the result of power distribution and power is important in international politics. And international politics are anarchic. Rules are important for international life, representing represent the fundamental normative principle of international politics¹⁵.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 11

¹² *Ibidem*

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 8

¹⁴ James Wood Forsyth Jr., Maj Billy E. Pope, "Structural Causes and Cyber Effects Why International Order is Inevitable in Cyberspace", in *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2014, p. 113

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 116

The global players have to cooperate to create rules to shape the international order, but it is difficult to do so in cyberspace. Why is that so difficult? Because it concerns sovereignty, freedom of speech, and democracy and it is almost impossible to govern cyberspace. No state alone could do all, only by cooperation. A good example are the USA which proposed an International Strategy for Cyberspace.

In May, 2011, former President Obama has launched the *International Strategy for Cyberspace*, with three important keywords: prosperity, security and openness in a networked world¹⁶. That was the signaled for international actors that a new dimension of international system was framed and that a new international policy - cyberspace policy – will designed the global governance.

The prosperity is visible by using the means of new technologies, which brought advantages in different spheres of daily lives, as:

- e-business, which supports jobs creations and economic development opportunities for companies;
- learning (with videoconferences facilities) and field-changing research;
- e-administration, by empowering people by using of new technologies, and by making public administrations more open, transparent and responsive.

The international security is challenged for a few years to re-design its priorities, strategies, mechanisms and means (technological, laws, diplomacy) in order to response to this new forms of crime and aggression - cyberattacks, in order to protect our innovations, that intend improve lives and drive markets. Cybersecurity is a new field of international security, without which we cannot conceive any initiative of security policy and international or national level.

Nevertheless, the digital world is not a privileged space, but a dimension of international environment with specific laws, conduct for state and non-state actors, for individuals and public or private entities, as well as one of the best examples for an interconnected community, where public administrations, academia, private sector and other non-state actors work together for a common goal.¹⁷

¹⁶ *International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security and Openness in a networked world*, 2011, [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyber], 1 June 2017

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

The proposed international cyberspace policy is based on three principles: fundamental freedoms, privacy, and the free flow of information¹⁸. Besides the freedom of expression and association, is relevant for this policy, for the first principle to mention ability “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium and regardless of frontiers”¹⁹. It is about the freedom of speech in cyberspace, but taking into account the laws that the use of Internet implies (referring here also to the inciting to the acts of violence and terrorism, etc). The protection of citizens and of our interests comes with the commitment to the privacy, in terms of using the personal data. Regarding the free flow of information, cybersecurity should be the instrument that assure the adaptability, without affecting the network performance.

The information and communications technologies brought benefits for states and their citizens, but they are also used by a variety of actors with differing motivations and means. That is why the cybersecurity community has consistently warned about the increasing number of cyber -attacks. So, the cyberspace is operationalized by nation states as a domain for conflict, and permanent threats²⁰.

The Internet dependence and the increasing interdependence within the online environment will become a fact of life and will continue to challenge our ability to manage the consequences of cyber-attacks, at national and international levels.²¹ A strong supports for the development of cybersecurity norms should be seen from actors from state and private entities. The cybersecurity norms will have to increase the security of cyberspace and also the preservation of a globally connected society.

The above mentioned authors believe that these norms should take into account acceptable and unacceptable state behaviors, fostering greater predictability, and limiting the potential for the most problematic impacts. They conceptualize two types of norms:

- norms for improving defenses, which reduce the risk by providing a foundation for national cybersecurity capacity and for domestic, regional, and international organizational structures and approaches that increase understanding between states;

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 5

¹⁹ *Ibidem*

²⁰ Angela McKay, Jan Neutze, Paul Nicholas, Kevin Sullivan (eds.), *International Cybersecurity Norms, Reducing conflicts in an Internet-dependent world*, 2015, Microsoft, p. 2

²¹ *Ibidem*

- norms for limiting conflict or offensive operations, which will serve to reduce conflict, avoid escalations, and limit the potential for catastrophic impacts in, through, or even to cyberspace²².

They proposed six cybersecurity norms to limit conflicts:

- states should not target ICT companies to insert vulnerabilities (backdoors) or take actions that would otherwise undermine public trust in products and services.
- states should have a clear principle-based policy for handling product and service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to vendors rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them.
- states should exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and should ensure that any which are developed are limited, precise, and not reusable.
- states should commit to nonproliferation activities related to cyber weapons.
- states should limit their engagement in cyber offensive operations to avoid creating a mass event.
- states should assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from events in cyberspace²³.

In order to be effective, these norms should meet four key criteria:

- they must be practicable.
- they also need to reduce risks of complex cyber events and disruptions that could lead to conflict.
- they need to drive behavioral change that is observable and that makes a demonstrable difference in the security of cyberspace for states, enterprises, civil society, and individual stakeholders and users.
- effective norms should leverage existing risk-management concepts to help mitigate against escalation, and, if escalation is unavoidable, they should provide useful insight into the potential actions of involved parties²⁴.

²² *Ibidem*

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 11-13

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 11

The cybersecurity norms are needed by different actors from international arena, such as states, the private sector, and citizens. Without them, there is a genuine risk that threats in cyberspace could grow and undermine economic growth and technical innovation²⁵.

We are living in a world of *cybered conflicts* and we will need cyber mechanisms to limit the negative actions of different actors. The open international cyberspace will challenged national sovereignty and the state leaders will have to find ways of responding to this continuous and sophisticated threats.

There is an evolution of conflicts and competitive relations among states in a changing international system. That is why policymakers, representative of military, academic and business communities have to react to the global spread of a cyberspace and its changes to the international environment²⁶. The Policymakers in have issued or are writing national cyber security policies and laws. The scholars of international relations seem to be bound to their theories. But they will have to capture the emerging world and to explain major events such as the unprecedented rise of China in a single decade given the enormous scale of its poverty²⁷.

The international system is now shaped by international state and non-state actors and the new world order has assume the “systemic effects of the depth and rapidity of the global and largely unmonitored spread of the cyberspace”²⁸, which will modernize the nations. This could be a call for more research among scholars in this field of study. *Cyberizing the thinking of international relations scholars* requires “published works that challenge them to think beyond state–state conflicts of the past, beyond game or power theories that rest largely on isolating events from the new reality of a host of interrelated and ever more deeply integrated substate systems”²⁹.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 19

²⁶ Jan-Federick Kremer, Bendict Müller, “Preface”, in J.-F. Kremer, B. Müller (eds.) *Cyberspace and International Relations. Theories, Prospects and Challenges*, Berlin Heidelberg: Springer- Verlag, 2014, p. vi

²⁷ *Ibidem*

²⁸ *Ibidem*

²⁹ *Ibidem*

Now it is the moment to pay attention to the *cyberization* of IR, which refers to “the ongoing penetration of all different fields of activity of international relations by different mediums of the cyberspace on the one hand, and the growing dependence of actors in IR on infrastructure, instruments, and means offered by the cyberspace on the other hand³⁰”.

The new world order is now created!

3. Conclusion

The cyberspace represent a challenge, which not new in international politics. The international system is a continuing reconfiguration of a world order.

We can build now a future in which universities and companies are free to research and develop new concepts and products because they know their intellectual property and valuable data are safe and shared by networks. Also, individuals are aware and know the threats to their personal computers, and they can take easy-to-use measures to protect their systems. Private companies can take a responsibility for their network hygiene, and protect their investments.

The technological means of cybersecurity can detect threats early and share data in real-time to mitigate the spread of malware or minimize the impact of a major disruption. The laws that we created, limit the actions of cyberterrorists and try to create a protected space.

We have to create and develop instruments that will assure the international security and a more sustainable peace. The state actors will act as responsible parties in cyberspace and collaborate at bilateral, multilateral, and international level to negotiate and bring consensus in seeking to preserve the Internet, our innovations and the continuing configuration of the world order.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p.xi

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MILITARY TROLLS, PUBLIC DISTRACTIONS AND THE CYBER

Mihai-Lucian Bârsan*

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Abstract

Threat actors have started a disinformation process across the internet targeting the larger population, which mainly are intended to rise the mistrust of the population in the governing institutions and governmental actors. Dismantling these operations have proven to be a big challenge similar to cyberattacks which affect technological infrastructures. Even though some countries have taken a set of legal measures against disinformation and trolling many aspects have been left out and militarized trolling and the process of spreading false news is a phenomenon which can become more and more powerful.

Keywords: military trolls, cyber, cybersecurity, threats

1. Be a troll in 4 easy steps

“As my contact information was disclosed alongside the disinformation about me, my phone’s messaging and email inboxes were filled with messages from people angry at me for ‘persecuting Russians’. I received a phone call in which someone fired a gun. Later someone texted me, claiming to be my dead father, and told me he was ‘observing me’”¹

* Mihai-Lucian Bârsan is assistant researcher at The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brătianu”, Romanian Academy. Contact: bmihailucian@gmail.com

¹ Jessikka Aro, “The cyberspace war: propaganda and trolling as warfare tools”, *European View*, June 2016, Volume 15, Issue 1, p 123

A series of unconventional wars have started to impact the world in the last 20 years. With a rising number of terrorist attacks, cyberwarfare, the controversial rise of extremism in the world are just some of the factors that have changed the landscape of understanding security and resisting threats.

Taking into consideration these elements and viewing them at a macro scale, the impact they have on individuals or groups is extremely hard to assess in a simple statistical analysis due to the high number of silenced victims. The story above belongs to a young researcher that has become victim of online trolling because she wanted to analyze the impact of this phenomenon and the inception of tainted information (or fake news) in Finland. In the last year the intensifying rise of trolling has had the primary objectives to distract the public order by exaggerating the intensity or importance of a situation, manufacturing stories or events, aggressive comments that affected normal users and in connection with cyberattacks/hacking tainting information coming from leaked files or e-mails.

The paper intends to highlight that the methodological analysis done in the past has treated wrongly the types of threats mentioned above and will focus on the case of weaponized trolling and how this threat has been counteracted. Put in a very strong perspective, Patrick Michael Duggan pointed out: *As senior leaders have recently recognized, groups of special operators armed with asymmetric cyber tools, irregular warfare tactics, and mass disinformation can have strategic effects*². Thus, I will treat the subject of online trolling and the spread of fake information as a mainstream direct threat rather than an unconventional practice.

Challenging as it may be the development of online trolling has had a long historical backtrack in communist countries. Peter N. Tanchak traces it back to the “agents of influence” in Soviet Russia that played a key point in spreading false information aimed to promote pro-communist opinions and supporting the regime³. The importance of this historical dating of

² Patrick Michael Duggan, *Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyberspace*, Essay Competitions / Special Warfare in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 p.47.

³ Editor Olga Bertelsen, *Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine: The Challenge of Change, The Invisible Front: Russia, Trolls, and the Information War against Ukraine*, Peter N. Tanchak, online book [https://books.google.ro/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xCLADgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT232&dq=online+trolling+and+disinformation&ots=HOU6bCrFI9&sig=XU-cXZeOjmyx9364bnD65Zm-2ko&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=online%20trolling%20and%20disinformation&f=false], 1 July 2017

trolling implies a long standing tradition which evolved due to the rise of technological advancements and a highly decentralized network of blogs, websites and social media platforms.

For a clarification and as a statement no one wishes to institute an online police, where everyone would be closely watched. These are not constructive solutions that would be of much help, but rather impediments in development. Fighting disinformation and identifying trolls is not a new problem, but the real issue in this case is that it has never happened at this complex scale.

The rapid distribution of fake news over the internet can be done from any location and with any type of computer. Communities of online trolls are consisted of either paid people who write articles, comment and bots that automate a part of this process. Constructing the path through which these actors work is quite easy⁴, due to the immediate services that one has on the internet, putting it more in simple terms, one would just sit in front of his or her computer and:

1. Buy a domain;
2. Buy hosting services;
3. Create a basic website;
4. Start writing with the community:
 - 4.1. Articles;
 - 4.2. Comments;
 - 4.3. Distribute;
 - 4.4. Discredit any comment which is unfavorable to what has been written;

⁴ For further references regarding this problem, anyone can look up the simple steps taken for buying a domain or search for hosting companies. Everything is at hand and anyone can rapidly implement a simple website.

1.1. Given the problems and what to really expect

First of all, due to the rapid movement produced by these groups, an article is immediately taken over by other websites, afterwards (in some contexts) extremist groups start sharing the false news, which is rapidly picked up by mainstream media and spread to readers that become the victims of the attack. No one would expect that every person in the world start using online tools or have the sharp eye of a photographer to realize that an image was manipulated or start quickly checking that story on every possible platform.

Secondly, these communities create and generate almost alternative universes which nothing can be trusted, everything is put under a series of “attack” questions and leaves everything to wondering, never giving a clarification or solution. Readers are left with unverified facts about reality and what is happening in the world. Also, an argument that prevails among these trolls and goes beyond each border is *truth for each person* which implies a multiculturalist argument used out of context and undermines the argument of a normal user who expresses an opinion. On another side of the process, discouraging the act of expressing an opinion is attacked by trolls who start commenting about the user and use aggressive language destined to offend and not really attack the stated argument.

From Jessica Aro’s analysis, the systematic troll operation in Finland has discouraged many Finns to start chats on various forums, but were not psychologically or emotionally affected by what was stated by the trolls due to their high rate of education and continuous documentation of real facts⁵. Countries that have a less independent mass media and a lower education level are more vulnerable to what trolls distribute and write. In the case of Romania and other Eastern countries which have been classified in 2017 as free⁶, people are still having doubts about what is being reported by the national news agencies which leaves these countries more vulnerable to trolling operations. According to the Digital News Report from 2017 the

⁵ Jessikka Aro, *op.cit.*, p. 123

⁶ Freedom House, *Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy*, [<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>], 4 July 2017.

overall trust in news is only 39%⁷ which leaves the society open to fake news reports, due to their attitude of *let's start telling the truth*.

The strategy of the threat actors implies targeting the main problems of the given country and start commenting or writing fake articles that underneath feed the vulnerabilities of the society of the country, leading individuals to question their political authorities, question institutional decisions and believe in alternative facts which are just purely manufactured statements based on events or decisions never really taken into consideration.

1.2. Assessing the troll threat in security terms and dilemmas

In this contexts identifying trolls over the internet is proven to be very problematic because the term has been on the internet for a long time and was usually given to people who leave nasty comments on Reddit, 4chan and smaller forums⁸. This “new” type which can be termed as military trolls are nothing to be confused with the previous ones, due to their obvious intentions. Thus, the military trolls will try to distribute fake news through commenting on mainstream news posts and upvote through sharing and commenting the fakes ones and their purpose is to disinform the society and alter opinions.

Discovering this behavior becomes more complex when realizing how do troll factories⁹ work when targeting the events that occurred. The deployment of trolls happens at a rapid rate of response timed by the mainstream media. They have the opinion and they act convincingly like they know what is really going on. Take for example the investigation made by Radu Cupcea on the troll Ioan Sbucium who specializes only on

⁷ News Avoidance 2017 [<http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2017/news-avoidance-2017/>], 4 July 2017.

⁸ Consider the definitions of trolls on the online campaigning website <http://anti-troll.org/>

⁹ Term used across the media for groups of people that have been hired in questionable agencies in Russia that contribute mainly to the development of propaganda messages masked in articles, post, blogs etc. A journalist investigation was conducted and is related in the article written Leo Benedictus *Invasion of the troll armies: from Russian Trump supporters to Turkish state stooges*, [<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/nov/06/troll-armies-social-media-trump-russian>].

commenting news that is published on *Adevarul* news website and promotes an anti-American view with powerful nationalist views.¹⁰

At an international scale and in developed countries, trolls are more and more aggressive. The case reported by CitizenLab from Toronto in May 2017¹¹ is of most importance, trolls combined cyberattack resources and carefully implanted false information within stolen e-mails from the American journalist David Satter who criticized the Russian policies and abuses. Carefully false information was planted within the leaked e-mails that would lead a reader to believe that Satter and other Russian activists were receiving money from foreign international actors for the purpose of destabilizing Putin's image.

Both journalists Satter and Aro have been subjected to these type of attack and the disinformation campaign started against them feed the trolls' purpose in order to raise the distrust of the public in the mainstream media and governmental authorities. The analysis of these situations have unraveled the truth about them, through comparison between original e-mails and tainted ones, in the case of Satter and the attacks on Aro's reputation was covered with a false history of drug abuse, threats and insults which were proved not to be true.

The typical troll will try to confirm propaganda assumptions, using simple styled logic linking events with conspiracies, modifying photos, using shocking titles and damasking processes of the "corrupted political establishment". The leading scandals are linked to trolls influencing electoral campaigns like in the case of the US investigations of what happened during the US election last year¹². Cybersecurity, in many Western countries were not prepared for this kind of type of attack due to the mass specialization of other kind of attacks.

¹⁰ Radu Cupcea, *Trollii moldoveni si razboiul lor absurd impotriva Romaniei*,

[<http://larics.ro/trollii-moldoveni-si-razboiul-lor-absurd-impotriva-romaniei/>], 20 June 2017.

¹¹ Adam Hulcoop, John Scott-Railton, Peter Tanchak, Matt Brooks, and Ron Deibert, *Tainted Leaks: Disinformation and Phishing with a Russian Nexus*, [<https://citizenlab.org/2017/05/tainted-leaks-disinformation-phish/>], 29 June 2017.

¹² Reuters.com, *U.S. government loses to Russia's disinformation campaign: advisers* <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-disinformation-analysis-idUSKBN1492PA>, Reporter Joseph Menn, 4 July 2017.

What do all aspects show in this case for any kind of analyst that tries to tackle any of these facts? The response should be given in accordance with what was stated in the beginning, we can no longer speak of a type of situation in which the impacts of troll operation have a small and insignificant result, but being a direct attack which destabilizes a society's values, then it must be treated as a mainstream attack.

Pursuing trolls and constructing a defense against them presents a major problem due to legal aspects, technological impediments that are not yet available for the larger population and dealing with large quantities of false information that is transferred at rapid speed across the internet. Each will be analyzed in detail below.

2. Fighting against trolls with some legal aspects

The legal aspects of the situation in this case is that the problem of identifying the legal definition given to what a troll is. Sanctioning trolls for their behavior has been introduced in the United Kingdom, but it targets mainly the trolls that have an aggressive behavior against other, use edited images that humiliate others, but excludes the problems of disinformation that some distribute over the internet, because it is a thin line between claiming a right to say what is right or wrong in a free speech point of view. Military trolls play by a set of rules when spreading fake news, they do not spam nor illegally upvote fake articles, but behave like normal people do and try not to get noticed as being a troll, but rather an angry citizen or just a person who expresses themselves freely.

Given the case like Aro's would be under law violations, because trolls have violated what is under the definition of law, but fake news distribution is not¹³. Disinformation is rather a subject of security and while militarized trolls have been left in the unconventional section of war¹⁴, it seems that the authorities are not prepared to imply a mobilization of this threat among the people.

¹³ For UK policy check: BBC news, *Internet trolls targeted with new legal guidelines*, [<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37601431>], 4 July 2017.

¹⁴ I disagree with the discussions of hybrid warfare when discussing a phenomenon like militarized trolling that directly impacts a large population at an international scale.

On the online domain, companies like Google have modified their algorithm in order to promote better quality assured news, meaning that feedback sent by users of a website which distributes fake information would be downgraded from the search engine¹⁵. Facebook receives reports if a user has a false account and uses it to promote on social media fake articles and comments that are aggressive or make false statements¹⁶.

3. Technological limitations of the users

This section requires a special attention and further analysis. The elements of advancement in this domain that are relevant in this context is the massive management in big data, information security which for many years has been neglected and the disproportionate high rate of gadgets used by the larger public and the verification tools of understanding and verifying the quality of data that reaches people.

Localizing the source of troll factories or websites hosted on obscure servers can be a much of a challenge similar to cyberattacks. If even discovered and urged to be closed, the hosting company would be faced with a major dilemma. One is to face a paying customer and on the other hand face a governmental figure that urges a sanction for websites used for trolling.

Trolls that used modified images that are very believable can easily convince someone that it is real. To make sure photos haven't been manipulated implies knowledge of photo editing which not all people are prepared. Online tools that show the history of editing are not quite as accurate as they say they are¹⁷.

¹⁵ Alex Hern, *Google acts against fake news on search engine*, [https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/25/google-launches-major-offensive-against-fake-news], 4 July 2017.

¹⁶ Robert Booth, *Facebook announces steps against fake news during general election*, [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/08/facebook-help-tackle-fake-news-during-general-election], 5 July 2017.

¹⁷ See for example <https://superuser.com/questions/442352/detect-if-a-photo-has-been-manipulated-or-faked>, <https://www.izitru.com/>, <https://www.tineye.com/faq>. These sites claim that they can detect edited and altered images.

In a recent study on low quality viral information, that took into account the attention span of individuals, informational overload which is a main characteristic of social media news highlights that in this kind of virtual space the capacity of distinguishing from low quality to highest quality of news, memes, videos that inform people is no longer taken into account. Thus fake and true news have the same probability to go viral.

Creating images, articles, fake comments reproduce the same structural virality¹⁸ similar to the real facts and news. Basically trolls use the recipe to promote their spread of information, only this time the fake news can be really compared to a virus, that can have a negative reaction among individuals and alter their opinion. The online diffusion, as tested by Sharad Goel, Ashton Anderson and Microsoft Researchers Jake Hofman, Duncan J. Watts highlight that what goes viral receives powerful media coverage and web contented has been distributed by broadcasting media. The analysis that they undertook has shown that the diffusion processes the make pieces of content “viral”, received media attention and powerful coverage that lead the larger population of user to adopt that event and share it via Twitter, a process that for the average user that would observe it seem natural occurring. Take for example here the promotion of the next gen iPhone, which always makes a “big deal” when the key note from Apple is approaching (my personal example).

Taking into account these two significant studies, social media has a direct impact on how information is delivered to people. Thus making disinformation spread by militarized trolls a direct threat on the public opinion and the socio-political situation in every country targeted with these kind of structural attacks on real content that expresses an interconnected-false-truth.

For fake news and taking into account the number of processes that happen on social media the attention span of people and where they read the information affects *how* they read it and *where* they read it. It is quite hard to make sure that a story is true when one reads that the Anti-Missile System from Romania, can be easily armed for attack nuclear attacks¹⁹ when in a subway and has to be in office in 10 minutes. The fact is not true and it was highlighted

¹⁸ Sharad Goel, Ashton Anderson, Jake Hofman, Duncan J. Watts, “The Structural Virality of Online Diffusion”, in *Management Science* Vol. 62, No. 1, January 2016, pp. 180-196.

¹⁹ *Putin: Sistemul de la Deveselu nu este defensiv*, [<http://news.russiatoday.ro/putin-sistemul-de-la-deveselu-nu-este-defensiv/>], 6 June 2017.

by mainstream media and troll watching groups²⁰ who sent readers to the Agreement between Romania and USA signed in 2011, that clearly implied that the anti-missile system cannot be armed with nuclear bombs.²¹

There is a high stake on unspecialized groups of people that would not be able to understand the implications of the situation, similar to the Deveselu which implies a set of military understanding and geopolitical explanation. Thus enters the fake news that promotes false statements about the anti-missile system and, if read, seems to have an explanatory attitude regarding the situation unlike mainstream news that only reported the implementation. This is quite a smart strategy given the fact that social media news tends to be short and to the point. The premises line up very well for the context of trolling in an age where due to the informational overload and low attention (as pointed above) in reading and informing, many people received and still do, the misleading information about what truly happen in the world.

4. Conclusions and discussions

Understanding the processes of how information and news becomes viral requires more research and empirical data gathered by specialists from both private and public sectors. The structure of a viral news either fake or true cannot be taken separately in such a system because similar to the issue of sponsored content over the internet which cannot be differentiated from normal content by readers, fake news is masked in content which is carefully tailored to look like a mainstream journalistic written article.

Disinformation and trolling on online platforms treated as an asymmetric attacks companying cyberattacks has left it as a marginalized section of defense. This mistake has led authorities to believe that the impact would be of little importance if the national IT infrastructure is secure then trolling would be a mere breeze on the internet.

²⁰ #Checked: Scutul antirachetă de la Deveselu nu poate lansa rachete Tomahawk și nici nu e îndreptat împotriva Rusiei, <http://checkmedia.ro/checked-scutul-antiracheta-de-la-deveselu-nu-poate-lansa-rachete-tomahawk-si-nici-nu-e-indreptat-impotriva-rusiei/>, 6 July 2017.

²¹ *Acord între România și SUA privind amplasarea sistemului de apărare împotriva rachetelor balistice ale Statelor Unite în România*, https://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/tratate/2011.09_scut_ro.pdf, 6 July 2017.

Only in the last years', authorities from the European Union and state representatives have started discussions regarding the problem of militarized trolls and have assessed the damages that they can create. The question still remains though, how does the online communities and governmental institutions counter-attack trolls and disinformation?

In this article I have tried to highlight that militarized trolls have a higher impact on societies across the world and the false information that they spread over the internet or aggressive behavior on comment sections have the same behavior of mainstream distribution of news which leads to the same potentiality of that false information to become viral and even taken and distributed by mainstream media.

The rise of disinformation and troll attacks can be treated as operations similar to cyberattacks which insert fake ideas in vulnerable minds, by creating false interpretations of events, decisions and arguing on false pretenses of a relative truth or promoting conspiracies.

Solutions for this new revived issue, even though countries have been taken by surprise, can be immediately implemented by pointing out and explaining specific news that has been falsified by mainstream news groups to the larger population. Due to the factor of negligence of quality information on social media platforms, sanctions for distributing false information can be introduced which will down vote and stop that post to be suggested to people on their walls.

Discussions regarding the messages that trolls send out need further improvement due to their chaotic behavior over the internet. Furthermore, data gathering on this subject and how they have staggering impact on people needs more profound results coming from media watchdog, online military organizations that have had connections with national and international firewalls against cyberattacks, because given the direct impact that falsified information can have on societies and also databases of people's opinions, militarized trolls can be treated as a complex structure of operation that is a branch of cyberattack.

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CURRENT APPROACHES OF DIPLOMACY IN THE CYBERSPACE

Radu Constantin Mureșan*

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Abstract

In recent years, the Internet has had a positive impact, both on individuals and on governmental activity, and so it became a free and open space enabling almost all kinds of tasks. But more and more frequently, the Internet has also been the target of many cyber attacks, generating data leaks and financial losses. The vast majority of financial and telecommunication systems have been affected by numerous such intrusions. These incidents are more and more common and they impact heavily both on governments and businesses or individual users. In time, cybernetic security has become one of the main priorities for all these above mentioned types of users. Thus, along with the technological evolution in each sector, the implementation of a series of protection measures, designed to prevent the cyber attacks that the majority of the population now faces, became indispensable.

Keywords: cyberdiplomacy, cyberwar, cybersecurity, cyberterrorists, negotiations

1. Introduction

Diplomacy represents the art and the model of conducting an interstate negotiation through representatives, with the aim of a proper evolution of international relations at various levels-economic, cultural,

* Radu Constantin Mureșan, Master's degree on Management and International and European Negotiations, Faculty of European Studies, Babeș Bolyai University (Romania). Contact: hexorro@gmail.com

environmental, humanitarian or even military. By means of diplomatic relations, we can secure strategic advantages that bring us closer to common grounds between states, regardless the challenges. Thus, diplomacy is an essential instrument of skillful negotiations, basically meaning the polite expression and resolution of interstate conflicts. In this regard, diplomacy is strongly orientated towards the concept of negotiations that are indispensable in maintaining peace among nations, providing a major opportunity to develop a successful foreign policy.

Diplomacy aims at securing agreements between state actors, maximizing the advantages without taking avoidable risks. The diplomats should master the art of negotiation so that they can adjust interstate relations. To this extent, they make an efficient use of word power. The state and other organizations support diplomatic activity that empowers the leaders to approach issues from a different perspective and to develop proper strategies and tactics. A special case is represented by war diplomacy, when negotiations are meant to attract a solution to inner problems that have generated the conflict.

The diplomats benefit from diplomatic immunity, their rights having been stipulated since the XVIth century. By this immunity, they are offered protection from persecutions and penal trials or from personal attacks when they are in mission. Moreover, if during negotiations the host country becomes a war zone, the diplomats can be recalled for security reasons. In such cases, the diplomatic activity will be resumed by lower ranking officials. If a diplomat commits a severe crime abroad, he is considered *persona non-grata* and he is expelled to his home country where he is prosecuted. Diplomatic immunity is extended to the diplomat's family members¹. Diplomatic corps take part in conferences and negotiation rounds that involve both a technical and a normative part. An example of successful negotiation is Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, dating from 1978². Diplomatic recognition is an essential indicator for a country as independent nation-state. Sometimes this aspect becomes problematic, as there are nowadays several entities without full diplomatic recognition,

¹ *Imunitatea diplomatică*, 2013, [<http://www.businessintegrity.ro/content/imunitatea-diplomatic%C4%83>], 23 March 2017.

² *Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*,

[<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david>], 23 March 2017.

such as Taiwan (the Chinese Republic). Still, the relations which such entities are maintained through informal channels. Palestine is another case in point, with its own diplomatic service in many foreign countries. Nevertheless, many Western countries do not recognize its officials' diplomatic immunity, the missions being conducted in more general terms³. Diplomacy is tightly interconnected with espionage and so the collected information may actually ease the path to concluding treaties and partnerships. There are both spies working for the Secret Services within embassies and infiltrated diplomats who gather information that can have an impact for all diplomatic sectors. These spies play a fictional role in the embassy while collecting both internal and external information, under the remote surveillance of Secret Services. Had a spy gets revealed, he is excluded and sent back home. As mentioned above, collected information can have a great impact, supporting commercial agreements, border issues or even the military aspects⁴.

Informal diplomacy has been used since a very long time and it is still "in force". It is a method of providing information on other state's government, at informal level. Given his unofficial position, the diplomat suggests in informal language methods to be used for conflict resolution. It was the strategy employed by US presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter⁵. Diplomacy is equally important for small states as it is for great powers, because it provides the framework for the voices to be heard and for their problems to be approached at the negotiation table. It ensures international cooperation, challenging small actors to develop an efficient diplomacy.

Diplomacy can also be classified into a number of categories that distinguish themselves from one another through diplomatic strategies employed in each sector. By means of this "division of labor", the diplomatic conduct reaches its aims and balances its advantages and losses.

³ *Diplomatic Recognition*, 2014,

[<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/palestine/recognition.htm>], 5 May 2017.

⁴ *Embassy cables: Where does diplomacy end and spying begin?*, 2010,

[<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/28/where-diplomacy-end-spying-begin>], 5 May 2017.

⁵ *Informal diplomacy*, 2010, [[https://www.boundless.com/political-](https://www.boundless.com/political-science/textbooks/boundless-political-science-textbook/foreign-policy-18/foreign-policy-108/diplomacy-573-4996/)

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Preventive diplomacy is a creation of the 1990's with the aim of easing interstate disputes and of preventing potential conflicts to reach a snowball effect and get internationalized. Prevention also refers to the administrative structure, ensuring national security and consolidating peace.

In time, this kind of diplomacy has evolved and it has transformed itself into a sophisticated mechanism severely regulating the military field, even though this is not the only important intervention. We can also discuss here the management of economic or energy issues. To summarize, preventive diplomacy has proved its usefulness by ensuring a stable and secured international environment⁶.

Economic diplomacy accounts for a major instrument in economic politics, connecting it with the citizens. It offers a successful framework for cooperation among institutions and it aims at promoting economic interests of states and citizens, by means of foreign policy instruments. A state may have particular interests in promoting its goods and services in another country, thus collaborating with international institutions and organizations. Companies exploit the potential to expand abroad, with mutual benefits for both countries. Nuclear diplomacy is a sector that has as an objective preventing attacks or a potential nuclear warfare. Cultural diplomacy or the use of *soft power* tools develops relations based on mutual respect and trust, seeking to achieve influence and advantages. It displays a range of ideas and concepts promoted by a state representative in order to exercise influence over a country or its citizens without the use of military or economic force. This type of diplomacy resorts to specific "instruments", both internally and externally, like festivals, libraries and cultural institutes or even international cooperation. It proposes itself to attract intellectual elites into the process of implementing the state's positive image at all levels of the society⁷. Public diplomacy has the aim to communicate with people in other states in searching for potential solutions to problems. Even though it is quite beneficial, it can degenerate sometimes into a "citizens' diplomacy" or even to reach the dimension of propaganda. Together with

⁶ *Revista forțelor terestre*, 2017, [http://www.revista.forter.ro/2010_2_t/05-inv/03.htm], 5 May 2017.

⁷ Lucian Jora, *Diplomația Culturală a Uniunii Europene. Aspecte funcționale ale serviciului European de acțiune Enternă*, 2012, [<http://revista.ispri.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/30-44-Lucian-Jora.pdf>], 29 April 2017.

the technological advancement, this type of diplomacy has transformed itself into cybernetic diplomacy, making the communication easier by means of mass-media or social media. Public diplomacy is now more and more frequently used by world leaders and diplomats.

2. E-diplomacy

E-diplomacy is a new evolution of the XXIst century, with a very well designed and secured platform of action. At its core we find new communication technologies providing the opportunity to interact with the wider public through a network designed for both internal and external leadership. This project appeared in America and it is managed by the US State Department, as a new instrument to fulfill diplomatic missions. It is aimed at enhancing security by information and governmental data updates for both the internal and external public. The electronic platform brings its contribution even to economic growth, time saving activities, as everything goes faster online. The platform can also be used by the army thus offering the possibility to a more efficient, safer and more secure communication with governmental authorities, all at a click's distance. Moreover, we should consider that cyberspace has become a matter of foreign policy, within multilateral forums, in current bilateral relations as well as in relation to the industry and the civil society.

The platform comprises several instruments that blend in with traditional diplomacy, being more efficient, with innovation and cutting-edge technology making the world faster and more interconnected. In 2009, e-diplomacy has been widely acknowledged by Americans, being mentioned both in mass media and social networks such as Facebook and YouTube, reaching out to a huge audience.

The "Development Review of 2010" magazine explains that in diplomacy this technology is the most revolutionary with a huge benefit. Such platform is useful to us, because the states can interconnect with each other and it can influence national debates. It is also through this technology that you can access your own debating agendas. The State Department has also founded other programs or platforms to achieve total success. These include the following applications: Dip Note, Democracy Dialogues and Opinion Space. The success of this cyber diplomacy has led the US State

Department to have up to now 230 facebook pages, 40 YouTube channels and 80 active tweeter accounts.

