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BOOK REVIEW

POLITICAL BOUNDEDNESS AND THE ROLE OF CARTOGRAPHY

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Abstract

I will question the legitimacy of borders via its underlying premise: the supposedly natural boundedness of communities. Two avenues are usually used to show the legitimacy and necessity of borders: either as a way to protect and preserve the conception of the good and the values of an already existing bounded community; or as a way to create a democratic polity, the limits of which are required to uphold the rights of citizens. Either way, what is presupposed is that communities are and/or should be bounded. I will argue that the arguments in favour of political boundedness do not hold up to scrutiny, least of all in the form of territorial borders. This will lead me to a discussion on the precedence of the graphic gesture of drawing the line, and hence on the violence of boundary-making.

Keywords: Boundaries, space, nation, state, cartography, line

Borders are frontier lines which demarcate two nation states. As such, they rely on two main premises: that political communities are and should be bounded, and that this boundedness requires a manifest and visible delineation on the ground. It means in effect that the form of the modern nation-state has been seen as the ideal solution to the political problem of boundedness: linearly demarcated territories, which express and make visible a political reality, that of national communities which want or need to separate. In other words, the issue of boundaries is inseparably political

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and spatial, but it is viewed as spatial only as a consequence of the political: we tend to view boundaries as a necessary consequence, a subsequent corollary, of the need for political boundedness.

I will argue that it all actually happened the other way around: we decided on a spatial demarcation, then invented the political arguments that were required to shore it up. What mattered was to create lines; *ex post*, we then made something - a people, a *demos*, a nation - out of what or who was inside. My point is not just historical (the boundaries came first, then the creation and elevation of the nation). What was at stake, fundamentally, was a changing theory of vision, a changing conception of space, which then led to a reconceptualization of the polity, and in turn, to the need for political separation. Political boundedness is, I hold, fundamentally a paralogism.

I will first show that the arguments for political boundedness are unconvincing; then how our concept of space, and the necessity of lines and boundaries came to shape and inform our concept of the political. I will then turn to the metaphysics which underpin this shift, which also explain why all arguments for either political boundedness or territorial rights ultimately leave us wanting.

The limitations of the arguments on enclosing the nation

The boundedness argument takes several forms. Its common thread, though, is to argue from the existence of a commonality in a community to the importance of preserving it through a boundary-making process; in other words, to defend the importance of enclosing, encasing the community in a political institutional framework. The causality here is from the nation to the state: a nation exists, therefore an isomorphic institutional frame is required to sustain it.

The main argument posits that national boundaries are required to preserve the common good understood as a social and cultural good. This communal good, built over time, is usually understood as a form of national identity, including values, traditions, cultural practices, possibly a religion, and a common history. This is naturally at the heart of the communitarian argument; it posits a pre-existing common good, which informs and shapes individuals; such a common good is also often brought up in discussions

on immigration ethics, in order to attempt to found the right to exclude. The gist of the argument is that cultures and such common goods are best protected by an isomorphic political institution. Boundaries are essential to preserve the natural boundedness of communities, it is said.

However, such an isomorphism between nation and political institutions is disputable on several grounds:

First, it is based on an essentialist, substantialist conception of culture and the common good, which is not sustainable.[1] Cultural identity presents us with the paradox of Theseus, and is inherently unstable[2]: the idea of encasing it like a sausage goes against the very idea of a living culture. Secondly, why would the common good be a *national* good, requiring borders? Cultures thrive in many settings and spatial surroundings – think of regional, local, or urban cultures – none of which requires political separateness to be viable. There is no incompatibility between a political entity and the preservation, or even the protection, of several distinct cultures within it. In other words, the spatial and juridical coincidence of culture and polity is not warranted. As Lord Acton wrote in his 1862 piece on *Nationality:*

> The combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society. (…) Where political and national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance.[3]

Let us further note that the underlying (utilitarian) premise that such cultural identities should, as a matter of public obligation, be preserved is not entirely convincing. We are, as private individuals, interested in having a "cultural market" as diverse as possible, on aesthetic and personally educational grounds; there is undeniably a private interest in maintaining various common cultural goods; but does public reason sustain such a position? Is there a public *obligation* to uphold cultural diversity? Jeremy Waldron notes that there is something artificial about a commitment to

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[1] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, University of California at San Diego, 1994.

[2] Vincent Descombes, *Les Embarras de l'identité,* Paris : NRF, 2013.

[3] Lord Acton, "Nationality", *The Home and Foreign Review*, July 1862, reproduced in http://www.panarchy.org/acton/nationality.html.

preserve culture, which often translates into "tak[ing] a favoured 'snapshot' version of it, and insist[ing] that this version must persist at all costs, in its defined purity, irrespective of the surrounding social economic and political circumstances"[4]. Even if such a public obligation could be established, the problem would remain of *which* cultures deserve protection, thereby implying a possible – and very problematic – hierarchy. This is the path chosen by e.g. Martin Buber, who deems nations with "unjustified and meaningless" existences to be doomed to wither away[5]: the mere continuity of a community does not in and of itself qualify it for continued existence – said culture further needs to exhibit some higher moral or political purpose. Although Martin Buber's version seems brutal to contemporary eyes in its unequivocal hierarchisation of nations and peoples, it is however, conceptually, not far from what contemporary authors such as Will Kymlicka, Avishai Margalit or Joseph Raz do when they need to choose which groups are entitled to collective rights.[6]

This allows us to draw the important temporary conclusion that *even if* we can rationally show that cultural pluralism is an important political good, the political organisation required to protect it is not necessarily that of a bounded polity; there is no direct isomorphism between nation and state. So, the first, cultural or communitarian argument for boundedness is insufficient to prove the necessity of boundary-making processes.

The second series of arguments rests on an individualistic premise: political boundedness is good for the individual. The national community becomes the main locus of self-fulfilment. Yael Tamir expresses it forcefully in *Liberal Nationalism* – national culture is supposedly such a source of personal realisation and fulfilment that it even allows us to "lessen the solitude and alienation characteristic of modern life".[7] The importance of the nation and its culture for human flourishing is frequently emphasised.

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[4] Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative", in *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform*, Vol. 25, 1992, p. 755.

[5] Martin Buber, *Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis,* New York: Schocken, 1963, p. 221.

[6] See Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship – A Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, p. 11, and Avishai Margalit, Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination" in Thom Brooks (ed.), *The Global Justice Reader*, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, p. 80.

[7] Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 85-86.

Kymlicka's notion of "societal culture" is paradigmatic. He defines it as the culture which "*provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities*, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres".[8] Similarly, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz's "encompassing groups" tend to shape "to a large degree [the individuals'] tastes and opportunities, and (…) provide an anchor for their self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging".[9] Now, according to these thinkers, belonging to such a group understood as culturally distinct, geographically concentrated, institutionally complete is the fundamental anchor point in the process of individual self-identification, and it is fundamental in the way we construct our personal identity. As such, it constitutes, in Kymlicka, Margalit and Raz's discussion, the normative basis for deciding which cultures should be allocated collective rights, and in particular, the right of self-government.

The problem with this argument is manifold. First of all, the overly vague assessment that national life gives you an anchor point for your self-fulfilment would need much precision to be convincing, besides the fact that it is empirically disputable, as well as historically constructed; such a broad statement does not either explain why this particular national culture would be more decisive for an individual's identity, rather than any other dimension. Further, unless you revert to the first argument on the common good, this is still not enough to make the case for political separation. This line of argumentation seems singularly weak.

The third line of arguments in favour of boundedness is of a political nature, and appears at first sight more difficult to object to. Here, boundedness is held to be good for political reasons.

It is firstly stated that the exercise of citizenship requires a "we-feeling", a collective identity, a *subjective* foundation for solidarity. Citizenship means accepting certain sacrifices, in particular through income taxation or, more radically, in warfare, in order to allow others to live well; such sacrifice must be based on a minimum of identification with fellow citizens,

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[8] Will Kymlicka, *op. cit.*, p. 76. Emphasis added.
[9] Avishai Margalit, Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination", in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 87, n° 9, Sept. 1990, p. 448.

and what better identification could we find than the one based on the cultural group we already form, a group which already shares common practices, language, religion, history? The problem here is manifold, including the vague psychological assumptions about subjective identification which are not tested, just posited; but suffice it to say that the "we-feeling" is always historically and socially constructed. If an identification to my fellow-citizens is required, then a cosmopolitan would e.g. argue that we should construct an all-encompassing we-feeling. There is nothing incoherent about it, and the warm, fuzzy "we-feeling" is insufficient to make the case for boundaries.

The second political argument is the recognition argument, which states that a political group necessitates an external other to define itself; a "we" requires a "they" from which it differentiates itself, without which it cannot assert its own identity. At its extreme point, this identity-from-difference position takes an agonistic turn, as is e.g. the case with Carl Schmitt's openly confrontational definition of the political: he defines it as the designation of an enemy;[10] there is no polity without the friend/foe distinction. Without going as far as Schmitt's *agon* as the fundamental condition of politics, the idea that a group requires an external other to exist has become a *lieu commun* which many deem to not even require justification.[11]

It often appears as a collective version of Hegel's dialectic of recognition, according to which a subject requires the recognition of another subject in order to fully become a subject: my own self-perception of being a free consciousness and a subject needs an objective certification and validation through the acknowledgment by another consciousness. Charles Taylor bases his own "politics of recognition" on Hegel's (as well as Rousseau's) analysis,

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[10] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, transl. George Schwab, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996, p. 26.

[11] E.g. Michael Walzer, "The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem", in *Dissent*, n° 39, Spring 1992, pp. 164-71; Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London: Verso, 1993; C. Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso, 2000; Dominique Schnapper, *La Communauté des citoyens: Sur l'idée moderne de nation*, Paris: Gallimard, 1993; David Miller, "In What Sense Must Socialism Be Communitarian?", *Social Philosophy & Policy*, n°6, Spring 1999, pp. 51-73.

in order to establish the "close connection between identity and recognition", be it for individuals or for communities.[12]

But while the case for the demand for recognition makes sense in the case of the formation of the individual self, it is much more problematic to extend it to communities, the identities of which are not constructed in the same manner as individual identity: in spite of the oft-noted isomorphism between the self and the nation-state (and because of it), collective identity is not structured and formed on the same basis as the individual self; neither does it require the same elements of differentiation. In particular, as Vincent Descombes suggests in his *Embarras de l'identité*, collective identity requires for the group to represent itself as the subject and maker of its history; this in turn supposes two conditions: a diachronic identity, and a consciousness of itself as a group (the subjective representation of the collective unity, as Benedict Anderson's imagined community).[13] Now these two conditions may be met through internal and/or temporal differentiation: they do not intrinsically require the encounter with an external other, i.e. a group outside the group itself. In other words, the subjective representation of the group *qua* group and its diachronicity, while they may require differentiation and dialogical conditions (in Taylor's terms), do not require an exterior alterity; the recognition may happen within the group itself, through other members of the same community. Similarly, the differentiation could happen in contradistinction with a previous era of its own collective life (typically, contemporary Germany defining itself in contrast, or rather in opposition, to its Nazi past).

As Arash Abizadeh shows, the "arguments in defence of the particularist thesis (that only communities with an external other can be the basis for identity) suffer from a fallacy of composition".[14]

Hence, *even* if we were to grant the requirement of differentiation for the formation of the collective self (which we might not have to, mind: a group does not necessarily need to define itself by exclusive terms, but can

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[12] Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 32-53.

[13] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 2006.

[14] Arash Abizadeh, "Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity", in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 99, n°1, Feb. 2005, p. 48.

possibly do so by inclusive ones), there is not much of a rational case for the need of another, external and different group, for the constitution of a collective self.

A stronger argument seems to stem from the requirements of the polity. Democracy needs a limited people to be meaningful; it means ruling, and being ruled by, equals, who have equal status and rights; it requires to "produce the people", in Balibar's terms.[15] National partition is required by democratic theory itself, as can be seen in Rousseau's theory, e.g. The argument here is that of national partition on the basis of the exigencies of *citizenship.*

In this version there is no predetermined people: the determination of the people hinges solely on a (democratic) procedure which operates as principle of legitimacy. The problem here becomes how to determine, through a fair procedure, who will be a member and who will be excluded. This was e.g. the idea behind the French version of the social contract, as expressed among others by Renan or Sieyès. In Renan's famous words, a nation is "reiterated in the present by a tangible fact: consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is (…) a daily plebiscite".[16] The people is constituted by those who express and reiterate their common will to live together: the essence of a nation is the social contract, i.e. the free and willing adhesion to the principles of the Republic. Such participatory version of citizenship is thus "particularizing and exclusionary".[17] In other words, it is the common rational will, and the history of common participation to political institutions, which procedurally constitutes the essence of the nation. Over time, this common will and political cooperation "thicken" into a national culture. Political cooperation gels into a sense of common nationhood and cultural identity. The state

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[15] Etienne Balibar, "The Nation-Form: History and Ideology" in *Race, Nation, Class – Ambiguous identities*, London: Verso, 2011, pp. 93-94.

[16] Ernest Renan, *What is a Nation?*, text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, transl. Ethan Rundell, Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1992, p. 10.

[17] Jean L. Cohen "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", *International Sociology*, vol. 14 (3), September 1999, p. 249. Citizenship used to be understood as requiring a unique set of capacities. In the classical ideal, the citizen had to be male, propertied, the head of a household and able and willing to take up arms. See John G. A. Pocock, "The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times", in *Queen's Quarterly*, 99/1, 1992, pp. 33–55.

becomes the nation,[18] instead of the nation giving rise to the state. What matters here is that the exclusiveness of the *demos* does not depend on the liberality of the rules of access to citizenship: it is inherent to the concept of citizenship.

But stating that the nation or the people is brought about by the state does not solve the normative problem of membership: how do we decide which individuals are legitimate (and long-standing enough) participants in political cooperation to belong to the "people"? How long must one cooperate in the political institutions to be considered a member? And what gives one right to cooperate? The problems of nationality laws are well known. Who exactly is part of the people? The rules of membership should be decided by the participating members; but who decides the criteria for selecting the participating members? How do states decide their boundaries? Who is a member? More importantly, "who questions, who decides, who justifies and who defines who 'Who' is?"[19] The question is not just a first order issue (who is member of the group?) , but also a second order question (who decides who is member?). There is no satisfactory definition of membership or belonging to a group or a culture; no set or cluster of criteria can be satisfactorily established that could decide who is or not a member. If democracy is the political theory according to which a justification is owed to *all* those over whom power is exercised, then the justification is owed to non-members as much as it is to members.[20] In other words, the democratic group cannot simply wash its hands of the foreigners it unilaterally excludes, because that very exclusion is a form of power and coercion which requires a justification.

So, the argument that we need political separation in order to found democracy hits two fundamental obstacles in the form of the impossible justification of *i)* its rules of access to membership and *ii)* its unilateral exclusion of non-members to whom a justification is *also* owed.

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[18] This incidentally naturally undermines the traditional distinction between the "civic" and "ethnic" definitions of a nation.

[19] Ulrich Beck, "The Cosmopolitan State: Redefining Power in the Global Age", *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 3/4, The New Sociological Imagination, Spring - Summer 2005, p. 144.

[20] Arash Abizadeh, "Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders", *Political Theory*, Vol. 36, n°1, Feb. 2008, p. 41.

In other words, the notion of reverse causality (from the state to the nation) produces an exclusion which is no easier to justify than the idea of an original givenness of peoples. The membership question thus raises a second-order membership question, leading to an infinite regress, which can only be solved by a *fiat*, an unjustified and arbitrary decision. The state might create a people, but it remains as fuzzy and undefinable as the original, nationalist account: the arbitrariness of the people might be a product of political history, rather than its origin; but it is arbitrary nonetheless. This is the invention of a "fictive ethnicity", in the terms of Etienne Balibar: no nation is ethnic, but as a people slowly gets nationalised, it is represented *as if* it formed a natural community, with an identity of origins, history and culture.[21]

We end up with the same problem of the givenness of the community – the very givenness which the democratic theory fundamentally wanted to avoid, by justifying its existence and norms to its members. What remains fundamentally problematic from the point of view of democratic theory is the internal incoherence of its very justification for boundedness. It claims to require finitude in order to exist, but the problem is that it can never fully justify the exact terms of this finitude.

A philosopher like Vincent Descombes tries to solve the problem by shifting from the normative to the empirical: he acknowledges that the membership issue cannot be solved normatively; but, he says, this is where the lived, historical community plays its part: "How can we evade the problem of circularity? In order to solve it, we need to *humanise* our description of the foundation, i.e. introduce the dimension of anthropological time (…). Instead of a mythical representation of the foundation of our community in a prodigious inaugural self-position *[autoposition]*, we are better off using the paradigm [of] the innumerable usages which constitute culture".[22] Alas, far from solving the problem, Descombes only further confirms the intractable arbitrariness of the determination of the *demos*: because only someone who is *already a member* can resort to the continuity of generations, of culture, on anthropological time; the issue, in its political and legal dimensions is by no way answered. This specific problem is highlighted in the conundrum of nationality laws, who always oscillate between *Jus Soli*

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[21] Etienne Balibar, *op.cit.* p. 96.
[22] Vincent Descombes, *op.cit.,* pp.115-116. Emphasis original.

and *Jus Sanguini*, is symptomatic thereof. Normative problems cannot be solved by diverting to the empirical data – that's the exact reason why they are normative. In other words, a polity based on principles of the right, or justice, cannot justify its separation without resorting to a conception of the good.

Political separation hits a wall of unjustifiability, from whatever angle we look at it.

The Spatial Premises of Political Boundedness

The intractable problem of political boundedness is clearly manifested by Descombes's statement of the circularity problem. I argue that if you turn things around, things make more sense: i.e. what came first was a metaphysical decision to create boundaries, and only *then* justify whatever was inside. Boundaries came before national communities – and creating boundaries means essentially drawing them on a map. I hold that the graphic gesture of drawing came before the concept of a national, bounded polity, and more importantly, conceptually enabled it.

Political modernity indeed seems to be about tracing boundary lines: think of the Vienna Congress in 1885, East and West Timor in 1914, Sykes and Picot in 1916, Yalta in 1945, Radcliffe's partition of South Asia in 1947; the separation of the two Koreas in the 1940s and the two Vietnams in the 1950s; way earlier, think of the line of Tordesillas treaty, in 1493, the most magical of all lines. Boundaries are remarkably potent: by the stroke of a pen, sovereignties are determined, populations are divided, nationalities are decided, properties are defined, political realities are created, and legal norms, established.

Such spatial delimitations are made possible only because of the existence of maps: without a map, you cannot see your territory, and certainly cannot divide it. The modern notion of the territory, and hence of the boundary, came to the fore with modern cartography, and is a direct consequence thereof. Cartography established the spatial reality of the national territory, and in effect *created* the territory as a single, unified space.

The conjunction between cartography and the emergence of modern State is well known. Jean Baudrillard famously noted that the map "precedes

the territory (...). It is the map that engenders the territory".[23] Cartography is a way of producing knowledge, but just as much, a way of producing political and social realities, and a tool to command space. While pre-modern political entities consisted of multiple overlapping social, religious and political affiliative and relational spaces, the modern notion of sovereignty is eminently spatial: you rule over a territory, and only via the territory, over the people in or on it. Territory is a spatial concept, and a fundamentally visual one. And the new cartographic advances of the 16th and 17th centuries allowed just that: they embodied and enabled the synoptic view of the newly formed State, as well as its rational, impersonal and uniform rule; the sovereign eye could be conceived of only when the territory became visible as a whole – on a map. Space became an autonomous entity to be ruled, possessed, conquered, in its own right – and importantly, independently of its inhabitants. The close affinity between cartography and political power works in several ways: while maps enhance and legitimise political authority, they also, more subtly, create the conditions of possibility of new political identities, as well as social and political practices. Maps empower: the newly acquired visibility of their territory allowed by cartography thus created new opportunities for agency, conquest, appropriation, and division[24]. Maps allowed rulers to seize control and assert authority over a surface area without reference to what or who was on the ground. The 18th century Cassini maps of France are to a certain extent paradigmatic of this two-way production power of maps, both representations and creators of powers. As the mapmakers progressively created the maps of the whole country through endless processes of triangulation, the rulers solidified and modified their rule over a land now made both homogeneous within the borders and heterogeneous to what was outside it. Maps recorded, magnified and enhanced political power by allowing it to be displayed under one single gaze: power could be reified and carry ontological weight, at an age where, as Walter Ong noted, knowledge shifted from being conceived in terms of discourse of hearing and persons, to one "where it is conceived of in terms of observation and sight

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[23] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, transl. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman, New York: Semiotext, 1983, p. 2.

[24] On this issue, see, among others, Jeppe Strandsbjerg, "The Cartographic Production of Territorial Space: Mapping and State Formation in Early Modern Denmark", in *Geopolitics* 13(2), 2008, pp. 335–58 and Jordan Branch, *The Cartographic State*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

and objects".[25] This newfound unity and autonomy of political spatiality also gave it a sudden instantaneity: thanks to the map, the territory could be viewed *at a glance* Thanks to cartography, knowledge of the territory became a purely spatial affair, that could be calculated and deducted in some ministerial room or cartographer's cabinet in no time. In a Kantian way, maps were the condition of possibility of Nation-states as objects of incredibly and increasingly efficient political rule.

"The great man is a little man with a good map" says Bruno Latour cheekily.[26] In other words, the State became territorial in part thanks to cartography. Cartography profoundly modified the nature of boundaries, both in principle and in reality; here, the crucial element is the ability to draw lines: the concept of a delineated territory could naturally only emerge when a thin line could be drawn on paper.

This precedence of graphism and of the drawn line over the concept of the political has metaphysical reasons: it comes down to the changing conception of space which emerged in the Renaissance and was theorised by Descartes. From the closed world to the infinite universe: we went from an Aristotelian concept of space which worked as an aggregate of locations and places, with absolute situationality, to a space conceived as a *tabula rasa*, a flat, infinite expanse, abstract and isotropic in nature, it could then be geometrised, gridded, framed, shaped and drawn upon.

Two attributes are particularly important for us – because these are the two properties which will have direct bearing on the political covenant: space's unitotality and its divisibility. In other words, space is now an abstract, homogeneous extension, which allows for a new constructivism of the mind; in particular, space is all about dividing and cutting it out.

The possibility of cutting out precisely delineated objects also entails the discontinuity and exclusion between bodies. More than the common milieu of belonging, modern space is the very possibility of distinction and exclusivity: positing one-next-to-another. Space's divisibility may be seen as a consequence of extension: extension actually entails a *multiplicity* of extensions, situated next to, and excluding, each other. An extended being cannot but exclude all its neighbours: extension is exclusion. This is precisely what the modern state system is about.

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[25] Walter J. Ong, "System, Space, and Intellect in Renaissance Symbolism," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 18 (1956), p. 224.

[26] Bruno Latour, "Visualisation and cognition", in H. Kuklick (ed.), *Knowledge and Society Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present*, Jai Press, vol. 6, 1986, p. 19.

The new concept of space also meant a greater emphasis on the construction of space as opposed to the objects depicted within it, and hence presupposed a notion of space as an empty– or at least emptiable –, abstract and homogeneous container. This is exactly what we see in national territories: emptiable, sealable Tupperware boxes. In other words, the representation of boundaries preceded the construction of the modern Nation-state, and enabled it. Epistemology became a prerequisite of modern politics. Carl Schmitt, in his *Nomos of the Earth*, described this change as marked by a "global linear thinking"[27]: early modernity became dominated by creating, and drawing lines, as a means of establishing law and political bodies.

The boundary signalled a new manner of viewing the territory and appropriating it. The graphic invention of the boundary created the isomorphism typical of the nation-state: a multi-layered cake made of coextensive and superimposed layers of language, culture, law, nationality public goods, etc.

By enclosing the territory, the boundary has also enclosed all the other components of the nation: the notion of nation includes the possibility of closure of the group, of a clear delimitation of the members of the group and the criteria of belonging. And this is where the problem of political boundedness comes in: it is the result, not the origin, of the visibly enclosed territory on the map. The limits of the community are undefinable – but the illusion of a clear delimitation of the bounded community stems from this fictional belonging to the same territory, that fixed delineated surface area. Zygmunt Bauman writes:

> The search for an 'objective definition' [of a nation] obliquely legitimizes the nationalistic claims that it is the sharing of certain attributes that 'makes a nation', that integrates a certain number of people into a spatial and temporal unity, rather than exposing the fact that the 'commonality' itself (of land, of language, of tradition) is always an artefact of boundary drawing activity.[28]

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[27] Carl Schmitt, *Nomos of the Earth*, Transl. G.L. Ulmen, New York: Telos Press, 2003, p. 87.
[28] Zygmunt Baumann, "Soil, Blood, Identity", in *The Sociological Review*, 1992, p. 46.

It is the specific mode of spatialisation of the national community which explains the exclusionary characteristic of the *demos*. In other words, the problem of boundedness (the rules on membership) is inextricably linked to the boundary problem (the geographical drawing of lines). We view citizenship as membership in a community which occupies a bounded space on Earth, and, crucially, there is no space left unoccupied.

This precedence of drawn boundaries over and above any concern for the polity is particularly salient in an extraordinary piece of international legislation, the rule of *Uti Possidetis Juris*, which states in essence that boundaries as drawn on the map are eternal.

Uti Possidetis Juris first arose in Roman law as a means of maintaining the *status quo* of a situation of ownership. The principle was later embedded in international law as a means of consolidating the *de facto* situation following hostilities – in other words, it is a principle which endorses the foundational violence of states. The principle came to full force during the era of decolonisation in the 20th century: it stated that the borders of a newly independent colony should be the same as the administrative limits established prior to independence (it was implemented notably in Africa). It consecrated the continuance of boundaries, although these were widely acknowledged to be entirely artificial, drawn on a piece of paper, independently of the geographic, political, social and ethnic reality on the ground. The International Court of Justice specifies that no matter what the political and social situation is on the ground (i.e. regardless of any political boundedness issues), the boundaries should remain. What is particularly telling in the case of the African decolonisation is that *Uti Possidetis* could acquire such a fundamental operative power *precisely because* of the precariousness of the colonial boundaries in their geographic and historical context. The boundaries might not be legitimate by any criteria… but the mere fact of their existence is enough to give them the force of perpetual law. It operates as a divine fiat. The more illegitimate, the more powerful, so to speak. The International Court of Justice noted in the Libya/Chad case that: "A boundary established by treaty thus achieves a permanence which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy. The treaty can cease to be in force without in any way affecting the continuance of the boundary. In this instance the Parties have not exercised their option to terminate the Treaty,

but whether or not the option be exercised, the boundary remains (…) The establishment of this boundary is a fact which, from the outset, has had a legal life of its own.[29]

Conclusion

Whichever way we envisage it, boundaries remain normatively unjustifiable, "both absolutely compelling and hopelessly arbitrary",[30] always suspended to a pure factuality, and retrospectively legitimised by the institution of the Nation-state. When Walter Benjamin in his *Critique of Violence* shows that the rule of law and the institutional framework of the State always rests on a foundational, "law-establishing" violence, which only *ex post facto* acquires a legitimacy as concealed in the juridical,[31] we may now see this initial and original violence as the boundary-making territorialisation of the State. The foundational violence is nothing but the divine *fiat* of its spatialisation.

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[29] ICJ Reports, 1994, Parag. 73, p. 37.

[30] Richard Ford, "Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)", *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 97, n° 4, February 1999, pp. 850-851.

[31] W. Benjamin, "Critique of Violence", in *Selected Writings*, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996.

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NON-PLACES OF MEMORY: SPACE, MATERIALITY AND FALSE CEMETERIES

Łukasz Posłuszny[*]

Abstract

The article deals with the concept of non-place of memory (NPM).[1] Author defines NPM broadly as entity which once created by people lost its perceptive properties as man-made, but at the same time kept it material basis. In the narrower sense of the definition NPM are places of murder and bodies deposition sites which are either unrecognized as such or haven't been yet changed into places of memory. Analysis are based mostly on cases of Roma massacres in Poland which took place during II World War, and compared with history of burials and concept of cemetery. Transitions of NMP is then explained by using the Mary Douglas' concept of anomaly.

Keywords: Non-place of memory, place of memory, genocide, materiality, space

This is, to me, one of the great mysteries in Eastern Europe: it has been my repeated experience that things pertaining to the war are officially invisible. Even though the traces truly exist and are blatantly visible to anyone who would look, an illusion is created: as if, arriving at the gates of Auschwitz, one met people claiming that there were no traces of the camp left, and everyone believed them.[2]

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[2] Patrick Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest's Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 28.

Introduction

In the article I reflect on two closely related dimensions of non-places of memory that I consider crucial for grasping their very essence: materiality and spatiality. I use an approach related to the study of space inspired by humanistic geography and the cultural biography of things.[3] When exploring individual layers of non-places of memory, it is worthwhile to pay attention not only to material remnants (matterscape), but also to their socio-cultural dimension (socioscape).[4] The presented way of creating a conceptualization of a non-place of memory is embedded in my previous experience and research.[5] However, the basic empirical material is the data gathered during the research carried out in a project *Uncommemorated Genocide Sites*,[6] especially at the sites of Roma massacres in Poland (Bielcza, Borzęcin, Szczurowa i Żabno).

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[3] Igor Kopytoff, "The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process" in Arjun Appadurai (ed.), *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1986, pp. 64–91; Anne Kelly Knowles et al. (eds.), *Geographies of the Holocaust*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014; Łukasz Posłuszny, "Przestrzeń, miejsce i nie-miejsce w relacji do pamięci i nie-pamięci" in Zofia Budrewicz, Roma Sendyka, Ryszard Nycz (eds.), *Pamięć i Afekt*y, Warszawa: Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, 2014, pp. 309–321; Roma Sendyka, "Pryzma: zrozumieć nie-miejsce pamięci ('non-Lieux de Mémoire')", *Teksty Drugie*, no. 1/2, 2013, pp. 323–344.

[4] Jan Kolen, Johannes Renes, "Landscape biographies: key issues" in Jan Kolen, Johannes Renes, Rita Hermans (eds.), *Landscape Biographies: Geographical, Historical and Archaeological Perspectives on the Production and Transmission of Landscapes*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015, pp. 21–47; Arjun Appadurai, "Introduction. Commodities and the Poliltics of Value" in Arjun Appadurai (ed.), *The Social Life of Things. Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 3–63.

[5] Łukasz Posłuszny, Przestrzenne formy upamiętniania Zagłady, Kraków: Aureus, 2014; Joanna Posłuszna, Łukasz Posłuszny, "The Aural Landscape of Majdanek" in Wojciech Klimczyk, Agata Świerzowska (eds.), *Music and Genocide*, Berlin, New York, Oxford: Peter Lang Verlag, 2015, pp. 105–120; Łukasz Posłuszny, "Instytucje Totalne Dzisiaj: Stan Badań, Krytyka, Rekonfiguracje", *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 4, 2017, pp. 121–145; Łukasz Posłuszny, "Memory and Non-Places in a Cityscape. Synagogues and Parking Lots" in Beata Frydryczak, Alto Haapala, Mateusz Salwa (eds.), *Moving from Landscapes to Cityscapes and Back. Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Human Environments*, Łódź: Przypis, 2019; Łukasz Posłuszny, "Przestrzenno-materialny krajobraz obozu koncentracyjnego", *Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej*, no. 1, 2020, pp. 120–142.

[6] Uncommemorated Genocide Sites and Their Impact on Collective Memory, Cultural Identity, Ethical Attitudes and Intercultural Relations in Contemporary Poland (Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the National Programme for the Development of Humanities)

For this reason, I created a database consisting of partial reports created during research grant and external studies,[7] which I coded in the MAXQDA[8] software. I present here only a part of this study, which I considered the most important for my theses. In the article there will be no conceptualizations of structural links between non-places of memory and cemeteries, places of worship, houses, stores, etc. This relationship is undeniable,[9] and I intend to describe it in a separate, more holistic text on the concept of non-places of memory.[10]

In the meantime, I propose to highlight two variants of the definition. In the broadest sense, I call a non-place of memory a type of place, which - once created or marked by people - lost its perceptive properties as man-made, became ahistorical, natural, metaphorically or literally "invisible", although it still has a real, material basis (eg. foundations, body remnants, marks on wall or ground, changes in soil structure etc.). As Patrick Desbois emphasizes in the quoted incipit, there are many traces that remain invisible, although they sometimes become an element of social memory, a vernacular topographical compass that orientates inhabitants in space and

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[7] Patrick Desbois, *op.cit.*; Marta Zawodna, *Martwe ciało w kulturze zachodniej. Sposoby postępowania ze szczątkami ofiar zagłady na terenach KL Auschwitz-Nirkenau i KL Kulmhof w okresie powojennym*, Poznań: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 2013; Caroline Sturdy Colls, *Holocaust Archaeologies: Approaches and Future Directions*, Cham: Springer, 2016.

[8] MAXQDA is a software designed for computer-aided qualitative and mixed data analysis, text and multimedia, and is widely used in sociological research. The codes I used are: human remains (with subcodes: management, exhumation, cemetery, mass grave, hiding), space (hiding place, house/shop/synagogue, mobility, ghetto, killing site, camp, scented landscape, soundscape, orientation), materiality (animals, contamination, movables, ground/surface/facture, vegetation, looting, property, corpses, intermediaries, material witness), memory (oblivion, site of memory, prayer, commemoration, spontaneity).

[9] Jan Grabowski, Dariusz Libionka (eds.), *Klucze i kasa: O mieniu żydowskim w Polsce pod okupacją niemiecką i we wczesnych latach powojennych 1939-1950*, Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2014; Andrzej Leder, *Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenie z logiki historycznej*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2014.

[10] I believe that the concept of non-places of memory should be considered in a broader sense than in the presented article, pointing not only to the specificity of the execution and the lack of commemoration, but also to the spatial and material relations with the surroundings of the victims. Their "invisibility" is shocking, and therefore the issues of appropriation should be included in the analysis and conceptualization of non-memorial sites.

history, such as the traces left in the language - in the areas studied. For example, the term Cygańskie Górki (Gypsy Hillock) is the local name of the mass graves of Roma in the forest near Borzęcin village, while the name of its hamlet, Czarnawa (something which is getting black), takes its name from the "blackening" bodies of peasants who died during the Swedish invasion in 1655 and who were forbidden to bury. We might say, after Michel Foucault, that the "invisibility" of non-places of memory understood in the spirit of heterotopia is a certain illusion that enables the creation of a utopian order.[11] Such non-places of memory would be, in a broad context, "after" spaces, e.g. cemeteries, houses, shops, factories and synagogues, appropriated and often destroyed or adapted after being left by legitimate owners like Jews or Roma. I would also consider places once created "by" them through slave labor,[12] mainly modern infrastructure like railways, roads, water systems which are overlooked as non-places,[13] innocent means to the ends;[14] in the narrower sense of the definition – which is the subject of this article and research project – non-places of memory are places of murder and bodies deposition sites which are either unrecognized as such or haven't been yet changed into places of memory[15] and are therefore under transition.

The article begins with a reflection on the relationship between a non-place of memory and a cemetery. I use the term "false cemetery", which emphasizes their mutual closeness, but also a signaled difference. Then, starting from the difficulties in locating non-places of memory, I pay attention to their origins related to spatial dispersion. Remedial and

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[11] Michiel Dehaene and Lieven de Cauter, *Heterotopia and the City : Public Space in a Postcivil Society*, London, New York: Routledge, 2008.

[12] James A. Tyner, "Dead Labor, Landscapes, and Mass Graves: Administrative Violence during the Cambodian Genocide," *Geoforum,* 52 (2014): 70–77, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.12.011.

[13] Marc. Augé, *Non-Places: An Introduction to Supermodernity*, London: Verso, 2008.

[14] For theoretical development of the broader definition look at my article about parking lots and synagogues Łukasz Posłuszny, "Memory and Non-Places in a Cityscape. Synagogues and Parking Lots" in Beata Frydryczak, Alto Haapala, Mateusz Salwa (eds.), *Moving from Landscapes to Cityscapes and Back. Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Human Environments*, Łódź: Przypis, 2019.

[15] Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, vol. 1 Conflict, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

counteracting activities are those focused on gathering the remains and commemoration in a more precisely and spatially defined place of memory. The last part of the article introduces the concept of anomaly, which allows to partially explain the dynamics of changes or duration of non-places of memory.

Non-places of memory as "false cemeteries"

The study of the social and material dimension of a landscape can be complicated mainly because there are sometimes many overlapping places in one space, both diachronically and synchronically[16]. The fact that they most often occur in a blurred form, moving from non-places to places and vice versa, makes their recognition even more difficult[17]. However, there are types of places with a more pronounced existence and influence, which are significant and crucial to human experience - homes and cemeteries. The home is the first and most basic place in human life, being the center of a particular spatial system. Until recently, it was the place where people were born and died, and some cultures even used to bury the dead in the house, sharing physical and spiritual space with them. It is not without reason, therefore, that the essence of a place reveals itself most fully in the indigenous communities that are fiercely guarding their territory and holy places, seeing the traces of the past - the powers of ancestors or spirits - filling them up[18]. Accepting these anthropological diagnoses, and keeping the context of a secularized contemporary society, particular importance should be attached to cemeteries. They are, in fact, places as meaningful as homes (houses), their modern reverses, where the deceased "lives" after the earthly life, having personal and private space reserved for their own. The grave and the cemetery give back the legitimacy to the living, certifying their

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[16] Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018; Tim. Dant, *Material Culture in the Social World : Values, Activities, Lifestyles*, Buckingham: Open Univ. Press, 2008.

[17] Joe Moran, *Reading the Everyday*, London; New York: Routledge, 2005; Magdalena Bartnik, "„Przestrzenie przepływów" i „przestrzenie niczyje" w hipernowoczesności. Nowe ujęcie przestrzeni według Marca Augé i Manuela Castellsa," in Maciej Gdula, Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska, and Renata Włoch (eds.), *Nowe rzeczywistosci spoleczne, nowe teorie socjologiczne: dyskusje i interpretacje*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2012.

[18] Marc Augé, *op.cit.*

rights, presence and belonging[19], which is another link between the cemetery and home.

Pointing out this relation is important for three reasons. First, many executions, for example at Szczurowa and Żabno, took place at the cemetery. Secondly, even if this was not the case, after the war there were attempts to exhume the corpses and move them to the cemeteries or, if this was not possible for religious reasons, to create a kind of cemetery commemoration at the execution site (eg. installing tombstone as commemoration). Thirdly, the survivors, community members and historians often compare a non-places of memory to cemeteries (concentration and extermination camps, execution sites and mass burials).

Henryk Jerzy Szcześniewski speaks rhetorically in his testimony about Concentration Camp Majdanek (KL Lublin) as a Jewish cemetery[20]. Completely non-metaphorically, the KL Plaszow was established on the grounds of the cemeteries, and the matzevot left behind were used to pave roads on its grounds. The matzevot were also moved from the cemeteries and used as a building material, among others at Majdanek. The first film about the Shoah, made at Majdanek in 1944, is entitled "Majdanek: Cemetary of Europe". In the case of martyrdom museums, a description formula is sometimes used which states that it is something more than the former camp and museum: it is described as a memorial site and compared to a cemetery. A similar, although obviously not fully identical, semantic relationship exists with the non-places of memory produced by the Einsatzgruppen and their helpers – local communities talk of a "without-Kaddish" ("*bezkadiszowy*") burials, "second pits" ("*drugie doły*") and use other terms to emphasize abnormality of this sites. On the one hand, this testifies to their partial semantic relationship with the cemetery, and on the other hand, to their indirect, unfinished and liminal status, which distinguishes them from typical grave in cemetary.

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[19] Philippe Ariès, *The Hour of Our Death: The Classic History of Western Attitudes Toward Death over the Last One Thousand Years*, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).

[20] Wojciech Lenarczyk (ed.), *Majdanek w Dokumentach*, Lublin: Państwowe Muzeum na Majdanku, 2016.

The relationship of unmarked single and mass graves with the cemetery concerns also familiarization of space through adopted cultural practices – norms and mores regarding behavior in cemeteries, such as lighting a candle, laying a stone, praying, keeping silence and revering. An interesting example can be found in the activities of the *Pomost Association*, which carries out exhumations of German victims of the Second World War in western Poland. They work in cemeteries and in forests, on private properties and farmlands. These spaces could be defined as non-places of memory, since they usually completely unmarked, and if commemorated, often only temporarily. These are pits with material objects such as dog tags, weapons or clothes that allow us to tell more about the remains resting there. There are bystanders who know the location of the burials, sometimes they visit them, lay flowers, light candles, and pray[21].

Taking into account the above-mentioned elements, I believe that non-places of memory are intuitively approached by members of the local communities as quasi-cemeteries (hereinafter: false cemeteries), which, however, formally are not sacred spaces, but rather an intermediate form. For this reason, the historical description of the cemetery and the understanding of its significance seem crucial for determining the status of non-places of memory.

The importance of the cemetery as an institution is recalled by Philippe Ariès, who distinguished three periods of the development of the necropolis: antiquity, the Middle Ages (from the 5th century) and modernity (after the 18th century). In antiquity, the dead were buried *extra muros*, outside the city border, along roads such as via Appia in Rome, in family tombs, in private estates or in collective cemeteries under the management of associations. The basic rule was that all deceased were to be taken outside the city because death could have tainted its sanctity. In antiquity, a dead body, especially one marked by murder, was therefore considered unclean, defile and ominous, and its place was far from the living.

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[21] Maciej Frąckowiak, Kornelia Kajda, "Żyjemy w skażonych krajobrazach. Archeologia i przywracanie pamięci o przeszłych zbrodniach", *Biografia Archeologii*, no. 1, 2015, pp. 27–37.

Christianity has radically changed this norm. It was due to the aftermaths of the cult of relics, which allowed the storage and veneration of body fragments of saints or things with which they came into contact in their lives. Faith in their supernatural powers and resurrection made Christians want to be buried as close to their patrons as possible. Chapels and basilicas were built on the tombs of saints, which began to mark the center of the *ad sanctos* (next to the saint) cemetery. Religious inhabitants began to settle in the vicinity of the miraculous graves. The spatial transformations were accompanied by a social change in attitude towards death, the closeness of which for city dwellers has since become indifferent. The ancient experience of impurity and distance from the dead gave way to the Judeo-Christian sense of the sacred place where rests the body. The tombs became a destination for pilgrimages. In the 12th century, the *ad sanctos* principle was superseded by the *apud ecclesiam* formula, which considered the best resting place to be the area of influence of the sacred temple - the episcopal church, parish church or abbey. The burial space also reflected social stratification: the privileged ones were buried in churches, and the best of them near the presbytery or the chapel of Our Lady. The rest had to be content with the church cemetery.[22]

This trend continued until the 18th century, when scholars found a link between cemeteries, water contamination and epidemics, and burials became a public matter. The dead body turned threatening and dangerous again. The postulate of allocating an appropriate space for the dead was given legal form in France in the decree of June 12, 1804, which defined the approach to burial to modern times. It forbade funerals in churches, while in cities it ordered the dead to be buried at least 35 to 40 meters from the border of the metropolis[23]. I emphasize this fact, because it shaped the way of thinking about the space for a dead body to this day.

It is worth noting that in Europe, between the 5th and 18th centuries, the dead were also buried in mass and nameless graves. While the privileged of those times were buried individually and non-anonymously

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[22] Philippe Ariès, *The hour of our death: the classic history of western attitudes toward death over the last one thousand years*, New York: Vintage Books, 2008.
[23] *Ibidem.*

within churches, the poor were not even able to identify where the graves of their relatives were. The notion of a grave as a private space that is owned, inhabited and one has an individual right to it appear only in modernity. The grave then becomes more closely related to social relations in earthly life. The growing importance of burial is particularly evident among the rural community and the urban poor. Suffering deficiencies and humiliations in everyday life, they see in it an act of agency and freedom: "The possession of their death is «their right to escape someday from the grip of poverty and the injustices of life. » Death gives them back their dignity"[24]. What restores it, however, is not only the act of death, but most of all what accompanies it - burial rituals (religious or cultural) and commemoration (material), most often associated with the laying of the body to the grave in the space of a cemetery which is protected both by the sacred and by the law. The lack of these elements seems to be crucial for understanding the status of non-places of memory. Historically, non-places of memory are thus close to solitary graves of the damned, from the Middle Ages considered cursed, frightening or suggesting notoriety and violent death. Such places, where the bodies of the cursed were abandoned, were called "false cemeteries".[25] Their cultural closeness to non-places of memory is additionally emphasized by similar practices, e.g. using them as dumps, which should be read as a long-term structure.

To sum up, in antiquity the graves, as unclean and hostile, were located mainly outside the city. The system of their localization was scattered, varied and spatially more extensive than that used by later rites. Christianity made cemeteries concentrate in the sacred spaces established by the relics of saints and the power of temples. Paradoxically, however, cemeteries in the Middle Ages decreased and disappeared, blending topographically with the urban buildings. Ariès even suggested that Western civilization from the Middle Ages to the 17th century had become a civilization without cemeteries. The revolution took place in the 19th century, when vast and modern cemeteries appeared on the maps, inspired and organized in accordance with the principles of designing park landscapes.

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[24] *Ibidem*, p. 556.

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 43.

The growing size of cemeteries resulted from the belief that every man deserves their own grave. On the other hand, the spatial displacement of the necropolis to the periphery should be understood not only as a sanitary act, but also as an indicator of a change in attitude towards death – since then more distant, hidden, and handed over symbolically to appropriate institutions. Non-places of memory I have studied were also located on the outskirts of the town. This situation is well illustrated by the cases of Romani genocide sites, which I recall later in the article. On their basis, three spatial options for the creation of mass graves can be distinguished - "on the spot" (e.g. a pogrom death in/near the house, in a village), on the edge of a village (e.g. a cemetery) and beyond its borders (e.g. a forest, ravine).[26]

What makes single and mass burials within the cemetery a non-place of memory is the lack of a funeral ritual and commemoration (socio-cultural factors) with simultaneous presence of the body remains (material factor). For this reason, some burials in a cemetery should still be considered as a non-places of memory, despite the fact cemetery is a space neutralizing the negative charge of dead bodies. I am mentioning this because cemeteries were used as crime scenes by the Nazis from the very beginning,[27] also in Żabno, where the Jewish cemetery from March till April 1943 was used as a place of execution and burial of about fifty Jews[28]. The decision to choose a cemetery for a crime scene could be explained and justified in terms of sanitation. Such the explanation, however, is only partial for at least two reasons. First, the place of the murder is deliberately

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[26] Aleksandra Szczepan, Łukasz Posłuszny, "Bielcza i Borzęcin. Ustanawianie i uśmierzanie pamięci o romskiej Zagładzie" in Roma Sendyka et al. (eds.), *Nie-Miejsca Pamięci. Nekrotopografie*, Warszawa: Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, 2020.

[27] Caroline Sturdy Colls, *Holocaust Archaeologies: Approaches and Future Directions*, Cham: Springer, 2016. One can find more about cemeteries as killing sites by looking at research conducted by Caroline Sturdy Colls in a project „Recording Cultural Genocide and Killing Sites in Jewish Cemeteries, [www.recordingculturalgenocide.com/], 20 October 2020,

[28] Paweł Domański, *Żabno w Latach Okupacji Hitlerowskiej 1939–1945*, Żabno: [No Publishing House], 1997; Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, *Rejestr Miejsc i Faktów Zbrodni Popełnionych Przez Okupanta Hitlerowskiego na Ziemiach Polskich w Latach 1939-1945: Województwo Tarnowskie*, Warszawa: GKBZHwP, 1984.

unmarked, which I would interpret as a particularly effective concealment of the crime: bodies buried within a cemetery are never surprising and are not something "out of place". Secondly, as Caroline Sturdy Colls points out, the Nazis used cemeteries to mask mass pits as early as during Action T4.[29] Therefore, the practice pretending normatively appropriate handling of the body of the deceased should be considered as misleading and inscribed from the very beginning in the genocidal tradition. I encountered an interesting case in this respect at the Catholic cemeteries in Żabno and Szczurowa, where there were no recorded funeral rituals, markings or commemorations for Roma victims[30]. Moreover, the bodies were buried at the ends of the cemeteries, away from the rest of the "right" graves, as if separately and "hidden", which is a hint of a symbolic difference between one type of burial and the other within the same spatial frame and evokes an association with a lonely, damned grave, and the term "false cemetery" takes on a new shade of meaning.

Dispersion and concentration

A cemetery as a social institution allows for a better understanding of what a non-place of memory is and what scenarios of social activities are associated with it. Applying Kopytoff's biographical approach to space, it can be said very generally that the social life of the human body usually begins with birth at home or in a hospital and ends with death and burial in a cemetery. However, if we carefully examine this passage in relation to the victims of genocide and look only at its last stage, we will notice that it consists of several intermediate points that, in fact, make it difficult to ascribe one specific location for the dead body. Borzęcin case has shown for example that subsequent exhumations mean that in the last burial place, already in the cemetery, there is practically no trace of the bodies.

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[29] Caroline Sturdy Colls, *Holocaust Archaeologies: Approaches and Future Directions*, Cham: Springer, 2016.

[30] Aleksandra Szczepan, Łukasz Posłuszny, "Bielcza i Borzęcin. Ustanawianie i uśmierzanie pamięci o romskiej Zagładzie" in Roma Sendyka et al. (eds.), *Nie-Miejsca Pamięci. Nekrotopografie*, Warszawa: Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, 2020.

Archaeologists Erin Jessee and Mark Skinner created a typology of execution sites (ES), helpful for the study of non-places of memory. It begins with a distinction into two types of executions: those taking place (1) on the surface (SES - surface execution site) and (2) in a previously dug pit (GES - grave execution site).[31]

In the surface execution site (1), two variants are possible - primary deposition site (PDS) and temporary deposition site (TDS). If the bodies are to be buried elsewhere, they are gathered first and then moved, often by machinery, to another place where they can stay for weeks. This exposure influences the decomposition process, making it possible to find out, in the case of later exhumation, whether the corpses had already been deposited. Traces of clothes, personal belongings, blood and bone fragments may remain in the temporary deposition area. In the case of the primary site of corpse deposition (PDS), the scale of material evidence is larger and more spatially dispersed: the bodies have simply been abandoned here and their remains stay on the surface.

Grave execution site scenario (2) assumes burial, i.e. inhumation. Sometimes the natural layout of the terrain is used, but usually the burial pit takes the form of a cuboid, dug by hand or with the use of heavy machinery. The excavator bucket leaves traces in the ground different from the shovel and only careful archaeological work can distinguish these traces. Primary inhumation sites (PIS) are often the same as the place of execution. Then a different process of decomposition is observed and more complete sets of material evidence are found - not only fragments of bodies and soft tissue, but also objects and instruments of crime. However, as in the case of the TDS, the bodies can also be moved to another burial pit.

This takes me to the next phase described by Jessee and Skinner, i.e. moving or unearthing of the bodies and material evidence. They differentiate between secondary inhumation site (SIS) and its specific type related to the concealment of the crime - the looted inhumation site (LIS). In SIS, a remote place is selected and the remains are shifted there, along with

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[31] Erin Jessee, Mark Skinner, "A Typology of Mass Grave and Mass Grave-Related Sites", *Forensic Science International*, no. 1, 2005, pp. 55–59.

the soil, which in this context is important evidence of the crime. The LIS indicates instead destroying and hiding evidence of the crime, most often by burying the bodies in a secret location or, as was the case with action 1005, cremation, grinding and scattering them.

Summing up, the first stage of the dead body biography concerns the execution site, the act of death, which I call the place of the massacre, be it a house, a wall, a synagogue, a cemetery or a pit. It leaves a material evidence such as a cartridge, a bullet, a hole in the wall, blood or a nail in a tree used for hanging weapons, but it does not necessarily have to be a place where bodies are supposed to be buried. In the second stage, the corpses might be left in one place permanently or transported several times, before the next, third stage when they are buried. Later, victims' bodies could be exhumed by perpetrators who try to destroy or hide the evidence of a crime, by robbers or by services and other social actors who want to restore order by moving the body to the cemetery, providing it with an appropriate burial and commemoration.

The aforementioned distinctions make it clear that specific, material evidence such as bullet holes, cartridges, blood, tissue, bones or clothes left in subsequent locations where the corpses reside today prove that a non-place of memory can be understood as a complex spatial structure, a sum of discrete sites, sometimes significantly distant from each other. Jessee and Skinner's theory helps to understand why non-places of memory tend to be scattered and take the form of networks. This means that although material evidence of only one crime may be concentrated in several locations, even kilometers apart, there is still a connection between them - an imperceptible thread that can be called material memory.[32] Recognizing this makes it possible to assign successive material elements of the crime to the same network.

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[32] Anna Izabella Zalewska, "Pamięć miejsca naznaczonego Akcją 'Reinhardt'. Materialne pozostałości po SS-Sonderkommando Sobibor z perspektywy archeologa" in Stephan Lehnstaedt, Robert Traba (eds.), *Akcja "Reinhardt". Historia i Upamiętnianie*, Warszawa: Neriton, 2019.

The non-places of memory need not to be dispersed, even though the cited study of conflict archeologists suggests it is the most common scenario. It is so due to the described actions of the perpetrators, as well as bystanders - detectorists, who are exhuming bodies and extracting objects or even animals digging in the ground. Thus, not only limited perceptive qualities of non-places of memory, but also their spatial dispersion and material incompleteness explain why one is feeling so lost when trying to locate particular place.

The dispersion of non-place of memory raises also the practical problem related to commemoration. Where should it be placed, in which part of the network? The site of the massacre, the first, second or other inhumation? Or maybe in the place indirectly or not related to the crime scene at all? Moreover, if the cultural norm states that human life is socially closed by a funeral in a cemetery, then the scattering of the bodies or ashes creates many complications. Particularly for religious and practical reasons, this normative postulate cannot be fulfilled, e.g. in the case of Jewish victim, therefore often a non-place of memory is symbolically transformed into a kind of monument, temporary memorial, an example of which may be the commemoration performed by the Rabbinical Commission for Cemeteries in Radecznica. At Majdanek, the first commemoration was connected with collecting the ashes of the victims, making a mound of them and fencing it with a wall, which later turned into a Mausoleum.

Another issue is related to exhumation, which if possible, often becomes incomplete. The first problem stems from the difficulty of locating all the graves or recovering intact bodies and objects.[33] Moreover, a large number of corpses may contribute to the formation of the necrosol, a cemetery soil characterized by a disturbance of the original genetic system, the presence of mixed layers in the soil, the presence of artifacts and a significantly increased content of phosphorus[34]. Should, therefore, the exhumation also take care to transfer the closest material context of the body and to what extent is it possible? Despite the cultural order to bury

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[33] Erin Jessee, Mark Skinner, *op.cit*.

[34] Ewa Domańska, *Nekros. Wprowadzenie do ontologii martwego ciała*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2017.

and commemorate the dead, non-memorial sites often remain intact for decades.[35] Should, therefore, the exhumation also take care to transfer the closest material context of the body and to what extent is it possible? With the death of the last witnesses, they may fall into oblivion and, as such, never become incorporated into collective or cultural memory by subsequent generations. They can be temporarily commemorated in a symbolic, vernacular, and formally unnoticed way that is not public but rather on a small scale, family-like or locally restricted, which sets them apart from places of memory we know. They can become actively uncommemorated, that is, intentionally destroyed, littered with rubbish and distorted. Last but not least is to turn them into a place of memory, most often by installing a monument or plaque and by exhuming and moving the bodies to a cemetery. Even a completely forgotten non-place of memory can become visible by objects or remains pushed out by the ground or revealed during agricultural or construction work. The situation of "exposure" forces action. Sites that are uncommemorated or temporarily commemorated have a blurred transitional status, are non-institutionalized and precarious, therefore they have an equal chance of becoming a place of memory as well as of being forgotten.

The analysis of the network of places related to the extermination of the Roma allows us to examine the dynamics of the transformation of non-places of memory. The first scenario is represented by Szczurowa and Żabno, where the metamorphosis of non-places of memory into places of memory was the easiest, as mass graves were already located in the cemeteries. The second scenario shows the cases in Bielcza and Borzęcin, where there is a mediation stage related to exhumation and burial in cemetery. As a result, the locations of the crimes are not non-places of memory anymore, as their material basis is lost. Nevertheless, on both crime scenes there were temporary commemorations, i.e. birch crosses dug in the vicinity of earlier burial sites. However, in Bielcza the cross was removed, while in Borzęcin it was replaced with an officially approved monument. On the one hand, two strongly connected and mutually influencing places of memory were therefore created in Borzęcin – in the cemetery and in the

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[35] Martin Pollack, *Kontaminierte Landschaften*, St. Pölten, Salzburg, Wien: Residenz, 2014.

former execution site in the forest. On the other hand, in Bielcza, the execution site is tending to be forgotten, because it has not been commemorated materially nor ritually since birch cross removal.

Anomaly and crisis of order

The above-mentioned scenarios for the transformation of non-places of memory can be understood as a condition which occurs during restoration of the social structures. Military violence destabilizes and disturbs the social order inducing an anomy. One of the tangible, material effects of violating social norms are the dead bodies of genocidal massacres, but also deserted places of worship, public buildings, houses, furniture and objects,[36] or strayed animals.[37] In a situation where there are no legitimate owners who will surround their property with protection, the community faces a legal, technical and symbolic problem on a previously unprecedented scale. Animals, scattered and damaged things, empty houses, streets flooded with blood and the bodies lying on them are signs of a crisis that calls for restoration of order. As Mary Douglas states: "if uncleanness is matter out of place, we must approach it through order. Uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be included if a pattern is to be maintained."[38] Restoring order consists of a whole spectrum of activities. In understanding the dynamics of transformations of non-places of memory, it may be helpful to think about them in the category of anomaly proposed by Douglas, i.e. entity which does not fit into the categories of the adopted cultural pattern or is difficult to assign.

Douglas notes that each culture has its own recommendations for neutralizing anomalies. First, an anomaly can be reclassified and ambiguity reduced by settling one or other interpretation. Second, the anomalies can

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[36] About the objects look at: Łukasz Posłuszny, "Materialny Świadek, czyli co mówi pasiak obozowy" in Katarzyna Grzybowska, Sylwia Papier, Roma Sendyka (eds.), *Rzeczowy Świadek*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2019, pp. 249–70;

[37] Patrick Desbois, who is mentioned in the article's incipit, recalls the story of the animals wandering around, and a cow that howls in pain the day after the massacre, because the killed owner did not manage to milk her; Patrick Desbois, *op.cit.*

[38] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, London, New York: Routledge, 1984, p. 41.

be physically controlled. Third, anomalies can be avoided: "a rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms and strengthens the definitions to which they do not conform."[39] Fourth, anomalies can be labeled dangerous, induce anxiety when confronting them and therefore trying to move them away. Fifthly, anomalies can be used in rituals to enrich meanings and redirect attention to other dimensions of existence.

Thus, anomalies can be redefined, physically controlled, avoided, moved away (labelled dangerous) and sacralized. How would this flexibility affect the understanding of non-places of memory as anomalies? An example of applying the first strategy of action against anomalies is Jedwabne massacre, where the way to deal with the place of mass grave was uncommemoration, which distorted the information on the memorial plaque and blamed the Germans soldiers instead of Polish citizens. The second way to deal with the tensions around the anomaly of a non-place of memory is destruction of evidence, e.g. demolition of a synagogue, devastation of a cemetery, burning things and bodies, leveling the ground and afforestation of the vicinity of mass graves as in death camps in Chełmno or Sobibór. The third strategy is to avoid the disturbing object by going around it, trying not to disturb it, creating information of prohibitions and submitting to it. The fourth method would characterize labelling location dangerous or moving it symbolically away from the areas used by a given community by letting it to be overgrowth with plants, bushes and trees, marking the area with rubbish and creating unofficial dump there. The last strategy would be sanctified inclusion, i.e. commemorating events through temporary and permanent forms and transferring remains and objects to "their" normatively prescribed spaces, e.g. to cemetery, museums or family members. The first two actions are characterized as exclusion, the next two as active avoidance, and the last as inclusion. Similarly, I analyze the social attitude towards non-places of memory. Here, too, one can indicate at least three analogous actions: oblivion which is exclusion through denial or destruction, uncommemoration which is related to active avoiding or stigmatizing, and commemoration which is inclusion through sacralization, erecting monuments and installing

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[39] Mary Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

plaques. Oblivion and commemoration are opposites of each other, while uncommemoration is a neither-nor category, i.e. it keeps in existence an ideal non-place of memory, because it does not destroy it, but also does not allow to transform it into place of memory by commemorating it.

Conclusions

A non-place of memory is not a subjective construct, but has a real material foundation, which nevertheless escapes attention in everyday experience. The material scenery of a non-place of memory is defined by two organizational frames. The first concerns the foundation event and the establishment of the crime scene (body remains, instruments of violence such as weapons and cartrigdes, or changes in the landscape), which emphasize the starting point in the biography of space marked by event. The second frame is defined by human and non-human factors that generate commemorations and uncommemorations such as social rituals, monuments, destruction or plants overgrowth. Due to the nature of the activities of perpetrators, the formation of a non-place of memory extends in space and time, which makes one think of its nature as dispersed and point-like, although creating one network. Socially and culturally, a non-place of memory is an intermediate, liminal form that becomes an anomaly that disturbs the order and requires actions. Usually, the local community is the first to react, using different strategies to deal with the anomaly, which is undoubtedly influenced by the broader political context and local, particular interests. The cultural biography of non-place of memory indicates that the first responses are temporary commemorations (creating vernacular proto-monuments, installing crosses and signs, lighting candles, saying prayers) or uncommemorations (destroying a site, littering it, moving away by covering or producing entry bans). Both types of practices influence and constitute the identity of the community and the group. The change in attitude to non-place of memory is both endogenous and exogenous. The local community may itself lead to an official, public commemoration, or to cover up any traces of troublesome events. The same actions may result from external political will. In other words, there are three possible scenarios for the development of non-place of memory:

oblivion (destruction, distortion), unofficial precarious temporariness at the local level (either commemorating or uncommemorating it) and official, permanent commemoration at public level.

It is also important to find out what happens when the third scenario is selected. The social norm states that a cemetery is a place for a dead body. This is why the exhumation and transfer of the remains is a practice that neutralizes the anomaly and affectivity of a non-place of memory. The whole process is ritualized and follows the social norms, thus the transfer is accompanied by commemoration, which is a social closure restoring order and changing it into a place of memory.[40] Commemoration can also be created at the site of a previous burial, which is a way of dealing with the affectivity that is still felt. It should therefore be specified that the most desirable scenario for a non-place of memory seems commemoration through exhumation and normatively appropriate burial in a cemetery or/and erecting a monument at the execution site, which changes it into a place of memory.

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[40] Antonina Ostrowska, *Śmierć w doświadczeniu jednostki i społeczeństwa*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, 2005, p. 61.

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LANGUAGE AND PUBLICS IN A GLOBAL DIGITAL WORLD. WHAT IS LINGUISTIC CITIZENSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

Britta Schneider*

Abstract

In this article, I discuss language from a linguistic anthropological perspective, where the existence of standardised languages is understood as an outcome of socio-political discourses in the age of nationalism, in which the technologies of print literacy enabled national public spaces – and with it, national language standards – to emerge. What happens to language standards and public spaces in the era of digital technologies and transnational interaction? I introduce some examples and develop ideas on language policing in settings where monolingual national ideals exist besides other emerging linguistic authorities.

Keywords: languages, nationalism, public spaces, standardization, late modernity

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Introduction

Language plays a central role in imaginations of European citizenship, and most states have developed language policies designed to make heterogenous populations conform to monolingual, national ideals. In linguistic anthropology, it has been argued that, historically, the emergence of national standard language is in a dialectal relationship to the emergence of national public space. In national publics 'voices from nowhere' are formed, whose hegemonic position renders their language practices to appear unmarked and neutral.[1] In this sense, the construction of public authority and the construction of linguistic norms are intrinsically related to each other. At the same time, as a technical medium is required to distribute the ideas of standard language and national publics, both are inconceivable without the technologies of the printing press and mass literacy.

The concept of monolingual national publics has to be scrutinized in contemporary society. Beyond the observation that societies have always been multilingual and will become increasingly so in the future, it is important to study the reconfigurations of national language orders where print literacy is replaced by digital communication. What are the effects of this on the relationship of language, public space and citizenship? In this article, I give various examples of language practices that hint at a reconfiguration of linguistic orders, and with it, public spaces. The observations indicate that we are confronted with simultaneous developments of destabilization and reification of traditional language norms. On the one hand, there is an increase of multilingual practices and an apparent destabilization of formal written language in online settings. At the same time, English is dominant on various levels, from transnational lingua franca uses to being an index of education and class belonging. In addition, through the inscription of English as unmarked language in digital culture – in programming and as training tool for AI controlled language tools (from translation to Alexa) – we may ask whether English is on its way of becoming a 'voice from nowhere' in transnational digital publics.

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[1] Susan Gal and Kathryn A. Woolard, *Languages and Publics: The Making of Authority*, Manchester: St. Jerome, 2001.

On the basis of these observations, questions to be discussed are: What are European responses to the dominance of English and to linguistic complexity that is beyond multilingualism as ordered additive monolingualisms? Can or should we nationally or supra-nationally regulate the reifications and new patterns of dominance that develop through programming, digital platforms and AI tools? What is linguistik citizenship in the 21st century?

In the first part, I introduce the idea of 'languages' as discursive constructs, based on insights from contemporary linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics. Secondly, I focus on the construction of language as it has been typical for modern nation-state societies, that is, a concept of language as 'naturally' based in national communities, leading to imaginations of monolingual territories and unambiguous linguistic standards, in lay and in academic settings alike. I contrast these imaginations with empirical examples of language uses in contemporary transnational publics and digital culture, where multilingualism and a destabilization of national norms come to the fore, as well as the dominance of English in a large number of social settings. Finally, I discuss the consequences of such observations for linguistic research and for institutional and governmental language policies.

Standard Languages as National Language Ideologies

The assertion of *languages* as given entities is a pre-condition for research in synchronic structuralist linguistics, which is based on Saussurean models of the linguistic sign.[2] Both, the sign, as consisting of a stable combination of *signifier* and *signified*, as well as the *speech community* are here treated as a priori categories.[3] From a linguistic anthropological and deconstructive view, however, the meaning of the sign is not given and stable[4] and languages and their boundaries have to be problematized and studied as an outcome of social discourses. In this light, "[l]anguages are no more pregiven entities that preexist our linguistic performances than are

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[2] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours De Linguistique Générale. (Course in General Linguistics),* London: Duckworth, 1913 (1993).

[3] For a critique, see e.g. Thomas Metten, *Kulturwissenschaftliche Linguistik. Entwurf einer Medientheorie der Verständigung,* Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014, Ch.1.

[4] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology,* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974.

gendered or ethnic identities. Rather they are the sedimented products of repeated acts of identity."[5] If we regard *languages* as an outcome of social developments, their discursive, historical and social preconditions come into focus. These include the emergence of the idea that there is only one 'correct' language in one nation, and that all other uses within a national territory are compared and devalued in relation to this one standard.[6] Among the elements that contribute to the establishment of language standards are, for example, social power differentials as it is the speech habits of the social elite that are turned into 'languages'. Also, technological printing devices that allow for the development of uniform representations of sounds as visual symbols, which, on the medium of paper, can be distributed across territories as large as a nation, are crucial for the general acceptance of national language norms.[7]

Besides social and technological preconditions, the social power of language standards is accomplished via discourses that make them credible. The discourses, that is, the interactional practices that bring social reality into being,[8] concerning language are referred to as *language ideologies* in the tradition of linguistic anthropology.[9] The term *language ideologies*

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[5] Alastair Pennycook, "Performativity and Language Studies," *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies*, 1, 2004, p.15.

[6] See also Pierre Bourdieu, *Was heisst Sprechen? Die Ökonomie des Sprachlichen Tausches*, Wien: Braumüller, 1980 (2005); *Language and Symbolic Power*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999.

[7] For thoughts on the role of the printing press in imaginations of language, see also Daniela Kloock, "Oralität und Literalität," in *Medientheorien: Eine Einführung*, ed. Daniela Kloock and Angela Spahr, Stuttgart: UTB, 2008; Per Linell, *The Written Language Bias in Linguistics*, Linköping: The University of Linköping, 1982; Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man*, London: University of Toronto Press, 1962; Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word*, London: Routledge, 1982.

[8] As elaborated in e.g. Michel Foucault, "The Discourse of Language," in Lucy Burke, Tony Crowley and Alan Girvin (eds.), *The Routledge Language and Cultural Theory Reader*, London: Routledge, 1970 (2000); Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland, "Introduction. Perspectives on Discourse Analysis," in Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland (eds.), *The Discourse Reader*, London: Routledge, 2006; Sara Mills, *Discourse*, London: Routledge, 1997.

[9] See e.g. Susan Gal and Judith T. Irvine, *Signs of Difference. Language and Ideology in Social Life*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019; Paul V. Kroskrity, "Language Ideology," in Jan-Ola Östman and Jef Verschueren (eds.), *Handbook of Pragmatics*, Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2001; Kathryn A. Woolard, "Introduction. Language Ideology as Field of Inquiry," in Bambi B. Schieffelin, Kathryn A. Woolard, and Paul V. Kroskrity (eds.), *Language Ideologies. Practice and Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

emerged in the late 1970s in a paper by Silverstein.[10] He discusses the cultural concept that languages should be regular as affecting language structure in processes of language change. Language ideology research focuses on interrelationships between the social and the linguistic, and in the interaction of language and social hierarchies[11] and

> [t]hough language ideology has become a familiar term, it is still worth emphasizing that it labels a form of reflexivity: It is metacommunication, participants' talk about talk, or their reflections, signals, and presuppositions about linguistic forms and their use. Sometimes this reflection is explicitly formulated, as in corrections ("don't say ain't"), generalizations ("dropping your r's makes you sound like a New Yorker"), or nomic statements ("proper people do not curse"). More often, it is simply an unspoken inference that participants make on the basis of prosody, intonation, the frequency of sociolinguistic variables, or shibboleths.[12]

Language ideologies can be considered a 'switchboard' between language choice on the micro level of everyday interaction and the macro level of social discourse. They "organize and order the normative relationships between speaking, social identity, situation and social function, as perceived by speakers."[13] Speakers are often unaware of these models as – in their functions of being ideologies – they are mostly naturalised, "they represent commonsense views of language and society that people take for granted".[14]

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[10] Michael Silverstein, "Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology," in Paul R. Clyne, William F. Hanks, and Carol L. Hofbauer (eds.), *The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels*, Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society, 1979.

[11] See Britta Schneider, *Salsa, Language and Transnationalism*, Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2014 for a more detailed history and overview of the field.

[12] Susan Gal, "Sociolinguistic Differentiation," in Nikolas Coupland (ed.), *Sociolinguistics. Theoretical Debates*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 116.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 115.

[14] Alan Bell, "Succeeding Waves: Seeking Sociolinguistic Theory for the Twenty-First Century," in Nikolas Coupland (ed.), *Sociolinguistics. Theoretical Debates*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 403.

Naturalised concepts of language are closely interrelated with the discourses that construct social order and are never about language alone as language practice is a central element in the constitution of social relationships.

> Indeed, one can point to a general analytical ploy. Ideologies that appear to be about language can be read as coded stories or 'displacements' about political, religious or scientific systems; ideologies that seem to be about religion, political theory, human subjectivity or science can be reinterpreted as implicit entailments of language ideologies, or the precipitates of widespread linguistic practices.[15]

Therefore, the study of the conceptualisation of language allows insight into processes of social structuration, which is crucial where discourses of nationhood have made invisible the fact that the social world is not 'naturally' made up of monolingual, culturally homogenous nation-state societies.[16]

Language ideologies that are central to the orders of the national age are, above all, based on the idea that citizens of one state live in a clearly defined territory where one language is spoken. This implies the discursive concept that only one type of language – the *standard language* – is correct. This linguistic system is understood as a stable entity. Its actual form is legitimised through what is defined as 'native speakers', that is speakers with national heritage who have been socialised in the territory in question.[17] Overall, the effect of national language ideologies is the conception of self-contained categories of language, tied to national (ethnic) territories.

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[15] Susan Gal and Kathryn A. Woolard, "Constructing Languages and Publics: Authority and Representation.," *Pragmatics*, 5, 1995, p. 132, footnote 5.

[16] For discussion, see Britta Schneider, "Methodological Nationalism in Linguistics," *Language Sciences*, 76, 2019; Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences," *Global Networks*, 2, no. 4, 2002.

[17] On the discourses of the native speaker, see e.g. Stephanie Hackert, *The Emergence of the English Native Speaker. A Chapter in Nineteenth-Century Linguistic Thought,* Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012; Nigel Love and Umberto Ansaldo, "The Native Speaker and the Mother Tongue," *Language Sciences* 32 (2010); Ben Rampton, "Displacing the Native Speaker: Expertise, Inheritance and Affiliation," in Tricia Hedge and Norman Whitney (eds.), *Power, Pedagogy and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 1996.

On grounds of the above made observations, it can be maintained that the formation of standard languages is a historical process that is conceivable via national language ideologies. Scrutinizing the historical processes that produce the dominance of these ideologies, Gal and Woolard argue that there is a dialectical relationship between the emergence of public authority and the emergence of standardised, national language.[18] In other words, language form and political power in public space interact. Language form becomes credible because of political authority and political authority is enforced through particular language forms. In this light, national public space 'makes' language and languages 'make' public spaces. One of the outcomes is what Gal and Woolard call "voices from nowhere",[19] that is forms of speech that are perceived as 'normal' and unmarked, apparently not indicating a social position.

In contemporary, 21st century societies in Europe, we are still very much accustomed to the idea that there are 'normal' forms of speaking that are based on using 'correct' language, reproducing the discourses of power of the national age. Yet, the development of new technologies that distribute language in written form via digital media has not only brought about the possibility to easily interact across national boundaries, it has also reconfigured the relationship between languages and publics.[20] What happens to the discursive construction of national, standardised *languages* in contemporary publics under the conditions of transnational digital mediality and digital publics? In the following, I give some examples of language use that illustrate that national language standards in national public spaces today exist besides other, heterogenous settings that involve heterodox writing, multilingual language uses and new, non-national configurations of language and social structure. I also argue that digital algorithms as found, for example, in smartphone texting tools, AI translations or voice-controlled devices, intervene with these developments.

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[18] Susan Gal and Kathryn A. Woolard, "Constructing Languages and Publics: Authority and Representation.," in Susan Gal and Kathryn A. Woolard (eds.), *Languages and Publics. The Making of Authority*, New York: Routledge, 2001.

[19] *Ibidem*.

[20] For further discussion, see also Theresa Heyd and Britta Schneider, "The Sociolinguistics of Late Modern Publics," *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 23, 2019.

Restructuring Language in Late Modern Publics

Informal and non-standard writing in digital publics

It is now a common observation that writing in digital contexts, such as chatting, email-writing, social media posting or texting, often does not conform to traditional orthography or grammar. Some of the deviations are based in the technical affordances of the tools, where it may be easier to only use small letters or to use the words the text tools of, for example, smartphones suggest. A lot of the social functions of uses in digital settings correspond to what formerly has been performed in oral uses, namely informal, interpersonal communication,[21] so a second factor that impacts on the non-adherence to traditional standards is the informality and the rapidity with which these interactional activities are realised. Thus, even though practices of specification such as, for example, punctuation, do not necessarily imply more effort than in previous times (or, comparing it to using a typewriter, actually less), the genre of informal writing, its social functions and need for instant reaction make complex punctuation or orthography rules less relevant. Furthermore, consequently adhering to formal norms in this context may be interpreted as signalling social positioning, such as social distance, official communication or a stiff personality.[22]

Thus, in digital settings such as in the below example, non-standard writing is common. In image 1, we see a Facebook post from a neighbourhood group in Berlin.

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[21] For a traditional model of oral and literate uses, see Peter Koch and Wulf Oesterreicher, "Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz. Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spannungsfeld von Sprachtheorie und Sprachgeschichte," in Olaf Deutschmann, et al. (eds.), *Romanistisches Jahrbuch*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985.

[22] On functions of digital writing, see Jannis Androutsopoulos, "Theorizing Media, Mediation and Mediatization," in Nikolas Coupland (ed.), *Sociolinguistics. Theoretical Debates*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Image 1: Non-standard writing in social media settings – "Is there someone who does nails privately?"

The writer asks other group members (about 1800 members in total, so it is not a private context) for someone who offers professional nail care privately (given that stores are closed due to the Corona pandemic). In formal German, the sentence would be something like: "Guten Tag. Kennen Sie jemanden, der privat Nagelpflege anbietet? Mit freundlichen Grüßen" (*Hello. Do you know anyone who offers nail care privately? Best wishes*). The post is, however, much more informal stylistically and it would be unusual and socially marked for a Facebook post to display traditional formal language styles (as for example using 'Sie', the German personal pronoun indicating social distance). The person instead asks: „Hi gibt es jemand der Nägel Privat macht LG" (*Hi is there anyone who does nails privately bw*). This involves not only informal language but also shows lack of punctuation, grammatical deviation, non-standard use of capital spelling and an online-specific abbreviation. In standard (colloquial) German, the spelling of this sentence would be (differences from the original post in bold letters): "Hi**. G**ibt es jemand**en,** der **p**rivat Nägel macht**? Liebe Grüße**". Using colloquial language and non-standard spelling and grammar is not commented upon by other users and has become common in many online settings, where traditional formal writing is often a socially marked form.

