

COMPARING BARBARY AND ISLAMIC STATE TERROR TO AN ACADEMIC CONSENSUS DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Isaiah Winters*

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Abstract

Though the terrorism practiced by the Barbary States of yore and the Islamic State of today are separated by two centuries, there is a considerable amount of overlap between the two that this research seeks to explore. By comparing each of these forms of terrorism to the revised twelve-point academic consensus definition of terrorism compiled in Alex P. Schmid's Handbook of Terrorism Research, this analysis is able to determine how closely both Barbary and Islamic State terrorism match Schmid's nuanced definition, as well as what makes each form of terrorism unique. The findings show that Barbary State terrorism is distinct for having been asymmetrically state-regulated, while Islamic State terrorism is distinct for its quasi-state characteristics.

Keywords: terrorism, Barbary States, Islamic State, definition of terrorism

Introduction

Given the complexity of terrorism as we know it today, coming up with an all-encompassing definition that broadly satisfies all interested parties is a Sisyphean task. In their earlier work, Schmid and Jongman nevertheless did yeoman's work cobbling together a detailed definition of terrorism by synthesizing over two hundred definitions of terrorism written by academics and other professionals. Together, these myriad authors, Schmid and Jongman note, "have spilled almost as much ink as

* Isaiah Winters, Master's degree in Transatlantic Studies, Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University (Cluj-Napoca, Romania). Contact: isaiahsamuelwinters@gmail.com

the actors of terrorism have spilled blood.”¹ Schmid’s revised academic consensus definition of terrorism from 2011 goes further, distilling two-hundred and sixty definitions of terrorism into twelve main components.² Though still imperfect, this revised definition provides a fairly cohesive framework that is conducive to the comparative analysis herein. In this analysis, both Barbary and Islamic State terrorism are considered in relation to each of Schmid’s twelve components of terrorism. The aim is to determine how closely each form of terrorism fits Schmid’s definition, as well as what differentiates each form of terrorism from said definition.

1. Broadly Defining Terrorism

Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;

Islamic State terrorism fits very well with the first component of terrorism. The Islamic State has been especially effective at using direct violent action or the threat thereof to achieve political aims and generate psychological effects such as fear among various audiences and conflict parties. In addition, its selection of targets has been shown to be very calculated and demonstrative, while its violent actions have been done without legal or moral restraints. In fact, the extreme barbarity of Islamic State attacks advances the aim of maximum attention-seeking while legitimizing an alternative to international norms of morality.³ If there is any restraint to Islamic State violence, it is yet to be found, as evidenced by the fact that most of its victims are Muslims themselves.⁴ One nuance worth

¹ Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1988, p. xiii.

² Alex P. Schmid, *Handbook of Terrorism Research*, London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 86-87.

³ Rafia Zakaria, “Clicking for Isis”, in *The Nation*, vol. 300, iss. 2/3, 2015, p. 24.

⁴ Center for Research on Globalization, *Muslims are the victims of “Between 82% and 97% of Terrorism-Related Fatalities”*: US Government, 25 March 2016,

noting in regard to the first component is that while the Islamic State does in fact operate conspiratorially in regions where it is weak (e.g. Europe), it operates openly where it is strong (e.g. Raqqa).

Contrarily, Barbary State terrorism only partly fits Schmid's first component of terrorism. Slave raids conducted along the coasts of Christian Europe and the enslavement of captured merchantmen crews overwhelmingly impacted civilians and non-combatants, resulting in psychological effects for a wide range of parties; however, such acts were done openly rather than conspiratorially, and were essentially commercial kidnappings regulated by foreign nations through treaties.⁵ One example of this historical reality can be seen in Benjamin Franklin's observation that the harassment of U.S. trade vessels by Barbary State corsairs was in England's trade interests so much so "that if there were no Algiers it would be worth England's while to build one."⁶ These treaties placed certain legal restraints on Barbary State terrorism, while certain moral restraints naturally resulted from the Barbary States' ransom-driven profit motive.

