STUDIA UBB. EUROPAEA, LX, 2, 2015, 147-184

# LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, CONTESTATION: INTRODUCING THE BRAZILIAN FORMULA FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

**Dawisson Belém Lopes***

**Abstract**

*In this paper the process of international legitimation is assessed from an International Relations standpoint, namely from the perspective adopted by international institutionalism, taking intergovernmental bodies as venues where political contestation to a state of (world) affairs might take place within a certain set of rules and procedures, in a somewhat 'orderly' fashion. Institutional contestation grants legitimacy to the global order to the extent that it absorbs much of the criticism and demands voiced out by states and non-state actors, transforming the world order from the inside and accommodating tensions and dissatisfactions. In this sense, recent Brazilian foreign policy attitudes towards the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership reform, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota share distribution, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism, exemplify the idea of international legitimacy production by way of institutional contestation.*

**Keywords:** global governance, international institutions, legitimacy, Brazilian foreign policy.

## Introduction

Many different accounts of legitimacy in international politics have been forged over time with the purpose of explaining why or how some actions/actors are imbued with a sense of moral adequacy and happen to be seen as 'good' or 'just'. Most of these accounts derive their premises from

* Professor of International and Comparative Politics, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Brazil.
Contact: dawisson@fafich.ufmg.br

fields other than International Relations (IR), such as Law, Economics, and Political Science – as they often rely on concepts as diverse as legality, efficiency, and/or democracy. This paper consists of assessing the process of international legitimization from an IR standpoint, namely from the perspective adopted by international institutionalism (that is, assuming international institutions to matter), taking intergovernmental bodies as venues where political contestation to a state of (world) affairs might take place within a certain set of rules and procedures, in a somewhat 'orderly' fashion. Institutional contestation grants legitimacy to the global order to the extent that it absorbs much of the criticism and demands voiced out by states and non-state actors, transforming the world order from the inside and accommodating tensions and dissatisfactions. In this sense, recent Brazilian foreign policy attitudes towards the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership reform, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota share distribution, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism, exemplify the idea of international legitimacy production by way of institutional contestation.

## 1. Can there be legitimacy in global governance?

From the late 1970s on, worldviews supported by the premise of 'systemic anarchy' have become commonplace in academic reflections on international politics.[1] The premise of systemic (or structural) anarchy implies the recognition that in an environment where sovereign states embody supreme authority over the limits of their respective territories, there can be no world government. It is a logical corollary to the modern principle of equality among nations. So if there is not an instance of power above or beyond states, there would prevail structural anarchy. It is up to each state to produce its own jurisdiction and the use of force within its borders.

[1] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, Londres: Macmillan, 1977; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton University Press, 1984; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge: CUO, 1996.

This modern international system (also called 'Westphalian') is extensively based on the notion of territorial sovereignty and the horizontal relationship among states (as opposed to the 'vertical' relation seen at the domestic level, between the ruler and the ruled). Martin Wight even claimed once that what one identified as 'international politics' should actually be termed 'diplomatics,' since there was no public space in the world dedicated to sovereign nations, but only interactions, on a more or less regular basis, between their diplomatic corps (or armed forces, when diplomacy failed).[2] Kenneth Waltz[3] postulated that the modern international system was not the result of deliberate policy choices, but rather a delicate balance reached among states by launching themselves in efforts for national survival and constraining each other into some compromise. Hence the origins of the dynamic realists have named the 'balance of power'.

This mechanistic and sovereigntist perspective was nuanced over the years, along with profound reconfigurations experienced in the field of international studies. Although there has not been acknowledged so far any actor to overpower the modern nation-state, today we can already identify some *loci* of authority that compete with the 'territorial sovereignty' paradigm, injecting new political contents and interfering with the course of international relations. Authors have been employing the term 'governance without government'[4] to describe the fluidity of political authority in the contemporary world. As for *government*, it refers to the activities supported by formal authorities, i.e. the police power that ensures the implementation of duly established policies. For *governance* it is meant those activities supported by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal responsibilities and not necessarily rely on police power that be put into practice. According to James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, governance is broader a concept than government, as the former is not limited to the latter.

[2] Martin Wight, "Why is there no international theory?", in M. Wight, H. Butterfield (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, London: Unwin, 1966.

[3] Waltz, *op. cit.*

[4] James Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governança sem Governo*, Brasília: Editura UnB, 1992; Oran Young, *Governance in World Affairs*, Cornell University Press, 1999.

Noting the fragmentation and multiplicity of relations of political authority in contemporary politics, Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker developed the concept of 'private authority.'[5] If it is correct that the term 'political authority' was linked through the course of modernity to the management of public affairs, the authors realized that, more recently, some private entities have come to project authority and influence on a growing number of international issues. Actors from the private sector are not only important for the international economy any longer, as they have also become of critical relevance in matters concerning multiple areas of systemic governance. These agents have been involved in the establishment of social norms, provision of welfare, safeguarding of contracts, peace keeping, bioethics, inter alia. Not by coincidence, Hall and Biersteker pointed out the emergence of private authority as an unequivocal sign of global governance. Even though private authority almost never exceeds the authority of the national state, [for the authors] it is increasingly important for the understanding of political dynamics in international relations – which today contemplate actors as diverse as states, market players, international organizations, transnational movements, mafias, churches etc.[6]

The complexity of this framework of 'global governance without a world government' is aggravated by the debate promoted lately on political legitimacy in international relations. The question that recurrently comes up in discussions goes as follows: If there is 'governance without government' on a global scale, where does it derive its legitimate authority from? Assuming the diagnosis that democracy consists in the preferred political regime and source of procedural legitimacy for domestic constituencies, yet some serious pitfalls remain, within the ambit of the modern system of states, when operating with democratic formulas.

Given the 'systemic anarchy' – and the absence of a global democratic system or a universal Leviathan – there surely are theoretical as well as empirical barriers to 'democratizing' international politics. Within this paper, our starting question was: Considered the non-existence of a polity on planetary scale, is there a conceivable way to speak of democratic political interactions in a system of territorial sovereign states?

---

[5] Rodney Hall, Thomas Biersteker, *The Emergence of Private Authority*, Cambridge: CUP, 2002.
[6] *Ibidem*.

This text will subsequently point some of the conceptual and theoretical difficulties involved in the attempt to bring the democratic formula (or to apply a democratic regime) into international politics, illustrating and discussing the evolution of the academic approaches to the problem (next section) and, in the third section, presenting the reader with possibilities and limits for the operationalization of the idea. In the light of global governance and middle-power theories, the case of Brazil will be assessed in the fourth section, as well as some potential pathways for this research agenda in the future.

## 2. Legitimacy, democracy, and global institutions

In this current stage of international relations, the emergence of global issues which potentially affect the entire planet has come to demand new public policies that traditional territorial states might find difficult to carry out. These are issues that require international and cross-border approaches, since its causes and effects are no longer restricted to one or another state, region or group of states. In sum, the contemporary problématique can be enunciated this way: global issues constitute a reality that few international actors have the wherewithal to tackle single-handedly. Claims for a global governance that is compatible with (some degree of) democracy have thus spread out.

Nonetheless, such claims for a more democratic global governance – that is, one that provides more open and plural decision-making processes regarding major global issues with repercussions on planetary scale – often clash with allegations that, in practical terms, the operationalization of this goal is confined to technocratic elites of intergovernmental organizations, with little or no connection with an electorate or genuinely global audiences.[7] Rather, it is skeptically said that international organizations entrusted with the tasks of global governance consist, in most cases, of 'bureaucratic bargaining systems' among rulers, because they are opaque and fundamentally anti-democratic.[8]

---

[7] Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo, Andrew Moravcsik, "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism" in *International Organization*, n. 63, 2009, pp. 1-31; Susan Marks, "Democracy and international governance", in J.M. Coicaud, V. Heiskanen (org.), *The Legitimacy of International Affairs*, Tóquio: UNU, 2001.

