

THE POLITICAL EXILE OF ROMANIAN SCHOLARS IN ITALY

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Abstract:

The existentialism of the other Romania, or of the alternative Romania, as the Romanian scholars themselves named it, is shaped around three main markers: the political, the cultural or the spiritual resistance towards the communist regime of the native country. This was an assumed resistance, resulting in the attributes, the purposes, the ideals or the fears of the exile. It also meant the sensible shades of unity existent in the Romanian communities and, of course, the perspectives of identity redefining in the destination country as well as the care for conserving Romanian-ism, especially after the '50s, when the prolonging of the exile period became more and more evident.

Keywords: exile, resistance, identity, anti-communist militants, refugees, communist regime.

In the once a while ago Paris, Mircea Eliade was talking about the role of the Romanian exile as being “a cultural role played in the human civilization, which has to be recognized and shared in the same way as all other great diaspora – the Hebrews, the Armenian – recognized and shared theirs and continue to do it”¹. It is a known fact that the *catharsis* of the forms of exile arose from the Romanian people’s philosophy of the sacred, it being nothing else but “the revelation of the real”².

In Italy, the same as in other countries with relevant Romanian participation, the exile of Romanian scholars was expressed by the attempts of political organization, reflected in the structure of the Romanian National Council,

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¹ Titus Bărbulescu, *Ființa neamului românesc*, Bucharest: Vestala, 2005, p. 184.

² *Ibidem*.

but also by a trend of deep cultural rediscovery. The peculiarities of the Italian political system after the war, but also the reticence towards the political problems of East Europe, abandoned more and more to the claws of Russian power, in the attempt to shield the Western values from the peril of the “red” ideology, did not encourage a political organization of the Romanians, similar to those occurring in the United States of America, France or Spain. Better settled in time and space, the resistance by culture gathered at Rome, around the Society of the Romanian Academy, an alternative academy, free and competent, along with significant personalities of the Romanian culture in exile, from Mircea Eliade, Monica Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca, Dinu Adameșteanu, Vintilă Horia, Ovidiu Bârlea to Gheorghe Caragață, Teodor Onciulescu, Mircea Popescu, Paul Miron or to some Italian close collaborators, such as Bruno Manzone, the ex director of the Italian Institute of Culture of Bucharest.

Thus, the fight in the exile undergone, concomitantly with the changes in the international frame, more metamorphoses: the first wave, in between 1945-1953 being known as the anti-totalitarian Romanian exile, bore the hope of changing the Communist regime, seeing the political resistance as predominant and expressed by memoirs, protests, resistance or social organizations; the second wave, in between 1954-1968, was the stage of a new period of waiting for the defeat of Communism and last but not least, the third wave, in between 1968-1989, was the stage of the “spring” of lost hopes.

Regarding the helplessness of the Romanian communities in exile to organize themselves in unity we must say that this was reflected also upon the group of scholars established in Italy, their cultural and political preferences being dominated by vanity and lack of credibility despite the efforts, often successful, to communicate with the scholars from other countries of Europe or America. Much more, some of them, once out of the communist influence, did not continue to spread the anti-communist spirit, after signing the Faustian pact with the Securitate (the Romanian Secret Service), while others refused to let go of the past, of the traditions, of the origins, in their strive to acquire a second identity, some of them, especially the ones who ran away during the second and third wave, choosing to keep the double citizenship.

The Securitate documents, which exist in the CNSAS (the National Council for the Studying of the Securitate Archives) archives, refer to a series of aspects which allowed the political institution to radiograph the state of being of the Romanian exile and to indicate the strategy of the anti-exile fight. Some of the

most daring monitoring were the ones regarding the institutionalization of the exile in its extent, the political social or professional configuration of the groups, the relationships from within, the level of anti-communist involvement of their members, the activity and the role of the elite. Due to the fact that the informative activity of the Securitate abroad was strictly related to the functions and to the organization of the exile, SIE (External Intelligence Service) focused mainly on the political exile and on the anti-communist militants, who expressed themselves by speeches and effective actions against the dictatorship regime from Bucharest.

The anti-totalitarian political exile was mainly formed by ex members of the diplomatic and consular body abroad, who remained outside Romania after August 23, 1945, when they did not answer Petru Groza's request to return to the homeland, thus consolidating the exile and giving it an anti-communist dimension. The same as it happened in France, in the Great Britain and overseas in the United States of America, Italy offered asylum to a significant number of ex-diplomats, politicians and scholars who asked for political asylum, the CNSAS indicating the Securitate's concern for the Romanian community from the Italian peninsula and even for the social and political reality in Italy.