This platform was also implemented in Europe in 2000, under the name of GovDelivery, with over 1,800 organizations that are part of this platform and about 120 million subscribers. On average, monthly growth of UK citizens is over 50,000 subscribers per month. This platform is used, as well as those mentioned above, for the benefit of both citizens and government. This platform, through the advanced technologies used on it, aims to interconnect both governments and citizens, informing them about all the daily news⁸.

Every citizen subscribed to this platform can get news by email about anything happening in the government so that it gets involved in various public service programs. This platform also organizes online communities that aim to change societies' behavior and increase online audience⁹. GovDelivery is a platform that, with the help of technology, builds both online communities and enables citizens to communicate with the public administration. Thus, each subscriber once connected to GovDelivery can also receive information from governments and he/she can select the information he wants to receive from agencies already connected to this platform. However, the platform also communicates directly with the British government website, which can access various information directly, without having to access official websites. Thus, a study shows that about 3.5 million visitors were directed to the UK government website. Once you subscribe to both this platform and the Cloud, it accounts for over 85% of an organization's subscriber database.

This technology of communication between government and citizens proved to be beneficial in terms of receiving real-time information that is useful, building better decisions that will change the lives of every citizen.

The platform features advanced technology that can be used on any device, allowing the user to communicate with each government in real time, thus having the opportunity to express their views for future improvement

⁸ *Digital dilomacy*, 2012, [http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/interviu-faceti-cunostinta-cu-stepan-soukenik-consultant-in-comunicare-govdelivery/], 17 March 2017

⁹ *Digital diplomacy*, 2017, [http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/], 6 May 2017

as quickly and efficiently as possible. Thus, through this platform, every citizen will be safely informed in case of emergencies. The government is equally privileged, because with the help of GovDelivery it can receive information about every citizen subscribed to this platform, regardless of the case. In emergency situations communication is much faster and more accessible, so that the information comes from the government to the citizen in the shortest possible time.

For this step towards technology, EU countries have had different views, so some of them take that path, one side to consider this platform harder. Talking about the countries, we can bring Estonia as an example, which has turned to this technology at a fast pace, just like Slovakia, which through branding campaigns has reached the resources and technologies essential to the development of this type of platform¹⁰.

It is important to note that the vast majority of countries should implement such technologies for better communication between government and citizens. In order to be better informed in real time, especially during emergencies.

In the case of Romania, this process related to such technology is on the right track moving at a fast pace, with a very well-developed infrastructure in terms of IT. It is a good opportunity to implement new technology segments, considering the speed of the Romanian internet, the fiber optics and the fact that it is easy to get through to these platforms. It should be noted that Romania ranks fifth in the ranking of countries with a fast internet rate, thus being superior to many countries in the world.

Therefore, the Internet speed in Romania is around 37,5 Mbps as compared to USA with only 29,6 Mbps.

An essential aspect of why the Internet has so high a speed in Romania would be the neighbouring networks and the development of infrastructures and technologies in the IT field, which have a large number of customers, covering quite many locations. Thus, there is no need for an excessive investment in hardware and networking, so costs are low enough to develop this platform. In this respect, the cost is decreasing and the pace of its growth is rather rapid considering both the development of its

¹⁰ *Digital dilomacy*, 2012, [<http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/interviu-faceti-cunostinta-cu-stepan-soukenik-consultant-in-comunicare-govdelivery/>], 17 March 2017.

segment and its partnerships in Romania, as well as the speed of the Internet. Equally important would be the fact that through these networks with a large number of users, a segment of citizens can benefit from the new communication platforms between the government and the population¹¹.

The agenda for Romania towards this platform by 2020 contains five key objectives, including: legislation, innovation, procedural changes and behavioural mitigation. Thus, through these objectives, a framework is defined in terms of the institutional structure which envisages a unitary vision. Through this platform, Romania aims to manage information to citizens in real time and to achieve advanced cooperation between governments and citizens. By associating the technology and information tools with the classical tools and the five objectives that are under consideration, the Agenda set for 2020 envisages both technology development and the development of the economy in the IT market¹².

3. Cyber Diplomacy

Cyberdiplomacy represents a multitude of mechanisms in relation to new cybernetic competition from both the security and online crime scene and the internet governance. It aims both to evolve the sector such as the security of the cyberspace and to stop and fight cyber terrorism.

The use of both the computer and the internet has created social, economic and political benefits, they also made life easier for every single user. But it causes tensions and conflicts between countries or even causes material and financial damage. Thus, for national security, it has become a new challenge becoming one of the nonconventional threats to international addresses.

Cyberspace attacks highlight the fact that a public policy with a strong international component is needed. Thus, this space is very complex

¹¹ *Țara cu cea mai mare viteză la Internet. România, prezentă în top 5, 2013*, [<http://incont.stirileprotv.ro/mobile-si-telecom/romania-ocupa-locul-5-in-topul-tarilor-cu-internet-de-mare-viteza-dupa-letonia.html>], 27 April 2017.

¹² *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România – 2020, 2014*, [<http://gov.ro/ro/guvernul/sedinte-guvern/strategia-nationala-privind-agenda-digitala-pentru-romania-2020>], 7 May 2017.

and the threats are more and more frequent. It has generated a new challenge for policymakers who are struggling both to fight crime and to modernize cyber security. In the cyberspace, security experts identified the following categories of threats: terrorism, crime, espionage and cyberwar. Otherwise, cyber space has turned into a war zone where simple users can be security engineers and terrorists who can launch an attack on a country as well as violate the law of other countries through computer fraud or identity theft. The events over the past ten years show that the attacks were of an economic and social nature¹³. The diplomatic impact was also accentuated by the revelations of *Edward Snowden* who worked in the *NSA* and *CIA* secret service sector. He issued flash news that the *NSA* has been monitoring the masses in the *US* and some *EU* countries. Thus, they had access to the telephone network and social media messages or accounts in the online environment, thus controlling the population¹⁴.

The elements that led to the consolidation of cyber diplomacy were the frequent attacks in the cyber space in the infrastructures area. One example is the *DDoS* attack in *Estonia* in 2007 that lasted three weeks and was in a hybrid form, attacking government websites and banks, universities and newspapers. Thus, it has been reported that cyber-protection measures in the cyber space and a diplomacy with a strategy designed in such a way that the security of users in virtual space is placed first¹⁵.

Cyber space is thus a component of the foreign policy, in the context in which states are debating in international fora the problems of the applicability of the consequences of cyber-attacks and the respect for human rights and the rules of behaviour in this environment. Among these problems difficulties were identified in addressing these issues at international levels due to differences in terminology regarding cyber-terrorism laws.

¹³ *European Parliament Think Tank*, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2015)571302], 24 February 2017.

¹⁴ *Who Is Edward Snowden?*, 2013, [https://edwardsnowden.com/], 28 Aprilie 2017.

¹⁵ *Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National Security*, 2017, [http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65], 28 April 2017.

The concept of cyber diplomacy involves both communication between states on the advanced security of cyberspace as well as collaboration and confidence building through the transparency of communications. The exchange of information and collaboration between cyber-security teams are also an essential aspect of this concept. Thus, by means of these CERT teams, who are responsible for emergencies and collaboration between governments, cyber security can be increased. Through this concept, both cybercrime and cyber damages can easily be identified, as well as cyber terrorists, so that human rights are protected and do not cause a risk factor, especially in terms of data protection¹⁶.

This concept includes tools and technology systems that aim to improve and analyze cyber security. Such tools range from media to web analysis, data, or platforms that can generate strategies to improve security and combat attacks and cybercriminals. The concept comes with a wide range of challenges such as: creating effective and secure spaces for state actors' debate and the development of digital tools so that in the future generations of political leaders communicate virtually through a platform. As regards the virtual environment, the European Union is becoming more and more active at international level, having a network of cyber partnerships and key countries in terms of improving security. These partnerships aim to explain the mechanisms and their development, but also to combat cybercrime. The European Union is thus helping with a cyber security strategy, called *NCSS*, to improve security in the virtual environment. These partnerships are intended to consolidate bilateral collaborations aimed at enhancing online governance and developing cyber security of diplomatic agencies¹⁷.

In the current debate on the role of internet governance and the enforcement of international rights in the virtual environment, the European Union is focusing on a number of key areas such as: improving and protecting the cyberspace, and strengthening cyber capacities in third

¹⁶ *Cyber diplomacy vs. Digital diplomacy: a terminological distinction*, 2016, [<https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/cyber-diplomacy-vs-digital-diplomacy-terminological-distinction>], 6 May 2017.

¹⁷ *European Union Agency for Network and Information Security*, [<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map>], 6 May 2017.

countries. In the 2013 cyber security strategy, the European Union explains the strong need for international partnerships as an essential means of promoting political and economic interests, as well as the conclusions on cyber diplomacy adopted in February 2015¹⁸.

The Council conclusions on cyber diplomacy of 10 February 2015 addressed both the promotion and defense of human rights, the application of international security rights and the development of cybernetic capabilities. Thus, it is considered essential that cyber diplomacy embraces both the promotion of human rights and the right to free speech in the virtual space. In other words, it must also include the safety of the Internet so that it is not used abusively or for malicious purposes. This diplomacy must therefore be based on gender equality, protect the fundamental rights of the European Union by strengthening cyber security and developing cooperation with the Member States. This should help to reduce threats and cyber-attacks, and to better combat future conflicts. To allow citizens to use virtual space at its maximum capacity and enjoy its social and cultural benefits¹⁹.

This concept encourages the development and consolidation of cyber capabilities as well as the integration into global approaches in the areas of cybernetics. In fact, it supports initiatives to increase cyber security and the open online environment. The strategy addresses new threats and challenges in this area through collaboration with Member States and cyber agencies. It combats crime and supports countries adhering to the Council of Europe Convention. It aims at capitalizing on the specialized knowledge of the organizations and agencies or of cyber intervention teams.

4. Conclusion

The Internet and technology have become the engines of economic growth for the European Union, so security in the online environment of

¹⁸ *European Parliament Think Thank*,

[[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2015\)564378](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2015)564378)], 24 February 2017.

¹⁹ *Draft Council Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy*, 2015,

[<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6122-2015 INIT/en/pdf>], 3 February 2017.

data, infrastructures and systems is facing more and more challenges such as: the Cloud, mobile and social technologies. In fact, the security of online commerce ensuring a part of the economy is also essential, so the European Union has a key role in setting ICT standards for cyber security and development.

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THE REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIA FRAMES

Flavia Durach, Mirela Pîrvan, Georgiana Udrea*

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Abstract

Among many conceptualizations, Europeanization can be understood as a mediatized discourse on the triumph and failures of European integration. Supporting this perspective, we turn to framing theory and research to make a comprehensive analysis of the Romanian media coverage of the refugee crisis. We choose to focus on this particular context due to its practical consequences and its potential to refuel Eurosceptic and populist arguments among the member states. Our paper aims to identify the prevalent themes associated with the issue, and the specific manner in which the refugee crisis is framed in high-impact media outlets in Romania. The refugee crisis is the symptom of a broader restructuring of international relations. It is expected that the way this crisis is framed and perceived will shape major political decisions in the EU.

Key words: immigrant crisis, Euroscepticism, European integration, framing

* Flavia Durach is assistant lecturer at National University for Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest. Contact: flavia.durach@comunicare.ro

Mirela Pîrvan is doctoral student at National University for Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest. Contact: mirela.pirvan@comunicare.ro

Georgiana Udrea is assistant lecturer at National University for Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest. Contact: georgiana.udrea@comunicare.ro

Introduction

What the media conventionally calls “the European refugee crisis” or “the immigrant crisis” began in 2015, when a rising number of refugees (and among them, economic migrants also) made the journey to the European Union to seek asylum, traveling across the Mediterranean Sea or through Southeast Europe. Due to extreme conditions in Syria and Iraq, 1.5 million migrants left their home countries to make a perilous journey across the Mediterranean. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that more than 1,011,700 migrants arrived by sea in 2015, and almost 34,900 by land¹. War-torn Syria was the migrants’ main country of origin.

While the amplitude of the migratory wave itself suffices to make the headlines, what drew the attention of the international media at first was the human tragedy. In April 2015, a boat with approximately 550 migrants on board sank off the coast of Libya. Officials believe that 400 victims drowned, while other 150 were rescued by the Italian coastguard. During the year 2015, the EU struggled to find humane solutions to cope with the constantly growing number of refugees. The official position of EU leaders was that Europeans must show solidarity, since the latter is core EU value. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker was very explicit in this regard: “If ever European solidarity needed to manifest itself, it is on the question of the refugee crisis”².

At first, Member States agreed on a ten-point plan to increase financial resources for addressing the problem and expanding the search area for naval missions, as well as to find solutions for many requests for humanitarian aid, asylum and integration. In June 2015, the EU member states agreed to the distribution of refugees, but failed to reach consensus on distribution quotas. In September 2015 the Commission’s proposal for taking in an additional 120,000 refugees met the firm opposition of some member states, including many Eastern-European countries. Recent

¹ BBC, *Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts*, 2016 [<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>], 15 August 2016.

² European Commission, *Press release- Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action*, 2015 [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm], 15 August 2016.

developments bring progress towards the reform of the Common European Asylum System. The European Commission is committed to ensuring a more humane, fair and efficient European asylum policy. Its first set of proposals were adopted on the 4th May 2016. The Common European Asylum System continues to be the object of refinement and initiative³.

This unique context of crisis sparked our interest whether the recent developments changed the way the EU is perceived (and framed) in the mediatized discourse. Drawing from discourse analysis and framing theory, we consider frames as key instances articulating the on-going discourse on the EU and Europeanization, interpretive packages giving meaning to issues of public interest⁴.

The theoretical framework of our paper revolves around the intricate relationship framing and issue and public perceptions of that issue. In the empirical section, we aim to identify the specific manner in which the issue of the refugee crisis is framed in high-impact media outlets in Romania, knowing that media framing of an issue influences the public perceptions of that issue. Furthermore, we question whether the crisis is represented as an European one (which would mean shifting blame and responsibility on the EU), or as an external disruptive event to be received with hostility.

The refugee crisis is the symptom of a broader restructuring of international relations. During that process, the EU is seeking a new place and destiny as a global actor. Due to the pressure stemming from the domestic accountability of the European leaders, it is expected that the way the refugee crisis is framed and perceived will influence the major political decisions.

Blaming the EU: Euroscepticism or Political Strategy?

As we mentioned in the introductory section, one aim of our study is to find out if the refugee crisis is represented as EU's problem and

³ European Commission, *Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System*, 2016 [http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/07/20160713_en.htm], 15 August 2016.

⁴ William Gamson, Andre Modigliani, "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach" in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 95(1), 1989

responsibility to solve. If so, EU blaming games might lead to a twist from triumphant Europe to disrupted Europe. There are two general contexts in which the EU becomes the object of blame and criticism: one directly related to EU affairs, the other set in the domestic context. The first context we are referring to is characterized by the existence of an Eurosceptic discourse in the national public spheres, a discourse which takes into consideration the function and outputs of the EU, as well as the results of EU regulations and policies. The second one is not necessarily linked to the direct outcomes of European integration, but to the need to shift blame for unpopular decisions from the political leaders to the more distant supranational institutions.

In one of the most cited definitions in the literature, Euroscepticism is conceptualized as a “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”⁵. While “Hard Euroscepticism is a principled opposition to the EU and the European integration”, party-based soft Euroscepticism is characterized by opposition to one or many policy areas in need of improvement⁶. The arguments of Eurosceptics are numerous, but they all gravitate around the following: European institutions are too strong and lack transparency, the European super-state has become distant from its citizens, the EU supports unpopular politics, the sovereignty of the national state is under a threat, European requirements are not fully applicable to developing economies from the Central and Eastern Europe⁷.

Citizens tend to hold the EU responsible in many policies areas, since the decision-making processes have shifted to a significant extent from the national level to the supranational one. Consequently, Euroscepticism manifests itself vigorously in times of crisis, when the costs of European membership seem too great, and/or when EU’s performance

⁵ Paul Taggart, Alex Szcerbiak, “Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe, in *Opposing Europe?*” in idem, *The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 7.

⁶ Paul Taggart, Alex Szcerbiak, *Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 8th Biannual International Conference, Nashville, 2003 p. 2.

⁷ Alina Bârgăoanu, *Examenul Schengen. In căutarea sferei publice europene* [The Schengen Exam. In Search of the European public Sphere], Bucharest: Comunicare.rom, 2011, pp. 42-43.

seems less than average. For instance, during the peak of the economic crisis in Europe, hundreds of thousands of people in Portugal, Greece, and Italy protested about austerity measures, many aiming not at the national governments, but at the European Union⁸.

Nevertheless, the mechanisms of assigning responsibility are more complex than merely shifting responsibility from the national level to supranational institutions. Hobolt and Tilley⁹ emphasize three mechanisms of assigning responsibility: 1. relating to institutions; 2. relating to information; 3. relating to individual biases. For instance, institutional differences, as well as changing economic and political context shape the views of the citizens. Furthermore, when quality information on responsibility in the media exists “it helps creating views similar to expert judgements”¹⁰— meaning a clearer view on how responsibility is distributed between the nation state and the EU.

When assigning responsibility lacks clarity, the EU may become the victim of popular resentment. Research shows that emotions play a great role in Europeanizing voting (eg. referendums) - anger being the worst motivator. Compared to anxious and fearful citizens, the angry ones are less likely to learn about, reflect upon and vote on the basis of the implications of the substantive content of the issue. Furthermore, they are more likely than anxious and fearful citizens to rely on second-order factors, blaming and punishing their government if they are dissatisfied with its performance or relying on habitual partisan-based voting¹¹. Blaming European integration for unsatisfactory national performance is “either plain wrong or, at the very least, that any pressure emanating from integration is redundant in view of exogenous constraints.”¹², but regular

⁸ Sara Hobolt, James Tilley, *Blaming Europe? Responsibility without Accountability in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 3.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹¹ John Garry, “Emotions and voting in EU referendums” in *European Union Politics*, vol. 15(2), 2014.

¹² Staffan Kumlin, “Blaming Europe? Exploring the variable impact of national public service dissatisfaction on EU trust” in *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 19(5), 2009, p. 418.

citizens are likely unaware of this error and base their attitudes on assumptions about cause and effect.

In a remarkable effort to clarify the many factors involved in assigning responsibility, Hobolt and Tilley¹³ (2014) worked towards a comprehensive model (see Fig. 1). The key factors that make individuals assign responsibility differently are their general attitudes towards the EU, their political awareness and their consumption of information. The authors emphasize that different individual attribution judgements are shaped by the political context (e.g. the information available about the EU and the clarity of multi-level institutions). The model also takes into consideration how divisions of power matter and how the relationship between institution context and attribution of responsibility is mediated by information (at the individual and contextual level). It also indicates the relationship between performance evaluations and responsibility and how that is moderated by group-serving biases.




Fig. 1. A Model of assigning responsibility in the EU.

Source: Hobolt & Tilley, 2014, 14.

As the model suggests, attributing responsibility correctly in multilevel systems is very challenging. The same authors acknowledge that “not only may voters have difficulty figuring out who is responsible for

¹³ Sara Hobolt, James Tilley, *Blaming Europe? Responsibility without Accountability in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 14.

what, but politicians will have strong incentives to engage in blame shifting and credit taking that will further serve to undermine clear responsibility linkages.”¹⁴. This observation leads us to another context in which the EU can become the scape-goat: blame-shifting strategies in the national context.

Blaming games are an intrinsic part of any political system¹⁵. As it has already been said, blame-avoidance is often claimed to be central to both political and bureaucratic behavior¹⁶. The key aspects of blame avoidance behavior include: (1) the effect of different levels of blame on decisions of officeholders whether to take an active or a passive stance; (2) the temporal sequencing of presentational strategies; (3) the effectiveness of different strategies in affecting the relationship between blame on one day and the next¹⁷.

The blaming theory basic assumptions are: (1). That political actors generally have more to lose in electoral terms from perceived failure than can be won from perceived success (the negative bias assumption). As a consequence, actors will put more time and effort in shifting blame, than in taking credit. The negative bias means that blame avoidance strategies shape the nature of institutional reforms and political agendas, and include direct attempts to persuade the public that other actors, perhaps at other levels, are responsible for failure¹⁸. (2). Scapegoating depends on citizens forming meaningful perceptions of how credit and blame are distributed across actors and levels, and is the most effective where such perceptions “not only exist in an isolated sense but are part of a coherent belief system.”- the “constrained perceptions assumption”¹⁹.

¹⁴ Sara Hobolt, James Tilley, “Who’s in Charge? How Voters Attribute Responsibility in the European Union” in *Comparative Political Studies*, XX(X), 2013, p. 5.

¹⁵ Sten Hansson, “Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: A framework for analysis” in *Discourse & Society*, vol. 26(3), 2015, p. 298.

¹⁶ Christopher Hood, “What happens when transparency meets blame avoidance?” in *Public Management Review*, vol. 9, 2007, no. 2.

¹⁷ Christopher Hood, Will Jennings, Paul Copeland, “Blame Avoidance in Comparative Perspective: Reactivity, Staged Retreat and Efficacy” in *Public Administration*, vol. 94, no. 2, 2016, p. 544.

¹⁸ Staffan Kumlin, “Claiming blame and giving credit? Unintended effects of how government and opposition frame the Europeanization of welfare” in *European Union Politics*, vol. 12(4), 2011, p 579

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

Blame avoidance is a very frequent strategy in periods of austerity²⁰ or during different crises - e.g. the aftermath of the oil shock in the 1970's²¹. Such strategies are also of the greatest importance for the implementation of radical reforms, when they are politically needed because welfare state reform is typically and generally an unpopular endeavor, likely to cost the governing party or parties votes.²²

Blame avoidance strategies have been extensively documented in the literature. The linguistic approach²³ (classifies such strategies under six categories. The first one focuses on ways of arguing- either the perception of loss by proposing that there is little or no reason to blame anyone because little or no harm has been done, or by the perception of agency by proposing that harm has been done unintentionally, unknowingly, involuntarily or by someone else. Argumentative fallacies that neglect certain premises of rational discussion are also included here. Other strategies include: wof framing (e.g. Rescue narrative, the Bad Apple frame), ways of denying, and ways of representing actors and actions. Representations of social actors may be analyzed in terms of how calculated ways of naming are used for membership categorization and how calculated ways of attributing are used for portraying actors either as more positive or negative. Blame is easier shifted to "other" or to "the bad guys". Lastly, blame avoidance takes place through specific ways of legitimizing and/or manipulating.

In political science there are at least three broad kinds of blame-avoidance strategies that can be identified from the literature: agency strategies, presentational strategies and policy strategies²⁴. Agency strategies are attempts to avoid or limit blame by arguing that formal responsibility, competency or jurisdiction is allocated among other institutions and officeholders²⁵. In

²⁰ Nathalie Giger, Moira Nelson, "The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment: Blame avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity?" in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 50, 2010.

²¹ Reimut Zohlnhöfer, "The Politics of Budget Consolidation in Britain and Germany: The Impact of Blame Avoidance Opportunities" in *West European Politics*, vol. 30, no. 5, 2007.

²² Barbara Vis, Kees van Kersbergen, "Towards an Open Functional Approach to Welfare State Change: Pressures, Ideas, and Blame Avoidance" in *Public Administration*, vol. 91, no. 4, 2013, p. 841.

²³ Sten Hansson, "Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: A framework for analysis" in *Discourse & Society*, vol. 26(3), 2015

²⁴ Christopher Hood, "What happens when transparency meets blame avoidance?" in *Public Management Review*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2007.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 199.

other words, the approach is to shift the blame for unpopular decisions to another institutional setting²⁶. Presentational strategies spin, time, stage and manage the argument, by offering plausible excuses, turning blame into credit by justificatory arguments that accentuate the positive or by diverting public attention onto other matters²⁷. Policy strategies are attempts by officeholders or institutions to avoid or limit blame by the substance or content of what they do rather than in how the issue is presented²⁸.

At the national level, blame avoidance and credit claiming between the government and opposition makes it clear that what is good news for one side is bad for the other, whereas this type of zero-sum thinking is less obvious when political levels are involved²⁹. And this is precisely EU's case: "Certainly, the real-world relationship between the EU and a member state cannot be boiled down to a simple zero-sum game. Not least, work on 'multilevel governance' emphasizes how intertwined, interdependent and ambiguous decision-making at different political levels is"³⁰. The nation state is affected by Europeanization in less than obvious ways. The relation between national and European regulations is frequently disputed and indirect, and therefore "provides fertile soil for attempts to reshape citizens' views of how credit and blame is distributed"³¹. It is a facile escape route for pressured governments to use the EU as a scapegoat in order to survive the unpopularity of austerity measures. Hobolt and Tilley concluded that policy-makers use three types of blaming strategies with regard to the EU: scapegoating, redefining the issue, and circling the wagon³².

²⁶ Carsten Daugbjerg, Alan Swinbank, "The Politics of CAP Reform: Trade Negotiations, Institutional Settings and Blame Avoidance" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, number 1, 2007.

²⁷ Christopher Hood, "What happens when transparency meets blame avoidance?" in *Public Management Review*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2007, p. 200

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Staffan Kumlin, "Claiming blame and giving credit? Unintended effects of how government and opposition frame the Europeanization of welfare" in *European Union Politics*, vol. 12(4), 2011, p. 579.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 589.

³² Sara Hobolt, James Tilley, *Blaming Europe? Responsibility without Accountability in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

In the end of this section we must emphasize that blame games have significant societal implications, as they “derail, obstruct or prevent public debates over certain policy issues, alter political agendas and alliances, legitimate some actors and disempower/delegitimize others³³. Due to the consequences of blame avoidance strategies for delegitimizing the EU, we will focus in the empirical section the presence/ absence of the “blaming EU” frame in the mediated discourse with respect to refugee crisis.

Frames: shaping the way we perceive an issue

As previously mentioned, this paper aims at identifying the key frames and narratives employed by the Romanian mainstream media discourse when tackling the refugee crisis. Given that media messages are a rich source of frames regarding the world they present³⁴ and considering that news frames play a leading role in shaping perceptions of everyday realities³⁵, we should look deeper into the mediatized discourse in order to understand how the current debate over the recent migratory waves is processed and perceived. However, one must always keep in mind that, although the media should ideally provide a balanced account of all the events as they occur, media news actually present to the public a particular framing of reality and thus a biased account, by including specific aspects and interpretations while leaving others out³⁶.

In dedicated literature, a common view regarding frames defines them as patterns of interpretation generated by emphasizing certain aspects

³³ Sten Hansson, “Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: A framework for analysis” in *Discourse & Society*, vol. 26(3), 2015, p. 298.

³⁴ Shanto Iyengar, Mark D Peters, Donald R. Kinder, “Experimental demonstrations of the “not-so-minimal” consequences of television news programs” in *American Political Science Review*, no. 4, vol. 76, 1982.

³⁵ Claes H. De Vreese, “New avenues for framing research” in *American Behavioral Scientist*, no. 3, vol. 56, 2012.

³⁶ Stephanie A. Fryberg, Nicole M. Stephens, Rebecca Covarrubias, Hazel Rose Markus, Erin D Carter, Giselle A. Laiduc, Ana J. Salido, “How the media frames the immigration debate: The critical role of location and politics” in *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, no. 1, vol. 12, 2012.

of reality and hiding or minimizing others³⁷. Framing effects refer to the way information is selected, organized, packaged and presented in the public discourse so as to make accessible and encourage a specific interpretation of a given issue³⁸. Thus, frames “define problems”, “diagnose causes”, “make moral judgments”, “suggest remedies”³⁹ and “direct attention to particular reference points or considerations”⁴⁰. In a nutshell, frames can be seen as a guide for understanding and interpreting new mediated information and for “arranging” it with already existing knowledge⁴¹. Hence, frames seem to play an equally important role in news production and news reception and may cause changes in thoughts, viewpoints, expectations and behaviour. Put differently, the exposure to a particular frame may impact upon both the attitudes that people form as well as how people respond to and behave toward specific policy areas⁴². Nevertheless, as Shuck and de Vreese showed, attitudes and knowledge preceding the exposure to the news message play an important role on determining the framing effects, the latter being also influenced by the receiver’s propensity to look at a debated issue from a certain perspective⁴³. However, some academics show that framing effects are not limited to changing certain opinions; they also imply adding new beliefs⁴⁴.

³⁷ Robert M. Entman, “Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11” in *Political Communication*, no. 4, vol. 20, 2003.

³⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power” in *Journal of communication*, no. 1, vol. 57, 2007.

³⁹ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm” in *Journal of Communication*, no. 4, vol. 43, 1993.

⁴⁰ Shanto Iyengar, “Framing responsibility for political issues: The case of poverty” in *Political behavior*, no. 1, vol. 12, 1990, p. 20

⁴¹ Bertram Scheufele, “Framing-effects approach: A theoretical and methodological critique” in *Communications*, no. 4, vol. 29, 2004.

⁴² Michael A Cacciatore, Dietram A. Scheufele, Shanto Iyengar, “The end of framing as we know it... and the future of media effects” in *Mass Communication and Society*, no. 1, vol. 19, 2016.

⁴³ Andreas R. T. Shuck, Claes H. De Vreese, “Between Risk and Opportunity. News Framing and its Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement” in *European Journal of Communication*, no.1, vol. 21, 2006.

⁴⁴ Sophie Lecheler, Claes H. de Vreese, Rune Slothuus, “Issue importance as a moderator of framing effects” in *Communication research*, no. 3, vol. 36, 2009.

The prominence of news frames in building a certain representation of facts generated in academic debates a high degree of interest concerning a typology of frames⁴⁵. Besides Iyengar's classification highlighting episodic versus thematic news frames⁴⁶, de Vreese distinguishes between issue-specific (apply only to news or to specific topics) and generic news frames⁴⁷, which can be associated with various topics, and further classified into five categories: "human impact", "powerlessness", "economics", "morality" and "conflict"⁴⁸. Other studies have revealed the existence of pre-defined news frames and frames emerging in the course of analysis⁴⁹. Similarly, Scheufele differentiates between communicator-based and effects-based frames. While the first describe how the content is presented due to journalistic choices and work routines, the latter describe what is presented, focusing on the aspects that determine a certain orientation of the reader⁵⁰. Finally, according to Kinder and Sanders there is a firm distinction between media frames – defined as "devices embedded in the political discourse" and individual frames, understood as "internal structures of the mind"⁵¹.

With regard to migration discourses in press and TV news, studies reflect a rather negative representation of immigrants in mass media⁵². Although the political orientation of the specific newspaper/ TV channel tends to influence the coverage and framing of the migration topic, the overall tendency in news reporting remains rather sceptical towards both

⁴⁵ Donald R. Kinder, Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

⁴⁶ Shanto Iyengar, "Framing responsibility for political issues: The case of poverty" in *Political behavior*, no. 1, vol. 12, 1990.

⁴⁷ Claes H. De Vreese, "Television reporting of second-order elections" in *Journalism Studies*, no. 2, vol. 4, 2003.

⁴⁸ W. Russell Neuman, Marion R Just, Ann N.Crigler, *Common knowledge*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

⁴⁹ Claes H. De Vreese, "News framing: Theory and typology" in *Information Design Journal + Document Design*, no. 1, vol. 13, 2005.

⁵⁰ Bertram Scheufele, "Framing-effects approach: A theoretical and methodological critique" in *Communications*, no. 4, vol. 29, 2004.

⁵¹ Donald R. Kinder, Lynn M. Sanders, "Mimicking political debate with survey questions: The case of white opinion on affirmative action for blacks" in *Social cognition*, no. 1, vol. 8, 1990, p. 74.

⁵² Baldwin Van Gorp, "Where is the frame? Victims and intruders in the Belgian press coverage of the asylum issue" in *European Journal of Communication*, no. 4, vol. 20, 2005.

the asylum-seekers fleeing conflict and the working migrants in search of a better future. Also, in light of the current situation in Europe, migrants' portrayal in the media grew highly negative, with news frames relating them to danger, insecurity, and (ethnic) threat⁵³). More recently, both refugees and migrants (Muslims mostly) became commonly associated with religious fanaticism and terrorism, Islam being presented as a threat to Western values, and Muslims being depicted as "intruders", "cowards", "fanatical", "violent" and "terrorists"⁵⁴.

Methodology

Our paper addresses the restructuring of the international system brought by the refugee crisis from the perspective of media studies. Following a communicational approach, we are interested in how the refugee crisis was covered by the media in Romania, how the issue was framed and who was deemed responsible. Furthermore, we inquire whether the situation was represented as a humanitarian crisis or a security issue for the EU.

We explore these topics by means of a quantitative method of research, more precisely content analysis. The recording and context unit are identical - the online news article. Given the growing tendency towards the digitalization of journalism, we selected two online news websites (hotnews.ro and ziare.com), and two press agencies' websites (mediafax.ro and agerpres.ro). The period of analysis starts from 1st of September 2015 to 30th of September 2015, this being the most eventful month, according to the timeline of the crisis for the year 2015. It is expected that the media coverage of the topic will reflect the busy series of events during the first month of Fall.

We conducted a two-step selection of the corpus. Firstly, we used the search function provided by each of the four websites to identify articles related to the subject. By using a broad range of key words (migrant, migrants,

⁵³ Katerina Manevska, Peter Achterberg, "Immigration and perceived ethnic threat: Cultural capital and economic explanations" in *European Sociological Review*, no. 3, vol. 29, 2011.

⁵⁴ Magdalena Wojcieszak, Rachid Azrout, Hajo Boomgaarden, Amanda Paz Alencar, Penelope Sheets, "Integrating Muslim immigrant minorities: the effects of narrative and statistical messages" in *Communication Research*, no. 4, vol. 44, 2017.

refugee, refugees, immigrant, immigrants, emigrant, emigrants, asylum seeker, asylum seekers, quota, quotas, and mandatory quotas), a total number of 6,334 news were identified. Considering a probability of 95% and an error margin of $\pm 3\%$, a sample of 763 articles was extracted. During the coding process, 34 news articles were eliminated, based on lack of connection to the topic of the refugee crisis. The final corpus consisted of 729 news.

The research questions that guide our analysis focus on the identification of prominent themes and frames:

RQ1. What are the prevalent themes associated with the refugee crisis, as reflected by the media coverage of the topic, for the period of analysis?

RQ2. What are the prevalent frames of the refugee crisis, as reflected by the media coverage of the topic, for the period of analysis?

RQ3. Is the refugee crisis perceived as EU's responsibly, or as an external occurrence?