English in emerging transnational publics

Besides changes of social functions of writing and the loss of perceptions of standard orthography and punctuation as socially unmarked, the context of digital interaction allows for everyday interaction that is

beyond the reach of national boundaries. Speakers can easily and instantly interact with others who are located elsewhere or who speak other languages, in contrast to previous times. Before the digital age, media technologies based on print literacy and nationally regimented mass media limited cross-national interaction to mostly private communication in, for example, letter writing and telephone calls. As public discourse depended primarily on formalised and nationally confined distribution – for example, TV and radio broadcasting or newspapers – public space was above all perceived as national.[23]

Given the ease of interaction in digital settings and its availability beyond private contexts, it is unsurprising that public spaces have emerged that are transnational and not governed by concepts of national monolingualism, ethnocentricity or formality. Thus, individuals with similar interests may form new types of community that are not based on territorial location or ethnic affiliation. Blommaert calls such social formations *light communities* or 'communities of knowledge':

> … think of Hip-Hop, Rasta, Metal or Gothic communities, but also of 'fashionistas' and 'foodies', of Premier League soccer fans and so forth. All these micropopulations could be more finely described as groups of people who are translocally connected as what we could call *communities of knowledge* […] We are facing a new type of social formation here: a 'light' community that differs from the 'major social formations'.[24]

Language use is here less bound to national hierarchies that have been crucial in the formation of national language norms. Without being able to say today what will be the defining authorities in these contexts (and assuming that social status will define what is considered appropriate or correct here, too, as in any other social setting), the often international character of these communities involves the use of English.

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[23] See e.g. Susan Gal, "Linguistic Theories and National Images in 19th Century Hungary," in Susan Gal and Kathryn A. Woolard (eds.), *Languages and Publics. The Making of Authority*, New York: Routledge, 2001.

[24] Jan Blommaert, *Durkheim and the Internet. Sociolinguistics and the Sociological Imagination*, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 71

Based on an ethnographic study, I here want to introduce an example of such a transnational and anglophone social setting, namely the so-called *Third Wave Coffee Culture*. It is a cultural environment based on the production, distribution, sale and consumption of so-called specialty coffee. Third Wave Coffee Culture is a contemporary trend in locations in many countries in the world, tied to an urban lifestyle and associated with other elite practices of food consumption such as the *slow food* movement.[25] For various reasons, the use of English is very common in this context.[26] Consider names of local coffee bars or coffee roasteries in Berlin, Germany (see image 2), for an illustration of this dominance of English:

Image 2: English names for Berlin-based coffee bars and roasteries

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[25] Discussed e.g. in Richard Wilk, *Home Cooking in the Global Village*, Oxford: Berg, 2006; on holding conversations over coffee as classed practice, see Rudolf P. Gaudio, "Starbucks and the Commercialization of Casual Conversation," *Language in Society*, 32, 2003.

[26] For further analyses, see Britta Schneider, "Language in Transnational Communities of Consumption – Indexical Functions of English in Third Wave Coffee Culture," in Susanne Mühleisen and Sofia Rüdiger (eds.), *Talking About Food: The Local and the Global in Eating Communities*, Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2020.

The names *Five Elephant*, *The Barn*, *Aunt Benny* and *Father Carpenter* are all taken from local Berlin roasteries and cafés, displaying that it is very common to use English for naming. This shows that English here functions as a prestige language, appropriate for advertising the luxury product speciality coffee.

Even though it would require empirical study to document to what extent the use of English is as common in other places as it is in Berlin (as for example in Third Wave Coffee places in Sofia, Warsaw, Paris, Stockholm or Rome), it is safe to say that English is used as *lingua franca* in transnational interaction among members of this cultural setting. In the Berlin case, as was found in my empirical study,[27] English is not only used for communication with members who live elsewhere but also the dominant mode of interaction in local contexts, including in menus, in interaction between customers and staff, and in some conversations where both speakers have German as their first language. This aroused a public language ideological debate in the summer of 2017, where newspaper articles from the local, national and international press appeared that reported on customers' complaints about the expectation to order food and drinks in English in these settings,[28] expressed in headlines such a "Spricht Ihre Kneipe noch Deutsch?" (*Does your pub still speak German?*).[29]

The common use of English in these contexts has the effect that, as is common for situations of language contact, linguistic features of English and German are used in combination, particularly when German is spoken (less so when English is spoken as competence in German is not commonly expected). See below one example from an interview with a leading figure of the Berlin Third Wave Coffee scene, who explains the concept of 'Third Wave' and its aims and ideals, in a qualitative interview:

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[27] See also Theresa Heyd and Britta Schneider, "Anglophone Communities in Germany: The Case of Berlin," in Raymond Hickey (ed.), *English in the German-Speaking World*, Cambridge: CUP, 2019; Schneider, "Language in Transnational Communities of Consumption – Indexical Functions of English in Third Wave Coffee Culture" In Sofia Rüdiger and Susanne Mühleisen (eds.), *Talking about Food – The Social and the Global in Eating Communities*, Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2020.

[28] Philip Oltermann, "Berliners Frustrated over Restaurants Where No German Is Spoken. German MPs Say Some Waiters Only Speak English and That It Ostracises Native Population from Life in the Capital," *The Guardian*, 14.08.2017 2017; Jens Spahn, "Sprechen Sie doch Deutsch!," *DIE ZEIT*, 24.08.2017, 2017.

[29] Sophia Kräge, "Spricht Ihre Kneipe noch Deutsch?," *Berliner Kurier*, 13.08.2017 2017.

Excerpt 1

Der Begriff **Specialty Coffee** ist der, der eigentlich besser ist als **Third Wave**, *weil die Wellen versteht eh keiner*, äh, wir sagen immer alles was nach **Starbucks** kam is **Third Wave**, dabei sind wir eigentlich schon **Fourth Wave** und dann ham wir gesagt ,so können wir eigentlich niemanden abholen, weil wir wollen eigentlich unsere Barrieren senken und ähm *es geht am Ende des Tages* um Geschmack.' […]

Der **Reach**, der die Erreichbarkeit und so wird glaub ich auch immer größer, also **Specialty Coffee** ist die stark wachsende Nische in dem Bereich [...] wir sind eigentlich die **quality leaders** und **pushen** und **pushen** und **pushen**.

The term Specialty Coffee is the one that is actually better than Third Wave, because nobody understands the waves anyway, uh, we always say everything that came after Starbucks is Third Wave, but we are actually already Fourth Wave and then we said 'so we can't really pick anyone up because we want to lower our barriers and uh, at the end of the day it's all about taste.' […]

The reach, the accessibility and I think it's getting bigger and bigger, so Specialty Coffee is the strongly growing niche in the area [...] we are actually the quality leaders and push and push and push.

In the above quote, all lexical items that stem from English are in bold script, showing that a considerable number is English-based, including verb use that is combined with German inflectional morphology, marking first person plural (underlined in *push-en*). Besides, I have marked two passages in bold and italics which make use of German lexical items but display non-traditional German syntax and a loan translation. In the first example – "weil die Wellen versteht eh keiner" – where the conjunction *weil* (because) is used as coordinating, meaning it is followed by a main clause with S-V-O order, that is, subject (die Wellen, *the waves*), verb (versteht, *understands*), object (keiner, *nobody*). Traditional German syntax defines *weil* as subordinating conjunction, followed by a subordinate clause that has a verb final order, that is, subject, object, verb order (S-O-V). Using *weil* as coordinating conjunction is common in spoken colloquial German, where some suspect that this tendency is enforced through English, in

which *because* is also followed by S-V-O clauses, given that word order in English is generally fixed.[30] A much clearer case of the impact of English on German is, however, the second example, "es geht am Ende des Tages um Geschmack" (*at the end of the day it's all about taste*). The phrase "at the end of the day", meaning "after all", is not common in German and thus "am Ende des Tages" has to be understood as a loan translation or calque. Taken together, the lexicon, syntax and idiomatic expressions in the above quote show clear impacts of English.

Examples of the impact of English, in the form of either using English as medium of communication or in producing mixed forms of English and German, are also found in other transnational social contexts, such as other communities of consumption related to food (e.g. veganism) or media, music culture, social media groups, academia or artists communities. These are obvious examples of the development of new public spaces in which the logics of national publics, with national language standards, loose in relevance. While such translingual mixings are often understood as emancipatory and a liberation of national normativity in current sociolinguistics,[31] it is important to consider that new publics not only bring about liberation but also new normativities. In order to ponder the question of linguistic citizenship and language policies in the 21st century, these new normativities have to be considered. Besides the cultural dominance of Anglophone culture and the established role of English as international *lingua franca*, digital algorithms and the logics of machines here play a role.

Reifications in digital programming and AI technologies

As has been mentioned in the theoretical considerations about language ideologies (see above), technical tools have played a role in the formation of normative language standards for a long time. Thus, the printing press is central in the establishment of national public spaces and

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[30] On *weil* with V2 constructions, see e.g. Gerard Kempen and Karin Harbusch, "Verb-Second Word Order after German Weil 'Because': Psycholinguistic Theory from Corpus-Linguistic Data," *Glossa: a journal of general linguistics*, 1, 2016.

[31] See e.g. Suresh Canagarajah, *Translingual Practice. Global Englishes and Cosmpolitan Relations*, London: Routledge, 2013; Alastair Pennycook and Emi Otsuji, *Metrolingualism. Language in the City*, London: Routledge, 2015.

national language norms, allowing for the distribution of written text that makes use of homogenous scripts and letters across territories as large as a nation.[32] Digital tools make use of the letters developed in early modernity but are based on different ideas of representation and correctness. Definitions of correct language in the age of print literacy are largely based on the writings of elite speakers, among them authors of literary, religious or governmental text (see e.g. etymological dictionaries). Many contemporary dictionaries or translation tools are based on text that appears online. The corpus on which correctness is defined is therefore larger and, to a certain extent, more democratic, as more people have access to publishing text in the digital era than in the era of the printing press. Basically, this implies that social elites' ability to produce printed written text, and with it, to define standards, is replaced by a logic in which frequency of use in a very large number of texts defines what is conceived as 'correct' (even though very informal writings as in chats or social media are probably excluded from corpora that are used for translation tools or dictionaries).

An example for these newer formations of standards is given by translation tools. A very successful tool from the German context is the Cologne-based company *deepl*, which has been celebrated for very good results in producing text translation via the use of an artificially intelligent algorithm.[33] The corpus with which the AI tool is trained is based on websites that exist in the languages in question. In the case of German-English translation, this means that texts available online in both English and German function as source for the AI to learn what is 'correct' English and 'correct' German. Many of the texts stem from commercial and governmental settings – the same source texts are used in the online dictionary *linguee.com*, in which passages of the corpus are given, so that at least some of the original text samples can be examined. The available texts have been translated by individuals who are competent in both English and German. Some linguistic phenomena occurring seem to indicate that many

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[32] On the role of the printing press in early modern European culture, see Michael Giesecke, *Der Buchdruck in Der Frühen Neuzeit. Eine Historische Fallstudie über die Durchsetzung neuer Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.

[33] See www.deepl.com, discussed e.g. in Zeit Online. (29.09.2020). "DeepL" macht Google Translate Konkurrenz. https://www.zeit.de/news/2020-09/29/deepl-macht-google-translate-konkurrenz, 16.12.2020

of these translators must have had German as their first language as semantic contents and metaphorical constructions appear that are common in German but (so far) not so much in English.

For example, the German phrase German 'die Barrieren senken', meaning 'to make something more easily accessible' (see Extract 1 above), is translated as 'to lower the barriers' in both *deepl* and *linguee* (as of 18th of November 2020, the results may change if the corpus changes). The fact that the phrase 'to lower the barriers' is not very common in English can be seen when searching the web for this phrase, showing that the most frequently retrieved hits stem from the *linguee/deepl* corpus and not from other uses in public space. Without having access to the algorithms and corpus data of the company, we may interpret this phenomenon as showing the social effects of computer corpora, which are chosen on grounds of easy access (only texts that are automatically retrievable online on the web are used), in combination with the machine logics of frequency (items that appear frequently in the corpus appear as 'correct'). The potential long-term effect of this may be that the phrase is enregistered as correct beyond the translation tool. As it is to be assumed that the phrase will be used more often as it is shown as 'correct' in the translation tool, a looping effect is likely, as the corpus with which the translation tool works will have even more hits with this phrase. In the end, it is language items that are frequent in language corpora accessible to machine reading that become 'correct'. The logics of national standards based on elite language use is then combined with logics of machine readability and frequency.

Besides the above described looping effects, it is likely that English will generally have an increasing impact in contexts in which frequency plays a role, with a high potential for the language becoming the "voice from nowhere" (see above) in transnational public settings as English is the language used most in web (statistics ranging from 25% of all web content to over 50% of all web content, see e.g. www.usertesting.com/blog/localization, www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm, Date of Access: 18.11.2020). The fact that anglophone cultural and linguistic concepts underlie many tools which we use in digital everyday life is also obvious in the use of programming languages – all programming languages that are prominent and commercially used are based on English lexical items (see e.g. https://www.bitdegree.org/tutorials/most-used-programming-languages/).

Furthermore, increasingly popular voice-controlled home computers such as *Google Home*, *Alexa* or *Siri* also have been designed and programmed in English-speaking contexts. It is thus, at least currently, not uncommon to be confronted with anglophone concepts when using such tools. Besides phonetic realizations that do not match, for example, French, Spanish or German phonology, there can also be cultural concepts that are transported via these tools. Consider image 3 below, where a German user asks Apple's IPhone tool *Siri* what to give the children for Christmas:

Image 3: Anglophone cultural concepts in Siri use

The answer of Siri is "How about an ugly pullover?". In German, the concept of 'ugly pullover' is its direct semantic meaning – a pullover that is ugly. Thus, the answer in a German context does not make sense and is

even irritating (after all, why does Siri want someone to give their children something ugly for Christmas?). Only users who have access to US American Christmas traditions will be able to understand the answer, as knitted pullovers with Christmas designs (Santa Claus, reindeers, etc.) are referred to as *ugly pullovers* in English. The examples show on the one hand that some of the tools are still badly designed and more efforts will have to go into what companies refer to as 'localization', that is, adapting computer programmes and AI tools according to local cultures and traditions. On the other hand, it is likely that machine logics and algorithms, with their very often Anglophone cultural bias and logics of frequency, where what appears often is taken as model, will interact with and influence cultural and linguistic practices worldwide. And indeed, the custom of buying and giving 'ugly pullovers' is currently becoming popular in Germany.

The Consequences of Late Modern Language Phenomena for Language Study, Language Education and Language Policy

The above made observations have consequences for how to study language from a scientific point of view and they have consequences for language policy and language education.

In the field of linguistics, the role of standard languages has to be reconsidered. While homogenous and standardized languages are often treated as 'natural' phenomena, understood as arising from the unconscious development of genuine cultural communities in which native speakers live,[34] standard languages, as we know them today, are not conceivable without the discourses of the nation-state and the technologies of the printing press. In this sense, they are not natural, quasi-biological entities but an outcome of social processes and power struggles. A view on languages as part of cultural history allows for overcoming what has been referred to as methodological nationalism[35] – the tendency of social sciences to work under the "assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural

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[34] For a critique, see e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language," in, Lucy Burke et al. (eds.), *The Routledge Language and Cultural Theory Reader* London: Routledge, 1980 (2000), p. 468.

[35] Wimmer and Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences."; Schneider, "Methodological Nationalism in Linguistics."

social and political form of the modern world".[36] We can then start to study language as not 'naturally' framed in ethnic or national cultures and consider the role of socio-political discourses (e.g. the idea that groups in one territory should be homogenous), the impact of institutional practices (e.g. schooling that teaches only one correct version of language and co-produces discourses of linguistic anxiety) and the crucial contribution of media technologies – from writing, the printing press and digital devices – in framing cultures of standardization and the territorial distribution of norms. Multilingual and non-standard productions of language, in written or spoken form, no longer appear as deviations from a norm but as practices that index individual life trajectories and potentially complex forms of social belonging.

Considering possible educational responses to late modern language practices, we first of all have to ask what would be reasonable reactions to linguistic complexity that is beyond a 'multilingualism' as additive and ordered monolingualisms. Schools and universities as educational institutions have to deal with diversity on different levels. New forms of language teaching should, for example, include reflecting (presumably neutral) standards and reflecting social indexical functions of language instead of presenting some forms as inherently or morally better than others. Creative language production and word play with multilingual resources can here be one option to create awareness of the social functions and power of language. At the same time, this should not mean that traditional language standards are no longer taught as they continue to fulfil important functions in hierarchical social contexts as on the job market, but also in producing social bonds among populations.

Policy responses on the governmental level will have to deal not only with the fact that populations become increasingly diverse but also with technological realities. One question that emerges in this context is in what way we can or should nationally or supra-nationally regulate the reifications and new patterns of dominance that develop through programming, digital platforms and AI tools. Assuming that language will develop 'naturally' in

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[36] Wimmer and Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences.", p. 301.

communities as is still common in many strands of linguistics is certainly not helpful as large supranational commercial actors, from Google to Amazon, already impact on the way linguistic features are distributed and framed as correct. Whether or not this is a problem will have to be discussed elsewhere. What is, however, clearly problematic is data security as most language tools are based on the uncontrolled collection of large amounts of language data from private individuals, often from private face-to-face settings as in the use of voice-controlled devices in families or from other private or semi-private settings in, for example, WhatsApp, Facebook or Instagram communication. In the European context, data security standards as developed in the European Union should be a measure to collect data from AI translation tools, social networks and voice-controlled devices.

Another problem we face is the logics of algorithms, which is mostly based on the idea that what is frequent is right. As has been discussed in relation to, for example, race or gender discrimination,[37] these tools produce cultural biases in Big Data settings. The effect of these programmes is that what is already dominant will become more dominant, a kind of Matthew principle.[38] It is likely that this presents a threat to minority languages as what now is dominant may, because of its frequency, become more dominant. On these grounds, the dominance of English and of anglophone culture is likely to increase. As the use of English as lingua franca contributes to cross-cultural understanding, this is not necessarily a problem as such – as long as other linguistic and cultural practices continue to have a place in publics. Financial support for the development of less commercially successful software (e.g. auto-correction, AI templates) for lesser spoken or minority languages may thus be one solution to continue the European idea of unity in diversity.

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[37] See e.g. Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru, "Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification," *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, 81, 2018; Joy Buolamwini, "Artificial Intelligence Has a Problem with Gender and Racial Bias. Here's How to Solve It," *TIME,* https://time.com/5520558/artificial-intelligence-racial-gender-bias/, 07.02.2019.

[38] See e.g. Robert K. Merton, "The Matthew Effect in Science. The Reward and Communication Systems of Science Are Considered," *Science*, 159, 1968.

Linguistic Citizenship in the 21ˢᵗ Century

To finally give some answers to the question of what is linguistic citizenship in the 21ˢᵗ century, we can maintain the following:

- To avoid provincialism and ignorance, language competences of the informed citizen should not be limited to one monolingual standard.
- Citizens of an educated Europe should have access to (digital and analog) literacy in minority languages to be able to maintain cultural diversity and to reproduce their heritage cultures, including languages with a migration history.
- Competences in national standards have to be ensured to allow for access to discourses of the social and educational elites.
- Competence in standardised varieties English is similarly relevant for access to elite discourses and participation in transnational knowledge production.

Besides actual linguistic competences, knowledge about language has to involve meta-linguistic competences in order to be able to not only produce language form but to develop awareness of the social power of language in a complexifying world:

- Speakers generally have to develop the ability to deal with linguistic complexity and constantly evolving forms.
- This implies the ability to reflect on the existence, conditionality and potential relevance of norms.
- Finally, this also means to develop an awareness of the important functions of language in ordering social relationships.

Taken together, this is probably demanding and will require a restructuring of established form of schooling and governmental language policies. Yet, democratic ideals can neither be maintained by hopelessly reproducing language cultures from a bygone age of monolingual national print culture, nor by leaving the field to capitalist actors.

Conclusion

In this article, I have introduced linguistic anthropological concepts that conceive of separate and standardised *languages* as an outcome of socio-historical processes that were particularly prevalent in the age of nationalism and print culture. Several examples were introduced that illustrate a potential reframing of language, and with it, a reframing of public cultures, where the technologies of digital culture play an important role. Finally, I have given some thoughts on what these observations may imply for education, language policy and the enlightened linguistic citizen in contemporary times.

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Online therapy - short-term solution or opportunity during the COVID-19 pandemic? An overview of the dynamics of the therapeutic field in Romania

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced people to rethink borders and spatiality. The main aim of this article is to explore the changes brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic in the face-to-face talking therapeutic work. The main solution recommended and adopted by therapists in this context is online therapy. Online therapy becomes an increasingly popular and convenient approach in mental and emotional health treatment due to its advantages in terms of mobility, geographical distance, time management, work-life arrangements, affordability and efficacy. Besides its undeniable advantages, online therapy also raises a number of issues regarding therapists' education, the means of communication, confidentiality, intimacy, therapeutic relationship, etc. Briefly, online therapy makes us reconsider work, space, place, time, relationship, intimacy and personhood. This article draws on a secondary and primary exploratory research carried among Romanian therapists. The exploratory research is based on unstructured interviews with therapists trained in psychodynamic therapy who moved their face-to-face sessions online as a reaction to the new constraints engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic. While online therapy sessions used to be a niche service before the outbreak, they have now become the norm, thus ensuring continuity within an

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ever-changing environment and at the same time opening up to new therapeutic avenues (e.g. COVID-19-induced anxiety, depression, stress, etc.). Our focus is on how therapists work, on how they view the changes they are currently making to their work and on whether they envisage implementing these new found solutions in the longer term once the crisis is over.

Keywords: online therapy; therapeutic boundaries; space and time boundaries; work-life balance; intimacy boundaries

Introduction

The switch from face-to-face talking therapy to online therapy induced changes in space, place, time, relationship, intimacy and personhood. One of the most important changes induced by this switch is the rethinking of the physical therapeutic presence, which is regarded as a critical element in therapy efficacy.[1] The question of "presence" doesn't only concern the e-therapy, it is a debated issue in more general analyses of online spatiality. Berger analyzes the concept of "telepresence" in relationship to the concept of space, showing how individuals construct their spaces through "perception, feelings and thoughts" and that one cannot merely talk about spatial metaphors with regard to the Internet, but about a space which is the result of a mix between concrete and virtual elements.[2]

The self is also affected by the switch to e-therapy, as it becomes a "disembodied self", which has a negative impact on the therapist's ability to create a safe and containing space, which is an essential part of the therapeutic process, especially in dynamic therapies. Space is an important part of the psychotherapy setting, that goes beyond the consulting room and includes many other "organizational" aspects that are meaningful for

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[1] Shari M. Geller, Leslie S. Greenberg, "Therapeutic Presence: Therapists' experience of presence in the psychotherapy encounter", in *Person-Centered and Experiential Psychotherapies*, December 2002, vol. 1, issues 1-2, pp. 72-73.
[2] Viktor Berger, "Phenomenology of Online Spaces: Interpreting Late Modern Spatialities" in *Human Studies*, 13 May 2020, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341345177], p. 4.

therapy, such as: confidentiality, duration, time, frequency, fees, breaks, cancellations, etc. All these elements set the physical and psychological boundaries between therapy and the "external world", as well as those of the therapeutic relationship,[3] thus creating a secure transitional space.[4]

The positive aspect of this change is an increased client empowerment, which brings benefits to his/her self-esteem and self-reliance. Also, Lemma argues that, in fact, the self is not disembodied and that in online, mediated therapy, there is an embodied presence, the difference lying only in the way we experience it.[5] Space and Self are important issues for more general analyses of online spatiality. Online spaces are generally conceived as "(…) mixed experience of both real and imagined spatiality".[6] Dix describes how our "internal models of space", a mix of objective and subjective experiences, of essential and non-essential characteristics function in the construction of information space/cyberspace.[7]

Weinberg and Rolnick emphasize the fact that online therapy still allows for feelings, body sensations and emotional communication but what is missing is body-to-body communication. In these conditions, the therapist must focus more on the client's non-verbal cues, such as posture, body relaxation/tension, etc. and on active listening. Sometimes, online therapists try to replicate face-to-face space by imposing distancing and seating rules in front of the computer, but it is debatable whether this replication is possible and whether it has the same therapeutic effects.[8]

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[3] Haim Weinberg, Arnon Rolnick, "Introduction", in Haim Weinberg, Arnon Rolnick (eds.), *Theory and Practice of Online Therapy. Internet-delivered Interventions for Individuals, Groups, Families, and Organization*, NY & London: Routledge, 2020, p. 7.

[4] Donald Woods Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, London & NY: Routledge Classics, 2005, pp. 1-34.

[5] Alessandra Lemma, *The Digital Age on the Couch. Psychoanalytic Practice and New Media*, London & NY: Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017, pp. 90-92.

[6] Denise Doyle, "Avatar Lives: Narratives of Transformation and Identity", in Jayne Gackenbach, Johnathan Bown (eds.), *Boundaries of Self and Reality Online: Implications of Digitally Constructed Realities*. 1st Edition. London, UK: Academic Press, 2017, p. 60.

[7] Alan Dix, "Paths and Patches: Patterns of Geognosy and Gnosis", in Phil Turner, Susan Turner & Elisabeth Davenport (eds.), *Exploration of space, technology, and spatiality : interdisciplinary perspectives*, NY: Information Science Reference: Hershey, 2009, p. 26.

[8] Weinberg, Rolnick, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Another important change is the advent of a new kind of intimacy: the online intimacy or e-intimacy, described as more similar to the intimacy developed in face-to-face therapeutic large groups, based on a cohesive climate and on a feeling of belonging.[9] Lemma talks about the "simulating presence" as a result of technology altering intimacy, and mediating it.[10]

All these changes have an impact on the therapeutic relationship and raise a more general question regarding the contribution of the therapeutic relationship as opposed to that of therapeutic techniques to the efficacy of the therapeutic process. A related question is if online therapy is recommended for all therapists, for all clients and for all types of therapy (e.g. cognitive and behavioral therapies that are more technique-based, as opposed to affect-based and relational therapies).[11] Other important aspects of the therapeutic relationship affected by the switch to online therapy are: how the therapeutic alliance takes shape, transference and countertransference processes, detachment and the end of therapy. Online therapy has the advantage and disadvantage at the same time of developing the "(…) fantasy that we can overcome human limitations of time and space, as we can continue our relationship whenever we want and wherever we are."[12]

Online therapy and the question of boundaries

The main boundaries challenged, created or erased by the switch from face-to-face talking therapy to online therapy are: therapeutic boundaries; intimacy boundaries for both the therapist and the client; space and time boundaries; social class and income boundaries.

The ones most challenged by online therapy are the *therapeutic boundaries*.[13] The necessity arises to create and maintain boundaries so as not to affect the treatment negatively and so as to optimize its results.

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[9] Gily Agar, "The Clinic Offers No Advantage over the Screen, for Relationship is Everything Video Psychotherapy and its Dynamics", in Weinberg & Rolnick (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 66-78.

[10] Lemma, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 87.

[12] Weinberg, Rolnick, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[13] Katherine B. Drum, Heather L. Littleton, "Therapeutic boundaries in telepsychology: Unique issues and best practice recommendations", in *Professional Psychology Research and Practice*, 2014, vol. 45, no. 5, *passim*.

Therapeutic boundaries include *spatial boundarie*s. Here, space is transitional and allows for safety, predictability, confidentiality, trustworthiness and is altogether a very personal space.[14] "*Transitional spaces are characterised both by external reality and boundaries, and by individual and shared phantasies*".[15] In online mediated therapy, the creation of a transitional space becomes the client's responsibility in equal measure, he/she becomes a co-constructor.

The therapeutic boundaries are closely linked to *intimacy boundaries for both the therapist and the client.* Zur, Williams, Lehavot & Knapp analyse the effect of Internet technology on therapeutic classical instruments of intentional self-disclosure and transparency, concluding that "the Internet has irreversibly changed the nature of self-disclosure and psychotherapists' transparency",[16] because clients have more access and search for information about their therapists. That leads to a change in how roles, expectations and power are perceived; the "patient" becomes an "informed consumer" who has the right to research, and to expect and demand transparency from psychotherapist from personal and professional standpoint.[17] These changes relate to more general analyses on the influence of Internet on power relationship, such as that of Poster[18] who describes how the new media and Internet have affected the interaction and power relationship, and transformed the construction of identity. The client is also affected by the issue of transgression of the boundaries of his/her personal life, because therapists have more access to information about their clients via the Internet. At the same time, because of the change in therapeutic settings, they can get direct and indirect information about the client's environment.

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[14] Elizabeth Punzi, Cristoph Singer, " 'Any room won't do.' Clinical psychologists' understanding of the consulting room. An interview study", in *Psychodynamic Practice*, 2018, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 319-320.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 319.

[16] Ofer Zur, Martin H. Williams., Keren Lehavot & Samuel Knapp "Psychotherapist Self-Disclosure and Transparency in the Internet Age", in *Professional Psychology Research and Practice*, 40(1), February 2009, p. 22.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 25.

[18] Mark Poster, "CyberDemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere", Irvine: University of California, 1995, https://acloudofdust.typepad.com/files/cyberdemocracy.doc], 30 august 2020.

Online therapy has changed the *space and time boundaries.* It increases access for clients from remote locations or areas which are not connected by public transport and lack therapy services. Also, it allows for a better time management for people with busy schedules[19] and consequently, a better work-life balance: "In a global fast-moving economy time and geographical distance have become key variables that determine the viability of long and more intensive therapy".[20]

National boundaries no longer exist in online therapy. This gives the expat client the opportunity to continue or to have therapy in his/her native language. Language is an important factor in the development of identity, it has a major influence on an individual's worldview, according to Sapir-Whorf's Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis[21] and, consequently on cognitive processes and the concept and sense of self. Language has an integration function and the ability to transcend time, space and social context: "through language, an entire world can be actualized, any time".[22] The native language plays an important role in the creation of a therapeutic alliance[23] because the language learned in childhood during primary socialization is more emotion-related.[24]

Online therapy has also challenged *social class and income boundaries,* which offers increased access to underserved groups, such as low-income individuals. Online therapy is generally cheaper than face-to-face therapy because the therapist's expenses are lower, and there are no extra costs for transportation, for instance. In addition, it offers a better social connection, irrespective of social class due to easier access to technology and an Internet

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[19] Kate Anthony, DeeAnna Merz Nagel, *Therapy online: A Practical Guide*, LA, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage Publications, 2010, p. 7.

[20] Lemma, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[21] Basel Al-Sheikh Hussein, "The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis Today", in *Theory and Practice in Language Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, March 2012, p. 642.

[22] Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann, *Construirea socială a realității*, București: Art, 2008, p. 60.

[23] Daria Diakonova-Curtis, "Bilingualism as a Tool in Psychotherapy", in *Psychotherapy Bulletin*, Society for the Advancement of Psychotherapy, 2017,

[https://societyforpsychotherapy.org/bilingualism-as-a-tool-in-psychotherapy/], 30 July 2020.

[24] Catherine L. Caldwell-Harris, "Emotionality differences between a native and foreign language: theoretical implications", in *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 5, September 2014, p. 2.

connection.[25] Another important aspect is that power imbalance deems, and people feel more at ease to express themselves and they perceive themselves as more independent.[26]

Online therapy during the COVID-19 pandemic. An overview of the dynamics of the therapeutic field in Romania

The analysis of online therapy and the dynamics of the therapeutic field in Romania during the COVID-19 pandemic draws on an exploratory qualitative research. The data collection method is that of an in-depth unstructured interview. The subjects are ten therapists trained in psychodynamic therapy who moved their face-to-face sessions online as a reaction to the new constraints engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic during the state of emergency and the national lockdown in Romania (16 March-15 May 2020). All subjects have private practice. With the lockdown lifted, and the state of alert still in place, some of them have continued to work exclusively online and some of them in a mixed formula: face-to-face talking therapy and online therapy (15 May 2020- present).

All interviewed therapists have previous online therapy experience with persons who live in other countries or in various regions in Romania. Some of the therapies started directly online while others started face-to-face and then continued online after the client moved to live in a different location. In these cases, therapists consider online therapy as a necessity and not a choice. If they could work face-to-face, they would prefer it. *I cannot see any benefit to working online. Even with those people who live abroad or in other cities, if I could, I would work face-to-face. It is only a necessity. (M.R.)*

People who live abroad have chosen to work with a therapist from Romania because they need to work with someone who speaks their native language and because the prices are lower. Many of them have tried to work with therapists from the country where they currently live, but they could not overcome the foreign language barrier in order to open up and

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[25] Belle Liang, Nicole Duffy, Meghan Commins, "The Online World, the Internet, Social Class, and Counseling" in William Ming Liu (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Class in Counseling*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 261.

[26] Anthony, Merz Nagel, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

emotionally express themselves. For therapies that started face-to-face, the therapeutic relationship is the most important factor in the decision to continue working online.

I rarely accepted to work online before the COVID-19 pandemic. Usually, it was the case of people who lived in other countries. They wanted a Romanian therapist because they considered that they could better understand the cultural context. I am referring to migrant adults. Besides, paying 23-25 euros per hour is considerably more affordable than paying 100 euros. (G.E.)

Online therapy constituted the main, and during the lockdown, the only solution to continue the therapeutic work, for both therapists and clients. For some of the clients, the lack of an intimate space was the main reason to pause therapies and to pressure the therapist into continuing the face-to-face therapy after the lockdown was over.

Time management has been different, for both therapists and clients. Some clients continue to work from home during the state of alert as well, while some of them have gone back to their regular work schedule. Obviously, this has also had an impact on the therapists' work schedule. Some therapists have tried to keep the same work schedule as before in order to respect the previous therapeutic time arrangements and not to create chaos when they go back to face-to-face therapy.

During lockdown, the clients were more flexible, because many of them were also working from home. Before, my schedule was busier in the afternoon, when people finished work. Now, my afternoons are not so busy, I have more time for myself, I enjoy this schedule, that gives me the opportunity to have more time for my personal life. (C.S.)

Therapeutic boundaries are the most affected in the online setting. Space plays a vital role in the therapists' narratives about the difference between working online and working face-to-face. The therapeutic space is defined by: physical setting, atmosphere, energy, emotional closeness, non-verbal/body language, confidentiality, trustworthiness and intimacy. The atmosphere, the energy, the emotional closeness and the ability to read and interpret the non-verbal language are the most negatively affected by the

switch from face-to-face to online therapy. The therapist cannot relate emotionally with the client in the same way and cannot read the subtle cues given by the physical presence.

When I work face-to-face, in my private practice I have a sort of tentacles through which I can feel the client. In the online setting, these tentacles disappear. (G.E)

I think there is a difference in energy, because the other one can see you, can feel you, and you can see and feel him/her. Face-to-face, I can see every micro expression. Online, this is not possible anymore. (I.R.)

The atmosphere and the emotional closeness can be more easily recreated in the online setting if the therapy started face-to-face, even if it is not the same thing. That is why some of the therapists schedule 2-3 face-to-face meetings and then move online in order to stay safe during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not a new way of working, since even before the pandemic face-to-face meetings were specifically required or encouraged by the therapist before working online where possible (e.g. during the client's holidays or short visits in Romania).

In my opinion, if the therapeutic relationship is born online, I cannot emotionally connect to the client. It's different, I think that there is also the screen, I believe this is a big obstacle. I cannot see the posture, I can see the expressions, but I cannot see the micro expressions. I cannot feel the energy, I no longer benefit from that moment when I first meet the client, in order to see how and where he/she sits, if he/she analyzes me or the office. The emotional spectrum lacks. I'm not saying that online therapy doesn't work, but it's much poorer. (I.R.)

During the lockdown, all the interviewed therapists worked from home. At present, the situation is more nuanced: some of them work online from home, some work online from the office, and yet others work online and face-to-face in the office. Working from home raises the issue of work-life balance, of increased access of the client to the therapist's personal intimacy, and the access of family members to the professional intimacy required by the therapeutic work. The situation was even more difficult during lockdown and the state of emergency because the entire family had to stay at home,

the schools were closed, and the learning process moved online. In some cases, working from home was better because the therapist could fulfill his/her family responsibilities and have a better time management.

After I put a locker on my room, it was better. My parents moved in to live with me; my father has dementia, he didn't want to interrupt me, but he forgot and a few times he came in to tell me something. Otherwise, for me, it was better, I felt better when I worked from home, because I had a better time management. All my clients were extremely punctual, and so was I. When I work face-to-face, I need to take longer breaks, of 30 minutes, in order to clear my mind between therapies, and to avoid overlapping sessions when they don't start on time. When I worked online only from home, I had a 15-minute break, and that was enough. Moreover, I could also respect the routines required to care for my old parents. (C.V)

In terms of time management, for me it is better to work from home. I have the opportunity to take care of my daughter, and to assist her with online learning. In terms of energy and attention, sometimes it is worse, because I have to change the focus and the mindset, and at the end of the day I feel extremely tired. (M.M)

The question of work-life balance was also addressed by the therapists who live alone and don't have family responsibilities.

Although I live and work in the same place, working online was a big change. Before the pandemic, I would descend into the office, change my clothes, put on makeup, and meet my colleagues. I feel isolated now. Our work isolates us anyway, but now I feel even more isolated. This is one of the reasons why I decided to start working face-to-face again come September. (C.S.)

Professional intimacy and a better work-life balance are the main reasons why some of the therapists decided to work online from the practice. Therapeutic work requires a considerable amount of attention, being focused on multiple levels, being connected with yourself and with the other person and it is easier to have this mindset in the office.

It is difficult to work from home. Even if I have a well-separated working space where I have intimacy, I am distracted by all kinds of stimuli: a sound, my kid's voice, the painting I can see in front of my eyes, all sorts of things. That's why

I decided to go and work from the office, even if for a while I worked exclusively online. When I close the door to my office, I enter the therapeutic mindset straightaway. (C.D)

When I worked online only from home, it was difficult to enter the therapeutic mindset, but after the first client, it was easier, it was no longer a problem. A more important issue was that after the last session, I didn't have the time to clear my mind, to disconnect from therapies. The transition from work to personal life was extremely abrupt and I was in the "doing mode". Now, even if I work mainly online from my office and I am in a rush to go home because my kids are waiting for me, I have some time for myself. While I do a little bit of cleaning and get ready I can clear my mind. (M.M)

Generally, the interviewed therapists didn't feel there was a breaching of the personal intimacy boundaries on the client's part. Some clients manifested an explicit interest regarding certain objects from the therapist's physical setting, like a drawing, a painting, the wall design or color, or a decorative object, but it wasn't any different from the usual small talk around the physical setting in face-to-face therapy. There were instances when the client had involuntary access to the therapist's personal life, such as interruptions from the therapist's family members (usually the children) or pets (cats, dogs) who entered the room, the couriers' arrival, etc. Some therapists felt the need to explain where they were working from in order to assure the client of the privacy and intimacy of the session, which implicitly revealed to the client some information about the therapist's personal life. There were clients who noticed the changes in the therapist's physical setting, but there weren't any intrusions.

In the beginning, honestly, it was pretty hard to connect, I needed to adjust a little bit, to make an effort and it was tiring. I had to explain to my children that this was my new office, that I needed privacy and that they were not allowed to disturb me when I was working. Still, they interrupted me a few times, I didn't like it, I had the impression that the clients had too much access to my private life. (A.C.)

However, none of these aspects had a negative influence on the therapeutic relationship. On the contrary, in some cases, the therapeutic relationship benefited from this involuntary self-disclosure. The therapeutic boundaries became more flexible, and that led to a more equal relationship.

It was a very interesting phenomenon. Because the clients saw me as a human being, I somehow lost the "aura" of the authority figure and this was beneficial for the therapeutic relationship because people opened up more. Also, they were more concerned about my wellbeing and health, as if we were in the same boat. I think the pandemic has also had the equalizing effect of putting all human beings on the same part. (T.G.)

Online therapy proved to be a very rich source of information about the dynamics of the client's life system, which is very useful for the therapeutic work.

I could see cases when the client's partner didn't respect the therapy, those wretched 50 minutes when a person needs to be by herself. The partner entered the room 5 or 6 times under the pretext that he needed something. Moreover, he was half -naked. By working online, I got important information about my clients' problems. (G.E.)

In addition, online therapies revealed the importance of the intimacy of the therapeutic physical space provided in face-to-face talking therapy. Half of the interviewed therapists had to explain, especially to the new clients with whom they started to work directly online, the rules of intimacy and privacy required by the therapy.

I pay a lot of attention to my clients' intimacy. Especially when I started to work online, and not only then, I asked them if they felt comfortable, if they could talk freely. That is important, because otherwise, the therapy doesn't sink in. The big majority created a safe space themselves. If they didn't have intimacy, they went in their cars, locked themselves in a room, asked their partener to also wear headphones or asked their partner to go out for a walk with or without the kids, depending on the case. It proves also the client's motivation to work in therapy and to solve his/her problems. (I.R.)

There were also cases where the therapists decided to reschedule or to postpone the therapy because the client's setting didn't observe the standards of confidentiality, privacy and intimacy required by the therapeutic work.

Online therapy allows for a high degree of flexibility, but there is a fine line between flexibility and chaos. I had cases when the clients didn't arrive on time in a private space, when they started the session while still in their car or even while driving. It was difficult, the setting was changing all the time, they weren't focusing on the therapy and nor was I. For instance, I would pay attention to the sounds of the traffic they were in. I decided to reschedule the therapy, because one cannot work like this. (I.R.)

I was extremely surprised when one of my clients was in a hairdressing salon, it was impossible for me to understand how she thought we could work like that. I suggested we reschedule our session. (T.G.)

The question of the Self in the online setting is involved in every interaction between therapists and clients, directly or indirectly. For example, the therapists pay attention to the messages and information that their working space conveys to their clients, especially when they work from home. Generally, the focus was to minimize the space exposure (e.g. to blur the image of the space that is behind him/her) and to ensure both a professional setting and a professional relationship. They even maintained the same physical appearance (clothes, make up etc.) and kept the same habits they had when they were working face-to-face. The fact that they can seem themselves on screen is sometimes disturbing for the therapists, because they feel more exposed and move their attention to their own look, gestures and mimics. There are clients who also try to minimize their exposure, but there are also clients who open up more and who show the therapist their entire home or working space if these are reasons for high self-esteem.

Conclusion

While online therapy sessions used to be a niche service before the outbreak, they have now become the norm, thus ensuring continuity within an ever-changing environment and at the same time opening up to new therapeutic avenues (e.g. COVID-19-induced anxiety, depression, stress, etc.). Our primary research revealed that COVID-19-induced psychological disorders are not so present in the interviewed therapists' work. There were only cases where the COVID-19-induced stress made more acute the client's symptoms, depending on the client's previous problems (e.g. anxiety, agoraphobia etc.). Some of the interviewed therapists registered to work online, voluntarily, with people emotionally distressed by the pandemic, but the clients' addressability to their services was extremely low.

Online therapy was the norm during lockdown, when face-to-face therapy was forbidden by law, which stipulated that the psychological counselling could continue by phone or other electronic means. Some therapists chose to work online even before the lockdown and the enforcement of the legal obligation to do so for safety reasons. At present (end of August 2020), as the state of alert continues in Romania, and the therapeutic work can be done face-to-face with the obligation that both therapist and client wear masks, the circumstances are more nuanced. Some of the interviewed therapists continue to work exclusively online, motivated by the responsibility for their own safety and health, as well as for their clients. They are also motivated by the negative impact of the obligation to wear masks on the therapeutic work efficacy, because of the impossibility to read the client's emotional cues that can be gathered from the facial expressions.

I believe it is safer for everyone. It is not only about me, I have health problems, and I have to protect myself more, but I cannot risk contracting and spreading the virus. I work with a lot of people. What is more, many of my clients are physicians and they are more exposed to the virus. In addition, it is impossible for me to imagine how we can work in therapy with masks. You cannot see the entirety of their faces. Online, at least you can see the face, even if you cannot entirely read the

emotional expressions because of the screens. Or, if someone cries in therapy, which is something that happens very often, how do we go about it now that we need to wear a mask? Plus, we cannot hear and understand each other properly. (V.O.)

Some of the interviewed therapists have a mixed approach in therapeutic work: online and face-to-face. The online work is either from home or the office. Some of them clearly divided the work schedule in days for working online and days for working face-to-face. Some of the therapists alternate face-to-face and online therapies in order to have longer breaks between the face-to-face therapies so that they can clear the air in the working room. The option to work face-to-face and the schedule are also influenced by how the physical space of the office is organized. In some situations, the space was modified in order to respect the safety norms such as separate circuits, rearrangement of the furniture in order to respect the distancing norms, etc. and air filtration measures (e.g. the acquisition of UV lamps for disinfection, or ozone for air purification, keeping a window always open etc.). If the space could not be changed or did not assure the safety norms, the therapists decided to work online or to work from a different space. One of the main reasons why they came back to working face-to-face was the need of both therapists and clients to experience the human presence and emotional connection, which lack or are poorer in the online therapy.

I cannot stand working online anymore, I miss the emotional connection, and the clients miss it as well. They are super-happy that we will meet again face-to-face. (G.E.)

Other very important reasons are the fatigue provoked by online work and the negative impact of various technological issues on the quality of the therapeutic work, such as delays, poor signal, quality of image and sound.

Other reasons that have led to resuming face-to-face meetings are: the lack of intimacy for some of the clients, the inability of some clients to adjust to online therapy and the increased efficacy of face-to-face therapy compared to online therapy in some specific cases such as the type of psychological issue (e.g. paranoid elements), special physical health conditions when

online working is contraindicated (e.g. epilepsy), age and the ability to focus in the online setting (e.g. children). The incomes of the interviewed therapists weren't significantly affected by the move to online therapies, with a reported loss of 5%-6% of their clients provoked by the move to online therapy. This might explain why the financial motivation was not an incentive to go back to face-to-face therapy, whereas that was precisely the main reason for other therapists to do so, as the secondary research of forums and online groups revealed. Furthermore, there were psychologists and therapists who applied for furlough payments (net income: 2.382 ROL/month) according to the regulations of emergency ordinance 32/2020 which instituted social protection measures for the economic activities affected by the restrictions required by the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The questions of "trust" and "taking a risk together" are important elements in the narratives of those therapists who decided to work face-to-face and become a part of the therapeutic relationship.

I trust them, many of my clients only leave the house to come to therapy. They don't expose themselves; they come by personal car, and they work from home. (C.V.) Yes, I think there are risks, but there are also benefits. I asked them how they wanted to continue, I didn't impose anything on them. We agreed that we were in this together. But life is also about taking risks. (C.D.)

For those who work in a mixed formula (online and face-to-face), the alternation of the two ways of working is deemed the solution during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, depending on the number of infected persons and the measures taken by the government.

No matter the current working formula, all interviewed therapists see online therapy as just a short-term solution to continue their work. Only one of them considers that the online therapy offers the opportunity to diversify the services and to increase the addressability for some clients, not for therapy, but for individual or group psychological counselling, which does not require such in-depth work as therapies do. Apart from the already mentioned reasons, online therapy is considered by the interviewed therapists to be less effective than face-to-face therapy, at least in the psychodynamic studied practice, because it is more difficult to "feel" and to

work with the processes of transference and countertransference, to create a strong therapeutic alliance and to apply more diversified in-depth therapeutic strategies, techniques and methods (e.g. psychodrama, art therapy, hypnosis).

Thank God that there is the alternative to work online. It is better than nothing, and I am glad that people are open to this option. I have seen on various groups that many colleagues were hardly hit and negatively impacted. I think working online will be a very good alternative for the year to come. Or until a vaccine is discovered. (C.V.)

Online therapy has undeniable advantages in terms of mobility, geographical distance, time management, work-life arrangements, costs, affordability and efficacy in some types of disorders. While it challenges and erases some of the boundaries raised by face-to-face therapy, it creates some others, because of its perceived impersonality, the poor emotional connection, the absence of a shared safe and containing physical therapeutic space, and the negative impact on the creativity and diversity of methods required by the therapeutic work.

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RADIO ROMANIA INTERNATIONAL –
A JOURNALISTIC TOOL TO CROSS BORDERS

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Abstract

The paper analyzes how international broadcasters cross all types of borders, physical or conceptual, in order to reach the public and fulfill their role of public diplomacy tool for their countries in a difficult context for international stations and for media in general. We focused on Radio Romania International, which produces and broadcasts programs in 13 languages, aiming at promoting Romania, its domestic and foreign policy.

Keywords: international radio, borders, information, promotion, credibility

Introduction

Radio Romania International (RRI) has mission to promote Romania, its domestic and foreign policies. Our main objective is to find how international broadcasters can overcome different types of borders: physical, conceptual, linguistic, of mentalities, in order to fulfill their mission. The study will elaborate on the roles and effectiveness of international stations in an era of disinformation, fake news, and on the journalistic tools allowing them to keep their most important asset, credibility.

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Research questions and used methods

How can the international broadcasters (IBs in text) reach the public when less democratic political regimes have built legal, physical or electronic borders to prevent their populations from free information? How can the IBs efficiently communicate their messages to very different and diverse audiences? We used the bibliographic research and the observation methods.

Fundamental concepts in Communication

Communication Sciences developed based on communication models. Rus described more models: Lasswell's linear model, Shannon's linear model (1948), Weaver, Meyer-Eppler's model (1963), the circular model (1974) of Hiebert, Ungurait and Bohn, the interactive model, the two-steps flow communication model (1948, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet).[1] Petcu et al have also studied the most important communication models: Laswell (1948), Shannon and Weaver (1949), Newcomb (1953), Osgood and Schramm (1954), Gerbner (1956), Dance (1967).[2] Rus classifies the communication forms: verbal, non verbal, interpersonal, intrapersonal, group, mediated (publicized), mass communication, Aesopian, political&electoral, business communication, public communication, advertising communication, educational, civil society organizations' communication, paradoxical, international.[3]

Mediated communication

The communication of a radio with the public is mediated, unidirectional, "presupposes the existence in the communication process of one or more transmitters or a collective transmitter, which broadcasts messages through technical devices and means of communication for transmitting the information to multiple receivers", considers Rus.[4] The

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[1] Flaviu Călin Rus, *Introduction to the science of communication and public relations*, Iaşi: European Institute, 2002, pp. 40-47.

[2] Marian Petcu (coordonator), *Dicţionar enciclopedic de comunicare şi termeni asociaţi*, Bucureşti: Editura C.H. Beck, 2004, pp. 326-327.

[3] Rus, *op.cit.*

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 25.

journalists do the so-called mass communication, explains Rus. It addresses large masses and can be subjective (aimed at "manipulating public opinion in the sense desired by communicators")[5] or objective. "In journalism, the notion of objectivity is of central importance," said Kunczik and Zipfel, meaning the public can form its opinion based on the information received.[6]

Radio, a credible medium

Radio and TV are the most trusted media in the EBU (European Broadcasting Union) area.[7] Radio is most trusted in 73% of countries surveyed, TV in 9%. Social networks are least trusted in 85% of the countries. The trust in PSMs (public service media) is high and the higher the level of trust, the higher press freedom is in that country. This correlates directly with the 2020 World Press Freedom Index.[8] In another survey the EBU shows that in 65% of European markets PSMs, including international stations, are the most trusted source of news and their contribution to democratic societies remains crucial. "With 47 international all-news services active in 2020, EBU PSMs appear as reference news providers not only for their domestic audiences, but also for Diasporas abroad, travelers and international audiences. In addition, more EBU PSMs broadcast specific international versions of their generalist channels, which also play a vital role in informing diasporas abroad."[9] The international broadcasters do not have an intrinsic credibility, but they largely rely on credibility. They represent mainly states and in democratic countries they have to observe strict legal, journalistic, ethical rules, which allow them to be more reliable and unbiased. The states use IBs as a soft diplomacy tool. Cull

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[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 25-26.

[6] Michael Kunczik, Astrid Zipfel, *Introduction to the science of journalism and communication*, Cluj: Cluj University Press Publishing House, 1998, pp. 97-98.

[7] Media Intelligence Service, "Trust in Media", *European Broadcasting Union (EBU)*, June 2020, [https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/MIS/open/Trust_in_Media_2020/EBU-MIS-Trust_in_Media_2020.pdf], 25 July 2020.

[8] "2020 World Press Freedom Index", 2020, [https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/carte_2020_en.pdf], 25 July 2020.

[9] Media Intelligence Service, "Public Service Media and News", *European Broadcasting Union (EBU)*, August 2020, p. 13 [https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/MIS/login_only/psm/EBU-MIS_PSM_and_News_2020.pdf], 15 August 2020.

considers IBs are aware that the impression of the public of an editorial connection to Governments negatively affects their credibility. O'Keeffe and Oliver also consider that "the broadcaster's reputation rises or falls on the credibility of the news it reports. (…) Independence is the lynchpin of credibility. As soon as interference is detected, credibility is shattered and audience loyalty vanishes."[10] They are in line with Rawnsley: "When communications technologies now shatter the boundaries between domestic and international domains, and space/time are no longer as relevant as they once were, political actors and broadcasters are speaking to multiple audiences simultaneously. This means any inconsistences or contradictions in messages across platforms, or between messages and events (…) impact on and ultimately damage the source's credibility."[11]

International radio, a radio with history

International broadcasting has a long history reminds Rawnsley: "The earliest recorded instance of the organized use of radio for political purposes was in 1926 when Russia used radio broadcasting to demand the return of Bessarabia from Romania. Moscow was also the first to employ international radio as a tool of its foreign policy: the inauguration of Radio Moscow in 1929, first in four languages and growing to 11 by 1933, resulted from an aspiration to explain the Communist revolution to the wider world and communicate its accomplishments".[12] A 1933 article published in "Nature" raised concerns over the use of IBs for propaganda, while jamming the "enemy" station signal was already discussed: "More objectionable is the increasing use of broadcasting in languages other than that of the country of the transmitting station for propaganda purposes. The new 500 kW

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[10] Annmaree O'Keeffe, Alex Oliver, "International Broadcasting and its contribution to Public Diplomacy", *Lowy Institute for International Policy Working Paper*, September 2010, p. 32 [https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/international-broadcasting-and-its-contribution-public-diplomacy], 12 August 2020.

[11] Gary D. Rawnsley, "To Know Us is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting in Contemporary Russia and China" in *Politics*, vol. 35 (3-4), 2015, p. 281, 9 August 2020.

[12] Gary D. Rawnsley, Introduction to "International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century" in *Media and Communication*, Volume 4, Issue 2, 2016, p. 43, 10 August 2020.

station of the Comintern at Moscow is apparently used for transmitting Communist propaganda in English, French, German and Italian. (…) This may lead to retaliatory measures which will not improve the hearing of broadcasting".[13] For instance, Pleikys showed that the USSR and its satellites used 6 types of jamming audio signals: "In the late 20's Berlin started to jam the programs of Radio Komintern. In 1931 the USSR jammed the Romanian radio; in 1934 Austria jammed the German radio. (…) Massive jamming of foreign radio broadcasts was initiated by the USSR in February 1948. (…) Eventually jamming developed into a true monster".[14] O'Keeffe and Oliver summarized the history of IBs: "For more than 80 years, international broadcasting funded by government has played an important role in advancing the strategic and national interests of countries around the world. It is one of the principal means of presenting a country's perspective, views and values to foreign publics and their leaders. A growing number of countries are investing increasing amounts in their international broadcasting efforts as part of targeted public diplomacy programs."[15]

The missions of international broadcasters

Radio Romania International produces and broadcasts programs in Romanian and other languages to promote the image of Romania, its internal and foreign policy.[16] In turn, "BBC World Service broadcasts and distributes accurate, impartial and independent news and content in a range of genres aimed primarily at users outside the UK. (…) BBC World Service should contribute to the BBC's international news mission to address the global gap in provision of trusted international news, by providing accurate,

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[13] ***, "Future of International Broadcasting" in *Nature* no. 132, 2 December 1933, p. 848 [https://www.nature.com/articles/132848b0], 30 July 2020.

[14] Rimantas Pleikys, "Radio Jamming in the Soviet Union, Poland and others East European Countries" in *ANTENTOP*, 01-2006, p. 71 [http://www.antentop.org/008/jamm008.htm], 9 August 2020.

[15] Annmaree O'Keeffe, Alex Oliver, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

[16] Legea nr. 41 din 17 iulie 1994 privind organizarea și funcționarea Societății Române de Radiodifuziune și Societății Române de Televiziune (republicată și actualizată), art. 16 (1) [www.srr.ro/legea_nr_41_din_17_iulie_1994_republicata_si_actualizata-11879], 30 July 2020.

impartial and independent news and analysis of the highest quality. In developing countries the World Service aims (…) to improve the welfare and economic development of citizens."[17] Radio France Internationale "offers its listeners information meetings and magazines offering the keys to understanding the world."[18] Germany's Deutsche Welle "is an unbiased media organization, based in Germany. We provide our journalistic content to people worldwide, giving them the freedom to make up their own minds and the information required to form their own opinions".[19] The American IBs (USAGM: Voice of America, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Open Technology Fund), have the mission "to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy".[20] USAGM's 2018-2022 Strategic Plan includes two strategic goals: "1) expanding freedom of information and expression and 2) communicating America's democratic experience and values".[21]

O'Keeffe and Oliver have classified the missions of IBs into 5 categories: "to provide credible alternative sources of information and ideas, particularly to nations which may have insufficient resources to support robust independent media (such as former colonial possessions); to access and influence the overseas residing diaspora; to preserve non-English languages; to counter Western and English language media, cultural or political dominance; to project a country's culture, ideals, values and expertise."[22] They recommend

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[17] BBC Trust, "BBC World Service Operating Licence", *BBC*, 2016 [http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/our_work/world_service/2016/wsol.pdf], 30 July 2020.

[18] ∗∗∗, „Qui sommes-nous?", *Radio France Internationale*, [https://www.rfi.fr/fr/qui-sommes-nous], 30 July 2020.

[19] ∗∗∗, "Unbiased information for free minds", *Deutsche Welle*, [https://www.dw.com/en/about-dw/profile/s-30688], 30 July 2020.

[20] ∗∗∗, "Who we are – Mission", United States Agency for Global Media [https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/mission/], 30 July 2020.

[21] Vivian S. Walker, Shawn Baxter, "2019 Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting: Focus on FY 2018 Budget Data", The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, p. 151, [https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2019-ACPD-Annual-Report.pdf], 9 August 2020.

[22] Annmaree O'Keeffe, Alex Oliver, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

the best "mix" for IBs: "Clear goals and direction are fundamental ingredients for successful broadcasting. Part of a broadcaster's strategic strength lies in the selection of the target markets and target audiences."[23]

A tool of public diplomacy, under threat

The IBs were until 1989 propaganda tools for Western and Communist regimes, crossing borders over the Iron Curtain. After the collapse of Communism they were empowered with more roles: public diplomacy tool, to promote their countries, to export democracy, to express the points of view of their countries or…to continue propaganda. Cull classifies public diplomacy's components and interrelationships: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting. He considers the most important element of IBs is the use of objective news. Price is more direct about what IBs really are: "International broadcasting is the elegant term for a complex combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertainment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state's boundaries. It is the use of electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another."[24] Rawnsley considers "International broadcasting remains a key activity in public diplomacy. International broadcasting has long been associated with the projection of foreign policy interests, from an instrument of empire building in the 1920s and 1930s, through the Cold War and beyond. (…) The internet and social media have transformed the way international broadcasting contributes to public diplomacy".[25] Price considers that after the fall of Communism, IBs had difficult times: "As the Cold War ended and with it the established basis for this ethereal penetration of sovereign borders, fundamental geopolitical change has required the reconfiguration of international broadcasting as new targets, new justifications, and new purposes were explored. Until resuscitated by the war on terrorism, international broadcasting underwent a

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[23] *Ibidem*, p. 34.

[24] Monroe Price, "Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of International Broadcasting" in *Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal*, 21 (1), 2003, p. 53. Retrieved from [https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/120], 9 August 2020.

[25] Gary D. Rawnsley, Introduction to "International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century", p. 42.

deep crisis of purpose and credibility in the mid-1990s. Budget considerations, new technologies, and new industrial modes of distributing information were influential in the reassessment process."[26] So, the IBs had to re-invent themselves, explains Price: "In the face of this effective opposition, the Radios began to rethink their missions. No longer facing an authoritarian regime where they served as surrogates expressing the views of dissenters, they created a new role for themselves: facilitating transitions. The Radios' missions, they claimed, had evolved from the purely surrogate task of providing news and analysis on internal events where no such media were available, to compensating for the limitations of domestic media and setting a standard by which emerging free media could judge themselves".[27] This transformation included a shift towards TV, Internet, domestic rebroadcasting on FM. Price considers that 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had a big impact on all of public diplomacy, including IBs. Price et al. warned that "the performance of international broadcasting is, undoubtedly, related to complexities of foreign policy and their relationship to the current geopolitical environment."[28] Kent asked and answered: "Why do US international media exist? Few debate the need for a strong US capacity to speak to the world, particularly amid the disinformation and propaganda of the present day. But the message to be delivered by those media has often been controversial".[29] He made some recommendations for the USA IBs: separate missions of the government and surrogate broadcasters, adequate funding, "preparation for worst-case scenarios" (web blocking; broadcast jamming, restrictions on local media distribution and harassment and brutality toward its reporters). In line with Kent, O'Keeffe and Oliver explain the still robust use of IBs as public diplomacy tool: "Commercial, and arguably more appealing, broadcasters are already crowding the international marketplace. So what prompts a

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[26] Monroe Price, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-58.

[27] *Ibidem*, pp. 60-61.

[28] Monroe E. Price, Susan Haas, Drew Margolin, "New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and Transformations" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, 2008, p. 166, JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/25097999], August 2020.

[29] Thomas Kent, *US International Broadcasting Recommendations from the Eurasian Experience*, Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, 2019, p. 1 [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/US_International_Broadcasting-Recommendations_from_the_Eurasian_Experience.pdf], 9 August 2020.

government to spend annually tens of millions of dollars on their country's broadcaster to attract a fickle audience? While there are overlaps in the answers for every one of those broadcasters, the diversity underscores the plurality of international broadcasting's role in public diplomacy."[30]

The challenges of international broadcasters

The IBs have to face more challenges. They have to convince decision makers to finance them. For instance, Nye argues: "Some skeptics have concluded that Americans should accept the inevitable and let market forces take care of the presentation of the country's culture and image to foreigners. Why pour money into VOA, when CNN, MSNBC, or Fox can do the work for free? But such a conclusion is too facile. Market forces portray only the profitable mass dimensions of American culture, thus reinforcing foreign images of a one-dimensional country".[31] They IBs have to cross borders, despite physical or digital obstacles raised by less democratic regimes. For instance USAGM's Open Technology Fund works to "support open technologies and communities that increase free expression, circumvent censorship, and obstruct repressive surveillance as a way to promote human rights and open societies".[32] The Association for International Broadcasting warned that jamming never ceased after 1989: "As shortwave broadcasting has slowly faded away, satellites have become the target. (…) The satellite industry has responded, and now far greater levels of security exist that prevent almost all attempts to stop TV and radio signals from reaching their intended audiences. This does not mean that the free flow of information across borders is guaranteed today. Some governments continue to try to restrict the work of international broadcasters."[33] Cull speaks about the new world of IBs: "Commercial channels now compete with the old state-based providers; new media offer both new mechanisms

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[30] Annmaree O'Keeffe, Alex Oliver, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-11.

[31] Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, 2008, p. 105, [www.jstor.org/stable/25097996], 9 August 2020.

[32] ∗∗∗, "Who we are – Mission", United States Agency for Global Media.

[33] ∗∗∗, "AIB history brief – jamming", Association for International Broadcasting, 30 June 2020 [https://aib.org.uk/aib-history-short-jamming/], 12 August 2020.

to access old services and make alternatives readily available. While there is still a place for the traditional services, international broadcasters need to respond creatively to the new world and guard against preserving old practices and approaches for their own sake."[34] He is in line with Rawnsley, who thinks that "now we must also consider more carefully the impact of the Internet, social media and other platforms of communication on how a political or diplomatic actor uses international broadcasting to further their own interests and ambitions".[35] In a previous article, Rawnsley speaks about the convergence of media and platforms. More than that, Miazhevich thinks we are in a "post-broadcast epoch": "The post-broadcast epoch presupposes the use of multi-platform systems for producing and delivering media content."[36] This leads to fragmentation of the audience who consume media at different times, in different ways and places, with different degree of concentration. The IBs also have to carefully communicate the messages to be sure they are understood. According to Miazhevich the "construction of a media event for a transnational public needs both to adhere to the 'soft power' strategy of a particular nation state and to take into account the reception and re-negotiation of this mediation within a particular (national) context."[37]

The IBs have to be competitive from a technical point of view. "The information technology revolution has created its own revolution in international broadcasting. (…) 21st century international broadcasting exploits the digital potential and makes use of podcasting, webcasting, streaming; it is 24/7 in nature and its appeal is widespread.", stated O'Keeffe and Oliver.[38] At the same time, they have to compete with the 24/7 world news outlets, as Rawnsley says: "The rapid development of live round-the-clock international news programming has since morphed again

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[34] Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories'" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 2008, p. 52,
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/25097993?seq=1], 9 August 2020.
[35] Gary D. Rawnsley, Introduction to "International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century", p. 43.
[36] G. Miazhevich, "International Broadcasting and the Conflict-related National Media Events: The Framing of EuroMaidan by the BBC and RT" in B. Mitu, S. Poulakidakos (eds), *Media Events*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 54.
[37] *Ibidem*, p. 56.
[38] Annmaree O'Keeffe, Alex Oliver, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

to provide for live and instant news broadcasting via the Internet. (…) Moreover, the likes of CNN and the BBC no longer tower above the global news media environment that is now characterized by more regional actors facilitating a multi–directional flow of news and information".[39] All these efforts are worth doing because consider O'Keeffe and Oliver, "As a tool of public diplomacy, international broadcasting is a remarkably cost effective way of reaching audiences in their millions on a regular basis."[40] But to reach the audience, the IBs must enjoy several cumulatively conditions, consider the authors: independence, financial security and legislative protection.

Case study

We focused on Radio Romania International, which produces and broadcasts programs to promote the image of Romania, its internal and foreign policy. The stations use a mix of broadcasting tools: shortwaves (analogue, digital), satellite, Internet (website, apps, social media), rebroadcasting. According to our experience and observation, the station is a real soft power diplomacy tool for Romania.

Conclusions, limitations, further research

The IBs from democratic countries are offering the information missing in different areas. Based on research of big IBs, we estimate the role of international broadcasters has become more important today, maybe more than during Cold War. We live now in a more complicated world, with multiple poles of power/influence in motion, with trade wars, disinformation, misinformation, fake news, and information "bubbles" isolating people from reality. In many countries local populations are denied the right information. Here comes the role of IBs, to fill this gap via terrestrial broadcasts over the boundaries, via satellite or Internet, using different ways to avoid the blocking/jamming of their programs. In a time when many political regimes close the borders or switch off Internet, IBs should continue their mission to keep informed listeners/users with very

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[39] Gary D. Rawnsley, Introduction to "International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century", p. 43.

[40] Annmaree O'Keeffe, Alex Oliver, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

different backgrounds. We consider that the possibility of IBs to cross the physical borders and to offer the missing information to large numbers of people is the biggest asset (added value) of these broadcasters. Some of them are doing even more: they try to change mentalities, to promote their countries, to dissolve the conceptual, educational, linguistic barriers. The study should be continued and extended to more IBs, because propaganda, fake news, disinformation are again prominent in more and more countries and in more and more online "bubbles".

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RÉTROACTES DU CONFLIT CONGOLAIS (RDC) ET REGARD SUR SES CAUSES

RETROACTS OF THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT (DRC) AND A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS CAUSES

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Abstract

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and their consequences remain a major source of concern, as they constitute a multidimensional challenge to economic and human development in the country and the region. There is a need to address the issue at the highest level, both regionally and globally, and to support the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo in its search for a solution to the conflicts and in its efforts to put the country back on the path of sustainable development. In this context, this article seeks to increase understanding of the root causes of conflict and their consequences for development so that informed decisions can be made at the national, regional and international levels.

Keywords: conflicts, violence, natural resources, development, Central Africa

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Introduction

Les faits qui ont conduit au conflit armé en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) sont aussi bien d'origine lointaine qu'immédiate. Il importe de les clarifier dans un premier temps avant d'en conférer une quelconque appellation. Tous ces faits au demeurant, se sont complexifiés à cause de l'aggravation de ce conflit ayant entraîné de nombreuses conséquences douloureuses sur le plan humain et sur le plan matériel[1] (Nations Unies, 2015). Les préoccupations sécuritaires du Rwanda et de l'Ouganda ainsi que le problème de nationalité des populations d'origine rwandaise, dites Banyarwanda, expliquent l'origine profonde du conflit armé en République Démocratique du Congo. À la suite de cet épisode sombre du génocide de 1994 au Rwanda, des milliers de réfugiés ont traversé la frontière du Rwanda vers les régions des Kivu au Zaïre[2] (rebaptisé République démocratique du Congo, RDC, en 1997). Parmi eux se trouvaient les gens de l'ethnie hutu : plusieurs d'entre eux étaient qualifiés de « génocidaires », mais aussi des dirigeants dont on dit qu'ils avaient orchestré le génocide et leurs sbires. En République Démocratique du Congo, ils prennent alors rapidement le contrôle des camps de réfugiés d'où ils cherchent à reconquérir le Rwanda.

Le présent article traite de rétroactes du conflit congolais et regard sur ses causes de 1994 à nos jours. Il cherche à mieux faire comprendre les causes profondes des conflits et leurs conséquences sur le développement afin que des décisions soient prises de façon éclairée aux niveaux national, régional et international. Ce conflit, très compliqué par sa nature, comporte des causes d'ordre structurel et des facteurs aggravants. Les causes structurelles se manifestent par la faillite de l'État congolais. L'absence de démocratie et l'usure du pouvoir accompagnées d'une violence aveugle sur les populations civiles ont fini de convaincre les bailleurs de fonds ainsi que les partenaires européens de la République Démocratique du Congo de l'agonie du régime du Maréchal Mobutu. Leur refus d'injecter financièrement ce type de régime est à la base de la faillite de l'État congolais qui ne pouvait plus faire face à ses responsabilités régaliennes consistant à fournir

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[1] "Conflits en RDC. Causes, impacts et implications pour la région des Grands Lacs", Nation Unies, Addis Abeba: Ed. CEA, 2015, p. 132.

[2] Rapport global du HCR: République Démocratique du Congo, HCR, 2010, pp. 29-34.

des services élémentaires aux citoyens, dans des domaines primordiaux que la santé, l'éducation, l'administration générale et l'armée. En fait, la rupture de la coopération financière n'a fait qu'aggraver une économie déjà en grande difficulté à cause des effets des politiques de nationalisation des entreprises congolaises de 1973, du retrait des étrangers spoliés de leurs biens et de la mauvaise gestion des affaires de l'État par les dirigeants congolais.[3]

Si les causes du conflit congolais se limitaient à la faillite de l'État, la guerre pourrait être évitée mais les facteurs aggravants comme les effets du génocide rwandais ont précipité le pays dans la guerre, tandis que la manipulation ethnique, les problèmes fonciers et l'exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles ont servi de combustible pour alimenter le conflit.

L'implication des pays voisins comme le Rwanda, le Burundi, l'Angola et l'Ouganda à cause de la porosité des frontières et l'instabilité qui règne dans ce pays, lui confère une dimension régionale car la République Démocratique du Congo s'est transformée en champ de bataille où s'affrontent des milices locales et étrangères, de même que les armées étrangères.[4]

Le conflit qui s'est déporté en République Démocratique du Congo et qui a conduit le pays dans une spirale de violence a pris sa source principalement au Rwanda où un génocide a fait plus de 800 000 morts en majorité tutsis et hutus modérés.[5] Les causes profondes de la guerre au Rwanda sont à rechercher dans l'histoire de ce pays longtemps marqué par les clivages entre Hutus et Tutsis alternant au pouvoir depuis plus de 40 ans. La révolution sociale de 1959 a permis aux Hutus majoritaires d'accéder au pouvoir au détriment de la minorité Tutsi jadis favorisée par les colonisateurs belges qui les divisaient pour mieux régner.

Face à l'avancée rapide du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), venu secourir les Tutsis massacrés, les génocidaires perdirent du terrain et se réfugièrent en masse dans les pays voisins plus particulièrement au Zaïre

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[3] Pierre Jacquemot, « La résistance à la bonne gouvernance dans un état africain. Réflexions autour du cas congolais (RDC) », *Revue Tiers Monde*, no. 204. pp. 129-146.

[4] Stevio Ultrich Baral-Angui, « Migrations, identités et tensions sociopolitiques en Afrique centrale », *Sciences humaines-Cames*, vol. 1, no 6., 2016, pp. 222-238.

[5] Claudine Vidal, « La commémoration du génocide au Rwanda: violence symbolique, mémorisation forcée et histoire officielle », *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 2004, pp. 575-592.

déjà fortement affaibli par la gestion personnalisée du pouvoir par le Maréchal Mobutu, la récession économique et la désintégration de l'armée. Ainsi, l'AFDL de Laurent Désiré Kabila soutenu par le Rwanda et l'Ouganda va profiter de cette faillite de l'État congolais et du chaos provoqué par l'afflux de réfugiés à l'Est du Zaïre pour s'emparer du pouvoir le 17 mai 1997. C'est la naissance de la République Démocratique du Congo.

Loin de faire l'unanimité auprès de la communauté internationale et de l'opposition politique congolaise qui lui reprochaient respectivement d'avoir massacré des réfugiés rwandais et d'avoir confié le pays aux étrangers, Laurent Désiré Kabila décida de se séparer de ses anciens alliés. Se sentant trahis, l'Ouganda et le Rwanda se retournèrent contre le nouveau régime congolais en créant respectivement le MLC et le RCD, deux mouvements rebelles. En guise de réponse, le Président Laurent Désiré Kabila sollicitera des soutiens du Zimbabwe, de l'Angola et de la Namibie. Les acteurs étatiques, au-delà de soutien apporté à la République Démocratique du Congo auraient des intérêts économiques à défendre ou seraient motivés par le désir de déloger des mouvements rebelles qui ont choisi le territoire congolais comme sanctuaire. Dans les deux cas, leur implication confirme la dimension régionale du conflit appelé aussi "*première guerre mondiale africaine"*.

La signature tardive des accords de paix de Lusaka puis de Sun City, mettant officiellement fin à la guerre, a favorisé la multiplication des acteurs non étatiques. Ce qui a rendu le conflit plus meurtrier et plus difficile à résoudre. En effet, les manipulations ethniques (entre Hemas et Lendus par l'armée Ougandaise et entre populations originaires du Rwanda et autochtones par le Rwanda) sont pratiquées en même temps que l'exploitation des ressources naturelles par les acteurs étatiques comme non étatiques. Cette exploitation peu orthodoxe des ressources naturelles, favorisée par les entreprises multinationales qui achètent ces matières premières, permet de financer la guerre et donne au conflit toute sa dimension économique.[6] À cela, il faudra ajouter les problèmes fonciers qui opposent les lendus et les hemas, les autochtones et banyarwanda. Les intentions de conquête de territoire que l'on prête au Rwanda qui

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[6] Claude Serfati et Philippe Le Billon, *Mondialisation et conflits des ressources naturelles*, Ed. Presses des sciences Po, 2007, p. 9.

souhaiterait trouver des solutions à l'exiguïté de son territoire en annexant les deux Kivus compliquent davantage la résolution du conflit.

Face à cette complexité, la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), constituée en 1999 de forces hétéroclites sans équipements nécessaires pour la protection de civils et sans mandat clair ne pouvait qu'être impuissante quant au rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité, fortement perturbées par des supposés ennemis de la paix[7].

La théorie du conflit en République Démocratique du Congo

Le conflit de la République Démocratique du Congo échappe presque aux théories de la guerre et de la paix, longtemps mises en avant par les réalistes qui mettaient l'État au centre de la conflictualité. La guerre était synonyme de mobilisation des armées nationales et l'État avait le monopole de cette violence légitime. L'État a toujours été considéré comme l'unique auteur reconnu par les réalistes dans les relations internationales tandis que les néo-réalistes, même s'ils reconnaissent l'existence d'autres acteurs, considèrent l'État comme l'acteur principal. Pendant longtemps, cette conception stato-centrée des relations internationales a servi de base pour analyser les phénomènes de la guerre et de la paix pendant la guerre froide. Depuis 1989, avec la fin de la guerre froide, tout a basculé. Le conflit idéologique a cédé sa place aux conflits de toute nature, notamment avec l'explosion de l'ex-Yougoslavie et de l'ex-Union soviétique "*alors que bon nombre d'observateurs pronostiquaient après la guerre froide un monde post-moderne issu du double triomphe de la paix et de la démocratie*"[8] constate, à juste raison Pascal Chaigneau. Les conflits internes existaient bien avant la fin de la guerre froide "*en Inde, au Sri-Lanka, au Soudan, dans la corne de l'Afrique, au Burundi, au Pérou, au Kurdistan et dans d'autres lieux*" mais ils étaient souvent considérés comme marginaux, sans importance.[9]

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[7] Didier Let, « Genre et paix. Des mariages croisés entre quatre communes de la Marche d'Ancône en 1306 », *Annales, histoire, sciences sociales*, 2012, pp. 629-655.