The years of terror and repression following the installation of the communist regime were followed by the deceiving de-Stalinisation period, which started in 1955, two years after Stalin's death, by decree 253, which promulgated the initiative of repatriation of the Romanians remaining in the Western countries after World War II³; all these occurred on the background of the geopolitical reality of Romania being accepted into the UN and as a consequence it was shaping its entrance on the international political stage⁴. In such internal and international context, on October 25, 1955, the Securitate opened by Direction I, the problematic dossier 779, which took under analysis "the unification attempt of the resistance from Italy"⁵. The document did not explicitly expose the problem of attracting the exiled on the part of the regime, but it inventoried with extremely "meticulous" ideological spirit the evolution of the phenomenon of the anti-communist resistance in Italy, having as a landmark to chronologically depict the action of the exile at that moment represented by August 23, 1944. The stress was

³ Nicolae Petcu, "Problema repatrierii mitropolitului Visarion Puiu reflectată în documentele securității", in *Caietele CNSAS*, Bucharest, year II, no. 2 (4) 2009, p. 229.

⁴ Ion Calafeteanu, *Exilul românesc. Erodarea speranței. Documente (1951-1975)*, Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 333-339, 341-348.

⁵ Archives CNSAS (ACNSAS), Bucharest, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 7.

upon the radiography of the political activity but also on following the ecclesiastical and cultural movements, especially derived on political orientation and on the degree of involvement of the exiled, which either established in Italy before 1944 or after the end of the war, when they found it proper to “act intensely against the interests of the RPR (Romanian Popular Republic)”⁶. Actually, despite the multiple corrupted, lapidary or inexact formulations, the text was realistically recording the fact that the fleeing “elements” “contributed to the formation of a reactionary Romanian movement in Italy, with all the contradictions [...] and interests of each of those, [being nevertheless] united amongst them by the hatred bore to the popular democratic regime”, the anti-communism constituting the essence of the Romanian exile, or, better said, the common thread of all its manifestations, even if not all the participants continued to be vigilant, critical and awake up to the very end.

According to the DIE (External Information Bureau) estimations, the number of Romanian colonies in the Italian territory reached a few thousands in the '50s, out of which only a small part represented the population established in Italy before August 23, 1944, that is the merchants, the ministries officials, the Romanian language and literature foreign lecturers and the diplomacy of the “old bourgeois diplomacy”, starting with Vasile Grigorcea, the lyrical artists present at the La Scala opera theatre of Milan, such as Toma Spătaru, Ionel Perlea and Puiu Cucu, as well as members of the Romanian Academy from Rome, all advocates of a “shameless political action” towards Bucharest and thus favourable to the “past regimes”⁷.

In the first decade after the end of the war, the Securitate appreciated, realistically, the fact that the majority of the exiled were, from a social point of view, scholars, then in a lesser measure merchants, businessmen and last but not least workers, which were almost insignificant in numbers. Of course there were also the priests, driven either by the “Anglo-American imperialist interests”, or by the Italian ones, of the Vatican. The political orientation, or, better said, the political tagging, was the most important element in the documents of the repressive institution of the Romanian State, from the general tag of political refugee to the tag of legionary, which were particularly targeted, members of the National Peasants' Party, liberals or social democrats, the diplomats also belonging to a special category, that of the “reactionary trends” and which, even if not all of them

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 94.

⁷ *Ibidem*, ff. 92-93.

belonged to a political party, "maintain an unfavourable atmosphere towards the homeland regime"⁸.