These legal and moral restraints will be explored in more depth later.

2. Terrorism's Three Main Contexts

Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors;

Regarding the second component of terrorism, the Islamic State employs its tactics in all three contexts to varying extents, though there is a significant issue over whether the Islamic State actually constitutes a state.

[<http://www.globalresearch.ca/muslims-are-the-victims-of-between-82-and-97-of-terrorism-related-fatalities-us-government/5516565>], 26 May 2017.

⁵ Frederick C. Leiner, *The End of Barbary Terror: America's 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 13-14.

⁶ Benjamin Franklin, *Benjamin Franklin Papers - To Robert R. Livingston (unpublished)*, July 22, 1783, [<http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=40&page=083>], 27 May 2017.

The Islamic State does not have U.N. membership or recognition from any other states, though it does have some features of a state. Bruce Hoffman notes that the Islamic State's "hybrid force holds territory, controls populations, conducts business and enforces laws,"⁷ and it often does so more effectively than the Syrian and Iraqi governments in the conflict zones under their respective jurisdictions. Assuming that the Islamic State is not a state, the second component still holds strong in the second and third contexts. Islamic State operations in Europe are the embodiment of the second context—i.e. propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in peacetime or outside conflict zones—while its illicit tactics of irregular warfare by state- and non-state actors is typified by its actions in Iraq and Syria.

The third context of the second component of terrorism is the most relevant to Barbary State terrorism, though it only fits in part because said terrorism was regulated to some extent and therefore not entirely illicit.

Both state and state-sponsored actors working under the *deys*, *beys* and *bashaws* of the Barbary States were active in slave raiding and seizing trade vessels. This irregular warfare had been a way of revenue-making for hundreds of years in the region, with both local corsairs and foreign privateers—many ironically coming from Europe⁸—working in the employ of the Barbary States with the hopes of getting rich through sanctioned plunder.⁹

3. Single-, Dual- and Multi-Phased Violence

The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual-phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in 'disappearances' involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder);

⁷ Bruce Hoffman, "Return of the Jihadi" in *National Interest*, iss. 141, 2016, pp. 10-14.

⁸ G. Thomas Woodward, "The Costs of State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Example of the Barbary Pirates" in *National Tax Journal*, vol. LVII, no. 3, 2004, p. 600.

⁹ Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror*, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, pp. 48-49.

As for the third component of terrorism, Islamic State terrorism is a perfect fit. The Islamic State's use of physical violence or the threat thereof can occur in single-phased acts (e.g. bombings), dual-phased acts (e.g. hostage-taking for coercive bargaining), or multi-phased acts (e.g. kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder). The recent nail bomb which exploded at a concert in Manchester, U.K., is a horrific example of a highly successful single-phase act. As for hostage-taking for coercive bargaining, the Islamic State has made a lucrative business of it, with France reportedly paying \$14 million and Italy \$12 million to the Islamic State for the release of journalists and aid workers.¹⁰ Its multi-phased actions are well known, as they often culminate in real-life executions used for propagandistic purposes, examples of which are the gruesome beheadings of American and British citizens.

The third component of terrorism also fits well with Barbary State terrorism, especially the dual- and multi-phased sequences of violence for purposes of coercive bargaining. Barbary State corsairs and privateers would raid coastal villages and then try to get the captives' relatives or government to ransom them back. In some cases, immediately after these slave raids took place, the Barbary State ships would simply stay offshore in the harbor until the captives could be bought back.¹¹ Many more were taken back to the Barbary States and were either imprisoned until ransomed back or enslaved indefinitely if no ransom was forthcoming.

4. Communication That Threatens and Recruits

The public(-ized) terrorist victimization initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators;

¹⁰ Jonathan Gatehouse, Adnan R. Khan, Michael Friscolanti, "The New Age of Terror" in *Maclean's*, vol. 128, iss. 47, 2015, p. 21.

¹¹ Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror*, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, p. 50.