[8] Pascal Chaigneau, "Géopolitique des conflits africains", *Géopolitique africaine*, no. 7-8, 2002, pp. 83-89.

[9] Bernard Badie, Marie-Claude Smouts, *Le retournement du monde, sociologie de la scène internationale*, 3ème édition, Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1999, p. 171.

En somme, le conflit de la République Démocratique du Congo est un conflit non idéologique impliquant des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques avec des revendications politiques cachant un agenda économique. Ce qui le rend, dès lors, inclassable dans une théorie générale mais il peut trouver sa signification dans plusieurs théories locales. Ce qui importe c'est de trouver dans les théories locales des éléments permettant d'éclairer la problématique et d'appuyer les solutions que nous proposons pour la résolution de ce conflit.

Notre ambition dans le cadre de cette recherche est de proposer des stratégies de résolution du conflit de la République Démocratique du Congo, qui est un conflit complexe, parce que mobilisant plusieurs acteurs étatiques et non étatiques ayant des ambitions différentes. Il est multidimensionnel car il présente les symptômes d'un conflit interétatique, voire régional, vu les États voisins qui sont directement ou indirectement impliqués. À cela, il faut ajouter les dimensions ethnique et économique rendues plus compliquées par la faillite de l'État qui peine à jouer son rôle régalien. Ce type de conflit tire en longueur et laisse des séquelles, notamment sociétales, importantes. Quelles stratégies faut-il mettre en œuvre pour éviter qu'il rejoigne ceux appelés communément "intractable conflict" ou conflits incurables ? Les méthodes de résolution des conflits appliquées par l'ONU et qui reposent sur la mise en place d'un système politique démocratique et l'établissement d'une économie de marché sont-elles adaptées à ce conflit? Pour répondre à ces questions, la théorie de la paix démocratique qui sous-tend les stratégies de l'ONU sera d'abord examinée dans sa dimension politique et économique, afin de vérifier sa conformité avec les conflits internes de manière générale et le conflit de la République Démocratique du Congo, en particulier. Ensuite, nous postulons que la refondation de l'armée, la consolidation des institutions, le développement d'une économie basée sur les piliers de l'économie congolaise (agriculture, mines et exploitation forestière), la mobilisation des médias au service de la paix, la coopération entre la République Démocratique du Congo et ses voisins, l'endiguement des influences extérieures, l'introduction des valeurs de paix dans l'éducation nationale sont autant de solutions proposées pour la résolution du conflit de la République Démocratique du Congo. Étant donné que la vérification de ces hypothèses révélera des limites, nous ne manquerons pas de les souligner.

Méthodologie

Ce travail a commencé par une phase d'exploration du sujet et des théories qui ont éclairé la problématique que nous avons traitée. Différentes sources ont été utilisées pour mener à bien notre recherche. Le recours aux travaux publiés sur le sujet par plusieurs auteurs a été indispensable. Parmi ceux-là, nous citerons: Collier P., "*Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy*, World Bank, Working paper, 2000"; Failly Didier, "*Coltan: pour comprendre...*"; William Zartman, "*Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimata authority*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, p.2; Jacquemot, Pierre, (ex. Ambassadeur de France en RDC), « *Économie politique des conflits en RDC, Revue Cairn. Info – Afrique contemporaine, 2009* ; Roland Pourtier, "*Le Kivu dans la guerre: acteurs et enjeux*", 2009; et Marine Lester, "L'Est de la RDC: Du scandale géologique au scandale politique, économique, humanitaire, 2011". Nous nous sommes contentés des ouvrages, des rapports réguliers et très détaillés des Nations Unies ainsi que des nombreuses organisations non gouvernementales comme Human Rights Watch, International Committee Rescue, Médecins sans frontières, International Crisis Group, L'association nationale pour l'évaluation environnementale et le consortium des recherches sur l'évaluation environnementale des conflits armés en RDC présents sur le terrain. Nous avons diligenté les entretiens semi-dirigés avec certaines organisations de la société civile dans les pays du nord, à l'occurrence de la Belgique et avons consulté des nombreux articles de presse en papier comme sur internet qui nous ont été d'un très grand apport, dans le cadre de nos recherches. En effet, pour traiter cette question, la théorie de la résolution des conflits semble plus adaptée à notre démarche, dans la mesure où elle étudie les causes, la gestion et la consolidation de la paix.

Cependant nous restons conscients de ses limites et du fait qu'elle ne s'adressait pas spécifiquement aux conflits internes comme c'est le cas du conflit congolais. Étant donné aussi que ce conflit est multidimensionnel et que la résolution des conflits englobe plusieurs domaines comme les causes des conflits, la négociation et la consolidation de la paix, nous tenterons chaque fois d'éclairer le domaine traité avec une théorie locale, si nécessaire, avant de le traiter.

Notre méthode a consisté aussi à confronter les faits observés avec la théorie pour en tirer des conclusions, les expliquer et les analyser avant de faire des propositions. Cette démarche permettra d'étudier les causes du conflit dans toutes ses dimensions et d'expliquer le rôle de la communauté internationale sous l'égide de l'ONU dans la gestion du conflit, en questionnant ses stratégies fondées sur la théorie de la paix démocratique avant de proposer des solutions complémentaires alternatives.

Causes et constances du conflit congolais

Le conflit congolais est le produit de l'enchevêtrement entre des causes structurelles et des éléments conjoncturels, qui contribuent à leur donner de l'intensité. Les deux causes structurelles identifiées ici sont un héritage de la colonisation de 1885 à 1960, à savoir la distribution du pouvoir et l'attention portée aux différences ethniques comme mode de mobilisation. Les éléments conjoncturels sont les ingérences extérieures, le rôle des matières premières dans les conflits et l'absence de victoire militaire. S'agissant des causes structurelles, la faillite de l'État, la déliquescence des forces de sécurité et l'absence de justice sociale constituent les éléments déclencheurs du conflit en République Démocratique du Congo. Il s'agit bien évidemment, comme le souligne Emmanuel Banywesize cité par le Professeur Sergiu Miscoiu, de l'absence de l'État de droit, remplacé par la volonté et les caprices des dirigeants, et l'exclusion mutuelle des familles, des ethnies, des tribus, des partis et des courants idéologiques du projet collectif qui repose sur la domination et la mainmise temporaires sur les ressources du pays[10]. En effet, les congolais n'ont jamais profité pleinement de la richesse de leur pays. Les fruits de l'exploitation de ses immenses richesses sont concentrés entre les mains de la classe dirigeante qui en fait un usage impartial et gabégique.

En fait, la faillite d'un État est souvent à la base de désordre sans précédent, conduisant pour la plupart à de violents conflits. Selon le professeur William Zartman" *state collapses when the structure, authority, law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or*

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[10] Sergiu Mișcoiu, Sedagban Hygin Faust Kakai, Koukou Folly Hetcheli (dir.), *Recul démocratique et néoprésidentialisme en Afrique centrale et occidentale,* Iași: Institutul European, 2015, p. 15.

new".[11] En d'autres termes, quand l'État ne remplit pas convenablement ses fonctions régaliennes qui consistent à fournir aux citoyens un système de santé fonctionnel et une éducation de qualité, à assurer la sécurité des personnes et des biens pour ne citer que ceux-là, il est permis de dire qu'il est en faillite. Et la conséquence est que chaque groupe ou chaque citoyen va se substituer à l'État pour assurer sa propre protection car la déliquescence de l'État se traduit, dans une certaine mesure, par la désintégration des forces de sécurité. Tel est le cas de la République Démocratique du Congo.

Quand on se penche sur la configuration politico-administrative héritée de la colonisation, on observe que la caractéristique des rébellions successives de la crise congolaise est assurément la distance séparant la capitale du pays du lieu de la rébellion. Pratiquement toutes les rébellions prennent racine à l'Est et débutent dans les zones frontalières avec des pays voisins. Les deux provinces de Kivus en RDC, à la frontière avec le Rwanda et l'Ouganda tiennent le flambeau même si on a observé d'autres milices au Maniema et au Katanga. Cette constante est une conséquence de l'organisation territoriale des pays africains héritée de la colonisation : la priorité donnée par les colonisateurs à l'exportation des biens explique qu'ils aient privilégié comme centres administratifs et économiques des bordures côtières ou fluviales, au détriment de l'arrière-pays. Ainsi, Kinshasa, la capitale de la RDC, est situé en bordure du fleuve Congo.

À cette configuration politico-administrative s'est ajouté le fait que l'État congolais a été créé avant d'être une nation, sur la base d'une multiplicité des peuples ethniquement différents.[12] À ne considérer que les régions des Kivu, il y a une mosaïque des peuples dits « autochtones », des peuples hutu et tutsi de souche et de culture kinyarwanda, mais aussi d'une importante population immigrée venue du Rwanda ou du Burundi à des moments différents pendant la colonisation. Ainsi, le sentiment national dans des pays comme l'ex-Zaïre est-il davantage né de l'allégeance au dirigeant en

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[11] William Zartman, *Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority*, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Punlishers, Boulder, p. 2.

[12] Gérard Eddie Guipié, *La question ethnique dans la formation des alliances interétatiques lors des conflits armés en RDC et dans les Grands Lacs Africains* (Thèse de doctorat, École doctorale de droit), Lyon, 2014.

place – Joseph-Désiré Mobutu[13] – que de la définition formelle d'un projet national. Bien qu'existant jusqu'à aujourd'hui, ce sentiment national n'a pas mis fin à la persistance de la solidarité ethnique comme outil de mobilisation politique[14].L'adoption de constitutions démocratiques et l'instauration du multipartisme au début des années 1990, en fragilisant ces régimes autocratiques, a aussi ébranlé la domination de la conception de la nation qu'ils avaient jusque-là imposée.

Le règne de la majorité qu'implique le scrutin majoritaire a remis au cœur du débat la question de la composition de la nation, donc du corps politique et électoral. La marginalisation politique de certaines populations à l'instar des rwandophones comme cela a été lors de la Conférence nationale souveraine, a été un catalyseur de crises futures. Il suffit ici d'évoquer l'épisode de la guerre dite des Banyamulenge (rapidement récupérée par l'AFDL de Laurent-Désiré Kabila) pour s'en convaincre. Ce qui s'observe dans le conflit qui endeuille la RD Congo aujourd'hui, c'est la plupart des mouvements insurgés manifestent un attachement au cadre territorial et national hérité de la colonisation et n'affichent pas de tendances sécessionnistes et ne réclament pas un rattachement aux pays voisins.[15]

Contrairement à ce qui se passe ailleurs où les différences ethniques et religieuses sont des éléments de mobilisation pour les groupes insurgés, au Congo Kinshasa, ces dimensions doivent être relativisées. Il est difficile de nier que les tensions ethniques n'existaient pas avant les conflits à l'Est de la RD Congo, notamment dans les deux provinces du Kivu. Cependant, ces tensions constituent rarement l'élément déclencheur du conflit. Loin d'être un élément structurant des conflits, l'appartenance ethnique ou religieuse s'avère avant tout un outil de mobilisation pour des mouvements rebelles ou insurgés.

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[13] Herbert F. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, "The enduring idea of Congo", in Ricardo René Laremont (dir.), *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, Boulder/London: Lynne Rennier Publishers, 2005, p. 159.

[14] Lazare Ki-Zero, « La crise de l'État en Afrique », *L'Europe en formation*, no. 296, print. 1995, p. 65.

[15] Filip Reyntjens, "The privatization and the criminalization of public space in the geopolitics of Great Lakes Region", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4, 2005, p. 604.

Eléments conjoncturels : les ingérences des pays voisins

La proximité des provinces en rébellion aux frontières du pays renforce la probabilité d'une alliance ad hoc entre les mouvements rebelles et les pays avoisinants. Cet aspect du conflit congolais a été sous-estimé et les pays occidentaux n'y ont accordé qu'une attention très discrète sans toutefois le condamner. La faiblesse intrinsèque de l'Etat congolais tend à exclure toute velléité d'expansion de sa part ; par contre, cet État dispose à la fois les effets de la solidarité ethnique transnationale dont bénéficient les groupes insurgés rwandophiles et ougandophiles et la volonté des régimes rwandais et ougandais d'intervenir chez son voisin pour des buts précis.

La cause principale de l'instabilité persistante dans l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo est l'ingérence de ses voisins rwandais et ougandais depuis 1996. Ces deux pays, qui ont participé militairement au renversement du maréchal Mobutu, ont créé l'AFDL de Laurent-Désiré Kabila, qui servait de vitrine congolaise à ce qui était de fait une invasion étrangère. Le Rwanda et l'Ouganda justifiaient alors leurs actions par des objectifs sécuritaires qui étaient de priver leurs rébellions respectives de leurs sanctuaires zaïrois dans les Kivus et en Ituri. Les événements ont cependant montré que ces objectifs sécuritaires dissimulaient des visées expansionnistes.

Le régime rwandais a utilisé le territoire congolais comme un théâtre de projection de sa puissance au détriment du régime de Mobutu et du régime de Kabila. Ce dernier échappa à la défaite en 1998 face à son ancien allié uniquement grâce à la mobilisation populaire et au soutien de l'Angola, du Zimbabwe, du Soudan et de la Namibie ; il échappa aussi à l'emprise de son ex-allié ougandais qu'il a vaincu militairement à Kisangani en 1997(RDC).[16]

Dans les faits, on a pu voir que le Rwanda a affirmé sa puissance en contrôlant, après 1998, les Kivus via sa vitrine congolaise, le RCD/Goma (Rassemblement des Congolais pour la démocratie). Ce mouvement rebelle qui se prétendait protecteur des populations tutsies est devenu, depuis le

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[16] Bernard Leloup, « Le Rwanda et ses voisins, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs », *Annuaire 2004-2005*, pp. 152-159.

retrait officiel des forces rwandaises en 2002, son bras politique en RD Congo. Le Rwanda, à travers le RCD-Goma, instrumentalise le sentiment anti-tutsi de la majorité des Congolais – en réaction aux invasions rwandaises – pour justifier son refus de désarmer ou d'intégrer les forces armées nationales, afin de maintenir son emprise sur les Kivus[17]. Il contribue de cette manière à détacher cette région – et ses populations – de la RDC pour l'installer durablement dans l'orbite rwandaise.

Par ailleurs, les ressources naturelles sont apparues comme un outil de prolongation des conflits en RD Congo[18]. Les liens entre la présence de ressources naturelles et les crises à l'Est de RD Congo sont aussi évidents qu'ils peuvent être diffus. La richesse du sous-sol constitue une donnée importante : minerais, diamants, bois, coltan, etc.[19] S'il est avéré que la présence d'importantes ressources matérielles dans une région augmente la probabilité des conflits du fait de l'absence de redistribution des revenus tirés de leur exploitation, une incertitude demeure à propos de son importance dans l'échelle des priorités des belligérants.

Deux tendances qui ne sont pas exclusives se dégagent. La première est que le contrôle des régions produisant des matières premières constitue un but intermédiaire, lequel serait l'affaiblissement de l'Etat qui en tire ses revenus. La seconde tendance observée, à l'Est de la RDC, fait du contrôle de ces zones un objectif prioritaire à des fins de financement des activités militaires. Dans l'Est du Congo, le contrôle de l'Ituri et des Kivus par les différents mouvements rebelles et leurs parrains ougandais et rwandais a donné lieu à une exploitation accélérée des minéraux comme l'or, le coltan.[20] L'exploitation des ressources s'avère pernicieuse pour la mise en œuvre d'un processus de paix et s'érige rapidement en facteur de prolongation du conflit. Du fait des positions économiques avantageuses

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[17] Filip Reyntjens, "Rwandan: ten years from genocide to dictatorship", *African Affairs*, vol. 103, no. 411, 2004, p. 207.

[18] Rapport final du Groupe d'experts de l'ONU, 2002.

[19] Marine Lester, « L'est de la République Démocratique du Congo : du scandale géologique au scandale politique, économique, humanitaire » *Les Cahiers d'Outre-mer*, 2011, pp.435-438

[20] Jeroen Cuvelier, « Réseaux de l'ombre et configurations régionales : le cas du commerce du coltan en République Démocratique du Congo », *Politique Africaine*, no. 93, 2004, pp. 82-92.

acquises pendant le conflit, il devient difficile pour de nombreuses parties d'intégrer un cadre politique légal qui exclut certaines pratiques.[21] Les acteurs qui en profitent privilégient donc le statu quo en entretenant l'instabilité.

Les acteurs étatiques ou régionaux impliqués dans le conflit

Sept pays sont à des formes et niveaux divers impliqués dans le conflit : la République Démocratique du Congo est le pays agressé car la guerre se déroule sur son sol. Le Zimbabwe, l'Angola et la Namibie sont venus au secours de Kabila à sa demande. Le Rwanda, l'Ouganda et le Burundi sont considérés comme les agresseurs et anciens alliés de Laurent Désiré Kabila qui se sont subitement retournés contre lui. D'autres pays comme le Tchad, la Libye, l'Erythrée, la Zambie ont une implication moindre dans le conflit.

Acteurs intérieurs

La guerre du Kivu est une guerre africaine : on se massacre entre Africains. En tuant de préférence des civils, il y a moins de risques pour les détenteurs de « kalach » et autres armes de plus en plus destructrices. Loin est le temps où les mercenaires, dans les années 1960, avaient fait du Congo le terrain de leurs aventures. Toutefois, il ne faut pas perdre de vue qu'aucun des belligérants ne possède d'usine d'armement et que la guerre par conséquent est alimentée par le commerce mondialisé et généralement illicite des armes, munitions et autres équipements militaires (jusqu'à l'habillement). Les systèmes de télécommunication, en particulier le téléphone portable, qui jouent un rôle essentiel dans des guerres de mouvement sont contrôlés par des groupes internationaux. Le Rwanda constitue un proche et efficace relais logistique pour les rebelles tutsis.

Ces acteurs intérieurs connus et reliés au conflit peuvent être classés de la manière suivante :

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[21] Philippe Hugon, « Conflictualité armée en Afrique : le rôle des facteurs économiques », *The Europea Journal of Development Research*, vol. 18, no 2, 2006, p. 26

Les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) qui ne constituent pas une armée unifiée, disciplinée et en ordre de marche. Cette armée congolaise présente les mêmes faiblesses que celles des ex-Forces Armées Zaïroises de Mobutu. Ces troupes mal payées et contraintes de facto à vivre dans le pays, manquent de discipline. Il est à souligner qu'il y a coupure entre l'État-major et le terrain des opérations ainsi que la corruption d'officiers plus sensibles à la « politique du ventre » qu'à l'engagement au combat.[22] La débandade des soldats des FARDC après chaque avancée des rebelles témoigne de la faiblesse de leurs capacités combattantes. Les soldats se livrent aux actes de pillage et de violences contre les populations civiles, faisant fi de toute éthique militaire.

Les milices Mai-Mai[23] constituent des groupes d'autodéfense des communautés locales et présentent ainsi une forte identité ethnique. Les groupes Mai-Mai sont à la fois très autonomes et facilement instrumentalisés par les leaders politiques et autres entrepreneurs de guerre ; leurs alliances sont changeantes. Le seul point commun réside dans le rejet des étrangers, en l'occurrence les Rwandais, principalement les Tutsis. Dans le contexte actuel, ils combattent au côté des FARDC pour repousser les rebelles dont ils ne tolèrent pas l'origine rwandaise. Le même rapport de l'ONU de décembre 2008 confirme que les Mai-Mai constituent le troisième groupe armé le plus important après le Front Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) et le Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) transformé aujourd'hui en M23.[24]

Le Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, (CNDP) appelé M23 en 2012.

Ce mouvement politico-militaire est issu au départ de populations rwandophones, désignées sous l'appellation générique « Banyarwanda » et plus précisément de leur composante tutsie « Banyamulenge »[25] Le chef de

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[22] Le rapport du groupe d'experts de l'ONU sur la RDC sur les ventes d'armes par les officiers de FARDC, y compris au CNDP, 2008.

[23] Franck van Acker, Koen Vlassenroot, « Les Mai-Mai et les fonctions de la violence milicienne dans l'Est du Congo », *Politique africaine*, no. 84, 2001, pp. 103-116.

[24] Rapport de l'ONU, Décembre 2008.

[25] Banyarwanda signifie "les gens du Rwanda", Banyamulenge "les gens de Mulenge" du nom d'un village du massif de l'Itombwé en RDC, à l'Ouest du Lac tanganyika, habité par les pasteurs tutsis. Avec l'ethnicisation croissante des rapports sociétaux, le terme de Banyamulenge a tendance à englober l'ensemble des Tutsis vivant au Congo.

ce mouvement a justifié sa rébellion par la nécessité de protéger les Tutsis du Congo, dont la sécurité et les intérêts économiques apparaissent menacés depuis que la mise en œuvre des accords de Pretoria a modifié la configuration géopolitique de la nouvelle RDC. De profondes affinités rapprochent les Tutsis congolais de ceux du Rwanda. Un certain nombre de cadres militaires du CNDP (actuel M23) s'étaient engagés au côté du Front Patriotique Rwandais jusqu'à la prise du pouvoir à Kigali en 1994. Après plusieurs tentatives destinées à les intégrer dans la nouvelle armée congolaise (FARDC), le processus dit de « mixage » ou de « brassage » s'est finalement soldé par un échec, préludant à la reprise des combats, fin 2007. Cette trajectoire explique en grande partie l'efficacité des troupes du CNDP (M23). Aguerries dans les combats passés, ces troupes qui maîtrisent l'art de la guerre, ne connaissent pas les faiblesses de l'armée congolaise qui ne parvient pas à devenir « nationale ». Soutenues par le Rwanda, notamment en logistique et en équipements, elles représentent la composante armée la mieux organisée et la plus déterminée de tous les belligérants avec un effectif évalué à 7000 hommes. Depuis ses premières victoires sur les FARDC, les forces armées du CNDP (M23) n'ont cessé de monter en puissance. En automne 2008, elles se sont emparées d'une grande quantité d'armes et de munitions lors de la prise du camp militaire de Rumangabo, situé au nord de Goma. En 2012 ces troupes ont fait une entrée fracassante dans Goma pour piller les commerces, banques et faire toutes sortes d'exactions contre les populations civiles.

Le Front Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR

Les survivants des forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) durant la période où les Hutus exerçaient le pouvoir et des miliciens Interahamwe, acteurs centraux du génocide de 1994, ont cherché à se donner une respectabilité politique en opérant sur le territoire congolais. Depuis la destruction en 1996 des camps de réfugiés hutus installés en RDC, une dizaine de milliers de rescapés ont trouvé refuge dans les forêts du Kivu où ils ont fini par s'installer durablement avec la bienveillance sinon le soutien actif du gouvernement congolais. Pour le Rwanda, la présence de ces Hutus en RDC représente une pomme de discorde interdisant toute relation durablement pacifiée entre les deux pays, mais elle est aussi un alibi commode pour légitimer diverses formes d'interventions rwandaises

au Kivu. Depuis la recrudescence des combats entre l'armée rebelle et les forces armées congolaises, le FDLR lutte ouvertement au côté de celles-ci qui lui fournissent armes et munitions. Outre cette source d'approvisionnement, le financement de la composante armée du FDLR provient principalement de l'exploitation des ressources minières dans les zones qu'il contrôle au Nord et au Sud Kivu. Le communiqué commun signé par la RDC et le Rwanda le 9 novembre 2007 soulignait la priorité de s'attaquer au problème du désarmement et du rapatriement des Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. La résolution 1856 du 22 décembre 2008 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies insiste à nouveau sur ce point avec raison, car aucune sortie de crise n'est imaginable sans ce préalable[26]. Les interventions du Rwanda dans l'Est de la RDC ne sont toutefois justifiées par son gouvernement qu'en raison de la nécessité de combattre les « forces négatives » hutues, ces anciens génocidaires qui ont trouvé refuge au Kivu et constituent un fort potentiel d'insécurité. La présence des FDLR sur le territoire congolais arrange bien des acteurs en eau trouble[27].

La Mission des Nations Unies en RDC, la MONUC

Créée en novembre 1999, elle est la plus importante et la plus coûteuse des missions actuelles des Nations Unies. Elle compte actuellement quelque 19000 soldats, dont plus de la moitié, au Nord-Kivu. En dépit de cet engagement dont le coût annuel se chiffre à plus d'un milliard de dollars US, il n'est ni exagéré ni provocateur de dire qu'elle a surtout servi à verser de confortables salaires à ses militaires-fonctionnaires. Ils sont originaires de pays en développement et que par conséquent la guerre au Kivu participe d'une certaine manière à l'aide internationale en faveur des pays du Sud.[28] Les populations du Kivu, en dehors de quelques prostituées, de quelques chauffeurs recrutés localement savent qu'elles n'ont pas profité de leur présence : l'essentiel des approvisionnements de la MONUC est importé et la protection des populations civile n'a pas été assurée. La

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[26] Résolution de l'ONU 1856 du 22 décembre 2008.

[27] Résolution de l'ONU 1856 du 22 décembre 2008.

[28] Au 7-10-2008 : les principaux contingents par nationalité se répartissaient ainsi: Inde(4372), Pakistan (3551), Bangladesh (1330), Uruguay (1324), Afrique du Sud(1056), Népal (1030)- Source ONU.

préoccupation principale de l'ONU étant qu'il n'y ait aucune victime dans les rangs de ses soldats, comment pourrait-elle pacifier le Kivu, c'est-à-dire désarmer les FDLR, les Mai-Mai et les troupes du M23? La MONUC qui est mandatée pour utiliser ses moyens de surveillance et d'inspection pour empêcher les groupes armés illégaux de bénéficier d'un appui provenant du trafic des ressources naturelles semble ne pas jouer son rôle. Les populations du Kivu trouvent cette organisation complice dans l'escalade du conflit qui les menace. L'exploitation des ressources comme facteur de perpétuation du conflit est clairement ciblée et l'ONU semble y participer. Cette mission sera éventuellement remplacée par la MONUSCO dont le mandat est prorogé jusqu'au 1er février 2015.[29]

Acteurs africains

Les voisins : l'ombre du Rwanda

Le Rwanda est un acteur essentiel de la guerre du Kivu. Non seulement parce que la déstabilisation de l'Est de la RDC est la conséquence directe de ses problèmes internes, mais aussi parce que le Rwanda essaie d'exercer un contrôle sur l'Est du Kivu, tant pour sa sécurité que pour s'approprier des terres et des ressources minières. Le Rwanda est certainement le pays le plus impliqué dans le conflit avec l'Ouganda. Après avoir longtemps nié toute implication dans le conflit congolais, le Rwanda par le biais de Paul Kagamé a reconnu publiquement[30] avoir aidé la rébellion conduite par Kabila à conquérir le pouvoir au Zaïre. Le Rwanda avait fourni armes et entraînement aux troupes de Kabila et "*l'armée rwandaise a participé dans la prise d'au moins quatre villes (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kenge et Kisangani).*"[31]L'Ouganda a aussi des visées économiques sur le Nord de la province, mais il est surtout concerné par le conflit, à certains égards comparables, de l'Ituri. Le Rwanda a été choisi par les Américains comme zone d'influence pour l'Afrique centrale ainsi que le contrôle de l'Afrique de l'Est. C'est ainsi que les Américains y placent leur

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[29] Résolution S/RES/2136 (2014).

[30] Interview accordée au Washington post, le 9 juillet 1997.

[31] *Ibidem*.

base militaire et soutiennent clairement ce pays où ils instrumentent sur place des unités bien formées et livrent matériel et équipement sophistiqués. Ainsi, le Rwanda rend service aux multinationales qui opèrent en RDC pour l'évacuation de leurs produits.[32] La question de l'implication du Rwanda dans la guerre du Kivu fait toujours problème, car elle pose *in fine* celle du périmètre de l'État. Le chevauchement d'identités ethniques transfrontalières et d'appartenance nationale dessine des configurations complexes et des statuts ambigus. Le Rwanda souhaite que l'Est de la RDC demeure une zone de souveraineté partagée pour des raisons économiques et de ce fait, il veut demeurer une plaque tournante pour l'exportation des minerais extraits en RDC (coltan, cassitérite,…). La découverte des gisements pétroliers a aiguisé l'appétit des pays voisins qui estiment que l'exploitation de ceux-ci devrait être partagée entre l'Ouganda et le Rwanda.

Le rôle de l'Ouganda : la sécurité comme leitmotiv

À l'instar de son allié rwandais, l'Ouganda est impliqué dans le conflit de la République Démocratique du Congo mais avec un niveau d'implication et de motivations différentes. Même s'il est accusé au même titre que le Rwanda et le Burundi quant à la prédation de richesses, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il reste très préoccupé par la sécurité de son territoire car le Maréchal Mobutu *"tolérait, depuis longtemps, la présence dans le Kivu de mouvements de guérilla hostiles au Président ougandais Museveni"*.[33]

Le rôle du Burundi : le droit de sécuriser ses frontières

L'implication du Burundi dans le conflit congolais semble très limitée, en tout cas largement inférieure au niveau d'implication du Rwanda et de l'Ouganda. Sa participation relève plutôt d'une *complicité tolérante*[34] que de l'engagement actif. Ainsi, l'entrée des troupes de l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR) et du matériel au sud Kivu s'est faite à travers le territoire

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[32]Alain Deneault, « Noir Canada : pillage, corruption et criminalité en Afrique », *Éco société*, 2008, p. 9.

[33] Marie Joannidis, Christophe Champlin, "République Démocratique du Congo: le dossier d'un conflit régional", *Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, vol.33, 1999, p. 144.

[34] Olivier Lanotte, *République Démocratique du Congo, guerres sans frontières, op.cit.*, p. 173.

burundais en parfait accord avec le régime de Bujumbura.[35] Selon Olivier Lanotte, cette modération de Buyoya, Président Burundais est due au manque d'effectifs de l'armée burundaise qui devait faire face aux assauts de trois mouvements rebelles. Ce qui l'empêche de combattre dans plusieurs fronts.

Les puissances régionales : les ambitions de l'Angola

Parmi les deux principaux alliés de la RDC, le Zimbabwe est aujourd'hui hors course car très affaibli par la crise politique qui le paralyse, son économie est ruinée. En revanche, l'Angola entend jouer un rôle régional à la hauteur de sa nouvelle richesse pétrolière. Son soutien à la RDC en échange d'avantages économiques, est aussi un moyen de damer le pion aux ambitions du Rwanda. Plusieurs témoignages ont récemment fait état de la présence d'Angolais au Kivu. Selon le journal « Le Potentiel » publié à Kinshasa, il pourrait s'agir d'instructeurs et d'officiers du renseignement. Si l'Angola intervenait militairement aux côtés de la RDC, ce serait le signe d'une nouvelle régionalisation du conflit.[36]

Les axes de tension

Comme nous l'avons signalé au début de notre analyse, pour beaucoup d'acteurs le chaos entretenu en RDC permet une exploitation illicite des ressources naturelles. Des réseaux maffieux, mais aussi des multinationales bien connues, achètent et commercialisent des produits issus de cette contrebande sans devoir payer quelque redevance à l'État congolais. Et pour des pays voisins comme l'Ouganda, mais surtout le Rwanda, la RDC est un réservoir à exploiter ou à extraire en toute quiétude aussi bien pour assurer la gestion interne de leur clientèle politique que pour soutenir leurs efforts de développement. Depuis le début de la guerre jusqu'à ce jour, un complexe militaro-commercial s'est développé en Ouganda qui organise l'exploitation et le trafic de l'or, du bois et du diamant de la RDC, tout en évitant la répression systématique comme celle

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[35] Claude Kabemba, « Rapport Written no 16/2000 : De l'indépendance à la première guerre mondiale africaine », UNCHR, *Centre de documentation et de recherche*, 2001, p. 16.

[36] Courrier international, 2008. No 941

qui existe dans les territoires occupés par les Rwandais[37] Le dernier rapport du groupe d'experts donne des précisions quant au partage de facto des territoires miniers entre les groupes armés illégaux, mais aussi les militaires des FARDC.

Les FDLR détiennent les positions les plus importantes; ils comptent parmi eux de grands commerçants qui négocient avec les comptoirs de vente ayant pignon sur rue, y compris au Rwanda.[38] Le Rwanda n'est pas doté des ressources naturelles dont regorge la province congolaise du Kivu qui le jouxte. Ses rapports annuels font clairement état des exportations, en Occident, de ces ressources à partir de son territoire. En mai 2002, le Rwanda et l'Ouganda ne se sont-ils pas affrontés à Kisangani, capitale de la province orientale, pour le contrôle de cette ville congolaise, pourtant située loin de leurs territoires respectifs ? Dans cette province abondent moult ressources, entre autres : diamant, or, pétrole, etc. L'exploitation des matières premières en provenance du Kivu semble être militarisée et partiellement sous contrôle d'officiers de l'armée rwandaise sans que l'on voie trace d'une implication étrangère directe. La commercialisation se fait par les filières commerciales d'avant-guerre, contrôlées par les commerçants libanais ou rwandais en collaboration avec ou sous contrôle d'officiers de l'armée rwandaise. L'opacité des réseaux de commercialisation fait l'affaire de tous les acteurs. Les circuits de l'or sont particulièrement opaques, les activités illégales profitant aux groupes armés, aux commerçants, aux transporteurs, aux douaniers, etc. avant que l'or ne s'envole pour Dubaï, sa destination de prédilection. Dans un contexte général, la seule loi qui puisse prévaloir sur le terrain est celle de la *kalachnikov*. Mais si ce conflit perdure, c'est en grande partie parce que beaucoup d'acteurs extérieurs y trouvent leur intérêt.

Pour le Rwanda, la perpétuation de la confusion au Kivu favorise son entreprise de peuplement, ses positions économiques dans la commercialisation des ressources minières et son influence politique. Pour les multinationales et plus généralement toutes les entreprises mondialisées, les productions extraites du sous-sol du Kivu par une multitude de

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[37] Erik Kennes, « Le secteur minier au Congo : Déconnexion et descente aux enfers », *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2000-2001*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000, p. 327.
[38] Roland Pourtier, « Le Kivu dans la guerre : acteurs et enjeux », *EchoGéo Sur le Vif*, 2009, p. 12.

creuseurs misérables sont une aubaine, car mises sur le marché à vil prix, elles permettent des bénéfices considérables tout au long d'une chaîne de commercialisation où les activités réputées licites frayent sans vergogne avec le monde obscur de l'illicite. L'explosion de la demande mondiale de tantale[39] à la fin des années 1990 a aiguisé l'appétit des pays voisins de la RDC. Ce métal se trouve en effet en abondance dans le sous-sol du Kivu sous la forme d'un minerai composite, la colombo-tantalite, en abrégé *coltan*.[40] Il se trouve que la fièvre du coltan a correspondu à la période d'occupation du Kivu par les militaires rwandais et ougandais, période durant laquelle toutes les ressources naturelles, bois, or, coltan ont fait l'objet d'un pillage systématique, dénoncé à partir de 2001 par un groupe d'experts mandatés par l'ONU.[41] Le tantale nous semble le seul métal produit au Kivu vraiment utile pour l'économie minière internationale, et la recherche des gisements et de points d'achat par les compagnies acheteuses est intense. Ainsi, le peuple congolais est obligé de résister parce que ses richesses sont pillées par des puissances étrangères avec la complicité d'une élite congolaise.[42]

La communauté internationale a toujours pris des positions incohérentes sinon contradictoires par rapport à la situation complexe de l'Est de la RDC. On sait depuis longtemps que des armées et des entreprises étrangères y opèrent en toute illégalité et brutalité dans l'exploitation des ressources ; que le droit international y est bafoué avec le non-respect des frontières de la RDC. Des ONG et d'autres acteurs locaux ou étrangers n'arrêtent pas de dénoncer les viols et autres exactions dont les populations locales sont régulièrement victimes. Mais on ne fait pas grand-chose pour aider la RDC à mettre fin à ce conflit. Une force internationale (MONUSCO), bien équipée et très couteuse, y est déployée, mais avec un mandat tellement flou ou limité, sans qu'on sache clairement à quoi sert sa présence.

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[39] Le tantale est utilisé pour la fabrication des condensateurs des téléphones portables et de consoles de jeux.

[40] De Failly Didier, « Coltan : pour comprendre….. », *l'Afrique des Grands Lacs*, *Annuaire 2000-2001*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002, pp.279-306

[41] Groupe d'experts des Nations-Unies de 2001 à 2003 et le même groupe a été reconduit en 2007-2008.

[42] S. Jackson, « Nos richesses sont pillées, Économies des guerres et rumeurs des crimes au Kivu », *Politique africaine*, no. 84, 2001, pp. 117-135.

Aujourd'hui encore, nonobstant les trois rapports des Nations Unies mettant en exergue le soutien accordé par le Rwanda et l'Ouganda au M23, et qui corroborent ce que d'autres observateurs ou analystes avaient toujours stigmatisé, aucun compromis ne se dégage au niveau international pour adopter de vraies sanctions à l'encontre de ces pays pour les contraindre à jouer un rôle plus positif dans la crise congolaise. Bref, pour comprendre notre analyse, il y a lieu, pour clore ce chapitre, d'indiquer trois facteurs majeurs qui semblent expliquer la situation actuelle à l'Est de la RDC avant de proposer une intervention pour parvenir à une paix durable dans cette région :

- les appétits économiques et hégémoniques de certaines puissances étrangères, dont les pays limitrophes comme le Rwanda et l'Ouganda;
- les incohérences et contradictions de la communauté internationale face à la situation en RDC;
- la faiblesse structurelle des institutions étatiques congolaises, et l'incapacité de ses dirigeants d'y trouver une solution véritable dans un horizon de long terme.

L'absence de victoire militaire

Le déroulement de ce conflit congolais porte en germe l'échec de toute tentative extérieure d'imposer la paix. En l'absence d'une victoire de l'une des parties, toute sortie de crise est vouée à être un consensus mou, préalable à de futurs affrontements. Ce conflit permet de dégager un modèle de déroulement en trois étapes, dont l'ultime est la stagnation. Première étape, le déclenchement d'une rébellion à partir d'une province frontalière, souvent avec le soutien de l'État voisin. Deuxième étape, l'échec des rebelles devant la capitale, après que les forces gouvernementales ont bénéficié d'un soutien extérieur : ainsi, l'offensive du Rwanda et de l'Ouganda et de leurs alliées congolais sur Kinshasa a été mise en échec par le gouvernement de Kabila assisté par l'Angola et le Zimbabwe. Troisième étape, le repli de la rébellion vers son point de départ et la partition du pays : les mouvements rebelles congolais se sont repliés vers le nord du pays qu'ils contrôlent, entérinant ainsi la division du pays.

L'incapacité des belligérants à remporter une victoire militaire définitive tient à la faiblesse de leurs moyens en dépit des soutiens extérieurs et de la stratégie employée. Les mouvements rebelles n'ont jamais réussi à sortir des frontières du Kivu, probablement par manque d'un objectif précis de renverser le pouvoir de Kinshasa.

Quant au régime de Kinshasa, il n'a pas non plus réussi à écraser les rébellions probablement à cause de la faiblesse du budget, consacré probablement à autre chose qu'à l'équipement de l'armée gouvernementale.[43]

Ces mouvements rebelles, en l'absence d'un soutien accru de leurs parrains et d'un entraînement conséquent, manquent de capacités pour l'emporter militairement. De plus, les mouvements rebelles sont souvent composés de déserteurs ou de mutins et ont le même déficit de formation que leurs adversaires.

La victoire militaire est rendue encore plus hypothétique par la configuration des ces rébellions où les lignes de partage se font sur des clichés rwandophones. Dans ce cas, la victoire militaire du régime de Kinshasa nécessiterait la disparition des populations soutenant l'adversaire ou leur neutralisation pour un certain temps. Cette stratégie démontre paradoxalement la faiblesse des capacités des belligérants, en ce que les actes de violence à l'égard des civils sont préférés à des affrontements directs. La mise en œuvre de cette stratégie exige cependant une planification, des moyens et un contexte d'indifférence de la communauté internationale. Si ces trois éléments ont été concordants au Rwanda, il n'en a pas été ainsi au Congo Kinshasa, où la présence des troupes de la MONUSCO dissuade les parties de s'attaquer ouvertement aux civils. Toutefois, la multiplication des atrocités, loin de décourager les populations, ne contribue qu'à gonfler les effectifs de la rébellion des rescapés des violences. Le poids croissant de ces derniers au fur et à mesure du conflit fait que les calculs rationnels ayant motivé l'insurrection sont

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[43] Marc Fontrier, « Des armées africaines : Comment et pourquoi faire ? » *Outre-Mer*, no. 11, 2005, p. 375. Voir également Mathilde Leyendecker, Sergiu Mișcoiu, "Passé militaire, trajets militants: La poursuite politique de la lutte armée par les indépendantistes en Casamance" in Michel Catala (dir.), *L'Europe et l'Afrique - Conflits nationaux et coopérations régionales, des indépendances à nos jours*, Rennes : Presses Universitaires des Rennes, 2020, pp. 117-130.

remplacés par des envies de vengeance et des attitudes jusqu'au-boutistes, qui rendent difficile à terme l'établissement d'un dialogue. Il se dégage clairement que les hostilités cessent ou baissent d'intensité davantage du fait de l'incapacité des acteurs à l'emporter que d'une réelle volonté. Cette tendance est renforcée par des interventions extérieures, dont l'impact sur le conflit n'est pas forcément décisif.

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HASHTAG DIPLOMACY AND ITS USE IN AFRICA

Suzanne Graham[*]

Abstract

Hashtag diplomacy or 'Twitter' diplomacy, sometimes referred to as twiplomacy, is an emerging tool used by international policy actors, such as heads of state and diplomats, to conduct public diplomacy and to reach out to worldwide audiences. In a 2018 study of government Twitter users around the world, 951 Twitter accounts were identified as belonging to state leaders and foreign ministries in 187 countries. Therefore, close to 100% of United Nations members states (193 members) consider Twitter to be a valid enough tool to employ on a frequent basis. These users have a combined audience of close to 490 million followers. But what of Twitter's value for individual diplomats, foreign ministries and heads of state and government in Africa? Can this tool be of use in the management and implementation of public diplomacy in a continent where internet penetration is 40% of the combined population and if so, what are these foreign policymakers using it for? This chapter intends to address these questions by exploring the use of hashtag diplomacy in Africa, and other regions, in reference to select examples. It will begin by situating this type of diplomacy under the umbrella of public diplomacy and it will then move on to consider feasibility and reach of this social media platform in Africa.

Keywords: hashtag/Twitter diplomacy; Africa; social media

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Introduction

'A Swedish diplomat once asked me how one can reduce the complexities of international diplomacy to a 140 character tweet. I responded by saying that Twiplomacy must be regarded as an art form, one that uses the language of Twitter in order to condense foreign policy initiatives or official statements into short bursts of diplomacy'.[1]

Hashtag diplomacy or 'Twitter' diplomacy, sometimes referred to as twiplomacy, is an emerging tool used by international policy actors, such as heads of state and diplomats, to conduct public diplomacy and to reach out to worldwide audiences. Twitter is a social media tool that allows all registered users with access to the internet to send short messages, or 'tweets' of up to 280 characters in length (originally 140 characters and which is still the length for some languages). Users can also receive messages, attach web links or other resources and can 'follow' other Twitter users via this platform. Hashtags refer to identifiers, or labels, for specific content posted in tweets. This tool allows users to remain aware of the latest news and events worldwide, and to draw attention to specific statements or images or events quickly through retweeting and all thanks to the relative convenience of a smart-enabled cellular phone or similar device. In a 2018 study of government Twitter users around the world, 951 Twitter accounts were identified as belonging to state leaders and foreign ministries in 187 countries. Therefore, close to 100% of United Nations member states (193 members) consider Twitter to be a valid enough tool to employ on a frequent basis. These users have a combined audience of close to 490 million followers.[2]

But what of Twitter's value for individual diplomats, foreign ministries and heads of state and government in Africa? Can this tool be of use in the management and implementation of public diplomacy in a continent where internet penetration is 40% of the combined population and if so, what are these foreign policymakers using it for? This chapter intends to address these questions by exploring the use of hashtag diplomacy in Africa, and other regions, in reference to select examples. It

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[1] Ilan Manor, "Exploring the Use of Hashtags", *Exploring Digital diplomacy*, 2014, [https://digdipblog.com/2014/09/30/hashtags/], 20 February 2020.

[2] Burson, Cohn & Wolfe, *Twiplomacy study*, 2020, [https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2018/], 20 February 2020.

will begin by situating this type of diplomacy under the umbrella of public diplomacy and it will then move on to consider feasibility and reach of this social media platform in Africa.

Layers Of Public Diplomacy

Diplomacy involves the management of interstate relations and relations between states and other actors.[3] This can be a very intricate business, as Hocking and Melissen support, and any analysis of diplomacy would need to separate out the diplomatic domains (the often complicated context behind negotiations) from diplomatic sites (that is the nature of the process through diplomatic communication occurs via specific channels)[4]. Although questions around the risks of using social media as a communication tool of diplomacy abound, in an increasingly digital world, it cannot be discounted. And it is within this digital debate, that public diplomacy is most often emphasised.

Public diplomacy refers to that mechanism by which the Government of a state promotes its foreign policy goals by communicating its foreign policy to international audiences not only foreign governments but foreign publics too. Communicating foreign policy is key. South Africa, for example, experienced heavy backlash from domestic, and international, audiences in 2017 when it failed to communicate to them, effectively, its reasons for its voting decisions during its first year as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.[5] As an instrument of soft power, public diplomacy has encompassed the cultivating of public opinion in other countries; reporting on international events and their impact on foreign policy; and investing in intercultural communications Public diplomacy, therefore, can be regarded as an overarching concept encompassing cultural diplomacy, public affairs and propaganda.[6] In a

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[3] Ronald P. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy* (4th Edition), London: Routledge, 2013.

[4] Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, *Diplomacy in the Digital Age*, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2015.

[5] Chris Landsberg, Suzanne Graham, "South African foreign-policy formulation, 2009-2016" in Chris Landsberg, Suzanne Graham (eds.), *Government and Politics in South Africa: Coming of Age*, Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2017, pp. 263-285.

[6] Nina Gorenc, "Public Diplomacy as an Instrument of US Foreign and Security Policy" in *Teorija in Praksa*, no. 3-56, 2019, pp. 911-929.

recent study, Sanchez found that Mexico and Russia are using "soft power as part of their diplomatic strategies in Twitter to respond to current challenges of the International Relations dynamic in Foreign Policy issues."[7]

Traditionally states have made use of four correspondence tools in their dealings with each other and other international actors.[8] These are notes; letters; memoranda and aides-memoires. However, Rana contends that "public diplomacy as it takes place now could not be conducted without the ICT revolution" and that due to evolving technologies, "communication with publics is transformed."[9] Although Ciolek asserts that only the mode of delivery is changing and that the purpose of public diplomacy remains unchanged.[10] It is true that "Twitter has taken on diverse and occasional roles in diplomatic communications, from cordial announcements of bi-lateral cooperation to terse exchanges and diplomatic jabs, as well as more casual posts".[11] Indeed, Manor argues that "understanding hashtags, or hashtag literacy, is now a requisite from all those following diplomatic institutions be it scholars, journalists, citizens or even other diplomats."[12] He goes on to state that on occasion hashtags can indicate countries' entire foreign policy initiatives and they offer global followers the chance to understand how countries' promote themselves around the world.[13]

Twitter is appealing because it is quick and by nature enforces succinct short text messages. Public figures, like heads of state, enjoy this advantage as it also accommodates dynamic political situations requiring Twitter storms of information, advice, opinion and responses. Users can

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[7] Ramses Sanchez, *Digital Diplomacy of Mexico and Russia: Cross-National Comparative Analysis*, (MA Dissertation) 2018, [https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/12938/1/MA_ Dissertation_RamsesSanchez_2018.pdf], 26 February 2020.

[8] Ronald P. Barston, *op.cit.*

[9] Kishan S. Rana, *21st Century Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Guide*, London: Continuum, 2011.

[10] Muhammad Ittefaq, "Digital Diplomacy via Social Networks: A Cross-National Analysis of Governmental Usage of Facebook and Twitter for Digital Engagement" in *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia*, no. 1-18, 2019, pp. 49-69.

[11] Datta Dinkar Chavan, "Twitter Diplomacy", 2019 [https://abhipedia.abhimanu.com/Article/IAS/MTE4OTU0/Twitter-Diplomacy-India-and-the-world-IAS], 15 February 2020.

[12] Ilan Manor, "Exploring the Use of Hashtags".

[13] *Ibidem*.

also search for specific hashtags and subjects can trend which draws global attention to them. Moreover, it offers an easy browsing experience on cellular phones. However, Dee argues that:

> "Whilst Twitter has become a major component of diplomatic life, with diplomats themselves frequently tweeting position updates and news from negotiations, it does also present a major challenge for diplomacy. If diplomacy is best achieved where trust is developed quietly and away from the public eye, Twitter can provide the medium for removing that trust between diplomats as any statement, off-hand comment, or 'red-line' presented can be tweeted and showcased to the world. Worse still, it raises serious concerns where diplomats' own politicians can broadcast statements which either contradict or undermine the position they are presenting or even attack the other party with whom the diplomats are seeking to build rapport and trust."[14]

The public reads the tweets of leaders and diplomatic actors and by retweeting or responding to these tweets has the power to legitimise these actors and the foreign policy principles they are communicating.[15] Dissenting from this view are Uysal and Schroeder who contend that, in the case of Turkey, the public has very little power via this social media platform and that 'Twitter' public diplomacy is a decidedly government-driven strategy. In essence it is about propaganda and not about engagement. Moreover, a consequence of this type of diplomatic communication is the birth of a 'new' cult of personality in public diplomacy.[16] Simunjak and Caliandro, argue that US President Donald Trump's interactions with political leaders around the world through Twitter have often failed to employ conventional diplomatic language. President Tump has frequently used Twitter to insult those he opposes, to inform about policy changes or to announce his frustrations. And often it is

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[14] ∗∗∗, "Trump, Twitter and diplomacy", (Commentary for the University of Warwick Knowledge Centre by Guido Van Meersbergen and Megan Dee), *Knowledge Centre*, 2017 [https://warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/knowledgecentre/society/politics/Twitter-diplomacy/], 20 February 2020.

[15] Constance Duncombe, "Twitter and the Challenges of Digital Diplomacy" in *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, no. 2-38, 2018, pp. 91-100.

[16] Nur Uysal, Jared Schroeder, "Turkey's Twitter public diplomacy: Towards a 'new' cult of personality" in *Public Relations Review*, no. 5-45, 2019.

world leaders who take to Twitter to respond to President Trump's declarations.[17] When President Trump allegedly referred to some African countries as in 'very bad shape' and used offensive language to describe them, @NAkufoAddo, President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana, responded on Twitter: "…we will not accept such insults, even from a leader of a friendly country, no matter how powerful".

In a study conducted in the six Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, by Straub, Kruikemier, van der Meulen and van Noort found that Western embassies rarely engage in direct, interactive personal communication with their foreign audiences. Moreover, Western embassies' networks are limited, and social media is used only to post information.[18] O'Boyle suggests that mainstream news houses are relying more and more on social media as a news source.[19] This is an important factor for foreign policy practitioners to consider as social media can, through dialogue and engagement, assist states in building a positive image globally.[20]

Kampf, Manor, and Segev reviewed dialogic communication adopted via social networking sites of 11 Ministries of Foreign Affairs around the globe (including Somalia) and found that these Ministries have "quarantined their engagement with followers".[21] In other words, the potential use of these social platforms has been unfulfilled mainly because Ministries remain committed to conventional broadcast models of communicating diplomatic content.

Cowan and Arsenault refer to three layers of public diplomacy. The first is one-way communication to a foreign audience (monologic), for example through a speech. The second is two-way or multidirectional

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[17] Muhammad Ittefaq, *op.cit.*

[18] Nadine Straub, Sanne Kruikemeier, Heleen van der Meulen, Guda van Noort, "Digital diplomacy in GCC countries: Strategic communication of Western embassies on Twitter" in *Government Information Quarterly* no. 4-32, 2015, pp. 369-379.

[19] Jane O-Boyle, "Twitter diplomacy between India and the United States: Agenda-building analysis of tweets during presidential state visits" in *Global Media and Communication*, no. 1-15, 2019, pp. 121-134.

[20] Muhammad Ittefaq, *op.cit.*

[21] Ronit Kampf, Ilan Manor, Elad Segev, "Digital Diplomacy 2.0? A Cross-national Comparison of Public Engagement in Facebook and Twitter" in *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, no. 10, 2015, pp. 331-362.

communication (dialogue), for example discussions between two heads of state. The third refers to initiatives where people 'work together on a joint venture or project' (collaboration).[22] It is important to consider in what ways hashtag diplomacy may be a useful tool for foreign policy practitioners. It may be that all three layers of public diplomacy, as referred to above, can be facilitated through Twitter. In December 2019 and January 2020 @Paul Kagame, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, tweeted a confirmation of the positive bilateral relations shared between Rwanda and the United Arab Emirates whilst referencing its political leader @MohamedBinZayed; and congratulated his "brother & friend" @hagegeingob, President Hage Geingobon, on his re-election in Namibia and on the growing relationship between Rwanda and Namibia respectively. In another example, in June 2017, United States (US) President Donald Trump announced his intentions to withdraw the US from the Paris Climate Agreement. In response to this, the Prime Ministers of Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland and Denmark coordinated a Twitter reply that the US should not leave the Agreement and @realDonaldTrump should "show global leadership."[23]

Zahran offers another view on the above. She contends that the age of social media has created a new phase of public diplomacy - one that concerns the public. Twitter is a relatively accessible tool for interested publics, and civil society organisations, globally and via this platform they can become content producers of foreign policy agendas not helpless consumers of it. Public choice has also expanded. Publics can choose 'to follow' state leaders they are interested in on Twitter, for example. Governments have become increasingly aware of this and as a result public diplomacy literature has become peppered more and more with phrases such as 'partnerships'; 'mutuality'; 'social networks' and 'relationship building'.[24]

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[22] Geoffrey Cowan, Amelia Arsenault, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy" in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 10-616, 2008.

[23] Burson, Cohn & Wolfe, *op.cit.*

[24] R.S. Zaharna, "From Pinstripes to Tweets", *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, Winter 2015, [https://www.thecairoreview.com/issues/winter-2015/], 15 March 2020.

Twitter Diplomacy In Africa

It is interesting to note that the South African Government (@GovernmentZA) is among the top five most active Twitter accounts in the world, according to the 2018 Twitter study, with more than 30 tweets a day on average.[25] The hashtags #Rwanda and #Kagame are among the most frequently used most especially because the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, consistently refers to these labels in his own tweets. President Kagame appears to value Twitter. He takes the time to respond to his followers and conversations in his Twitter feed, which would require a great deal of time as he has close to 1,8 million. Nearly all of his tweets are responses to other Twitter users. President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya has around 3.3 million followers on Twitter, the most in Africa, followed by Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo, Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari and Rwanda's President Paul Kagame.[26] Table 1 offers a possible explanation as to why Kenya's President has the most followers in Africa; Kenya has the largest percentage of population with access to the internet. Manor contends that the value of Twitter, and other social media platforms, as diplomatic channels for African countries lies in three parts: diaspora diplomacy, networked diplomacy, and nation branding. Africa countries can bolster trade and cultural links with global diasporas by investing in tweets about embassy activities, events, historical connections and common thoughts on economic and political issues.[27] For example, in the UK, the Ethiopian embassy has 7000 followers on Twitter and the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry has an active Twitter presence to important expatriate locations including Canada, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the US and UK. Examples such as these reflect the value of using Twitter for diaspora diplomacy. In relation to networked diplomacy, Manor found that when Amina Mohamed was the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Kenya, she was able to serve as a hub of information linking Ministers that did not follow

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[25] Burson, Cohn & Wolfe, *op.cit.*

[26] *Ibidem*.

[27] Ilan Manor, "Digital Diplomacy in Africa: A Research Agenda", *University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy Blog*, January 20, 2016 [https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/digital-diplomacy-africa-research-agenda], 10 March 2020.

each other directly on Twitter. At the time, she performed the role of "an information junction…, attracting attention from her peers around the globe."[28] This reflects a type of social media mobility which small countries may also make use of to elevate their global diplomatic positions.

Table 1. Percentages of Top 10 African Countries in Terms of Internet Penetration (as of June 2019, rounded off)

Country	% population with access to the internet	% internet growth over two decades (2000-2019)
1. Kenya	90%	23%
2. Liberia	81%	805%
3. Seychelles	70%	1%
4. Tunisia	67%	8%
5. Morocco	65%	24%
6. Mali	63.4%	66%
7. Mauritius	63.2%	824%
8. Cabo Verde	62.8%	4%
9. Gabon	62%	9%
10. Nigeria	61%	62%
11. South Africa	56%	1%

In terms of nation branding governments can make use of Twitter to flex any soft power they may have; manage their international reputation and attract investors. In July 2015 US President Barack Obama visited Kenya as part of the Global Entrepreneurial Summit. This visit drew a lot of media attention and Kenyan authorities made use of this attention to boost its brand internationally via Twitter, and other media. It marketed itself as

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[28] *Ibidem*.

a rising economic power with growth opportunities for international investors to close on two million people. This was done through the use of the Obama hashtag alongside #chooseKenya as well as Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta's personal Twitter handle and the President's official channel. When the American news network CNN made a serious error in labelling Kenya a 'hotbed of terror', prior to Obama's visit, Kenya's active Twitter community criticised the network, setting it right, using the hashtag #someonetellcnn, which trended for several days.[29]

Turning Off Twitter

In 2016 the governments of Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Togo and Uganda shut down social media platforms during elections and in some cases instituted full internet blackouts.[30] In March 2019 Chadian citizens had experienced a full year of Government restrictions on social media platforms such as Twitter.[31] These shutdowns had been imposed since March 2018 when constitutional changes were permitted allowing Chad's President Idriss Deby, in power since 1990, to continue in his role until 2033. Chadian public protests had been on the increase in recent years due to "austerity measures, increased economic hardship following a drop in oil prices, and violence between ethnic groups."[32]

The Police Chief in Ghana, a noted democratic state, also threatened to shut down the internet during the run up to Ghana's general elections that in 2016. However, a backlash from Ghanaian civil society resulted in Ghana's President declaring that the government had no intention of

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[29] Murithi Mutiga, "CNN executive flies to Kenya to apologise for 'hotbed of terror' claim", *The Guardian*, 14 August 2015, [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/cnn-kenya-apologise-obama], 25 March 2020.

[30] Abdi Latif Dahir, "More African Governments Are Trying to Control What's Being Said on Social Media and Blogs", *Quartz Africa*, July 17, 2018, [https://qz.com/africa/1329145/african-governments-silence-social-media-bloggers-on-Twitter-whatsapp-facebook/], 21 February 2020.

[31] Abdi Latif Dahir, "Chad Has Now Spent A Full Year Without Access to Social Media", *Quartz Africa*, March 28, 2019, [https://qz.com/africa/1582696/chad-has-blocked-whatsapp-facebook-Twitter-for-a-year/], 21 February 2020.

[32] *Ibidem*.

closing social media platforms during the elections.[33] When the Ugandan government blocked Twitter and other social media sites on election day, citizens took measures to circumvent these blocks by using virtual private networks (VPNs). Governments tend to suggest that they are shutting down these sites to avoid electoral fraud or the spreading of misinformation or 'fake' news or because of security concerns.[34] The public sees it as clamping down on freedoms. In other examples of state control in Africa, Tanzanian bloggers have to pay government authorities more than $900 for web licenses; and officials in Egypt banned calls using social media platforms; "blocked hundreds of local and international websites, and called for the launch of a state-owned, Facebook-like platform."[35]

Reasons For Using Twitter

In a 2016 study conducted by Portland Communications, entitled, 'How Africa Tweets', political hashtags made up close to 9% of all hashtags in Africa. This was an interesting finding especially since this percentage was comparatively higher than those in the UK, US, France or Canada, where data and social media platforms are largely more accessible. This study suggests two reasons for this. Either African populations are more politically engaged, or conventional channels for freedom of expression are limited encouraging users to go online to express their voice. A main finding of this study revealed that "Twitter is a valuable tool for engaging a population around an issue or an election."[36]

This is an important point for policymakers and advisors in cabinets to reflect upon as social media can become an important Government communication tool - amongst other things. In 2015, for example, Egypt had the most tweets in Africa with 456 million, followed by Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Ghana with 347; 323; 76 and 65 million tweets

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[33] Kate Hairsine, "Using Social Media for Good During Ghana's Elections", *DW*, 5.12.2016 [https://www.dw.com/en/using-social-media-for-good-during-ghanas-elections/a-36646065].
[34] *Ibidem*.
[35] Ilan Manor, "Exploring the Use of Hashtags".
[36] Portland Communications, "How Africa Tweets: Politics and the Twitter Revolution", 2016 [https://portland-communications.com/publications/politics-and-the-Twitter-revolution/], 25 February 2020.

respectively.[37] It is also important to note that although Twitter may not always be effective as a protest or campaign tool, the #Kony2012 movement ended in failure as the leader of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, eluded capture despite the world's focus; in some instances if enough people 'speak' through platforms such as these, governments start to pay attention.

In April 2014 over 200 girls were abducted from their schools in Nigeria by Boko Haram, a radical Islamic group. The Vice President of the World Bank for Africa, Oby Ezekwesili openly called on the Nigerian government to 'bring back our girls'. Thereafter, Twitter users across Nigeria began using the hashtag #BringBackOur Girls and very soon over a million tweets included this hashtag worldwide.[38] The hashtag #BringBackOurGirls movement became a global campaign that drew attention from around the world, endorsed by Michelle Obama, US First Lady at the time, and highlighted the plight of ordinary citizens in Nigeria's north-east at the mercy of Boko Haram's activities. However, the initial global attention began to fade and two years later some girls were released. One hundred and twelve girls remain missing.

Examples from Africa indicate that Ministries of Foreign Affairs are using tweets to advertise important milestones in bilateral relations; to express messages of condemnation, condolence or congratulations; to declare solidarity and support by retweeting, and to relay information. For example, in August 2019, Chad's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, @ChadianMFA, retweeted Moussa Faki Mahamat's, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, call for a new multilateral world order post-G7 Summit. This tweet declared that Africa knows what it wants – all its partners to adapt by responding to #Agenda2063 for #TheAfricaWeWant. In October 2019 @ChadianMFA reported a meeting between Chad's Foreign Minister, Cherif Mahamat Zene and United Kingdom Ambassador to Chad, Rowan Laxton. They met to talk over strengthening bilateral and

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[37] *Ibidem*.

[38] Matt Collins, "#BringBackOurGirls: the power of a social media campaign", *The Guardian*, 9 May 2014,
[https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-network/2014/may/09/bringbackourgirls-power-of-social-media], 20 February 2020.

business relations between the two countries.[39] The Ministry also congratulated Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali on his Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019. @ChadianMFA tweeted: "You have inspired Africa and the whole world for signing a peace deal with Eritrea and ending two decades of hostilities. Well deserved award". In November 2019, @ChadianMFA tweeted Chad's condemnation of 'terrorist' attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso respectively and reached out to the people and governments of both countries to offer Chad's support. For public diplomacy purposes it is important for Twitter followers to be given some insight into what is being tweeted.

South Africa's Department of International Relations and cooperation (@DIRCO_ZA) tweeting simply that the Central African Republic (CAR) President, Faustin-Archange Touadera, was received by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pandor at a South Africa Airport in March 2020 is a missed opportunity. What is it about South African – CAR relations that the public should be made aware of or should care about? What is the purpose of the tweet? If the tweet offers bare essentials, then it remains an information relaying tool only. In an effort to broadcast the South African government's intent to serve the people of Africa, the Deputy Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation Candith Mashego-Dlamini was quoted in a March 2020, DIRCO tweet as saying: "African continent is less about its political leadership and more about its people---Africa's greatest asset". South Africa took on the Chairship of the African Union for 2020. @DIRCO_ZA, which has about 51 000 followers has also retweeted tweets that mention DIRCO in a positive light. In early March 2020, @DIRCO_ZA retweeted Georgian Ambassador, Beka Dvali (@BekaDvali1) who expressed his "utmost pleasure & honour, in my capacity of Dean of European Group of Ambassadors to South Africa, meeting Ambassador Maud Dlomo, Deputy Director General (DDG) for #Europe & #Americas at DIRCO.

Cowan and Arsenault's position that regardless of the public diplomacy initiative or tool, the most effective outcome is the intent behind the initiative and that intent is designed "with an eye for the best means of engaging with and building credibility among foreign publics."[40] This

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[39] Twitter.com, 2019 [https://Twitter.com/chadianmfa?lang=en], 27 February 2020.

[40] Geoffrey Cowan, Amelia Arsenault, *op.cit.*

credibility may be based on manipulation. In some cases, as Donaldson notes, "regimes may even use social media to allow people opportunities to air grievances and create an illusion of free expression, whilst themselves diverting or subverting debate."[41]

When Do Tweets Become Influential?

Twitter diplomacy has implications for international relations. An emerging trend has been the 'politicisation' of Twitter. More and more state actors, and citizens too, are using Twitter to launch political attacks. US President Trump's particular Twitter style has provoked reactions across the globe. In May 2019 @realDonaldTrump, President Trump tweeted the following: "The United States has been losing, for many years, 600 to 800 Billion Dollars a year on Trade. With China we lose 500 Billion Dollars. Sorry, we're not going to be doing that anymore!"[42] Trump threatened to raise tariffs on certain imports from China resulting in serious political setbacks for global stock markets. Using Twitter as a platform for diplomacy, President Trump signalled to the world how US-China trade relations were deteriorating.[43]

Although some would suggest that social media platforms like Twitter should be thought of as "the world's largest cocktail parties, where everyone is invited and guests kindle conversations and relationships, just as in real life",[44] others would suggest that Twitter diplomacy has

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[41] Alasdair Donaldson, "The Soft Power of Twitter", *British Council*, January 2016 [https://www.britishcouncil.org/research-policy-insight/insight-articles/soft-power-Twitter], 19 February 2020.

[42] Matthew Yglesias, "The Trump trade tweets that sent the stock market tumbling, explained: Trade war clouds return", *Vox*, May 6, 2019,
[https://www.vox.com/2019/5/6/18531101/trump-china-tariff-tweet-schumer-stock], 28 February 2020.

[43] Chu Wang, "Twitter Diplomacy: Preventing Twitter Wars from Escalating into Real Wars", *Future of Diplomacy Project*, May 20, 2019
[https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/Twitter-diplomacy-preventing-Twitter-wars-escalating-real-wars], 28 February 2020.

[44] Wren Elhai, "Twitter Is a Cocktail Party, Not a Press Conference (or, Social Media for Reporting Officers)", *The Foreign Service Journal*, December 2019
[https://www.afsa.org/Twitter-cocktail-party-not-press-conference-or-social-media-reporting-officers], 27 February 2020.

potentially disastrous consequences for diplomatic relations. In 2018, for example, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland tweeted the following: "Very alarmed to learn that Samar Badawi, Raif Badawi's sister, has been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. Canada stands together with the Badawi family in this difficult time, and we continue to strongly call for the release of both Raif and Samar Badawi".[45] Samar Badawi is a writer-activist who created the website 'Free Saudi Liberals'. A second round of Canadian tweets followed from @CanadaFP: "Canada is gravely concerned about additional arrests of civil society and women's rights activists in #SaudiArabia, including Samar Badawi. We urge the Saudi authorities to immediately release them and all other peaceful #humanrights activists". The Saudi government responded swiftly with a series of tweets, @KSAmofaEN, denouncing Canadian interference in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia, and declaring that Canada's Ambassador was no longer welcome in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Government would freeze all new trade and investment transactions with Canada and end student exchange programs amongst other actions. This diplomatic incident attracted support from other actors. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash the United Arab Emirates, tweeted that his country stood in support of Saudi Arabi's sovereignty. Bahrain's foreign minister, Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, also offered a similar note of support for Saudi Arabia. This case demonstrates how a series of tweets can escalate diplomatic tensions quickly and create deep longer lasting fissures in diplomatic relations.

The fast-paced, relatively uncensored nature of Twitter means that diplomats can tweet anything and even if the intent is well-meaning, the slightest misreading of it could have serious consequences for all actors involved. Traditional diplomatic controls or risk assessments via bureaucratic processes can be bypassed with the use of this social media platform. Heads of state can tweet foreign policy positions without consulting cabinets and often these become formal policy setting back government strategists. This relatively unfiltered expression of personal opinion or emotion of state leaders can also prove very telling for interested observers. The risk of different publics having access to a type of 'insider' knowledge of what drives a word leader could be useful for allies and

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[45] Chu Wang, *op.cit.*

adversaries alike. For example, Wang suggests that when Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, won the 2014 general elections he tweeted his thanks in response to country leaders for their messages of congratulations in order of personalised importance.[46] He kept the US waiting and thanked Canada first.

In Africa, Algeria is a good example of a country using Twitter for political ends. Domestic and foreign crises are highlighted in various tweets by Algerian citizens and officials. Supporters of the Algerian government's claim to be an "important actor" in the Western Sahara conflict favouring the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination have used hashtags referring to Sahara or desert or Algerian Sahara. In response Moroccan activists have created their own hashtag referencing Moroccan Sahara. Algerian 'foreign-oriented' tweets focused on Iran in 2017 after the announcement that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani would be visiting Algeria. Activists launched a Twitter campaign, for example #(No to Rouhani in Algeria) and #(Algerians against Iran) to condemn the visit for fear that Iran might try to interfere in the Algerian domestic situation. President Rouhani's visit was postponed as a result.[47]

Twitter accounts may be used by international organisations to draw media attention to smaller, more under-resourced states. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation, #FAO, has over 350 000 followers. This reach is quite important as the FAO highlights the plight of small island developing states (SIDS) through Twitter. In a September 2019 tweet, the FAO, posted a video identifying five ways in which it is helping SIDS to achieve food security. Alongside this video the hashtag #SamoaPathway was also posted. The latter is a decade-long framework that intends to help these states build stronger economies and resilience to climate change consequences. Three of the six African small island developing states (ASIDS) feature in the top 10 African countries in terms of internet penetration (see this chapter's Table 1): Seychelles; Mauritius and Cabo Verde.

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[46] *Ibidem.*

[47] Future for Advanced Research and Studies, "Hashtag Diplomacy: Twitter as A Platform for Political Attacks", 2017 [https://futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/2708/hashtag-diplomacy-Twitter-as-a-platform-for-political-attacks], 18 March 2020.

In an example of self-promotion on Twitter, @SeychellesDFA, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Seychelles, drew attention to Seychellois Ambassador Barry Faure, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Blue Economy, who presented at two high level panels on human rights promotion and protection at Human Rights Council talks in Geneva Switzerland in February 2020. States and international actors can boost each other through social media platforms, as seen with the FAO example above. In another example, Seychelles and the United Nations Development Programme refer to each other's handles via Twitter. Amanda Serumaga (@ASerumaga), who is the new UNDP resident representative to Seychelles tweeted: "Thank you to Ambassador Barry Faure @BarryFaure @SeychellesDFA for an excellent discussion on all things #SIDS! @UNDPSeychelles commits to continuing our support to #ClimateChange mitigation #BlueEconomy and the push to listen to SIDs voices!" (Twitter.com).

Mauritius has numerous Twitter channels: @GovMauritius; @MFA_MU, which is the official account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Mauritius; @MauritiusPM; @Diplomacy_MU. In March 2019, Diplomacy_MU retweeted Mauritius' national birthday congratulations from India and Israel's diplomacy Twitter channels. It also retweeted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Ukraine (@MFA_Ukraine which celebrated the anniversary of Mauritius' Independence Day. Ukraine's Ministry also stated that they consider Mauritius to be an important partner in Africa and that they continue to count on the Republic for further support of Ukraine's territorial integrity. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Mauritius, Pravind Jugnauth, used his Twitter handle @PKJugnauth to reach out to Mauritian diasporas wishing all his compatriots at home and abroad a happy Independence Day.

In February 2020, the President of Cabo Verde used his Twitter handle (@PresidenciaCV) to announce the visit of a Luxembourgish delegation to the African state. Luxembourg is paying for a solar photovoltaic production system for Cabo Verde's parliament, with an expectation of up to 30% reduced electricity usage. The president of the country's National Assembly, Jorge Santos; the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communities of Cabo Verde, Luís Filipe Tavares, and the Luxembourgish Minister for Cooperation and Humanitarian Action, Frantz

Fayot participated in these talks. Luxemburg and Cabo Verde have a longstanding relationship of cooperation programmes, the next round of which starts 2021-2024 with an increased investment from 45 million Euro to around 60 million Euros.[48]

In line with the new phase in public diplomacy referred to earlier in this chapter where public voices can be augmented through Twitter, there are a growing number of climate change youth activists using Twitter to spread their messages condemning governments and industries around the world for not doing enough to combat global warming.[49] In October 2018 Zimbabwean-based #AfricanYouthInClimateAction (@AyiccZim) joined Twitter. Its goal, as an African youth initiative focussing on climate change issues, is to bolster intergenerational dialogue in as many forums as possible. It posts about events in Zimbabwe and regional activities too. A youth activist from Uganda, Vanessa Nakate (@vanessa_vash) began a Rise Up Movement in Africa also focused on climate change issues. The 23-year old Nakate has over 140 000 followers on Twitter.[50] Another Ugandan youth Leah Namugerwa (@NamugerwaLeah) already has a Twitter following of 17 000 people despite only joining the social media site in February 2019. She uses the platform to mobilise the youth, and others, to plant trees and ban plastic and clean up litter. South African, 17-year old, Ayakha Melithafa represented the Republic at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2020 and is referred to often via climate change channels on Twitter.

Sweden's Greta Thunberg (@GretaThunberg) is another example. Thunberg is 17 years old. Despite her young age she has stumped politicians with her speeches and inspired climate change activists globally. When Thunberg was named Time magazine's Person of the Year in December 2019, President Trump's responded via Twitter: "So ridiculous.

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[48] Macauhub, "Luxembourg finances solar energy project of the Cabo Verde parliament", 19 February 2020, [https://macauhub.com.mo/2020/02/19/pt-luxemburgo-financia-projecto-de-energia-solar-do-parlamento-de-cabo-verde/], 25 February 2020.

[49] Inma Galvez-Robles, "Climate Action: 19 Youth Climate Activists you should be Following on Social Media", 2019 [https://www.earthday.org/19-youth-climate-activists-you-should-follow-on-social-media/], 19 March 2020.

[50] Sheree Bega, "How Africa's Youngsters Are Saving the Planet", *IOL*, 2020 [https://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/news/how-africas-youngsters-are-saving-the-planet-42547371], 25 February 2020.

Greta must work on her Anger Management problem, then go to a good old fashioned movie with a friend! Chill Greta, Chill!" Thunberg responded the following day by changing her Twitter biography to, 'A teenager working on her anger management problem. Currently chilling and watching a good old-fashioned movie with a friend' (Voytko, 2019).[51] Although President Trump probably meant to downplay Thunberg's importance through his tweet, he inadvertently drew attention to her name, and indirectly what she stands for, by allowing his 74 million followers the opportunity to find out more about the activist.

Conclusion

This article briefly explored the nature and value of hashtag diplomacy or Twitter diplomacy in Africa, and other regions, with reference to a few examples. The chapter began by outlining where hashtag diplomacy fits within the umbrella of diplomacy and especially public diplomacy. Although traditional tools of diplomacy remain intact, the evolving nature of technology demands that in order to stay relevant, state leaders and other foreign policymakers must acknowledge the potential impact of using social media networks as a diplomatic tool and decide how best to reduce its risks and exploit its advantages. Social media is fast and effective. However, it can also be home to Twitter wars and the possibility of misinterpretation or insults that traditional bureaucratic modes of diplomacy, by their very nature of being thought-through and methodical, strive to avoid. This chapter referred to the point that only 40% of Africa has internet penetration which means that for African leaders to reach out to foreign publics using Twitter, for example, in other African countries they will be reaching out to a relative few with access to the internet. Despite this, it is clear that African countries acknowledge the power of this medium as some governments have taken stringent measures, especially during elections, to prevent the public from accessing Twitter. Moreover, there are examples of African leaders, such as Rwanda's Paul Kagame and

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[51] Lisette Voytko, "Trump Attacks Greta Thunberg On Twitter—And Greta Trolls Him Back", *Forbes*, 12.12.2019, [https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2019/12/12/trump-attacks-greta-thunberg-on-Twitter-and-greta-trolls-him-back/#6773c0bc1792], 19 March 2020.

Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta and African Ministries of Foreign Affairs making frequent use of this platform and this would suggest some belief in its necessity.

It is evident that African Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and state leaders, are using tweets to advertise important milestones in bilateral relations; to express messages of condemnation, condolence or congratulations; to declare solidarity and support by retweeting, and to relay information. In addition, As Manor contends "digital diplomacy holds the potential to increase the effectiveness of African diplomacy in diverse areas."[52] This includes governments reaching out to diaspora communities; soft power boosts through nation branding and self-promotion; and becoming active hubs in growing networks connecting leaders and policymakers with common goals and challenges. The public, as agents in their own right and part of the public diplomacy process, can draw global attention to issues that affect them, for example, climate change. This platform also affords communities considered to be outside the realm of usual actors in the political world the opportunity to have a voice, such as the youth. Social media sites, like Twitter, can also be used by small island developing states to project onto a global platform their relevance and needs. Used properly, digital diplomacy can, in conjunction with traditional diplomacy, be an effective platform for policymakers and state leaders in 21st century diplomatic activities.