The political resistance of the Italian exile was initiated and configured by the Romanian diplomats from the peninsula. From a political party's point of view, the main power was detained by the members of the National Peasants' Party which were the majority and then, in a lesser measure by the liberals and social democrats that had fewer personalities with significant say, reality reflected by the Securitate documents. In the area of diplomatic representation, the documents of the communist regime especially targeted the following diplomats: Alexandru Gregorian, Vasile Grigorcea and Teodor Scoteșcu, but also Augustin Popa, theologian, journalist and ex Romanian parliamentarian, who was not also a diplomat, contrary to the Securitate classification, but who fraternised, during his exile in Paris and in London, with the members of the Yugoslavian National Peasants' Party and respectively with the Monsignor Aloisie Tăutu and with the linguist Sever Pop, who accomplished with their ecclesiastical and cultural representation attributes. For Alexandru Gregorian, press consultant in between 1940-1944 at the Romanian Diplomatic Bureau from Venice, the anti-communist fight was reflected in the eight years of Italian exile especially in his journalist work from Radio Rome and Radio Free Europe, where he was director of the Romanian language department. In his turn, Vasile Grigorcea, Iuliu Maniu's representative in Rome, held also important functions, including leadership functions, in the architecture of the Romanian exile. In which regards the good collaboration with the Vatican and particularly with cardinal Tisserand, this was a natural consequence of the diplomatic mission that Grigorcea had in between November 1940 - August 1941 and October 1943 - January 1st, 1946, when, as plenipotentiary minister in Vatican, he negotiated the relationship of the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church with the Pontifical Forum, his replacement in 1941 with general Dănilă Papp actually upsetting the Vatican. Following the same logic of the relationships with the pontifical institution, Teodor Scoteșcu represented Romania at the Vatican in between 1942-1944, and Augustin Popa, became during 1945-1948 (?), the period of his Italian exile, predecessor of Iuliu Maniu and the leader of the Manist trend in the peninsula "Maniu's representative at the Vatican"⁹.

⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 96.

⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 112.

In fact, we can undoubtedly affirm that in such climate of the attempt to politically exist, the majority of the exiled appealed to the philosophy of national unity promoted by Iuliu Maniu, about which they said, as the documents of the communist regime critically show, it was “the only element which could maintain the equilibrium of powers between the labour parties and Romanian bourgeoisie”.

“The subversive fight” against the communist regime and “the united resistance from abroad” initiated in the Manist spirit, by the involvement of the diplomats and of the ex members of the political parties had different intensities by the middle of the '50s, when it started to become more and more evident the fact that neither the governments of the western states nor the public opinion from Eastern Europe was willing to sustain the cause of democracy in the states dominated by communist regimes. In 1946, Grigore Gafencu was Minister of External Affairs (1938-1940) and ambassador of Romania at Moscow (1940-1941), and contacted the “resistance from Italy”, as the Securitate documents show, sustaining Vasile Grigorcea in elaborating the memoriam which was supposed to be sent to the Great Powers in the occasion of the Paris Peace Conference. Both the ex diplomats and the diplomats on the role at that time “agreed with the propaganda hostile to the communist regime” refusing to consider themselves “representatives of the government, but they did consider themselves Maniu’s people”¹⁰.

In February 1947, Grigore Niculescu-Buzești, ex Minister of External Affairs in the Sănătescu government (August 23 – November 2nd, 1944) designated by Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Brătianu and Titel Petrescu as representative of the abroad opposition, participated to the “reaction Conference of Geneva” together with Grigore Gafencu and Augustin Popa, the representatives of the Romanian exiled from Italy. At that time the communication between the opposition from the country and the exiled could still be assured by various channels, the same as it was still high the hope of the political resistance to break down the communist regime. For instance, Dinu Adameșteanu, during his years as secretary of the Romanian Academy, established liaisons with the homeland by the diplomatic courier of the Italian Embassy at Bucharest, reality which was well known by the Securitate, Augustin Popa corresponded with members of the National Peasants' Party by means of the Apostolic Nunciature from Romania, and Ilie Olteanu by

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 105.

“Nicolae, the diplomatic courier from the Ministry of External Affairs”¹¹. Some of the exiled were liaison couriers between different geographical parts of the world or between the Western countries. In this way, Puiu Cucu succeeded to assure the couriering with Latin America, Spain and Portugal, while as Mihail Popescu did the same thing for Switzerland and France.

Shortly after the abdication of King Michael I and the proclamation of the Republic, the resistance movement from the Italian exile becomes radical under the careful managing of the actions of the “three big members of the Romanian resistance in Italy”: Augustin Popa, Aloisie Tăutu and Sever Pop¹². In the spring of 1948, when in Romania the Groza government was preparing the antidemocratic law of nationalization and in Italy the Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi was strengthening his beliefs in favour of a United Europe, the elite of the Romanian exile from the peninsula was establishing the bases of the National Freedom Committee, “formed with the moral support”¹³ of the Italian state, which had sent already two representatives at the initial meeting.