Component four of terrorism is also a perfect match with Islamic State terrorism. The Islamic State uses threat-based communication processes which, on the one hand, make intimidating demands for submission from certain constituencies and, on the other hand, appeal for support from specific constituencies (in this case, based on religious in-group affinities). This is done very effectively by the Islamic State through the use of the internet: for purposes of intimidation and issuing demands, it releases choreographed videos of hostage executions and other mass executions, while utilizing Twitter bots for the “hashtag hijacking” of unrelated hashtags to amplify its message. For purposes of recruitment, it issues online magazines, holds online Q&A sessions and targets vulnerable individuals for recruitment via secure messaging servers.¹²

The first half of the fourth component of terrorism fits well with Barbary State terrorism. It almost goes without saying that the Barbary States relied on threat-based communication processes with other governments, as the seizure of ships or capture of civilians would often be followed by demands for ransom and tribute at the threat of future losses.

For the Barbary States, a state of low-intensity war existed between them and any government with which they did not have a treaty.¹³ This threat of perpetual, organized, state-regulated maritime violence and kidnapping was simply a way of doing business.¹⁴

As for the second half of this component of terrorism, although the Barbary States ostensibly presented a largely unified front against Christian Europeans, they were not very keen on calling for support from each other or from their coreligionists. Instead, each Barbary State secured its own treaties independently while nursing rivalries with the others, often over perceived shifts in the balance of power among them, which they often deduced from the amount of gifts and tribute secured from European states.¹⁵ Furthermore, non-Muslim raiders were often hired by the Barbary

¹² Emerson Brooking, P. W. Singer, “The War of Social Media”, in *Popular Science*, vol. 288, iss. 2, 2016, pp. 62-65.

¹³ G. Thomas Woodward, “The Costs of State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Example of the Barbary Pirates” in *National Tax Journal*, vol. LVII, no. 3, 2004, p. 600.

¹⁴ Frederick C. Leiner, *The End of Barbary Terror: America's 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 18.

¹⁵ Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror*, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, p. 156.

States because of their expertise and access to technology, so this half of the fourth component of terrorism does not fit well with Barbary State terrorism.

5. Generating Fear

At the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities with the direct victims – generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act, [including] its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment;

As for the fifth component, at the origin of Islamic State terrorism certainly stands *terror*, which is spread indiscriminately among a larger target audience through shocking brutality with no legal or moral restraints. Symbolism is greatly important in these attacks, as was shown by the recent Manchester bombing, where a young Western audience at an American pop-concert was targeted on the day when President Trump was visiting Israel. By targeting such a young audience, the Islamic State showed a gross disregard for any of the rules of warfare concerning non-combatants. Moreover, the fact that the attacker himself died in the explosion represents the ultimate display of disregard imaginable: the shocking and terrifying disregard for life itself in support of establishing a global caliphate. This same disregard for life in support of the Islamic State's cause is seen on the battlefield with elite *inghamasi* shock troops who blow themselves up on the battlefield, usually after expending their ammunition.¹⁶

The fifth component of terrorism matches Barbary State terrorism well, except where indiscriminate attacks are concerned. To be sure, coastal slave raids were indiscriminate, provided the captives were non-Muslims whose government(s) did not have a formal treaty with the Barbary States.

Among communities at risk, there was surely immense fear, dread, panic and anxiety over whether they would be next. The key similarity shared by the enslaved and those most at risk of enslavement was that they

¹⁶ Bruce Bower, "Deadly Devotion" in *Science News*, vol. 190, iss. 1, 2016, p. 18.

were Christian Europeans living or working in coastal areas. Some scholars¹⁷ argue that this specific targeting of Christian Europeans can be explained mostly by religious grievances (i.e. “jihad” as payback for Christian Spain expelling the Moors in 1492), while others¹⁸ argue that the targeting of Christians was largely economical (i.e. Christian Europe was the closest source of non-Muslims to capture for ransom and for labor).