[8] Robert Dahl, "Can international organizations be democratic? A skeptic's view", in I. Shapiro, C. Hacker-Cordón (eds.), *Democracy's Edges*, Cambridge: CUP, 1999; Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Thrid Way and liberty" in *Foreign Affairs* 78, n. 5 (September/October) 1999, pp. 13-17.

It is admitted, however, that this tension between the democratization of international relations and the performance of international multilateral institutions be perceived from other angles. Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin despite grudgingly recognizing the unfulfilled promises of multilateralism and the major obstacles faced in the implementation of democratic global governance, postulate the existence of an intense contemporary transnational activity, which, in some cases, reaches the interior of intergovernmental organizations (see the cases of the European Union, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations), bringing along democratizing potentials (e.g., the formal inclusion of non-state actors in consultation and decision-making processes).[9]

Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik contend, from a different point of view, that formal international institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the European Union, contribute to the promotion of a 'constitutional democracy' paradigm in international relations, by safeguarding individuals and minorities against the interests of ruling coalitions and powerful factions. Moreover, they hypothesize that the promotion of multilateral cooperation unleashes the propagation of information and arguments – and, by an indirect pathway, the generation of accountability – as often happens with the cases that are brought up to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.[10]

So, to think of the multi-faceted relationship among democracy, global governance and the modern system of states requires, in our opinion, a previous attempt to catalogue and classify the approaches, lest we compare excessively disparate objects. There are in the literature at least two established ways of approaching the democratization of global governance, which I call, for the sake of didacticism, (a) traditional and (b) contemporary.

Traditional approaches to the phenomenon of 'democratization of global governance' focus on the pluralization of state actors with proven ability to participate in formal multilateral arrangements, to elaborate and

[9] Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, Anders Uhlin, "Democracy in Global Governance" in *Global Governance*, n. 16, 2010, pp. 81-101.
[10] Robert Keohane et al., *op. cit*.

vocalize their preferences (in equality of conditions with other players) and to make decisions regarding the various agendas of international relations. They are derived from the diagnosis that states (actors granted with territoriality and sovereignty) matter and, more than that, are necessary pieces to solve the global public administration puzzle.

Along this line, Guy Hermet understands that, although subject to the trends of globalization in myriad of new issues, the territorial state remains the only actor able to put a halt, at least provisionally, to the clashes that paralyze the global, regional, and national political agendas. It is, so to speak, an unavoidable reference in the 'space management.'[11] Therefore, any measure to establish democratic governance in the international system will depend on the effective capacity of sovereign states to collegially formulate and inscribe international regimes into the proceedings of public international law.

Darren Hawkins et al. have employed 'principal-agent' theories (derived from modern representative democracy) to explain some of the decision processes occurring in multilateral international organizations. Within this analytical framework, 'delegation' takes place when 'an amount of political authority is conceded to an agent by a principal, empowering the former in the name of the latter.'[12] According to the authors , delegation within international organizations (IO) works on very similar lines to that of domestic politics , but with the difference that instead of individuals, are the states who assign powers (always limited by a mandate) to the IO. Thus, international organizations are thought of as the agents that can implement policy decisions of states and pursue their strategic goals.

The traditional approach to the democratization of global governance will demand from its adopters an emphasis on the concept of 'system of states'. It resembles, in terms of method, the representative/constitutional conception of democracy, as long as citizens will just be able to influence

[11] Guy Hermet, "A democratização dos países emergentes e as relações entre o Estado, as OIGs e as ONGs" in C. Milani et al. (org.), *Democracia e Governança Mundial*, Porto Alegre, Editora da Universidade (UFRGS), 2002, p. 44.

[12] Darren Hawkins et al., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge: CUP, 2006, p. 7.

international affairs through the national elections they join. As summed up by Susan Marks, it is as if democracy could only be materialized through the 'nation-state container.'[13] Furthermore, there is greater attention to formalities of international political participation, which will be led (and even monopolized) by sovereign states.[14]

If states are hubs of political loyalties par excellence, how is it possible to imagine a legitimate locus of power that is above and beyond sovereign states? For Robert Howse (2001), the mental operation is relatively simple: He proposes an analogy between the formal attribution of authority that states promote in relation to international organizations on the one hand, and the (actual or presumed) allocation of authority from individuals to state representatives on the other. Interstate multilateralism works as the device by which relations within the system of states are legitimated, in the shadow of liberal contractualist formulas in modern political theory.

However, it should be clear that the argument of multilateralism as an extension of domestic democracy will invariably prove fallacious because a considerable portion of the members of global international organizations is made up of non-democratic states. Additionally, as has already been convincingly demonstrated by Miles Kahler, the larger the number of members of a formal multilateral arrangement, the greater the tendency of 'minilateral' practices to take place (i.e., the formation of small 'clubs' of actors, with similar or compatible interests among themselves within the framework of international institutions).[15]

In a nearly opposite direction to that of traditionalists, contemporary approaches take into account the incorporation of non-state actors – such as local governments, NGOs, advocacy networks, social movements, political parties, transnational corporations, philanthropic agencies, etc. – into global decision-making practices formerly dominated by states.[16] It is, therefore, a

[13] Marks, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[14] Bexell et al. 2010, *op. cit.*

[15] Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with small and large numbers", in *International Organization*, 46 (3), 1992.

[16] Coate Alger, "Expanding Governmental Diversity in Global Governance" in *Global Governance* 16, 2010, 59-79; Bexell et al., *op. cit.* 2010; Keohane et al., *op. cit.*

matter of acknowledging the transnational characteristics acquired by democracy in the midst of a broad and all-encompassing process of globalization of social and human relations.[17]

Contemporary interpretations of the global governance democratization take as a model institutional formulas that allow a more direct exercise of democracy by the 'global citizens' (those directly involved in political processes), mixing up ingredients of representation, participation, and deliberation. The alleged advantage of the method lies in its inclusiveness, since the participation of transnational actors (beyond and below the state) expands and improves the access to public power of significant strata of the world's population – which would most likely remain ostracized by the usual representative channels.[18]

Note that the argument does not go without controversy. As Margaret Keck pointed out, the activism of transnational civil society in international organizations may represent positions not people, ideas not voters. Thus, the inclusion promoted can collaterally generate problems of selectivity and representation biases.[19]

In view of the theoretical difficulties and moral problems brought to the fore, authors such as David Held, Peter Singer, and Jürgen Habermas have tried to imagine possibilities of inclusion and reconciliation between the traditional democratic method of decision-making (which assumes the representation and/or participation of each and every citizen) and the desirable effectiveness of states' foreign policies. As a first step, Held proposed a bold reform in the current model of global governance that was established throughout the 1990s. 'The possibility of a global social-democratic polity is connected to an expanded framework of states and agencies bound by the principles of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights,' he affirms.[20] In rejecting the proposal of a gradual evolution within the already established set of institutions, Held suggested the creation of a comprehensive and

[17] Marks, *op. cit.*, 2001; David Held, *Global Covenant*, Oxford Polity Press, 2004; Thomas Zweifel, *International Organizations and Democracy*, Londres: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.
[18] Bexell et al. 2010, *op. cit.*; Marks 2001, *op. cit.*
[19] Margareth Keck, "Governance Regimes and the Politics of Discursive Representation" in N. Piper; A. Uhlin (org.), *Transnational Activism in Asia*, Londres: Routledge, 2004.
[20] Held, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

interconnected network of public fora, overlapping cities, states, regions, and finally the entire transnational order. In local domains, the participatory processes of the demos would take place in direct fashion, and in more remote domains, there would be mediation through representative mechanisms. In this context, the formation of a global assembly, encompassing all states and agencies, should be envisaged. The focus of this assembly would be the examination of the most salient global concerns (e.g., global health and diseases, food supply and distribution, financial instability, foreign debts, climate change, disarmament, nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons etc.).