Under the presidency of Vasile Grigorcea, the representative in Italy of general Rădescu, and of the Caroman society, the Committee numbered also Teodor Scorțescu, ex minister at Rome, Teodor Galița, ex embassy secretary at the Vatican, Sever Pop, Scarlat Lambrino and Dinu Adameșteanu, ex cultural councillor respectively ex director and secretary of the Romanian School from Rome, V. Constantin, ex lecturer at Bologna, Mircea Moschuna Ston, ex prime minister of Rome Embassy, Augustin Popa, Maniu’s representative at the Vatican and Ilie Olteanu, as well as Nicolae Petrescu Comnen, “Gafencu’s representative in Italy” whose adherence was “principled”¹⁴. After a new redefinition, the Resistance Committee of the Romanian exiled from Italy, new personalities adhere, such as Lucia Trancu-Iași, Aloisie Tăutu, the leader of the Greek-Catholic Church in Rome, Teodor Solacolu, doctor in medicine and natural sciences in Paris¹⁵ and ex minister to the Vatican, replaced in 1948 as a consequence of the “cleaning” process of the central and external apparatus of the MAE (Ministry of External Affairs) and Vadimir Ionescu, a quite controversial character, ex press

¹¹ *Ibidem*, f. 110.

¹² *Ibidem*, f. 101.

¹³ *Ibidem*, f. 112.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ D. Gr. Constantinescu, *Profesorul Dr. Theodor Solacolu: viața și opera lui: (1876-1940)*, Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice "Lupta" N. Stroilă, 1941, pp. 5-14.

consultant under the Antonescu regime, reason for which the Securitate used to tag him a “legionary”, respectively general consul and custodian of the ex royal house from Venice.

The Committee was composed of five departments, adapted to the need of helping the refugees at the end of the '40s. The Help office was constituted, as it was only natural, of Greek-Catholic priests such as Aloisie Tăutu and Ovidiu Bojan, as well as Ilie Olteanu, who accumulated experience in helping the refugees in the concentration camp from Aversa and then in the Greek-Catholic Parochia from Rome. The Press and Propaganda office was represented by Pascal Teodorescu Valahu, journalist who later, was employed at the Associated Press in the USA, Vladimir Ionescu, ex press consultant under Ion Antonescu regime and Teodor Solacolu, ex in charge with the affairs *ad interim* at the Vatican. The Coordination department was based on the activity of the National Peasants' Party representatives in the peninsula, Augustin Popa, and of two other scholarship owners from the Romanian School from Rome, Puiu Cucu and Scarlat Lambrino. The diplomatic representation was assured by Teodor Scorțescu, ex diplomat at the Vatican, “very close to the democrats and [especially] to De Gasperi”, a diplomat with powerful liaisons at the Italian Ministries of External and Internal Affairs, concerned with the “faith of the Romanians from Italy”, Mircea Moschuna Ston, who had “relations in the Chigi palace” and Augustin Popa who had “relations at the Vatican”¹⁶; while as the Consular department was organized under the supervision of Dinu Adameșteanu and of the priest Carol Capros.

In order to grant a larger opening and shelter itself from the political speculations, from the intrigues and from the vanities which were more and more evident overseas, at Washington, the Committee of Political Resistance from Rome was dominated by the association of the ones without political orientation, more precisely nine diplomats (S. Pop, T. Solacolu, V. Grigorcea, Al. Gregorian, T. Galița, M. Moschuna Ston, V. Ionescu, M. Popescu and T. Scorțescu), three priests (A. Tăutu, O. Bejan, C. Capros) and three personalities without political colour (M. Moschuna Ston, S. Lambrino, L. Trancu-Iași). The political algorithm inclined towards a majority representation of the National Peasants' Party members, out of which some were also diplomats (A. Popa, S. Pop, T. Galița, T. Scorțescu, Puiu Cucu), followed by the minority, but no less suggestive of the legionary (I. Olteanu, D. Adameșteanu, V. Ionescu, Ș. Popescu); to which we add Vladimir

¹⁶ ACNSAS, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 113, d. 1463, f. 6.

Ionescu, “the representative of the ex King Michael” and Pascal Teodorescu Valahu “the well known agent of the Americans”¹⁷.