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[52] Ilan Manor, "Digital Diplomacy in Africa: A Research Agenda".

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'WITH WHOM WE TALK?'
DRAWING REGIONS IN 21ST CENTURY AFRICA

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Abstract

The African continent inherited borders drawn by foreign actors for centuries, with a limited influence exerted by its internal political structures. This impacted its development across decades, acting as a contributing factor to economic, social and political conflicts, some of them resulting in further divisions in time: new states emerged, while the federal structures developed within some states remain unstable.

In this paper, the author investigates the current regional groupings of states established in different African frameworks in an attempt to answer the question "how external actors influence and legitimize the development of regions" in 21st century. From a functionalist perspective, it explores the motives for the formation of a wide range of regional integration and cooperation organizations.

The case study of G5 Sahel, an institutionalized regional arrangement focused on security and development of its member states, is analyzed as an arrangement emerged with support from France and the European Union. The case study analysis trails the cooperation with these two foreign actors with the G5 Sahel member states in the five years, focused on evolution, financing and joint initiatives – including to what extent these contributed to consolidation of the regional borders.

Keywords: region-building, G5 Sahel, regional cooperation, European Union, development cooperation

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1. A theoretical framework for region-building. The functionalist perspective

The study of regions provides an opportunity to answer questions on how regions were designed and developed, how regional institutions were built, under what context, how the difference is managed or how the processes of regional integration were sustained in time.

In some cases, based on historical processes as in the colonial past, regions were drawn and influenced to a large extent by external actors. Our aim in this paper is to investigate the current groupings of states established in Africa and to answer the question how external actors legitimised these groups and regions and drive the agenda of regional integration and international cooperation. A case study later follows this influence in the development of G5 Sahel, based on the analysis of official documents and initiatives developed by the grouping. As explained later in the article, there is not a single interpretation of the boundaries of Sahel, with different countries and regions sharing the space and defining its limits.

With or without external influence, regions are not only a level of governance above and beyond the state in the international order. Their role is justified, according to Andrew Hurrell, apart from the homonymous level in the multilevel global governance, as containers for diversity and difference, as poles and powers, and harbinger of change in international society.[1] Accordingly, understanding regional projects from multiple analytical frameworks is central to discuss their viability.

This endeavour is inspired by the functional approach to international relations, which argued in favor of a pragmatic functional integration, the functional organization of the world proposed by the Romanian-bord British academic David Mitranyi in 1943. Described during the Word War II, in period of intense debate over the new organization of peace, the main principle of the functional approach states that "*the activities would be selected specifically and organized separately-each according to its nature, to the*

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[1] Andrew Hurrell, "One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society", in *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 83, no. 1, 2007, pp. 127–146.

conditions under which it would allow to operate, and to the needs of the moment would allow, therefore, all freedom for practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter".[2] Mitranyi described even the wider cooperation in this 'spiritless cooperation', in which various interlinked functional agencies can work together in a more comprehensive international organization, working together with an international planning agency.

Even though Mitranyi promoted an idea aimed at peace and cooperation at world level, the functional approach can be replicated at regional level. In a response to critics, David Mitranyi underlined that functional arrangements can be adapted to every dimension, including regional, that suits the nature of the task[3]. Therefore, the focus in the case study on the G5 Sahel is based on the areas of cooperation it is authorised to act and relevant initiatives it has developed in time to promote regional cooperation. The functional approach of region-building is focused on the organization of international organisations at regional level. The political authority overseeing these processes can be or cannot be, as argued by the father of this approach in the foundational text, in which agreements between states can fill this gap.

2. Origins of regions in Africa. From UN to AU and other conceptions. Introducing the levels of analysis

Often, Africa is depicted as unitary entity, despite the variety it contains in many aspects of social and political life.

In terms of regional cooperation, the development of the African Union as a continental political form of organization, with 55 member states, almost all of the African states, has contributed to this image. While the regional organization is at the forefront of the Pan-Africanist objectives, with equivalents as the European Union or the Association of South-East

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[2] David Mitranyi, *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966 [1943], p. 105.
[3] David Mitranyi, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective", in *International Affairs*, 47, no. 3, 1971, p. 541.

Asian Nations, the achievement of the objectives of the African Union is based on the pillars of regional economic communities, 'the building blocks' of the Union.

However, the continental Pan-African dimension and the regional economic communities are not the unique subregional entities in Africa. A functional approach to regional organization will redirect us to other agencies of international cooperation.

In Northern Africa, together with Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia signed the Agadir Agreement (entered into force in 2007), a plurilateral free trade agreement among the Arab Mediterranean countries, born in the context of the Barcelona Process, hosted in Amman. Additionally, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia are part of PAFTA, Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, an agreement that entered into force in 1998, known also as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. Four more African states are candidates to join this plurilateral trade area: Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia. In Eastern and Southern Africa, eleven states became part of a joint partnership agreement with the European Union. While there are distinct groupings joining this evolving partnership on trade and development cooperation, it brought together Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe in a functional region, described as Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) by the European side. Furthermore, the Sahelian region is an interesting case, as discussed in the paper.

The Abuja Treaty, adopted in 1991 and entered into force in 1994, established the African Economic Community, with a proposal of six stages for a transitional period of up to 34 years. The first stage consisted in strengthening the regional economic communities and the establishment of new economic communities in regions where they do not exist, as part of the gradual establishment of the Community.[4] Most of African states are currently members of the regional communities. These regional communities reflect their own development. Despite having a roadmap for economic integration and contributions to the continental communities, there are different states of development and regional integration. Most of the regional economic communities were established before the Abuja Treaty.

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[4] Organization of African Unity, *Treaty establishing the African Economic Community*, 1991.

While there are other regional groupings, the African Union states that it recognizes only eight regional economic communities: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), with two additional entities part of the African Standby Force, with whom it maintains relations: Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism and the North African Regional Capability.[5] Among them, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) did not sign the protocol on the coordination framework between the regional economic communities and the African Union. Furthermore, UMA is more engaged in Mediterranean and Pan-Arab dialogue and less developed in the distinct four-five Maghreb unitary cooperation.

A functional approach to regional cooperation in African redirects us specific sectors. From a security perspective, regional groupings are based on the African Standby Force (ASF) pillar within the African Peace and Security Architecture. There are five regional groupings: the North African Regional Capacity, ECOWAS Standby Force, ECCAS Standby Force, Eastern Africa Standby Force and the SADC Standby Brigade. Nevertheless, some of them are less effective in achieving the objectives and each region has its own operational strategy. Among the five brigades, some of them are in a less capacitated situation: relatively frozen since conflicts arose (e.g. Arab Spring), temporary based on UNSC authorisation (e.g. ECCAS Standby Force). On military matters, the external influence is more visible compared to the cases of regional political cooperation, since there are joint missions and support for capacity building not only from the continental level and the United Nations, but also from external stakeholders with security roles as the People's Republic of China, the European Union or the United States of America.

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[5] African Union, *Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*, AU Organs, 2013, [https://au.int/en/organs/recs], 21 May 2020.

An observer of regional dynamics in Africa can see additional initiatives developed over time with a functional role. Remembering the older commissions for Danube or Rhine, the Mano River Union (MRU) was created in 1973 as a custom union and economic cooperation organization between Sierra Leone and Liberia. It survived the conflicts within its member states and developed joint projects with benefits for all its member states. Currently, the Mano River Union has four member states: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, members of ECOWAS. It is a bottom-up initiative with dialogue and cooperation, regional integration and development objectives. MRU highlights success stories based on international cooperation through its contributions to border security and peace maintenance, addressing diamond smuggling, crisis response in the Ebola health crisis and ecosystem conservation.[6] This organisation is an example sui generis for the functional approach to international relations, with states developing cooperation agreements in areas such as defense and security, trade, internal affairs, and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, its first part of existence, regardless of joint projects, did not guarantee the maintenance of peace, and it was relaunched as soon as the peace and security cooperation allowed.

The functional approach is identifiable in the case of the ten Central African countries that form the Commission of the Forests from Central Africa (COMIFAC). As an international organization, it aims to harmonise the forestry policies at subregional level and to better govern and make use of the forests and the protected areas.[7] Thus, it contributes to conservation and better management at subregional level of the natural resources within its scope.

Another case is present in the Great Lakes region. Established in 1976, the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC), formed by Burundi, Congo DR and Rwanda, all three COMESA members, oversees four specialised institutions in the region with functional roles: a development

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[6] Manu River Union, "*Mano River Union - Success Stories*", 2020, [https://mru.int/success-stories/], 3 June 2020.

[7] COMIFAC, "Missions de la COMIFAC", *Commission Des Forêts d'Afrique Centrale*, 2020, [https://www.comifac.org/a-propos/que-faisons-nous/missions], 3 June 2020.

bank, an electricity generation company, an energy community and an agricultural research institute. Internal struggles limited the development of ECGLC, yet the organization was reinvigorated in the previous two decades. ECGLC describes its missions to strengthen the peace, security and stability in its member state, to encourage economic and social activities of joint interest, to foster trade exchange and the free movement of goods and persons, and to cooperate in multiple areas.[8]

United Nations regions and African Union regional economic communities

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was established as part of the United Nations global organization, being set up in 1958.

ECA has five regional offices (North, East, Southern, West and Central Africa). Their roles are mainly in the policy realm: providing better information, strengthening the capacity of the member states in policy-making activities for economic and social development according to their priorities, provision of policy advisory services to states, economic communities and other actors to support regional integration and sub-regional initiatives, facilitating UN system's integration activities. Their mandates are closely linked to the African development agenda - Agenda 2063 - and its ten-year implementation roadmaps.

However, the UN sub-regional offices do not necessarily reflect the AU regional economic communities. In fact, the distribution is slightly different, in spite of the geographical designation. The following country table highlights the differences between the UN subregional offices (SRO) and the regional economic communities (REC). Additionally, it underlines the participation of member states in overlapping regional integration processes.

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[8] ECGLC, "Communauté Économique Des Pays Des Grand Lacs", *Communauté Économique Des Pays Des Grand Lacs*, 2020, [http://www.cepgl.org/cepgl], 7 June 2020.

Table 2: Membership distribution in AU RECs and UN SROs

Region	#	Membership	Region	#	Membership
SRO - CA	10	AO, BI, CM, CF, TD, CD, CG, GQ, GA, ST	ECCAS	11	AO, BI, CM, CF, TD, CD, CG, GQ, GA, RW, ST
SRO - EA	14	BI, KM, CD, DJ, ER, ET, KE, MG, RW, SC, SO, SS, SD, TZ, UG	IGAD	8	DJ, ER, ET, KE, SO, SS, SD, UG
SRO - NA	7	DZ, EG, LY, MR, MA, SD, TN	UMA	5	DZ, LY, MR, MA, TN
SRO - SA	11	AO, BW, LS, MW, MU, MZ, NA, ZA, SZ, ZM, ZW	SADC	17	AO, BW, KM, CD, SZ, LS, MG, MW, MU, MZ, NA, ZA, TZ, ZM, ZW
SRO - WA	15	BE, BF, CV, CI, GM, GH, GN, LR, ML, NE, NG, SN, SL, TG	ECOWAS	15	BJ, BF, CV, CI, GM, GH, GN, GW, LR, ML, NE, NG, SN, SL, TG
			EAC	6	BI, KE, RW, SS, RZ, UG
			CEN-SAD	23	BJ, BF, CF, TD, CI, DJ, EG, ER, GM, GH, GW, LR, LY, ML, MA, NE, NG, SN, SL, SO, SD, TG, TN
			COMESA	21	BI, KM, CD, DJ, EG, ER, SZ, ET, KE, LY, MG, MW, MU, RW, SC, SO, SD, TN, UG, ZM, ZW

Historically, the UN Economic Commission for Africa provides the first regional arrangement in the global post-war order within the continent, followed by the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity as a Cold War peak of the Pan-Africanist movements. The opening of the subregional offices followed in 1963 supporting strengthening the capacity of member states, development support, policy support, providing technical assistance and contributing to regional cooperation and integration. These functions are applicable to the five subregional offices and the close cooperation with the regional cooperation and integration initiatives serves as a pillar.[9]

Mapping the main regional initiatives is important to understand the local, subregional, regional and continental governance in Africa. Moreover, it provides an image of the main cleavages in the definition of the regions. In-depth analysis of each of them is further required to give a clear perspective on a case by case basis. However, this is not the aim of this paper. Since Dumbarton Oaks, regional arrangements have been a key pillar of international organization and management of peace, security and development.

The tendency to neglect the influence of external actors is attractive, based on the historical anti-colonial developments and the development of the past years. Similarly, the questions of external actors' influence in the design of regional arrangements appear, with patterns of regional organisation discernible. Some regions reflect historical constructs. ECOWAS, for example, is still politically divided by two regional blocs, the French and the English-speaking regions, with separate levels and heritage of economic and monetary integration. The Southern African Custom Union (SACU) claims its origin in a 1889 custom union convention and describes itself as the world's oldest custom union. Following successive agreements, the custom union has resisted until today. The East African Community traces its origins in the late 19th century colonial development projects and the early 20th century established customs and currency unions. Nowadays, the East African Community has a clear path towards regional integration with the end of a political federation, transitioned by a confederation project.

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[9] Information about the subregional offices are available on the website of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2020, [https://www.uneca.org/sro-ea]

According to the World Trade Organisation repository of the trade agreements, filtered by plurilateral intra-regional agreements, EAC is the most advanced in terms of regional integration, with an enacted customs union agreement and economic integration agreement. COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS & WAEMU, SACU function as customs unions, and SADC has a multilateral free trade agreement in force.[10] Even with these arrangements, as the database shows, Africa remains the global region whose countries have the least participation in regional trade agreements in goods and services.

3. Understanding the emergence of G5 Sahel and the role of external actors

3.1. *Mapping the Sahelian distribution of regional organisations*

Sahelian regionalism brings a set of methodological questions. While the geographical Sahel is relatively clear, as described below, the political Sahel has older and novel organizational projects. Firstly, these projects do not fit the already discussed allocation of regional economic communities or subregional development offices. Moreover, the external influence in the development of these region is remarkable - G5 Sahel is discussed in detail. Thirdly, it trails a functional participation of its member states focused on security and development, supported by the former colonial rule.

Based on the regional economic communities, the countries that are understood as part of Sahel are dispersed across several regional communities: ECCAS, ECOWAS, UMA and CEN-SAD. CEN-SAD, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, gathers most of the Sahelian countries. However, the Tripoli-based organization established in 1998, is crumbling, despite a treaty revision focused on regional security and sustainable development. CEN-SAD aimed to develop an economic union, focused on removal of restrictions hampering integration, promoting external trade, developing

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[10] RTA-IS, "Regional Trade Agreements Database", *World Trade Organization*, 2020, [http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx], 4 July 2020.

common projects and promoting the harmonization of measures in areas such as education and culture. Founded by six Sahel-Saharan states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan and Libya), it gathered 29 member states during its peak in 29. The following crisis in northern and central Africa made the project unoperational. The treaty revision in 2013 obtained only 13 signatures from a minimum of 15.[11] Moreover, the orientation towards the Sahel in the region decreased; NEPAD programmes implemented in CEN-SAD were rather oriented towards the development of the Eastern or the Western side of the territory.[12] CEN-SAD included the Sahel states as members.

Bringing into question the limits of the political Sahel and its understanding by external actors, various lines of separation appear. The French diplomacy limits it to five states: Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania, with a population of almost 100 million people.[13] Not the same interpretation is provided by other external stakeholders. The former Department of International Development of the United Kingdom included in the Sahel region Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan.[14] In addition to the core members, Spain also added Senegal in the pool of Sahelian countries.[15] Nine states are highlighted in the region by the United Nations Secretary General: Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, Eritrea and Nigeria.[16] UNOCHA

[11] ECA, "CEN-SAD - The Community of Sahel-Saharan States", *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,* 2020, [https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-states], 4 June 2020.

[12] AUDA-NEPAD, "Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD*)", African Union Development Agency,* 2019, [https://www.nepad.org/where-we-work/region/110], 4 June 2020.

[13] Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, "France's Action in the Sahel", *France Diplomacy,* 2020, [https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/terrorism-france-s-international-action/article/france-s-action-in-the-sahel], 5 June 2020.

[14] DFID, "Profile of Development Work: Sahel", *Department for International Development,* London, 2020, p. 1, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/profile-of-development-work-sahel], 5 June 2020.

[15] Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación, "Sahel y Malí", *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación,* 2020, [http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/Africa/Paginas/Sahel.aspx], 5 June 2020.

[16] UNSG, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel Region", *United Nations Security Council*, New York, 2013, p. 2.

also includes Cameroon in the region.[17] The European Commission mentions nine Sahel countries.[18]

In 1976, OECD launched its partnership with Africa, *Club du Sahel*, after the first extreme drought crisis in 1973. *Club du Sahel* provided support for the Permanent Inter-State Committee of Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), a functional international organisation founded by six states - Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, currently having 13 members.[19] From 2001, it expanded and included additional West African states.

In 2014, to address the security and development challenges, G5 Sahel was announced by the representatives of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Complementarily, in 2018, international donors, mainly European, announced their support for the Sahel Alliance, providing aid, assistance and investments to the Sahelian partners for hundreds of projects. The military arm of the group is the G5 Sahel - Joint Force. If the Sahel Alliance is focused on the development arm, the 2020 International Coalition for the Sahel focuses on the facilitation of the coordination provided by international actions, particularly on security, targeting areas such as fighting armed terrorist groups, building the capacities of armed forces, supporting the sovereign function of the state and administrations in the territory, and assisting development.

3.2. *The emergence of G5 Sahel: functions, sponsors and initiatives*

G5 Sahel emerged from security needs, supported by external actors, as a regional organization. Its origins can be traced to the French military operations in its former Sahelian colonies at the request of the Malian authorities. The case study discussion is centered on its origins, actors involved in its development, the region-building processes and their governance.

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[17] UN OCHA, "Sahel", *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, 2020, [https://www.unocha.org/sahel], 11 July 2020.

[18] European Commission, "European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - Africa - Sahel", *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*, 2020, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/sahel_en], 18 July 2020.

[19] SWAC, "The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC)", OECD, Paris, 2020, [http://www.oecd.org/swac/aboutus/], 18 July 2020.

Authorised by the United Nations, Operation Serval started on 11 January 2013 and fought against the advancements of the Islamists insurgents. Serval was declared a success by the French authorities at that time, yet the root causes of conflict remained. The crisis that became visible in 2012 in Mali, and the first attempts to stabilise was an African-led support mission to Mali (AFISMA). Operation Serval had three objectives: to stop the jihadist advance, to prevent them from further endangering the stability of the country, to protect the European and French nationals, and to restore Mali's territorial integrity.[20] Serval addressed the French political objectives but did not accomplish or provide a long-term solution to the conflict in Mali.[21] It transferred the stabilisation mission to the UN multidimensional mission and to Mali's authorities, deployed in 2013.

G5 Sahel was created in February 2014 to respond to the security and development challenges at the initiative of the given countries in the region, particularly at the initiative of the Mauritanian Presidency of the African Union. Based on the creed that joint action and regional integration could reinforce their resilience, the group of five countries announced the creation of "*an institutional framework of coordination and regional cooperation named G5 Sahel*".[22] The new legal person has its headquarters located in Nouakchott and has four objectives: "*to guarantee the security and development conditions in the member countries, to provide a strategic framework for intervention that allows the improvements of the life conditions of the populations, to link development and security, supported by democracy and good governance in a mutually beneficial international and regional cooperation framework, to promote a sustainable and inclusive regional development*".[23] A new regional organisation is born.

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[20] Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, "Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38, no. 6, 2015, p. 11.

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 22.

[22] G5 Sahel, *Convention portant creation du G5 Sahel*, 2014, Nouakchott, p. 3.

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 4.

The leaders and promoters of the new organisation were aware of and recognised the importance of the international partners in order to achieve the expected results. The preamble of the Convention reaffirms the willingness for cooperation with the external partners by negotiating jointly with "*technical and financial partners, public and private, to find harmonious solutions to problems affecting security and development*".[24] From that moment, it continued its development as an organization. G5 Sahel became the main regional partner for international organisation on the Sahelian issues.

Who supports what? The answer to this question is provided by looking into the participation of the ceremonies that launched the initiatives under the G5 Sahel framework. In 2014, in a 'mini-summit' of the five countries. According to the then president of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, and chair of the African Union, the organization "*does not replace CILSS or other subregional organisation but allows for coordination among the five countries that share the same challenges*".[25] Based on media reports, the presidents called for support from partners in order to develop their actions, especially from the Arab financing institutions and OPEC. The missing country at that time was Senegal.

Few months later, France launched Operation Barkhane. The French ministry described the operation as an initiative aimed to encourage partnership and the stabilisation in Mali and Liptako-Gourma. According to French sources, the Sahelian strategy aimed to support the states in the region to ensure their security by their own. Barkhane had three objectives: fight against terrorist groups, support the armies of the G5 partners, and action in the service of the population.[26]

The joint force of G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) was launched in 2017. Announced in 2017, the joint force was marked by a summit that, apart from the participation of the G5 Sahel presidents, the French president was taking part. The European Unions supported and financed the initiative. France does not assume directly the ownership of this initiative, despite the involvement and efforts pursuit in this direction. However, in public diplomacy, the

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[24] *Ibidem*, p. 3.

[25] Le Monde, "Un « G5 Du Sahel » Pour Le Développement et La Sécurité", *Le Monde Afrique*, February 16, 2014, [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/02/16/un-g5-du-sahel-pour-le-developpement-et-la-securite_4367635_3212.html], 13 January 2020.

[26] Ministère des Armées, "Dossier de Presse: Operation Barkhane", 2020, p. 7.

Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations mentions its initiatives within the Security Council on this matter and it recognised, in the case of FC-G5S, it *"is resolutely committed to the fight against terrorism in Mali and the Sahel alongside the joint G5 Sahel force, with Operation Barkhane".*[27]

The region-building process continued with an extensive investment commitment. Launched in July 2007 by France, Germany and the European Union, the Sahel Alliance is focused on the five countries and focuses on development cooperation. The implementation of over 800 projects is planned by 2022 with funding amounting 11,6 billion EUR.[28] Other European states joined in the meantime the Alliance (Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Luxemburg, Denmark, Netherlands), together with multilateral financing organisations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the United Nations. We can observe that, apart from the G5 states, Sahel Alliance remains a European initiative for the development of the region. The African participation is limited. The African Development Bank, despite having beneficiaries from Africa, has a global membership. The projects implemented in G5 Sahel by the Alliance will improve the interconnectivity and functional cooperation among its member states. Among the 800 projects, most of them are limited to one country, yet there are transnational initiatives (e.g. energy, border management, security).

However, there are landmark projects in the region that can contribute to a new regionalization in this area. The railway project from N'Djamena to Nouakchott, the Trans-Sahelian, will link all G5 countries, from Chad to the Atlantic. The Defense College of G5 Sahel, a military higher education institution, had already the second promotion of officers trained.[29] Similar initiatives are discussed, having a regional dimension. The concerted action of G5 Sahel and Sahel Alliance contributes to the

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[27] Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, "Sahel", 2020, [https://onu.delegfrance.org/G5-Sahel-Joint-Force-10433], 4 July 2020.

[28] Sahel Alliance, "The Sahel Alliance", 2020, [https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/sahel-alliance/], 5 July 2020.

[29] G5 Sahel, "Collège de Défense du G5 Sahel: Sortie de la deuxième promotion" (2020, July 16), [https://www.g5sahel.org/article/college-de-defense-du-g5-sahel-sortie-de-la-2e-promotion], 2 August 2020

development of a common mechanism for the governance and implementation of priority projects for Sahel.[30]

While the financial sustainability of the organisation remains questionable without external support, G5 Sahel is a political reality as a regional project. The previous sections highlighted the differences related to name and the challenges related to the definition of specific regions embedding these member states. Seven years after the announcement of the G5 Sahel in a mini-summit, the coordination framework was announced: the International Coalition for the Sahel.

On 13th of January 2020, the International Coalition for the Sahel was announced during a summit held in Pau. The summit in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques brought together France and the G5 Sahel states, together with the representatives of the United Nations, European Union, African Union and other organizations. While the Coalition will not replace the G5 Sahel decision-making processes, it defined the governance framework for the region on military, security, political and development matters. Under its four pillars, all major initiatives of the last decade were reunited:[31, 32]

- Pillar 1 on fighting armed terrorist groups will be led by the African armies and the G5 Sahel Joint Force with its partners, including Barkhane, MINUSMA and the Takuba Task Force;

- Pillar 2 on building the capacities of the armed forces of States in the region, will be based on the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S), initiated by France and Germany during the G7 Summit in Biarritz in 2019, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and EU's support through EUTM Mali and the African Peace Facility;

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[30] Sahel Alliance, "The Projects", 2020, [https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/the-projects/], 5 July 2020.

[31] Elysée, "G5 Sahel : Conférence de Presse Des Chefs d'État à l'issue Du Sommet de Pau", 2020, [https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/01/13/sommet-de-pau-declaration-conjointe-des-chefs-detat], 14 January 2020.

[32] Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, "France's Action in the Sahel", *France Diplomacy*, 2020, [https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/terrorism-france-s-international-action/article/france-s-action-in-the-sahel], 7 June 2020.

- Pillar 3 on supporting the return of the State and administrations in the territory, will be based on P3S, and EU's support through the EU Emergency Trust Fund and the EU civilian missions (EUCAP Niger and Mali);

- Pillar 4 on assisting development will have the G5 Sahel and the Sahel Alliance as leaders.

Under the legitimizing auspices of external actors, in a context that required support for security and development, G5 Sahel emerged, disrupting the existing regional architecture and encouraged by a functional approach to international affairs.

Concluding remarks

Region-building in Africa remains a dynamic process. There are few definitive or predictable regions. The aim of this paper was to investigate the current regional arrangements in Africa, focused mainly on the political dimension. Additional, how external actors can drive the regional integration agenda. The latter case study provided an instance on how in less than a decade, but having the memory of conflict, historical links and pragmatic functional cooperation, a new regional project can be developed with a feasible future.

The emergence of G5 Sahel in an area historically dominated by other regional arrangements, either regional economic communities, plurilateral trade agreements or subregional development offices, provides an example for pragmatic functional cooperation at regional level. It raises in the same time interrogations related to the sustainability of the imitative. The relations of G5 Sahel with the African parties such as the African Union and ECOWAS raised questions from many observers. Does its governance framework consent sufficient local ownership? Is the political authority governing the regional cooperation real? Similarly, there is the question of

post-crisis operational and financial sustainability, since the wider context of the development of a new region, if we include the variations in the previous designation of Sahel, includes the crisis in northern Africa in a security nexus linked to Europe.

This new political Sahel is a reality today. Nevertheless, tomorrow, another reality can define the region, its borders and its development.

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WATER CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF THE NILE RIVER AND THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM

Cătălin Badea[*]

Abstract

The most crucial element of every life form on our planet, water has always been a source of potential animosity between clans, tribes and even states. With the advent of modern technology we have devoted less and less of our attention to this all-needed resource, but pollution, large-scale industrialization and agriculture, the population boom of the last centuries and crucially the climate calamity that it threatens to unleash, forces us to reconsider the key role played by water in the delicate and fragile ecosystem of our planet. This article takes a look at how water is, and will increasingly be, a source of contention and even conflicts between states, as climate changes and increasingly larger populations will be forced to fight over more and more depleted resources. With a focus on the case of the Nile river and the potential conflict over its water resources between Egypt and Ethiopia, this article examines how the mainstream state of water conflict thinking fails to explain the case of the Nile River Basis and the newly built Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and why the alternative ideas that are based on the notions of cooperation and justice might ultimately provide a better way of understanding the complex problem of the delicate management and use of water resources.

Keywords: Water conflicts, Egypt, Ethiopia, GERD, The Nile

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Introduction

All forms of life as we know it, from the smallest, microscopic organisms to the largest beings, including mankind, share one crucial aspect: they depend, in a clear, physical way, on the availability of water in order to survive. Indeed, mankind has been, from its tribal origins and up until modern, complex societies, searching and staying close to fresh water sources. We only need to look at a map of any country to see that virtually all settlements, large or small, follow the trail of rivers, streams or springs. While modern technology and society has eliminated the need of people to actively search for fresh and clean water, at least in the developed, wealthy global North, this luxury might very well be a short-lived one.

In the words of Ismail Serageldin, former Vice-President of the World Bank, all the way back in 1995: "Many of the wars of this century were about oil, but wars of the next century will be about water".[1] And this is not just one, solitary voice, calling and drawing attention to a remote and isolated problem. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan echoed the same concerns in 2000: "…fierce competition for freshwater may well become a source of conflict and war…".[2] Many scholars also call for a more thorough look at how we use water, and the role of water in future conflicts. Westing draws attention to how "competition for limited..freshwater…leads to severe political tensions and even to war".[3] Furthermore, Butts exemplifies the historic argument, saying that "history is replete with examples of violent conflict over water".[4]

If we were to summarize these arguments, the main point of argument that all these scholars march towards is that water is ultimately a limited resource and given the crucial role it plays in our lives it can always be a point of contention or source of conflict. Furthermore, given the scarce

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[1] Ismail Serageldin, "Water: Conflicts set to arise within as well as between states" in *Nature*, 459, 2009.

[2] Shavkat Kasymov, "Water Resource Disputes: Conflict and Cooperation in Drainage Basins", in *The International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2011, p. 85

[3] Arthur Westing (ed.), *Global resources and international conflict: environmental factors in strategic policy and action*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986

[4] Kent Butts, "The strategic importance of water" in *Parameters*, Vol. 27, No.1, 1997, p. 70

nature of fresh and clean water, and the innate transboundary statute of water, conflicts may arise not just at the personal, local or regional level, but at the international level.

In this article we will look precisely at this last level, the international one. When speaking about water and possible conflicts, the case of the Nile River, with a focus on the rising tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, is certainly one of the first that comes to mind. In the following pages we will take a deeper look at the current paradigm of water conflict theory, then we will focus on the Nile River and GERD. The main focus of this article is to delve, albeit not in a complete or holistic manner, into the topic of water conflicts, a topic that will surely become more and more pressing in the next decades by examining the case study of the Nile River, one of the most cited cases of the mainstream current of thinking on the topic, and questioning if it does indeed prove the theory and predictions of hydroegoism true. This article will also take a look at the alternative ideas that are represented by the hydrosolidarity school of thought and analyze whether it can provide a better solution to the pressing matter of water scarcity stress and its impact on the eruption and escalation of conflicts, violence and war.

The New Oil

Humans need a relatively low amount of water for survival and even for most ordinary activities, but modern human activities such as industry and large-scale agriculture need a staggering amount of water. Estimated by hydrologist to at least 1700 m3 of annual water supply per person, the threshold for 'normal' water levels is not reached for over 2 billion people as of 2018[5] and the forecasts for the future do not look any better. Estimates by UNICEF indicate that with current levels of progress, by 2040, one in four children under 18 in the world will live in extreme water stress[6] and estimates by the UNESCO World Water Development Report say that by

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[5] UN Water, "Sustainable Development Goal 6 Synthesis Report 2018", 2018, https://www.unwater.org/publication_categories/sdg-6-synthesis-report-2018-on-water-and-sanitation/, accessed 17 November 2020

[6] UNICEF, "Thirsting for future. Water and children in a changing climate", 2017, https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/UNICEF_Thirsting_for_a_Future_REPORT.pdf, accessed 17 November 2020

2030 water scarcity will displace between 24 million and 700 million people worldwide.[7]

Indeed, it is not hard to see why some politicians and scholars would draw parallels between oil and water as resources that attract the possibility of conflict. Scarcity in some places and the abundance in others – or what could be more academically called as the 'uneven distribution' of oil across the world – alongside the reverse uneven distribution in terms of military power was one of the main driving forces of conflicts in the recent pasts, as oil was, and for the moment still is, the literal fuel of the world economy, and nations would go to extreme lengths and would not shy away even from war in order to gain access to it.

But as crucial as oil is to the functioning of the world, water is important on a completely different magnitude – the very existence of the world is based on it and not just the economic well-being of it. And with the rising global temperatures, climate change, deforestation, pollution, large-scale industry and inefficient large-scale agriculture among others, the already delicate balance of the water resources are threatened even more, and it is not entirely unimaginable that conflicts, if not wars would erupt in the future over access and control of water. Another crucial element of the equation is humanity itself – and the huge growth in numbers of mankind and the inherent pressure this puts on water resources.

Currently, there are 7,8 billion people on our planet, and already 2 billion of us do not have access to a normal or sufficient amount of fresh water. With current estimates placing the world population at 10 billion in 2055[8] and no signs that the current trends of humans-induced global warming, climate change and general destruction of the environment are reversing or even slowing, it is not hard to draw the conclusions that by 2055 water will be a source of contention between more and more people, regions and nations.

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[7] UN Water, "UN World Water Development Report 2009", 2009, https://www.unwater.org/publications/water-changing-world/, accessed 17 November 2020

[8] Anthony Cillufo and Neil G. Ruiz, "World's population is projected to nearly stop growing by the end of the century", Pew Research Center, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/worlds-population-is-projected-to-nearly-stop-growing-by-the-end-of-the-century/, accessed 18 November 2020

Egoism and solidarity

This line of reasoning has led many authors to conclude that future conflicts over water resources are not be a question of 'if', but rather a question of 'when' and 'where'. Thus, many arguments have been made and a great deal of energy has been spent on finding out where the hotspots for such inevitable conflicts will appear, for assuming this concept intellectually we instantly negate even the possibility that such conflicts may be avoided altogether. Following the logic of the argument, we see that because fresh water is, innately, a non-renewable resource (aside from the incredibly costly and difficult de-salinization process), and the world population, especially in the global south where fresh water resources are much more limited, is expanding at a staggering rate, combined with the fact that the majority of the countries in the global south are under-developed and thus are likely to put an emphasis on the implementation of large-scale agricultural processes as well as large-scale, environmentally damaging industries, processes that will increase the pressure on water resources exponentially, so as to improve or at least sustain their already poor economic situation, an economic situation that is only being put under more pressure as population grows, we arrive at the conclusion that it is inevitable that water will become such a scarce resource, but also such a needed one, that conflict will be inevitable.

This line of thinking is underpinned by much of the same fundamental elements as the Realist theories in International Relations. Following the realist, state-centric and self-help principles of functioning, and given the above-mentioned inescapable dilemma of an invaluable resource that is both disappearing and outside the control of a single state given its natural borderless or international character, we can only conclude that states will have no other choice than to resort to conflict or out-right war in order to defend their dwindling water resources from other states that will want to obtain them for their own use. Fittingly, this paradigm, that has been the mainstream current in terms of water-conflict related ideas, has been named 'hydroegoism' given the self-centered nature of the arguments that is presents. Hydroegosim can be excellently

described as "…the belief that individual, competing, interests guide water allocation decisions, with conflict frequently resulting from the interactions by diverse stakeholders."[9]

Given the dominant position of this theory for the last decades, it has indeed developed and been refined and focused on diverse topics, with the case of rivers and the fresh water they provide being one of the most central one. The hydroegoist paradigm can be best resumed, when the matter of rivers is at hand, as per Homer-Dixon and Percival: "wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbours are likely to occur in a narrow set of circumstances. The downstream country must be highly interdependent on the water for its national well-being, the upstream country must be able to restrict the rivers flow, there must be a history of antagonism between the two countries, and, most important, the downstream country must be military much stronger than the upstream country."[10]

We can see that, assuming the paradigm of hydroegosim, we are bound to look for the scenarios and regions that are most likely to be engulfed by conflict over water resources. Rivers, of course, given their role as fresh water sources as well as the traditional way of populations to settle along the beds of rivers and streams, are at the forefront of this discussion and rivers that span multiple borders are the most likely to be the source of potential conflicts.

However, hydroegoism is, despite its dominant position, not the only theory in the field. Opposing the notions of egoism and the zero-sum game it depicts is the concept of 'hydrosolidarity'. Based, as the name implies, around the notion of solidarity instead of egoism, hydrosolidarity was developed precisely as a response to the mainstream way of thinking by

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[9] Cameron Harrington, "Toward a critical water security: hydrosolidarity and emancipation" in *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 21, 2014, p. 4

[10] Val Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Briefing Book*, Toronto: University College, 1996, as quoted in Olaf Westermann, "Interstate Collaboration, Local Conflicts and Public Participation in the Nile River Basin" in Jannik Boesen and Helle Munk Ravnborg (Eds.), *From Water 'Wars' To Water 'Riots'?*, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004 , p. 121

Swedish hydrologist Malin Falkenmark in the late 1990's.[11] Developed as an mixture between human rights, social justice, solidarity but also including the element of good economic management of resources, hydrosolidarity can be best understood as: "…developed so far within a context of sustainable development, the paradigm of development that promotes social equity and environmental protection, while retaining the necessity of maintaining economic efficiency".[12]

The concept gained traction immediately, as it was the only alternative to the more pessimistic hydroegoist current, but it also came under criticism as it did not provide tangible ways of implementing the otherwise noble goals of justice and solidarity.

Since the early days, the notion has been further developed by scholars with the notable addition of the dimensional layer of understanding that differentiates between local, national or regional and even global types of solidarity in terms of water access, usage and management. Latest additions to the concept include the stress put on the "need for cooperative frameworks to manage transboundary waters"[13] as a way to better translate the concept of hydrosolidarity in palpable actions.

The Nile – The Backbone And The Achilles Heel Of Egypt

With the theoretical underpinnings of the world of water crisis briefly explained, we can turn our focus to our case study on the Nile River and the newly finished Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). To better understand the topic and the context of why the Nile River was and is the source of potential conflict and why supporters of the hydroegoism current were and still are looking at the Nile, and more precisely at Ethiopia and Egypt as the hotbed of a conflict, we must firstly look at the facts.

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[11] Malin Falkenmark and Jan Lundqvist, "Towards Hydrosolidarity, Focus on the Upstream-Downstream Conflicts of Interests" in *Water International*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, see also William J. Cosgrove, "Fulfilling the world water vision – hydrosolidarity" in *Water International*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2003, pp. 527-531

[12] Andrea K. Gerlak, Robert G, Varady, Olivier Petit and Arin C. Haverland, "Hydrosolidarity and beyond: can ethics and equity find a place in today's water resource management?" in *Water International*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2011, p. 256

[13] Jacob Petersen-Perlman, Jennifer C. Veilleux and Aaron T. Wolf, "International water conflicts and cooperation: challenges and opportunities" in *Water International*, 42, vol. 2, 2017, p. 13

Ethiopia's new Nile dam

Figure 1: The Nile River with its tributaries. Source: BBC News

As illustrated in Figure 1, the Nile River is, not just for historic reasons, one of the most important rivers of Africa, as its basin spread across eleven states: Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the D.R. of Congo. Out of these countries, the Nile is crucial mainly for the more downstream countries, with Egypt and Sudan being almost entirely dependent upon its waters for agriculture, industry and even day to day water usage.

Egypt, one of the largest countries both in terms of population and from the economic viewpoint, is according to UN data, 98% dependent on the waters of the Nile,[14] waters that come from outside its borders, thus are outside the direct control of the Egyptian state.

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[14] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Egypt Country Fact Sheet", http://www.fao.org/aquastat/en/countries-and-basins/country-profiles/country/EGY, accessed on 22 November 2020

The Nile river, the longest in the world, has an annual discharge of approximately 84 billion cubic meters of water, a figure that tends to have some, but not large, variations due to the pattern of rainfall in the region.[15] Out of the 84 billion, almost 80% comes from the Blue Nile tributary, that has its source at Lake Tana in Ethiopia and merges with the White Nile at Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, to form the main Nile.

While Egypt is 98% dependent on the Nile, it does not contribute even 1% to its waters, and on the reverse, Ethiopia, the largest country by population in the region, contributes 80% to the water resources of the river, yet it does not benefit from its potential, or it did not until GERD was built.[16]

Ethiopia, with a population of 108 million and a rapidly growing economy,[17] is starting to look more and more as a potential challenger for Egypt's hegemonic role in the region, also given its historic ties and importance. But leaving aside the discussion about strategy, hegemons and the military sector in general, the Nile and its geography, hydrology and the economic and geopolitical position of the countries along its banks, especially Egypt and Ethiopia, presents an inherent and gross inequality of resource allocation.

This inequality, where Egypt, the strongest and wealthiest country in the region is virtually 100% dependent on the resources that (almost entirely) come from Ethiopia, a weaker and poorer country that wants to develop has also historic roots. As per many of the world's problems, especially in Africa or the Middle East regions, this inequality has been forged into the status quo by the British Empire during colonial times. As Egypt was under British Rule and was given a strategic importance by London, treaties were established as to guarantee Egypt's access to the Nile resources. Out of the many treaties of this sort, it is worth mentioning the 1902 Treaty between Britain and Ethiopia, a treaty that prohibits Ethiopia from constructing any dam on the Blue Nile or reduce by any means the

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[15] Sam L. Laki, "Management of water resources of the Nile Basin", in *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1998, pp. 288-292

[16] *Ibidem*.

[17] Ethiopia's economy grew around 10% annualy in the last decade according to the CIA World Factbook - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html, accessed 24 November 2020

flow of water towards Egypt,[18] the 1929 treaty signed between Egypt and Sudan, allocates the water resources of the Nile as: 4 billion cubic meters to Sudan and 48 billion cubic meters to Egypt. The 1929 Treaty also binds, though it is only signed by Sudan and Egypt, upstream countries to not construct any waterworks without the consent of the downstream nations.[19]

Finally, the 1959 treaty, perhaps the most important and most contentious one as it is still cited by Egypt today when other countries question the legitimacy of their claims[20], states that the waters of the Nile will be allocated entirely between Egypt and Sudan: 55,5 billion cubic meters towards Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters towards Sudan. The 1959 treaty also establishes that no further water works such as dams can be built along the Nile and its tributaries without the consent of Sudan and Egypt. The problem arises, just as in the case of the 1929 Treaty, that only Egypt and Sudan signed the 1959 'Treaty for the Full Utilization of the Nile', thus it is hard to see how Ethiopia or other riparian countries would feel the need to abide by it, not to mention the inherent problematic approach of the principle of acquired rights that is espoused by Egypt largely thanks to this treaty, and the opposition by the use of the principle of equity that is not just more morally and lawfully just, but is, of course, preferred by the rest of the riparian countries.[21]

Gerd – A Disaster In The Making?

This threefold complex issue – the inherent unequal distribution of natural resources on the Nile combined with the reversed unequal distribution of economic, military and human resources between Egypt and Ethiopia, the most important riparian countries, on top of the historically unjust and unlawful legal situation – has prompted scholars to assume that the issue of a conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over the rights to the Nile River and its precious water resources can naturally only lead to a situation of ever-

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[18] Sam L. Laki, *op. cit.*, p. 291

[19] *Ibidem.*

[20] Dalia Abdelhady, *et. al., "*The Nile and The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Is there a Meeting Poin between Nationalism and hydrosolidarity?" in *Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education*, Issue 155, 2015, p. 79

[21] Olaf Westermann, *op. cit.*, p. 125

increasing stress and tensions in the face of the unstoppable disappearance of water, thus a war between the two countries was only a question of 'when', not a question of 'if'.

Indeed, if we analyze the situation of Ethiopia and Egypt on the backdrop of the requirements for war over water resources put forward by Homer-Dixon and Percival we see that our case fits almost perfectly the described prescription of a war setting. Egypt, the downstream nation, is not highly dependent on the water of the Nile, but entirely so. Egypt is also much stronger in terms of military capabilities than Ethiopia[22] and antagonism between the two countries is not a new topic.[23]

Thus, when GERD, a massive $5 billion project that will see Ethiopia double its energy production capabilities when at full operational capability,[24] was finally completed in July 2020, and Ethiopia announced that it will start filling the reservoir of the dam[25], thus restricting the flow of water, to a certain extent, towards Egypt, analysts immediately started to look for the signs of escalation from Egypt. To some, the war already started,[26] though in practical sense the threshold of fiery declarations, was never crossed. Indeed, Egypt's response is far from the fiery rhetoric of its declarations, such as the notorious line of former President Mohamed Morsi when he promised that Egypt will "defend each drop of Nile water with our blood".[27]

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[22] Egypt has a military force of around 450,000 troops, compared to Ethiopia's 150.000. Military spending is also much larger in Egypt - ~3 billion $ - compared to Ethiopia's ~800 million $ - facts taken from CIA World Factbook –
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/330rank.html#EG, accessed 27 November 2020

[23] For a more in-depth view of the topic, see Fred Lawson, "Egypt versus Ethiopia: The Conflict over the Nile Metastasizes", in *The International Spectator*, 52, 4, 2017

[24] Margaret Suter, "The Politics of Water: What We Know About the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam", 2016, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-politics-of-water-what-we-know-about-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/, accessed 27 November 2020

[25] ∗∗∗, "River Nile dam: Reservoir filling up, Ethiopia confirms", *BBC*, 15 July 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53416277, accessed 22 November 2020

[26] Ayenat Mersie, "The Ethiopian-Egyptian Water War Has Begun", *Foreign Policy*, September 20, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/22/the-ethiopian-egyptian-water-war-has-begun/, accessed 25 November 2020

[27] Patrick Kinglsey, "Ethiopia rejects Egyptian protests over Nile dam", *The Guardian*, 11 June 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/ethiopia-rejects-egyptian-protests-nile-dam, accessed 25 November 2020

Quite to the contrary, Egypt and Ethiopia, alongside Sudan, have been involved in a long process of negotiations over a new treaty that could solve once and for all the dispute over each country's claim towards the waters of the Nile. While the process is difficult and has not yet yielded any palpable results, the fact that the countries, especially Egypt, are determined to follow a political solution to the problem,[28] with Egyptian President Al Sisi even going as far as to officially ruling out a military intervention,[29] is a clear sign that hydroegoism is not entirely accurate and that there is hope for a more rational and just solution.

Conclusions

The case of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Nile River is a paramount example for the wider discussion about water conflicts. Indeed, while in this article I have attempted to demonstrate that hydroegoism and the worldview that it envisions are not the only solution, and that there are alternative, more rational, just and conflict-avoiding solutions such as the view offered by hydrosolidarity, the problem of water scarcity and the possibility of conflict that it ensues will not always be so easily solved as in the case of Egypt and Ethiopia. Even our case can always, if the national and regional context allows, slide backwards toward a more egoist and nationalistic confrontation. With the rate at which our climate is changing, combined with the forecasted population growth of the next decades, especially in the poorer, both in terms of economic and water resources, global South, and the apparent lack of interest on a wide-scale of people to actually meaningfully change our ways of consuming and managing resources, conflicts, disputes or even wars over natural resources, water being on the frontline of this, are likely to appear more and more often. This is not to say that they are inevitable, or the natural conclusion of the given situation, but there are still high changes for those situations to arise,

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[28] ***, "Nile dam talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan fail again", *Al-Jazeera*, 5 nov 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/5/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-fail-to-succeed-in-disputed-dam-talks, accessed 25 November 2020

[29] ***, "Egypt's Sisi rules out military action over GERD dispute with Ethiopia", *Egypt Independent*, July 5, 2020, https://egyptindependent.com/egypts-sisi-rules-out-military-action-over-gerd-dispute-with-ethiopia/, accessed 28 November 2020

and the struggle to avoid the degeneration of such tensions must always be focused on the finding of alternative solutions that must involve justice, lawfulness, good management practices and, ultimately, solidarity.

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PETIT REQUIEM POUR LA DEMOCRATIE CONGOLAISE

A SMALL REQUIEM FOR CONGOLESE DEMOCRACY

Andreea Bianca Urs*

Abstract

The reader's interest in the substrates of Congolese democracy is deeply revived through the writing of Jean Bofane, the place where reality and fiction become one. The start of 2019 has been a historic moment for the DRC as it is the first time that a former president has peacefully handed over power. Outgoing President Joseph Kabila cedes power to Félix Tshisekedi while maintaining the mystery of his deep and future intentions. The new President, Felix Tshilombo Tshisekedi, operates literally like the character Tshilombo in the novel Mathematiques congolaises. Starting from this resemblance, we've created a political-literary analysis around the events that took place both in the book and reality.

Keywords: literature, politics, democracy, conflict, Democratic Republic of Congo

> *Pour moi, la littérature et la politique n'ont été jamais des contraires qui s'excluent. La langue que j'écris souffre de politique, le pays où j'écris endure durement les conséquences de son politique; les lecteurs sont, comme moi, l'auteur, marqués de la politique. Il avait peu de sens que je cherche des idées apolitiques, même les métaphores de la lune sont devenus macabres.* (Journal de Günter Grass, 1990)

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Introduction

À l'exemple d'André Gide qui s'intéresse de plus en plus à la politique après son voyage au Congo, l'intérêt du lecteur (surtout européen) pour les substrats de la démocratie congolaise est ressuscité à travers l'écriture de Jean Bofane, car pour lui, le réel et la fiction ne font plus qu'un, exactement ce que nous nous proposons de prouver à travers les pages suivantes. Le lecteur se met en contact avec les réalités de la République Démocratique du Congo (dorénavant abrégé RDC), des réalités qu'il parvient ainsi à comprendre, à déplorer et à raisonner d'une manière particulière. Sous la forme d'une analyse politico-littéraire, notre démarche représente un requiem pour la démocratie congolaise, encore captif dans les structures de l'ancien régime.

L'objectif de notre recherche est double : d'abord, d'envisager d'une manière claire le caractère révélateur de la littérature dans l'univers politique, en insistant sur les indices prémonitoires fournis par l'écrivain congolais Jean Bofane qui trace des pistes de questionnement sur la situation actuelle de la RDC : le nouveau Président, Felix **Tshilombo** Tshisekedi, actionne à la lettre comme le personnage **Tshilombo** du roman *Mathématiques congolaises*.[1] Le roman a été rédigé pendant l'apogée de l'ère Kabila et la violence du système nous est transférée parmi les 10 chapitres du roman. Puis, à la lumière de cette réflexion, nous allons essayer d'analyser la première alternance pacifique de l'histoire de la RDC à la suite des élections présidentielles du 30 décembre de 2018, en mettant un focus particulier sur le Président sortant, Joseph Kabila. Le focus particulier est essentiellement nécessaire car les deux Tshilombo (réel et fictif) rapportent au même Président, au Joseph Kabila. *Mathématiques congolaises* se confonde avec le passé et le présent du Congo, d'ici la question si on peut parler d'une prévoyance congolaise. Comment l'écrivain a-t-il réussi à capturer quelques moments clés 11 ans avant leur concrétisation dans la réalité ? A la première vue, il nous semble que le message noir du texte blanchi de *Mathématiques congolaises* exprime une prophétie remplie.

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[1] In Koli Jean Bofane, *Mathématiques congolaises*, Paris : Actes Sud, 2008. Dorénavant abrégé MC.

Les trois parties de l'article répondent aux plusieurs questions nécessaires afin de comprendre la trajectoire possible du pays après les élections de 30 décembre 2018. La transmission pacifique du pouvoir du président Joseph Kabila Kabange (le quatrième président de la RDC du 26 janvier 2001 jusqu'au 24 janvier 2019) vers Felix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo (l'actuel président investi le 24 janvier 2019) représente-t-elle le début d'une nouvelle démocratie ou, au contraire, son enterrement définitif ? Est-ce que Tshisekedi est le masque choisi par Kabila afin de continuer son régime ? Est-ce qu'il prépare son retour au pouvoir dans les élections présidentiels de 2023 ? Premièrement, nous avons envisagé le contexte électoral de 2018. Comme approche théorique, dans la deuxième partie, nous avons utilisé comme repère le concept de « democratie metisse » avancé par distingué intellectuel congolais Emmanuel Banywesize.[2] La troisième partie représente l'analyse politico-littéraire des données, et nous nous sommes exclusivement appuyés sur le roman *Mathématiques congolaises* qui semble s'inscrire davantage dans notre réalité. Plus qu'une réflexion, ce travail se veut un clé de lecture de la situation actuelle de la RDC, une loupe mise sur son réel Président.

Le début de l'année 2019 a été un moment historique pour le RDC car c'est la première fois qu'un ancien président transmet pacifiquement le pouvoir. Le président sortant Joseph Kabila cède le pouvoir à Félix Tshisekedi en entretenant le mystère sur ses intentions profondes et futures. On soupçonne Joseph Kabila de planifier son retour au pouvoir aux élections présidentielles de 2013. Cette intuition est potentiellement confirmée par son affirmation faite autour des élections : « Je ne vous dis pas adieu, je vous dis tout simplement au revoir».[3]

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[2] Emmanuel B. Banywesize, « La démocratie métisse. Propos sur la gouvernementalité en République Démocratique du Congo » en Sergiu Mișcoiu, Sèdagban Hygin F. Kakai, Kokou Folly L. Hetcheli (eds.), *Recul démocratique et néo-présidentialisme en Afrique Centrale et Occidentale*, Iași : Institutul European, 2015, p. 105.

[3] Dernier discours de Joseph Kabila en tant que président de la République devant les dirigeants des pays de la SADC réunis à Windhoek.

1. Le contexte politique dans la République Démocratique du Congo

Tout d'abord, le déroulement des élections présidentielles de décembre 2018 était ombré de plusieurs facteurs. Trois jours avant la date prévue, le 23 décembre, le scrutin est reporté au 30 décembre par la Commission électorale nationale et indépendante (CENI) en raison du retard dans l'impression des bulletins, des difficultés rencontrées face à l'épidémie d'Ebola dans l'Est du pays, ainsi qu'à cause de l'incendie d'un entrepôt de la commission contenant plusieurs milliers de machines à voter destinées à la capitale.[4] Le 30 décembre 2018 a eu lieu l'élection présidentielle dans la RDC, élection reportée à plusieurs reprises depuis 2016 (deux ans et dix jours après l'expiration du mandat de Joseph Kabila), processus qui lui a assuré un successeur. Le régime de Joseph Kabila est accusé de réprimer brutalement l'opposition politique : à en croire l'ONG Human Rights Watch,[5] près de 300 personnes entre 2015 et 2018 ont été tuées dans des manifestations pacifiques. Cet aspect nous intéresse de façon particulière, parce qu'on arrive à le saisir sous la description de Jean Bofane.

La campagne était dominée par l'affrontement des trois candidats : Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary (58 ans), dauphin désigné de Joseph Kabila, Félix Tshisekedi (55 ans), fils du candidat au second tour de la présidentielle précédente Étienne Tshisekedi, ainsi que le candidat commun de la coalition Lamuka (*Réveille-toi* en lingala), Martin Fayulu (62 ans). Avec un peu plus de 38 % des suffrages selon les résultats provisoires, Félix Tshisekedi devance Martin Fayulu, qui en recueille près de 35 %. Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, fidèle au Joseph Kabila, candidat du parti du président sortant obtient seulement 23 %.Dès l'annonce des résultats, ceux-ci sont contestés

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[4] « RD Congo : il n'y aura pas d'élections ce dimanche 23 décembre », sur *Le Point Afrique*, le 20.12.2018, en ligne, URL: https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/rd-congo-il-n-y-aura-pas-d-elections-ce-dimanche-23-decembre-20-12-2018-2281135_3826.php, consulté le 11 août 2019.
[5] « RD Congo: la répression perdure tandis que la date limite fixée pour les élections approche. Le Président Kabila doit garantir un scrutin crédible et respecter la Constitution », *Human Rights Watch*, en ligne, URL: https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2018/06/29/rd-congo-la-repression-perdure-tandis-que-la-date-limite-fixee-pour-les-elections, consulté le 20 août 2019.

par Martin Fayulu, qui se met à la recherche de la « vérité des urnes ; la Conférence épiscopale du Congo annonçant par ailleurs que ces derniers ne correspondent pas aux résultats collectés par ses 40 000 observateurs sur le terrain. Fayulu est devenu de plus en plus vocal, soutenant ardemment que « Félix a vendu le pays à Kabila[6] » et qu'il ne contrôle « absolument rien[7]». Pendant les derniers mois il ne désarmait pas et continuait la lutte au sein de l'opposition. Son malheur s'est concrétisé dans la création de la plateforme *Dynamique pour la vérité des urnes*.

Le gouvernement est accusé d'avoir, devant l'impossibilité de faire élire son candidat, choisi de faire gagner le candidat de l'opposition le moins hostile au régime. Un accord aurait ainsi été conclu entre Tshisekedi et Kabila, attribuant au premier la présidence et au second le contrôle du gouvernement et de plusieurs secteurs régaliens via une mainmise sur l'Assemblée nationale et celles provinciales. Le contrôle de ces dernières permet à Joseph Kabila, sénateur à vie, de conserver une grande partie du pouvoir. Le Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), coalition autour l'ex-président Joseph Kabila (JK) et du PPRD (Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie), est donné largement vainqueur des sénatoriales du 15 mars 2019 : 95 sièges pour le FCC, 7 sièges pour Lamuka (Coalition autour de Jean Pierre Bemba, Moise Katumbi, Martin Fayulu et Adolphe Muzito) et seulement 3 sièges pour *Cap pour le changement* (CACH), coalition autour de Felix Tshisekedi et Vital Kamerhe. Selon les résultats provisoires annoncés par la CENI le 10 janvier 2019, Felix Antoine Tshilombo Tshisekedi est proclamé vainqueur de l'élection présidentielle par la Cour constitutionnelle et prête serment le 24 janvier 2019. Il devient ainsi le cinquième président du pays et le premier à accéder au pouvoir par le biais d'une alternance pacifique.

Dans une république semi-présidentielle, le président et le gouvernement doivent travailler ensemble, et l'ancien président JK obtient une majorité écrasante aux élections législatives et provinciales. Suite aux élections législatives, la plateforme de Kabila *Front commun pour le Congo*

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[6] « RDC: en meeting à Kinshasa, Martin Fayulu fustige l'alliance Tshisekedi-Kabila », sur *Rfi*, le 24.04.2019, en ligne, URL: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190428-rdc-meeting-kinshasa-martin-fayulu-fustige-alliance-tshisekedi-kabila, consulté le 1.10.2019.
[7] *Ibidem.*

(FCC) - a remporté 341 sièges sur 500 et la majorité dans 22 des 26 provinces aux élections provinciales. Au Sénat, 95 sièges sur 108 appartiennent au FFC, le poste de sénateur à vie étant évidemment attribué à l'ancien président Joseph Kabila. Tels étant les résultats, on peut dire que la voix dominante à Kinshasa reste celle de JK. Bien évidemment, il n'y a pas de concordance entre les présidentielles et législatives : les résultats du présidentielles révélèrent la volonté de changement (Tshisekedi + Fayulu ensemble obtient 73%, donc un victoire évidente sur le dauphin de Kabila), tant que les législatives de mars 2019 présente une situation totalement différente. La question que l'on se pose, c'est celle de savoir si Tshisekedi, en acceptant le deal politique avec l'ex président, a su à ce moment-là que l'Assemblée nationale allait avoir une majorité accablante FCC et que finalement cela n'allait pas lui donner beaucoup de marge de manœuvre. Le gouvernement nommé le 26 aout 2019 compte 76,9% des personnalités qui n'avaient jamais détenu de portefeuille ministériel.

La République Démocratique du Congo vit une situation inédite.

2. Les particularités de la démocratie congolaise

Une démocratie - de la démocratie grecque (demos = peuple; cracia= gouvernement) - est un système politique qui permet la gouvernance du peuple par le peuple. Elle se caractérise par la participation des citoyens au processus décisionnel et garantit les libertés individuelles, le respect des groupes minoritaires par la majorité et la protection des droits des groupes minoritaires. Plus important encore, une démocratie permet aux citoyens d'une nation d'élire librement les fonctionnaires du gouvernement qui pourraient mieux servir leurs intérêts. Une démocratie centrée sur les congolaises est un système politique qui permet la gouvernance les peuples de la RDC et par les peuples de la RDC, en mettant leurs intérêts et leur bien-être au centre des décisions qui affectent leur vie.

Même si la RDC est le seul pays africain qui a le qualificatif *démocratique* dans son appellation, la démocratisation est un processus lourd qui ne se termine jamais. Le régime dictatorial de Mobutu (1965-1997) a été suivi par une série de guerres civiles et de conflits armés régionaux. En 1993, une profonde crise politique engloutit le Zaïre alors que le pays, profondément appauvri et corrompu, commençait à s'ouvrir au multipartisme

démocratique. Peu de temps après son auto-proclamation comme président, Laurent-Désiré Kabila rebaptise le Zaïre qui devient la République Démocratique du Congo. Désirant divorcer de ceux qui l'ont mis au pouvoir, en juillet 1998, L.-D. Kabila a ordonné aux troupes rwandaises de quitter le pays. Cela a conduit au déclenchement du Deuxième guerre au Congo. Le 16 janvier 2001, L.-D. Kabila a été assassiné par l'un de ses gardes du corps et il a été succédé par son fils Joseph Kabila. Ensuite, le 17 décembre 2002, le gouvernement congolais et les groupes rebelles ont signé « l'accord de paix global et inclusif » à Pretoria, en Afrique du Sud. L'accord signifiait un accord de partage des pouvoirs avec la formule 1 + 4, c'est-à-dire qu'un gouvernement de transition serait au pouvoir pendant deux ans avec Joseph Kabila comme président et quatre vice-présidents - un du MLC, du RCD, du gouvernement et de l'opposition politique. L'Acte final d'ICD, qui est un accord sur le partage du pouvoir au niveau national, a été signé à Sun City, en Afrique du Sud, le 2 avril 2003. Par la suite, la deuxième guerre congolaise a été officiellement déclarée terminée et le gouvernement de transition de l'unité nationale a commencé le 30 juin 2003. La transition politique jusqu'à 2006 a été caractérisée par une crise politique, économique, sécuritaire et surtout humanitaire. Plusieurs violences ont emailé cette période : épurations ethniques, guerres civiles de libération, d'occupation et de prédation. Ainsi, les anciens seigneurs de guerre se sont retrouvés placés dans un nouveau contexte, plus paisible, mais toujours avec une arme à la main. Bofane nous invite de prendre part à ce processus :

> Entre-temps, le vent de la démocratisation forcée poussait certains dans le dos. Les politiciens, dépourvus de finances, essayaient par tous les moyens de consolider leurs partis et ceux-ci n'étaient pas nombreux. Soit on obtenait un poste au gouvernement, ce qui garantissait un salaire mensuel et des privilèges, soit on nouait des alliances, soit on se faisait remarquer à moindres frais. On fourbissait ses armes, c'était palpable. On ne savait jamais si processus électoral il y avait vraiment, mieux valait être prêt. (MC, p. 63)

Selon la Constitution, la RDC est une république, une démocratie, un État de droit, social et laïc. Emmanuel Banywesize avance le concept de « démocratie métisse[8]» : la RDC adhère aux principes du constitutionalisme,

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[8] Emmanuel B. Banywesize, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

de la révision judiciaire et de la séparation des pouvoirs, mais s'accommode en même temps avec les spécificités tribales. La démocratie métisse représente une fausse démocratie à travers laquelle on n'arrive pas à trouver une synthèse menant à l'édification d'une nation congolaise. Ce sont l'absence de l'État de droit, remplacé par la volonté et les caprices des dirigeants, et l'exclusion mutuelle des familles, des ethnies, des tribus, des partis et des courants idéologiques du projet collectif qui reposent sur la domination et la mainmise sur les ressources du pays.[9] Pour donner suite à la lois congolaise, le président n'est pas constitutionnellement au-dessus du gouvernement et des autres organes horizontaux comme verticaux mais pourtant sa suprématie n'est pas moins évidente, le Premier Ministre ne peut pas prendre des décisions par lui-même, il attend souvent des injonctions du Président pour pouvoir agir. La révision constitutionnelle du 20 janvier 2011 a renforcé la suprématie du Président de la RDC en centralisant le pouvoir dans ses mains. Suivant les nouvelles dispositions, en concentration avec les Bureaux de l'Assemblée nationale et du Senat, le Président peut dissoudre l'Assemblée provinciale, le Gouverneur de province peut être relevé de ses fonctions par le Président, lorsque celui-ci juge qu'il y a une crise grave et persistante qui menace le fonctionnement régulier des institutions provinciales.

Mr. Banywesize filtre les moments de domination en trois formes de personnalisation du pouvoir : première, celle de Mobutu, puis le dirigisme de Laurent Désiré Kabila, et la troisième forme, qui nous intéresse de façon particulière, est donnée par le régime collégial de cohabitation entre 2003 et 2006. Le pouvoir avait été réparti entre 5 personnalités issues des forces politiques et rebelles signataires de l'Accord global et inclusif de Pretoria:[10] Joseph Kabila et ses quatre vice-présidents : Jean Pierre Bemba (de la rébellion du Mouvement de Libération du Congo), Azaris Ruberwa (de la rébellion du Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie), Yeroudia Abdoulaye Nbombasi (Gouvernement) et Arthur Zaidi Ngoma (Opposition politique). Cette répartition laissait croire à l'éclatement de la personnalisation du pouvoir et ce montage a été réalisé pour obtenir non seulement que les forces rebelles renoncent aux armes et intègrent les institutions, mais cela a

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[9] *Ibidem.*

[10] Voir le texte de l'accord de Pretoria, en ligne, URL: http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/036/article_18705.asp, consulte le 17.12.2019.

permis aussi au Président de la République de rester « en dehors de la mêlée » intouchable et dominant tout l'édifice ; un exercice de pouvoir qui se fit discret.[11]

2.1 Une personnalisation spécifique du pouvoir – portrait du Président – Joseph Kabila

Le présidentialisme de Joseph Kabila s'encadre dans un néo-présidentialisme qui s'exerce à travers une stratégie qui consiste à diriger de l'arrière. Diriger de l'arrière signifie assumer une posture de gouvernance par camouflage, c'est choisir d'habiter une position qui laisse parfois à croire qu'il y a une absence de leadership.[12] Kabila a été perçu comme le président dont l'autorité est molle, mais il a été pourtant la personnalité dominante de la gestion collégiale du pays. « **Celui qui tentera d'arrêter le processus de paix en marche sera écrasé** » avertissait-il en 2003. Il représente aussi un héritier du nationalisme congolais dont les figures sont Patrice Lumumba et Laurent-Désiré Kabila, il se veut aussi modernisateur, ouvert au néolibéralisme. Kabila utilise presque la même stratégie de camouflage par l'intermède de son successeur Tshilombo Tshisekedi (celui qui incarne le pouvoir choisit de diriger de l'arrière - leading from behind - c'est-à-dire gouverner de façon camouflée en laissant le soin à d'autres acteurs de se mettre en avant). JK est alors soupçonné de chercher, à défaut d'une victoire de son dauphin, à faire proclamer vainqueur Tshisekedi, considéré comme une opposition plus « douce », au détriment de Fayulu, d'une opposition dure soutenue par les candidats contre lesquels le gouvernement a tout fait pour prévenir l'éligibilité.

3. Jean Bofane et la prévoyance congolaise

Écrivain en exil qui vit à Bruxelles, In Koli Jean Bofane naît en 1954 à Mbandaka et il a vécu sa vie en fonction des soubresauts politiques au Congo ; par suite son écriture est étroitement liée à sa biographie. Jean-Paul Sartre constate que pour un écrivain, l'action consiste à écrire en transformant « sa plume en épée[13] ». C'est ce que Jean Bofane arrive à réaliser : en essayant

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[11] Emmanuel B. Banywesize, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 105.

[13] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Les Mots*, Paris : Gallimard, 1964, p. 216.

d'imprimer son attachement au Congo, son écriture représente une arme contre l'injustice subie par les Africains. L'intérêt pour la justice, la condition de la femme et la liberté représentent les thèmes centraux qui révèlent un écrivain se sentant responsable pour la collectivité africaine, asiatique et européenne. Il dirige ses lecteurs vers un engagement similaire au sien, vers la responsabilité et la profondeur humaine. Ses ouvrages témoignent de l'acuité du regard que le romancier pose sur la RDC, il décrit avec lucidité les forces et notamment les intérêts qui déchirent ce territoire depuis plus d'un siècle.

Le génocide de Rwanda en 1994 a représenté un moment essentiel pour son écriture : « c'est Rwanda qui m'a incité à écrire. Aujourd'hui je continue à écrire parce que je suis victime du Rwanda. Mais c'est le seul moyen que j'ai trouvé ».[14] L'auteur avoue que le génocide rwandais l'a provoqué parce que tous les commentaires étaient faits par des africanistes non africains, par des blancs. Il a ressenti alors la nécessité de prendre la parole, de « rendre sa dignité au peuple congolais [15] » en dénonçant « les systèmes qui pèsent sur les hommes ».[16]

On a demandé à Jean Bofane quelles étaient ses références en littérature, en général, et il a répondu que la référence, c'était lui-même. Parce qu'on ne peut se fier qu'à soi-même, *ekenge* fait l'homme (la prudence fait l'homme), dit-il. Grace à cette réponse, on pense que lui, comme écrivain africain en exil, se reconnaît dans les vers suivants :

> Je viens du pays ou nul ne parle
> Ou les étoiles refusent de briller
> Ou les morts affamés fuient leurs tombes
> Ou les escargots effrayes abandonnent
> Pour toujours la coquille de fer
> Ou les enfants dansent au rythme des mouches
> Et s'excitent au lyrisme de moustiques[17]

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[14] In Koli Jean Bofane, le 27.12.2016, entretien vidéo *Grand Angle TV5 Monde*, minute 13:02 URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1iCMeDyDwo , consulté le 22.02.2018.

[15] Nicolas Michel, « RDC : In Koli Jean Bofane, le satyricongolais », in *La Jeune Afrique* 09 avril 2014, en ligne, URL : http://www.jeuneafrique.com/133814/culture/rdc-in-koli-jean-bofane-le-satyricongolais/ consulté le 22.09. 2019.

[16] *Ibidem.*

[17] Kama Sywor Kamanda, « *Poemes. La somme du néant* », coll. « Poètes des Cinq Continents », Paris : L'Harmattan, 1989, pp. 15-16.

Mathématiques congolaises fit son apparition en 2018 comme roman dédie à Kinshasa, « à ses dix millions d'habitants qui statistiquement, devraient être morts alors qu'en dépit du bon sens, ils se débrouillent pour vivre ».[18] Le roman présente l'histoire de Célio Matemona, un jeune orphelin obsédé par un vieux livre de mathématique, hérité de son père décédé. Celio Mathématik, le protagoniste d'une comédie humaine très bien structurée, se fait remarquer par les hommes d'affaires grâce à son intelligence brillante et arrive à travailler dans un bureau au service du Président. Les politiciens l'ont recruté afin d'utiliser au maximum ses capacités intellectuelles qui serviront à la réalisation des jeux politiques poussiéreux. La représentation de la classe politique kinoise et ses influences est nuancée par d'autres problèmes qui détruisent la population : la sorcellerie et la Faim. Les dix chapitres sont un amalgame de remous de toute sortes, de manipulation et de paraboles mathématiques. Celio, dans la recherche des réponses, applique les théorèmes mathématiques dans la vie réelle ce qui crée parfois des situations amusantes.

Bertrand Westphal affirme que « l'espace oscille entre réel et fiction, sans que les niveaux soient vraiment discernables[19] ». Dans certains cas, la fiction est supérieure au réel, mais le réel sera l'ambition, le *terminus ad quem* de la représentation. Le réel est également l'ambition de Jean Bofane, sa représentation de la démocratie et de la violence du régime Kabila montre clairement l'évidence au dépit des épisodes drôles.

L'élément unificateur de cette analyse est le fait que les deux Tshilombo (réel et fictif) rapportent au même Président : le roman *Mathématiques congolaises* a été rédigé pendant l'apogée de l'ère Kabila, et l'auteur crée un personnage-marionnette soumis au Président Kabila. Sans savoir à ce moment-là, il a décrit le parcours de Felix Antoine Tshilombo Tshisekedi qui garde une liaison étroite de soumission avec son prédécesseur.

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[18] Freddy Mulongo, *In Koli Jean Bofane, écrivain : Mathématiques congolaises ou Kinshasa la débrouille !* en *Reveil FM livre*, le 15 octobre 2009, en ligne, URL :
http://www.congoforum.be/fr/congodetail.aspsubitem=37&id=162000&Congofiche=selected, consulté le 18.09.2019.

[19] Bertrand Westphal, *La Géocritique. Réel, fiction, espace,* Paris : Les Editions de Minuit, 2007, p. 150.

Le nouveau président Felix **Tshilombo** Tshisekedi actionne à la lettre comme le personnage **Tshilombo** du roman Mathématiques congolaises. La ressemblance entre les deux est frappante et devient de plus en plus visible dès qu'on avance dans la lecture du roman. En premier lieu, les deux mènent leur existence en exerçant des fonctions de direction : Felix Antoine Tshilombo Tshisekedi est le 5ème Président élu de la République, Gonzague Tshilombo est Directeur général du bureau d'information au service du Président de la République. Questionné par rapport à cette ressemblance,[20] Jean Bofane assure que la ressemblance est purement fortuite.[21]

Le Président appréciât sa rapidité, parfois même sa brutalité dans la réalisation des stratégies subtiles. Tshilombo est l'homme de confiance du Président, il va de soi que le président en cause n'est rien d'autre que Joseph Kabila. Gonzague Tshilombo dirige le bureau avec efficacité et sans sensibilité. Tshilombo du roman installe sa subjectivité froide dépourvue de toute émotion, ainsi comme Tshilombo du Palais de la Nation, dépourvu de toute capacité d'actionner, reconfigure le régime de son prédécesseur.

3.1 Une visibilité qui embête le publique

Tshilombo, c'était visible, allait de victoire en victoire. Il était aussi craint que respecté, la situation la plus rassurante pour l'homme. (MC, p. 352)

Dans les premiers mois qui ont suivi son investissement, le nouveau président a répandu le parfum de la victoire à travers de multiples voyages internationaux. Fragilisé en interne par la mainmise que Joseph Kabila a conservée sur le Sénat et l'Assemblée entre autres, Félix Tshisekedi a également pris soin depuis son élection de s'assurer une légitimité à l'international, multipliant les déplacements à l'étranger : Angola, Ouganda, Rwanda, États-Unis. Felix Antoine Tshilombo est devenu un personnage de plus en plus visible, il a effectué plusieurs voyages à l'étranger et avait rencontré plusieurs personnalités, en Europe et dehors, même le milliardaire américain Bill Gates.

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[20] Nous avons demandé directement l'écrivain et il assure qu'il s'agit d'une coïncidence.
[21] Source : commentaire sur le profil Facebook de l'écrivain

En visite aux États Unis en avril, Félix Tshisekedi a promis de « déboulonner » le système « dictatorial » de son prédécesseur en estimant qu'il avait hérité un pays « au bord du gouffre ».

> Tshilombo appréciait de vivre cette période de transition. Il estimait connaître des moments privilégiés où le savoir-faire d'hommes tels que lui était nécessaire. Il était non seulement l'expert en écran de fumée, mais aussi le spécialiste en « comment poser une poutre dans l'œil du voisin sans faire tomber la paille qui s'y trouve déjà, des qualités inestimables en matière d'intoxication et de désinformation, car telle était sa véritable tâche. (MC, p. 111)

En visite à Washington au début du mois d'avril, Felix Tshilombo réclame d'ailleurs que l'ONU inscrive l'ADF Nalu au registre des organisations terroristes. Tshilombo a déclaré que la menace islamiste représente une préoccupation permanente pour lui et son désir est que son pays soit un membre de la coalition contre la lutte anti-terroriste. Il a aussi confié sa crainte de voir une tentative d'installation d'un califat dans la région de Beni et Butambo. Dans la RDC, l'ennemi c'est toujours le voisin : l'Ouganda, le Rwanda, le Burundi. Ce sont eux qui sont coupables pour tous les malheurs de congolais. Dans cette déclaration Tshisekedi fait référence au mouvement rebelle *Forces démocratiques alliées* (ADF Nalu) groupe qui a des racines ougandaises mais au présent il s'agit d'un groupe purement congolais.[22] Le 18 avril 2019, par le biais d'un message d'une agence de propagande, le groupe État islamique a revendiqué une attaque dans l'est de la RDC, dans le village de Bovata, à la frontière avec l'Ouganda.[23]

> Le président tint à féliciter Tshilombo personnellement. Grâce à lui, l'ambassadeur de France, qui avait sollicité une audience en urgence, avait tenu à réaffirmer la volonté de son pays de poursuivre des relations bilatérales basées sur la confiance et le respect mutuel. (MC, p. 347)

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[22] Andreea Urs, « Du conflit au terrorisme en RD Congo », *Studia Europaea*, LXV, 1, 2020, pp. 55-73.

[23] Stanis Bujakera Tshiamala, « RDC : pour la première fois, le groupe État islamique revendique une attaque sur le territoire congolais » le 19 avril 2019, sur *Jeune Afriques*, en ligne, URL : https://www.jeuneafrique.com/764953/politique/rdc-pour-la-premiere-fois-le-groupe-etat-islamique-revendique-une-attaque-sur-le-territoire-congolais/, consulté le 30.09.2019.