The answers to these questions will contribute to a better understanding of the public perception of this complex issue. We aspect identify the prevalent media themes and frames, and to explore whether the EU is blamed for causing or aggravating the crisis.

Findings and Discussion

Out of the total number of news articles of 6,337, only 2,679 focus on the refugee crisis, meaning roughly 42%. The news on the refugee crisis were distributed across news portals, thematic areas and subthemes. We were able to identify 14 thematic areas, as follows: recent events, business, press releases, culture, economy, English (meaning a section dedicated to articles in English), foreign affairs, justice, lifestyle, politics, social, sports, news of the day.

It is worth mentioning that this is an exhaustive list covering all the four portals, but not all thematic areas could be found on each portal. Table 1 depicts the unequal distribution of the thematic areas across websites. Data shows that the refugee crisis was covered mainly under one of the following thematic areas: foreign affairs (41.7%), recent events (31.28%), politics (12.35%),

social (4.94%), and press releases (3.7%). Surprisingly, the refugee crisis is not analysed in relation to its implications on the economy (0.69%)- see Fig.1.

Table 1. News distribution on thematic areas, across news portals

	hotnews.ro	ziare.com	mediafax.ro	agerpres.ro
news	110	118	0	0
business	0	5	0	0
press releases	0	0	0	27
culture	0	0	3	2
economy	1	0	3	1
english	0	0	0	5
international affairs	0	0	127	177
justice	0	0	1	1
lifestyle	0	2	2	1
politics	0	23	35	32
press review	7	0	0	5
social	0	0	28	8
sports	1	0	1	2
news of the day	0	0	0	1

As shown in Table 1, the news agencies (agerpres.ro și mediafax.ro) are the ones that filed the refugee crisis under the thematic area of external affairs, whereas the news websites (hotnews.ro and ziare.com) chose to relate to the topic more as a novelty (thematic area “news”). Irrespective of the editorial choice, the implications are similar: all four media outlets distance themselves from the crisis, which is represented, alternatively, as a question of foreign affairs, or as one among the many events of the day.




Fig. 2. News distribution per thematic area

The widest distribution of the news across thematic areas can be found on the agerpres.ro website, whereas the narrowest, on hotnews.ro and ziare.com (Fig. 3). More specifically, the news on agerpress.ro are spread across 12 thematic areas, the only ones missing being “recent news” and “business”. In turn, Mediafax news covers unevenly 8 thematic areas. The uncovered thematic areas in this case are recent news, business, press releases, English section, press review, and news of the day. Hotnews.ro and ziare.com both cover 5 thematic areas that overlap only in the case of “recent events”. It can be argued that press agencies tend to cover the refugee from multiple perspectives more than news portals do.




Fig. 3. Thematic area distribution per website

During the coding process, a total number of 34 sub-themes were identified. In order to facilitate analysis, these sub-themes were in turn reorganized in 6 main sub-themes (Domestic and international actors, Europe/ The EU, Migrant invasion, International, Issue-specific subthemes, General subthemes), as shown in Table 2.

Under the subtheme “Domestic and international actors” we included all topics related to different types of public actors. Notably, the only prominent international actor is Angela Merkel, who played a leading role during the unfolding of events, due to highly controversial statements welcoming refugees in Germany. All the other actors are domestic political figures: Klaus Iohannis – President of Romania, Victor Ponta – (then) Prime-Minister, Bogdan Aurescu – (then) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cristian Preda – Member of the EP, Monica Macovei – Member of the EP, Vasile Blaga – President of PNL (political party), Traian Băsescu – President of PMP (political party) and former Head of State. This distribution – contradicting the basic reality of the refugees crisis as being EU-wide problem - suggests that online media outlets in Romania are focused on the local perspective, instead of acknowledging or responding to the public debate in other national public spheres.

Table 2. Subthemes reorganized in 6 main categories

Domestic and international actors	Europe/ The EU	Migrant invasion	International	Specific issues	General issues
Angela Merkel	EU funds	Migrant invasion	International	Business	Fundamental
Bogdan Aurescu	Europe-Germany	Migrant invasion-Europe	International-Islamic State	Football	Media
Cristian Preda	Europe-European countries	Migrant invasion-France	International-Turkey	Politics	Opinions
Klaus Iohannis	Europe-Hungary	Migrant invasion-Germany		Stars	Radio TV
Monica Macovei		Migrant invasion - Greece			Issue of the day
Traian Basescu		Migrant invasion - Italy			
Vasile Blaga		Migrant invasion - Romania			
Victor Ponta		Migrant invasion - Syria			
		Migrant invasion - Turkey			
		Migrant invasion - Hungary			

The subtheme “Europe/The EU” comprises all topics referring to Europe as a geographic or political space: EU funds, Europe-Germany, Europe-European countries, Europe-Hungary.

The following subtheme, “immigrant invasion” includes topics such as: Migrant invasion, Migrant invasion-Europe, Migrant invasion-France, Migrant invasion-Germany, Migrant invasion – Greece, Migrant invasion – Italy, Migrant invasion – Romania, Migrant invasion – Syria, Migrant invasion – Turkey, Migrant invasion – Hungary. In this particular case, we would like to draw attention from the start to the fact that the name itself (invasion) has negative connotations, thus influencing the public perception of the issue.

The “International” subtheme grouped the topics International, International-Islamic State, International-Turkey.

Under the “Specific issues” subtheme we filed topics reflecting particular interests, such as Business, Football, Politics and Stars (e.g. from showbusiness).

The “General issues” include the more broad (unspecific) topics: Fundamental issues, Media, Opinions, Radio, TV, Issue of the day.

As depicted in Table 3, in the case of hotnews.ro and ziare.com all the main thematic areas are organized in subthemes, whereas in the case of the news agencies, subthemes can be identified in only a few notable exceptions.

Table 3. Distribution of restructured subthemes according to news portals

	Restructured subthemes							Total
	No sub theme	Domestic and international actors	Europe/ The EU	Migrant invasion	International	Specific issues	General issues	
portal hotnews.ro	1	0	1	0	76	8	33	119
ziare.com	0	13	3	123	5	4	0	148
mediafax.ro	198	0	0	0	0	0	2	200
agerpres.ro	260	0	0	0	0	0	2	262
Total	459	13	4	123	81	12	37	729

More than half of the total number of news (63%) are not included in a subtheme at all (Fig. 4). Out of the remaining 37%, most articles cover the refugee crisis as an invasion (16.87), others file it under the category of international

events (11.11%), or under general issues (5.08%). This distribution suggests that the refugee crisis is not depicted in the media as Europe's problem. Instead, it is perceived as an external, violent interruption of the status quo. The crisis is almost dissociated from Europe/ The EU, this subtheme being identified in less than 1% of the cases.




Fig. 4. Distribution of news per recoded subthemes

Framing the refugee crisis

Our second research question focuses on how the refugee crisis is framed in the news. Throughout the analysis, we will refer to the following general news frames: responsibility frame, conflict frame, human interest frame, economic consequences frame. Data suggests that the responsibility frame is the most visible (mean $\bar{x}=0,67$, standard deviation $s=0,320$), followed by conflict (mean $\bar{x}=0,38$, standard deviation $s=0,358$). Less frequent are the human interest frame ($\bar{x}=0,19$, standard deviation $s=0,332$), and economic consequences (means $\bar{x}=0,11$, standard deviation $s=0,244$).




Fig. 5. Prominence of frames (total, in time)

When analysing the evolution of frames in time (Fig. 5), it becomes apparent that the responsibility frame is the most prominent, closely followed by the conflict frame, and that this hierarchy remains unaltered with only a few exceptions. This is in line with the “blaming games” theory, as presented in our literature review section. Media is often inclined to frame sensitive topics in terms of “finding the guilty ones” or “scapegoating”, even in the case of events with profound humanistic implications, such as the drama of the refugees flying conflict by taking enormous risks.

The 3rd and 4th place are disputed alternatively by the human interest and the economic consequences frames. The exceptions relate to the first week of September, when human interest frame becomes, for a little while, the most prominent one, and the last week of analysis, when this frame gains momentum for the second time. These peeks are associated with news related to human losses and growing number of victims among the refugees.

At this point, we can conclude that there is evidence in favour of the argument that the EU is not victim of a blaming game. We have shown that topics related to the refugee crisis were include in the foreign affairs or recent events category, that international actors are almost absent, and that subthemes connecting the crisis to Europe or the EU could be found in less than 1% of the cases. Nevertheless, the prominence of the responsibility frame suggests that media coverage is deeply preoccupied with identifying those culpable or responsible for drafting a solution. It appears that the EU

is not held accountable, though. The prevalence of the conflict frame second to the responsibility frame, as well as the prevalence of the migrant invasion subtheme encourage us to conclude that economic of humanitarian arguments lose ground in favour of the perception of the crisis as a security threat.

Conclusions

To conclude, two important and connected phenomena related to the refugees' crisis could be identified in the Romanian online media. Firstly, this new European crisis – with multiple security implications – has been largely thematised as an invasion. The term “*invasion of migrants*” has often been used to depict the many facets of the refugees' crisis, this contributing to the oversimplification of the whole discussion. Coherent and neutral analyses on the social and economic implications simply lacked or, if present, were rather superficial. This implies that the migration debate revolved around an exaggerated emphasis placed on threats to the national security, which has also shaped public opinion on this rather sensitive topic.

Secondly, the migration crisis has been extensively framed in accountability terms. The prevailing responsibility frame directed the discussion towards the necessity to find the ones – be them institutional or individual stakeholders – in charge of the whole situation. In line with similar research, this blaming game is confusing and diverts the public's attention from real issues and solutions.

In a nutshell, our research reveals that the Romanian online media has intensively oversimplified the debate on the migration crisis, by overemphasizing the security risks, on the one hand, and underemphasizing the need for feasible solutions to tackle the crisis, on the other one.

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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT. FROM “EMERGING NORM” TO A FALSE PROMISE. A NEW CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Alexandru C. Apetroe*

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Abstract

The meaning of RtoP (responsibility to protect) is self-explanatory, it shows what the international community (or at least some part of it) considers unacceptable in today's world: genocide, ethnic cleansing and barbarous acts against civilians. However, the same international community stood silent when Rwanda and Srebrenica happened. Yet precisely because of the guilt and shame associated with its previous failures, the same international community managed to launch an initiative, "responsibility to protect" (RtoP/R2P), in 2001. We insist on calling RtoP an "initiative", not as a derogatory term, but as a counter-rhetoric argument to the so-called "RtoP emerging norm". According to international law theory, a norm can be either customary (derogatory), either peremptory (jus cogens), there is no in-between option, particularly when interpreting the UN Charter provisions in relation with to the broad-spectrum of the principle of non-intervention as opposed to human rights (the area where RtoP tries to overstep the Charter's authority). The main aspects of RtoP are, (1) on one count, the infringement on state-sovereignty (the "functional sovereignty" theory), particularly on the quality of the so-called "Westphalia-style" sovereignty, (2) the other being the clear purpose of the ICISS, above and beyond of ending mass-atrocities, which is the process of legalizing humanitarian intervention. After the 1999 Kosovo Intervention and during

* Alexandru C. Apetroe has a BA in Law ("Al. I. Cuza" University Iași) and a BA in European Studies ("Babeș-Bolyai" University Cluj) and is currently enrolled at the Double-Diploma MA Programme in Political Sciences at "Babeș-Bolyai" University and Université Paris XII. Contact: alex_apetroe@yahoo.com

the early phases of the War on Terror, humanitarian intervention became seriously delegitimised, this is why something novel was needed, which where RtoP stepped-in, riding on the hopes of many.

Keywords: humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, international law, state sovereignty, (non) interventionism, human rights.

Introduction

Following a series of ominous cases of egregious human rights violations during the final decade of the 20st century, the initiative called *RtoP* (responsibility to protect) came into being, addressing the same issues which its previous counterpart, *humanitarian intervention*, failed to manage: the *principle of non-intervention*, the *authority of the UN Security Council* on deciding when intervention is legal, the issue of *legitimacy by appealing to the cosmopolitanism of human rights*. Because of the increasing prevalence of human rights rhetoric in the legal scholars' *communis opinio*, the main aspect of *RtoP* is centred on the *defence of fundamental human rights*, via the *functional interpretation of the principle of state-sovereignty* – sovereignty is directly involved with the well-being of the state's citizens – *when a state abuses its citizens, it automatically forfeits the right to be called a state*, and at the same time it incurs the wrath of the international community which sees it as its 'sacred duty to intervene' and protect civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing.

However, with all the goodwill and noble intentions, we cannot overlook the *unresolved aspects which RtoP has 'inherited'* from the now-defunct humanitarian intervention: (1) the desire to *legalize unilateral military interventions*, (2) the *lack of consensus* in the 'rest of the world', particularly in the East and South and the former colonies, (3) the desire to circumvent the UN Security Council, (4) the desire to *impose a reformation of the current international system* without the input from all the major players, (5) the *over-concentration on the matter of legitimacy (just cause)* while *disfavouring the concrete aspects with regards to the implementation and conduct of the intervention*, and (6) *after, the post-intervention situation*: if the military operation has accomplished its main task – preventing genocide (i.e. the

responsibility to protect) – *what will happen next* ? Another concern with the application of RtoP stems from the *fears of the developing nations* with the occult purpose of intervention – *can RtoP actually be a tool for regime change* in the guise of the unbridled humanitarian concerns? As we have seen in the case of the *Intervention in Libya (2011)*, the recoil of regime change can have a dangerous and costly price.

Finally, we must raise the question on *the viability of intervention in connection with the RtoP framework*, as we have seen in the past, consensus is hardly ever present, particularly in cases which involve such delicate aspects as intervention and sovereignty. Therefore, *we propose a paradigm shift* from “Responsibility to Protect” to “Responsibility to Prevent”, since it will involve far more states and entities which are now *opposed to the militaristic rhetoric of RtoP*.

Historical aspects and early development

In 2000, in the wake of the events in Africa (Rwanda, Somalia) and during the Break-up of Yugoslavia¹, especially after the Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995)² massacres, and in the aftermath of the Kosovo

¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, ICISS, Ottawa, 2001, p. 1; *Idem*, *The Responsibility To Protect. Research, Bibliography, Background*, ICISS, Ottawa, 2001, p. 3; Charles Cater, David M. Malone, “The origins and evolution of Responsibility to Protect at the UN”, in *International Relations*, Vol. 30(3), 2016, pp. 282-285, accessible on-line: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0047117816659586> (03.03.2017).

² The *Srebrenica Massacre* (July 1995) was the systematic killing of more than 8000 Bosniak-Muslims men and boys, in and around the vicinity of the town of Srebrenica, by units of the Army of Republica Srpska aided by the “Scorpions” Paramilitary Group, during the Bosnian War. In 1993, the Srebrenica town and surroundings (the Srebrenica enclave), were declared a “safe zone” by the UN (the Security Council Resolution no. 819), the subsequent UNPROFOR Peacekeeping Mission on the premises, was represented at the time by the Dutch “Dutchbat” peacekeeping force of around 400 troops, however they did not prevent the capture of the town by elements of the Army of Republica Srpska (the *Drina Corps* under the command of General Živanović), with reports of the Dutch forces being overwhelmed and unable to act. The ensuing massacre was perpetrated by army units under the command of General Ratko Mladić. After the massacre, it is approximated that a number between 25.000 and 30.000 Bosniak women, children and elderly, were forcefully re-located,

Intervention (1999)³, the *International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS)⁴, issued a report entitled “the Responsibility to Protect” (*RtoP*) which proposed a series of radical changes, especially involving the *notion of sovereignty* (and subsequently *non-intervention*) vs. *human rights*⁵.

The “core dilemma” of *RtoP* is centred on *sovereignty vs. human rights*, with the notion of *sovereignty as a responsibility*, asserting the shift “[...] from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties”⁶ with a series of consequences: state authorities are responsible for the protection and welfare of their citizens, the political authorities have a *dual responsibility*: both to their citizens and the international community, the agents of the state are responsible for their actions (for both omission and commission)⁷.

with the purpose of ethnic cleansing, this was used as evidence of the genocidal intent of the Main Staff of the Army of Republica Srpska. Also there were widespread individual violations against women and children, including mass rape, and indiscriminately killings of pregnant women and children. See more, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, “Srebrenica Massacre”, accessible on-line: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1697253/Srebrenica-massacre>; *The Hague Justice Portal*, *Srebrenica in Summary*, accessible on-line: <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=9564>; *The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*, “Reports”, accessible on-line: <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/ReportsandPublications> (03.03.2017).

³ Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 246-250.

⁴ In September 2000, the ICISS was formed as the behest of the Canadian Government, aided by a group of major foundations and supported by the UN. The Commission was asked before the UN General Assembly to address the wide palette of questions which formed the *debate around humanitarian intervention and genocide prevention* and to present to the Secretary-General of the UN a report which would bridge the dissensions on the issues of sovereignty and human rights. ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p. vii; Gareth Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect”, in *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, pp. 704-712.

⁵ C. G. Badescu, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights*, Routledge Publishers, 2011, pp. 19-20.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 13;

⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh Thakur, *Global Governance and the UN. An Unfinished Journey*, Indiana University Press, 2010, pp. 312-313; Peltonen Hannes, “Sovereignty as Responsibility, Responsibility to Protect and International Order: On Responsibility, Communal Crime Prevention and International Law”, in *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 7, No. 28, Winter, 2011, pp. 59-81.

Therefore, *the attack of the “Westphalian-style sovereignty”*⁸, is the most important aspect of the RtoP initiative since it challenges the domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty in the specialized interpretation of the term, deferring sovereignty as “exercise[ing] exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders”⁹ and imposing a *functional interpretation of sovereignty*¹⁰, as being limited by state action when the obligation to provide protection to its citizens is not fulfilled, meaning that non-intervention is superseded by human rights and that “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.

In light of the ICISS’ interpretation, *sovereignty is not indivisible*, therefore it would be possible to forfeit some aspects of it as to allow intervention and provide relief “[...] where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure”. Also, it makes reference to the process of creating *new rules of customary international law*, by using the terminology “developing practice”.¹¹

The overall strategy of RtoP is organized into *three pillars*¹², which are “equal in terms of size, strength and viability”¹³ as follows: *first*, states have the responsibility to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; *second*, the international community has a responsibility of assistance towards the state in question, as to fulfil its primary responsibilities; *third*, if the state does not fulfil its primary responsibilities, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures short of the use of force (economic sanctions and other diplomatic measures), with military intervention being considered as a last resort. The Report also discusses its *new approach* – the umbrella-concept of “the Responsibility to Protect”, the interconnectivity of the pillar system is made as to ensure that intervention on grounds of

⁸ Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh Thakur, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-311.

⁹ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰ C. G. Badescu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹¹ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p. 9.

¹² Hugh Breakey, *The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts: Review and Analysis*, Griffith University, May, 2011, pp. 37-40.

¹³ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/60/L.1, para. 138-139, p. 31; on the *three pillars of RtoP*, see Ban Ki-moon, *UN Secretary-General’s Report: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, A/63/677, pp. 10-27.

genocide prevention must be employed as an “extraordinary and exceptional measure” and that it meets specific criteria, represented by its *four basic objectives*:

“(1) [...] to establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene; (2) [...] to establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and after all other approaches have failed; (3) [...] to ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to minimize the human costs and institutional damage that will result; (4) [...] and to help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace”¹⁴

These aspects which involve military intervention are considered as a “last resort” and are undertaken only after the preventive (non-military) options have been exhausted, the decision to act with military force must be taken in observance of special conditions which include: a *clear purpose*, *proportionality* and *reasonable prospects*, and only under the “direct authority of the Security Council”¹⁵. On these proposals, the ICISS report has received significant support both from states and legal scholars¹⁶, though it has been criticized by some BRICS states (such as India, Russia¹⁷, Brazil¹⁸ and China¹⁹), and some authors²⁰ whilst others have a mixed, semi-favourable

¹⁴ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p. 11.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. xii-xiii.

¹⁶ The authors which have expressed support for RtoP: C. G. Badescu, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*, Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p. 11; *Idem*, *From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect*, p. 703; Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh Thakur, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

¹⁷ Gareth Evans, *From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect*, p. 716.

¹⁸ The position of the Brazilian ambassador to the UN signifies that “R2P is not a principle proper, much less a novel legal prescription. Rather, it is a powerful political call for all States to abide by legal obligations *already set forth in the Charter*, in relevant human rights conventions and other instruments”. Aidan Hehir, “R2P and International Law”, in Philip Cunliffe (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect, Interrogating Theory and Practice*, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 92.

¹⁹ “However, some Member States criticised the manner in which these mandates were implemented. Critics complained that NATO (in Libya) and the UN (in Cote d’Ivoire) overstepped their Security Council mandates by *contributing to the forcible change of regimes*,

reviews²¹. The UN in particular, has recognized its importance at the 2005 *World Summit*,²² and since then it has twice endorsed the RtoP initiative²³; the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also voiced his support

that they used disproportionate force which increased the risks to the civilian populations and that they ignored or outright rejected opportunities for political dialogue. A number of countries, including Russia, India, and China went so far as to argue that regime change must never be part of the toolkit of responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Subsequently, Russia in particular, has argued that Libya coloured its thinking on Syria, pushing it to resist Western pressure on the al-Assad regime on the grounds that this might open the door to regime change.” See, Alex J. Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect: Towards a “Living Reality”*, Report written for the United Nations Association-UK, UNA-UK, 2013, p. 19.

²⁰ These authors have expressed critical opinions of RtoP: Louis Pingeot, Wolfgang Obenland, *In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect*, Global Policy Forum, 2014, p. 32; Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On”, in *Ethics and International Affairs*, Issue 24, No. 2, 2010, p. 143 ; Philip Cunliffe, “Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility”, in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, Alexander Gourevitch, (eds.), *Politics without Sovereignty A critique of Contemporary International Relations*, University College London Press, 2007, p. 39-41; Alexander Gourevitch, “National Insecurities. The new politics of the American National Interest”, in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, Alexander Gourevitch, (eds.), *Politics without Sovereignty A critique of Contemporary International Relations*, University College London Press, 2007, p. 58; Aidan Hehir, *op. cit.*, in Philip Cunliffe (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect, Interrogating Theory and Practice*, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 84.

²¹ James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, Who Should Intervene?*, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 252-253.

²² “Amidst the general disappointment [...] there were several important rays of hope [...] perhaps in the longer term the most important, was the General Assembly’s endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’”. Nicholas J. Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit”, *Journal of International Law & International Relations*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2005, p. 95, accessible on line: http://www.jilir.org/docs/issues/volume_2-1/2-1_7_WHEELER_FINAL.pdf (03.03.2017).

²³ On *two separate occasions*, the Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment for the initiative presented by RtoP, first in 2006 with *Resolution no. 1674*, and second in 2009 with *Resolution no. 1894*, (both, para. 138, 139). The Security Council has since then mentioned RtoP on a number of cases, for example: *Libya*, with *Resolution no. 1970*, *Resolution no. 1973*, *Resolution no. 2016*, *Resolution no. 2040*; and *Mali*, with *Resolution no. 2085*, *Resolution no. 2100*; as well as in other cases which involved resolutions for countries engulfed in civil war and civil disobedience. See, *United Nations Security Council, “Resolutions”*, [S/RES/1674 (2006); S/RES/1894 (2009); S/RES/1970 (2011); S/RES/1973 (2011); S/RES/2016 (2011); S/RES/2040 (2012); S/RES/2085 (2012); S/RES/2100 (2013)], accessible on-line: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/ods/> (03.03.2017).

for RtoP, with the first comprehensive document released in 2009, during the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, and afterwards debating RtoP in the UN General Assembly for the first time, giving states the floor in voicing their support and concerns on the matter. This practice has continued in the subsequent UN Secretariat's Annual Report since 2010.²⁴

Criticism of the RtoP initiative

On the other side of the argument, we have the critics of the ICISS report. One of the most vehement voices to challenge the RtoP initiative is that of Alan Kuperman, who believes that “[actually] RtoP caused genocide” referring to the cases in which rebels would encourage uprisings or secessions, as to incur a genocidal response from the authorities so that the West who would militarily intervene and change the ‘murderous’ regime and in the process aiding the “political games of rebels”, and that “RtoP is a wonderful principle”, unfortunately the “norm meant to protect civilians has backfired”²⁵. This argument is quite famous, though is not the first time it has been used, (during the Yugoslav Wars, the Serbs have claimed provocation into genocide by Muslim separatists) and it has been linked to a number of *false flag operations*²⁶, with the most recent one exactly

²⁴ *The United Nations*, “Reports of the Secretary-General”: (1) Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (A/64/864, 2010); (2) The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect (A/65/877-S/2011/393, 2011); (3) Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response (A/66/874-S/2012/578, 2012); (4) Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention (A/67/929-S/2013/399, 2013), accessible on-line: <http://www.un.org/sg/speeches/reports/68/report.shtml>; (03.03.2017).

²⁵ Alan J. Kuperman, “Review of Gareth Evans’ Responsibility to Protect”, in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 124, No. 3, (Fall 2009), p. 591. For a more comprehensive debate between the two, see: *CNN’s Amanpour*, “Does the World Have the Right to Prevent Genocide?”, CNN Transcripts, October 28 2009, accessible on-line: <http://transcript.cnn.com/TRANS-CRIPTS/0910/28/ampr.01.html> and on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jWOUTm6iY2M> (03.03.2017).

²⁶ * In military terminology, *false flag* (sometimes *black flag*) represents the covert operation or (*black op.*) meant to deceive the enemy and the population in such a way, that the subversive actions appear as though they have being carried out by entities, groups, or nations other

in April 2015²⁷, so technically, there is the possibility that in some part of the world, this could be used as a tool for independence. Before their debate (Evans vs. Kuperman), Gareth Evans, one of the “fathers” of the RtoP initiative, in defence of his creation and discussing about sovereignty – the arch-enemy of humanitarian intervention – wrote that “sovereignty is a license to kill: what happens within state borders, however grotesque and morally indefensible, is nobody else’s business”²⁸. In this line, he mentioned the largely criticized Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, whom he views as being a humanitarian intervention and as an example of how sovereignty, even when used by genocidal governments, represents a bygone era of the time when newly formed states “proud of their identity, conscious in many cases of their fragility, and generally saw the non-intervention norm as one of their few defences against threats and pressures from more powerful international actors”²⁹. Evans forgets to add that at the time the US were actively supporting the Khmer Rouge (the perpetrators of the *Killing Fields*) at the time, and that

than those who actually planned and executed them. Though they are considered “perfidy” and prohibited under the 1977 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions (1949) they have been extensively used (and still are), particularly by the US, British and the Russians.

** For example, the US and the UK, used a directed and complex false-flag operation, in conjuncture with a coup d’état in 1953, called *Operation TP-Ajax*, to remove the democratically elected government of Iran (prime-minister Mosaddegh), by employing a directed campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Loyalist Communist Party to undermine the authority of the government. This ultimately led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which overthrew the Shah, the US-Iran relations being extremely tense ever since. Another example, the Russians are suspected to have organize the 2008 *Kurcha incident*, as to provide them with a *casus belli* to intervene in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, because of the pro-West stance that former Georgian president Saakashvili took, with later information suggesting that the film crew (supportive of the Russians) who recorded the incident, was already in place before it happened. See more, Robert B. Durham, *False Flags, Covert Operations, & Propaganda*, First Edition, 2014, pp. 1-6, 254-277; C. G. Badescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-144.

²⁷ *Global Research*, “Turkey Wages War on Syria: Leaked Recording Confirms Turkish “False Flag” Attack”, accessible on-line: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/turkey-wages-war-on-syria-leaked-recording-confirms-turkish-false-flag-attack/5375807> (03.03.2017).

²⁸ Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect”, in Richard H. Cooper, Juliette Voïnov Kohlerin, (eds.), *Responsibility to Protect The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 16.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

they were the most ardent critics of the Vietnamese intervention, and also that the situation has not changed from the 1970s, powerful states continue to involve themselves in other states' business. Also, it is noted that the majority of historians actually perceive that the Vietnamese intervention was in fact a self-defence operation, as radical Khmer factions were responsible for several attacks across the border, the fact that the intervention had a humanitarian outcome, does not change the fact that the military operation of Vietnam was not a humanitarian intervention, though it clearly had humanitarian outcomes.

In relation with the *Darfur case*, as one humanitarian crisis which did not receive the 'benefit' of the RtoP intervention, Evans tries to clarify the confusion which baffled many academics. In this respect, he devises a series of criteria which he applies to the Darfur case as to prove that military intervention on behalf of the RtoP was, until the time of his writing, unnecessary, and that "the point particularly for those who continue to think that any embrace of R2P means committing oneself to multiple military interventions in highly problematic circumstances, is that R2P is about much more than coercive humanitarian intervention"³⁰:

"(1) *Seriousness of harm* – does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended; (2) *Proper Purpose* – the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other motives may be in play; (3) *Last Resort* – has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored; (4) *Proportional Means* – are the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective; (5) *Balance of consequences* – is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction."³¹

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 23-24.

We disagree with the opinion of Evans, mainly because the rhetoric of the conditions above is seen as overly cautious at best in comparison with the rhetoric used in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. The fact that the previous cases in which humanitarian interventions were used backfired profusely and delegitimized the intervening states in such a way in which now they employ a series of criterions as to convince themselves (and the world) that Darfur did not need an Western intervention, represents, in our opinion, the negative consequences of overextending one’s reach in the preceding situations which were hailed as “humanitarian interventions”. The “need for selectivity”³² which Evans endorses, reminds us of the rhetoric of act-utilitarianism, hence, the self-defeating quality of his discourse and of the applicability of RtoP. He supports the need that further criteria must be developed for better deciding which situation should be included as being under the RtoP mandate, therefore he proposes the creation of a “credible R2P watch list”, which should encompass a number of instruments, as to help determine the position in which the a respective or prospective country is, relative to the RtoP mandate.

“(1) *The first relevant consideration* is whether the country in question has a past history of mass atrocities perpetrated by repressive governments or different groups in the population against each other or both; (2) *The second* is whether tensions of a kind that have given rise to conflict in the past, even if falling short of the perpetration of full-scale mass atrocities, still persist; (3) *The third factor* is the strength of the country’s coping mechanisms when it comes to resolving grievances and tensions; (4) *The fourth factor* is the receptivity of the country or society in question to external influence, either positively, in the form of welcoming assistance to solve its problems, or negatively, in the sense of being susceptible to economic, political, diplomatic, legal, and – in the last resort – military pressure; (5) *The final factor* [...] is good leadership. Countries with such leadership tend to be able to solve almost any problem.”³³

³² *Idem*, *The Responsibility to Protect, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*, pp. 71-74.

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 74-75.

Evans' proposal seems to assume too much on the part that the international community, for it seems less likely that it would accept this type of "blacklist" where states which do not behave accordingly are going to be written down and then chastised publically through acts of diplomacy before being threatened with intervention if they refuse to conform. Also, we must remember that RtoP is not an internationally accepted norm, it has only reached the status of *proposal*, and in the last years, it seems to have regressed to the point where some believe it will remain exactly that, a proposal. Therefore, it seems that Evans is somewhat surmising too much from his creation and from counting too much on the alluring power of anti-genocide rhetoric. Another aspect which intrigues us is the so-called "good leadership" criterion, as it would infer that leaders who do not fit the prescribed qualities of "good leaders" represent a threat to their country. Yet even assuming that it is so, is it not the responsibility of the people to decide which leader is best suited to their needs? This proposal alone makes us seriously consider that all the good aspects of RtoP are not enough to fill the hole that Evans' proposal, of implicit regime change, made, and what is even worse, it the 'proposal' that it should be endorsed internationally, with the violation of so many Charter rules and international documents.

Other authors also voiced their criticisms. Aidan Hehir, another concerned voice, believes that the RtoP initiative is not what it seems, or more correctly put, *it's no longer what it seemed to be at the beginning*, being *radically changed* from the time of its inception:

"[...] the significance of R2P is very limited and the furore over its prescriptions is a function more of what people imagine them to be rather than what they actually are. As R2P has evolved since 2001 it has moved away from the issue that was its inspiration, namely responding to certain egregious intra-state humanitarian crises, and has increasingly developed into an amorphous concern with prevention. While the term 'Responsibility to Protect' and its abbreviation 'R2P' have very quickly pervaded political discourse, both lack substance and are little more than slogans employed for differing purposes shorn of any real meaning or utility."³⁴

³⁴ Aidan Hehir, "The Responsibility to Protect: 'Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing'?", in *Sage Journals' International Relations*, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2010, p. 219.

He points out that when RtoP was created, its main purpose was that of responding to situations which were similar with the massacres of Rwanda and Srebrenica, however, it has since evolved into an operative principle with more emphasis on prevention and political involvement than clear actions amounting to the radical changes in international relations, as it claimed in its early days. Also, Hehir indicates that the involvement of the UN, the Security Council in particular, seemingly warped the original purposes, diluting the original text which made a clear reference to “the obligation of the international community” and replacing it with the lesser term of “responsibility”, which gives way for the Security Council to “be prepared act” instead of “the shared responsibility to take collective action”. Continuing, he points out that the rhetoric of the 2005 *Outcome Document* could be interpreted as giving a “significant scope for politically determined *ad hoc* interventionism”³⁵. Hehir believes (and justly so), that the “fundamental flaw” which RtoP has, (morally speaking) is the rhetoric of “never again”, though with “little demonstrable utility in practice” and its “seemingly wilful evasion of the influence of power and inflated sense of the capacity of R2P may advocates to influence the behaviour of states through the application of moral pressure”³⁶. Therefore, the implications of the fact that the 2005 *Outcome Summit* does not carry much legal weight (if any), and *does not enforce RtoP as a legal international norm*, coupled with the grandiose presentation and limited support (not for the concept itself, but rather for the issues with implementing the *third pillar*) make Hehir to conclude that “R2P’s only possible utility lies in its shaming power and rhetorical impact”³⁷.