In its rush to tag them politically, the Securitate classified differently its political adversaries, the Greek-Catholic priest Aloisie Tăutu being labelled as “Manist”, probably by association to the belonging to the PNTȚ National Peasants' Party of the majority of the personalities involved in the institutionalized politics from Italy, but also as a legionary sympathiser, due to the fact that he helped the members of the Legionary Movement, which was an “ideological” exaggeration; actually the help being offered generally speaking to all of the exiled. The data from the personal history of the priest Tăutu prompt to the fact that he intersected the Manist formation starting with the summer of 1919, when he returned to Big Romania from the faculty of theology of the University from Vienna, through Yugoslavia, helped by a transportation organized by Vaida and Maniu¹⁸; the exile making the collaboration with the representatives of the National Peasants' Party from Rome a natural fact. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies, the inaccuracies and the erroneous interpretations made by the Securitate employees went as far as considering an exile such as Moschuna Ston both a “Manist” and a personality “without political colour”¹⁹; as a matter of fact, the great majority of the diplomats were invariably considered to be “Manists”. The tagging, the disinformation and the lies, as well as the actions of political processing of the exiled, be them members of the National Peasants' Party, liberals, legionaries etc., were well known practices of the Securitate abroad.

The president Vasile Grigorcea, was the representative in Italy of the only general who had the courage to oppose the soviets, Nicolae Rădescu, and Teodor Scorțescu was the person liked by Grigore Niculescu-Buzești, designated by the leaders of the historical parties – I. Maniu, V. Brătianu and T. Petrescu – to represent the country in exile.

Actually the Securitate associated the appearance of the Committee to the “official entrance of general Rădescu in the political arena [when] the unification activity [started to become more and] more evident” which was true, in fact. Coming from the school of economics, Rădescu succeeded to build an exceptional military career and then become prime minister of Romania, actually the last

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 114.

¹⁸ Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *O contribuție la istoria exilului românesc*, vol. VIII, Bucharest: Vreemia, 1999-2011, tome VIII, pp. 164-165.

¹⁹ ACNSAS, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 113, ff. 114.

prime minister of a democratic government, demitted after the soviet vice deputy for external affairs A.I. Vâșinski, the one who imposed to the King on February 27, 1945 the government change, came to Bucharest. Forced to clandestinely leave the country in 1946 due to the persecution for his attitude towards the Communist Party and towards the soviet occupant authorities, the general – a dignified figure, covered by the drama of the times he lived – becomes a landmark of the exile by shaping the Rădescu trend, which resulted in the Resistance Committee, in 1948, at Washington, which was to become later the Romanian National Council and also by creating a cultural organization. With the help of the funds provided by Nicolae Malaxa, general Rădescu sustained publications of the Romanian exile and after he resigned from the presidency of the Committee he created the League of the Free Romanians.

The Greek-Catholic priest Augustin Popa and the member of the National Peasants' Party Emil Ghilezan formed the Council of the Democratic Parties. The CNR (Romanian National Council)²⁰ vanguard, created May 10, 1949 at New York played symbolically the role of government for the Romanian exile, statute which was not recognized by any of the big powers and not even by the United States, who “tolerated within certain limits” the constitution of such committees of national freedom of the occupied nations and even permitted the existence on its territory of the formula the Organization of the Captive Nations, but did not proceed to encourage any of the claims or actions of the exiled to contest the legitimacy of the governments from the socialist space²¹. Up to the middle of the '50s, the Council was concerned with “attracting the attention of the entire world upon what was happening in Romania, before the new regime entered in constant relationships with the free countries”, insisting upon the lawful right order and claiming real peace and independence of all people. In the notes of the Council for State Security, the Committee was described as a “private organization of propaganda against the socialist countries, which gradually was subordinated to the State Department and to the CIA the USA organism, which funded it and used it [...] in terms of intelligence and anti-communist propaganda”²², in conformity to the principle of “the universal enemy”, imperialist, and directed against communism.

²⁰ Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, pp. 343-348.

²¹ Neagu Djuvara, *Amintiri din pribegie (1948-1990)*, Bucharest: Humanitas, 2005, p. 35.

²² Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, *Securitatea. Structuri, Cadre, obiective și metode*, Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2006, vol. II, p. 136.

As the founding principle of the CNR (Romanian National Council) was not a consultative one, in which concerns the exiled, but of representation for the historical parties which had an overwhelming majority at the rigged elections 1946²³, the first disputes in the forum arose once with the decision of the political algorithm. Finally, April 23rd, 1949, King Michael approved that four independents and respectively six political figures, members of the National Peasants' Party and social democrats, enter the Council lead by Rădescu, the last democrat prime minister. In the perspective of the repressive institution of the communist party, the Committee represented "an attempt to unite the fleeing traitors with the help of international bourgeoisie and with the purpose of intensifying the attack against the popular democratic regime"²⁴.