Les 6 premiers mois après l'investiture de Tshilombo ont été marqués par les inquiétudes générées par la coalition FCC- CACH par rapport à la formation du gouvernement. Chaque jour venait avec la confirmation que le pays tourne en rond. Le bilan des premiers 100 jours montre que la stratégie adoptée par Tshilombo était celle des « petits pas » : le gouvernement a été nommé après 7 mois d'attente, le 26 aout 2019. Huit mois après son investiture, Tshilombo Tshisekedi prend ses marques dans une cohabitation inédite avec le Président. Pendant cette période les deux ont gardé des rapports très cordiaux. Un intime du chef de l'État affirme que « Joseph Kabila a compris que si Felix Tshisekedi échouait, cela lui coûterait aussi ». [24]

3.2 Les incidents du 16 mars 2019 - les militants de l'UDPS en colère après les élections sénatoriales

> Célio le haïssait aussi pour cela. Il tardait à rédiger le rapport sur les pourquoi et les comment des dernières manifestations. Le jeune homme savait aussi que la situation professionnelle de son patron n'était plus aussi stable. Son parti, en organisant ces émeutes, l'avait touché personnellement. Le Président lui reprochait de n'avoir pu prévoir et surtout, éviter les fâcheux incidents. Compte tenu de la propension du chef de l'État à remplacer ses collaborateurs, Tshilombo n'en menait pas large. (MC, p. 440)

Le 16 mars 2019, le lendemain des élections sénatoriales, les manifestants en colère se sont réunis au siège de l'UDPS, situé sur la 11è rue Limete. Sur leur parcours, les manifestants pro UDPS ont saccagé un bureau du *Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie* (PPRD), parti de l'ex-président Joseph Kabila, situé sur le boulevard Sendwe, à Matonge. L'effigie de l'ancien président a été détruite et des pneus ont été brûlés sur la chaussée, devant le Palais du Peuple, siège du parlement.[25]

« Dans la fiction narrative, les références au monde réel se mêlent si étroitement que, après avoir habité un roman et en avoir confondu, ainsi qu'il convient de le faire, les éléments fantastiques et les références à la

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[24] Romain Gras, « Raison et sentiments » en *Jeune Afrique*, No. 3063, 2019, p. 84.

[25] « RDC: les militants du l'UDPS en colère après les élections sénatoriales », sur *Rfi*, le 16 mars 2019, en ligne, URL: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190316-rdc-militants-udps-colere-resultats-elections-senatoriales-mbuji-mayi-goma-kananga-, consulté le 1.10.2019.

réalité, le lecteur ne sait plus très bien où il en est ».[26] On peut lier très bien l'incident du roman (manifestations contre le parti du Président) à l'incident du samedi 16 mars 2019, où les militants du l'UDPS manifestent en colère après l'humiliation subie aux élections sénatoriales. En définitif, les deux incidents identiques (réel et fictif) ont été une réaction contre le même régime Kabila.

3.3 Le fils de son père ?

> On croisait donc les doigts. Tout était prêt pour désigner, dès demain, de véritables mandataires politiques et bientôt, le premier président de la République, dûment élu. Pas comme avant. Pas un président du genre qui, quand on vous demande son nom, vous fait vous sentir comme le bâtard à qui on demande le nom de son père. (MC, p. 573)

Les deux Présidents ont hérité l'intérêt pour le pouvoir sur la voie paternelle. Tout réflexion faite, on peut renforcer ici que le nouveau président devrait arriver avec le changement. Rival de Mobutu et des Kabila, Etienne Tshisekedi, mort d'une embolie pulmonaire à 84 ans, n'a jamais cessé de rêver de diriger la RDC. Felix Antoine Tshilombo Tshisekedi est donc le produit d'une histoire glorieuse, et les attentes créés autour de lui sont énormes.

De l'autre cote, JK est le fils de celui qui a libéré le Zaïre depuis 32 de dictature sans partage, mais les actions de Kabila père ont généré le déclanchement d'une violence accrue lors de la première guerre de Congo. La citation montre l'espérance de l'auteur de finir avec l'époque de Kabilas, mais voici le brimbalement de la situation, après 8 ans : Kabila a choisi le fils du plus grand des opposants, et l'a fait trahir les 38 années de lutte de son père. Le 23 décembre 2011, à l'issue d'une élection présidentielle marquée par de graves « irrégularités » selon plusieurs organismes locaux et internationaux, Joseph Kabila est proclamé président de la République. Étienne Tshisekedi, qui est arrivé deuxième, revendique la victoire, se proclame président de la République démocratique du Congo et prête serment depuis sa résidence

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[26] Umberto Eco, *Six promenades dans les bois du roman et d'ailleurs*, Paris : Ed. Grasset, 1996, p. 159.

de Limete. À la suite de ce scrutin contesté, Tshisekedi radie du parti les députés élus de l'UDPS qui, malgré l'interdiction, ont siégé au Parlement. La mort d'Etienne père bloque le processus de sortie de la crise politique.

3.4 Le périls d'une continuation de l'ère Kabila

Les 300 personnes tuées dans des manifestations pacifiques (rapport de l'ONG Human Rights Watch) peuvent être retrouvées dans la mort du personnage Baestro, épisode marquant qui ouvre le roman et qui nous introduit dans une Kinshasa salie par la classe politique au pouvoir. Le roman *Mathématiques congolaises* s'ouvre avec la mort de Lofombo Bolenge, alias Baestro. Tout au long du récit, on essaie d'élucider le mystère créé autour de sa mort. Baestro et son frère Gaucher sont les neveux de Mère Bokeke Yyofa ; ils sont deux jeunes venus d'Équateur et qui veulent réussir à Kinshasa. Le jeune mélomane chante des chansons mélancoliques où il s'agit de rêves inaccomplis, d'espoirs déçus et de l'amertume de la vie. Un jour, l'adjudant Bamba invite les deux garçons à un meeting politique. Gaucher est très enthousiasmé espérant être bien payés mais Baestro n'aimait pas ce type de manifestations ; selon lui, le pays doit changer, on veut la démocratie, il reflète beaucoup mais il cède finalement :

> « **Après réflexion, les scrupules de Baestro fondirent comme le salaire moyen d'un travailleur kinois, un jour de paie** » (MC, p.17)

Il était gravement blessé dans le Massacre de Limete et mené à l'hôpital :

> « **Baestro s'éteignit dans le meuble de fer, au milieu d'ustensiles chirurgicaux, inoxydables et froids, comme l'est la raison d'État** » (MC, p.28)

Il est essentiel de relire entre les lignes et de comprendre que le régime en place pendant la rédaction du roman a tué des congolais innocents par sa violence. Le fait que tout au long du roman les questions sur la mort de Baestro flottent devant les yeux du lecteur transmet que la violence du régime a laissé des traces difficiles à estomper.

Celio Mathématik, infiltré dans la branche des politiciens, continue à investiguer la mort de son ami Baestro. Au cours d'une discussion avec le père Lolos, Celio commence à lui poser des questions. Il arrive à douter si le massacre de Limete a été un affrontement réel ou seulement un jeu politique macabre. Le jeune mathématicien se rend compte que Makanda Rachide et aussi Tshilombo sont coupables de la mort de son ami. Le seul qui peut l'aider à clarifier la situation c'est Gaucher, le frère de Baestro, qui a été obligé par le peuple du Tshilombo de se taire et de vivre caché au Masina. En définitive, Baestro représente l'illustration des 300 personnes tuées entre 2015 et 2018 dans les manifestations pacifiques.

> Tshilombo jubilait déjà. Il allait impliquer Makanda dans un des nombreux complots contre l'État, ou supposés tels, qu'avait connus le pays depuis son accession à l'indépendance. Le politicien voulait la reconnaissance ? Tshilombo allait l'y aider et ensemble, ils écriraient l'Histoire. (MC, p. 453)

Makanda Rachidi a répondu aux condoléances dues au « Massacre de Limete » et pensa que l'incident fut un tournant dans sa nouvelle orientation politique. Il acquit enfin la crédibilité dont il avait besoin aux yeux de la nation, mais deux martyrs tombés au champ d'honneur, fauchés par les suppôts de l'État, c'était un incident inattendu et bienvenu. Makanda Rachidi, le président du Parti la nouvelle démocratie (PND), est le prototype de l'homme politique, toujours à la recherche de l'argent et des bénéfices pour son parti. Il a toujours un discours convaincant et il ne renonce pas jusqu'à ce qu'il obtienne ce qu'il veut. Son but est d'intimider et de forcer la main de Tshilombo, un homme plus puissant que lui, pour lui donner cent mille dollars. L'argent représente le but suprême, car sans cela, rien n'est faisable dans cet univers corrompu. Makanda et Tshilombo étaient ennemis dans la vie politique mais dans la vie réelle ils avaient des arrangements. Makanda Rachidi et Tshilombo suivaient la même candidature à un moment donné. Les deux se sont rencontrés furtivement pour garder les apparences, ce qui met en lumière encore un cas d'escroquerie et manipulation du publique. On ne peut pas dire qui est le pire des deux : Makanda Rachidi qui avait été le promoteur de la tentative de coup d'État ou Tshilombo qui en avait été l'organisateur.

> Dans son esprit tordu, Tshilombo avait vite perçu le bénéfice qu'il pourrait tirer d'une telle théorie. Il aimait cet univers quantique qui échappait totalement aux lois régissant les choses ordinaires. L'indépendance serait-elle le facteur indispensable pour atteindre l'excellence ? Sommes-nous contraints, pour réaliser les plus grands desseins, de nous libérer de certaines règles ? De vivre au-dessus des lois ? Tshilombo en était intimement persuadé. Cette fois-ci, il voulait marquer les esprits. Mettre au point quelque chose qui laisserait des traces durables. (MC, p. 454)

À première vue, tout indique que le message noir du texte blanchi de *Mathématiques congolaises* exprime une prophétie remplie, mais au-delà de ça, il s'agit d'une continuation du régime. C'est le président sortant Kabila qui tire les ficelles, dirige de l'arrière et planifie son retour sur la scène politique. Rappelons qu'il s'agit notamment d'une interprétation menée dans le but de questionner davantage les substrats de la démocratie congolaise.

En définitive, la parole et l'écriture représentent un instrument de résistance à la violence politique présente dans la RDC, écriture qui actionne comme un agent révélateur et potentiellement réparateur : « Il faut raconter ce qui se passe de la façon la plus neutre possible. Surtout parce que, dans un roman, il n'y a pas de parti pris. On a affaire à des personnages qui sont Mauvais qui peuvent être critiquables[…] **dans les romans on assigne les rôles** ».[27] Par l'intermède de son personnage **Tshilombo**, pleinement enraciné dans la temporalité passée et présente, Bofane évoque la violence du système politique congolais, il démasque ainsi un Président qui préfère diriger de l'arrière, en étirant ses tentacules partout. Cette littérature est double car elle est fidèle au passé donc en étant fidèle au passé, elle évite de parler du présent, mais en ne parlant pas du présent, elle s'y réfère sans en parler.[28] La description des faits est étroitement liée aux évènements déroulés au moment de l'écriture (Pour

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[27] In Koli Jean Bofane, propos retranscrit de l'entretien vidéo Grand Angle, *TV5 Monde*, le 27/12/2016 sur http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kliCMeDyDwo , consulté le 30 septembre 2019.

[28] Buata B. Malela, « Afrique centrale et violence symbolique dans le discours littéraire de la diaspora afrodescendante », en Simona Jişa, Sergiu Mişcoiu, Buata B. Malela (eds.), *Littérature et politique en Afrique. Approche transdisciplinaire*, p. 74, apud Jean BESSIÈRE, *Inactualité et originalité de la littérature française contemporaine. 1970-2013*, Paris : Honore Champion, coll. « Unichamp-Essentiel » , 2014.

rappel : en 2001 on a assisté au changement de Kabila à Kabila. Joseph Kabila arrive au pouvoir à 29 ans après l'assassinat de son père, Laurent Désiré Kabila. En décembre 2002 on assistait aux négociations et partage du pouvoir, le 18 décembre 2005 envisage la naissance d'une nouvelle République et le 6 décembre 2006 Joseph Kabila est devenu président). Le roman a été rédigé pendant l'apogée de l'ère Kabila et la violence du système nous est transférée parmi les 10 chapitres du roman.

Il apparaît bien pour finir cette analyse de transmettre le conseil de l'écrivain Jean Bofane (via social media) pour un président pas vraiment président : « Personne ne le lui avait encore dit, mais [Tshisekedi Tshilombo] était un homme de paille. La paille c'est pratique. Ça isole, c'est écologique, biodégradable – dans la tendance de ce début du XXIe siècle, en somme – et ça brûle vite et bien...»[29]

En guise de conclusions – 5 signaux d'alarme

Ce travail est une interprétation personnelle dans le but de mettre en valeur la connexion littéraire, une parallèle qui s'est avérée à être fructueuse. En guise de conclusions, nous présentons cinq signaux d'alarme. Vu l'actualité des problématiques abordés, on peut observer que :

1. **La personnalisation du pouvoir et le culte du président sont en plein ascension.** Plus que jamais, la vie politique congolaise est bâtie autour du chef d'état, soutenir ou boycotter le président en fonction est la seule idéologie dominante dans la République dite Démocratique du Congo. Toute l'énergie se cristallise autour du départ de Kabila, comme s'il n'avait jamais quitté.

2. **Un pays sans progresses en ce qui concerne la démocratie**. Les problèmes sont les mêmes depuis vingtaine d'années, mais les solutions sont inexistantes. Après 18 ans de kabilisme, les structures sont si vieux et pourri, pour que le nouveau pouvoir soit en mesure de gestionner efficacement le patrimoine du pays.

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[29] In Koli Jean Bofane, *Congo Inc. Le testament de Bismarck*, Paris : Actes Sud, 2014, p. 116.

3. **Le profil de l'homme politique reste inchangé**

4. **La coalition FCC- CACH est un amalgame de contradictions** et la source principale d'amertume des peuple – Felix Tshisekedi Tshilombo et les ministres FCC sont allés à Kingakati, le domaine de Kabila pour prêter serment devant lui.   À travers un année de collaboration et des scissions perpétuelles, ils n'ont rien construit, au contraire, ils ont désintégré, ils ont divisé les peuple.

5. **Diriger de l'arrière reste la principale stratégie de Joseph Kabila.** JK restera dans l'histoire pour plusieurs raisons, mais il est entré encore une fois dans l'histoire de son pays : en devenant le premier ancien Président de la République Démocratique du Congo à siéger au Sénat après avoir quitté la Présidence, fait très rare dans l'univers politique.

L'ambition principale de cette réflexion était de signaler le pouvoir révélateur de la littérature et d'ouvrir la voie aux interrogations autour de la première alternance pacifique en RDC. Suite à l'analyse de l'écriture de Bofane, en surveillant les deux Tshilombo soumis au même Président, on a réalisé des connexions considérables par rapport à la situation du pays post 30 décembre 2018. En suivant les indices prémonitoires de Bofane, cette présidence est une continuation vicieuse du régime Kabila, car c'est toujours lui qui tire les ficelles. La fin de l'année 2018 supposait apporter le changement au peuples congolais après 18 ans de régime Joseph Kabila. Pour le moment, il n'y a pas ni la possibilité, ni la volonté de se rompre de Kabila. Par l'intermède de son personnage **Tshilombo**, Bofane trouve une manière pour affirmer l'option réaliste de sa démarche littéraire qui insiste sur le défaut d'histoire, en évoquant le présent et le passé. Par conséquence, la démocratie congolaise a été enterrée pendant l'apogée de l'ère Kabila, et son exhumation lors des dernières élections est seulement une illusion.

Je terminerai en disant que ce qui était estimé au début comme un prévoyance littéraire, a dévoilé des problèmes de plus en plus graves enracinés dans le système actuel. Tel comme précisé auparavant, Kabila se dirige vers les élections présidentielles suivantes. Les deux présidents, Joseph Kabila et Felix Tshisekedi se retrouveront face à face aux élections présidentielles de 2023 et alors tout sera clairement compris.

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Consequences de Choix Methodologiques sur l'analyse de l'evolution de l'organisation Clandestine ETA

Consequences of methodological choices on the analysis of the clandestine organisation ETA

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Abstract

Born in December 1958, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was dissolved on May, 11th 2018. During its almost sixty years of existence, ETA has undergone phases of military offensive and then a decline in its operational activity. In order to understand the limits of these episodes and their reasons, we have created an original database listing all the actions of the armed group. Its analysis contributes to highlight the strategic developments of the clandestine organisation and makes possible to discuss the conclusions previously drawn from the group's databases of fatal victims. We will thus consider the consequences of methodological choices on the interpretation the history of a clandestine organisation and of its key moments.

Keywords: ETA, clandestine violence, armed strategy, Basque country, statistical analysis.

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« *Lepoan hartu ta segi aurrera* » (Relève le camarade qui est tombé et continue à aller de l'avant).

Introduction

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), organisation armée basque, a signé son acte de naissance le 31 juillet 1959. Elle a été mise sur pied par des étudiants basques œuvrant dans le magazine *Ekin*, las de la passivité des dirigeants du nationalisme traditionnel incarné par le Parti Nationaliste Basque (PNV). Au terme de 60 années de lutte contre l'État espagnol pour un Pays basque socialiste et indépendant, ETA s'est dissoute le 3 mai 2018.[1] Bien qu'officiellement née en 1959, cinq ans (1964) se sont passés avant qu'ETA n'emploie pour la première fois des explosifs contre des plaques commémoratives de la dictature franquiste.[2] Au cours de ces six décennies, il est commun de rappeler qu'ETA a fait plus de 800 victimes mortelles.[3] La période a été particulièrement meurtrière puisque le conflit en tant que tel au Pays basque entre 1960 et 2013 a provoqué au total la mort de 1 004 personnes selon les chiffres du gouvernement basque.[4]

Les actions menées par le groupe clandestin ont fait l'objet de plusieurs études de type quantitatif, presque toutes réalisées par des auteurs espagnols. Une seule exception est donnée par Clark qui a recensé les 287 attaques mortelles d'ETA (de 1968 à 1980) et a présenté quelques statistiques descriptives sur la sélectivité des victimes durant cette période.

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[1] Pour une mise en perspective de l'histoire d'ETA et de ses actions, voir Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents : ETA, 1952-1980*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984; John Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism : The Fight for Euskadi, 1890-1986*, Londres: Routledge, 1988; Joseba Zulaika, *Basque violence, metaphor and sacrament*, Reno (Las Vegas) : University of Nevada Press, 1988; Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, *¿El final de ETA? De la negociación a la tregua*, Madrid: Taurus, 1998b.

[2] K. de Zunbeltz [José Luis Zabilde], *Hacia una estrategia revolucionaria vasca*, Hendaye, 1968, p. 105.

[3] En 2013 encore, le nombre de victimes attribuées à ETA variait selon les sources (voir Manuela Carmena *et al.*, « Informe-base de vulneraciones de derechos humanos en el caso vasco (1960-2013) », Secretaría General de Paz y Convivencia, Vitoria-Gasteiz, juin 2013, p. 14, https://www.irekia.euskadi.eus/uploads/attachments/3214/informe_base_es.pdf?1371196800, consulté le 21/12/2020). Dans les chiffres du gouvernement basque fournis pour la période 1960-2013, les auteurs d'actions ayant eu fait treize victimes demeurent non identifiés.

[4] Voir http://www.euskadi.eus/gobierno-vasco/estadistica/, consulté le 21/12/2020.

Les travaux ultérieurs sont, pour l'essentiel, lacunaires du fait de l'époque à laquelle ils ont été réalisés. Tel est par exemple le cas des données quantitatives établies par Domínguez pour la période 1978-1992.[5] La contribution majeure à la constitution d'une base de données des *victimes* mortelles d'ETA a été proposée par De La Calle et Sánchez-Cuenca puis par Sánchez-Cuenca.[6] D'un point de vue analytique, les études statistiques sur les actions entreprises par ETA ont été soit descriptives (Domínguez), en plus de porter sur une période ancienne (1978-1992), soit de type économétrique,[7] faisant abstraction de considérations sociologiques.

Plus généralement, ETA et les organisations armées au Pays basque ont suscité l'attention des commentateurs sous plusieurs aspects qu'il s'agisse de l'antiterrorisme,[8] de la réponse sociale à la violence,[9] des stratégies des organisations terroristes[10], et de leurs discours,[11] des militants eux-mêmes[12] ou des mouvements sociaux qui les portent.[13]

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[5] Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, *ETA : estrategia organizativa y actuaciones 1978-1992*, Bilbao : Universidad del País Vasco, 1998a.

[6] Luis De La Calle et Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, « La selección de víctimas en ETA », *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, n° 10, avril 2004, pp. 53-79 ; Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, « Explaining temporal variation in the lethality of ETA », *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, vol. 67, n° 3, 2009, pp. 609-629.

[7] C. Barros, « An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: The Spanish ETA Case », *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 14, n° 6, 2003, pp. 401-412; C. Barros, J. Passos et L. Gil-Alana, « The timing of ETA terrorist attacks », *Journal of Policy Modeling*, vol. 28, 2006, pp. 335-346; C. Barros et L. Gil-Alana, « ETA: A Persisten Phenomenon », *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 17, n° 2, 2006, pp. 95-116.

[8] Óscar Jaime Jiménez, *Policía, terrorismo y cambio político en España*, 1976-1996, Valence : Tirant lo Blanch, 1998.

[9] María José Funes, *La salida del silencio. Movilizaciones por la paz*, Madrid : Akal/Foca, 1998.

[10] Domínguez, *op. cit.*, 1998a; *op. cit.*, 1998b; Pedro Ibarra Güell, *Evolución estratégica de ETA : de la "Guerra revolucionaria" (1963) a la negociación (1987)*, San Sébastian : Kriselu, 1987 ; Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, *ETA contra el Estado : las estrategias del terrorismo*, Barcelone : éd. Tusquets, 2001.

[11] Manuel Mata José, *El nacionalismo vasco radical*, Bilbao : Service Éditorial de la UPV, 2003 ; Martín Alonso, et Fernando Molina, « Historical narratives, violence and nation. Reconsidering 'The Basque conflict' », *in* Rafael Leonisio *et al.* (eds.), *ETA's Terrorist Campaign. From Violence to Politics, 1968-2015*, Londres : Routledge, 2017, pp. 163-183.

[12] Fernando Reinares, *Patriotas de la Muerte, Quiénes han militado en ETA y por qué*, Madrid : éd. Taurus, 2001; Caroline Guibet Lafaye, *Conflit au pays basque: regards des militants illégaux*, Bruxelles : Peter Lang, 2020a ; Caroline Guibet Lafaye, « Militantes clandestines dans le conflit armé basque », *Champ pénal/Penal field* [En ligne], vol. 19, 2020b, https://journals.openedition.org/champpenal/11572, consulté le 21/12/2020.

ETA ayant écrit le dernier chapitre de son histoire, nous avons souhaité, dans un contexte dépassionné, revenir sur sa trajectoire, faite de propositions politiques, de stratégies politico-militaires et d'actions armées. Notre approche se concentre sur ces dernières ainsi que sur leur évolution, conformément à une hypothèse analogue à celle retenue par De La Calle et Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, établissant que la fréquence et le type d'opérations militaires réalisées reflètent les options stratégiques du groupe. Il s'agira en particulier de confronter les conclusions de travaux antérieurs, s'appuyant sur le recensement des *victimes*, à celles qui peuvent être tirées de l'analyse d'une série statistique des *actions* menées par l'organisation durant l'ensemble de son histoire. L'attention à ces dernières permet une approche affinée de la stratégie d'ETA que biaise un intérêt exclusivement porté aux victimes.[14] Non seulement elle permet d'écarter les « erreurs » commises par le groupe, dont certaines ont conduit à un nombre de victimes civiles important mais non volontaire, mais également de faire un pas de côté eu égard à une focalisation très prégnante dans le débat public sur les victimes. Nous verrons également d'une part que la « chute de Bidart », c'est-à-dire l'arrestation de l'exécutif d'ETA en mars 1992, ne peut nullement être considérée comme « amor[çant] le début du déclin des actions et de l'organisation »,[15] contrairement à des conclusions antérieurement avancées. Nous montrerons, d'autre part, que toute phase d'offensive armée intervient à l'appui de négociations politiques dans une perspective de règlement du conflit au Pays basque. Cette conjonction permet de reconsidérer l'image du groupe, en particulier postérieure à la dissolution d'ETA-politico-militaire (ETA-pm). Loin d'être la « bande terroriste » que les médias espagnols se plaisent à dépeindre, ETA s'efforce d'intervenir dans le champ politique comme un acteur à part entière, porteur d'une stratégie politique (politico-militaire), et déploie son action sur les plans politiques, militaires et sociaux quoiqu'avec des moyens d'action illégaux.

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[13] Isabelle Lacroix, « Les femmes dans la lutte armée au Pays basque », *Champ pénal/Penal field* [En ligne], vol. VIII, mis en ligne le 11 juin 2011 ; Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina et Diego Muro (eds.), *ETA's Terrorist Campaign. From Violence to Politics, 1968-2015*, Londres : Routledge, 2017.

[14] Sur la place des victimes du terrorisme dans le débat public et sur l'évolution des politiques pénales en Espagne, voir Truc, *op.cit.*

[15] Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, « Explaining temporal variation in the lethality of ETA », *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, vol. 67, n° 3, 2009, p. 622

Afin d'étayer ce propos, nous préciserons dans un premier temps les limites des bases de données existantes expliquant que nous ayons privilégié d'autres options méthodologiques. Nous exposerons ensuite les éléments à partir desquels nous avons construit la base que nous exploitons, et présenterons enfin les conclusions que les séries statistiques autorisent à déduire.

1.   Questions de méthode

1.1 Constitution des précédentes bases de données

Afin de mieux saisir l'apport de la base de données que nous avons constituée, il convient de préciser la façon dont été élaborées celles qui ont servi aux principaux travaux statistiques sur ETA. Dans son étude sur la période 1968-2000, Barros a procédé à une collecte de données annuelles en exploitant trois types de sources.[16] Il a recensé les exécutions et les enlèvements réalisés par ETA entre 1968 et 2000, à partir des travaux d'Abadie et Gardeazabal (2001) qui proposent 33 observations annuelles. Le SIPRI-Yearbook[17] du Stockholm International Peace Research Institute a également été utilisé ainsi que la base de données des statistiques du tourisme en Espagne (www.ine.es/inebase/index.html, consulté le 21/12/2020). Dans une étude ultérieure sur la période 1968-2002, Barros *et al*. (2006) ont exploité la base de données ITERATE (https://library.duke.edu/data/ sources/iterate, consulté le 21/12/2020) qui recoupe partiellement celle du *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD). Barros et Gil-Alana s'appuient sur la même source.

Une recension plus systématique des victimes, à partir de sources très éclectiques allant de la gauche abertzale (patriote) à l'extrême droite, a été opérée par De La Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca. Ces auteurs se sont appuyés sur une pluralité de sources dont la base de données de l'Association des Victimes du Terrorisme (AVT), la liste de victimes d'ETA fournie par Calleja (1997), le CD-ROM *Euskal Herria y la Libertad* de Landa (1995), des

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[16] C. Barros, « An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism : The Spanish ETA Case », *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 14, n° 6, 2003, pp. 401-412.

[17] https://www.sipri.org/yearbook, consulté le 21/12/2020. Le SIPRI-Yearbook est consacré à l'armement, au désarmement et à la sécurité internationale.

informations tirées du quotidien *El País* à partir de mai 1976, la chronologie publiée par *Egin* (1982) pour la période 1977-1982, celle publiée par l'Equipo D (1984), rattachée à l'extrême droite, pour la période 1973-1983. Cette pluralité de sources permet à De La Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca d'estimer disposer d'une base de données exhaustive des victimes du terrorisme d'ETA (*Domestic Terrorist Victims*[18]). Le travail a été complété par Sánchez-Cuenca (2009) qui a ajouté à ces données 160 observations entre le premier trimestre 1968 et le dernier trimestre 2007.

Enfin, Martínez Herrera (2002) s'est appuyé sur des sources policières pour établir sa base de données. Il n'y prend pas seulement en compte les victimes mortelles mais aussi les blessés. Contrairement à De La Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca, il a exploité, dans ses deux articles,[19] des séries annuelles de décès de 1969 à 2001 ce qui conduit à une approche beaucoup moins fine que celle des auteurs précités. Il cherche à identifier l'effet des politiques espagnoles soit antiterroristes soit de résolution du conflit sur les actions menées par ETA, l'incidence étant déduite de la corrélation entre le nombre d'opérations réalisées et des étapes historiques de l'agenda politique. Les deux variables étudiées sont « réponses politiques » (*responsive policies*) et « politiques répressives » selon qu'elles s'abattent sur l'exécutif du groupe clandestin ou consistent en arrestations de membres dits ordinaires de l'organisation.

Limites des bases de données antérieurement réalisées

La principale originalité de la base de données que nous avons constituée est de ne pas seulement recenser les *victimes* faites par ETA mais d'identifier les *actions* menées par le groupe, ce qui a pour effet mécanique d'augmenter considérablement le nombre d'items susceptibles d'être pris

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[18] Voir https://ic3jm.es/investigacion/proyectos/explaining-terrorist-and-insurgent-behavior/, consulté le 21/12/2020.

[19] Enric Martínez Herrera, « Nationalist Extremism and Outcomes of State Policies in the Basque Country, 1979-2001 », *International Journal on Multicultural Studies*, vol. 4, n° 1, 2002, pp.16-41; E. Martínez Herrera, « Government restructuring and reallocation of resources in the face of ethno-nationalist insurgency in the Basque Country (1979-2005) », in M. Oberg et K. Strom (dir.), *Resources, Governance Structures and Civil Conflict*, Londres: Routledge, 2007, pp. 101-124.

en compte. La base utilisée par De La Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) puis par Sánchez-Cuenca (2009), « "the Victims of ETA" dataset »,[20] répertorie 596 actions[21] dont la dernière date de 2006, c'est-à-dire douze ans avant la dissolution du groupe. La nôtre comprend 3096 actions qui se sont déroulées entre 1959 et 2011. Il semble en effet méthodologiquement problématique de réduire à ses 837 victimes une organisation qui a commis plus de 3 000 actions. La stratégie d'un groupe terroriste dépasse de loin, en particulier lorsqu'il pratique, de façon privilégiée, le ciblage des victimes, la seule réalisation de victimes mortelles. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai pour ETA qu'elle a défini son action de façon originelle comme se déployant sur quatre fronts, politique, culturel, militaire et social (Ve assemblée d'ETA, 1972). Dès lors que l'attentat indiscriminé n'est pas l'unique pratique d'un groupe terroriste, on ne peut l'étudier à partir des seules victimes mortelles qu'il a provoquées.

Au-delà de cette limite temporelle et numérique, la base des victimes présente un autre biais en ce qu'elle agglomère les actions d'ETA-militaire (ETA-m) et ETA-pm,[22] d'une part, et, d'autre part, celles des Commandos Autonomes Anticapitalistes (CAA), d'ETA-pm VIIIe Assemblée (scission d'ETA-pm), *Iraultza* et *Gatazka* (scission des CAA), alors même, comme le reconnaissent les auteurs, que 93 % des assassinats (773 sur 832) sont le fait d'ETA-m. De même, la période 1968-1973 est écartée de l'analyse de la violence politique par Sánchez-Cuenca (2009) dans la mesure où aucune action mortelle n'y est enregistrée. Cette considération conduit également l'auteur a délaissé la période postérieure à 2003 ce qui, d'un point de vue analytique est discutable, dans la mesure où cette option revient à considérer qu'une organisation clandestine qui ne fait pas de mort n'a pas de stratégie politique ce que d'autres groupes illégaux comme Iparretarrak, ayant également œuvré au Pays basque, récusent.

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[20]http://recursos.march.es/web/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/datasets/the%20Victims%20of%20ETA%20-DATASET.sav, consulté le 21/12/2020.

[21]https://ic3jm.es/investigacion/proyectos/explaining-terrorist-and-insurgent-behavior/, consulté le 21/12/2020.

[22] À l'occasion de la Ve assemblée, s'opère une scission entre ETA militaire, ETA politico-militaire et *Frente Obrero* (*Front ouvrier*, qui deviendra *LAIA*).

1.2 Résultats antérieurement mis en évidence

Quels résultats les travaux précédemment évoqués permettent-ils de dégager ? L'analyse des actions menées par ETA sert, dans certains cas, de soubassement à une appréciation des politiques antiterroristes de l'État espagnol de 1968 à 2000, notamment en termes de dissuasion.[23] L'approche proposée par Barros et ses coauteurs est exogène. Une tentative d'étude endogène est néanmoins proposée à partir d'une comparaison des périodes de cessez-le-feu et des actions armées mais les résultats sont pour le moins décevants, la principale conclusion formulée étant que les attaques d'ETA semblent augmenter en été et diminuer, lorsque l'on prend en compte d'autres variables, comme les arrestations, la politique répressive, les phases de négociation avec le gouvernement, les meurtres.[24] De même, les corrélations proposées par Martínez Herrera s'avèrent le plus souvent négatives.[25]

L'exploitation de la base de données de De La Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) autorise des conclusions plus pertinentes en matière de comportement stratégique d'ETA, à partir de l'hypothèse que les variations dans les caractéristiques des victimes de l'organisation traduisent des changements stratégiques de cette dernière. L'étude des victimes sert de point d'appui pour tester des hypothèses sur la stratégie d'ETA. De même, les séries statistiques autorisent Sánchez-Cuenca (2009) à identifier, pour la période 1973-2003, quatre phases dans l'évolution de la violence du groupe. Chacune de ces périodes correspond à une étape du développement stratégique de ce dernier (Tableau 1). 1. La première coïncide avec le régime franquiste (1959-1975) et repose sur une stratégie de l'action-répression-action. 2. La deuxième période, couvrant les années 1977-1981 et plus exactement 1978-1980, est marquée par une intense offensive contre l'État espagnol et coïncide avec le début d'une guerre d'usure. 3. Au cours de la décennie 1982-1992, le conflit se prolonge et la guerre d'usure se stabilise. 4. Enfin l'arrestation des principaux responsables de l'organisation à Bidart (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) le 29 mars 1992 amorce le début du déclin

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[23] Barros, *op.cit.*, 2003.

[24] *Ibidem* ; La nature de la variable n'est pas précisée par les auteurs.

[25] Martinez Herrera, *op.cit.*, 2002, 2007.

des actions et de l'organisation.[26] Ce 29 mars, l'« opération Bidart » menée par le RAID conduit à l'arrestation de 11 personnes dont le collectif Artapalo. Ce dernier associe à Francisco Mugica Garmendia, dit *Pakito*, José Luis Alvarez Santacristina, dit *Txelis*, et José Arregui Erostarbe, dit *Fiti*. Ces trois hommes sont considérés comme la « troïka dirigeante » d'ETA (*L'Express*, 17/11/2008), l'exécutif d'ETA.

Tableau 1 : Périodisation de l'intensité des actions mortelles menées
par ETA selon Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)

Périodes	Contextes	Types de lutte
1959-1975	Franquisme	Lutte antifranquiste, stratégie de l'action-répression-action
1977-1981	Transition vers la démocratie	Offensive contre l'État espagnol
1982-1992	Gouvernement élu, démocratie stabilisée	Guerre d'usure
Après 1992	Démocratie stabilisée	Déclin des actions d'ETA

L'articulation de ces périodes s'expliquerait comme suit : 1. entre le milieu des années soixante et la fin des années soixante-dix, ETA estime que la violence peut entraîner une insurrection populaire contre le régime de Franco par le biais d'une stratégie d'action-répression-action : la violence entraîne une réaction répressive disproportionnée de l'État qui, à son tour, accroît le soutien populaire au groupe clandestin qui peut ainsi augmenter sa capacité offensive.[27] Sanchez-Cuenca convoque, pour expliquer cette première phase de l'action d'ETA, les thèses développées par une partie de la direction du groupe, en l'occurrence les anciens membres d'*Ekin*,[28] à l'origine de la Ve assemblée d'ETA et qui soutiennent la théorie de la spirale de la violence, c'est-à-dire la thèse selon laquelle la violence stratégique contribuera à alimenter un soulèvement populaire. 2. À la suite des premières élections de la transition démocratique, fin 1977, ETA amorce une offensive contre l'État qui ouvre la phase de la guerre d'usure.[29]

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[26] Sánchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. 622.

[27] *Ibidem*.

[28] *Ekin* est le bulletin intérieur du groupe d'étudiants qui est à l'origine d'ETA.

[29] Sánchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2001, chap. 3 ; Sánchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2007.

L'intentionnalité de l'usage de la violence n'est plus de susciter le soulèvement des masses mais d'infliger un coût à l'État qui refuse de satisfaire les demandes contenues dans l'Alternative KAS (Coordination abertzale socialiste).[30] Il s'agit d'imposer une pression sur l'État via des pertes en termes de vies humaines, de destruction de biens et du prélèvement de l'impôt révolutionnaire, afin de le faire céder. Cette offensive s'étend de 1977 à la fin de 1980. En 1981, on constate une réduction très sensible du nombre d'actions ayant donné lieu à des morts. 3. Sánchez-Cuenca estime que, dans la troisième phase (1982-1992) qui relève toujours de la guerre d'usure, un certain équilibre est atteint entre l'activité illégale d'ETA et l'action répressive de l'État.[31] 4. Sánchez-Cuenca

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[30] L'alternative KAS est présentée publiquement 1er août 1975 et définie comme « coordinatrice permanente de l'action, qui sera en même temps une table de débat ». Le 30 août 1976, KAS présente, à l'occasion d'une conférence de presse, les sept points de son alternative. Le 30 janvier 1978, l'alternative KAS est redéfinie autour de cinq points : amnistie pour tous les prisonniers politiques basques en Espagne ; légalisation de tous les partis politiques y compris indépendantistes ; expulsion du Pays basque des forces policières et militaires de l'État espagnol ; amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail des classes populaires, et satisfaction immédiate des revendications en matière socioéconomique exprimées par leurs organismes représentatifs ; un statut d'autonomie accru.

[31] L'argumentation de Sánchez-Cuenca concernant cette période trahit un embarras manifeste. Si sur l'ensemble de la décennie, le nombre de morts est relativement stable, plusieurs pics se dessinent : celui du deuxième trimestre 1987, correspondant à l'attentat dans le parking du supermarché Hipercor à Barcelone, dont on sait qu'il s'agit d'une « erreur » stratégique de l'organisation et d'un défaut des autorités ; le second pic s'esquisse au deuxième trimestre 1991 avec l'action contre le quartier général de la garde civile à Vich le 29 mai 1991. *A contrario*, on observe une diminution des victimes mortelles entre 1988 et 1990 dans un contexte de discussions entre le gouvernement de Felipe González et ETA. L'embarras dissimule une difficulté méthodologique évidente : le fait de ne s'intéresser qu'aux victimes conduit inévitablement à ce type de saillance qui sont intrinsèquement problématiques. L'attentat d'Hipercor provoque un nombre inégalé de victimes dans l'histoire d'ETA (21 morts et 45 blessés). Or non seulement le groupe a reconnu son erreur (*Communiqué d'ETA au Peuple Basque*, 21 mai 1987), c'est-à-dire le fait qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de produire ces victimes mais, en outre, la Chambre administrative contentieuse de la Cour suprême a établi la responsabilité de l'administration de l'État « pour la passivité ou l'omission des forces de sécurité et de police dans ces événements » (voir décision de la Cour suprême, mai 1998), autrement dit pour n'avoir pas évacué le magasin en dépit des alertes lancées auprès de la police urbaine, de l'entreprise et du journal *Avui*. L'attaque de la caserne de Vich (9 morts et 44 blessés), comme celle du café Rolando, se fait dans un contexte où des militaires sont visés mais où l'évacuation des civils des installations militaires et de police, demandée par ETA depuis 1981 (voir *Zuzen*, n° 52, septembre 1991),

délimite, de façon définitive, la quatrième phase de l'histoire d'ETA avec l'arrestation de la direction du groupe lors de l'opération du RAID à Bidart le 29 mars 1992, considérant qu'« ETA ne s'est jamais remise de Bidart ».[32] Constatant qu'ETA n'a plus jamais affiché les niveaux de violence comparable aux deux phases précédentes (1977-1992 ; voir Tableau 4), Sánchez-Cuenca estime que l'arrestation du collectif Artapalo affaiblit définitivement l'organisation au plan opérationnel, sans considérer les changements stratégiques susceptibles de s'opérer au sein du groupe, y compris après l'arrestation de son exécutif. Nous soulignerons au contraire les évolutions stratégiques opérées par l'organisation, conformément à l'hypothèse que le politique prévaut sur le militaire, quand bien même elle agit de façon illégale. De la même façon, le défaut d'attention aux options stratégiques consciemment et explicitement formulées ainsi qu'à la volonté d'ETA de se poser en acteur politique à part entière, induit des flottements dans l'interprétation des cycles de violence des années 2000. Sánchez-Cuenca considère que l'impossibilité de parvenir à un accord avec les nationalistes modérés conduit ETA à mettre un terme au cessez-le-feu en novembre 1999, en omettant l'effet des dispositions stratégico-politiques du gouvernement. En octobre 1999, celui-ci nie avoir reçu une lettre d'ETA évoquant les conditions d'un dialogue après la trêve décrétée le 16 septembre 1999. Le 25 octobre 1999, Belén González Peñalva, dite *Carmen*, interlocutrice pour ETA dans les discussions avec les représentants du gouvernement en mai 1999 à Zurich, est arrêtée à Pau. Dans le même esprit, le gouvernement révèle aux médias, fin octobre 1999, le rôle de médiation joué par l'évêque de Zamora, Juan María Uriarte qui, à la suite de cette annonce, se retire des négociations.[33] Ces événements conduisent à un blocage du dialogue et pèsent dans la rupture du cessez-le-feu.

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n'a jamais été réalisée par le gouvernement espagnol. Un déséquilibre dans la lecture de la stratégie du groupe est induit car lorsqu'il décide intentionnellement d'une action, il ne maîtrise pas le nombre de victimes produites, en particulier lorsque sont utilisés des explosifs ou perpétrées des actions de mitraillage.

[32] « L'effet de Bidart n'est pas circonstanciel, il est structurel : ETA ne s'est jamais remise de ce coup. » (Sánchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. 23).

[33] Iker Casanova Alonso, *ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia*, Tafalla (Navarre) : Txalaparta, 2007, p. 321.

S'appuyant sur un comptage des victimes, Sánchez-Cuenca conclut que le cycle de violence commençant au début des années 2000 est de portée et de durée plus limitées que les précédents, l'offensive s'étant principalement concentrée sur le dernier trimestre 2000 et les deux premiers trimestres 2001. Il estime que depuis 2003, l'intensité de la violence meurtrière a fortement diminuée, témoignant de ce qu'ETA serait entrée dans une phase terminale. L'auteur attribue la diminution des actions aux opérations des forces de sécurité (et à l'absence de stratégie susceptible de remplacer la tactique du « front nationaliste », rassemblant indépendantistes modérés et indépendantistes « radicaux »), sans tenir compte du fait que les attentats du 11-Septembre et du 11 mars 2004 à Atocha obligent ETA à reconsidérer l'usage stratégique de la violence et son interprétation par la population. Ces éléments permettent à Sánchez-Cuenca de conclure que la violence est surtout concentrée dans les phases (ii) (1977-1981) et (iii) (1982-1992), celles qui correspondent à la guerre d'usure, ce qui revient à penser l'activité d'ETA à partir d'une courbe de Gauss et à amalgamer les périodes sans instituer de nuance entre elles.[34]

D'un point de vue analytique, d'autres éléments semblent discutables. Les aléas qu'impliquent l'activité clandestine sont soit surévalués (cas d'Hipercor) soit sous-évalués s'agissant en particulier de la disponibilité logistique du matériel, de la faisabilité des opérations envisagées, de la maîtrise relative des conséquences des actions menées. Ensuite, Sánchez-Cuenca, comme nombre d'auteurs adoptant une perspective exogène, part du postulat que la dimension opérationnelle/militaire – plutôt que politique – prévaut dans la ligne stratégique de l'organisation. Cette approche analytique fait sienne le postulat interprétatif réducteur selon lequel pour ETA-m l'action militaire prévaut sur l'action politique à rebours de la posture politico-stratégique adoptée par ETA-pm, ce que l'abondante littérature produite par ETA tend à récuser. Enfin, les critères à partir desquels la périodisation proposée est construite sont hétérogènes : les périodes 1959-1975 et 1977-1981 sont définies à partir d'un critère macrosocial et historique (le franquisme, la période du gouvernement de transition), là où Sánchez-Cuenca s'appuie sur les interrelations entre ETA et le gouvernement espagnol et les effets de l'antiterrorisme pour définir les phases de l'évolution d'ETA.

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[34] Sanchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2009.

Parallèlement à cette contribution centrale à la littérature, d'autres travaux également anciens, réalisés par des auteurs espagnols dans un contexte où ETA n'avait pas déposé les armes, s'intéressent de façon récurrente à l'effet des politiques répressives sur les activités du collectif[35]. Si Martínez Herrera parvient à des conclusions plus nuancées sur l'effet des politiques répressives et principalement des politiques de résolution de conflit sur les actions du groupe, il semble que tel soit moins le cas s'agissant des effets de l'arrestation d'« Artapalo » en 1992, induits par De la Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca (2004). Dès lors, on peut s'interroger sur l'importance pour une perspective hispano-centrée, de la chute de Bidart dans la lecture de l'évolution du groupe et du fait qu'elle puisse marquer une rupture, alors même que l'organisation armée a encore connu 20 ans d'existence.

2. Constitution de notre base de données

2.1 Description des sources utilisées

La base de données que nous avons réalisée, recensant l'ensemble des actions menées par ETA, s'appuie sur plusieurs types de sources : 1. elle s'est en premier lieu nourrie de bases de données existantes, telle celle du Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[36]

2. Nous avons également retenu les bases de données répertoriant les victimes du terrorisme basque en reprend soin de ne retenir que les victimes réalisées par ETA (ETA-m et ETA-pm) à l'exclusion de tout autre groupe ;

3. les informations tirées des quotidiens nationaux et régionaux, en castillan, français, anglais et en langue basque (*euskara*) ;

4. de la presse (en réalisant des extractions à partir de la mention « ETA » et en excluant tous les items non pertinents) ;

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[35] Voir Barros, *op.cit.*, 2003 ; Barros *et al.*, *op.cit.*, 2006 ; Martínez Herrera, *op.cit.*, 2002, 2007.

[36] Nous avons procédé à un travail à la fois de nettoyage et de complément de la base GTD dans la mesure où, d'une part, aucune donnée n'a été collectée pour l'année 1993 et, d'autre part comme nous l'avons souligné, elle compile au moins 79 actions qui ne sont pas le fait d'ETA (qu'elles soient imputables à IK, *Iraultza*, *Gatazka*, la kale borroka (*i.e.* à la guérilla urbaine des années 1990-2000) voire associe aux actions d'ETA celles des groupes paramilitaires d'extrême droite (ex : attentats du 29 mai 1994 à Muskiz et Artxanda) qui conduisent à la mort de membres d'ETA. Dans cette base, 321 actions ne peuvent, de façon certaine, être imputées à ETA.

5. des sources gouvernementales du ministère de l'Intérieur espagnol ;

6. des documents produits par la gauche abertzale et par l'organisation clandestine elle-même.

Les sources ont été systématiquement croisées pour pallier à l'absence de revendications et à l'attribution fautive au groupe clandestin d'actions non revendiquées. Elles sont systématiquement répertoriées en *Annexe 1.* Nous avons retenu à la fois les actions militaires mais également, en particulier pour les premières décennies d'existence d'ETA, toutes les actions illégales susceptibles d'attirer la répression. Les premières opérations illicites n'ont pas fait de victime et peuvent sembler insignifiantes qu'il soit question de graffiti, d'accrochage du drapeau basque (ikurriña) alors interdit, de distribution de tracts. Pourtant les fondateurs du groupe[37] ainsi que les documents officiels rappellent les risques qu'encourraient leurs auteurs.[38] Ces actions ont été fondatrices du groupe clandestin. Elles ont éveillé la conscience de la population sur la possibilité d'une réponse/résistance à la répression. Du fait de leur illégalité, elles ont déchaîné des vagues de répression[39] qui justifient qu'elles figurent dans notre base de données.

2.2 Apports méthodologiques et statistiques de cette nouvelle base de données

Bien que nous ayons visé l'exhaustivité, la constitution d'une base de données à partir de sources secondaires n'est pas sans poser de difficultés méthodologiques. La première concerne la reconstitution des actions menées

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[37] Voir Madariaga, « Así nació ETA », *Punto y Hora, 25 Aniversario*, 13 juillet 1984, pp. 7-9 ; Zunbeltz, *op.cit.*, 1968, pp. 106-107.

[38] « La quema de la bandera en un edificio oficial, a plena luz del día, en un San Sebastián donde el veraneo reunía a lo más selecto del Régimen y del aparato fascista, suponía una operación madurada, calculada y con cierto riesgo. » (Jon Nicolás, *Documentos Y*, 1979, cité in Nuñez, *op.cit.*, 1993, vol. I, p. 60).

[39] Citons pour seul exemple l'adoption du décret 1794/1960 sur la « Rébellion militaire, le banditisme et le terrorisme » (*Rebelion Militar, Bandidaje y Terrorismo*) du 21 septembre 1960. Il accroît les compétences militaires en matière d'ordre public et interdit toute forme de manifestation, de réunion et de grève. Il intervient après les premières actions réalisées à l'aide d'explosifs par ETA en décembre 1959, en l'occurrence trois bombes artisanales qui ont explosé au gouvernement civil de Gasteiz, à la rédaction du journal phalangiste *Alerta* à Santander et au commissariat de police d'Indautxu (Bilbao) (Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 17).

au cours d'une période difficile à documenter, en l'occurrence les années 1960. Les historiens établissement que le groupe récemment formé réalise, avant 1964, plusieurs actions par semaine.[40] Quoique peu spectaculaires aux yeux de nos contemporains, le fait de dresser l'*ikurriña* alors interdite, de faire des graffiti rappelant l'identité basque, de distribuer des tracts sont des actions susceptibles d'être très durement réprimées à l'époque franquiste et dont l'importance, dans ce contexte, ne doit pas être sous-estimée.[41] Évanescentes, elles sont difficiles à documenter avec précision. Une large part d'entre elles nous a échappé. De même, les opérations menées en soutien ou par des militants exilés d'ETA en Argentine, au Venezuela, au Mexique dans la seconde moitié des années 1960 ne sont pas toujours identifiables avec exactitude quoique bien réelles. Songeons par exemple au lâcher d'*ikurriñas* par hélicoptère sur l'ambassade espagnole au Mexique. Ce type de difficulté se retrouve y compris dans les années 1970. La littérature secondaire souligne qu'en 1979 ETA-pm est à l'origine d'« actions punitives contre les employeurs et [de] certaines actions contre les FSE [forces de sécurité espagnoles]. Certaines initiatives ont également été entreprises pour soutenir les luttes sociales et contre les équipements officiels »[42] sans plus de détail. Il est non seulement difficile de les identifier dans leur singularité mais plus encore de croiser ces informations avec une autre source afin de les valider définitivement. Une partie d'entre elles a donc été omise.

L'identification d'actions plutôt que de victimes, dans une visée d'exhaustivité est délicate, dans la mesure où celles-ci sont quasiment toutes répertoriées, alors que tel n'est pas le cas des premières. Les actions spectaculaires laissent des traces dans les quotidiens ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas d'actes de moindre envergure. De même, l'accès aux journaux locaux – plutôt que nationaux – où des opérations de sabotage peuvent être répertoriées est plus difficile.

Une deuxième difficulté concerne *a contrario* certaines actions ayant eu un retentissement spectaculaire, alors qu'elles n'avaient pas pour objectif principal de réaliser de victime. L'attentat d'Hipercor en est emblématique.

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[40] Casanova, *op. cit*.

[41] L'action la plus spectaculaire de cette période réside dans la tentative de faire dérailler un train à Usurbi (Guipúzcoa) transportant des partisans de Franco vers San Sébastian, le 18 juillet 1961, pour la célébration des 25 ans de la victoire du dictateur durant la guerre civile.

[42] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

L'explosion d'une voiture piégée dans le parking du centre commercial Hipercor à Barcelone le 19 juin 1987 a fait 21 morts et 45 blessés, alors que la police et l'entreprise avaient été prévenues de l'existence de la bombe.[43] Au-delà des dommages humains engendrés, l'événement prend un poids politique considérable. Pourtant ces victimes ne sont pas volontaires. Le codage consistant à accorder le même poids à chaque événement permet de limiter cet effet.

Une troisième difficulté est inhérente aux sources, poreuses aux effets de propagande gouvernementale ou anti-gouvernementale. Le cas de la lutte contre la construction de la centrale nucléaire de Lemoiz en est emblématique. En août 1981, l'entreprise Iberduero, impliquée au premier chef dans ce projet, affirme avoir subi 250 attentats depuis le début de l'année (*El País*, 15/07/1981), auxquels il faudrait en ajouter près d'une centaine d'autres dans les mois suivants.[44] Pourtant il n'a été possible de documenter que 82 actions contre l'entreprise entre janvier et août 1981. De même, d'autres sources font mention de 1 000 actions de sabotage[45] dont le rythme s'accélère en 1997. Nous en avons validé moins d'une vingtaine pour l'année 1997.

Face à ces difficultés, nous avons privilégié plusieurs options méthodologiques. En premier lieu, nous avons retenu toutes les actions d'ETA confirmées par deux sources indépendantes, ce qui permet de pondérer l'effet « victimes » et de tenir compte de façon plus homogène de l'ensemble de la période d'activité du groupe. En second lieu, s'il existe un risque de sous-évaluer le nombre d'actions de l'organisation durant ses vingt premières années d'existence, en revanche les victimes non volontaires tendent à accroître le nombre d'*item* sans considérer l'intentionnalité réelle eu égard à la stratégie adoptée. Pour cette raison, la base de données ne retient que des actions à proprement parler et non les situations où un policier ou un garde civil est tué, dans un échange de tirs, ni celles où un artificier qui tente de désamorcer une bombe, dont l'emplacement a été

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[43] Hipercor n'a pas été évacué. ETA diffuse ses excuses pour les conséquences de l'explosion (voir *Communiqué d'ETA au Peuple Basque*, 21 mai 1987).

[44] Casanova, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

[45] *Ibidem*, p. 296.

indiqué par l'organisation, est tué.[46] Dans la mesure où nous tentons de saisir la stratégie de l'organisation, la référence à l'intentionnalité des actions intervient comme un critère discriminant pour les retenir ou les exclure de la base de données. Ces choix méthodologiques permettent d'éviter de distinguer entre victimes intentionnelles et victimes accidentelles ou collatérales,[47] actions intentionnelles et « erreurs » de l'organisation ayant conduit à la mort, actions ciblées et opérations aveugles.

L'originalité de l'analyse que nous proposons repose donc sur plusieurs axes. D'une part, elle s'appuie sur des données qui tiennent compte de l'ensemble de la période où ETA a été active, de sa création à sa dissolution alors que la base de données la plus complète des victimes s'étend de 1973 à 2003.[48]D'autre part, notre ambition est de ne pas seulement prendre en considération les meurtres mais bien toutes les actions du groupe ce qui permet de saisir de façon plus fine les options stratégiques d'ETA et de ne pas survaloriser des actions meurtrières, surtout lorsqu'elles consistent en erreur. La stratégie de l'organisation est reflétée par l'ensemble des opérations réalisées plutôt qu'uniquement par les exécutions ou les meurtres, chacune ayant vocation à avoir une incidence sur les parties prenantes du conflit et la position prise au sein du jeu politique. Enfin, l'une des originalités de ce travail est d'associer la lecture des sciences sociales et l'analyse statistique ce qui n'a pas toujours été le cas dans la littérature existante.[49]

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[46] Ce qui signifie que nous avons épuré les listes proposées par des sites comme Mapa del terror, Mapa del Olvido, ceux consacrés aux victimes de l'*Ertzaintza* (police autonome basque) ou réalisés par l'extrême droite (tels *Nacional Socialismo sin censura*). 64 actions, ayant donné lieu à 43 morts, ont été ainsi exclues de la base GTD.

[47] De la Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) regroupent au sein d'une même catégorie les décès collatéraux ou accidentels et ceux résultant d'attaques aveugles ou indiscriminées. Ils distinguent (i) les décès recherchés intentionnellement (tant des forces de sécurité que de l'armée et des civils) ; (ii) les décès dans lesquels ETA se trompe de victime ; (iii) les décès qui ne sont pas nécessairement intentionnels, comme ceux qui surviennent lors d'affrontements armés entre la police et ETA, ou lorsque des policiers meurent en essayant de désamorcer une bombe ; et (iv) les décès collatéraux, accidentels ou indiscriminés.

[48] Sánchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2006.

[49] Voir Barros, *op.cit.*, 2003 ; Barros *et al.*, *op.cit.*, 2006.

3. Résultats empiriques : les phases d'offensive politico-militaire

3.1 Résultats empiriques : les phases d'offensive politico-militaire

Les données collectées mettent en évidence deux séries caractérisant les actions militaires d'ETA comme le montrent la Figure 2 (*Annexe 2)* et le Tableau 2.

La première distingue les années 1977-1986 et 1988-1991 où l'activité militaire est inégalée dans l'histoire du groupe avec un nombre d'actions annuelles supérieur à 100.[50]

Tableau 2 : Pics de l'offensive armée d'ETA

Années	Nombre d'actions	Périodes	Nombre d'actions
1977	105	1er semestre	77
		2nd semestre	28
1978	**153**	1er semestre	72
		2nd semestre	**81**
1979	**173**	1er semestre	**107**
		2nd semestre	66
1980	**153**	1er semestre	70
		2nd semestre	**83**
1981	**144**	1er semestre	**94**
		2nd semestre	50
1982	**224**	1er semestre	**92**
		2nd semestre	**132**
1983	**142**	1er semestre	42
		2nd semestre	**100**
1984	**176**	1er semestre	**89**
		2nd semestre	**87**
1985	**146**	1er semestre	**104**
		2nd semestre	42
1986	**139**	1er semestre	63
		2nd semestre	76

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[50] Comme nous l'avons souligné, une continuité pourrait fort bien exister entre 1977 et 1985 car l'année 1981 avec la lutte contre la centrale de Lemoiz pourrait compter bien plus d'actions que le tableau n'en fait figurer.

Années	Nombre d'actions	Périodes	Nombre d'actions
1988	**105**	1er semestre	43
		2nd semestre	62
1989	**136**	1er semestre	65
		2nd semestre	71
1990	**139**	1er semestre	64
		2nd semestre	75
1991	**166**	1er semestre	**86**
		2nd semestre	80

Ces moments forts de l'activité armée permettent de saisir la stratégie militaire d'ETA, de comprendre comment le groupe intervient dans la vie politique du Pays basque et espagnole. Ils témoignent également de ce que l'action militaire est absolument subordonnée à la stratégie du groupe, y compris après la dissolution d'ETA-pm en 1982 et à l'encontre des interprétations réductrices à la fois des actions de l'organisation et plus généralement du terrorisme.

3.2 Esquisse de périodisation

Ces moments forts de l'activité armée mis en évidence, il s'avère possible de délimiter des variations diachroniques de l'activité de l'organisation, c'est-à-dire des phases de son histoire.

Tableau 3 : Périodisation des opérations d'ETA

Périodes	Moyenne annuelle des actions	Contextes	*Modus operandi* dominant	Cibles privilégiées
1959-1976	12	Franquisme	Incendies, explosifs de faible intensité, armes de poing	Bâtiments publics, actions symboliques, vols
1977-1981	146	Transition démocratique	Armes de poing, armes automatiques, explosifs	FSE (gardes civils), bâtiments publics, lutte anti-nucléaire
2nd semestre 1982-1986	165	Monarchie constitutionnelle,	Armes de poing, voitures piégées	Banques, intérêts français, FSE et

Périodes	Moyenne annuelle des actions	Contextes	*Modus operandi* dominant	Cibles privilégiées
		gouvernement socialiste, guerre sale		paramilitaires, cibles touristiques (« campagne d'été »)
1987-1988	98	Trêve, recherche d'un dialogue avec le gouverne-ment socialiste	Explosifs, voitures piégées	Intérêts français, FSE
2nd semestre 1988 - 1er semestre 1992	128	Gouvernement socialiste	Lettres piégées, voitures piégées, explosifs	FSE, intérêts français, projet d'autoroute à Leizarán
2nd semestre 1992- 1er semestre 2000	35	Gouvernement socialiste puis PP après 1996	Explosifs, voitures piégées	FSE y compris basques et militaires, personnel politique et journalistique, « campagne d'été »
2nd semestre 2000-2001	80	Gouvernement PP	Explosifs, voitures piégées	Cibles gouvernementales (bâtiments publics), FSE, personnel politique
2002-2009	29	Gouvernement PP jusqu'en 2004 puis socialiste	Explosifs de faible intensité	Cibles civiles matérielles (entreprises en lien avec l'« impôt révolutionnaire »), gouvernementales (bâtiments publics), FSE, cibles touristiques, actions symboliques
2010-2018	moins d'1	Gouvernement socialiste jusqu'en 2011 puis PP jusqu'en 2018	Explosifs de faible intensité	

Le Tableau 3 met en évidence les différences émanant d'une périodisation fondée sur la chronologie espagnole et nourrie par une base statistique constituée à partir des actions menées par l'organisation (Tableau 1). Sans négliger la modification des rapports de force à l'intérieur

des mouvements basques dans l'évolution des stratégies d'ETA, ni les fluctuations de la politique nationale espagnole ou encore les stratégies répressives des gouvernements successifs (GAL, tortures, exécutions…), nous montrerons comment ces périodes prennent sens à partir de l'histoire d'ETA et de ses reconfigurations stratégiques.

◆ Les années 1959-1977, période inaugurale du groupe clandestin, sont celles de la structuration et de la montée en puissance de l'organisation. Bien que frappée par des vagues d'arrestation notables,[51] ETA se structure, tient plusieurs assemblées, développe ses publications, tout en parvenant à réaliser une douzaine d'actions annuelles remarquables – l'année 1972 faisant exception avec 73 opérations – et dont les cibles privilégiées sont plutôt symboliques, visant en particulier les bâtiments publics, symboles de l'« occupation » espagnole au Pays basque.[52]

◆ Une deuxième période s'illustre entre 1977 et 1982 avec une moyenne de 146 actions annuelles. Cette offensive coïncide très exactement avec la période de transition dite démocratique que traverse l'Espagne entre la mort de Franco et l'élection du gouvernement socialiste de Felipe Gonzalez. Deux alternatives politiques se dessinent à la suite de la mort de Franco : la rupture démocratique et la réforme démocratique. Les forces politiques dominantes optent pour une réforme du franquisme, supposant l'acceptation de la monarchie imposée par Franco, le drapeau et l'hymne national franquiste, le concept d'unité indissoluble de la patrie garantie par l'armée, la persistance des membres de l'appareil franquiste (pouvoir judiciaire, armée, pouvoirs économiques) dans les structures de l'État. ETA prend l'option de la rupture démocratique, multipliant les attaques contre les structures de l'État, en procédant à une stratégie militaire de harcèlement de ce dernier, visant à imposer ses revendications concernant le Pays basque. Le spectre des cibles visées s'élargit pour ne pas concerner seulement les

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[51] Comme en mai 1962, en 1964, en janvier-mars 1966, le 1er octobre 1967, en mars-avril 1969, en mars 1971 et en juillet-septembre 1975.

[52] Après les arrestations de mars 1960 à la suite des trois premières explosions menées par ETA, « la represión, la falta de medios económicos y materiales y la necesidad de fortalecer la organización llevan a ETA a descartar la realización a corto plazo de más acciones armadas y a centrarse en la captación, la formación y las actividades propagandísticas, con la intención de reforzar la organización a medio plazo. » (Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 18).

gardes civils (et les militaires), mais également les maires, les trafiquants de drogue, les informateurs de la police, les collaborateurs de la guerre sale et l'extrême droite.[53] Parallèlement, l'année 1982 semble marquée par une évolution dans l'usage des armes mobilisée par ETA, en l'occurrence le fusil de précision ou les voitures piégées télécommandées.

♦ Au cours de la période couvrant le 2nd semestre 1982 jusqu'en 1986, s'affirme une très forte période de reprise de l'activité armée coïncidant avec une phase de la « guerre sale »,[54] menée par le gouvernement socialiste, ainsi qu'avec le développement de l'antiterrorisme transfrontalier.

♦ Du 2nd semestre 1988 au 1er semestre 1992 se déploie une sorte de « phase de croisière » de l'activité militaire d'ETA dont l'intensité de l'action est de l'ordre de 128 opérations annuelles.

Cette intensification produit, au sein de la société civile, une évolution de l'attitude face au groupe armé dont l'accord signé entre José María *Txiki* Benegas et le *lehendakari* José Antonio Ardanza, le 30 janvier 1985, constitue une illustration[55]. Le PNV s'éloigne progressivement de la gauche abertzale pour apporter son soutien au PSOE, parti de gouvernement,[56] et dont le chef est à l'origine de la répression paramilitaire des GAL. La rupture entre le PNV et l'*Euskadiko Ezkerra* (EA) en 1986 confirme cette prise de distance qui culmine dans le pacte d'Ajuria Enea, signé le 12 janvier 1988. Bien qu'ETA formule en 1988 une proposition de cessez-le-feu, les tergiversations autour de ce dernier et l'échec des négociations d'Alger donnent lieu à une reprise virulente des actions armées. Avec la rupture des négociations d'Alger en avril 1989 s'opère un durcissement réciproque des positions. Celui-ci gagne l'ensemble des secteurs impliqués dans le conflit. À partir de février 1989, la gauche abertzale initie une campagne de revendication du

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[53] Les campagnes contre l'extrême droite (41 morts) et contre les participants à la guerre sale (18 morts) sont concentrées dans les années 1978-1980 et dans les premières années de la décennie 1980, puis elles s'estompent progressivement.

[54] Voir Barros, *et al.*, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 344.

[55] Le document reconnaît et ratifie le respect du cadre juridique politique basé sur la Constitution et le Statut d'Autonomie, la condamnation frontale de la lutte armée, le rejet de la négociation avec les organisations armées, le soutien à la réinsertion des prisonniers politiques, l'abandon de la critique de la politique antiterroriste du gouvernement.

[56] Le 23 janvier 1985, A. Ardanza est investi comme *lehendakari* avec deux votes du PSOE.

droit à l'autodétermination[57] alors que, de son côté, le pacte d'Ajuria Enea[58] appelle le 3 février à une manifestation pour le 18 mars 1989, une semaine avant la fin du cessez-le-feu.[59] Le slogan de l'événement est « La paix maintenant et pour toujours ». La violence est associée exclusivement à l'action d'ETA, la « paix » impliquant la disparition du groupe. Parallèlement, *Jarrai* promeut à partir de 1990 le mouvement d'insubordination au service militaire[60] et la campagne de désobéissance civile à l'encontre du service militaire espagnol est soutenue, à partir de l'année suivante (1991), par *Herri Batasuna*.

Le gouvernement, pour sa part, intensifie sa politique de dispersion des prisonniers qui, de leur côté, rejettent les mesures de réinsertion sociale. Un exemple de ce climat de tension est offert par les manifestations organisées contre les familles de prisonniers politiques détenus à la prison d'Alcalá-Meco par les syndicats de police le 27 mai 1989. L'attaque des autorités ne vise pas exclusivement les prisonniers d'ETA mais aussi la gauche abertzale. En février 1992, HASI (*Herriko Alderdi Sozialista Iraultzailea -* Parti Révolutionnaire Socialiste du Peuple) est dissout.[61] Le 21 du même mois, la loi organique de protection de la sécurité citoyenne, dite loi Concuera, est promulguée. Elle facilite les arrestations et la répression des manifestations au nom du respect de l'ordre public.

L'intensification des actions d'ETA intervient dans un climat de tension voire de violence exacerbée. Prenons pour seuls exemples, l'exécution par des groupes paramilitaires d'extrême droite (les GAL) de Josu Muguruza, candidat élu d'HB pour la Biscaye et journaliste à *Egin*. Il est tué le 20 novembre 1989 dans l'hôtel Alcalá de Madrid la veille de son investiture au Parlement espagnol et à la date anniversaire de la mort de Franco. À la même époque, ETA diversifie ses moyens d'action en ayant recours à des lettres et

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[57] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 246.
[58] Le pacte d'Ajuria Enea, ou accord pour la Normalisation et la Pacification du Pays basque, a été signé le 12 janvier 1988 par l'ensemble des forces politiques basques et espagnoles à l'exclusion d'Herri Batasuna (HB). Il rejette publiquement toute alliance avec des organisations soutenant l'action violente – telles HB – ou toute négociation avec des mouvements clandestins.
[59] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 246.
[60] *Ibidem*.
[61] *Ibidem*, p. 268.

colis piégés.[62] Depuis le milieu des années 1980, ETA use de voitures piégées.[63] L'ensemble de ces événements intervient sur fond d'élections qu'il s'agisse des élections générales anticipées du 29 octobre 1989, de celles qui ont lieu au Pays basque en octobre 1990 ou encore des municipales en mai 1991 où se joue la présence d'HB sur la scène électorale. Plus largement ainsi que nous l'avons précédemment évoqué, la perspective de l'Exposition universelle de Barcelone et des Jeux olympiques de 1992 explique la multiplication des opérations menées par ETA dans l'intensification du rapport de force avec le gouvernement espagnol afin d'obtenir une avancée dans les négociations.

♦ S'il est incontestable qu'advient un ralentissement substantiel de l'activité de l'organisation entre le second semestre 1992 et le premier semestre de l'année 2000, où l'on ne dénombre qu'une moyenne de 35 actions annuelles, s'explique-t-il seulement par la chute de Bidart ou bien également par d'autres facteurs liés aux discussions avec le gouvernement et aux rapports sociopolitiques au sein du Pays basque voire par des raisons internes à l'organisation (raisons mésosociales) ?

Notre interprétation tendrait à souligner, non pas le rôle exclusif de l'arrestation du collectif Artapalo, comme d'autres auteurs l'ont mis en avant, mais le changement stratégique qu'ETA a tenté de mener entre 1995 et 1997 que ce soit sur le plan politique ou opérationnel. Chacune des phases d'activité du groupe, intense ou faible, paraît trouver sa raison – indépendamment des contraintes logistiques qu'affronte l'organisation clandestine – dans une recherche de stratégie politique, *i.e.* dans la mobilisation de moyens distincts visant à parvenir à un même objectif. Dès le milieu de l'année 1993, l'organisation déclare vouloir « privilégier la qualité des *ekintzas* (*i.e.* des actions) plutôt que la quantité, assurer la sécurité,

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[62] Cette pratique a été initiée en 1986, à destination de fonctionnaires de prison, bien que nous ne soyons parvenus à authentifier aucune action de cette nature avant mai 1989. Leur utilisation est récurrente de 1989 à 1992 puis sporadique en 2001 et 2005. Ces dispositifs sont censés permettre un ciblage accru des victimes mais dans les faits les erreurs sont très grandes.

[63] De la Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) notent que la moitié (64 sur 126) des civils classés comme morts collatérales, accidentelles ou indiscriminée s'explique par l'utilisation de voitures piégées depuis 1985.

éviter de commettre des erreurs (sans oublier que ce risque existera toujours), et tenir les préparatifs d'attentats à l'abri des délais ou des pressions imposés par la conjoncture ».[64] Ainsi à partir d'avril 1995, ETA envisage une solution au conflit s'appuyant sur l'Alternative démocratique qu'elle propose alors et que soutient HB ainsi que la gauche abertzale.[65] À partir de 1998, ETA prend la société basque comme interlocutrice pour la sortie du conflit plutôt que seulement l'État. ETA tente d'incarner une crédibilité au sein du jeu politique, dans un contexte particulièrement hostile, puisque le juge Garzón, annonce le 16 janvier 1996, en pleine période électorale, son intention d'enquêter sur KAS, coordination inactive depuis 1995.[66] Commence en juin 1998 le procès 18/98 au cours duquel sont jugés des membres de *KAS*, *Ekin*, *Xaki*.

La réorientation stratégique d'ETA est concomitante d'une implication plus forte de la société civile dans la recherche active d'une solution négociée au conflit. Il faut se souvenir de la prise de conscience suscitée dans l'organisation par l'échec des négociations d'Alger.[67] On assiste en mars 1998 à des pourparlers politiques entre les différents partis pour mettre fin à la violence au Pays Basque. Elles donnent lieu à la présentation de la *Propuesta para un final dialogado* (Proposition pour une fin négociée) ou « Plan Ardanza », le 17 mars, esquissant les bases d'une négociation avec ETA, sans condition préalable et exigeant une trêve

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[64] Cité in Elorza, *op.cit.*, 2000, p. 392.

[65] Le 25 avril 1997, la gauche abertzale appelle à une journée de lutte en faveur de l'Alternative démocratique (Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 296) durant laquelle des milliers de personnes se sont mobilisées.

[66] *Ibidem*, p. 287. De même, le 6 octobre 1997 la Cour Suprême accuse certains membres de la Table Nationale de « collaboration avec un groupe armé » en raison de l'introduction, dans leur campagne publicitaire, du slogan « Alternative Démocratique » associé à ETA.

[67] « Nous devrions être conscients que si nous déclarions à nouveau une trêve sans un minimum de garantie, il ne nous resterait plus que deux choix à l'expiration des trente ou soixante jours de trêve. Ou bien, il faudrait céder pour ne pas subir une rupture comme celle d'Alger, et par conséquent nous acheminer pieds et poings liés vers un autre cessez-le-feu. Et alors, ne nous leurrons pas, céder à nouveau aurait pour conséquence inévitable d'engager des périodes prolongées de paix, de nous retrouver mains liées pour toujours et de nous conduire inévitablement vers l'extinction. Ou bien ne pas céder et devoir subir une nouvelle rupture d'Alger, suivie des conséquences incontrôlables que cela pourrait avoir pour la cohésion et pour les forces de gauche abertzale, et donc, pour l'ensemble du processus. » (*Barne Buletina*, mars 1993, cité *in* Jacques Massey, *ETA histoire secrète d'une guerre de cent ans*, Paris : Flammarion, 2010, p. 299).

préalable et indéfinie.[68] Alors que le PNV prend contact avec ETA et HB pour une discussion en vue d'une solution au conflit, il s'investit toujours davantage dans la répression aussi bien aux côtés de l'*Ertzaintza* que dans des groupes armés comme Berrozi.[69] De même, le 26 mars 1998, 146 personnalités espagnoles publient un manifeste « en faveur d'une solution négociée du conflit basque ».[70] Cette mobilisation multilatérale débouche sur la déclaration de Lizarra-Garazi, Pacto de Estella, le 12 septembre 1998, dans laquelle les partis nationalistes et indépendantistes basques (PNV, EA, EH anciennement HB, IU, Zutik-Batzarre et Abertzaleen Batasuna) ainsi que 19 organisations sociales et syndicales[71] basques s'engagent à initier ensemble une voie de lutte empruntant des moyens pacifiques, pour la « construction nationale du Pays basque par des institutions démocratiques ». La déclaration commune porte sur le droit à décider de son avenir pour le Pays basque et sur sa territorialité (la résolution de la question basque concernant aussi l'État français).[72]

ETA s'aligne néanmoins sur les options politiques incarnées par le pacte de Lizarra-Garazi et reconsidère ses opérations militaires en conséquence puisqu'à la suite de cet accord, elle déclare le 16 septembre 1998 une trêve illimitée ou « trêve unilatérale et indéfinie ». S'incarne durant ces années un élan social partagé puisque les élections au Pays basque du 25 octobre 1998

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[68] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 304.

[69] Groupes qui ont participé à l'expulsion des élus d'HB lors de la visite du roi en 1981 (*Ibidem*, p. 232).

[70] *Ibidem*, p. 304.

[71] Les syndicats ELA, LAB, ESK, Stee-Eilas, Ezker Sindikala, EHNE, Hiru.