Contrary to this view of global democracy (which he labels as 'Kantian'), Ali Kazancigil is of the opinion that 'it takes all states and nations to share similar worldviews, principles, and political systems, a condition that probably will never be met on a planetary scale.' The author argues the unfeasibility of a model based on the concept of 'global constituency', because it is a 'distant perspective, almost utopian.'[21] He admits as a most optimistic hypothesis the existence of some regional democratic governance in the world today (namely, in parts of the European Union), but reaching just a limited number of state and non-state actors.

Singer states that if the group before whom one must justify their behavior is a tribe or nation, their morality tends to be tribal or national. If, however, the communications revolution has created a global audience, one might feel the need to justify their behavior to the whole world. Such a change, for the author, creates the material basis for a new ethics that reaches all of the planet's inhabitants. It is therefore possible to derive that individuals suitably adapted to the new global dimension of political decisions will be able to think of social integration beyond the neighborhood, the city, or the country. Contemporaneously, the virtue of thinking the 'political' beyond the state territorial boundaries seems a requirement.[22]

Regarding the possibilities of applying democratic formulas to international relations, Habermas argues that a political community must –

[21] Ali Kazancigil, "A regulação social e a governança democrática da globalização" in C. Milani et al. (org.), *op. cit*.

[22] Peter Singer, *Um Só Mundo*, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004.

if it regards itself as democratic – be able to distinguish between those who are their members and those who are not. The self-referential concept of 'collective self-determination' points out the logical space occupied by citizens brought together as members of a particular political community (as opposed to other political communities gathered under other states). This particular political community establishes itself as democratic as it proves capable of elaborating its own standards and norms for the interactions it will promote with other political communities around the world. The solidarity forged by the population within a state is rooted in one particular collective identity, supported by historical references and moral persons. That is what shapes the nation and sets its potential for self-administration.[23]

A similar argument is put forward by Howse, for whom the applicability of the term demos in reference to issues related to the modern system of states remains questionable. The author elucidates his objection as follows: 'as there is not a transnational demos, then transnational civil society will continue deriving its legitimacy from the ability to represent interests, values, and those stakeholders which have some domestic salience.'[24]

The two perspectives –traditional and contemporary– are greatly relevant for the studies on democratization of international politics, either for their potential or their limits. It is not our intention to propose a reflection on the theme of global governance democratization that necessarily evokes the 'armor of the nation-state' reading,[25] nor to accept the idea of 'global governance against the state.'[26] After all, it is not a matter of pursuing the finely outlined extremes of this debate, but rather of advancing a useful proposal for the understanding of, say, the constitutive problem of international politics.

[23] Jürgen Habermas, *La Constelación Posnacional*, Barcelona: Paidós, 1998.

[24] Robert Howse, "The legitimacy of the World Trade Organization", in J.M. Coicaud, V. Heiskanen (org.), *The Legitimacy of International Affairs*, Tóquio: UNU, 2001, p. 362.

[25] Marks, *op. cit.*

[26] Hermet, *op. cit*.

## 3. How 'democratic' can global governance be?

It is important to recall that different approaches to the subject of democratization have led to different formulas of operationalizing 'democracy' at the academic realm of International Relations (IR). Susan Marks,[27] for instance, has set forth a tripartite division of the projects for the democratization of global governance, and grouped them into (a) world government, (b) pan-national democracy, and (c) cosmopolitan democracy projects. While the first category refers, quite literally, to the possibility of building a global democratic state, and the second one to the pool of existing democratic regimes in the world, the third combines elements from (a) and (b), associating the growing democratization at the domestic level to the emergence of transnational and supranational institutions with the capacity to democratize contemporary international politics. Raffaele Marchetti, in a different fashion, has dismembered contemporary approaches into transnational and cosmopolitan, identifying at least three normative models for the purpose of applying democratic formulas to international politics (see Table 1).[28] In order to grasp the degree of 'transnational democracy' of different international institutions, Thomas Zweifel was a pioneer in measuring seven indicators, namely appointment, political participation, transparency, reason-giving, overrule, monitoring, and independence. The results proved disheartening for the democrats around the world: from the eleven entities under evaluation, only two of them (the European Union and the International Criminal Court) accomplished positive scores in transnational democracy. All others were considered deficient by Zweifel's classification (see Table 2).[29]

[27] Marks, *op. cit*.

[28] Rafaelle Marchetti, "Modeling Transnational Politics", Paper apresentado no 22º Congresso Mundial da Associação Internacional de Ciência Política (IPSA), Madrid, Espanha, julho de 2012.

[29] Zweifel, *op. cit.*

**TABLE 1:** Application of the democratic formula to international politics

| Approach | Model | Democratic Scope | Democratic Principle | Institutional Design |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional | Inter governmental | National *Demoi* | Symmetrical Association | Interstate Multilateralism |
| Contemporary (1) | Transnational | Transnational *Demoi* | Inclusion of representative social positions | Hybrid Networks (with state and non-state actors) |
| Contemporary (2) | Cosmopolitan | Global *Demos* | Universal inclusion | World Federation |

Adapted from Marchetti, *op.cit.*

**TABLE 2:** Evaluation of the level of 'transnational democracy'

| Dimension | UN | ICC | WB | IMF | WTO | EU | OAU | AU | NAFTA | NATO | ASEAN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Appointment | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 | +1 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 |
| Participation | -1 | +1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | +1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 |
| Transparency | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Reason-giving | 0 | +1 | +1 | -1 | 0 | +1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Overrule | -1 | 0 | -1 | -1 | +1 | +1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 |
| Monitoring | -1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 | +1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Independence | -1 | +1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | -1 | 0 | -1 | 0 | -1 |
| TOTAL SCORE | -5 | +3 | -1 | -3 | -2 | +4 | -6 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -4 |
| Ranking | 10th | 2nd | 3rd | 8th | 4th | 1st | 11th | 7th | 4th | 4th | 9th |

Adapted from Zweifel, *op.cit.*

According to Zweifel, the direct confrontation between the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) was favorable to the second. Taken from the perspective of its Security Council, the UN was successful in criteria such as transparency and capacity to offer public arguments (reason-giving). Given the universe of cases, it has only

outperformed the now defunct Organization of African Unity. On the other hand, the WTO – notwithstanding the difficulties concerning the monitoring of its members, its lack of transparency, and poor inclusion of actors in decision-making processes – got good grades in categories such as 'appointment' (its director-general is appointed by consensual decision among member states), 'reason-giving' and 'independence', and its capacity to prevail over its members (so-called 'overrule') deserved special merit. It achieved the fourth place on the proposed ranking. If paired, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank reached distinct classifications. By those criteria employed, the World Bank appears to be slightly more used to democratizing processes than the Fund – a judgment based on their ability to share with policy stakeholders the underlying reasons for their decisions. Overall, the IMF and World Bank are neutral or deficient with regard to most of the indicators. Both received the grade <-1> for the 'overrule criterion', which leads to the inference that when member states have consolidated their positions, the two multilateral banks can do little to resist them (see Table 2).

The absence of a mechanism to weighing Zweifel's operational criteria for transnational democracy is noteworthy. There is no hierarchy among indicators for the calculation of the index, as they simply assume, in a somewhat vague and impressionistic manner, values ranging from '-1' (absence of democracy), to '+1' (presence of democracy). In this scale, '0' (zero) represents a dysfunctional democracy. Nonetheless, the unilinearity of indicators may distort the conclusions achieved, as there are certain elements that turn out to be more decisive than others for the functioning of democracy. For example, it might be claimed in defense of the United Nations that, in privileging the Security Council in this measurement exercise, the author jettisoned all political potentials from its General Assembly, making use of the proverbial technique to 'throw the baby out with the bathwater'.