In November 1950 and not in 1953, as a note of the Securitate specifies²⁵, Rădescu's group (Gafencu, Caranfil, Fărcășanu), recognized as a "political organization", broke with the Committee, forming the League of the Free Romanians. Among the contributors to the League's newspaper, *Românul* (*The Romanian*), we can name Emil Ghilezan, established in Italy after 1961 and Vintilă Horia, who left Italy in 1948²⁶.

In fact, the dissatisfactions created around the "Cretzianu fund"²⁷ triggered the most violent discussions, to it being added the supposed sponsorship of Rădescu by the Romanian industrial magnate Malaxa, the influential and judgement lacking stile of general Rădescu, "incapable of representing the Romanian interests abroad"²⁸, the assumption of actions which could not be rigorously controlled, the vanities of the two groups Rădescu - Buzești (which included Vișoianu and Cretzianu) and, of course, the lack of direct sustaining from the East European countries. Emil Ghilezan himself, as general secretary of the Committee, ended in being marginalized in its attempt to side with both parties. The Committee enters in disgrace starting with 1972 when it is

²³ Neagu Djuvara, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²⁴ Florica Dobre, Florian Banu, *Securitatea. Structuri, Cadre, obiective și metode*, Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2006, vol. I, p. 291.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 566.

²⁶ See, Mihail Fărcășanu, *Viitorul libertății: publicistică din țară și din exil (1944-1963)*, Iași: Polirom, 2013.

²⁷ See Mircea Ciobanu, *Convorbiri cu Mihai I al României*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1997, p. 288, Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Ion Pătroi, *Documente franceze privind începutul organizării exilului românesc*, Bucharest: Vremea, 2003, p. 12.

²⁸ Neagu Djuvara, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

left without external funds and in 1975 it gets dissolved, its main sponsor, the *National Committee for a Free Europe* starting to reduce funding at a half at the middle of the sixth decade, due to the new American politics of “building bridges” towards the USSR.

Within the committee, each of the members had specifically determined functions. Exiled in Italy, Augustin Popa’s responsibility was to edit the publications and to continue the “anti-governmental propaganda”²⁹. Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen was among the 12 representatives of CNR (Romanian National Council) outside the United States of America. Their nomination, made directly by the King, starting from the principle of its prestige, was much more important that it was thought, since we speak about a Western country chosen as exile place by many “representative Romanian scholars” and which contained “the passing points of the Romanian refugees”³⁰. Starting from the discussions he had with the Pontifical Sovereign and with the minister Sforza, Comnen showed himself interested in representing the Romanian National Committee “with the utmost discreet prudence”, reason for which C. Vișoianu proposed him to collaborate with a “vice representative” or “deputy” which was supposed to keep the correspondence with the “compatriots from Italy” in the person of Vladimir Ionescu, ex General Consul at Florence (at Rome)³¹, although, Comnen liked D. Popescu. Thus, Comnen was supposed to maintain contacts with the Italian government as well as with the Italian journalist and publicist circles, while as Ionescu was supposed to keep giving administrative assistance. The fact that Italy never accepted an “official representative of the Committee” is evident from the correspondence between Comnen and Cretzianu; Scelba, the minister of Internal Affairs being “contrary” to such “diplomatic clandestine” which could very well be “spies, agitators or amateur diplomats”, and the Italian Council of Ministers being contrary to such a formula because they were fearing the “danger of animosity from the Soviets” or because they did not want any “occasion to aggravate the tension existing between the government and the powerful Italian Communist Party”.³²

²⁹ ACNSAS, fond SIE, d. 779/I, f. 103.

³⁰ Ion Calafeteanu, *Exilul românesc. Erodarea speranței. Documente (1951-1975)*, Bucharest: ed. Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 97-98.

³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 69-70, 84-85, 87.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 62.

We must say that each of them consolidated the exile, giving it an anti-communist tenure, as answer to the sovietization and communistization of the country and thus understanding to lobby in favour of imposing economic sanctions against the Romanian communist authorities, to participate at the European Council and UN Assemblies as well as to the Captive European Nation Assembly, to militate for the installation of democracy in Europe, to incriminate the abuse of the communist leaders and even to organize censuses of the Romanian refugees³³.

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³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 65-66.

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