We agree with this view, in particular with the arguments about the moral aspect of RtoP. The desiderate of stopping genocide is axiomatically a noble and just ideal, however, to believe that states will give up their power and commit manpower and resources just for the fact that they’ve publically endorsed RtoP is naïve at best. Also, the RtoP language reminds

³⁵ *Idem*, “R2P and International Law”, in Philip Cunliffe (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect, Interrogating Theory and Practice*, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 90-91.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 95.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 96.

us of the utilitarian rhetoric of John Stuart Mill³⁸, who viewed the British Empire as the great civilizing force which even when it made “any attempt it makes to exert influence over them [other states], even by persuasion, is rather in the service of others, than of itself”³⁹, and at the same time ignored the atrocities committed during the *Sepoy Rebellion in of 1857*, really shows the extent and reach of foreign policy and state interest warped into *power politics*. It is the same story with RtoP, it claims it wishes for prevention rather than intervention, but when put to the test it suffers from the same old *humanitarian intervention disease* which did not prevent Rwanda and Srebrenica, in practice, its moral qualities fail utterly, first and foremost, because the foreign policy of the interveners and their inability to take the responsibility of what intervention for humanitarian purpose actually involves – loss of life from the intervening forces, very high costs and political chaos at home.

Another critique towards RtoP comes from Louis Pingeot and Wolfgang Obenland, who uncovered a series of “flaws of R2P” as follows:

“(1) it has too many analytical gaps, problematic assumptions, and controversial solutions; (2) its understanding of the mechanisms behind conflicts and global policymaking is at times naïve and disconnected from reality; (3) it is far from being universally applicable, and it employs double standards; (4) it fails to ask the right questions, by focusing on sovereignty as the main obstacle to saving lives; (5) it originates from a government project, rather than a project that sprung from civil society initiatives, therefore making it questionable; (6) the supporters of R2P usually discard criticism of the doctrine as a “misinterpretation” of what it truly is or as a knee-jerk reaction; (7) although its supporters present the doctrine as a revolutionary advance in international relations, it in fact has many historical predecessors – with emphasis on the *colonial period*”.⁴⁰

Among these, we believe that (2), (3) and (4) represent the most significant failures of RtoP, because they rely on an idealized interpretation of

³⁸ John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” in *Fraser’s Magazine*, 1859 (first appeared), in *Foreign Policy Perspectives*, No. 8, 2006.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Louis Pingeot, Wolfgang Obenland, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, 32-41.

its role, they do not try to understand the underlying issues which cause ethnic conflict, and they automatically revert to a sort of simplistic reactionary rhetoric which derives from the process of managing the already enacted genocidal violence. Instead on shifting the whole approach towards *trying to ascertain the root cause of human conflict*, they blindly accept that it may occur at any time and the only solution is enforced prevention. We believe that one cannot invoke prevention before one understands the underlying mechanics of what one tries to prevent from occurring actually is. RtoP does nothing of this sort, it basically tries to wrap the ugly and complex facets of ethnic conflict in the cloth of imperfect sovereignty and governmental responsibility, doing this without the slightest application of the realistic concepts which drive inter-human sectarian conflict. We fail to ascertain why the great minds behind this initiative did not consider the *worst-case scenario*, which involves *RtoP's usage as a tool which causes disgruntled minorities and rebellious factions to provoke and sustain artificial ethnic dissention* so that the highly susceptible and sensitive Western societies would immediately take action, so that their establishments are shielded from being publically chastised by their own citizens. However, they do recognize *some arguments in support of RtoP* such as the reiteration of principles and concepts and existing state obligations, and with the desiderate of trying to change the old rhetoric, distancing itself from humanitarian intervention, though it did not “manage to completely disentangle itself from the concept of humanitarian intervention”⁴¹; it “underlines the primary responsibility of states towards their own people”; it emphasizes the “role of the international system in helping individual states to fulfil their responsibility towards their own citizens”⁴²; it attempts to build more “consistent international response to crises” and to “overcome the doctrine of (unilateral) humanitarian intervention”; stressing that “all actors involved in a conflict should be held accountable”, by endorsing “correlation between criminal prosecution and deterrence”⁴³. We do believe that some parts of the RtoP initiative are welcoming, for example the *accountability issues* are approached in the fashion in which *both*

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 23.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

interveners and intervened are considered equally responsible under international criminal law, making the job of the troops on the ground much more equitable for the civilian population trapped within the conflict area, it also gives a sense of justice and delimitates the responsibility of the entire operation from the acts of individuals which do not respect their mission and abuse their power. However, this proposal could backfire, since the “possibility of holding intervening states accountable for their action in the course of R2P could have serious repercussions for the effectiveness of interventions”⁴⁴, again bringing into question the double standards problem of the interveners.

Another proposal of RtoP is that of focusing, albeit theoretically, “on ‘root cause prevention’ [it] offers an opportunity to advocate for more international support to help states not only in times of crisis and conflict, but also in times of peace”⁴⁵. Though this is highly commendable, this could in fact corrupt the whole process of aid and international assistance, by transforming the alleged economic assistance tools into instruments to politically intervene in the affairs of the state in question, conditioning the aid and international support in exchange for proxy control, *turning R2P into colonialism 2.0*, which represents one of the many fears of former colonies which are slowly transitioning towards democratic elected governments.

Quiet support for RtoP

In support of RtoP, Anne Orford believes that “[...] the significance of the responsibility to protect concept lies not in its capacity to transform promise into practice, but rather in its capacity to transform practice into promise, or deeds into words”⁴⁶. She argues that one important aspect of RtoP is the separation from the aspect of sovereignty infringement, view which characterized the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, perceiving the concept of sovereignty as possessing the criterion of being “effective at

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ Anne Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect*, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 2

guaranteeing protection” as part of the intrinsic quality of legitimate authority as being an intrinsic part of sovereignty⁴⁷. Orford does not agree with the idea that *RtoP* is being forcefully imposed as a form of “soft-law”⁴⁸, since she considers that “[...] most agree that the World Summit Outcome cannot be understood to impose new legal obligations [...] nor does it appear that the declaration of an international responsibility to protect has imposed a legal obligation upon states to engage in unilateral or collective intervention in situations of humanitarian crisis”⁴⁹, arguing that those obligations already existed in various international instruments, such as the Genocide Convention⁵⁰ and other UN General Assembly documents.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

⁴⁸ In the classic, *binary rhetoric* (*lex lata* vs. *lex ferenda*, complete law vs. legal project), the concept of “soft law” refers to non-binding agreements, as opposed to “hard law” which are considered binding or obligatory. The discussion does not stop here, with the dichotomy of soft vs. hard law being perceived differently. According to Professor Shaw, “It is sometimes argued more generally that particular non-binding instruments or documents or non-binding provisions in treaties form a special category that may be termed ‘soft law’”, though, he clearly points out that “‘soft law’ is not law”. So, while not legally binding, soft law can be politically influential in setting down objectives and aspirations which may crystallize into custom or be adopted as treaties. In spite of this, some disconsider the binary rhetoric (hard law is preferable over soft law). At the extremes of the debate, *constructivists* believe that soft law should have a more active role to play, in contrast with *legal positivists* who prefer hard law, considering that soft law is problematic and is only useful when included in the process of developing hard law. See more, Gregory C. Shaffer, Mark A. Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance”, in *Minnesota Law review*, No. 94, Issue 706, 2010, pp. 712-717, 720-727, ; Malcom N. Shaw, *International Law, Sixth Edition*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 117-118; John P. Grant, J. Craig Barker, *Parry and Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, Third Edition*, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 558; Samantha Besson, “Sources of International Law”, in Samantha Besson, John Tasioulas (eds.), *The Philosophy of International Law*, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 170-172.

⁴⁹ Anne Orford, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

⁵⁰ The *Genocide Convention*, (the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9 1948, and entered into force on 12 January 1951, until now being ratified by 146 states, defines the term “genocide” in Article 2 and incriminates it in Article 3 along with other connected activities. According to Article 2, the term “genocide” represents “[...] any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about

On the methods which involve practical accounts of RtoP implementation (police action), particularly on unauthorized/unilateral humanitarian intervention, Anne Orford discusses the concerns of some academics that concentrated on the possibility that it might be misused:

“Noam Chomsky focused upon the danger that the doctrine of the responsibility to protect concept might be misused by powerful states to justify unilateral humanitarian intervention, [...] There has been much less critical attention paid to the possibility that the responsibility to protect concept might be used precisely as its proponents suggest it should be used – that is, to expand international executive rule in the name of protecting life”⁵¹

In her opinion, the issue is far more complex than the concern raised by Noam Chomsky, arguing that the failure of the UN to respect its main purpose (maintaining peace and security) and the failure to respond to cases of massacre and genocide “would mean abandoning what many had come to see as the mission of the organization”, and that the Kosovo and Iraq cases represented a form of “possible dystopian future in which powerful states or coalitions of the willing side-lined the UN and took its place as the representatives of humanity”⁵². She believes that RtoP is a response to the above-mentioned threat, behaving in a manner consistent with the UN principles and the result of that is “a detailed argument for the political authority of the international community and for the consolidation and integration of executive rule by international actors”. Therefore, Orford considers that RtoP has *dispelled the fears* that the “neo-imperialist triumvirate of the US, Britain and France” (the words of Noam Chomsky) which existed and was using RtoP to facilitate their interests, this being endorsed by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his speech before the General Assembly in 2011, affirming that the “[...] development of a

its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”. *United Nations Treaty Series*, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, 1951, p. 280.

⁵¹ Anne Orford, *op. cit.*, p. 27-28.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 33.

credible multilateral alternative would make it more difficult for States or groups of States to claim that they need to act unilaterally or outside of United Nations channels”⁵³.

We disagree with this opinion, simply because the facts don’t add up to the proposed ideas which RtoP tries to empower. *Firstly*, if we analyse the military power of states with a tradition of colonial and imperial actions, only the “neo-imperialist triumvirate” fits the *needed requirements*: a strong, flexible military with a blue-water navy, the strong economy needed to support this, and the incommensurable desire to control and intervene. The imperial and colonial traditions of other states, Russia, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain/Portugal have either been abandoned their imperialistic desires (due to obvious domestic reasons), or the costs and manpower necessary to maintain them are very high. Other possible candidates are India and China, but up until now, they do not have the military and blue-water navy as to impose themselves as interveners. The only exceptions (as humanitarian interveners) are India, who involved itself in the Sri Lanka Civil War, and Russia which still follows the doctrine of “buffer zones” and tries to retain control of key regions in the Baltic (Finland’s neutrality) and Eastern Europe (East Ukraine and Crimea). It is however possible in the future to witness the re-emergence of the Sino-Japanese rivalry in South-East Asia, Japan being on a slow but very well planned shift from isolationism to regional importance, and China trying to manage the huge economic growth and channelling her vast resources into building-up its military. Therefore the costs, both political and financial, do not entice them to spearhead this type of actions, leaving only the three (the US, Britain and France) as the main ‘culprits’ and ‘instigators’ of humanitarian interventions.

Laura Herța contends that RtoP has the quality of an “emerging norm”, emphasizing the interpretation of *sovereignty as responsibility* (in contrast to *sovereignty as authority*) and pointing to the following “huge differences that while the [latter] refers to states’ control over their territories and population, the [former] suggest that sovereignty is conditional on a state demonstrating respect for a minimum standard of human rights”; this approach is further reinforced by the interpretation of

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter which views state sovereignty as already yielding to the desire of the international community to preserve “peace and security”.⁵⁴

This argument could lead to further interpretations, which reduce the political and legal significance of sovereignty. In what follows, we will counteract such potential interpretations. *First* – the interpretation of *sovereignty as being divorced from the ethos of the state would be incorrect*, the existence of a state is, first and foremost, inextricably linked with the notion of sovereignty, which is indivisible; a state cannot have absolute internal sovereignty and pooled or shared external sovereignty, these notions are incompatible. *Second* – the interpretation of the UN Charter as providing an *ex ante* permission to intervene when the threats to peace and security are obvious would be misguided, since it would disregard the provisions on the authority of the Security Council to decide on the matter (Article 24), and legally speaking, would render useless the purpose of the Security Council⁵⁵. *Third* – the shift from *sovereignty as authority to sovereignty as responsibility* does not represent a solution to the problems of human rights violations, it will only empower or facilitate regime change and will lead to international instability and mistrust, since it would make it extremely difficult to convince the developing nations to acquiesce this ‘reformation of the international system’.

In a more specific context, that of the *intervention in Libya* (2011), Laura Herța emphasizes the “empathy [of the international community] for the suffering of innocent Libyans” and, discussing the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1973, she draws attention to

⁵⁴ Laura M. Herța, “*Jus in Bello* and the Solidarist Case for Humanitarian Intervention. From Theory to Practice”, in *Studia Europæa*, LVIII, Issue 1, March, 2013, pp. 28-29.

⁵⁵ Article 25 states that: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” Corroborating this with the previous provision, this means that the Security Council is mandated to first analyse and then decide on the opportunity to disregard the rule set forth in Article 2(4) (forbidding the use of force), the states are bound to respect the decision of the Security Council only, automatically applying the Chapter VII Action by circumventing the vote on the Security Council amounts to a breach of Article 2(4), which according to international law, is considered as an act of aggression.

“The milestone showing that ‘the world has become more committed to the protection of civilians’ was reflected in the fact that two UNSC Resolutions on Libya ‘passed with unprecedented speed and without single dissenting vote’⁵⁶.

In our opinion, the situation revealed by the two Security Council Resolutions (Resolution no. 1970 and 1973) point to a mixed status, that of a *pseudo-humanitarian intervention*, since it does not represent a humanitarian intervention *per se*, and it involves several rhetorical aspects pinpointed in the RtoP rationale.

First, from the *standpoint of international law*, Resolution no. 1973 has a number of ambiguities: the reference in para. 4 (which remarks on para. 9 of the Security Council’s Resolution no. 1970) uses the legal term of “notwithstanding”, combining the two paragraphs into one interpretation:

“Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, [...] to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding *paragraph 9 of resolution 1970* –

{“all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer [...], of arms and related materiel of all types, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities [...] or use of any arms and related materiel, including [...] armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below;

(b) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only; *or*

⁵⁶ Laura M. Herța, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

- (c) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;”], to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” }
- to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”.⁵⁷

Interpreting the phrase “to take all necessary measures, *notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970*, to protect civilians” is as follows: the absolute embargo imposed to all arms shipments stands as absolute, with the exception of *the humanitarian rationale* – military equipment supplied to the rebels – which is considered as such because it serves the purpose of protecting civilians by providing them means to protect themselves, these actions are considered as legal (i.e. within the limits of the Security Council’s resolutions).

Second, from the operational perspective, the decision to impose NFZ (no fly-zones) has multiple reasons: from protecting civilians from governmental air-strikes, to reducing the number of collateral victims; but the *main objective was to act as a proxy rebel air force*, since the targets were easier to find (either on the ground, or in the air). This kind of support given to rebels, in the absence of the NFZ, could be interpreted as *unconditional aid given to the rebel forces* which could pose serious legitimacy issues to the providing nations which could be deliberately violating international law⁵⁸.

With a less aggressive, yet sometimes still with a critical tone, Alex Bellamy, affirms the semblance between RtoP as “old wine in new bottles” or as a “Trojan horse”, representing the hidden interests of states like the US and Great Britain, in their quest to impose their will as “norm carriers”, and also as a way in which they will justify interference in the internal

⁵⁷ The United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 1970 (S/RES/1970 (2011)**), p. 3; *Resolution 1973 (S/RES/1973 (2011))*, p. 3.

⁵⁸ *BBC News*, “Libya: Coalition divided on arming rebels”, accessible on-line: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12900706> ; *The Guardian*, “Libya: Coalition bombing may be in breach of UN resolution’s legal limits”, accessible on-line: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/28/libya-bombing-un-resolution-law> (03.03.2017).

affairs of less-powerful states:

“Do states and regional organizations recognize that they have a ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians at risk, as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued? Or is humanitarian intervention perceived as a ‘Trojan horse’ used by the powerful to legitimize their interference in the affairs of the weak? I examine whether the Iraq War has shifted the balance between these two positions, posing the question: Is there more or less likelihood of global consensus on armed responses to ‘supreme humanitarian emergencies’?”⁵⁹

Also, he discusses about the concerns of other states who view RtoP as a form of neo-imperialism, “[...] [there are] lingering concerns about RtoP potential to legitimize interference in the domestic affairs of states and other fears about abuse”⁶⁰. Bellamy does not only criticize RtoP as a practical failure⁶¹, for not being applied in situations such as Darfur and Somalia⁶², thus not respecting its own principles, but indicates that even on situations it has been applied it has raised important concerns on the issues of abuse and excesses. For example, in the case of Myanmar, France’s invocation of RtoP was “widely rejected and criticized”, and in the cases of Kenya and Myanmar⁶³, “the feared mass atrocities did not eventuate”.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq”, in Joel H. Rosenthal, Christian Barry, (eds.), *Ethics & International Affairs. A Reader*, Third Edition, Georgetown University Press, 2009, p. 104.

⁶⁰ *Idem*, *The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On*, p. 144.

⁶¹ The *Bellamy Report* identified “five critical challenges” which represent the weak points of RtoP: (1) Deepening the engagement of Member States and Regional Arrangements; (2) Making prevention of the four crimes a living reality; (3) Mainstreaming RtoP goals across the UN system; (4) Learning lessons about the implementation of enforcement mandates; (5) Protecting the consensus on RtoP. *Idem*, *The Responsibility to Protect: Towards a ‘Living Reality’*, p. 39.

⁶² On the ICISS’ ‘silence’ on the issue of Somalia, being *more involved with tackling piracy than genocide*, “Despite widespread attacks on civilians, international actors have remained reluctant to link the situation to RtoP. Indeed, the ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans, suggested that Somalia was not a ‘classic [RtoP] situation’ but that the imminent threat of mass atrocities warranted its placing on a watch list of countries of RtoP concern.” *Idem*, *The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On*, p. 156.

⁶³ C. G. Badescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

Discussing the Libyan Crisis, he argues that “some accept the novelty of the intervention [...] reluctant however, to relinquish their critique that R2P ‘did not figure significantly in the Security Council’s thinking’ and most importantly, regarding the position of the US on Libya and RtoP, “it was not cited as a justification for action because either it was not active in policy –makers minds or, if it was, it was outweighed by other considerations”.⁶⁵ He also analyses the consequences that have appeared as a result of the inapplicability of RtoP and its connection to the Iraqi Insurgency as a part of the “war on terror”⁶⁶. As he puts it, the “subtle changes” to the humanitarian intervention process are: (1) *first*, the position of the US and Great Britain, as main supporters of interventionism, has since been eroded and they have lost much of their international credibility, particularly on the issues regarding backlash for their actions and regional support in conflict areas: “it has become harder for these states to persuade others to act decisively in humanitarian emergencies at precisely the moment when those states themselves are less able to bear the costs of acting outside the world’s institutional framework”⁶⁷; and (2) *second*, on the issue of the “responsibility to protect” rhetoric, the change of language, from the well-known “humanitarian intervention” to the “responsibility to protect” has been pinned by Bellamy on the desire to both “oppose international activism as much as to support it” and that “the brief period of acquiescence to humanitarian interventions in the 1990s was at least partly due to the absence of plausible arguments against them”⁶⁸. Here Bellamy makes a powerful assumption, that *interventionism in the post-Cold War period was a form of re-balancing act between the international community and the state*, as an example, he gives the case of Darfur where “[the]

⁶⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On*, pp. 163-164.

⁶⁵ *Idem*, *The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense*, Oxford University Press, First Edition, 2015, p. 96.

⁶⁶ *Idem*, *Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?*, p. 108.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 104.

⁶⁸ Bellamy believes that the military overstretch of the US and its Allies (Britain in particular), have made them more sensitive to the issue international response and the consequences of aggressively pushing for unilateral or unauthorized intervention, outside of the Security Council’s authority, were considered “infeasible”, the same thing can be said for their diplomatic approach for coercive measures, “[the measures] would probably have been counterproductive”. *Ibidem*, pp. 105, 121-122.

‘responsibility to protect’ language has now enabled *anti-interventionists* to legitimize arguments against action by claiming that primary responsibility in certain contested cases still lies with the state, and not (yet) with an international body”⁶⁹.

Another aspect of the Darfur crisis which has come to influence RtoP, is, as per the argument of Ramesh Thakur: “[the] ‘responsibility to protect’ criteria could constrain as well as enable intervention”⁷⁰ but Bellamy perceives this as a serious blow to the interventionist movement, since it gave ammunition to the opponents of RtoP by referencing to the “prevailing normative order” replacing the discredited absolute sovereignty with the primary responsibility to the government, and not the international community.

However, over the years, Bellamy has watered-down his criticism “RtoP tries to do this change [a world free of atrocities] in an incremental and orderly fashion”⁷¹ and “RtoP has begun to change the world”⁷², also addressing the criticism of Mahmood Mamadami who believes that RtoP is a “a right to punish without being held accountable – a clarion call for the recolonization of ‘failed’ states in Africa [...] in its present form, the call for justice is really a slogan that masks a big power agenda to recolonize Africa”⁷³ because of the West’s struggle for resources and economic supremacy, inherited from the Cold War era, against the two emerging super-powers (China and India). He continues with his disbelief in the theory proposed by Mamadami, that of the West ‘playing’ the African diplomats into endorsing RtoP in the UN General Assembly, and agreeing (contrary to their peoples’ interests) to support an tacit “right to punish” African states for their perceived misdeeds⁷⁴, and also, refuting the idea that RtoP is in fact a generator of “moral hazard” because “it would seem

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 122.

⁷⁰ “Ramesh Thakur, another ICISS commissioner, argues that the moral consensus about the ‘responsibility to protect’ is likely to be strengthened in the wake of Iraq as states come to realize that it provides a language that can be used to oppose legitimate intervention.” *Ibidem*, p. 110.

⁷¹ Alex J. Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense*, p. 109.

⁷² *Ibidem*, p. 111.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 114.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 117-120.

that are no grounds to support the view that RtoP causes atrocities that would not otherwise have happened [...] at this macro level, the theory remains merely a hypothesis"⁷⁵.

From our perspective, the position of Bellamy has changed little, his original views on RtoP were that of silent support, though he has, on occasion, thrown his share of stones at the hypocritical West for not using RtoP to tackle the humanitarian disasters in Darfur and other parts of Africa and the Middle-East. However, we cannot agree on a number of issues presented by *RtoP* especially on *duality of the concept* – as it seems to implement *double standards* and alludes to the spectre of 'gunship diplomacy', and also, in selection, on *three aspects*.

First, the problem with the RtoP pillar system (particularly the relation between the *first pillar* – the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens and the *third pillar* – the international community's responsibility to intervene), is that it acts like a double-edged sword since it indicates the government's responsibility as a premise which permits intervention, however, since the pillars are all equal, there is no way in which one of them could be silenced from asserting its function. We believe that this is one of the greatest blind spots of the whole RtoP initiative, since it renders as useless the response of the international community. When the state is not directly responsible for atrocities, for example, it supports and supplies paramilitary groups with intelligence and weapons, and then turns a blind eye on the ensuing massacres, the international community cannot intervene without breaking both the rules within RtoP and those of international law. This puts the intervening states in a very uncomfortable position as being allegedly aggressors and not saviours, and with the terminology of "humanitarian intervention" being perceived as flawed, this practical issue alone can spell the end of the RtoP initiative. Most likely, those who envisioned the initiative did not believe it possible that such a small miscalculation, this hairline fracture in the seemingly impervious rhetoric, could prove to be such a hassle in the practical phase of the RtoP process.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 126.

Second, with regards to the potentially destabilizing factor of RtoP, we find that it is a very easy to claim the international responsibility to protect civilian population against gross human rights abuses committed by their governments, and subsequently intervene to stop massacres from happening. However, as the case in Libya has revealed, the overthrow of the Arab Jamahiriya on the pretext that Ghaddafi called the rebels in the town of Benghazi “rats”, “cockroaches”, and that he was going to “get rid of them” really sparked the fear of genocidal intent in Western leaders, as they forgot all about the rich oil fields of Libya and rushed to save the rebels from being killed⁷⁶. Now, after almost four years since the Libyan ‘Revolution’, the country is involved in a brutal civil war between four factions⁷⁷: the internationally recognized *Government in Tobruk* (Council of Deputies), *Islamist Government in Tripoli* (New General National Congress), *Ansar-al Sharia in Benghazi* (Shura Council), and *Da’esh*. The recent intervention of Egypt (aided by UAE forces), which supports of the Government in Tobruk, further complicates the situation, with recent Egyptian air-strikes aimed at Da’esh forces which executed twenty-one Egyptian Coptic Christians⁷⁸ in February 2015. The implications of RtoP have to be put in perspective, however, the fact that the Western states gladly intervened in Libya, whilst turning a blind eye on the situations which could qualify as being far worst, such as the Boko Haram⁷⁹ and Sri Lanka⁸⁰, really makes the

⁷⁶ *ABC News*, “Raging Gaddafi orders forces to ‘capture the rats’”, accessible on-line: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-02-23/raging-gaddafi-orders-forces-to-capture-the-rats/1953788> ; *Times of Malta*, “Gaddafi: ‘I will not give up’, ‘we will chase the cockroaches’ ”, accessible on-line: <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110222/local/gaddafi-in-fighting-speech-i-will-not-give-up.351487> ; *BBC News*, “Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit”, accessible on-line: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12544624> (03.03.2017).

⁷⁷ *The Economist*, “Libya’s Civil War, The four-year descent from Arab spring to factional chaos”, accessible on-line: <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21638123-four-year-descent-arab-spring-factional-chaos-it-should-come> (03.03.2017).

⁷⁸ *BBC News*, “Islamic State: Egypt urges international intervention in Libya”, accessible on-line: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31494806> (03.03.2017).

⁷⁹ *The Independent*, “Boko Haram renames itself Islamic State’s West Africa Province”, accessible on-line: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-renames-itself-islamic-states-west-africa-province-iswap-as-militants-launch-new-offensive-against-government-forces-10204918.html> (03.03.2017).

⁸⁰ C. G. Badescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 176; *World Without Genocide*, “Sri Lanka”, accessible on-line: <http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/sri-lanka> ; *Genocide Watch*, “Sri Lanka”, accessible on-line: <http://www.genocidewatch.org/srilanka.html> (03.03.2017).

case for both the hypocrisy of politicians and the lack of vision for the RtoP implementation system.

Thirdly, on the overall issue of the RtoP initiative, we first and foremost believe it to be a perfect example of “good intentions paving the road to hell”, this because there are, in fact, *two versions of RtoP: the first one*, or the ‘original’ RtoP (or RtoP 2001) as presented by Gareth Evans⁸¹ Co-Chair of the ICISS, which reiterates various principles upheld by a number of UN documents and international conventions; and *the second*, or the *reformed version of RtoP* (or RtoP 2005) to which virtually all of the world’s countries have agreed to and have endorsed in the 2005 Outcome Summit of the UN General Assembly⁸². The modifications in question, address the complex issues of military intervention for humanitarian reasons, and in the case of a stalemate in the Security Council, *regional groups can act to enforce the RtoP* by carrying out non-authorized humanitarian interventions, with *post factum* authorization. Also, some other paragraphs have been excluded, for example, the responsibility to reconstruct or rebuild.⁸³

⁸¹ (1) “The UN may not always be the most appropriate instrument. While the world organization remains the centrepiece for discussions of improved international capacity for conflict prevention, prospects for strengthening the role of regional organizations are also being explored”. (2) “Another potential source of authorization for interventions is regional organizations. Chapter VIII of the Charter assigns a possible role in the maintenance of international peace and security to ‘regional arrangements or agencies’. Regional organizations are becoming more assertive in authorizing their own interventions without prior approval from the Security Council. There is also growing opinion that to be regarded as “legitimate”, such interventions need only be preceded by a credible account of an incipient or actual humanitarian catastrophe, demonstrate that reasonable efforts to reach a diplomatic or peaceful resolution have failed, and carry out the operation in accordance with IHL. Such a conception of legitimacy suggests that a literal reading of Chapter VIII of the Charter is no longer an accurate reflection of contemporary international law.” ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect, Supplementary Volume*, pp. 29, 160, 170.

⁸² *The World Summit Outcome Document*, 2005, A/RES/60/1; See also, Fredric L. Kirgis, “International Law Aspects of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document”, in *American Society of International Law*, Vol. 9, Issue 30, 2005, accessible on-line: <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/9/issue/30/international-law-aspects-2005-world-summit-outcome-document> ; (03.03.2017).

⁸³ “R2P 2005 does not explicitly rule out other types of authorisation – even unilateral action remains a possible action outside of the R2P 2005 aegis”. Hugh Breakey, *op. cit.*, p. 31-37.

RtoP and Syria

In 2015 we witnessed the anniversary of a decade of RtoP since it was officially recognised in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. Since then, and “despite the insistent language of responsibility in the doctrine”,⁸⁴ the situation of the globe has not changed for the better, with ongoing conflicts in Burundi, Yemen, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, with the Syrian civil war topping the list⁸⁵. While RtoP has been used (unsuccessfully and with dramatic consequences) during the Libyan crisis of 2011⁸⁶, it has not been used in the Syrian scenario, even though on more than one occasion (the Yazidi peoples’ plight⁸⁷, the Al-Ghouta chemical attacks and the destruction of *Palmyra*⁸⁸) it could have been invoked and applied. The reasons for this are *multiple*, from the complexity of the Syrian situation and the heterogeneity on the ground towards the delicate balance of power and vested interests of the UNSC Member States.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Philip Cunliffe, “The doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a practice of political exceptionalism”, in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, Issue 22, 2016, pp. 2-3, accessible on-line:

<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066116654956?journalCode=ejta> (03.03.2017).

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ “[...] the Libyan intervention morphed into regime change R2P was announced ‘R.I.P.’; and in Syria the international community has ‘dismally failed to uphold its responsibility to protect’”, Christopher Hobson, “Responding to failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya”, in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2016, p. 2, accessible on-line: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0305829816640607> (03.03.2017).

⁸⁷ Adam Roberts, *The Yazidi and the Responsibility to Protect*, Thesis, Department of International Studies and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon, June 2016, pp. 31-33, 50-52, accessible on-line:

https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/20521/Roberts_oregon_0171_N_11609.pdf?sequence=1 (03.03.2017).

⁸⁸ Camilla Rigano, *RtoP and Cultural Heritage An analysis of the Responsibility to Protect Culture Heritage of an Outstanding Universal Value*, Thesis, Department of Political Science, LUISS, 2016, pp. 32-36, accessible on-line: http://tesi.eprints.luiss.it/17596/1/073782_RIGANO_CAM-ILLA.pdf (03.03.2017).

⁸⁹ “[...] it would be foolish to equate Libya with Syria – the circumstances of the two countries were quite different in the period 2011–2012 and are even more so today, if that is conceivable, and consequently equally foolish to extrapolate directly from UNSC decision-making over Libya to Council decisions, or lack thereof, on Syria”. Charles Cater, David M. Malone, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

Therefore, Syria is a very particular and peculiar landscape, one which cannot support the monochrome framework of RtoP. In the opinion of Hobson⁹⁰, RtoP was envisaged as a means to address humanitarian crises by “turning the protection of civilians into a responsibility” in the sense of trying to find a way to “transcend the political differences that can lead to inaction in the face of a humanitarian crisis”. Yet the use of RtoP in Libya was exactly the opposite: it “morphed into a tool for regime change”⁹¹, to even consider the same happening in Syria, where the dangers of extremism and radical Islam were already present, was deemed unacceptable. But this meant that the use of RtoP in one situation, and the abstention of its use in the other (albeit more complex, but more so in need of intervention) was the admission that RtoP was exactly what its critics claimed it to be, a hollow promise which only serves as “humanitarian” when the interests of the few and powerful are sated. The best example was the refusal of the African Union and some African countries to support the draft resolutions proposed by Western states to apply RtoP to Syria in 2013⁹² because of the threat that if they would take part to another regime change with possibly more devastating consequences than those which took place in Libya. Another aspect is that of the humanitarian facets of RtoP which not necessarily need to involve military action. For example, Holmes talks about his experience as a UN emergency relief co-ordinator and the scepticism involved with military intervention for humanitarian purposes, “[...] humanitarians are deeply and rightly sceptical of military interventions presented as for protecting civilians. The unintended consequences tend to be severe, including further civilian casualties”⁹³. Also, military interventions

⁹⁰ Christopher Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

⁹² Matthias Dembinski, “Procedural justice and global order: Explaining African reaction to the application of global protection norms”, in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, Issue 24, 2016, pp. 2-3, accessible on-line:

<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066116681059?journalCode=ejta>
(03.03.2017).

⁹³ John Holmes, “Does the UN's Responsibility to Protect necessitate an intervention in Syria?”, in *The Guardian*, 28 August 2013, accessible on-line:

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/28/syria-intervention-un-responsibility-to-protect> (03.03.2017).

can hinder and even threaten the lives of humanitarian relief workers “[...] from perceptions of direct or indirect western intervention”.⁹⁴

In our opinion, RtoP was too deeply influenced by the central idea and its ultimate goal: to stop genocide. However, if the situation on the ground is complex and highly changeable, for example, Syria (from ‘Arab Spring’ to civil war, ‘moderate rebels’ and ‘Islamic State’) then RtoP cannot be invoked, let alone applied, without clearly knowing who the “good guy” and who the “bad guy” is. In many ways, the final chapter of RtoP is just another form of unilateral intervention, yet to reach that, one must either dispense any other means short-of-intervention, or to find/create a *nefarious persona ficta* so that the international community cannot refuse not to follow suit. In Libya, the “bad guy” was Ghaddafi, but Syria’s Bashar al-Assad is viewed *differently*⁹⁵, as a person which one can talk to, even moderate, an perhaps more importantly, he has important allies (Russia and Iran⁹⁶) all which can make the ordinary person confused about the purpose of a 3rd pillar RtoP involvement in Syria. Yet even if we might supposedly comprehend that RtoP is all about good intentions, in the Syrian scenario it cannot be invoked, since “[...] taken together, in the case of Syria, the three elements of right authority, right intention and reasonable prospects are missing”⁹⁷.

Our conclusions on the RtoP initiative

We believe that RtoP is a remarkable process, though when put into practice its flaws are revealed in such a way that it makes up question the whole concept, not as being poorly designed (it possesses some innovative

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁵ Jonathan Steele, “US must identify IS, not Assad, as the main enemy in Syria”, in *Middle East Eye*, 18 September 2015, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/us-must-identify-not-assad-main-enemy-syria-1955255349> (03.03.2017).

⁹⁶ Simon Adams, “Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council”, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Occasional Paper Series*, No. 5, March 2015, pp. 14-16, accessible on-line: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/syriapaper_final.pdf (03.03.2017).