[72] « El contencioso vasco es un conflicto histórico de origen y naturaleza política en el que se ven implicados el Estado español y el Estado francés. Su resolución debe ser necesariamente política. Siendo distintas las concepciones que existen sobre la raíz y permanencia del conflicto, expresadas en la territorialidad, el sujeto de decisión y la soberanía política, éstos se constituyen en el núcleo de cuestiones fundamentales a resolver […]. Ello conlleva que una negociación resolutiva no comporte imposiciones específicas, respete la pluralidad de la sociedad vasca, sitúe todos los proyectos en igualdad de condiciones de consecución, profundice la democracia en el sentido de depositaren los ciudadanos de Euskal Herria la última palabra respecto a la conformación de su futuro y se respete la decisión, por parte de los Estados implicados. Euskal Herria debe tener la palabra y la decisión. » (déclaration de Lizarra, 12 septembre 1998, signée par AB, HB, PNV, EA, IU, Batzarre, Zutik, ELA, LAB, ENHE, ESK-CUIS, STEE-EILAS, Ezker Sindikala, Hiru, Gogoa, Amnistiaren Aldeko Batzordeak, Senideak, Bakea Orain, Elkarri, Egizan, Herria 2000 Eliza, Gerníka Batzordea, Autodeterminazioaren Biltzarra).

confirment le poids des forces ayant signé l'accord de Lizarra-Garazi[73]. En août 1998, ETA, le PNV et l'EA passent un accord secret pour la construction d'une institution nationale souveraine pour l'ensemble du Pays basque, laquelle négocierait la résolution du conflit avec l'État espagnol et un nouveau scénario politique.[74] La foi sociale dans la possibilité d'une issue au conflit est d'autant plus présente qu'au même moment le processus de paix en Irlande du nord trouve une issue[75] et commence à inspirer la gauche abertzale. Dans cette perspective, HB appelle en octobre 1997 à la création d'un forum de partis et de représentants de la société pour étudier le processus de paix irlandais et s'en inspirer.[76] Si les arrestations qui se multiplient entre 1992 et 1994, puis en 1996 participent des raisons mésosociales, susceptibles d'expliquer la réduction des activités de l'organisation, les options politiques de cette dernière permettent principalement de comprendre l'évolution de ses opérations militaires. En août 1999 notamment, ETA suggère la tenue d'un processus électoral au Pays basque dont naîtrait une institution nationale qui favoriserait un nouveau statut souverain et une Constitution pour le Pays basque.[77]

Quoique plus limitées, les actions armées présentent un nouveau visage dans cette seconde moitié des années 1990. Les cibles évoluent puisqu'à partir de 1995, l'*Ertzaintza* est explicitement visée. De même, l'organisation, peut-être affaiblie, choisit de viser le personnel politique, en particulier les conseillers municipaux, les élus, les intellectuels, les journalistes plutôt que les seules « forces d'occupation ». L'analyse statistique des victimes d'ETA permet de dire que les hommes politiques et les représentants de

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[73] Casanova, *op.cit.*, pp. 314-315. Aux élections du Parlement basque de 1998, HB fait le meilleur score de son histoire avec 224 001 voix soit 17,91 % des suffrages.

[74] En particulier, « EAI-PNV y EA asumen el compromiso de abandonar todos los acuerdos que tienen con las fuerzas cuyo objetivo es la destrucción de Euskal Herria y la construcción de España : PP y PSOE » (cité in Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 311).

[75] Sont signés le 10 avril 1998 les accords de Stormont ou du Vendredi Saint qui mettent un terme au conflit armé en Irlande du nord.

[76] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 301. Le forum irlandais est organisé le 19 juin 1998 à Lizarra (Navarre). Y participent 18 collectifs pour discuter et débattre du processus de paix en Irlande du Nord. Sont présents ELA, LAB ainsi que d'autres secteurs abertzales et populaires.

[77] Cette proposition formulée à l'endroit de l'EA et du PNV reste lettre morte (voir communiqué d'ETA, 28 novembre 1999). La trêve est sur le point d'être rompue.

l'État ne représentent que 2,6 % des décès entre 1977 et 1992, alors que ce chiffre atteint 21,7 % entre 1992 et 2007.[78] Pourtant les maires ont été pris pour cibles privilégiées du groupe dès la fin des années 1970. Ils demeurent numériquement moins victimes que les gardes civiles (car quantitativement moins nombreux) mais ETA, à partir de ces années, les vise explicitement. L'organisation procède à ce que ses opposants ont nommé la « socialisation de la souffrance ». De très hauts responsables politiques sont visés comme José Maria Aznar, dans un attentat manqué à la voiture piégée le 19 avril 1995, rue José Silva à Madrid. Il est alors leader de l'opposition conservatrice et du Parti Populaire (PP). Aznar est perçu par ETA comme l'« un des plus grands ennemis garantissant l'oppression du Pays basque » (communiqué du 25 avril 1995). Trois militants d'ETA, José Rego Vidal, Jorge García Sertutxa et Iñaki Rego sont arrêtés à Palma de Mallorca (Baléares) le 10 août 1995, alors qu'ils projetaient de réaliser un attentat contre le roi Juan Carlos,[79] confirmé dans un communiqué du 18 août 1995.[80] Un autre projet d'attentat est également fomenté contre le roi, quoiqu'à une moindre échelle : un commando d'ETA préparant une attaque à la grenade contre l'inauguration du musée Guggenheim de Bilbao, à laquelle le roi devait se rendre, est surpris par la police autonome le 13 octobre 1997. À ces opérations d'envergure, s'ajoutent des prises d'otage spectaculaires qui n'ont pas pour vocation un financement de l'organisation mais une négociation politique obtenue par l'instauration d'un rapport de force : tel est le cas de l'enlèvement du fonctionnaire de prison José Antonio Ortega Lara, le 17 janvier 1996, libéré après 532 jours (le 1er juillet 1997) par les FSE puis de Miguel Ángel Blanco Garrido, conseiller municipal PP d'Ermua (Biscaye), enlevé le 10 juillet 1997 et tué le 12 juillet.

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[78] Sánchez-Cuenca, *op.cit.*, 2009.

[79] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 285.

[80] « Al sucesor de la dictadura le resulta admisible cualquier método que mantenga la 'unidad de la patria', añadiendo a la ocupación militar la tortura y la Policía y, por si eso fuera poco, castigando la resistencia vasca de la mano del PSOE mediante acciones parapoliciales bautizadas con el nombre de los GAL. […] Responsabilizamos a los partidos sometidos al Ejército […] de la legalización del exterminio de los luchadores vascos de la extorsión económica que sufre Euskal Herria, del genocidio cultural y de la falta de futuro » (in Egaña, 2005, tome IX, pp. 228-229).

Si, pour une part, l'évolution stratégique et politique d'ETA est soutenue par de larges franges de la société civile, en revanche, les actions contre les élus ne sont pas bien accueillies par la population. L'exécution de Miguel Ángel Blanco ainsi que les mobilisations sociales organisées en protestation contre cet acte provoquent un durcissement de la politique antiterroriste du gouvernement Aznar. ETA n'est pas la seule visée. Toute la gauche abertzale l'est conformément à la thèse du « tout est ETA ». Ainsi entre le 4 et le 18 février 1997, 23 membres de la Table Nationale[81] sont arrêtés sur ordre de la Cour Suprême. Au cours du mois de février, 25 responsables politiques élus d'HB sont convoqués par les juges. L'« opération Persiana » menée le 15 juillet 1998 conduit à la fermeture du quotidien *Egin* et de la station de radio *Egin Irratia* ainsi qu'à l'arrestation de la direction d'*Egin* sur demande du juge Baltasar Garzón.[82] Parallèlement à la répression qui s'étend à l'ensemble des secteurs de la gauche abertzale, se voit réitéré, au fil des années, un constant refus de dialogue de la part du gouvernement en dépit des innombrables propositions formulées par ETA.[83] Il faut attendre la fin de la période qui, à la suite du travail réalisé au sein de la société civile ayant donné lieu au pacte de Lizarra-Garazi ainsi qu'à la déclaration de « trêve unilatérale et indéfinie » du 16 septembre 1998, pour que le gouvernement fasse un geste concernant le transfert de 21 prisonniers d'ETA détenus dans les îles Canaries, à Ceuta et Melilla vers la péninsule espagnole le 10 novembre 1998.[84] Le changement d'attitude du gouvernement permet qu'ETA souligne les progrès réalisés et ratifie la validité de son cessez-le-feu le 25 février 1999.

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[81] *I.e.* la structure dirigeante d'HB.

[82] *Gara*, 10/10/2006. Cette décision sera déclarée illégale par le Tribunal suprême le 22 mai 2009 (sumario 18/98).

[83] Des propositions pour un dialogue ont été exprimées par ETA en juillet 1992, juin 1993, mars 1994, à l'été-septembre 1995, en juin 1996, décembre 1996, mars 1997, puis à la mi-décembre 1998, en mai 1999, août-septembre 1999, octobre 1999 jusqu'à ce que la trêve soit rompue le 2 décembre 1999.

[84] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 316.

♦ 2000-2001 (2nd semestre 2000-2001) : 40 actions semestrielles en moyenne.

À la phase de réduction des opérations militaires des années 1998-1999, coïncidant avec le cessez-le-feu, succède une nouvelle recrudescence de l'action armée au début des années 2000, s'expliquant par l'échec de la stratégie politique de la période antérieure), tout comme des négociations secrètes entreprises en 1998 entre des représentants du gouvernement Aznar et d'ETA en Suisse. Quoique de moindre intensité que celle des années 1970-1980 ou celle du début des années 1990, elle se comprend également par une forme de réaction aux politiques répressives et antiterroristes élargies à de nombreux secteurs de la société civile. L'intensification des actions d'ETA jusqu'au milieu des années 2000, se déploie sur fond de *kale borroka*[85] et d'une résistance incarnée par le mouvement de l'insoumission d'une jeunesse qui s'engage et souhaite démontrer à l'État espagnol sa capacité de confrontation. Bien que le durcissement de la législation antiterroriste notamment contre la *kale borroka* connaisse un nouveau tournant, la multiplication des commandos dans les années 2001, qui fleurissent notamment autour du « complexe Donosti »,[86] remet en question la thèse de l'essoufflement logistique d'ETA après 1992. La politique gouvernementale du « tout est ETA » continue de s'étendre au secteur de la jeunesse et aux émeutes urbaines. Elle suscite un raidissement social contre les revendications armées basques avec notamment l'accord du 12 décembre 2000 « pour les libertés et contre le terrorisme » entre le PP et le Parti socialiste, auquel ETA répond par une extension de ses cibles aux partis signataires de l'accord. Ce front sociopolitique se double d'une offensive judiciaire contre toutes les organisations de la gauche abertzale déclarées, les unes après les autres, illégales.[87] Le gouvernement de José

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[85] Ce que la gauche abertzale désigne comme *herri borroka* (lutte populaire) le gouvernement espagnol le nomme *kale borroka* (guérilla urbaine).

[86] Cf. les notes à partir du site : http://www.angelfire.com/pq/terroristas/historia.htm#Secuestros, consulté le 21/12/2020.

[87] Il s'agit d'abord d'*Egin*, *Segi*, *Jarrai/Haika*, puis en mai 2001 de la fermeture préventive du magazine d'investigation *Ardi beltza*, ensuite des associations de soutien aux prisonniers *Askatasuna* et *Gestoras pro-Amnistia*, du seul quotidien en langue basque *Egunkaria*, enfin des partis politiques *Batasuna*, *Euskal Herritarrok* et *HB*.

Maria Aznar, avec le soutien de la gauche espagnole (PSOE) mène une série d'actions contre les organisations politiques et culturelles basques accusées d'être contrôlées par ETA. Toutes sont placées sous l'accusation d'apologie du terrorisme. Au-delà du démantèlement de nombreux commandos en 2001-2002, les attaques du 11-Septembre 2001 servent d'accélérateur à des résolutions législatives qui visent à exclure la gauche abertzale du paysage politique, telles la loi organique 6/2002 sur les partis politiques, appelée « loi des partis ».[88] À cette occasion (5 juin 2002), six lois sont modifiées conduisant à la réduction des possibilités d'action de la politique abertzale.[89] Cette nouvelle phase offensive se caractérise toutefois par des ajustements stratégiques remarquables. À partir de 2000, ETA utilise durant quelques années des colis piégés. Une large part des actions menées, au début de la période, est à attribuer au « Complexe Donosti ».

♦ 2002-2009 : 29 actions annuelles en moyenne.

Après le 11-Septembre puis le 11-M, ETA se voit contrainte de reconsidérer ses options stratégiques. Celles-ci sont lisibles dans le *modus operandi* des rares actions réalisées : la plupart des bombes posées sont signalées. Les dispositifs sont de faible puissance. Des appels sont quasi systématiquement passés à la DYA pour indiquer le lieu et l'heure de l'explosion. Dans les cas où celle-ci advient, elle fait peu de victimes ce qui marque un changement stratégique évident de l'organisation. ETA persiste à vouloir exister sur la scène publique mais sans faire de victime surtout après 2004. Les cibles consistent avant tout en objectifs matériels. Cette volonté d'affirmer sa présence dans le jeu politique n'est pas sans lien avec la récente formulation de la proposition d'Anoeta (14 novembre 2004), ce qui explique la multiplication des actions militaires y compris dans un contexte de tentative de négociations (2004-début 2006) voire de trêve déclarée. Le changement stratégique, en termes de dommages causés, est motivé à la fois par des raisons mésosociales mais également par les

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[88] http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/lo6-2002.html, consulté le 21/12/2020. Elle permet la dissolution des partis dans les cas caractérisés d'association illégale/d'association à des organisations illégales.

[89] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 333.

événements du 11-Septembre 2001 et du 11-M.[90] Néanmoins il s'agit toujours bien, pour ETA, de s'imposer dans le paysage politique dans un nouveau contexte de recherche active d'une issue au conflit (2005-2007), à la suite de la proposition d'Anoeta et où le gouvernement, adossé au Congrès, réalise des gestes d'ouverture et s'engage dans des discussions multiples. Lors de l'arrestation de Mikel Albizu Iriarte, dit *Antza*, le 3 octobre 2004, à Salies-de-Béarn, on retrouve des documents esquissant des étapes d'une négociation s'échelonnant de 2004 à 2012.[91] Une trêve est envisagée, par celui qui est alors considéré comme le numéro un d'ETA, à partir de 2005 en échange d'une déclaration d'intention du gouvernement espagnol inspirée des procédures mises en œuvre en Irlande du nord en 1993. Un cessez-le-feu définitif est prévu pour 2008 si plusieurs revendications sont satisfaites : (re)légalisation de Batasuna, formation d'une table ronde politique pour débattre de l'avenir du Pays basque, reconnaissance du droit à l'autodétermination des provinces basques, rapprochement des prisonniers puis amnistie.

Dans cette perspective, l'année 2005 se présente à la fois comme celle où le nombre d'actions militaires est le plus élevé (N = 52) et l'époque où se tient une nouvelle tentative de résolution du conflit, cette fois menée par le parti Batasuna, sur fond d'élections au Pays basque (avril 2005). Le 1er janvier, Batasuna s'adresse au *lehendakari* Juan José Ibarretxe en vue de la résolution du conflit. Le 14, c'est au tour du chef du gouvernement J. L. Zapatero qui, le lendemain, déclare publiquement sa réceptivité aux propositions de Batasuna de résoudre le conflit au Pays basque par la « voie politique » et par une « démilitarisation multilatérale ». Parallèlement, le 15 janvier ETA assume officiellement son engagement public quant à la proposition d'Anoeta présentée le 14 novembre 2004 par la gauche abertzale.[92] Le 25 février 2005, Batasuna adresse une lettre ouverte au président Chirac afin de jouer les intermédiaires dans une négociation avec ETA. Ces

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[90] Voir D. Bigo, L. Bonelli et Th. Deltombe (dir.), *Au nom du 11 septembre. Les démocraties occidentales à l'épreuve de l'antiterrorisme*, Paris : La Découverte, 2008.

[91] Massey, *op.cit.*, p. 332.

[92] Casanova, *op.cit.*, p. 346. La proposition d'Anoeta se résume dans la formule : « Oraín Bakea Orain Herria » (Maintenant la paix, maintenant le peuple). Sur le contenu de l'accord, voir *Ibidem*, pp. 344-345.

démarches conduisent à ce que trois mois plus tard, en mai 2005, se tienne, en un lieu inconnu, entre les représentants d'ETA et du gouvernement espagnol une réunion afin d'ouvrir la voie à une résolution du conflit au Pays basque.[93] Le 17 mai 2005, le Congrès, à l'exception des députés du Parti populaire (PP), vote une motion « pour une fin négociée de la violence » à condition de renoncer à celle-ci. Entre mai et juillet 2005, les délégations d'ETA et du gouvernement espagnol tentent de se mettre d'accord sur « le point O du processus » de résolution du conflit, c'est-à-dire le moment à partir duquel celui-ci devrait s'initier. Ce premier cycle de négociations consiste en sept réunions, qui se sont tenues principalement en juillet, représentant un total de vingt heures de négociation directe à Genève (Suisse) et à Oslo (Norvège). Elles aboutissent à un accord. Ce processus donne lieu à un deuxième cycle de négociations entre ETA et les représentants du gouvernement espagnol à partir de novembre 2005.[94] Il ratifie l'accord initial sur la déclaration du chef de l'exécutif et définit précisément la portée du cessez-le-feu qu'ETA doit déclarer.[95]

Cependant la volonté des parties d'affirmer une position de force face à l'adversaire conduit le gouvernement à poursuivre les arrestations et ETA à réaliser des actions spectaculaires comme l'explosion d'une voiture piégée dans le Terminal 4 de l'aéroport madrilène de Barajas, le 30 décembre 2006.[96] Cette opération provoque un raidissement de la société et du gouvernement face à toute velléité de négociation. Au-delà des interventions par lesquelles ETA affirme son poids politique à travers une présence militaire,[97] plusieurs des actions menées constituent comme des réponses militaires aux options politiques de l'adversaire. Une voiture piégée, visant la police autonome à Getxo (Biscaye), explose le 18 janvier après la comparution devant la justice

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[93] *Ibidem*, p. 349.

[94] *Ibidem*, p. 352.

[95] Pour des extraits de l'accord, voir *Ibidem*, pp. 352-353.

[96] Elle a été interprétée comme une peur de « perdre », de trop céder (Massey, *op.cit.*, p. 360) et a été désavouée par Julen Madariaga, membre fondateur d'ETA, qui a vu dans cette offensive « un signal musclé qui a dépassé les limites tolérées » (cité par l'AFP, 4/01/2007).

[97] L'affirmation politique ne passe pas seulement par des opérations militaires mais également par des déclarations publiques comme celle du bulletin interne d'ETA, *Zutabe* (8 juillet 2005) où celle-ci fait savoir que sont exclues de la « trêve » les autorités de l'État et les personnes ayant des responsabilités dans le gouvernement.

du dirigeant de *Batasuna* Arnaldo Otegi. Une *Ertzaintza* est légèrement blessée. Deux jours avant l'ouverture des débats sur le Plan Ibarretxe, une bombe explose à l'hôtel Port Denia à Denia (Alicante, 30 janvier 2005). De même, le 9 février 2005, quelques heures avant son inauguration par le roi et le président mexicain, Vicente Fox, et la visite de la féria d'Ifema une voiture piégée explose près du Champ des Nations (*Campo de las Naciones*) accueillant la foire artistique de l'ARCO. Dans d'autres cas, les actions militaires viennent soutenir la parole politique comme lorsqu'explosent quatre bombes de faible intensité à Ordizia (Guipúzcoa), Amurrio (Álava), Gernika (Biscaye) et Berriozar (Navarre) entre 2h10 et 8h25 le 25 octobre 2005,[98] après qu'ETA a remis la veille un communiqué à *Gara* et à *Berria*, dans lequel elle exprimait la « ferme volonté » d'avancer dans la résolution du conflit basque « par la négociation et un accord » au sein d'un processus démocratique « sans condition ». La fonction de l'opération armée est alors évidente comme affirmation de soi dans un rapport de force avec les institutions gouvernementales.[99]Une forme de montée en puissance de la démonstration de force, au cours de l'année 2005, intervient encore avec l'installation de deux lance-grenades près de l'aéroport de Parayas (Santander) dont la présence est annoncée, le 6 décembre 2005, au journal *Gara* afin qu'il soit procédé à l'évacuation de l'aéroport.

L'ultime phase offensive du groupe armé, quoique de plus faible intensité, intervient après l'annonce par ETA le 4 juin 2007 de la fin du « cessez-le-feu permanent ». Cette déclaration conditionne la reprise des opérations armées dans les mois qui suivent[100] ne serait-ce qu'au nom de la crédibilité du groupe et de l'affirmation de son existence. Elle coïncide avec la perspective de la tenue au Pays basque d'un referendum, décidé par le gouvernement régional, sur le droit du peuple basque à l'autodétermination. Néanmoins le referendum est interdit par le Tribunal constitutionnel le 11 septembre 2008. Les actions réalisées sont à la fois numériquement moins importantes et symboliquement moins signifiantes. Des stations de

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[98] https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/10/25/espana/1130222613.html, consulté le 21/12/2020.

[99] On citerait également l'explosion de cinq bombes de faible intensité sur des autoroutes madrilènes le jour de l'anniversaire de la Constitution le 6 décembre 2005, qui constitue avant tout une action symbolique.

[100] On compte 34 opérations en 2008.

répétiteurs sont visées ainsi que des biens matériels. En dépit du nombre d'opérations menées, les victimes sont peu nombreuses.[101] La stratégie de la répression-action demeure toujours à l'œuvre puisque le 1er mai 2008 explosent à 0h30 trois bombes en Biscaye et à Arrigorriaga (Guipúzcoa) après la demande d'arrestation, par le juge B. Garzón, de la maire de Mondragón, Inocencia Galparsoro (ANV), pour collaboration avec un gang armé. Comme dans les années 1970 mais avec des actions moins spectaculaires et moins meurtrières, ETA agit en soutien aux luttes contre les Grands Projets Inutiles tels la « Y basque/*Y vasca* », train à haute vitesse devant desservir le Pays basque.[102]

♦ L'ultime période de l'histoire d'ETA s'étend de 2010 à 2018 avec, d'une part, l'année 2010 qui constitue le « chant du cygne » durant laquelle trois actions sont perpétrées et, d'autre part, la phase ultime de 2011 à 2018 qui conduit au dépôt des armes puis à l'autodissolution du groupe. Après 2009, l'organisation s'essouffle après avoir épuisé toutes les stratégies possibles de négociation avec l'État espagnol, y compris en mobilisant la société civile dans cette intention. La dissolution témoigne de ce que la stratégie politico-militaire dans le contexte des années 2000-2010 où les attaques indiscriminées de l'islam politique se multiplient, n'est plus l'instrument approprié pour tenter de trouver une issue au conflit politique au Pays basque, dans un contexte où, de surcroît, les voies du dialogue avec les institutions gouvernementales ont toutes mené à des impasses.

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[101] On dénombre quatre victimes mortelles dont deux exécutions ciblées : l'ancien conseiller socialiste (PSE-EE) Isaías Carrasco à Arrasate-Mondragón (Guipúzcoa), est tué au cours de la campagne électorale et deux jours avant les élections générales, le 7 mars 2008 ; Ignacio Uria Mendizabal, responsable de l'entreprise *Altuna y Uría*, laquelle participe à la construction du train à haute vitesse basque, *Y vasca*, est tué le 8 décembre.

[102] C'est d'abord le cas le 1er juin 2008 avec une action à l'explosif visant une entreprise travaillant pour la « Y basque » à Zarauz (Guipúzcoa) puis avec l'exécution d'Ignacio Uria Mendizabal le 7 mars.

Conclusion

La constitution d'une base de données originale concernant l'organisation clandestine ETA a permis d'établir des résultats, s'agissant des phases de son histoire et de ses options stratégiques, qui n'avaient pu jusqu'à présent être mis en évidence du fait d'orientations méthodologiques divergentes. Au plan méthodologique et s'agissant d'une organisation clandestine pour laquelle l'accès aux sources est complexe, le présent article souligne les écarts interprétatifs que peuvent susciter certains choix épistémologiques. Comme nous l'avons rappelé, analyser l'évolution stratégique d'un groupe comme ETA, en s'appuyant sur le recensement des *victimes* mortelles plutôt qu'en exploitant la série statistique de ses *actions*, induit des divergences de lecture remarquables. Dès lors qu'une organisation clandestine recourt à l'explosif – plutôt qu'à des exécutions à l'arme de poing – le résultat de ses actions présente une dimension aléatoire, en dépit des précautions prises par les auteurs, lorsque ceux-ci n'ont pas pour intention de produire le plus grand nombre de victimes possibles. L'intention de tuer ou d'épargner des cibles fait partie de la stratégie d'un groupe politique illégal mais le nombre de ceux qui sont touchés ne peut être planifié.

L'intensité des phases d'activité du groupe échappe en revanche à l'aléatoire pour se comprendre à partir de ses évolutions stratégiques[103]. Les périodes de mobilisation armée soutenue sont associées à des moments politiques forts pour le Pays basque, tels la transition vers la démocratie où se joue le statut politique de la région ou les phases de négociation avec le gouvernement du début des années 1990. Elles sont également liées à une dynamique de réaffirmation d'une présence sur la scène politique (cas des années 2000) après l'échec d'une résolution du conflit, passant par un moindre usage des armes et par la mobilisation de la société civile durant une large part des années 1990. Du début à la fin de son histoire, ETA s'est efforcée, par ses actions militaires et ses propositions politiques, de se

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[103] Indépendamment des contraintes logistiques qu'affronte l'organisation mais qu'il est difficile de percer du fait de sa clandestinité.

placer sur la scène publique comme un acteur politique, soit en accroissant l'intensité des actions après les ruptures de trêve ou avant des négociations, pour peser dans la « balance du dialogue », soit lors d'élections aussi bien à l'initiale de la mise en place des structures démocratiques en Espagne, c'est-à-dire dans les années 1970, que jusqu'au début des années 2000, soit au moment de négociations politiques au sein de la société civile pour peser dans la recherche d'une issue au conflit. Il s'est agi, pour l'organisation armée, d'instituer un rapport de force avec le gouvernement, dans une logique politique, afin de parvenir à une négociation, dont l'objet a évolué avec le temps qu'il ait été question d'un statut politique pour le Pays basque, de l'amnistie des prisonniers, de leur rapprochement du Pays basque voire de leur libération. Lorsqu'ETA se place dans un contexte de négociation avec l'État espagnol, elle multiplie les actions à l'étranger afin d'attirer le regard d'autres pays sur le processus en cours. L'ensemble des possibilités de négociations – que ce soit avec l'État, par une implication forte de la société civile, par une offensive militaire intense ou via des cessez-le-feu – étant épuisé, le contexte international ayant également évolué du fait de l'émergence de l'islam politique violent, il était inéluctable que l'organisation en vienne à prononcer sa dissolution.[104]

La multiplication des arrestations entre 1992 et 1994, puis en 1996, participe des raisons mésosociales, susceptibles d'expliquer la réduction des activités de l'organisation. Toutefois les choix politiques opérés autour des années 1994-1996 impliquant un abandon d'une logique exclusive de résistance en faveur d'une dynamique de construction nationale expliquent également la baisse de l'activité militaire. En ce sens, l'arrestation de Bidart est loin de constituer à elle seule l'unique clef explicative de l'évolution opérationnelle d'ETA après 1992. La stratégie politique plutôt que les seules raisons opérationnelles est mieux à même de rendre compte des évolutions de l'action militaire du groupe comme le confirment certains des communiqués publiés par ETA.[105]

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[104] Indépendamment, encore une fois, de sa capacité à renouveler ses membres.
[105] Voir celui de 1993 in Elorza, *op.cit.*, p. 392.

Annexes

Annexe 1

Références des sources ayant été utilisées dans la constitution de notre base de données

1. Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/, consulté le 21/12/2020.

2. Sources répertoriant les victimes du conflit au Pays basque :

La base de données réalisées par De la Calle et Sanchez-Cuenca : https://ic3jm.es/investigacion/proyectos/explaining-terrorist-and-insurgent-behavior/, consulté le 21/12/2020.

La liste de victimes d'ETA publiée par Calleja (1997).

Les associations de victimes *:* l'Association des Victimes du Terrorisme (www.avt.org, consulté le 21/12/2020.)

Les victimes des forces de sécurité :[106]

https://mapadelterror.com/
https://mapadelolvido.blogspot.com/
https://ertzaione-1.blogspot.com/
https://web.archive.org/web/20090202121213/http://www.guardiacivil.org:
80/terrorismo/acciones/estadistica07.jsp
http://especiales.elperiodico.com/graficosEEPI/VICTIMAS/
tablavictimas.html#ARRIBA

Les victimes du côté abertzale ou basque : http://www.euskalmemoria.eus/

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[106] Tous les liens qui suivent ont été consultés le 21/11/2020.

Autres base de données recensant les victimes du terrorisme :

http://www.angelfire.com/pq/terroristas/
http://blogs.libertaddigital.com/in-memoriam/
https://victimas-de-eta.blogspot.com
https://www.abc.es/especiales/eta/victimas/11.asp
https://eu.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zerrenda:ETAk_hildakoak_(1968-1979)
https://ns-markoss88.blogspot.com/

3. Les quotidiens nationaux :

https://www.elmundo.es/; https://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/
https://elpais.com/
https://www.lavangarde.com/
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/
https://www.elcorreo.com/
https://www.abc.es/
https://www.laverdad.es/
https://www.20minutos.es/
https://www.lainformacion.com/

Les quotidiens régionaux :

https://www.noticiasdegipuzkoa.eus/
https://www.eitb.eus/es/
https://www.elnortedecastilla.es/
https://www.elcorreogallego.es
https://www.diariodesevilla.es/
https://borrokagaraia.wordpress.com/

Les quotidiens français rapportant les actions du groupe :

https://www.liberation.fr/
https://www.lexpress.fr/
https://www.lejdd.fr/

Les sources anglophone :

https://www.theguardian.com
http://news.bbc.co.uk
https://www.reuters.com
https://www.telegraph.co.uk

Les journaux en langue basque :

https://www.naiz.eus/
http://gara.naiz.eus
http://www.diariovasco.com/

5. Les sources gouvernementales du ministère de l'Intérieur espagnol :

http://www.mir.es/DGRIS
http://www.interior.gob.es/fallecidos-por-terrorismo

6. Les documents produits par la gauche abertzale et l'organisation clandestine elle-même :

http://www.abertzalekomunista.net/es/relato-historico/historia-del-mlnv/
v-asamblea/documentos-v-asamblea
https://borrokagaraia.wordpress.com/acabas-de-llegar-empieza-aqui/
http://www.ehk.eus/es/v-asamblea-cast/revistas-v-asamblea-cast/4292-
barneko-gora-beherez-1-1968-cast
http://euskaletxeak.org/lemoiz/inicio.html

Annexe 2

Figure 2 : Illustration des actions menées chaque semestre par ETA
à partir de la base réalisée par les auteurs

Tableau 4 : Actions ayant provoqué la mort (victimes mortelles)
par année (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009)

Années	Nombre d'actions réalisées
1968	2
1969	1
1972	1
1973	2
1974	6
1975	13
1976	13
1977	8
1978	**50**

Années	Nombre d'actions réalisées
1979	**62**
1980	**67**
1981	25
1982	*29*
1983	*33*
1984	27
1985	31
1986	18
1987	15
1988	15
1989	13
1990	16
1991	26
1992	17
1993	7
1994	10
1995	9
1996	5
1997	13
1998	4
1999	0
2000	17
2001	12
2002	4
2003	2
2004	0
2005	0
2006	1
2007	1
2008	5
2009	2
2010-2018	0

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3. Barros, C., (2003), « An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: The Spanish ETA Case », *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 14, n° 6, 401-412.
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6. Bigo, D. ; Bonelli, L. ; Deltombe, Th. (dir.), (2008), *Au nom du 11 septembre. Les démocraties occidentales à l'épreuve de l'antiterrorisme*, Paris : La Découverte.
7. Calleja, José María (1997), *Contra la barbarie. Un alegato en favor de las víctimas de ETA*, Madrid: Temas de Hoy.
8. Carmena, Manuela ; Mirena Landa, Jon ; Múgica, Ramón et Uriarte, Juan Mª Uriarte (2013), « Informe-base de vulneraciones de derechos humanos en el caso vasco (1960-2013) », Secretaría General de Paz y Convivencia, Vitoria-Gasteiz, juin, https://www.irekia.euskadi.eus/uploads/attachments/3214/informe_base_es.pdf?1371196800, consulté le 21/12/2020.
9. Casanova Alonso, Iker, (2007), *ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia*, Tafalla (Navarre) : Txalaparta.
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12. De La Calle, Luis; Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2006), « The Production of Terrorist Violence: Analyzing Target Selection within the IRA and ETA », Working Paper, Instituto Juan March, n° 230.

13. Domínguez Iribarren, Florencio (1998a), *ETA : estrategia organizativa y actuaciones 1978-1992*, Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco.

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MULTILINGUALISM AND THE IDEAL OF UNITY IN DIVERSITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.
KEY CONCEPTS AND CONTEXT

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Abstract

In a world challenged by cultural diversity, this article aims to look at the great diversity of languages and cultures that coexist within the European Union. Building on the story of the Tower of Babel that explains, from a religious point of view, the cultural and linguistic diversity existing in the European Union, the authors tried to contextualize EU's motto of "unity in diversity", interpreted as an ideal involving a lot of effort and sometimes even many conflicts, but one that we should all fight for and strive to maintain.

Keywords: linguistic diversity, ethnicity, nation, minority, majority, communication, unity in diversity

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Introduction

Linguistic and cultural diversity, multilingualism and multiculturalism are among the main values of Europe. Nowadays, multilingualism (which "refers to both a person's ability to use several languages and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical area"[1]) is a bridge among cultures, but one must be aware that it has not always been this way. Languages, together with other cultural instruments, were also used as "battlefields". Some languages dominated, others were discriminated or even excluded. It is still the case in certain countries, where linguistic, cultural or religious differences cause riots, rebellions that lead to the death of many people.

1. What is linguistic diversity?

Linguistic diversity refers to the variety of languages in a certain area, state, region etc. According to Glanville Price,[2] there are almost 300 languages on the territory of Europe. However, compared to the large number of languages that exist all around the world, one may say that Europe is not very rich in what linguistic diversity is concerned.

In 1929, the *Académie Française* identified 2,800 different languages in the world, while in 1931 a German linguist identified around 3,000 different languages. Current data show there are around 6,700 languages in the whole world.[3]

Europe might seem poor as to its language diversity, and this may look strange to some persons, but one should recall the extraordinary language diversity existing in Africa or in Asia, for instance. According to Jean-Claude Beacco and Michael Byram, the languages spoken in Europe

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[1] Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the European Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, the COR: A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism", Brussels, 22/11/2005, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0596 &from=EN], 13 November 2020.

[2] Glanville Price, *Encyclopedia of the languages of Europe*, London: Blackwell, 1999, p. 499.

[3] Mark Aronoff; Janie Rees-Miller, *The Handbook of Linguistics*, Second Edition, 2017 Hoboken and Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., p. 21.

represent only 3% of the total number of languages existing in the world, whereas the languages spoken in Africa and Asia represent 30% each. They also mention the fact that out of the large number of languages spoken all over the world, ten of them tend to dominate, while five of them are spoken in Europe (English, German, Russian, Portuguese and Spanish).[4]

The world has always been diversified from the linguistic point of view, but the study of its linguistic diversity is a rather new domain. Beacco and Byram propose two ways of defining linguistic diversity. The first one takes into consideration the mere number of languages: "the more languages, the more LD [linguistic diversity]", referring only to autochthonous languages. The second one refers to the non-endemic languages, such as German, which is spoken as mother tongue not only in Germany, but in Austria, Switzerland and Belgium as well.

In Europe, linguistic diversity can be traced way back to the Roman Empire. As Franco Fanciullo argues in his book, "the linguistic and cultural situation existing in today's Europe has its roots in the Roman Empire and in the movements that took place during the Middle Ages".[5] During the Roman Empire, "The language of Virgil and Cicero (…) was so universally adopted in Africa, Spain, Gaul Britain, and Pannonia, that the faint traces of the Punic or Celtic idioms were preserved only in the mountains, or among the peasants. Education and study insensibly inspired the natives of those countries with the sentiments of Romans".[6] Still, even though they were living in a multilingual and multicultural society, due to their conquests, Romans never developed any interest for this situation. Silvia Luraghi mentions that, in the best case, they wrote grammar books in which they

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[4] Jean-Claude Beacco, Michael Byram *apud* Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, *Why Should Linguistic Diversity Be Maintained and Supported in Europe? Some Arguments. Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe from Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education –* Reference Study, Language Policy Division, Directorate of School, Out-of-School and Higher Education DGIV, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2002, p. 7, [http://www.linguistic-rights.org/tove-skutnabb-kangas/Why_should_linguistic_diversity_be_maintained_and_supported_in_europe__Tove_Skutnabb_Kangas_Council_of_Europe_Strasbourg_2002.pdf], 12 November 2020.

[5] Franco Fanciullo, *Introduzione alla linguistica storica*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007, p. 229 (the authors' translation from Italian).

[6] Edward Gibbons, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Vol. 1-6), eBookMall, Inc., 2001, p. 65.

compared their own language (Latin) to the Greek language,[7] while Gibbons states that "the two languages exercised at the same time their separate jurisdiction throughout the empire: the former, as the natural idiom of science; the latter, as the legal dialect of public transactions".[8]

The separation of the Roman Empire, which took place during the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D., into the Western Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire (commonly known today as the Byzantine Empire), also meant the separation from the linguistic point of view. Therefore, the Western Roman Empire maintained Latin as the official language, while the Eastern Roman Empire adopted Greek. But, as Fanciullo mentions, this separation was also cultural and religious, as the alphabets used were the Latin one in the West and the Greek one (and Cyrillic) in the East; the population was Catholic in the West and Orthodox in the East.[9]

This was in fact just the beginning for what was about to follow. During the following centuries, and especially during the Middle Ages, the great monarchies of that time, such as England, France or Spain, militated for a single language that would become the national "liaison" of the people. In this aspect, Fanciullo named the punishments applied by the English and Spanish monarchies against those who spoke other language than the "national" one (Celtic language in the case of England and the Basque in Spain)[10]. This linguistic unification of peoples and the politics of the states advocating for unity led, in fact, to the wars for independence, which were carried out, in the beginning, against the great empires of that time that were multilingual and multicultural.

The Roman Empire, as well as other great empires of the history (such as the Ottoman Empire or the Austro-Hungarian one), was never monolingual. It is the situation today as well. Even though some say that European countries are monolingual, this is in fact unnatural, as it is usually just a matter of political choice. In the context of this globalisation era, the free mobility of the persons led to their movement from one country to another, which created situations of bilingualism and multilingualism.

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[7] Silvia Luraghi, *Introduzione alla linguistica storica*, Roma: Carocce Editore, 2006, p. 25.

[8] Edward Gibbons, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

[9] Franco Fanciullo, *op.cit.*, p. 199.

[10] *Ibidem.*, pp. 201-202.

2. Minority languages in the European Union

According to the *European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages*, regional and minority languages represent the languages "traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population".[11] These languages are different from a State's official languages and do not include dialects or the immigrants' languages.

The differences existing among cultures, languages and religions should be seen, in a democratic society, as necessary in the education of the democratic citizens. Diversity is necessary, both in a classroom as well as in a society.[12]

> "Difference and multiplicity are valued differently in Europe ("a founding value" to be preserved) and in America (*ex pluribus unum*, "one out of many") might be one of the critical issues in the 21st century, as the opposing positions concerning the 2003 Iraq war have begun to show. The U.S. motto *ex pluribus unum* focuses on unity, i.e., on the result of the process of unification: the United States are "united", a past participle, indicating that the process is "perfect", concluded; children born in American belong to the *unum*, have one language and one culture. The European Union is not *unum* but *unionem*, which means "the process of becoming united": a process which will cost each child born in the EU the effort of learning three languages at least, of interacting with least six, seven cultural areas."[13]

The languages spoken by the European citizens define us as individuals, as the document *Speaking for Europe. Languages in the European Union* states. The numerous languages spoken by the five hundred million citizens in the European Union are spread on the continent as a mosaic. The

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[11] Council of Europe, "European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages", Strasbourg, 5th November 1992 [https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/21486313/ecrml.pdf], 13 November 2020.

[12] Heidi Biseth, "Multilingualism and Education for Democracy", in *International Review of Education*, 55, 2009, p. 20.

[13] Paolo E. Balboni, "Transition to Babel: The Language Policy of the European Union", in *Transition Studies Review*, 11 (3), 2004, p. 164.

European Union recognizes the right to identity and promotes the freedom of speech and writing in each individual's language. Furthermore, through its institutions, the European Union continues its actions to the attainment of its purpose, i.e. having a better integration among its member states.[14]

2.1. Ethnicity and nation

Ethnicity is generally identified with a community characterized by language homogeneity, the same customs, traditions and history, all in a delineated territory, even though this aspect is not common to all ethnicity – for instance this is not valid for Romani people.[15]

As Toso mentions in his book, *Frammenti d'Europa. Guida alle minoranze etnico-linguistiche e ai fermenti autonomi*, it is not easy to make a clear distinction between ethnicity and nation. He defines *nation* as the collective belonging of a community characterized by common cultural, racial, religious traits and he associates it to a political and social institutionalized organization. Furthermore, he states that *nation* was born as a functional union made to satisfy certain determined exigencies in order to satisfy the common aspirations. Conversely, Toso describes *ethnicity* as being an unorganized community, while *nation* is or tends to be a society, the result of an agreement among its members. *Ethnicity* is a nation in power, while *nation* is the expression of an ethnic group which is able to give life to a state and its structures.[16] Moreover, he states that *nation* is the result of a historical process that, through a series of actions (treaties, conquests, agreements etc.), led to the fusion of different communities into a society that tends to give a certain homogeneity to language, traditions and common objectives.

From a linguistic point of view, as Sue Wright argues, the landscape in Europe "was both more local and more 'international' than today." It is said that multilingualism was simply a necessity of life in the Middle

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[14] European Commission, "Speaking for Europe. Languages in the European Union" (brochure), Directorate-General for Commission Publications, European Communities, Published in Germany, 2008, p. 3 [canvas.gu.se › files › download], 16 November 2020.

[15] Fiorenzo Toso, *Frammenti d'Europa. Guida alle minoranze etnico-linguistiche e ai fermenti autonomisti*, Milano: Baldini e Casoldi, 1996, p. 16.

[16] Fiorenzo Toso, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-19.

Ages.[17] At the top of the hierarchy of social classes in Medieval Europe, multilingualism was a normal thing, due to the alliances and marriages that were made among the dynasties of that time. The result of these alliances and inter-marriages were the multilingual families.

Rulers at that time required loyalty from their populations, but they were not interested in their people's language and linguistic behaviour. It wasn't until the 17th and 18th centuries, when the feudal systems collapsed in Europe, that the national space started to be delineated and the affiliation to a certain nation became important for the people. "The authority of the monarch is increasingly presented to the population as spectacle and a discourse develops where loyalty to the monarch and the dynasty begins to be expressed as patriotism. The country personified in the king appears increasingly as a focus for identity."[18]

Between the 16th and the 17th centuries, the feudal systems of that time began to collapse. Furthermore, the kings' divine right to rule was also challenged. All these led to the shaping of the national idea. From a linguistic point of view, this area was dominated by religious writings. Official religious texts were produced in Latin, but there was a need to translate them so that every Christian was able to understand them. Therefore, texts had to be translated into the so-called "vernaculars" and the use of printing could not have come at a better time.[19]

However, even though the power of the Church and the influence of religion were increasing, many dissensions appeared as a result of religious beliefs, and they culminated in wars, riots and rebellions.

From the linguistic point of view, the period coincided with the introduction of the bureaucratic system. This was a central tool of the administration and an agent of linguistic unification. There were linguistic differences between people who lived in rural areas and those who lived in urban areas, the latter that belonged usually to the upper class being more proficient in the languages of the court.

But absolutism was too drastic not to cause riots and rebellions. As Wright mentions, "once the divine right of the sovereign had been disputed, it

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[17] Sue Wright, *Language Policy and Language Planning. From Nationalism to Globalisation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 20.

[18] *Ibidem*.

[19] *Ibidem*.

was necessary to find an authority to put in its place".[20] She mentions Montesquieu and Voltaire in France who introduced the idea that the people should also have a saying in the decision-making process, while Rousseau introduced the *volonté générale* of the people so that they are able to say what is good for them.

All these ideas were the basis of the Revolutions that took place at the end of the 18th century in Europe and America. Sue Wright also mentions the linguistic difficulties that the French revolution had to face. At that time, according to a census carried out in 1790, there were only three million persons speaking French as their first language, while the rest spoke a vernacular language and had little or no competence at all in French. "The revolutionary message was spread in the various languages and dialects of France."[21] However, with the triumph of the Jacobins in France, linguistic diversity was no longer tolerated and it became a patriotic duty to speak French.

According to Hroch, Spain, Portugal, France, Britain, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands were the first countries that had settled their borders and set up themselves as nation-states.[22] Wright discusses Miroslav Hroch's idea of nation, as he states, in one of his books, that nation is "a large social group characterised by a combination of several kinds of relations (economic, territorial, political, religious, cultural, linguistic and so on) which arise, on the one hand from the solution found to the fundamental antagonism between man and nature on a specific compact land-area and, on the other hand, from the reflection of these relations in the consciousness of the people."[23]

The 19th and 20th centuries were dominated by the doctrine of nationalism that promoted the idea according to which every individual was unique and "one was born into a nation as one was born into a family"[24], therefore the doctrine advocated for the so-called "one state – one nation – one language". It was usually the linguists and the writers of a country that played an important role in the elaboration and establishment of linguistic traditions for a national group.

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[20] *Ibidem*, p. 31.

[21] *Ibidem*.

[22] Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 8.

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 5.

[24] Wright, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

2.2. *Majority and minority*

In Europe, ethnicity represents a group of people with certain common characteristics determined by cultural homogeneity, these characteristics being those that identify and individualize the group from the rest of the population in the country of belonging. It therefore represents a *minority*.[25] Minorities are inferior in number to the rest of the population. "What makes an ethnic group a minority is a numerically and politically non-dominant position in a state of which they are citizens."[26]

According to Stefan Wolff, there are four types of minorities: national minorities; transnational minorities; indigenous minorities; immigrant minorities. *National minorities* are described as those ethnic groups that live on a state's territory but are "ethnic kins of the titular nation of another, often neighbouring state (kin-state)"[27] (Germans in Central and Easter Europe, Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus etc.). *Transnational minorities* are the "ethnic groups whose homeland stretches across several different states, but do not form the titular nation in any of them" (the Frisians in the north of the Netherlands and in Germany, the Basques and the Catalans in Spain). According to Stefan Wolff, the *indigenous minorities* refer to the "ethnic groups living in their ancestral homelands in only one state of which they are not the titular nation"; this is the case for Corsicans and Bretons in France, Scottish and Welsh in Britain etc. Finally, the fourth type of minority is represented by the *immigrant minority* formed of the immigrants who moved from their homeland to a foreign country, but they are not the citizens of their new host country. Here, examples can be numerous: north-African immigrants in France, Pakistani and Indian immigrants in the UK, Turkish immigrants in Germany, Romanian immigrants in Italy, etc.[28]

The situation in Europe today is rather complicated from this point of view. The European Union has twenty-seven member states and twenty-four official languages. Apart from these, the EU also recognizes the regional and minority languages existing in its member-states and tries to promote them.

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[25] Toso, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

[26] Stefan Wolff, "Ethnic Minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts", 2010 [http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/min-eu.pdf], 17 November 2020.

[27] *Ibidem*.

[28] *Ibidem*.

After the two World Wars, which were considered to be the wars of high nationalism, the picture in Europe started to change. With the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), with the birth of the European Union and a more intensified the process of globalization, minority rights and linguistic rights rapidly spread.

2.3. *Language policies in France*

Joshua A. Fishman said that "there are three types of language policies for threatened languages: permissive language defence (tolerating the use of particular languages or ensuring freedom of speech); active language defence (therapeutic measures for disadvantaged languages); preventive (proactive) language defence (legally enforceable measures to ensure the use of a particular language in education and public services)."[29] Moreover, it seems that in the European Union "one in six citizens speak at home a language other than the dominant language of the state."[30]

France may be considered one of the most diversified European countries from cultural and linguistic points of view. Although French is used my most of the population (approximately 82%) and is the official language of the state, there are other languages used (regional or immigrant languages). Some of the most important immigrant communities in France come from the north-African colonies, as well as from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Armenia and Vietnam.[31] The number of immigrants has been continuously rising in the last decade. Studies show that there are no monolingual speakers of regional languages anymore, but, unfortunately these languages are being used only by adult population, they are no longer transmitted to younger generations, as they do not see any practical reason in them.[32]

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[29] Robert Phillipson, *English-only Europe? Challenging Language Policy*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 16.

[30] *Ibidem*, pp. 16-17.

[31] P. Rowlett, "France: Language Situation", in Keith Brown, *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, vol. I-XIV, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Elsevier Pergamon, 2004, p. 621.

[32] *Ibidem*.

France is always a good case study for many specialists in what its language policies are concerned.[33] Many laws adopted along the centuries have been extremely protective with the national language of the French state. Therefore, in order to protect the French language, the edicts of Villers-Cotterêt were adopted in 1539 and imposed French as the language of law courts. Then followed the decrees of 1794, during the French Revolution; they converted Church schools into state schools and established French as the only medium of instruction. According to Spolsky,[34] in 1881, the Prime Minister of France at that time repeated the fact that French was the only language to be used as medium of instruction in schools. Mention should be made that French was the most important language for about three centuries; we may very well call it the *lingua franca* before the two world wars. "French was the main foreign language learnt in Europe for three centuries. In the German-speaking world French joined Latin and Greek as part of the core curriculum in the Gymnasium in the eighteenth century. English was the other main foreign language in the curriculum, but significantly more usual in the vocational *Realschule* in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In Britain, French had traditionally been the main foreign language that was learnt."[35]

Another very important act adopted to protect the language of the state was *Bas-Lauriol Loi* of 1975, which imposed the use of French in all commercial, industrial activities, including advertising. In 1989, the French government created the *Délégation générale à la langue française* that was responsible for the promotion of French language teaching at all levels (national as well as international) and also for the respect of linguistic and cultural diversity. In 1992, French became the only official language of the state for the very reason of protecting France against the progress of the

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[33] See: Dennis Ager, *Language Policy in Britain and France. The processes of policy*, London and New York: Cassell, 1996; François Grin, *Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, 1st edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Sue Wright, *Language Policy and Language Planning. From Nationalism to Globalisation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Bernard Spolsky, *Language Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Philippe van Parijs (ed.), *Cultural diversity versus economic solidarity: Proceedings of the 7th Francqui Colloquium*, Brussles, 28 February – 1 March 2003, Bruxelles: De Boeck & Larcier s.a., 2004.

[34] Bernard Spolsky, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

[35] Sue Wright, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

English language. Two years later, in 1994, the *Loi Toubon* stated that "By virtue of the Constitution, French is the language of the Republic, and the French language is a fundamental element of the character and heritage of France."[36] Furthermore, the law also imposed French as the compulsory language in affairs, employment, education, radio and TV broadcasts. Therefore, the *Loi Toubon* extended the supremacy of French over all official documents, over the mass media and over education.

Internationally, however, these measures taken by France to protect its language were perceived as harmful to multilingualism and multiculturalism. Under these pressures, as well as in the context created by the European Union, France was somehow obliged to adopt the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in 1999. Furthermore, in 2001, the *Délégation générale à la langue française* changed its name into *Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de la France*.

Nowadays, multilingualism is a very debated topic. It has not always been like this as, for instance, the great ancient empires were both multilingual and multicultural, but multilingualism was not preserved, nor promoted, so that it can now be a rather new topic of discussion in Europe.

3. What is multilingualism?

Linguists and specialists in this field have tried to define the term of "multilingualism". Therefore, Robert Phillipson defines is as follows: "Multilingualism, in the sense of an individual or institution operating effectively in more than one language, is an everyday reality, a source of richness and joy for us, facilitating access to a range of cultures."[37]

Mention should be made that, on the one hand, the Council of Europe, for instance, makes a distinction between "multilingualism" and "plurilingualism". The former refers to a geographical area where there is a certain linguistic diversity, several languages or dialects being spoken in the given region. The latter refers to the languages one can use in order to communicate and it is, therefore, the opposite of "monolingualism".

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[36] Bernard Spolsky, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

[37] Robert Phillipson, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

Therefore, we may say that an area, a region, a university is multilingual, while a person is plurilingual.[38]

On the other hand, one may easily notice that, according to many essays on this topic, several authors use the term "multilingualism" in order to define both situations. For instance, Herdina and Jessner define multilingualism as being "the command and/or use of two or more languages by the respective speaker."[39]

Probably one of the most comprehensive definitions to define the term, which would satisfy both parts, is the one given to multilingualism by the European Commission in an official document of 2005 (*A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism*): "Multilingualism refers to both a person's ability to use several languages and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical area."[40]

Irrespective of the definitions given by different specialists in the field, one thing remains certain: multilingualism has to be considered and treated as a valuable asset that has to be preserved and promoted; multilingualism refers to both great international languages and to "small" languages, to official languages as well as to minority languages. Moreover, „multilingualism is to be seen as a desirable goal for all nations, and it should be maintained and spread in all societies via appropriate language policies, choices of languages offered in secondary and tertiary education, and other measures to be taken in political and social institutions as well as the media."[41]

Languages are obviously "central to our increasingly international world, to globalisation and to the accelerating process of European unification."[42] The ability to communicate in several languages is a truly extraordinary advantage for any person, organisation or company, as it

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[38] Council of Europe, "From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education: Guide for The Development of Language Education Policies in Europe", 2007 [https://rm.coe.int/16806a892c], 14 November 2020.

[39] Philip Herdina, Ulrike Jessner, *A Dynamic Model of Multilingualism. Perspectives of Change in Psycholinguistics*, Clevedon-Buffalo-Toronto-Sydney: Multilingual Matters LTD., 2002, p. 52.

[40] Commission of the European Communities, *op.cit.*

[41] Juliane House, Jochen Rehbein (eds.), *Multilingual Communication*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004, p. 10.

[42] Phillipson, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

stimulates one's creativity, destroys cultural stereotypes and encourages an original way of thinking.

Languages represent the core of the European project as they reflect our different cultures and, at the same time, they represent the key to the understanding of those cultures. The European Commission plays an obvious role in the support and assistance given to member states in their actions to promote multilingualism.

Citizens who are able to speak several languages can fully enjoy the free mobility within the states of the European Union and, consequently, they can integrate easily in another country to study or work.

Furthermore, language skills are required by many companies on the labour market, and they can increase the employability of the persons. They are also essential means of communication, as the mastering of foreign languages improves the intercultural understanding, within and outside Europe.

Languages are important in different areas of human life. Without them there will be no understanding, no development. As such, languages are considered very important for the economic environment of each country[43]. Today's world implies coexistence in a complex environment, in which people have to face specific challenges and varied problems. The solution is to increase their ability in giving specialized answers by trying to understand diversity in spite of uniformity, the ability of speaking several languages being seen as a great advantage for any individual, organization or company.

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[43] Their importance has been affirmed by many politicians, businessmen etc. along the years. See, for instance, the *Recommendations from the Business Forum for Multilingualism* established by the European Commission at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ d5ee6ef0-986c-49e6-b8ac-71da8401efc6, 18 November 2020; see Leonard Orban's speech (the former European Commissioner for Multilingualism) on the importance of languages for business at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_07_559, 18 November 2020; see also the study *ELAN: Effects on the European Economy of Shortages of Foreign Language Skills in Enterprise*, at https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/languages/policy/ strategic-framework/documents/elan_en.pdf, 18 November 2020.

Conclusions

The concept of globalization is not new, but the challenges we are facing nowadays seem to put us in a position of continuous actualization of values and identities. In the context of the recent events, multilingualism and language competencies may not occupy a leading position in the preoccupations of EU officials, but, since languages are strong markers of national and regional identities, sociolinguistic inequalities should not be disregarded.

The European Union is defined by the languages and cultures existing on its territory. Although the differences existing between different nations may lead to linguistic or religious conflicts, the European Union strives to preserve each nation's rights and to create an environment that cherishes this diversity, under the motto of "unity in diversity". Whether this apparent stability will last or not, we shall see in the years to come.

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ANTI-ROMA DISCOURSES: THE STRUGGLE FOR ROMA HOLOCAUST RECOGNITION, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND IDENTITY

Norina Herki[*]

Abstract

This paper aims to trace and chart the interplay between the struggle for recognition of the Genocide and the Roma civil rights movement, respectively to what extent memory, commemoration, reconciliation play a role and contribute to building a collective identity for the Roma, the Roma narrative – in which persecution, past trauma are important.
The paper will also analyze the struggle for recognition and identity as a resistance to the manifestations of Antigypsyism in contemporary society. Furthermore, the paper proposes to analyze the European dimension of the Roma mobilization, respectively to what extent there is a Europe-wide movement for recognition of the Roma Holocaust, given the many Roma groups, different regional histories and the heterogeneous identity of the Roma.

Keywords: Roma civil rights movement, Roma genocide, Antigypsyism, Memory, Identity, Recognition, Remembrance;

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Echoes of the Romani Holocaust during the Covid-19 pandemic

The pandemic created or revealed a virulent world, in which tensions have broken out and inequalities have been highlighted, with nationalist, populist, authoritarian tendencies fueling the backsliding of democracy at global level. Despite the globalizing trend that our societies have been engaged in, the crisis has shown us that far from being citizens of the world, we are bound to nation-states, and the national states from the EU have demonstrated once again that the national states are from impartial in their treatment of (national) minorities. Threats to the rule of law and democratic values in some EU countries have intensified during the pandemic and monitoring organizations have reported a rise in hate speech and hate crimes against Asian people, particularly against Chinese people in Europe and the Americas, and the Roma and migrants in the EU.

Matache and Bhabha have underlined that some of the measures taken by European member states under the guise of containing the spread of the virus have been disproportionate, militarized and "driven by a racist narrative that casts Roma as a collective health and safety threat" and are "harsh reminders of earlier European anti-Roma racist measures"[1]. In an analysis of the social inequalities and vulnerabilities of the Roma communities in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, Rorke states that "this new virus has given added boost to an older one – racist scapegoating of Roma."[2]

In Romania, according to a study carried out by IRES and Asociatia Impreuna in June 2020, one in ten Romanians considers Roma as being guilty for spreading the Coronavirus, after diaspora and migrants.[3]

In a compelling radiography of the negative, racialized portrayal of the Roma by the mass-media and social-media Costache exposes the ethnicization of the Covid-19 virus in Romania and traces back a tendency to look at and consider Roma bodies as a source of biological threat that that goes back to

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[1] Margareta Matache, Jacqueline Bhabha, "Anti-Roma Racism is Spiraling during COVID-19 Pandemic", in *Health and human rights*, vol. 22, 1, 2020, pp. 379-382.

[2] Bernard Rorke, "Inequality, anti-Roma racism, and the coronavirus", *EU Observer*, March 19, 2020, [https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147759], 31 August 2020

[3] Agentia Împreuna and IRES Survey, "Percepția asupra romilor în timpul pandemiei de covid-19", *IRES*, June 2020, [https://ires.ro/articol/403/percep-ia-asupra-romilor-in-timpul--pandemiei-de-covid-19], 1 October 2020

WWII eugenics theorists who advocated for the internment and sterilization of Roma. In Costache's view the pandemic did not produce nor was a catalyst for dormant racism, it simply produced new conditions for the ongoing racism against the Roma to precipitate. The source of this racism is traced back to the Roma Holocaust and Roma slavery in Romania and is identified as the root cause of the social inequalities that Roma face today. The pandemic is "a moment of sincerity in which long-held prejudices become presumably admissible. The ethical threads holding civil society together begin to fray, what is moral and the good lose meaning."[4]

The view that surges in racism are related to key, specific or crisis moments, is reinforced by a research study by the Ellie Wiesel National Institute for Studying the Holocaust, which has carried out two research projects, between 2016 and 2018, respectively monitoring and combating anti-Semitic and anti-Roma discourses, online and on social media. The authors of the research report identify as cause for the surge in hate speech on social networks, not only in Romania, three events in 2015: the project of building a mosk in Bucharest, the refugee crisis and the amendments to Gov. Emergency Ordinance 31/2002 on combating fascist, racist and xenophobic ideologies, which have served as pretext for massive hate campaigns against ethnic and religious minorities, in Romania, chiefly the Jews and Roma.

They have identified and constructed an online platform which indexes 39 themes of the anti-Roma and anti-Semitic discourse in the Romanian virtual space, and offer counter-narratives to combat such discourses. The following themes have been identified among the recurrent anti-Roma discourses related to the Romani genocide: "gypsies belong to an inferior race", "The gypsies were deported at the behest of the Germans", "Deporting the Roma to Transnistria- Saving them from Auschwitz?, "Only the criminal gypsies have been deported", "The Roma talk about the Holocaust only for receiving compensation".[5] According to the report, anti-Roma messages are more dependent on biological racism, Roma being considered an inferior race (27% of the analyzed content on Facebook). Furthermore, memes of Antonescu and Adolf Hitler, images of fire weapons

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[4] Ioanida Costache, " "Until we are able to gas them like the Nazis, the Roma will infect the nation:" Roma and the ethnicization of COVID-19 in Romania", *DoR*, April 22, 2020, [https://www.dor.ro/roma-and-the-ethnicization-of-covid-19-in-romania/], 31 August 2020

[5] [https://faraura.ro/], 30 September 2020

and crows are used frequently to evoke and approve the genocide against Roma. The authors of the report further emphasize that in the case of the Roma, the anti-Roma messages are much more radical, as 42% of the monitored and analyzed content proposes the extermination of the Roma, referencing the genocide against the Roma and Sinti and presenting it as a model to follow, and enjoy a greater audience.[6] The research study also shows the lack of counter-narratives to combat such hate speech.

The Recognition of the Roma Holocaust, Shaping the Past and the Roma Narrative after the Fall of Communism in Romania

The Sinti and Roma Genocide has been dubbed for a long time as "The Forgotten Holocaust", partly because its recognition occurs quite late, the earliest in 1982 in Germany, and in Romania, after the fall of Communism, and partly because, in terms of research and knowledge production, the interest has been modest and the struggle to make the Roma genocide more widely known and recognized as an integral part of European history is still ongoing.

The dominant narrative, or the public discourse concerning the Roma Holocaust in Romania, is related to the fact that the deportation of the approximately 15.000 Roma was not racially or ethnically motivated, but rather socially, in the sense that only criminal, "asocial" Roma have been deported. Other dominant narratives are related to the fact that only nomad Roma were deported and that the deportations, and ultimately the extermination of the Roma have been carried out at the behest and instigation of Nazi Germany, the Romanian state having been blameless of the atrocities.

Knowledge production plays an important role in the formation of such narratives. Earlier research on the history of the Roma in Romania, particularly the Roma Genocide, has been reluctant or failed to recognize the racist and systematic character of the Roma genocide, some have emphasized the social character to the detriment of the racial and ethnical character, while others present an "essentialized Roma identity, obscure a

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[6] Institutul Național Pentru Studierea Holocaustului Din România "Elie Wiesel", *Discursul instigator la ură împotriva evreilor și romilor în social media*, 2016, [http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/files/proiecte/DIU/DIU_social_media_1.pdf], 30 September 2020

long history of marginalization and subordination and favor the blaming the victim approach".[7]

Moreover, in Romania, during the communist regime, talking about Romania's war time racist policy, particularly the deportations to Transnistria was taboo, and the fact that the Roma were not considered a national minority, respectively were not listed as "co-inhabiting nationalities", not only reduced scientific interest in the Roma population, but also did not enable them to benefit from legislation concerning minorities nor the political, educational, cultural, or other measures taken in favor of the co-inhabiting minorities.[8]

Following the fall of the Communist regime in Romania, the EU enlargement eastward, the strategic objectives regarding the European Union and NATO, Romania's accession to the Council of Europe, NATO and EU, as well as fulfilling certain criteria related to democracy, rule of law and human rights, that would fuel the important steps made by Romania in early 1990s regarding the recognition and protection of national minorities, including the Roma, and create the context for recognition of the Jewish and Roma genocide in Romania. In addition, wetward migration, the frequency of the interethnic conflicts from 1990-1996, the reports of the intergovernmental and international organization and institutions regarding the situation of the Roma in Romania, bring about the interest of western countries for improving the situation of minorities.[9]

However, the years immediately after the fall of Communism have focused on the victims and crimes of the Communist regome, rather than the Holocaust, mainly due to the fact that the communist experience was more recent, but also because the narrative of the nation as perpetrator of violence and genocide was in contradiction with the narrative of the nation as victim of the comunist regime. Paradoxically, Antonescu „was billed as a hero for fighting Communism", statues have been erected in several cities,

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[7] Marian Viorel Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies in the History of Romania: An Old Challenge for Romanian Historiography" in *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, pp. 262-274

[8] Viorel Achim, "Romanian Memory of the Persecution of Roma" in *Roma and Sinti: Under-Studied Victims of Nazism*, Symposium Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2002, pp. 59-77

[9] László Fosztó, *Colecție de studii despre romii din România*, Cluj – Napoca: Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităților Naționale : Kriterion, 2009, pp. 73-75

and in 2006, he is placed sixth in a Romanian public television which sought viewer votes on the ten most popular Romanians of all times, his popularity decreasing only in the context of legislative measures that banned the promotion of fascism and Holocaust denial, with the joining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union.[10]

Despite its potential for nation, collective identity building or political mobilization, the Roma Holocaust would remain untapped into for several decades, as the discourses after the Fall of Communism in Romania have focused on human rights rather than identity (re)construction, which is understandable given the inter-ethnic conflicts that emerged in the first half of the 1990s. In addition, Kelso mentions that for communities characterized by economic deprivation and struggle, public commemoration may be an economic luxury that they forgo to focus on immediate needs and the pursuit of the public good of historical commemoration is influenced by class position and those with greater cultural, social and economic capital are relatively more likely to both seek and receive recognition[11]. The lack of an educated elite or a tradition of historical reflection on the past are also considered to have contributed to the absence of Roma narratives.[12]

In addition, a study on the testimonies of Romanian Roma Holocaust survivors, concludes that a direct consequence of the Holocaust is the rejection or the hiding of their ethnical identity because of the fear to be discriminated, persecuted or stigmatized.[13]

Thus, even though the first official recognition of the Roma as an ethnic minority occurs in the 1991 Constitution, in which Article 6 recognizes the right to identity and protection measures for national minorities, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and following the assimilation

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[10] Michelle Kelso, Daina S. Eglitis,"Holocaust commemoration in Romania: Roma and the contested politics of memory and memorialization" in *Journal of Genocide Research*, no. 16, 2014, pp. 487-511

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] Andrzej Mirga, "Roma Genocide: Historic and Symbolic Meanings for Collective Memory and Identity" in Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka, Esteban Acuña C. and Piotr Trojański (eds.), *Education for Remembrance of The Roma Genocide. Scholarship, Commemoration and the Role of Youth*, Cracow: Libron, 2015, p. 60

[13] Adrian Nicolae Furtună, Delia Grigore, Mihai Neacşu, *Sostar na rovas?... O Samudaripen thaj lesqi ciaci paramisi/ De ce nu plâng?... Holocaustul romilor şi povestea lui adevărată*, Bucureşti: Editura Centrului Rromilor „Amare Rromentza", 2010, p. 170

policies of the Communist regime, the early post-comunist years of Holocaust denial, the Roma population in Romania, despite their demographics (census in 1992 indicates 400.000 Roma, while a study indicates 1,5 million; census data in 2002 indicates 535.000; census data in 2011 indicates that 621.573 Romanian citizens of Roma ethnicity have declared that belonging to the Roma minority, however, experts estimate numbers between 1 and 2,5 million) are underrepresented and have only managed to acquire political representation ex officio, by virtue of the legislation for national minorities, which provides a deputy mandate for organizations of national minorities which participated in the elections but whose candidate was not elected. A statistical analysis regarding Roma self-identification in the last four censuses indicates a significant growth from 227.398, in 1977 to 621.573, in 2011.[14]

The Roma poltical ladership, in the 1990s and first decades of the 2000s has not focused on building an etno-political project, in which the traumatic shared past, holocaust recognition and historical justice for the Roma played any role. Despite the political protocols, partnerships (tacit agreement in 2000[15], 2003[16], 2012[17]) with leading political mainstream party PSD, the political leadership has continued the social approach to the Roma minority, requesting measures for social inclusion, representation in the governmental structures, in exchange for supporting and promoting the mainstream party candidates in the parliamentary electoral colleges, claiming the recognition or wider recognition of the Roma genocide and historical reparation for the Roma minority has not been a preocupation of the Roma political leadership.

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[14] Tamás Kiss, Ilka Veress, *Minorități din România. Recensământ 2011 - procese demografice*, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităților Naționale, 2018, p. 64

[15] Sergiu Mișcoiu, "Is there a model for the political representation of the Romanian Roma?" in *Sfera Politicii*, nr. 123-124, 2006, pp. 78-90

[16] [http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1075996669257], 1 October 2020

[17] Alina Novaceanu, "Alegeri Parlamentare: PSD și Partida Romilor au încheiat un accord de susținere reciprocă", *Mediafax*, November 3, 2012, [https://www.mediafax.ro/politic/alegeri-parlamentare-psd-si-partida-romilor-au-incheiat-un-acord-de-sustinere-reciproca-in-alegerile-parlamentare-10274051], 1 October 2020

The agreements can be considered to be an example of the lack of a coherent ethno-political vision of the Roma community. Furthermore, Miscoiu demonstrates that, politically speaking, the Romanian Roma communities, both in structure and representation, follow the model of "political precariousness", leading to an "underrepresentation and misrepresentation of the Roma community in Romania".[18] Building on the heterogeneity of the Roma community, McGarry points out the ambiguous nationalism, „the lack of a coherent vision of and for the Roma nation" that accounts for parliamentary underrepresentation and the fact that the electoral support and political presence is disporportionate to their numerical weight.[19]

Though the authors assert that far from being observed and practiced by all people considered to be Roma on the bases of hetero- or autoidentification, in a recent investigation into the instances of Roma autonomous lawmaking, respectively the unofficial Roma legal system „Kris", they argue that it has played over time a „crucial role in producing and reproducing the boundaries of Roma identity at large, providing a code of organizing Roma communities and sustaining the bases of solidarity among members".[20] As traditional Roma groups have been foremost the targets of the genocide, it begs investigation to what extent operating outside state systems and the insulation of the Roma from the majority society has played a role in diminishing and marginalizing the Roma accounts about the genocide, which some mention have been underpinned by traditional beliefs. The confessions of the survivors, suggests one of the first Roma-led researches on memorialization of the Roma Holocaust in Romania, are considered „taboo subjects of the Romani culture, the shame of having been there".[21]

It would be the Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, established by then president Iliescu, following a governmental incident of Holocaust denial which sparked international

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[18] Sergiu Mişcoiu, *op.cit.*

[19] Aidan McGarry, "Ambiguous nationalism?: Explaining the parliamentary under-representation of Roma in Hungary and Romania" in *Romani Studies,* 19, no. 2 , 2009, pp. 103-124.

[20] Levente Salat, Sergiu Mişcoiu, "Roma autonomous lawmaking - the Romanian case" in Tove H. Malloy, Levente Salat, *Non-Territorial Autonomy and Decentralization: Ethno-Cultural Diversity Governance*, London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 167–194

[21] Adrian Nicolae Furtună, Delia Grigore, Mihai Neacşu, *op.cit.*, p. 176

outrage, that would break the camel's back and put an end to the victimhood narrative of Romania and that the genocide of the Jews and Roma was perpetrated by Nazi Germany, the Romanian state having been blameless.

The Commission was chaired by Nobel Laureate and Vice-Chairman of the Yad Vashem Council, Prof. Elie Wiesel and comprised recognized historians and public figures from the United States, Romania, France, Germany and Israel and was backed by the American Jewish Committee, B'nai Brith, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and Yad Vashem. The report of this commission, submitted in 2004, unequivocally concluded that the Romanian regime actively targeted, deported and murdered Jews and Roma.[22]

As a result of the report, in 2009, the Romanian government unveiled a Holocaust memorial to commemorate over 280,000 Jews and 11,000 Roma who died as victims of the Ion Antonescu regime. Though their victimhood is recognized in the external and internal exhibits and the population losses made explicit, Kelso suggests that Roma are „simultaneously represented, unrepresented and misrepresented", as the agents and context of their suffering are not well illuminated, the Romani language and the terms coined for the genocide, Porrajmos or Samudaripen are absent, "not seeking to capture the historical narrative in their cultural voices."[23]

Romania has commemorated both the Jewish and Roma Holocaust on Holocaust Remembrance Day, October 9, as the date signifying the beginning of Jewish deportations to Transnistria.

Following in the footsteps of the European Parliament which declared in 2015, August 2 as the annual "European Roma Holocaust Memorial Day", in 2020 Romania adopted a Law establishing the 2nd of August as the National Day of Commemorating the Holocaust against Roma – Samudaripen. The initator of the piece of legislation was the deputy representing the Roma minority from the Roma Party „Pro Europa".

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[22] Elie Wiesel, Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu, *Final Report: of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*, Bucharest, 2004, [https://www.yadvashem.org/docs/international-commission-on-romania-holocaust.html], 30 September 2020

[23] Michelle Kelso, Daina S. Eglitis, "Holocaust commemoration in Romania: Roma and the contested politics of memory and memorialization", in *Journal of Genocide Research* no. 16, 2014, pp. 487-511.

Wider recognition of the Roma and Sinti Genocide: From Oppression to Resistance and Remembrance

The spark that lighted the civil rights movement and the recognition of the Roma and Sinti Holocaust was lit in Germany, in 1979 at the first international memorial rally to commemorate the Sinti and Roma murdered by the National Socialists. The event attracted a lot of attention, Simone Veil, a survivor of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and the first female President of the European Parliament, was the key speaker at the rally.[24] A key event and turning point of the Roma civil rights movement in Germany, has been the hunger strike organized at the former Dachau concentration camp during Easter 1980 in which the strikers called out for the recognition of the genocide, and the occupation of the basement of the Tübingen University archive by eighteen Sinti who demanded the immediate removal of the Nazi race files to the Federal Archive, locating the files and documenting the genocide having been an important objective of the movement.

Germany would be the country who took the first steps to officially recognize the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in 1982. In 1997 the Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma was officially opened with a permanent exhibition on the Holocaust of the Sinti and Roma, and in 2012 a Memorial to the Sinti and Roma of Europe Murdered under the National Socialist Regime was erected in Berlin, marking "the closure of the struggle, both historically and symbolically",[25] thus establishing a remembrance culture of the genocide of the Sinti and Roma who were killed in Nazi-occupied Europe.

The topic of the Roma and Sinti Holocaust and the issue of compensations is a recurrent topic at the World Roma Congresses (Genève 1978, Göttingen 1981, Warsaw 1990, Prague 2000, Lanchiano 2004, Zagreb 2008), and in the governing body of International Romani Union the

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[24] ∗∗∗, "First public civil rights campaign against racism", 2020, [https://www.roma-sinti-holocaust-memorial-day.eu/rom/recognition/first-public-civil-rights-campaign-against-racism/], 31 August 2020
[25] Andrzej Mirga, *op.cit.*, p. 57

Commission on the Compensations for the Holocaust has always been included.[26]

Nevertheless, it would be the context of the European Union as supranational entity in which national states, which has been proven that are not ethnically impartial, lose power both vertically and horizontally, that has created the premises for recognition and empowerment of national minorities, including the Roma, and for wider recognition of the Sinti and Roma genocide, enabling the Roma population to engage in transnational commemoration of the genocide and (re)construction of discourses on collective identity.

Following the Jewish model, the Roma activists have made efforts to coin a 'Roma name', in analogy with 'Shoah" respectively Porrajmos (in Romanes – 'the Devouring'), or Baro Porrajmos (in Romanes – 'the Great Devouring'), a term, considered offensive by some Roma groups, thus other activists invent and start to use an alternative term Samudardipen – in Romanes 'Overall killings'). Marushkiakova and Vesselin also mention that the words Holokosto or Holokausto, Kali Traš (in Romanes 'Black fear') are used together with metaphoric expression Berša Bibahtale (in Romanes 'unhappy years') to reference the Sinti and Roma Genocide.

Romani Resistance Day is an initiative of Roma civil society that "sprung out of the need to rise above the role of victim ascribed to Roma by society and instead to stand up against prejudice and actively shape their own future" commemorating the victims but also remembering the acts of resistance.[27]

The narrative of the Sinti and Roma Genocide becomes more diverse, recasting Roma not only in the roles of victims, but also as "heroes" by starting a culture of remembrance in what Brooks calls "one of the most significant - but understudied - acts of resistance", respectively the

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[26] Elena Marushiakova, Vesselin Popov, "Holocaust, Porrajmos, Samudaripen ... Creation of New National Mythology..", in *Studia Romologica*, 3, 2013, pp. 75-94, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235700074_Holocaust_Porrajmos_Samudaripen_Creation_of_New_National_Mythology], 31 August 2020.