More important than the index itself and the ranking elaborated by Thomas Zweifel are in fact those reflections they provoke on the subject. Beginning with the institutional conception of democracy the author evokes for his analysis. Arguably it is not precisely a transnational ontology what Zweifel delivers, since the author brings together many institutes

from domestic democracy as parameters. It seems inappropriate to expect that international courts and organizations be able to reproduce, in the same way as contemporary nation-states would, conventional democratic experiences, given the absence of a global polity or global demos. Although the gravest problem, in our view, lies not in the 'methodological statism' of the study, but in hardly comparable objects, so diverse as a court of justice, two multilateral banks, two global international organizations, and six regional international organizations (with rather discrepant levels of institutionalization and ambitions; see the cases of the EU and NAFTA). Albeit laudable per se, this broad comparative enterprise cannot fully achieve its heuristic objectives.[30]

Our judgment is that the debate on the democratization of international politics is decidedly something that is needed, not being afforded to Politics and IR academics the option to bypass it. Susan Marks succinctly stated the reasons for this – on the one side, the commitment to democracy has never been this disseminated throughout the world, on the other, never before has the awareness of its empirical limitations been so acute.[31]

In view of the literature, we insist on the need to assess the democratization of international politics from a variety of, both traditional and contemporary, analytical prisms. This will allow the understanding of how sovereign states and other important non-state actors formulate and reformulate the institutional paths to a more plural and open – and, in a very peculiar sense, more democratic – management of global governance, under conditions of structural anarchy. Contemporary political dynamics lead to membership enlargement in intergovernmental organizations and, by extension, help such institutions to globally project the values and rules that emerge from a process of normative construction whose cornerstones are the organizations themselves. Not to mention, of course, the hundreds – if not thousands – of non-governmental organizations, subnational governments, companies, individuals etc. that, since the early 1990s, have been gaining recognition and authorization to work within the arrangements of global governance, both on ad hoc basis and on regular advocacy networks.

[30] *Ibidem*.
[31] Marks, *op. cit.*

Moreover, with regard to intergovernmental organizations and international regimes, what in fact is at stake is less the ability to replicate the democratic formula (such as we know it) to tackle the problematic issues of the international agenda, and more the authority that such institutions are increasingly vested in to play the functions of global administration (even if not by democratic means). Therefore intergovernmental organizations and international regimes are both important political actors and meta-political spaces (that is, microcosms) of this 21st-century asymmetrical global governance.

## 4. 'Global democratization' via institutional contestation: the Brazilian formula for legitimacy

The behavior that stems from Brazilian foreign policy in the last couple of decades may be neatly described as *middlepowermanship*, a term that refers to the tendency of middle powers to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy.[32] Robert Keohane, in what is possibly one of the first scholarly accounts of middle powers in world politics, defines such countries as *system-affecting* ones, as they 'cannot hope to affect the [international] system acting alone [but] can nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances or through universal or regional international organizations.'[33] In the absence of abundant material capabilities, a country will rely on reputational goods and well-established legal frameworks as a means to reach the best outcomes in international relations, as well as to protect itself from the outside world – an IR perspective somewhat inspired by Hugo Grotius and his school of thought, known as 'rationalism' or 'Grotianism'.

---

[32] Andrew Cooper et al., *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993.

[33] Robert Keohane, "Lilliputians Dilemmas: small states in international politics" in *International Organizations*, vol. 23, 1969, p. 295.

Behind this line of reasoning, there might be a bet on the effective role of regulation played by international regimes, as long as they are believed to matter and influence international behavior by providing 'selective incentives' for a country to resort to multilateral institutional solutions rather than '*ad hoc*' unilateral policies.[34] By placing emphasis on institutional power instead of military and economic assets, Brazil assumes international institutions to function as proxies to 'raw power' disputes. It can work as a formula to borrow international prestige without incurring the risks and costs involved in 'great-power politics'.

A country like Brazil will manifest strong preferences for multilateral arrangements and collective decision-making processes as it proves an efficient way for burden-sharing and countering hegemonic intentions. There has always been in Brazilian foreign policy a deep sense of mistrust in regard to European colonial powers and, from the 19th century on, the United States. To assure Brazil's political independence and territorial integrity, Brazilian diplomats have often stressed the importance of a coherent multilateral diplomacy, on practical as well as on discursive grounds. In this sense, a peaceful diplomatic orientation could be rendered as 'niche diplomacy', a problem-solving approach based on sheer calculation, not an ideologically or morally-driven (Kantian) formula, that applies to controversies that would not be tackled otherwise. To paraphrase a quotation from San Tiago Dantas (a former Minister of External Relations in Brazil), in the absence of exceeding levels of material power, stability of principle becomes the strongest weapon of those militarily weak.[35]

Reputational assets have therefore been the cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy well before the country became a middle power. The shift from a purely diplomatic discourse to a more consistent set of practices, however, has arguably taken place in the last decade. For the first time, Brazil has made use of its credibility and quasi-universal empathy in the context of multilateralism to consistently push its interests forward and maximize 'soft' power attributes. In previous attempts at going global, the country was either too feeble and powerless (therefore falling short of having a say in world politics, such as in the case of Brazil's participation in the League of Nations), or too suspicious of international governance

[34] Olson, *op.cit.*

[35] San Tiago Dantas, *Política Externa Independente*, Brasília: Funag, 2011.

(therefore shying away from a greater engagement with the United Nations in the 1970s and early 1980s). The last decade saw the country pursue a more active diplomacy in various fields, including in matters of international security, making use of soft power as its primary foreign policy tool.[36]

A look at the current Brazilian experience is revealing of the behavior of middle powers. Following the constructivist argument advanced by Alexander Wendt, they are not defined solely by their material capabilities, but rather (and most importantly) by the perceived role they play in global affairs – or their social identities.[37] Rather than a straightforward label, *middlepowermanship* presents itself as a constructed concept, embedded in social structures that exist in practices and processes. That is why one must not just look at what countries say or have (in material terms), but at what they do. In the case of middle powers, they have historically placed multilateralism at the top of their agendas, and have usually adopted a cooperative stance toward international regimes and institutions. Brazil's activism in the realms of the WTO, the environmental and non-proliferation regimes, or peacekeeping operations (PKO) are good examples of how these identities ultimately shape behavior in world politics.

Whereas the constructivist approach to middle powers is a positive one, in the sense that it sees their behavior as the product of shared worldviews and identities, a realist understanding of *middlepowermanship* portrays multilateral activism and institutional engagement as a means to downplay the global supremacy of the US. In the backdrop lies a profound dissatisfaction with the unipolar structure of the international system. One may hence interpret the institutional strategies of middle powers as an attempt at balancing against America. If, according to Robert Pape, a direct confrontation with the world's only superpower may prove 'too costly for any individual state and too risky for multiple states operating together,'[38] then countries may resort to soft-balancing measures, that is, 'actions that

[36] L. B. Pereira, "Turkey, Brazil and New Geopolitics of the World", Bilgesam: Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies. Available at http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=437:turkey-brazil-and-new-geopolitics-of-the-world-&catid=89:analizler-latinamerika&Itemid=139, 2011.

[37] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics" in *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995.

[38] Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States" in *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005, p. 9.

do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies.'[39]

There seems to be a close link between the behavior of middle powers within international institutions – and towards one another – and such attempts at countering America's preponderance. Stephen Walt's definition of soft-balancing describes it as 'the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the balances did not give each other some degree of mutual support.'[40] Since this is a broader concept, which encompasses not just U.S. military policies but preferences by and large, it seems particularly useful to explain cooperative efforts between middle powers in nonmilitary arenas, and seems quite evident when linked to multilateral strategies.

But what may lead middle powers to soft balance against the US? In the words of Walt, this strategy can have at least four objectives. First and foremost, states may balance so as to increase their ability to stand up against US pressure – in political, economic, or military terms. Secondly, soft balancing comes at times as a way of improving states' bargaining position in international negotiations, be it related to a discrete issue or to broad institutional arrangements of global governance. Third, balancing may function as a warning to the US that it cannot rely upon the compliance of other countries. Finally, it may also operate as a means to become less dependent on US protection and aid, allowing for some states to chart their own course in world politics.[41] While all goals seem to make sense when looking at the behavior of middle powers in global affairs, the second one embodies the institutional strategy usually favored by such states, and the fourth one deals with the quest for autonomy – which is also a key aspect of middle power politics in general.