⁹⁷ Erfaun Norooz, “Responsibility to Protect and its applicability in Libya and Syria”, Thesis, *Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law*, 2015, Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp. 36-38, accessible on-line: https://www.icl-journal.com/download/1d60bf91da3f98e153088f67d3676e5a/ICL_The-sis_Vol_9_3_15.pdf (03.03.2017).

aspects), but poorly implemented. RtoP had the chance to become one of the greatest post-World War II initiatives, rivalling the UN Charter itself, but sadly it has wasted away that chance. On the flaws in implementing RtoP, they have a number of sources.

First, it gives the impression of a “Trojan Horse”, particularly in the view of African states, since it makes it relatively easy to either use the short-of-war instruments to ‘persuade’ the governments into taking certain measures, *dangerously blurring the line between international responsibility to protect and interventionism*, and in the process, reminding them of the colonial past (*post-colonialism*⁹⁸). Basically, the endorsement shifts from the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” (as it has been known in the 1990s) to the modern form of the concept “the responsibility to protect”. It seems logical to assume that the shift from the rhetoric of the now-infamous Kosovo Intervention, which badly stained the reputation of term “humanitarian intervention”, had to be changed to something novel, fresh and more complex, and which also directly emphasised *prevention by non-forceful measures*, and that *military intervention was the last resort option* for situations with the potential of Rwanda and Srebrenica. There have also been concerns about the implementation of RtoP from the G77 Countries⁹⁹, especially some African states, who view it as a form of neo-colonialism and infringement of the non-intervention principle.

Second, RtoP claims novelty, but it only reiterates various concepts and principles already well-known and accepted worldwide, possibly in an effort to pre-legitimize and brush-off any criticism as an attack aimed on genocide prevention and not on its underlying issues. In this respect, it uses the artifice of integrating the now-infamous practice of “humanitarian intervention” in its three-pillar system, transferring the attention towards

⁹⁸ Mojtaba Mahdavi, “A Postcolonial Critique of Responsibility to Protect in the Middle East”, pp. 1-5, 10, in *PERCEPTIONS*, Spring 2015, Volume XX, Number 1, accessible on-line: http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/02_Mahdavi.pdf (03.03.2017).

⁹⁹ The G77, (or Group of 77) represents a coalition of developing nations, formed in 1964, with the purpose of mutual support inside the UN and economic interests and implementing regional policies. The G77 has now 137 member states, with 120 of them also being members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Though they represent a loosely coalition, it is notable to remember that they also represent the “rest of the world” encompassing two thirds of the UN’s members and more than half of the population and territory of the world.

the debate on sovereignty rather than on applicability of measures, implementation procedures and on the ground strategy, employing instead the pre-established UN intervention methods, with skilfully hiding the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” as a form of collective responsibility in the case of stalemate in the Security Council.

Thirdly, RtoP has serious issues in relation to morality and applicability, it does not have the guarantee, nor does it hint at the possibility of, it being used, *in extremis*, against a Western country. This raises significant concerns on its overall purpose and it clearly shows that its ultimate motivation was not to prevent genocide but to manage or react to the situations in which the genocidal violence is imminent. However, it doesn't quite succeed in that either. Since its inception, it has not seen consistent usage, this alone represents a far cry from the rhetoric of “never again” and represents the fatal Achilles heel of the RtoP initiative. Sadly, the Libyan Crisis, and the subsequent Syrian Civil War, has revealed that the motivations behind the foreign policy of powerful states make them impervious to the chagrin of clothing their self-interested actions into the fabric of RtoP, though some academics believe that it is the other way around, that the very fabric of RtoP, indeed contains several loopholes hinting to aspects of less than universal significance.

Our proposal

With respect to the RtoP initiative, we consider that it should focus more on the issues which are considered as the *underlying causes of ethnic conflict*, such as previous ethnic tensions spanned across centuries, the involvement of great powers which favoured one group above the other (ex. political, confessional, racial criteria) and the factors which exacerbated these pre-existing frictions such as economic hardship and cultural and identity crises. Therefore, RtoP should encourage international and UN-sponsored aid programmes which could tackle the complex problem of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic environments, emphasising on the *prioritization of education and multiculturalism* as opposed to heated debates over sovereignty and intervention. We believe it is more preferable to prevent and neutralize the causes which lead to the radicalization based on ethnic affiliation, than

intervene after the problems have escalated towards violence and hatred, the risks to all parties involved will multiply exponentially, as violence only creates more violence. The *pivot from protection to prevention* (from “Responsibility to *Protect*” to “Responsibility to *Prevent*”) will dispel many of the fears and mistrust associated with RtoP and Western agenda, and will prove its commitment towards maintaining and promoting global peace and security.

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THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE CHECHEN WARS

Maria-Cristina Coleașă*

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Abstract

The aim of this essay is to assess the impact of the Chechen Wars on the international community and to analyze the motives behind the modest international response to the issue. While the first section of the paper provides an overview of the conflicts, their background and their nature, the second section analyzes the international context in which the wars occurred and attempts to offer scholarly results to the following questions: What caused the indifferent international reaction to the Chechen Wars? What was different in these wars that prompted the neglect of the Western policy makers?

Keywords: international community, wars, conflict, international reaction, policy makers

Introduction

The 1990s saw the international arena consumed with numerous conflicts which prompted many scholars and policy makers alike to question the stability of the post-Cold War era. The humanitarian crises in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda are but a few examples of conflicts which appalled the Western publics and prompted interventionist

* Maria-Cristina Coleașă is a second year MA student at the *Studii Politice Europene Comparate (SPEC)* program, Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University. Contact: crisa_2010@yahoo.com

reactions from the policy makers. However, not all the decade's conflicts were met with the same interest and involvement on the part of the international community. Such an example is represented by the Russo-Chechen Wars, which did not trigger any firm response from the West, despite their acknowledged atrocious effects. Although spanning throughout the entire decade and afterwards, the Chechen Wars remained a neglected issue on the international agenda.

The aim of this essay is to assess the impact of the Chechen Wars on the international community and to analyze the motives behind the modest international response to the issue. While the first section of the paper provides an overview of the conflicts, their background and their nature, the second section analyzes the international context in which the wars occurred and attempts to offer scholarly results to the following questions: *What caused the indifferent international reaction to the Chechen Wars? What was different in these wars that prompted the neglect of the Western policy makers?*

Background and nature of the Chechen Wars

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought political and social turmoil in the ex-Soviet republics seeking their independence. In the case of the Caucasus region, one of the major factors of conflict after the weakening of the USSR was Soviet ethnofederalism, which Christoph Zürcher defines as "the territorialization of ethnicity: administrative units with a defined titular nation."¹ While this system was of great help in preventing secessionist movements during the Soviet rule, it was also the main incentive for nationalist ambitions after the implementation of Gorbachev's policies of liberalization. Titular nations in each Soviet entity felt they had the legitimacy to create their own independent states. Unfortunately, the story of independence movements in the Caucasus is far less successful than that of, for instance, the Baltic States, with consequences still affecting Caucasus peoples nowadays. The hierarchy established by the Soviets between the various entities meant

¹ Cristoph Zürcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars. Rebellion, ethnic conflict and nationhood in the Caucasus*, New York: New York University Press, 2007, p. 23.

little possibility for the construction of strong, viable states in the post-Soviet era and facilitated the further disintegration of the newly created countries or the collapse into violence of former Soviet republics which never managed to secure their independence.²

The Chechen conflict, which started in 1991 as a fight for independence but remains unresolved to date, is a telling example of the abovementioned struggle in the ex-Soviet space. In fact, it is viewed as “one of the most protracted of all the post-Soviet conflicts”³ and as “by far the bloodiest of all the conflicts in the post-Soviet Caucasus.”⁴ We consider two main characteristics of the Chechen people to be of the utmost importance when analyzing the causes of the conflict. The first one is the strong sense of Chechen identity, perceived in opposition to other group identities, especially to the Russian one. As this section explains, this sense of identity emerged throughout the history of war which preceded Chechnya’s inclusion in the USSR in 1922. The second feature is the traditional organization of the Chechen people into clans ruled by councils of elders and their resistance to the creation of modern state institutions. After the fall of the USSR and the complete dismantling of the former Soviet institutions, the Chechen society was unable to create new viable institutions which would have secured a functioning independent state. Apart from these two characteristics, the religious element – Islam as the main religion – is also of relevance. The reason why we rank it as secondary lies in its becoming manifest only in the later stages of the conflict, while it was not the trigger of the struggle in the early 1990s.

According to Monica Duffy Toft, the successive waves of conquest throughout history ingrained a strong sense of distinctiveness and identity into the Chechen people. They also instilled into them the sense that it was their duty to resist all foreign attempts at domination, to protect their homeland and to aim for independence. Before the direct clashes with the Russian Empire in the 19th century, it was the Golden Horde in the 1300s and afterwards the Ottoman Empire that attempted to subdue the

² *Ibidem*, p. 133.

³ James Hughes, “Chechnya: The causes of a protracted post-Soviet conflict”, 2001, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/641/1/Hughes.Chechnya.Civil_Wars.pdf, consulted 9 July 2016.

⁴ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Caucasian peoples, the Chechens among them. It was during the period of Turkish domination that the Chechens added another significant element to their identity, namely Islam. This new feature would later add to the friction with the Russian Empire and afterwards with the USSR, both hostile to the practicing of Islam. In this sense, the episode of the Caucasian rebellion against the Russian Empire, under the leadership of Imam Shamil, is telling. Against the Russian attempt to disarm and subdue them, the Chechens cemented their identity as an Islamic people by seeking protection and guidance in this military and spiritual leader.⁵

The clashes between the Chechens and the colonizing actions of the Russian Empire led to the creation of a strong Chechen “nationalist narrative.” In other words, for the Chechens, the Russians became the “Other” that they needed to resist at all cost:

“In the Chechen nationalist narrative, the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus and the colonial wars against the Chechen tribes are the first of many instances of a genocidal policy of the Russian state against the Chechen nation.”⁶

When Chechnya was later incorporated into the USSR, the Soviet abuses against the Chechens only managed to strengthen even more their determination to resist any attempt at Sovietization. As stated in the Introduction, the Soviets used ethnonationalist policies in order to subdue the conquered peoples. This is true in the case of Chechnya, which was included in 1934 in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR:

“By giving them something to gain or lose, namely recognition – thus making them more cooperative – and by creating tension among the groups through competition for recognition, the Soviet Union hoped to reduce the instability that the existence of such groups presented.”⁷

⁵ Monica Duffy Toft, *The geography of ethnic violence*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 65-66.

⁶ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁷ Duffy Toft, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

However, the mass deportation of Chechens after the Second World War and the continuous repressive policies of the USSR only proved to the Chechens that their only chance of survival was resistance. As part of the Soviet repression, the cleavage between Russians and Chechens increased because of the inequality with regards to career and political opportunities in the ASSR. Thus,

“In the Soviet Union, it was difficult to have a career as a Chechen. Even within their *own* republic, key political and economic positions were by and large beyond the reach of Chechens. This was in contrast to other ethnic republics, in which representatives of the titular nations had good career chances up to a certain point.”⁸

The Chechen resistance was most evident in their opposition towards Soviet institutions and the preservation of traditional Chechen forms of organization, which led to the “parallel existence of two normative systems.”⁹ As the following paragraphs explain, this was of great importance after the fall of the USSR and explains why Chechnya did not manage to become a viable state.

The Chechen Revolution, which started in 1990 and resulted in the Chechen Declaration of Independence in 1991, was possible due to the weakening of the USSR and the wave of secessionist movements in other Republics. During this period, there was general mobilization among the Chechen society, which successfully rallied around their leader Dudayev against the external Russian threat. The Revolution was thus essentially an ethnic conflict between the Chechens and the Russians. However, between 1991 and 1994, with the temporary withdrawal of the Russian intervention, Chechnya was gripped by internal conflicts, no longer ethnic, but between the different warlords and their warring factions who started to claim their right to power and to challenge Dudayev.

⁸ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁹ *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

The most cited causes of the outbreak of the First Chechen War are Russia's concern that Chechnya's independence might prompt other Republics to secede from the federation and Yeltsin's decreasing popularity in Russia and his hope of increasing his chances of being elected President over a short, successful war with Chechnya. The first argument constitutes what Monica Duffy Toft calls "the logic of precedent setting."¹⁰ As negotiations between Yeltsin and Dudayev reached a stalemate due to Dudayev's unwillingness to compromise over Chechnya's independence, Yeltsin believed in the possibility of a quick victory that would bring the Republic back under Russia's control. This rationale is captured in one of Yeltsin's speeches: "We cannot stand idly by while a piece of Russia breaks off, because this would be the beginning of the collapse of the country."¹¹ To this logic, the Chechens answered with a "survival rhetoric", which "accused Moscow of robbing Chechnya of its cultural heritage and economic assets." The Chechen resistance during the First War was fierce, based on "the notion that Chechnya must be ruled by Chechens and the perception that Chechens had an obligation to defend their homeland."¹² The results of the First War were the killing of Dudayev by Russians in 1996, a humanitarian disaster consisting of thousands of civilian deaths, both Chechen and Russian and the conclusion of the Khasaviurt agreement. However, this agreement avoided the crucial question of Chechnya's status and proved to be of no use in securing peace, as the Second Chechen war broke out in 1999.

So far, Chechen arguments for independence had centered around the idea of survival and self-determination, without relying very much on the religious aspect. As Marc Jansen states, "originally Dudayev had not aimed at making Chechnya, traditionally a tolerant country with respect to religion, an Islamic republic."¹³ However, in 1999, the new Chechen leader, Mashkadov, was forced to introduce Sharia legislation by the different

¹⁰ Duffy Toft, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 80.

¹³ Marc Jansen, "Chechnya and Russia, between revolt and loyalty", in Françoise Companjen, László Marác and Lia Versteegh (eds.), *Exploring the Caucasus in the 21st Century*, Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2010, p. 97.

warlords who were financed by Emir Khattab. Of these warlords, the most influential was Shamil Basaev, who “grew into a devout Muslim” and under whose command “the Chechen revolt degenerated into a fight for the forming of a caliphate from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, if not the Volga; a holy war against Russia, justifying a carnage.”¹⁴ Following a series of explosions in Russia, the new President Vladimir Putin accused the Chechens of being terrorists and of making Chechnya “a scene of jihad”, thus legitimizing a new Russian military intervention. The Second Chechen War was the scene of atrocities perpetrated by Chechen and Russian militants alike. On the one hand, of the Chechen civilians, “on suspicion of contacts with rebels, during so-called purge operations, many people were arrested, often robbed, tortured, raped, killed, or they disappeared.”¹⁵ On the other hand, according to a Human Rights Watch researcher, “Chechen fighters, particularly those among them who consider themselves Islamic fighters, have shown little regard for the safety of the civilian population”, while there is also “convincing evidence that Chechen fighters have executed captured Russian soldiers in this conflict.”¹⁶

In light of the abovementioned features, the Chechen wars are clearly an example of what Herfried Münkler calls the “New Wars.”¹⁷ The Russo-Chechen Wars were fought between a state and one of its independence-seeking regions and therefore cannot be categorized as inter-state wars. The privatization of war is illustrated by the emergence of powerful warlords and their warring factions in Chechnya instead of a unitary “Chechen” army. Finally, the result of the wars was a civilian death toll much more significant than the military one, as “it is Chechen civilians who have borne the brunt of the Russian offensive in this war.”¹⁸

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 98.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 101.

¹⁶ Peter Bouckaert, “War Crimes In Chechnya and the Response of the West”, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2000, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west>, consulted 9 July 2016.

¹⁷ Herfried Münkler, *New Wars*, UK: Polity Press, 2005, pp. 193-194.

¹⁸ Bouckaert, *op.cit.*

The international response to the Chechen wars

Russia's actions in Chechnya entailed serious violations of human rights, the authors of which were never punished domestically. However, what most scholars find confusing is the lack of reaction on the part of the international community, which chose to ignore the plight of Chechen civilians and to concentrate its attention on other conflicts. Criticism for the lack of reaction has been primarily directed towards the United States, especially in light of its interventionist stance in other conflicts throughout the 1990s. As Elizabeth Bagot explains,

“Given the U.S.'s recent record of militarily intervening in cases of international human rights abuse, its failure to take a decisive stance regarding Russia's invasions of separatist Chechnya in the 1990s came as a surprise.”¹⁹

The very first international reaction to the outbreak of violence in Chechnya was to “proclaim the crisis in internal Russian affair.”²⁰ In the beginning, very little attention was given to the events in Chechnya, a neglect which many authors attribute to the nascent cooperation between the West and the democratizing Russia. As Cornell puts it, “there seemed to be a consensus that Chechnya should not be allowed to become an obstacle in the Western relationship with Russia and Yeltsin.”²¹ This holds true especially in the case of the United States, whose “strategic interest in supporting the new democratically-elected Russian government”²² prevented it from voicing more than “mild criticism of the Russian conduct.”²³ Western Europe took a more firm stance and condemned the atrocities in Chechnya,

¹⁹ Elizabeth Bagot, “US Ambivalence and the Russo-Chechen Wars: Behind the Silence”, in *Stanford Journal of International Relations*, vol. XI, no. 1, Fall 2009, p. 33, https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/pdf/Chechnya_11.1.pdf, consulted 9 July 2016.

²⁰ Svante E. Cornell, *Small nations and great powers. A study of ethnopolitical conflict in the Caucasus*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 223.

²¹ *Ibidem*, loc.cit.

²² Bagot, loc.cit.

²³ Cornell, loc.cit.

considering even the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia, although no concrete action was taken.²⁴

Even if the American lack of reaction can be explained by Chechnya's lack of strategic interest to the US, this attitude remains hypocritical. Given that "international law had already established that massive human rights violations were not to be treated as the internal matters of the state"²⁵ – an argument frequently invoked by the US to legitimize other interventions – e.g. in Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina – the US should have expressed a vocal condemnation of the war crimes in Chechnya. However, the difference in the case of Chechnya was that the US did not want to antagonize Russia, in which it saw a strategic partner in, for example, the fight for nuclear disarmament. In other words, "the US simply could not risk upsetting the delicate balance already in place with Russia."²⁶

When Vladimir Putin was elected President in the wake of the Second Chechen War, he used the American past interventions in order to justify its own actions in Chechnya. The example of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, in violation of international law, was skillfully deployed by Russia in order to secure the non-intervention of the international community in its affairs with Chechnya. The same past interventions also prevented the US from voicing any harsh criticism, as it would have put Russia in a position to also criticize the American conduct in other conflicts.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the Chechen Wars exhibited the features of "New Wars" and developed from being an ethnic Russo-Chechen conflict to incorporate religious aspects. Despite the fierce Chechen resistance, the two wars did not secure the Republic's independence and the conditions were never created for a viable Chechen state to emerge.

Although the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya bore no difference to the crises in other conflict areas, it did not receive the same international attention because of the strategic interest that Russia presented to the West

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 224.

²⁵ Bagot, *loc.cit.*

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

and to the United States in particular. It was not the conflict in itself that caused its non-internationalization, but the broader context of the 1990s and the fresh emergence of international politics from the bipolarity of the Cold War, which prompted the West to prioritize the consolidation of its relations with Russia over the tragedy of the Chechen civilians.

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THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC BORDERS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Luminița Șoproni, Constantin Țoca*

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Abstract

In order to adapt to the new context created by globalization, borders have got a dynamic sense, losing some of their traditional functions and acquiring new roles, which transform them from barriers to fluid and permeable lines. Thus, they delimit a space permanently reconstructed by the interdependencies and interactions of its members, contributing to the shaping and development of new regions in international relations. Technology and international and bilateral agreements are "the engines" that generated and allowed the integration of economies and markets, and redefined the economic frontiers.

Keywords: border, globalization, regionalization, international relations theory

1. Introduction

The globalization and regionalization processes are important parts of the current international relations as their influence over state and non-state actors is significant, they generate new forms of association and create

* Luminița Șoproni is Senior Lecturer, PhD at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea (Romania). Contact: lsoproni@uoradea.ro
Constantin Țoca is Lecturer, PhD at the at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea (Romania). Contact: ctv_i@yahoo.com

new power and influence poles in the global economic landscape. Economic and political interests align and unite, but are confronted at the same time with identity and cultural challenges.

In order to understand globalization, we need to study the world and events that have a global impact through a multidimensional perspective, as globalization represents „a multidimensional and multifaceted process that is transforming the organisation of time and space across national borders”¹. The *New York Times* columnist, Thomas Friedman, states that we cannot understand the contemporary world unless we can see the connections that form between politics, national security, culture, finance, technology and ecology. The borders between these fields are becoming thinner and are about to disappear completely². Because of this reasoning globalization is viewed as the total sum of all the political, economic and social processes that belong to internationalization and transnationalization that are happening in the world right now, as well as all the interactions that happen between them in time³. Internationalization refers, in this case, to the development of formal and informal mechanism of cooperation and integration between states (treaties, international regimes, common norms, solutions and cultural patterns), while transnationalization refers to developing new types of structures and formal and informal processes between actors on both sides of the border; this includes economic private institutions and other structures within the market (companies or commercial associations), organizations and social-political associations (pressure groups, NGOs, transnational advocacy networks) and social-cultural networks (mass-media, ethnic cross-border structures or religious ones, etc.)⁴.

¹ Jens-Uwe Wunderlich, *Regionalism, globalisation and international order: Europe and Southeast Asia*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, p. 44.

² Thomas L. Friedman, *Lexus și măslinul. Cum să înțelegem globalizarea*, București: Editura Fundației PRO, 2001, pp. 41-47.

³ Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz and Philip G. Cerny, *Internalizing Globalization. The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

The way in which the economic border is defined⁵ depends at this time on the perspective from which globalization is analysed, a perspective that determines the relationship between globalization and the nation-state at the same time.

2. Border, Globalization and State

The debate on globalization as part of the theory of international relations is centred on the continuous dispute of state-centric theorists (realists and neo-realists) and non-state-centric theorists⁶ (liberals, neo-liberals, cosmopolitans), more accurately between the promoters of sovereign states as the central component of international relations and those that consider the nation-state as being obsolete, as a component that has lost its pivotal role and relevance within the international relations system, as a result of transnational movement generated by economic globalization.

If we were to present the relation between borders and globalization on an axis, on one side we would have a world that has an integrated global economy, while on the other end we would find an international economic system that still works based on the economic interactions among nations, economic integration is developed on a small scale and the economic border still hold an important role, especially in the relation between a wealthy North and a poor South.

The current available literature on the subject present multiple perspectives on globalization, ones that we will try and describe in relation to their ideas and perspectives and their influence on how the economic border is defined and understood, as well as its role in contemporary global economics.

⁵ On this subject, see also the article of Luminița Șoproni, "The Economic Borders in the Age of Globalization", in Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu; Dana Cigan (eds.), *The frontier worker – new perspectives on the labor market in the border regions*, București: C.H. Beck, 2013, pp. 53-62.

⁶ Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 289-293.

The first perspective we will be taking a look at is *hiper-globalist*. This perspective considers that globalization is the culmination of liberal economy principles, rooted in ideas such as growth and development of national economies in a world without borders. Promoters of these ideas (*neo-liberal thinkers*) present globalization as a framework built upon generating increased figures for commerce, with an emphasis on accelerated growth in both rich economies and developing ones. This sustained growth is viewed as the solution to all the world's economic problems, aimed at reducing the inequality between states and regions of the world. This perspective can be included in framework of the Washington Consensus that views free trade as a benefit for the global economy, generating sustained development for all types of countries.

The modern commercial system that promotes free trade, leading to the decay of the border as an international relations construction, is openly promoted by international organizations that have been built after the end of the Second World War, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or the International Chamber for Commerce. These organizations have played an important role in promoting neo-liberal doctrine, encouraging free trade in the detriment of protectionism and promoting a free global market for goods and services.

The forces that promote globalization – free movement of production factors, transnational corporations, new information and communication technology, economic interdependence – see the world as borderless (administrative, economic, political and social), with frontiers playing a much less important role in the prospect of growth and development, and the same goes for national economies that become less relevant. The criteria that guides economy today is that of maximizing profit, which means that companies search the world for cheaper production costs and more profitable markets in which to sell goods and services. This criteria is responsible for the existence of a borderless global economy⁷ and not that of other economic indicators (such as the ratio of exports in a country's GDP or the income of a nation's citizens around the world).

⁷ Lester C. Thurow, "Globalization: The Product of a Knowledge-Based Economy", in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* no. 570, July 2000, p. 20.

Journalist Thomas Friedman, that promotes similar ideas to the ones detailed above, talks about the concept of globalization as a means of “integrating markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree that has never been seen before”⁸, making the world “flat” and borderless in an economic sense. Part of this growth phenomenon is dictated by “the newly discovered power of the individuals to cooperate and to compete globally”⁹, as a result of increased integration of information technology and the changes that this has brought. The IMF shares this perspective, defining globalization as “the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services, of international capital flows, and through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology”¹⁰. The key elements of integration are international commerce and cross-border investments¹¹, and new information technologies facilitate the free movement of financial and material capital on a global scale, maximizing profits.

Global economics reconfigure the social and political architecture by modifying the power ratios between the state and market forces. Susan Strange states that “where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states”¹². Globalization has shifted the balance of power and the negotiating power from states towards the international markets, as states have become more dependant on transnational companies than the other way around¹³. This is the reason why some governments pay taxes to transnational corporations (as tax rebates or other financial incentives) in order to make their market more attractable and also to keep corporations from leaving their borders.

⁸ Friedman, 2001, p. 31.

⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, *Pământul este plat. Scurtă istorie a secolului XXI*, Iași: Polirom, 2007, p. 26.

¹⁰ International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook*, May 1997, p. 45.

¹¹ Tatyana P. Soubbotina; Katherine A. Sheram, *Beyond Economic Growth. Meeting the Challenges of Global Development*, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2000, p. 66.

¹² Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State. The diffusion of power in the world economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 4.

¹³ Thurow, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

State authority is transferred to international institutions, regional organizations and transnational companies, surpassing and ignoring territorial borders. In this context both transnational companies and states are locked into competition over attracting the most funds for development; their decisions are influenced by neighbouring companies and governments that exist in the region. Under this set of circumstances, the rules can no longer be contained within national borders as global negotiations are held within a “diplomatic triangle” with three key components: the relations between states and companies, relations between states and the relations between companies¹⁴.

Kenichi Ohmae, business consultant, gives his own definition of globalization, pushing the concept even further: he argues that the development of global economy should be the basis for border removal all together. In his view the “borderless world” is the result of the inevitability of the globalization process where all the obstacles have been moved to make way for the means of production. Kenichi argues that the economic border is not relevant anymore, as it can hurt the economic relations between companies and states: “the global economy ignores barriers, but if they are not removed, they cause distortion”¹⁵. The global economy follows its own rules, beyond that of the state borders. When looking towards the business world with all its constitutive elements (communication, capital, corporations, consumers), Kenichi argues that the concept of border disappears completely¹⁶.

George Ritzer comes with a more nuanced approach, a moderate one; in his view integration is not an inevitable result of globalization as the process can see accelerated integration at times, while other times can see slower integration. Ritzer sees globalization as a process that brings together „increasing liquidity and the growing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places and information as well as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows”¹⁷. Even in the case of a global market, there still are economic barriers that slow or block the movement of people, goods and information; such is the case of trade agreements,

¹⁴ John M. Stopford; Susan Strange; John S. Henley, *Rival States, Rival Firms. Competition for world market shares*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 18-23.

¹⁵ Kenichi Ohmae, *The Next Global Stage. Challenges and Opportunities in Our Borderless World*, New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing, 2005, p. xxv.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁷ George Ritzer, *Globalization: A Basic Text*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, p. 2.

regulatory agencies, borders, customs barriers and standards or „the digital divide” between the developed states and the developing world¹⁸.

Ritzer introduces us to the second perspective on globalization, represented by *skeptics*,¹⁹ which state that states today present less integration than before the First World War, that period having a much more global economy than that of today. Without neglecting the importance and accuracy of globalization, Hirst and Thompson make the distinction between global and international economy: „There is a vast difference between a strictly global economy and a highly internationalized economy in which most companies trade from their bases in distinct national economies. In the former national policies are futile, since economic outcomes are determined wholly by world market forces and by the internal decisions of transnational companies. In the latter national policies remain viable, indeed they are essential in order to preserve the distinct styles and strengths of the national economic base and the companies that trade from it”²⁰. In this case borders become clearly defined and necessary in their role as economic and national identity safeguards. States are still the key actors in the global economy, being the main architects of globalization through the use and promotion of regulation in transnational economics.

This perspective consider economic integration as not relatable to a global scale, but on a regional one as the movement of capital, commerce and investments are centred around Europe, North America and Japan / Eastern Asia, while developing countries are being marginalized²¹. This can also explain the divide that is being drawn among the North-South line as there is great inequality among developed and developing nations²².

In this context the world is still a mix of individual states that are separated by barriers put in place to stop commerce between rich and poor

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 20-24.

¹⁹ Peter Dicken, *Global Shift. Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*, New York: The Guilford Press, 2011, p. 6.

²⁰ Paul Hirst; Grahame f. Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 185.

²¹ Debra Johnson; Colin Turner, *International Business: Themes and Issues in the Modern Global Economy*, New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 27-28; Joshua Goldstein; Jon C. Pevehouse, *Relații Internaționale*, Iași: Polirom, 2008, pp. 427, 400-401.

²² Joseph Stiglitz, *Mecanisme globalizării*, Iași: Polirom, 2008, pp. 23, 57-63.

nations. According to Anderson and Bort, borders still safeguard the differences among states, especially when it comes to organizing and economic activity²³. Robert Gilpin also agrees with this ideas as he points out that “whereas powerful market forces (trade, finance, and investment) jump political boundaries and integrate societies, governments frequently restrict and channel their economic activities to serve the interests of their own societies and of powerful groups within those societies”²⁴.

As a result of these considerations, we can sum up the skeptics’ point of view: the economic border still plays an important role in the global economy, protecting states, especially the developed states that have leverage and can impose their will on the global market in the detriment of poor states and developing states, thus becoming agents of transnational processes of the globalization.

The third perspective on globalization (*the transformative approach*) takes into consideration the consequences of sovereignty erosion as a result of supranational organizations and transnational companies that generate authority diffusion²⁵. Many of the economic prerogatives of the states are being handled by these organization (such as the EU, IMF, World Bank, WTO), impacting the relevance of the economic borders through specific policy measures adopted by each state in order to meet their interests and specificity. States have become unable to control the impact of transnational companies and the movement of capital; this has been clear since the financial crisis of 2008 that posed a great threat to the nation state as a whole²⁶, given the vulnerabilities that have become apparent; at the same time we still see the nation state as an actor on the global scale that doesn’t disappear (as believed by the globalist perspective). This is the reason why the interaction between global forces and local initiatives (authorities, organizations and agencies that are national, regional, local) is important in defining the future of the international system.

²³ Malcolm Anderson; Eberhard Bort, *The Frontiers of the European Union*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 37.

²⁴ Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy. Understanding the International Economic Order*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 81.

²⁵ Goldstein and Pevehouse, *op.cit.*, p. 401.

²⁶ Ritzer, *op.cit.*, p. 140.

In opposition to the ideas of hyper-globalists, the transformative approach believes that the nation state is not at a point where it will be replaced by other entities in its role as a tool for local and global governing. The changes act as a complementary addition to the nation state that needs to work in a much more complex system with multiple actors. The state still remains the most important player on the global scale, but it's no longer the only one. If we were to represent the global economic and political space as a matrix we would observe that most governing activities on the global level happen around the area of influence of the nation state²⁷.

	Private sector	Government sector	Other Organizations
Supranational	Transnational companies	Intergovernmental organizations	NGOs
National	National Companies	Government	National non-profit organizations
Subnational	Local Business environment	Regional and local Administrations	Local groups

Figure 1. Actors involved in governing the global space

Sources: Robert O. Keohane; Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Introduction", in Joseph S. Nye Jr.; John D. Donahue (eds.), *Governance in a Globalizing World*, New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p.13; William C. Clark, "Environmental Globalization", in Nye and Donahue, p. 99.

Its not only the global environment that has become more complex, but also the leadership tools and styles on all three of the matrix areas, because of the new rules, norms and markets. The world is no longer being governed by the rules and laws of nation-states, but by the rules of transnational companies. At the same time, private companies and NGOs pressure the government to create legislation that is more favourable on a

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr.; John D. Donahue, *Governance in a Globalizing World*, New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 12.

local level as well as on an international level. The result of these actions is not the disappearance of the state, but its transformation and the emergence of new governing bodies within the global space.²⁸

Based on these concepts, globalization is the main engine for transformation within the global space where there are no longer significant difference between national and international processes in economic, social and political sectors.²⁹ New infrastructures are developing as well as economic, political and cultural organizations that shape relations and social transactions on new levels, from regional to global³⁰. Economies become more flexible in terms of territory and span different nations as a result of capital mobility, transnational companies and the interdependence of national economies that give access to their resources in order to grow and generate development.

Sociologist Anthony Giddens argues that in the same spirit, globalization needs more than the liberalization of markets, it also requires exchange and spread of ideas and technology, with an effect on global social relations. He defines the phenomenon as „the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”³¹, while staying true to Marshall McLuhan idea of the global village where time and space are more compact as a result of new information and communication technology.

We can start talking about a global economy that is not necessarily a single economy, homogenous and convergent, but a system that is characterized by the interdependence between different national, regional and supra-national actors, that are grouped in inter-regional networks. Castells argues that this type of economy is actually a regional structure where the local, national and regional economic activities are integrated on a global level through the networks created around capital, goods and

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 12-13.

²⁹ David Held; Anthony McGrew; David Goldblatt; Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 27-28.

³⁰ David Held (ed.), *A globalizing world? Culture, Economics, Politics*, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 2.

³¹ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 64.

information³². Borders remain relevant, but the economic, social and political activities that are defined by these limits (even though they still have local origins) become deteriorated and reorganized: a company that has its headquarters in a specific area becomes international when its resource collection area becomes international, when the workforce needed by the company moves on a global scale or when the products are advertised and sold internationally.

3. Conclusion:

What does the economic border represent in the global economy?

Along time the importance, role and function of economic borders has modified constantly in relation to a number of variables: the economic preferences that dictated the international relations, the interest of actors on global economic scale, the inability of states to exert stability and maintain economic policies in the face of supra-national organizations or transnational corporations, the need of states and regions to integrate in the global market in order to have access to resources for growth and development. Thus, besides the basic concept of borders as barriers, these take on the role of bridges, resources and symbols of identity, each of these dimensions with their own characteristics depending on the type of border or the specific region³³.