[27] Council of Europe, Advisory Council of Youth, "The Statement on Romani Resistance Day", 16 May 2020, [https://rm.coe.int/romani-resistance-day-16-may/16809e4ece], 1 November 2020

uprising of the Sinti and Roma prisoners against the SS guards, in the Zigeuner lager, which postponed the liquidation of the prisoners for a few months.[28]

The year 2015 would give new impetus to the Roma movement for Holocaust recognition. The European Parliament and some EU Member States, including Belgium, recognized the Armenian Genocide.[29] Crucial steps have also been made in terms of truth and historical justice with the European Parliament recognizing the Roma Genocide and paving the way towards reconciliation with the Resolution "International Roma Day– anti-Gypsyism in Europe and EU recognition of the memorial day of the Roma genocide during WWII". The European Parliament affirms in this resolution that ''2 August has been chosen by Roma organizations as the day to commemorate all Roma victims of this genocide'' and that the recognition "would thus constitute an important symbolic step in the fight against anti-Gypsyism and contribute to general knowledge of Roma history in Europe."[30]

The EP recognition prompted French officials as well, as in 2016 President Francois Hollande recognized and assumed responsibility for the estimated 200.000 – 500.000 Roma killed in the French concentration camps during the Vichy regime.[31]

Antigipsyism has been frequently mentioned and emphasized in policy documents of the Council, the EP and the EC. Despite competing definitions and alternative concepts to refer to Roma oppression, such as

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[28] Ethel Brooks, "Remembering the Dead, Documenting Resistance, Honoring the Heroes" in *UN Discussion Papers Series*, 2015,
[https://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/paper23.shtml], 1 October 2020

[29] ∗∗∗, "Armenian Genocide: After EU, the US recognizes genocide in WWI", *Brussels Times*, 30 October 2019, [https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/world-all-news/76395/armenian-genocide-after-eu-the-us-recognizes-genocide-in-wwi/], 1 January 2020

[30] ∗∗∗, "European Parliament recognizes Antigypsyism and Roma Genocide", Alliance against Antigypsyism, April 15, 2015,
[http://antigypsyism.eu/?p=178%20eu%20and%20roma%20genocide], 1 January 2020

[31] Olimpia Nicolae, "Presedintele Francois Hollande recunoaste Genocidul Romilor intreprins de Franta in Al Doilea Razboi Mondial", *Mediafax*, October 29, 2016, [https://www.mediafax.ro/externe/presedintele-francois-hollande-recunoaste-genocidul-romilor-intreprins-de-franta-in-al-doilea-razboi-mondial-15880208], 1 January 2020

anti-Roma racism, Antiziganismus, Romaphobia, Antigyspyism seems to be the prevalent term.

Several scholars and activists have attempted to define the concept and phenomenon, one such definition states that Anti-gypsyism incorporates elements of biological racism but it also centres around "cultural" differences between "us" versus "them"[32] while another defines it as "a special form of racism directed against Roma that has at its core the assumptions that Roma are an inferior and deviant group. Other key assumptions of anti-Gypsyism are: orientalism, nomadism, rootlessness and backwardness".[33] The Alliance against Antigypsyism, an occasional coalition of organizations that promote equality of rights for Roma has drafted the following working: "Antigypsyism is a historically constructed, persistent complex of customary racism against social groups identified under the stigma 'gypsy' or other related terms, and incorporates: 1. a homogenizing and essentializing perception and description of these groups; 2. the attribution of specific characteristics to them; 3. discriminating social structures and violent practices that emerge against that background, which have a degrading and ostracizing effect and which reproduce structural disadvantages."[34]

Rostas identifies the following manifestations of Antigypsyism: discrimination, segregation, physical, verbal and symbolic violence, collective punishment and mob violence, assimilation policies, deportations, extermination, mass expulsion of Roma from different countries etc., including Holocaust denial etc. Rostas underlines that Antigypsyism is embedded in structural institutions and has a systemic character, emphasizing the oppression of a group for its identity and the role of the state in

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[32] Valeriu Nicolae, "Towards a Definition of Anti-Gypsyism", Ergo Network, 2006, [https://ergonetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Valeriu-Nicholae_towards-a-definition-of-antigypsyism.pdf], 31 August 2020

[33] Sergio Carrerra, Iulius Rostas, Lina Vosyliūtė, *Combating Institutional Anti-Gypsyism: Responses and promising practices in the EU and selected Member States*, Brussels: CEPS, 2017, p. 71, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320879566_Combating_Institutional_Anti-Gypsyism_Responses_and_promising_practices_in_the_EU_and_selected_Member_States], 1 August 2020

[34] ∗∗∗, "Antigypsism. A reference paper" on Antigypsyism", Alliance against Antigypsyism, 2017, [https://secureservercdn.net/192.169.221.188/abv.a52.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Antigypsyism-reference-paper-16.06.2017.pdf], 1 October 2020

producing and reproducing racism as well as the impunity of the perpetrator. He argues that as a specific term, Antigypsyism predates the term racism, a product of modernity, and epitomizes an entire tradition of Roma oppression, which goes beyond European modernity, referencing the enslavement of the Roma in Moldavia and Wallachia. Following the model of the Jewish scholars in the coining of the term anti-Semitism, Antigypsyism would signal a shift in power and power relations, challenging the dominant narratives about the Roma and showing the need for historical and social justice.[35]

Renan has been among the firsts to elaborate upon the importance of collective memory and of a common shared repository of history and culture for the accomplishment of any nationalist project. According to Renan, the nation is a culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice and devotion, based on the cult of the ancestors, that is to say built on a heroic past, great men and glory, a social capital on which to base a nation. In his opinion, national memories are made up "suffering in common", which unifies more than triumphs, and that this imposes duties and requires efforts.[36] In his speech, at the inauguration of the Memorial to the Sinti and Roma of Europe Murdered under the National Socialist Regime, in 2012, Romani Rose, Chair of the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, stated: "There is not a single family of Sinti and Roma in Germany who has not lost immediate family members. It shapes our identity to this day."[37] He later on added in an interview "There is no family in Germany, nor in the European countries that were under Nazi occupation, which did not fall victim to the Nazi regime."[38]

Smith adds that in order for shared memories to become national they need to be attached to specific places and territories through a process of territorialization of memory, which inspires historical claims to historic

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[35] Iulius Rostas, *A Task for Sisyphus: Why Europe's Roma Policies Fail*, CEU Press, 2019, pp. 16-20.

[36] Ernest Renan, "What is a nation?", in Homi Bhabha (Ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 8-22

[37] Ethel Brooks, *op.cit.*

[38] "Interview with Romani Rose", International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 1.08.2016, [https://holocaustremembrance.com/stories/interview-romani-rose], 1 October 2020.

homelands and sacred sites.[39] In this sense, turning the former Roma camp and Lety pig farm from the Cezch Republic into a commemoration site, the commemoration monuments, the annual commemoration at the Auschwitz-Birkenau Roma camp, which reenacts the past and establishes a tradition and culture of remembrance contribute and impact national and collective identity building.

Challenges instead of Conclusions

The power struggle for shaping the past and the Roma narrative of the Genocide is ongoing. The high-level recognition of EU bodies and institutions, and state-level formal recognition has not been translated at the level of the wider public. Recognition of the Roma Holocaust at EU level has been facilitated by international institutions, mechanisms and in the framework of the development of the discourse on minority rights.

The Roma Holocaust in Romania is an unresolved issue in Romania, as evidenced by its recurrence in contemporary anti-Roma discourses, especially during moments of crisis, society not having undergone the moral catharsis for reconciling the dominant and marginal narratives.

The Holocaust narrative has been more successful at European level, in Romania it competes with the Communist narrative, which references a more recent past and consistent with the national image of Romanian as victims and heroes of the Communist regime not to mention that Romania's war time policy remains controversial. While more remote in time as a historical event, the narrative of enslavement has received a wider acceptance in Romanian society, due perhaps to more documentation and research of the period, the abolition of Roma slavery coincides with the birth of modern Romania and has been deemed more acceptable as it pertains to a period before the modern age, in a time of principalities in which the Romanian state did not exist per se.

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[39] Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism", in *International Affairs*, 72, no. 3, 1996, pp. 445-458.

The Roma movement in Romania deals marginally with the Roma Holocaust and does not tap into its potential for collective and national identity building. Recent approaches of framing the Holocaust as part of a long tradition of Antigypsyism, might serve as an instrument for countering anti-Roma discourses/racisms and mobilization for historical justice and reparation, however, scholars warn against building an identity based on victimhood and persecution. The term is receiving more and more acceptance in academic and activist circles, but also in European policy documents with the New EU Framework for Roma Inclusion giving more importance and calling upon EU member states to prioritize and combat Antigypsysim in their National Roma Inclusion Strategies. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how the term will be received and used in Romania, as the Romanian governments have had a social and combatting poverty approach to Roma. Furthermore, the Roma political project in Romania has focused for more than two decades on an identity politics based on replacing the "Gypsy"/ Tigan exonym with the "Roma" endonym. To what extent this shift, in form, will set the movement forward or backward, remains to be seen.

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2. Anastasoaie, Marian Viorel (2003), "Roma/Gypsies in the History of Romania: An Old Challenge for Romanian Historiography" in *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 3, no. 1, 262-274

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Populism or the Broken Promises of Democracy. Concepts, Causes and Solutions

Răzvan-Samir Avram[*]

Abstract

Europe's response to the consequences of the Two World Wars was the need for joint association in a European project. Later on, the communist revolutions have sparked hopes on the European continent in creating a much-dreamed prosperity. One by one, the Eastern European Countries have joined the European project, the last country being Croatia in 2013. Time has passed, but not all problems seem to be resolved, on the contrary, we could say, extremism is on the rise, intolerance of migrants and foreigners it's a topic on any internal debate. And s as if it weren't enough, Brexit, in conjunction with the rise in the voting intentions for the populist leaders like Marine Le Pen with The National Front in France, Matteo Salvini with Lega Nord in Italy and Nigel Farage with UKIP and later on with Reform Part. This Article aims to provide some clarifications in relation with the conceptual nature of populism, in order to define the concept and identifying and analyzing the main key messages within the populist speech, and also to identify why such messages have success, using as a starting point the idea that populism is only the result of stagnation of the current political class, as well as of the shortcomings of the democratic system.

Keywords: democracy, populism, unemployment, civic-unrest, crisis, elitism, fake-news.

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Introduction

"I simply don't see any competitors to modern democracy"[1] they represented some of Francis Fukushima's words at the time in which he published his article entitled "The End of History" and later his book entitled "The End of History and The Last Man" which they were best-sellers. And after all, with all of Huntington's manifesto, the first, continued his rhetoric by saying that "what we are witnessing is not just the end of the cold war, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[2] In his view, this was "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy"[3] and it was inevitable, using as an argument the reforms that were taking place in Russia and China. And, after all, who was to contradict him in the light of the events which were in progress at that time: the anti-communist revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall, free elections won by the new democratic parties in the former communist countries where there were young hopes like Viktor Orban in Hungary. In such a situation, the future seemed to be the of the following kind: "in the post-historical period, there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed."[4] But euphoria didn't last long. In 1991 the war in Yugoslavia began, the World Trade Center attacks were taking place in 2001, and then the American invasion in Iraq, and later, the Russian invasion in Georgia and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the same country in 2014. This is only in terms of the military aspect of the

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[1] James Atlas, "What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?", *NY Times*, Oct. 22, 1989, [*https://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/22/magazine/what-is-fukuyama-saying-and-to-whom-is-he-saying-it.html*], accessed on 2 October 2020

[2] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, p. 1 [https://www.embl.de/aboutus/science_society/discussion/discussion_2006/ref1-22june06.pdf], accessed on 2 October 2020

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] *Ibidem*, pp. 17-18.

post-USSR era. In regard with the financial side of the world, wake-up came in 2008 with the start of the financial crisis. This event was of particular significance because "free markets have not only enlarged the gap between rich and poor, but have also reduced average incomes across the developed and developing worlds."[5] In response, the masses redirected their disappointment and anger towards parties and by switching sides in favor of those with extremist views, sweeping through voting left-wing parties and bringing to power personalities like Geert Wilders, Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini , and as a turning point there were the presidential elections with the finals between Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron , and the pearl of populism, Brexit. Above all, and a wave of rising racism, anti-Semitism and multi-culturalism against the backdrop of the migration crisis against the backdrop of the war in Syria and Iraq, as well as the terrorist attacks in France.

"What is going on? The continuation, at all costs, of a weary world? A salutary crisis of that world, racked by its victorious expansion? The end of that world? The advent of a different world?"[6] These statements are perfectly justified in a world that seems to be like that he lost his compass, societies seem to be getting more and more attracted to the unknown amid dissatisfaction with the failure of liberal society. Of course, the benefits of democracy are undeniable, both in terms of citizens' rights and freedoms, the technological and economic progress, the comparison between the liberal and the totalitarian world does not exist, yet, the current democratic system has been wrong on numerous occasions.

To begin with, the financial crisis has revealed weaknesses and the stiffness of the capitalist system that believed in solving of its own problems by itself. In return, the crisis revealed the worst in it: institutional corruption, money laundering, financial fraud.

Secondly, from the political establishment, we saw exactly the same gaps as in the case of the banking and financial institutions. Likewise, they also thought that when it comes to political elections, we are only going to have a cyclicality and that the European elections are only a kind of protest

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[5] Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, Massachusetts/ London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Reprint Edition, 2017.
[6] Alain Badiou, *The Rebirth of History. Times of Riots and Uprisings*, London, New York: Verso; 1st Edition, 2012.

valve, as protest votes which are only held in the case of these elections. They preferred to mime reforms or not to take them in time, so that they would not lose votes. In addition, we are in a situation where we can see a fall in the training of politicians, proven by their public appearances, and in the way in which the public policies are made up. Thus, the dissatisfaction needed a name and some "heroes", the latter being politicians like Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini and the "culprits" were the classic political parties, the political and the financial system which were portrait as being the world elite, interested not in solving the pressing problems of society, because otherwise they would have to lose power.

Of course, except for Brexit, the results are not threatening, (for now) but they have an obligation to take a note. These movements would not succeed if they did not have at least a kernel of truth in the way they lay problem.

Source: Foundation for European Progressive Studies

I am not at all in the same way in the belief that citizens are to be blamed for the way the society looks by choosing the populist and nationalist leaders, after all, it is their right to choose and the obligation of politicians to find the appropriate solutions and, if they wish to find those who are guilty, they can find them inside their own parties, and in the lack of courage and vision in implementing institutional and educational reforms in order to prevent the advance the daily fake-news.

2. Concepts in understanding populism

Given the waves made by this phenomenon, it is not surprising that the world is overexcited about this subject. Often referred to as "the great ambiguity"[7] or by other authors such as Cas Mudde as an ultra-widespread concept, a kind of label combining political parties, leaders belonging to the movement which are even opposed from a doctrinal point of view.[8] Margaret Canovan made the following remark about the difficulty of defining and identifying the elements that make up populism "there exists a shoe - the word "populism" - for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism."[9]

Thus, the study of populism has inevitably led to interesting debates, reaching into the place that populism has become studied not only as a self-standing phenomenon in politics, but also in mass-media,[10] law,[11] agriculture, or because populism is considered to be an evolutionary process[12], in this the early stage there presented as historical populism and

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[7] Yves Mény et Yves Surel, *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 1-21

[8] Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu, and Sorina Soare, *Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 6.

[9] *Ibidem* apud. Margaret Canovan, *Populism*, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981, p. 7.

[10] Moshe Loeb Gat, *The Media and Neo-populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis*, Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003.

[11] John Pratt, *Penal Populism*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

[12] Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu, and Sorina Soare, *op.cit.*, p. 15

on his is evolution he has turned into an advanced populism. In my opinion, I believe that populism is not divided, but is a discursive phenomenon present in the political world, and that evolutionism is necessary to adapt to the masses in order to attract support. Thus, media and legal populism come as a result of society's predisposition in favor of the populist message, each theory representing the missing piece to characterize and identify populism.

From other point of views, populism is a phenomenon that transcends the social classes, and encourages greater resistance to modernization by illustrating the peasants' riots in the new urban dimension. He also identified the reasons for increasing support for populism, namely: the inability of urban workers to form autonomous organizations and a culture; the increase in the number of marginalized people due to rapid migration and urbanization; the expansion of cities, therefore this has created difficulties for the rural area.[13] This idea will also be supported by Andrej Walicki, who identifies some features of populism: reluctance to capitalism, confrontation between local culture (Russian) and foreign culture (Western), attracting on the side of the populist phenomenon not only of the more conservative class (farmers), but of all the discontented.[14]

For Mény and Surel, the process of defining populism starts from understanding globalization by showing the functioning of the liberal democratic system through the perspective of the trident and the interdependence between sovereignty-constitutionalism-citizens, bringing new elements in order to identify and understand populism.[15]

In their view, sovereignty is the basic element of the strength and consistency of democracy, which re-enacts institutions and which gives the institutions authority, and on the other hand, it legitimizes social criticism, the system of public control of the institutions, as well as the source of the limitation of institutional power. Thus, popular sovereignty has a dual role: to legitimize and de-legitimize institutions.

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[13] Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner, *Populism: its meaning and national characteristics*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969, pp. 28-62.

[14] *Ibidem*, pp. 62-96

[15] Manuel Anselmi, *Populism. An Introduction*, New York/London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 35-36

Constitutionalism is the fundamental law of the state which sets certain limitations on institutional power in order to avoid an institution becoming able to benefit from discretionary powers and also to defend the rule of law.

Populism, on the other hand, promises a more direct representation and connection with citizens, a top-down relationship, by removing barriers and institutions with a role in mediation. In addition, populism has a double role: both in de-legitimizing of institutions and legitimizing, depending on the actual situation. In the end, however, populism proposes an erosion of the rule of law, regardless the consequences. Thus, populist politicians clamping popular support oppose the politicians elected in the same way, as well as the institutional way of working by virtue of the fact that they build a different understanding of sovereignty.

Moreover, Mény and Surel also identify 3 types of communities essential for the good functioning and success of the populist society: The sovereign people at political level, the people as a social class in economic terms and the nation-state from a cultural perspective.

The Community of the sovereign people refers to the nation and its power to legitimize and de-legitimize institutions, and it is the source of political order in this respect, and political power must act in the interests of and as part of the citizens.

The Community as a social class is the community which is in constant conflict with those perceived as the higher economic class, and thus, they feel themselves oppressed by them, and is therefore advocating against globalization and economic expansion beyond the borders of the local community.

The Community-nation relies on sentimental belonging to the local area, that there is a feeling of exception in that the individual belongs to a specific geographical area, a geographical area which gives him unity in terms of culture, values and tradition and therefore, this space must be preserved from the foreign influences.[16]

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[16] Yves Mény and Yves Surel, *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 187

In Edward Shills's view, populism is a phenomenon that manifests itself and is successful as a result of societal problems.[17] Shills's study is based on an analysis of the relationship between public opinion, conspiracy theories, using the US political system during the Cold War, and later on a comparison between the US and British political systems as a case study.

The study was all the more interesting not only in terms of the fact that the period was under great tension and sometimes even paranoia, but because these things were public because according to Shills, the American society was built in a certain way and was more prone to react in a certain way than other nations.

Thus, the study is based on an analysis of liberal democracy, which in its view should include a balanced connection of three elements: privacy and secrecy A comparative analysis is carried out between the UK and the US to illustrate this. In the first case, the conclusion is that the mix between the two is perfect, where the most vulnerable were defended from government abuses, where hierarchies were respected, private life enjoys great respect, the advertising was not overdone and the fears were not fed. According to the author, the American society was the opposite of the British society, a society in which the public dimension was very important to society, an aspect which was attributed to the lack of confidence of the middle class in aristocracy and hierarchical forms of organization, a society based on individualism and where institutional identity was weak. All these attitudes led to other generalized reactions in society: fear of secrets, dependence on secrets and a strong dependence on advertising, all of which created a political leaning toward the conspiracy theories.

He believed that populism should not be seen from a political perspective but rather as social mentality issue, a phenomenon that needs to be studied from a social and cultural point of view. Populism therefore calls for aggressiveness against elites, traditional forms of institutional organization, hierarchical organization, in a word, of the way the state is organized by promoting the elimination of the check-and-balance mechanism, the institutions and the idea of political plurality. As a counterbalance to this phenomenon, Shills is advocating in favor of the strengthening of pluralism within the society.

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[17] Manuel Anselmi, *op.cit.,* pp. 16-17

Canovan study was based on the "theory of similarity" built by Ludwig Wittgenstein and argued that there is a variety of populism, each having distinct characteristics depending on the historical and social context in which they appeared and where they manifested themselves.[18] Therefore, she proposed a classification of populism based on case studies.

Agrarian populism has been based on the study of the agrarian movement in Eastern Europe, especially of Russian populism and in the radical character of the American farmers, with the movements being directed against the elites and traditional politicians. Although in most of the cases, these movements had their logos within the society, as a result of the need for representation and with people of a rural nature as promoters. Russian populism was the creation of intellectuals as a tool of promoting the country's glorious past, a means to glorify the tradition and religious character of the country as a quintessence of the country, a shield against modernization.

In the case of political populism, also called dictatorial populism[19] it is considered to include the following elements: it has an urban character, the presence of a charismatic leader and there is a similar organization to that of a party in classical form. These elements do not exclude that political populism cannot include elements specific to agrarian populism.

The populist democracy refers to that populism which wants an increase in the participation of the masses in political life, as well as in the process of government. This form of democracy advocates for a more direct interaction of citizens with the state by removing barriers such as institutions, procedures, practically all intermediaries or at least reducing them to a symbolic level.

Reactionary populism is characterized by a xenophobic, nationalist, anti-modernization, traditionalist, in favor of return to the roots.[20] Political populism refers to the actions and the gestures taken by politicians to gain popular support. This type of populism can be found both in the democratic parties and in radical parties, anti-political parties or in locomotive parties.[21]

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[18] Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung", in *Annalen der Naturphilosophische*, XIV, 3/4, 1921 (*Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinnes), London, Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 185-262.

[19] Margaret Canovan, *op.cit.*, pp. 136-172

[20] *Ibidem*, pp. 225-231

[21] *Ibidem*.

Building on Marxist ideology, Laclau introduced the principle of political antagonism which says that the development of a society, as well as its understanding, takes place on the basis of conflicts between citizens and the ruling classes. However, he considered the concept of proletariat and that of class are inappropriate to the events of time, thus building a need to introduce new concepts that are much more appropriate to the economic development. This is how the populism concept that is considered to be of a neutral nature, considered to be neither good nor bad, and put in the negative light attributed to the concept on the neoliberal literature that discrediting the masses. He argued that the neutrality of populism was due to the fact that it was a phenomenon of a linguistic and social nature, which thanks to its way of being, in particular, its symbolic nature, it manages to incorporate elements that would otherwise be together with more difficulty, giving them a macro-identity to these elements called people. Populism is thus a way of building a political dimension with the property of giving a collective identity, or in Laclau's view, the way we build collective identities is a crucial step in building political power. Its neutral nature is the lack of a clear ideology that allows populism to fit on any side of the political spectrum.

The ethos of populism, it is the moment when there is social demand or social need. If this demand is not taken into account, then masses become aware of their common identity, which is reflected in the desired social need and thus demand becomes democratic.[22]

Thus, despite the fact that the process of populism classification is different from one author to another, however, researchers have mostly come to the drawing up of a scale on which we can identify the presence of populist attitudes in the political message namely:

- it is anti-intellectual, anti-elite, anti-establishment, science and technology

- inclined toward the promotion of conspiracy theories and short violence for a short period of time

- susceptibility to corruption

-the gestures and leaders' behavior are essential in relation to the movement's support

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[22] J. Uldam, A. Vestergaard, *Civic Engagement and Social Media: Political Participation Beyond Protest*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015

- promotion of historical nostalgia

- demonising of foreigners

- the contesting of inequality promoted by the institutions but support when they are produced as a result of traditions

- can also have an urban character, not just rural.

Considering all the points mentioned, we can say that populism is a message that exploits society's failures because of the failures of the liberal society they are using a "we" vs. "they" rhetoric, giving them the fuel to criticize the globalization and multiculturalism, to hate the foreigners, and to support the fake-news.

3. The Populist Discourse

The populist discourse is not a whole, but rather a cocktail of elements that are central to the respective societies. Thus, the central topics of debate will be presented with only half of the truth in order to get votes, regardless of their consequences or how Machiavelli would say "the end justify the means". Thus, there are some central ideas in the populist message, namely: anti-elitism, anti-migration and globalization, the use of a highly emotional language plays its part in the process of flattering the people, by giving them the possibility of reliving the historical golden age of the state in which they "the real people",[23] they will do it better, by presenting simple solutions to complicated problems. In the populist sense, it is not a classic debate in which the opposing party is an individual with different opinions, an opponent, but rather, it is portrait as being the enemy, the source of all evil and disasters in society, whether we are talking about other political leaders, whether we are talking about institutions or crises with a significant impact such as migrants. Within this paradigm there is not "we" as a society, but rather "us" against "them".

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[23] Zoe Williams, "Nigel Farage's victory speech was a triumph of poor taste and ugliness", *The Guardian*, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/nigel-farage-ugliness-bullet-fired, accessed on 4 October 2020.

They understand by the idea of elites those people or institutions that come with some expertise in finding the best solutions, but which are not in line with the populist message. After Brexit, the following way of working appeared "I think the people of this country have had enough of experts with organisations with acronyms saying that they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong"[24] or as Marine Le Pen said "it is time to free the French people from an arrogant elite".[25] This message is particularly important because in the populist sense of the elite, educational institutions or NGOs have the role of putting things in a certain context, or the last thing any demagogue politician wants is to wake up the electorate. In the theory of populism there is a new typology, namely, of educational populism that acts in total opposition to the traditional educational system, that is why all false conspiracy and fake-news derive and that must be presented as absolutely worthy scientific proof in favor of populism.

Then we have the tickling of the electors' opinion presented as being "the real people",[26] "the true majority", whose will go beyond any rules and institutions: „populism proclaims that the will of the people as such is supreme over every other standard, over the standard traditional institutions, over the autonomy of institutions and over the will of other strata. Populism identifies the will of the people with justice and morality".

Then we are moving to portray globalization, strangers and the migration process as harmful to society. Thus, we have "savage globalization",[27] the foreigners are "scum"[28] or in other cases they are

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[24] Tim Wallace, "Voters really have had enough of experts: trust in economists has slumped since referendum", *The Telegraph*, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/11/22/voters-really-have-had-enough-experts-trust-economists-has-slumped/, accessed on 5 October 2020.

[25] Kim Willsher, "Marine Le Pen heads to the rust belt to celebrate French election success", *The Guardian*, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/23/marine-le-pen-french-presidential-election-success accessed on 5 October 2020

[26] "EU Referendum: Farage declares 'independence day' ", *BBC*, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36613295, accessed on 5 October 2020

[27] "Marine Le Pen rejette la 'mondialisation sauvage' d'Emmanuel Macron", *Le Point*, 2017, https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/en-direct-presidentielle-entre-le-pen-et-macron-la-bataille-du-1er-mai-01-05-2017-2123911_3121.php accessed on 5 October 2020

presented as "Islamic invasion".[29] These elements attack the purity of the nation, the jobs of citizens, without mentioning that those who come in, often get the lowest paid jobs that the natives do not want or do not take, in those cases the employer is forced to find a workforce in sensitive areas.

That is why Platon calls such a speech as being demagogue "the demagogue is one who preaches doctrines he knows to be untrue to men he knows to be idiots".[30] The demagogy in this case is the statement of a problem, real or not, but by presenting simple solutions. But in a global world, free trade agreements are not being made from today to tomorrow. Labor is needed to support economic growth and it is the duty of the employer to find solutions when citizens do not want to take a certain job. It is, of course, the state's duty to offer skill and skill programs for entering the labor market, but it is not the state's duty to offer job by force.

4. How did we get here?

It would be counterproductive to consider Brexit as the central event alongside Donald Trump's election as mere history accidents. In particular, they are the result of stagnation in the best case of the policy since the fall of communism in 1989. This is why we should start from the analysis of the populist discourse to see if the said words do not contain a certain truth and then we should also pass on to the liberal political spectrum.

A first aspect to be considered is that of globalization and migration, as the two are interrelated. A universally accepted definition of globalization does not exist, but we can see its impact or its effects on society. In particular, when we talk about globalization, we refer to a number of interdependencies generated by exchanges between economic and political actors, exchanges that generate interactions and major changes in the market, not least in term of culture. In short, the term

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[28] Robin McKie, "Far-right leader Geert Wilders calls Moroccan migrants 'scum' ", *The Guardian*, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/18/geert-wilders-netherlands-describes-immigrants-scum-holland, accessed on 5 October 2020

[29] Yoruk Bahceli, "Wilders tells Dutch parliament refugee crisis is 'Islamic invasion'", *Reuters*, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-netherlands-idUSKCN0RA0WY 20150910, accessed on 5 October 2020

[30] H.L. Mencken, *Notes on Democracy*, New York: Holmes Press, 2007, p. 76

interdependence can be combined into one concept, namely globalization.[31] This mean that globalization at societal level takes place through three dimensions: society or socialization, economy and politics, These 3 are due to the change in the paradigm of inter-state relations in Western Europe post-1945 by creating the European Economic Area and by lifting restrictions on the free movement of goods, product and persons, and gained further momentum after the fall of communism.

The globalization of social relations requires, above all, a reconsideration of time and space in social life. People's lives are increasingly influenced by events that are far from the social context in which they carry out their daily activities.[32] Thus, through the interactions with citizens from other countries on the occasion of relocation of activity, cultural events, exchanges of experience due to Erasmus-type student programs, and tourism, followed later in some cases of permanent or temporary establishment in other countries, we have a process of cultural exchange, with faster or slower adaptability, depending on the case. A good example is the situation of citizens who had establish in west after the fall of communism. This interaction can often create cleavages. In this respect, it is important that there is a process of European integration, among many other unifying measures, that the EU integration process is one of the most important, a "Europe without borders", the elimination of reciprocal exclusivity – under conditions the coexistence of closed systems at the level of the nation states, which involves among other things, the creation of a common culture or a process of diffusion an existing culture, whether as a collective participatory process to create a new one.[33] This only implies the habit of peaceful and cultural coexistence between native and foreign nationals. It is the political dimension that ultimately determines the policy of globalization, the directions and the strategies, the steps toward achieving global society. She is the one that makes and breaks alliances of all nuances, structure markets, induce changes in the sovereignty of states, disturbing existing identity structures, etc., all determined by the factor of interest, it is assumed by the general human interest.

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[31] Vasile Stănescu, *Societatea civilă în fața globalizării,* Bucuresti: Editura Expert, 2001, p. 21
[32] *Ibidem*.
[33] *Ibidem*, p. 22.

In this context, globalization appears as the greatest defiance and challenge of the century but also as a threat. Because "global society" or "the world system" does not only appear on the basis of the interdependence and mutual ties of its parties, globalization can move forward in both the direction of freedom and domination. The classic example is the relationships between "center" and "periphery". With the objective of this process, in which economies, markets, capital, will no longer have borders, where competition and efficiency become benchmarks, the role of man, education, professionalism and pragmatism, its intelligence and ingenuity, and power is becoming a defining factor, of the power to adapt to an increasingly mobile world. Sustainable human development remains the main (human) dimension, which ensures overall development, the democratization of society, ensures human dignity, solidarity, participation in decision-making process, fair distribution and the protection of the natural environment.[34] Globalization is therefore an objective process characterized by improvement and modernization, efficiency, productivity and flexibility, understanding and adaptation, alignment of states, their attributes with democratic values and institutions, which aim to become widespread and create a single world, an interrelated system of networks using the same language, generally codified, of technologies and systems of interest, based on cooperative, participatory coordination, which will change the universal way in which humanity works.[35]

Within the economic dimension, economic operators with economic power are emerging in some cases even higher than some countries and through the capital injections in the new states, through the creation of new jobs, as well as other direct investments such as taxes and taxes paid to the budget requires a new organization for those employed by introducing internal procedures, a working method and promotion based on merit rather than loyalty, and transparency of expenditure. They are valuable in the way they have shaped the world we live in, namely: they have contributed to the increase of the living standards, transfer of technology and know-how to reduce the gaps , they produce in some cases cheap high quality products and and not least, perhaps a large proportion of local

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[34] *Ibidem*, p. 25

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 26

entrepreneurs were formed as a result of the organizational culture they joined during their employment in a multinational company, this is important because organizational culture means a set of specific practices from which the main company comes and teaches you how to act in order to be effective . The fault appears after an in-depth analysis of these 3 components.

Firstly, it is true that the arrival in other markets of large companies has created a boost by creating new jobs, but often they have been characterized as greedy, and as having only one purpose: that is to make the most profit at the lowest cost.[36] The main problem in many eyes is that some companies have come to have a higher turnover than dozens of states and therefore they can use their financial strength to influence states in policies such as tax deductions and tax regime.

Of course, the way corporations act and the way globalization look now is far from perfect, but it is not right to consider the big companies to blame for the current situation. First, in the case of global warming, there has been talk of the need for car manufacturers to find a solution to the pollution problem (which electric cars will be seen to be) but not a word about the behavior of the buyer.

Secondly, companies often take advantage of political opportunism and ambiguous legislation to circumvent taxes and duties. Let us not mention the numerous cases of state aid that governments knowingly grant.

And last but not least, the question of profit. We must say that the purpose of any business is to make the greatest profit at the lowest cost. Companies are not charities or NGOs. Of course, those who apply for a position within a department within a company will have a remuneration that is directly proportional to the position they are located in the company and therefore to the profit or the status they have. In other words, the higher the rank in terms of hierarchical position and therefore the responsibilities, the higher the remuneration.

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[36] Joseph Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work,* New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Reprint Edition, 2007, p. 163.

The benefits of globalization, multiculturalism and the European project are far greater than the disadvantages, we only need to analyse the impact of tourism on GDP,[37] or increase in per capita income.[38]

However, the problem arises within the context of social inequality, the center over the periphery paradigm where the poor have not only remained the same, but the situation has worsened, and thus, they are cut off from quality educational services, and they are not in the labor market, leading them to criminal groups or without education, they will believe everything they are told, and they will become the mass of maneuver for politicians who do not only want to exploit them, but they want to maintain the existing status-quo given the minimum effort they have to make to win votes. After all, it is easier to say that they are a "privileged" group, oppressed by an elite who use foreigners to take jobs than to deal with their real problem. After all, they were the main pool of supporters for Brexit. And this is where the fault is largely also on the side of classic politicians. Current society has forgotten inclusion, believing that those at the margins of society are not important, often accusing them of having reached the same place because of them, that their vote does not count, however, by counting the results at important voting times where the results often were different because of them. Of course, this does not mean that the state must become a socialist-type union, with production jobs for the sake of pointless production, but without giving them a meaning, a purpose, they will find a purpose in something else. And we see why there is an adherence to conspiracy theories, to fake-news, to racism and xenophobia. Because if the current political class disregards them, the populists give them a meaning, even if only formal.

Another problem is the decline in political confidence at global level, which exudes totalitarian regimes, the quality of politicians in the parties, let's say traditional. Because the general public might understand the need to tighten the belt for a while, to understand that the alternative presented by extremist parties is not a solution, but the minimal logic forces us to

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[37] J. Luty, "Travel and tourism in Europe - Statistics & Facts 2020",
https://www.statista.com/topics/3848/travel-and-tourism-in-europe/, accessed on 6 October 2020

[38] "European Union Wage Growth", https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/wage-growth, accessed on 6 October 2020

question the moment when top people come up with proposals or words at best humorous, If not tragic , demonstrating that Sarah Palin is not the only one, in the case of the UK it is competition: Michael Gove,[39] Chris Grayling, Grant Shapps,[40] David Tredinnick, Jeremy Hunt.[41] Of course, politicians from the other spectrum are not below, on the contrary, those named above represent those who, by their way of being, make the average man with the everyday problems, to wonder what qualities the above-mentioned possess (or does not possess) that would be worth leading a country's destiny. In such a situation, confidence in politicians is at alarmingly low levels.[42]

What can be done?

After the victory in the elections, Mark Rutte said his that victory was one of "the good populism against the bad populism",[43] that those who do not abide the dutch law should leave,[44] others like the Austrian Chancellor have co-opted in the government populists.

1. First of all, the adoption of this rhetoric by the Liberal parties only legitimizes these messages even more, in the last minute they are unable to gain electoral capital from it,[45] like the German Social Democratic Party

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[39] Mark Burdman, "Britain: The Case of Desperado Michael Gove", *Executive Intelligence Review*, Volume 29, Number 48, December 13, 2002, pp. 40-42.

[40] Suzanne Moore, "Grant Shapps: just how gullible does he think voters are?", *The Guardian*, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/16/grant-shapps-gullible-voters-michael-green-second-job accessed on 6 October 2020

[41] Polly Toynbee, "Who dares confront Jeremy Hunt, NHS bully-in-chief?", *The Guardian*, 2015.

[42] Ipsos MORI, "Politicians trusted less than estate agents, bankers and journalists", *Ipsos Mori Political Monitor*, February 2013, https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/politicians-trusted-less-estate-agents-bankers-and-journalists, accessed on 6 October 2020

[43] Cas Mudde, "Good' populism beat 'bad' in Dutch election", *The Guardian*, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/19/dutch-election-rutte-wilders-good-populism-bad- accessed on 6 October 2020

[44] Cynthia Kroet, "Mark Rutte: 'Act normal or leave' ad not aimed at ethnic groups", *Politico*, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/mark-rutte-act-normal-or-leave-ad-not-aimed-at-ethnic-groups/, accessed on 6 October 2020

[45] Markus Wagner, "Tarik Abou-Chadi, The Electoral Appeal of Party Strategies in Postindustrial Societies: When Can the Mainstream Left Succeed?", in Jeffery A. Jenkins (ed.), *The Journal of Politics*, 81 no. 4, October 2019, pp. 1405–1419, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/704436 accessed on 6 October 2020.

(SPD), which took over the Alternative for Deuschland (AFD) rhetoric without success.[46]

2. Politicians should be aware of populist issues and come up with solutions, with clear and effective policies, to put the whole problem in a context, because often populist politicians do not come up with solutions, for them, complicated problems have simple solutions.

3. The education system must be rethought in such a way that pupils are given the means to identify lies from the truth. It is fascinating how in the 21st century, in the context where the information is just a click away, to consider diseases to be spread by 5G antennas, to reiterate the geographical assumptions of the Medieval time that have long been eluded and then, after a decision is made at the polls, we have made the mistake by searching the internet as well.[47] We need to rediscover our critical sense and analysis, to put everything in context without which any problems stated become a pretext.

Conclusions

We have to learn from all these crises and to draw the necessary lessons.

Democracy is not a self-standing building, but the result of philosophical thinking that has been used and in practice has led to the present world. It must be adjusted where necessary so as not to become an exclusive club or a society where some are more equal than others, or the good principle to be put on the front of institutions but impossible to implement. Democracy without change, slips towards extremism or

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[46] Cas Mudde, "Why copying the populist right isn't going to save the left", *The Guardian*, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/14/why-copying-the-populist-right-isnt-going-to-save-the-left, accessed on 6 October 2020; Christine Coester, "Europe's Left Turns Right on Immigration", *Handelsblatt Today*, 2018, https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/opinion/rise-of-the-right-europes-left-turns-right-on-immigration/23582516.html, accessed on 6 October 2020

[47] Brian Fung, "The British are frantically Googling what the E.U. is, hours after voting to leave it", *Washington Post*, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/24/the-british-are-frantically-googling-what-the-eu-is-hours-after-voting-to-leave-it/, accessed on 6 October 2020

becomes only a dictatorship of the majority. Democracy is not only about referendums, but also about principles such as the rule of law and the protection of minority groups, without which we would be in a totalitarian society.

Populism is the mirror of democracy, in the sense that it helps the society to see its defects and shortcomings. Prosperity exists, but the poverty has increased, freedom of movement exists, but it needs an explanation of the integration process, as well as a process of integrating for the new arrivals without affecting their culture, but above all, to feel part of the new house. Politicians must be made aware of the changes of the future, if today some people are taking jobs from other countries because they do a job that the natives do not want to do in context where the first are often poorly paid,[48] what will do in the context of digitalization and robotization of work,, let alone when many jobs in the construction of machinery and services will disappear by introducing electrical machines.[49] For now, populism sleeps but will return when the nowadays crisis will stop.

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[48] Jeanette Seiffert, "Study: Eastern Europeans underpaid in Germany", *Deutsche Welle*, 2014 https://www.dw.com/en/study-eastern-europeans-underpaid-in-germany/a-17431961, accessed on 6 October 2020.

[49] Jeff McMahon, "More Electric Cars Mean Fewer Mechanical Jobs", *Forbes*, 2019 https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/05/30/more-electric-cars-fewer-manufacturing-jobs/#29e7b0613378 accessed on 6 October 2020

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IDENTITY-BUILDING IN KAZAKHSTAN

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Abstract

As a young nation that came into existence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan undergoes a gradual transformation within its demographics. The issue of national identity within what was once an important and well-integrated part of the USSR continues to draw the involvement of its administrative apparatus that has to find the equilibrium between, on one hand, maintaining national integrity through various mechanisms and, on the other, managing the level of external and internal factors that may lead to the fate of its fellow Central-Asian republics.

Keywords: nationalism, populism, Central Asia, statehood, post-Soviet identity

Introduction

The question of Kazakhstan's core identity arose at the end of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union collapsing and a number of newly-independent states appearing in Central Asia. The Republic of Kazakhstan, inheriting a wide array of special traits and issues from its former soviet

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administration, found itself in need of policies that may steer it in a stable direction, a challenge for a young state with a massive surface and a small, heterogeneous population.

Kazakhstan had to devise ways on which it could establish itself as a stable statehood in the immediate years after gaining its independence, and on how to play "the long game" in assuring its economic and political viability and territorial integrity.

The issue of group identity in Kazakhstan has been, however, a troubling one, not only due to the heterogeneity of the ethno-linguistic horizons, but also due to the economic differences between an industrialized North and a rural, traditionalist South. Moreover, an administrative solution to this issue had to be taken under the auspices of an ever-evolving oil and gas market, to which Kazakhstan is inextricably linked.

In order to understand Kazakhstan's statehood and identity issues, one must first understand the traditional means of nation-building and to decide on whether or not the conventional models apply to it. Moreover, once the compatibility of models is established, we can determine the reasons that stand behind the similarities and the differences, eventually comprehending its evolutional pattern.

Given the fact that we analyse the topic of nation-building and group identity, it is worth reviewing the manifestation of nationalism in Kazakhstani society, determine the dimension of social friction and which role does the political element play in the evolution of this phenomenon.

An overview of traditional nation-building and identity groups

Nationalism and populism are flexible concepts that can manifest themselves differently, in accordance with the environment in which such phenomena appear. Oftentimes, they go hand-in-hand, particularly in the case of societies in which political stability may have certain degrees of volatility. They do not characterize a specific type of society, as the phenomena can manifest themselves in a multitude of environments, under the influence of a large array of factors. Within territories that have gained independence or have underwent regime changes, but face economic hardship and potential political instability, these phenomena are often encountered, and just as often exploited for one purpose or another.

Nationalism and populism are enabled by the manifestation of group identity.[1] Both concepts reflect the existence of an acknowledged conflict and the need of assuring an identity-oriented positive outcome can come out of it. Group identity's primary goal is that of surviving, with nationalistic societies being keen on securing their survival with a minimized disposition for compromise. Conservative in their nature and their purpose, nationalistic societies tend to display more orthodoxy to their cause, leaving little room for interpretation, least they might see the framework of their social construct bend and break.[2] Populism, just as the name implies, requires the participation of a larger portion of society, "the people"[3], in the political process, but does so outside the regulation imposed by political mechanisms, or those of statehood. Populism is often an agitative tactic of drawing an increased number of participants in the unfolding of a conflict, and can be employed for its capacity of stimulating nationalism.[4]

This reality can be easily explained through the analysis of basic human psychology, as society itself is a manifestation of the collective human psyche: we are social beings, exhibiting group mentalities which, in order to function, require specific behaviours. Affiliation, as part of human behaviour, is structural, and ranges from family ties, to greater group associations through a variety of means (language, culture, shared natural environment, mutual interests etc.). Thus, one of the first social traits we inherit is group affiliation, which can either expand or contract in accordance with events that transpire throughout our natural lives. And, just as the notion of affiliation is structural, so is that of society, as the direct result of the former. Social evolution, an aspect that today we are able stratify, represents the timeline of human development, ranging from the early forms of association as the hunter-gatherer pack, up to the current forms of association into supranational political entities that tend to dominate the socio-economic landscape, starting with the 20th century. All these aspects,

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[1] Sergiu Mișcoiu, "De la populism la neopopulism? Câteva repere empirice pentru o delimitare conceptuală", in Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mișcoiu, Sorina Soare (eds.), *Populismul contemporan*: Iași: Institutul European, 2012, p. 28

[2] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 360

[3] Chantal Delsol, "Idiotul comun al populismului" in Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mișcoiu, Sorina Soare (eds.), *op. cit*, pp. 55-56

[4] *Ibidem*, pp. 147-149

ranging from the basic biological traits and going to the more complex social behaviours that enabled us to form cultures based on language, traditions, customs and interpretation of our existence, are fragments that, summed-up, construct our group identity.

Thus, we could state that, by putting socio-political entities under the magnifying glass, we can determine the catalyst that lead to the formation of their group identity, how it evolved and how it might continue to evolve. Group identity, as the fundamental binder of a society, took multiple forms throughout recorded human history, being essentially based on the relation between our need for natural resources and our capabilities of attaining them. Therefore, one could interpret that the root of societal evolution and conflict is, in a way, group identity itself. As the reality that rests behind every *casus beli* is the necessity of assuring the survival of one society or another, and, by association, of group identity, the sense of belonging has taken multiple forms, as the human population grew, evolved technologically and devised new ways of conducting its administrative affairs.[5] Out of the forms of association that became pillars of group identity, we will mention those that became milestones in our understanding of the concept, such as kinship (association based on area of origin and familial ties),[6] confession (association based on one's religious confession, that transcended kinship), nationality (determined by common languages, shared history and living space) and allegiance (vassal-like allegiance, transcending kinship, confession, and nationality).[7]

In our current times, we can observe that kinship and confession continue to maintain a certain amount influence, albeit on a significantly smaller scale when compared to the influence they've held in the past. At the same time, it is important to understand that, while we all share a common living space given the circumstances of the gradual and lengthy globalization process, from a regional point of view societies have not recorded their progress in a symmetric manner, a reason for which even today we can clearly talk about different levels of social development. The

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[5] David A. Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 10 - 15

[6] Pierre L. Van de Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, Wesport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1987, pp. 15-22

[7] *Ibidem*, pp. 27-28

traditional allegiance-based group identity has been rendered obsolete once hegemonic relations transformed in the wake of the rise of nation-states, with expansive empires collapsing under internal and external pressure. Indeed, we can interpret federative systems such as the USA or supranational bodies such as the EU as allegiance-based identity groups, as their constituents, while of diverse individual backgrounds, share sufficient common traits and objectives to acknowledge and accept various degrees of centralization and authority. Yet, as opposed to the traditional allegiance-born group identity, its modern counterpart is not reliant on responsibilities taken upon by means of spoken word (fealty), but rather by a clearly-defined array of rights and responsibilities, embodied in a legally-binding contract. Ultimately, it is still the concept of nation-state that continues to characterize most of the inhabited world and shape the general state of affairs.

Interaction between different identity groups resulted in a relation dictated by dominance and absorption. Political realism considers that the first and foremost objective of an identity group is that of maintaining its existence – in other words, to survive. This necessity prompts dominating identity groups to exert influence over those with which contact leads to conflict, whose complexity increases proportionally to the complexity of the involved social groups (mainly dictated by societal needs and technological capabilities). Conflict, either dictated by rules or devoid of them, generates various degrees of entropy throughout the social environment, a condition that cannot perpetuate by itself. Therefore, the rational outcome of conflict is the formation of order, which upon completion marks the assertion of hegemonic influence. In itself, the extension of a hegemonic force induces a process of social evolution, which can take effect over the political, economic and social life on an identity group. As a rule, hegemons will seek transformation within dominated entities for the sake of administrative efficiency and control over potential risk factors. There is no universal model over how the relation between a hegemon and a dominated identity group transpires, as oftentimes throughout history we have observed how hegemonic powers have managed to bring areas into submission, only to find itself gradually absorbed due to a lack of cultural or linguistic dominance. A good example of the before-mentioned situation can be observed during the

migration of the nomadic Turks (Pechenegs, Cumans, Seljuks etc.) or during the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire.[8]

Post-imperial forms of hegemony, however, tend to be characterized by a much more effective approach to territorial domination, as it employs the use of increasingly efficient means of conducting social engineering. This is, to a large extent, owed to the changes that occurred in societal structure throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, changes which have crippled the administrative capabilities of the traditional empires and lead to their eventual collapse.

The modern notion of the nation-state had been gradually built initially throughout Europe, as traditional social binders began to erode and social clustering suffered transformations brought about by technological and administrative progress.[9] Ethnicity and common cultural values remained at the core of the rise of nationalism throughout Europe, but so did the valid need for different methods of centralization and standardization, particularly so in areas where populations have been traditionally structured in multi-ethnic horizons.[10]

The Peace of Westphalia marked one of the most important steps in the evolution of what we regard today as group identity, having managed to underline the importance of balance of power between the empires of Europe and the sectarian violence that characterized the troubling events of the 30 Years War (1618 – 1648). The decline of confession-based allegiance within western Christianity reshaped the way in which territoriality and group identity functioned, leading to an evolution and an increased concentration in matters of social cohesion. The trials and tribulations that nation-states faced in the face of social progress gradually shaped the manner in which the nation-state maintained viable forms of existence. The two world wars heralded the fall of the conventional hegemony and imperialistic methods of the Old World, with colonialism coming to a more or less abrupt end. This wasn't, per se, the sole manifestation of independent

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[8] Rene Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central* Asia, (N. Walford, Trans.), New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970, pp. 321-323.

[9] Sergiu Mișcoiu, *Formarea Națiunii în Europa: O teorie socio-constructivistă*, Cluj-Napocoa: EFES, 2006, p. 26

[10] Alexander Wendt, *op. cit,* p. 210

statehood at the core of the decolonizing struggle, but a collection of factors that gradually lead to the way in which today's nations present themselves.[11]

The dramatic societal changes experienced throughout what is generally known as the Western World can be interpreted as a result of its technological progress, gaining the upper hand in overall development when compared to the other regions of the globe.[12] The newly-founded balance of power enabled the major European actors to enable more proper levels of centralization, with conflict being mostly limited to their peripheral territories. Centralization increased the overall effectiveness of administration, which gave central authorities the tools of conducting social engineering and standardization throughout their areas of jurisdiction.[13]

Moreover, as education became a basic human right, it hastened the process of social cohesion, creating environments in which theoretical notions could materialize. Education, as a tool of social engineering, has the benefit of shaping local mentalities, its stand-alone purpose being that o broadening the knowledge and the skills of its beneficiaries, with one of its long term effects being that of increasing social cohesion through standardization, even in matters of linguistics. Prior to the implementation of compulsory education in multicultural societies, a *lingua franca* was generally adopted by the broader society by means of spoken word and direct social interaction, but it had the downside of being a generally lengthy and uneven process. Education, however, became an important social binder as it was made compulsory and basic human right, having the ability of overcoming societal barriers and boosting interaction between communities.[14]

As previously-stated, decolonization was, at its core, the struggle to overthrow the hegemonic power that certain political entities held over foreign territories, imposing their rule over fundamentally-different identity groups and funnelling important resources into their own economies. Decolonization, at the same time, was the result of a major disturbance in the balance of power that conventional hegemons have held, with the destructive potential of the 20th century's warfare far exceeding the capabilities

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[11] Henry Kissinger, *Ordinea Mondială*, București: RAO, 2015, pp. 27-35

[12] Sergiu Mișcoiu, *op. cit*, p. 58

[13] Alexander Wendt, *op. cit*, pp. 8-10

[14] *Ibidem*, pp. 209-210

of social sustenance. World War I represented the first large conflict in which the evolution of armaments rendered conventional fighting obsolete, the results of which were disastrous. Moreover, it underlined the inability of the traditional westphalian-styled sovereignty to maintain the balance of power between industrialized nations, particularly so in Europe. Lastly, decolonization was a direct manifestation of the large-scale evolution of group identity.

Populism, a phenomenon that became increasingly common in industrialized societies, focused on the general state of inequality that capitalistic practices have rendered within communities. Inequality, however, was not a novelty in human society, as it represented one of the main moving forces behind the formation of nation-states. Yet as traditional power waned and as an array of social binders became obsolete, the issue of group identity was subjected to reformation under different lines. While linguistic arguments and historic investigation continued to strengthen the base of national identity, it could not be estranged form the economic challenges that industrialized societies have experienced. As traditional social binders degraded, the reformation of identity was carried largely on ideological lines, albeit initially in localized, concentrated environments. In itself, *ideology* is defined as a system of ideas and ideals with influence over the economic and political spheres. *Encyclopedia Britannica* describes ideology as a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it.[15] Industrialization brought with it a population boom, increasing productivity and agricultural output and clustering what continued to be a more or less scattered population. The availability of industrial jobs created a working class which, due to the lack of regulation in matters of living and working standards, faced appalling life standards. The ideologies put into theory in the 19th century proposed potential solutions to the problems that industrialized societies were facing, each with its unique touches that were to adapt them to the specific needs of a specific area. Spread initially in higher society through the academic circles of the time, the idea of forming a society based on ideological allegiances became increasingly popular. Left-leaning ideologies favoured the elimination of traditional ways of asserting identity, instead uniting the

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[15] see Maurice Cranston, "Ideology", as defined in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* at https://www.britannica.com/

working class under the banner of socialism, especially relevant in an era in which the importance of social protection and of social services was often disregarded by those in power. At the opposite spectrum, right-leaning ideologies favoured identity politics, engulfing traditional social binders (religion, language, ethnicity) and implementing them in national policy. Populism played an essential role in the popularization and propagation of political ideologies, offering the great mass of people the option of causing bottom-up changes in societies in which the leadership failed to address and solve certain issues.

Left-leaning and right-leaning ideologies have sprouted long before the outbreak of World War I, a process to which a large array of works and personalities from different backgrounds and different lines of thinking have contributed. The events of the war, however, allowed ideologies to gain ground, underlining the obsolete nature of antiquated administration and ways of balancing power.[16] World War I did not solve the issue of power balance, as the collapse of already-established European empires gave rise to a number of states, often with conflicting interests. National interest, in most cases, proved detrimental to maintaining a viable form of peace between nation-states to which the viability of their own statehood took priority. At the same time, within the losing end of the conflicting camps of World War I, irredentism took root, creating a volatile environment in which the aggressiveness of both the winners, as well as the defeated, began to smoulder.

Embodied in the events of World War II, these smouldering issues have violently manifested themselves, rendering efforts of maintaining the status-quo through legal conventions effectively-useless. The inflicted devastation, loss of human life and the eventual liberation and occupation of what were once nations at war represented a decisive blow to identity politics throughout much of the world, with fascist ideologies plummeting in popularity, facing criminalization and their promoters - persecution.

Ideologically-motivated group identity, however, did not fade in intensity or popularity in the post-war world. The political bipolarization of the world that followed the conclusion of World War II was a continuation of conflicting territorial and economic interests fought on the grounds of

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[16] David A. Welch, *op. cit*, pp. 96-97

ideology, with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and the United States of America engaged in a struggle for dominance in which would be coined the Cold War (1947-1991). Marking a major transition of power, the Cold War signalled an accelerated change in hegemonic influence. Both the USA, as well as Russia (embodied in the form of the USSR), have not distinguished themselves as traditional global hegemonic powers, in spite of their economic, social and military potential manifested throughout history. The end of World War II, however, brought about the erosion of traditional Western-European hegemony (The United Kingdom, France), and the rise of the American and Russian spheres of influence.[17] The Cold War strengthened the notion of identity created along ideological lines, a notion that, to this day, continues to define much of the developed world and is believed to maintain its relevance, at least for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the struggle between the liberal West and the socialist East has managed to create broad stability through the military potential of symmetrical aggression, with both sides being locked into an uneasy stalemate due to the risk of mutually-assured destruction (abbreviated M.A.D.) through the employment of nuclear arsenals.[18]

Based on this brief overview of how group identity evolved throughout ages in the European and western sphere, we will conduct the analysis of Kazakhstan's evolution in matters of identity and politics, influenced by both internal, as well as external factors.

Kazakhstan's classic culture and identity and their formation

What we know today as the Republic of Kazakhstan is the political entity that occupies a large part of a geographical area known as the Western Steppe. In itself, the Western Steppe is part of the Eurasian Steppe biome, which expands over a large swath of land that ranges from the Danubian lowlands in the West, and stretches in the East, to the historical province of Manchuria. Given the historical connection of the nomadic Kazakh people to the natural environment, the Western Steppe also goes under the name of the Kazakh Steppe.

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[17] Daniel Biro, *Relațiile Internaționale Contemporane*, Iași: Polirom, 2013, p. 20
[18] David A. Welch, *op. cit*, pp. 33-34

Generally-speaking, the steppe environment is rather poor in biodiversity, being deprived, for most of the year, of the necessary quantities of water. Moreover, being geographically located deep within continental surfaces, steppes experience a large degree of thermal discomfort, with temperature differences between summer and winter being one of the defining traits of its excessive continental climate. Throughout the territory of Kazakhstan, the steppe is either bordered or interrupted by cold deserts, particularly in the South and in the East, with the North exhibiting more a lusher climate. Summed-up, the natural environmental conditions are rather inhospitable, and the patterns of cultural evolution throughout this region of the world prove how a lack of essential natural resources can slow down social development.

The steppe, however, in spite of its harsh nature, was never devoid of life, and adapting to a life on the great plains of Eurasia has led to the formation of some of the more unique cultures of the world. Most cultures have established themselves and thrived in conjunction with the practice of agriculture, raising crops and livestock and developing increasingly effective methods of improving social sustenance by manipulating and repurposing natural resources. This also caused visible cultural changes amidst traditionally-agricultural societies, a large role being played by early industrialization and the equilibrium of power between competing imperial structures.

Steppe-inhabiting cultures had been economically-reliant on the process of pastoral nomadism, with the main source of sustenance and livelihood being the semi-interfering exploitation of animal herds, out of which the reliance on horses gave a distinguishing character to these cultural groups. Steppe-inhabiting cultures saw the early domestication of the horse, which in turn granted nomadic tribes a high level of mobility that allowed them to instil control over large areas of grassland that was to be employed for animal grazing. Their reliance on horses has also shaped Central-Asian nomads into a respected and feared armed force, famed for its ability of conducting swift military maneuvers on the battlefield, their reputation being passed through generations and remaining alive in the collective psyche of their former adversaries. But, while their combat prowess had been recognized and respected, the human development within nomadic groups has always been rather lacklustre, given the critical

lack of resources and their frequent infighting over control of the land. Another major aspect that strained development throughout Central Asia was the lack of urbanism and of social cohesion, with permanent settlements being reduced to areas in which microclimatic factors have allowed the establishment of agriculture by means of irrigation, which allowed them to host a sufficiently-large manpower that might repel the raids of the roving nomadic clans.

Nomadic culture is a culture of continuity, its essential economic practices remaining unchanged for a much longer period of time, when compared to their agricultural correspondents. The Turkic migration into Central Asia, a phenomenon that continues to be subjected to heavy debate, commenced sometime around the 5th century, at least by most accounts. A heterogeneous group, the Turkic tribes moved from the Siberian regions of what today is the Russian Federation, following a southern migration pathway, gradually occupying land once dominated by Iranian nomadic populations (Scythians, Sakas), triggering significant in the ethno-linguistic horizons of the region. Culture, however, remained dictated by the predominant economic activity (pastoral nomadism), with Turkic settlers causing little change in the way society provided its livelihood. A major limitation to development was imposed by the lack of domestically-generated technological evolution, Central-Asian societies never experiencing a self-generated phenomenon of industrialization and rarely being able to form a sustainable balance of power between their polities. Identity among the nomadic clans maintained its more primal aspects, with social organization relying heavily on familial ties between the various clans. Social stability often relied on the ability of the leader (known as *khan*) to negotiate and to devise peaceful ways in which its subordinated clans could effectively separate grassland, so as to avoid confrontation and over-competitiveness. Strategic domination over the land was assured by uniting under loose confederations, under the higher authority of a *khagan/gurkhan* (a Great-Khan).[19] For this reason, the general identity of the Turkic tribes of Eurasia was limited, much like in Antiquity, to the nomenclature employed by their neighbouring cultures to describe them.

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[19] Ahmad-Hassan Dani, Vadim Mikhailovich Masson, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia (vol. V) – Development in Contrast: from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century*, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2003, pp. 91-92

Internally, the looseness of social cohesion and the lack of proper channels of centralization prompted the inhabitants of the steppes to disregard social binders, such as linguistics or cultural similarities, and favour localized allegiances based on blood ties and fealty to local warlords. As it was typical for clannish societies, the social fabric, that in its entirety forms a broad group identity, prioritized the survival of its smallest units (the clans themselves), given the material limitations they've faced. Stability was more characteristic to the southern portion of Central Asia, where, due to its greater economic potential, proximity to the lucrative Silk Road and influence of the much more centralized Persian Empire, sedentary societies could be established and could thrive (such as in the case of the city-states of the Fergana Valley). An exception to the rule came in the form of the Mongol Empire, where the Mongol hegemony and its enforcement of an early form of rule of law brought temporary stability within the occupied regions, only for it to collapse and resume its traditional form in the aftermath of its ensuing civil war and fragmentation.

Group identity build on the framework of religious confession had found disproportionate success throughout Central Asia, having a greater impact in its southern half where central administration was much more commonplace and was already accustomed to institutionalized religion and religious organization. Within northern half of Central Asia, in which nomadism dominated, Islam was gradually adopted, but did not have its dogma properly implemented given the lack of centralization and the uncertainty of jurisdiction over land that seemed to fall under frequent territorial claims. Thus, while Islam may have added to the cause of identity-building in the Western Steppe, it did not reach the point where a code of rules based on Sharia-law could be established, and much of its dogma was eventually amalgamated with the ancestral folk religion (which had been previously amalgamated with Zoroastrian beliefs).[20]

To conclude our analysis over the factors that have prevented nation-building in the Kazakh Steppe, we will enumerate:

- Prioritization of the survival of the clan vs. the survival of the larger identity group. Given the limited access to resources, claims over territory could not be prevented by the establishment of a long-

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[20] *Ibidem*, p. 108

lasting *de jure* administration. Without proper technological advancement and enforcement of a common law, the land would continue to be disputed in localized conflicts;

- The lack of institutionalized religion prevented the formation of a strong confession-based social binder, maintaining the heterogeneous character of the Turkic clans in the northern part of Central Asia;
- Scarce essential resources prevented the formation of fully-fledged permanent settlements, which would enact as hubs of progress and advancement, promote trade and act as administrative seats that would enforce law over its areas of jurisdiction;
- The absence of any consecrated means of social engineering (institutionalized religion, rule of law, education, and centralized rule) prevented peaceful ways of establishing a stable reign over the land. Turkic clans often found themselves at odds with Mongolian-speaking Oirat tribes, a situation that would only be solved through Russian intervention in the affairs of Central Asia.

Absorbed by Russia

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the independent Republic of Kazakhstan emerged, its territory making it the 9th largest state on the surface of the terrestrial globe. While the history and the culture of the Kazakh people carried incontestable weight in the issue of group identity, Kazakhstan inherited a series of traits from its former Soviet administration that raised fears in regards to the legitimacy of Kazakh statehood, as technically, nowhere else in history did Kazakhstan exist as a sovereign nation. Moreover, Kazakhstan's interaction with its northern neighbour did not raise deep concerns over potential interethnic tension following the period of destalinization, with identity-based conflicts being sparse and never gaining sufficient tension so as to degenerate into truly aggravated problems (such as it did in the Caucasus).[21]

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[21] Alexander J. Motyl *et. al*, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts (VOL II)*, London: Academic Press, 2001, p. 80

The population of the Western Steppe has had a long history of friction with the Eastern Slavs, with a long period of Turko-Mongolic hegemony over the Russian and Ukrainian homelands during the time which is remembered as the Tatar-Mongol Yolk (1237-1480). Following the overthrow of Mongol hegemony over the Russian principalities and their unification under the Russian Tsardom, Russia commenced its expansion east of the Ural Mountains, conquering the Khanates of Kazan and of Astrakhan and reaching the borders of the Kazakh Khanate by the 17th century. With relations already soured by the sporadic Kazakh slave-raids conducted in Russian territory, the three Kazakh traditional hordes (the three *zhuz*: Lesser, Middle and Great) have fallen to Russian occupation, with the Great Horde losing its independence in 1820. Russia took deep interest in the agricultural potential of these territories, commencing a process of colonization and carrying significant efforts of settling the nomadic native population. By bringing an end to widespread nomadism, the traditional identity of the Kazakh people suffered radical changes. By having its defining trait disrupted, Central Asian nomadic culture was eventually engulfed in the newly built cultural melting pot, with a significant number of Kazakhs gradually adopting the ways of the colonists and becoming part of Russia's citizenry. The end of nomadism, however, caused famine and discontent among a large portion of the native population, before tensions erupted into turmoil and loss of life at the precipice of World War I. The short-lived Alash Autonomy (1917-1920) represented a brief attempt at gaining independence from Russia and initiating a domestically-generated process of nation-building, but would eventually be supressed by Bolshevik forces and reincorporated into Russian administration.[22]

Soviet authority over the Kazakh Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (KASSR) caused dramatic changes over the land, with the process of colonization continuing, while agricultural collectivization and seizure of graze land caused severe famine and loss of life. At this point, a portion of the population took to fleeing beyond the borders or into more remote areas of Central Asia, with some settling in the mountainous regions of southern Central Asia while others crossed the border to Mongolia and

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[22] Chahryar Adle, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia (Vol. VI): Towards the Contemporary Period*: Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2005, pp. 250-255

China. Under Stalin, the Kazakh Steppe became one of the main destinations for deportees, with entire ethnic populations being moved into labour camps or forced to settle into depopulated regions of the KASSR or of other republics of Central Asia. It is estimated that, prior to World War II, an approximate 1 million Kazakh and Kyrgyz perished as result of early Soviet reforms. The situation would only worsen in the aftermath of World War II, as many deportees and prisoners of war were sentenced to forced labour in the infamous Soviet Gulag system. The settlement of non-native population, combined with the availability of a large pool of labourers saw a period of urban development throughout the resource-rich areas of the KASSR. The republic developed its extraction sector, providing hydrocarbon fuels, uranium and rare earths to the Soviet economy.[23]

Following the death of Stalin, the process of destalinization returned many of the deportees to their original homeland, but did not hinder the multi-ethnic character that the KASSR gained under Soviet administration. At the same time, Kazakhstan's disproportionate development became evident when comparing its northern to its southern half, with a heavily industrialized and urbanized north and a rural, underdeveloped south, save for its capital and largest city of Alma-Ata. Northern Kazakhstan, by being the recipient of the greatest part of the migratory influx, played an increased role in the economy of the Soviet Union. This would only increase under Khrushchev, with even more non-natives settling in the northern areas as part of the Virgin Land Campaign to exploit Kazakhstan's agricultural potential. Compulsory education and its requirement in places of employment made Russian the dominant language, even amongst the natives of the land, many Kazakhs being slowly absorbed into the technocratic working class. Moreover, as education became a basic human right, it hastened the process of social cohesion, creating environments in which theoretical notions could materialize. Education, as a tool of social engineering, has the benefit of shaping local mentalities, its stand-alone purpose being that o broadening the knowledge and the skills of its beneficiaries, with one of its long term effects being that of increasing social cohesion through standardization, even in matters of linguistics. Prior to the implementation of compulsory

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[23] Yelena Petrenko, Elena Vechkinzova, Viktor Antonov, *Transition from the industrial clusters to the smart specialization: a case study*, Lyon: HAL Archives-ouvertes, 2019, pp. 118-120

education in multicultural societies, a *lingua franca* was generally adopted by the broader society by means of spoken word and direct social interaction, but it had the downside of being a generally lengthy and uneven process. Education, however, became an important social binder as it was made compulsory and basic human right, having the ability of overcoming societal barriers and boosting interaction between communities. Thus, if at the beginning of the 20th century, Kazakhs still maintained most aspects of their traditional lifestyle, the new generation, born under the Soviet administration, would retain few distinguishable traits from the general identity created under Moscow's authority.

The southern region, however, had been disregarded given its weaker economic potential, being the target of little investment and never experiencing the social pressure to which the north had been subjected. The lower living standards of the south put it in stark contrast to the northern half, most of its inhabitants living in rural environments and practicing agriculture as their main source of livelihood. Naturally, such communities tended to maintain a much more conservative attitude, Kazakh being widely spoken, as opposed to Russian, religion continuing to play an important role in the behaviour of the community and, given the nature of their economic activity and of the role played by traditional beliefs and societal pressure, families being more numerous.

The final years of the Soviet administration did not spare the KASSR from the general economic strains experienced throughout the USSR. In 1986, First Secretary of the KASSR, Dinmukhamed Kunayev was ousted from his position of power, being succeeded by Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian from outside the KASSR. This triggered the first ethnic tension within Kazakhstan under the Soviet administration in the events known as the Jeltoqsan Riots. What started as outrage over the decision of Moscow soon became a general protest over the poor economic conditions that the population faced in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, events that ended up in tragedy, with around 200 protesters killed and many injured. These events, however, allowed Nursultan Nazarbayev to come to power in 1989, first as leader of the local Communist Party, and eventually as President, his election occurring on the 24th of April 1990.

Under Nazarbayev's administration

Nazarbayev spent most of his political career climbing the hierarchical ladder within the structure of the Communist Party of the KASSR, being deeply acquainted with the mechanisms of power. Born in southern Kazakhstan to a poor family, he had proven to be ambitious from an early age, learning Russian and spending his early adulthood in Central Kazakhstan, working in metallurgy. He joined the Komsomol in 1962, and soon after found employment within the Communist Party. By the early `70s, he was one of the main figures of the Communist Party in the Karaganda region, KASSR`s most industrialized area. Having a good relation with then-leader Kunayev, Nursultan Nazarbayev becomes Prime Minister of the republic in 1984, falling out of Kunvayev`s grace soon after, with a conflict sparking between the two. His voice carried much weight in the ousting of Kunayev.

In 1990, Kazakhstan declares its sovereignty, attaining independence on the 16th of December, 1991. Prior to its declaration of independence, however, Kazakhstan, under the rule of Nursultan Nazarbayev, used its position as a possible precursor to the Soviet Union as leverage in its negotiations with what was soon to become the Russian Federation, a key objective being that of limiting a potential control of Moscow over the rich natural resources of the territory. At the same time, the issue of national identity within Kazakhstan, especially in the northern half, posed a risk of separatism, Nazarbayev fearing that the borders of independent Kazakhstan would not coincide with those of the KASSR. Thus, as negotiations concluded, Kazakhstan would be the last Soviet republic to declare its independence, marking the incontestable dissolution of the USSR.[24]

The question of group identity in Kazakhstan remained an issue for Kazakhstan's new administration. A conclusion that we could draw from our previous statements is that, in spite of the obvious differences between the natives and the "newcomers", the Kazakh people integrated in the grand Soviet project with a rather high level of success, the country exhibiting obvious signs of Russification. The northern areas, in particular, tended to be numerically-dominated by Slavs, with high concentrations of

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[24] Alexander J. Motyl, *op. cit*, pp. 364-365

Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians found in the Karaganda, Pavlodar and Semipalatinsk regions, as well as in more localized settings all throughout the North, North-West and North-East. The authorities deemed it necessary to balance the issue of ethnicity in a sensible manner, so as to avoid criticism by Russia or by any other political entity that might feel threatened by such actions.

Nazarbayev`s political survival, however, required of him to quickly strengthen his position in the state. The early `90s represented a period of instability throughout the former Soviet Union, but also one of newly-found freedom. Glasnost accustomed the population with higher levels of freedom of speech and a more lively interest in the political process. As a result, various elements of private media emerged, with most of them being critical of Nazarbayev's presidency. Moreover, as Kazakhstan`s constitution allowed political pluralism (as stipulated in the 1993 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan), Nazarbayev found himself tasked with directing a flawed state in which ethnic tensions could lead to separatism, while simultaneously having to devise ways in which he could overcome political opposition. As a result, Narazbayev's early presidency was marked by populism, a fact made evident by his frequent attacks over the forms of political opposition. By analysing Nazarbayev's populist behaviour from the perspective of Hawkins` concepts, it is clear that he aimed at bipolarizing the political arena, creating a binary dimension to political conflicts. His discourse painted the opposition as decrepit remnants of a former age, that in spite of he himself hailing from the same political environment prior to 1990. At the same time, he made certain to present his envisioned ways as the only option for any improvement, as a gateway to democracy and to the long-coveted high living standards that the voters were expecting. This trend saw the transformation of Nazarbayev into a patriotic nationalist, a move that gained favour with a large number of voters. As a result, he was re-elected as President of Kazakhstan in December 1991, with 98,7% of the votes, with participation being that of 80%.

The Constitution of 1993 allowed political pluralism, relatively independent juridical bodies, private media, NGOs, protected freedom of speech, of opposition and of criticism. While these rights painted Kazakhstan as a society on its path to a more liberal political and social environment, its results grew up to be a thorn in the side of Nazarbayev and of his political

allies, the president spending the better part of the `90s laying siege to any significant form of opposition. 1995 saw Kazakhstan hosting two referendums, both of which passed:

- The referendum of April 1995, which prolonged Nazarbayev's term to 2000, being justified by a need of economic development and of carefully-devised strategies;
- The referendum of August 1995, which modified the constitution and made Kazakhstan a presidential republic.

Nazarbayev thus gained the power of dissolving the parliament (including for failure to appoint the presidentially-nominated PM), limited the presidency to two terms of 7 years each (reduced to 5 years in 2015), limited the age-limiting threshold for the presidential candidates to 65 and imposed a perfect command of the state language for any potential candidate's eligibility. He would go to win the presidential elections of 1999 (81% of total votes, 87% participation), 2005 (91% of total votes, 76,8% participation), 2011 (95,5% of total votes, 90% participation) and 2015 (97,7% of total votes, 95% participation).[25] He would resign from his position as president on March 19th 2019,[26] allegedly out of health concerns, and would be succeeded by hand-picked Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a career politician that occupied various high posts (Deputy PM and Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretary, Chair of the Senate of Kazakhstan).

With his position of power secured, Nazarbayev spent the following years attacking the right to freedom of speech and the independent media, with its most ardent critical media trusts and newspapers facing constant inspections of the Kazakh Anti-Fraud Department (institution lead by his son-in-law, Rakhat Aliev), and, incidentally, mafia-style attack on property and threats of violence.[27]

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[25] Qishloq Ovozi, "Kazakh 'Rerun': A Brief History Of Kazakhstan's Presidential Elections", *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, March 09, 2015

[26] "Kazakh President Nazarbayev Abruptly Resigns, But Will Retain Key Roles", *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, March 19, 2019

[27] Rokhila Madaminova, "Populist Discourse in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Tajikistan" (Master thesis, Central European Universtity, 2017), pp. 28-30

In 1999, his newly-formed party, Otan (Fatherland), over which he presided as chairman, controlled the political scene with impunity, becoming an important mechanism in the future prospects of the president.

By the early 2000, with opposition going underground, Nazarbayev's presidency was left unchallenged, and gradually began exhibiting an array of dictatorial traits. Populist discourse was no longer commonplace, instead turning to heavy patriotism and optimistic outcomes. Unopposed and not risking of being held accountable by legal means, Nazarbayev's policy towards Kazakhstan gradually started to materialize, having deep effect over internal social dynamics. His addresses to the Kazakhstani people became events of national importance, his discourse underlining the obvious shift towards nationalism and the consolidation of a group identity within the territory of Kazakhstan. Such changes were soon felt in every state-related domain, with a high importance being placed on a gradual shift from Russian language-based education and administration to ones in Kazakh, a shift which many in the northern half saw as detrimental to the quality of education and services provided in state institutions. The media and the political sphere was equally affected, as the shift towards Kazakh language left many feeling alienated in their native country, many of which are actual Kazakh ethnics. Moreover, the issue of territorial stability and ethnic horizons prompted the government to prioritize identity policies, incentivizing the northwards migration of poor, less-educated southerners for the sake of balancing the population ratio and of increasing the prevalence of spoken Kazakh throughout the northern regions, eroding the practice of meritocracy. A good example of identity politics in Kazakh state institutions is the promotion of Kazakh-speaking officials for the sake of them being able to speak Kazakh, not out of pragmatic concepts and interests. In matters of education, young adults hailing from the southern regions of Kazakhstan are being motivated to move to the Northern provinces so as to study in state educational institutions, in spite of their poor academic results - a situation made possible by lowering the educational standards of said institutions.

The fear of losing territory to its northern neighbour had also motivated Kazakhstan's administration to strategically move its capital from the largest city of Almaty to Astana (renamed Nur-Sultan in 2018), a move that

saw much of the country's budget being dumped into contemporary architecture and skyscrapers in what most consider to be a soulless city.