The truth probably lies somewhere in between, with religious doctrine and grievances providing a wealth of convenient rationales for the economically practical targeting of Christians by the Barbary States.

Concerning the seizure of American and European merchant vessels at sea, Barbary State corsairs were not indiscriminate in any sense—in fact, they were so discriminating that their raids were almost predictable.

As noted earlier, the Barbary States primarily harassed the shipping of states with which they did not have treaties. As proof of this, captives from states too poor to pay ransom and tribute made up the majority of prisoners in the Barbary States.¹⁹ But even states which had legitimate treaties with the Barbary States were not entirely safe. It was well known that when a new treaty was signed with one power, it usually meant a war would be started with another.²⁰ As a result, anyone following the treaty processes taking place in the Barbary States would have had favorable odds for predicting which state’s shipping would be targeted next.

6. Targeting Innocent Civilians

The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenseless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism;

¹⁷ Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. xxv.

¹⁸ Frederick C. Leiner, *The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 2.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

²⁰ G. Thomas Woodward, “The Costs of State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Example of the Barbary Pirates” in *National Tax Journal*, vol. LVII, no. 3, 2004, p. 603.

The main direct victims of Islamic State terrorist attacks in Iraq, Syria and abroad are certainly innocent civilians and non-combatants. To be sure, the Islamic State also targets various security forces, but its main targets include public officials, professionals, journalists, tribal and religious leaders, and other civilians. Although it is difficult to measure the exact numbers, from January 2014 to October 2015, an estimated 55,047 civilian casualties and 3.2 million displaced persons resulted from conflicts involving the Islamic State in Iraq alone.²¹ When the Islamic State takes over a village, it is known to systematically execute most of the men and force many of the women and girls into sex slavery, especially when the village is populated by ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Yazidi minority in Iraq and Syria.²² In addition to these conflict zones, an analysis by *The New York Times* has shown, as of mid-2016 more than 1,200 civilians outside of Iraq and Syria have been killed by the Islamic State or its affiliates' attacks.²³ In short, Islamic State terrorism fits perfectly with Schmid's sixth component of terrorism.

The sixth component of terrorism also fits perfectly with Barbary State terrorism in that most of the victims of Barbary State raids, both on land and at sea, were civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenseless persons. To give an example, in 1631 Algerian corsairs reached the village of Baltimore, Ireland, and seized the entire population, carrying it back to the slave markets of Algiers.²⁴ These innocent civilians likely did not even know of the existence of the Barbary States, and certainly would not have been responsible for their own capture. Mostly, however, coastal areas of Tuscany, Sardinia, Sicily and the Greek isles were the main targets

²¹ United Nations, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May-31 October 2015*, 2015, p. i, [<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMIRreport1May31October2015.pdf>], 28 May 2017.

²² Maisam Alahmed, "Hope for Female Victims of ISIS" in *Solutions Journal*, vol. 6, iss. 1, 2015 [<https://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/article/hope-for-female-victims-of-isis/>], 28 May 2017.

²³ Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins, Tom Giratikanon, Jasmine C. Lee, *How Many People Have Been Killed in ISIS Attacks Around the World*, *The New York Times*, 16 July 2016, [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html?_r=0], 28 May 2017.

²⁴ Frederick C. Leiner, *The End of Barbary Terror: America's 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 13.

for corsairs as they were not wealthy or well defended enough to stop corsair raids from occurring.²⁵

7. Generating Messages

The direct victims are not the ultimate target (as in a classical assassination where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims' plight or the terrorists' professed cause;

Islamic State terrorism fits well with the seventh component of terrorism, as it relies heavily on the media coverage generated by its attacks on civilians. Beginning with the highly choreographed execution video of journalist James Foley, the Islamic State has continued to expand its outreach through acts of "message-generating" violence shared across social and other forms of media. Now, social media is being successfully used by the Islamic State to inspire its members and sympathizers around the world to commit acts of terrorism on behalf of the Islamic State's cause.²⁶ There is, however, one caveat to Islamic State terrorism in relation to the seventh component. While the Islamic State certainly uses its acts of violence against civilians to generate messages over mass media, many of its atrocities are done with no consideration for the publicity they might generate. This is because of the fact that the Islamic State seeks to seize and hold terrain in order to exercise governance there, something Hoffman considers to be "unique in the annals of terrorism".²⁷ Therefore, many acts of Islamic State violence are done as a matter of necessity for establishing a Weberian monopoly over power and violence in the areas it controls.