Regardless of the theoretical standpoint one adopts to understand the role middle powers play in international relations, there seems to be a conceptual common ground that may be summarized as follows: (1) historically, middle powers had no special place in regional blocs during

[39] *Ibidem*, p. 10.
[40] Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2005, p. 126.
[41] *Ibidem*, pp. 127-129.

the Cold War, but they were closely linked to the process of international organization;[42] (2) middle powers support the goals of international peace and security because they are ultimately interested in a stable and orderly environment;[43] (3) they try to build consensus around multilateral issues, such as non-proliferation or environmental protection, as a means to overcome their lack of material capabilities;[44] finally, (4) they base their demands in international institutions on a discourse of global justice and democratic multilateralism.[45]

The bottom line of the behavior of middle powers is thus the engagement in global governance. Their diplomatic narratives, especially in recent decades, have been built around the idea of international organization and the regimes that stem from institutional cooperation. Being an inseparable aspect of middle-power politics, it is now time to move to an examination of how global governance mechanisms were conceived of, and how Brazil has paved its way into such institutions.

### *4.1. United Nations Security Council*

When it comes to taking part in international security bodies as a permanent member, Brazil has been a long-time campaigner. Back in the 1920s, when the League of Nations (LON) was the world's ultimate multilateral resource to tentatively prevent a conflict among major powers, Brasília has persistently bid for a seat at the League of Nations' Council – the organ where life-or-death, war-or-peace decisions were taken. The legitimatizing argument of Brazil's diplomatic campaign was the absence of a representative from the Americas inside that body, as long as the United States' Senate didn't ratify the LON Pact. Based on this arguable representational deficit, Brazil offered to put itself into the US' shoes – what sounded then as a reasonable claim. Not that having Brazil among the permanent members (Italy, Great Britain, France, Japan, then Germany and finally the USSR) would have changed the LON's dramatic fate.

---

[42] Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship: Japan and the future of the world order", in R. Cox, T. Sinclair (eds), *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, p. 245.

[43] Daniel Flemes, "Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: state and perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum", *GIGA Working Papers*, no. 57, 2007, p. 10.

[44] *Ibidem*, p. 11.

[45] *Ibidem*, p. 24.

Against this background, the adoption of the UN Charter on October 24th 1945 gave birth to a (relatively) successful story. It was the launching of a complex system of intergovernmental agencies – an attempt to prevent another world war from happening. This system was headed by the United Nations (UN), an international organization (IO) designed to tackle the problems that had led the League of Nations into utter failure. The UN was founded by 51 member states. A decade later it had already reached 76 members. The following leap forward was even more impressive: as an outcome of the decolonization process (which the UN helped catalyze), it could count 144 members in 1975, almost twice as many participants as in 1955. The expansion went on and on, despite some pressure not to admit a few states as UN members. In its fiftieth anniversary (1995) the UN gathered no less than 185 members. Almost seven decades since its founding, the UN can claim the status of a 'semi-universal' membership, totaling 193 members. And what is more, there has never been a UN member permanent withdrawal from the institution. The only case of temporary withdrawal of a member state was Indonesia's, which after announcing it was leaving the organization on 20 January 1965, returned on 28 September 1966.[46]

The UN has accomplished the goal of transforming the otherwise reluctant US – a hegemon of the postwar order – into a member state. The UN institutional design benefited from learning with historical experience. Two key factors seem to explain why the UN has become more successful than the LON (1920-1946), especially when it comes to geographic representativeness. The first was the creation of a political body (the UN General Assembly) designed to contemplate all states recognized as such by the international community. This premise of strict equality among states implied express recognition of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other states, besides the application of the 'one state, one vote' principle over issues discussed within the scope of the UN General Assembly. This was perhaps the most important institutional innovation represented by the advent of the so-called San Francisco Organization.

The second decisive element for UN survival and increase of global coverage over time seems to be the composition of its Security Council (UNSC), the body directly entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining peace and security in the world. Instead of restricting its membership to

[46] United Nations, Data from the official website www.un.org, Access on 17 March, 2010.

Europeans (along the lines of the LON after 1933, and before that, the Holy Alliance from 1815 to 1825), the new Council proved able to contemplate by way of its mechanism of permanent representation three continents (America, Europe, and Asia) and after all did not neglect Africa and Oceania, although on a non-permanent basis. Furthermore, UN goals as stated by the Moscow Declaration (1943) envisaged a generalist (subject-wise) and quasi-universal (membership-wise) IO, conceived to embracing all 'peace-loving nations' in the world.[47] In addition to institutional improvements and the steep rise of UN member states in recent history, Nagendra Singh notes at the UN Charter an attempt to purge it [the UN] from all ethnocentrism that marked the LON's experience. The UN Charter brought provisions that would mitigate this trait, such as the principles of 'peoples' decolonization' and 'political independence with territorial integrity of member states.' Those changes in UN legal texts and political practices were guided by the need to expand the concept of 'international community' in order to attract more states to remain under the UN institutional umbrella.[48]

At the time of the UN foundation, Brazil had been seriously considered to take a permanent seat at the UNSC, because of its relevant participation in WWII as an official US ally since 1942, and as a member of the United Nations (the war alliance, not the formal organization).[49] Brazil's participation in war was primarily naval, although it did send a regiment to the Western Front. The navy and air force have had a role in the Battle of the Atlantic after mid-1942, but more importantly, Brazil contributed with an infantry division that entered combat on the Italian Front in 1944. Notwithstanding, by the time the world was being reconstructed in the aftermath of war, Brazil did not reap what it had allegedly sown, what can be told in light of the failure of its diplomatic campaign to grab a seat at the UNSC even now, more than six decades after the decisions made in San Francisco.[50] Unsurprisingly, that moment of Brazilian diplomatic history (the late 1940s) is currently known as the 'unrewarded alignment.'[51]

---

[47] Dawisson Belém-Lopes, *A ONU entre o Passado e o Futuro*, Curitiba: Appris, 2012.

[48] Nagendra Singh, "The UN and the Development of International Law" in Kingsbury, B. e Roberts, A. (org.), *United Nations, Divided World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

[49] Eugênio Garcia, *O Sexto Membro Permanente*, Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2012.

[50] João Vargas, *Campanha Permanente*, Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2009.

[51] Gerson, Moura, *O Alinhamento Sem Recompensa: a política externa do governo Dutra*, Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, 1990.

Briefly speaking, when the UN was still being thought of, namely at the high-level conferences that happened before the one in San Francisco (in Tehran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and Potsdam), a regionalistic approach toward UNSC membership gained momentum as the proposal of granting Brazil a permanent seat at the Council has been openly supported by U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.[52] By 1944, it was not clear yet which would be the new 'guardians' of the emerging world order – the US, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union… Who else? If a regionalistic criterion were to have conquered hearts and minds, Brazil would have probably been included as a UNSC founder and permanent seater, inasmuch as it was the most important South American ally of the U.S. in 1945 (not to mention that Argentina was raising concerns due to its proximity with the Axis countries in and after WWII, and should be balanced and even contained by Brasília).

However, the prospects that Brazil would serve as a regional watchdog and unconditional ally to the US provoked negative reactions both in the UK and USSR diplomatic personnel. That move was interpreted as an American maneuver to double its voting weight at the UNSC, as Brazil was expected to replicate American positions. It is arguable that the UK – a decaying empire then – feared being overshadowed by an emerging South American country, and the USSR did not want the US to have majority control of the votes in the Council. In the end, a regionalistic approach was replaced by the argument in favor of having great powers in the lead, because they would theoretically be better equipped (by military and economic rankings) to bear the burden of maintaining peace and security around the world. The US delegation let it go. No sooner than June 1945 had the UNSC defined its permanent membership: the countries to take the five seats were great powers (US, Soviet Union) and 'quasi' or 'had-been' powers (China, France, UK). The regional formula was first neglected, then abandoned once and for all.[53] Veto power, an instrument whose legal status and scope was not fully settled in the UN early years, soon became a practical reality. Brazil, in spite of almost having become the sixth permanent member at the UNSC foundation, did not and probably

[52] Garcia, *op. cit.*

[53] Garcia, *op. cit.*; Vargas, *op. cit.*

will not get the slot any time soon, given its regionally-grounded middle power profile.