The answer to the question "has the economic border changed in the context of globalization?" depends on the perspective taken on globalization:

- Hyper-globalists argue that the economic borders between states have disappeared in the context of global integrated economy;
- The realist perspective looks to the role and functions of the border on the global market in the context of bigger gaps between the North and South divide and the tendencies of states to become more protective of their economy (the scenario dictates that states will increase

³² Manuel Castells, *End of Millenium*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 352.

³³ Liam O'Dowd, "The Changing Significance of European Borders", in James Anderson; Liam O'Dowd; Thomas Wilson (eds.), *New Borders for a Changing Europe – Cross Border Cooperation and Governance*, London: Frank Cass Publishing, 2003, pp. 19-29.

competitiveness in order to take control of the global market, thus widening the gap of inequality between rich and poor);

- The economic borders have become diluted as a part of their functions have been lost, while they gained new functions as links and access points; this comes as a result of the decline of nation-state prerogatives on the international level in the face of growing competition from transnational companies and international organizations.

Adapting to the new context brought up by globalization, borders have become more dynamic in their functions and role, aspects that are apparent given by their fluidity and permeability. Technology, as well as international accords, have become the drivers of these changes, allowing economies and markets to become better integrated and helping to redefine the economic borders.

The new economic border defines a new space, a regional one, that we can present as a dynamic entity, constructed around economic, social and political interactions between state actors and non-state actors with common goals, with a contoured regional identity and a high level of social and economic cohesion.

Borders that trace such a region can be defined only through delimitating the sphere of influence of relations and processes within itself (not as clearly defined lines or limits), an approach that is closer to the concept of system region or total region³⁴. In this spirit, the border of the new region represents "the area where connections and processes become less relevant and even cease to exist and a new, different kind of system appears"³⁵, in line with the dimension of economic resource of O'Dowd (the border as a supplier of opportunities for regional actors)³⁶.

The development of regional structures as growth poles of the global economy is the new step in defining and structuring economic borders, especially in an age of instant communication and liberalization of capital markets, issues that have raised serious questions regarding the governing practices to both states and organizations that assume global governance.

³⁴ Dav Nir, *Region as a Socio-environmental System. An Introduction to a Systemic Regional Geography*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, pp. 89-91.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 71.

³⁶ O'Dowd, *op.cit.*, pp. 24-26.

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**PERSPECTIVES DU MARABOUTISME DANS L'ISLAM POLITIQUE
OUEST-AFRICAIN**

**PERSPECTIVES OF MARABOUTISM IN THE POLITICAL ISLAM OF
WEST AFRICA**

Ciprian Gabriel Oros*

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Abstract

Towards the end of the 12th century, the first Islamic sufi orders (brotherhoods) emerge in the sub-Saharan Africa's Islam, which will dominate the local religious landscape throughout the entire following centuries and which will form one of the peculiarities of the African Islam. We deal with the establishment of a network of Muslim religious followers reunited around a central charismatic figure, which became some kind of a "saint", this character being something in between human and divinity, the holder of a "divine blessing", barakat, which confers special, mystical powers upon him and who, through his powers, may liaise the relationship of the believers with Allah. In Sahel, the religious system is established on the grounds of these true social and religious organisations, which somehow take over the disappeared monarchy's system and which have both religious functions, as well as, especially, functions which pertain to the profane, strictly political and administrative. The system emerges on the background of a profound crisis generated by the colonial conquerors and will continue to develop in the same manner over the following centuries, up to the current days, when a reformatory

* Ciprian Gabriel Oros est Premier Conseiller à l'Ambassade de Roumanie à Dakar, doctorant en science politiques à la Faculté des Etudes Européennes à l'Université « Babes Bolyai ». Contact : oros.ciprian@gmail.com

current calls for the return to "salafiya" (initial Islam) and claims the ad-litteram observance of the Quran and of Sunnah, essentially to give up to the Islam of brotherhood.

Keywords: Islam, marabout, jihad, sharia, brotherhood, ummah, Sufi

Les premiers marabouts

Au fil du temps, il y a eu dans l'islam une série de tendances générées par les différentes interprétations du Coran et de Sunna (la tradition islamique). Parmi celles-ci, l'approche scientifique implique l'interprétation littérale ou exotérique du texte sacré musulman. Elle appartient exclusivement à la branche sunnite de l'islam et se trouve notamment dans le wahhabisme, qui rejette catégoriquement toute autre forme de connaissance. L'autre tendance est celle mystique, ésotérique, où les textes sacrés sont interprétés de façon symbolique et allégorique.

Le soufisme est la doctrine mystique par excellence, dans son cadre apparaissant, dans l'islam ouest africain, les confréries et, avec elles, le culte des saints. Conformément à l'Abdoulaye Bara Diop¹ il ne s'agit pas uniquement d'une pratique religieuse, mais d'un mode de vie. On y pratique des rituels spécifiques (danse, chansons, incantations), la méditation, le mystique soufi arrivant ainsi à un état extatique et à une union avec la divinité.

Parmi les croyants, il n'y a que certains qui arrivent par ascèse et pureté morale, par la pratique religieuse rigoureuse, à avoir la vision d'Allah. Il s'agit de ceux qui sont à moitié hommes, à moitié saints, les possesseurs de la charisme divine, barakat.² Ce sont les marabouts, les intermédiaires de la relation avec Allah, transmettant ultérieurement aux membres des confréries qu'ils créent, « la bonne voie », tariqa.

L'islamisation de l'espace ouest-africain s'est faite quelques siècles avant les conquêtes coloniales, par l'installation aux cours des souverains de cette région de quelques savants et érudits mystiques, nommés dans le

¹ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *La société wolof*, Paris : Karthala, 1981, p. 236

² Octave Depont, *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, Alger : Jourdan, 1897, p.83

langage populaire marabouts. Par leur intermédiaire et sous leur influence, ces Serigne (moitié hommes, moitié saints) ont réussi en moins d'une génération à convertir à l'islam la plupart de la noblesse ouest-africaine. On estime que les premiers musulmans ont été les membres de la famille War Jabi Ndiaye du royaume Tekrour de Sénégambie Inférieure, le souverain cherchant dans l'islam du début la communion paisible de tous les habitants de son royaume, convaincu par la subjective capacité du marabout de sa cour d'apporter la pluie et de riches moissons.³

Pendant la même période, les activités des commerçants arabes musulmans des centres urbains ouest-africains en développement ont engendré le mélange entre l'islam et le commerce, caractéristique aux premiers convertis africains. Une religion née au sein d'une société du commerce, l'islam a disposé dès le début d'une série de percepts propices au déroulement de l'activité économique, simultanément avec la pratique de la religion. Pourtant, la vraie installation du système religieux musulman n'aura lieu qu'au moment de l'apparition des premières confréries religieuses dans cet espace.

Néanmoins, l'islam seul ne peut pas offrir l'explication d'une stratification socioreligieuse dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Non seulement parce qu'il s'agit d'une religion apparue dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest à peine au 11^{ème} siècle, mais surtout parce que l'islam prône l'égalité de tous les croyants devant Allah. Rien de tout ce que nous savons sur les religions antérieures à l'islam de la région ne paraît justifier la stratification en familles/confréries, qui appartiendrait, surtout, à une division sociale en fonction du degré de proximité des croyants avec la personne charismatique d'un marabout et l'appartenance à sa famille⁴. Essentiellement, la particularité de l'islam subsaharien vient de la société préislamique, où c'était le culte familial, le clan, qui dominait, avec une attention particulière pour le respect des ancêtres.⁵

Vers le milieu du 12^{ème} siècle, dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest se font l'apparition les ordres islamiques soufis (les confréries islamiques), qui

³ Mountaga Diagne, "La gouvernance des foyers religieux au Senegal", dans le vol. *Etat, Societe et Islam au Sénégal*, Karthala, Paris, 2015, p. 228

⁴ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p. 40

⁵ Olivier Roy, *L'échec de l'islam politique*, Paris : Edition du Seuil, 1992, p. 124

domineront le paysage religieux local tout au long des siècles suivants et qui donneront une des particularités de l'islam africain. Il s'agit de la constitution d'un réseau de fidèles croyants musulmans réunis autour d'une figure centrale, charismatique, devenue une sorte de « saint », personnage charismatique dont le tombeau devient la plupart du temps un lieu de pèlerinage pour ses adeptes. Cet individu, qui se trouve à la frontière entre l'humain et le divin, est le possesseur d'une « bénédiction divine », *barakat*, qui lui offre des pouvoirs spéciaux, mystiques et qui, par ses pouvoirs, peut être le médiateur dans la relation du croyant avec Allah.

Qadiriya, la plus ancienne des confréries, a été fondée au 12^{ème} siècle par le marabout Cheick Abd al Qadir al-Jilani et elle a eu un rôle important dans l'islamisation de la population de l'Afrique subsaharienne, en particulier grâce au développement du centre commercial et religieux Tombouctou.

La confrérie Tidianiya, l'une des plus répandues, a été fondée au 18^{ème} siècle, à Fès, au Maroc, par Serigne Ahmed Tidiani, originaire du sud de l'Algérie. La confrérie la plus dynamique, Mouridiya, a été fondée par le marabout Ahmed Ben Habib Allah, connu sous le nom de Cheick Amadou Bamba ou Serigne Touba. La mystique du soufisme des mourides repose sur le renoncement total aux choses terriennes en faveur de l'entier dévouement à la Divinité, par discipline et travail. Enfin, la confrérie la plus récente est celle des Layènes, fondée le siècle dernier, dans la région Dakar (Yoff) de Sénégal et comprend la communauté musulmane majoritairement de Lebous.

Marabout et la diffusion de l'islam

Selon Fernandes⁶, l'islamisation dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest s'est faite par l'intermédiaire des marabouts arabes et maures, mais surtout dans les classes dominantes et moins dans le milieu populaire. Le rôle des marabouts a été primordial, dans une société qui manque de clergé autochtone et où la propagande religieuse n'a été faite que par les étrangers. En ce qui concerne le développement de l'islam, celui-ci s'est fait par les efforts et le charisme

⁶ Victor Fernandes, *Description de la Côte Occidentale*, Bissau, 1951, p. 7

du marabout qui a fait preuve d'une extraordinaire souplesse, s'adaptant au contexte socio-culturel d'une époque dominée par les croyances traditionnelles, avec un culte suprême des ancêtres protecteurs et des pratiques magiques nécessaires à la lutte contre le mal de toutes sortes.⁷ Les Marabouts ont su répondre aux attentes des dirigeants politiques, mais aussi à celles du peuple, adaptant l'islam à des pratiques locales. Ils ont beaucoup forcé les limites de l'islam arabe, jouant le rôle des magiciens traditionnels, confectionnant des amulettes (gris-gris), dont le rôle était d'éloigner tous les maux et de protéger le croyant contre des éphémères forces maléfiques.

La considération dont les marabouts ont bénéficié, dès l'islam ouest-africain du début, est due notamment au fait qu'ils savaient lire et écrire, un aspect qui les rendait sacres et inviolables et qui leur apportait une série d'avantages économiques, qu'ils garderont jusqu'à la contemporanéité. De plus, l'existence des marabouts a été le principal facteur de l'expansion de l'islam, suscitant la vocation religieuse au sein d'une population dominée de croyance et de mythes animistes.⁸

Jusqu'au 17^{ème} siècle, dans l'Afrique Subsaharienne, l'islam de cour s'oppose au paganisme de la population. Ultérieurement à cette période, les choses changent fondamentalement. Avec l'expansion de la *sharia*, l'aristocratie s'éloigne de l'islam, qui devient la croyance populaire dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest, avec le renoncement aux pratiques des religions animistes. Pendant cette période, les marabouts maures commencent le Djihad contre les souverains qu'ils accusent de s'être éloignés de « la bonne voie » du Prophète et, par conséquent, ne sont plus de bons musulmans.

Le principal instigateur a été un marabout mauritanien, Naasir Al-Din, qui a dirigé le premier mouvement de purification de l'islam ouest-africain, comme une critique du comportement religieux et politique de l'aristocratie au pouvoir. Al Din a demandé à « tous les rois de changer de vie, de remplir leur obligation de salat (prière), d'avoir trois ou quatre femmes et d'éloigner de leur entourage ceux qui les éloigneraient de la juste foi ».⁹ Naasir Al-Din a compris que la meilleure variante de faire

⁷ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p. 219

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 220

⁹ Christophe I. Ritchie, *La Compagnie du Sénégal*, Paris : Karthala, 1968, p. 338

répandre l'islam parmi la population était de lier la réforme religieuse à celle politique, en motivant la tyrannie du souverain par l'infidélité du respect des percepts islamiques.¹⁰

Dès l'époque des conquêtes wolof (16^{ème}-17^{ème} siècles), le souverain ouest-africain avait toutes les prérogatives d'un monarque de l'Europe médiévale, à deux exceptions : la fonction législative et celle religieuse. Si en ce qui concerne la fonction religieuse, petit à petit, après l'installation de la religion musulmane, les choses changeront un peu, en ce qui concerne le droit d'émettre des lois, celui-ci ne reviendra plus jamais au monarque. « La fonction législative, que les juristes considèrent comme la plus importante – celle qui consiste à adopter des lois, comme règles générales et impartiales, qui traduisent dans des normes concrètes les principes essentiels qui règlent la vie quotidienne et qui assurent la protection des individus, a été celle qui excédait le souverain. Beaucoup plus anciens que sa propre personne, ces principes fondamentaux sont issus de la tradition coutumière, expression permanente et immuable de la volonté divine sur Terre. »¹¹

Ultérieurement, avec la défaite du mouvement maraboutique de Nassir AL-Din, la victoire de l'aristocratie païenne se transpose par le massacre de tous les adeptes du mouvement par les armées du colonisateur français. Nous assistons à ce moment-là à un recul de l'islam, mais le mouvement se traduit par l'hostilité et la méfiance qui domineront les relations marabout-politique pendant les siècles suivants, l'exercice du pouvoir politique considéré incompatible avec la loi islamique et sa pratique orthodoxe. En outre, le progrès de la pénétration de l'islam parmi la population autochtone se traduit comme un moyen de défense contre l'oppression venue de l'extérieur, aggravée par le développement progressif des pratiques commerciales esclavagistes, apanage des colonisateurs. Pour le croyant musulman, ce n'est que la population païenne qui peut être transformée en esclaves, et cela ne peut se faire que jusqu'à leur conversion à l'islam.

¹⁰ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p. 222

¹¹ Jean Bruyas, *La royauté en Afrique Noire, Annales Africaines*, Université de Dakar, Paris, 1966, p.198

L'islam populaire

Au 15^{ème} siècle, lorsque les premiers missionnaires portugais arrivent à Sahel, la religion musulmane était déjà largement répandue, notamment parmi l'aristocratie¹². Du haut en bas, à l'échelle sociale, la société commençait le processus d'islamisation. L'aristocratie, « le roi et tous les nobles et les séniors d'ici étaient mahométans et ils avaient parmi eux des marabouts arabes, qui savaient écrire et lire. »¹³

Dans l'histoire de Sénégal, par exemple, il y a eu deux types de marabouts, en fonction des relations qu'ils avaient avec l'aristocratie et le monde politique: *serigne fakk-tall* et *serigne laamb*.¹⁴ Ceux de la première catégorie ont toujours eu une fonction essentiellement spirituelle, sans rapports avec le pouvoir. Etymologiquement, en wolof, « serigne fakk-tall », désignait la personne dont le rôle était de transmettre les connaissances religieuses aux disciples (talibé), avec la grammaire et, éventuellement, des notions de droit théologique. L'importance de ces marabouts se lisait dans le nombre de disciples qu'ils avaient, des jeunes que les parents envoyaient pour qu'ils acquièrent des connaissances de ces « sages », qu'ils suivaient dans toutes les activités quotidiennes.

En dehors de ces questions strictement religieuses, les marabouts fakkètall géraient aussi une série d'attributs qui relèvent, à l'époque moderne, du droit civil : successions, héritages, mariages, divorces, etc., se manifestants comme des leaders de la communauté musulmane qu'ils dirigeaient.

Néanmoins, lorsque les leaders du pouvoir le demandaient, serigne fakk-tall déployaient des rituels religieux à leur honneur, en leur assurant, aux yeux des croyants, une sorte de protection divine, nécessaire pour rester au pouvoir et pour s'assurer la victoire devant des adversaires de tout type.

Du point de vue de leur appartenance ethnique et de leur origine sociale, la plupart des serigne fakk-tall provenaient soit de l'Afrique de Nord, soit même de plus loin, des pays du Moyen Orient, ce qui bloquait

¹² Olivier Roy, *Op. cit.*, p. 137

¹³ Victor Fernandes, *Op. cit.*, p. 7

¹⁴ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p. 236

leur accès à de hautes fonctions, au-delà du village / de la commune où ils se trouvaient.¹⁵.

En ce qui concerne la deuxième catégorie de marabouts, « serigne-lamb » ils ont été à l'origine des leaders de la communauté, mais la collaboration avec les autorités centrales, musulmanes ou non, les a transformés en leurs représentants au niveau local, et la fonction politique a prévalu par rapport à celle religieuse. Leur rôle d' « envoyés » du souverain se déduit dès l'étymologie du terme « lamb », qui signifie « tam-tam » (wolof), à savoir l'instrument musical (le tambour /le tambourin) qui précédait les annonces publiques.

A la différence de *serigne fakk-tall*, qui étaient mis dans la fonction religieuse par la communauté locale, *serigne-lamb* étaient venus du centre du pouvoir politique, nommés par le souverain, uniquement après avoir démontré leur entière loyauté face à celui-ci.

Ils remplissaient les mêmes fonctions publiques que les autres représentants royaux, administratives, judiciaires, fiscales et militaires, et, au fil du temps, la conduite individuelle s'est transformée de celle de leaders religieux, en celle de fonctionnaires gouvernementaux, dont le comportement religieux était purement formel, caché derrière le titre « serigne ».

Le système religieux maraboutique

Parmi les facteurs ayant favorisé l'expansion de l'islam, le principal a été la déstructuration des monarchies locales, islamisées antérieurement uniquement de façon formelle et qui empêchaient une expansion de la religion dans les couches les plus profondes de la société. La nouvelle vie politique, apparue après la consolidation de l'administration coloniale, a permis l'installation d'un système religieux dont les dirigeants avaient déjà gagné leur prestige dans la lutte avec le souverain et qui sont devenus guides non pas seulement dans le milieu de la sacralité mais notamment dans des questions profanes. Les marabouts prennent possession de la société ouest-africaine, qui traverse une crise majeure provoquée, d'une

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 239

part, par la déstructuration du système monarchique, mais aussi par l'apparition d'une administration coloniale, complètement étrangère et inadaptée aux réalités locales.

L'islam s'est imposé dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest même avant l'époque coloniale, les éléments d'un système religieux musulman étant définis pendant la période des régimes monarchiques locaux, lorsque les marabouts ont été intégrés au système monarchique. Cependant, l'échec du Djihad ouest-africain du début a rendu impossible la création d'une théocratie locale. Dès le début de l'époque coloniale, le système religieux local s'est constitué sur les ruines des monarchies vaincues par l'armée française.¹⁶

A Sahel, un espace qui avait connu l'islam maraboutique avant les conquêtes coloniales, le système religieux se constitue sur les bases des confréries, de vraies organisations socioreligieuses, qui reprennent en quelque sorte le système de la monarchie récemment disparue et qui ont des fonctions religieuses, mais surtout des fonctions qui tiennent du domaine du profane, strictement politiques et administratives. Il faut mentionner que ce nouveau système prend naissance sur le fonds de la crise profonde générée par les conquêtes coloniales et se développera de la même façon les siècles suivant, jusqu'à présent.

L'islam ouest-africain est essentiellement confrérique. Ce fait a deux causes principales. Une de nature externe, à savoir l'influence précoloniale des marabouts venus du monde arabe, et l'autre, de nature interne, déterminée par la crise politique et sociale profonde survenue après les conquêtes coloniales, qui a générée l'apparition de personnages charismatiques à la tête de certaines communautés religieuses, qui ont réorganisé la société après la disparition des monarchies locales.

La caractéristique de la société islamique locale est donnée par les aspects particuliers que la relation binaire marabout / talibé acquiert. D'une part, nous avons les marabouts « savants », les connaisseurs des textes sacrés et de leurs interprétations. Ce sont les « lettrés » du Coran, de la théologie, du rituel et de l'exégèse islamique. Ils appartiennent la plupart du temps au clergé, ce sont les imams des mosquées, les dirigeants des communautés locales, juges ou professeurs.

¹⁶ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p.263

Parmi ceux-ci, « serigne nadw » (wolof) sont « les petits marabouts », dont les connaissances sont limitées et se résument surtout à réciter le Coran. « Serigne mag » ou « les grands marabouts » sont ceux qui ont fait des études de droit, de théologie.

Lorsqu'un marabout devient un savant connu, généralement dans le monde théologique et / ou littéraire / scientifique, celui-ci peut fonder une branche de la confrérie, recevant le titre de « scheik ». A partir de ce moment-là, il passe dans une autre catégorie, celle des semi-saints, les possesseurs de barakat.¹⁷

Le Djihad des marabouts

Dans L'Afrique de l'Ouest, généralement, et au Sénégal, en particulier, l'islam a toujours joué un rôle important dans la vie politique, à chaque fois que la société s'est trouvée dans une situation de crise. L'exemple le plus significatif se trouve au 17^{ème} siècle, dans ce qu'Abdoul Aziz Kebe appelle « la guerre des marabouts ». Il s'agit de l'opposition des leaders musulmans au commerce avec des esclaves, dans un moment de la dissolution totale du contrat social entre l'aristocratie traditionnelle africaine et la population. Nassir Al-Din, le leader des mouvements maraboutiques et l'initiateur du premier Djihad ouest-africain appelle à la lutte armée la population contre une classe politique qui ne respectait plus la norme religieuse islamique.

Quelques siècles plus tard, l'islam sénégalais est inchangé. Les marabouts des confréries sont considérés à la fois des modèles de piété et des guides spirituels qui inspirent de la confiance et de l'admiration. Il suffit d'entendre leur nom, et leurs disciples, les talibés, sentent déjà la présence divine. Cette confiance et ce respect immesurables que la communauté leur accorde ont fait d'eux des alliés stratégiques des autorités politiques, initialement coloniales, puis purement sénégalaises. Leur influence est essentielle et leur rôle est de maintenir le système politique et administratif de Sénégal fonctionnels, par une continue médiation politique et sociale.

¹⁷ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p.270

Cet équilibre persiste depuis l'époque coloniale par l'intermédiaire d'une convention tacite entre les marabouts et le pouvoir politique, d'une part ceux-ci « bénissant » les figures politiques, et d'autre part, recevant du politique un espace à l'intérieur même du système étatique où ils peuvent répandre l'influence parmi les masses de croyants.¹⁸

Après une première période d'islamisation, disons superficielle, de l'aristocratie, grâce aux relations commerciales avec les marchands arabes qui ont traversé le désert et qui ont considéré que du point de vue économique il était plus convenable d'islamiser du haut en bas, il suit une deuxième phase de l'islamisation, qui commence dans la deuxième moitié du 17^{ème} siècle, par les mouvements maraboutiques et le Djihad que ceux-ci promeuvent. Nous aurons, à partir de ce moment, un islam populaire, profondément installé dans les masses populaires par le marabout, qui le défendront contre la violence et l'esclavagisme, prônant « la guerre sainte ». Néanmoins, l'intervention européenne ainsi que l'aristocratie traditionnelle essayeront d'empêcher l'accès des marabouts au pouvoir politique, tout d'abord à cause de leur hostilité par rapport au commerce des esclaves. Leur manque de cohésion et surtout les alliances de quelques-uns avec le colonisateur français vont rendre impossible l'adoption de la sharia pendant les siècles suivants.¹⁹

La victoire du colonisateur français doit être regardée avec une certaine réserve, car la défaite des marabouts ne doit pas être considéré sans prendre en compte le succès initial de leur Djihad, la population les regardant comme des libérateurs dans la lutte avec les « oppresseurs » étrangers. La plupart des musulmans vont s'engager avec enthousiasme dans la guerre sainte qui continuera, cette fois-ci contre le pouvoir étranger et moins contre l'aristocratie locale. Nous pouvons affirmer quand même que l'islam a été essentiellement vainqueur dans ce conflit, apparaissant comme un espoir pour la plupart de la population dans la lutte avec l'opresseur étranger.²⁰

¹⁸ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p.227

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 276

²⁰ Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971, p. 70

L'islam politique maraboutique

Une catégorie à part de marabouts, ce sont les leaders des confréries. Les Saints. Autour d'eux, on a créé l'entier système religieux ouest-africain, en même temps que le début de l'ère coloniale. Leur sainteté est héréditaire, dans la contemporanéité la plupart des dirigeants des ordres religieux étant des descendants par ligne paternelle des fondateurs des confréries. Ils ont généralement reçu une éducation rigoureusement religieuse mais, indépendamment de celle-ci et de leur comportement dans le monde profane (qui parfois n'est pas tout à fait exemplaire), ils bénéficient tout au long de leur vie de la qualité de saint.²¹

Immédiatement après cette catégorie, ce sont les « scheiks » locaux qui suivent, les individus qui se trouvent dans un stade socioreligieux intermédiaire, choisis par les leaders religieux pour leur haut niveau de connaissances, les qualités morales et le niveau de soumission face à la confrérie. Ils ont reçu une sorte d'initiation de rang spécial ou bien ils l'ont acquise au fur et à mesure, étant les guides spirituels accessibles aux croyants communs, avec lesquels ils ont des relations d'ordre personnel. Généralement, ce sont les descendants des grands marabouts qui ont été dans l'entourage du fondateur de la confrérie, la liaison de la lignée familiale dépassant le simple niveau de soumission.

Pendant les monarchies locales, antérieurement à l'ère coloniale, juste avant l'expansion totale de l'islam dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest, les marabouts se sont intégrés dans la société comme les protecteurs magiques-religieux des guerriers et des leaders politiques qui se trouvaient à cette époque-là presque tout le temps sur le champ de bataille. Pourtant, au fil du temps, avec l'expansion de l'islam, les marabouts sont devenus les protecteurs de la populations face aux abus des souverains et les principaux adversaires du commerce des esclaves²².

Au moment du début de l'ère de la conquête coloniale, en pleine période de crise, l'attitude des marabouts et leur opposition à la violence de

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 272

²² Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *Op. cit.*, p. 70

la colonisation leur ont permis d'apparaître devant la population comme des guides religieux et des dirigeants des communautés locales, donc de façon implicite des ennemis de la monarchie. Après l'installation complète de la colonisation, les marabouts vont apparaître comme les principaux vecteurs de l'intégration de la population dans le système colonial, au niveau politique ainsi qu'au niveau socio-économique, favorisant la soumission à l'administration coloniale.

Dans l'islam il n'y a pas de séparation nette entre le monde profane et l'espace sacré, entre temporaire et spirituel, toute la vie de la communauté des croyants (*umma*) est fondée et dirigée en fonction des préceptes du Coran et de *sunna* (la tradition islamique). Y compris l'acte de justice se fait en fonction des textes sacrés et il est effectué par les leaders religieux (marabouts, imami, émir), qui ont une double valence, spirituelle et administrative-politique. Mais lorsque cette double valence n'est pas tolérée par les souverains, le Djihad, la guerre sainte, est déclenché.²³

Le colonialisme a mis fin non seulement à la monarchie mais aussi à la guerre sainte déclarée à celle-ci. En Sénégambie, par exemple, les deux confréries principales apparues à cette époque-là ont eu des approches différentes. Les Tijjanes ont collaboré dès le début avec les colonisateurs, tandis que les mourides se sont opposés avec véhémence initialement, pour qu'enfin ils choisissent une voie du compromis qui a assuré la paix sociale dans la région, le siècle suivant. De façon pragmatique, l'impossibilité d'une lutte armée avec le pouvoir colonisateur a obligé les marabouts à collaborer avec les représentants du nouveau pouvoir politique afin de continuer le prosélytisme d'une manière paisible.

Dans ce sens, Diop parle dans *La société wolof*²⁴ à propos de l'« idéologie collaborationniste », une doctrine politique qui est, apparemment, encore en vigueur au Sénégal, et qui trouve ses racines dans l'œuvre d'Al Hadji Malick, le fondateur de la confrérie Tijaniyya. Celui-ci identifie dans les textes sacrés islamiques une série de principes qui conseillent le respect de l'autorité politique tant que celle-ci ne s'oppose pas à la religion. Il s'agit d'un soi-disant « neutralisme positif ». ²⁵

²³ Olivier Roy, *Op. cit.*, p. 139

²⁴ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p.329

²⁵ René Dumont, *L'Afrique noire est mal partie*, New York, Praeger, 1962, p.69

La collaboration avec le pouvoir colonial est l'un des thèmes de prédilection des écrits des principales figures du tijanisme, Al Hadji Malick, encourageant ses disciples à un respect profond de toute autorité temporelle, qui n'exclut par Allah : « Les français nous ont imposé les bienfaits de la justice, de la sécurité intérieure, de la paix générale, le développement du commerce et de la façon de vivre, tout dans un profond respect de notre religion. ».²⁶

Il demandera aux fidèles tidjanes de respecter les dogmes et les lois du colonisateur français, de payer les impôts et de participer aux efforts de guerre à chaque fois qu'il sera nécessaire.

En ce qui concerne la relation de l'autre leader religieux important de Sénégal, Amadou Bamba, celle-ci est plus complexe. Dans une première phase, le fondateur du mouridisme est accusé d'avoir essayé de reprendre les prérogatives du souverain éliminé par les colonisateurs, ce qui l'a transformé dans le symbole incontestable du nationalisme et de la résistance à la colonisation. Cependant, au fil du temps, les français comprendront qu'Amadou Bamba est un leader religieux qui manque de grandes ambitions politiques²⁷ et que sa lutte et celle de ses disciples est essentiellement une de résistance passive.

Tout comme Al Hadji Malick, Bamba adopte le principe du « neutralisme positif », son collaborationnisme avec les autorités colonisatrices étant considéré par ses disciples l'expression d'une volonté divine, ayant comme but de rétablir la paix, l'ordre et la justice, sous le spectre de l'islam.

Ainsi, les marabouts deviennent les intermédiaires de la relation entre la population et l'administration coloniale, le gouverneur de la Sénégal notant en 1932 que « les marabouts font preuve de dévouement à la cause du colonialisme, car ils ont pris en charge la défense des points de vue divergents avec la population locale. »²⁸

Après la fin de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et avec l'élargissement de l'électorat par l'enlèvement de l'interdiction de voter sur la base de l'avoir personnel, les leaders politiques ont compris que dans le futur système politique ouest-africain le rôle des confréries sera de plus en plus important. Mais cette action sera toujours ambivalente : les rivalités qui

²⁶ Abdoulaye Bara Diop, *Op. cit.*, p.322

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 323

²⁸ Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *Op. cit.*, p. 70

explosent au sein des confréries, en particulier en ce qui concerne la lutte pour la succession du khalifat, seront exacerbées sur le plan politique, par l'entrée dans différents camps de divers intérêts de parti. Pour cela, les deux parties mèneront une lutte acerbe pour des alliances politiques et religieuses, traduites la plupart du temps par des transferts financiers énormes d'une part et d'autre, en fonction des besoins de moment de chacune des parties.

L'exemple le plus éloquent se trouve dans la politique interne sénégalaise, immédiatement après l'obtention de l'indépendance, lorsqu'en 1962 un conflit politique éclate entre le président choisi Léopold Sedar Senghor et le premier ministre Mamadou Dia, suite à une tentative de ce dernier de coup d'état. La profonde crise dans laquelle le nouvel état se trouve ne sera résolue qu'au moment de l'entrée en scène du calife général de la confrérie mouride qui, suite à des négociations avec l'ancien pouvoir colonial, intervient personnellement et incline décisivement la balance en faveur de Senghor, un proche du général De Gaulle, le président de la France à ce moment-là.

Toujours dans la politique sénégalaise il y a un autre exemple qui apparaît, celui de l'accession au pouvoir d'Abdoulaye Wade, le troisième président choisi démocratiquement. Son appartenance à la confrérie mouride et l'utilisation de celle-ci et des immenses ressources dont elle dispose ont engendré une nouvelle approche de la personnalisation de la relation entre l'état et les confréries. Avant l'époque Wade, les relations directes entre les deux parties n'étaient que supposées, pas démontrées. A partir des années 2000, le chef d'état lui-même devient le manifeste du croisement entre le politique et le religieux. Une fois installé au pouvoir, Abdoulaye Wade devient simultanément « le premier président mouride » et « le premier président des mourides »²⁹.

Les confréries apparaissent, dans ce contexte, comme une sorte de « régulateurs sociaux »³⁰ mais aussi politiques, leur influence dans la politique sénégalaise étant définitoire et leurs interventions fermes, doublées par l'immense soutien dont ils se réjouissent parmi les fidèles, en leur laissant la possibilité d'intervenir afin d'être médiateurs dans les disputes entre les

²⁹ Cheick Gueye et Abdourahmane Seck (2015), « Les renégociations du rapport islam, politique et société » dans le vol. *Etat, sociétés et Islam au Sénégal*, Abdou Salam Fall (éd.), Paris : Karthala, p. 23

³⁰ Seydou Kanté, *Géopolitique du Sénégal : une exception en afrique*, 3 août 2014, <http://www.igfm.sn/geopolitique-du-senegal-une-exception-en-afrique/>

camps adverses sur la scène politique. A partir de l'époque du président Senghor et jusqu'à présent, en passant par les périodes Diouf et Wade, tous les chefs d'état ont été obligés d'entrer dans le jeu des confréries, soit pour se légitimer du point de vue politique, comme dans le cas de Senghor, soit pour justifier leur programme public, comme dans le cas de Wade.

L'image du Président Wade agenouillé devant le calife général des mourides, après avoir remporté les élections de 2000, lors de son premier déplacement officiel, comprend justement le paysage des relations entre les marabouts et la politique. En outre, il est nécessaire de souligner que les frustrations survenues au milieu public suite à cet événement n'ont pas été dues, principalement, à l'absurde de la situation, mais plutôt à une sorte de jalousie générée par le choix de la confrérie que le président Wade a fait.³¹

De plus, le renoncement à la neutralité officielle des califes de deux principales confréries sénégalaises, les mourides et les tidjanés, a été utilisé par les principaux partis politiques, les Marabouts de deux parties entrant dans l'Assemblée nationale sénégalaise, à savoir juste dans l'épicentre du pouvoir politique, en s'appuyant sur la légitimité des communautés locales de provenance.