The seventh component of terrorism fits perfectly with Barbary State terrorism in that the victims of Barbary State corsairs were only a means to political and financial ends. The capture of Christian coastal

²⁵ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006, p. 19.

²⁶ Emerson Brooking, P. W. Singer, "The War of Social Media", in *Popular Science*, vol. 288, iss. 2, 2016, p. 61.

²⁷ Bruce Hoffman, "Return of the Jihadi", in *National Interest*, iss. 141, 2016, p. 14.

dwellers and merchantmen crews was a way of sending a message to either their communities or governments back home. Stated in economic terms, the message (i.e. piracy) was a way of securing protection money (i.e. treaties)—the two main outputs of Barbary State terrorism.²⁸ The Barbary States always sought to balance acts of piracy with the signing of protection treaties: Too much piracy would lead to open war and thus fewer treaties, while too little piracy would weaken the Barbary States' threat-based messaging, also resulting in fewer treaties. Therefore, the message had to be clear and frequent without being too frequent.

8. Structures of Terrorist Groups

Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams);

The eighth component of terrorism matches perfectly with Islamic State perpetrators, who can conduct independent, self-directed acts of violence in a clandestine manner, or work in small groups under the guidance of Islamic State operatives in person or over secure internet channels.²⁹ As for the Islamic State's structure in Iraq and Syria, the fortunate seizure of a hard drive containing 1,200 documents belonging to the Islamic State revealed that its operation was structured based on the "multidivisional-hierarchy form" seen in corporate management.³⁰ Using this model, the Islamic State had created a hierarchy of self-financed semiautonomous cells within Anbar province whose day-to-day decisions were carried out locally, thereby freeing top leaders to focus on strategy and overall performance.³¹ This shows that the structure of the Islamic State can take on many forms, from the lone-wolf in North America to the highly sophisticated M-form seen in Anbar province.

²⁸ G. Thomas Woodward, "The Costs of State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Example of the Barbary Pirates" in *National Tax Journal*, vol. LVII, no. 3, 2004, p. 603.

²⁹ Bruce Hoffman, "Return of the Jihadi" in *National Interest*, iss. 141, 2016, p. 13.

³⁰ Cam Simpson, Nadeem Hamid, *The Banality of Islamic State*, *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 20 November 2014, [<https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2014-the-business-of-isis-spreadsheets-annual-reports-and-terror/#/>], 28 May 2017.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

The eighth component of terrorism matches well with Barbary State terrorism, especially where state actors and state-sponsored actors are concerned. The state actors involved are obvious: corsairs born and raised in the Barbary States who worked directly for the *deys*, *beys* and *bashaws* of each Barbary State. Less known are the privateers or state-sponsored actors working in the Barbary States' employ, though there were a great many throughout history. One famous example from the first Barbary War was Scotsman Peter Lisle, who was captured on the American schooner *Betsey*.³²

Lisle soon "turned Turk," a pejorative term for converting to Islam and, because of his great skill as a mariner, became a very prosperous corsair captain. He would eventually marry the *bashaw's* daughter and later make the rank of grand admiral of Tripoli. While Lisle's case was exceptional, it goes to show the appeal of Barbary State terrorism to state as well as state-sponsored actors.