Today, Brazil is no longer the 'gentle giant' it used to be. There has been considerable increase in military expenditure during the last 20 years and a mounting interest for international politics among Brazilian presidents ever since Cardoso's coming into power. But there are important nuances in this position. President Rousseff has recently reinforced Brazil's commitment to the idea of 'Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)' rather than endorsing 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P)' doctrine (also known as 'Ban Ki-moon doctrine'). Given that Brazilian foreign policy has always relied upon the long-standing principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, it has underlined that the use of force on the grounds of humanitarian intervention undermine the very rationale of the UN system, since there are no legal provisions in the UN Charter that allow the use of force in such scenarios.

After the development of the 'R2P doctrine' after the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was published and, chiefly, through its adoption by the 2005 World Summit and Resolution 60/1 of the UN General Assembly, Brazil has endeavored to limit its scope. It has also stressed the prevalence of non-coercive and diplomatic measures (R2P's second pillar) and, thus, has drawn attention to the subsidiary and last-resource character of military intervention (R2P's third pillar).

Brazil has pointed out, moreover, that the use of force based on R2P must be discharged in accordance with international humanitarian law, human rights law, and the rules regarding the use of force (*jus ad bellum*), since these actions should not worsen the conflicts and do harm to the civilian population. Consequently, the Brazilian reasoning has led to the development of the concept of RwP, which aims to show the importance of complying with a rather strict legal framework during these operations.

Brazil has set forth, likewise, the importance of reform in the structure of the UNSC so as to incorporate, as permanent members, developing states from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. Pursuant to the Brazilian position, the role of the UNSC in the R2P issue is essential, inasmuch as it must authorize all actions and ensure accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force in cases that they breach international Law.

Besides, participating in the UN PKO in Haiti represents a shift in Brazilian foreign policy since it indicates that, although the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention still play a pivotal role in its foreign policy, Brazil has perceived that these international rules must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the idea of 'non-indifference.'[54] This notion might be defined, from a Brazilian perspective, as the willingness to provide assistance, mainly in terms of diplomacy, when required, and when a state deems it pertinent, so as to settle a political or social crisis.

All in all, it means Brazil will neither simply bandwagon the efforts of traditional oligarchic world powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China) nor emulate the positions taken by emerging military powers (Turkey, South Africa, India etc.). Its position will be carefully crafted so as to sound authoritative and nationalistic rather than merely guided by the balance-of-power logic. Claims are that Brazil will avoid at all cost the label of 'regional leader' inasmuch as it can be wrongly taken for nurturing sub-imperialistic intentions towards its neighbors.[55] However, speeches often made by governmental officials emphasize Brazilian 'natural candidacy' to seizing a seat in the event of the UNSC expansion/reform. At a slow pace, Brazil is engaging in issues/regions that did not otherwise belong to its top foreign policy priorities (Central America and the Caribbean, Middle East etc.).

Overall, Brazil displays pacifist diplomacy, reliant on the idea of 'consensual hegemony' over South America, with a grain of light revisionism toward international security institutions. Its low military potentials combine with a persistent bid for UNSC reform (even if it comes with no veto power), as long as it should contemplate Brazil. One could also cite as an important aspect of Brazilian foreign policy nowadays its half-hearted advocacy for human rights (especially after Cardoso's government).

#### *4.1.1. International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization*

The Brazilian participation at the Bretton Woods (BW) Conference in 1944 – and afterwards, when GATT (WTO), IMF, and IBRD developed into the 3 most important multilateral economic institutions of the world –

[54] Amorim, *op.cit.*

[55] Sean Burges, "Consensual Hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War", *International Relations*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008.

can serve as a useful 'proxy' indicator, and lead to a better understanding of the country's actual standing in the international system by the 1940s.

According to John Ruggie, the GATT was one of the pillars for the BW institutional tripod (alongside the IBRD and the IMF), whose implicit goal was to instill liberal contents in international economic relations after WWII. The US and Western European countries (the USSR did not join IMF and the WB when they were founded) sponsored the creation of IOs whose mandate involved liberalizing trade and finances and preventing serious balance-of-payment crises in major debtor states, thereby setting the levers of governance for a powerful economic governance machine. The concept of 'embedded liberalism' relies both on an abstract element (the wide acceptance of 'liberal virtues' in Western countries) and the institutional structures of coercion (mainly represented by the BW institutional tripod).[56] Two other functions of that institutional arrangement would be to spur international trade flows and assure that WWII debts would get paid one day, given that military victors coincided with economic creditors.[57]

By the time Bretton Woods Conference was held in the US, Brazil was still an agrarian country trying to make its way into modernity. Only 1 out of 5 Brazilians lived in urban areas in the early 1940s. It was a highly indebted nation whose economy was reliant on primary-sector activities and commodity exports after all. Under the aegis of *Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/ECLAC*-biased 'developmentalist' economic thought (which meant an option to prioritize internal market dynamics and the so-called import-substitution orientation instead of becoming an export-led economy), South American countries aspired to break the 'center/periphery' structural ties and confront economic status quo – seen as quite unfavorable to the poorest.

In the aftermath of WWII, Brazil was much closer to qualifying as an international receiver of donations and a candidate for loans than as a country with interests at stake in the global financial architecture. Contrary to what would happen in San Francisco in 1945, in the economic realm the Brazilian government used to position itself as an underdog with no

[56] John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization*, Volume 36, Issue 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982), pp. 379-415, 1982.
[57] Sylvia Nasar, *A Imaginação Econômica*, São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

consistent bid or role to play but to follow the capitalist paymasters (of course, with the US taking the lead). Apart from vested interests from a few industrials, bankers, economists, and diplomats (but hardly from incumbent politicians), Brazilian civil society could not properly realize what was going on in Bretton Woods, nor in Havana or Geneva.[58]

Such peripheral participation in drawing the lines of a global economic governance schema – which eventually proved to be a most powerful economic leverage tool – is a precondition to fully grasping how Brazil became under-represented and marginalized within the ambit of BW institutions over the decades. Yet to make things worse, Brazil (and Latin America as a whole) has never been contemplated by a Marshall Plan or the like, what certainly help explain why the expression 'unrewarded alignment' so well translates the Brazilian foreign policy for the postwar period.

In the wake of the 1990s, the BW system was in high demand. In the year the Maastricht Treaty turned the European communities into a European Union, the IMF and the WB started fostering transition from real socialism to utopian liberalism in post-Iron Curtain region. Those organs were also responsible for husbanding the aftermath of Latin American's 1980s crash (after the 1987 Brady Plan), including Brazil, which defaulted not only once, but twice during the decade. BW' organs even indulged in post-conflict reconstruction (what 'An Agenda for Peace' tentatively called 'peacebuilding') elsewhere.[59] By 1994 GATT's Uruguay round gave way to a WTO undreamed of since WWII (1948 International Trade Organization succumbed to Cold War vicissitudes). The newborn IO would from its inception bear sanctioning power on member states. That was an IO, therefore, 'with teeth,' somehow closer to the UNSC than to loose arrangements such as GATT.

However, the WTO's position gradually eroded as a result of the massive anti-globalization protest activity surrounding its Ministerial Conference at the Washington State Convention and Trade Center in

[58] Rogério Farias, 'Industriais, economistas e diplomatas: o Brasil e as negociações comerciais multilaterais (1946-1967)', Doctoral thesis, International Relations Graduation Program, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2012.