Ainsi, aux élections générales de 1998, de la part du Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) entrent dans le comité législatif cinq Marabouts, parmi lesquels la figure la plus importante est celle du président de la communauté rurale de Touba, la ville sainte des mourides. Celui-ci n'est mis en évidence que deux semaines avant les élections, au détriment de certaines personnalités politiques traditionnelles du parti.

Cependant, en analysant le rôle des marabouts et des confréries dans la vie politique sénégalaise, nous tirons la conclusion que, après 1960, malgré certaines crises internes inhérentes à une démocratie africaine à ses débuts, y compris la tentative de coup d'état de 1962, la situation politique stable de Sénégal est due surtout à l'équilibre socio-politique que les confréries assurent.

O'Brien estime que cet équilibre entre les deux pôles - politique et religieux est comme une sorte de « contrat social typiquement sénégalais », qui, cependant, après les années '90-2000, est perturbé par l'apparition sur la scène politique des « petits-enfants » de premiers marabouts. Ceux-ci se sont détachés dès le début de tout contrat social et, entrant sur le premier plan de la politique sénégalaise, ils souhaitent changer le discours religieux.

³¹ *Ibidem*

Il y a une rupture par rapport à l'orientation traditionnelle confrérique s'est toujours appuyé sur la non-implication directe dans la vie politique. Les nouveaux marabouts, bien que toujours attachés à leurs origines soufies et confrériques, revendiquent un nouveau type de « contrat social », avec une différente légitimation du rapport entre religieux et politique, jusqu'au point de créer des formations politiques et entrent complètement dans le jeu du pouvoir.³²

Le mouvement confrérique, spécifique à l'islam de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, est entré au Sénégal, dans une étape de reconfiguration, les nouvelles transformations cassant le monopole de la relation confrérie - pouvoir politique et créant plusieurs centres de pouvoir, avec de multiples acteurs. Ces dernières années, la pluralité des héritiers de l'« empire » confrérique engendre des tentatives d'établir son propre espace d'expression dans une lutte sourde pour l'accession au pouvoir. Pendant ce temps, avec une influence extérieure des pays du Moyen-Orient, exportateurs du fondamentalisme islamique, on sent le développement d'un courant réformiste. Localisées surtout dans les centres urbains, une série d'organisations non-gouvernementales financées par l'Arabie Saoudite exigent un retour à la « Salafiya » (l'islam original) et demandent le respect du Coran et de la Sunna ad-litteram. Par son agressivité, le nouveau courant réformiste dénonce avec véhémence l'abandon de toutes les pratiques jugées contraires à l'orthodoxie islamique, essentiellement de l'islam confrérique.

L'action réformiste consiste dans l'entière déconstruction du système maraboutique et en particulier, de la relation marabouts-Talibé, qui est en fait son fondement. Les nouvelles orientations se dirigent vers le remplacement des écoles islamiques traditionnelles (daaras) où les talibés dépendent exclusivement de la volonté des marabouts et où ils mémorisent le Coran, vers un système d'éducation dual, bilingue franco-arabe, où les élèves étudient les textes sacrés avec une approche salafiya. Tout cela se passe dans une société sénégalaise qui est en pleine crise sociale, marquée par une croissance démographique incontrôlée, une urbanisation artificielle, qui laisse place à un discours néo-fondamentaliste, détruisant les relations de clientèle entre les autorités politiques et les marabouts.³³

³² Mamadou Bodian et El Hadji Malick Sy Camara (2015), « Les religieux musulmans dans l'amélioration du débat public » dans le vol. *Etat, sociétés et Islam au Sénégal*, Abdou Salam Fall (éd), Paris : Karthala, p. 117

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 119

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SOCIAL APPROACH OF THE RELATIONSHIP CONCEPT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Salanțiu Tudor*

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Abstract

In this paper, we will address to deficits of the study of relationship construction in IR by approaching the meaning of the concept in network structures. After presenting the interactions patterns as one of links sources as well as of conceptualizing of relationship, we will introduce the social roles of relations as an approach of the social processes. We will show that relationship have a relative character that is related with information flow, culture interaction and which is detached from the realism perspective. Furthermore the approach will offer a theoretical surveillance from social and group's perspective of the interconnectivity between international actors.

Keywords: network, behavior patterns, social relations, information, international actors.

Introduction

The existence of the *relations* among actors result from the history of interactions in a horizon of time under different situations or events. How the actors develop this relations between them based on their position and information access in network structures is probably the most disputed discussion from international theories.

* Salanțiu Tudor is a PhD candidate, Doctoral School *European Paradigm*, Faculty of European Studies, University Babeș-Bolyai. Contact: salantiutudor@yahoo.com.

The discussion begins from the classical paradigms view as realism and neo-realism where relations between actors are considered to be constructed on the base of the exercise of power, influence and on the survival tendency¹ (Morgenthau, 2007, Waltz, 2006, Mearsheimer, 2006). The outcome of such understanding is a pragmatic logical scheme of the links where the actors have an enough degree of paranoia to try to be more powerful as their partners continuously.

On the other hand, the paradigms as constructivism consider that an important role in relations construction is occupied by the similarity and identity among actors, and how the values are assigned². A second assumption, resume to the fact that in international structure, an important role is occupied by the culture as an interaction dimension and cultural intelligence as a new kind of ability to adapted to the new culturally diverse situation from the global level³. However, both types of paradigms, grant an important aspect to the relations to explain how the actors exercises the influence and power in the system to achieve the interests. And neglected the importance of what relations represent from the social network perspective, and thereby what the actors follow through relations construction from point of social processes.

For this reason, the paper aim is to make a theoretical surveillance of the *relationship* concept in social and group terms. Through this approach we try to put in evidence the link between social and security dimension as source of dynamics in structure as network. And to discuss what is the role of social patterns in relations construction under structure trends.

The paper is divided in three sections, in first section we present some preliminary of the theoretical framework. After that, we analyze the relations construction in International Relations through social mechanisms, where we use the interaction process as pattern sources. The last section are the conclusions.

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni*, Iasi: Polirom, 2007, pp. 585-587; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoria politicii internaționale*, Iasi: Polirom, 2006, p. 120; John J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forță*, București: Antet XX Press, 2003, pp. 28-31.

² Alexander Wendt, *Teoria socială a politicii internaționale*, Iasi: Polirom, 2011, p. 260.

³ Jolita Kiznyte, Ruta Ciutiene, Andre Dechange, "Applying Cultural Intelligence in International Project Management", in *PM World Journal*, vol. IV, issue VI, 2015, pp. 1-16.

1. Preliminary

Same as social constructivism, we consider that the basic of the international system structure are the links set among actors and social dynamics, which occupied rather than material positioning. Because of this, we identify the source of interaction in the perspective which information created and which is materialized in the actors decisions.

Considering the *relations* and *information* concepts as the central elements of the approach, allow us to interpret the international system imagine as an emergent out-puts from the continue interactions among actors. This particularity, allocate to the links the creation role of the structure interface where the dynamics represent one of the socialization patterns in social terms between actors.

The last idea is contoured around the *information* concept which in a social network contain data about the structure, state, entities characteristic and behavior of this. Therefore, the *information* -from the social perspective- represent a deductive variable about dynamics, trends and environment shape which can allocate different meanings to the existing or hypothetical relations. This possibility conduct us to assume that each actor from a social network have a knowledge base compound from personal information and general ones to which he has access through time needed. Thus, we allocate to the actors the capacity to assimilate and use information to create new social elements in the structure.

2. Social construction

The *system* concept in International Relations field, has allocated two meanings: first is correlated with the *state* where the security is the essence. This represent the perception of an entities group about how the actions or the behavior of an external actor can affect the integrity or the personal interests in the system⁴. The last meaning, refereed to a *stable environment* due to the internal rules and laws which govern the actors

⁴ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back in", in *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, pp. 72-107

behavior and assure the stability of the system⁵. These two meanings, represent in International Relations the "constants" which influence mostly the actors perception in interaction process through the fact that are used as landmarks in the way that environment is perceived.

From this causes, the social importance allocated to the *system* concept in IR paradigms came from the necessity to structure the social reports among actors in order to reveals how the entities are integrated and perform. However, an alternative to describe or to report to the international environment is through the *network* concept. As Hafner-Burton et al. show, this concept is used in IR paradigms to make reference to a particular mode of organization which sustain common actions and cooperation⁶. The advantage of this view, is that replace the internal mechanism -which usually impose the assignment of the *black-box* as an internal reference- whit the social dimension which can provide answer to key question using the structural approach. In this sense the network research is focused more on the activity effects on the structure then change effects on the actors. This being the general discussion between neo-realism and constructivism.

As a social construction, the network integrate the *state* and *stability* concepts as parameters of the patterns which emerges from the interaction process, and influence the structure dynamics. This approach satisfy -in general- through interaction based on a cultural set of norms the Ackoff's conditions that:

- *the behavior of each element has an effect on the behavior on the whole.*
- *the behavior of the elements and their effects on the hole are interdependent.*
- *however, subgroups of the elements are formed, each has an effect on the behavior of the whole and none has an independent effect on it*⁷.

Which allocate to international activity the influence dimension in order to explain how connectivity between actors behavior and groups dynamic can lead to environment transformations.

⁵ Jean L. Cohen, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 118

⁶ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, Alexander M. Montgomery, "Network analysis for International Relations", in *International Organizations*, no. 63, 2009, pp. 559-592

⁷ Russell L. Ackoff, *Creating the corporate future*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981, p. 15

We start the surveillance with the analyze of the network as a reference architecture in order to show that understanding of the international system as a network do not have a mechanical development as realism or neo-realism argue⁸. In contrast with this, we attribute a dynamical evolution which can change over time the behavior variation of the actors. The lack of stiffness to the network make to exist an additional support on social construction outlined by the social objects which have a determinant role in limiting the choice, and work as a constraint of the actions.

In this sense Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the norms have a decisive role in the political changes of the actor, which conduct to the change of international landscape through propagation of the idea⁹. This follow to define the path from the formulation by the actor to the internalization and its acceptance as a norm. And Katzeintein, called conformity¹⁰ in order to describe the predictable outcomes for a particular behavior of an actor.

The follow of this argue in structure approach is used as an epistemological orientation by the constructivism to consider that the configuration of the international system in time is determinate by the *idea* distribution among actors¹¹. As a second element, the *idea* and the sharing of this among actors, fulfills the role to provide the knowledge and to construct a networking culture. The force of the *idea* in comparison with the power and influence in the classical sense is reflected in an environment with more than one dimension of activity where it can be translated in the instruments, resource, preferences or innovation. What we want to reveal through the implication of the social objects in the network construction is that they represent "*common knowledge*". And the objects used in the international system by the actors formulate information sets which setting the interaction between actors.

⁸ Barry Buzan, "From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the english school", in *International Organization*, vol. 47, no. 3, 1993, pp. 327-352

⁹ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International norm dynamics and political change", in *International Organization*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1998, pp. 887-917

¹⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The culture of national security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 28-29

¹¹ Alexander Wendt, "Constructing international politics", in *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, pp. 71-81

2.1 *The interaction process*

This part is focused on the interaction patterns which exist in relationship between actors. The discussion begin from the decisional process attributed to the foreign policy in the sense that each decision represent a direction on long term and an action on the short term. The question which rise from this is what is the role of the information diffusion in relationship? In a general way the answer is that assure the flow between actors and describe the integrations of the interest groups dynamics. As a particular answer, the diffusion create through combination of data flows with the behavioral patterns the configuration of the relationship.

In this sense, the search of the interactions patterns represent the identification of the diffusion mechanisms from policy adoptions¹² to integration process in the relationship. In fact the diffusion represent a metric of interaction which provide meanings that reunites character variations which governing the social actions in links set. Therefore, can have either a voluntary or coercion manifestation in the relations which drive to competition, demands or to vertical influence.

Berry and Berry argue that the diffusion mechanisms are created by the four forces which allow that transfer either voluntary, coercive or combination between actors¹³. The voluntary adoption, represent a continuum function of the actors in the relationship with the partners which allow to be more adaptive in the behavior. On contrary with this, the coercive manifestation represent an emulation of the actor in one moment of time in relationship with the partners which can assure the maximization of the value or survive in a domain. Therefore, in the relations with others, the actors will use the communication channels to construct different dependences or to produce an external signal. Lake interpret the objective of these actions in alliance constructions as development of some parts of

¹² Diane Stone, "Transfer agents and global networks in the 'trans nationalizations' of policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.11, no. 3, 2004, pp. 545-566

¹³ Stokes Frances Berry and William D. Berry, Innovation and diffusion models in policy research, in Sabatier A. Paul and Weible M. Christopher, *Theories of the policy process*, ed. 3th, Boulder, Westview Press, 2014, pp. 169-200

relationship which already exist¹⁴, with the properties that minimize the cost of actions and the security sustained. This modification alters the internal frequency distribution which competing with reproduction and adaptation after their imitation and selection process.

On the functional level, the adaptation using the diffusion contain a dynamical approach which is based on the calculation of the most efficient actions set. Because of this, the interdependence between actors on the interaction level involve process like persuasion, sanctioning and imitation in the form of response to the influence that they receive. Analyzing the actors behavior as a diffusion in interdependence, Martin show that existing of the reciprocity of the diffusion do not imply a specialization of the actor actions on the medium terms¹⁵. This behavior choice represent instead the tendency of the actor to make prospection of the possibilities which exist in relationship before to begin an integration. On the other hand on a long term the reciprocity diffuseness create a historical of the relationship which can assure a balance points set.

The implication of this possibility is found in the probability of the actors to make predictions about reality before to answer, base on the historical experience. This discussion brings forward the fact that the understanding of diffusion imply the approach of the coordination problem between actors. Where the discussion referee to a temporal and quantitative dimension of outcomes of the actors into relationship and the limits to assimilation.

2.2 *The relationship surveillance*

To explain the links between actors in a network will refers to the *relationship* concept as a social one. This approach, have the advantage to be more closes -in a general sense to the social constructivism and institutional liberalism face to the pragmatic approach. First propinquity with the IR paradigms represent the structural significance of the *relationship* in terms of the interconnection among entities. In this sense, Kelley et al. define the

¹⁴ David A. Lake, "Anarchy, hierarchy and the variety of international relations", *International Organization*, vol. 50, 1996, pp. 1-33.

¹⁵ Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, in *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 4, 1992, pp. 765-792.

relationship in the context of inter-group interaction as a: "intertwined of two peoples have mutual influence on each other and they are interdependent"¹⁶. Regard with this, the definition given by Kelley, reveal a similar mechanism of connection among entities like the interdependence concept from international paradigms.

Allocate this structural frame to the links among actors in international environment, these receive a role in production of the power, which affects the actors capacity¹⁷. This complementarities between relationships as a *structure instrument*, and as a *mechanism* in power production¹⁸ is summarize to the fact that in a normative structure, the modes function and normative process among actors are dependent operations. Because of this, the existing of a complex agenda and a multiple projects between actors grant to the relations set a various mechanism in dissemination of the knowledge¹⁹ and influence²⁰ in discursive practice in the network. This intersection between structural complementarities and group connection on the organizational network conclude in formulation of the social power through relations mechanism.

On this account, in a complete network the "anarchy" state as Axelrod and Keohane enounced²¹ become a false affirmation about the state which governance the environment. The argumentation start from the presumption that governance of a network represent the management of the complementarities and of the connection between actors. Therefore, the legitimization of the power granted to a common government or to a super-agent as neorealism sustain become unfounded. Instead of this state, network take the properties of the deterministic chaos in the sense of an

¹⁶ Harold H. Kelley et al., *Close relationship*, New York: W. H. Freeman & Co, 1983, p. 18

¹⁷ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics", in *International Organization*, vol. 59, no. 1, 2005, pp. 39-75

¹⁸ Daniel J. Brass, "Being in the Right Place: A Structural Analysis of Individual Influence in an Organization", in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1984, pp. 518-539

¹⁹ Hermina Ibarra, "Network Centrality, Power and Innovation Involvement: Determinants of Technical and Administrative Roles", in *The Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 36, no. 3, 1993, pp. 471-501

²⁰ Noah E. Friedkim, vol. 58, no. 6, "Structural Bases of Influence in Groups: A Longitudinal Case Study", in *American Sociological Review*, 1993, pp. 861-872

²¹ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", in *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1985, pp. 226-254

evolution with a fuzzy direction in a long period of time. In this condition the network governance is replaced with the relations management implemented in the system by the actors groups.

A secondary propinquity which relations needs to accomplish in the interaction and socialization process are the social principles. This discussion follow to highlight how the inter-groups interface can construct the relations set under different social events and how influence the interaction. From this perspective, the *relations* are possible to be defined in terms of the behavior patterns. Based on this possibility, Sherif and Sherif argue that in social interaction, the behavior patterns can be understand through the reciprocal behavior exposed between actors and which is associated to the expectations manifested.²²

Following the framework developed by Sherif and Sherif, we can classify the roles of the relationship in interaction in three classes: First class represent the rules and instruments set which have the goal to elaborate the social mechanism that can assure the existence of the relationship. As the main domain, the public diplomacy is maybe the most important tool that can facilitate the communication and social construction between different groups.

As a communicational process, the public diplomacy is defined by the Sharp as: "*the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country's people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented*"²³. In this terms the concept represent an instrument of the *smart power* used by the actors in relations to promote their interests in domains where the application borders are diffuse. A particular field of the public diplomacy is occupy by the cultural diplomacy, which imply a set of actions based on the change of the values, ideas and different cultural or group identity aspects. In application of this diplomacy, the actors follow to create a smart dialogue among the own entities. This type of dialogue is integrated on the public interaction because the entities which manifest the interest to

²² Musesafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Social psychology*, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, pp. 139-141

²³ Paul Sharp, Revolutionary states, outlaw regimes and the techniques of public diplomacy, p. 106, in Jan Melissen, *The new public diplomacy*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, pp. 106-124

interact with different culture have a multitude of information sources which can facilitate knowledge and exchange.

Thus, the link between diplomacy and power result from the complementarities substance form of the concepts. Through this, the public diplomacy is a combination of the particular values from the social entity with the group interest, reported to the available quantity of the resources which can be allocated to the application. However, because the power is limited, his exercitation in interaction conduct in time to the consumption and in the end to extinction, this process create for the actors the necessity to conserve the power using subsidiary instruments. Therefore, the use of the power request the search of alternative channels of manifestation which to accept the different power types.

What result through application in the relationship, is a set of interaction rules based on the accepted common values created and evaluated through particular values which have been shared before. Through this, the actors follow a stable space of interaction constructed on common values and identity norms. On this account, the combination between diplomatic institution with the public diplomacy matter in the manner which can assure a multilateral openness in the form of transnational cooperation²⁴.

The second class of role is the reciprocity. On a first look, this class present some similitude with TIT-FOR-TAT model developed in strategy approach on the relationship. This correlation in the repeatedly interaction, is based on enforce of the adaptation process of the actors behavior in order to maintain the optimal degree in interest solution. In practice the thinks are little different, in the IR field and special on international law, the reciprocity represent a principle of the symmetric behavior in sort with the adopted response of the interaction partners. In his analyze, Keohanne approaches the reciprocity that the actors can develop in relationship in two types: specific and diffuse²⁵. This characterization reveal

²⁴ James A. Caporaso, "International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations", in *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 3, 1992, pp 599-623 și Robert Cooper, *The breaking of nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty -First Century*, New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003, p. 94

²⁵ Robert Keohanne, "Reciprocity in International Relations", in *International Organization*, vol. 40, no.1, 1986, pp. 1-27

how the different sequence of flows can be influence by the perception of involved parts through density representation of the events. What is important in the Keohanne classification, is that he formulate a difference between similar exchange sequence as norms and the proximity sequence with a crisp character as institutions.

Through this, the classification confer to reciprocity concept a representation which in essence is the shared degree of the actors in different situation. Thus, the interpretation of the promotion instruments as public diplomacy or soft power used is that are elements which formalize the behavior in time. On this account, the material factors from IR became the idea which have impact in social process and reflect the interest and establishes of the behavioral norms.

The last role in general sense is the exchange process in time of interaction. The difference by the social form is that in IR, this role is possible do not accomplish always the reciprocity meaning. The argumentation is that the role appear as an effect of the reciprocal reliance between involved actors, and characterize a form of interaction which is based on trust and on the international regularization. In this case, and because the exchange do not have a social meaning, the international laws are formulated from treaty, agreements and international procedures which conferred an institutional form.

The expressiveness of this role in relationship, indicate the willingness of the actors to develop an extensive meaning to interaction which to be implementing in the behavior. Therefore, the adoptions of this meaning in their perspective of the actions and in the opportunities creations enable the actors to have a different forms of direct means which can influence the relationship. This kind of interventions may produce on the short time a distortion of the relationship which on the network level can express a stress experience. This mechanism through the intervention can transformed in a stress is similarly with the snowball. The procedure take in account the fact that some interventions represent sign that one or more actors try to change their position in the structure with the aim to toughen the openness to the information flow.

Thus, the interpretation of the relations set in IR by the actors under different context conduct to allocation of a development degree in future perspective to each relationship, which can oscillate. Therefore, the

decisions which can take about how relations need to evolve in depth, represent the rapport between positive perspective existence and how the network is possible to change.

In fact, this correlation between the behavior patterns and expectation is materializing in the identification of a real and rational perspective of the link in time by the actors. The applicative part of this, is founded in formulation of the action strategies about the self-interest of the social group which help the actor to create a sustainable micro environment which allow to achieve his expectations. On this sense, all three groups represent instruments and techniques of interaction among actors which have the role to facilitate the dialog and the possibility to achieve the goals.

Interpretation of the actors behavior through the above model, highlight the tendency to intensify the connection through different channels in the network level to assure a better the information access. Through this action, the actors have the possibility to develop the social power in the structure using their capability to manage the information distribution in some areas from the network.

This interest for the actors' position is related with what they can represent for the groups in a network as transitions nodes. On the other hand, the performance objective followed by the actors through their place, is understood as the rapport between outsource control degree and the enforcement of the sanctions imposed by other actors²⁶. This tendency, to have a dominant position is correlated with the concept of "*libido dominanti*" -as a particularity of power manifestation in the network, which assure the exercise of influence over dynamics vectors. These two objective describe for each actor the competitive tendency in the network reporting to the social interaction.

Therefore, through the need of the actors to be recognized in the network is defined the necessity to be framed into a reality expressed by the rest of the actors. This implication assure that through interaction and socialization the actors can receive the attention needed to confirm their existence. In this sense, the importance degree into the structure, make the

²⁶ Mavis Hiltunen Biesanz and John Biesanz, *Introduction to Sociology*, 3th edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1978, pp. 148-151

link between the actor role in one situation for the groups as cut point and the possible rewarding which came with affirmation or received attention.

For performance in this complex process, the actors need to have in rapport with the partners an order and predictability degree which to assure behavior transparency. In relationship construction this allocate the "meanings" in attempt to decode the information and to eliminate the uncertainty from the process. On that account, the social process (interaction and socialization) between actors to be recognizing in the network must be seen in terms of particular imposed conditions for the each situation. In his work, Fiske argue that in social process, which are organized in term of the existence relations, this elements of transparency represent an evaluation parameter of the social relationship²⁷. Where, their use is related with the organizational patterns of the group in the sense of maximization of the positive outcomes for the each participant²⁸. Thus, the interaction between the actors it can be interpreted through continue searching of the partners in the network and the behavior adaptation to respect the structural characteristics. In IR, this interpretation of the searching can be found on the interaction constructions as alliance or partnerships between actors on the structural level. And this is possible because the strategic decisions represent regularities engaged in reiterated actions of the actors.

3. Conclusions

We begin the study from the assumption that relations among international actors represent social constructions which are capture in a network structure. Because of this, we thought that the relations represent an interconnectivity element which are submitted to the social process. And assure the maintaining of the actors interest in interaction environment. This transposition of the discussion from the International Relations paradigms in a social perspective represent in fact a simplification of the reality where the accent

²⁷ Alan Page Fiske, "The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations", *Psychological Review*, vol. 99, no. 4, 1992, pp. 698-723

²⁸ Marvin E. Shaw, Philip R. Constanzo, *Theories of social psychology*, New York: Mc Grow-Hill Inc, 1970, p. 304

is placed on the links between actors. Analyzing this model allow us to change the political perspective with a social one where the concepts as power, influence, balance, institutions and interdependence are replaced whit social behavior, information, norms, reciprocity and connections. On this dimension we understand the international relations as links set which are subjected to Ackoff's conditions. Therefore, the discussion about how the relations are constructed start from the motivation of the actors to interact and from the meaning that is granted to the relationship. Because of this, the information about the network and state actors have a main role in the production of the interaction need. This desire of the state actors is translated as a form which can maintaining the own interest in the network and to make to be more connected with the others in the sense to benefit after opportunities. In this sense, the submission of the behavior to the Ackoff's conditions define the dynamics in the network through interactions between actors.

A second consequence of this conditions is that the interface of the social network include in fact in a sociological sense the intersection between actors behavior and groups dynamics which leading to the system transformations. Including the relations as links among actors receive the meaning of the communication channels which are sustained by the strategically interest materialized on the social behavior and submitted to the social regularization. The changes of the international system, implement to the relations a continuity factor in time. From this fact the actors have the tendency to adapt the relations to facilitate the social process between them. This calibration of the relations as social channels was possible because in a global world the channels take the meaning of the mutual dependence as Kelley defined in group approach and Nye with Keohane considered through interdependence concept in international relations.

In the end, we conclude that relations approach through social constructivism represent social channels based on the object classification used by the state actors. On this consideration, the construction process represent an integration of the similar objects classification by two or more partners in a social regularized form with the characteristic of communication channel. The understanding of relations constructions in International Relations field through this description reveal that the links

between actors represent not just an institutional ties but receive a role of social channels which can connect actors with similar behavior. However, the shortcoming of our research is the lack of values measurement of relations between international actors. Because of this, the discussion proposed remain just on theoretical level. Second there exist a need of more social instruments which can to explain the effects of cultural interaction on social level.

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BOOK REVIEW

Iulia Anamaria Ghidiu*

Vasile Pușcaș, *România și calea de viață europeană*

[*Romania and the European way of life*], Cluj-Napoca, Școala Ardeleană
Publishing House, 2017, 252 pages

The volume “Romania and the European way of life” (2017), by professor Vasile Pușcaș, presents-without pretending to be exhaustive on the topic-a comprehensive analysis of the local, national, regional and global context of Romania's accession to the European Union, an analysis of the-both technical and political- process of accession negotiations, as well as of the post-accession European evolution of the country, at exactly one decade of membership.

The book appeared at Școala Ardeleană publishing house (Cluj-Napoca) and it encompasses the vast experience of Romania's chief negotiator with the European Union, unveiling in its two sections (*Articles* and *Interviews*) the advantages, the benefits for us, the Romanians following the accession (although mainly by the contagion effect of the single market), our attitude as country when relating to the supranational level of decision making, the less inspired interpretation of the true meaning of EU membership (a partnership and not only a mere alliance or practice of foreign policy), and of the role that we must assume, as well as

* Iulia Anamaria Ghidiu is MA graduate from the program on Management and International and European Negotiations, Faculty of European Studies, University Babeș Bolyai. Contact: iulia_anamaria_g@yahoo.com.

recommendations on the lessons Romania should internalize, in order to shape a distinct type of involvement, a distinct, proactive cooperation, at the European Union level and not exclusively.

Moreover, in a deeply interconnected world, our country vision must be a global, integrationist one, we have to detect and to access in a wise manner the opportunities standing out on the horizon. The transatlantic partnership represents another worthy reference point where Romania has to revise its real value potential.

Although with prospective lucidity, often critical-not unreasonably!-about the chances that were given to us and that we didn't rend profitable, Vasile Pușcaș maintains his optimism and confidence in the inception of a fresh, authentic and vigorous leadership (at both the national and the European levels), who could give an impetus to the European identity reconstruction, managing the crisis the Union is undergoing at the moment and who could insert Romania on the right path to sustainable development and prosperity for all citizens.

The series of articles published and gathered in the present volume preserves the same line, the same pulse, the same tonic and, now and then, metaphoric language. The author reinforces perspectives resorting to sincere confessions and beliefs, as one who has been there in flesh and blood and who knows when the time is ripe. The alarm signal-in academic style-, the stimulus to general mobilization are not absent equally, alternating the first person singular with the plural demonstrates the diplomat's confidence in the power of collective action for the common good of the country: "a dignified and prosperous insertion of the country on the European way of life. I believe this is our duty, of all the young men and women of Romania, for the next decade and for the others to come!"¹

Elaborating a post-accession strategy was not one of our virtues, it had no significant impact and was showing syncopes from the part of the government that ended up suspending the whole process. Not until recently, the subject of a country project has stagnated and because of that, Romania didn't make a favourable impression at the supranational level.

¹ Vasile Pușcaș, *România și calea de viață europeană*, Cluj Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2017, p. 64.

The best practice model of the "business plan", specific to corporate governance, could and it should represent a case in point, a source of inspiration for the decisions being taken in the internal political leadership sphere, at the level of what generically call "country project" or "national project".

The motivation lies, indisputably, in the optimization of the process of allocating different resources, of assessing and harnessing the identified opportunities-through realist projections- but also in offering the ideal framework for multilevel cooperation among numerous state and non-state actors. In addition, the country project involves the political forces into a beneficial competition, designed to generate the social progress of the citizens and it is a strong symbol of the modernity, maturity and identity with which we affirm ourselves externally, at European and international levels. On this matter, Romania must begin performing, in the context of a complex global system, characterized by profound interdependencies, thus becoming a proactive force, not only reactive, reactionary to a series of exogenous stimuli, a partner and not only an ally.

There were, of course, both supporters and critics on the development of a country project. Many opinion leaders approved its obvious necessity, but we could also see others' skeptical attitude towards such an ambitious project.

It is true that, in 1989, Romanians' disconnection with the old regime and Occidental transition didn't proposed an own model of progress to be completed, following the mimesis approach and considering many things for granted once the accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Romania's full integration is still desirable, in a not too distant future, as the chief negotiator and we, the young generation, hope.

Romania's journey within the European Union has been marked by a context of successive crises for Europe (a constitutional one-see the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands and the transposal of many of its provisions into the Lisbon Treaty-, an economic and financial one, a leadership crisis and even an existential one). Brexit has pointed out the tensions at their peak within the European globe, a state of surprise and of shock.

The European crisis was maintained by the wrong approach of member states' leaders (Romania included) towards local action and effect, compared with an ample, integrationist view. Even though the benefits of EU membership are significant, our involvement continues to be lacunary. Especially given the systemic crisis we are now undergoing, Romania's initiative in consolidating partnership relations and in balancing global-integrationism with national sovereign order becomes indispensable in overcoming the stalemate and rebuilding the European architecture from the bottom, avoing the superficiality in our relation with Brussels.

Assessing the first decade of European membership has preoccupied not only the Romanian society at large (not so much the leadership) but also the elites in other member states, if we consider the internal problems our country still faces and the larger context of the enlargement process, for which some voices expressed their skepticism.

Undoubtedly, the economic benefits of our membership to the European construct (resulted in their majority from the inevitable contacts with the Single Market, manifested in its four liberties) can be considered the most eloquent example (EU funded programs, attracting FDIs, GDP growth, exports growth). Still, one could have observed the inconsistency in continuing to apply the European policies after accession, in comparison with the Polish model of development, which the author mentions frequently.

With a dose of realism, Vasile Pușcaș expresses his regrets for Romania's current state of progress, from the perspective of a triad that he proposes as an ideal formula to mark the EU integration, *change-developent-modernization*: "I do not believe the fact that Romania is still the country with the major discrepancies within the European Union is anyhow satisfactory, if we take into account that, from 1997 we apply regional development policies but these discrepancies continue to grow."² The vicious pro-ciclicity (affecting the status of a functional market economy), serving the interests of small groups, the lack of vision, have all drifted us away from the European core and from the international network.

² *Ibidem*, p. 35.

The Romanian crisis is not exclusively the effect of the atmosphere within the European Union that has marked the moment of our accession, it has also been enforced by internal inconsistencies (economic crisis, democratic deficit). Fellow countrymen who have chosen to make a living abroad (since we could not "bring Europe at home") simply didn't find enough incentives to return.

Another deadlock Vasile Pușcaș is underlining refers to the erroneous interpretation of the native leadership, to the division EU=economic prosperity versus NATO=national security guarantees, detrimental to a vision of the complementarity of these two entities Romania is part of, the active involvement as a member country in one structure automatically generating effects on the other type of partnership.

If once in the possession of "the European passport", political leaders refrained from exhibiting the same interest in "the transition to the unknown", the author attributes a great contribution-and absolutely with good reason-to the entrepreneurs community in Romania for what means detecting the competitive advantages of the Single Market and making skillful use of them by exploiting resources, the native development potential of the country.

Following a transparent analysis of the status quo, the university professor stimulates Romania to take advantage of its first European decade anniversary and to see it as a reflection moment on several pillars, regarding what was offered to/requested from us as in the position of member state, regarding what we have harnessed and what not-extremely important!-, as well as what we could (and should!) change in the future. A future of the identity (re)construction that requires to be shaped from the inside, with the cooperation of endogenous forces and where Romania will have the chance of a more able involvement. Also must we consider the not too distant assuming of the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, beginning with July 2019.

In professor Pușcaș' s words, overcoming the deadlock where the Union is now trapped does not mean evoking the days of glory in the history of European construction or simply hoping for a better day. Quite the opposite, pragmatic action is required, rethinking the decision-making processes at the level of European institutions, the EU imposing itself as first-hand actor on the international scene.

Out of a series of constructive dialogues he had had with master students, professor Vasile Pușcaș wanted to display their position towards Romania in the European Union, emphasizing the majoritarian optimism for personal involvement on the way to development, for the internal metamorphosis of the country and of the European construction, as well as the young generation's lucidity about the current crisis the Union is undergoing.

The europenization process is understood by the students in terms of sustainable development projects, of connecting the local aspirations to the regional/European ones, of recovering the issue of brain drain, of investing in the human capital, in innovative industries, in terms of perception change in the mentality of the common citizen and of the elites, in the terms of a strategy of visionary and mobilizing political leadership.

Vasile Pușcaș mentions some other challenges Romania faces at this time. More precisely, he talks about redressing the large dependence on the EU Internal Market with regard to the export flow, about the valorisation of the real commercial potential in Romanian-American bilateral relations and about revising the mix of national economic policies in accordance with the new trends at regional, transatlantic and even global levels.