9. Political Violence

While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions;

Islamic State activities do often bear similarities with methods employed by organized crime, such as the running of extortion and protection rackets, the levying of "taxes" on minorities, truckers and farmers, and through the black-market sale of looted antiquities and seized oil.³³ Its motivation for these and other activities, it could be argued, is overall political. The ultimate aim of Islamic State is to redraw the map of the Middle East by establishing an Islamic caliphate under Sharia law that stretches from Spain to Southeast Asia.³⁴ In terms of societal repercussions, Islamic State-inspired attacks abroad have resulted in deepened political and social divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims in many societies.

³² Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror*, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, p. 144.

³³ Jonathan Gatehouse, Adnan R. Khan, Michael Friscolanti, "The New Age of Terror" in *Maclean's*, vol. 128, iss. 47, 2015, p. 21.

³⁴ Bruce Hoffman, "Return of the Jihadi" in *National Interest*, iss. 141, 2016, p. 12.

These attacks may be part of a strategy to radicalize the Muslim diaspora into exercising “propaganda of the deed” in various countries whose electorates are gravitating to rightwing politics partly out of fear of terrorism.³⁵

The ninth component of terrorism fits well with Barbary State terrorism, though the political aspect is somewhat of a technicality. The Barbary States made much of their revenues through what was effectively a protection racket, which is very much in line with the practices of organized crime. By today’s standards, war crimes were definitely committed by Barbary State corsairs, most notably hostage-taking and torture,³⁶ though it should be mentioned that such acts were by no means unique to the Barbary States. The political motivations for Barbary State terrorism are more moot, however. On the one hand, the motivation for such violence was clearly financial (i.e. collecting ransom and tribute payments), and oftentimes the ransom money raised was through non-political channels, such as through the efforts of “Redemptionist” priests who raised funds privately and attempted to negotiate the release of Christian prisoners.^{37,38} On the other hand, the most lucrative payments were acquired through political channels from governments, which technically places those financial deals under the broad umbrella of politics.

So while the primary motivation for such violence was very much financial, political negotiations were required in order to formalize the treaties sought.

10. Intentions of Terrorism

The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or

³⁵ Thomas Zeitzoff, Anna Getmansky, “Divide and Conquer – The Long-Term Political Effects of Terrorism” in *Political Violence @ A Glance*, 2015, [<https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/11/23/divide-and-conquer-the-long-term-political-effects-of-terrorism/>], 28 May 2017.

³⁶ *United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Crime Court, Article 8 War Crimes*, 1998, [http://legal.un.org/icc/STATUTE/99_corr/cstatute.htm], 27 May 2017.

³⁷ Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror*, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, p. 52.

³⁸ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006, p. 17.

provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public;

The tenth component of terrorism fits perfectly with both Islamic State and Barbary State terrorism, and encompasses many aspects of earlier components which have already been discussed. In the case of the Islamic State, all of the intentions stated above have been behind the procurement of favorable power outcomes, chief among which are the facilitation of publicity, money, submission, mobilization, immobilization and other political aims. As for Barbary State terrorism, the acts of violence committed were clear messages intended to coerce and compel either communities or governments to enter into negotiations that would favor the Barbary States. Preferred power outcomes for the Barbary States included extorting ransom money and securing tribute payments and/or gifts that would continue into the future.

11. Motivations for Terrorism

The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives;

Dovetailing with the eleventh component, the motivations behind Islamic State terrorism are indeed broad. While some experts bundle the messianic and apocalyptic religious beliefs of Islamic State volunteers into a grand ideological narrative, others find their motivations to be better explained by more complex group interests.³⁹ In contradiction to the purely religious explanation, Islamic State volunteers are often found to be rather impious religious novices who crave adventure.⁴⁰ For many other Islamic

³⁹ Mehdi Hasan, "How Islamic is Islamic State?" in *New Statesman*, vol. 144, iss. 5252, 2015.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

State volunteers, motivation often comes from donning and defending a powerful new group identity. To be part of an in-group that does not judge one's past actions or status is a powerful motivating force for people of all backgrounds who feel "adrift in a globalized world."⁴¹ Furthermore, the Islamic State has had quite cozy relations with rather irreligious remnants of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, without which it likely would not have had the networking, resources and military know-how to hold on to the city of Mosul.⁴² In short, religion is likely a convenient vehicle for Islamic State volunteers' outrage, group identity and myriad other motivations.⁴³