Internationally, Nazarbayev sought to promote the image of Kazakhstan by allocating important funds to the state's soft power potential. The government of Kazakhstan, whose economy is heavily dependent of the extraction and export of oil, gas, coal and uranium continues, to this day, to aggressively promote its main products, a successful strategy given the fact that it is among the top 10 petrol exporters in the world. More recently, however, as petrol prices recorded significant downturns, the state budget find itself at odds with the overall needs of its society, in spite of the fact that it extracts and exports more petrol than ever before. The production and service sectors of Kazakhstan are underdeveloped, with a number of enterprises failing to be privatized post-independence and, as the livelihoods of many depend on drawing a salary from working in such enterprises, they are being sustained by the state budget, creating unnecessary losses to a country that struggles to maintain economic balance. Kazakhstan is actively engaging potential foreign investors, and uses its national identity as a method of marketing, of attracting tourists, investment and as consolidating its position as a state. International recognition has made the object of policy for Nazarbayev as he often sought to mediate international conflicts and host talks over disputes. The precarious position of the nation, wedged between a totalitarian and often ruthless China and a competing, unpredictable Russia, did not allow the international openness that he envisioned, Kazakhstan being one of the most expensive countries to export to or to import from.[28] Nevertheless, efforts have been made to befriend western, liberal democracies by promoting some of the key elements of global liberalism. Nazarbayev portrays himself as one of the most outspoken leaders for the cause of non-proliferation and denuclearization of the world, a subject which continues to affect Kazakhstan's relation to Russia given the Soviet experimentation with nuclear weapons in the Semipalatinsk (Semey) polygon, located today on the territory of Kazakhstan.[29] In order to expand Kazakhstan's soft power, its capital hosted EXPO 2017, event dedicated to, among others, denuclearization. Its fulfilment required

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[28] Khushboo Sheth, "20 Most Expensive Countries To Ship Exports From", *WorldAtlas*, April 25, 2017

[29] Alexander J. Motyl, *op. cit,*

significant budgetary sacrifices, with allegations going as far as to the slashing of retirement pension funds, leaving many of Kazakhstan's retirees with less than $100/month for the duration of the project. Slashes in the wages of state employees were felt equally as much. While these allegations have been sporadically addressed in a more or less cryptic fashion, an official statement was never formulated as to deny, nor confirm the cuts in wages and/or monetary welfare.[30] The economic outcome of the grandiose project was, at most, lacklustre.

The search for international recognition has been, so far, a double-edged sword, the Kazakh government managing to build an oscillating reputation. On one hand, Kazakhstan has been the proponent for the creation of a number of international organizations, with the most eloquent example being spearheading the creation of the Eurasian Tradin Block (The Eurasian Union) with most former soviet republics joining it as members. Moreover, Kazakhstan has joined several organizations built on cultural and economic lines, such as the Turkic Council, underlining the increasing soft power of Turkey and the search for more lucrative exporting hubs outside of Central Asia.[31] On the other hand, this attitude drew criticism for a variety of reasons, Nazarbayev's policy coming under fire from a number of western states and organizations due to Kazakhstan's poor record in human rights and the dictatorial behaviour of the leader. Despite being the most prosperous of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan did not stray too far from the dictatorial model that tends to apply for most former soviet republics, Nazarbayev cultivating a closeted cult of personality in the wake of his victory against internal political opponents and frequent attacks on societal freedoms. Nazarbayev adopted the title of *Elbasy* (Head of the People) and engaged in a campaign of systematic inclusion of personality-related memorabilia and imagery into society, such as renaming main boulevards and infrastructural hubs in his name (avenues, the country's main airport, train stations etc). Multiple institutions bear his name or make reference to it, such as the capital's *Nazarbayev University*, as well as the *Nazarbayev School* chain of private primary and secondary schools established

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[30] "Астана ЭКСПО-2017» опровергла информацию о привлечении средств ЕНПФ" (trans. *Expo-2017 Astana denies information on attracting UAPF funds*), Radio Azattyk (branch of RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty), August 10, 2016

[31] Rokhila Madaminova, *op. cit*, pp. 32-35

throughout the larger cities. Press agencies, as well as the dominant party, adopted *Nur* (meaning *light/brightness* in Kazakh, a loanword from Arabic) as a prefix or as full name, with examples such as Nur-Otan (political party) or Nur.kz (important news outlet). The capital, with much of it being built in accordance to his own preferences, changed its name from Astana to Nur-Sultan in March 2019, in a move that sparked controversy, both internally, as well as abroad, reminding people of the Bolshevik manner in which historically-established toponomastic elements were changed as homage to personalities or ideals of Russia's communists. The capital seeks to impress through the magnanimity of the project, being heavily charged with symbolism and glorifying reminders of the heroic past of Kazakhstan. Some consider Nur-Sultan to be a monument to megalomania, while others see it as Nazarbaye's solution of preventing a possible secession of its northern provinces.[32] Even today, Kazakhstan's main urban landmarks are bearing the "mark" of Nazarbayev's covert cult of personality.

External criticism has received mixed responses on behalf of the Kazakh government, as it tended to avoid the issue when engaging its western peers, yet reacting harshly when confronting its more traditional partners, particularly in the case of Russia. The Kremlin took concern with Nazarbayev's heavy focus on nationalism, signalling an increase in xenophobia and Russophobia within the more conservative Kazakh-speaking communities.[33] At the same time, in spite of the stable economic relation between the two, Russia and Kazakhstan have an on-going dispute over oil-rich areas of the Caspian Sea. The Russian political sphere has not been a stranger to putting Kazakhstan's statehood and claims in question, actions which drew strong responses from Nazarbayev.[34] From a realist's perspective, the sporadic squabbles between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are tied to their natural competition that arose following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. They both draw their main source of income from hydrocarbon reserves, which they extract and export to

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[32] Adrian Blomfield, "Boom time in the city that taste forgot", *The Telegraph*, December 06, 2005

[33] Arslan Sabyrbekov, "Russian and Kazakh Leaders Exchange Worrying Statements", *The Central-Asia and Caucasus Analyst*, September 14, 2014

[34] Anna Dolgov, "Kazakhs Worried After Putin Questions History of Country's Independence", *The Moscow Times*, September 01, 2014

foreign markets. Russia, however, has maintained the upper hand in this competition given Kazakhstan's geographical dependence on its Northern neighbour and on its system of pipelines. Kazakhstan's aims of gaining an increased independence in its trade with the western world have encountered the insurmountable obstacle of geopolitics, rendering it unable of exporting its resources via its southern neighbouring areas given the high level of political instability and the high costs of developing infrastructural projects. A potential solution would rest in the Chinese-lead Belt-and-Road Project which aims at, among other objectives, developing the infrastructure of the southern regions of Central Asia, which may allow Kazakhstan to ease its dependence on Russian pipeline. This however is highly speculative, and the Belt-and-Road initiative has yet to prove its viability. Given the fact that its oil-extracting industry is in its majority located on the Russian border, and the large shares that Russians companies hold in Kazakhstan's petrol market, trade continues and will continue to be done in conjunction with the Russian Federation, and, most likely, on its terms as well.[35]

And, to be fair, such criticism may have fair grounds on which its arguments were founded, as the Kazakh government has been deeply dedicated to the cause of strengthening its soft power. A relatively young nation with a vast history behind it, Kazakhstan displays group mentality, with individuals taking success, as well as shortcomings, as a personal issue. Individuals are actively encouraged to take pride in the achievements attributed to Kazakhstan. As a result, media has been noticed to artificially "Kazakhify" certain aspects of history, exacerbating the role that Turkic – and by association, Kazakh – identity played in the evolution of Kazakhstan. Some of these disservices to history may be forgiven, while others are blatant efforts of promoting an artificially-improved image of Kazakhstan by falsifying or exaggerating elements of local history.[36] A trivial example of this would be the products of Kazakh cinematography, notorious for their nationalistic and identity-related tone. The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, with members of the Nazarbayev

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[35] Dina Zhuzbayeva, *Convenția Mării Caspice* (Master thesis, The University of Bucherest), 2019, pp. 56-58

[36] Brigit Brauer, "Rebranding Kazakhstan by Changing its Name", *The Jamestown Foundation: Global Research & Analysis*, Febryary 15, 2014

family as associates, has been deeply involved in the script and direction of its domestic cinematographic creations, at times being the sole source of funding in such ventures. Internationally these creations failed to gather any worthwhile success, but the fact that this practice continues in spite of their lack of popularity strengthens the argument that Kazakhstan's government is pursuing identity politics and is cultivating nationalism within its ethnically-Kazakh population. The main trait of such creations are the focus on ancestral heroism, the focus on Kazakh as the sole spoken language, the demonization of the Soviet Past, the exacerbation – to the verge of being pathetic – of Kazakhstan's traditional values and spiritual bind to the ancestral land.[37]

Nazarbayev has effectively built a masked totalitarian state, being internationally recognized as a soft dictatorship. He supressed dissent not only by modifying legislation in ways that favour those in power, but also by creating a state-system in which those employed require to be members of the dominant party (Nur-Otan) so as to maintain their positions. Vocal opposition may not lead to brutal repression, at least not if it is conducted outside of organized protests, but can be punished through the loss of your job, rendering society crippled in the face of what is obviously an abuse of power.[38] Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan, a project that continues to this day, is a deeply-flawed system in which the collapse of the oil market may lead to a general domino-effect. The issue of identity in Kazakhstan is dictated by the need of strengthening the legitimacy of the statehood, with Kazakhstan displaying a higher level of openness given its need for investment and diversification of the market.

The Kazakh government may find itself at odds with their creation, as the national identity of Kazakhstan and the desired direction in which it was taken is subjected to external hindrances. Russia, a country with which Kazakhstan has often revisited relations, remains the main soft-power exerting entity active in most aspects of Kazakh society. Despite the efforts

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[37] Rico Isaacs, *Film and Identity in Kazakhstan. Soviet and post-Soviet culture in Central Asia*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2018, pp. 11-19

[38] Susan Ariel Aaronson, *Repression, Civil Conflict and Leadership Tenure: A case study of Kazakhstan*, (research paper, as part of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory under grant W911NF-14-1- 0485), Washington D.C: Institute for International Economic Policy, 2017, pp. 15-19

to strengthen the Kazakh character of the country, Russian media remains largely consumed, particularly so by the younger generation. Moreover, it is regarded as a gate to the coveted western world, and, in itself, a destination to the on-going exodus of ethnic Russians and of what still comprises the technocratic class.[39] At the same time, religious identity can prove problematic and conflicting with the economic aspirations of the nation, the government finding itself compelled to intervene in the religious affairs of those that began exhibiting more radicalized versions of Islam. Religious dogmatism, once common mostly in disgruntled grandparents, is more prevalent nowadays, creating a conflicting environment in which the liberal youth finds itself under criticism and threat by its religiously-fundamentalist counterpart. State-seeded nationalism, combined with misguided religious dogmatism creates a volatile environment in which the more progressive, liberal individuals are labelled *mankurts*[40] by those believing themselves to be displaying the true Kazakh identity. The issue of religious dogmatism and fundamentalism prompted Nazarbayev, in one of his addresses to the people, to underline the fact that ultra-orthodox Islam is becoming a concern in Kazakhstan, and vowed to regulate the more problematic aspects of it.

Conclusion

Kazakhstan`s identity-building process, while peculiar, is a tale of artificial interference with the natural patterns along which group identity is being constructed. It proves that social engineering comes with its risks and its benefits. This analysis does not aim to disprove, belittle or to stain the image that Kazakh culture holds and that it tries to promote. It merely serves as an observation over how nation-building use of identity politics has shaped its social dynamics and administration.

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[39] Chachryar Adle, *op. cit*, pp. 598-599

[40] An element of Turkic mythology later popularized through Chinghiz Aitmatov's literary works. It designates those that lose their identity and become subservient to a master. Used post-independence as a pejorative term aimed against Russified, Russophonic and/or Russophile natives.

Kazakhstan's first and foremost interest in that of maintaining its statehood intact, a process that has yielded promising results given the fact that it has achieved a higher level of stability in a region struck with economic and social difficulties. Its proximity and ties to the Russian Federation and its domestic policy has kept the doors open to investment, shaping islands of fledgling liberalism throughout the country. This liberalism, however, is not the result of a direct process of liberalization and transit towards a western-fashioned democracy, but was rather born out of the economic policies that kept the state tied to foreign markets throughout the world. Kazakhstan needs a liberal image in order to gain goodwill from its peers, but by analysing its internal pressures one might see the cracks in the surface. It is rightfully considered a dictatorship, albeit one of the softest dictatorships encountered throughout the former Soviet Union.

A post-Narazbayev Kazakhstan may yet achieve its original goals of establishing a lasting stability through economic diversification and partial shift to a service-based source of income. However, the foreseeable future continues to present the country as a "gas-station nation" in which the welfare state encounters frequent oscillations due to the heavy dependence on the global oil market.

Regarding its identity-building process, it is clear that its history within the Soviet super state had seen the Kazakh Steppes burning through a number of stages that characterize the evolutional patterns of society, with the local economy being "uplifted" by an external hegemon prior to obtaining its independence. Kazakhstan is not considered a former colony in the same sense as the countries of the 3rd world were. The Soviet Union, despite acting in similar ways to imperialistic political entities, conducted lasting social-engineering processes throughout its territory, achieving a noticeable level of assimilation within its economically-significant zones, an aspect that continues to be visible in the more technocratic elements of society. A combination of soft power and employment-related requirements, the Russian language continues to maintain its importance in Kazakhstan, thus assuring that local identities will not evolve in the direction of complete cultural separation. In our opinion, a larger challenge is that of maintaining social equilibrium and harmony while undergoing the process of assimilation in the northern regions so as to avoid the estrangement of

minorities. At the same time, Kazakhstan needs to address its growing brain-drain, a concerning phenomenon that was born largely out of the feeling of estrangement and lack of opportunities. With more than half a million Russian speakers migrating to the Russian Federation in the '90s and their subsequent replacement with Kazakh speakers, the changing social environment and growing discontent among the youth have prompted those coming from higher income backgrounds or those of higher education to seek opportunities abroad, with the main target destination being the Russian Federation or the countries of the European Union.[41]

Future Kazakh governments might find themselves confronting a situation in which identity-building may backfire under the pressure of uncontained nationalism and its hybridization with a more violent, religiously-fundamentalist undertone that will drive the nation further from its western aspirations, simultaneously compromising social equilibrium between the dominant group and the large number of minorities. The same applies in the case of economic challenges and crippling corruption, which saw crime rates increasing and dwindling trust in the state's institutions and their ability of fixing the growing issues. It is clear that Central-Asia, with Kazakhstan as its "poster-child" will open new noteworthy perspectives with time, once the identity-building process will yield clearer results and outcomes. Its current direction leads to heavy centralization and focus on the dominant group, with Kazakhstan's soft power and international image being basically build around ethnocentric elements. It is early to draw conclusions on whether or not ethnocentrism will remain its centralized core identity policy. However, in its current form, Kazakhstan's social policies have promoted a group and disregarded many others, forming a "forgotten" generation of non-natives that does not feel properly represented, regards the paltry measures of representation as inefficient and feels increasingly compelled to seek a more fulfilling life outside the country's borders.

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[41] Madina Zhalil, "The Urgency of Brain Drain in Kazakhstan, *The Qazaq Times*, 15.11.2017

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TESTING THE SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS MODEL ON THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN ROMANIA

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Abstract

The Treaty of Rome adopted in 1957 included provisions on the elections of the then European Parliamentary Assembly elections, but it took more than two decades for the members of the European Parliament to be directly elected. Immediately after the first direct elections of the European Parliament in 1979, the second-order elections model was conceived in order to understand the new type of supranational but less important elections. The model includes several hypotheses deriving from the idea that in the European elections there is less at stake, so instead of having genuine EU elections, in reality there are now 27 simultaneous national elections. The paper tests the second order elections to see whether its hypotheses are valid in the case of 2019 EU elections in Romania.

Keywords: European Union, European Parliament, elections, Romania, 2019.

The European Parliament elections

After the establishment of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, the Common Assembly of the European Community of Steel and Coal was expanded to cover all three

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communities. The new created assembly had 142 members and met for the first time in 1958 using the name of European Parliamentary Assembly. The European Parliament received its name in 1962 and acted as a body which lacked almost all recognized parliamentary functions. As noticed by Jan Kovar, the assembly was meant to exercise advisory and supervisory powers, according to the EC Treaty, contributing in this way to the limitation of the supra-national democratic deficit of the decision-making process of the European Community.[1]

The Assembly was formed by delegates designated by the National Parliaments of the member states, despite the fact that the Treaty of Rome contained specific provisions on the direct elections of the European Parliament. These provisions steamed from the belief that only with a strong parliament the European Union could claim authority over the Member States.[2] The idea of creating a genuine European Parliament dates back to the federalist movement during the World War II, but as the Treaty of Rome did not provide any timetable for universal suffrage, the elections were postponed due to the emphasis put at that time on economic integration.

The Member States decided that the European Parliament would consist of national MPs convening for a few weeks each year. In 1961, 1963 and 1969 the Assembly wanted to comply with the provisions in the Treaty of Rome regarding the direct elections and asked for proposals for direct elections to be organized in the member states based on a uniform procedure. The Council did not respond to these requests, mainly as it considered that its authority shall be weaken in case the European Parliament would strengthen its legitimacy and powers following direct elections.[3]

At the Summit Conference held in Paris in 1974, European national leaders decided that elections will take place in or after 1978. The members states reached an agreement in 1976, which following ratification by all

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[1] Jan Kovar, *Revisiting the Second-Order Election Model and Its Application to European Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern European Countries*, Prague: Metropolitan University Prague Press, 2016, p. 15.

[2] Yves Meny, *Building Parliament: 50 years of European Parliament History 1958–2008*, Florence: European University Institute, 2009, p. 34.

[3] Desmond Dinan, *Ever closer union: An introduction to European Integration*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 264.

member states entered into force in 1978. The first direct elections for the European Parliament took place on 7 and 10 June 1979.[4] 410 members representing the then nine member states were elected, and the first session of the newly elected assembly took place between 17 and 20 July 1979. The European elections take place every five years, and they aim to reduce the democratic deficit by creating a direct connection between the citizens of the now 27 member states and the decision-making process at the European level. Besides contributing to the creation of a representative democracy at the level of the EU, the European elections were considered to be a good instrument to create a common identity among the people of Europe and create a new balance among the European institutions.

The first European elections were seen as revolutionary and as an instrument to consolidate the European democracy: 185 million voters expressed their votes, representing a 63% of the citizens with right to vote. Due to the direct elections, the "Parliament was able to use its new legitimacy to consolidate its powers and to play its full role in the Community decision-making process, which at that time was, to say the least, opaque".[5]

Since the first European elections, the powers of the European Parliament have expanded considerably, leading optimists to believe that it has been a right move to increase legitimacy at EU level. While the Single European Act, the first major treaty to be adopted after the first European elections, introduced the cooperation procedure and the assent of the European Parliament for accession and association treaties, the Treaty of Maastricht introduces the codecision procedure, extended the cooperation procedure and gave it the power to approve the membership of the European Commission. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice extended the codecision procedure, while with the Treaty of Lisbon this procedure became the ordinary legislative procedure and the most widely used. As the European Parliament recognizes, "it became clear that Parliament had made full use of the Treaty provision of Article 14 TEU, which states: 'The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and

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[4] The European Parliament, *The European Parliament: historical background*, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/11/the-european-parliament-historical-background], 5 March, 2020.

[5] Yves Meny, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect the President of the Commission'".[6]

The last European elections were held in May 2019, being the ninth round of parliamentary elections since the first ones in 1979. The results of the elections held in 2019 can be summarized as being: 751 European Parliament members from the 28 members states have been elected and they will represent the will of representing more than 512 million people. Although the number of the MEPs was supposed to decrease following the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU, the allocation of seats remained unchanged following the extension of Article 50 to 31 October 2019.

The elections of the European Parliament members take place according to national electoral systems, but all states, despite their electoral laws, need to respect some common rules, as for example the proportional representation. In some member states, the national electoral laws foresee the vote for closed list, in others preferential voting is used, meaning that voters can choose between one or more candidates, while other use the single transferable vote system. There are quite some differences also between member states in what concerns the threshold (it varies from 2% to 5%), the minimum age to be an eligible voter, or the minimum age to be eligible as candidate. Moreover, in five states voting is compulsory, thus also the turnout is quite high, and the precise date of vote is decided by individual members States (throughout 4 days in total).[7]

The second-order elections model

Immediately after the first direct elections of the European Parliament in 1979, the second-order elections model was conceived in order to understand the new type of supranational but less important elections. Reiff and Schmitt, the fathers of the second-order elections model, suggestively start their article by stating that the "European Parliament

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[6] The European Parliament, *op. cit*.
[7] Giulio Sabatti, Gianluca Sgueo and Alina Dobreva, *2019 European elections: national rules*, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019, p. 2.

direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second-order elections".[8]

The model starts from the distinction between first order elections, which are national parliamentary elections in the case of parliamentary systems and national presidential elections in the case of presidential systems, and second-order elections (by-elections, municipal elections, regional elections, those for a second chamber). In other words, the European Parliament elections do not decide who is gets the power and there was much less at stake in comparison with national elections where members of the national parliament or even presidents are elected. In these circumstances, voters preferences are significantly influenced in second order elections by political calculations concerning the first order arena. If indeed the voters perceive the two separate decision-making levels, the models predicts that the information from the national level determine the voters' decisions at the EU level.[9]

The first dimension of European elections, as developed in the original model, is the less at stake dimension, which lead to a series of characteristics. The first characteristics deriving from this dimension is that participation at European elections tends to be lower compared to previous national first order elections. This is very true if we analyze the turnout at European elections. Between 1979 and 1994, the turnout for the European Parliament elections was above 50%, but declining constantly. From 1999 to 2014 the turnout averages was below 50%, also declining constantly, while in 2019 at the last elections round the turnout increased to 50,66%. As Luiza Filimon correctly noticed, the "turnout has declined from one election to the next even though potential voters from new member states were added in seven out of eight electoral cycles".[10] The situation is also controversial if we have in mind the fact that the powers of the European Parliament raised constantly over decades.

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[8] KarlheinzReif and Hermann Schmitt, "Nine second-order elections - a conceptual framework for the analysis of European elections results" in *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 8, 1980, p.3.

[9] Simon Hix and Michael Marsh, "Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections", in *The Journal of Politics*, no. 2, 2007, p. 499.

[10] Luiza-Maria Filimon, "Beneficiaries of the second order elections model: radical right parties in the European Parliament", in *Europolity*, no. 2, 2015, p. 195.

This situation changed in 2019, as voter turnout increased in 20 out of 28 members state, mainly due to the mobilization of the younger generation. Still, this situation does not challenge the first characteristic of the second-order model as figures are still modest compared to most national elections on the European continent.[11] Moreover, several studies have shown that this increase cannot be seen as a mobilization of voters based on arguments which are relevant for the EU level, but is rather a consequence of national political agenda.

Existing research forecast that the turnout for EP elections will continue to experience a decline - especially between 2020 and 2040. The main explanation for the low turnout for European elections compared to national elections is that indeed there is more at stake in the national elections compared to the European ones and the voters are well aware of this.[12] Voters do not vote as they feel that they cannot improve anything or abstain because their vote has no influence, in order words they see no reward in taking part in these elections.

The next characteristic of the model affirms that small and new parties do better in European elections, if we compare their results with the results obtained in national elections. In first order elections, citizens tend to vote strategically and as such the "large, electorally decisive parties may receive votes in first-order elections from voters whose actual preference lies with some small or new party".[13] Since in second order elections there is less at stake, there will be less strategic voting, which means that the electorate will vote for their most preferred party, even if it is a small party with no possibility to win, because there are less consequences for wasting one's vote. In other words, voters tend to vote more sincerely in second order elections than in first order national elections. After the second round of European elections, Reif expanded this characteristic about small and new parties and included radical parties. Consequently, he argues that more extreme parties (radical, populist or protest parties) have the tendency to receive more support and thus more centrist parties lose votes.[14]

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[11] Niklas Bolin and Kajsa Falasca, "Introduction", in Niklas Bolin and Kajsa Falasca (eds.), Euroreflections, *Leading academics on European elections 2019*, Sweden, 2019, p. 9.

[12] Jan Kovar, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[13] Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, "Nine second-order elections", p. 9.

[14] Karlheinz Reif, "Reflections: European elections as member state second-order elections revisited", in *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 31, 1997, p. 118.

The third characteristic of the model states that government parties lose in European elections. This characteristic is very much related to the concept of electoral cycle which considers that the popularity of national government parties increases shortly after the elections, but declines afterwards, reaches its minimum at the middle of the legislative period, only to increases again just before the next round of elections. In the case of European elections, several studies have confirmed that that parties which are members of the government loose most at midterm, perform a bit better when EP elections that place shortly after the midterm or ahead of the next first-order elections.

There are several explanations for this situation: mobilization of the opposition, the voters disappointment with the government or some supporters use their negative vote in EP to apply pressure on the government. This hypothesis has been tested during all rounds of EP elections and the conclusion is that except with the first EP elections, the anti-government tendency increased significantly between 1979 and 1994, fell slightly in 1999, only to be reconfirmed from 2004 onwards.[15] It can be said that European voters use the EP election to apply their evaluation of national government performance.

The fourth and last characteristic of the second-order elections model states that there will be higher percentage of invalidated ballots. In the words of Reif and Schmitt "displeasure at the set of parties and/or candidates which is offered the voter in first-order elections may find expression here in more explicit ways: by invalid marking of the ballot. [16] This hypothesis was less tested and verified and some studies even exclude it. As Jan Kovar concludes, "this hypothesis has been tested partially in other countries and subsequent EP elections but has generally received only limited support.[17]

The majority of the studies have focused on the analysis of these four characteristics which are all related to elections outcomes, but in time a new characteristics related to the EP campaign was added by Reif himself. The fifth characteristics states that the campaigns for the second order elections,

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[15] Luiza-Maria Filimon, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

[16] Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, "Nine second-order elections", p. 9.

[17] Jan Kovar, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

so also for the European elections, are a mix between first-order arena specific issues and second-order arena issues. [18] While the hope was that the introductions of European elections will lead to genuine European debates and electoral campaigns, the studies conducted so far have proved that the European electoral campaigns are rather national campaigns and have little to do with what actually the EU does or could do for its citizens.

The European direct elections have not lead, as it was hoped, to an Europeanization of the electorate, but on the contrary. Nowadays, the fact that the EU elections are second order elections intensifies the democratic deficit of which the EU is so often accused of. But, as scholars have noticed, "when voters are given more information about the placement of parties on the EU dimension, the importance of European concerns also increases",[19] which means in practice that a more European campaign could determine the EP elections to become more important.

Several studies have focused also on pointing out the limits of the second order elections model. For example, Robert Rohrschneider and Nick Clark argue that "while EP elections are no doubt less relevant in power terms, they may not be second-order in terms of the mechanisms that underlie people's vote choice. In short, the aggregate approach is running the danger of committing the ecological fallacy".[20] The second concern states that "evidence of low turnout and defection from governing parties may be consistent with the second-order model, it can equally lend credence to alternative explanations",[21] as for example dissatisfaction with the position occupied by these parties on the European integration dimension.

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[18] Karlheinz Reif, "National electoral cycles and European elections 1979 and 1984", in *Electoral Studies*, no. 3, 1984, p. 247.

[19] Sara Binzer Hobolt and Jill Wittrock, "The second-order election model revisited: An experimental test of vote choices in European Parliament elections", in *Electoral Studies*, no. 30 , 2011, p. 30.

[20] Robert Rohrschneider and Nick Clark, "Second-Order Elections versus First-Order Thinking: How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of Governance", in Cees van der Eijk and Hermann Schmitt (eds.), *The Multilevel Electoral System of the EU*, Mannheim: Connex, 2008, p. 142.

[21] Sara Binzer Hobolt and Jill Wittrock, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

Testing the second order elections model on the 2019 European Elections in Romania

The ninth round of European election took place between 23 and 26 May and a total number of 751 members of the European Parliament representing more than 512 people from 28 member states have been elected. The European People's Party obtained 182 seats, less with 34 seats compared to 2014, the Social Democrats obtained 154 seats, less with 31 seats compared to 2014, the Renew Europe obtained 108 seats, more with 39 seats compared to 2014, the Greens obtained 74 seats, more with 22 seats, Identity and Europe got 73 seats, more with 37 seats compared to 2014, The European conservatives and Reformist won 62 seats, less with 15, Nordic Green Left obtained 41 seats, less with 11, The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy disappeared while the number of non-attached grew to 57 compared to 20 in 2014. The average turnout was of 50,66% marking a grew from 42,61% registered in 2019.

In Romania the elections for the European Parliament took place on May 26, 2019. Seven independent candidates and 23 parties have registered at the Central Electoral Office, and out of these the office validated three independent candidates and 13 parties or alliances. The elections took place simultaneously with a referendum on justice at the initiative of the Romanian president. The results obtained can be summarized as being:


Chart 1. Results of European Elections in Romania 2014 versus 2019

These percentages have been translated into the following number of seats: National Liberal Party - 10, Social Democrat Party - 8, Alliance 2020 - 8, Pro Romania - 2, Popular Movement Party - 2 and Democrat Union of Hungarians - 2. The turnout was 51,20% in considerable raise compared to 2014 when the turnout was just of 32,44%.

The press rapidly concluded that "the opposition scored a massive victory over the ruling coalition in Romania in the elections for the European Parliament"[22] and that "Romania's pro-European parties inflicted a serious defeat on Romania's ruling Social Democrats (PSD)". [23] The results showed that the biggest opposition party at that moment - the National Liberal Party, won the vote in the country, while the alliance formed out of Save Romania Union and PLUS succeeded to gain most votes in cities and diaspora. The Social Democratic Party suffered a heavy loss compared to the former parliamentary elections in 2016 when it succeeded to achieve 45% of votes, while the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), their coalition partner, did not manage to pass the 5% threshold.

If after the thirds round of elections organized in Romania in 2014, Ovidiu Vaida correctly assessed that the second-order elections model should be applied with prudence in the case of Romania,[24] in 2019 we can consider that the Romanian electorate has acquired sufficient experience in European matters for the theory to be applied. In order to test the second order elections model, the results of the European Parliament registered in Romania in 2019 shall be compared with the results of the first order national parliament elections organized in December 2016. The Romanian Parliament has two chambers, the upper chamber being the Senate and the lower chamber being the Chamber of Deputies. As the electoral system does not differ for the two chambers, the results used in this analysis shall be the average between the scores registered for the two votes.

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[22] "EU elections: Opposition scores massive victory over ruling coalition in Romania", in *Romania insider*, 2019 [https://www.romania-insider.com/eu-elections-2019-results-romania], June 20, 2020.

[23] Bogdan Neagu, *Romanian ruling social-democrats suffer heavy loss*, 2019 [https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2019/news/romanian-ruling-social-democrats-suffer-heavy-loss/], June 22, 2020.

[24] Ovidiu Vaida, "Europeni în curs de dezvoltare. Trei runde de alegeri europarlamentare în România", in *Sfera Politicii*, no. 189-190, 2016, p. 68.

The results of the elections organized in Romania in 2016 for the national parliament can be summarized as being: the turnout was 39,49%, 136 senators and 329 deputies have been elected using the system of proportional representation with a threshold of 5%. The main parties obtained the following results: Social-Democrat Party - 45,57%, National Liberal Party - 20,22%, Save Romania Union (currently member of Alliance 2020 together with Plus party) - 8,89%, Democrat Union of Hungarians - 6,21%, Alliance of Liberal Democrats in Europe - 5,81%, Popular Movement Party - 5,49%.

We follow by testing the hypotheses of the second order elections model in Romania 2019 European elections:

A. Participation at European elections tends to be lower compared to previous national first order elections

The turnout at European elections 2019 in Romania was of 51,20%, slightly higher than the European average of 50,66% and considerably much higher than the turnout at previous national elections which was of 39,49%. The first hypothesis of the model does not stand in the case of the EU elections in Romania in 2019 but there are several explanations for this high turnout. First of all, the average turnout was the highest in 20 years determined mainly by a raise of the votes of young people below 39 years. One of explanation for this high turnout is directly linked with the fact that in Romania the elections for the European Parliament took place in the same day as the referendum for justice convened by the Romanian president who succeeded to mobilize better the voters, especially the young generation, after two years of heated debates on this subject. In consequence, the higher than average turnout can mainly be attributed to national circumstances and the mobilization of the voters due to the national agenda and not the European one.

B. Small and new parties do better in European elections, compared to their results in first order national elections

In terms of small and new parties, the main champions of European elections in Romania 2019 have been Alliance 2020 with a score of 22,36% and Pro Romania. Alliance 2020 is formed by Save Romania Union, which succeeded in obtaining just around 9% at the previous national elections,

and PLUS Party (Liberty, Unity, Solidarity), a new party formed in 2018. With an anti-corruption, pro-western and reformist discourse, the Alliance registered officially just some months before the elections, managed to conquer the young electorate and the diaspora. Another small party that entered the scene was Pro Romania launched in 2018 and comprising several former social-democrats unpleased with the work of PSD. Being a pro-western center-left party has the advantage of having as leader a former prime-minister and as member the former EU Commissioner of Romania. In the case of the EU elections in Romania 2019, the second hypothesis is verified.

C. Government parties lose in European elections

The government party during the European elections 2019 in Romania was the Social Democrat Party supported also by the Alliance of Liberal Democrats in Europe. As correctly predicted by the second order elections model, both of these parties loose during the European elections. While the Social Democrats obtained just 22,50% compared to 45,57% during the previous national first order elections, the Alliance of Liberal Democrats in Europe did not even pass the threshold obtaining just 4,11%. The European elections took place at the middle of the electoral cycle and this could be one of the explanations for the great fall in the voters' preference of the government parties. As already mentioned above, there has been a wide mobilization of the opposition and the European elections have been used to punish the government party for the reforms in the justice sectors for which a parallel referendum was taking place at the same time.

D. Higher percentage of invalidated ballots

This is the most untested hypothesis of the second order elections model. As the Romanian Parliament has two chambers, we shall take into account the average number of invalidated ballots, which was of 209.944, while the number of invalidated ballots at the 2019 European elections was of 270.186, which is considerably higher. The electorate has used the EP elections, as pointed by the second order elections model, to show its dissatisfaction for all of the parties and for politics in general.

E. Second order election campaigns are a mix of second-order arena specific issues as well as first-order-arena specific issues

While the introductions of the European elections was considered to be a tool which will lead to the Europeanization of the electorate, the successive round of elections have shown the contrary. In Romania, the European campaign was put in a shadow by the referendum for justice initiated by the president, and the political parties preferred to present themselves as highly-EU oriented without any clear indications on what they will do in Brussels once they become MEPs. For example, the National Liberal Party used as slogan for the EP elections "Romania first" copied after the slogan of Donald Trump "America first" promising the entrance of Romania in the Schengen and Euro areas, scholarships and free tickets, the Social Democrats ran under the slogans "Patriot in Europe" and ″Romania deserves better″ after several criticisms coming from Bruxelles on the state of law and corruption, while the USR chose to bet on the slogan ″A Romania without corruption″ and the Alliance's of Liberal Democrats in Europe campaign was based on the idea "#IrespectRomania".

None of these slogans take us to the idea that there is a campaign for the European elections, but rather a campaign for national first order elections. This situation is even more obvious in Eastern and Central Europe countries, where slogans like the ones used are a consequence of the short history of democracy and the low level of political culture. Moreover, the government parties chose to play the nationalist card at the 2019 EU elections, while the opposition did no better at structuring and presenting a clear programme of their future activities in the European Parliament. Even when these programmes exist, it is surprising to see that most candidates prefer to say what they will do for their country from Brussels and not what they will do for the entire Europe. The European Union exists, but the union between people and countries still needs to be developed. The second order elections model's hypotheses on the election campaign is definitely confirmed in the case of 2019 EU elections in Romania.

Conclusions

Developed four decades ago, the second order elections model is far from being obsolete nowadays. Testing its hypotheses on the 2019 EU elections in Romania has shown that small and new parties did better in European elections, compared to their results in first order national elections, government parties lost, there were higher percentages of invalidated ballots than in national elections and the campaign was based on national specific issues. Still, there is a slight deviation from the second order elections model at the hypothesis on the participation at the European elections, but the percentage of voters tended to be higher than at the national elections in all EU countries and considerably higher than at the previous elections for the EU parliament. This deviation should by no means interpreted in the sense that EU elections have the same importance as the national elections, but is rather a consequence of the higher mobilization at national levels. In the case of Romania, the higher participation at EU elections can be attributed to the fact that the elections took place at the same time with the referendum on justice convoked by the president who succeeded in mobilizing the Romanian voters. As long as the EU elections remain 27 national elections, the second order elections shall most probably continue to be valid with small deviations from the original model.

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THE "HOMOGENIZATION PROCESS" IN ROMANIA

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Abstract

The present research examines the relationship between the development of the nation state and homogenization efforts in Romania. On the one hand, this requires examining the establishment of ideological and dictatorial power practices that emerge from the historical context of capitalist and imperialist developments. On the basis of which the national conceptions of a closed "body" evolved, and thus certain groups, experienced because of their "otherness" compared to the national similarities, social exclusivity. Thus, the racial ideological attitudes and the resulting homogenization and repression policies of the dictatorships of the 20th century emerged. The aim of this work is to show how the homogenization process took place in Romania.

Keywords: dictatorship, total rule, nation, anti-Semitism, homogenization, modernization, Romania.

Introduction

In the 19th century, after the French Revolution, the formation of nation states in Western Europe is largely completed. This means that initially republics were founded and the absolute monarchies slipped into a kind of transitional phase. They had to restructure themselves because the

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political construct of the monarchies could no longer keep up with the economic conditions of the time. The economic change was based on rapid industrialization, the liberalization of social conditions, increased population growth and others. W. Reinhard sees in his work *The Life Forms of Europe*, this chain of political, economic and social conditions exactly the other way conditioned and namely:

> "At the beginning there is the population growth, which produced an increasing social division of labor and thus - as Luhmann said - an increasing complexity of life. This led to the wider interdependence of the people on the one hand, the formation of a public monopoly of power: the state and to constant conflicts on the other hand."[1]

Basically, both statements amount to the same thing. Reinhard is concerned to illustrate the "process of civilization": The increased ratio is necessary to overcome the increasingly complex problems of European societies. As a result, external compulsion or foreign coercion is increasingly being replaced by the inner self-compulsion; the compulsory apparatus is relocated into man himself.[2] Similarly, Elias argues in his "On the Process of Civilization."[3] The reorganization of the political construct at the beginning of the twentieth century was that the monarchies developed the first social and welfare state, partly constitutional elements, as the power of the nobility became increasingly diminished. This meant that political power no longer belonged only to the sovereign and his servants, but gradually had to be shared with an ever-widening administrative state apparatus. By the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the great powers were already in the age of imperialism in the struggle for resources. During this time Germany fought in Europe for territories and economic power with the colonial powers France and Great Britain, which pursued their imperialist plans. In Europe and America, cities and municipalities were supplied with electricity throughout the second industrial revolution.

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[1] Wolfgang Reinhard, *Lebensformen Europas. Eine historische Kulturanthropologie* [engl. *Life forms of Europe. A historical cultural anthropology*], München: C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 62.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 62.

[3] Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation -Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen* [engl. *About the process of civilization - Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations*], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976.

The invention of the internal combustion engine contributed to a considerable increase in economic and private mobility. The space-time relationships were almost turned upside down, and novel social phenomena such as migration, population growth, urbanization, social mobility, and networking served as a catalyst for immense capitalist economic growth, fueled by new modes of production, changing work conditions, and rising consumption. In Western Europe and America, the beginning of the third energy revolution was marked by the discovery of oil, which ushered in a new stage of capitalist development and another epoch of "civilization" in the West. John D. Rockefeller[4] founded the Standard Oil Company of Pennsylvania in 1868, recognizing that the key to the success of the oil business lay in the ownership of the refineries and thus in the control of the transport and marketing of the final products.[5] The legendary American *Way of life* of capitalist societies was intended to fundamentally redefine the values of modern man.[6] Not only is the beginning of the modern capitalist global

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[4] As a staunch capitalist and utilitarian, it's interesting to see what John D Rockefeller believes: See John D. Rockefeller, „An was ich glaube", in Christoph Fehige and Georg Meggle (ed.), *Der Sinn des Lebens*, [engl. *"What I believe"* in Christoph Fehige and Georg Meggle (ed.), *The Meaning of Life*], München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004, p. 356.

[5] Jeremy Rifkin, *Die empathische Zivilisation. Wege zu einem globalen Bewusstsein* [engl. *The empathic civilization. Paths to a global consciousness*], Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010, see pp. 285-286: "Refined oil provided the fuel to get almost everyone in the world at the wheel of a car." [...] "He concluded preferential contracts with the railway companies and later bought up Pipelines. In 1879, the Standard Oil Company controlled nearly 95% of the refinery capacity in the country. (Quoted from Robert Anderson, *Fundamentals of the Petroleum Industry*, Norman: University Press, 1984, p. 20) In the 1930s, all the major oil companies already existed that would shape this world's largest industry, including Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Humble Oil, Atlantic Refining Company, Sinclair Oil, Standard Oil of Indiana, Phillips 66, Sucony, Sun, Union 76 and Texaco. A total of 26 companies together owned two-thirds of the capital of this industry, 60% of boron equipment, 90% of pipelines, 70% of refineries and 80% of distribution networks."

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 286: „In 1911, the first gas station in the United States opened in Detroit. The staggering speed of automobile production meant an insatiable fuel demand for the petroleum industry: [...] Oil companies therefore had to expand their exploration steadily and opened up new oil fields almost weekly (in 1916 there were 3.4 million cars in the US and in 1930 already more than 23, 1 million cars (quoted in Daniel Yergin, *Der Preis. Die Jagd nach Öl, Geld und Macht*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993, p. 269). [...] For the remainder of the twentieth century, automobiles formed the core of industrial capitalism [...] especially because the automotive industry was networked with other industries. In the 1960s cars

market economy emerging at this point, but also an increasingly ruthless competition for resources between internationally competing actors and nations - the age of the war industry begins.

> "The relations between different nations depend on how far each of them has developed their productive forces, the division of labor and the internal traffic [...] not only the relationship of one nation to another, but also the whole internal organization of these Nation itself depends on the stage of development of its production and its internal and external traffic."[7]

The more mature the capitalist economic system is in a nation, the more structured and articulated its internal structure and forms of work are; the more progressive their work organization, the better the social system and the higher the standard of living.[8] Furthermore, the economic power of a nation also increases its political power, also on an international level. The increased and rationalized power was to culminate in the twentieth century in its "mightiest" form in the two world wars, which in turn should lead us back to the dictatorships of the twentieth century in Romania. Since both dictatorships emerged in economically difficult times for Romania and got their political legitimacy, through nationalism and the promise of modernization of Romania. The cornerstone of Romania's political culture was to maintain (political and economic) power and its unity, no matter what (repressive) forms it was supposed to take. In order, as we shall see below, to meet the quest for economic growth, prosperity and modernization, and the construct of one's own nation.

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devoured 20% of the steel, 12% of the aluminum, 10% of the copper, 51% of the lead, 95% of the nickel, 35% of the tin and 60% of the rubber, which were consumed in the US. (Quoted from A. Q. Mowbray, *Road to Ruin*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969, p. 15.)

[7] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie. Kritik der neuesten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten* [engl. *The German ideology. Criticism of the latest German philosophy in their representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner and German socialism in its various prophets*], Berlin/DDR: Dietz Verlag, 1958.

[8] See Helmut Thome, „*Wertewandel in Europa*", [engl. „*Changing Values in Europe*"], in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (ed.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas* [engl. *The Cultural Values of Europe*], Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005, pp. 386-444.

Homogenization as the cornerstone of national economic policies in Romania

In order to better understand the development of anti-Semitism in Romania, it is worth taking a closer look at the dictatorships of the 20th century.[9] It shows how totalitarian violence[10] has been used to complete the construct of the Romanian nation. A theoretical basis appropriate to this theme provides Hannah Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism*, whose concepts help in the reconstruction of Romanian development towards the nation state in times of dictatorships. Especially those upheavals in Romania that correspond to the concept of "totality and the degree of politicization and centralization under the deliberate absence of autonomous intermediary actors" are important here.[11] In order to understand the historical, political and economic contexts, the reverse side of the highly technological development of capitalist production relations and their forces must be taken into account in the development of Romanian history and its modernization efforts. For this reason, with reference to Arendt, the foundations of racial ideological and anti-Semitic attitudes and ideologies are described below.[12] The beginnings of modern anti-Semitism can be

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[9] See Manfred Funke, „Braune und rote Diktaturen- Zwei Seiten einer Medaille? Historikerstreit und Totalitarismustheorie", [engl. "Brown and Red Dictatorship - Two sides of a coin? Historikerstreit and totalitarian theory"], in Eckhard Jesse (ed.), *Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert*, [engl. *Totalitarianism in the 20th century*], Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1996, pp. 152-153.

[10] *Ibidem*.

[11] Raj Kollmorgen, "Gesellschaftstransformation als sozialer Wandlungstyp. Eine komparative Analyse", in Raj Kollmorgen (ed.), *Politische Soziologie*, First published in Raj Kollmorgen, *Transformation als Typ sozialen Wandels. Postsozialistische Lektionen. Historische und internationale Vergleiche*, [engl. „*Social transformation as a social transformation type. A comparative analysis*", in Raj Kollmorgen (ed.), *Political Sociology*, *First published in Transformation as a type of social change. Post-socialist lessons. Historical and international comparisons*], Münster: LIT, 2005, p. 17.

[12] Eric D. Weitz, "From Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights. Forced Deportations and Civilizing Missions", in *American Historical Review*, No. 5, Vol. 113. 2008, p. 1323: „The first genocide of the 20th century was perpetrated by the German Army at the Hereros and Namas in South Africa, today's Namibia, under lieutenant Lothar von Trotha, the commander of the German troops, from racial ideological attitude, that has killed about 60-80% of the Herero and 40-60% of the

traced back, according to Arendt, in the 19th century, where anti-Semitic movements emerged, especially in Austria and France. Anti-Semitism, however, was a pan-European movement and by no means an exclusively German phenomenon.[13] According to Arendt; "The hatred of Jews in Poland and Romania" outweighed everything we know from Western and Central European countries and it was owed in contrast to these essentially economic and non-political causes."[14] The reason for this, Arendt sees in the fact, that the eastern countries like Romania, for example, had difficulties in building their own nation state, and in Romania the young national government was unable to resolve ethnic conflicts and reform feudal conditions.[15] At the same time, whereby the majority of the nobility, which belonged to minority population in Romania, continued to maintain a stable political position and inhibited the development of a Romanian bourgeoisie or middle class. The ethnic composition of Transylvania, for example, in 1920 consisted of about 57% Romanians, 26, 5% Hungarians, about 10% Germans and about 6, 5% other ethnic groups[16] and remained virtually unchanged until 1930, while in 1910, during the dual monarchy and at the height of the Magyarization policy, were counted 53, 8%

Namas and introduced the system of apartheid, in which were introduced separate settlement areas and dwellings for all "tribes"; for all Africans were introduced passports and "rational" physical punishment and a monitoring system." (Quoted from National Archievs of Namibia relating to the districts of Okahandja and Reheboth: BRE 14/B.10.3/4, 4RS; BRE 14/B. 10.a/1; BRE 22/E. 1.c/10; BRE 26/E.1.8.1/; DOK 29/E.4.a, Vol. ¼,5,25,17,31; DOK29/E.4.d,Bd.7/17RS; see also Jürgen Zimmmrer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia,* Münster, 2002.

[13] *Ibidem* and see Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, [engl. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*], München: Piper Verlag, 2009, p. 98.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 84.

[15] See detailed Ladislau Gyemant, *Mişcarea naţională a românilor din Transilvania între anii 1790 şi 1848*, [engl. *The National Movement of the Romanians in Transylvania between 1790 and 1848]*, Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1986.

[16] See Buletinul Statistic al României. Serie IV, Bd. XV, Nr. 3, 1920, pp. 156- 157. These statistics take into account all territories beyond the Carpathians, which formerly belonged to the dual monarchy (including the Banat and the Maramures). Quoted in Lucian Leuştean, „Rumänische Mehrheit und Ungarische Minderheit" [engl. "Majority and Hungarian minority"] in Flavius Solomon, Alexander Rubel, Alexandru Zub (eds.), *Südosteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert. Ethnostrukturen, Identitäten, Konflikte*, [*Southeastern Europe in the 20th century. Ethno structures, identities, conflicts*], Iaşi: Editura Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza"/ Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2004, p. 102.

Romanians and 31, 6% Hungarians.[17] Lucian Leuștean attributes the decrease of about 5% of the Hungarian population not to the Romanization policy,[18] but to the exodus of about 200.000 Hungarians during the period of 1918-1924,[19] as well as the renewed ethnic differentiation, supported by the Romanian state, of the already Hungarian-assimilated Danube Swabians, Armenians or Slovaks.[20] At national level, the proportion of Romanians in 1930 was 71, 9%, that of Hungarians as the largest ethnic minority 7, 9% of the total population.[21] According to Leuștean, statistically speaking, Hungary did not pose an obstacle to the consolidation of the Romanian state. However, the short quarter of Transylvanian citizens of Hungarian descent were made up of the economic, cultural and social former power elites of the region, their favor it was to won. Economically, this group was still one of the most influential players in the region, including the magyarized Jews with about 3,2%.[22] According to Leuștean, the Romanians themselves were more or less the "national proletariat" and for that reason had to form their "own" middle class and national elite, which would have required a social revolution under national auspices.[23]

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[17] See Ioan Bolovan and Sorina Bolovan, „Contribuții privind structura etnică și confesională a Transilvaniei in sec. XX", [engl. "Contributions to the Ethnic Structure and Confession of Transylvania in the 20th Century"], in Sorina Bolovan and Ioan Bolovan (ed.), *Sabin Mănuilă, Istorie și demografie. Studii privind societatea românească între sec. XVI- XX, [engl. „History and demography. Studies on the Romanian society during the XVI-XX centuries"]*, Cluj- Napoca: Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1995, p. 159.

[18] Ilyes (cf. note. 2), p. 58f., quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, pp. 102-103.

[19] See on the exodus of the Hungarians from Transylvania in Istvan Mocsy, "Partition of Hungary and the Origins of the Refugee Problem", in Bela K. Kiraly, Peter Pasztor, Ivan Sanders (eds.), *War and Society in East Central Europe,* (Vol. VI, *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon*), New York, 1982, pp. 491-508, quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

[20] See Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Bolovan, *op.cit.*, p. 160f.

[21] Irina Livezeanu, *Cultură și naționalism în România mare. 1918-1930*, [engl. *Cultural politics in Greater Romania. 1918-1930*], București: Humanitas, 1998, p. 19.

[22] Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Bolovan, *op.cit.*, p. 159. See also D. Scharry, "The jewish Policy in Great Romania between the Two World Wars", in Ion Stanciu (ed.), *The Jews in the Romanian History*, București, 1996, p. 153, quoted in Leuștean, *op cit.*, p. 103.

[23] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors, The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919- 1937*, Oxford, 1937, p. 287, quoted in Leuștean, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

The general problem of minorities stems from the fact that in Romania, in the constitution of 1866 it was stated that only foreigners of Christian denomination could be naturalized, whereby the majority of the Jews, for example, were stateless until after the First World War and could be at any time deported abroad as "vagabonds". For this reason, the great powers demanded in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin a naturalization of all Jews. Serbia and Bulgaria are implementing the request, but Romania has only ostensibly done so. According to Lazare, the number of 1075 naturalization cases published at that time, contains in 600 cases, the names of Jews which already died in the war.[24] According to a study, L. Boia notes that in 1899 in the Moldovan capital Iași, which had 76.277 inhabitants, lived only 26.747 Romanians and more than half of the city population (48.530) was of Jewish origin.[25] At the end of the 19th century, Bucharest, which had 250.000 inhabitants, had 32.000 Catholics and Protestants and 31.000 Muslims. The figures illustrate that a quarter of the capital's population did not belong to the Romanian ethnic group and Orthodox denomination, not to speak of the other parts of Romania, such as the Transylvanian cities, where the Romanians, especially in the cities, constituted a minority against inhabitants of German or Hungarian descent.[26] Nevertheless, the great powers tolerated the situation of stateless Jews in Romania for the peace conference after the

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[24] Mariana Hausleitner, „Minderheitenpolitik in Rumänien", [engl. „Minority policy in Romania"], in Larisa Schippel (ed.), *Im Dialog: Rumänistik im deutschsprachigen Raum*, [engl. *In dialogue: Romanian in the German-speaking area*], Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004, p. 361.

[25] Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, [engl. *History and myth in Romanian consciousness*], București: Humanitas, 2011, p. 66.

[26] *Ibidem*, and see Leuștean, *op. cit.*, p. 104: [...] „the cities of Transylvania first had to be romanized, as the Romanians represented there until 1930 only about 35% of the population, while the proportion of Hungarians was 38%, that of Germans 13% and that of magyarized Jews about 10, 5%." and p. 105 (Zvi Hartmann, „The Issue of the Jewish Identity in Transylvania between the Two World Wars", in Ion Stanciu (ed.), *The Jews in the Romanian History*, București, 1996, p. 190) and p. 104: „Only in 1992, after about 70 years of Romanian administration, the Romanization could be realized with the increase of about 75% urbanized Romanian population."; see also Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Bolovan, *op.cit.*, p. 159): „[...] the percentage of magyarized Jews was over 50% at the beginning of the interwar period."

Balkan wars[27] in 1912/1913, so as not to harm their own economic interests.[28] The situation of the Jews did not improve in view of the fact that in 1912 they accounted for just 3, 5% of the total population (239.967), after 13.777 Jews emigrated between 1904 and 1912 and 9.288 were expelled, so that by the First World War one third of the Jews had left Romania. But especially after the Romanian unification, during which Romania doubled its territory and gained several areas where large Jewish, Hungarian, German and Slavic populations lived, the unresolved minority issue became more alarming.[29] Anti-Semitism in Romania gained ground in the fact that the only class that resembled a Western European middle-class model, according to Arendt, was the Jews. Although the Jews from the perspective of the economic development of the Eastern European countries were basically insignificant, especially since they were just as little involved in industrial undertakings to develop a capitalist bourgeoisie as in Western Europe, especially because they are operating a malfunctioning, chaotic monopolization of retail trade in consumer goods, which did not correspond to any production system. Although their social status bore witness to great poverty, they were still perceived as a political and social threat, as they were socially located exactly there, where one could expect the development of a Romanian bourgeois class.[30]

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[27] Eric D. Weitz, "From Vienna to the Paris System", pp. 1322-1323: „Indeed, following the Balkan Wars, treaties among Greece, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire led to new rounds of deportations, each designed to make the respective states more homogeneous."; also: "Tens of thousands of Muslims were forced out of their homelands and fled to Anatolia, and some 100.000 Pontic Greeks were compulsorily removed beginning in 1913. The deportations continued during World War I."

[28] Fritz Stern, *Gold und Eisen. Bismarck und sein Bankier Bleichröder*, [engl. *Gold and iron. Bismarck and his banker Bleichröder*], Reinbeck, 1988, pp. 490-547, quoted in Mariana Hausleitner, *op.cit.*, p. 361: „Bismarck no longer supported the Romanian Jews after the Romanian government took over the Strousberg railway company, whose bankruptcy threatened many German shareholders."

[29] Leon Ghelerter, "Decreșterea populației izraelite în România 1899-1912" [engl. "Decrease of Israeli Population in Romania 1899-1912"], in *Convorbiri sociale,* [engl. *Social Conversations*], *1* (1916): p. 10-11, quoted in Mariana Hausleitner, *op.cit.*, p. 362.

[30] See Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, pp. 84-85.

"Insofar as it gave the appearance of representing the bourgeois class of the country, it came into conflict with the layers of the indigenous people, who claimed that for themselves. In addition, in their loathsome attempts to favor the emergence of a middle class without eliminating the noble landlordism and reforming the feudal structure of the country, the governments adhered to and repeatedly tried to persuade the Jews, to liquidate Jewish positions administratively - partly as a concession to public opinion and a diversionary maneuver so that it might appear as if at least something was happening, but partly because the Jews were indeed sitting there, where a beginning bourgeois class really should have been sitting."[31]

Another reason for the pronounced anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and especially Romania, according to Dumitru Ivanescu, could be due to the fact that the Russian anti-Semitism after the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 forced a large number of Russian Jews to emigrate. These arrived on the way to Palestine or in the United States first in the Moldova and then in the Kingdom of Romania. This led the Romanian state to a restrictive legislation against the "strangers"; other language speakers and other-faith groups were particularly disadvantaged, in order to strengthen the ethnic-Romanian majority.[32] These tensions between Romanians and the minorities, especially the Hungarian minority, were aggravated by the linguistic possibilities of communication. Most Romanian families rejected Magyarization during the Dual Monarchy, just as the Hungarians resisted their Romanization, so that in the 1920s there were relatively few Romanians who spoke Hungarian and even fewer Hungarians who spoke Romanian. In addition, the sense of territorial and political superiority, which is historically grounded, most Hungarians created an aversion to the Romanian language and culture.[33] The image of Romanians in Hungarian society before 1918 points to the different mentality of these two ethnic

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[31] *Ibidem*, p. 85.

[32] Dumitru Ivănescu, „Die Emanzipation einer Minderheit. Die Geschichte der rumänischen Juden vom Ende des 19. bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts.", [engl. "The emancipation of a minority. The history of Romanian Jews from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century."], in Flavius Solomon, Alexander Rubel, Alexandru Zub (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 79.

[33] A.M.A.E., Fond 71/ (1920-1944), Transylvania, Propaganda revizionistă ungară. [engl. Transylvania, Hungarian *Revisionist Propaganda*] Vol. 1, quoted in Leuștean, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

groups and illustrates that in this situation there were hardly any possibilities for communication and similarities. Rather, mutual attributions of stereotypes and prejudices dominated the image of the other group: "If the Jew was 'greedy,' the Slovak 'stupid' and the Serb 'terrible', then the Romanian were 'dirty'.[34] Expressions such as these show why the Hungarian minority was reluctant and resentful of their new Romanian "masters".[35] The Romanians were considered to be the backward people of the Dual Monarchy, notorious as drunken and vindictive people, as dishonest illiterates, working just as much as needed for self-preservation.[36] The homogenization policy of the Romanian government, which aimed to secure the new position of power and the construct of the Romanian nation, brought, among other things, difficult conditions with regard to access to education for the Romanian-based minorities and conflicts over land ownership and property reform of post-1918 Bucharest authorities, which were not resolved throughout the 20th century. In addition, the centralization of the public administration[37] contributed to the fact that already since the interwar period, but especially since the Second World War, about 2 million people, mainly from the German, Jewish, Hungarian and Roma minority population, emigrated from Romania.[38] The 15 other ethnic minorities in Romania, such

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[34] Andrea Petö, "The Image of a Remote Enemy", in László Kontler (ed.), *Pride and Prejudice. National Stereotypes in 19th an 20th Century Europe East to West*, Budapest, 1995, p. 199, quoted in Leuştean*, op. cit.*, *p*p. 107-108.

[35] Leuştean, *op.cit.*, p. 108.

[36] Marian Nagy, "Ninteenth Century Hungarian Authors on Hungary´s Ethnic Minorities", in László Kontler (ed.), *Pride and Prejudice. National Stereotypes in 19th an 20th Century Europe East to West*, Budapest, 1995, p. 40, quoted in Leuştean, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-108.

[37] *Ibidem*, pp. 106-107: Leuştean notes that, with regard to these issues, corruption unexpectedly has had a positive effect on Romanian-Hungarian relations and has been a communication factor in settling many conflicts, because many members of the minorities, in conflict situations, had the choice between submitting a petition to the League of Nations or bribery of a local official; in which the second way was undoubtedly the more promising. C.A. Macartney wrote in 1937: „Bribery can solve a lot of problems. 'The corruption of the Romanians', an old Jew told me with cynicism: 'is our Geneva'.

[38] Andrei Roth, „Abwanderung aus Rumänien", in Anton Sterbling (ed.), *Migrationsprozesse. Probleme von Abwanderungsregionen, Identitätsfragen*, [engl. "Emigration from Romania", in *Migration processes. Problems of emigration regions, Identity issues*.], Beiträge zur Osteuropaforschung Bd. 12, Hamburg: Krämer Verlag, 2006, pp. 61-62: "Among them was the largest minority, those of Hungarians with 1.6 million people, Germans and Jews with about 800,000 each and in addition, there are the Roma," whose number is uncertain in view

as Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Russians, Ukrainians, Turks, Tartars, etc., remained and did not present a problem for the Romanian state, nor did their own situation as a minority in Romania seem to be problematic.[39]

> "The Jewish emigration was thus almost completed at Ceauşescu's time, since the census of 1992 recorded only 8,959 citizens of Jewish ethnicity, so not much more than one percent of the Jews in 1930 [...] 2002 then designated only 5,870 Romanian citizens as Jews, while the German minority counted about 800,000 people before the war, in the 2002 census, there were only 60,088 Germans, or 7.5 percent, since the first wave of emigration took place between 1944 and 1950, the second after 1967 and the third and most extensive in 1988 and 1991."[40]

Due to the growing nationalist movements in the context of dying of the monarchically organized feudal system of Europe, the ethnic minorities of the national development stage of Romania appeared more and more as a disruptive factor because they were associated within a "homogeneous" national construct with the "stranger".[41] On the other hand, as a "Romanian"

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of the fact that until today their real number is unknown and estimated at around 1.5 million to 2.5 million.

[39] *Ibidem*: "In Romania there are 19 ethnic minorities represented in the parliament." See Andrei Roth, "Gehen oder Bleiben? Dilemmata der Emigration aus Rumänien" [engl. „Go or stay? Dilemmas of emigration from Romania"], in Armin Nassehi (ed.), *Nation, Ethnie, Minderheit. Beiträge zur Aktualität ethnischer Konflikte.* [engl. *Nation, ethnic group, minority. Contributions to the topicality of ethnic conflicts*], Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1997, p. 433 f.

[40] Andrei Roth, „Abwanderung aus Rumänien", p. 62: „The emigration process of the Hungarians is still ongoing: between 1992 and 2002, about 11.8 per cent emigrated (but this large number of emigrants can also be attributed to factors such as mixed marriages - assimilation - or a decline in natural reproduction) [...] and continued between 2002 and 2004." See also p. 63.

[41] Wolfgang Reinhard, *Lebensformen Europas*, pp. 325-330: „The "stranger" includes the non - sedentary - that is, the nomads and the traveling people - nomads - like the Gypsies, for example, were especially meant, while a full member of the (European - especially Western) society(s), since their appearance in the 15th century was only a married man with a house and a yard"; p. 325: "Gypsies appeared in the 14th century in the Balkans, in the 15th century in Central Europe, where they first gained a nimbus as pilgrims and even imperial protection. Their predominantly nomadic way of life and the corresponding refusal to integrate themselves culturally led quickly to a reversal and their rejection as robbers, thieves and fraudsters. In addition, they were considered spies of the Turks."; p. 329: "In the

nation, they also wanted to liberate themselves from the hitherto prevailing minority populations, such as the Hungarians and their former political, economic and social superiority, and to assert them anew by trying to assimilate them. As a result, in Romania, the emergence of radical parties; as nationalist, fascist, ethnocratic or anti-Semitic parties followed soon after 1918. Due to the national aspirations of Romania at the beginning of the 20th century, therefore, increased ethnic homogenization and assimilation efforts emerged. The reason was particularly that the still very young Romanian and politically inexperienced nation and its elite had through ideologies such as National Socialism and later national Communist an easier match winning the votes of the national majority in this way and thereby to secure their own political power easier and above all, to legitimize better. According to Arendt, the anti-Semitic parties of Europe have clearly been differentiated from other parties from the very beginning. They expressly did not declare themselves "*a party among parties*," but rather a "*party over the parties*," declaring themselves representatives of the state and the nation as a whole.[42] One of the anti-Semitic movements was, for example, the Pan movement in the context of continental imperialism in Russia and Austria. The Pan Movement addressed its adherents by

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sense of the English vagrancy law of 1531, non-sedentaries were suspected because they were poor, unemployed, but able to work and homeless." [...] "The exclusion of non-sedentaries or nomadic people was and still is culturally conditioned, because Western society is sedentary. They sought to expel them (Gypsies) in Central, Southern and Western Europe together with the Jews and Muslims [...] in Eastern Europe they fared better until even there, the enlightened absolutism slammed and led or resulted to violent attempts to integrate this cultural foreign body into the well-ordered, subordinate societies through sedentary action. [...] In 1937 their massive persecution set in the Third Reich, although they belonged to the so-called "Aryan race" in contrast to the Jews and only in 1981, when their 3rd World Congress met in Göttingen, the politically correct self-designation Sinti and Roma was introduced."

[42] Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, see p. 104: "This was precisely the function and monopoly of the state apparatus, while the parties openly and admirably represented the special interests of certain groups within the nation [...] in these power struggles, of the parties that ran against each other, the state had the task of balancing interests and parties. With their claim to be above the parties and beyond the classes, the anti-Semite parties made clear, that they intended to seize power, to seize the state apparatus, liquidate the party-politically neutral civil service and place its party members in its place. [...] Here is the first clear declaration of war on the nation-state, as we know it later under the name of the fascist movement throughout Europe."

belonging to an ethnic group and considered using certain groups of peoples such as "the Slavic" and "Germanic" to seize world domination. H. Arendt links the emergence of anti-Semitism in the 19th century not only with the ideology[43] of the nation that aroused the xenophobia, but above all with the emerging nation state and thus the collapse of imperialism. There are multiple reasons for this: The nation also means the end of the imperial state monarchies and empires and thus also the discrimination of the Jewish population, since national affiliation defined by the common origin, common language, common beliefs and common national heroes of a Christian institutionalized state for a Christian people. Through this conservative ideology, the Jews and other minorities who did not share social spaces with the Orthodox population were credited with the role of the exotic strangers,[44] and finally those of a threat, due to their unavailable source or ostensibly unjustified wealth.[45] The more closely the categories of national affiliation were knit and the more powerful the nation's ideology became in the population, the more difficult it became for Jews and other minorities with more complex or simply little-known ethnic and religious roots to be included in the nation's existing schema. Thus, an increasingly pronounced anti-Semitic or hostile attitude developed in the majority population towards the minorities. The minorities themselves, like the Hungarian population of Romania, not only did find themselves "superior" to the Romanians because of their historically grown socially and economically

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[43] *Ibidem*, pp. 40-41: "[…] Ideologies are desperate attempts to escape political responsibility for actions and events. [...] Modern ideologies, on the other hand, are all about achieving a permanent victory at the expense of reality itself. [...] One of the purposes of ideologies is to replace the no longer valid rules of common sense; the ideological susceptibility of the modern masses grows to the extent that common sense (and that is common sense, the sense of community through which we experience and understand each other in our common world) is no longer sufficient, to understand the public political world and their events. "

[44] See Andrei Marga, *Fratii mai mari. Intalniri cu iudaismul,* [engl. *The bigger brothers. Encounters with Judaism*], Bukarest: Hasefer, 2009, p. 203: "The "stranger" continued to be an element of anti-Semitic attitudes in communism and was still used as a symbolic language in the interests of power." Quoted from Liviu Rotman, *Evreii din Romania in perioada comunista. 1944-1965.* [engl. *The Jews from Romania during the time of communism. 1944-1965*], 2004, p. 163.

[45] See Georg Simmel, *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung,* see ch. „Exkurs über den Fremden" [engl. *Sociology. Investigations on the forms of socialization,* see ch. "Excursus on the stranger"], Berlin: Duncker & Humblot Verlag, 1908, pp. 685-708.

privileged position, they also consciously took themselves out of the construct of the Romanian nation, as did the Jewish population, since they had anyway no integration and recognition to expect from the rest (Romanian) population.

Conclusions

The aim of this repressive policy was the "modernization"[46] of Romania, which went hand in hand with a unified concept of progress.[47] However, the Romanian agricultural historian D. Șandru stated that the land reform of 1918/21 and the large land redistribution promised no long-term effective improvement in the material situation of the peasants and that the agricultural structure in Romania had not changed effectively, because despite the land redistribution no structural transformation successes took place.[48] The difficulties of Romania to assert itself as a nation after the unification of Greater Romania in 1918 contributed to the economic difficulties. Thus, especially after the First World War,[49] Romania is on the one hand concerned with the reconstruction of caused war damage and material losses and on the other hand with the integration of large ethnic minorities[50] and the economic and political administration of the resulting Greater Romania. As it turned out, inflation - also known as the "monetary agreement"[51] created by the integration of the new

[46] Walter Rothholz, *Politik und Religion. Eine kurze Einführung in die Grundkategorien ihrer Beziehung*, Szczecin: Politisches und Europäisches Institut der Universität Szczecin, 2013, see p. 20.

[47] Walter Rothholz, "Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur in Rumänien", in *Studia Europaea*, no. 2, June 2016, 33–61, see pp. 38-40.

[48] Valeriu Bulgaru, *Către o nouă reformă Agrară* ? [engl. *Another land reform*?], București, 1963, p. 8; Dumitru Șandru, *Reformă agrară din 1945 în România*, București: Editura Academiei, 2000, p. 275.

[49] See more detailed Bogdan Murgescu, *România și Europa*, [engl. *Romania and Europe*], București: Polirom, 2007, cap. III. 1. and III. 2, p. 203 f.

[50] See Rudolf Poledna, „Zur Rezeption der Soziologie Max Webers in Rumänien, Hintergründe einer unbefriedigenden Situation", [engl. „To the reception of the sociology Max Webers in Romania, background of an unsatisfactory situation"], in Anton Sterbling and Heinz Zipparian (eds.), *Max Weber und Osteuropa*, Hamburg: Krämer Verlag, 1997, p. 275.

[51] Murgescu, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

territories due to the unification of Romania - was a particularly difficult undertaking for the young nation. The main difficulty was the large amount of Russian rubles and Austro - Hungarian crowns that circulated in the market to convert to Romanian lei.[52] Influenced by political and economic crises, in Romania, under the head of state Ion Antonescu,[53] in a populist manner and with bio-political[54] measures, the "peasant question" was once again adopted as King Ferdinand had already submitted from exile in Moldavia in 1917, and announced in the Official Journal of the Government of 22 April 1942, that after the war, frontline troops in the eastern territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina would receive land allocations of all non-Romanians.[55]

> "The land redistribution served the purpose of creating larger land holdings for Romanians[56] by confiscating or nationalizing the land holdings of displaced or murdered Jewish farmers in Bessarabia or Ukrainian farmers from Bukovina and the resettled German peasants from the two reconquered eastern provinces."[57]

The forced or enforced land redistribution by biopolitical and authoritarian rule practices, which served its own national or class enrichment, became a strategy that was also adopted by subsequent regimes in Romania. In communism, the expropriation of the entire non-Romanian population

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[52] *Ibidem*, p. 223, see cap. III. 2: Greater Romania and its economic failure.

[53] Comisia Internationala pentru studierea Holocaustului in Romania [engl. International Commission for the Study of Holocaust in Romania], *Final Report*, București: Polirom, 2004, p. 179.

[54] Michel Foucault, *Der Wille zum Wissen. Sexualität und Wahrheit* [fra. La volonté de savoir] Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979; Michel Foucault, *In Verteidigung der Gesellschaft. Vorlesungen am Collège de France (1975-76)*, [fra. *Il faut défendre la société*], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999, pp. 276-305.

[55] Monitorul Oficial Nr. 93 v. 22. 04. 1942, 179-181, quoted in Dumitru Șandru, *Satul românesc între anii 1918- 1944,* [engl. *Romanian village between 1918 and 1944*], Iași: Editura Cronica, 1996, p. 103, p. 148.

[56] Dumitru Șandru, *Satul românesc între anii 1918- 1944*, p. 103 f.

[57] „The latter had the Romanian state replaced in a compensation agreement with the "Third Reich"." in Krista Zach, "M. Gormsens Modernisierungskonzept für die rumänische Agrarwirtschaft (1939/1945)", in Krista Zach and Cornelius Zach (eds.), *Modernisierung auf Raten in Rumänien*, München: IKGS Verlag, 2004, p. 275.

generated considerable state property. In post-communism, state ownership passed through privatization into the hands of the nomenklatura's political and economic elites. It is not hard to see that repressive measures of population homogenization, based on ideologies, served to strengthen ("their own") political and, above all, economic power. The ideology of communism also served to legitimize the country's political power and became Romania's political system when the coup d'état of 23 August 1944 was perpetrated, the military dictatorship and the replacement of Antonescu by King Mihai I took place and the constitution of the great Romanian unity and constitutional monarchy of 1923 was reintroduced. The goal of this political ideology was to remedy the backward development of Romania, which was still largely agricultural. Through these forced modernization measures, Romania and all other Eastern European countries sought to catch up with the ever-widening gap with Western European and capitalist countries. This gap with the western European countries had become particularly large in view of the economic restructuring of the capitalist countries and the steadily increasing modernization. Communism and its repressive policy replaced the hitherto constructed "foreigner" - enemy image with the "class enemy" and forced the population to work with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, the dictatorships of Romania represent the desperate attempt of a backward country to achieve modernization of the western type.

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Book review

Lucian Boia, *Românii și Europa*, București: Humanitas, 2020, 80 p.

Antonela Gyöngy[*]

Romania´s diverse and often contradicting transformation within Europe is a common but still relevant topic discussed in the academic field. Although scientific research on Romania and Europe has become more accurate, the public view upon the same topic remains biased. What does Europe mean and how has the image of Europe changed over time? To what extent and in which areas has Romania become Europeanized and which opposing tendencies can be observed in society? The historian Lucian Boia deals with these questions in his recently published essay „Românii și Europa. O istorie surprinzătoare". The publication of this book shows that „Europeanization", as an increasing field in the academic investigation, goes, once again, beyond the mainstream political science debate about Europe and the European Union. Apparently, „Europeanization" is a concomitant phenomenon and an accompanying term to „integration", which was extensively examined and publicly

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discussed in the context of Romania´s accession process to the EU. While „integration" focuses on institutional cooperation between states and their interdependence at the European level, the rediscovered concept of "Europeanization" broadens the field of scientific investigation, including domestic, interstate, and transnational discourses and social practices labelled as „European". It is, therefore, more appropriate to start from a constructivist perspective and emphasize or even critically evaluate social constructions of Europe and Europeanness. Considering Europe as a fixed unit, by which belonging can be normatively measured, could easily fall into a Eurocentric approach.[1] From a constructivist view, Europe can be ascribed different meanings, thus it changes its appearance according to socially constructed attributions of "Europeanness" prevalent in each historical context.

Lucian Boia´s book might be only partially assigned to this approach. Even if the author traces different historical events, through which Romania has built a European identity, placing them in the South-Eastern European context, he ultimately relates them normatively to the Western societies.

It is, however, confirmed that the historian does not pretend to undertake a systematic analysis of the Europeanization process in Romania, but rather a selective presentation of different critical aspects of Europeanization, which he comments in an essayistic register.

With his essay, Lucian Boia is continuing his 2012 published and controversial discussed book „De ce este România altfel?".[2] In the short foreword, he intends to emphasize Romania's European pathway with its remarkable developments and turning points, by tracing – similar to „De ce este Romania altfel?"– the exceptions and otherness, i.e. the Romanian exceptionalism. This approach was already controversial in connection with his earlier book, when critics argued that he selectively provided historical facts in line with his initial thesis. Moreover, he created a myth of

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[1] *Cf.* Ulrike von Hirschhausen, Klaus Kiran Patel, „Europeanization in History: An Introduction", in: Martin Conway; Klaus Kiran Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series, 2010, pp. 1-18.

[2] Lucian Boia, *De ce este România altfel?* București: Humanitas, 2nd added edition, 2013.

negative exceptionalism by attempting to deconstruct the current political myths.[3] Boia seems to have put forward an uncomfortable thesis that has not been left unquestioned by the critics. This critical reaction materialized in a suggestively entitled anthology „De ce este România astfel?", edited by Vintilă Mihăilescu.[4] In this book, prominent scholars are analyzing issues such as the geopolitical situation, the way the Orthodox church is hindering modernization, the politicized and corrupt privatization process, the consequences of national communism, to justify Romania´s exceptionalism or non-exceptionalism.

Regarding Romania and Europe, Boia asks whether the willingness to adapt and the partly unquestioned, reckless receptivity of different cultural and political models has Europeanized Romania over time. The linguistic and cultural diversity, which emerged from the back and forth movement between Orient and Occident, mainly from the earlier changes of political and cultural directions, led to a variety of influences such as Slavic, Ottoman, Western European and even American to interfere in this region.

The adaptability thesis is recurrent in all nine chapters. On the one hand, cultural and linguistic framework, the mixture of external influences, the role of ethnic groups that shaped the urban landscape, and the option of state centralization are being analyzed. On the other hand, Boia draws on the current period with the so-called "Dragnea experiment", which pointed to the political volatility and the authoritarian relapses in the society.

Over time, Romania has practised its ability to adapt to various cultural contexts and political situations, but despite its repeatedly demonstrated adaptability, society in Romania does not seem to be ready to comply with the norms and institutions imported from the West. According to Boia, Romania cannot reach the level of a society that trusts in rules, as long as opposing interpretations and tendencies often weaken these norms and rules.

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[3] See critical reviews in: Vintilă Mihăilescu (ed.), *De ce este România astfel? Avatarurile excepționalismului românesc*, Iași: Polirom, 2017.

[4] Vintilă Mihăilescu (ed.), *De ce este România astfel? Avatarurile excepționalismului românesc*, Iași: Polirom, 2017.

Finally, it cannot be denied that while Boia´s book does not bring a consistent contribution to the scientific community, it does provide enough incentives for debates and further academic research on Romania and Europe.

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e.g.: E. D. Hirsch, Joseph F. Katt, James Trefil, *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, 2002 [http://www.bartleby.com/59/17/postindustri.html], 20 January 2005.

4. Authors are required to use **bibliography**, numbered and in alphabetical order, as following:

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< For books: Author(s): Last name, First name, (Year), *Title*, Place of publication: Publisher

e.g.: Mişcoiu, Sergiu (2005), *Le Front National et ses repercussions sur l'echiquier politique francais*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES

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19 January 2005

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