[59] Carlos Gama, "Bridge over Troubled Waters: United Nations, Peace Operations and Human Security", *Journal of Human Security*, v.5, pp. 9-31, 2009.

Seattle, Washington, in December 1999. UNCTAD X, the tenth session of the Conference held in Bangkok in February 2000, proved a good opportunity to make a conceptual contribution to the 'post-Seattle scenario' and the re-establishment of the developing countries' confidence in the multilateral trading system. UNCTAD's contribution eventually helped pave the way for launching a new WTO round of negotiations in Doha in November 2001, whose specific goal was to address the issues of developing countries in a so-called Development Agenda for Trade Negotiations. Circumstances had nonetheless dramatically changed as a result of the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September. While politics and economics were mutually reinforcing, trade barriers were being rebuilt. Wars were fought in Afghanistan and Iraq and dangerous confrontations took place around the globe, almost all of them involving the US and its Western allies. It is against the background of this shift in international security and its strong impact on international trade and development opportunities that one can accurately apprehend the case of Brazil.

Talks on a 'new global financial architecture' have spread from the 2000s on, especially after the events that led to the ongoing financial crisis in Europe and the US. They have drawn Brazil's attention and fueled its ambitions to revising the world order in a way it would benefit from its economic coming of age. After all, in a scenario where old powerhouses failed to deliver prosperity and a glimmer of hope, the rising powers – BRICS *inter alia* – have filled this gap, allowing the economy not to stall, and then claiming their institutional rewards (e.g., a revision of the IMF quota system that would acknowledge developing countries' growing importance for the world economy). Brazil, once a borrower, suddenly became a lender to the IMF, during the second presidential mandate of Lula da Silva. That comes wrapped in a new discourse that celebrates the virtues of 'democratization' and 'pluralization' among the nations, not to mention the Brazilian government's stance for developmental economics, making the country a 'state capitalism' ideologue according to some critics (cf. The Economist, "The rise of state capitalism", 21/01/2012).

**FIGURE 1:** Cases involving Brazil at the WTO Dispute Settlement System




Source: WTO Official Website (as of February 2013).

This call for revisionism on Bretton Woods' apparatuses has its most concrete manifestation inside the WTO, at the level of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This is the place where Brazil and many developing countries (like India and Argentina) voice out their concerns and reclaim their rights, whenever a country doesn't play by the rules of international commerce. Brazil is a major user of WTO Dispute Settlement system and an arbitration champion, both as complainant and respondent (see Figure 1). Informally, Brazil is a political leader in trade negotiations – heading, alongside with China and India, the recently founded G-20 (a group of states with convergent interests in world commerce). In addition, it can be stated that Brazil, India, and China have replaced Japan and Canada as the most important developing states to prevent a stalemate in WTO Doha Round. Together with the US and the European Union, they are the world trade regime's centerpieces today. Besides, Brazil's expertise on WTO issues has more than once accredited Brazilian candidates to run for office

at WTO. The latest bet is Ambassador Roberto Azevedo, a Brazilian diplomat whose knowledge of WTO bureaucracy and world trade are believed to make him a good name to succeed Pascal Lamy.

## Bibliography


1. Abbott, Kenneth; Snidal, Duncan (1997), "Why states act through formal international organizations?" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
2. Alger, Coate (2010), "Expanding Governmental Diversity in Global Governance" in *Global Governance* 16, 2010, 59-79.
3. Amorim, Celso (2011a), "Discurso por ocasião da transmissão do cargo de ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores", in: Amorim, C. *Discursos, Palestras e Artigos do Chanceler Celso Amorim: 2003-2010*. Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores.
4. Amorim, Celso (2011b), "Brazil and the Middle East", *Cairo Review*.
5. Auvachez, Elise (2009), "Supranational citizenship building and the United Nations" in *Global Governance*, 15, 43-57.
6. Barbé, Ester (2008), *Relaciones Internacionales*, Madri, Tecnos.
7. Barnett, Michael; Finnemore, Martha (2004), *Rules for the World*, Cornell University Press.
8. Barral, Welber (org.) (2007), *Solução de Controvérsias na Organização Mundial do Comércio*, Brasília: Funag.
9. Barton, John et al. (2006), *The Evolution of the Trade Regime*, Princeton University Press.
10. Belém-Lopes, Dawisson (2007), "A ONU tem autoridade?" in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, v. 50, n. 1.
11. Belém-Lopes, Dawisson (2012), *A ONU entre o Passado e o Futuro*, Curitiba, Appris.
12. Belém-Lopes, Dawisson; Casarões, Guilherme (2010), "Can International Organizations Be Democratic? Rethinking Robert Dahl's Skeptical Argument". Trabalho apresentado no 60º Encontro Anual da Associação de Estudos Políticos do Reino Unido (UK PSA). Edimburgo, Escócia, março/abril de 2010.

13. Belém-Lopes, Dawisson; Gama, Carlos (2009), "'Bem me queres, mal me queres': ambivalência discursiva na avaliação canônica do desempenho da ONU", *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, v. 17, n. 33.
14. Bexell, Magdalena; Tallberg, Jonas; Uhlin, Anders (2010), "Democracy in Global Governance", *Global Governance*, n. 16, 81-101.
15. Blank, S.J. (2010), "Russia's Prospects in Asia", Retrieved from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1032.pdf, Access on 31 January 2012.
16. Bull, Hedley (1977), *The Anarchical Society*, Londres, Macmillan.
17. Burges, Sean (2008), "Consensual Hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War" in *International Relations*, vol. 22, no. 1.
18. Carranza, M. E. (2003), "Can Mercosur survive? Domestic and international constraints on Mercosu" in *Latin American Politics and Society*, v. 45, n. 2.
19. Carvalho, Maria (2010), "Condicionantes internacionais e domésticos: o Brasil e o G-20 nas negociações agrícolas da Rodada Doha", *Dados*, vol. 53, no. 2.
20. Chari, C. (2010), *Superpower Rivalry and Conflict - The Long Shadow of the twenty-first century,* London, Routledge.
21. Claude, Inis (1956), *Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international organization*, Nova York: Random House.
22. Cooper, Andrew et al. (1993), *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
23. Couto, Cláudio and Abrucio, Fernando (2003), "O Segundo Governo FHC: coalizões, agendas e instituições" in *Tempo Social*, vol. 15, no. 2.
24. Cox, Robert (1996), "Middlepowermanship: Japan and the future of the world order" in Cox, R. and Sinclair, T. (eds), *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: CUP.
25. Dahl, Robert (1999), "Can international organizations be democratic? A skeptic's view" in Shapiro, I. and Hacker-Cordón, C. (eds.), *Democracy's Edges*, Cambridge: CUP.
26. Dahl, Robert (2005), *Poliarquia*, São Paulo: Edusp.

27. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1999), "The Third Way and liberty" in *Foreign Affairs* 78, n. 5 (September/October), pp. 13-17.
28. Dantas, San Tiago (2011), *Política Externa Independente*, Brasília, Funag.
29. Drezner, D. (2010), *The Tragedy of the Global Institutional Commons*, Retrieved from http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/InstitutionalProliferation.pdf, Access on 17 March 2013.
30. Elster, Jon (2007), *Explaining Social Behavior*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press.
31. Farias, Rogério (2012), 'Industriais, economistas e diplomatas: o Brasil e as negociações comerciais multilaterais (1946-1967)'. Doctoral thesis, International Relations Graduation Program, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2012.
32. Flemes, Daniel (2007), "Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: state and perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum", *GIGA Working Papers*, no. 57.
33. Flemes, Daniel (2010), "O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança?" in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 53, no. 1.
34. Fonseca Jr., Gelson (2008), *O Interesse e a Regra*, São Paulo: Ed. Paz e Terra.
35. Gama, Carlos (2009), "Bridge over Troubled Waters: United Nations, Peace Operations and Human Security" in *Journal of Human Security*, v.5, 9-31.
36. Garcia, Eugênio (2012), *O Sexto Membro Permanente*, Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto.
37. Gonçalves, Williams (2011), "Panorama da Política Externa Brasileira no governo Lula da Silva", in Freixo A. et al. (orgs.), *A política externa brasileira na era Lula: um balanço*, Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri.
38. Habermas, Jürgen (1998), *La Constelación Posnacional*, Barcelona, Paidós.
39. Hague, Rod and Harrop, Martin (2004), *Comparative Government and Politics*, New York, Palgrave.
40. Hall, Rodney and Biersteker, Thomas (2002), *The Emergence of Private Authority*, Cambridge, CUP.