With the occasion of various interviews he gave, professor and diplomat Vasile Pușcaș discussed the malformations of the faulty mechanism of Romania's European integration. Beyond the visible progresses in the economic sector (as part of the contact with the Single Market rules of the game), Romania has been a counterexample, an underperformer on matters of social cohesion and convergence. The mercantilist, clientele-like approach, favouring small groups, did not shed a pleasant light on us in Brussels.

The state of preparations regarding the eurozone accession is, in the author's perspective, conditional upon the evolution of the efforts towards implementing real convergence policies. Here, Romania still needs to work.

Out of his experience in negotiating Romania's accession Treaty with the EU, the diplomat remembers the added value of the negotiation team who joined him in Brussels, the most sensitive chapters but also the disappointment from some leaders who did not assume their commitments made in 2007 and who, basically, missed out on many opportunities, a fact that resulted in a series of costs for the Romanian society.

At some point, Vasile Pușcaș emphasizes that one of the most significant challenges for our country at the very beginning of the accession negotiations was the process of trust building among the actors at the table. We were accepted to the league when not even our compatriots believed there will be such a possibility, although they were heavily supporting this result.

The erroneous perception of "Santa Claus' abundance bag" towards the EU has costed us a lot. Romania should have actively involved and refused displaying the "snow flower behaviour". At the same time, it would be more beneficial-as the author suggests-to stop blaming the supranational authorities or "the corporate invasion" for our own failures and to begin looking for the intrinsic causes of the problem (it is also true that populist tendencies have been observed in many member countries).

Although he admits the absence of an European leadership capable to speculate about the long term opportunities of sustainable development of the European project (following the reconstruction model of the European Community soon after the eurosclerosis period between 1975-1985), Vasile Pușcaș maintains his optimistic message that they will appear out of somewhere.

The context in which our country entered the accession negotiations was not one of the happiest ones and we discuss here both the international changes (caused by the tragic 9/11 events, the Balkan crisis) and the country's image (see the repeated refusal Romania received with regard to its accession to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization or the conflictual characteristics of the internal political environment).

During the interview with the Austrian professor Michael Gehler, Vasile Pușcaș talks about "the common values" (humanity and democracy) that attracted the intellectual elites towards accessing the European project, identifying a sense of attachment to the interwar system order. Even so, "the restauration" had been replaced by internal struggles for power among the postcommunist nomenclature, a wasted time, detrimental to consolidating relations with the Central and Eastern Europe.

Romania's (and Bulgaria's) accession was perceived by the European Union from a more strategic perspective, in order no to keep these states in a buffer zone, given the context of the Balkan conflict.

The chief negotiator presents a radiography of the European politics at the moment of the accession negotiations, he also describes both the technical and the political dimensions of the process, the large and lasting consultations, the internal political, economic and social negotiations, that involved a great number of stakeholders from all the society levels (governments, opposition representatives, trade unions, NGO's, European transnational parties, the academic environment, the market partners). The present work unveils, from backstage, the negotiator and his team's amount of work, his mobility in space and time, his agility, coordinating a complex network, shifting foreign investors' perspective once the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* during the preparation stage, the process of bilateral negotiations, the shaping of a country image in the European capitals, harnessing other member states know-how, as well as a series of obstacles he has faced (the opposition of some states on the last minute towards concluding the negotiations, proposals of freezing the discussions during the process or proposals to radically change the overall negotiation strategy).

The importance of the Copenhagen (1993) and the Madrid (1995) criteria is understood in the vision, the orientation of the Romanian political leadership, through their pattern of development, of transforming the mere accession, although many leaders have related themselves to these as to a number of directives and recommendations coming from outside and not as to a reality that had to be internalized in the domestic environment. There's nothing untrue about the fact that the negotiator's identities have multiplied once the ample process of country representation at the supranational level and of negotiating its new status in Europe, but this is a completely different discussion.

The personality of the European commissioner managing the enlargement portfolio at that time, Mr. Günter Verheugen, is reflected in the present volume, "Romania and the European way of life", Vasile Pușcaș noting his pragmatic attitude („facts, not words!"), the way in which the commissioner, even if he had started skeptically, when identifying a small piece of progress within the country, he encouraged us, he supported the idea that change is actually possible and he stimulated us to start working.

Although it was an assymmetric negotiation process, as the Transylvanian diplomat remembers, Verheugen knew how to promote the formula of a win-win result, being "a fair negotiator, dedicated to the European cause".³

Of course, atlanticism has also impacted on the process of accession negotiations (both positively and negatively-see the contradictions between the allies regarding NATO's intervention in Iraq). Undisputably, for the Romanian cause there was a strong connection between the EU and NATO, in the sense that NATO acceptance has opened up the road for the accession to the Community space, considering the country's state of development.

On the anniversary of the first European decade, "Romania and the European way of life" offers the public a commemoration of the experiences that determined the path to progres, to the modernization of the country to be opened, a commemoration of the difficulties and of the persistence of those who believed in this noble cause, of the benefits as member and as partner (as actively engaged as possible!) but also to draw attention to the side slip manifested in the post-accession period (and of the peril that may still perpetuate if we do not mobilize a genuine change!).

Professor Vasile Pușcaș's confessions and incentives enjoy transparence and they totally deserve make their echo heard within influential decision-making circles, because they happen in the framework of the negotiation mandate in itself, in other words, out of the experience of the one to whom the Romanians entrusted their shift of historical destiny, the attraction to the Western dream, the transition to a distinct set of values.

Therefore, the volume proposes a complex approach, placing the discussions into the context of global interdependencies and thus, it accounts for a sincere and open call to massive involvement at all the society levels, towards all the actors and potential dialogue partners, in troubling times for our continent.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 227

BOOK REVIEW

Elena Cristina Vohn*

Dan Dungaciu, Ruxandra Iordache (editors), *The Perfect Storm of the European Crisis*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017, 364 pp.

European Union is in a continuous crisis for a decade. The global economic crisis triggered in 2007 has hit the European Union in the highest degree, through the banking system crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Since then, there have been overlapping successive waves of crisis, emerging at various level the European construction, from deepening the economic crisis with all its effects, the Grexit that has turned into Brexit to migration and terrorism. All these phenomena that the EU is facing today are found in the core of the debates taking place in the European public space.

An important contribution to a better understanding of these phenomenon and for identifying solutions for the future of Europe is the book *The Perfect Storm of the European Crisis*, recently published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing and edited by Dan Dungaciu and Ruxandra Iordache. The volume that reunites the contributions of the scientists from the „Ion I. C. Brătianu“ Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy „decrypts the status of today’s Europe, hit from all directions, and — all the more unbearable — concomitantly“ (p. VII). This phenomenon that „affects all the level of our lives — be they political, economic, cultural or social“ has been called „the perfect storm“ — the title of the volume.

* Elena Cristina Arvatu (Vohn) is Scientific Researcher III PhD Candidate, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations "Ion. I. C. Brătianu". Contact: cristinavohn@gmail.com

The book has 4 parts and reunites 18 studies on the most challenging issues facing the EU today. The part one, *The European Crisis: Dilemmas, Texts and Pretexts* is opened by the Dan Dungaciu's study „*The Perfect Storm*” in Europe: *Towards a New Way of Understanding the European Crisis and its Consequences*. The study proposes a new model for understanding the European crisis that is „of a different nature and acknowledges essentially three levels.” The first level is the Paretian model of „mutual dependencies”, the second level is a fundamental problem, that is absent in the actual debates, the identitary question (the author making a pertinent analyze on the identitary European crisis which he consider to be „the nodal axis of the crisis”) and the third level aims to make a clear distinction between cause and effect, independent variable and dependent variable (p. 6). The whole analysis is aimed to identify the ways towards a new European normality.

The following studies approach different theoretical aspects of the European crisis. Lucian-Ștefan Dumitrescu analyses the European Union exceptionalism in *The Strategic Culture of the European Union: Security Dilemmas of an Anti-Geopolitical Project*, based on the main idea that „through exploring the strategic culture broached by Brussels, the distant sources of some of the major security issues facing today's European Union can be unravelled.” (p. 25) In the study „*The Perfect Storm*” and the *Transformations of the European Strategic Culture: Several Considerations*, Gabriela Tănăsescu believes that the actual context „dominated by the unilateral American leadership and a non-integrated European strategic culture, could constitute the EU's chance to return to a strategic vision defined by the coordinates of a defensive, humanitarian and irenic strategic paradigm.” (p. 49). The next study sign by Darie Cristea and Diana Didă, *Crisis of Confidence or Institutional Crisis? Declining Confidence in Institutions as a Symptom of Institutional Crisis in the EU Space*, approaches one of the most important issue of the European democracy, the low trust in the European institution or the democratic deficit. Lorena-Valeria Stuparu is the author of the study *Globalisation and the Significance of Populism in Europe*, that offers a comparative conceptual analysis of populism. Cristina Vohn analyzes the various scenarios of the future of the EU that appears in the European public space in *Perspectives on the Future of Europe*.

The second part of the book *Multiple Challenges: Facets of the European Crisis* contains 5 studies on the specific aspects of the European crisis: Cristian-Ion Popa, *Ordnungspolitik: the German Solution*, Viorella Manolache, *“Europastorm”: Brexit – the Crisis of a Europe in Crisis*, Bogdan M. Popescu, *Europe: Between the Crisis of Legitimacy and Brexit*, Cristi Pantelimon, *TTIP: A Controversial Treaty*, Răzvan Munteanu, Nicolae Țîbrigan, *Europe under the Pressure of Hybrid Threats*.

Four studies are reunites in the Three Part of the volume *The Apex of the Storm: Migration and Terrorism*. Ruxandra Iordache (*The EU and the Turkish Candidacy: The Chronicle of a Perpetual Crisis*) and Lucian Jora (*Functionality Aspects of the EU – Turkey Agreement Relating to the Management of Migration*) analyses the controversial problem of the integration of Turkey in the EU; Oana Simion focus on *The Migration Route in the Western Balkans and the Challenges to the European Union* and Sanda Cincă approaches the terrorist phenomenon in *Current Trends of the Terrorist Phenomenon in the European Union*.

The last part of the volume *Perceptions and Assesment in the European Press* contains another 3 studies on the different aspect of the European crisis reflected in the European press: Henrieta Anișoara Șerban, *“Europe-Titanic”: The European Union Among Distress Signals*; Carmen Burcea, *The Perfect Storm: Waves of Migrants in the Mediterranean or the Sinking of the EU – Perceptions in the Media*; Cristina-Georgiana Ivan, *The Refugee Crisis: The “Dreyfus Affair” of the Extreme Right in Contemporary France?*

The present volume, through the themes approached, —some of them absent from the European public agenda — represents an important contribution to the public debate on the European crisis. The 18 studies formulate questions and offer pertinent answers to the actual profound European crisis. Yet, as Dan Dungaciu asserts in the *Introductory Note* „the book does not claim to offer definitive answers to what is happening to all of us. Far from that. However, it attempts to outline the context in which these answers can be found and, moreover, to point out the places where one should search for them.” (p. VIII)

BOOK REVIEW

Anca Oltean*

István Polgar, Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie (eds.), *Migration and European Integration of Minorities*, Saarbrücken, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2017, 376 pages

Polgar Istvan in the article *The phenomenon of migration and integration of minorities in the European Union* brings into discussion the issues of demography and migration bringing together other issues related to the place of origin and receiving places of potential immigrants, integration of minorities in the areal of EU, considering as a solution for the contemporary times the concept of *Europe without borders*. After the disappearance of multinational empires such as Tsarist Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire, the pattern for the national states was imposed. But the directing lines of national states were not drawn accordingly and a lot of minorities emerged between national boundaries of states in Europe and this small groups posed problems leading to *internal frontiers* defined by professor Marga as separating different parties with their values, really separatory dividing lines. After pointing out the failure of communist with the failure of its egalitarianism, the model of European Union emerged as the only viable pattern for the future of European states and the idea of free movement of citizens on the territory of the union gained consistence. The problem of migration is regarded by the author as a European issue, an

* Anca Oltean, PhD is Research assistant, Institute of Euroregional Studies within the University of Oradea (Romania). Contact: olteananca@hotmail.com

issue of great importance for all the member states of European Union. The link between competitive economies and regions and migration of the labor force is strongly emphasised by the author (p. 11). The demographic decline of the European Union will change the perspective on migration, is the opinion of the author (p. 12).

The first part of the volume is entitled *Minority and majority in the Eastern European Area*. It opens with the article of Mircea Brie, *National minorities: levels of educational analysis*. The author emphasises the issue of national minorities as a main priority for the EU countries. The author focuses on the two concepts of ethnicity and religion which both generate feelings of extreme intensity. Diversity and openness are two strictly related terms. The author debates the idea of actual crisis as having political, social, mental and ideological connotations, placing European societies at crossroads. The social, political, economic life are redefined. The current European societies develop a sort of *self-protection* preserving economies, current identities and cultures. It emerges a European cultural space of cultures (p. 20). The author makes a critical approach of the Romanian model of interethnic relations being a model of a dominant culture in the logic of nation-state. The existence of minorities that asserted their rights leads the author to the problem of confessional rights that adjusted to the non-discrimination principle granted by the European Union. In the part of conclusion, the author poses some problems still faced by the minorities in Romania such as the discrimination against the Roma community and "the dispute over the granting of a form of autonomy from the central regions for the Hungarian community" (p. 33).

János Péntzes, István Zoltán Pásztor, Erzsébet Jász in the article *Gypsy population in Hungary—Databases and their background*, focus on the aspect that there are no exact data with the view of Gypsy population in Hungary. Gypsy population has to suffer a lot of social problems, representing the largest minority in Hungary. Different surveys reveal a number of Gypsies in Hungary varying between 315 000 and 881 000 (p. 38). The authors point out that the Gypsy population in Hungary can be divided in three ethnic groups: Hungarian Gypsies (Romungros), Vlach Gypsies, Beas ethnic group, Sintos and Vend Gypsies. Among the databased quoted by the authors when evaluating Gypsy community, we remember censuses, sociological surveys, minority local government elections, data of birth/marriage registers.

Penka Peeva, in the article *The Turkish Ethnic Group in Bulgaria: History and problems of integration*, mentions that Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are the second ethnic group as size from this country. Some of them are descendents of the Turkish people that settled in the Balkans during 14th century (p. 53). Others were Bulgarian Christians converted to Islam. In the years 1980, the Bulgarian communists tried to replace the names of Turkish-Arabbians with Bulgarian names. This community was oriented towards the promotion of socialism. But, also, among this community it took place a rebellion in 1984 with anti-communist stances. In consequence, moving for good reasons in new regions, more than 2000 Turks were deprived of their jobs and homes (p. 57). In January 1990, a part of the rights of this minority were returned back. This issue, underlines the author, must take into consideration the balance between individual rights and national interest.

Gabriel Moisa, in the article *Minority and majority. The case of the historical Romanian community from Hungary in post- Trianon era*, points out that the first documents about the Romanians in Hungary dates back in the XVIIIth century, so the Hungarians can lead their history on a different path. Romanian Orthodox parishes were the first who enacted documents about the Romanians from Hungary. Making a history of historiography in the field of Romanian element in Hungary, the author asserts that, in XVIIIth century, are considered to be found the original documents about Romanian minority in Hungary, in the context of the lack of archeological and archival systematic research (p. 66).

Natalia Putină in the article *National minorities in Moldova between Eastern and Western aspirations: risks and challenges* focuses on the ethno-political background and political orientation of ethnic minorities in the Republic of Moldova. The author underlines the multiethnic character of the Republic of Moldova in 1989, as an inheriting republic of USSR. The Gagauz minority enjoyed strong support from Turkey and Russia, Bulgarian minority was helped by Bulgaria, Moldovan minority enjoyed support from Romania. Then, the author focuses on electoral orientation of minorities from Moldovan Republic. Ethnic cleavages generate different political orientations is the opinion of the author. Last but not least, the author writes about the dilemma of the Republic of Moldova to choose between European and Eurasian integration.

Constantin Liviu Demeter, in the article *Twenty-five years of demographic forum of Germans in Oradea*, writes about the fact that the year 1989 opened a path of linguistic and spiritual freedom and for 25 years the German Community from Oradea developed projects and activities here. The German community in Transylvania was divided between Saxons in the South of Transylvania with Evangelical religion and Swabians, in the West of Transylvania with Universal Catholic Church. The author writes about Lutheran Church from 28, Tudor Vladimirescu Street which have an existence of 200 of years, after the Lutheran reform, mentioning that a part of the Germans from Oradea were living in that area. The Frimont family and the Palota village are other benchmarks for the community of Germans from Bihor county. In 1990, two weeks after the creation of German Democratic Forum in Sibiu, there was created a German Forum in Oradea. At 25 years after the Revolution of 1989, it seems they are still living ethnic Germans in the villages of Palota, Petreu, Pădurea Neagră, Tărian and Sâniob. The aim of German Democratic Forum from Oradea is to preserve and to teach the German language in Oradea and Bihor County with the financing of Romanian state.

Renata Hegedüs in the article *Migration and integration of immigrants* emphasizes the complexity of migrations phenomenon at global scale. One of the subjects approached by the author is migration and discrimination. In the context of the recent global economic crises, migration and discrimination phenomenon occur more and more often. In what concerns the issue of migration in Europe, the author considers that many European countries are multiethnic states even if the actors are still the nation – states from EU (p. 99). One of the effects of migration in Europe is that the actors of migratory fluxes are high qualified individual who want to reside in the core states of European Union. The future of immigrants, in EU, depends on their educational level, concludes the author.

Vasile Cucerescu, in the article *Cohesion, integration and securitization challenges for EU migration law and policy*, presents the migrations phenomenon as a process dating back to ancient times and which manifests even in present times. Migration issues had been the object of research for several disciplines and impose an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research approach. The author brings into discussion the three layers of the research objectives of migration issues such as cohesion, integration and securitization

(p. 104). As a target territory for migrations European Union was perceived, during history, as the cradle of civilizations, the territory of “Old continent”, an area of welfare and prosperity and peace. The desired immigrant in the European Union is a highly qualified individual being able to adjust to European standards. The author makes an elaborate analysis of the EU legal provision on migration. The issue of migration imposes also new challenges for the development of EU legislation in this field is the conclusion of the author (p. 124).

Nataliya Nechayeva–Yuriychuk, in the article *The problem of Russian-speaking people integration in post-Soviet states*, emphasizes the hot subject of Russia’s occupation of Crimea and Russia’s aggression in East Ukraine, posing new threats on European security. In this context, the situation of national minorities is very important, in Europe. The purpose of research, as defined by the author, “is to define the place of Russians and Russian-speaking minority in social and political life of Latvia”. (p. 128) The author draws the picture of the evolution of Russian minority in Latvia in the XIX and XXth centuries. In spite of Latvian authorities to preserve and enforce the Russian language, the Russian minority from Latvia was never fully integrated in this state.

The second part of the volume has the title *The phenomenon of migration in Europe. Migration and integration of immigrants in the EU* and opens with the paper of Mihai Sofonea, *The immigration under the intelligence panopticon effect*. The author points out that the communication in immigration process is hindered by different obstacles. In the same time, the international migration is increasing in scale and complexity. (p. 142) International mobility is part of globalization process. Foucault quoted by the author established a connection between power and knowledge and instituted surveillance of the members of the society, including the immigrants, as a tool of political power. Security and surveillance should prevent the terrorism instauration, transnational crime and illegal migration from development on European soil.

Ambrus Attila and Teperics Károly in the paper *The examination of the cross-border catchment area of medical science universities of Debrecen – Oradea*, focuses on the beginning on demographic increase and the role of Hajdu-Bihar and Bihor counties in developing neighborhood relations. The authors analyze the role of the universities of Debrecen and Oradea in fostering

bilateral and international relations. The author focuses on particularities and differences between the two countries.

Constantin-Vasile Țoca in the article *Erasmus Programme. European Instrument for European Educational Migration* focuses on the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP) that took the place of former programmes such as Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci ITC/Open & Distance Learning. The author mentions that this survey is dedicated to Erasmus programme. Providing different graphs and statistics with the view of providing the number of beneficiaries of this program,

Ludmila Rosca, in the article *Moldovan Diaspora in Italy: Valuable integration experiences*, brings into discussion the problem of international migration as being defined by several aspects such as the existential-philosophical, philosophical-pragmatic, economic, psychological, political, social, cultural, religious. Then the author focuses on the particularity of Italian case in the options for emigration of ethnic Moldovans. Church and public organizations play an important role in the integration of emigrants. In the context when the Republic of Moldova remains the poorest country in Europe, the possibility to migrate is on the liking of Moldovan people.

Claudiu Filimon, Cosmin Chiriac și Luminița Filimon in the article *Migration and the perspective of demographic revitalization of the rural settlements in the metropolitan area of Oradea (ZMO)* make the description of Metropolitan Area of Oradea established in May 2005. ZMO comprises today Oradea and 11 communes. After the entrance in the second millennium, it became obvious the migration from rural to urban settlements. According to statistical data in most communes from ZMO immigration was higher than emigration rate for the period 2005- 2012. In all these communes, the proportion of the group of 20-64 years % is the highest during the years 2002-2011. The effects of this migration trend are not significant, in the opinion of the author, the life of the migrants being connected with the city of Oradea.

Joszeff Fekete and Zsolt Radics in the paper *International migration trends in Turkey and the Balkans* show the migration trends from Southeast Europe. The events from the Balkans impacted on the migration process in SE of Europe. The authors focus on historical migration during in interwar period, after World War I and World War II, on the emigration process from Turkey and in Turkey, on the migration in the Balkans. From European

countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, there are known some migration waves to Turkey in the context of increasing economic situation. In the same country, the role of Turkey increased as a transit country towards West.

Judit Molnár and Tibor Kóródi in the article *A new Era of Hungarian emigration: Why are residents of Hungary thinking about leaving their home country?*, emphasize the problem of international migration due to the aging of Hungarian population. 5354 of people were questioned in 5 different towns of Hungary in the issue of migration plans. It follows to question Hungarian migrants who are living abroad. Hungary needs to attract young workers as the Hungarian population is in an aging process.

Anca Oltean in the paper *The emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel during the years 1945-1969* finds reflections of Jewish exodus from Romania in Israel in the works of Liviu Rotman and Radu Ioanid. Then, she makes the portrait of Romanian-Israeli diplomatic relations during the years 1945-1969 basing her research on a collection of documents edited by Daniela Bleoancă, Nicolae- Alexandru Nicolescu, Cristina Păiușan, Dumitru Preda, namely *Romania – Israel. 50 de ani de relații diplomatice (Romania-Israel. 50 years of diplomatic relations)*. The diplomatic relations between the two countries evolved in time, revealing economic, cultural, human rights problem, migration, religion.

The third part of the volume has the title *Managing interethnic relations and community security*. The first paper is written by Gabriela Goudenhooff and has the title *The European Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor of European Integration*. The author emphasizes the institution of European Court of Justice, one of the most important institutions of the European Union. The actual trend in EU, points out the author, is to abandon political integration approach in favor of “legal integration”.

Márton Tonk and Tünde Székely wrote the study *Hungarian minority and minority higher education system in Romania* and bring up the issue of Bolyai University closed by the communist authorities in 1959 and the idea of having in Romania universities in the Hungarian language for the Hungarian minority. The authors provide a table with the universities with training in Hungarian for the academic year 2013-2014 (pp. 270-271).

Gábor Pálóczi, István Máté Lengyel and Ernő Molnár in the article *Changing commuting pattern in Hungary after the turn of the millennium* show that the Hungarian economy was characterized by processes of spatial restructuring, the problem of commuting dealing with spatial inequalities in demand and supply.

Klára Czimre and Gábor Kozma in the work *Characteristics of the cross-border suburbanisation process in the Oradea agglomeration* emphasize the fact that the borders lost their significance and international mobility increased. The agglomerated zones of the city developed, rural areas are more valorified and the number of inhabitants of the cities in this part of Europe increases.

István Süli-Zakar, Ágnes Pálóczi, István Molnár in the article *Questions of Roma integration and migration endeavouring of the Roma people in South-Eastern Europe*, wrote about Roma people, the largest minority in the European Union. The trend of Roma people is to migrate from South Eastern Europe to Western Europe and North America. Their low level of education, unemployment, high criminality rate, illegal affairs hinder their integration in SE Europe. The Gypsies' problem is a European issue, conclude the authors.

Edina Lilla Mészáros in the article *Is the European Union turning into a gated community? The principle of selective permeability and African 'soccerscapes' to the EU*, focuses on irregular migration in the European Union, an unauthorized migration which causes the concern of European Union. Among the factors that generate irregular migration, the author identifies economic, demographic, political, social, cultural, and environmental. It is necessary to have a global approach to migration and mobility. The EU should review its immigration filters, thinks the author, because it discriminates people based on their country of origin.

Felix-Angel Popescu, in the article *European Structural Funds for migrants and minorities during 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 periods*, states that migrants and minorities bring a significant contribution to the economies of EU member states. During 2007-2013, more funds were allocated to people with migrant and minority background, less than during 2000- 2006.

We see thus a variety of papers from the domain of "migration and European integration of minorities", a variety of detailed information about migration process and solutions for a better integration of immigrants at

the scale of EU. Authors coming from all Europe, but mostly from Romania, Hungary, Republic of Moldova bring significant Eastern contributions in finding solutions to migration and ethnicities' issues in Europe.

BOOK REVIEW

Alin Ionuț Cornel Moise*

Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mișcoiu (eds.),
Miturile politice în România contemporană, Iași, Institutul European,
2012, 406 pages

The bases of this complex volume were laid back in 2012 by two editors and it was written by experts in the field. This volume is a unique contribution because the field of the political myths is a particular category.

In the Romanian language, it doesn't exist something similar that can look at these issues systematically. This book with theoretical approaches wants to give a response, for various questions related to political myths. The volume addresses the general public in Romania and the students of social sciences find it as a true oasis.

This volume is structured in twelve chapters, where each chapter is trying to make a contribution by providing an answer to questions about political myths.

The introduction of this volume is written by the editors Sergiu Mișcoiu and Sergiu Gherghina who begin to "open" this volume in a very elegant manner by saying "The myths are the reinterpretation of reality in the way imagined by their creators" (p.7).

The first chapter, "Statutul mitului politic dincolo de realitate și ficțiune" written by Paul Kun, provides explanation of the "myth" concept which is a fanciful explanation of an event, occurrence, etc. with a narrative

* PhD candidate, Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Conatc: moisealin3@yahoo.com

structure that precedes modern fairy tale and narrative structures. Political myth has a performative role, with many flawless elements that connect it to reality in an image as accessible to the collective imaginary.

In premodern societies, authority was the subject of unique information and its producer. Today we have a lot of sources of information, diverging in excess, and the myth is ordering, humanizing the image of the politician.

The next chapter, "Demitizarea sau mitologizarea postcomunismului?", by Codrin Tăut, show how in the contemporary period the term "myth" is regarded as a result of media communication and the general trend is to turn it into a mere fiction, and how political myth lacks depth and mystery appears in the Romanian political culture: nationalism, xenophobia, inadequate values of democracy in the imaginary perspectives. The post-communist era becomes a land of their own political myths recurrence due to fear, confusion, and absence of free and democratic traditions. Democracy in its full meaning is a utopia: it would be unable to keep promises, exorbitant and contradictory.

In chapter three, authored by Daniel Șandru, "Ideologie și mituri politice în România contemporană", says that the ideology and the myth as well as utopia can be identified on at least three levels: epistemological, identity, and the researcher's relation to the subject.

Ideologies give us the opportunity to dismantle the socio-political fabric of the axiological, attitude and behavioural fabric of a given society. In modern societies, the role of the myth tends to highlight the impact that myth has in a plan of sacredness, as well as in the chain of social relations.

In chapter four, "Dihotomii și antinomii în imaginarul politic românesc", Gabriela Goudenhoft, illustrates how the dichotomies and antinomies are typical of the Romanian mind and imagination, adding the "dishonest" tendencies as modalities of transition from ordinary rationality to mythical quasi-rationality. Representations as an autonomous form of knowledge have an interesting position within the imaginary because they seem more friendly and closer to logic and reason. As a form of political imagination, utopia is linked to ideology, both being "two divergent ways of approaching reality".

The next chapter, "Miturile politice ale Binelui și Răului în România post-decembristă", by Doru Pop, focuses on the political conflicts surrounding the suspension of President T. Basescu and the intensification of the public and political discourse indicated the deep division of the Romanian society, the theory of the two Romanias - an urban one, educated Romania that opposes to a rural Romania with medium or primary education.

Political mythology of good and evil borrow much of the arsenal of ideas narratives of a religious or theological character. Manicheism, whose concept intersects with Gnostic dualism, is the most important religion based on the eternal conflict between good and evil. Mythological constructions are based on the distribution of information in the media that use the media as the main tool for spreading political mythology.

In the sixth chapter, "Comuniști "nativi" versus comuniști "moscoviți". Strategii de reconstruire identitară a național-comunismului în România postcomunistă", the author Emanuel Copilaș claim that duality native/moscoviti (as belonging to Moscow beliefs) possess a printed structure, consisting of a scientific discourse, a political and ideological one, and how the communism aims indoctrination of all the full exercise of their types of ideological hegemony through which it reports Leninist party and who sacrifice everything. After '89 exponents of national-communism recycled in "patriots" who inherited thinking and reflexes during PCR membership, follow the exit out and getting a satisfactory result.

The next chapter, "Mitul purificării în România postcomunistă", by Adrian-Paul Iliescu explain the "myth of purification" which mean a set of mentality focused on: a Manichean perception of reality (the struggle between good and bad); Apocalyptic representation of the present; a political theology and a soteriological principle.

Promoters of purification postulate that "ex-communists" are at the origin of the present social evil. Some former "patriots" and "nationalists" were recycled in different parties, others have become orthodox and others have passed anti-communist parties (Christian Democrats, Liberals). Those who remained "on the left sight", have rallied successively to NSF PDSR, PSD.

In chapter eight, "Intelectualii între cunoaștere și putere în viața politică românească" author Sorina Soare speak about the "intellectual myth" where power needs intellectuals to define priorities and political landmarks, and

intellectuals need power to influence the result of political actions. Intellectuals are permanent attracted by the dilemma of choosing between the role of apologists of power and advisors of the company.

The next chapter, "Lupta pentru legitimare. Mituri politice în campanile electorale", by Alexandru Ionașcu explain how the primordial speeches, the "fantasies of change" and the exclusion calls took over the central functions of identifying crystallization, becoming a constant of the postcommunist policy, identifiable for all electoral competitors.

The political myth is conceived in terms of utility and not in relation to a political truth, and it is devoid of its own political significance. The identification of a specific national spirit, the confusion of Romanism with Orthodoxy, the authoritative referential of the National Pantheon and the conflicting history of the Romanian people are shaped as recurring themes of the interpretation of our past, viewed by the instinctive lens of the intellectuals and political elites of various historical periods.

The tenth chapter, "Mitul poporului român ca popor născut creștin. Consecințele în spațial public ale unei liturghii politice" by Adriana Marinescu relates that there have been moments throughout the history of "civil" and "political" power being upheld or used by religious authority to give a sense of government or a new identity to communities, the result being a so-called "sacrament of power" beyond the historical games of alliances and inter-alliances between the Church and the State. One of the insufficient myths presented so far is that of the Romanian people as a Christian born nation.

The next chapter, "Istorie, memorie și mit în martirologia competitivă Holocaust-Gulag", written by Michael Shafir explain said both communism and Nazism were destructive, extermination and deportation regimes, and they were accused of crimes against humanity. He also speaks about the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 23rd of August as the European Day of Commemorating the Victims of Nazism and Communism. Michael Shafir also reminds about the OSCE who adopted the resolution for the same reasons and about the acknowledged of the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and of course he relates also about David Katz concept.

The last chapter, "Mituri politice, mitologizări, demitizări și demistificări în tranziția postcomunistă" by Ovidiu Pecican focuses on the Study of the imaginary (fiction) historical on the life of human society, be understood as

a reference to imaginary historiography, where it is important that the agreed vision of history as opposed to another, and how Historical forgeries, claims without documentary coverage, testifying to the impetus and mistakes of the profession, manipulation and evasion, vanity and humiliation are just as important as truths and achievements.

BOOK REVIEW

Tudor Salanțiu*

Editorial notes, *IUIES Journal*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2017, 144 pages
Edited by: International University Institute of European Studies,
Gorizia.

IUIES Journal is a four monthly journal and which belongs to International University Institute of European Studies. The first number from this year of the journal, propose as subject a surveillance of the First World War (FWW) with the occasion of the centenary beginning from 2014 and in the next years since. In one way, the subject putted in this context wants to be a re-evoked of what this event means for the modern world and different dimensions that it surprised.

In accordance with the editor, the specific contribution of this number to the subject studied face compared to other works from this period is the multidisciplinary approach of the FWW from the perspective of different country implied. Thus, the authors which submitted to this number formulate a standpoint from the view of their country, academic discipline, and interest for the subject. This interdisciplinary in the subject approach assure to the number a fine observations to the FWW event as a systemic situation which requiring an analysis from a range of perspectives due to the effect on long time which have been create in special in Europe.

The journal structure is divided in four sections, each of this it is centered on a general theme. This clustering of the articles around the subject is to assure a large perspective developed as a progressively chain

* Tudor Salanțiu is a PhD candidate, from Doctoral School *European Paradigm* Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai Universit. Contact: salantiutudor@yahoo.com

which to introduce the scholars in events progress. Second, it follow to underline the own perspective of the authors in the subject approach from the interdisciplinary point of view. Thus, the first part describe the long processes which are allocated to the FWW and change the conflict approach and their studies, somehow making the transition from traditional to modern. In second part, the general theme approach the impact of the FWW on the international structure. In special the political reconfiguration of the Europe post war -in particular central Europe, where disappear of Austro-Hungarian Empire conduct to new scenario and tensions. In the third part the authors examined specific questions related to the effects of FWW in four cases: Hungarian single day, coronation of King Charles IV, Ukrainian universities experience, Yugoslav succession in national literature and Macedonia identity. And the last part approach the Italian experience in the FWW.

From this point of view, what rise the interest for this number is examination of this large set of themes from the interdisciplinary framework as an original contribution of the authors to the FWW consequences evaluation.

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Johnson, Pierre; Kranzenstein, Rashela (1995), *From the First Empire to the Second*, Boston: Rufus Publ.

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Hirsch, E. D.; Katt, Joseph F.; Trefil, James (2002), *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy* [<http://www.bartleby.com/59/17/postindustri.html>],
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