As for the Barbary States, there is a strong case to be made for other non-financial and non-political motivations which, if valid, would fit well with the eleventh component of terrorism. The religious motivation behind Barbary State terrorism is often cited. For example, when questioned in London by Thomas Jefferson as to why his country was making war with the United States when it had done Tripoli no harm, the Tripolitan ambassador invoked the Koran, saying that it was the right and duty of Muslims to make war on any who did not acknowledge their authority.⁴⁴

As noted earlier, some scholars see the increased religious motivation as a response to the expulsion of the Moors from Spain in 1492.⁴⁵⁴⁶ If this is accurate, then alleged grievances and collective punishment would have surely motivated many Barbary State Muslims, especially the expelled Moors, to commit acts of violence against Christians. Although the historical references to religious motivations are many, religious doctrine and grievances were more likely apposite justifications for what were truly financial and political motivations. Had "jihad by the sword" been the core motivation, Christian captives would likely have been either killed or forced to convert *en masse*, neither of which actually happened. Christian

⁴¹ Bruce Bower, "Deadly Devotion" in *Science News*, vol. 190, iss. 1, 2016, p. 18.

⁴² Mehdi Hasan, "How Islamic is Islamic State?" in *New Statesman*, vol. 144, iss. 5252, 2015, p. 30.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

⁴⁴ National Archives (2017), *American Commissioners to John Jay, 28 March 1786*, Founders Online, [<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0315>], 27 May 2017.

⁴⁵ Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. xxv.

⁴⁶ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006, p. 17.

captives were more useful for their ransom and labor. The choice to “turn Turk” was always available, but it was hardly obligatory. Thus, religion played an important motivating role, but so did money and politics.

12. Perpetual Climate of Fear

Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone but form part of a campaign of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.

Naturally, the twelfth component of terrorism fits very well with Islamic State terrorism, as the steady number of attacks over the last few years has created not only a perpetual climate of fear, but even an unfortunate resignation to the fact that regular terrorist attacks are the new normal. For example, the U.K.’s MI5 recently increased the threat level for international terrorism in the U.K. to “severe,” the second threat level increase this year alone.⁴⁷ But even before the recent Islamic State-affiliated bombing in Manchester, London’s mayor, Sadiq Khan, said that he believed the threat of terror attacks is “part and parcel of living in a big city.”⁴⁸ Across the Channel, one year after the terrorist bombings at Brussels Airport, Belgium maintains an elevated terrorist threat,⁴⁹ as do France, Germany and the United States.⁵⁰ The fact that the Islamic State is losing ground in the Middle East only increases the threat of terrorism, as potentially thousands of volunteer fighters may return home to countries all over the world and commit terrorist acts there in the name of the Islamic State.

⁴⁷ MI5 Security Service, *Threat Levels*, 2017, [<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>], 30 May 2017.

⁴⁸ Gabriel Samuels, *Sadiq Khan: London mayor says being prepared for terror attacks ‘part and parcel’ of living in a major city*, *The Independent*, 22 September 2016, [<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sadiq-khan-london-mayor-terrorism-attacks-part-and-parcel-major-cities-new-york-bombing-a7322846.html>], 30 May 2017.

⁴⁹ Riccardo Dugulin, “Belgium’s evolving terror threat” in *Global Risk Insights*, 2017, [<http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/03/belgiums-evolving-terror-threat/>], 30 May 2017.

⁵⁰ Oliver Smith, *Mapped: The 48 countries where a terrorist attack is most likely*, *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2017, [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/maps-and-graphics/Mapped-Terror-threat-around-the-world/>], 30 May 2017.