41. Hardin, Garrett (1968), "The Tragedy of the Commons" in *Science*, New Series, Vol. 162, No. 3859. (Dec. 13, 1968), 1243-1248.
42. Hasenclever, Rittberger et al. (1997), *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge: CUP.
43. Hawkins, Darren et al. (org.) (2006), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge: CUP.
44. Held, David (2004), *Global Covenant*, Oxford: Polity Press.
45. Hermet, Guy (2001), "A democratização dos países emergentes e as relações entre o Estado, as OIGs e as ONGs" in Milani, C. et al. (org.), *Democracia e Governança Mundial*, Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade (UFRGS).
46. Hoekman, Bernard and Mavroidis, Petros (2007), *WTO: Law, Economics, and Politics*, New York: Routledge.
47. Howse, Robert (2001), "The legitimacy of the World Trade Organization" in Coicaud, J.-M. e Heiskanen, V. (org.), *op. cit*.
48. Hurrell, Andrew (2008), "Lula's Brazil: a rising power, but going where?" in *Current History*, February.
49. International Monetary Fund (2013), Data from the official website www.imf.br, Access on 17 March 2013.
50. Jacobson, Harold (1979), *Networks of Interdependence*, New York: Alfred Knopf.
51. Jain, S.C. (2006), *Emerging Economies and the Transformation of International Business - Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs)*, Northampton: Edward Elgar.
52. Kahler, Miles (1992), "Multilateralism with small and large numbers" in *International Organization*, 46 (3).
53. Karns, Margarth and Mingst, Karen (2004), *International Organizations*, London: Rienner.
54. Kazancigil, Ali (2001), "A regulação social e a governança democrática da globalização" in Milani, C. et al. (org.), *op. cit*.
55. Keck, Margareth (2004), "Governance Regimes and the Politics of Discursive Representation" in Piper, N. e Uhlin, A. (org.), *Transnational Activism in Asia*, Londres: Routledge.

56. Kennedy, Paul (2007), *The Parliament of Man*, New York: Random House.
57. Keohane, Robert (1969), "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: small states in international politics" in *International Organization*, vol. 23.
58. Keohane, Robert (1984), *After Hegemony*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
59. Keohane, Robert et al. (2009), "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism" in *International Organization*, n. 63, pp. 1-31.
60. Krasner, Stephen (org.) (1983), *International Regimes*, Stanford: Stanford University.
61. Kurlantzick, J. (2007), *Charm Offensive - How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, Yale: Yale University Press.
62. Li, M (2009), *Soft Power - China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, New York: Lexington.
63. Lima, Maria; Hirst, Monica (2006), "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities" in *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1.
64. Mackinnon, A. and Powell, B. (2008), *China Calling: A Foot in the Global Door*, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
65. Marchetti, Rafaelle (2012), "Modeling Transnational Politics". Paper apresentado no 22º Congresso Mundial da Associação Internacional de Ciência Política (IPSA). Madrid, Espanha, julho de 2012.
66. Marks, Susan (2001), "Democracy and international governance" in Coicaud, J.-M. e Heiskanen, V. (org.), *The Legitimacy of International Organizations*, Tóquio: UNU.
67. Moura Gerson (1990), *O Alinhamento Sem Recompensa: a política externa do governo Dutra*, Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil.
68. Nasar, Sylvia (2012), *A Imaginação Econômica*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras.
69. O'Brien, Robert et al. (2000), *Contesting Global Governance*, Cambridge: CUP.
70. Oliveira, Amancio et al. (2006), "Coalizões Sul-Sul e Multilateralismo: Índia, Brasil e África do Sul," *Contexto Internacional*, vol. 28, no. 2.

71. Oliveira, Marcelo (2005), "Alianças e coalizões internacionais do governo Lula: o Ibas e o G-20,", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 48, no. 2.
72. Onuf, Nicholas (1998), *The republican legacy in international thought*, Cambridge: CUP.
73. Pape, Robert (2005), "Soft Balancing against the United States" in *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 1.
74. Pecequilo, Cristina (2010), "A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US relations in Lula's presidency (2003-2010)" in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 53, special edition.
75. Pereira, João (2010), *O Banco Mundial como Ator Político, Intelectual e Financeiro*, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.
76. Pereira, L. B. (2011), "Turkey, Brazil and New Geopolitics of the World", Bilgesam: Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies, Available at http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=437:turkey-brazil-and-new-geopolitics-of-the-world-&catid=89:analizler-latinamerika&Itemid=139.
77. Peterson, M. J. (2009), *The UN General Assembly*, Londres: Routledge.
78. Pieterse, J.N. and Rehbein, B. (2009), *Emerging Societies - Development and Inequality*, Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan.
79. Ramamurti, R. and Singh, J.V. (2009), *Emerging Multinationals in Emerging Markets*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
80. Reis, Fabio (2010), "Democracia, política externa e relevância" in *Política Externa*, São Paulo, Ed. Paz e Terra, set/out/nov 2010.
81. Rosenau, James and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (1992), *Governança sem Governo*, Brasília: Editora UnB.
82. Ruggie, John (1982), "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization*, Volume 36, Issue 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982), 379-415.
83. Ruggie, John (1993), *Multilateralism matters – The theory and praxis of an institutional form*, Columbia: Columbia University Press.
84. Saraiva, José (2010), "The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy" in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 53, special edition.

85. Singer, Peter (2004), *Um Só Mundo*, São Paulo, Martins Fontes.
86. Singh, Nagendra (2003), "The UN and the Development of International Law" in Kingsbury, B. e Roberts, A. (org.), *United Nations, Divided World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
87. United Nations (2010), Data from the official website www.un.org, Access on 17 March 2010.
88. Vargas, João (2009), *Campanha Permanente*, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.
89. Vieira, Marco and Alden, Chris (2011), "India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA): South-South cooperation and the paradox of regional leadership", *Global Governance* 17.
90. Vigevani, Tullo and Cepaluni, Gabriel (2007), "Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification" in *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 1.
91. Vigevani, Tullo et al. (2003), "Política Externa no Governo FHC: a busca da autonomia pela integração" in *Tempo Social*, vol. 15, no. 2.
92. Visentini, Paulo (2011), "Brazil's Contemporary Foreign Policy: an affirmative agenda". In Hofmeister, W. (ed). *G20: perceptions and perspectives for global governance*, Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
93. Vreeland, James (2007), *The International Monetary Fund*, London and New York: Routledge.
94. Wade, R.H. (2011), "Emerging World Order - From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank and IMF" in *Politics and Society*, 39, 347-369.
95. Walt, Stephen (2005), *Taming American Power*, New York: W.W. Norton.
96. Waltz, Kenneth (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill.
97. Wendt, Alexander (1995), "Constructing International Politics" in *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1.
98. Wendt, Alexander (1996), *Social Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge: CUP.
99. Wight, Martin (1966), "Why is there no international theory?", in Wight, M. e Butterfield, H. (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, London, Unwin.

100. Woods, Ngaire (2006), *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
101. World Bank (2013), Data from the official website www.worldbank.org, Access on 17 March 2013.
102. World Trade Organization (2013), Data from the official website www.wto.org, Access on 17 March 2013.
103. Young, Oran (1999), *Governance in World Affairs*, Cornell University Press.
104. Zweifel, Thomas (2006), *International Organizations and Democracy*, Londres: Lynne Rienner Publishers.