The twelfth component of terrorism also fits well with Barbary State terrorism, as such violence had been taking place in one form or another since the fall of the Roman Empire. At the beginning of the 16th century, however, the presence of Barbary State corsairs became much more significant, taking on the wholesale state-sponsored characteristics outlined in this research.⁵¹ The threat of Barbary State terrorism was not permanent, fortunately. Following the American successes at throwing off the odious yoke of Barbary State terrorism during the Barbary Wars, European states followed suit and won their own exemptions from Barbary State demands through force. When the French invaded Algiers in 1830, the serial acts of terrorism and threats posed by the Barbary States were permanently ended.⁵² As a result, the climate of fear that had emanated from the coasts of Barbary for hundreds of years finally came to an end.

Conclusion

Both Barbary and Islamic State terrorism fit overwhelmingly with Schmid's revised academic consensus definition of terrorism, although they deviate from certain components due to the unique nature of each "state."

Islamic State terrorism deviates from components one, two and seven, though only partially in each case. As per the first component, the Islamic State only operates clandestinely where it is weak, leaving it otherwise free to operate openly in the territory it holds. This distinction spills over into the second component regarding the Islamic State's quasi-state existence. The Islamic State has been fairly unique for its effectiveness at seizing, holding and governing territory—something it has done better than the formally recognized states of Iraq and Syria at times. Given its unique aim to seize and govern territory, the Islamic State does not always seek maximum media coverage of its many atrocities, as Schmid's seventh component stipulates; many of the acts of violence it commits are done out of a Weberian necessity to establish a monopoly over the use of force in areas it controls. Beyond these *sui generis* distinctions stemming from its state-like behavior, the Islamic State's variety of terrorism matches Schmid's definition of terrorism point for point.

⁵¹ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006, pp. 20-21.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 87.

As for Barbary State terrorism, its unique aspects only differentiate it in part from components one, two, four and five of Schmid's definition of terrorism. Regarding the first component, Barbary State terrorism was conducted openly rather than clandestinely, as much of the violence committed was essentially commercial kidnapping regulated by foreign nations through treaties. These treaties placed legal restraints on Barbary State terrorism—an aspect which is partially at odds with Schmid's second component. As for the fifth component, terrorism's lack of moral restraints, including indiscriminant raiding, enslavement and executions, was not a feature of Barbary State terrorism. The religious constraints of Islam meant that only non-Muslims could be targeted, while the chance to ransom captives meant that they were worth more alive than dead. Add to this the chance for Christians to gain freedom through conversion, and the de facto result is that Barbary State terrorism came with certain moral restraints.

Regarding Schmid's fourth component of terrorism, Barbary State terrorism differed in that its threat-based communication did not include a call to arms among the co-ethnics and co-religionists of Barbary. The Barbary States ostensibly posed a unified threat to the Christian world, though in practice they acted autonomously and sought to maximize relative gains at each other's expense. Religious doctrine and grievances were surely important motivating factors behind Barbary State terrorism, especially for the Moors bitterly expelled from Spain, but, on the whole, religion likely served more as a convenient enabler for the Barbary States to target non-Muslims, while the allure of riches through ransoming, looting and lucrative contract-making—rather than the desire to spread religion—were the Barbary States' key recruitment tools.

In conclusion, this comparative analysis was done with the aim of comparing and contrasting both Barbary and Islamic State terrorism to a highly nuanced definition of terrorism in order to identify the unique features of each. Islamic State terrorism's distinctiveness relative to Schmid's definition comes mainly through attempts to control territory in much the same way a traditional state does. Contrarily, what mainly distinguishes Barbary State terrorism from Schmid's definition is more multifaceted. It was a distinctive form of asymmetrically state-regulated maritime violence kept within certain legal and moral bounds by a variety of political, economic and religious motivations. Leaving aside the obvious apples-to-oranges issues

with assessing Barbary State terrorism using a contemporary definition of terrorism, this paper's basic academic exercise has been useful for highlighting the considerable overlap between these two forms of terrorism and Schmid's academic consensus definition of terrorism.

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